1. [G.R. No. L-2578. July 31, 1951.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LADISLAO BACOLOD, Defendant-

Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND DISTURBANCE
OF PUBLIC ORDER; TWO DISTINCT OFFENSES THOUGH ARISING FROM A SINGLE ACT. — Conviction of
the crime of physical injuries thru reckless imprudence does not bar trial for the offense of causing
disturbance in a peaceful gathering, although they may arise from the same act.

2. ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY. — The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A
single act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar
prosecution under the other.

DECISION

This appeal calls for practical application of the principles governing the defense of double jeopardy.

In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, on September 10, 1948, Ladislao Bacolod pleaded guilty to an
information charging him with the crime of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
committed on February 21, 1948 in Santa Fe, same province. Thereafter he was arraigned in another
case for having caused a public disturbance on the same date, the second information alleging.

"That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent, and on the occasion of a dance held in the municipal tennis court in connection with
the town fiesta, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously cause a serious disturbance in a
public place by firing a sub-machine gun which wounded one Consorcia Pasinio, thereby causing panic
among the numerous people present in the said dance who ran and scampered in all directions.

His counsel de oficio moved to quash this second information, invoking double jeopardy by reason of
the first information which for convenience is quoted:

"That on or about the 21st day of February, 1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused, then a member of the
PC patrol, by reckless imprudence and without taking due care and precautions to avoid damage and
injury to the life and property of other persons, did then and there fire a shoot of a sub-machine gun
thereby hitting Consorcia Pasinio at the back of the right side of her body, which physical injury
required or will require medical attendance for more than 30 days but less than 90, and incapacitated
or will incapacitate her from performing her customary labor for the same period of time.

The motion to quash was granted, and the People appealed in due time.

Did the lower court err?

It will be observed that both informations have one common element: defendant’s having fired a sub-
machine gun. The first, however, charged him with physical injuries inflicted on Consorcia Pasinio thru
reckless imprudence. On the other hand the second information accuses him of having deliberately fired
the machine gun to cause a disturbance in the festivity or gathering, thereby producing panic among
the people present therein. The two informations do not describe the same offense. One is a crime
against persons; but the other is an offense against public peace and order.
The first is punished under article 263 of the Revised Penal Code and the latter under article 153
referring to individuals disturbing public gatherings or peaceful meetings, The proof establishing the
first would not establish the second, it being necessary to show, besides the willful discharge of firearm,
that there was a dance in the tennis court in connection with the town fiesta, and that the people in
attendance became panicky and terrified. The offenses are not the same although they arose from the
same act of Ladislao Bacolod. Consequently conviction for the first does not bar trial for the second.

A majority of the American courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot is distinct
from the offense of assault and battery.

The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A single act may be an offense
against two different provisions of law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other.

It is true that section 9 of Rule 113 prohibits prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former information. But it may not be held that the
second offense in this case necessarily included the first, because physical injuries is not necessarily
included in a public disturbance in the way that physical injuries is included in a charge of murder.
Neither may it be maintained that every crime of physical injuries necessarily produces such public
disorder as is contemplated by section 153 of the Revised Penal Code. Note especially that the first
information did not describe the festal celebration in which the injuries were inflicted.

It has been suggested that the new Rules of Court modified the above principles, and the precedent of
People v. Tarok, 40 Off. Gaz., 3488 is invoked. Enough to state that this last decision and its doctrinal
innovation has been expressly repudiated in Melo v. People, 47 Off. Gaz., 4631, with which our present
views substantially conform.

From the foregoing observations it follows that the court a quo made a mistake in dismissing the
second information. Therefore, the appealed resolution is reversed and the record is remanded for
further proceedings. So ordered.

2. [ GR No. L-4081, Jan 29, 1952 ]

PEOPLE v. TEODORO TINAMISAN ET AL. +

In August 1, 1949, the accused Teodoro Tinamisan and Apolonio Bendaño went out to fish in the Zamboanga sea,
bringing with them five bottles of explosives. After throwing one into the water, they were caught and arrested, and the
four bottles in the canoe seized. Charged with the crime of illegal fishing with explosives in Criminal Case No. 586 of
the court of first instance, they were convicted, the four bottles having been exhibited by the prosecution.

Prosecuted again for illegal possession of explosives in Criminal Case No. 899 of the same court, they pleaded double
jeopardy, on the ground that the explosives mentioned in the information are the identical four bottles presented in the
previous criminal case. After hearing both sides, the judge sustained their plea and dismissed the second case.

Hence this appeal, wherein the single issue is whether the first prosecution bars the second.

The use of explosives in fishing except when permitted under special circumstances by the Secretary of Agriculture is
prohibited and penalized under Act No. 4005 as amended by Act No. 471.

The possession of dynamite or explosives without license from the Chief of Constabulary is prohibited and punished by
Act No. 2225 as amended by Act No. 3023.

One offense is distinct from the other. When a man fishes with explosives, he violates the first-mentioned law or the
second, or both, or he may commit no offense at all. No offense, if he obtained licenses from both the Secretary of
Agriculture and the Chief of Constabulary. He infringes the first (and not the second) if he has no license from the
Agriculture Secretary, but he has license from the Chief of Constabulary. He transgresses the second (but not the first)
if he holds no license from the Constabulary, but he wields a permit from the Agriculture Secretary. He transgresses
both laws, as in this case, when he exhibits no license at all.

Wherefore, one violation does not necessarily include, and is not necessarily included in the other. The double jeopardy
rule does not attach[1].

Killing a person with a firearm may mean homicide or illegal possession of firearm, or both, or no crime at all. No
crime, if the killing was done in self-defense and the killer had a permit to possess the firearm. Both offenses, if the
killing was not justified and the offender had no permit. The first (and not the second) if there was permit to possess
the weapon but no justification for the violence. The second, (and not the first) if the offender had no permit to keep the
gun, but acted in self-defense. Prosecution for one offense, does not prevent trial for the other. Conviction for both may
legally be had[2].

"Assault and carrying weapon. Conviction of an assault with intent to murder does not bar a prosecution for carrying a
pistol, although both offenses were committed on the same occasion and were parts of the same transaction; and a
conviction of the latter is not a bar to a prosecution for the former offense. A conviction for an assault with a weapon is
not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon; and a conviction for carrying prohibited
weapons is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for assault and battery." (22 C. J. S. p. 430)
The trial judge was apparently impressed by the fact that the four bottles of explosives had been exhibited in the trial
for illegal fishing. That was obviously done to invoke the provision that the finding of explosives in the fishing
boat constitutes a presumption that said explosives had been used for fishing. But, in all probability, the accused could
not have been convicted of illegal possession in that first trial, because, it may be supposed, the information for illegal
fishing did not contain the allegation that they had no permit from the Chief of Constabulary to possess the explosives.
Defendants, at least, do not claim the contrary.

His honor was of course right in saying that possession of the four or five bottles could not be split into two or more
offenses of illegal possession[3]. But mark well, illegal possession. Before us are two offenses of a different nature: illegal
fishing, and illegal possession.

The People's appeal is sustained, the order of dismissal revoked, and the case remanded for further proceedings. So
ordered.

3. [G.R. No. L-3047. May 16, 1951.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GUADALUPE ZAPATA and DALMACIO

BONDOC, Defendants-Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. ADULTERY EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE A CRIME. — Adultery is a crime of result and not of
tendency, as the Supreme Courts of Spain has held (S. 10 December 1945); it is an instantaneous
crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each
sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569).

2. ID.; ID.; LAW DOES NOT BAR FILING OF AS MANY COMPLAINTS AS THERE ARE ADULTEROUS ACTS.
— True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants are against the same person
— the offended husband, the same status — the union of the husband and wife by their marriage, and
the same community presented by the State for its interest in maintaining and preserving such status.
But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the
crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as long as the status
remains unchanged, the nexus undissolved, an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a
crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many complaints for
adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; JEOPARDY RULE, NOT VIOLATED; REASON. — A second complaint charging the
commission of adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does not constitute a violation of the
double jeopardy clause of the Constitution, otherwise the adultery by the made defendant charged in
the second complaint, should he be absolved from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence
 that he did not know that his codefendant was married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The
defense set up by him against the first charge upon which he was acquitted would no longer be
available, because at the time of the commission of the crime charged in the second complaint, he
already knew that his codefendant was a married woman and yet he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her.

