Ran Ipc V2

Date and Time: 10 October 2020 01:00:00 IST
Job Number: 127316055
Documents (75)
1. [s 171A] “Candidate”, “Electoral right” defined.—

Client/Matter: -None-
2. [s 171B] Bribery.—
3. [s 171C] Undue influence at elections.—
4. [s 171D] Personation at elections.—
5. [s 171E] Punishment for bribery.—
6. [s 171F] Punishment for undue influence or personation at an election.—
7. [s 171G] False statement in connection with an election.—
8. [s 171H] Illegal payments in connection with an election.—
9. [s 171-I] Failure to keep election accounts.—
10. [s 172] Absconding to avoid service of summons or other proceeding.—
11. [s 173] Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or preventing publication thereof.—
12. [s 174] Non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant.—
13. [s 174A] Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section 82 of Act 2 of 1974.—
14. [s 175] Omission to produce [document or electronic record] to public servant by person legally bound to
produce it.—
15. [s 176] Omission to give notice or information to public servant by person legally bound to give it.—
16. [s 177] Furnishing false information.—
17. [s 178] Refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public servant to make it.—
18. [s 179] Refusing to answer public servant authorised to question.—
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19. [s 180] Refusing to sign statement.—
20. [s 181] False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person authorised to administer an oath or
affirmation.—
21. [s.182] False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another
person.—
22. [s 183] Resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a public servant.—
23. [s 184] Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of public servant.—
24. [s 185] Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of public servant.—
25. [s 186] Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions.—
26. [s 187] Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give assistance.—
27. [s 188] Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.—
28. [s 189] Threat of injury to public servant.—
29. [s 190] Threat of injury to induce person to refrain from applying for protection to public servant.—
30. [s 191] Giving false evidence.—
31. [s 192] Fabricating false evidence.—
32. [s 193] Punishment for false evidence.—
33. [s 194] Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of capital offence.—
34. [s 195] Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of offence punishable with
imprisonment for life or imprisonment.—
35. [s 195A] Threatening any person to give false evidence.—
36. [s 196] Using evidence known to be false.—
37. [s 197] Issuing or signing false certificate.—
38. [s 198] Using as true a certificate known to be false.—
39. [s 199] False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence.—
40. [s 200] Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false.—
41. [s 201] Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender.—
42. [s 202] Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform.—
43. [s 203] Giving false information respecting an offence committed.—
44. [s 204] Destruction of [document or electronic record] to prevent its production as evidence.—
45. [s 205] False personation for purpose of act or proceeding in suit or prosecution.—
46. [s 206] Fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in execution.—
47. [s 207] Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in execution.—
48. [s 208] Fraudulently suffering decree for sum not due.—
49. [s 209] Dishonestly making false claim in court.—
50. [s 210] Fraudulently obtaining decree for sum not due.—
51. [s 211] False charge of offence made with intent to injure.—
52. [s 212] Harbouring offender.—
53. [s 213] Taking gift, etc., to screen an offender from punishment.—
54. [s 214] Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening offender.—
55. [s 215] Taking gift to help to recover stolen property, etc.—
56. [s 216] Harbouring offender who has escaped from custody or whose apprehension has been ordered.—
57. [s 216A] Penalty for harbouring robbers or dacoits.—
58. [s 216B] Definition of “harbour" in sections 212, 216 and 216A.—
59. [s 217] Public servant disobeying direction of law with intent to save person from punishment or property
from forfeiture.—
60. [s 218] Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment or
property from forfeiture.—
61. [s 219] Public servant in judicial proceeding corruptly making report etc. contrary to law.—
62. [s 220] Commitment for trial or confinement by person having authority who knows that he is acting contrary
to law.—
63. [s 221] Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of public servant bound to apprehend.—
64. [s 222] Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of public servant bound to apprehend person under
sentence or lawfully committed.—
65. [s 223] Escape from confinement or custody negligently suffered by public servant.—
66. [s 224] Resistance or obstruction by a person to his lawful apprehension.—
67. [s 225] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension of another person.—
68. [s 225A] Omission to apprehend, or sufferance of escape, on part of public servant, in cases not otherwise
provided for.—
69. [s 225B] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension, or escape or rescue, in cases not otherwise
provided for.—
70. [s 226] Unlawful return from transportation.—
71. [s 227] Violation of condition of remission of punishment.—
72. [s 228] Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding.—
73. [s 228A] Disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences, etc.—
74. [s 229] Personation of a juror or assessor.—
75. [s 229A] Failure by person released on bail or bond to appear in Court.—
[s 171A] “Candidate”, “Electoral right” defined.—
RA Nelson's Indian Penal Code, 12th ed
R A NelsonJustice K T Thomas, Justice T S Doabia and M A Rashid
RA Nelson's Indian Penal Code, 12th ed > RA Nelson's Indian Penal Code, 12th ed > Volume 2
> R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code > Chapter IXA Of Offences Relating to Elections
R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code

1Chapter IXA Of Offences Relating to Elections
9.1 Introduction
This chapter comprising nine sections was inserted in the Code by the Indian Elections Offences and Inquiries Act,
1920. That Act was passed on the recommendation of the joint parliamentary committee appointed to report on the
Government of India Bill (9 and 10 Geo 5, c 101). The recommendation was in the following words:
The committee are firmly convinced that a complete and stringent Corrupt Practices Act should be brought into operation
before the first election to the legislative council. There is no such Act at present in existence in India and the committee are
convinced that it will not be less required in India than it is in other countries.
In giving effect to this recommendation, the Government of India thought it desirable to make election offences a
part of the general law of the land, not only in respect of the legislative bodies, but also in the case of elections of
public bodies generally.
The bill was accordingly passed as Act 39 of 1920. This Act comprised of two parts. Part I added explanation 3 to
section 21 and the whole of this chapter to the Code. Part II dealt with election inquiries.
This chapter seeks to make punishable under the ordinary penal law, bribery, undue influence and personation and
certain other malpractices at elections not only to the legislative bodies, but also at elections to membership of
public authorities where the law prescribes a method of the election; and, further, to debar persons guilty of such
malpractices from holding positions of public responsibility for a specific period.2 It provides for six offences, relating
to elections, viz:
(a) Bribery (section 171B).
(b) Undue influence at election (section 171C).
(c) Personation at election (section 171D).
(d) False statement in connection with an election (section 171G).

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(e) Illegal payments in connection with an election (section 171H).

(f) Failure to keep election accounts (section 171-I).
Of the remaining sections, section 171A contains only definitions, and sections 171E and 171F only provide for
punishments for the first three offences mentioned above. Punishments for the last three offences have been
provided for by the respective sections defining these offences. From the whole scheme of this chapter it will be
clear that it provides for the punishment of malpractices in connection with elections and attempts to safeguard the
purity of the franchise.3
Part I of the Indian Elections Offences and Inquiries Act, 1920, was repealed by Act I of 1938. The rest of the Act
was repealed by section 171 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951), as all the provisions of the
former are re-enacted in the latter Act sections 126–1384 of this new Act of 1951, deal with certain other offences
with respect to elections.
It may be noted that the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides for additional penalties for offences
punishable under section 171E or section 171F (that is bribery, undue influence and personation) of this Code.
Thus, under section 1395 of the Act 43 of 1951, offences punishable with imprisonment under section 171E or
section 171F of the IPC shall also entail disqualification for membership of parliament and of the Legislature of
every state for a period of six years from the date of the conviction for the offence. And under section 1416, of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act 43 of 1951), the person convicted of any such offence shall be
disqualified for voting at any election for a period of six years from the date of the conviction.
9.2 Jurisdiction
Under Article 324 of the Indian Constitution, the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the
electoral rolls for, and the conduct of elections to the parliament and state legislatures and of elections to the offices
of President and Vice-President is vested in an election commission, and Article 329(b) ousts the jurisdiction of the
courts and provides that no election to either of the Houses of Parliament or a state Legislature shall be called in
question except by an election petition.
The Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a self-contained enactment so far as elections are concerned, which
means that whenever we have to ascertain the true position in regard to any matter connected with elections, we
have only to look at the act and the rules made thereunder. Section 80, of the Representation of the People Act,
1951 (Act 43 of 1951), which is drafted in almost the same language as Article 329(b), provides that “no election
shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of this part”
sections 80, 100, 105 and 170 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, are the main provisions regarding the
judicial dealing of election matters, and there is no provision anywhere to the effect that anything connected with
elections can be questioned at any intermediate stage.7 But even when the Legislature states that the orders of a
tribunal under an Act like the Representation of the People Act, 1951, shall be inclusive and final,8 the High Court
and the Supreme Court may interfere under Articles 226 and 136 respectively. The powers conferred on the
Supreme Court by Article 136 of the Constitution and on the high courts under Article 226 cannot be taken away or
whittled down by the legislature. So long as these powers remain, the discretion of the Supreme Court and that of
the high courts is unfettered.9
So far as the offences under this chapter are concerned, there can be no doubt that the ordinary criminal courts
have jurisdiction to punish them like other offences.
9.3. Punishment
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The system of elections in India is now quite old and cannot be said to be in its experimental stage. The degree of
solemnity that attaches to elections in England, however, does not attach to elections in this country, and these
possibly are the reasons which influenced the legislation in providing for comparatively lenient and alternative
punishments for offences committed at elections in India as compared to the punishments provided in England. A
person convicted in England of personation, or aiding, abetting, or procuring is to be punished by imprisonment for
a term not exceeding two years together with hard labour. Whereas the punishment provided by section 171F of
this Code is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year or with fine or with both.10
However, the question of punishment seems to depend on two considerations—firstly, the public importance of the
offence and the deterrent effect of the punishment; and secondly, the desserts of the particular offender. On public
grounds this class of offence ought to be stamped out with great severity. Election may be a new thing, but the
difference between right and wrong is old. Above all, candidates who profess to represent respectable electors, and
even to legislate for them, must set the highest standards of conduct themselves and an example to their agents
and to the general public. Further, a mere fine in the case of a candidate who may be presumed to be better off
than the majority of his constituents would create an impression that there is “one law for the rich and another for
the poor. A poor man guilty of this offence would have to go to prison”.11 The fact that he is a man of some
education and position and a member of the legislative council cannot be urged in his favour as an argument for the
infliction of a fine only. Indeed these considerations cut the other way, and the case must be treated as one of
public importance and the offence as one of gravity.12
13 [s 171A] “Candidate”, “Electoral right” defined.—

For the purposes of this chapter—
14[(a) “candidate” means a person who has been nominated as a candidate at any election]
(b) “electoral right” means the right of a person to stand, or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being, a
candidate or to vote or refrain from voting at any election.]
[s 171A.1] Scope
This section only defines the expressions, “candidate” and “electoral right”.
[s 171A.2] Legislative Changes
Clause (a) of section 171A was substituted by Act 40 of 1975, section 9, w.e.f. 6-8-1975.
[s 171A.3] Election
The term “election” is defined in explanation 3 of section 21 of this Code as denoting “an election for the
purpose of selecting members of any legislative, municipal or other public authority, of whatever character, the
method of selection to which is by, or under, any law prescribed as by election”. In its ordinary or etymological
meaning it implies some act of choosing on the part of the electorate, though indeed we are accustomed to
speak of an “uncontested election”, where the single candidate is unopposed. The word “election” has by long
usage, in connection with the process of selection of proper representatives in democratic institutions, acquired
both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the narrower sense, it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate
which may embrace the result of the poll when there is polling, or a particular candidate being returned
unopposed, when there is no poll. In the wider sense, the word is used to connote the entire process
culminating in a candidate being declared elected. It bears, thus, a wide meaning whenever we talk of elections
in a democratic country. Hence, the term election may be taken to embrace the whole procedure whereby an
elected member is returned, whether or not it was found necessary to take a poll.15 Election has the same
meaning as the expression used in Articles 327 and 328, of the Indian Constitution, viz., matters relating to or in
connection with election.
[s 171A.3.1] Election Embraces Whole Procedure
Election is not merely the ultimate decision or the ultimate result. Election is every stage from the time the
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notification is issued till the result is declared, and even perhaps if there is an election petition, till the decision
of the Election Tribunal. It is a whole continuous integrated proceeding and every aspect of it and every stage
of it and every step taken in it is a part of the election.16
[s 171A.4] Definition of Candidate
The definition of candidate in this section has been adopted from the English Municipal Corporations Act, 1882,
section 77 and Municipal Elections (Corrupt and Illegal Practices) Act, 1884.17
In section 79(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the term “candidate” is defined as:
Candidate means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election.
Unless, therefore a case falls within the latter half of the definition a person becomes a candidate under the first
part of the definition only when he has been duly nominated as a candidate and the furtherance of the
prospects of a candidate’s election must, therefore, in such a case, commence from after that stage.18 Before
the 1975 amendment, the word candidate included a person who, when an election was in contemplation, held
himself out as a prospective candidate thereat; provided that he was subsequently nominated as a candidate at
such election. The natural effect of this definition is that a person, who holds himself out as a prospective
candidate cannot be treated as a candidate in the eyes of law unless he is actually nominated as such. The
expression “holding out as a prospective candidate” has now lost its significance.
[s 171A.5] Candidate—Determining Factor
The question as to when a person becomes a candidate must be decided on the language of section 79(b) of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Under that section, the candidature commences when the person
begins to hold himself out as a prospective candidate. The determining factor, therefore, is the decision of the
candidate himself, and not the act of other persons or bodies adopting him as their candidate.19 When,
therefore, a question arises under section 79(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 as to whether a
person had become a candidate at a given point of time, what has to be seen is whether at that time he had
clearly and unambiguously declared his intention to stand as a candidate, so that it could be said of him that he
had held himself out as a prospective candidate. That he has merely formed an intention to stand for election is
not sufficient to make him a prospective candidate, because the essence of the matter is that he should hold
himself out as a prospective candidate. That can only be possible if he communicates such intention to the
outside world by a declaration or conduct from which it could be inferred that he intends to stand as a
candidate.20
[s 171A.6] Withdrawal after Nomination—Effect
It is obvious that a person who has been duly nominated as a candidate is a candidate within the definition of
this word in this section. He remains a candidate even though, after having been duly nominated, he withdraws.
The words of the definition itself are clear and there is no manner of ambiguity in this respect.21
[s 171A.7] “Electoral Right”—Definition of
The term “electoral right”, defined under clause (b) of section 171A, IPC clearly indicates that an electoral right
is of a definite nature and it is to be exercised by an individual.22 Electoral right has been defined in section
171A, IPC, inter alia as either to vote or refrain from voting at an election.23 Under the definition given here, the
expression electoral right embraces not only the right of a person to stand or not to stand as a candidate or to
withdraw from being a candidate at an election,24 but also his right to vote or refrain from voting at an election.25
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The right to nominate a candidate does not, however, constitute an electoral right.26
1 Chapter IXA (consisting of sections 171A to 171-I) ins. by the Act 39 of 1920, section 2.
2 The Statement of Objects and Reasons, Gazette of India, 1920, Pt V, p 135, section 4.
3 State v Siddhannath Gangaram, AIR 1956 MB 241, p 243.
4 Section 137 of the Act 43 of 1951, repealed by the Act 47 of 1966 (w.e.f. 14-12-1966). Section 138 of the Act 43 of
1951 repealed by the Act 36 of 1957 (w.e.f. 17-9-1957).
5 Section 139 of the Act 43 of 1951, repealed by the Act 47 of 1966 (w.e.f. 14-12-1966).
7 NP Ponnaswami v Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64 [LNIND 1952 SC 2], p 69.
8 Refer to section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
9 Raj Krishna Bose v Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 202 [LNIND 1954 SC 17], p 204.
10 Emperor v Badan Singh, AIR 1928 All 150, p 154, per Iqbal Ahmad J.
11 Ibid, p 155, per Walsh J.
12 Ibid, p 156, per Mears CJ.
13 Ins. by the Act 39 of 1920, section 2.
14 Subs. by Act 40 of 1975, section 9, for clause (a) (w.e.f. 6-8-1975).

15 NP Ponnuswami v Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64 [LNIND 1952 SC 2] , p 68; Shankar Rao Ramaji v State of
Madhya Bharat, AIR 1952 MB 97 (FB); Hari Vishnu Kamath v Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 [LNIND 1954 SC
174] , p 238; Okram v Election Commissioner, AIR 1968 Mani 84 , p 93 (Election commences after the issue of
notification); AV Srinivasalu Reddy v S Kuppuswami Gounder, AIR 1928 Mad 253 [LNIND 1927 MAD 310] (explaining,
Krishnawami Chettiar v Ghulam Muhammad, AIR 1926 Mad 951 [LNIND 1926 MAD 96] ); Srinivasachariar v
Venkaterama Aiyar, AIR 1925 Mad 376 [LNIND 1924 MAD 289] ; Sarvothama Rao v Chairman, Municipal Council,
Saidapet, AIR 1923 Mad 475 [LNIND 1923 MAD 5] ; Sat Narain Gurwala v Hanuman Prasad, AIR 1946 Lah 85 .
16 Shankar Nanasahab Karpe v Returning Officer, AIR 1952 Bom 279 .

17 47 & 48 Vic c 70, section 34.
Page 6 of 6
18 Raj Krushna Bose v Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 2002 .
19 S Khader Sheriff v Munnuswami, AIR 1955 SC 775 [LNIND 1955 SC 52] .
20 Ibid.
21 Moolchand v Rulia Ram Panna Lal, AIR 1963 Punj 516 , p 517; Rao Abhe Singh v Rao Nihal Singh, AIR 1964 Punj 209
; Indira Nehru Gandhi v Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299 [LNIND 1975 SC 432] , p 2413.
22 Deepak Ganpatrao Solunke v Govt of Maharashtra, (1999) Cr LJ 1224 (Bom) (DB).
23 Court on its own motion v UOI, (2001) Cr LJ 225 (P&H).
24 Moulvi Ahmed Kabir Chowdhary v Emperor, AIR 1938 Cal 274 , p 275.
25 Venkata Krishna Rao v G Appalaswamuy, AIR 1957 AP 845 [LNIND 1956 AP 51] , p 846.
26 SK Singh v VV Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] , p 2110.
End of Document
[s 171B] Bribery.—

9.1 Introduction
to elections, viz:

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9.2 Jurisdiction
9.3. Punishment
Page 3 of 10
27 [s 171B] Bribery.—
(1) Whoever—
(i) gives a gratification to any person with the object of inducing him or any other person to exercise
any electoral right or of rewarding any person for having exercised any such right; or
(ii) accepts either for himself or for any other person any gratification as a reward for exercising any
such right or for inducing or attempting to induce any other person to exercise any such right,
commits the offence of bribery:
Provided that a declaration of public policy or a promise of public action shall not be an offence under
this section.
(2) A person who offers, or agrees to give, or offers or attempts to procure, a gratification shall be deemed
to give a gratification.
(3) A person who obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain a gratification shall be deemed to
accept a gratification, and a person who accepts a gratification as a motive for doing what he does not
intend to do, or as a reward for doing what he has not done, shall be deemed to have accepted the
gratification as a reward.]
[s 171B.1] Scope
This section defines bribery at an election.
[s 171B.1.1] Bribery in Election
“Bribery” is defined primarily as the giving or acceptance of a gratification, either as a motive or as a reward to
any person, either to induce him to stand as, or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being a candidate, or to
vote or refrain from voting at an election. It also includes offer, or agreements to give or offer, and attempts to
procure, a gratification for any person. Gratification was formerly explained in section 161 of this Code, now
replaced by section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), and it states that the word
gratification is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money.28
[s 171B.1.2] Bribery as Corrupt Practice
The definition of bribery given here differs materially from the definition of bribery as a corrupt practice given in
section 123(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which runs:
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(1) “Bribery” that is to say,—
(A) any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or
his election agent of any gratification, to any person whomsoever, with the object, directly or indirectly of
inducing—
(a) a person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at an
election, or
(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to—
(i) a person for having so stood or not stood, or for having withdrawn or not having withdrawn his
candidature; or
(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting;
(B) the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any gratification, whether as a motive or a reward:
(a) by a person for standing or not standing as, or for withdrawing or not withdrawing from being, a
candidate; or
(b) by any person whomsoever for himself or any other person for voting or refraining from voting, or
inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any candidate to withdraw
or not to withdraw his candidature.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause the term “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or
gratifications estimable in money and it includes all forms of entertainment and all forms of employment for reward but
it does not include the payment of any expenses bona fide incurred at, or for the purpose of, any election and duly
entered in the account of election expenses referred to in section 78.
That section contemplates only the making of a gift by a candidate, whereas bribery in this section embraces
not only the making of a gift but also the acceptance of it.29
[s 171B.1.3] Laws of England
Bribery at a parliamentary or local election was an indictable offence at common law punishable by fine and
imprisonment. The common law offence has, however, been superseded by express statutory provisions.
A person is guilty of a corrupt practice if he is guilty of bribery. A person is guilty of bribery:

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(1) if he, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf:
(a) gives any money or procures any office to or for any voter or to or for any other person on behalf of any
voter or to or for any other person in order to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting; or
(b) corruptly does any such act as mentioned in head (a) above on account of any voter having voted or
refrained from voting; or
(c) makes any such gift or procurement to or for any person in order to induce that person to procure, or
endeavour to procure, the return of any person at an election or the vote of any voter; or if upon or in
consequence of any such gift or procurement he procures or engages, promises or endeavours to
procure, the return of any person at an election or the vote of any voter;
(2) if he advances or pays or causes to be paid any money to or for the use of any other person with the intent
that that money or any part of it is to be expended in bribery at an election or knowingly pays or causes to be
paid any money to any person in discharge or repayment of any money wholly or in part expended in bribery
at any election;
(3) if, before or during an election, he directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf
receives, agrees, or contracts for any money, gift, loan or valuable consideration, office, place or employment
for himself or for any other person for voting or agreeing to vote or for refraining or agreeing to refrain from
voting;
(4) if, after an election, he directly or indirectly by himself or by any other person on his behalf receives any money
or valuable consideration on account of any person having voted or refrained from voting or having induced
any other person to vote or refrain from voting.
Where in an election petition it is shown that corrupt practices committed in reference to the election for the
purpose of promoting or procuring the election of any person at that election have so extensively prevailed that
they may reasonably be supposed to have affected the result, his election, if he is elected, is void and he is
incapable of being elected to fill the vacancy or any of the vacancies for which the election was held.30
[s 171B.2] Gratification
The term “gratification” has been explained above.
[s 171B.3] Gratification to Individual and not to the Party
The term “electoral right” as defined under clause (b) of section 171A of the IPC clearly indicates that the
electoral right is of a definite nature and it is to be exercised by an individual. So, the gratification has to be
given to an individual. When the offer is made to the Republican Party of India and not to an individual and
there is nothing in the offer which indicates that any influence is being brought on any individual with respect to
exercising his electoral right, that means, to stand, or not to stand as, or to withdraw from being a candidate or
to vote or to refrain from voting at the election, seeking support of a political party, during the cause of election
and making an offer to a political party of some share in political power for giving such support cannot be called
as giving gratification as contemplated under section 171B of IPC.31
[s 171B.4] Gratification not Limited to Money
Gratification is not necessarily limited to money or money’s worth, since anything done or omitted to be done
may amount to a gratification and consequently a bribe. For example, the promise of a situation or
employment32 or the offer to vacate an office in favour of the briber33 are within its mischief. Payment to the
voter for loss of time is equally so.
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Where a candidate for an election writes a letter to his agent asking him to dissuade a rival candidate from
standing for the election by offering him money and the agent accordingly offers a big sum of money to the rival
candidate for withdrawing his candidature, the conduct of the accused candidate is within the mischief of this
section.34
[s 171B.5] Gratification—Tests to be Applied
For finding out whether a particular promise or act amounts to gratification, two tests have to be satisfied. First,
that the gratification must be something which is calculated to satisfy a person’s aim, object or desire, and
secondly, such a gratification must be of some value though it need not be something estimable in terms of
money.35 The word “gratification” should be deemed to refer only to cases where a gift is made of something
which gives a material advantage to the recipient.36 It is not, however, necessary that the gratification offered
should be of value only to the person to whom it is offered, and not to anybody else.37
Whether the object, for which gratification has been paid, has been achieved or not is immaterial.38
[s 171B.6] Making of Gift is Corrupt Practice
An acceptance of bribe or gift made to a candidate with the intention of inducing him to drop out of the election
contest is not a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123(1)(A) of the Representation of the People
Act, 1951. The words “gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or by any other person” clearly show
that what is contemplated is the making of the gift and these words are wholly inappropriate to describe the
acceptance of the gifts. The words “with the object, directly or indirectly of inducing” also indicate that only the
making of the gift is contemplated, for the object is to punish the person making the gift, and clearly not of the
person accepting it.39
[s 171B.7] Contribution to Charity
Charitable gifts, at the time of an election, may, in conceivable cases, amount to the corrupt practice of bribery,
provided the motive behind the charity was corrupt.40 Bona fide charity has always been allowed. On the other
hand, what are called charitable gifts may be merely a specious and subtle form of bribery. If a gift is charitable,
it will not become bribery because of the use made of it, even if political capital is made out of it; it is not
possible by any ex post facto act to make that which was legal at the time, illegal and criminal.41 It is the object
of the act to determine whether or not it amounts to bribery. It is, therefore, the motive which is behind the
charity that should be taken into consideration in finding whether or not it is a subtle form of bribery. If the
motive is corrupt and the object is to induce the voters to vote in a particular way, it is bribery.42
[s 171B.8] What is Treating?
“Treating” is a form of bribery. The explanation to section 171E says that “treating” means that form of bribery
where the gratification consists of food, drink, entertainment or provision.
Under section 100 of the (English) Representation of the People Act, 1949:43
A person shall be guilty to treating if he corruptly, by himself or by any other person, either before, during or after an
election, directly or indirectly, gives, or provides or pays, wholly or in part, the expense of giving or providing any meal,
drink, entertainment or provision to or for any person—
(a) for the purpose of corruptly influencing that person or any other person to vote or refrain from voting; or
Page 7 of 10
(b) on account of that person or any other person having voted or refrained from voting, or being about to vote to
refrain from voting.
Every elector, or proxy of an elector who corruptly accepts or takes any such meal, drink, entertainment or provision
shall also be guilty of treating.
A corrupt promise of refreshment to voters to induce them to vote has been held to be bribery. Where, however,
the object of a candidate in distributing sweets to school children was not to secure votes, it could not be held to
be a case of bribery, even if the idea, that the donation would increase his popularity and might result in some
indirect propaganda for him, might have been at the back of the candidate’s mind.44
[s 171B.9] Proof—To be Proved as any other Offence
Due proof of a simple act of bribery by or with the knowledge and consent of the candidate or by his agents,
however insignificant that act may be, is sufficient to invalidate the election.45 The charge of bribery is indeed a
serious criminal charge. It falls within the ambit of section 171B of the Indian Penal Code, and is a criminal
offence. If that be so, it must follow that clear and unequivocal proof is required before a case of bribery is held
to be established. It should satisfy the test applied to the proof of offences in criminal cases. The court must be
satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that the said bribery has been proved.46 Suspicion is not sufficient,47 and
the confession of the person, alleged to have been bribed, is not conclusive.48 It is not safe to base a finding of
bribery on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice except possibly, in very exceptional circumstances.49
[s 171B.10] Illustrative Cases
Most of the decisions relating to bribery are on election petitions under the Representation of the People Act.
Paying a voter’s debts,50 permitting a voter to shoot rabbits on the estate of the candidate,51 paying the
travelling expenses of a voter on condition that he must vote for the payer,52 paying the rates and taxes of a
voter,53 payment made to keep away voters from voting,54 payment to a voter for loss of time55 offering money
to a rival candidate for withdrawing his candidature,56 are all instances of bribery, but it is not bribery to make
payment to election agents,57 or payment of election expenses to a candidate.58
Money paid to a club to pay off its debts and to repair its premises, with the object of inducing those of its
members who are voters to record their votes in favour of the candidate is a bribe.59
Where the motive is corrupt and the object of giving the gratification is to induce the voters to vote in a
particular way, it is bribery.60
A person, who gives some land to a voter for refraining from voting at an election, is guilty of an offence under
this section.61
Page 8 of 10
29 SB Adilgam v VS Kandaswami, AIR 1958 SC 8570 .
30 Vide, Halsbury Laws of England.
31 Deepak Ganpat Rao Salunke v Govt of Maharashtra, (1999) Cr LJ 1224 (Bom) (DB).
32 Re Plymouth, (1859) 2 Per & Dav 238.
33 Waterford, (1870) O M&H 25.
34 Ahmed Kabir Chodhary v Emperor, AIR 1938 Cal 274 : (1938) 39 Cr LJ 483 : 174 IC 808.
35 Mohan Singh v Bhanwar Lal, AIR 1964 SC 1366 [LNIND 1963 SC 224] , p 1369 : (1964) 5 SCR 12 [LNIND 1963 SC
224] ; Trilochan Singh v Karnail Singh, AIR 1968 Punj 416 , pp 420, 421 : (1968) Cr LJ 1199 (FB).
36 Iqbal Singh v Gurdas Singh, AIR 1976 SC 27 [LNIND 1975 SC 354] , p 34 : (1976) 3 SCC 284 [LNIND 1975 SC 354] .
Page 9 of 10
37 Trilochan Singh v Karnail Singh, AIR 1968 Punj 416 , pp 424, 425 : (1968) Cr LJ 1199 (FB).
38 Pillai v Dangali, AIR 1942 Rang 52 , pp 54, 55.
39 SB Adityan v S Kanaswami, AIR 1958 SC 857 [LNIND 1958 SC 203] .
40 Sarla Devi v Birendrasingh, AIR 1961 MP 127 , p 131.
41 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn reissue, Vol 15, para 689.
42 Braj Bhushan v Raja Anand Brahma Shah, AIR 1961 All 356 [LNIND 1960 ALL 11] , p 361.
43 12, 13 and 14, Geo 6, c 68.
44 Braj Bhushan v Raja Anand Brahma Shah, AIR 1961 All 356 [LNIND 1960 ALL 11] , p 360; See also the English cases
cited therein.
45 Re Plymouth, (1880) 3 OM&H 107, p 108; Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn vol 15, reissue, (1977), p 425, para
695; C Subba Rao v KB Reddy, AIR 1967 AP 155 [LNIND 1965 AP 265] : (1967) Cr LJ 691 (DB).
46 C Subba Rao v K Brahamanda Reddy, AIR 1967 AP 155 [LNIND 1965 AP 265] : (1967) Cr LJ 691 (DB) : (1966) 2
Andh WR 401.
47 Re Lichfield, (1869) 1 OM&H 22, p 38.
48 Re Ipswich, 1857 Wolf & D 173, p 178.
49 Trilochan Singh v Karnail Singh, AIR 1968 Punj 416 , pp 420, 421 : (1968) Cr LJ 1199 (FB); Halsbury’s Laws of
England, Vol 15, 4th Edn 1977, p 425, para 684 (bribery may be implied from the circumstances of the case and the
court is not bound by the strict practice applicable to criminal case; it may act on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice).
50 (1869) 1 OM&H 274.
51 (1874) 2 OM&H 129.
52 Cooper v State, (1857) 6 HL Cas 746.
53 Worcester, (1819) C&D 173.
54 Re Bradford, (1869) 1 OM&H 30, p 32.
55 Re Bolten, (1874) 2 OM&H 145.

Page 10 of 10
56 Ahmed Kabir Chowdhury v Emperor, AIR 1938 Cal 274 : (1938) 39 Cr LJ 483 .
57 Re Youghal, Sup p 295, 21 LT 316.
58 Re Belfast, (1869) 1 OM&H 281, p 285.
59 Pillai v Daugali, AIR 1942 Rang 52 : 199 IC 110; Sarla Devi v Virendra Singh, AIR 1961 MP 127 , p 131 : (1961) MPLJ
1361 .
60 Brij Bhushan Singh v Raja Anand Brahma Shah, AIR 1961 All 356 [LNIND 1960 ALL 11] , p 361 : (1960) All LJ 369
(DB); Iqbal Singh v Gurdas Singh, AIR 1976 SC 27 [LNIND 1975 SC 354] ; Trilochan Singh v Karnial Singh, AIR 1968
Punj 416 : (1968) Cr LJ 1199 (FB).
61 Venkata Krishna Rao v Appalaswamy, AIR 1957 AP 245 : (1957) Cr LJ 212 .
End of Document
[s 171C] Undue influence at elections.—

9.1 Introduction
to elections, viz:

Page 2 of 11
9.2 Jurisdiction
9.3. Punishment
Page 3 of 11
62 [s 171C] Undue influence at elections.—
(1) Whoever voluntarily interferes or attempts to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right
commits the offence of undue influence at an election.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), whoever—
(a) threatens any candidate or voter, or any person in whom a candidate or voter is interested, with
injury of any kind, or
(b) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or voter to believe that he or any person in whom he is
interested will become or will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure or of spiritual censure,
shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or voter,
within the meaning of sub-section (1)
(3) A declaration of public policy or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without
intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of
this section.]
[s 171C.1] Scope
This section defines the offence of “undue influence” and section 171F provides the punishment for it.
[s 171C.2] Analogous Law
“Undue influence” as a corrupt practice is defined in sub-section (2) of section 123 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 as:
(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate
or his agent, or of any other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent, with the free exercise of
any electoral right:
Page 4 of 11
Provided that—
(a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this clause, any such person as is referred to therein
who—
(i) threatens any candidate or any elector, or any person in whom a candidate or an elector interested, with
injury of any kind including social ostracism and ex-communication or expulsion from any caste or
community; or
(ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is
interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure,
shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or
elector within the meaning of this clause;
(b) a declaration of public policy, or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent
to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this clause.
The law in England relating to undue influence at elections, is not the same as in India, as will appear from the
following definition of “undue influence” contained in section 2 of 46 and 47 Vic, c 51, which substantially re-
enacted the former section 5 of 17 and 18 Vic, c 102:63
Every person who shall directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf made use of or threaten to
make use of any force, violence, or restrain, or inflict or threaten to inflict, by himself or by any other person, any
temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss upon or against any person in order to induce or compel such
person to vote or refrain from voting, or on account of such person having voted or refrained from voting at any
election, or who shall by abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or contrivance, impede or prevent the free
exercise of the franchise of any elector, or shall thereby compel, induce, or prevail upon any elector either to give or to
refrain from giving his vote at any election, shall be guilty of undue influence.
[s 171C.3] Difference between English and Indian Law
The law relating to undue influence at elections in England is not the same as in India. The words of the English
Statute quoted in note no. 1 above, lay emphasis upon the individual aspect of the exercise of undue influence.
It is with reference to the words of that statute that Brumwell, B made the following observation in the North
Durham case:64
Page 5 of 11
When the language of the act is examined it will be found that intimidation to be within the statute must be intimidation
practised upon an individual.
The Indian law, on the other hand, does not emphasise the individual aspect of the exercise of such influence,
but pays regard to the use of such influence as has the tendency to bring about the result contemplated in the
clause. What is material under the Indian law is not the actual effect produced, but the doing of such acts as are
calculated to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. Decisions of the English courts based on the
words of the English statute, which are not strictly in pari materia with the words of the Indian statute, cannot,
therefore, be used as precedents in this country.65
[s 171C.4] Undue Influence—Meaning of
The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the bill states:
Undue influence at an election is defined as the voluntary interference or attempted interference with the right of any
person to stand, or not to stand as, or withdraw from being, a candidate, or to vote or refrain from voting. This covers
all threats of injury to person or property and all illegal methods of persuasion and any interference with the liberty of
the candidates or the electors. A sub-section is added to explain that the inducing or attempting to induce a person to
believe that he will become the object of divine displeasure is also interference. It is not, however, interference within
the meaning of the clause to make a declaration of public policy or a promise of public action.66 The second sub-clause
is merely explanatory of the general definition in the first sub-clause and does not restrict the generality of the words
used there. We have considered the criticisms of this clause based on the generality of the words employed, but we
are satisfied that any attempt at specific enumeration would be open to a serious danger of loopholes in what we
regard as a most salutary provision.67
The definition of undue influence given in section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, is more
or less in the same language as in section 171C of the IPC, except that the words “directly or indirectly” have
been added to indicate the nature of interference. It will be seen that the definition of undue influence in the
Representation of the People Act may be wider.68
[s 171C.5] The term “Under Influence” is not Susceptible to Precise Definition
The term “undue influence” is not susceptible of any precise definition, but it suggests the overcoming of the will
of one by the other who superimposes his will on the weaker party despite the latter’s disinclination or effective
resistance. “Undue influence” is a species of constructive flow. Undue influence is used in contradistinction to
proper influence which may be secured through affection bestowed or from kindness indulged.
In order to establish undue influence it must be proved that the influence was such as to deprive the person
affected of the free exercise of his will. It must amount to imposing a restraint on the will of another whereby he
is prevented from doing what he wishes to do or is forced to do what he does not wish to do.
[s 171C.6] Acts which do not Amount to Undue Influence
A friendly advice or an influence arising from gratitude or esteem is not undue influence, unless thereby the
functioning of a free mind is destroyed. Mere suggestions or appeals cannot have such an effect. An influence
which exists from attachment or respect or which results from arguments or appeals to reason and judgment is
not undue influence.69 A threat to a member of the legislative assembly of Bengal that if a certain candidate was
Page 6 of 11
elected as the President of India, he would enforce President’s rule in Bengal, doesn’t amount to undue
influence.70
An advice, argument, persuasion or solicitation cannot constitute undue influence. Honest intercession, even
importunity, falls short of controlling a persons’ free exercise of his will. A persuasion, which leaves a person
free to adopt his own course, is not undue influence. On the other hand, a suggestion or an entreaty from
somebody, held in esteem, could be treated as undue influence. In the absence of proof, that a person has
been, in consequence of the alleged influence, deprived of free agency, the question of there being an undue
influence does not arise.
[s 171C.7] Essence of Undue Influence
It is not objectionable to exercise an influence by acts of kindness or appeals to the free reason and
understanding of a person. So long as the free agency of the other person is not prevented or impaired by
obtaining a domination over his mind, it is not an exercise of undue influence. The essence of undue influence
is that a person is constrained to do against his will, but for the influence he would have refused to do it, if left to
exercise his own judgment. It has to be shown that a person’s volition had thus been controlled by another,
whereby he could not pursue his own inclination, being too weak to resist the importunity and in view of the
pressure exercised on his mind he could not act intelligently and voluntarily and had become subject to the will
of the other who had thus obtained dominion over his mind.
In a Madras case,71 Odgers J doubted if merely telling people not to vote would constitute an offence under this
section.
[s 171C.7.1] Gist of Undue Influence
The gist of undue influence at an election consists in a voluntary interference or an attempt at interference with
the free exercise of any electoral right. Any voluntary action which interferes with or attempts to interfere with
such free exercise of electoral right would amount to undue influence. However, even though the definition in
sub-section (1) of section 171C, IPC is wide in terms it cannot take in a mere canvassing in favour of a
candidate at an election. If that were so, it would be impossible to run democratic elections.72 If the intended
phonogram is not with reference to the right of a person to stand or not to stand as a candidate or to withdraw
from being a candidate, it cannot be said that canvassing in favour of a candidate is to exercise undue influence
and no offence under section 171C, read with section 171F, IPC can be said to have been committed.73
When the elector goes through the mental process of weighing the merits and demerits of candidates and
makes his choice, even at that stage, undue influence may come in. The distribution of a pamphlet imputing
vices and immorality to a candidate would amount to an attempt to interfere with the free exercise of the right to
vote and undue influence under this section.74
Recitation in a public meeting of a poem containing false statements or facts, with the consent and knowledge
and in the presence of a candidate, about another candidate, and its publication would make the candidate
responsible under section 123(4), Representation of the People Act, 1951.75
It is the degree of the gravity of the allegation which will be the determining factor in deciding whether the
offence falls under section 171C of this Code. If the allegation, though false and relating to the candidate’s
personal character and conduct, made with the intent to affect the result of an election, does not amount to
interference, or an attempt to interfere, the offence would be a lesser one. If, on the other hand, it amounts to
interference, or an attempt to interfere, it would be a graver offence under section 171F read with section 171C,
IPC.76
[s 171C.8] Editorial to Vote Freely—Whether Attracts this Section

