vii. Ordinance, Statute, Memo Cir.

, Rules

People v. Nazario, G.R. No. L-44143, 31 August 1988 (void for vagueness)

Facts:

Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes
amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series
of 1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at
Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to
pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was
covered under the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous
and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto

Held:

1. No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he
comes with the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and
maintaining it, so despite only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get
any profit as it goes only to Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated “Beginning
and taking effect from 1964 if the fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the
amendment under Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-
payment has been made punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a
retroactive penalty

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001 (plunder; void for vagueness)

FACTS:
Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act
Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659. On the information, it
was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or a
series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines. Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against
petitioner.

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation,

reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied. Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding
that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the
arrest of the accused. Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on
the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an indictable offense since the law
on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information
for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.

ISSUE:
WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed. We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse
petitioner in his defense.

viii. Motion for Reconsideration

Casuela v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 112354, 04 August 1997

Medenilla v. CSC, G.R. No. 93868, 19 February 1991

Pontejos v. Desierto, G.R. No. 148600, 07 July 2009

Facts: On August 26, 1998, the Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB, for brevity)
received a Notice of Appeal filed by Rasemco Inc. represented by its president Restituto Aquino,
asking for the nullification of all the proceedings conducted before Arbiter Pontejos for alleged
extortion, bribery and graft and corruption committed by Pontejos in conspiracy with Director
Wilfredo Imperial and Ms. Carmen Atos, both of HLURB and one Roderick Ngo, officer of
Hammercon, Inc. The gravity of the allegations contained in the complaint prompted the HLURB
to conduct an investigation despite the absence of a formal administrative complaint. While the
fact-finding committee of the HLURB created to investigate the background and circumstances
of Mr. Aquino’s complaint against Dir. Imperial, Arbiter Pontejos and Carmen Atos, was
investigating, Mr. Aquino filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against the same persons on alleged conspiracy to extort money form him under a promise that
a favorable decision will be rendered in a case pending before HLURB. The Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB, for brevity) of the Office of the Ombudsman conducted
a preliminary investigation and directed the respondents to file their counter-affidavits and
other supporting evidence. Meanwhile, the fact-finding committee of the HLURB proceeded
with their own investigation, limiting their inquiry into the administrative aspect of the
complaint. On January 29, 1999, the committee submitted its report on the investigation
proposing among others to indorse the report to the Office for the Ombudsman for its
consideration. On February 18, 1999, public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto issued
an order placing petitioner Pontejos under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months
without pay and further directing him and Dir. Imperial to file their counter-affidavits and other
controverting evidence to the complaint. Thereafter or on February 19, 1999, the EPIB of the
Office of the Ombudsman issued a joint resolution recommending that: 1) an Information for
Estafa (one count) be filed against respondent Atty. EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; 2) an Information for Direct Bribery be filed against
respondent Atty. EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; 3) an
Information for Unauthorized Practice of Profession in violation of R.A. 6713 to be filed against
Atty. EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City; 4) the
complaint against Director WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL and RODERICK NGO be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence; and 5) respondent CARMENCITA ATOS y. RUIZ be extended immunity
from criminal prosecution in accordance with Section 17 of R.A.A 6770 and be utilized as a state
witness. Respondent Pontejos (petitioner, herein) moved to reconsider the Order of the Office
of the Ombudsman dated February 18, 1999 which motion was denied in an Order dated March
5, 1999. In accordance with the recommendation of the EPIB, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed criminal informations for bribery and estafa against respondent Atty. Emmanuel T.
Pontejos. Meanwhile, in a Resolution dated June 21, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman
granted Carmencita Atos immunity from criminal prosecution for bribery and estafa filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the decision but this was denied by the Ombudsman.
Thereafter, he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court in the CA but was
dismissed and upheld the Ombudsman’s decision finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA denied his motion.