4. ID.; ADULTERY NOT A CONTINUING OFFENSE OF UNITY OF CRIMINAL INTENT OR PURPOSE. — The
notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law
transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II,
p. 521). For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time;
unity of appeal provision infringed upon violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means
that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united ion one and the same intent leading
to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520). In adultery, the last unity does
not exist, because the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse and they not do another
or other adulterous acts to consummate it.

5. ID.; PARDON BY HUSBAND. — Even if the husband pardon his adulterous wife, such pardon would
not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for adulterous acts committed after the
pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous, and not to subsequent, adulterous acts
(Viada, 5th ed., Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard, 2nd ed., Vol. 5, pp. 57-58).

DECISION

In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against
Guadalupe Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having repeated
sexual intercourse during the period from the year 1946 to 14 March 1947, the date of the filing of the
complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant to be a married woman (criminal case No. 426).
The defendant-wife entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor
which penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948, the offended husband filed
another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March 1947 to
17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second complaint (criminal case No. 735). On 21
February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to quash the complaint on the ground that they
would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court upheld the
contention of the defendants and quashed the second complaint. From the order sustaining the motions
to quash the prosecution has appealed.

The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the first and second complaints must be deemed
one continuous offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same and identical persons and
the two sets of unlawful acts having taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947 and part of
1948, and "that the acts or two sets of acts that gave rise to the crimes of adultery complained of in
both cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision that ’No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.’"

Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10
December 1945); it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at
the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calón,
Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 569). True, two or more adulterous acts committed by the same defendants
are against the same person — the offended husband, the same status — the union of the husband and
wife by their marriage, and the same community represented by the State for its interest in maintaining
and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended party, status and society does not argue
against the commission of the crime of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated,
for as long as the status remain unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken, an encroachment or
trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is no constitutional or legal provision which bars
the filing of as many complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting
one crime.
The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in the juridical fiction favorable to the law
transgressors and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello Calón, Derecho Penal, Vol. II,
p. 521). For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time;
unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means
that two or more violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading
to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520). In the instant case the last unity
does not exist, because as already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in every sexual intercourse
and they need not do another or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the last act of adultery
had been committed as charged in the first complaint, the defendants again committed adulterous acts
not included in the first complaint and for which the second complaint was filed. It was held by the
Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their
provisional release during the pendency of the case in which they were later on convicted, had sexual
intercourse up to the time when they were sent to prison to serve the penalty imposed upon them (S.
28 February 1906; 76 Jur. Crim. pp. 208-210).

Another reason why a second complaint charging the commission of adulterous acts not included in the
first complaint does not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the constitution is that, if
the second complaint places the defendants twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, the
adultery committed by the male defendant charged in the second complaint, should he be absolved
from, or acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he did not know that his codefendant was
a married woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense set up by him against the first charge
upon which he was acquitted would no longer be available, because at the time of the commission of
the crime charged in the second complaint, he already knew that this codefendant was a married
woman and yet he continued to have carnal knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon his
adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the wife and her paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the pardon was granted, because the pardon refers to previous and not
to subsequent adulterous acts (Viada [5th ed. ] Vol. 5, p. 208; Groizard [2nd ed. ] Vol. 5, pp. 57-58).

The order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is hereby reversed and set
aside, and the trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the defendants in accordance with law,
with costs against the appellees.

4. [G.R. No. L-6971.  February 17, 1956.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. PETRONIO REMERATA, Defendant-Appellee.
 The accused Petronio Remerata was convicted of stealing a rifle. After sentence was passed, the Fiscal filed another information
charging him with illegal possession of the same firearms. Remerata set up autrefois convict, and upon his motion, the Court of
First Instance of Cotabato, invoking Rule 113, section 9, dismissed the second information, on the theory that the illegal
possession was inseparable from the theft of which the accused had already been convicted and sentenced. The Fiscal appeals to
this court from the order of dismissal.
The appeal must be sustained. While in stealing a firearm the accused must necessarily come into possession thereof, the crime
of illegal possession of firearms is not committed by mere transient possession of the weapon. It requires something more: there
must be not only intention to own but also intent to use (People vs. Estoista, 1 49 Off. Gaz. [8] 3330), which is not necessarily the
case in every theft of firearms. Thus, stealing a firearm with intent not to use but to render the owner defenseless, may suffice for
purposes of establishing a case of theft, but would not justify a charge of illegal possession of the firearms, since intent to hold
and eventually use the weapon would be lacking.
Besides, an information charging larceny will not usually sustain a conviction for illegal possession of firearms, for it does not
ordinarily allege that the accused had no previous authority or license to keep the weapon, this circumstance being immaterial to
the theft. On this basis, we held in People vs. Alger, 2 48, Off. Gaz. (11) 4799, that a previous conviction for homicide is no bar to
subsequent prosecution for illegal possession of the firearm employed in the killing.
The first information for theft in Remerata’s case is not before us, not having been presented in evidence, and we cannot say that
its terms would have enabled the State to convict him for illegal possession of the rifle involved.
Since there can be theft without illegal possession of firearms; and vice-versa, illegal possession may exist without the element of
taking (asportation) that is essential in theft, conviction of one offense will not be a bar to prosecution for other.
The order dismissing the information is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Costs against the accused. SO
ORDERED.

5. [G.R. No. L-2621. February 28, 1950.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JESUS GUANCO, Defendant-

Appellant.

SYLLABUS

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY; CONVICTION FOR HOMICIDE THROUGH

RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE DOES NOT BAR PROSECUTION FOR DRIVING MOTOR VEHICLE WITHOUT
LICENSE. — When the allegations in the information specifically show that the accused had
operated a motor vehicle in an imprudent and reckless manner, for which he was convicted and
held responsible for the death of four passengers of the vehicle, a subsequent prosecution of the
same accused for operating motor vehicle along the national highway, without a license therefor,
does not constitute double jeopardy pursuant to the provisions of section 68 of Act No. 3992.

DECISION

The above-named accused was charged in and convicted by the Justice of the Peace Court of
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, for violation of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the Motor Vehicle
Law. He appealed to the Court of First Instance of said province, and the latter, after due trial,
found him guilty of the offense charged, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. He moved for a new trial which was
denied and brought this case on appeal to this Court, mainly on the ground that he has been
placed twice on jeopardy.

It appears that on June 30, 1946, appellant Jesus Guanco drove a jeep in a public highway
between the municipalities of Hinigaran and Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, carrying fourteen
passengers. While on the way, the jeep, which was being driven by him at a rate of speed
prohibited by law, that is, between 50 to 60 miles per hour, after zigzagging, turned turtle into a
ditch, and as a result thereof, four of the passengers were killed.

It further appears that on the day of the accident, Jesus Guanco, being less than 18 years of age,
could not, and did not have the required license to operate a motor vehicle and thus violated the
provisions of section 27 of Act No. 3992.

In another case, he was charged in and convicted by the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental of multiple homicide through reckless imprudence, where he was found guilty and
sentenced accordingly and from which sentence he appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the
latter, after reviewing the evidence, affirmed the order of the lower court, and, pursuant to the
provisions of article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, ordered his commitment to the Training School
for Boys until he shall have reached his majority.

In the case before us, this appellant admitted having driven the jeep in question on the day of the
accident, without the necessary license, due to the fact that he was less than 18 years of age. This
constitutes a violation of section 27 of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the Motor Vehicle Law.
Such violation is distinct from, and has no connection with the other offense, which is a violation of
paragraph (d) of section 67 of the same Act, of which he was found guilty and, under a suspended
sentence, committed to the Training School for Boys.