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To attract section 171C of the IPC, it has to be established that the petitioners voluntarily interfered or
attempted to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. In one case, what has been published in the
editorial was only a general statement highlighting the difficulties encountered on account of a large number of
candidates contesting the elections. The opinion of a newspaper or friendly advice made by it to the voters will
not constitute an offence under section 171C of the IPC. As a matter of fact, the request made to the voters
through the editorial, was only to exercise their votes freely and not to be influenced by the gimmicks shown by
the rebel candidates and those candidates who do not put forward any definite programmes or who do not have
any clear manifesto to offer to the people. In order to establish undue influence, the complainant has
necessarily to prove that the influence was such as to deprive the voter of the free exercise of his will.77
The message by a person to a particular political party to boycott the election does not amount to interference
with the free exercise of the electoral rights of the voters of that party, within the meaning of section 171C of the
IPC, for the simple reason that the voters of that party would still be free to vote for the candidate, whom they
desire, in spite of the message.78
[s 171C.9] Meaning of “Without Prejudice to the Generality of the Provisions of Sub-section (1)”
Section 171C is enacted in three parts. The first sub-section contains the definition of undue inference, which is
in wide terms and renders a person voluntarily interfering or attempting to interfere with the free exercise of any
electoral right guilty of committing undue influence. That this is very wide is indicated by the opening sentence
of sub-section (2), ie, “without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1)”. It is well settled
that, when this expression is used, anything contained in the provisions following this expression, is not
intended to cut down the generality of the meaning of the preceding provision.79
It follows from this that we have to look at sub-section (1) as it is, without restricting its provisions by what is
contained in sub-section (2). Sub-section (3) throws a great deal of light on this question.80 In above case, the
Judge observed:
At what stage would a declaration of public policy or a promise of public action act tend to interfere? Surely only at the
stage when a voter is trying to make up his mind as to which candidate he would support. If a declaration of public
policy or a promise of public action appeals to him, his mind would decide in favour of the candidate who is
propounding the public policy or promising a public action. Having made up his mind he would then go and vote and
the declaration of public policy having had its effect it would no longer have any effect on the physical final act of
casting his vote.81
[s 171C.10] Sub-section (2)—Mere Canvassing does not Amount to Undue Influence
Sub-section (2) of this section shows what the nature of undue influence is; it does not cut down the generality
of the provisions contained in sub-section (1). What is contained in sub-section (2) of section 171C is merely
illustrative. It is difficult to lay down in general terms where mere canvassing ends and interference or attempt
at interference with the free exercise of any electoral right begins. That is a matter to be determined in each
case; but there can be no doubt that if what is done is merely canvassing, it would not be undue influence. As
sub-section (3) of section 171C shows, the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an
electoral right would not be undue influence.82
[s 171C.11] Sub-section (3)
Sub-section (3) proceeds on the assumption that a declaration of public policy or a promise of public action or
the mere exercise of a legal right can interfere with an electoral right, and therefore, it provides that if there is no
intention to interfere with the electoral right, it shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this
section.83 The expression “free exercise of any electoral right” is to be kept in mind while interpreting sub-
Page 8 of 11
section (3).
Sub-section (3) further proceeds on the basis that the expression “free exercise of his electoral right” does not
mean that a voter is not to be influenced. This expression has to be read in the context of an election in
democratic means. Candidates may propound their programmes, policies and views on various questions
which are exercising the minds of the electors. This exercise of the right by a candidate or his supporters to
canvass support does not interfere or attempt to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right. What
does, however, attempt to interfere with the free exercise of an electoral right is, if we may use the expression,
“tyranny over the mind”.84 As sub-section (3) of section 171C shows, the mere exercise of a legal right, without
intent to interfere with an electoral right, would not be undue influence.85
It is open to ministers to canvass for the candidates to their party standing for election. Such canvassing does
not amount to undue influence. It is only where a minister abuses his position as such and goes beyond merely
asking for support for the candidates belonging to his party, then a question of undue influence may arise.86
The statements that M made promises to the voters about non-recovery of bank dues, removal of taxes and the
repealing of some laws in no sense embody any allegation of undue influence. They are only statements which
are generally made at election time by candidates boosting up their programme and achievements and running
down the policies and failures of the opponents. Such declarations do not amount to exercise of undue
influence on the part of the declarant.87
The Himachal Pradesh High Court, in Dr YS Parmar v Hira Singh Pal,88 approved the following observations
made by the Election Tribunal Bangalore in Linga Gounda v Shivananjappa:-89
A leader of a political party is entitled to declare to the public the policy of the party, and ask the electorate to vote for
his party without interfering with any electoral right and such declarations on his part would not amount to undue
influence under s 123(2). The fact that he happens to be a Minister or Chief Minister of the state would not deprive him
of this right.
[s 171C.12] Threat of Injury
Where a day before the election, the complainant, a candidate for election, was prevented from coming out of
his house and going to the voters by his rival candidate and the latter’s supporters who were picketing the
former’s house, it was held that the accused, the rival candidate, was not guilty of the offence under this section
as he could not be said to have interfered or attempted to interfere with the free exercise of an electoral right or
threatened any candidate or voter with injury of any kind.90 Where it was averred that one of the candidates
seated in an easy chair was remarking, as the voters were proceeding, that gosha women need not vote and
that the better thing for them would be to remain at home and that his own wife remained at home, it was held
that there was neither a threat to any candidate or any voter with an injury of any kind nor an attempt to induce
a belief in the voter that he would be rendered the object of divine displeasure.91
[s 171C.13] Appeal to Religion and Community
If a political party is criticised on the ground that it has a communal outlook and that its policy is to suppress the
members of another community, for example, the Jan Sangha or the Muslim League, and if it is stated that
people should not vote for any of these communal organisations because the essential policy of these
organisations is to further the ends of the Hindus or the Muslims at the cost of the members of the other
community, the appeal in such cases would be to the members of the Hindu or the Muslim community, but it
Page 9 of 11
would not be on the ground of religion or community, but on the ground of the wrong policy of the particular
organisation. This would be a criticism, of a policy of the organisation and not an appeal to vote or to refrain
from voting on the ground of religion or community. If the Legislature really meant to prohibit an appeal to a
community, it could easily have said so, instead of saying “on the ground of religion”.92 A religious leader has
the right to freely express his opinion on the comparative merits of the contesting candidates and to canvass for
such of them as he considers worthy of the confidence of the electors. In other words, the religious leader has a
right to exercise his influence in favour of any particular candidate by voting for him and by canvassing votes of
others for him. Such a course of conduct on his part will only be a use of his great influence amongst a
particular section of the voters in the constituency; but it will amount to an abuse of his great influence if the
words he uses in a document, or utters in his speeches, leave no choice to the persons addressed by him in
the exercise of their electoral rights. If the religious head had said that he preferred the appellant to the other
candidate because, in his opinion, he was more worthy of the confidence of the electors for certain reasons,
good, bad or indifferent, and addressed words to that effect to persons who were amenable to his influence, he
would be within his rights and his influence, however great, could not be said to have been misused. However,
if the religious leader practically leaves no free choice to the electors, not only by issuing in writing the hukam or
farman, but also by his speeches, to the effect that they must vote for the candidate, implying that disobedience
of his mandate would carry divine displeasure or spiritual censure, the case is clearly brought within the purview
of the second paragraph of the proviso to section 123(2) of the Representation of the People Act, and within the
mischief of this section.93
[s 171C.14] Corrupt Practice under Section 123, Representation of the People Act, 1951 may not be Offence
Under this Section
A corrupt practice under section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, may or may not be an
offence under this chapter. The Rajas of Puri have been associated with the management of the Temple of
Lord Jagannath and the Raja of Puri is venerated as Chalantika Bishnu (movable Bishnu as distinct from the
immovable deity inside the shrine) by a large majority of Oriyas. Lord Jagannath is not only the national deity of
Orissa but he also occupies a unique position throughout India. Hence as the Adya Sevak of the Lord, as his
moving representative, the Raja of Puri is undoubtedly held in great veneration. In a case, a brother of the Raja
being a candidate for election to the Orissa Legislative Assembly, it was alleged that he and his agents
informed the voters that as he was Chalanti Vishnu and as such a representative of Lord Jagannath himself,
any person who did not vote for him would be a sinner against the Lord and the Hindu religion and that he
would be committing sacrilege to the deity. It was held that such a propaganda would come within the scope of
the second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and that it
would also amount to an election offence under section 171F read with section 171C of the Code. It was further
held that appealing to the voters to vote for him saying that he was the crown jewel amongst them, and using a
religious symbol, namely Nila Chakra of Lord Jagannath and asking them to vote for him as he was the moving
representative of Lord Jagannath would come within the scope of section 123(3) of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, but would not amount to an offence under this section.94
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63 Section 101 of the (English) Representation of the People Act, 1949 (12, 13 & 14 Geo, 6, c 68) is in the same
language.
64 North Durham case, (1874) 2 OM&H 152, p 156.
65 Ram Dial v Sant Lal, AIR 1959 SC 855 [LNIND 1959 SC 73] , p 859.
66 Statement of Objects and Reasons, Gazette of India, 1920, Pt V, p 135, section 9.

67 Ibid, 1920, Pt V, p 178.
68 Baburao Patel v Dr Zakir Hussain, AIR 1968 SC 904 [LNIND 1967 SC 314] : (1968) 2 SCR 133 [LNIND 1967 SC 314] :
(1968) 1 SCA 632 : (1968) 2 SCW 10 : (1968) 2 SCJ 490 .
69 Amir Chand Tota Ram v Suvhitra Kriplani, AIR 1961 Punj 383 , p 386.
70 SK Singh v VV Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] : (1971) 2 SCR 197 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] .
71 Re Palani Kumara Chinnayya Gounder, AIR 1922 Mad 337 [LNIND 1921 MAD 121] , p 339.
72 Baburao Patel v Dr Zakir Hussain, AIR 1968 SC 904 [LNIND 1967 SC 314] : (1968) 2 SCR 133 [LNIND 1967 SC 314]
: (1968) 1 SCA 632 : (1968) 2 SCWR 10 : (1968) 2 SCJ 490 .
73 M Analagan v Dy Inspector of Police, (1981) Cr LJ 1179 .
74 SK Singh v VV Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] , pp 2112–16.
75 Kumara Nand v Brijmohan Lal Sharma, AIR 1967 SC 808 [LNIND 1966 SC 296] : (1967) Cr LJ 823 .
76 SK Singh v VV Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] , p 2113 : (1971) 2 SCR 197 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] .
77 KM Mathew v Damodaran Pillai, (1987) 2 Ker LT 592 .
Page 11 of 11
78 M Anbalagan v State, (1981) Cr LJ 1179 , p 1180 (Mad).
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Baburao Patel v Dr Zakir Hussain, AIR 1968 SC 904 [LNIND 1967 SC 314] : (1968) 2 SCR 133 [LNIND 1967 SC 314] :
(1968) 1 SCA 632 : (1968) 2 SCW 10 : (1968) 2 SCJ 490 .
84 Ibid.
85 Baburao Patel v Dr Zakir Hussain, AIR 1968 SC 904 [LNIND 1967 SC 314] , p 911.
86 Ibid; YS Parmar v Hira Singh, AIR 1958 HP 29 ; Jayalakshmi Devamma v Janardhan Reddi, AIR 1959 AP 272 [LNIND
1958 AP 126] .
87 Mohan Singh Laxman Singh v Bhanwar Lal Rajmal Nahata, AIR 1964 MP 137 [LNIND 1963 MP 24] .
88 Dr YS Parmar v Hira Singh Pal, AIR 1958 HP 29 .
89 Linga Gounda v Shivananjappa, 6 E.L.R. 288.
90 Ram Saran Das v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 297 , p 298.
91 AK Bijli Sahib Bahadur v MK Mahommad Asan Marachair, AIR 1934 Mad 27 [LNIND 1933 MAD 211] , p 29.
92 Ghayar Ali Khan v Keshav Gupta, AIR 1959 All 264 [LNIND 1958 ALL 115] , p 270.
93 Ram Dial v Santlal, AIR 1959 SC 855 [LNIND 1959 SC 73] , p 860.
94 Raj Rajdeb v Gangadhar Mahapatra, AIR 1964 Ori 1 [LNIND 1962 ORI 29] , p 4.
End of Document
[s 171D] Personation at elections.—

9.1 Introduction
to elections, viz:

Page 2 of 9
9.2 Jurisdiction
9.3. Punishment
Page 3 of 9
95 [s 171D] Personation at elections.—

Whoever at an election applies for a voting paper or votes in the name of any other person, whether living or
dead, or in a fictitious name, or who having voted once at such election applies at the same election for a voting
paper in his own name, and whoever abets, procures or attempts to procure the voting by any person in any
such way, commits the offence of personation at an election]:
96[Providedthat nothing in this section shall apply to a person who has been authorised to vote as proxy for an
elector under any law for the time being in force in so far as he votes as a proxy for such elector.]
[s 171D.1] Legislative Changes
The proviso to the section was inserted by Act 24 of 2003, vide its section 5 and became effective from 22
September 2003.
[s 171D.2] Scope
This section defines the offence of personation at election and section 171F, prescribes the punishment for the
offence. The definition of “personation” closely follows the definition in section 24 of the Ballot Act, 1872 of
England and covers both a person who attempts to vote in another person’s name or in a fictitious name, a
voter who attempts to vote twice, and any person who abets, procures or attempts to procure such voting.97
[s 171D.3] Analogous Law
“Personation” at election is defined in section 24 of the (English) Ballot Act, 1872,98 as follows:
A person shall, for all purposes of the laws relating to parliamentary and municipal elections, be deemed to be guilty of
the offence of personation who, at an election for a country or borough, or at municipal election, applies for a ballot
paper in the name of some other person, whether that name be that of a person living or dead, or of a fictitious person,
or who having voted once at any such election, applies at the same election for a ballot paper in his own name.
By the (English) Representation of the People Act, 1949 (12, 13 & 14 Geo 6, c 68), section 47:
Page 4 of 9
A person shall be deemed to be guilty of personation at a parliament or local government election if he:
(a) votes in person or by post as some other persons, whether as an elector or as proxy, and whether that other
person is living or dead or is a fictitious person; or
(b) votes in person or by post as proxy:
(i) for a person whom he knows or has reasonable grounds for supposing to be dead or to be a fictitious
person; or
(ii) when he knows or has reasonable grounds for supposing that his appointment as proxy is no longer in
force.
For the purposes of this section, a person who has applied for a ballot paper for the purpose of voting in person or who
has marked, whether validly or not, and returned a ballot paper issued for the purpose of voting by post, shall be
deemed to have voted.
[s 171D.4] Essence of the Offence
The essence of the offence of false personation is that the offender pretends to be other than what he really is.
The gist of the offence being false personation, the section does not come into play when the voter himself
does not put the cross-mark against the name of any of the candidates, but permits the candidates or their
agents to do so, and the candidate or his agent does not claim to be the voter himself when he makes a cross-
mark against any name.99
[s 171D.5] “Applies for” Interpretation—Presumption Under Section 114 Evidence Act
The indictee must have applied for a ballot paper. Only voting takes place inside the booth and a person who
enters the booth against whom an allegation is raised that he had applied for the voting paper, must certainly
be saddled with the responsibility at least under section 114 of the Evidence Act to explain why he entered the
polling booth and for what purpose. If he hands over a slip showing the name of a voter other than himself the
irresistible inference to a prudent mind can only be that he was applying for voting paper in the name of such
person. Courts cannot be oblivious to life and real life situations while appreciating oral evidence. Section 114
of the Evidence Act permits and mandates courts to draw reasonable inferences based on their experience of
men and matters in life.100
[s 171D.6] “Applies for a Voting Paper”—Meaning of
The procedure for voting is as follows: the voter goes to an officer who issues what are known as “signature
slips”. He has to state, or in some other way indicate to that officer, who he is. On ascertaining that the
applicant is a real voter, the officer, in whose charge the signature slips are, issues one to the applicant. The
applicant then signs the signature slip, and on the strength of that signature slip, obtains a voting paper. It is the
application for a voting paper by a wrong person that has been made punishable under section 171F of the
Code.101 Where the accused is charged of personation at an election, the first element to be proved by the
prosecution is that he had applied for a voting paper at the election in question. So long as the voter does not
approach the polling officer for the purpose of getting the ballot paper, it cannot be said that he applied for a
voting paper. The mere obtaining of an identity slip, or an attempt to obtain it, is not enough.102
Page 5 of 9
In Reg v Parrick Fox,103 a person applied for a ballot paper in a name which appeared on the register of voters’
list and which was inserted therein by the overseers in the belief that it was the name of the applicant; was
consequently held as not guilty of the offence of personation.
Where in a municipal electoral roll the name of Mahommad Din, son of Faqir Mohammad, was recorded as a
person entitled to vote, and the accused, whose name also was Mahommad Din but whose father’s name was
Abdulla, asked for a ballot paper saying that he was Mohammad Din, son of Faqir Mahommad, it was held that
he was guilty of the offence of personation under this section.104
The indictee had applied for a ballot paper. Only voting takes place inside the booth and a person who enters
the booth against whom an allegation is raised that he had applied for the voting paper, must certainly be
saddled with the responsibility at least under section 114 of the Evidence Act to explain why he entered the
polling booth and for what purpose. If he hands over a slip showing the name of a voter other than himself the
irresistible inference to a prudent mind can only be that he was applying for voting paper in the name of such
person. Courts cannot be oblivious to life and real life situations while appreciating oral evidence. Section 114
of the Evidence Act permits and mandates courts to draw reasonable inferences based on their experience of
men and matters in life. It would be puerile for a court to look for specific evidence of the indictee entering the
polling booth and making a ceremonial declaration in writing or in words that he is applying for a voting paper.
That would be an unreasonable and perverse approach to the evidence tendered. Appellant accused was
convicted for offence under section 171D, IPC.105
Dissenting from the view taken by the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v Gokul Barik,106 the Gujarat High
Court in State of Gujarat v Chandulal Bhikalal107 has held that everyone who goes to the first polling officer for
checking of his name and he has not already voted, does so because he applied for a ballot paper, although
the ballot paper is actually issued by the third polling officer. If he has applied for a ballot paper under a false
name, he comes within the mischief of the section. This view appears to be correct.
[s 171D.7] When Corrupt Motive is Implied
No intention or no corrupt motive is necessary to be proved when a person goes to the polling station and
applies for a ballot paper under a false name. Corrupt motive is implied by the very fact that he applies for a
ballot paper under a false name.108
[s 171D.8] Double Voting
An application for a second voting paper by a person who has already voted once at the same election is an
offence under this section.109
[s 171D.9] Mens Rea or Corrupt Motive, Necessity of
It is not stated in this section, or in section 24 of the (English) Ballot Act (35 & 36 Vic Chapter 33) which it
closely follows, that personation must be with a corrupt or any other intention. However, in the Stepney case110
a man’s name had been wrongly included in the register of two divisions. He voted twice and it was admitted
that he was ignorant of the law and had acted conscientiously by mistake, that he had no corrupt intention and
that he had not been corruptly influenced. Denman J held:
It is thoroughly understood in election law that, unless there be corruption, and a bad mind and intention in
personating, it is not an offence. If it is done under an honest belief that the man is properly there for the purpose of
voting, it is held in these cases and in other cases analogous that no offence has been committed… They are
enactments which can be really only applicable to an intentionally bad act, because if a man is guilty at all he is guilty
of felony, and may be imprisoned as a felon for a considerable time. To suppose that the legislature even intended to
Page 6 of 9
enact that man, who with perfect honesty but from a mere blunder as to his rights, gives a vote, and then (believing
that he has right to do so), gives a second vote, he being on the register, on the same day, is to be deemed guilty of
felony, is to impute an intention to the legislature which is absurd, though if it had said so in absolutely plain words, we
must have carried it out. I do not think that that is the intention of the act; I think there is still to be added to the offence
of personation a corrupt intention, and where the corrupt intention is absent, the offence of personation cannot have
been committed.
The same has also been followed in Pantan Venkayya v Emperor,111 in which the facts were very similar.
[s 171D.10] Intention—Relevancy of
Chapter IXA of the IPC provides for the punishment of malpractices in connection with elections and attempts
to safeguard the purity of the franchise. The very idea of personation connotes knowledge of or advertence to
the act of pretending to be some other person. In fact, it implies false pretense. The only intention which is to be
found in the section and which is the central element requisite to a conviction is the intention to personate the
election for one who is a voter.
It will thus be seen that the statute does not rule out mens rea as a constituent part of the crime and the
accused cannot be found guilty of an offence under section 171D, IPC unless he is proved to have a guilty
mind.112 The word personation itself implies corruption or fraud,113 and a person cannot be convicted under this
section unless it is proved that in doing what he did he was actuated by a corrupt motive.114
Holding claim of a right, honestly and bona fide, is a question of fact.
[s 171D.11] Mistake of Law and Good Faith—Effect of
It is well settled that ignorance of law will not excuse a person from the consequence of guilt if he has the
capacity to understand the law. A mistake of law, however, normally relates to a mistake as to the accused’s
rights under the law to do a particular act or pursue a particular course of conduct. The courts are not at all
concerned with the legality or otherwise of the rights under which the accused purported to act. The only
question that the courts have to decide in such cases is, whether the claim of right was honestly and bona fide
held by the accused. This question will essentially be one of fact. In such cases, it is the good faith of the
accused and not the right itself which requires adjudication. In this sense, a mistake of law can, to a certain
extent, be a defence to a criminal charge.115 It was observed in Tolson’s case,116 that “an honest and
reasonable mistake stands in fact on the same footing as absence of the reasoning faculty, as in infancy or the
perversion of that faculty as in lunacy”. It was also added that this exception of common law equally applies in
the case of statutory offences unless it is excluded expressly or by necessary implication. It is now well-settled
as a principle of English criminal law that as a general rule, an honest and reasonable belief in a state of facts,
which, if they existed, would make the accused’s act innocent, affords an excuse for doing an act which would
otherwise be an offence. And in this connection, the difference between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law
would not be material.117
[s 171D.12] Abetment of Personation—When it Amounts to an Offence
Under section 107, IPC “A person abets the doing of a thing who intentionally aids by any act or illegal omission
the doing of that thing”. The intention should be to aid the commission of a crime. A mere giving of an aid will
not make the act an abetment of an offence if the person who gave the aid did not know that an offence was
being committed or contemplated. The intention should be to aid an offence or to facilitate the commission of an
offence. However, if the person who lends his support does not know, or has no reason to believe, that the act
which he was aiding or supporting was by itself a criminal act, it cannot be said that he intentionally aids or
facilitates the doing of the offence. In one case, the accused was a candidate at a municipal election. A person
named H was a voter on the electoral roll. He was absent but in his stead some person came forward at the
time of the election and professed to be H and put his thumb mark on the voting slip. The voting slip was
Page 7 of 9
attested by the accused, after ascertaining from the voter and his men as to who the man was. This was done
to the knowledge of the polling officer. It was held that the candidate did not abet, by intentionally aiding, the
commission of the offence under this section. There is an essential difference between a reckless act, for which
a man may be held civilly liable, and a criminal act for which he may be punished by imprisonment or fine.118
But in the subsequent case of Emperor v Badan Singh,119 where a candidate at an election, who was,
according to the procedure to be followed, to identify the voters, recklessly attested the signature slip without
taking care to ascertain whether the thumb-impression was that of the voter, Iqbal Ahmad J held that the
candidate was only technically guilty of the offence under this section and deserved a lenient punishment, but
Walsh J disagreed with him. The case being referred to a third judge, Mears CJ held that, it being found that the
real voter, whether dead or alive, was not present at the polling station and that the accused candidate was not
the victim of a plot, the inevitable inference was that he corruptly, wrongfully and intentionally abetted
personation within the meaning of this section and deserved severe punishment.
[s 171D.13] “Attempt to Obtain Voting Paper”—Meaning of
An act, to amount to an attempt, must be such that, if not prevented, it would complete the offence. The mere
obtaining of a signature slip would not amount to an application for a voting paper. If, therefore, a person is
frustrated in getting the signature-slip, his attempt to obtain the signature would not amount to an attempt to
commit the offence of fraudulently applying for a voting paper.120 Mere approach to a polling officer for an
identity slip or signature-slip may amount to some preparations for the commission of the offence, but
preparation is not an attempt within the meaning of section 511, IPC.121
[s 171D.14] Courts’ Approach to Evidence
It would be puerile for a court to look for specific evidence of the indictee entering the polling booth and making
a ceremonial declaration in writing or in words that he is applying for a voting paper. That would be an
unreasonable and perverse approach to the evidence tendered and would not be the standards of an ordinarily
prudent person which, law in section 3 of the Evidence Act mandates the courts to follow.122
[s 171D.15] Sentence
Where a person is found guilty for offence under section 171D, a deterrent sentence of fine can be imposed
along with substantive sentence of imprisonment for a reasonable period. The accused petitioner was
sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 3 months and to pay an amount of Rs 10,000/- as
fine and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of 2 months.123

Page 8 of 9
96 Ins. by Act 24 of 2003, section 5 (w.e.f. 22-9-2003).
97 Clause 10, Gazette of India, Pt V, 3 July 1920, p 135.
98 35 and 36 Vict, c 33.
99 Vinjamuri Parthansarathi v P Ramachandra Rao, AIR 1956 AP 65 , p 72 (FB).
100 E Anoop v State of Kerala, (2007) Cr LJ 2968 (Ker).
101 Malkhan Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 All 226 .
102 State of Orissa v Gokul Barik, AIR 1959 Ori 97 [LNIND 1958 ORI 75] : (1959) Cr LJ 752 ; Malkhan Singh v King-
Emperor, AIR 1925 All 226 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 359 .
103 Reg v Parrick Fox, 16 Cox CC 166.
104 Mahommad Din v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 52 , p 53 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 853 .
105 E Anoop v State of Kerala, 2007 Cr LJ 2968 , p 2970 (Ker) : 2006 (3) KLJ 50 : 2006 (3) Ker LT 711 .
106 State of Orissa v Gokul Barik, AIR 1959 Ori 153 : (1959) Cr LJ 752 .
107 State of Gujarat v Chandulal Bhikalal, AIR 1965 Guj 83 [LNIND 1963 GUJ 43] : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 440 : 6 Guj LR 485.
108 State of Gujarat v Chandulal, AIR 1965 Guj 83 [LNIND 1963 GUJ 43] , p 84 : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 440 ; State v Siddhanath
Gangaram, AIR 1956 MB 241 , p 243.
Page 9 of 9
109 V Sesha Ayyar v Venkatasubba Chetty, AIR 1924 Mad 487 , p 488 : (1924) 25 Cr LJ 442 .
110 Stepney case, 4 OM&H 34.
111 Pantan Venkayya v Emperor, AIR 1930 Mad 216 [LNIND 1929 MAD 246] : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 329 .
112 State v Siddhanath Gangaram, AIR 1956 MB 241 , p 243.
113 Mulchand v Emperor, AIR 1937 Sind 21 : (1937) 38 Cr LJ 306 .
114 State of Orissa v Gokul Barik, AIR 1959 Ori 97 [LNIND 1958 ORI 75] : (1959) Cr LJ 752 .
116 Tolson’s case, (1889) 23 QBD 168 , 181(H).
118 Ram Nath v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 All 230 , p 234 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 362 ; Ram Nath v King-Emperor, AIR 1926 All
231 , p 233 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 705 .
119 Emperor v Badan Singh, AIR 1928 All 150 .
120 Malkhan Singh v King Emperor, AIR 1925 All 226 , p 227.
121 State of Orissa v Gokul Barik, AIR 1959 Ori 97 [LNIND 1958 ORI 75] , p 98.
123 E Anoop v State of Kerala, 2007 Cr LJ 2968 , p 2971 (Ker) : 2006 (3) KLJ 50 : 2006 (3) Ker LT 711 .
End of Document
[s 171E] Punishment for bribery.—

9.1 Introduction
to elections, viz:

Page 2 of 5

9.2 Jurisdiction
9.3. Punishment
Page 3 of 5
124[s 171E] Punishment for bribery.—

Whoever commits the offence of bribery shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both:
Provided that bribery by treating shall be punished with fine only.
Explanation.—‘Treating’ means that form of bribery where the gratification consists in food, drink,
entertainment, or provision.]
[s 171E.1] Scope
This section merely prescribes the punishment for the offence of bribery under section 171(B). The punishment
for bribery by “treating” is fine only, but the punishment for other forms of bribery is imprisonment of either
description for one year, or fine, or both.
[s 171E.2] “Treating”—Meaning of
See notes under section 171B.
[s 171E.3] Procedure
The offence punishable under this section is non-cognizable and summons shall ordinarily issue in the first
instance. The offence is bailable but not compoundable and is triable by a first class magistrate. The period
prescribed for the prosecution of this offence is one year.
[s 171E.4] Charge
The following form of charge may be adopted:
I (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
Page 4 of 5
(where the accused is the giver of the bribe)
That you, on or about the …………… day of …………… at ……………, gave a gratification, to wit …………… to
……………, with the object of inducing him or … (name the other person, if any) to exercise his electoral right (or
rewarding him for having exercised his electoral right), and thereby committed an offence, punishable under section
171E of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by this court on the said charge.
(where the accused is the acceptor of the bribe)
That you, on or about the……………day of……., at………, accepted for yourself, or for……………, a gratification, to
wit……………, as a reward for exercising you (or his) electoral right (or for inducing or attempting to
induce……………to exercise his electoral right), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 171E of
the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 171E.5] Proof
Where the accused is the giver of the bribe, it has to be proved that:
(a) he gave gratification to a particular person; and
(b) he did so with the object of (i) inducing him or any other person to exercise any electoral right, or (ii)
rewarding any person for having exercised any such right.
Where the accused is the acceptor of the bribe, it has to be proved that:
(a) he accepted either for himself or for any other person a gratification; and
(b) he did so as a reward (i) for exercising any electoral right, or (ii) for inducing or attempting to induce
any other person to exercise any such right.
Page 5 of 5
End of Document
[s 171F] Punishment for undue influence or personation at an election.—

9.1 Introduction
to elections, viz:

Page 2 of 6

9.2 Jurisdiction
9.3. Punishment
Page 3 of 6
125[s 171F] Punishment for undue influence or personation at an election.—

Whoever commits the offence of undue influence or personation at an election shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.]
[s 171F.1] Scope
This section prescribes the punishment for the offences of undue influence and personation at election defined
in sections 171C and 171D, IPC.
In one case, a direction was given by the election commission to the chief minister, who was campaigning for
himself on the date before the election, to return to the state headquarters under the threat of facing a drastic
action otherwise and the Chief Minister was thereby prevented from exercising his franchise at a place where
he was registered as a voter. No allegation of violence in the election process was reported against him. The
directions, further, were passed orally without giving any reasons. It was held that such direction violates
section 171F of the IPC.126
[s 171F.2] Procedure
The procedure to be followed is the same as in the case of an offence punishable under section 171E, IPC
except that the offence of personation is cognizable. The period prescribed for the prosecution of an offence
under this section is one year.
Where the accused had picked up or snatched the ballot papers from the custody and possession of some
public servants and they had even torn the same and in the process they used criminal force, charges under
sections 171F and 353, IPC framed by a judicial magistrate against them were found in order and the petition,
under section 482, CrPC, of the accused persons for quashing the FIR and the charges framed against them
were dismissed.127
[s 171F.3] Charge
Page 4 of 6
The following form of the charge may be adopted:
I, (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the……………day of…………… at……………voluntarily interfered (or attempted to interfere)
with the free exercise of and electoral right, to wit……………(or……………threatened) ……………a candidate or voter
or person in whom a candidate (or voter to wit…………… is interested) with injury, (to wit …………… or induced or
attempted to induce) …………… a candidate (or voter) at an election, to wit ……………, to believe that he or any
person in whom he is interested, to wit ……………(will become an object of divine displeasure or of spiritual censure)
and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 171F of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge.
The charge for the offence of personation at an election may run thus:
I (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the …………… day of …………… at the election to wit, applied for a voting paper (or voted) in
the name of another person, to wit ……………, who is living (or dead) (or in a fictitious name, to wit ……………) (or in
your name after having voted once at the said election) and thereby committed an offence punishable under section
171F of the Indian Penal code and within my cognizance.
[s 171F.4] Proof
In the case of undue influence at an election, the prosecution has to prove:
(a) that the accused voluntarily interfered or attempted to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral
right; or
(b) that the accused threatened any candidate or voter or any person in whom a candidate or voter is
interested, with injury of any kind; or
Page 5 of 6
(c) that the accused induced or attempted to induce a candidate or voter to believe that he or any person
in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or of spiritual
censure.
In the case of personation at an election prosecution has to prove:
(a) that at an election the accused applied for a voting paper or voted in the name of any other person,
whether living or dead, or in a fictitious name; or
(b) that the accused having voted once at an election applied at the same election for a voting paper in his
own name; or
(c) that the accused abetted, procured or attempted to procure, the voting by any person in any one of the
above ways.
[s 171F.5] Sentence
The pride of India is that its democratic structure has been maintained without any major dent from the date of
its independence in 1947. While democracy has floundered all around in the neighbourhood, the Indian
democracy has lived and survived all along though not ideally. Any attempt to undermine the democratic
process must be frowned upon in unmistakable terms. There can be no place for misuse or abuse of the right to
vote in a democracy. The abhorrence of the enlightened polity to the crime must be expressed by the sentence
imposed by the court. The length of the period which the offender spends behind the bars need not be
reckoned as vitally relevant. A deterrent sentence of fine can be imposed along with substantive sentence of
imprisonment for a reasonable period.128
Personation in elections, that is, recording votes in elections under a false name is a serious offence and fine is
not an adequate punishment.129
Page 6 of 6
126 Court on its own motion v UOI, (2001) Cr LJ 225 (P&H) : (2001) III CCR 212 (P&H).
127 Bhupinder Singh v State of Punjab, (1997) Cr LJ 3416 (P&H).
129 Emperor v AK, AIR 1948 Sind 109 , p 110 : (1947) 48 Cr LJ 481 ; Emperor v Badan Singh, AIR 1928 All 150 , refer to
notes under section 171D.
End of Document
[s 171G] False statement in connection with an election.—

9.1 Introduction
to elections, viz:

Page 2 of 7

9.2 Jurisdiction
9.3. Punishment
Page 3 of 7
130 [s 171G] False statement in connection with an election.—

Whoever with intent to affect the result of an election makes or publishes any statement purporting to be a
statement of fact which is false and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true,
in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate shall be punished with fine.]
[s 171G.1] Scope
The offence defined in this section is the making of a false statement in relation to the personal character or
conduct of a candidate at an election. This offence may be committed by any person or association, whether
corporate or incorporate. The section does not apply to defamatory statements about persons who are not
candidates131 at an election.
[s 171G.2] Analogous Law
This section, which penalises false statements of fact in relation to the personal character and conduct of a
candidate for election, corresponds to section 1 of the (English) Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act, 1895.132 The
acknowledgement of this fact has been made in the Statement of Objects and Reasons.133
This corrupt practice is defined in section 123(4) of our Representation of the People Act, 1951, as follows:
The publication by a candidate or his agent, or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election
agent, of any statement of fact which is false, and which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in
relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate, or in relation to the candidature or withdrawal of any
candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate’s election.
[s 171G.3] Section 171G Distinguished from Section 171C
It is the degree of gravity of the allegation which will be the determining factor in deciding whether the offence
Page 4 of 7
falls under section 171C, IPC or this section. If the allegation, though false and relating to a candidate’s
personal character and conduct, made with the intent to affect the result of an election, does not amount to
interference or an attempt to interfere, the offence would be the lesser one. If, on the other hand, it amounts to
interference, or an attempt to interfere, it would be the graver offence under section 171F, IPC read with section
171C.134
[s 171G.4] Distinction between Defamation (Section 499A) and Offence under Section 171G
This section, leaving aside the clause “with intent to affect the results of an election”, does not follow the
language used in section 499, IPC or refer to the offence of defamation, but uses a special language of its own
with the result that there may be cases under this section which do not fall under section 499 and vice versa.
This section is not a species of the more general offence of defamation or is carved out of section 499. It
cannot, therefore, be said that a complainant should proceed against the offender under section 171G and not
under section 500.135
The offence under sections 171G and 500 are separate and distinct, the ingredients of an offence under section
171G being different from those of an offence under section 500. The main distinction between the two sections
is that under section 171G, the allegations must be false whereas under section 499 even if the allegations are
true, the complaint for defamation will lie unless the person, who makes such defamation, comes under any
one of the exceptions. Section 499 covers a wider field. In a prosecution under section 171G if the accused is
able to show that the allegations made by him are true, the matter ends there. However, in a prosecution under
section 500, even if the accused contends that his statement is true, it may not be a full defence for him unless
he comes under any one of the exceptions.136
[s 171G.5] Statement of Fact—Meaning of
It is not apparent why the Legislature should have thought fit to use the words “any statement purporting to be a
statement of fact”, but what was intended doubtless was “any statement which is made as a statement of fact”
and that comes to much the same thing as is conveyed by the English statute. One thing at any rate is clear,
that something must be stated as a fact and not as a general imputation or as a matter of opinion.137 General
charges of misconduct are not statements of fact within the meaning of section 171G, IPC, and though one of
the statements may be construed as a statement of fact when the other statement was a general imputation of
misconduct unaccompanied by any charge of particular acts, not amounting to a statement of fact, this would
not fall under section 171G.138 This section would not be contravened where the statement was a statement not
of a fact, but merely of an opinion unless the expression of the opinion was supported by instances. Such
reference must not be merely inferential.139
[s 171G.6] Question to be Decided on the Facts of Each Case
The question whether a particular statement with respect to a candidate at an election is a statement of fact or
is a mere expression of opinion, would depend on the facts of each case and will have to be judged on the
circumstances in which the statement was made and in the context of the writing in which it appears, in case it
is part of a writing.140
[s 171G.7] “In Relation to the Personal Character or Conduct of any Candidate”—Meaning of
The statement must relate to the personal character or conduct of a candidate. The publication by one of the
contestants to an election that the other contestant is a leper, knowing it to be untrue with the mala fide
intention of injuring the latter’s reputation and humiliating him before the public, does not constitute an offence
under this section.141
[s 171G.8] Freedom of Speech—Limits of
In the language of Parker’s Election Agent and Returning Officer, there is no special privilege attached to
speeches made during an election. A speaker has full freedom of speech on matters of public interest and
general concern. He may express his honest opinion, however adverse, of the policy or public conduct of any
public man, and his comments, if uttered fairly with an honest purpose and not maliciously, are not actionable
even though they may affect the reputation of some individuals. The mere fact that his opponent is also a
Page 5 of 7
candidate for election to the parliament does not give the speaker a right to discuss all his private life and
history.
[s 171G.9] Privileged Comments
Unless a speaker is in a position to show that he had a good reason, such as would convince a man of an
ordinary common sense to believe in the truth of the statement he proposes to make, such statement had
better be left unsaid. The political address or the public career or speeches of his rival are fair subjects for bona
fide discussion and unfavourable comments are privileged. He should not, however, allude to the private life or
circumstances of any candidate. He should always bear in mind the distinction between criticism and an
allegation of fact.
It is one thing to comment upon or criticise, even with severity, the acknowledged or proven acts of a public
man and quite another to assert that he has been guilty of some particular acts of misconduct.142
[s 171G.10] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence punishable under section 171E. See notes thereunder.
The limitation prescribed for the prosecution of this offence is six months only.
[s 171G.11] Charge
That you, on or about the ……………day of ……………at…………… with intent to affect the result of the election, to
wit……………made (or published) a statement in relation to the personal character (or conduct) of a candidate, to wit
…………… which statement is false and which you knew (or believed) to be false (or which you did not believe to be
true) and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 171G of the Indian Penal Code.
[s 171G.12] Proof
For an offence under this section, the points required to be proved are:
(a) that an election was impending;
(b) that the accused made or published a statement;
(c) that it purported to be a statement of fact;
(d) that it is related to the personal conduct or character of a candidate;