Issue: WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PETITIONER
WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Held/Ruling: Petitioner contends that he was denied of his right to due process when he was
not able to confront Aquino who failed to appear in two hearings. He further avers that
Aquino’s absence in those hearings constitutes failure to prosecute and a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative case against him. Petitioner insists that no substantial evidence
existed to hold him liable for grave misconduct as the Ombudsman merely relied on the
affidavits of Carmencita Atos and respondent Aquino’s subordinates namely Ruth Adel, Rowena
Alcovendas and Atty. Thaddeus Venturanza, in determining his administrative liability. Due
process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in
courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through
pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy
at hand. In the instant case, petitioner had ample opportunity to ventilate his case. On the
administrative complaint filed by Aquino against him with the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner had received sufficient information which, in fact, enabled him to prepare his
defense. He submitted his counteraffidavit denying the allegations in the complaint. He was
also able to seek reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Order placing him under preventive
suspension for six (6) months. Finally, he was able to appeal the Ombudsman’s ruling to the CA.
Clearly, petitioner had all the opportunity to be heard, present his case and submit evidence in
his defense. We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain
one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration. As the records would show, petitioner had filed a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman. Hence, petitioner’s
protestations that he had been deprived of due process must necessarily fail. The absence of
Aquino in two hearings is not a sufficient ground to say that due process was not afforded
petitioner. Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure
and the rules obtaining in courts of law. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. In fact, it is well-settled that, in
administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial
proceedings. Thus, petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine
Aquino since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. To repeat, in
administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet
the requirements of due process. Petitioner cites Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure to support his argument that the administrative case against him should have been
dismissed for failure to prosecute because Aquino failed to appear in two hearings of the EPIB
of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, states
– SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. – If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the
court's own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court. The provisions of the
Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of
the administrative agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to every
litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to proceedings before an
administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different and valid statutory or
administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and
adjudication of cases before it. However, even if Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court is
applied to the subject administrative proceedings, petitioner’s argument on the matter of
failure to prosecute still lacks merit. Section 3, Rule 17 provides for three instances where the
complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear during a
scheduled trial, especially on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails
to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and (3) if he fails to comply with the
rules or any order of the court.11 We thus find petitioner guilty of grave misconduct. By his
actuations, he violated the policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics in the public
service. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice,
and lead modest lives. Public servants must bear in mind this constitutional mandate at all
times to guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in the government service.

ix. Suretyship

Stronghold Insurance v. CA, G.R. No. 89020, 05 May 1992

FACTS: Northern Motors Inc. and Macronics Marketing entered into a lease agreement wherein
Northern Motors leased certain premises to Macronics. Macronics failed to pay its bills to
Northern Motors so the latter was forced to terminate the lease. Northern Motors was forced
to sell off Macronics’ properties in an auction sale to cover for unpaid liabilities. Northern
Motors was the buyer. Macronics was duly notified of the sale. On March 21, 1985, Leisure Club
Inc., sister company of Macronics, filed a case for replevin and damages against Northern
Motors. It sought the recovery of certain office furniture and equipment. Lower court ordered
the delivery of the subject properties to Leisure Club subject to the posting of the requisite
bond under Rule 60, Sec 2 of ROC. Leisure Club posted a replevin bond in the amount of
P42,000 issued by Stronghold Insurance. The lower court issued the writ of replevin. Leisure
Club then took possession of the properties. Northern Motors filed a counterbond for the
release of the properties. However, Leisure Club was never heard of again. The latter failed to
appear in the pre-trial and was declared non-suited. Lower court decided in favor of Northern
Motors, dismissing Leisure Club’s complaint and ordering it to pay for damages. On July 3, 1986,
Northern Motors filed a Motion for Issuance of Execution Against Bond of Plaintiff’s Surety,
which was treated by the lower court as an application for damages against the replevin bond.
Stronghold Insurance opposed arguing, among others, that: o The motion for a writ of
execution is not the proper remedy; it should have been an application against the bond. o It is
not a party to the case and that the decision clearly became final and executory and, therefore,
is no longer available on the bond. Lower court held Stronghold liable under its surety bond for
damages awarded to Northern Motors. CA affirmed.

ISSUE AND RATIO DECIDENDI Issue W/N Stronghold is liable for damages awarded to Northern
Motors?
Ratio YES. 1. Stronghold never denied that it issued a replevin bond. Under the terms of said
bond, Stronghold together with Leisure Club solidarily bound themselves in the sum of P42,000
– (a) For the prosecution of action, (b) For the return of the property to the defendant if the
return thereof be adjudged, and (c) For the payment of such sum as may in the cause be
recovered against the plaintiff and the costs of the action. 2. In this case, all the necessary
conditions for proceeding against the bond are present: (a) Leisure Club, in bad faith, failed to
prosecute the action, and