It is argued by appellant that when he was tried in the other case, for multiple homicide through
reckless imprudence, it was proven that he had driven the motor vehicle without license, and that
fact was mentioned by the court in its decision as one of the factors indicative of appellant’s
negligence. But upon comparing the allegations contained in the two informations, it is very clear
that under the specific charge made against him in the one case, that of having operated the jeep
in an imprudent and reckless manner, he was responsible for the death of four of the passengers
of the vehicle; while in the information filed in this case, he was simply charged with having
operated a motor vehicle along the national highway between Hinigaran and Pontevedra, without
providing himself with a license therefor.

Moreover, under section 68 of the Motor Vehicle Law, it is provided that —

"SEC. 68. Punishment for other offenses. — The conviction of any person of any offense under this
Act shall not bar prosecution of other offenses in this Act or elsewhere defined and penalized which
may have been committed by such person concurrently with the commission of the offense of
which he was convicted or in doing the act or series of acts which constituted the offense of which
he was convicted." cralaw virtua1aw library

We, therefore, find no merit in the contention of appellant that by his conviction in the present
case he has been put in double jeopardy, because the offense charged in the case at bar is not
included in the offense charged in the other case.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

6. G.R. Nos. 59568-76               January 11, 1990

PETER NIERRAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY and HON. ANTONIO S. LOPEZ, in their capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch
IV, Court of First Instance of Leyte, Palo, Leyte, and City Fiscal of Tacloban City, Leyte,
respectively, respondents.

Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction for the annulment of the resolution dated September 17,
1981 of the respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled "People of the Philippines v.
Peter Nierras" docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387, for estafa
under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's motion to quash. Said motion to quash
was filed by petitioner on the ground of double jeopardy as these offenses were already included in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras,"
for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, pending before the lower court. In both sets of
criminal cases, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower court. However, immediately
after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of
not guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by respondent Judge ruling as follows:

The motion to quash should be and is hereby denied. Accused Peter Nierras allegedly issued the checks in
favor of complainant Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation in payment of oil products which the latter delivered
to him simultaneously with the issuance of the checks.

x x x           x x x          x x x

. . . The crime of estafa committed by means of bouncing checks is not committed by mere issuance of a
check. Under Art. 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 4885, the following
are the elements of estafa: (1) the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at
 the time the check was issued; (2) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the
payee thereof (People v. Sabio, 86 SCRA 568). Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (1979) the mere issuance of
a check without sufficient funds issued in payment of a simultaneous  obligation and the check was dishonored
upon presentation for that estafa is committed under the Revised Penal Code. At the same time, the drawer
will also be liable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 for offense of issuing a check without sufficient funds (pp.
1-2, Resolution On Motion To Quash dated September 17, 1981; Annex "MM", Petition). (p. 100, Rollo)

The issue now submitted for Our consideration is whether the filing of the nine (9) other informations for estafa against
petitioner under the Revised Penal Code after he had earlier been charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
for issuing the same bouncing checks will put him in jeopardy of being convicted twice for the same offenses. In other
words, can petitioner be held liable for the nine criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and separately
also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the
same bouncing checks?

It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it.
Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the
Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already
closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of petitioner either to deposit funds for
his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either.

Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the
Revised Penal Code are also present in that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 namely (1) "the
postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof."

Petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.

Petitioner is charged with two (2) distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
approved on April 3, 1979 which provides that:

Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of
issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid
reason ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but
not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS or both such fine and imprisonment
at the discretion of the court.

and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein
below . . .

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts, executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud;

x x x           x x x          x x x

(d) By postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.

What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article
315 (2-d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance
of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the
same without sufficient funds and hence punishable (People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523) which is not so under the
Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be
convicted under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a  pre-existing obligation, while under
Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different
penalties are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system;
(4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
are  mala prohibita.

These differences are better understood by presenting the pertinent discussions on the passage of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 between the author of the bill, former Solicitor General and Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the
Honorable Estelito P. Mendoza, presented in the memorandum for the government as follows:

MR. MENDOZA. If there is evidence demonstrating that the act committed does not only violate this
proposed Act but also the Revised Penal Code, there will be further prosecution under the Revised
Penal Code. That is why it is proposed in this Act that there be a single uniform penalty for all
violations in this Act. However the court is given the discretion whether to impose imprisonment or fine
or both or also in whatever severity the court may consider appropriate under the circumstances.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. VELOSO, F. The other way around, it is not so. So precisely, if I file a case for estafa against a
particular person for issuance of a bouncing check, then necessarily I can also be prosecuted under
this proposed bill. On the other hand, if a person is prosecuted under the proposed bill, it does not
necessarily follow that he can be prosecuted for estafa.

MR. MENDOZA. This is simply because that in a certain set of circumstances, the offense under this
Act is the only offense committed while under a different set of circumstances, not only the offense
described in this Act is committed but also estafa. So that, for example, if a check with sufficient funds
is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation and the position of the Government should turn out to
be correct that there is no estafa, then the drawer of the check would only be liable under this Act but
not under the Revised Penal Code. But if he issues a check in payment, or contemporaneously with
incurring, of an obligation, then he will be liable not only for estafa but also for violation for this Act.
There is a difference between the two cases. In that situation where the check was issued in payment
of a pre-existing obligation, the issuance of the check does not cause damage to the payee and so it is
but appropriate that he should not be held for estafa but only for violating this Act. But if he issued a
check to induce another, to part with a valuable consideration and the check bounces, then he does
inflict an injury to the payee of the check apart from violating this law. In that case, it should be but fair
that he be subject to prosecution not only for estafa but also for violating this law.

MR. VELOSO, F. Yes, I agree with the Solicitor General on that point but my worry is with respect to
situations where there is prosecution first to estafa.

MR. MENDOZA. Well, if there is estafa . . .

MR. VELOSO, F. Estafa committed by the issuance of a bouncing check, in which case it will be
mandatory on the part of the prosecuting official to also file a case for violation of this offense under
the proposed bill.

MR. MENDOZA. Yes, that is correct. In such a situation because if the offender did not only cause
injury on account of the issuance of the check but did issue a bouncing check penalized under this
Act, then he will be liable for prosecution under both laws. I would admit that perhaps in such situation,
the penalty may be somewhat severe. As a matter of fact, in other jurisdictions, the issuance of
bouncing checks is penalized with substantially lower penalty. However, because of the situation in the
Philippines, the situation being now relatively grave that practically everybody is complaining about
bouncing checks, may be it is necessary at least initially, at this point in time for us to impose a rather
severe penalty and even allow liability not only under this Act but also for estafa. Then perhaps, after
the necessary discipline has been inculcated in our people and that the incidence of the offense has
 been reduced, we may then decide to amend the law and reduce the penalty. But at this time, shall we
say the evil is of such magnitude that only a dramatic and expeditious effort to prosecute persons who
issue bouncing checks may be necessary to curb quickly this evil. (explanations given by Solicitor
General ESTELITO P. MENDOZA at the Batasan Pambansa during his sponsorship speech of BP 22
which he authored, pages 1037-1038, Record of the Batasan, Plenary Session No. 70, Dec. 4, 1978).
(Emphasis supplied). (pp. 115-117, Rollo or pp. 9-11, Memorandum for respondents).

Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that:

Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised
Penal Code.

While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner, the
prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of
offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law as
in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity
of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden
is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to
double jeopardy (People v. Miraflores, 115 SCRA 570).

In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We have held in Acharon v. Purisima, et al. (13 SCRA 309)
that "when a motion to quash a criminal case is denied, remedy is not certiorari  but to go to court without prejudice to
reiterating special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to
appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law," invoking the rule laid down in People v.  Magdaluyo (1 SCRA 990).
If the petitioner cannot appeal at this state of the proceeding, it is because there is still a necessity for the trial on the
merits wherein the parties may present proofs in support of their contentions and not because the remedy of appeal is
unavailing.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

7. G.R. No. L-2666             September 26, 1951

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
JOSEPH ELKANISH, defendant-appellee.

The defendant was a member of the crew of the S.S. "Washington Mail," of American registry, on which 65 large boxes
of blasting caps were found and seized by the authorities while it was anchored inside the breakwater off Manila. The
ownership of the explosives being imputed to the accused, two separate informations were filed against him on the
same date, one charging illegal importation of the articles under section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code and
the other, illegal possession of the same articles under Section 1 of Act No. 3023.