Page 6 of 7
(e) that he published it with an intent to prejudice his election; and
(f) that it was false or that the accused had no reasonable grounds for believing it to be true.143
131 Narayanaswami v Devaraja, AIR 1936 Mad 316 [LNIND 1935 MAD 294] : (1935) Mad WN 1164; VP Shanmugam v
Thangavelu, AIR 1958 Mad 240 [LNIND 1957 MAD 148] , p 241 : (1958) Cr LJ 647 (2).
132 58 and 59 Vic c 49.
133 Gazette of India, Pt V, 3 July 1920, p 135.
134 SK Singh v VV Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] , p 2113 : (1971) 2 SCR 197 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] .
Page 7 of 7
135 Bhagolelal Kwalchand Darji v Emperor, AIR 1940 Ngp 249 , p 251 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 734 ; VP Shanmugam v
Thangavelu, AIR 1958 Mad 240 [LNIND 1957 MAD 148] , p 241.
136 Anthony v Nedanchezian, AIR 1970 Mad 509 [LNIND 1969 MAD 101] : (1970) Cr LJ 1593 , p 1594; Ramaswamy v
Karunanidhi, (1970) LW (Cr) 245, p 247; Bhagolelal Kwalchand Darji v Emperor, AIR 1940 Ngp 249 , p 251 : (1940) 41
Cr LJ 734 ; VP Shanmugam v Thangavelu, AIR 1958 Mad 240 [LNIND 1957 MAD 148] , p 241.
137 AS Radha Krishna Ayyar v Emperor, AIR 1932 Mad 511 : (1932) 33 Cr LJ 665 .
138 Narayanaswamy Naicker v Devaraja Mudaliar, AIR 1936 Mad 316 [LNIND 1935 MAD 294] : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 629 .
139 VP Shanmugam v Thangavelu, AIR 1958 Mad 240 [LNIND 1957 MAD 148] , p 241 : (1958) Cr LJ 647 (2).
140 Kumara Nand v Brij Mohan Lal Sharma, AIR 1967 SC 808 [LNIND 1966 SC 296] , p 811 : (1967) 2 SCR 127 [LNIND
1966 SC 296] : (1967) 2 SCJ 889 : (1967) 1 SCA 614 : (1967) Cr LJ 823 : (1967) Mah LJ 280 : (1967) MPLJ 329 .
141 Hajee Mahommad Kadir Sheriff v Rahimatullah Sahib, AIR 1940 Mad 230 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 577 .
142 VP Shanmugam v Thangavelu, AIR 1958 Mad 240 [LNIND 1957 MAD 148] , p 241 relying on Davis v Shepstone,
(1886) 11 AC 187 ; Barley v Edmons, (1895) 1 TLR 537 ; Silver v Benn, (1896) 12 TLR 199 ; Re St Georges, (1896) 5
OM&H 171; Re Cockermouth, (1901) 5 OM&H 155; Rogerson, Elections, 19th Edn pp 559–60; Halsbury’s Laws of
England, Vol 15, 4th Edn reissue, p 705 and following.
143 VP Shanmugam v Thangavelu, AIR 1958 Mad 240 [LNIND 1957 MAD 148] , p 241 : (1958) Cr LJ 647 ; Kumara Nand
v Brij Mohan Lal Sharma, AIR 1967 SC 808 [LNIND 1966 SC 296] : (1968) Cr LJ 823 .
End of Document
[s 171H] Illegal payments in connection with an election.—

9.1 Introduction
to elections, viz:

Page 2 of 4

9.2 Jurisdiction
9.3. Punishment
Page 3 of 4
144 [s 171H] Illegal payments in connection with an election.—

Whoever without the general or special authority in writing of a candidate incurs or authorises expenses on
account of the holding of any public meeting, or upon any advertisement, circular or publication, or in any other
way whatsoever for the purpose of promoting or procuring the election of such candidate, shall be punished
with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees:
Provided that if any person having incurred any such expenses not exceeding the amount of ten rupees
without authority obtains within ten days from the date on which such expenses were incurred the approval in
writing of the candidate, he shall be deemed to have incurred such expenses with the authority of the
candidate.]
[s 171H.1] Scope
This section makes it an offence to incur unauthorised expenses in connection with an election. Under the
proviso, expenses to the extent of Rs 10 may be incurred without previous authority, but subject to subsequent
ratification by the candidate within 10 days.
[s 171H.2] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence punishable under section 171E, IPC. The period of
limitation prescribed for this offence is six months only.
[s 171H.3] Charge
I (name and the office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you without the general (or special) authority in writing of ……………on or about ……………incurred (or
authorised) expenses on account of the holding of a public meeting at……………or upon an advertisement, circular or
Page 4 of 4
publication, exhibit v, (or in any other way whatsoever), for the purpose of promoting (or procuring) the election
of……………and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 171H of the Indian Penal Code and within
my cognizance.
End of Document
[s 171-I] Failure to keep election accounts.—

9.1 Introduction
to elections, viz:

Page 2 of 4

9.2 Jurisdiction
9.3. Punishment
Page 3 of 4
145 [s 171-I] Failure to keep election accounts.—

Whoever being required by any law for the time being in force or any rule having the force of law to keep
accounts of expenses incurred at or in connection with an election fails to keep such accounts, shall be
punished with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees.]
[s 171-I-1] Scope
This section penalises the failure to keep accounts of election expenses as required by law.
With reference to the elections to the house of the people and to the legislative assembly of a state, this section
has to be read with section 77 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which provides that every
candidate at an election shall, either by himself or by his election agent, keep a separate and correct account of
all expenditure in connection with the election incurred or authorised by him or his election agent from the date
of nomination to the date of declaration of the result in the manner prescribed.
[s 171-I-2] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence punishable under section 171E. The prescribed period
of limitation for prosecution under this offence is six months only.
[s 171-I-3] Charge
I (name and officer of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows: That you being required by law
for the time being in force, to wit………. (or by any rule having the force of law, to wit……) to keep accounts of
expenses incurred at or in connection with the election to wit………., failed to keep such accounts and thereby
committed an offence punishable under section 171I of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
Page 4 of 4
End of Document
[s 172] Absconding to avoid service of summons or other proceeding.—
> R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code > Chapter X Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public
Servants
Chapter X Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public Servants

This chapter is designed to penalise disobedience of public servants exercising lawful authority.1 Chapter IX dealt
with offences by or relating to public servants which are meant to prevent abuse of their power by public servants.
This chapter deals with offences of contempt of the lawful authority of public servants. They are meant to enforce
obedience and respect to the lawful authority of the public servants. It codifies the pre-existing regulations on the
subject and lays down in one place all contempt, whether they relate to the lawful authority of the courts of justice,
or officers of revenue or officers of the police. No distinction is made between the three departments, as the authors
of the Code thought that “while the division of labour between the different departments of the public service is so
imperfect it would be idle to make nice distinctions between those departments in the Penal Code”.
This chapter comprises of seven groups of offences:
(i) Disobedience to summons, etc. (sections 172–175).

(ii) Omission to give information, and furnishing false information (sections 176–177).
(iii) Refusing to take oath, etc. (sections 178–180).
(iv) False statement on oath, and false information with intent to injure (sections 181–182).
(v) Obstruction of, and omission to assist, a public servant (sections 183–187).
(vi) Disobedience to the order of a public servant (section 188).
(vii) Threat of injury to a public servant (sections 189–190).
Thus, the chapter deals with contempt in its various forms, but two elements are common to all the offences
comprised in this chapter, viz., (a) the order disobeyed must be legal, and (b) the disobedience must be intentional.
Where the facts of a case disclose no offence under sections 172–190, IPC, the case may be tried as contempt
under section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.2
This chapter does not affect the other coercive powers possessed by public servants to compel obedience to their
orders whether by attachment and sale of property, or otherwise.3

Whoever absconds in order to avoid being served with a summons, notice or order proceeding from any public
servant, legally competent, as such public servant, to issue such summons, notice or order, shall be punished
with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five
hundred rupees, or with both;
or, if the summons or notice or order is to attend in person or by agent, or to 4[produce a document or an
electronic record in a Court of Justice], with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or
Page 2 of 6
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
[s 172.1] Legislative Changes
The words “produce a document or an electronic record in a Court of Justice” were substituted by Information
Technology Act, 2000, section 91 and Sch I, for “produce a document in a Court of Justice.”
[s 172.2] Scope
Sections 172, 173 and 174 of this chapter all relate to a summons, notice or order lawfully issued by a public
servant. Section 172 punishes absconding to avoid service, section 173 punishes preventing service, and
section 174 punishes non-obedience to a summons, notice or order. The object of this section is to punish an
offender for the contempt his conduct indicates of the authority whose process he disregards. In order to prove
the commission of the offence, it must be shown that a summons, notice, or order has been issued. A person
cannot evade a direction which has not been given. There must have been an exercise of the authority of the
court or officer competent to issue the mandatory process before there can be a contempt of that authority. It is
not, therefore, sufficient to show that a person apprehending that a process will be issued has absconded. He
may do so in the hope that his absence will deter the court or officer from issuing the process, and he would not
be guilty of the offence contemplated by this section.5 This section can apply only if a summons, notice or order
is to be served on the accused, who absconded with a view to evading its service. It is doubtful, to say the least
of it, if an order that information of the date fixed for a case be given to a party is such an order as is
contemplated by this section. The section is not applicable, unless summons, notice or order which was to be
served on the accused was, in fact, in existence and capable of being served.6
There is nothing in section 98, CrPC, which requires service of an order under that section, for restoration of a
woman unlawfully detained to her liberty, to be served on any person. The order is one capable of execution,
and the section lays down that the magistrate may compel compliance with such order using such force as may
be necessary. Once an order under section 98, CrPC, has been passed, it is open to the magistrate to use all
lawful means to have the woman restored to her liberty. It is conceivable that, for that end, he may legally issue
an appropriate direction to some other person in whose custody the woman may be. When such a direction is
not given to an accused, nor was it intended by the district magistrate that any order should be served upon him
for compliance with its terms, then the accused, if he absconds, does not commit an offence under section 172,
IPC.7
[s 172.3] Analogous Law
This section is analogous to section 4 of Regulation 11 of 1796, which it substantially reproduces.
[s 172.4] Essentials to Constitute an Offence under this Section
To constitute an offence under this section two things are essential:
(a) A summons, notice or order proceeding from a public servant legally competent to issue it.
(b) Absconding in order to avoid being served with the summons, notice or order.
[s 172.5] Role of Police for Efficient Criminal Justice Delivery System
Police officers are duty bound and they are expected to be diligent in serving the summons on the witnesses so
as to enable the criminal courts to effectively discharge their duties. It is highly essential for the proper and
effective functioning of the concerned criminal courts. The important role to be played by the police wing and
the investigating agency in the administration of criminal justice delivery system needs no emphasis at the
hands of this court. Service of summons on witnesses and prompt attendance thereof is an essential facet of
criminal justice delivery system. Criminal justice delivery system to function efficiently needs effective
Page 3 of 6
coordinative and cooperative gesture of the investigating agencies inclusive of the police wing. Several of the
aspects like service of summons on witnesses, prompt attendance of the ordinary witnesses, official witnesses,
police officers, experts, judicial magistrates and the like, the execution of warrants in all promptness are a few
which may be mentioned in this context. The said list is only illustrative, but not exhaustive. Giving less priority
to these duties by the concerned executive wing is to be deprecated since it will tell upon the functioning of the
very system itself. The separation of judiciary from the executive is not to operate as an obstacle for the
effective functioning of the system. Better co-ordination is essential for better governance and better judicial
administration as well.8
[s 172.6] Second Part
The second part of the section applies only where the summons, notice or order is (a) for attendance in court or
(b) for production of a document in a court of justice.
[s 172.7] Non-appearance and Non-production of Property
This section makes absconding of a person, in order to evade from being served with a summons or notice, an
offence and does not make non-appearance of a person served with a summons or notice an offence.9
Where, however, certain movable property attached in execution of a decree was placed in charge of the
accused, and he evaded service of a notice to produce the property, and the property was not produced for
sale, it was held that he was guilty of the offence under this section and not under section 406.10
[s 172.8] “Whoever”
The use of the word “whoever” in this section implies that the operation of the section is not confined to parties
but extends also to witnesses.11
[s 172.9] “Absconds”
To abscond is to retire from public view, to take oneself off, to decamp, to go out of the way.12 According to the
Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1985 “abscond” means to depart secretly or flee from the law. However, the term
“abscond” is not to be understood as implying necessarily that a person leaves the place in which he is. Its
etymological and ordinary sense is to hide oneself; and it matters not whether a person departs from a place or
remains in it, if he conceals himself; nor does the term apply only to the commencement of the concealment. If
a person, having concealed himself before process issues, continues to do so after it has been issued, he
absconds.13
[s 172.10] “In Order to Avoid being Served”
The section declares a person to be liable to punishment if he has absconded “in order to avoid” service. The
absconding must be with a purpose. This implies that the absconder knows, or at least has reason to believe,
that the process has issued. He may abscond to avoid the issue of process, but this would not be an offence
punishable under this section. When he knows or has reason to believe that it has issued, he may be unwilling
to show contempt of the authority of the court or officer who has issued it, and may comply with it, or so conduct
himself that service may be effected; but he can hardly be said to be guilty of contempt of authority if he does
not know, and has no reason to believe that the authority has been exercised, nor to be absconding to prevent
the service of a process, if he does not know, nor has reason to believe, that it has issued.14 This implies that a
summons, notice or order has been issued, for absconding in order to avoid a summons which has not been
issued, is no offence under this section.15
The statement of a magistrate that a summons might issue has been held equivalent to its actual issue.16
[s 172.11] “With a Summons, Notice or Order”
Sections 61–68 of the CrPC lay down the rules as to issue and mode of service of summons under that Code.
Page 4 of 6
Orders V and XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, lay down the rules as to issue and service of summons
under that Code.
The provisions of this section do not cover the absconding from a warrant of arrest. A warrant addressed to a
police officer to apprehend an offender and to bring him before the magistrate is not a “summons, notice, or
order” within the meaning of this section, and the offence of absconding by an offender against whom a warrant
has been so issued is not punishable under it.17
[s 172.12] “Public Servant”
Section 21, ante, and commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 172.13] “Legally Competent” to issue such Summons, etc
The liability of the accused under this section and sections 173–174, IPC depends upon the legal competence
of the public servant to issue the summons, etc.18 Where a duty is imposed on a public officer to superintend
and control other public servants, authority to inquire into misconduct imputed to such servants in the discharge
of their official duties is implied. If a public officer has authority to hold an inquiry, he has also authority to
summon witnesses.19
[s 172.14] “Document”
Section 29, ante and commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 172.15] “Court of Justice”
Section 20, ante and commentary thereunder may be referred to.
The word “court” used in this section has, however, a wider meaning than a “Court of Justice” and it includes a
tribunal empowered to deal with a particular matter and authorised to receive evidence thereon.20
[s 172.16] Procedure
The offence is non-cognizable and summons should ordinarily be issued in the first instance. The offence is
bailable, but not compoundable, and is triable by any magistrate. It may also be tried summarily. An offender
committing an offence under this section can be prosecuted within one year of the offence subject to the
provisions of chapter 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[s 172.17] Complaint of Public Servant Concerned, Necessary
Under section 195(1)(a), CrPC no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 172–
188, IPC, or of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or of any criminal conspiracy to commit
such offence except on the complaint of the public servant concerned or of some public servant to whom he is
administratively subordinate. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 inter alia, section 190 et
seq, including section 195 must be strictly followed in such cases.21
A complaint directly made by a public servant mentioned therein is quite as sufficient as his sanction.22
[s 172.18] Charge

Page 5 of 6
That you (*) on or about the ……………. day of ……………. at……………., absconded to avoid service of summons (or
notice or order) proceeding from……………. (name of the public servant and his office or of the court of justice) and
thereby committed an offence punishable under s 172 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 172.19] Proof
To establish an offence under this section it has to be proved:
(i) That the process in question was a summons, notice or order.
(ii) That the same was issued by a public servant.
(iii) That such public servant was legally competent as such to issue it.
(iv) That such process was issued in order to be served on the accused.
(v) That the accused absconded in order to avoid being served with such process.
For the second clause of the section, it has to be proved further:
(i) That the process required the attendance of the accused (either personally or by his agent) or required
the production of a document by him either personally or by his agent.
(ii) That such attendance or production was to be in a court of justice.
1 Nandini Satpathy v PL Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 , p 1031.

2 Waryam Singh v Sadhu Ram, AIR 1972 SC 905 , pp 907–08 : (1972) Cr LJ 635 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v Reva
Shanker, AIR 1959 SC 102 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] : (1959) Cr LJ 251 .
3 Queen v Womesh Chunder Ghose, 5 WR 71, 72 and sections 82–87, CrPC, 1973.
4 Subs. by Act, 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch I, for “produce a document in a Court of Justice” (w.e.f. 17-10-2000).
Page 6 of 6
5 Madapusi Srinivasa Ayyangar v Queen, 4 ILR Mad 393, p 396.
6 Abdul Jalil Khan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 354 , p 356 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 713 .
7 Abdul Jalil Khan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 354 , p 356 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 713 .
8 Paleti Anil Babu v State, (2006) Cr LJ 3084 (AP).
9 State v Hem Narain Singh, AIR 1953 All 200 [LNIND 1952 ALL 204] .
10 Harnam Singh v Emperor, AIR 1918 All 406 (1) : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 975 .
11 Re Hossein Manjee, 9 WR 70.
12 Century Dictionary, 1897.
13 Madapusi Srinivasa Ayyangar v Queen, 4 ILR Mad 393, p 397 : 1 Weir 76.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Potts v Cambridge, 27 LJNSMC 62.
17 Queen v Womesh Chunder Ghose, 5 WR 71 (FB), per majority; Majhi Mamud v Emperor, (1906) 3 Cr LJ 117 : 2 Cal LJ
625; Queen v Zahoor Ali, (1872) 4 All HCR 97; Queen v Amir Jan, (1875) 7 All HCR 302; Re Alla Baksh, 28 PR 1890;
Queen v Hossen Manjee, 9 WR 70; Sheo Jangal Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1928 All 232 , p 233.
18 R v Purshottam Valji, 5 Bom HC 33 : 1 Weir 86.
19 Madapusi Srinivasa Ayyangar v Queen, 4 ILR Mad 393, p 396.
20 Raghoobans Sahoy v Kokil Singh, 17 ILR Cal 872; Atchayya v Gangayya, 15 ILR Mad 138; R v Ram Lal, 15 ILR All
141; section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
21 Kala Khan v Crown, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 190 , 191; For detailed commentary see Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st
Edn LexisNexis.
22 Poonit Singh v Madho, ILR 13 Cal 270.
End of Document
[s 173] Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or preventing
publication thereof.—
Servants


[s 173] Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or preventing

publication thereof.—
Whoever in any manner intentionally prevents the serving on himself, or on any other person, of any summons,
notice or order proceeding from any public servant legally competent, as such public servant, to issue such
summons, notice or order,
or intentionally prevents the lawful affixing to any place of any such summons, notice or order,
Page 2 of 4
[s 173] Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or preventing publication thereof.—
or intentionally removes any such summons, notice or order from any place to which it is lawfully affixed;
or intentionally prevents the lawful making of any proclamation, under the authority of any public servant legally
competent, as such public servant, to direct such proclamation to be made,
shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may
extend to five hundred rupees, or with both;
or, if the summons, notice, order or proclamation is to attend in person, or by agent, or 23[to produce a
document or an electronic record in a Court of Justice], with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend
to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
The words “to produce a document or an electronic record in a Court of Justice” are substituted by the
Information Technology Act, 2000, section 91 and Sch I, for “produce a document in a Court of Justice.”
[s 173.2] Scope
The first part of this section speaks of four offences thereunder:
(a) the prevention of service of a summons, notice or order;
(b) the prevention of the lawful affixing, to any place, of such summons, etc.;
(c) the removing of such summons etc., after it has been affixed; and
(d) the prevention of the lawful making of any proclamation.
In all of them the intention of the offender and the lawful authority of the public servant to issue the process are
essential pre-requisites. The offender is liable for simple imprisonment of one month or fine up to Rs 500 or with
both. The gravity of offence as per second part of the section increases if the summons, notice or proclamation
order is for attending or producing documents or electronic record in a court of justice. In the latter case, the
offender is liable to be punished by simple imprisonment of up to 6 months or with fine of up to as Rs 1000 or
with both.
[s 173.3] Preventing Service
Both under the Code of Civil Procedure24 and the Code of Criminal Procedure25 a summons may be served by
delivering or tendering a copy of the same to the person concerned.
Section 62, CrPC, provides that the summons shall, if practicable, be served personally on the person
summoned, by delivering or tendering to him, one of the duplicates of the summons, and that every person on
whom a summons is so served shall, if so required by the serving officer, sign a receipt therefor on the back of
the other duplicate.
Considering that tender itself amounts to service and delivery is not necessary, it has been held in several
cases that a refusal to accept a summons, when tendered, does not amount to intentionally preventing service
of summons. What seems to be required under this section is some act of opposition offered to the officer
Page 3 of 4
serving the process.26 However, in Budha v Emperor,27 Walsh J, held that a tender, to be sufficient service must
be a real tender of a document which is understood by the person to be served, and he must have voluntarily
waived actual delivery and indicated in some way that a tender was sufficient, and that a man, who gets away
from the serving officer with the obvious intention of not allowing him to hold any communication with him at all
and shuts himself in his house, is intentionally preventing service either by tender or by delivery. The act of
throwing down a summons which has actually been served on the accused, does not amount to a prevention of
service within the meaning of the section.28
[s 173.4] Refusal to Sign Receipt for Summons
It has been held in a number of cases that a refusal to sign a receipt for a summons, ie, a refusal to sign and
return the duplicate as required by section 62(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not an act which
prevents the service of the summons within the meaning of this section.29
A refusal to serve as a special constable, when ordered to do so, is no offence under this section and
proceedings taken under this section for such refusal are bad in law and should be quashed.30
[s 173.5] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence under section 172, IPC. The limitation prescribed for
this offence is also one year.
[s 173.6] Complaint
Complaint of the public servant concerned necessary. Synopsis notes under section 172 may be referred to.
[s 173.7] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it has to be proved that:
(i) the process in question was a summons, notice or order or a proclamation;
(ii) it was issued by a public servant;
(iii) he had authority to issue it;
(iv) if a summons, notice or order, it was issued for service on someone;
(v) the accused knew it;
(vi) he either prevented its service or removed it from any place to which it has been lawfully affixed; or that
he prevented the making of the proclamation; and
(vii) he did so intentionally.
The following aggravating facts where applicable, may be added:

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(i) that the process of proclamation required the attendance of the accused either in person or by an
agent, or the production of a document or electronic record; and
(ii) that such process or proclamation was to attend or to produce the document or electronic record in a
court of justice.

23 Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch I, for “produce a document in a Court of Justice” (w.e.f. 17-10-2000).
24 Refer to O 5, rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
25 Refer to section 62, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
26 U Thudama Wara v King-Emperor, AIR 1923 Rang 146 , p 147 : (1923) 24 Cr LJ 737 [relying on Queen v Punamalai,
5 ILR Mad 199; G Zapantis v Emperor, AIR 1920 UB 18 : (1920) 21 Cr LJ 688 ]; Chandika Prasad v Emperor, AIR
1918 Oudh 412 (1) : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 801 ; Sahadeo Rai v Emperor, AIR 1918 All 409 : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 746 ; Debigir
Tapdhari v Emperor, AIR 1925 All 322 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 909 ; Emperor v Ahmed Husain Khan, (1909) 10 Cr LJ 435 :
31 ILR All 608 : 6 All LJ 777.
27 Budha v Emperor, AIR 1928 All 118 , p 119 : (1928) 29 Cr LJ 263 .
28 Queen v Arumuga Nadan, 1 Weir 79.
29 Emperor v Ahmad Husain Khan, (1909) 10 Cr LJ 435 : 31 ILR All 608 : 6 All LJ 777; Reg v Punamalai, ILR 5 Mad 199;
Reg v Kalya Bin Fakir, 5 BHCR (Cr) 34; Queen-Empress v Bhoobuneshwar Datt, 3 ILR Cal 621; Re Ananta Kunaya, 1
Weir 80; Queen-Empress v Hira Lal, 1883 All WN 222 (where section 172 appears to have been inadvertently printed
for section 173); Queen-Empress v Krishna Gobinda Das, ILR 20 Cal 358; Debigir Tapdhari v Emperor, AIR 1925 All
322 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 909 .
30 Gopinath Paryah v Empress, (1906) 3 Cr LJ 169 , 177.
End of Document
[s 174] Non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant.—
Servants



Whoever, being legally bound to attend in person or by an agent at a certain place and time in obedience to a
summons, notice, order or proclamation proceeding from any public servant legally competent, as such public
servant, to issue the same,
intentionally omits to attend at that place or time, or departs from the place where he is bound to attend before
the time at which it is lawful for him to depart,
Page 2 of 13
shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may
extend to five hundred rupees, or with both;
or, if the summons, notice, order or proclamation is to attend in person or by agent in a Court of Justice, with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees, or with both.
Illustrations
(a) A, being legally bound to appear before the 31[High Court] at Calcutta, in obedience to a subpoena
issued from that Court, intentionally omits to appear. A has committed the offence defined in this
section.
(b) A, being legally bound to appear before a 32[District Judge], as a witness, in obedience to a summons
issued by that 33[District Judge], intentionally omits to appear. A has committed the offence defined in
this section.
By Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, the words in illustration (a) “Supreme Court”, and by the same enactment,
in illustration (b), the words “District Judge” were substituted for the words “Zila Judge”.
[s 174.2] Scope
There are two offences under this section: (i) Non-attendance in obedience to a summons, notice, order or
proclamation proceeding from a public servant legally competent to issue the same; and (ii) departure before
the time when it is lawful to depart.
In either case, the section requires the following three conditions to be fulfilled:
(i) A summons, notice, order or proclamation for attendance must be issued by a public servant who was
legally competent to issue the same.
(ii) The person summoned must be legally bound to attend at a certain place and time in answer to the
summons, notice, order or proclamation.
(iii) The person summoned must have in the first case: (a) intentionally omitted to attend at that place and
time, or in the second case, (b) departed from the place before the time at which it was lawful for him to
depart.34
In order to sustain a conviction under section 174, IPC, it must be shown that the summons issued was issued
by a public servant legally competent as such public servant to issue the same, and the accused intentionally
omitted to attend in pursuance of the summons.35
The word “whoever”, as used in section 174, IPC, is wide enough to cover any party to a proceeding as well as
a witness.36
[s 174.4] “Summons, Notice, Order or Proclamation”

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A citation to appear, issued to a person, who is in arrears of revenue, under section 147, Land Revenue Act
(UP Act 3 of 1901) is not a “summons, notice or order” which the recipient is legally bound to obey, and a
person is not guilty of the offence under this section if he fails to comply with it.37
Where the citation was issued on 25 February and it was not served till 10 March 1927, at 5:00 pm, and called
on the accused to be present at noon on 11 March “in case the entire arrears… are not paid very soon” no
conviction under section 174, IPC could possibly stand.38 For a proclamation requiring appearance before a
court, refer to section 82, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The summons, etc., contemplated by the section are those which have been issued according to law. Failure to
comply with summons, issued in proceedings, which are themselves illegal is not an offence under this
section.39
A warrant is not a “summons, notice or order” and this section does not apply to an escape from custody under
a warrant in execution of the decree of a civil court.40
A person disobeying a coroner’s summons under section 17 of the Coroners Act, 1871 (Act 4 of 1871), is guilty
of an offence under sections 174 or 175, IPC, as the case may be.
[s 174.5] Summons, etc, must be Mandatory and not Optional
Summons may be issued to a party or to a witness or to a party who is sought to be examined in the case as a
witness. The object may be to give notice to a party of some suit, application or other proceeding. In such a
case, the party is not bound to appear in court although his non-appearance may entail the consequence of an
ex parte order against him.41 Again, the object may be to compel his appearance in court to give evidence. In
such a case, he is legally bound to appear in court and he cannot be allowed to contumaciously withhold his
appearance. A summons to a witness is a process of mandatory character. In a civil suit, the court has
summary powers to proceed against him and pass orders under O XVI, rule 12, CPC. Such summary powers
have now been conferred on criminal courts as well under section 350 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. The cases of deliberate disobedience of summons are rare. Whether a party or a witness was bound to
appear in a proceeding has to be determined by a reference to the nature of the proceeding and the provision
of the particular statute under which he is served with the notice.
[s 174.6] Section not Applicable when Appearance is Optional
Section 201, UP Land Revenue Act, 1901, provides that no ex parte order or order by default shall be set aside
without a notice of the application to the opposite party. This section is analogous to O IX, Rule 14, CPC. Here
the notice served to a party is not for personal appearance. It is a matter of his option to appear or not to
appear, but non-appearance exposes him to certain legal consequences. It may be conceded that the party
served with notice in these cases is not legally bound to appear.42
[s 174.7] Form and Contents of Summons—Time and Place
Summons should be clear and specific in their terms as to the title of the court, the place at which the day, and
the time of the day when the attendance of the party summoned is required, and they should further go on to
say, that such party is not to leave the court without leave, and if the case, in which he has been summoned, is
adjourned without ascertaining the date of adjournment. Where a summons did not mention the place at which,
or the time of the day when, the attendance of the person summoned was required, it was held that such
person could not lawfully be punished under section 174, IPC for non-attendance in obedience to such
summons.43 Before convicting a person under this section, it is necessary to prove that he had notice to appear
at a certain time and place, and that he did not do so.44 But it would be most unreasonable to serve a notice on
Page 4 of 13
a person at 5:00 pm one day that he was to be present with the money on the next day by noon at a distant
place.45
A subpoena issued to a person, which did not require him to attend at a certain place, but called on him to
attend wherever the officer concerned might happen to be, is not a legal subpoena, failure to comply with which
one cannot be punished under this section.46
A summons which, although specifies the place and the day, but omits to mention the time, is a summons
which is not sufficiently specific to justify a prosecution if it is not complied with. It is not necessary that in every
case the exact hour at which the attendance of the person upon whom the summons is served is required
should be mentioned. A summons which required a person to attend at a particular police station on a particular
date between the hours of three and five in the afternoon, or “at such time as may be convenient between the
hours of 8 and 12 in the morning” would be such a summons as would render the person to whom it is
addressed liable to prosecution if he failed to obey it, but the position is different when the summons omits any
reference whatever to the hour of the day at which the attendance of the person on whom that summons is
served is required.47 A case cannot be adjourned by a proclamation merely,48 but a definite verbal order is
enough.49 A summons returnable on a sundry is legal.50 A mere verbal direction to appear before a police
officer as a witness, having regard to section 160, CrPC is not sufficient.51 The place fixed for appearance must
be within India. It is no offence to disobey a summons directing a person to appear at a place outside India.52
[s 174.8] Fact Requisite for Conviction
For a conviction under this section it must be proved that the officer in question was present53 at the place on
the date, both of which must be fixed in the summons54 and in the case of proceedings in a court, that as a fact
he took up the case in question.55
[s 174.9] Summons or Order must be Addressed to the Person Whose Presence is Required
The order in writing contemplated by the provisions of section 160, CrPC, is an order addressed to a person
whose presence is required. An order given to a subordinate police officer to produce a person before the sub-
inspector is not an order contemplated by the provisions of section 160, CrPC, disobedience of which could be
made punishable under this section, even though the order might be brought to the notice of the person
concerned. The words “summons, notice, order or proclamation”, used in this section are different forms of
directions for compliance and they would not partake of the character of directions as such if they are not
addressed to the persons whose attendance is required.56
[s 174.10] Summons or Order, must have been Properly Served
In order to sustain a charge under section 174, CrPC for disobedience to a summons issued by a court, it is
necessary to prove personal service of the summons in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.57 And, therefore, where a summons was not served personally on the defendant, but affixed
to the door of his house and he failed to attend, it was held that he had committed no offence.58 For service of
summons, refer to Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, sections 62–69. The mere production of a summons with
an endorsement of service is not sufficient proof of service. The evidence of the serving officer is necessary.59
A tender and refusal to accept a summons is a personal service.60 The summons should be left with the person
summoned.61 If a case is postponed, fresh summons or notification of postponement must be served.62 If a
witness does not receive or hear of the summons till after the day named therein, he cannot be fined for non-
attendance.63 There must be evidence to show that the summons was brought to the knowledge of the
accused.64
Section 66, CrPC, which prescribes a special mode of service on a Government servant applies only to
summons issued by a court of justice and not an order under section 160, CrPC, issued by a police officer. If
such an order is personally served on an amin of the court and is disobeyed, he would be liable under this
Page 5 of 13
section.65
[s 174.11] Party should be Legally Bound to Obey Summons, etc
Under this section it is necessary that the party should be legally bound to obey the summons. This obligation
would, in general, follow as a necessary consequence from the competence of the officer to issue the order.
But cases might arise in which there would be no such obligation. For instance, a witness, already in
attendance at one court, would be under no obligation to go to a court at a distance, until he had given his
evidence in the case for which he has been first cited.66 Where the presence of the accused required before an
authority issuing the summons, is optional, and not compulsory, it cannot be said that the accused is legally
bound to appear.67
The police have not been given powers to summon witnesses during investigation in respect of proceedings
under any of the chapter of Pt IV, CrPC, dealing with prevention of offences, unlike in the case of investigation
of offences under chapter 14, CrPC. In the absence of such powers, the petitioners can ignore the summons
and the prosecution of the petitioners for the offence under section 174, IPC, cannot be sustained.68
[s 174.12] Public Servant must be “Legally Competent” to Issue Process
The liability of the accused under this section and sections 172 and 173, IPC depends upon the legal
competence of the officer to issue the summons, etc. or to make the proclamation.69 In order to sustain a
conviction under this section it must be shown that the summons issued was issued by a public servant legally
competent to issue the same, and the accused intentionally omitted to attend in pursuance of the summons.70
[s 174.13] Public Servants not held Competent
A receiver appointed under section 56 of the Bengal Land Registration Act, 1876 (8 of 1876) is not a public
servant legally competent to issue and pass order directing persons to attend before the collector with their
collection papers and rent receipts, and disobedience to such an order does not constitute an offence under
this section or section 175.71 There is no law which makes non-attendance when called upon to serve as
coolies, an offence, and a tahsildar acting as a magistrate is not legally competent to summon persons to
appear before him and show cause why they refused to appear as coolies. They are not legally bound to obey
his summons, and cannot be convicted under this section for non-attendance in obedience to the summons.72
A cantonment magistrate is not legally competent to require the attendance of agents of bungalows in
connection with the acquisition of bungalows for military purposes, as it is not a matter connected with him as a
magistrate, and disobedience of such a requisition by him is no offence under this section.73 A tahsildar is not
legally competent to issue summons for the attendance in court of persons who prepare and attest a list of
cattle in the Mianwali district in order to make the revenue authorities able to distribute the revenue over
wastelands, and the persons called munsifs cannot be convicted for their non-attendance under this section.74
Under Rule 44 of the rules issued by the local Government in regard to the sale of ancestral land, a collector is
empowered to delegate his powers only to an assistant collector of the first class. He cannot delegate his
authority to an assistant collector of the second class and therefore, the latter is not legally competent to issue
summons, the disobedience of which would be an offence under this section.75
Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prescribes the mode of giving notice by means of a
proclamation to an accused person, alleged to be absconding, to appear in court on a particular date, and the
section makes it mandatory that the accused person shall be given notice of not less than thirty days’ period to
present himself in court, and if no such notice is given the proclamation is not a valid proclamation, and failure
to appear in obedience to it is not an offence under this section.76
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Section 160, CrPC does not provide for an order by an investigating officer to a subordinate police officer to
produce a person before him. Any such order not amounting to an order of arrest under section 41, CrPC has
no sanction of law behind it, and its disobedience by the person concerned to whose notice the order is brought
does not become a penal offence provided under this section.77
Where a tahsildar is authorised to hold an inquiry and has discretion to depute a revenue inspector to conduct
the inquiry, non-attendance in obedience to an order issued by the latter would be an offence under this
section.78
[s 174.14] Non-attendance must be Intentional
A conviction for non-attendance in obedience to an order from a public servant, under this section cannot be
had unless the person summoned was legally bound to attend, and refused or intentionally omitted to do so.79
The word “intentional” has not been defined in the IPC, but it means non-attendance which amounts to wilful
disobedience.80 The use of the word “intentionally” limits the application of the section to cases where the
omission is clearly wilful. It does not apply to a case where the omission arose from some circumstances which
rendered it impracticable for the person to attend.81
[s 174.15] Non-appearance when not Intentional
Where a person employed in an office was summoned to give evidence in a court and he failed to obey the
summons as his superior officer did not let him go, it was held that there was no intentional omission on his part
to attend the court in obedience to the summons, and he could not be held liable under this section.82
Non-appearance due to illness is not intentional. If a person is sufficiently incapacitated by illness as to have
given up his ordinary vocations, there would be sufficient excuse for him not to attend a court in obedience to a
summons.
The fact that he did not inform the court of his illness would not render him liable to punishment under this
section.83
Where an advocate summoned to appear before a magistrate on a charge under the Motor Vehicles Act was
unable to obey the summons as he was engaged in arguing a case in the High Court and sent another
advocate to ask for an adjournment, it was held that he did not intend to disobey the summons and, therefore,
committed no offence under this section.84
Where the accused summoned to appear before a settlement officer explained to the process-server his
inability to be present, but the latter omitted to mention it to the officer issuing the summons, it was held that he
could not be said to have intentionally disobeyed the summons within the meaning of this section.85 Whether or
not omission to appear was intentional is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court,86 after giving an
opportunity of hearing to explain the absence.87
[s 174.16] Appearance by Agent
An offence is not committed by an accused person in a summons case, who on the day fixed for the trial,
makes an appearance by his pleader to ask for an order dispensing with his personal attendance under section
205 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 if his conduct is in other respects lawful.88
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However, the accused specifically directed to appear in person had no authority to send his representative and
if the accused is found to have wilfully avoided to attend in spite of sufficient notice, he is guilty of offence under
section 174.89
[s 174.17] Intentional Departure before Time
In order to make a person, summoned as a witness, liable to punishment under this section, he must have
intentionally omitted to attend at the place or time mentioned in the summons, or wilfully departed from the
place where he had attended before the time at which it was lawful for him to depart.90 In Queen v Sutherland,91
it was held that a witness who attends in obedience to a summons at a certain hour is not bound to wait all day
long and if he goes away after a reasonable time, he cannot be convicted under this section. It may be doubted,
however, if a witness is not bound to wait so long as there is reason to believe that the case in which he is
summoned would come on, and his evidence taken.
In a Bombay case, a magistrate summoned the defendant to appear before him at 10 am. He attended
punctually, but the magistrate was detained by public business. After waiting for a few minutes, the defendant
went away. It was held that he was properly convicted under this section.92
Where the accused did not attend on the day fixed, but the magistrate was absent from the station the whole
day, it was held that, as the object of the summons was a meeting on a particular day between the person
summoned and a specified public functionary, the non-attendance at a time when no such meeting could have
taken place was not an offence.93
A person who duly appears in obedience to a summons but departs without permission is not guilty under
section 174, in the absence of a direction that he should not leave without permission.94
[s 174.18] Effect of Absence of Summoning Authority
For a conviction under this section for non-attendance in obedience to a summons issued by an officer, it must
be shown that the officer in question was present95 at the place and on the date, both of which must be fixed in
the summons,96 and in the case of proceedings in a court, that as a fact he took up the case in question,97
failing which the accused cannot be convicted.
[s 174.19] Opportunity to Explain Absence must be Given to Accused
Before considering the question whether or not disobedience to a summons was intentional, the accused
should be given an opportunity of explaining his absence.98
The offence under this section is non-cognizable and a summons should ordinarily be issued in the first
instance. It is bailable but not compoundable, and is triable by any magistrate. The period prescribed for
prosecution under his section is one year.
For the offender to be prosecuted for the said offence of disobeying the summons of the court, a charge has got
to be framed, he has to be tried and the procedure as is envisaged by the relevant provisions of CrPC, has to
be followed.99
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Non-attendance in obedience to a summons of a court is an offence under this section. If the magistrate thinks
that such an offence had been committed by the person in question, he ought to follow the procedure
prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in trying him therefor. When this is not done, but a simple
notice is sent to the person and he comes forward and asks to be excused, and the magistrate “sentences” him
to pay a fine of Rs 5, this procedure is not what is contemplated by the Code.100
[s 174.21] Complaint of Public Servant or Court Necessary
A competent court who can try the accused for the said infraction should try the case on a complaint filed by the
court. But there is a limitation for that competent court to take cognizance of the offence and in the absence of
the necessary complaint in writing filed by the public servant where orders have been flouted, the competent
court is precluded from taking cognizance under section 195, CrPC, which engrafts a bar for the court to take
cognizance of the offence alleged against the person who has violated the orders of the court in having failed to
appear before that court pursuant to the summons issued which is an offence punishable under section 174,
IPC. In the absence of any such written complaint filed by the public servant whose order has been infracted,
no court can take cognizance of the offence and there can be no punishment.101 In view of the provisions of
section 195(1)(a), CrPC, an offence punishable under this section can be taken cognizance of by a court only
on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is
subordinate.102 An offence under this section is against the public servant before whom the accused fails to
appear. Where, therefore, a witness fails to appear before the court, which summoned him, a complaint must
be made by the court. If there is no such complaint, the accused cannot be convicted on a complaint by a sub-
inspector of police.103
Therefore, if the court is of the opinion that there has been infraction of the order of the court by committing
default in making appearance before that court pursuant to the summons issued by it, such violation on the part
of the person responsible can be effectively dealt with only by ordering prosecution by filing a complaint in
writing before a competent court of magistrate empowered to take cognizance.104
[s 174.22] Whether Judge, Magistrate or Officer whose Order is Disobeyed, can Try such Offender
This section is one of the sections referred to in section 195, CrPC, and having regard to the provision of
section 352 of that Code, therefore, an offence under this section cannot be tried by the officer whose order is
disobeyed.105 Section 352 is a prohibitory section and it excludes the jurisdiction of a court in cases in which the
offence is committed before itself or in contempt of its authority.106 The prohibition is absolute and consent or
otherwise of the accused is immaterial.107
Section 345, CrPC, envisages a procedure, where a court can invoke its summary powers and punish the
contemnor who has violated the orders of the courts by taking cognizance of the offence and by calling for the
explanation from him and for that purpose by ordering detention of that person till the end of the summary trial
and at the end the court is empowered to inflict the sentence of fine not exceeding Rs 200 but the summary
power of the court can be exercised in respect of an offence enumerated under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or
228, IPC. The offence enumerated under section 174, IPC, is not the offence that can be tried summarily under
section 345, CrPC.108
Section 350 of the CrPC, however, provides a summary procedure for punishment for non-attendance by a
witness in obedience to a summons. Under that section, if the court before which the witness is to appear is
satisfied that it is expedient in the interest of justice that such witness should be tried summarily, the court may
take cognizance of the offence and after giving the offender an opportunity of showing cause why he should not
be punished under this section, sentence him to fine not exceeding Rs 100. In such cases, the procedure
prescribed for summary trial has to be followed as nearly as may be practicable.
Page 9 of 13

