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UMIL VS RAMOS

FACTS: Military agents received confidential information that a certain man, Ronnie Javellon, believed to
be one of the five NPA sparrows who recently murdered two Capcom mobile patrols was being treated
in St. Agnes Hospital, for having gunshot wounds. Later on, it was found out that Ronnie Javellon is a
fictitious name and that his real name is Rolando Dural (verified as one of the sparrows of the NPA).
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
Meanwhile, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols. In these 8 consolidated cases, it assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by
the military on the petitioners; that a mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army
member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD: YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of Section 5
Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was arrested for being a member
of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized and for subversion
which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense.

Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the
overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital.

Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without a warrant, at the
St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two
(2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there
and then.

Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents
or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or
insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e.
adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government is attained.

Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers of his
membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by actual facts
mentioned in this case.

With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named
persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple, and Ocaya), no prudent man can say that it
would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would
have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the peace
officers involved.

For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of
executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of the law and to prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21 An arrest is
therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without
limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule is founded on an
overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our communities.

In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of
committing the crime for which they were arrested. Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest
of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant.

The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. But if they do
not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of
arbitrary detention, for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other administrative
sanctions.

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