after relieving the property, it promptly disappeared, (b) The subject property disappeared with
Leisure, despite a court order for their return, and (c) A reasonable sum was adjudged to be
due to Northern Motors, by way of actual and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of
suit. 3. Stronghold can’t simply dissociate itself from Leisure and disclaim liability vis-à-vis the
findings made in the decision of the lower court. Under Sec. 2, Rule 60 of ROC the bond it filed
is to ensure “the return of the property to the defendant if the return thereof be adjudged, and
for the payment to the defendant of such sum as he may recover from the plaintiff in the
action.” 4. Moreover, the obligation of Stronghold under the bond is specific, i.e. the payment
of such sum as may in the cause be recovered against the plaintiff, and the costs of the action.
5. Hence, Stronghold must pay Northern Motors for damages.

RULING WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

x. Tariff and Customs Code

Feeder v. CA, G.R. No. 94262, 31 May 1991

xi. Appeal

Singson v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122389, 19 June 1997

Miguel Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In 1991, a Japanese national
alleged that Singson extorted money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess
baggage; and that to settle the issue, she needs to pay said amount to him. Singson was later
investigated and the investigating committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed Singson
from employment. Singson then filed a case before NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor
Arbiter Raul Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PAL’s side insufficient to dismiss
Singson. PAL appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and his case was
raffled to the 2nd Division thereof.

The 2nd Division, however, was composed of Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio
Rayala, and former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino – same arbiter which decided Singson’s case. The
commissioners deliberated on the case and thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.

Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala
deliberated on the motion. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied due process. The SC held that
Singson was denied due process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner of the
2nd Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL’s appeal. He was reviewing his own decision as a
former labor arbiter.

Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, each Division shall
consist of one member from the public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and
one member each from the workers and employers sectors, respectively. The composition of
the Division guarantees equal representation and impartiality among its members. Thus,
litigants are entitled to a review of three (3) commissioners who are impartial right from the
start of the process of review.

Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided
the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any participation in this case. The
infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of
Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Aquino. The right of
petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not
only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of Singson’s
right to an impartial review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due
process.

Alba v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 120223, 13 March 1996

xii. Closure Proceedings

CB v. CA, G.R. No. 76118, 30 March 1993

xiii. Biddings

Concerned Officials of MWSS v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 109113, 25 January 1995

FACTS: In order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in
the metropolitan area, Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) launched the
Angat Water Supply Optimization. Private respondent, Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes
Manufacturers' Association (PLDPPMA), filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
protesting the public bidding conducted by the MWSS for said project, detailing charges of an
"apparent plan" on the part of the MWSS to favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes, and urging the
Ombudsman to conduct an investigation thereon and to hold in abeyance the award of the
contracts. After investigation, the Ombudsman ordered the MWSS to: 1) Set aside the
recommendation of the MWSS to award the project to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes; 2)
Award the subject contract to a complying and responsive bidder. ISSUE: Whether or not
Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the complaint at bar HELD: No, the Office of the Ombudsman
has no jurisdiction over the complaint at bar. Although the Ombudsman is granted investigatory
power and public assistance duties, in issuing the challenged orders, it has not only directly
assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise pre-empted the exercise of discretion by, the MWSS. It
is the agency that should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of
the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its development plans. The issue here
involved, on basically technical matters, deserve to be disentangled from undue interference
from courts and so from the Ombudsman as well.

xiv. UDHA – RA No. 7279

DPWH v. Manalo, G.R. No. 217656, 16 November 2020

FACTS: Respondents are owners of residential structures on a parcel of land on Luzon Avenue,
Quezon City, owned by the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System. On September 13,
2010, they filed a Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC), seeking
determination and payment of just compensation from the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH). In their Complaint, Manalo, et al. alleged that the DPWH failed to initiate an
expropriation proceeding to hasten the completion of the project, and that DPWH has made a
voluntary offer of financial assistance, the amount of which was ‘notoriously small’ that they
had to turn down the offer. Citing an August 6, 2008 Memorandum of Agreement with the
DPWH and the Quezon City (QC) government, Manalo et al. prayed for just compensation and
that they be entitled to rights accruing to individuals whose properties were expropriated for
public use, and to moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

On November 15, 2010, the QC Task Force Control and Prevention of Illegal Structures and
Squatting issued a Notice of Demolition, asking Manalo et al. to vacate the land and remove the
structures and offered financial assistance worth Php 21,000 per family. Manalo et al refused to
vacate and accept the financial aid.