31 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “Supreme Court”.
32 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “Zila Judge”.
33 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “Zila Judge”.
34 Emperor v Himachal Singh, AIR 1930 All 265 , p 269 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 546 (FB).
35 Shiam Lal v Emperor, AIR 1914 All 519 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 595 ; Krishna v State, (1975) Cr LJ 620 (HP) : (1974) ILR HP
452.
36 Nyaya Panchayat Palog v Chanu Ram, AIR 1964 HP 2 [LNIND 1962 HP 18] (4) : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 34 .
37 Emperor v Himachal Singh, AIR 1930 All 265 , p 268 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 546 (FB); Banwari Lal v King-Emperor, AIR
1927 All 49 : (1927) 28 Cr LJ 153 ; Emperor v Bhirgu Singh, AIR 1927 All 122 : (1927) 28 Cr LJ 20 ; the rulings to the
contrary King-Emperor v Sarju Singh, 6 All LJ 114 (Notes); Ram Bali Singh v Emperor, (1909) 10 Cr LJ 250 ; Chandrika
Singh v Emperor, AIR 1928 Oudh 122 : (1928) 29 Cr LJ 94) are no longer good law.
38 Emperor v Tika Ram, AIR 1928 680 All (FB) : (1929) Cr LJ 910 (FB).
39 Behari Lal v Emperor, AIR 1920 All 304 , p 305 : (1921) 22 Cr LJ 79 .
40 Reg v Sardar Pathu, 1 Bom HCR 38 : 7 Mad HCR App 8; Queen v Womesh Chunder Ghose, 5 WR 71(FB); Sheo
Jangal Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1928 All 232 .
41 Refer for instance O IX, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
42 Per Sen J, in Emperor v Himachal Singh, AIR 1930 All 265 , pp 273–74.
43 Empress v Ram Saran, ILR 5 All 7 : (1882) 2 All WN 145 : 7 Mad HC Rep App 14.
44 Re Shib Pershad Chuckerbutty, 17 WR 38 : 7 Mad HCR 14, p 43 : 1 Weir 811.
45 Emperor v Tika Ram, AIR 1928 All 680 (FB) : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 910 (FB).
46 Hukum Singh v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 474 , p 475 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 697 .
Page 10 of 13
47 Latoor Mal v Emperor, AIR 1948 All 137 (2), p 138 : (1948) 49 Cr LJ 109 .
48 6 Mad HCR 29 : 1 Weir 84.
49 R v Guman Parthan BR, 5 Mad HCR 15 : 1 Weir 87 : 7 Mad HCR 3 : 1 Weir 88.
50 1 Weir 86.
51 Ibid.
52 Queen-Empress v Paranga, ILR 16 Mad 463 : 1 Weir 88.
53 R v Krishtappa, ILR 20 Mad 31 : 1 Weir 83.
54 1 Weir 81, 82.
55 R v Lalu, (1909) 10 Cr LJR 576 : 3 Serv LR 155.
56 Bhambhia Noghanji v State of Kutch, AIR 1954 Kutch 25 , p 26 : (1954) 55 Cr LJ 1060 .
57 Reg v Hury Nath, 7 WR (Cr) 58; Reg v Sreenath, 10 WR (Cr) 33; Pal Singh Santa Singh v State, AIR 1955 Punj 18 :
(1955) Cr LJ 318 .
58 6 Mad HC App 24.
59 1 Weir 85.
60 R v Punamali, 5 ILR Mad 199 : 1 Weir 81; R v Ahmad Husain Khan, (1909) 10 Cr LJ 435 : 6 All LJ 777.
61 Re Kuppan, ILR 11 Mad 137 : 1 Weir 10.
62 Re Breenath Ghose, 10 WR (Cr) 33 : 6 Mad HCR App 29 : 1 Weir 83.
63 R v Ungam Lall, 1873 1 NWP 303.
64 1 Weir 83 : 6 Mad HCR App 29; Periannamalawaram, 1 Weir 84; Ganapathi Aiyan, 1 Weir 85.
65 Re Gumparthi Venkataramiah, (1917) 18 Cr LJ 733 , p 734.
66 Mayne’s Commentary of section 74; Sitalal v Gram Panchayat Dhammod, (1962) MPLJ 331 (Notes).
Page 11 of 13
67 Abdul Khader v State, (1969) LW (Cr) 266, p 267; Re Sreenath Ghose, 10 WR 33; Dandapani v State, 26 Cut LT 571 :
(1960) 2 Ori JD 308.
68 Re Manicka Reddy, AIR 1968 Mad 225 : (1967) Mad LW (Cr) 173 : (1968) Cr LJ 760 .
69 R v Purshotam, 5 Bom HCCC 33 : 1 Weir 86; Re Vijayam & Co, (1962) 2 Mad LJ 264; Ebrahim Sircar v Emperor, ILR
29 Cal 236, p 239; Gopia v King-Emperor, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 497 : 1 All LJ 263; Radhakrishana Chettiar v Sales Tax
Officer, (1968) Ker LT 731 [LNIND 1968 KER 147] : (1968) Mad LJ (Cr) 603; Ram Chand v Emperor, (1922) 23 Cr LJ
230 ; Khota Ram v Emperor, (1907) 6 Cr LJ 107 ; Shiam Lal v Emperor, AIR 1914 All 519 , p 520 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 595
; Bhambhia Noghanji v State of Kutch, AIR 1954 Kutch 25 , p 26 : (1954) Cr LJ 1060 ; Re Manicka Reddy, AIR 1968
Mad 225 : (1967) Mad LW (Cr) 173 : (1968) Cr LJ 760 ; Krishna v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1975) Cr LJ 620 , p 621
(HP) : (1974) ILR HP 452.
70 Shiam Lal v Emperor, AIR 1914 All 519 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 595 ; Krishna v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1975) Cr LJ 620
(HP); Radhakrishan Chettiyar v Sales Tax Officer, (1968) Ker LT 731 [LNIND 1968 KER 147] : (1968) Mad LJ (Cr) 603.
71 Ebrahim Sircar v Emperor, ILR 29 Cal 236, p 239.
72 Gopia v King-Emperor, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 497 : (1904) 1 All LJ 263.
73 Ram Chand v Emperor, (1922) 23 Cr LJ 230 .
74 Khota Ram v Emperor, (1907) 6 Cr LJ 107 : 4 PR (Cr) 1907 : 37 PLR 1907 : 25 PWR 1907 (Cr).
75 Shiam Lal v Emperor, AIR 1914 All 519 , p 520 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 595 : (1914) 12 All LJ 680.
76 Pal Singh Santa Singh v State, AIR 1955 Punj 18 : (1955) Cr LJ 318 .
77 Bhambhia Noghanji v State of Kutch, AIR 1954 Kutch 25 , p 26 : (1954) Cr LJ 1060 .
78 Re Kamam Venkatrao, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 566 , 567; Queen v Subbanna, 1 Weir 90 (FB).
79 Re Sreenath Ghose, 10 WR 33; Dandapani v State, 26 Cut LT 571 : (1960) 2 Ori JD 308; Shiamlal v Emperor, AIR
1914 All 519 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 595 .
80 Mul Singh v Emperor, AIR 1923 Lah 163 , p 166; Abdul Khader v State, (1969) LW (Cr) 266; Dandapani v State, (1960)
2 Ori JD 308 : 26 Cut LJ 571.
81 Re Randhir, 22 PR 1880.
82 Re Sreenath Ghose, 10 WR (Cr) 33; Mul Singh v Emperor, AIR 1923 Lah 163 : (1923) 24 Cr LJ 433 ; Dandapani v
State, 26 Cut LJ 571 : (1960) 2 Ori JD 308; Abdul Khader v State, (1969) LW (Cr) 266, p 267.
83 Bohra Birbal v King-Emperor, AIR 1922 All 82 (1) : (1922) 23 Cr LJ 203 : (1922) 20 All LJ 192.
Page 12 of 13
84 JR Dass v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Rang 35 : (1924) 25 Cr LJ 229 : 2 Bur LJ 146.
85 Randhir, 22 PR 1880 (Cr).
86 Bhambhia Noghanji, AIR 1954 Kutch 25 , p 26 : (1954) Cr LJ 1060 .
87 Ramun v Emperor, (1908) 7 Cr LJ 226 , 227; Ebrahim Mammojee Parekh v Emperor, AIR 1926 Rang 188 .
88 Durga Das v Umesh Chandra, 27 ILR Cal 985.
89 UOI v SP Goyal, (2002) Cr LJ 4146 (Bom).
90 Queen v Sutherland, 14 WR 20.
91 Ibid.
92 Reg v Kisan Bapu, 10 ILR Bom 93.
93 Reg v Krishtappa, ILR 20 Mad 31.
94 Re Narayanappa, 1 Weir 99.
95 R v Krishtappa, ILR 20 Mad 31 : 1 Weir 83.
96 1 Weir 81, 82.
97 R v Lalu, (1909) 10 Cr LJ 516 : 3 Serv LR 155.
98 Ramun v Emperor, (1908) 7 Cr LJ 226 , p 227 : 2 PWRC 85; Ebrahim Mammojee Parekh v Emperor, AIR 1926 Rang
188 .
99 M Sudhakara Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) Cr LJ 448 (AP).
100 Shahab Din v State, AIR 1961 J&K 54 : (1961) 62 Cr LJ 87 .
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Sheomangan Singh v Emperor, AIR 1942 Oudh 425 , p 426 : (1942) 43 Cr LJ 641 .
Page 13 of 13
104 M Sudhakara Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) Cr LJ 448 (AP).
105 Deo Saran Tewari v Emperor, AIR 1918 All 320 (1) : 40 ILR All 86 : 15 All LJ 877 : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 688 ; Mahommad
Din v Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah 545 (1) : 35 PLR 454; Shahab Din v State, AIR 1961 J&K 54 .
106 Anand Reddi v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 AP 144 [LNIND 1958 AP 114] , p 146 : (1959) Cr LJ 300 .
107 Mahommad Din v Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah 545 (1).
108 M Sudhakar Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2001) Cr LJ 448 (AP).
End of Document
[s 174A] Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section 82 of
Act 2 of 1974.—
Servants


109[s174A] Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section 82

of Act 2 of 1974.—
Whoever fails to appear at the specified place and the specified time as required by a proclamation published
under sub-section (1) of section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both, and where a declaration has
been made under sub-section (4) of that section pronouncing him as a proclaimed offender, he shall be
Page 2 of 3
[s 174A] Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section 82 of Act 2 of 1974.—
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.]
This section is newly inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005), section
44(b) (w.e.f. 23-06-2006).
Notes on Clauses
CrPC (Amendment) Act, 2005—Clause 44.—This clause amends the Indian Penal Code as follows, namely:—
Clause 12 seeks to insert new sub-sections (4) and (5) in Section 82 of the Code to provide for the declaration of a
person as proclaimed offender, if he fails to appear inspite of the proclamation published under sub-section (1) of that
section. In order to curb the tendency on the part of criminals not to attend the Court in response to proclamation
published under sub-section (1) or further proclamation issued under sub-section (4) declaring the accused as
“Proclaimed Offender” a new Section 174-A is being added to the Indian Penal Code to prescribe punishment for such
offender.
[s 174A.2] Scope and Application
Persons against whom proclamation is issued under section 82(1), CrPC would be divided into two categories.
The first category would be of the persons who are accused of an offence other than the one mentioned in
section 82(4), CrPC and the second category of the persons accused of an offence mentioned in section 82(4),
CrPC. For these two categories of persons, punishment is differently provided by section 174A, IPC. Where the
accused is a person against whom proclamation stands published, he is liable to be proceeded against under
section 83, CrPC by way of attachment of his property as also under section 174A, IPC.110
If the IO submits charge-sheet without arresting the accused persons (unless he is on bail), it can be submitted
only if he has been declared absconder and the case under section 174A, IPC has also been registered as a
result of this proclamation.111

109 Ins. by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005), section 44(b) (w.e.f. 23-6-2006).
110 Sanjay Sarin v State (UT, Chandigarh), 2013 Cr LJ 408 , 410, 411 (P&H) (DB) : 2013 (3) Ren CR (Criminal) 138.
111 Iqbal v State of UP, 2013 Cr LJ 1332 : 1334 (All) : 2013 (1) ACR 1139 .
Page 3 of 3
[s 174A] Non-appearance in response to a proclamation under section 82 of Act 2 of 1974.—
End of Document
[s 175] Omission to produce [document or electronic record] to public
servant by person legally bound to produce it.—
Servants


[s 175] Omission to produce 112[document or electronic record] to public

servant by person legally bound to produce it.—
Whoever, being legally bound to produce or deliver up any 113[document or electronic record] to any public
servant, as such, intentionally omits so to produce or deliver up the same, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees,
or with both;
Page 2 of 6
[s 175] Omission to produce [document or electronic record] to public servant by person legally bound to
produce it.—
or, if the 114[document or electronic record] is to be produced or delivered up to a Court of Justice, with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
Illustrations
A, being legally bound to produce a document before a 115[District Court], intentionally omits to produce the
same. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
In the illustration, the words “District Court” were substituted for the words “Zila Court” by the Adaptation of
Laws Order, 1950.
The words “document or electronic record” were substituted by the Information Technology Act, 2000, section
91 and Sch I for “document” w.e.f. 17-10-2003.
[s 175.2] Scope
Section 174, IPC deals with disobedience of summons, etc., to attend and this section deals with disobedience
of a summons, etc., to produce a document. This section applies to a witness who, having a document, does
not produce it in obedience of a summons to produce it.116 In order to convict a person under this section for
non-production of a document, it must be shown that the production of the document was necessary or
desirable for the decision of the case in which it was summoned,117 and that it was in the possession or control
of the accused.118 The summons or order must specify the particular documents or books required.
Where a junior member of Hindu family attended court in obedience to a summons which directed him to
produce his account books in respect of a family business in which he was a partner with his father, but he did
not produce the same, it was held that he could not be proceeded against under this section or section 345 of
the CrPC since the summons was too vague in not directing any particular book to be produced and since he,
as junior member, could not be expected to have control of the books.119
A party to a suit, failing to comply with an order for production or inspection of documents, does not commit an
offence under this section, but is liable to be dealt with only in the manner prescribed by O XI, rule 22, CPC.120
The omission to produce the document must be intentional.
Where the omission on the part of the accused to produce and deliver up the document to the court constitutes
the real gravamen of the offence of contempt of court, this section would hardly be relevant.121 This section and
other sections of this chapter relate to particular rules of contempts of lawful authority of public servants. Where
the facts of a case disclose no offence under sections 172–190, the case, if the facts so permit may be tried as
a contempt case under section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.122
Under section 30(b), CPC, a court may issue a summons to any person whose attendance is required either to
give evidence or to produce documents and under section 32 it can compel the attendance of such person.
Order XI, Rule 14, CPC empowers the court during the pendency of a suit to order the production by any party
Page 3 of 6
produce it.—
thereto of such of the documents in his possession or power relating to any matter in question in such a suit.
Under section 162 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is
in his possession or power, bring it to court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production
or to its admissibility, and the validity of such objection shall be decided by the court.
Under section 130 of the 1872 Act, no witness shall be compelled to produce his title deeds and under section
131 of 1872 Act, no one shall be compelled to produce documents in his possession, which any other person
would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession, unless such last mentioned person
consents to their production.
There are also provisions in some special or local Acts under which persons are legally bound to produce
documents. Thus, under section 39 of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (V of 1954), a consolidation
officer may require any person to produce such documents as he may deem necessary for the proper exercise
of his powers or discharge of his duties, and the person required to produce the document is “legally bound” to
do so within the meaning of this section.
[s 175.4] Document
Section 29 and commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 175.5] Privileged Documents
Although a witness may refuse to deliver up a document on the ground that it is privileged, he is not excused
thereby, from bringing it to court for the court’s inspection and decision thereon, unless the document
constitutes state proceedings, in which case the word of the public officer having their custody, must be
taken.123
[s 175.6] “Legally Bound to Produce”
A person is not legally bound to produce a deed for the purpose of verifying a copy thereof in a registration
office.124 In Ishwar Chandra Ghoshal v Emperor,125 it was held that the provisions of section 91, CrPC, cannot
be taken to apply to the case of an accused person on his trial to whom a notice had been issued to produce an
incriminating document. However, it has also been held in several other cases that it is competent to a
magistrate under section 91, CrPC, to issue a summons to an accused person to produce a document or other
thing, even if the production of it might tend to incriminate him.126
Income-tax officers are not bound, by their oath of secrecy, when summoned, to give evidence in a court of
justice.127
When a karnam is in possession of Government records, he was ex necessitae to hand over the records to
another karnam who is duly appointed by the collector. His action would certainly fall within the definition of
“legally bound to do” under section 43, IPC. If he is legally bound to do an act and if he fails to do so, then this
section will apply.128
An offence under this section is committed when there is a legal obligation, on an accused, to produce or
Page 4 of 6
produce it.—
deliver the document or other thing to a public servant.129
[s 175.7] Procedure
An offence under this section is non-cognizable and bailable but not compoundable. This is triable by the court,
in which the offence is committed in a court by any magistrate.130 The period prescribed for prosecution for this
offence is one year.
[s 175.8] Complaint
Under section 195(1)(a) of the CrPC, no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections
172–188 of the IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public
servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. Subject to the provisions of section 352 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure 1973, no Judge of a criminal court or a magistrate can try any person for any offence
committed before him. Section 352 runs as follows:
[s 352] Certain Judges and Magistrates not to try certain offences when committed before themselves.—
Except as provided in sections 344, 345, 349 and 350, no judge of a Criminal Court (other than a judge of a High
Court) or magistrate shall try any person for any offence referred to in section 195, when such offence is committed
before himself or in contempt of his authority, or is brought under his notice as such judge or magistrate in the course
of a judicial proceeding.
[s 175.9] Special Procedure in Certain Cases of Contempt
Commentary on section 345(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973131 may be referred to.
[s 175.10] When Jurisdiction of High Court not Excluded
If the acts alleged are offences under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or section 228, IPC, they constitute contempt
and can be taken cognizance of by the court, in whose view or presence they are committed, and, in respect of
only such contempt, the High Court would not take cognizance because section 3(2) of the Contempt of courts
Act, 1971 bars its jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the act, complained of, which is alleged to constitute
contempt, is an offence under the Indian Penal Code, but other than an offence under sections 175, 178, 179,
180 or section 228 of the Code, then the jurisdiction of the High Court is not excluded.132
[s 175.11] Proof
To establish an offence under this section it must be proved that:
(i) the accused was legally bound to produce or deliver up any document or electronic record to any
public servant or to a court of justice;
(ii) he omitted to produce or deliver it up; and
(iii) he did so intentionally.

Page 5 of 6
produce it.—

112 Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch I, for “document” (w.e.f. 17-10-2000).
113 Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch I for “document” (w.e.f. 17-10-2003).
114 Subs. by Act 21 of 2000, section 91 and Sch I for “document” (w.e.f. 17-10-2003).
115 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “Zila Court”.
116 Re Premchand Dowlatram, 12 ILR Bom 63.
117 Mithan Lal v Emperor, AIR 1918 Pat 590 (2) : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 217 .
118 Damri Ram v Emperor, AIR 1918 Pat 590 , p 593; Re Salig Ram, (1890) 10 All WN 171.
119 Re Salig Ram, (1890) 10 All WN 171.
120 Ram Chand v R, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 386 : 15 PR (Cr) 1910.
121 State v Bhagwat Singh, AIR 1968 Del 208 [LNIND 1967 DEL 127] : (1968) DLT 174 (FB).
Shankar, AIR 1959 SC 102 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] , (1959) Cr LJ 251 .
123 Indian Evidence Act, 1872, sections 123, 162; Beatson v Skene, 29 LJ Ex 430; Hennessy v Wright, LR 29 QBD 5.
124 Asamatullah v R, (1906) 3 Cr LJ 114 : (1905) 2 Cal LJ 621 ; Re Phool Chand Brojobassee, 16 WR 35.
125 Ishwar Chandra Ghoshal v Emperor, (1908) 8 Cr LJ 224 .
126 Surey Kondareddi v Emperor, AIR 1915 Mad 17 : (1912) 13 Cr LJ 493 : 37 ILR Mad 112; Re Ahmed Mahamed, 15 ILR
Cal 109; Re HH The Nizam of Hyderabad v AM Jacob, ILR 19 Cal 52; Damri Ram v Emperor, AIR 1918 Pat 590 (2).
127 Lee v Birrell, 3 Cam 337; R v Yakatazkhan, 2 Mad Sess 1863.
128 Re AS Socha Gowder, AIR 1956 Mad 335 , 336 : (1956) Cr LJ 754 .
Page 6 of 6
produce it.—
129 Re Venkataraman, (1968) Cr LJ 417 , p 418 (Mad) : (1967) Mad LJ (Cr) 437, Re Vijayam & Co, (1962) 2 Mad LJ 264,
pp 265–66 : (1962) 75 Mad LW 607 ; Re AS Socha Gowder, AIR 1956 Mad 335 , p 336 : (1956) Cr LJ 754 .
130 See the First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; see also section 352 of the said Code.
131 For detailed commentary see Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn LexisNexis.
132 Re Bhola Nath Chaudhary, AIR 1961 Pat 1 , p 5.
End of Document
[s 176] Omission to give notice or information to public servant by person
legally bound to give it.—
Servants


[s 176] Omission to give notice or information to public servant by person

legally bound to give it.—
Whoever, being legally bound to give any notice or to furnish information on any subject to any public servant,
as such, intentionally omits to give such notice or to furnish such information in the manner and at the time
required by law, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with
fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both;
Page 2 of 9
[s 176] Omission to give notice or information to public servant by person legally bound to give it.—
or, if the notice or information required to be given respects the commission of an offence, or is required for the
purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or in order to the apprehension of an offender, with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees, or with both;
133[or, if the notice or information required to be given is required by an order passed under sub-section (1) of
section 565 (now 356) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (now 1973)134 with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees,
or with both.]
[s 176.1] Scope
This section applies to persons upon whom an obligation is imposed by law to furnish certain information to
public servants, and the penalty, which the law provides is intended to apply to parties who commit an
intentional breach of such obligation. No offence is committed if there is no such legal obligation.135 The gist of
the offence is that there should be an intentional omission to give the information.136 The section refers to
information to be given in statements required to be furnished under some provision of law.137
The section is in three parts. All the three parts deal with an omission to give notice or information to a public
servant. The omission to give information to a public servant “or any subject” by a person legally bound to give
such information is punishable under the first part of the section; and if the “subject” in question is an “offence”,
the omission is more severely punishable under the second part. The third part deals with an omission to give
notice or information required under section 565(1) (now section 356) of the CrPC.
It is a well established principle that section 176, IPC is intended to apply to parties who commit an intentional
breach of obligation to report, and not where the public servant had already obtained the information from other
sources.138 The provisions of this section should be used not for the purpose of vexation, but for ensuring that
information be not intentionally withheld by those whose position renders them liable to give it.139 When several
parties are bound to give information and one of them furnishes it, it is not reasonable to prosecute the other or
others for not giving the same.140
The third clause to the section was inserted by section 2 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1939. This
clause requires amendment to substitute section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the existing
words of section 565 of the same Code.
[s 176.3] Ingredients of Offence
The two ingredients of the offence are:
(i) intentional omission to give information to a public servant; and
(ii) that the accused was legally bound to give such information to a public servant.141
[s 176.4] Legally Bound
A person is said to be “legally bound to do” whatever it is illegal for him to omit.142 And it is only illegal for him to
omit what is an offence or prohibited by law or is ground for a civil action.143 To render a person liable under this
section it must be shown: (a) that there was an obligation imposed on him by law to give the notice or
information, and (b) that he “intentionally” omitted to give the same.144 If there is no such legal obligation, there
Page 3 of 9
can be no offence in withholding the information in question.145 This section refers to information to be given in
statements required to be furnished under some provision of law.146
[s 176.5] Sections 40, 43 and 176 Read Together
If sections 40, 43 and 176, IPC be read together, the result follows that one who fails to furnish information
which he is legally bound to furnish is punishable under section 176, that he is legally bound to furnish what it is
illegal for him to omit, that it is illegal for him to omit what is an offence and that an offence is what is punishable
under the Penal Code.147
[s 176.6] Statutory Obligation
Such legal obligations are imposed by various Acts, both Central and local.
(a) Information in Regard to Matters other than Offence
For duty of officer employed in connection with the affairs of a village to make certain report, see commentary
to section 40, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.148
A village headman, patwari and chowkidar are legally bound under section 40(1)(b) of the CrPC to give the
police information, which they possess respecting the resort to any place within their village of a proclaimed
offender to the village, and if being aware of such a visit, they intentionally omit to do so, they are liable under
this section whether the proclamation under section 87 of the CrPC was or was not made strictly in accordance
with the terms of that section.149 Under certain circumstances covered by section 45(d) of the CrPC, 1898 (now
section 40(d) of the CrPC, 1973), the concealment of suspicious death is punishable under this section, but
mere servants, who are entirely dependent on their master in whose house the death takes place, do not come
within the category of persons who are bound to communicate an occurrence of this sort.150
The bringing of a suspected robber under arrest to the village of the accused and releasing him there does not
amount to the resorting to any place within, or the passage through the village of a suspected robber within the
meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 40, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.151
In a case,152 the Madras High Court held that the owner of land on which a corpse is seen, need not be the
owner or occupier of land on which the occurrence took place. The finding of a dead body on any land would
ordinarily raise the presumption that death had taken place on that spot, so as to impose an obligation on a
person occupying one of the positions in relation to the land described in this section to communicate
information regarding the matter. He must justify the omission to give information. Per Prinsep and Macpherson
JJ (Mitter J, dissenting), held that the (dead) body standing by itself does not necessarily lead to the inference
that death took place in the village. It is equally consistent with death having taken place in another village and
the dead body having been subsequently removed to the village where it is at last found.153
A Karnam in Madras Presidency is bound to furnish true information regarding cultivation in his village.154 But
he is not liable under section 176, IPC, if he omits to submit the information in obedience to an order of a
Revenue Inspector.155
The allegation against the wife was that she was in possession of unauthorized liquor. The husband cannot be
compelled to give information to the police about the unauthorized possession of liquor by the wife. The wife
and the husband cannot be prosecuted for offences under sections 176 and 420, IPC.156
Foreigners Act, 1864157

Page 4 of 9
Under this provision masters of foreign vessels are liable to furnish information.
Coroners Act, 1871158
A person appearing on a summons before a coroner but who refuses to give the required information commits
an offence under this section.
Dramatic Performance Act, 1876159
Failure to give information as to a proposed dramatic performance, when called upon to do so by the local
government, or its officer, is punishable under this section.
Indian Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961)
Sections 94(6) and 133 empower Income-Tax Officers to require certain information and section 271 provide
penalties for failure to furnish the information.
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894)160
Section 10(2) provides that everyone required to make or deliver a statement under section 9 or section 10 of
the Act is legally bound to do so within the meaning of sections 175 and 176, IPC.
Indian Succession Act, 1925
If an executor or administrator, on being required by the court to exhibit an inventory or account under section
317 of the 1925 Act, intentionally omits to comply with the requisition, he shall be deemed to have committed
an offence under section 176, IPC.161
City of Bombay Municipality Act, 1888 (3 of 1888)
Section 473 provides that whoever contravenes the provisions of section 155(1) and (2), or section 187
commits an offence under section 176 or section 177, as the case may be.
Indian Works of Defence Act, 1903 (7 of 1903), Section 11
Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), Section 84(2)
Under sub-section (1) of the Act, every registering officer appointed under this Act shall be deemed to be a
public servant within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code, and every person under sub-section (2) of the Act,
shall be legally bound to furnish information to such registering officer when required by him to do so.
UP Land Revenue Act, 1901 (3 of 1901)
Under section 46, a zamindar is bound to furnish information required by a patwari to prepare his jamabandi,
and failure to do so is punishable under section 176, IPC.162 However, the zamindar is not bound to give the
information unless he is asked to give it by the qanungo or patwari.163
UP Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1954 (5 of 1954), Section 39
Under section 39, a person required by a Consolidation Officer to furnish certain information is bound to furnish
it.
It has been held that a person who refuses to answer when examined under section 161, CrPC cannot be said
to commit an offence under section 176 or section 179 or section 187, IPC.164
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(b) Information in regard to Offences
Under section 39 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 every person is bound to give information to the
nearest magistrate or police officer of the commission of, or intention to commit, any offences specified under
the Indian Penal Code.165 Again, under section 40(1)(c) and (e), CrPC the persons mentioned in the section are
bound to give information to the nearest magistrate or police officer respecting the commission or intention to
commit the offences specified therein.
(c) Information required to be given under section 356(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Before the insertion of the third part in this section by section 2 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 22 of
1939, and the amendment of section 567 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 by Act 7 of 1924 and Act 22
of 1939, it was held that notice of residence required to be given under section 565, CrPC was not required for
preventing the commission of any particular offence and that failure to give such notice fell under the first part
and not under the second part of section 176 of the Penal Code.166 The offence under the first part of this
section is punishable only with simple imprisonment or with fine extending up to five hundred rupees or both.
But now the third part of this section specifically provides for a breach of the order under section 565(1) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the punishment for failure to give the notice required by that section has
been altered to imprisonment of either description up to six months or fine up to Rs 1000 or both.
[s 176.7] “Offence”
By virtue of section 40, and the explanation to section 177, IPC “offence” means a thing made punishable by
the Code, or under any special or local law whether committed within or without India in the case of the
offences specified in the said explanation: or under any special or local law, if punishable thereunder by
imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards, whether with or without fine. The offences referred to in the
explanation to section 177 are murder, culpable homicide not amounting to murder, theft after preparation
made for causing death or hurt, in order to the committing of the theft, robbery, attempt to commit robbery,
voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery, dacoity, dacoity with murder, robbery or dacoity with attempt to
cause death or grievous hurt, attempt to commit dacoity when armed with a deadly weapon, making
preparation to commit dacoity, assembling for the purpose of committing dacoity, mischief by fire or explosive
substance with intent to cause damage to the amount of Rs 100, the same with intent to destroy a house, etc.,
house-trespass in order to the commission of an offence punishable with death, the same in order to commit an
offence punishable with transportation for life, lurking house-trespass or house-breaking by night, in order to the
commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment, the same after preparation made for causing hurt to
any person, grievous hurt caused whilst committing lurking house-trespass or house-breaking, death or
grievous hurt caused by one of several persons jointly concerned in house-breaking, etc.
[s 176.8] Doctor(s) Working in Hospital
Where a patient is brought to a doctor in a hospital for treatment of poisoning, duty lies on the doctor to inform
the police about the death of such patient who dies. Where the accused doctor did not do so, charges for
offences under sections 176 and 201, IPC were framed against him.167
[s 176.9] “Commission of an Offence”
The aggravated penalty imposed by the second part of the section can be inflicted only when the information
required to be given relates to the commission of some particular offence, and not of offences generally.168
Public servant has been defined by section 21, IPC. For the application of this section it is necessary that the
accused was legally bound to give notice or furnish information on any subject to any public servant. A person
who is directed to investigate into the affairs of an insurance company under section 33(1) of the Insurance Act,
1938 does not ipso facto become an officer or there is no office which he holds. The making of a statement to
the investigators under section 33(3) of the Insurance Act does not amount to furnishing information on any
subject to any public servant as contemplated by this section, an omission to furnish which would be an offence
under that section.169
[s 176.11] “Intentionally Omits”

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The omission must be intentional.170 Thus, the refusal of a person to join in a dacoity, but of which he says
nothing, does not necessarily render him liable to punishment under this section.171 Intention, which is the gist
of the offence172 is to be presumed from the circumstances of the case.
[s 176.12] Nature of Omission
Section 176, IPC, deals with omission to give notice or information to the public servant, by a person who is
legally bound to do it. An omission postulates legal obligation and knowledge, for there can be no omission
when there is no obligation and knowledge. The notice or information contemplated in section 176 is naturally
notice or information of a definite character, having a credible origin and such as may probably be a definite
character, having a credible origin and such as may probably be conductive to the apprehension of the crime or
prevention of crime. The action does not refer to vague floating gossips in which every market abounds.173
Where the accused who as a licensee was bound under the conditions of his licence to disclose the places
where he had stocked cloth meant for sale, was asked to submit a list of the mill-made cloth with him and he
omitted to mention in the list submitted by him the cloth he had stocked in a place other than his shop, it was
held that he intentionally omitted to furnish legal information which he was legally bound to furnish and
committed an offence under this section.174
It is not necessary in order to support a conviction under this section against a person falling within the
provisions of section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973, for not giving information of an occurrence falling
under clause (d) of that section, to show that the death actually occurred on his land, when the circumstances
disclosed, show that a body has been found under circumstances denoting that the death was sudden,
unnatural or suspicious; the finding of the body being a fact from which a court might reasonably infer, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that the death took place there.175
[s 176.13] Omission of Investigating Officer to Complete Investigation within the Statutory Period
Omission on the part of the Investigating Officer to complete the investigation within 60 days from the date of
the arrest of the accused, is not covered under section 176, IPC. The Investigating Officer, therefore, cannot be
said to be guilty under section 176 of the IPC.176
The offence under this section is non-cognizable and summons should ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable and not compoundable. It is triable by any magistrate, and may be tried summarily.
No court can take cognizance of an offence under this section except on a complaint in writing of the public
servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate.177 The prescribed period of
limitation for prosecution under this section is one year.
[s 176.15] Complaint of the Public Servant Concerned Necessary
The commentary under section 172 may be referred to.
[s 176.16] Particulars of Charge
The charge, under this section should distinctly set forth the particular offence in respect of which the accused
either omitted to give information, or gave information which he knew to be false; and it should appear precisely
what his duty was in the matter.178
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That you, on or about the………day of…………at…………., being legally bound to give any notice (or to furnish
information) on any subject, to wit, to……… a public servant intentionally omitted to give such notice (or to furnish such
information), which you were legally bound to give as to in respect of commission (or prevention) of an offence (or
apprehension of an offender) and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 176 of the Indian Penal
Code and within my cognizance.
[s 176.17] Proof
Before a person may be convicted under this section the prosecution is bound to prove that:179
(i) the accused person was legally bound to furnish a certain information to a public servant; and
(ii) he intentionally omitted to give such information.
In the case of an offence under the second or third part of the section, the aggravating circumstances have to
be proved in addition.

133 Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1939 (22 of 1939), section 2.
134 Corresponds to section 356 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
135 Re Phool Chand Brojobassee, 16 WR 35, 36; Lt Dhara Singh v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 515 , p 516 : 34 PLR 712.
Page 8 of 9
136 Re Luchmun Pershad Gorgo, 18 WR 22.
137 RK Dalmia v Delhi Admn, AIR 1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] , p 1870 : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 805 ; Geetha v Sub-
Inspector of Excise, Mudigere, 2007 Cr LJ 3496 : 2007 (4) Kar LJ 619 [LNIND 2007 KANT 166] (Kant).
138 Lt Dhara Singh v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 515 , p 516; Empress v Sashi Bhusan Chakraburty, ILR 4 Cal 628;
Satyasaheal Nandlal Naik (Dr) v State of Maharashtra, (1996) 3 CCR 222 , p 224 (Bom) : (1996) Cr LJ 1463 (Bom).
139 Re Pandya Nayak, 7 ILR Mad 436.
140 Queen-Empress v Gopal Singh, 20 C 316; Re Pavallimanakkal Narayan Nambudripad, 17 Mad LT 263 : (1915) 16 Cr
LJ 219 ; Bhagwantrao v Emperor, AIR 1927 Ngp 217 , p 218 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 1489 ; Re Pandya Nayak, 7 ILR Mad
436.
141 Satyasaheal Nandlal Naik (Dr) v State of Maharashtra, (1996) Cr LJ 1463 (Bom) : (1996) 3 CCR 222 , p 224 (Bom).
142 Section 43 of the Indian Penal Code.
143 Ali Mohamed Adamalli v Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 147 : (1947) Cr LJ 61 .
144 Re Phool Chand, 16 WR (Cr) 35.
145 3 Mad HCR App 30; R v Janki Singh, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 307 : 8 OC 128; R v Luckhee Singh, 12 WR (Cr) 23; R v
Sankaralinga, 23 ILR Mad 544; Gul Hassan Shah v Emperor, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 105 : 27 PR (Cr) 1908; Narasimayya v
Achayya, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 328 ; Hiru Satua Desla v Emperor, AIR 1929 Bom 12 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 172 .
146 RK Dalmia v Delhi Admn, AIR 1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] , p 1870.
147 Ibid.
149 Emperor v Ram Sarup, AIR 1938 Oudh 50 .
150 Thakri Mst v Emperor, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 425 , p 426 : 17 PWR 1911 (Cr).
151 Queen-Empress v Malik Daud, 31 PR 1887.
152 (1905) Mad HCR Cr App 648 .
153 Matuki Misser v Queen-Empress, 11 Cal 619; Empress v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279; Queen v Hurdut Sarma, 8 WR 68
(Cr); Queen-Empress v Waman Dhunad Ratanlal, 784.
154 Public Prosecutor v Venkatanarasappa, 1 Weir 111.
155 Re Tolupur Bhagavannulu, 1 Weir 105.
156 Geetha v Sub-Inspector of Excise, Mudigere, 2007 Cr LJ 3496 (Kant) : 2007 (4) Kar LJ 619 [LNIND 2007 KANT 166] .
157 Foreigners Act, 1864 (3 of 1864), section 20, now Act 31 of 1946, section 6(2).
158 Coroners Act, 1871 (4 of 1871).
159 Dramatic Performance Act, 1876 (19 of 1876), section 7.
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160 Now repealed by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (30 of 2013).
161 See the Indian Succession Act, 1925, section 317.
162 Emperor v Suraj Baksh Singh, (1907) 6 Cr LJ 301, p 302.
163 Budh Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1927 All 111 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 1367.
164 Queen-Empress v Sankaralinga Kone, 23 ILR Mad 544.
165 Cf Madras Regulation, 41 of 1816, section 8.