Having been arraigned and entered the plea of not guilty on the information for illegal possession, the accused
afterward moved to quash the information illegal importation, on the grounds (1) that blasting caps are not lawful
objects of commerce and hence not embraced by section 2702 of the Revised Administrative Code, and (2) that, in any
event, prosecution for importation is barred by the prosecution for illegal possession. Without touching the first ground,
His Honor, Judge Potenciano Pecson of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissed the information on the second.

This appeal, by the City Fiscal, is from that order. Parenthetically, it should be stated that since the appeal was taken,
the other case has been tried and the defendant acquitted.

We will follow Pecson's example and confine this decision to discussion of the question on which the information was
dismissed.
There are "hopeless conflicts" in judicial decisions on the questions of former jeopardy; apparent disharmony exists
even in decisions of the same court and, it would seem on the surface, in the decisions of this Court. The diversity
arose in large measure from the differences in the transactions involved and in the provisions of the statutes, from the
application of the general principles on the facts, and from the circumstance that "the tests commonly adopted are by
no means infallible." (22 C.J.S. 278) The nature then of the deed or deeds alleged in the two indictments and their
relation to each other to the statute concerned, must constantly be held in view if one is not to be misled by the
adjudicated case

Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court reads:

When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and
after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquital of the defendant or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.

With reference to the importation and possession of blasting caps, it seems plain beyond argument that the latter is
inherent in the former so as to make them juridically identical. There can hardly be importation without possession.
When one brings something or causes something to be brought into the country, he necessarily has the possession of
it. The possession ensuing from the importation may not be actual, but legal, or constructive, but whatever its
character, the importer, in our opinion, is a possessor in the juristic sense and he is liable to criminal prosecution. If he
parts with the ownership of interest in the article before it reaches Philippine territory, he is neither an importer nor a
possessor within the legal meaning of the term, and he is not subject to prosecution for either offense under the
Philippine Laws. The owner of the merchandise at the time it enters Philippine water is its importer and possessor. He
who puts merchandise on board a vessel and alienates the title thereto while it is in transit does not incur criminal
liability. Possession on ownership of a prohibited article on a foreign vessel on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of
the Philippines does not constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country. (U.S. vs. Look Chaw, 18 Phil., 573).

Of the reported cases, U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484 and U.S. vs. Poh Chi, 20 Phil., 140, bear the closest
resemblance to the case at bar.

In U.S. vs. Lim Suco, the defendant had been convicted for smoking opium in a pipe. He was afterwards prosecuted for
having a pipe in his possession. It was held that "the possession of which he is charged in the second complaint was
the same possession which he necessarily had in committing the offense specified in the first, and therefore he could
not be again convicted for having the pipe in his possession." the Court said that "when a person has been tried and
convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, he cannot be a second time tried for one of those
incidents without being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." (See also the cases cited.)

In U. S. vs. Poh Chi, the Court held that it was not the intentions of the legislature to have separate complaints filed
against a person found in the illegal possession of opium and a pipe for smoking the same-one for illegal possession of
the opium and another for the possession of the pipe.

When the above cases were decided, the law in force on the subject was General Orders No. 58, Sections 19-30. If
there is any difference between that law and Section 9 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, it is that the latter is more
liberal, whereas by General Orders No. 58 there was jeopardy when the offense charged in the second information or
indictment is necessarily included in the first complaint or information, the Rules of Court operates both ways, barring a
second indictment which charges an offense which "necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information."

Penal statutes, substantive and remedial or procedural, are, by the consecrated rule, construed strictly, or liberally in
favor of accused. The fact that the protection against being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense is not only a
legislative creation but secured by the Constitution, impresses with a command such construction as would bring the
statute into harmony with the spirit of the fundamental law. As this Court, through Mr. Justice Moreland, has said in
U.S. vs. Gustilo, 19 Phil., 208. —
 We are confident that portion of the Philippine Bill embodying the principle that no person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment of the same offense should, in accordance with its letter and spirit, be made to cover
as nearly as possible every result which flows from a single criminal act impelled by a single criminal intent.
The fact should not be lost sight of that it is the injury to the public which a criminal action seeks to redress,
and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to individuals. In so far as a single criminal act,
impelled by a single criminal intent, in other words, one volition, is divided into separate crimes and punished
accordingly, just so far are the spirit of the Philippine Bill and the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code
violated.

This doctrine was reiterated in U.S. vs. Poh Chi, supra.

In our case, there is no denying that importation and possession represents only one criminal intent, one volition; the
design was to sell or dispose of the blasting caps for profit, the importation and possession being no more than means
to accompolish that purpose, the media between the accused and the ultimate objective. Importation and possession,
at least in this particular case, played the same auxiliary role with reference to the object pursued. That, it should be
borne in mind, does not go exactly for smoking opium and possession of a pipe, the latter of which was considered
merged in smoking in the cases above cited. For smoking is an end in itself; and while pipe is indispensable and
therefore a means for smoking, possession of pipe may have a purpose for its owners other than selling it for
compensation or keep it as part of an equipment for running an opium den. In other words, possession of an opium
pipe may envisage broader objectives than possession and importation of blasting caps.

The appealed order is affirmed without costs.

8. [G.R. No. L-6518. March 30, 1954.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FRANCISCO DIAZ, Defendant-

Appellee.

SYLLABUS

CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND DAMAGED TO PROPERTY
THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE; APPLICABILITY OF REVISED PENAL CODE AFTER AMENDMENT OF
MOTOR VEHICLE LAW. — Where the information for homicide with serious physical injuries alleged facts
sufficient to constitute such crime as defined and penalized by section 67(d) of the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law and the information for damage to property through reckless imprudence is under the
Revised Penal Code, defendant’s two separate convictions were proper. However, Republic Act No. 557
amended section 67(d) of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law in the sense that "if, as the result of
negligence or reckless or unreasonably fast driving any accident occurs resulting in death or serious
bodily injury to any person, the motor vehicle driver at fault shall, upon conviction, be punished under
the provisions of the Penal Code." Although this Act took effect after the accident in question had
occurred, the same may be applied, it being more favorable to the accused. In conformity with article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, the defendant should be convicted only of the complex crime of homicide
with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.

DECISION

On November 24, 1951, Francisco Diaz was accused in the Municipal Court of Pasay City of a violation
of Section 52 of Act 3992 known as the Revised Motor Vehicles Law committed as follows:

"That on or about the 12th day of November, 1951, in Pasay City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused
Francisco Diaz being then the driver and person in charge of Automobile bearing plate No. 1560 (should
be 1560), did then and there wilfully and unlawfully drive and operate said automobile along Taft
Avenue, this city, in a fast and reckless manner, without taking the necessary precautions to avoid
accident to persons and damage to property, thereby causing an accident.”

Diaz pleaded not guilty to the charge and after the case was called for hearing twice without the
prosecution appearing, the Municipal Court on motion of the defense dismissed the case "for failure of
the Government to prosecute." This was on December 22, 1951.

On May 9, 1952, the Assistant City Attorney of Pasay City filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal charging the same Francisco Diaz with Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence
committed as follows:

"That on or about the 12th day of November, 1951, in Pasay City, Philippines, the abovenamed accused
Francisco Diaz being the driver and person in charge of automobile bearing plate No. 1560, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloneously drive, operate and manage the same along Taft Avenue,
this city, in a reckless, negligent and imprudent manner, without taking the necessary precautions to
avoid accident to persons and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and
imprudence the said automobile with plate No. 1560, hit, bumped and collided against an Oldsmobile
car with plate No. 12348 driven by Potenciano Eria, thereby causing damage to the latter vehicle in the
amount of P249.50 to the damage and prejudice of the owner Say Koc Chuan in the aforesaid sum of
P249.50." On October 10, 1952, the Rizal Court issued an order postponing the arraignment of the
accused to October 27, 1952, giving counsel for the defendant until October 16th within which to file a
motion to quash. On said date defendant’s counsel filed his motion based on double jeopardy because
of the previous charge of violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law sec. 52 thereof) with the Municipal
Court of Pasay City. On November 17, 1952, the Rizal Court issued an order sustaining the motion to
quash and dismissing the case with costs de oficio. The Government is appealing from that order and
because the appeal involves only questions of law, the same was taken directly to this Court.