In their Answer, DPWH alleged that Manalo et al. were admittedly squatting on government-
owned property without the owner’s express consent and as such, their structures may be
demolished under Sec 27 of RA No. 7279. They also alleged that Manalo et al. are builders in
bad faith and had no right of reimbursement for the value of their structures.

The RTC denied the DPWH’s prayer to dismiss the case, after it had found that the allegations in
the Complaint had a cause of action. The Motion for Reconsideration (MR) was denied. DPWH
filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the decision of
the RTC, holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it relied on the
Memorandum of Agreement in denying the prayer for the case’s dismissal. Thus, DPWH filed a
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the Complaint filed by Manalo et al. may be dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action.

Whether or not DPWH can extrajudicially and summarily evict respondents and demolish their
structures AND whether or not Manalo et al. are entitled to just compensation

HELD:

No.

Based on the allegations, and as aptly found by the lower courts, the Complaint sufficiently
states a cause of action. All the elements are present, namely: ( 1) respondents owned the
residential structures on Luzon A venue, Quezon City, and they have rights embodied in the
August 6, 2008 Memorandum of Agreement; (2) petitioner has the obligation to respect such
rights as it still has to comply with due process; and (3) petitioner's inaction to give respondents
what is due to them violates their rights.53

Contrary to petitioner's contention that the Memorandum of Agreement may not be

considered, this Court has held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals54 that
the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions, and the evidence
on record, for purpose of hypothetically admitting them without ruling on their truth or falsity.

Although generally, inquiry is limited to the four comers of the complaint, inquiry may not be
confined to the face of the complaint "if culled (a) from annexes and other pleadings submitted
by the parties; (b) from documentary evidence admitted by stipulation which disclose facts
sufficient to defeat the claim; or ( c) from evidence admitted in the course of hearings related to
the case."55

In any case, when petitioner offered respondents financial assistance, respondents' right has
already been acknowledged to have been violated. It is of no moment that petitioner denied
respondents' entitlement to just compensation due to their being professional squatters. In
Aquino v. Quiazon, 56 if the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis for the suit, the
complaint should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be raised.

No, Manalo et al. may not be extrajudicially or summarily evicted.

No, Article III of the Constitution does not apply.

Here, respondents admit that they are informal settlers, not lot owners. They claim to be
residents and owners of the residential structures on Luzon Avenue in Quezon City, along the
path of the C-5 extension project.61 Thus, the source of respondents' rights in the Constitution
is not Article III,· Section 9, but rather, Article XIII, Section 10.
Article XIII, Section 10 of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished,
except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner.

XXX

Under Republic Act No. 8974, the court shall issue a writ of demolition to dismantle the
structures found in the property. The implementing agency shall diligently observe the
procedure provided in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279, or the Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992, for when the expropriated land is occupied by informal settlers.

Here, there is no allegation that a writ of demolition was procured from the court, or that the
procedures provided in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279 were observed, as
mandated by Republic Act No. 8974. Instead, petitioner admits having offered financial
assistance to respondents, pursuant to Section 28(8) of Republic Act No. 7279. By doing this,
petitioner acknowledges that respondents are underprivileged and homeless citizens, entitled
to due process of law, prior to their eviction and the demolition of their structures.

Thus, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether respondents had
been prejudiced by the eviction and demolition of their structures, and if properly
substantiated, whether they are entitled to damages.

The Petition is DENIED.

Doctrine: In cases of dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, as in this case, "the inquiry
is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations"47 in the complaint. It delves
into "whether the material allegations, assuming these to be true, state ultimate facts which
constitute plaintiffs cause of action[.]"48 The test for determining whether a complaint states a
cause of action is "whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact
made in the complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint."

There are, however, exceptions to the rule that the allegations are hypothetically admitted as
true, namely: (a) if the falsity of the allegations "is subject to judicial notice"; (b) "if such
allegations are legally impossible"; or ( c) "if these refer to facts which are inadmissible in
evidence"; or ( d) "if by the record or document included in the pleading these allegations
appear unfounded."50 None of these exceptions were alleged to be present here.