166 Emperor v Hussain Beg, 31 ILR Mad 548 : (1908) 8 Cr LJ 425 : 19 Mad LJ 274; Emperor v Bhola, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 745 :
1 Ngp LR 133 both relying on Panatulla v Queen-Empress, 15 ILR Cal 386.
167 Ashok Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 2011 (107) AIC 810 (Raj).
168 Emperor v Hussain Beg, 31 ILR Mad 548.
169 RK Dalmia v Delhi Admn, AIR 1962 SC 1821 [LNIND 1962 SC 146] , 1870.
170 Satyasheel Nandlal Naik (Dr) v State of Maharashtra, (1996) 3 CCR 222 , p 224 (Bom).
171 R v Lahai, 7 WR 29; R v Phool Chand, 16 WR (Cr) 35; Luchmun Pershad, 18 WR (Cr) 22.
172 Luchmun Pershad, 18 WR (Cr) 22.
173 PK Saranji v State of Orissa, (1995) AIHC 5185 , p 5186.
174 Lal Mohan Paul v State of Tripura, AIR 1952 Tripura 18 , p 20.
175 Matuki Misser v Queen-Empress, ILR 11 Cal 619, p 624.
176 Manoj Kumar Gautam v State of UP, 2009 Cr LJ 3176 , p 3179 (All).
177 Section 195(1)(a), CrPC; Arjun Mal v Emperor, AIR 1923 Lah 260 .
178 Queen v Moosubroo, 8 WR (Cr) 37.
179 Shridhar v State, AIR 1954 HP 67 [LNIND 1954 HP 31] ; Satyasheel Nandlal Naik (Dr) v State of Maharashtra, (1996) 3
CCR 222 , p 224 (Bom).
End of Document
[s 177] Furnishing false information.—
Servants



Whoever, being legally bound to furnish information on any subject to any public servant, as such, furnishes, as
true, information on the subject which he knows or has reason to believe to be false, shall be punished with
rupees, or with both;
or, if the information which he is legally bound to give respects the commission of an offence, or is required for
the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or in order to the apprehension of an offender, with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
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Illustrations
(a) A, a landholder, knowing of the commission of a murder within the limits of his estate, wilfully
misinforms the magistrate of the district that the death has occurred by accident in consequence of the
bite of a snake. A is guilty of the offence defined in this section.
(b) A, a village watchman, knowing that a considerable body of strangers has passed through his village in
order to commit a dacoity in the house of Z, a wealthy merchant residing in a neighbouring place, and
being bound, under clause 5, section VII, 180[Regulation III, 1821], of the Bengal Code, to give early
and punctual information of the above fact to the officer of the nearest police station, willfully
misinforms the police officer that a body of suspicious characters passed through the village with a
view to commit dacoity in a certain distant place in a different direction. Here A is guilty of the offence
defined in the latter part of this section.
181[Explanation.—In section 176 and in this section the word “offence” includes any act committed at any place
out of 182[India], which, if committed in 183[India], would be punishable under any of the following sections,
namely, 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459 and
460; and the word “offender” includes any person who is alleged to have been guilty of any such act.]
The explanation to this section was inserted by section 5 of the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1894 (3
of 1894).
The words “British India” were successively substituted by the AO 1948, AO 1950 and the Pt B States (Laws)
Act, 1951 to read as above.
[s 177.2] Scope
This section is in two parts. The first part deals with the simple case of a person who, being bound to furnish
true information to a public servant, furnishes false information to him and under this part of the section, the
maximum punishment is six month’s simple imprisonment with or without fine. The second part deals with a
case when the information is required for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence or in order to
the apprehension of an offender, and under this part the maximum punishment is two years’ imprisonment of
either description with or without fine.184
A, a police officer, whose duty it was to enter all reports, brought to him, of offences in the station diary, refused
to enter a report, brought to him, of a certain offence, but entered, instead, a false report. A was held to have
committed an offence under this section.185 But A, who seeks to be enlisted in the police, falsely says that he is
not a resident of the district, commits no offence.186
A plain reading of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, shows that there is no bar to the trial of
conviction of an offender under two enactments but there is only a bar to the punishment of the offender twice
for the same offence. In other words, the section provides that where an act or omission constitutes an offence
under two enactments, the offender may be prosecuted and punished under either or both the enactments but
shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.187 The accused belonging to “Havyak Brahmin”
furnishing false information and obtaining admission by producing false Scheduled Tribe Certificate can be
convicted for offence under sections 120-B, 177 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.188
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Giving false information is distinct from omission to give information. Omission to give information is not an
offence under section 177, IPC, unless the same is intentional.189
Regulation 3 of 1821 of the Bengal Code, referred to in illustration (b) has been repealed by Act 17 of 1862.
The corresponding liability is now imposed by section 40(1)(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Section 52 of the Income-Tax Act, 1922190 stated as follows:
If a person makes a statement in a verification mentioned in s 19(A) or s 22, or sub-s (2) of s 26(A), or sub-s (2) of s
33(A), which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false, or does not believe to be true, he shall be
deemed to have committed the offence described in s 177, IPC.
Sections 277 and 278 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 may be referred to.
[s 177.4] Ingredients
The section lays down two ingredients: (a) that a person must be legally bound to furnish information on the
particular subject to the public servant, and (b) that he must furnish, as true, information on that subject which
he knows or has reason to believe to be false.191
[s 177.5] Relative Scope of Sections 177, 182, 201 and 203
Commentary under same heading in section 182, post may be referred to.
[s 177.6] “Being Legally Bound”
Section 43 and commentary under sections 43 and 176 may be referred to.
The section has no application to a case in which a false statement has been made to the police by a person
who was under no legal obligation or who was not legally bound to give that information. Such a person may be
liable for prosecution under section 182, IPC, which, however, is a different matter. To bring a case under
section 177, IPC, it is absolutely necessary to prove that the informant was “legally bound” to give the
information, which is proved to be false, to the public servant.192 A person may be guilty of a breach of
departmental orders such as sending in a false “nil” return, but he cannot be held liable under this section
unless he was legally bound to furnish the information required.193 The illustrations to this section show that it
does not apply to the case of any person, who is examined by a police officer, making a false statement, but it
evidently alludes to cases, when, by law, landholders or watchmen are bound to give information, and to other
analogous cases of the same description.194
Section 43, IPC, covers a breach of contract, and not merely a tort. The breach of contract, however, must be
one which furnishes ground for a civil action, that is to say, in respect of which damages could be obtained
under section 73, Contract Act, or which could be enforced specifically. Where there is a contract between the
Government and the municipality, under which a doctor of municipality was to furnish certain information (ie to
carry out post-mortem examination of bodies sent and to report result) to the government, there is no contract
Page 4 of 9
between the doctor and the Government and as such the doctor is not legally bound to furnish information
within the meaning of this section and the doctor cannot be prosecuted under it for giving a false report without
opening the bodies sent to him.195
Under section 40(1)(d) of the Code of Criminal Code, 1973, a mukhia of a village is legally bound to give
information to the police which he may possess respecting:
(i) the occurrence in or near such village of any sudden or unnatural death;
(ii) any death under suspicious circumstances;
(iii) the discovery in or near such village or any corpse or part of a corpse, in circumstances which lead to a
reasonable suspicion that such a death has occurred;
(iv) the disappearance from such village of any person in circumstances which lead to a reasonable
suspicion that a non-bailable offence has been committed in respect of such person.
If no death has taken place and there is no evidence that any non-bailable offence has been committed about
which the Mukhia had any information, which it was his duty to report to the police, he cannot be held liable
Under sections 139 and 140 of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1961,197 persons are legally bound to submit returns
of their income and to sign and verify them. If a person makes a false return on a false declaration in the
verification, he would be liable under this section.198 However, he is under no such obligation if no notice has
been given to him under section 139(2),199 and he cannot be held liable under this section.200 With reference to
the corresponding sections 22 and 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922, it has been held that the essence of an
offence under those sections lies in the verification of an untrue statement, and provided the statement was
deliberately false or not believed to be true, subsequent rectification cannot make it any less an offence, though
it may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in awarding sentence.201 Now section 277 of the Income
Tax Act, 1961, itself makes a false statement in declaring an offence punishable with simple imprisonment
which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to Rs 1000, or both.
Section 21 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, does not lay any obligation on the executant of a sale-deed to
correctly describe the property sold. The section only requires that the property should be described in sufficient
detail so as to make the identity thereof easier. If the description given by him is sufficient to identify it, the mere
fact that it was not described as laid down within the meaning of section 2 of Regulation 3 of 1914, will not
render him liable under this section.202
By section 44 of the Police Act, 1861, every officer in charge of a police station is bound to keep a general diary
in which he is to record “all complaints and charges preferred, the names of all persons arrested, the offences
charged against them”, and by section 23, he is bound to communicate intelligence respecting the public
peace. One object of that diary is to inform the magistrate of the district and the district superintendent of police
of the offences which have been reported at the thana. In that sense, the diary furnishes them with
“information”. If, therefore, a police officer in charge of a police station refuses to enter a report made to him
concerning the commission of an offence, and enters instead in the diary a totally different and false report as
that which was made to him, he commits an offence under this section.203 In the same case it was observed: “If
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he was legally bound to give information, he would be legally bound not to omit to give such information, and
such omission would make him punishable under this section.” The ground of liability under this section is not
the suppression or omission of the true information but the furnishing of false information.
[s 177.7] Foreigners Act, 1946 (31 of 1946)
A master of any vessel, who, being required to give information under section 6 of the Act, gives false
information, commits an offence under this section.
[s 177.8] Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, 1888 (3 of 1888) (Section 473)
A person who contravenes the provisions of section 28(j) or section 155(1) and (2) or section 187, commits an
offence under this section.
[s 177.9] Illustrative Cases
The following are some illustrative cases under this section:
A, not being bound to furnish information of an offence, falsely informs the police that an offence has been
committed. A has committed no offence under this section.204
A makes an entry in his official diary to the effect that he was on duty in a particular place on a particular day,
which is untrue. A has committed an offence under this section.205
A, a police officer, whose duty was to enter all reports brought to him of offences in the station diary, refused to
enter a report brought to him of a certain offence, but entered instead a different and false report. A committed
an offence under this section.206
Appellant Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat knowingly issued a false certificate in favour of one L that he did not
own any property except the land which he made fit for cultivation though L had owned 13 kanals and 13
marlas of land and his wife owned 70 kanals of land in the village. On the basis of that certificate L contended
to be landless and sought allotment of land and land was allotted to L. Conviction of the appellant under
sections 177 and 420, IPC was held proper.207
Respondent filed nomination for election and made wrong declaration before the Election authorities. Prima
facie respondent committed offence under section 177. High Court directed the authorities to initiate
proceedings against the respondent for making false declaration.208
A purchases a stamped paper and gives the vendor thereof a false name. He is not bound by law to furnish
information to the vendor, and is, therefore, not punishable under this section.209
A, seeking to be enlisted in the police, falsely said that he was not a resident of the district. A has committed no
offence.210
[s 177.10] “Which he Knows, or has Reason to Believe, to be False”

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Even if a person is legally bound to furnish information to a public servant, before he can be convicted under
this section, it has to be seen whether he knew or has reason to believe the information furnished to be false.211
It is not necessary to prove an intention to defraud in order to justify a conviction under this section. It is enough
to show that the information furnished as true was either known to be false or not believed to be true.212
The fact that a person, whose petition is alleged to contain false information, in bringing a suit on the basis of
the allegation that the information is true does not support the view that he knew or had reason to believe it to
be false, even though a magistrate on reviewing the evidence may have come to the conclusion that the
information was not true.213
[s 177.11] Information for the Purpose of Preventing the Commission of an Offence
The information which, under the second branch of this section, a person is legally bound to give “for the
purpose of preventing the commission of the offence” relates not to the commission of offences generally but to
the commission of some particular offence.214 Notes under section 176, ante may be referred to.
The procedure is the same as for an offence under section 176, IPC. The prescribed period of limitation for
prosecution for this offence is one year.
Where the complaint was filed against the accused for furnishing false information to the society regarding their
owning another house and having membership in other societies and getting plots allotted in their names, the
chargesheet was filed against the accused persons for offences under sections 420, 471, 120(B), 177 and 182,
IPC, nearly eight years after. Offences under sections 177 and 182, IPC, were held barred by limitation under
section 468, CrPC and other offences were not made out; so a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court quashed the criminal proceedings under section 482, CrPC pending against accused persons before the
metropolitan magistrate, Hyderabad.215
[s 177.13] Who can Order Withdrawal of Complaint
When a complaint of an offence under this section has been made under section 195(1)(a), CrPC by a public
servant, the authority to whom such public servant is subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint.
Interpreting the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the Madras216 and the Nagpur217 High
Courts have held that a First Class Magistrate is subordinate to the District Magistrate and not to an Additional
District Magistrate. The Allahabad High Court has, however, held that since the Additional District Magistrate
has got the powers of the District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate is subordinate to him.218
An Additional Deputy Commissioner exercising power under the CP and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, is not
subordinate to the Board of Revenue.219
[s 177.14] Charge
The first part of the section deals with a summons case which needs no charge. In the case of an offence under
the second part, the charge should distinctly set forth the particular offence in respect of which the accused
either omitted to give information, or gave information which he knew to be false; and it should appear precisely
what his duty was in the matter.220
[s 177.15] Form of Charge

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I (name and officer of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you (*) on or about the……………………. day of……………………. at……………………., being legally bound
furnish information on the subject, to wit……………………. to ……………………., a public servant as such, furnished
as true the information, to wit……………………. on the subject which you knew (or had reason to believe) to be false
(add if necessary) and the information which you were legally bound to give in respect of commission of an offence, (or
in order to the apprehension of an offender) and thereby committed an offence punishable under s 177 of the Indian
Penal Code and within my cognizance.
[s 177.16] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, the following facts must be proved that:
(i) the accused was legally bound to furnish certain information to a public servant;
(ii) he furnished information on the subject which he knew or had reason to believe, to be false; and
(iii) (in a case under the second part of the section) the information was with respect to the commission of
an offence.

180 Repealed by Act 17 of 1862.
181 Added by Act 3 of 1894, section 5.
182 The words “British India” have successively been subs. by the AO 1948, the AO 1950 and Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and
Schedule to read as above.
184 Pantulla v Queen-Empress, 15 ILR Cal 386, p 387.

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185 R v Mahommad Ismail Khan, ILR 20 All 151.
186 R v Dwarka, 6 ILR All 97.
187 TS Baliah v TS Rangachary, Income Tax Officer, Central Circle 6, Madras, AIR 1969 SC 701 [LNIND 1968 SC 381] :
(1969) 1 ITJ 732 : (1969) 72 ITR 787 [LNIND 1968 SC 381] .
188 State of Karnataka Appellant v GM Sumanabai, (2004) Cr LJ 4112 (Kant).
189 Veeramna v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 335 (Del).
190 Now repealed by the Income Tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961).
191 Jagannath v Rex, AIR 1950 Ajmer 19 , p 20 : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 883 ; Bishan Das v State of Punjab, 2014 (4) Crimes 181
(SC) : 2014 (143) AIC.
192 Lakhan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 788 , pp 799 : (1937) 38 Cr LJ 57 ; Queen-Empress v Appayya, ILR 14 Mad 584 : 1
Mad LJ 741 : 1 Weir 109.
193 Queen-Empress v Appayya, ILR 14 Mad 484 : 1 Mad LJ 741 : 1 Weir 109.
194 The Queen v Luckhee Singh, 12 WR 23, 24; Queen-Empress v Sankaralinga, 23 ILR Mad 544 : 1 Weir 122.
195 Ganpat Subrao Kashyapi v Emperor, AIR 1934 Bom 202 , p 204 : 58 ILR Bom 491 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 1429 : 36 Bom LR
373.
196 Lakhan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 788 : (1937) 38 Cr LJ 57 .
197 Section 22(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1922.
198 Hari Chand v Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah 626 : (1933) 34 Cr LJ 176 : 15 ILR Lah 832 : 35 PLR 544.
199 Sections 22 and 52 of the Income Tax Act, 1922.
200 PD Patel v Emperor, AIR 1933 Rang 292 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 131 .
201 Ganga Sagar v Emperor, AIR 1929 All 919 , p 927 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 88 : (1930) All LJ 26.
202 Jagannath v Rex, AIR 1950 Ajmer 19 : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 88 .

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203 Queen-Empress v Mahommad Ismail Khan, ILR 20 All 151 : (1897) 17 All WN 227; Re Syed Futteh Mahomed, 21 WR
(Cr) 30.
204 R v Saraji, BR 10 July 1873.
205 Viraswamy v R, ILR 4 Mad 144, as superseded by R v Appayya, ILR 14 Mad 484; 1 Weir 109; Ib 105, 106 and notes to
section 43.
206 R v Mahommad Ismail Khan, ILR 20 All 151.
207 Bishan Das v Stagte of Punjab, 2014 (4) Crimes 181 (SC) : 2014 AIR SCW 6207 : 2014 (143) AIC 182 (SC).
208 C Kuppusamy v Chief Election Commissioner, 2007 Cr LJ 3483 (Mad) (DB) : (2007) 5 Mad LJ 67.
209 Re Paramaya, BR, 19 February 1885.
210 R v Dwarka, 6 ILR All 97.
211 Jagannath v Rex, AIR 1950 Ajmer 19 , p 20.
212 Madras HC Proceedings of 19 November 1880, No 2342, 1 Weir 107.
213 Mahommad Wasil v Emperor, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 11 : 13 Cal WN 191 : 5 Mad LT 93.
214 Panatulla v Queen-Empress, 15 ILR Cal 386, p 387.
215 Salauddin Owaisi v DSP, CID Hyderabad, (2000) Cr LJ 4848 (AP)(DB).
216 B Thatayya v G Basavayya, AIR 1953 Mad 956 .
217 Prabhulal Ramlal v Emperor, AIR 1944 Ngp 85 , p 87.
218 Jaswant v State, AIR 1951 All 828 [LNIND 1951 ALL 127] .
219 Gopal Prasad v Board of Revenue, MP, AIR 1953 Ngp 121 .
220 Queen v Moosubroo, 8 WR 37, p 38.
End of Document
[s 178] Refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public servant to
make it.—
Servants


[s 178] Refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public servant to

make it.—
Whoever refuses to bind himself by an oath 221[or affirmation] to state the truth, when required so to bind
himself by a public servant legally competent to require that he shall so bind himself, shall be punished with
Page 2 of 4
[s 178] Refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public servant to make it.—
[s 178.1] Scope
This section makes refusal to take an oath or make an affirmation an offence. The liability of a person to take
the oath or affirmation depends upon the competency of the public servant to administer it. Refusal to take an
oath when required by a court amounts to contempt of court for which the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
a summary remedy of punishing the offender on the spot.222
The words “or affirmation” were added by section 15 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873.
[s 178.3] “Refuses to Bind Himself by an Oath, or Affirmation”
“Refusal” signifies a positive non-compliance with the demand made. Mere omission does not amount to a
refusal. If a person has opted to depose as a witness and his examination-in-chief has taken place, his refusal
to take oath and come to the witness box for his cross-examination amounts to an offence under section 178,
IPC.223 The ground upon which the refusal is based is immaterial, eg, that the person refusing is the father or
son of the one against whom he is required to testify,224 or the husband or wife of the same.225 Such refusal on
the ground of non-payment of expenses may, however, not amount to an offence in a civil case.226
[s 178.4] Refusal by Police Officials before Inquiry Committee
In a case, the police officials whose actions were sought to be inquired, were covered under section 8B of the
Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. They were sought to be cross-examined at the inception of the inquiry
though notices were not issued to them. On their refusal to appear and testify before the committee, the
committee directed for filing of a complaint against them under section 178, IPC.
On these facts, it was held that the orders of the inquiry committee directing complaints to be filed against the
police officials for an offence punishable under section 178, IPC, were the consequences of the
misapprehension that they were not covered by section 8(B), because no notices under that section had been
issued to them. The action of the committee in compelling them to enter the witness box on the dates in
question for being cross-examined, when even according to it and it was apparent from its order that persons
similarly situated were to do so at the end of the inquiry, was in itself discriminatory. There was, therefore, valid
justification for the refusal by the police official to take oath for cross-examination at the stage when they were
required to do so. Therefore, the inquiry committee should not have in Kiran Bedi & Jinder Singh v Committee
of Inquiry, directed the filing of a complaint against police officials for an offence punishable under section 178,
IPC.227
[s 178.5] “Oath”
Oath includes solemn affirmation. Section 51, IPC, may be referred to.
[s 178.6] “When Required so to Bind Himself”
Section 4 of the Oaths Act, 1969, makes it obligatory to make oaths and affirmations by all witnesses,
interpreters and jurors. This section provides punishment for refusing to bind oneself by oath or affirmation or
state the truth when required sections 9–12 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, since repealed, contain provisions
for special oaths. These provisions do not find a place in the Act of 1969. It is, therefore, not binding on any
person even under the present law to make a statement on special oath. Even under the repealed Act a refusal
to make the special oath was not binding under section 12 of the said Act.
A witness in a civil suit is entitled to be paid his expenses before giving evidence and a refusal to give evidence
on the ground of non-payment is no offence.228 As to expenses of a witness summoned by a criminal court,
refer to section 312 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[s 178.7] Legally Competent

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Notes under section 174 may be referred to.
By section 10 of the Public Gambling Act, 1867 [which extends to Punjab, United Provinces (now Uttar
Pradesh) and Central Provinces (now Madhya Pradesh)], a refusal to make oath or affirmation constitutes an
[s 178.8] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable and a summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable, and is triable by the court in which the offence is committed, subject to the
provisions of chapter 26, CrPC; or, if not committed in a court, by any magistrate.
Where the offence is committed in the view or presence of any civil, criminal or revenue court, the procedure
prescribed by sections 345 and 346, CrPC, has to be followed.
For “complaint” “jurisdiction” and “special procedure”, notes under section 175 may be referred to. Prosecution
for an offence under this section can be made within a period of one year only.

221 Ins. by Act 10 of 1873, section 15.
222 Refer to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 345.
223 Jibachh Shah v State, AIR 1965 Pat 331 , p 332, (1965) 2 Cr LJ 235 .
224 R v Baron Vidil CC Ct, 23 August 1861.
225 Indian Evidence Act, 1872, section 120.
226 Ngu Pyo v R, (1908) 7 Cr LJ 208 .
227 Kiran Bedi & Jinder Singh v Committee of Inquiry, AIR 1989 SC 714 [LNIND 1989 SC 833] : (1989) Cr LJ 903 .
228 Nga Pyo v R, (1908) 7 Cr LJ 208 ; UBR (Cr) 1907.

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End of Document
[s 179] Refusing to answer public servant authorised to question.—
Servants



Whoever, being legally bound to state the truth on any subject to any public servant, refuses to answer any
question demanded of him touching that subject by such public servant, in the exercise of the legal powers of
such public servant, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
[s 179.1] Scope
While the preceding section deals with refusal to take oath or make affirmation, this section deals with refusal to
Page 2 of 6
answer a question put by a public servant. Before a person can be convicted under this section it must be
shown that he was legally bound to state the truth and that he refused to do so. This is one of the provisions to
enforce compliance when a public servant legally demands a truthful answer but is met with a blank refusal or
plain mendacity.229 A breakdown of this section would yield the following results that:
(a) the demanding authority must be a public servant; and
(b) the demand must be to state the truth on a subject in the exercise of legal powers.230
Section 179 has a component of mens rea. Where there is no wilful refusal, but only unwitting omission or
innocent warding off, the offence under this section is not made out.231
This section has nothing whatever to do with the conduct of accused persons in court.232
[s 179.2] “Legally Bound”
Section 43 and notes thereunder and synopsis note under section 176 may be referred to.
[s 179.3] “To State the Truth”
Every person giving evidence on any subject before any court or person authorised to administer oaths and
affirmation is bound to state the truth on such subject.233 But to this section there are certain exceptions in the
form of privileges in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the witnesses cannot be compelled by law to answer
questions on some subjects. Thus, a witness is privileged or protected from answering any questions on the
following subjects:
(i) his own conduct in court as a Judge or magistrate or as to anything which came to his knowledge in
court as a Judge or magistrate;234
(ii) communication made to him during marriage;235
(iii) evidence as to affairs of state;236
(iv) official communications;237
(v) information as to the commission of any offence;238
(vi) professional communications;239
(vii) confidential communications with legal advisers.240
Under section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872:
A witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in
Page 3 of 6
any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate,
or may tend directly or indirectly to criminate such witness or that it will expose, or tend directly or indirectly to
expose, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind: Provided that no such answer, which a witness shall
be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved against him in any criminal
proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer.
Under section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, a Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proof of
relevant facts, ask any question he pleases of any witness or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant,
but this section does not authorise him to compel any witness to answer any question, which such witness is
entitled to refuse to answer under sections 121–131 of that Act. Although a Judge has power under section 165
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to ask a witness questions about any irrelevant fact, in order to obtain proof of
relevant facts, the witness is not bound to answer such a question if it is put, not for that purpose, but with a
view to criminal proceedings being taken against him.241
A complainant voluntarily preferring a complaint under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, cannot be
compelled to answer questions put by the magistrate, and therefore, his refusal to answer is not an offence
under this section, or section 349 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.242
Under section 161 of the CrPC 1973, a police officer making an investigation, under chapter 12 of the Code
may examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case, and
such person is bound to answer all questions relating to the case put by such officer. But a refusal to answer
questions asked by a police officer under this section is not punishable under section 176 or section 187, IPC,
as under the present Code there is no obligation to speak the truth as there was under the 1882 Code.243
[s 179.4] Mens Rea
Section 179, IPC has a component of mens rea and where there is no wilful refusal but only unwitting omission
or innocent warding off, the offence is not made out. When there is reasonable doubt indicated by the
accused’s explanation he is entitled to its benefit and cannot be forced to substantiate his ground lest, by this
process, he is constrained to surrender the very privilege for which he is fighting. What may apparently be
innocent information may really be innocent or not, when viewed in the wider setting.244
[s 179.5] Accused as Witness
Section 342A, CrPC, which has been newly inserted in the Code by section 61 of the Amendment Act (26 of
1955), enables an accused person to be a competent witness for the defence.245 Before this amendment, he
could not do so, although for the purpose of enabling him to explain the circumstances appearing in the
evidence against him, the court could put such questions to him as were considered necessary. Section 118 of
the Evidence Act deals with persons who are competent to testify as witnesses, but in view of section 342,
CrPC, before this amendment, no accused person could appear as a witness and therefore, section 118
aforesaid was inapplicable to him. Article 20(3) of the Constitution provides that no person accused of an
offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Now under this section the accused person has
become a competent witness for the defence, but he cannot be compelled to be a witness and cannot be called
as a witness except at his own request in writing, and his failure to give evidence cannot be made the subject
matter of comment by the parties or the court.246
Under section 342 the accused cannot be called as a witness except on his own request, but once he offers
himself as a witness and is put on oath, his position could not be either better or worse than that of any other
witness, and section 132 of the Evidence Act would apply to him. That section itself makes a distinction
between those cases in which a witness voluntarily answers a question and those in which he is compelled to
answer; and gives him a protection in the latter of these cases only. “Protection is afforded only to answers
which a witness has objected to give, or which he has asked to be excused from giving, and which then he has
Page 4 of 6
been compelled to give, and not to answers given voluntarily.”247
Apart from this, section 342, CrPC empowers the court to examine the accused for the purpose of enabling him
to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. However, no oath shall be administered to
him and he shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer the questions put to him in his
examination, or by giving false answers to such questions.248 Section 179, IPC, has nothing whatever to do with
the conduct of accused persons in court.249
[s 179.6] Refusal to Answer
The following are cases in which the answer given by the witness was held to amount to or not to amount to
refusal to answer.
A witness was asked the name of his grandfather and he replied that he did not remember it. It is not a refusal
to answer within the meaning of this section.250
A witness was asked as to what was the result of a case in which he was a witness, and he said he did not
know. He could not be considered to have refused to answer the question put to him.251
Where, however, a witness, though persistently asked by the court to give certain information, persisted in
giving only a prevaricating and irrelevant reply, it was held that it amounted to a refusal to answer within the
meaning of this section.252
[s 179.7] Procedure
It is the same as in the case of an offence under the preceding section 178, IPC. The prescribed period of
limitation for this offence is one year.

229 Nandini Satpathy v PL Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 , p 1031, (1978) Cr LJ 968 .
230 Ibid.
231 Ibid.
232 Re S Tirumale Reddi, AIR 1924 Mad 540 [LNIND 1923 MAD 246] : (1924) 25 Cr LJ 374 .
233 Oaths Act, 1969, section 8.

Page 5 of 6
234 Section 121, Evidence Act, 1872.
235 Ibid.
237 Ibid, section 124.
241 R v Hari Lakshman, 10 ILR Bom 185.
242 Re Ganesh Narayan Sathe, ILR 13 Bom 600, 604.
243 Kusana Karoo v Rajaram Paiku, AIR 1952 Ngp 68 : (1952) 53 Cr LJ 438 ; Mawzamagyi v Emperor, AIR 1931 Rang 26
: (1931) 32 Cr LJ 2013 ; Queen-Empress v Sankaralinga Kone, 23 ILR Mad 544; Queen v Luchee Singh, 12 WR 23; Re
Savani Virabayi, 1 Weir 111 and Criminal Revision Case No 221 of 1899 : 2 Weir 123; Gul Hassan Shah v Emperor,
(1909) 9 Cr LJ 105 ; Emperor v Mahomed Varis, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 302 .
244 Nandini Satpathy v PL Dani, AIR 1978 SC 1025 : (1978) Cr LJ 968 .
245 Subedar v State, AIR 1957 All 396 [LNIND 1957 ALL 51] , p 398.
246 Anant Gopal Sheorey v State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915 [LNIND 1958 SC 80] , pp 916–17.
247 R v Gopal Dass, (1881) 3 ILR Mad 271, p 280, (per Curiam J), Kernan and Ayyar JJ, dessenting; R v Gonu, (1888) 12
Bom 440, (per Curiam J) Birdwood J, dissenting; Emperor v Gunna, AIR 1920 Bom 270 : 49 IC 324 : (1921) 22 Cr LJ
68 : 22 Bom LR 1247 (FB); R v Samiappa, (1891) 15 Mad 63, per Curiam J; Mohar v R, (1893) 21 Cal 392 , per Curiam
J; R v Moss, (1893) 16 All 88 , p 100; Haider v Abru, (1905) 32 Cal 756 : 2 Cal LJ 105 : 9 Cal WN 911; Kashi Ram v
Emperor, 1930 All LJ 1121; Sodaruddin v R, (1904) 31 Cal 715 , pp 720–21 : 8 Cal WN 910; Bai v Omrao, AIR 1926
Bom 141 : ILR 50 Bom 162 : 39 IC 91 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 423 : 28 Bom LR 1(FB).
248 Code of Criminal Procedure, section 342.
249 Re S Tirumale Reddi, AIR 1924 Mad 540 [LNIND 1923 MAD 246] : (1924) 25 Cr LJ 374 .
250 Kallu v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 240 (2) : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 252 .
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251 Bhardul Kurmi v Emperor, AIR 1934 All 136 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 1036 .
252 Har Narayan v Emperor, AIR 1925 All 239 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 354 .
End of Document
[s 180] Refusing to sign statement.—
Servants



Whoever refuses to sign any statement made by him, when required to sign that statement by a public servant
legally competent to require that he shall sign that statement, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
[s 180.1] Scope
This section makes it an offence to refuse to sign a statement when required to do so by a public servant. But
the public servant must be legally competent to require the statement to be signed and the person required to
Page 2 of 5
sign must be bound to do so.
A person commits an offence under this section if he refuses to sign a statement, which he has himself made
and which he is required to sign by a public servant, legally competent to require him to sign the same.253 A
mere refusal to sign a receipt for a summons, as required by section 62(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973, is not an offence under section 173 or under this section.254 It is only when a person refuses to sign a
statement, which a public servant is legally empowered to require him to sign, he renders himself liable to
punishment.255
The essential ingredients to constitute the offence under this section are:—
(i) The accused made a statement before a public servant;
(ii) The accused was required by public servant to sign such statement;
(iii) Public servant was legally empowered or competent to require the accused to sign that statement, and
(iv) That the accused refused to sign statement.
In certain pension matter proceedings before the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Karnataka, the
counsel for the petitioner had made certain submissions, and when the counsel was required to sign the
proceedings, he was said to have refused to sign those proceedings. Held, no offence under section 180 or
section 353, IPC was made out, proceedings were quashed on petition filed under section 482, CrPC.256
The section was enacted at a time when the Acts and Regulations, then in force, required witnesses and
accused persons to sign the statements made by them. Now the law has changed considerably in this respect,
and care has to be taken, in applying the section, to see whether the accused was legally bound to sign his
statement.
Every refusal on the part of a counsel appearing for a party, to subscribe his signature to the proceeding sheet
in which the public servant has recorded the submissions of such counsel, is not an offence under section 180
of the IPC. To attract the offence under section 180, IPC, the person accused of such offence should be under
a legal obligation or compulsion to sign the statement or submission, and refusal on his part to sign such
statement or submission cannot be brought under section 180, IPC.257
[s 180.2] Civil Cases
The method of recording the evidence of witnesses in civil cases is laid down in O XVIII, Rule 5 of the Code of
Civil Procedure and is stated below:
In cases in which an appeal is allowed, the evidence of each witness shall be taken down in writing and when
completed, shall be read over in the presence of the Judge and of the witness, and the Judge shall, if
necessary, correct the same, and shall sign it.
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In this regard, there is a distinct provision that the Judge shall sign the deposition, but there is nothing about the
witness signing it also. There is no legal obligation upon witnesses in civil cases to sign or thumb-mark their
depositions. Courts cannot order, but can doubtlessly ask them to do so, and if they refuse, they cannot be
compelled and are not liable to prosecution for an offence under this section. Section 151, CPC, does not
authorise a Judge to force a witness to sign his deposition.258
Even assuming that, under the CPC, a Judge is legally competent to require that a witness shall sign his
evidence, it will only be when the evidence has been read over to the witness, and he has admitted it to be
correct, and has refused to sign it, that he will be guilty of an offence under this section.259
[s 180.3] Criminal Cases
Under five sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it is enacted that a person who has made a
statement thereunder shall sign it, when it is made in writing, or when reduced to writing. Under section 62(3) of
the CrPC 1973, every person on whom a summons is so served shall, if so required by the serving officer, sign
a receipt therefor on the back of the other duplicate. By section 154, CrPC, information in cognizable cases
“shall be signed by the person giving it”. Statements and confessions made to a magistrate in the course of an
investigation under chapter 12 must be signed by the person making them in the same manner that the record
of the examination of an accused person by a magistrate is required to be signed by the accused (sections 164
and 281). So too a complaint is required to sign the substance of his complaint, when reduced to writing, made
before the magistrate (section 200). No statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation, if
reduced to writing, is to be signed by the person making it, nor can such writing be used as evidence under the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (section 162).
It has been held in some cases that the provision in sections 122 and 346 of Act 10 of 1872 and the
corresponding sections 164 and 364(2) of the Code of 1898 that the accused should sign the record of his
statement, is only directory, and that an accused person who refuses to sign a statement made by him in
answer to questions put to him by a magistrate (in the case of a confession recorded under section 164 of the
CrPC) or by a court in the case of a statement recorded under section 364, in answer to questions put to him
does not commit an offence under this section.260 The reasons for this view are said to be: (a) that since the
essence of such confessions and statements is that they should be voluntarily made, and they cannot be
considered complete until signed by the accused person and that this object is wholly inconsistent with the use
of any compulsion, by fine or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining such signature;261 and (b) that the
procedure indicated involves the magistrate offering the record for the accused’s signature, but it does not
empower the magistrate to require his signature. It is only when a person refuses to sign a statement which a
public servant is legally empowered to require him to sign that he renders himself liable to punishment.262 It
may, however be pointed out that under sections 164 and 364 (now section 281) ample security is given to
ensure the statement being voluntarily made, and that the accused can explain or add to his answers before he
can be called upon to sign that which he has voluntarily declared to be the truth. To employ compulsion at this
stage cannot deprive the statement of its voluntary character. Even if the words “the record shall be signed by
the accused” in section 364(2) (now section 281(5)) can be construed only as a mere direction to the magistrate
or court to take the signature of the accused, yet it is difficult to hold that in requiring the signature, the
magistrate or Judge is not “legally competent” to so require it.263 The magistrate is a public servant legally
competent to require the accused to sign the statement, and if he refuses to do so, he will have committed an
offence under this section. It will be noted that an accused person is not bound to make any statement
whatsoever, but if he does, and if he is examined by the magistrate and replies to the magistrate’s questions,
the court is bound to reduce the statement to writing in the form of questions and answers and the magistrate is
bound to sign it, as also the accused.264 It has, however, been held in an old case that the signature of the
accused seems to be required more for his protection than to impose on him an obligation which is to be
enforced under section 180, IPC.265
Mere refusal to sign a receipt for a summons as required by section 62(2), CrPC is not an offence under section
Page 4 of 5
173 or this section.266
[s 180.4] Revenue Cases
A deponent in a revenue inquiry is not bound to sign his deposition.267
[s 180.5] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence under section 178. The limitation prescribed for this
offence is one year. A court wherein offence is alleged to have been committed can suo motu register a case
and punish the offender provided the procedure laid down by section 340, CrPC has been followed.268
[s 180.6] Appeal & Revision
Appeal, and not revision, lies against the order of conviction recorded under section 180, IPC.269

253 Umar Khan v Emperor, AIR 1917 All 48 , p 49 : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 559 ; Motilal v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 652 : (1935) 36
Cr LJ 1098 ; Regina v Bal Ratan, 10 Bom HCR 166 Reg v Apabin Kesar, 10 Bom HCR 181; Reg v Shivayya, 1 ILR
Bom 219; Empress v Ramannjiyya, ILR 2 Mad 5.
254 Queen-Empress v Gobinda Das, ILR 20 Cal 358; Re Bhoobaneshawar Dutt, 3 ILR Cal 321; Reg v Kalya Fakir, 5 Bom
HCR (Cr) 34.
255 Emperor v Ba Tin, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 205 (206); Emperor v Fateh Ali, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 713 ; Re Mabali Ram, (1881) All WN
43.
256 Basavaraj Shivarudrappa Sirsi v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 4809 (Kant) : 2011 (5) Kar LJ 153 [LNIND 2011 KANT
220] .
257 Basavaraj Shivarudrappa Sirsi v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 4809 , p 4812 (Kant) : 2011 (5) Kar LJ 153 [LNIND
2011 KANT 220] .
258 Emperor v Fateh Ali, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 713 : 8 PR 1912 (Cr).
259 Empress v Mabali Ram, (1881) All WN 43.
260 Imperatrix v Sirsapa, ILR 4 Bom 15; Emperor v Ba Tin, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 205 : 3 LBR 199.
261 Imperatrix v Sirsapa, ILR 4 Bom 15, p 19.
262 Emperor v Ba Tin, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 205 , p 206.