Is there double jeopardy in the present case?

As regards the dismissal of the first case in the Municipal Court of Pasay City, it is true that since the
defendant himself asked for said dismissal, at first blush, it may not be considered as coming under the
provisions of Rule 113, section 9 of the Rules of Court which provides that there is former jeopardy
"when a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant." But in the case of Gandicela v.
Hon. Lutero, 88 Phil., 299, we held:

"If the defendant wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he should ask, not for the
dismissal but for the trial of the case. If the prosecution asks for the postponement of the hearing and
the court believes that the hearing cannot be postponed anymore without violating the right of the
accused to a speedy trial, the court shall deny the postponement and proceed with the trial and require
the fiscal to present the witnesses for the prosecution; and if the fiscal does not or cannot produce his
evidence and consequently fails to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the Court,
upon the motion of the defendant, shall dismiss the case. Such dismissal is not in reality a mere
dismissal although it is generally so called, but an acquittal of the defendant because of the
prosecution’s failure to prove the guilt of the defendant, and it will be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense even though it was ordered by the Court upon motion or with the express consent of the
defendant, in exactly the same way as judgment of acquittal obtained upon the defendant’s motion
(People v. Salico, 84 Phil., 722).."

The dismissal of the charge in the Pasay City Municipal Court is even a stronger case than the example
considered in the case of Gandicela above referred to. Here the prosecution was not even present on
the day of trial so as to be in a position to proceed with the presentation of evidence to prove the guilt
of the accused. The case was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without asking for
postponement or giving any explanation, just failed to appear. So the dismissal of the case, the at the
instance of defendant Diaz may, according to what we said in the Gandicela case, be regarded as an
acquittal.

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor
Vehicles Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property
thru reckless imprudence charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double
jeopardy is whether of not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113, section 9). Another test is
whether the evidence which proves one would prove the others, that is to say, whether the facts
alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice
versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. 1

It is clear that in the present case the second charge of Damage to Property thru Reckless Imprudence
includes the first charge of reckless driving; that the facts alleged in the information on damage to
property thru reckless driving, if proven, would have been sufficient to support the first charge of
reckless driving, and finally, that the offense of reckless driving is an ingredient of the offense of
damage to property thru reckless imprudence, all for the simple reason that the basic element in both
offenses is reckless driving. Thus it is evident that we have here a case of double jeopardy. And there is
no explanation why when Diaz was first charged with a violation of the Motor Vehicle Law because of
reckless driving, the damage to property was not included.

A defendant should not be harassed with various prosecutions based on the same act by splitting the
same into various charges, all emanating from the same law violation, when the prosecution could
easily and well embody them in a single information.

The order of dismissal by the Rizal Court of First Instance is affirmed, with costs de oficio.

9. G.R. No. 6637           September 1, 1911

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POH CHI, defendant-appellant.

This defendant is the same person who was the defendant in the case of U. S. vs. Poh Chi. (See case No. 6636. 1) In
that case (No. 6636) the defendant was charged with the illegal possession of opium in violation of the provisions of
section 31, of Act No. 1761, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 1910.

In this case (No. 6637) the defendant is charged with the violation of section 7 of Act No. 1761. The complaint in each
case (Nos. 6636 and 6637) was filed in the lower court on the same day. The evidence adduced in both of these cases
in the lower court was practically the same. The evidence shows that one Merill, a lieutenant of Constabulary, went to
the house of the defendant, and after making a search found under the floor a small amount of opium and a pipe used
in smoking opium. The opium and the pipe were found together under the floor; they were found in the same place, at
the same time, and by the same person. As was said above the defendant was charged and convicted in case No.
6636 with illegal possession of opium. In this case, No. 6637, he is charged with the illegal possession of a pipe which
is used in smoking opium. The lower court, after hearing the evidence in this case, found the defendant guilty and
sentenced him to pay a fine of P400, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment and to pay the costs.
From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court.

The question presented here is, "Is the defendant guilty of two distinct crimes under the facts as above stated?"

This court, in the case of U. S. vs. Canuto Gustilo  (19 Phil. Rep., 208), speaking through Mr. Justice Moreland, said:

We are confident that the portion of the Philippine Bill embodying the principle that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense should, in accordance with its letter and spirit, be made to
cover as nearly as possible every result which flows from a single criminal act impelled by a single criminal
intent. The fact should not be lost sight of that it is that injury to the public which the criminal action seeks to
redress, and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to individuals. In so far as a single
criminal act, impelled by a single criminal intent, in other words, one violation, is divided into separate crimes
and punished accordingly, just so far is the spirit of the Philippine Bill and the provisions of article 89 of the
Penal Code violated.
 In our judgment of the possession of two firearms under the conceded facts of this case constitutes but one
criminal act, one violation. Having been punished once for that act, he cannot, under the provisions of the
Philippine Bill and article 89 of the Penal Code, be punished again for the same act.

The conclusion in the said Gustilo case is supported by many authorities, therein cited.

It is true that the Commission has provided a certain punishment for the possession of a pipe used in the smoking of
opium, for the smoking of opium, as well as a punishment for the illegal possession of opium, but it is not believed that
it was the intention of the legislature to have separate complaints filed against a person who was found in the illegal
possession of opium and a pipe at the same time. If that were true then every person who was found to be smoking
opium could be charged in three different complaints: First, with the illegal possession of the pipe; second, the illegal
possession of opium; and the third, for smoking the opium. Certainly the legislature did not intend any such
consequences.

For the reason stated in the said Gustilo case, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, the defendant is
discharged from the custody of the law and the complaint is hereby to be dismissed.

10. [G.R. No. L-5843. March 25, 1911.]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CANUTO GUSTILO, Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; JEOPARDY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE "PHILIPPINE
BILL." — That portion of the "Philippine Bill" embodying the principle that no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense should be made to cover, as nearly as possible, every result which
flows from a single criminal act born of a single criminal intent even though more than what might
otherwise be termed one crime is actually committed by said act. When a single act constitutes one or
more crimes, or when one crime is the necessary means of committing the other, there can be only one
punishment for all the crimes committed by such act.

2. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWO FIREARMS AT THE SAME TIME AND SAME PLACE. — The
possession of a shotgun and a revolver by the same person at the same time, and in the same place, is
but one act of possession, one violation of the law, and a conviction and punishment for the possession
of the one arm is a bar to a prosecution for the possession of the other.

DECISION

The question involved in this appeal is expressed by the court below in the following language:

"The defendant arraigned upon the information in this case has appeared with his counsel and entered
the plea of former jeopardy, said plea being based upon the record in criminal case No. 1360 of this
court, entitled "United States v. Canuto Gustilo," in which case the information was filed on the 17th
day of May, 1909, charging the defendant with the offense of illegal possession of firearms. To that
information the defendant pleaded guilty and was on the 10th day of July, 1909, sentenced to pay a
fine and costs.

"It is a fact disclosed by the record and admitted by the fiscal that the firearm which the defendant is
now charged with illegally possessing was possessed by him during the same period and was seized at
the same time and place as the arm for the possession of which he was convicted in case No. 1360. The
defense, therefore, contends that but one crime was committed by the defendant and that by
subjecting him to another prosecution the Government is violating the provisions of the Philippine Bill,
that no one shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. The position of the fiscal is that
inasmuch as the law requires a bond in the sum of two hundred pesos for each firearm possessed by
any individual, the offense defined and penalized by section 25 of Act No. 1780 is committed as many
times, as the accused has unlicensed firearms in his possession, in other words, that the possession of
each individual firearm constitutes a separate offense for which a prosecution will lie."