Perez v. Madrona, G.R. No. 184478, 21 March 2012

Facts: Respondent-spouses Fortunito Madrona and Yolanda B. Pante are registered owners of a
residential property located in Greenheights Subdivision in Marikina City where they built their
house and had it enclosed with a steel gate and concrete fence. They received a letter from
petitioner Jaime S. Perez, Chief of the Marikina Demolition Office stating that the structure they
built encroached on the sidewalk and is in violation of PD 1096 of the National Building Code
and RA 917 on Illegally occupied/ constructed improvements within the road right-of-way and
ordered the respondents to have the said structure removed within 7 days. Respondent sent a
letter to the petitioner stating that the letter sent by the latter contained a libelous accusation
as it is condemning him and his property without due process and has no basis and authority
because there is no court order authorizing him to demolish the structure the cited legal bases
in the letter that do not expressly give petitioner the authority to demolish and the letter
contained a false accusation since their fence did not in fact extend to the sidewalk After more
than a year, the petitioner sent the respondents the same letter giving them 10 days from the
receipt thereof to remove the said structure. Respondents filed a complaint for injunction
before the Marikina City RTC and sought the issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary
injunction to enjoin petitioner and all persons acting under him from doing any act of
demolition on their property and that after trial, the injunction be made permanent. The RTC
decision permanently enjoined defendant Perez from destroying or demolishing the
respondents’ property. The RTC held that respondents, being lawful owners of the subject
property, are entitled to the peaceful and open possession of every inch of their property and
petitioner’s threat to demolish the concrete fence around their property is tantamount to a
violation of their rights as property owners who are entitled to protection under the
Constitution and laws. The RTC also ruled that there is no showing that respondents’ fence is a
nuisance per se and presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare, nor is there
basis for petitioner’s claim that the fence has encroached on the sidewalk as to justify its
summary demolition. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: W/N respondents’ structure is a nuisance per se that presents immediate danger to the
community’s welfare and can be removed without need of judicial intervention since the
clearing of the sidewalks is an infrastructure project of the Marikina City Government and
cannot be restrained by the courts as provided in PD No. 1818

HELD: NO. If petitioner found respondents’ fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, the
remedy is not to demolish the same after respondents failed to heed his request to remove it
but instead, he should go to court and prove respondents’ supposed violations in the
construction of the concrete fence. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se one which affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention. Respondents’
fence is not a nuisance per se because by its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort
of the community but was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent
intruders from entering it. If petitioner believes that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on
the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. Not being a nuisance
per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial
intervention is unwarranted.
xv. Cancellation of Property Rights/Privileges

American Inter-Fashion v. OP, G.R. No. 92422, 23 May 1991

Facts: Glorious Sun Fashion was found guilty by GTEB of dollar salting and mis-declaration of
importations. As a result, its export quotas were cancelled. After GTEB rendered its decision,
Glorious filed with the Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that its right to
due process of law was violated and that GTEB decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. The Court then issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings.
However, on July 25, 1984, Glorious filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the
petition. The Court granted the motion for withdrawal. Glorious filed another motion to dismiss
with prejudice which the Court duly noted.

After two years, Glorious filed with GTEB a petition for restitution of its export quota allocation
and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. Glorious once
again alleged that the charges against them were not supported by evidence. Moreover, it
alleged that the GTEB decision cancelling its export quota was rendered as a result of duress,
threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in
order to transfer Glorious export quotas to “Marcos crony-owned” corporations. Glorious
further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition in G.R. No.
67180 and to enter into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of De Soleil
Apparel and AIFC.

On Sept. 4, 1987, GTEB denied the petition of Glorious. An appeal was then taken on Oct. 5,
1987 to the Office of the President. AIFC filed its opposition to Glorious’ appeal claiming that
the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984 has long been final. The Office of the President ruled in
favor of Glorious and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings. The motion for
reconsideration of AIFC was subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
1. W/N the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to the instant case on the ground
that the former decision was a final judgment on the merits. – NO
2. W/N Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB decision. – NO

Held:
The petitioner contends that in entertaining the appeal of private respondent Glorious, the
Office of the President “had unwittingly made itself a tool in a cunning move to resurrect a
decision which had become final and executory more than three years earlier. The petitioner
asseverates resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was res judicata on the matter.