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263 Refer to the dissenting judgement of Melvill, J in R v Sirsapa, ILR 4 Bom 15, p 16.
264 Umar Khan v Emperor, AIR 1917 All 48 , p 49 : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 559 ; Motilal v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 652 : (1935) 36
Cr LJ 1098 : (1935) All LJ 1058 Regina v Bai Ratan, 10 Bom HCR 166; Reg v Apabin Kesar, 10 Bom HCR 181; Reg v
Shivayya, 1 ILR Bom 219; Empress v Ramannjiyya, ILR 2 Mad 5.
265 Mad HCR Proceedings, 3 September 1881 No 1810, 1 Weir 113; following Imperatrix v Sirsapa, ILR 4 Bom 15.
266 Queen-Empress v Gobinda Das, ILR 20 Cal 358; Re Bhoobaneshwar Dutt, 3 ILR Cal 321; Reg v Kalya Fakir, 5 Bom
HCR (Cr) 34.
267 Mad HC Rule, 9 January 1870, 6 Mad HCR App 14 : 1 Weir 113.
268 Ashna Sofia v State of Kerala, 2014 (4) Ker LT 130 : 2014 (4) Ker LJ 15 (Ker).
269 Ashna Sofia v State of Kerala, 2014 (4) Ker LT 130 : 2014 (4) Ker LJ 15 (Ker).
End of Document
[s 181] False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person
authorised to administer an oath or affirmation.—
Servants


[s 181] False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person

authorised to administer an oath or affirmation.—
Whoever, being legally bound by an oath 270[or affirmation] to state the truth on any subject to any public
servant or other person authorised by law to administer such oath 271[or affirmation], makes, to such public
servant or other person as aforesaid, touching the subject, any statement which is false, and which he either
knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
Page 2 of 5
[s 181] False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person authorised to administer an oath or
affirmation.—
description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 181.1] Scope
Furnishing false information to a public servant is punishable under section 177, IPC. Making a false statement
on oath or affirmation to a public servant is an offence under this section. Giving false evidence is an offence
under section 191 punishable under section 193, IPC. To constitute an offence under this section—
(i) the accused took the oath or made the affirmation;
(ii) the accused must be legally bound by oath or affirmation to state the truth to a public servant or any
other person;
(iii) the public servant or other person must be authorised by law to administer the oath or affirmation;
(iv) the statement made by the accused touching the subject must be false; and
(v) one which he either knew or believed to be false, or did not believe to be true.
A falsehood made in good faith that it is true will not expose him to penalty.272
[s 181.2] Relative Scope of Sections 181 and 193
The wording of this section is apparently large enough to admit of false statements of every description, ie,
whether made in the course of judicial proceeding or not. However, the subject matter of this chapter is
“contempt of the lawful authority of public servants”, and provision is made in the following chapter,273 for the
offence of giving false evidence and offences against public justice. This section is, therefore, properly confined
to non-judicial proceedings.274 This was perhaps clearer under the old law, for by the Schedule to the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1861, an offence under section 193 was triable only by a court of session; whilst an
offence under section 181 was triable by that court or by a district magistrate.275 Under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898, however, (as under the Codes of 1872 and 1882) offences under either section are triable by
the same courts. But, as the Law Commissioners explained it, “when false information is given upon oath, the
offender is punishable under this clause, with imprisonment not exceeding three years. When the false
statement amounts to false evidence as defined in section 191, the offender is punishable more severely under
section 193 of the Code”.276 Seeing that special provision is made by section 193 for false statements made in
a judicial proceeding such a charge should be made under that section,277 though a conviction under section
181 for an offence which falls under section 193 is, apparently, good.278
A false return on oath of the service of a summons,279 and a false statement made on solemn affirmation before
an income tax commissioner,280 falls under section 193.
[s 181.3] Legally Bound
[s 181.4] Oath or Affirmation
[s 181.5] “Person Authorised by Law”

Page 3 of 5
affirmation.—
The officer administering the oath or affirmation must be one who is authorised by law to administer it in the
circumstances in question.281 A criminal appeal is a continuation of the criminal case, and an appellant in an
appeal against conviction has the privilege of an accused. He cannot be examined as a witness, and therefore,
cannot be punished for making a false statement, being protected expressly by section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973.282
Section 181 of IPC provides that a person who is legally bound by oath or affirmation to state the truth on any
subject to any public servant or other person authorised by law to administer such oath or affirmation, makes to
such public servant or other person any statement which is false, is liable for punishment as prescribed in the
said section. Complaint was filed on allegation that the accused persons made a false declaration before the
Notary Ex-Officio Sub-Registrar omitting to show that the applicant is one of the heirs of section This
declaration was sought to be used by the accused for applying for getting their names mutated in the
properties. There was nothing to show that the Notary Ex-officio Sub-Registrar was required to administer any
oath or affirmation to the persons who made the declaration excluding the applicant from the heirs of one
section The accused persons had not committed offence under section 181, IPC.283
However, if an accused person when not being examined under that section for the purpose of enabling him to
explain any facts apparently unfavourable to him, voluntarily gives false information to the court with the view of
obtaining a transfer of the case, he commits an offence under section 182, IPC.284
[s 181.6] Making False Statement in Affidavit
The mere swearing of an affidavit does not make the statement contained therein a piece of evidence which a
court would be bound to admit in a judicial proceeding. In receiving the statement, the officer before whom the
affidavit is sworn is not receiving something which is intrinsically evidence and is, therefore, not acting in the
exercise of any authority to receive evidence. Such an officer does not satisfy the definition in section 3, Oaths
Act, 1988 of a court or person authorised to administer oaths and affirmations, and the false statement is not
caught up under this section.285 For further discussion on the topic, notes under sections 191–193 may be
referred to.
[s 181.7] “Or Does not Believe to be True”
Making a statement with no knowledge one way or other as to its truth constitutes a false statement, since the
person making it does not believe it to be true.286
[s 181.8] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable and summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable and is triable by a magistrate of the first class. The limitation prescribed for this
offence is three years.
Where the accused was facing a charge before the trial court under section 181, IPC, he moved the High Court
by a petition filed under section 482, CrPC, which was allowed and criminal proceedings were quashed. The
appeal was filed before the Supreme Court where the accused appellant agreed to withdraw the petition from
the High Court under section 482, CrPC, which was ordered to be dismissed as withdrawn by the apex court
without prejudice to the right of the accused appellant and prosecution to raise whatever contentions they
propose to raise in the case which shall be decided by the trial court untrammelled by any observation made by
the earlier order of the trial court or the order of the High Court.287
[s 181.9] Complaint
No court shall take cognizance of an offence under this section except on a complaint of the public servant
Page 4 of 5
affirmation.—
concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate.288 The complaint for the offence under
section 181, IPC, is not covered by the provisions in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 195, CrPC; on the
other hand, it is covered by the provision in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 195, CrPC. Therefore, not
serving a show cause notice and not venturing into an inquiry under section 340, CrPC, for the offence under
section 181, IPC, is not violative of the procedural law.289 Even if the complaint is false but an offence as
alleged is made out, the officer competent to file the complaint is only the magistrate or his official supervisor
which anyhow the sub-inspector is not. He had no business to usurp the powers.290 Commentary under section
172, ante may be referred to.
[s 181.10] Charge
That you (*) on or about the……… day of………… at ………. being legally bound by an oath (or affirmation) to state
the truth, on a certain subject, to wit,……… to a public servant (or person) authorised by law to administer such oath
(or affirmation), did make to such public servant (or person) as aforesaid, touching that subject, a statement which was
false, and which you knew (or believed to be) false, to wit………. and thereby committed an offence punishable under
s 181 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 181.11] Joinder of charges
The case of each person accused must be inquired into separately and if committed for trial, each accused
must be separately tried.291

271 Ibid.
272 Kurien v State of Kerala, (1987) 1 Ker LT 619 ; Janardhan Kashinath Pal v Harishchandra Ladu Naik, 2013 Cr LJ 4082
(Bom).
273 Sections 191–209.

Page 5 of 5
affirmation.—
274 R v Buloram, 7 WR (Cr) 68; R v Andy Chetty, 2 Mad HCR 438; Khota Subba Chetty v R, 6 ILR Mad 252 : 1 Weir 116; R
v Nga Aung Po, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 474 : (1905) UBR 13.
275 R v Andy Chetty, 2 Mad HCR 438 : 1 Weir 114; R v Buloram, 7 WR (Cr) 68; R v Heeramun Singh, 8 WR (Cr) 30.
276 Second Report, section 102.
277 R v Khota Subba Chetty, 6 ILR Mad 252 : 1 Weir 116.
278 Madras HC Proceedings, 26 November 1867; 1 Weir 115 followed in 4 Mad HCR 18.
279 R v Shama Churn, 8 WR (Cr) 27.
280 R v Dayalji Endraji, 8 Bom HCR 21 : 1 Weir 115.
281 R v Niaz Ali, ILR 5 All 17; Kotha Subba Chetti v R, 6 ILR Mad 252.
282 R v Subbayya, 12 ILR Mad 451 : 1 Weir 114.
283 Janardhan Kashinath Pal v Harishchandra Ladu Naik, 2013 Cr LJ 4082 , p 4083 (Bom) : 2013 (5) ABR 978 [LNIND
2013 GOA 229] : 2013 ALL MR(Cri) 4174 : II (2014) CCR 81 (Bom).
284 Tribhuvan v R, (1911) 10 Cr LJ 509 : 12 OC 308.
285 Kamakshya Prasad Dalai v Emperor, AIR 1939 Cal 657 , p 658 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 21 : (1959) 2 ILR Cal 459 : 93 Cal WN
2033; Re Khota Subba Chetti, 6 ILR Mad 252 : 1 Weir 116.
286 R v Echan Meeah, 2 WR 47.
287 Santosh Kumar Bagrodia v SR Chattopadhayay, (2001) 2 CCR 308 (SC).
288 Section 195(1)(a), CrPC.
289 Gokula Chandra Rout v State of Orissa, (2001) 1 CCR 336 (Ori).
290 Kurien v State of Kerala, (1988) 1 Crimes 867 (Ker).
291 R v Niaz Ali, ILR 5 All 17; Khotha Subba Chetti v R, 6 ILR Mad 252.
End of Document
[s.182] False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his
lawful power to the injury of another person.—
Servants


292[s.182]
False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his
lawful power to the injury of another person.—
Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby
to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant—
Page 2 of 36
[s.182] False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another
person.—
(a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts
respecting which such information is given were known by him, or
(b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with
fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Illustrations
(a) A informs a Magistrate that Z, a police-officer, subordinate to such Magistrate, has been guilty of
neglect of duty or misconduct, knowing such information to be false, and knowing it to be likely that the
information will cause the Magistrate to dismiss Z. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
(b) A falsely informs a public servant that Z has contraband salt in a secret place, knowing such
information to be false, and knowing that it is likely that the consequence of the information will be a
search of Z’s premises, attended with annoyance to Z. A has committed the offence defined in this
section.
(c) A falsely informs a policeman that he has been assaulted and robbed in the neighbourhood of a
particular village. He does not mention the name of any person as one of his assailants, but knows it to
be likely that in consequence of this information the police will make enquiries and institute searches in
the village to the annoyance of the villagers or some of them. A has committed an offence under this
section.]
[s 182.1] Scope and Applicability
This section relates only to cases of information given to an official with the intention of causing, or with
knowledge that it is likely to cause, that official to do or omit to do something, which he ought not to do or omit
to do, or to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person. This is a distinct offence from the one
described in section 211, which relates to an attempt to put the criminal courts in motion against another
person.293
To make out a case under section 182, IPC the following ingredients are to be proved:
(i) An information was given by a person to a public servant.
(ii) The information was given by a person who knows or believes such statement to be false.
(iii) Such information was given with an intention to cause or knowing it to be likely to cause (a) such public
servant to do, or not to do anything if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given
were known by him, or (b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of
any person.294
The fact that the public servant did not, in fact, do or omit to do anything, or did not use his lawful power in
consequence is not a deciding factor. The guilt of the accused lies in his intention or knowledge, and a man’s
intention or knowledge must be judged from his acts and the surrounding circumstances.295 The criminality,
contemplated by the section, does not depend upon which is done by the public servant on such false
information.296
Page 3 of 36
person.—
The offence is, therefore, complete when the false information has been knowingly given, with one or other of
the intentions specified in clauses (a) and (b), and, being complete, then the offender may be prosecuted at
once under the section.297
The section penalises only the giving of false information to a public servant and not withholding information.298
The information need not necessarily be of the commission of a cognizable offence. When a false report is
made to the police, the question in deciding as to whether it amounts to an offence under this section is not
whether the report is one of a cognizable crime but whether it is of such a nature as might be supposed to lead
the police to make use of their lawful powers to the injury or annoyance of any person.299
The information given must be false to the knowledge or belief of the informant. The section does not
necessarily impose upon the person giving information to the officer, criminal liability for mere want of caution
before giving that information. There must be positive and conscious falsehood established.300
As has been mentioned earlier, the section contemplates two intentions on the part of the person giving the
false information, the intention to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause such public servant
to do or omit to do some act, the intention to cause or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause a public
servant to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person or persons. In the first case, the
offence falls under clause (a) in which case the intention may not be that the public servant should act on the
false information to the injury or annoyance of any person. The intention may be that the public servant should
omit to do something which he ought not to omit. In the second case falling under clause (b) the intention is that
the public servant should act on the false information and exercise his lawful power to the injury or annoyance
of any person.301
This section was substituted for the original by section 1 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1895 (3 of
1895). Prior to the amendment, clause (b) came first as clause (a), and clause (a) came second as clause (b).
In the new section, illustration (c) is newly added. Before this amendment, the Calcutta302 and Madras303 High
Courts held that for the application of the section there must be some particular person against whom the
information is levelled and that the act done must tend to do some direct and immediate prejudice of that
person. These views were dissented from by the Bombay High Court in Queen-Empress v Ganesh
Khanderao.304 By adding illustration (c), the Legislature makes it clear that they did not express the intention to
the legislature, and that the information need not be levelled against any particular person or persons and the
informant would be liable under this section, if he knew it to be likely that in consequence of the information, the
public servant would use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of some person or persons.
The ingredients of the offence under this section are:305
(i) the giving of false information;
(ii) to a public servant;
(iii) which the informant knew or believed to be false; and