The brief of the prosecution raises the preliminary question that:

"In pleading former jeopardy, it is not sufficient simply to establish that the party alleging it had been in
jeopardy once, but he must allege and prove in the most specific way that the offense of which he was
formerly convicted or acquitted was identically the same offense for which the courts were attempting
to try him again. This throws the burden of proof upon the defendant to prove his plea of former
jeopardy. In the case at bar no witness was called to prove his plea of former jeopardy and the facts
alleged in the plea are an admission that the facts alleged in the complaint are true. The record in case
No. 1360 and the record in case No. 1361 constitute records in absolutely separate and distinct criminal
actions, and under the rule in the Gavieres case, above cited, it was incumbent upon the trial court to
require the defendant to prove the allegations of his former jeopardy in the most specific way."

It is true that it does not appear affirmatively from the record that any evidence was, technically
speaking, offered by the accused to prove his plea of former jeopardy. But sufficient appears in the
record to establish the facts upon which the plea is founded. The accused, in his plea, after quoting the
information on criminal cause No. 1360, says:

"That the witnesses Agustin Landato and Ambrosio Burso, witnesses for the prosecution, testified under
oath in the preliminary investigation in criminal cause No. 1360, and also in the preliminary
investigation in the present cause, that the shotgun, with its ammunition, which was the subject of the
complaint in case No. 1360, and the Colt’s revolver, with its ammunition, which is the subject of the
present complaint, were in the possession, custody and control of the accused and were owned by him
together and were located in the same house, in the same room, and both of said arms were taken by
the public authorities by the same act, at the same time, and in the same place."

The provincial fiscal made the following answer to the plea:

"The undersigned fiscal, answering the plea of former jeopardy invoked by the defendant, alleges: That
the accused has not been placed in jeopardy for the reason that the facts detailed in prior case No.
1360 against the accused, Canuto Gustilo, upon which he was convicted, are not the same facts
mentioned in the complaint in the present cause. In the former, as in the present case, the body or
bodies of the crime are different and distinct between themselves and for that reason the allegation of
jeopardy alleged by the defense fails of legal foundation."

Upon this plea and the answer thus made to it, the court heard the arguments of the parties and
proceeded to a determination of the case. While the record fails to disclose that any evidence
substantiating the plea of former jeopardy was, technically speaking, introduced, it appears,
nevertheless, that everything necessary to present the facts upon which such plea was based was taken
for granted and as if it appeared in the case. Moreover, it is seen from the quotation above given of a
part of the decision of the lower court that it was expressly stated "that the record disclosed, and it was
admitted as a fact by the fiscal, that the firearm which the defendant is now charged with illegally
possessing was possessed by him during the same period and was seized at the same time and place as
the arm for the possession of which he was convicted in case No. 1360." From all the facts and
circumstances which appear of record in the appeal before us, and particularly in view of the fact that
the plea as presented has not really been traversed by the prosecution, we must presume conclusively
that all of the facts which the defendant required to present fully the question of former jeopardy were
included in the record and before the court at the time of his decision.

After a thorough consideration of the case, the trial court found the plea of the defendant good and
dismissed the cause. From the judgment entered on that dismissal the prosecution appealed to this
court.

That the portion of the statute under which the defendant stands charged which is material to the
disposition of the present question reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, . . . to possess, or have the custody of any shotgun,
revolver, pistol . . . or any other deadly weapon from which a bullet, ball, shot, shell, or other missile . .
. may be discharged by means of gunpowder or other explosive, and it shall be unlawful for any
person . . . to acquire, dispose of, or have custody of any ammunition or detached parts for weapons,
unless and until such person . . . shall secure a license . . . and otherwise comply with the requirements
of this Act and the rules and regulations issued . . . pursuant to the provisions of this Act. The word
"firearm" as used herein shall be interpreted to mean any and all of the weapons mentioned in this
section."

"SEC. 25. Any person having possession of any firearms in violation of any provision of this Act
shall . . . be punished by a fine . . . or by imprisonment . . . ."

The question is squarely presented to us on this appeal whether or not, under the statute above
quoted, the prosecuting officer may, when he finds a person in possession of two or more firearms at
the same time and in the same place, proceed against such person in as many separate actions as
there are different firearms in his possession.

We are confident that portion of the Philippine Bill embodying the principle that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense should, in accordance with its letter and spirit, be
made to cover as nearly as possible every result which flows from a single criminal act impelled by a
single criminal intent. The fact should not be lost sight of that it is the injury to the public which a
criminal action seeks to redress, and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to
individuals. In so far as a single criminal act, impelled by a single criminal intent, in other words, one
volition, is divided into separate crimes and punished accordingly, just so far are the spirit of the
Philippine Bill and the provisions of article 89 of the Penal Code violated.

In our judgment the possession of the two firearms under the conceded facts of this case constitutes
but one criminal act, one volition. Having been punished once for that act, he cannot, under the
provisions of the Philippine Bill and of article 89 of the Penal Code, be punished again for the same act.
(U.S. v. Lim San, 17 Phil. Rep., 273; U.S. v. Sauler, No. 6342, 1 State v. Benham, 7 Conn., 414; Rex v.
Johnson, 3 Mau. & Selw., 539, 548; Rex v. Clark, 1 Brod. & Bing; 473; Holland q. t. v. Duffin, Peake’s
Ca., 58; State v. Moore, 86 Minn., 422; State v. Colgate, 31 Kan., 511; State v. Egglesht, 41 Iowa,
574; Regina v. Brettel, 1 Carr. & Marsh, 609; 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law, sec. 565, note x; Lorton v.
State, 7 Mo., 55; State v. Nelson, 29 Me., 329; State v. Williams, 10 Humph., 101; State v. Morphin,
37 Mo., 373; Jackson v. State, 14 Ind., 327; U.S. v. Bereman, 5 Cranch (C. C.) , 412; State v.
Thurston, 2 McMullan, 382; The People v. Van Kuren, 5 Parker C. R., 66; Regina v. Erlington, 9 Cox C.,
86; People v. Stephens, 79 Cal., 428; People v. Willard, 92 Cal., 482; People v. Ny Sam Chung, 94 Cal.,
304; People v. McDaniels, 137 Cal., 192; bishop’s New Criminal Law, sec. 1,070; People v. Allen, 1
Parker’s C. R., 445; State v. Damon, 2 Tyler (Vt.) , 387; Clem v. State, 42 Ind., 420; Ben v. State, 22
Ala., 9; Womack v. State, 7 Coldwell, 508, 509; State v. Hennessey, 23 Ohio State, 339; Wilson v.
State, 45 Tex., 76; Hudson v. State, 9 Tex. Ct. App., 151; Rex v. Jones, 4 Car. 7 P., 217; Fisher v.
Commonwealth, 1 Bush., 211; People v. McGowan, 17 Wend., 386; Hinkle v. Commonwealth, 4 Dana,
518; Fiddler v. State, 7 Humph., 508; Roberts v. State, 14 Ga., 8; Copenhaven v. State, 15 Ga., 264;
State v. Lewis, 2 Hawks (N. C.) , 98; Woodford v. People, 62 N. Y., 117; Commonwealth v. Squire, 42
Mass., 258; State v. Cooper, 1 Green (N. J. L.) , 361; Commonwealth v. Wade, 34 Mass., 395;
Hennessey v. People, 21 How. Pr., 239; Holt v. State, 38 Ga., 187; Jones v. State, 55 Ga., 625, 626;
Wilson v. State, 24 Conn., 57, 69; Hinkle v. Commonwealth, 4 Davis, 518; State v. Chaffin, 2 Swan
(Tenn.) , 493; Laupher v. State, 14 Ind., 327; State v. McCormack, 8 Oregon, 236; 1 Bishop’s Criminal
Law, sec. 1,060; State v. Augustine, 29 La., An., 119; Commonwealth v. Prescott, 153 Mass., 396;
supreme court of Spain, decisions of 3rd May, 1871; 26th April, 1873; 4th December, 1871; 4th
October, 1871; 30th December, 1885; 10th June, 1886.)