The Supreme Court said that one of the requirements for a judgment to be a bar to a
subsequent case is that the it must be a judgment on the merits. A judgment is upon the merits
when it amounts to a declaration of the law as to the respective rights and duties of the parties,
based upon the ultimate fact or state of facts disclosed by the pleadings and evidence, and
upon which the right of recovery depends, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objection
or contentions. Certainly, the dismissal of G.R. No. 67180 cannot be categorized as a judgment
on the merits. The action in 1984 did not resolve anything. In fact, when the court heard the
parties during the oral arguments, GTEB was not able to present any showing of mis-declaration
if imports. The motion to withdraw te petition arose from the fears of Mr. Nemesio Co that not
only Glorious Sun but his other businesses would be destroyed by the martial law regime. The
resolution dismissing G.R. No. 67180 was based solely on the notice of withdrawal by the
private respondent. The dismissal of the petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather
than on the merits of the petition. Hence, it cannot constitute res judicata.

With regards to the second issue, the Petitioner contend that Glorious Sun was not denied due
process. Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision failed to disclose to Glorious vital
evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious was guilty of dollar-salting, it
contends that the subsequent disclosure in 1987, where relevant documents were given to
Glorious and that the latter was given an opportunity to comment thereon, cured the defect.
This contention by AIFC, the court holds, is MISLEADING. The SC recognized that the instant
petition involves the 1984 resolution of the GTEB. AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent
disclosure of the evidence used by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB
resolution. The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed to
disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious. Moreover, the
documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced the charge that the former was
denied due process.

Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the Chairman of the
Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade and Industry admitted that he was
pressured by Minister Ongpin to look for ways and means to remove the quotas from Glorious.
AIFC claims that it is an inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did not give credence to
it and also, none of the members of the committee would agree that there was any pressure or
instruction from Minister Ongpin.

The Supreme Court said that the fact that the other members would not agree that there was
pressure from Ongpin does not mean that Puno was not telling the truth. Mr. Puno stated that
he was pressured. He did not state that the members of the investigating panel were pressured.
Mr. Puno was the Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of his
position he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is every reason to suspect that
even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision to strip it of its quotas and to award them
to friends of their administration had already been made.

The Supreme Court also held that although factual findings of administrative agencies are
generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be disregarded if they are not supported
by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the
procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are
committed; or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.
Contrary to the petitioners posture, the record clearly manifests that in cancelling the export
quotas of the private respondent GTEB violated the private respondent’s constitutional right to
due process. Before the cancellation in 1984, Glorious had been enjoying export quotas granted
to it since 1977. In effect the private respondent’s export quota allocation which initially was a
privilege evolved into some form of property right which should not be removed from it
arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer it on another.

The motion for reconsideration was GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED.

ABAKADA v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, 01 September 2005

Facts:
ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition o questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties;
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties;

These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the President, upon recommendation of
the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified
conditions have been satisfied.

Issues:
Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2)
of the Constitution.

Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection of the Constitution.

Ruling:
No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was
acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and
excise and franchise taxes.

No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions
or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what
is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but
a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent.

No, the power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of
taxation has long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of assessment,
valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the
judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness,
discrimination, or arbitrariness.
British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, 20
August 2008

xvi. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation (Ombudsman)

Labay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 235937-40, 23 July 2018

FACTS:

The case arose from the complaint dated May 11, 2015 filed by the Field Investigation Office I
(FIO I) of the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner Labay for his participation in the
alleged anomalous utilization of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of former
Representative of the 1 District of Davao del Sur, Marc Douglas C. Cagas IV (Rep. Cagas IV). The
complaint was for violation of Article 217 (Malversation of Public Funds or Property), Article
171 (Falsification of Public Documents), paragraphs (1), (2), (4), and (7), Article 217 in relation
to Article 171 (Malversation thru Falsification of Public Documents), all of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as well as Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended. The complaint alleged that Rep. Cagas IV, in conspiracy with other public officials and
private individuals such as petitioner Labay, through the Technology Resource Center (TRC),
sought the release and transfer of his PDAF in the total amount of Php6,000,000.00 to Farmer-
business Development Corporation (FDC), which was led by its then president, petitioner Labay.
However, upon field verification conducted by the FIO I, it appears that the livelihood projects
funded by Rep. Cagas IV’s PDAF were never implemented and were considered to be “ghost
projects.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying Labay’s
Motion For Reinvestigation.

RULING: Yes. There is no dispute that the Ombudsman was unable to serve copies of the
complaint or of its September 1, 2015 Joint Order on petitioner Labay prior to or even during
the preliminary investigation of the case. While the Ombudsman was correct in resolving the
complaint based on the evidence presented in accordance with Paragraph (e), Section 4 of the
Ombudsman Rules of Procedure.