Page 4 of 36
person.—
(iv) which he gave to influence the public servant (a) to act otherwise than he would have acted, or (b) to
use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person.306
[s 182.4] Hoaxes
There may be many cases which in truth may be cases of hoaxes, which would still come within this section.
For example, suppose a man, knowing the statement to be untrue, but intending the magistrate to act upon it,
informed the magistrate of the district that a violent fire was raging in a city in the district of which he had
charge. Now, if the magistrate believed that statement, he would naturally send as many police as he could
spare to assist in quelling the fire and keeping order. He might possibly also ask for the assistance of the
military if there were any in the neighbourhood. That would be a perfect example of a hoax, and it would come
within the section whether or not the magistrate acts upon the information.307
[s 182.5] Moral Turpitude
An offence under section 182, IPC, whether falling under clauses (a) or (b), is an offence involving moral
turpitude.308
[s 182.6] Imputability and Deception
The offence consists in the giving of false information with intent to mislead a public servant, and is complete
whether the public servant was or was not misled. The imputability consists in the consciousness that the
deception is practised upon a public servant in contempt of his authority as such and that he might thereby be
induced to do what he ought not to do in the discharge of his duty as a public servant so as to prejudice the
public interest.309
Section 177 renders punishable the furnishing of false information to a public servant by a person “legally
bound” to furnish information sections 182 and 203 refer to the giving of information, which has been held to
mean the volunteering of information, to a public servant.310 Section 182 refers to the giving of any false
information with the particular intent specified in the section, while section 203 refers to the giving of false
information respecting the commission of an offence committed sections 201 and 203, IPC, contemplate giving
information respecting an offence which the accused person knows or believes to be false. For the offence
under section 201, the false information should also be furnished with the intention of screening the offender
from legal punishment. Unlike this section which deals with giving false information to any public servant,
sections 201 and 203 do not refer as to whom false information should be given; it would take in private
persons as well as public servants including the police.311
[s 182.8] Distinction between Sections 182, 499 and 500
The ingredients of the offence under section 182 cannot be said to be the ingredients for the offence under
section 500. Nor can it be said that the offence relating to giving false information relates to the same group of
offences as that of defamation. Offences under section 500 can be tried without sanction under section 195,
CrPC.312 Section 499 deals with defamation per se, and says nothing about where, why, or when the imputation
is made so the law would appear to apply in exactly the same way whether the imputation is made in a court of
justice or before some other public servant or anywhere else. Section 195, CrPC, lay down that a court shall not
take cognizance of certain offences under certain sections except on the complaint in writing of the public
servant concerned to that court or some other court to which the first court is subordinate and so on, but section
500 is not mentioned in section 195, CrPC. To section 499 there are 10 exceptions; it would have been quite
easy for the Legislature to have inserted an 11th exception saying that when the defamation is made in a
statement to a public servant or in court proceedings by virtue of which the offence was punishable under
sections 182 or 211, IPC or some other section, then no prosecution under section 500 would lie. But there is
no such extra exception.313 Thus bar of section 195, CrPC is attracted to sections 182, 211, IPC but not to
section 500, IPC.
Unlike section 191, the scope of this section is restricted. Whereas section 191 also makes it an offence on the
Page 5 of 36
person.—
part of the accused to make a statement which he does not believe to be true, this section does not make it
so.314 To constitute an offence punishable under this section it is necessary that the information given should be
information which the accused person knows or believes to be false. It is not sufficient that he had reason to
believe it to be false, or that he did not believe it to be true, there must have been positive knowledge or belief
that it is false.315
[s 182.10] Essence of Two Offences under Sections 211 and 182
Commentary under the same heading in section 211, post may be referred to.
[s 182.11] Distinction between Sections 182 and 211
Section 211 and this section have many elements in common and the question, whether an information of this
nature falls under section 211 or this section, has been the subject of debate in various High Courts and their
view is not unanimous. The Bombay High Court in Apaya Tatoba v Emperor,316 held that criminal law makes a
clear distinction between a false charge which comes under section 211 and false information given to the
police, which comes under this section. The distinction has been drawn thus:
If the information conveyed to the police amounts to the false institution of criminal proceedings against a defined
person, or amount to the falsely charging of a defined person with an offence, then the person giving such information
is guilty of an offence under s 211. In such a case this is not the appropriate section under which to frame a charge.
Section 182, when read with s 211, must be understood as referring to cases where the information given to the public
servant falls short of amounting to an institution of criminal proceedings against a defined person and falls short of
amounting to the falsely charging of defined person with an offence.
The Allahabad, Calcutta and Madras High Courts have taken a different view. The Calcutta High Court has held
that a prosecution for a false charge may lie under sections 182 or 211, but if the false charge is a serious one,
the graver section 211 should be applied.317 The Madras High Court has also held that there is no error in a
conviction under section 182, when the false charge made before the police is punishable under section 211.318
Many of the High Courts have taken the view that an offence may fall under both sections. It is said that an
offence under section 211 includes an offence under section 182, and that therefore, it is open to a magistrate
to proceed under either section, although in cases of a more serious nature, it may be that the proper course is
to proceed under section 211.319
The view of the Allahabad High Court was expressed by Edge CJ, in Queen-Empress v Raghu Tiwari,320 in the
following words:
Although it is difficult to see what case could arise under section 211 to which section 182 could not be applied yet
section 182 would apply to a case which might not fall under section 211. The offence under section 182 is complete
when false information is given to a public servant by a person who believes it to be false, but who intends thereby to
cause such public servant to institute criminal proceedings against a third person. The offence is complete although the
public servant takes no step towards the institution of such criminal proceedings. In our opinion it is in such a case, not
Page 6 of 36
person.—
at all necessary that the public servant should take any step whatever on the false information before instituting and
prosecuting to a conclusion a charge under section 182 against the person who had given such false information…In
cases to which section 211 especially applies and in which a criminal proceeding has been instituted a court should in
our opinion, as a rule proceed to determine such criminal proceeding instituted it and should give the person instituting
such proceeding a reasonable opportunity of supporting his case before proceeding against him for an offence under
section 211…It appears to us that it has been left to the discretion of the court to determine when and under what
circumstances prosecutions should be proceeded with under sections 182 and 211.
It has been held that an offence falling under this section is included in the more serious offences falling under
section 211; and a prosecution for a false charge may be either under this section or section 211, though
clearly if section 211 does apply and the false charge is serious, prosecution should be under the more serious
section 211. However, this does not mean that where an offence under section 182 is complete and the
prosecution is lodged, the proceeding must subsequently be quashed because the accused; not content with
the false report to the police, subsequently makes a false complaint to a magistrate in addition and thereby
exposes himself to a prosecution under section 211, IPC.321
Where a false report has been made to the police, and a similar complaint subsequently to the magistrate, a
proceeding under section 182 can be instituted by the police in reference to the false report made to them.322
The petitioner filed a complaint against the opposite party alleging that his son was kidnapped by the opposite
party. The kidnapped boy appeared before the court and stated that he was not kidnapped by the opposite
party but that he himself had gone voluntarily to marry a girl. The girl in statement under section 164, CrPC also
stated that she had married the petitioner’s son. The petitioner had filed a false case of kidnapping. Cognizance
of the offences under sections 182 and 211, CrPC taken by the Magistrate was held proper.323
However, as already pointed out, the Bombay High Court has taken a different view and held that the offence
under section 182 is a distinct offence from that under section 211.
In Raghavendra v Kashinath Bhat,324 Ranade J, observed:
The criminal law makes a clear distinction between a false charge which falls under section 211 of the Penal Code,
and false information given to the police, in which latter case the offence falls under section 182 of the same Code. If
plaintiff in the present case had chosen to prosecute the offender under section 182, it would not have been necessary
for him to prove malice and want of probable or reasonable cause, except so far as they were implied in the act of
giving information known to be false, with the knowledge or likelihood that such information would lead a public servant
to use his power to the injury or annoyance of the complainant. In an inquiry under section 211, on the other hand,
proof of the absence of just and lawful ground for making the charge is an important element.
In Emperor v Ram Krishna Yeshwant Adarkar,325 Batty J, delivering the judgement of the court, observed:
Page 7 of 36
person.—
Section 182 relates only to cases of information given to officials with the intention of causing or with knowledge that it
is likely to cause, that official to do or omit to do something which he ought not to do or omit to do, or to use his lawful
power to the injury or annoyance of any person. This is a distinct offence from that described in section 211, Indian
Penal Code, which relates to an attempt to put the criminal courts in motion against another person. The action which
section 211, Indian Penal Code, renders penal is action entailing very serious consequences, and therefore the more
serious consideration is required of the individual who takes it. It is sufficient, therefore, in such cases for the
prosecution to prove, not merely absence of reasonable or probable cause for giving the information, but a positive
knowledge or belief of the falsity of the information given.
Again in Apaya Totoba Mande v Emperor,326 Batchelor J, of the Bombay High Court observed:
The mere words of section 182, if they stood alone, are wide enough to cover the case where the information
conveyed to a Police Officer amounts to a direct charge of an offence as ‘offence’ is defined in the Penal Code; but
section 182 is to be interpreted not in isolation but in association with section 211, and, if the wording of the two
sections is contrasted, the different circumstances provided for by both seem to me to be fairly easy of ascertainment.
It appears to me that where the information conveyed to the police amounts to the institution of criminal proceedings
against a defined person, with an offence as ‘offence’ is defined in the Penal Code, then the person giving such
information has committed an offence punishable under section 211. In such case section 211 is, and section 182 is
not, the appropriate section under which to frame the charge…section 182, when read with section 211, must be
understood as referring to cases where the information given to the public servant falls short of amounting to the
institution of criminal proceedings against a defined person and falls short of amounting to the false charging of a
defined person with an offence as defined in the Penal Code. The distinction is substantial.
In one case,327 Mulla J, of the Allahabad High Court held that an accused can commit both offences under
sections 182 and 211 in the pursuit of the same purpose one after the other but their circles are clearly
separated and they do not overlap each other.
The Punjab Chief Court also followed the Bombay High Court and held that the two offences are essentially
distinct.328
For an offence under section 182, IPC, it is only necessary that the information given by the accused to a public
servant should be false to his knowledge, whereas to constitute an offence under section 211, IPC, it is
necessary that the accused should institute or cause to be instituted some criminal proceedings against another
person or should falsely charge him with having committed an offence.329 The essence of an offence under
section 182 is not the falseness of the information, as it is the essence of an offence under section 211, but the
contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant.330
It may also be noted that the offence, if any, constituted by a false complaint against unknown persons is not
one under section 211, but under this section.331
Page 8 of 36
person.—
A person who falsely informs the police that he has been robbed by a particular person is guilty of an offence
under section 211 and not under section 182.332
Section 211 applies only when a person institutes or causes to be instituted, criminal proceedings against any
person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence. A person actually institutes criminal
proceedings within the meaning of section 211 upon making a complaint as defined in section 2(d), CrPC. In
order to render an allegation a complaint, it must be made with a view to a magistrate taking action under the
CrPC. In the absence of a definite prayer asking the court to take such action, there must be clear proof that
that was the intention of the complainant. The words “falsely charged” in section 211 must be read with the
preceding words of that section and imply a false charge to a person in authority made with a view to setting the
law in motion. The question here again is one of intention. In the absence of proof that the intention of the
person giving the information was to set the criminal law in motion against the person charged, the case would
fall under section 182 and not section 211.333
However, if the motive was to induce the public servant not merely to do what he would not otherwise have
done but to take specific action of investigating the offence and prosecuting the person complained against, the
only section which is appropriate and which must be applied is section 211; and it would be obviously
anomalous and in every respect undesirable if the law were that simply because an offence under section 182
is also disclosed and because for the trial of such an offence a written complaint from a public servant is
necessary, the court should be debarred from inquiring into the real nature of the offence which comes within
section 211.334 But where a person gives false information to the police and subsequently files a complaint to a
magistrate to the same effect and allows the proceedings thereon to be dropped, the mere fact that a complaint
has been made does not bar the police officer to whom the false information was given from making a
complaint of an offence under section 182.335
It is true that the offence under section 182 is distinct from the one under section 211 though the latter is more
serious and may include the offence under the former section. The magistrate can take cognizance of an
offence under section 182 on a complaint in writing of the police officer by virtue of the provisions contained in
section 195(1)(a), CrPC. However, it would virtually lead to the circumvention of the provisions of section
195(1)(b) if the proceedings under section 182 can continue, where the offence disclosed is covered by section
211, IPC, and a complaint is pending which has been filed by the informant on the same facts and allegations
as were contained in his first information report. On a parity of reasoning with regard to an offence under
section 211, IPC, no cognizance can be taken by the magistrate for the alleged offence under section 193 of
the Penal Code which is one of the sections mentioned in section 195(1)(b).336 Once a complaint, filed by an
informant, is being proceeded with which is based on the same facts and allegations on which the first
information report was registered, it is not open to a magistrate to take cognizance of any offence alleged to
have been committed under section 211, IPC, unless there has been a proper complaint with the provisions of
section 195(1)(b), CrPC.337
[s 182.12] Distinction between Sections 211 and 182 Summarised
In a comparatively recent case the Madras High Court has held that section 182, IPC, deals with the offence of
giving false information to a public servant, thereby intending such public servant to use his lawful power to the
injury, or annoyance, of any person. Section 211 of the IPC deals with the offence of instituting, or causing to
be instituted, any criminal proceeding against any person, or falsely charging any person for having committed
an offence with intent to cause injury to any person knowing that there was no just or lawful ground for such
proceeding or charge against that person. Section 182 of the IPC deals with a lesser offence while section 211
of the IPC refers to a graver offence. If the information conveyed to the police amounts to the institution of
criminal proceeding against a defined person or amounts to falsely charging of a defined person with an
offence, then the person giving such information is guilty of an offence under section 211 of the IPC. In such a
case, section 211 is, and section 182 is not, the proper section under which a charge has to be framed Section
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182 read with section 211 of the IPC must be understood as referring to cases where the information, given to
the public servant, falls short of amounting to an institution of criminal proceeding against a defined person with
an offence as defined in the Penal Code. When a person specifically complains that another man committed an
offence and does so falsely with the object of causing injury to that person, he is guilty of making a false charge
of an offence under section 211, and not under section 182 of the IPC. Where the complainant has given a
complaint of theft of cash and other articles from his house against a defined person, who was formerly
employed under him, and the complaint has turned out to be false, the case falls under section 211, IPC, and
not under section 182, IPC. Further, when a complaint sets forth certain facts disclosing minor offence as also a
graver offence, the prosecution should ordinarily be for the graver offence.338
[s 182.13] When Offence is Covered under Section 211, Proceedings under Section 182 cannot Continue
[s 182.14] “Whoever Gives”
It is only the person who gives the false information to a public servant that can be held liable under this
section.
Where a false report of a theft was made at the police station by one S and U was with him when the report
was made, U cannot be held to have committed the offence, as he himself did not make the report.339
In a similar case, however, Stuart CJ, observed:
This report was made, as is clear from the proceedings, by Ram Jiawan and Ram Naresh jointly. Ram Jiawan first
stated the story and Ram Naresh corroborated him. But even if Ram Jiawan alone had told the story and Ram Naresh
had said nothing, both the men were clearly guilty on the facts: Ram Jiawan under the provisions of section 182 and
Ram Naresh for abetment, having engaged with Ram Jiawan in a conspiracy to make a false report and the false
report having been made in pursuance of the conspiracy. In respect of the decision of the late Mr Justice Karamat
Hussain which is reported in Umrao Singh v King-Emperor,340 it is sufficient to say that I do not agree with the view
which he took. He laid down that it was impossible for any person to be convicted in respect of a false report unless
false report had been taken down from his dictation.341
[s 182.14.1] Mere Spectator
It is difficult to understand how the other man can be made liable if he was only a spectator and there is nothing
to indicate that he associated with the person who actually made the false report or investigated or conspired
with or aided him.
Where an application containing false allegations is made by a person purporting to act on behalf of his father,
but there is nothing to show that the father instructed the son to make the application, the father cannot be
prosecuted for an offence under this section.342
[s 182.14.2] Scribe of the Report
Where the false information is contained in an application said to have been made by the accused, it must be
proved that he made the application, otherwise he cannot be convicted of the offence under this section. The
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mere writer of the application who had no reason to suppose that the allegations in it were false, cannot be held
guilty under this section.343
[s 182.15] Meaning of “Information”
The word “information” is not defined either in the IPC or the CrPC. It simply means the communication of any
intelligence or knowledge of facts. A mere expression of a private person’s belief or opinion344 or suspicion,345 is
not information within the meaning of this section.
Information as contemplated by section 182 need not be in writing or be reduced to writing, it may be oral.346
[s 182.16] “Gives any Information”—Signature on Information not Necessary
The expression “gives any information” occurs also in section 203, and has been interpreted to mean
“volunteers information”.347 Section 177 uses the word “furnishes” instead of “gives” when the informant is
bound to furnish the information. There seems to be no authority for asserting that a person cannot be said to
give information under section 182 unless he actually signs the document giving the information.348
The section penalises only the giving of false information to a public servant and not the withholding of
information.349
[s 182.17] Information Given in Answer to Question
It has been held in some cases that the plain ordinary meaning of the expression “gives information” is to
volunteer information and not to make statements in answer to questions put by the public servant.350 But in
these cases, except in the Rangoon case, the statements were made in answer to questions put by the police
during investigation under section 161, CrPC, and the questions whether or not they amount to information
under this section will be presently considered in the following note. In the Rangoon case,351 it was held that a
statement of a witness called for the defence of a departmental inquiry cannot, in general, form the basis of a
conviction under this section. Distinguishing these rulings, it has been held in a number of cases that there is
nothing to justify the reading in of the word “voluntarily” before the word “gives” in this section,352 that there is no
reason to insert in the statutory provisions of this section words that are not there, and thus to restrict unduly
the meaning of the words and to reduce the efficacy of the section in dealing with the mischief it was designed
to deal with353 and that any false information given to a public servant with the intention mentioned in this
section is punishable under that section whether the information is volunteered by the informant or given in
answer to questions put to him.354 There is no reason why the word “information” in this section be understood
to refer only to a first information recorded under section 154, CrPC. It is used in the section with reference not
to a police officer in particular but to any public servant.355 In Queen-Empress v Ramji Sajabarao,356 it was held
that false information given to a forest officer, a public servant, in answers given to questions put by him in the
course of an inquiry was punishable under this section.357 When questions are put to a person, he is bound, if at
all, to answer them truthfully and correctly; otherwise it is open to him not to answer the questions if he so liked.
But if he gives a false reply, he gives false information and is liable under this section, whether the statement is
made voluntarily or in answer to questions put to him.358
[s 182.18] Volunteer Information
Whether answers given to questions put by a police officer in the course of an investigation are punishable
under this section or not, the words “gives information” should not be interpreted as necessarily meaning
“volunteer information” ie, that it must be information on some matter which is not already under inquiry by the
public servant.359
Reviewing the entire case-law on the subject, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has observed:
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We are not inclined to give that restricted meaning of ‘volunteer’ to the word ‘give’. For instance, if a police officer has
reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence, he can investigate the case under section 157 for the
discovery and arrest of the offender. During such investigation he may find a person who gives him the required
information in answer to questions put him. There is nothing to prevent that officer from recording that information
under the provisions of section 154 and proceeding with the investigation of the case and if that information is proved
to be false the person can be prosecuted. That was what happened in Kalawati’s case360 and their Lordships of the
Supreme Court found her guilty of the offence under section 201, IPC.361
[s 182.19] Statements Under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
It is not disputed that if any person gives the first information statement to the police which is recorded under
section 154, CrPC, and if it ultimately turns out to be false, it would amount to giving false information and the
offender would be punishable under section 182, 201 or section 203, IPC provided the requisite intention is
proved.362
There is conflict of judicial opinion whether information referred to in these sections if given to the police would
refer only to information under section 154, CrPC, or whether they would refer to statements recorded by the
police during the course of investigation also. In some cases, it has been held that the words “public servant” in
this section sufficiently cover a police officer and that a reasonable interpretation of the words of this section is
to include information even if it is given to a police officer in the course of an investigation under section 161,
CrPC, in reply to questions put by him.363 These cases may be distinguished on the ground that they do not
relate to statements under section 161, CrPC. On the other hand, it has been held in a number of cases that a
statement made by a witness to the police under the provisions of section 161, CrPC, is not “information given
to a public servant” within the meaning of section 182, IPC.364 Reviewing the entire case-law on the subject, a
Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v Markose,365 observed:
Section 161 CrPC provides for the recording of statements of person acquainted with the facts and circumstances of
the case by the police officer making the investigation. A statement so recorded must be distinguished from one
constituting the information which starts the investigation, and it has been distinguished in section 162 by being
described as a statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation. Under the Criminal
Procedure Code of 1882, the public were no doubt bound to answer ‘truly’ all questions put to them by the police while
investigating a cognizable case. If, therefore, they answered falsely, they could have been then prosecuted under
section 193 of the Code. But this obligation of answering ‘truly’ no longer exists, and if they could be punished under
sections 182, 201 or 203, IPC, it would render nugatory the policy which dictated the amendment of the Criminal
Procedure Code by the removal of the word ‘truly’ from section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
That is why Irwin CJ, in King-Emperor v Nga Aung Po,366 observed that as persons examined by the police can
no longer be punished for giving false evidence, it would be mere evasion of law to hold them liable under
section 182, IPC. It also seems to us unfair that a man should be liable to be convicted of giving false
information on the strength of a statement given to a police officer which is not given on oath, which he has not
signed, and which he has had no opportunity of verifying. As is well known, such statements are hurriedly taken
down as rough notes and the police officer is not trained in taking evidence. We are aware of the force of the
argument of the learned public prosecutor of not imposing a liability on persons who give false information to
the police with the object of laying false trails or causing the inquiry to be burked or weaken the prosecution and
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thereby injuriously interfere with public justice but justice as well as expediency demand that a ban be placed
on prosecutions based on statements made to the police during investigation.
[s 182.20] Statements made by Accused—Such Statement is not Information
Neither can statement made by an accused person for purposes of his defence be held to be information given
to a public servant within the meaning of this section,367 nor can a false statement made by him in a petition of
appeal.368 A criminal appeal is a continuance of the criminal case, and, except so far as there is a provision to
the contrary, the appellant has the privilege of the accused and cannot be punished for making a false
statement under section 313, CrPC.369
A false statement made by an accused person when being examined under section 313, CrPC is not
information given to a public servant within the meaning of this section. However, if a person is not examined in
his capacity as an accused, a false statement made by him would render him liable under it.370
[s 182.21] Statements of Accused on Oath in Support of an Application for Transfer
It has been held in some cases that no one can be prosecuted in respect of false statements made by him in an
affidavit for the purpose of a revision,371 or transfer of a case in which he was an accused person.372 But,
dissenting from this view, it has been held that an application for transfer is not a part of the defence of an
accused person and statements made by an accused person in an affidavit in support of such an application do
not enjoy the immunity conferred by section 342, (now section 313) CrPC, upon answers to questions put to the
accused by the court trying the case.373
[s 182.22] “To any Public Servant”
For the meaning of “public servant” refer to section 21 and the commentary thereunder. A head constable is a
public servant within the meaning of this section.374 By the Railways Act, 1989, a railway servant, ie, any person
employed by a railway administration in connection with the service of a railway (section 2(34)) is deemed a
public servant for the purposes of chapter 9 of this Code.375
There is no provision in the Code which constitutes it an offence to lodge a false complaint in a foreign court or
to give false evidence before such court where the oath is not administered under the provisions of law in force
in India, but under the law of that state in relation to proceedings before that court. No offence under this
section, can be made out where it is not suggested that the false information was given to a public servant as
defined by this Code, quite apart from the consideration that it was given without and beyond India.376
[s 182.23] Indirect Communication of Information to Public Servant—When an Offence
It constitutes an offence under this section if a false complaint with evil intention is made to a village magistrate
for the purpose of being passed on to a station house officer, and which it is his bounden duty so to pass on.
Information given to A for the purpose of being passed on to B (a public servant), and which it was his bounden
duty so to pass on, must be considered as having been given, and intended to be given, to B.377 It would, of
course, be different if the false information was given to someone who was under no legal obligation to take any
action upon it.378
[s 182.24] Indirect Communication of Information to Public Servant—When Not an Offence
The accused, a liquor shop man in India, reported to his master that the excise inspector had asked him for
money and had watered some liquor in the shop with a view to getting him into trouble. The master as intended
by the shop man reported the matter to the collector, who after causing an inquiry to be made gave the excise
inspector permission under section 195(a), CrPC, to prosecute the shop man under this section, in order to
clear his own character. It was held that the accused was not guilty of the offence as the false information was
not given by him to a public servant, but to his own master.379
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Where the accused swore an affidavit containing false statements in support of an application by a complainant
for transfer of her case and handed it over to the complainant’s pleader for filing it in court, it was held that even
if the accused was the son of the complainant and made the statements to her pleader on her behalf, he could
not be held to have himself made the statements in court when the affidavit was filed, inasmuch as the pleader
was not his agent but represented his mother and she could have asked the pleader not to file the affidavit in
court.380
[s 182.25] “Information which he Knows or Believes to be False”
To establish an offence under this section there must, in the first instance, be legal proof that the information
given to the public servant was false. The mere opinion of the investigating officer on the point cannot be
treated as legal evidence and cannot be made the basis of a finding.381 It must further be proved that the
accused knew or believed it to be false and he gave it with such knowledge or belief.382 To establish the
offence, the prosecution must show, not merely that the accused gave the information, but that it was false and
that the accused knew or believed it to be false. A mere denial on oath by the person against whom the alleged
false information was given is not sufficient to prove the offence.383
The appellant had filed a complaint against her in-laws for dowry demand and harassment under section 498A,
IPC, and her brother-in-law was the Senior Superintendent of Police (respondent no. 3). No case was
registered but complaint was filed against the appellant under section 182, IPC for filing false report. Held, the
investigating officer failed to show that the appellant had given information which she was knowing and
believing to be false. In the investigation report it was not reported that the appellant was knowing that the
information given was false but still gave the information to harass the respondent. Thus, the proceedings
under section 182 were quashed.384
[s 182.26] Difficult to Prove Knowledge—Reasonable Inference—Burden not to be Laid on Accused
To constitute the offence, it is also necessary that the information given is information which the accused
person knew or believed to be false. It is not sufficient that he had reason to believe it to be false, or that he did
not believe it to be true; there must have been positive knowledge or belief that it was false.385 To bring the
case within this section, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove, not merely an absence of a reasonable or
probable cause for giving the information but a positive knowledge or belief of the falsity of the information
given.386 In Murad v Empress387 it has been held that:
It is not enough to find that he has acted in bad faith, that is, without due care or inquiry, or that he has acted
maliciously, or that he had no sufficient reason to believe or did not believe the charge to be true. The actual falsity of
the charge, recklessness in acting upon information without testing it, or scrutinising its source; actual malice towards
the persons charged, they are relevant evidence more or less cogent; but the ultimate conclusion must be, in order to
satisfy the definition of the offence, that the accused knew that there was no just or lawful grounds for proceeding. It
may be difficult to prove this knowledge, but, however difficult it may be, it must be proved and unless it is proved, the
informer must be acquitted.
To constitute the offence, it must be shown that the person giving the information knew or believed it to be false
or that the circumstances in which the information was given were such that the only reasonable inference is
that the person giving the information knew or believed it to be false. The fact that the information is shown to
be false does not cast upon the party who is charged with an offence under this section, the burden of showing
that when he made it, he believed it to be true. The prosecution must make out that the circumstances were
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such that the only reasonable inference was that he must have known or believed it to be false.388 The burden
of proof cannot be laid upon the accused. It is for the prosecution to show that the information given was false,
and not for the accused to show that it was true.389 The accused cannot be convicted if he fails to establish that
the reported information was true. An allegation which is found not proved, is not necessarily false and false to
the knowledge of the maker.390
[s 182.27] Particular Intention or Knowledge, Essential—Act or Mission of Public Servant not Material
This section requires that information which is false or which is believed to be false is given to a public servant
with a particular intention or knowledge, and if the information is known to be false and is given with the
intention mentioned in the section, the offence is committed. The fact that the public servant did not, in fact, do
or omit to do anything or did not use his lawful power in consequence, is not a deciding factor. The guilt of the
accused lies in his intention or knowledge, and a man’s intention or knowledge must be judged from his acts
and the surrounding circumstances.391 A man is presumed in law, to intend the ordinary and natural
consequences of his acts, and when he falsely charges another before the police with the commission of an
offence, knowing the charge to be false, there can be no doubt that he is guilty of an offence punishable under
both section 182 and section 211, even though his primary object may have been to protect himself rather than
to injure the person falsely charged.392 Without the requisite intent or knowledge, there can be no offence under
this section.393 The intention must be to cause the conduct specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of the section.
To put it in other words, section 182 of the IPC requires as an essential ingredient thereof, that the allegedly
false information must have been given with the intention to cause, or knowing it to be likely that it will cause, a
public servant in the exercise of his duties as such (a) to do or to omit anything which he ought not to do or
omit, on the basis of the true facts or (b) to use his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person.394
[s 182.28] Intention must not be Confused with Motive
Where the accused made a false report to the police that a burglary was committed in his house, not with the
intention or knowledge specified in the section, but with the ulterior motive of suppressing certain documents by
pleading that they were stolen in the burglary, it was held that he could not be held guilty of the offence under
this section.395
[s 182.29] Consequential Action not Necessary
The offence does not depend upon what is done or omitted to be done by the public servant, on such false
information, the question whether the public servant was induced to do or not to do anything thereby, being
absolutely immaterial so far as this section is concerned.396 The offence is, therefore, complete when the false
information has been knowingly given, with one or other of the intentions specified in clauses (a) and (b), and
being complete then, the offender may be prosecuted at once under this section.397 It is thus immaterial
whether or not the public servant is misled.398 It is not necessary that action should be taken by the police on
the information given. What is essential is the intention that an action be taken or the knowledge that it is likely
to be taken.399
[s 182.30] Clause (A)—Statutory Amendments
It may be noted that the marginal note to the section speaks only of “false information with intent to cause
public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person” which is covered by clause (b). The
reason is that clause (a) did not appear in the draft of the Indian Penal Code prepared by Lord Macaulay’s
Commission.400 It was subsequently added. The original clause was marked as (a) and the newly added clause
as (b). But the position of the two clauses was altered when the section was amended in 1895, and what was
clause (a) became clause (b), and clause (b) became clause (a).401
Under this section, the giving of false information to a public servant is made penal when either of two
consequences is intended to be caused, or known to be likely to be caused, by the false information. The first is
that which is described in clause (a) and the second is described in clause (b). The two consequences are quite
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distinct from each other. To constitute an offence under the first part, covered by clause (a), it is not necessary
that the act intended, or known to be likely to be done, be to the injury or annoyance of any third person.402 But
in either case the false information must call for some action or omission on the part of the public servant to
whom it is given. Thus, the making of a false report to the police alleging the disappearance of a bullock or a
buffalo does not call for any action on the part of the police, as the report does not disclose any cognizable
offence in which case only the police can take action. The making of such a report does not justify a conviction
under this section.403 But this does not mean that in order to constitute the offence under this section, the
information should be given to a police officer and that it must relate to a cognizable offence. Illustrations (a)
and (b) show that the information need not relate to an offence, cognizable or non-cognizable, punishable
under the Code and that it may be given to a public servant who is not a police officer.404
Where the accused sold his horse but falsely reported to the police that it was stolen, it was held that in making
this report, he clearly gave false information to the police which he knew to be false and he must have known
that it was likely that he would thereby cause the police authorities, if they found a horse answering to his
description, to take it from the possession of its rightful owner.405
It must be remembered that in a case under this part of the section, it is immaterial to consider the nature of the
action of the public servant; the question is what action the person, who gave the false information,
contemplated that the public servant would take. If the person intended and contemplated that the public
servant would do some act which, had he known the true facts, he would not have done, he (the person who
gave the false information) has committed an offence under this section.406
[s 182.31] “To do or Omit Anything”—Meaning of
The words “to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit” must mean, to do
something which the public servant was enjoined to do in his official capacity as a public servant. If a person
gives false information to a public servant, knowing it to be likely or intending that he would do something which
had no connection with his office as a public servant, then the conduct of the person giving such information
would not come within the purview of this section. For instance, if a person gave information to a public servant
knowing it to be likely or intending that such public servant would go and beat up somebody, then it cannot be
said that this offence has been committed, because it is no part of the duty of a public servant to beat up
people.407 However, it cannot be said that this section applies only to a complaint to a public servant when it is
made with the intention of inducing such public servant to take action of a sort which only a public servant of the
description in question could take, and which would not be open to a private individual. In illustration (a), the
action expected to be taken by the public servant was simply the dismissal of a subordinate and any master
could do the same.
Where a postman reported to the postmaster that he was beaten and robbed of his postbag by a person, and
the postmaster immediately gave information to the police who inquired into the matter and reported that the
complaint was false, it was held that his conviction under this section was justified, because the accused gave
to a public servant (the sub-postmaster) information which the accused knew to be false intending thereby to
cause the sub-postmaster to do something (viz, sending information to the police) which he ought not to have
done if the true state of facts were known by him.408
[s 182.32] “Which such Public Servant Ought not to do or Omit”, etc—Use of “Ought” Explained
The words “such public servant ought not to do or omit” in the section appear to resemble the words “to use the
lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person” only insofar as both sets of words
refer to an official conduct. But the latter phrase using the word “ought”, which implies duty and excludes
personal choice, covers duties imposed by more particular statutes, as well as duties arising otherwise from the
status or office of the public servant. The police, for example, are bound by an express statute, to vigilance, in
the prevention and detection of crime and the apprehension of offenders; the customs and excise officers are in
much the same position. But other public servants, in the absence of statutes, are required by the unwritten law
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to exercise vigilance and care, like the ministers of the government, to give good advice, or, like judges, to
hearken in their courts to the suitors and their counsel, or, like the magistrate, to suppress riots, or to comment
on the misconduct of the police in cases before them.409 The office, the honour, and the duty go together and all
relate to the public welfare. Now, as the officer is bound to act in the discharge of his office in the proper
circumstances, it may often be an interference with his duty, and thus dangerous to the public welfare, if
through false information he is prevented from acting, or induced to act wrongly.410
A personating B at an examination, passes it and obtains a certificate in B’s name. B files the certificate along
with an application to the assistant collector to have his name entered in a list of candidates for service in the
revenue department, and on the strength of the certificate, B’s name is registered. B is guilty of an offence
under clause (a) of this section.411
A makes a false charge of theft to a village magistrate. This is an offence under clause (a) read with section
45(c) (now section 40(1)(c)) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.412
[s 182.32.1] Request to do an Illegal Act not within the Purview of this Section
It has been held that clause (a) of this section applies to a case in which it is intended that a public servant
should do or omit to do something which he ought to do or omit to do if the facts were true, that is, which he
would be legally justified in doing or omitting to do if the facts before him were true. Asking a magistrate to do
an act which would be an illegal act even if true facts were stated to him, would not come within the purview of
the section. The information must be information regarding a fact which would induce the magistrate to do
something which he would be legally competent to do if he had been cognizant of the true facts. Where,
therefore, the accused petitioned the district magistrate praying that as certain tenants occupying his houses
had absconded, leaving the houses locked up, the houses might be unlocked to enable him to execute the
necessary repairs, and the application was sent for compliance and report to the police, who reported that the
allegations contained in the petition were untrue, it was held that this section was inapplicable to the
circumstances of the case.413 But dissenting from this, in a parallel case the Peshawar judicial commissioner’s
court had observed:
It appears to me to be a reductio ad obsurdum of section 182, Indian Penal Code, to hold that when a person gives
false information to a public servant deliberately asking that public servant to take certain action, he is not punishable
under this section because the public servant was not legally entitled to take the action requested. It would be more
than ever reductio ad obsurdum in a case like the present one where the application was nothing unusual, but was one
of a kind constantly made to magistrates on which magistrates were in the habit of taking the action requested. The
applicant believed that the magistrate had power to take the action requested and the magistrate himself believed it.
So far as the point goes, therefore, I cannot but hold that the persons making an application of this nature based upon
deliberately false information are certainly liable to prosecution under section 182, Indian Penal Code.414
[s 182.32.2] Making Investigation does not Affect the Falsity of Report
In a later case, where a report of a burglary was made to the police and on investigation the report was found to
be false, it was held that it cannot be said that making the investigation is an act which ought not to have been
done if the true facts were known. There is no law or rule requiring a public servant not to make an investigation
in certain circumstances. In the absence of a positive law or rule requiring him not to make an investigation if he
knew that a certain report was false, lodging a false report intending to cause, or knowing it likely to cause, him
to make an investigation would not constitute an offence.415 An accused who makes a false statement in his
petition of appeal, cannot be held to have committed an offence under this section, even assuming that the
false statement was made with the object of inducing and that it did induce, the appellate court to send for the
record of the case, as it cannot be said that the court was thereby induced to do what it ought not to have
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done.416 Similarly, a person who makes a false statement in his petition cannot be held to have committed the
offence simply because his claim is not substantiated, even assuming that some false statement, which was not
directly the subject of complaint, was made with the object of inducing and that it did induce the court to take
some action, as it cannot be said that the court was thereby induced to do what it ought not to have done.417
[s 182.32.3] Action Contemplated and not Taken is Material
It must be remembered that in a case under this part of the section, it is immaterial to consider the nature of the
action of the public servant; the question is what action the person who gave the false information contemplated
that the public servant would take. If the person intended and contemplated that the public servant would do
some act which, had he known the true facts, he would not have done, he (the person who gave the false
information) has committed an offence under this section.418
[s 182.32.4] Giving Wrong Identity Falls within the Mischief
Where on being questioned by a superintendent of police, the accused, driving a motor car without licence,
gave him a fictitious name as that of himself, it was held that the accused, by giving a false name must have
intended to cause, or have known that he would be likely to cause, the superintendent of police to prosecute a
fictitious person or to omit prosecuting the real offender, and even if the intention of the accused was to put
obstruction or difficulty in the way of the police officer taking action against himself, the false information given
by him came within the mischief of section 182(a), and that what the superintendent of police actually did was
immaterial.419
[s 182.33] Clause (B)—Test to be Applied
To bring a case within this clause, the intention or knowledge of the informant must be to procure the exercise
of the lawful power of the public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person. Whether a case falls under
this clause or not depends upon the answer to the question as to whether the information given to the public
servant was of such a nature as might be supposed to lead the public servant to make use of his lawful powers
to the injury or annoyance of any person.420 Where the accused in a petition of resignation made to the
collector, made certain false allegations against another person in order to forestall any proceeding which that
other person might take against him, but he never intended the collector to use his powers to the injury or
annoyance of that person, it was held that the accused was not guilty of the offence under this section.421
The accused appeared before the district magistrate and made certain allegation against a police officer, but
added that he did not wish to make an inquiry so as to prevent the police officer from behaving tyrannically
towards him. It was held that the accused was guilty, not under section 193, but under this section.422
So also where the accused said to an officer “I find there has been a theft, I suspect the persons named and I
want an inquiry to be made”, it was held that it was not a false charge within the meaning of section 211, but if it
was false, it was a false report made to the officer under section 182.423
In these two cases, the question as to whether the accused intended the public servant to use his lawful powers
to the injury or annoyance of the third person was not considered.
[s 182.34] “To use the Lawful Power of Such Public Servant”
The expression “such public servant” in the two clauses of the section refers to the public servant to whom the
false information is given with the intention specified in the two clauses.424 Information given to A (a village
magistrate or headman) for the purpose of being passed on to B (the police station-house officer), which it was
his duty so to pass on, must be considered as having been given to B.425 In the case last cited, the case of
Queen v Periannan426 was distinguished and dissented from. In that case also information of an offence was
given to a village magistrate who reported the matter at the police station, and the station house officer after an
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inquiry, referred the case as false to the sub-magistrate and also asked for a sanction to prosecute the
informant under this section. The sub-magistrate ordered the sanction and subsequently, himself tried and
convicted the accused (informant) under this section. The district magistrate, however, took the view that the
proceedings were illegal on two grounds: (a) that the village magistrate to whom the information was given had
no powers in the case, (b) that the sub-magistrate had no power to give sanction as he was not the public
servant to whom the information was given. The High Court did not concur in the opinion of the district
magistrate and refused to interfere with the conviction. With regard to the second ground on which the district
magistrate considered the proceedings to be illegal, the High Court observed: “As to the other question, we
think all was done that was necessary. The public servant himself complained, which is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the section (old section 467, now section 195, Criminal Procedure Code).” This can only mean
that it is not the village magistrate to whom the false information was given but the station-house officer to
whom the information was passed on and thus he was the “public servant concerned” within the meaning of
section 195, CrPC and “such public servant” within the meaning of section 182. And this is in accord with the
decision in Emperor v Jonnalagadda Venkatarayadu.427 With regard to “the use of his lawful power” in
Periannan’s case,428 it was remarked:
We think the words ‘to use his lawful power’ in s 182 refer to some power to be exercised by the officer misinformed,
which shall tend to some direct and immediate prejudice of the person against whom the information is levelled. They
do not (we think) apply to such prejudice as might eventually arise in consequence of certain harmless intermediate
steps to be taken by the misinformed officer such as were taken in the present case, where all that the misinformed
officer did or could do was to pass on the information.
Considered along with the final decision in the case these remarks can only mean that the village magistrate
(the magistrate within whose jurisdiction the concerned village lay) had no power except to pass on the
information to the station-house officer, and the station-house officer being the public servant to whom the
information must be considered to have been given, it is the use of his lawful power that has to be considered in
applying this section. It is unfortunate that the language of the judgment is misleading, but taken with the actual
decision in the case, it is submitted that there can be no doubt that the High Court meant to lay down nothing
contrary to what was clearly laid down in the case of Emperor v Jonnalagadda Venkatarayadu.429 In Public
Prosecutor v Thavasiandi Thevan,430 it was remarked: “The case of The Queen v Periannan reported in ILR 4
Mad 241 is not an authority against his view, since in that case the learned Judge only held that no offence
punishable under section 182(b) was committed.” It is submitted that this remark is due to a misunderstanding
of the actual decision in Periannan’s case.
[s 182.35] “To the Injury or Annoyance of any Person”
As to the meaning of “injury”, see s 44 and the commentary thereunder.
A tells B, a collector, that certain zamindars have usurped the possession of Government land. Supposing B
believes A and takes action thereon, he can only bring a civil suit against the zamindars, and would not thereby
be acting as collector or magistrate, and hence A has not committed any offence.431
“Any person” must mean some third person. A public servant cannot use his lawful power to the annoyance of
himself.432
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person.—
The other person may or may not be definitely ascertained. See illustration (c). Thus, whether the “person” in
question be one, more, or many, only one offence is committed.433
The offence under this section is non-cognizable and a summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable, and is triable by any magistrate. In a case, registered on the report of a police
officer for an offence under section 182, IPC, the provisions of section 256(1), CrPC, 1973 did not apply and the
accused could not be acquitted on the complainant’s failure to appear before the magistrate on the date fixed
for the hearing.434 No application can lie under section 476(1) (now under section 340), CrPC, for taking any
action in regard to an offence under section 182, IPC.435
[s 182.37] Limitation
The limitation prescribed for prosecution under this section is one year. The order taking cognizance thereafter
is bad in law and cannot be sustained.436 The offence under section 182, IPC is complete when the complaint is
found to be false. Therefore, it is the date for starting limitation when the investigating agency concludes the
investigation and finds the averments in the complaint are false. The acceptance of a cancellation report will not
extend the time, under section 469 of CrPC, where the commission of the offence is not known to the person
aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of
such person or any police officer, whichever is earlier. Therefore, when the police officer finds that the
complaint was false, it is that date when the limitation starts.437 Where the complaint was filed against the
accused for furnishing false information to the society regarding their owning another house and having
membership in other societies and getting plots allotted in their names, the chargesheet was filed against the
accused persons for offences under sections 420, 471, 120(B), 177 and 182 of the Penal Code nearly after 8
years. Offences under sections 177 and 182, IPC were held barred by limitation under section 468, CrPC and
other offences were not made out, so a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quashed under
section 482, CrPC, the criminal proceedings pending against the accused persons before a metropolitan
magistrate, Hyderabad.438
[s 182.38] Complaint of Public Servant Concerned Necessary
Under section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no court shall take cognizance of an offence
punishable under this section except on a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned, or some other
public servant to whom he is subordinate. Compliance with the provisions of this section is a condition
precedent to the court assuming jurisdiction, and a failure to comply with those provisions would vitiate the
entire trial as without jurisdiction,439 and it is doubtful whether section 465, CrPC can be pressed into service to
cure a defect of jurisdiction.440 In view of section 195(1)(a)(iii), CrPC, in order to maintain the complaint for the
offence under section 182, IPC, the complaint must be filed either by the person before whom such information
was given or the superior officer of that public servant.441 The Legislature has provided a condition precedent to
the exercise of jurisdiction by a court and the condition precedent must be strictly complied with.442 The
provisions of this section are mandatory, so that it has been held that no court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of any of the offences mentioned therein without the prescribed complaint,443 non-compliance with
the section being fatal to the prosecution.444 No prosecution can be entertained without the prescribed
complaint in the case of offences specified in the section.445 In the absence of a complaint as required by
section 195, the magistrate will be acting without jurisdiction in summoning the accused, and any subsequent
proceedings would be void,446 and the trial without the complaint, nugatory.447
There is absolute bar against the court in taking seisin of the case for offence under section 182, IPC except in
the manner provided in section 195 CrPC. Where complaint by the public servant is not filed and there is non-
compliance of the procedure laid down by section 195 CrPC, the prosecution is void ab initio.448
The Supreme Court has also held that the trial of an accused under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code,
without the complaint of the public servant concerned, is without jurisdiction ab initio and the conviction cannot
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be maintained.449 Where the complaint for giving false information was not filed by the authority to whom false
information was given but by a person not competent to do, accused was acquitted of the charge under section
182, IPC.450 Where, however, a complaint for an offence under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code has been
dismissed on the ground that it has not been presented by the public servant concerned, subsequent
prosecution of the accused on a valid complaint is not barred by section 300, CrPC, 1973.451
The allegations were that the petitioner committed fraud by getting sale deed of 324 square yards registered
whereas the actual ownership of the vendor was merely of 194 square yards. The complaint was filed before
the Magistrate under the signatures of the SHO. As the complaint was filed by an incompetent person, order
summoning the petitioner as accused under section 182, IPC was quashed452
[s 182.39] When False Information is Given to Superintendent of Police, Complaint Cannot be Filed by SHO or
Other Subordinate Police Officers
The question whether the superintendent of police is competent to file complaint or it could be filed even by a
person subordinate to him has been the subject matter of consideration in the cases of Harbans Singh v State
of Punjab,453 Davinder Singh Kapoor v State of Punjab454 and Malkiat Singh v State of Haryana.455 It has been
held in all the aforementioned judgments that the complaint is required to be filed by the public servant
concerned ie by the superintendent of police to whom false grievance is alleged to have been made by the
accused and not by the Station House Officer.456
[s 182.40] Facts Disclosing Two or More Offences One of which only Requires Complaint, Trial of Others
Without Complaint—Validity of
Section 195 provides inter alia that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under sections
172 to 188, IPC, except on a complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or some other public servant
to whom he is subordinate. The statute thus requires that without a complaint in writing of the public servant
concerned, no prosecution for an offence under section 182 can be taken cognizance of. It does not further
provide that if in the course of the commission of that offence other distinct offences are committed, the
magistrate is debarred from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well.457 Where, in the course of
the same transaction, distinct offences are committed, and only some of them require a complaint by the public
servant or the court concerned, cognizance of the other offences constituted by a different set of acts is not
barred.458
If the offence disclosed can be laid under different sections of the Indian Penal Code, some requiring sanction
and others not, it is quite competent for the prosecution to bring the offence under a section which does not
require a sanction.459
The allegations made in a complaint may have a double aspect, that is; on the one hand they may constitute an
offence against the authority of the public servant or public justice, and on the other hand, constitute the offence
of defamation or some other distinct offence. Section 195, CrPC does not per se bar the cognizance by the
magistrate of that offence, even if no action is taken by the public servant to whom the false report has been
made. The ingredients of the offence under section 182 cannot be said to be the ingredients for the offence
under section 500. Nor can it be said that the offence relating to giving false information relates to the same
group of offences as that of defamation.460 Where, upon the facts, the commission of several offences is
disclosed, some of which require sanction and others do not, it is open to the complainant to proceed in respect
of those only which do not require sanction; because to hold otherwise would amount to legislating and adding
very materially to the provisions of sections 195 to 199, CrPC.461 Hence, a prosecution for defamation, based
on a false information given to a public officer with an intent that the latter should act on it, is not barred for a
want of complaint by the public officer under section 195(1)(a), CrPC on the ground that a prosecution under
section 182 and section 500, IPC, should be said to arise out of the same facts.462 Even when an alleged
defamatory statement is made before a court and that court finds that the deposition is false, it is open to the
person defamed to institute proceedings under section 499, IPC, without the court filing a complaint in
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accordance with the provisions laid down in section 195, CrPC. All the more so is such a complaint
unnecessary where a defamatory statement is made by a witness in the course of a judicial proceeding and the
court was deprived of an opportunity of so adjudicating; in all such cases it is open to the party defamed to take
proceedings under section 499, IPC.463
Though section 195 does not bar the trial of an accused person for a distinct offence disclosed by the same
facts and which is not included within the ambit of that section, it has also to be borne in mind that the
provisions of that section cannot be evaded by resorting to devices or camouflages. The test as to whether
there has been an evasion of the section or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an
offence for which a complaint of the court or of the public servant is required. In other words, the provisions of
the section cannot be evaded by the device of charging a person with an offence to which that section does not
apply and then convicting him of an offence to which it does, upon the ground that such latter offence is a minor
offence of the same character, or by describing the offence as being one punishable under some other section
of the Indian Penal Code, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in the category of sections mentioned
in section 195 of the CrPC. Merely by changing the garb or label of an offence, which is essentially an offence
covered by the provisions of section 195, prosecution for such an offence cannot be taken cognizance of by
misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.464
Where the real offence committed is one under section 182, the accused cannot be tried for a minor offence
without a proper complaint.465
[s 182.41] When Complaint should be for an Offence Under Section 182, IPC and when for Offence Under
Section 211, IPC—Divergent Views—Test Suggested
On this question there is a difference of opinion between the various High Courts. The Bombay High Court
holds the view that false information to the police comes under section 182, IPC, and a false charge in a court
comes under section 211.466 The Calcutta High Court has held that prosecution for a false charge may be under
section 182 or section 211, but if the charge is serious, section 211 should be applied,467 and a false charge
made to the police of a cognizable offence falls under section 211 and not under section 182.468 But this does
not mean that where an offence under section 182 is complete, and the prosecution is lodged under section
182, the proceeding under that section must subsequently be quashed because the accused, not content with
the false report to the police, subsequently makes a false complaint to a magistrate in addition and thereby
exposes himself to a prosecution under section 211.469
It is for the court to determine under what section the prosecution should be held.470 When the false charge
amounts to an offence under section 211 also, proceedings should be taken with respect to the more serious
offence, ie, section 211.471 The main test as to whether a person makes “a charge” within the meaning of
section 211 is, “Does the person who makes the statement which is alleged to constitute the “charge” does so
with the intention and object of setting the criminal law in motion against the person against whom the
statement is directed.”472 If a case comes under both section 211 and 182, it is open to the authority concerned
to proceed under one section or the other. But if in such a case that authority has thought fit to file a complaint
under section 182, the magistrate is not justified in acquitting the accused on the sole ground that he should
have been prosecuted under section 211.473 It has been held that even if the offence falls under both the
sections, a conviction under section 182 will not be regarded as illegal.474
If the complaint sets out all the facts which constitute the offence, it does not matter whether the complainant
thinks that the offence committed is punishable under section 211 or under section 182, IPC.475
[s 182.42] Complaint by Whom to be Made
The complaint under section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 must be a complaint filed by
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the public servant concerned or by another public servant to whom he is subordinate, but not by a public
servant who is himself subordinate to the public servant concerned.476 The public servant concerned is the
public servant to whom the false information was given with the intention or knowledge that such public servant
will do something which he ought not to do.477 If a false report was made to a police officer, the complaint must
be by that police officer and not the magistrate who directed the police to complain.478 However, if the false
information given to a public servant is repeated before a magistrate, that magistrate may complain, whether
the false statement was made to him voluntarily or upon questions put to the accused.479 If the information was
given to a sub-inspector of railway police or to the inspector general of police, it is that officer who can complain
and not a sub-inspector of police who subsequently investigated the case.480 In the case of an offence under
this section, in connection with a complaint preferred to a magistrate, the proper authority to file the complaint is
the magistrate himself. A complaint filed by the sub-inspector of police under the direction of the magistrate is
not a proper complaint under section 195(1)(a).481
Where the accused persons were prosecuted for having committed serious offences under sections 363(A),
366 & 376, IPC, after the insuance of a suo motu notice for the cancellation of bail, the prosecutrix and the
witnesses completely reversed the stand taken earlier and no proceeding had been initiated against the
prosecutrix and her parents, the Punjab and Haryana High Court directed the concerned police station to
initiate the necessary proceedings against the prosecutrix and her parents for having committed the offence
under section 182, IPC, together with any other offence that may be made out.482
[s 182.42.1] Magistrate has no Locus Standi to Direct Filing of Complaint under section 182
Reading section 182, IPC with section 195(1)(a), CrPC, it is clear that no court can take cognizance of any
offence punishable under section 182, IPC (giving false information to a public servant in order to cause him to
use his lawful power) except on a written complaint of the concerned public servant or his higher authority.483
cognizance by a magistrate could only be taken in the given case, on a written complaint of the concerned
police officer. A magistrate has no locus standi to order the filing of a complaint in respect of an offence under
section 182, IPC.484
[s 182.43] Inquiry before Complaint—Whether Necessary
One of the ingredients of the offence under this section is that the accused should know or believe that the
information given by him was false.
The offence is one in which mens rea must be established by direct evidence or by circumstances of the case
and the conduct of the informant. Before a public servant may make a complaint of an offence under this
section, he must have before him some evidence, either direct or inferential, to establish the fact that the
information given to him was false to the knowledge or belief of the informant.485 But as pointed out by Cuming
J, in the case of Emperor v Baharali Biswas,486 there is no provision in the law that, before a magistrate can
inquire into a case under section 182, on the complaint of a police officer, he must give the accused party an
opportunity of proving the truth of his case, and therefore if the accused person is convicted without any
preliminary opportunity being given to prove the truth of his case, the conviction is not illegal on that account.487
The terms of section 340, CrPC do not make it obligatory in any case to direct a preliminary inquiry before the
making of the complaint; such preliminary inquiry may be held only when the offence is one of those referred to
in clause (b) of section 195(1), CrPC. Section 182, IPC, is not one of the offences mentioned in the aforesaid
clause, and therefore, there is no reason why there should be a preliminary inquiry before a complaint is
actually made by the public servant. Section 340, CrPC, speaks of holding a preliminary inquiry, if at all, by the
court, when it is making a complaint and not where it is the public servant who is making the complaint.488
When, as the result of a police investigation, it appears that a complaint made to the police of the commission
of an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code is false, it is not necessary that the complainant should
be given any further opportunity of establishing the truth of his allegations, before his prosecution under section
182 is proceeded with.489
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person.—
When a complaint of an offence under this section or section 211 (duly sanctioned or not requiring sanction) is
presented to a magistrate, it should be disposed of according to law, and there is no provision requiring him to
first give the accused person an opportunity of proving the truth of the charge he has made.490 But where a
person challenges the police report and reiterates the charges made before the police, it is clearly a complaint,
and the magistrate should deal with it under the provisions of section 203, CrPC. The case under this section
cannot be proceeded with until that person’s complaint has been dealt with in accordance with law.491
Where a narazi petition against the report of police has been actually dismissed by the magistrate under section
203, CrPC, there is nothing to prevent a trial under section 182 from proceeding.492
[s 182.44] Quashing of Complaint by High Court Allowing Petition Under Section 482, Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973
Where the complaint was lodged by the petitioner against the accused for the house trespass and theft of his
properties, after investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted final form with the report of false accusations,
no notice was sent to the petitioner informing him about the submission of the final report, subsequent protest
petition filed by him was not registered, instead the petitioner complainant himself was prosecuted under
sections 182 and 211, IPC for setting the law in motion falsely, order taking cognizance was found not
sustainable in law and was quashed.493
[s 182.45] Jurisdiction where Information Sent by Post
Where the information given to a public servant is contained in a letter posted at one place and delivered at
another, the offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, the court, therefore, within
whose jurisdiction the letter was posted is also competent to try the offence.494
[s 182.46] Charge
I (name and office of magistrate, etc.) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you on or about the ………… day of ………… at ……… gave to …………., (name of official designation of public
servant), a public servant, the following information, namely ……. which you knew or believed to be false, intending
thereby to cause (or knowing it to be likely that you would thereby cause) such public servant to do (or omit) something
to omit…, which such public servant ought not to do (or omit) if the true state of facts were known by him (or to use the
lawful power of such public servant, to the injury) (or annoyance) of …… and thereby committed an offence punishable
under section 182 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
And I thereby direct that you be tried by this court on the said charge.
[s 182.47] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it must be proved that the accused gave certain information to a
public servant,495 knowing or believing it to be false and with the intention, or knowledge, mentioned in either of
the two clauses [(a) or (b)] of the section.496 The prosecution has further to show that the accused intended
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thereby to cause or knew that it was likely that he would thereby cause such public servant to do or omit
anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit, if the true state of facts were known to him or that
he intended thereby to cause or knew that it was likely that he would thereby cause such public servant to use
his lawful powers to the injury or annoyance of any person.497
To constitute an offence under this section, it must be shown that the person giving the information, knew or
believed it to be false, or that the circumstances in which the information was given were such that the only
reasonable inference is that the person giving the information knew or believed it to be false. The fact that an
information is shown to be false does not cast upon the party who is charged with an offence under the section,
the burden of showing that, when he made it, he believed it to be true. The prosecution must make out that the
only reasonable inference was that he must have known or believed it to be false.498 It is not enough to find that
he had acted in bad faith, that is, without due care or inquiry, or that he had acted maliciously, or that he had no
sufficient reason to believe or did not believe the charge to be true. The actual falsity of the charge, a
recklessness in acting upon the information without testing it, or scrutinising its sources; or an actual malice
towards the person charged—they are relevant evidence more or less cogent, but the ultimate conclusion must
be, in order to satisfy the offence, that the accused knew that there was no just or lawful ground for proceeding.
It may be difficult to prove this knowledge, but however difficult it may be, it must be proved, and unless it is
proved, the informer must be acquitted.499
Where the oral and documentary evidence on record adduced by the complainant before the trial court did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused had committed the offences punishable under sections 182 and
209, IPC, the appellant accused was acquitted of the charges under sections 182 and 209, IPC.500
[s 182.48] Sentence
Where an accused was convicted under this section and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs 200 or, in default, to
undergo a rigorous imprisonment for six months, and it was found that he was a mere servant and presently out
of employment, his fine was reduced to Rs 100.501
[s 182.49] Effect of Acquittal
An acquittal on a charge under this section is no bar to a subsequent trial for an offence under section 211.502
But an acquittal under section 211 may be a bar to a trial under section 182.503 An acquittal on the ground that
the person to whom the information was given was not a public servant, is no bar to a trial for defamation under
section 500.504

292 Subs. by Act, 3 of 1895, section 1, for the original section.
293 Emperor v Ram Krishna Yeshawant Adarkar, 31 ILR Bom 204 : (1907) 5 Cr LJ 105 : 9 Bom LR 33.
294 Santosh Bakshi v State of Punjab, 2014 Cr LJ 4069 , p 4072 (SC) : AIR 2014 SC 2966 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 517 .
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295 Emperor v Gopaldas Khemchand, AIR 1936 Sind 94 , 97 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 870 ; Queen-Empress v Budh Sen, ILR 13
All 351 : (1891) 11 AWN 109 (dissenting from Gopal Ahmed Khan, ILR 14 Cal 314); Acting Public Prosecutor v
Chinnappa Reddi, 1 Weir 118; R v Raghu, 15 ILR All 336; R v Jonnalagadda, ILR 28 Mad 565, p 567.
296 Queen-Empress v Budhsen, ILR 13 All 351, p 353.
297 R v Raghu, 15 ILR All 336; R v Gokal Satram, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 3 : 3 Serv LR 132; Muhamad v Bhiki, (1914) 15 Cr LJ
360 .
298 Sher Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1940 Lah 15 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 368 : (1940) ILR Lah 396 : 42 PLR 171.
299 Kauleshar Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1943 All 96 : (1943) 44 Cr LJ 342 ; Emperor v Thakuri, AIR 1940 Oudh 413 : (1940) 41
Cr LJ 778 : (1940) Oudh WN 655; Fariduddin Khan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 313 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 562 : (1936) All LJ
253.
300 Emperor v Ram Krishan Yeshwant Adarkar, (1907) 5 Cr LJ 105 , p 110 : 31 ILR Bom 204 : 9 Bom LR 33.
301 Queen-Empress v Ganesh Khanderao, ILR 13 Bom 506; Baleshwar Singh v District Magistrate and Collector of
Banaras, AIR 1959 All 71 [LNIND 1958 ALL 88] .
302 Re Golam Ahmed Kazi, ILR 14 Cal 314.
303 Queen v Periannan, ILR 4 Mad 241.
304 Queen-Empress v Ganesh Khanderao, ILR 13 Bom 506.
305 Baleshwar Singh v District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras, AIR 1959 All 71 [LNIND 1958 ALL 88] , p 74; Banti
Pande v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 550 , p 555; State v Roopa, AIR 1966 Raj 101 [LNIND 1965 RAJ 134] : (1966) Cr LJ
576 (Raj).
306 Santosh Bakshi v State of Punjab, 2014 Cr LJ 4069 : AIR SC 2966 : (2014) 13 SCC 25 : 2014 (86) AIC 58 .
307 Queen-Empress v Budh Sen, ILR 13 All 351, p 355.
308 Baleshwar Singh v District Magistrate and Collector of Banaras, AIR 1959 All 71 [LNIND 1958 ALL 88] ; Sita Ram v
District Magistrate, Pilibhit, 1957 All LJ 383 : 1957 All WR (HC) 339.
309 Acting Public Prosecutor v Chinnappa Reddi, 1 Weir 118, p 119.
310 Queen-Empress v Joy Narain Patro, 20 WR (Cr) 66; Emperor v Akhtiar, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 252 ; Sarju Saran v Emperor,
(1910) 11 Cr LJ 438 .
311 State of Kerala v Markose, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] , p 135 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 610 : (1961) 1 ILR Ker
224 : (1961) Ker LT 1060 .
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312 Basir-Ul-Haq v State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] : (1953) Cr LJ 1232 ; Satish Chandra v
Ram Dayal, AIR 1921 Cal 1 (SB).
313 U Aung Ph v The King (FB), AIR 1938 Rang 232 : (1939) Cr LJ 663 (FB).
314 Sukhdev Singh v State, 63 Punj LR 566 : (1961) All Cr R 312 : (1961) All WR (Supp) 59.
315 Sardar Khan v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 54 (1) : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 1008 ; Harghan Khan v Empress, 32 PR 1884 (Cr);
Murad v Empress, 29 PR 1894; Emperor v Ramchandra Yashwant Adarkar, (1907) 5 Cr LJ 105 : 9 Bom LR 33; Thakar
Singh v Chhattan Pal, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 420 : 20 PR 1910 (Cr).
316 Apaya Tatoba v Emperor, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 491 (Bom); Raghvendra v Kashinath Bhat, ILR 19 Bom 717, p 725.
317 Emperor v Sarada Prosad Chatterjee, ILR 32 Cal 180 : (1905) 2 Cr LJ 171 .
318 Vide, High Court Proceedings, 23 April 1872, 7 Mad HCR App 5.
319 Bhokteram v Heera Kolita, ILR 5 Cal 184; Baparam Surma v Gourinath Dutt, ILR 20 Cal 474; Emperor v Sarada Prosad
Chatterjee, ILR 32 Cal 180 : (1905) 2 Cr LJ 171 ; Gati Mandal v Emperor, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 68 : 7 Mad HCR App 55; D
Venkata Reddi, 1 Weir 120; Muthu Velu Kudumbaran v Samiah Kudamabaran, AIR 1937 Mad 8 : 59 ILR Mad 1083 :
(1936) 37 Cr LJ 1134 ; Queen-Empress v Raghu Tiwari, 15 ILR All 336; Jang Bahadur Singh v Emperor, AIR 1928 All
342 : 26 All LJ 533; Daroga Gope v Emperor, AIR 1925 Pat 717 : ILR 5 Pat 33; Kantir Missir v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat
98 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 710 ; Nota Ram v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 31 : (1943) 44 Cr LJ 305 : (1942) ILR Lah 675; Mapaw
v King-Emperor, AIR 1931 Rang 52 : (1931) 32 Cr LJ 202 ; State v Bala Prasad, AIR 1952 Raj 142 [LNIND 1952 RAJ
68] : 2 ILR Raj 44; State of Punjab v Brijlal Palta, AIR 1969 SC 355 [LNIND 1968 SC 240] : (1969) Cr LJ 646 .
320 Queen-Empress v Raghu Tiwari, 15 All 336, p 337.
321 Nota Ram v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 31 , p 33 : (1943) 44 Cr LJ 305 ; Vadula Buchanna v State of Hyderabad, AIR
1956 Hyd 25 : (1956) Cr LJ 215 .
322 Jang Bahadur Singh v Emperor, AIR 1928 All 342 .
323 Chintamani Paul (Kumhar) v State of Jharkhand, 2009 Cr LJ 2283 (Jhar).
324 Raghavendra v Kashinath Bhat, ILR 19 Bom 717, p 725.
325 Emperor v Ram Krishna Yeshwant Adarkar, (1907) 5 Cr LJ 105 , p 109 : 31 ILR Bom 204 : 9 Bom LR 33.
326 Apaya Totoba Mande v Emperor, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 491 ; Chandrapal v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1969) Jab LJ 114
(SN) relying upon Emperor v Kashiram, (1924) 46 ILR All 906 (the distinction between report and charge should be
borne in mind).
327 Dajaj v State, (1962) 1 Cr LJ 627 , p 628.