We have carefully examined the numerous authorities cited by the learned counsel for the people. In by
far the most of them a second (not strictly so) punishment was permitted because there were two
distinct crimes, committed by separate and distinct acts impelled by the corresponding criminal intents.
With the others, in which a second punishment (strictly so) was allowed and imposed, although both
crimes resulted from a single volition of the accused, we cannot agree for the reason that they are
opposed to the law of these Islands and are in conflict with what we believe to be the weight of
authority.

The possession of the two firearms being, in our judgment, but one act, the present action against the
accused cannot be maintained, he having been already punished for such act.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, costs de oficio.

11. G.R. No. L-58886 December 13, 1988

CONSUELO E. MALLARI, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Section 22, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, reiterated as Section 21, Article III in the 1987 Constitution, provides
that "(n)o person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is the constitutional provision
relied upon by petitioner Consuelo E. Mallari in challenging the decision dated December 10, 1979 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Consuelo Mallari," as well as the
resolution of November 5, 1981 denying her motion for reconsideration. Petitioner attains her objective.

The antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Consuelo E. Mallari, with three (3) others, was accused of the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of Public
Document before the then Court of First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case No. 9800). As the other accused were at
large, the case proceeded only with respect to Consuelo Mallari, who, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty. Trial was
conducted; after which, the court rendered judgment finding Consuelo Mallari guilty of the crime charged and
sentencing her to imprisonment of one (1) year and to indemnify the offended party Remegio Tapawan in the amount
of P1,500.00 and to pay the costs.

Petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. No. 19849-CR, resulted in the affirmance of the trial
court's decision with a modification as to the penalty. In lieu of the straight penalty of one (1) year, an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months, as maximum, was
imposed on petitioner. 1

In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner contended that the decision in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR placed her twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the same offense as she had previously been convicted, sentenced and probationed for
the same offense in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR entitled "People of the Philippines versus Consuelo Mallari."

Unconvinced, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration in the assailed resolution of November 5, 1981,
to wit:

The court will now resolve as to whether the accused might be placed twice in jeopardy, the Court
sustains the position taken by the Solicitor-General that the acts of the accused in GA C.R. No. 19849-
CR are different and distinct from the acts committed in C.A. G.R. No. 20817-CR. Considering that
they were separate acts of deceit, they are therefore two separate crimes. 2

Hence, the instant petition for review.

By the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, it is understood that "when a person is charged with an
offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or Identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law
of reason, justice and conscience." 3

To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three (3) requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached
prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for
the same offense as that in the first. 4
With the prior conviction by a final judgment of petitioner for the crime of estafa thru falsification of public document in
CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR, there is no question that the first and second requisites above enumerated are present in the
case at bar. The problem then lies with the third requisite. Is the crime charged in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR the same as
in this case (CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR)?

We rule in the affirmative.

The Information in CA-G.R. No. 20817-CR reads:

That on or about December 15,1970 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused CELESTINO
HALLAZGO, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila and accused CARLOS SUNGA, DOMINGO
ESPINELLI and CONSUELO MALLARI, all private individuals, conspiring, and confederating together
with others whose true names and whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JULIA S. SACLOLO thru falsification of a
public document in the following manner, to wit- the said accused having somehow obtained
possession of T.C.T. No. 42694, issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite, belonging
to Leonora I. Balderas and duly registered in the latter's name and by means of false manifestations
and fraudulent representations which they made to said Julia S. Saclolo to the effect that said Leonora
I. Balderas was badly in need of money and that she was offering the aforesaid lot as collateral for a
loan of P1,500.00 then executing, forging and falsifying a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
acknowledged before accused CELESTINO HALLAZGO, Notary Public for and in the City of Manila
and entered in the latter's notarial register as Doc. No. 3719, Page No. 75, Book No. XII, Series of
1970 and therefore a public document, by then and there signing and/or causing to be signed the
signature "Leonora I. Balderas," thereby making it appear as it did appear in said document, that said
Leonora I. Balderas had participated in the execution of this Deed of Real Estate Mortgage by signing
her name thereon when in truth and in fact as the said accused or any of them to sign her name
thereon and by means of other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing said Julia
Saclolo to give and deliver as in fact the latter gave and delivered to said accused the said amount of
P1,500.00 said accused well knowing that their manifestations were false and untrue and were made
solely for the purpose of obtaining as in fact they did obtain the said amount of P1,500.00 which, one
(sic) in their possession, they did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, misappropriate,
misapply and convert to their own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of said Julia
S. Saclolo in said amount of P1,500.00, Philippine Currency. 5

The Information in CA-G.R. No. 19849-CR, on the other hand, reads:

That on or about the 15th day of December, 1970 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the accused
Celestino Hallazgo, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila, and accused Carlos Sunga, Domingo
Espineli and Consuelo Mallari, all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together with others
whose true names and whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Remegio G. Tapawan thru falsification of a public
document, in the following manner, to wit: the accused having somehow obtained possession of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42695 issued by the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite,
belonging to Leonora 1. Balderas and duly registered in the latter's name, and by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said Remigio G. Tapawan to the
effect that said Leonora 1. Balderas was badly in need of money and that she was offering the
aforesaid lot as collateral for a loan of P1,500.00, then executing, forging and falsifying a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage acknowledged before accused Celestino Hallazgo, Notary Public for and in the City of
Manila and entered in the latter's Notarial Register as Doc. No. 3718; Page No. 75, Book No. XII,
Series of 1970, and therefore a public document, by then and there signing and/or causing to be
signed the signature "Leonora I. Balderas," over the typewritten name "LEONORA I. BALDERAS"
thereby making it appear, as it did appear in said document, that said Leonora I. Balderas had
participated in the execution of said Deed of Real Estate Mortgage by signing her name thereon
neither had she authorized said accused or anyone of them to sign her name thereon, and by means
of other deceits of similar import, induced and succeeded in inducing said Remegio B. Tapawan to
give and deliver as in fact the latter gave and delivered to said accused, the amount of P1,500.00 ... 6

In CA-G.R. No. 20817, the Court of Appeals made the following observations:
 ... Testifying for the prosecution, witness Remegio Tapawan explained how Julia Saclolo became the
mortgagee of the land in question by declaring that the accused Consuelo E. Mallari herein after
referred to as the appellant, whom he had known since childhood came to his house in Rosario, Cavite
on December 10, 1970, bringing two (2) land titles both in the name of Leonora Balderas and told him
that she wanted to mortgage the titles for P1,500.00 each because she and her cousin Leonora
Balderas were in great need of money to pay some taxes with the Bureau of Customs where they have
some goods impounded. Not having enough money Tapawan refused. The appellant, however,
returned on December 15, 1970 with two titles and pleaded anew with Remegio Tapawan and his wife
for assistance because of her and Balderas great need of money. Tapawan gave in but because he
had only P1,500.00 while the accused needed P3,000.00 he took her to his mother-in-law, Julia
Saclolo and was able to secure the amount of P1,500.00. On the information given by Consuelo
Mallari that the deed of mortgage would be prepared in the office of Atty. Celestino Hallazgo at M.H.
del Pilar, Manila where the mortgagor Leonora Balderas would show up, Tapawan proceeded to the
place indicated. Immediately upon Tapawan's arrival, Atty. Hallazgo phoned someone and within 20
minutes the person arrived whom Consuelo Mallari and Atty. Hallazgo introduced to Remegio
Tapawan as Leonora Balderas. Thereafter, the mortgage deeds where prepared in favor of Julia
Saclolo and the other in favor of Remegio Tapawan for P1,500.00 each. The mortgage loan of
P3,000.00 was accordingly delivered to the person who posed as Leonora Balderas. Consuelo Mallari
and Domingo Espinelli, assigned as witnesses to the said documents. Later, during the preliminary
investigation at the Fiscal's Office, Tapawan learned that he was tolled (sic) because the person who
posed as Leonora Balderas was a man by the name of Carlos Sunga, who, at the time the mortgage
was constituted, was dressed in a woman's attire. Neither Remegio Tapawan nor Julia Saclolo were
able to recover a portion of the mortgage loan. 7

Similarly, the findings of facts in CA-G.R. No. 19849 ran thus:

REMEGIO TAPAWAN stated that sometime on December 10, 1970, his townmate Consuelo E. Mallari
saw him at his house, when she begged him and his wife to lend her cousin Leonora Balderas some
amount to pay taxes and customs duties for imported fruits impounded in the Bureau of Customs
offering as a collateral two (2) Certificates of Title, two deeds of sale, and four (4) tax declarations all in
the name of Leonora Balderas. Consuelo returned on December 15, and reiterated her request. Since
he had only P1,500.00 at that time he convinced his mother-in-law Julia Saclolo, to shell out additional
amount of P1,500.00. Consuelo and he then proceeded to the Office of Atty. Celestino Hallazgo in
Ermita, Manila for the preparation of the documents. This attorney called up Leonora Balderas who
arrived shortly accompanied by three (3) persons one of whom is the helper of Atty. Hallazgo,
Domingo Espinelli. This Leonora Balderas was introduced to him by Atty. Hallazgo and Consuelo who
claimed her to be a cousin "whom I should help." When the two (2) deeds prepared by Atty. Hallazgo
one for him and the other for Julia Saclolo were ready, they were signed by him, Mallari, Espinelli,
Balderas and the attorney, after which he delivered the money to the person introduced as Leonora
Balderas. 8

A comparison of the Informations filed in the two cases under consideration as well as the findings of facts of the
appellate court tells us that they refer to the same series of acts. These series of acts amount to what is known in law
as a continued, continuous or continuing offense.

A continued crime is a single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. It is a
continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,
however long a time it may occupy. Although there are series of acts, there is only one crime committed. Hence, only
one penalty shall be imposed.

The crime of estafa thru falsification of public document committed by Consuelo Mallari, although consummated
through a series of acts, was 'set on foot' by the single intent or impulse to defraud Remegio Tapawan of a total
amount of P3,000.00. And contrary to the appellate court's observation, there was only one deceit practiced by
petitioner on the two (2) victims, i.e. that being in need of money, Leonora Balderas was willing to mortgage two (2) lots
as security for a loan of P3,000.00. It was, in fact, by mere play of fate that the second victim, Julia Saclolo, should be
dragged into the swindle by reason of Tapawan having only P1,500.00 at that time. That there were two (2) victims,
however, did not accordingly convert the crime into two separate offenses, as the determinative factor is the unity or
multiplicity of the criminal intent or of the transactions for "the fact should not be lost sight of that it is the injury to the
public which a criminal action seeks to redress, and by such redress to prevent its repetition, and not the injury to
individuals." 9

The singularity of the offense committed by petitioner is further demonstrated by the fact that the falsification of the two
(2) public documents as a means of committing estafa were performed on the same date, in the same place, at the
same time and on the same occasion. This Court has held in the case of People v. de Leon, 10 that the act of taking two
or more roosters in the same place and on the same occasion is dictated by only one criminal design and therefore,
there is only one crime of theft even if the roosters are owned by different persons.

It has also been ruled that when two informations refer to the same transaction, the second charge cannot prosper
because the accused will thereby be placed in jeopardy for the second time for the same offense. 11

Petitioner, having already been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public document in CA-
G.R. No. 20817-CR, it stands to reason that she can no longer be held liable for the same crime in this case. The rule
against double jeopardy protects the accused not against the peril of second punishment but against being tried for the
same offense. 12 Without the safeguard this rule establishes in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety and peace of
mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might repeat his accusation as often as it is
dismissed by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his will and
pleasure. 13 The accused would never be free from the cruel and constant menace of a never ending charge, which the
malice of a complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended over his head. 14

NEMO BIS PUNITUR PRO EODEM DELICTO. No man is punished twice for the same fault or offense.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment of conviction in C.A. G.R. No. 19849-CR is set
aside on the ground of double jeopardy. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

12. G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M.
CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL
COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor FERDINAND ABESAMIS
and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed
with murder 1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government prosecutors filed another information charging
him for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The second information
reads:

That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Metro Manila and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonable ground to
believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there
unlawfully, feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or delay the apprehension of
said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.

On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest
pending personal determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the case and expunge the
information from the record.

On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied
Senator Enrile's Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable cause to hold the accused Juan
Ponce Enrile liable for violation of PD No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the
grounds that:

(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of factual and legal basis; and

(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-
conspirator of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December 1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of
the Senator for harboring or concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.

On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit
and setting Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.

The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the information on the following grounds, to
wit:

I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;

II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col. Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1
December 1989 is absorbed in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion presently
charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of Col. Honasan on the basis of the same
meeting on 1 December 1989;

III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only one prosecution for all the
component acts of rebellion;

IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for alleged violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1829;

V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829.
The preliminary investigation, held only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in
denial of due process.

On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from conducting further
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829
notwithstanding the rebellion case earlier filed against him.

Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed
against the petitioner on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter is based on the Revised Penal
Code or a general law.

The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings
of which were recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos.
92163 and 92164, June 5, 1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the long standing
proscription against splitting the component offenses of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a
procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently declared:

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which
that Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that commutes rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person cannot be charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the
greater penalty to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2) different offenses where one is a
constitutive or component element or committed in furtherance of rebellion.

The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No. 1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:

SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to
6,000 pesos or both, shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs, impedes,
frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent
his arrest, prosecution and conviction.

xxx xxx xxx

The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving
him food and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen.
Enrile allegedly did not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And because of such failure the
petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.

The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City were based on the affidavits executed by three (3)
employees of the Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan and some 100
rebel soldiers attended the mass and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the evening of December
1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3) particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989, Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed
rebel soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby concluded that:

In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house
in the presence of about 100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that they were
co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A, Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)

As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident
which gave rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No. 1829. Under the Department of Justice
resolution (Annex A, Rollo, p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated
murder but there could be 101 separate and independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan and
100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of component elements is readily apparent.

The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily,
being in conspiracy with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was for no other purpose but in
furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent or
resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v. Hernandez, supra:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive.  (p. 536)

The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues
and plots. (People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that acts committed in furtherance of the
rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of rebellion. (People v. Geronimo,
100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]; People v. Lava,
28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component or
ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate
charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is instructive:
 In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by some kind of action.
Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer v.
U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another
penal statute or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it becomes
Identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or used in
combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.
Just as one cannot be punished for possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug,
and a robber cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for robbery,
because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in smoking and in robbery
respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in conjunction
with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason.

The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special
law while the rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence, prosecution under one law will not bar a
prosecution under the other. This argument is specious in rebellion cases.

In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes,
whether punishable under a special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in
furtherance thereof, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes
in themselves. Thus:

This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of a crime form part and parcel
thereof, and hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or
by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)

The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common
crimes refer to all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc. as provided in the Revised Penal
Code. The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that the theory of absorption in
rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are perpetrated
in furtherance of the political offense.

The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied
up with his allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the same act to form two separate crimes of
rebellion and violation of PD No. 1829.

Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan
was committed in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be deemed as absorbed by, merged in,
and Identified with the crime of rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.

Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence overwhelmingly favor the proposition
that common crimes, perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their character as
"common" offenses, and assume the political complexion of the main crime of which they are mere
ingredients, and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal offense, or
complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p.
541)

In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused, after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime
of rebellion, faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. The Court ruled:

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with which the accused is charged in
the present case which is that of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as a
necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with which the same accused is charged with
other persons in a separate case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page 662)

xxx xxx xxx

 [T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the accused is charged in the present case is
already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him in double
jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341, January 30, 1990) where the Court had the
occasion to pass upon a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged member of the New
Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of subversion
under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the information, the petitioner based his arguments on
the Hernandez and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in rebellion. The Court, however,
clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS
HE BEING SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application
in this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no
separate prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The prosecution must make up its mind whether to
charge Senator Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and multiple
frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder. Neither can it prosecute him for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should be noted
that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In
such a case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 cannot prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with
rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate,
the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that is in
furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished
separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner cannot be tried separately under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in
the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of
preliminary injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial
Court of Makati, from holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from conducting further proceedings
therein is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.