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328 Thakar Singh v Chettar Pal, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 420 , following 31 ILR Bom 204.
329 Re Mallala Obiah of Owk, AIR 1918 Mad 731 [LNIND 1917 MAD 197] : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 38 : (1917) Mad WN 875.
330 Muthu Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1925 Mad 400 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 962 : (1925) Mad WN 108.
331 Ram Renu Chattoraj v Emperor, AIR 1941 Cal 288 : (1941) 42 Cr LJ 624 .
332 Empress v Arju, 7 ILR Bom 184.
333 Hidyatullah v Emperor, AIR 1936 Pesh 66 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 604 ; Zorawar Singh v Emperor, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 432 .
334 Muthuvelu Kundumbaran v Samiah Kundambaran, AIR 1937 Mad 8 : 59 ILR Mad 1083 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 1131 .
335 Mula v Emperor, AIR 1919 All 159 : (1919) 20 Cr LJ 114 : 17 All LJ 32.
336 State of Punjab v Brij Lal Palta, AIR 1969 SC 355 [LNIND 1968 SC 240] : (1969) Cr LJ 645 , p 649 : (1969) 1 SCJ 383
.
337 State of Punjab v Brij Lal Palta, AIR 1969 SC 355 [LNIND 1968 SC 240] , p 358 : (1969) Cr LJ 645 ; overruling
Emperor v Prag Dutt, (1928) 29 Cr LJ 938 ; Jaswant Singh v State, (1975) Cut LR (Cr) 325 (Punj); Valaiti Ram Grover v
State of Punjab, (1977) Cut LR 149, p 151 (P&H); Nota Ram v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 31 , p 33 : (1943) 44 Cr LJ 305 ;
Vadula Buchana v State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 Hyd 25 : (1956) Cr LJ 215 .
338 Nagalingam v State, (1984) Mad LJ (Cr) 593 (Mad).
339 Umrao Singh v Emperor, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 518 : 6 All LJ 236; dissented from in Ram Jiwan v King-Emperor, AIR 1926
Oudh 448 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 822 .
340 Umrao Singh v King-Emperor, (1909) 6 All LJ 236 : 2 IC 200.

341 Ram Jiawan v King-Emperor, AIR 1926 Oudh 448 : (1912) 27 Cr LJ 822 : 3 Oudh WN Supp 96.
342 Sant Ram v Divan Chand, (1923) 24 Cr LJ 913 .
343 State v Vidyanand Govind Kangali, AIR 1956 Bom 265 [LNIND 1955 BOM 221] : (1956) Cr LJ 503 (1).
344 Empress v Madho, ILR 4 All 498 : (1882) 2 All WN 128.
345 Ananga Mohan Datta v Emperor, AIR 1919 Cal 501 : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 336 : 22 Cal WN 478.
346 State of Maharashtra v Limbaji Sayaji Mhasle, Sarpanch Gram Panchayat, (1976) Mah LJ 475 ; Emperor v Gokul,
(1910) 11 Cr LJ 3 , p 4.
347 Queen-Empress v Joy Narain Patro, 20 WR (Cr) 66; Emperor v Akhtiar, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 252 ; Sarju Saran v Emperor,
(1910) 11 Cr LJ 3 , 4.
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person.—
348 Emperor v Gokul, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 3 , 4 : 3 Serv LR 132.
349 Sher Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1940 Lah 15 : (1940) 41 Cr 368 : (1940) ILR Lah 396 : 42 PLR 171.
350 Chinan Ramana Gowd v Emperor, 31 ILR Mad 506 : 18 Mad LJ 573 : (1909) 9 Cr LJ 77 ; Emperor v Nga Aung Po,
(1905) 2 Cr LJ 474 : 1905 UBR 13; Mangu v Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 306 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 650 : 227 PLR 1914 : 35
PWR (Cr) 1914, dissented from in Panna Lal v Emepror, AIR 1920 Lah 349 ; U Hlaing v RP Abigail, AIR 1937 Rang
232 : (1937) 38 Cr LJ 980 .
351 U Hlaing v RP Abigail, AIR 1937 Rang 232 .
352 Emperor v Lachman, AIR 1929 Pat 4 , 5 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 177 : 7 ILR Pat 715 : 10 PLT 244.
353 Emperor v Gopaldas Khemchand, AIR 1936 Sind 94 , 97 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 870 : 30 Serv LR 75.
354 Queen-Empress v Ramji Sajabarao, 10 ILR Bom 124; Sheo Prasad v State, AIR 1959 All 378 [LNIND 1958 ALL 185] ,
380 : (1959) Cr LJ 683 : (1959) All LJ 44; Re Pattammal, AIR 1940 Mad 893 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 950 ; Re Kottayan
Thevar, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] : (1960) Cr LJ 85 ; Panna Lal v Emperor, AIR 1920 Lah 349 : (1920)
21 Cr LJ 818 : 1 ILR Lah 410 : 166 PLR 1920.
355 Bodhan Garain v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 555 (1) : (1933) 34 Cr LJ 1216 : 16 PLT 541.
356 Queen-Empress v Ramji Sajabarao, 10 ILR Bom 124.
357 U Hlaing v RP Abigail, AIR 1937 Rang 232 .
358 Sheo Prasad v State, AIR 1959 All 378 [LNIND 1958 ALL 185] , p 379.
359 Bishwanath Singh v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 56 , 57 : (1928) 28 Cr LJ 872 : 9 PLT 342.
360 Kalawati’s case AIR 1953 SC 131 [LNIND 1953 SC 5] .

361 State of Kerala v Markose, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] , 137 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 610 : (1962) 1 ILR Ker
224.
362 Ibid; Fariduddin Khan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 313 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 562 .
363 Emperor v Gopaldas Khemchand, AIR 1936 Sind 94 , p 97 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 870 : 30 Serv LR 75; Jhamatmal Alumal v
Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 274 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 8 ; Bodhan Gerain v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 555 (1); Queen-Empress v
Ramji Sajabarao, 10 ILR Bom 124; Emperor v Lachman Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 4 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 177 ; Re Pattammal,
AIR 1940 Mad 898 [LNIND 1940 MAD 162] : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 950 ; Re Kuttayan Thevar, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND
1959 MAD 219] : (1960) Cr LJ 85 .
364 Kantilal v State, AIR 1970 Guj 218 [LNIND 1969 GUJ 56] ; State of Kerala v Markose, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961
KER 332] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 610 : (1962) 1 ILR Ker 224 : (1961) Ker LT 1060 ; U Hlaing v RP Abigail, AIR 1937 Rang 232
: (1937) 38 Cr LJ 980 ; Bo Ni Maung v Emperor, AIR 1935 Rang 97 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 9 ; Sultan v C De M Willbourne,
Page 29 of 36
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AIR 1925 Rang 364 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 1532 ; Subba Reddi v Emperor, AIR 1936 Mad 160 [LNIND 1935 MAD 334] :
(1936) 37 Cr LJ 857 ; Chinna Raman Gowd v Emperor, 31 ILR Mad 506 : (1909) 9 Cr LJ 77 ; Manju v Emperor, AIR
1914 Lah 360 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 650 ; Emperor v Akhtiar, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 256 (Sind); Sarju Saran v Emperor, (1910)
11 Cr LJ 438 (All); King-Emperor v Nga Aung Po, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 474 : 1905 UBR 13.
365 State of Kerala v Markose, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] , pp 137–38 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 610 : (1961) Ker LJ
1060 .
366 King-Emperor v Nga Aung Po, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 474 : (1905) UBR 13.
367 Queen v Daria Khan, (1870) 2 NWP (Cr) R 128.
368 Queen-Empress v Subbayya, 12 ILR Mad 451 : 1 Weir 113; Queen-Empress v Gokul, 34 PR 1879 (Cr); Empress v
Sant Lal, 41 PR 1881 (Cr); Ameer Ali v Dukhan Momin, AIR 1928 Pat 574 : (1928) 29 Cr LJ 613 .
369 Queen-Empress v Subbayya, 12 ILR Mad 451, 453 : 1 Weir 113.
370 Sheo Prasad v State, AIR 1959 All 378 [LNIND 1958 ALL 185] .
371 Re Barkat, ILR 19 All 200.
372 Emperor v Bindeshri Singh, (1906) 3 Cr LJ 225 : 28 ILR All 331 : 3 All LJ 98; Mattaan v Emperor, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 537 :
33 ILR All 163 : 7 All LJ 1143.
373 Mt Allah Wasai v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 12 , 13 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 1369 ; Ghulam Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1922
Lah 113 : 3 ILR Lah 46 : (1922) 23 Cr LJ 399 : 88 PLR 1922; Imperator v Khan Mahommad, 1 Sind LR 124.
374 R v Ram Golam, 11 WR Cr 22; R v Grish Chunder, 19 WR (Cr) 33.
375 KM Narapanaswami v Kerala State, AIR 1957 Ker 134 [LNIND 1957 KER 107] .
376 Re Rambharathi Hirabharti, AIR 1924 Bom 51 , 53 : (1923) 24 Cr LJ 333 : 47 ILR Bom 907 : 25 Bom LR 772.
377 Emperor v Jonnalagadda Vendatrayudu, (1906) 3 Cr LJ 108 : 28 ILR Mad 565, p 567, approving observation of Mayne
in Mayne’s Criminal Law of India, in section 372; dissenting from Queen v Piriannam, ILR 4 Mad 241 : 1 Weir 117;
Sessions Judge, Tinnevelly v Sevan Chetty, (1908) 9 Cr LJ 170 : 173(FB) : ILR 32 Mad 258 : 5 Mad LT 264.
378 Reg v Jamoona, 6 ILR Cal 620.
379 Ratanlal’s Unreported Cases 315, Cr R 1 of 1887.
380 Public Prosecutor in Katta Prakasam, AIR 1925 Mad 123 : (1924) 25 Cr LJ 1383 : 47 Mad LJ 658.
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381 Rogi v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 981 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 44 : 1935 All LJ 1145; Re Narayana Reddiar, AIR 1954 Mad 245
[LNIND 1952 MAD 5] ; Sambhoo Nath Gupta v State, AIR 1959 All 545 [LNIND 1958 ALL 203] .
382 Re Moulvy Abdul Lateef, 9 WR 31 (Cr).
383 Nga Lu Po v Emperor, (1909) 10 Cr LJ 12 , p 14.
384 Santosh Bakshi v State of Punjab, 2014 Cr LJ 4096 , p 4072 (SC) : AIR 2014 SC 2966 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 517 .
385 Hingan Khan v Empress, 32 PR (Cr) 1884; Sardar Khan v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 54 (1) : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 1008 : 30
PLR 655 : 11 LLJ 468; Sukhdeo Singh v State, 63 PLR 566 : (1961) AWR Supp 39.
386 Emperor v Ram Krishna Yeshwant Adarkan, (1907) : 5 Cr LJ 105 : 31 ILR Bom 204 : 9 Bom LR 33.
387 Murad v Empress, 29 PR (Cr) 1894.
388 Rugan Kutti v Emperor, ILR 29 Mad 640 : 1 Weir 190; Sakhichand Kandu v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 6 : (1937) 38 Cr LJ
289 : 1937 Pat WN 69 .
389 Nga Lu Po v Emperor, (1909) 10 Cr LJ 12 , p 14.
390 Kashiram Bhagirath v State, AIR 1955 NUC 35 : (1955) Cr LJ 171 .
391 Queen-Empress v Budh Sen, 13 ILR All 351; Emperor v Gopal Das Khemchand, AIR 1936 Sind 94 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ
870 ; Acting Public Prosecutor v Chinappa Reddi, 1 Weir 118; Emperor v Lachman Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 4 ; Chunni Lal
v State, AIR 1952 All 18 .
392 Public Prosecutor v D Venkata Reddi, 1 Weir 120.
393 Banti Pande v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 550 .
394 State v Roopa, AIR 1966 Raj 101 [LNIND 1965 RAJ 134] : (1966) Cr LJ 576 : (1965) 15 ILR Raj 1134 : (1966) Raj LW
33.
395 Shambhoo Nath Gupta v State, AIR 1959 All 545 [LNIND 1958 ALL 203] .
396 R v Budh Sen, 13 ILR All 351, dissenting from Re, Golam, 14 ILR Cal 314; R v Raghu, 15 ILR All 336; followed in Ma
Paw v Emperor, AIR 1931 Rang 12 : 32 Cr LJ 202; R v Jonnalagadda, 28 ILR Mad 565, 567; Emperor v Gopaldas
Khemchand, AIR 1936 Sind 94 ; Emperor v Lachman Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 4 .
397 R v Raghu, 15 ILR All 336; R v Gokal Satram, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 3 : 3 Serv LR 132; Mahommad v Bhiki, (1914) 15 Cr LJ
360 .
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398 Acting Public Prosecutor v Chinnappa Reddi, 1 Weir 118.
399 Emperor v Gopaldas Khemchand, AIR 1936 Sind 94 , p 95.
400 Queen-Empress v Ganesh Khanderao, 13 ILR Bom 506, p 512.
401 Notes under the heading “Legislative Changes”, supra.
402 Queen-Empress v Ganesh Khanderao, 13 ILR Bom 506; Baleshwar Singh v District Magistrate and Collector, Banaras,
AIR 1959 All 71 [LNIND 1958 ALL 88] , 74; Emperor v Lachman Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 4 .
403 Algoo Lal v Emperor, AIR 1920 All 196 : 21 Cr LJ 576 : 18 All LJ 626; Mosafir Singh v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 170 (1)
: 31 Cr LJ 314 : 13 PLT 83; Ganga Dayal v Emperor, AIR 1933 Oudh 374 : 34 Cr LJ 1149 : 10 Oudh WN 555;
Kauleshar Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1943 All 96 : 44 Cr LJ 342.
404 Kauleshar Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1943 All 96 : 44 Cr LJ 342; Emperor v Thakuri, AIR 1940 Oudh 413 : 41 Cr LJ 778;
Fariduddin v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 313 : 37 Cr LJ 562 : 1936 All LJ 253.
405 Incha Ram v Emperor, AIR 1922 All 272 : 24 Cr LJ 88 : ILR 44 All 647.
406 Queen-Empress v Budh Sen, 13 ILR All 351, 353; Emperor v Lachman Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 4 , 30 Cr LJ 177.
407 Pasupati Banerji v King, AIR 1950 Cal 97 , pp 99 : 51 Cr LJ 469.
408 Imandy Appalaswami v Emperor, 15 Cr LJ 672, p 673.
409 Kendillon v Maltby, (2) Moody & Rob 438, 1 Car & M 402.
410 Queen-Empress v Ganesh Khanderao, 13 ILR Bom 506, p 511.
411 Supra; Re Manikkram Pillai, (1907) 8 Cr LJ 421 : 4 Mad LT 324; R v Dwarka Prasad, 6 ILR All 97.
412 1 Weir 122; R v Jonnalagadda, 28 ILR Mad 565.
413 Manohar v Emperor, AIR (1918) All 85 (1) : 19 Cr LJ 895 : 16 All LJ 614.
414 Sant Ram v Diwan Chand, (1923) 24 Cr LJ 913, p 915.
415 Shambhoo Nath Gupta v State, AIR 1959 All 545 [LNIND 1958 ALL 203] : (1959) Cr LJ 103 : (1959) All WR (HC) 606;
Queen-Empress v Raghu Tewari, 15 ILR All 336.
416 Empress v Sant Lal, 41 PR 1881 (Cr); following Empress v Gokal, 34 PR 1879 (Cr).
417 Amir Ali v Dukhan Momin, AIR 1928 Pat 574 : 29 Guj LJ 613.
418 Queen-Empress v Budh Sen, 13 ILR All 351, p 353.
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419 Emperor v Lachman Singh, AIR 1929 Pat 4 : 30 Cr LJ 177 : 7 ILR Pat 715 : 10 PLT 244.
420 Fariduddin Khan v Emperor, AIR 1986 All 313 : 37 Cr LJ 562 : (1936) All LJ 253.
421 Devi v Emperor, AIR 1918 All 265 : 19 Cr LJ 257 : 16 All LJ 105.
422 Phulel v Emperor, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 56 : ILR 35 All 102 : 11 All LJ 15.
423 Mathura Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1917 All 223 : 18 Cr LJ 1017 : 39 ILR All 715 : 15 All LJ 767.
424 Pasupati Banerji v King, AIR 1950 Cal 97 : 51 Cr LJ 469.
425 Emperor v Jonnalagadda Venkatarayadu, (1906) 3 Cr LJ 108 : 28 ILR Mad 565.
426 Queen v Periannan, ILR 4 Mad 241 : 1 Weir 117.
427 Emperor v Jonnalagadda Venkatarayadu, 28 ILR Mad 565 : 3 Cr LJ 108.
428 Queen v Periannan, ILR 4 Mad 241 : 1 Weir 117.
429 Emperor v Jonnalagadda Venkatarayadu, 28 ILR Mad 565.
430 Public Prosecutor v Thavasiandi Thevan, 1 Weir 122.
431 R v Madho, ILR 4 All 498.
432 Shambhoo Nath Gupta v State, AIR 1959 All 545 [LNIND 1958 ALL 203] : (1959) Cr LJ 1037 : (1959) All WR (HC) 606.
433 Poonit Singh v Madho Bhat, 13 ILR Cal 270.
434 State of Rajasthan v Iqbal Hussain, (1963) Raj LW 48 .
435 Dahya Revla v Ravachhita, (1970) Cr LJ 425 (Guj).
436 Adhir Chandra Tiwary alias Adhiu Tiwari v State of Bihar, (1996) 2 East Cr C 613 (Pat).
437 Harbhajan Singh Bajwa v Seniour Supdt Police, Patiala, (2000) Cr LJ 3297 (P&H).
438 Salauddin Owaisi v DSP, CID Hyderabad, (2000) Cr LJ LJ 4848 (AP)(DB).

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439 State v Kanti Unad Ranning, AIR 1955 Sau 10 ; Daulat Ram v State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1206 [LNIND 1962 SC
28] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 286 ; Rameshwar Singh v State, (1963) BLJR 471 ; Brijmohan v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1969) All
Cr R 377–79 : (1969) All WR (HC) 600; Dujal v State, (1961) All LJ 278; Rudia Singh v State of Punjab, (1977) CLR
154 (Punj); Jaswant Singh v State, (1975) CLR 325 ; Lajja Ram v State, AIR 1952 HP 32 [LNIND 1951 HP 18] ; Re
Jagannathachar, AIR 1942 Mad 326 [LNIND 1941 MAD 267] ; State v Hem Narain, AIR 1953 All 200 [LNIND 1952 ALL
204] ; Sumer Goshain v State, AIR 1952 All 560 [LNIND 1951 ALL 132] ; Raj Roushan Yadav v State of Bihar, 2014
(143) AIC 432 (Pat).
440 State v Kathi Unad Ranning, AIR 1955 Sau 10 .
441 Kanta v BS Verma, (1999) Cr LJ 1839 (Bom).
442 Krishna Tukaram v Secy to Chief Minister, AIR 1955 Bom 315 [LNIND 1954 BOM 120] ; but Barkat v Emperor, AIR
1943 All 6 : 44 Cr LJ 165; State v Nandlal, AIR 1951 Sau 8 : 53 Cr LJ 850.
443 Lajja Ram v State, AIR 1952 HP 32 [LNIND 1951 HP 18] ; Re Jagannathachar, AIR 1942 Mad 326 [LNIND 1941 MAD
267] ; State v Hem Narain, AIR, 1953 All 200; Sumer Goshain v State, AIR 1952 All 560 [LNIND 1951 ALL 132] ;
Sheomangal Singh v Emperor, AIR 1942 Oudh 425 ; Re Veerappa Moopan, AIR 1939 Mad 469 [LNIND 1939 MAD
123] .
444 Makaradhwaj Sahu v State, AIR 1954 Ori 175 [LNIND 1953 ORI 39] ; Bansidhar v Province of Orissa, AIR 1951 Ori 84
[LNIND 1950 ORI 40] ; State of Orissa v Oria Samaj Majhi, AIR 1951 Ori 138 [LNIND 1950 ORI 8] ; Santi Lal v
Emperor, AIR 1948 Cal 103 .
445 Hari Lal v Abhoy Charan, AIR 1948 Cal 5 .
446 Sudarasan v Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 64 .
447 Babu v Emperor, AIR 1940 Oudh 241 .
448 Saloni Arora v State of National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2017 Cr LJ 976 (SC) : ( AIR 1962 SC 1206 [LNIND 1962 SC
28] , followed).
449 Daulat Ram v State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1206 [LNIND 1962 SC 28] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 286 ; Sudarsan v Emperor,
AIR 1947 Pat 64 ; Babu v Emperor, AIR 1940 Oudh 241 ; Rameshwar Singh v State, 1963 BLJR 471 ; Public
Prosecutor v Mahommad Ali, AIR 1969 AP 41 [LNIND 1967 AP 66] : (1969) Cr LJ 145 ; Saloni Arora v State of
National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2017 Cr LJ 976 (SC) : ( AIR 1962 SC 1206 [LNIND 1962 SC 28] , followed).
450 Vapan Kumar Khurana v Manjit Kaur, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 724 (P&H).
451 State v Birda, AIR 1966 Raj 40 [LNIND 1965 RAJ 81] : (1966) Cr LJ 166 .
452 Sham Lal Thukral v State of Punjab, 2009 Cr LJ 189 (P&H) : 2009 (3) Ren CR (Criminal) 168.
453 Harbans Singh v State of Punjab, (1991) 3 Rec Cr R 113 : (1991) 18 Cr LT 431 (P&H).
Page 34 of 36
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454 Davinder Singh Kapoor v State of Punjab, (1991) 1 CLR 194 (P&H).
455 Malkiat Singh v State of Haryana, (1999) 1 Cr CJ 702 : (1999) 2 Rec Cr R 10 (P&H).
456 Randhir v State of Haryana, (2004) Cr LJ 479 (P&H).
457 Basir-ul-Haque v State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] , p 294.
458 Basir-ul-Haque v State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] , p 294; Dhirendra Nath Bera v Nurul
Huda, AIR 1951 Cal 133 [LNIND 1951 CAL 148] (FB).
459 Pramatha Nath v State, AIR 1951 Cal 581 [LNIND 1951 CAL 180] ; Besir-ul-Haque v State of West Bengal, AIR 1953
SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] .
460 Basir-ul-Haque v State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] .
461 Ibid.
462 Dhirendra Nath Bera v Nurul Huda, AIR 1951 Cal 133 [LNIND 1951 CAL 148] (FB); Basir-ul-Haque v State of West
Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] ; Chaman Sing v Tarak Singh, AIR 1942 Lah 76 . Cases to the
contrary are no longer good law.
463 Narayana v Veerappa, AIR 1951 Mad 34 [LNIND 1950 MAD 160] (FB); Basir-ul-Haque v State of West Bengal, AIR
1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] , (Cases to the contrary are no longer good law); Shantabai v Kadia Trikamji, AIR
1954 Sau 50 ; Nallappa Govindan v Chinnammal, AIR 1942 Mad 19 [LNIND 1941 MAD 370] ; Mahommad Isa v Nazim
Hussain, AIR 1940 All 246 .
464 Basir-ul-Haque v State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] .
465 Re Chinnayya Goundan, AIR 1948 Mad 474 ; Re PM Kamath, AIR 1954 Mad 561 [LNIND 1953 MAD 125] : 55 Cr LJ
799.
466 Raghavaendra v Kashinathbat, ILR 19 Bom 717; Emperor v R Yeshwant Adarkar, ILR 31 Bom 20; Empress v Arjun,
ILR 7 Bom 184.
467 Emperor v Sarda Prasad Chatterji, ILR 32 Cal 180; Gati Mandal v Emperor, 4 Cal LJ 88; Balaji Appaji v Emperor, AIR
1946 Bom 7 , State v Vipra Khimji, AIR 1952 Sau 67 .
468 Girdhari Naik v Empress, 5 Cal WN 727.
469 Nota Ram v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 31 ; overruling Shah Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1941 Lah 216 .
470 Queen-Empress v Raghu Tewari, 15 All LJ 336.

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471 Mi Ngwe v Mi Chit, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 576 .
472 Rayan Kutti v Emperor, 26 ILR Mad 640; Emperor v Khubomal, (1915) 16 Cr LJ 104 .
473 State v Bala Prasad, AIR 1952 Raj 142 [LNIND 1952 RAJ 68] .
474 Ma Po v Emperor, AIR 1931 Rang 12 : 32 Cr LJ 202; See also the case law discussed therein.
475 Public Prosecutor v Linga Balija, AIR 1942 Mad 513 [LNIND 1941 MAD 273] .
476 Sher Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1940 Lah 15 ; Babu Ram v Ram Nath, (1976) All Cr Cas 319; JC Chopra v State,
(1971) Cr LJ 1009 , p 1010 (Del); Sudarsan v Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 64 ; State v Bala Prasad, AIR 1952 Raj 142
[LNIND 1952 RAJ 68] ; Ram Narain v State, AIR 1952 All 436 [LNIND 1950 ALL 363] ; Bachalal v Emperor, AIR 1936
Pat 56 : 37 Cr LJ 324.
477 Pasupati Banerji v King, AIR 1950 Cal 97 ; Oyyappa Kone v Chidambaram Chettiar, AIR 1941 Mad 764 ; Ram Rakha v
Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 624 .
478 Nayan Chand v State, AIR 1951 Assam 54 .
479 Sheo Prasad v State, AIR 1959 All 378 [LNIND 1958 ALL 185] .
480 Sudarsan v Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 64 ; State v Bala Prasad, AIR 1952 Raj 142 [LNIND 1952 RAJ 68] , Ram Narain v
State, AIR 1952 All 436 [LNIND 1950 ALL 363] .
481 Bachalal v Emperor, AIR 1936 Pat 56 : 37 Cr LJ 324.
482 Court of its own Motion v Sham Lal, (2001) (IT) Ren CR (Cr) 233 (P&H).
483 Rajnath Gupta v State, (1999) IV CCR 24 (Del).

484 Krishna Gopal v Purushottam and State of Madhya Pradesh, (1987) C Cr J (MP) 120.
485 D Sundar v Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 511 : 20 Cr LJ 618; Habibur Rahman v Munshi Khodabux, (1907) 5 Cr LJ 29 : 11
Cal WN 195; Re Govindan Nayar, 7 ILR Mad 224.
486 Emperor v Baharali Biswas, AIR 1931 Cal 634 : 134 IC 919 : 32 Cr LJ 1241 : (1931) Cr C 834 : 53 ILR Cal 1056.
487 Nishikanta Chatterji v Behari Kahar, AIR 1933 Cal 532 , 533 : 34 Cr LJ 1059 : 60 ILR Cal 565 : 37 Cal WN 368; Gopal
Chandra Mandal v State, AIR 1957 Cal 382 [LNIND 1957 CAL 59] , 383 : (1957) Cr LJ 716 ; Queen-Empress v Raghu
Tiwari, 15 ILR All 336; Emperor v Ghanshayam, (1908) 8 Cr LJ 349 ; D Revla v R Chitta, 1970 Cr LJ 425 , 427 (Guj);
Hanuman Pershad v Delhi Municipality, (1974) Cr LJ 1451 (Del).
488 Gopal Chander Mandal v State, AIR 1957 Cal 382 [LNIND 1957 CAL 59] -83 : (1957) Cr LJ 716 .
Page 36 of 36
person.—
489 Queen-Empress v Raghu Tiwari, ILR 15 All 336 : 13 All WN 1893.
490 Emperor v Ghansaram, (1908) 8 Cr LJ 349 .
491 Bhagabat Chandra Mandal v Emperor, AIR 1939 Cal 271 : 40 Cr LJ 644; Mehroo Vanko Rabri v Emperor, AIR 1937
Sind 209 : 38 Cr LJ 951 : 31 Serv LR 429; Emperor v Topan Chatomal, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 199 ; Ali Mahommad v
Emperor, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 539 ; Emperor v Rabta Raut, AIR 1915 Cal 733 : 16 Cr LJ 320; Sheo Balak v Emperor, AIR
1920 All 303 : 22 Cr LJ 81; Brindaban v Emperor, (1919) 20 Cr LJ 791 ; Mahadeo Singh v Queen-Empress, 27 ILR Cal
921; Queen-Empress v Sham Lall, 14 ILR Cal 707 (FB).
492 Kangali Molla v Emperor, AIR 1939 Cal 340 : 40 Cr LJ 647 : (1939) ILR 1 Cal 322; dissenting from Shekandar Mia v
Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 614 : 34 Cr LJ 1077 : 37 Cal WN 399.
493 Rajesh Kumar Sah v State of Jharkhand, (2005) Cr LJ 1554 (Jhar).
494 Emperor v Narain Das, AIR 1936 All 105 , p 107 : 37 Cr LJ 157, (1936) All LJ 416, section 182, CrPC.
495 Umarao Singh v Emperor, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 518 , 519 : 6 All LJ 236.
496 State v Roopa, AIR 1966 Raj 101 [LNIND 1965 RAJ 134] : (1966) Cr LJ 576 Raj; Re Jayadevan, (1971) 1 Mad LJ 497
: (1971) LW (Cr) 114; State of Maharashtra v Limbaji Sayaji Mahaske, (1976) Mah LJ 476 ; Sukhdeo Singh v State,
(1961) 63 Punj LR 566 : (1961) WR (Supp) 59.
497 State of Maharshtra v Limbaji Sayaji Mhaske, Sarpanch Gram Panchayat, (1976) Mah LJ 475 .
498 Rayan Hatti v Emperor, 26 ILR Mad 640; Empress v Madho, ILR 4 All 498; Fakirapa Ningappa Chikkabagewadi v
State, AIR 1960 Mys 208 ; Maung Po Ni v Emperor, AIR 1931 Rang 97 : 37 Cr LJ 9; Emperor v Chandra Kumar De,
AIR 1927 Cal 78 : 28 Cr LJ 25; Gopal Kahar v Emperor, (1921) 22 Cr LJ 347 ; Ali Ahmad v Emperor, 22 Cr LJ 503;
Gaya Barhai v Emperor, AIR 1923 Oudh 4 : 23 Cr LJ 641; Re Jayadevram, (1971) LW (Cr) 114 : (1971) Mad LJ (Cr)
334; State of Maharashtra v Limbaji Sayaji Mahaske, (1976) Mah LJ 475 .
499 Murad v Empress, 29 PR (Cr) 1894; Sardar Khan v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 54 (1) : 30 Cr LJ 1008.
500 T Revanna v H Chandrappa, 2007 Cr LJ 1995 , p 1997 (Kant) : 2007 (1) KCCR 803 [LNIND 2006 KANT 878] .
501 Gopal Chandra Mandal v State, AIR 1957 Cal 82 : (1957) Cr LJ 716 .
502 Thakar Singh v Chattar Pal, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 420 : 20 PR (Cr) 1910.
503 Re KG Ganapatti Bhatta, ILR 36 Mad 303.
504 Ramsebak Lal v Muneshwar Singh, 37 ILR Cal 604; Satish Chandra Chakrawarti v Ram Dayal, AIR 1921 Cal 1 .
End of Document
[s 183] Resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a
public servant.—
Servants


[s 183] Resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a

public servant.—
Whoever offers any resistance to the taking of any property by the lawful authority of any public servant,
knowing or having reason to believe that he is such public servant, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
Page 2 of 8
[s 183] Resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a public servant.—
[s 183.1] Scope
This section makes it an offence to offer resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a public
servant. Under this and the following sections up to section 187, IPC, two things must concur:
(i) there must be the lawful authority of a public servant,505 ie, the authority under which he acts must
have been bestowed upon him in accordance with law;506 and
(ii) the accused must know or have “reason to believe” (see section 26, IPC) that the public servant in
question is a public servant.
The application of this section is not limited to the parties to the donee under execution. Whoever offers
resistance, whether a party to a decree or not, is liable under this section if such offers resistance, knowing, or
having reason to believe, that the person, to whom resistance is offered, is a public servant.507
[s 183.2] “Offers any Resistance”
“Resistance” involves an active physical obstruction. Thus, a mere passive refusal, or even a threat of physical
obstruction, is not resistance.
Where certain property is entrusted to a firm for sale and subsequently, the management of the owner’s estate
is handed over to the court of wards, any refusal by the firm to deliver the property entrusted to them until their
general account is settled, does not amount to any resistance to the taking of any property by the lawful
authority of any public servant.508
Where the accused refused to hand over to a bailiff, money alleged to be in his pocket, it was held that there
was no “resistance” within the meaning of this section.509
But where the accused not only refused to give up the property, but threatened to do harm to the constable if he
should venture to carry out the warrant, it was held that the threat constituted an overt act sufficient to constitute
a “voluntary obstruction” within the meaning of section 186.510
[s 183.3] Oral Statement or Objection—Whether Amounts to Resistance
A mere oral statement by a person, claiming to be the owner of certain articles attached by a bailiff in the
execution of a decree, to the effect that he would not allow the bailiff to take away the articles unless he entered
them as his property, does not amount to an offence under this section. Where, therefore, when a bailiff
proceeded to attach certain articles as the property of a judgement-debtor, the accused, a third person, said
that the articles were his property and that he would not allow the bailiff to take them away, it was held that the
mere statement of the accused does not amount to “resistance” and that the accused was not guilty of an
Where a property in possession of the accused was, in their absence, seized by a head constable investigating
a case of theft and kept loaded in a cart for the purpose of being taken away, and the accused on hearing about
it, came and stood before the cart and raising their hands said that the cart should not be driven and they
Page 3 of 8
objected to the property being taken away, it was held:
A mere objection to the head constable’s seizing the article cannot be said to amount to ‘resistance’. All that was done
in this case was a statement by the accused objecting to the constable taking the article accompanied by a pantomime
indicating that they were so objecting. This could not be taken to amount to offering any ‘resistance’.512
[s 183.4] Lawful Authority—Meaning of
To constitute an offence under this section, the resistance must be to the taking of any property by the lawful
authority of any public servant.513
Unless it is clearly established that the person seizing the property had lawful authority to do so, there can be
no conviction under this section.514 “Lawful authority”, means an authority given to a public servant by law,
which thereby invests him with legal powers. An authority, therefore, which is not authorised by law, though it
may be given by a court, is not a “lawful authority”.515
[s 183.5] Extent of Authority Explained
Under the rules of the Calcutta High Court, where movable property is attached in execution of a warrant of
attachment, the attaching officer shall give the debtor or, in his absence, any present adult member of his
family, the option of having the attached property kept on his premises or in some other place in the village, on
condition that a suitable place for its safe custody be provided by him. Removal of the property by the civil court
peon, without leaving any option to the judgement-debtor to provide safe custody for the property, must be
considered as illegal, and consequently, the subsequent taking back of the property by the accused cannot be
held to constitute any offence under this section.516
A civil court’s bailiff, in executing a process against the movable property of a judgement-debtor, has no
authority to use force, and break open a door or gate,517 unless specifically authorised.
A bailiff who, in order to execute a civil court decree against A, breaks open the door of B’s house when neither
A nor his goods are in the house, is a trespasser and resistance by B is not punishable under this section or
[s 183.6] When Resistance is not an Offence
In order to prove that an attachment made in pursuance of section 109 of the Tripura Municipal Act was
effected by lawful authority, the prosecution has to prove that on the date the attachment was effected, the
necessary 15 days had elapsed after the service of the notice and the bill. If the prosecution fails to prove this,
the taking of the property is not by lawful authority. If the prosecution fails to prove that the taking of the
property was by lawful authority, then the offence under this section has to be treated as not having been
proved.519
Where the attaching officer had no list of the property to be attached,520 the warrant was not signed by the
court, and part of the form relating to security was left blank, and the accused, who was not the judgement-
debtor, resisted the attachment, it was held that he committed no offence.521
Page 4 of 8
A offers resistance to the execution of an order of a public servant. The order, as a matter of fact, had ceased
to be in force. A’s resistance is not punishable.522
An amin attempts to attach property under a warrant, which however he has not got with him. B resists the
attachment. This is no offence.523
[s 183.7] Seizure of Property under Illegal Warrant
In order to support a conviction for resisting the execution of a warrant by a public servant, the warrant must be
a lawful one and the person who executes the warrant must be clothed with lawful authority under the warrant
of execution, which does not bear a date on or before which it should be executed and after which it is not a
good warrant.
The nazir of a court has no lawful authority to execute a warrant directed to the bailiff of the court.524
A warrant for the attachment of property which is not signed by the Judge or such officer as the court may
appoint in this behalf, is not a legal warrant and the removal of property directed by such warrant for the
attachment of crops for arrears of revenue, the warrant being time-expired, A does not commit an offence and
the person resisting is guilty under this section.525 So the execution of a writ of attachment, after the expiry of
the date fixed for its return, is illegal and resistance to such execution is not an offence under section 186.526
The person who executes a warrant derives his authority from the court which issued it and not from the nazir
who endorsed it in his name. If the warrant is executed within the date fixed by the court, the execution of the
warrant is not illegal because the nazir fixed a date earlier than that in which it is executed.527
[s 183.8] Resistance to Seizure of Property when not Strictly Justifiable (a) When There is no Right of Private
Defence
There can be no doubt that in construing this section, the language of section 99 as well as that of other
sections concerning resistance to the acts of public servants, must be borne in mind. Section 99, IPC declares
that the protection afforded by the Penal Code to public servants acting in good faith, under colour of their office
is not lost to them, by reason of any mistake on their part in the exercise of their proper functions. The effect of
section 99, clause (1) is that although a public servant, lawfully authorised and acting under colour of his office,
in good faith, does something not “strictly justifiable”, still there is no right of private defence against such acts,
unless they cause an apprehension of death or grievous hurt.528
A public servant may do an act of a kind which he has no authority to do. In such a case, he could not be acting
in discharge of his public functions529 and the lawful authority required by this section will be clearly wanting.530
On the other hand, the public servant may do an act, acting in good faith under colour of his office, but the act is
not strictly justifiable by law. Thus, a public servant, authorised to attach the property of the judgement-debtor,
may attach the property of a third person under the bona fide belief that the property really belonged to the
judgement-debtor. If, in such a case, the owner of the property offers resistance to the taking of the property so
attached, is he liable to be punished under this section? The Madras High Court has held that he is so liable.531
(b) Whether the Authority and its Execution both be Strictly Lawful—Madras View
In Queen-Empress v Tiruchittambala Pathan,532 a decree having been passed against the assets of a deceased
debtor, execution was taken out, and the amin of the court attempted to attach and seize a brass plate in the
possession of the accused as forming part of the assets of the deceased. The accused wrested it from the
hands of the attaching officer stating that it belonged to him and not to the deceased. Setting aside his acquittal,
the Madras High Court again observed:
Page 5 of 8
The object of the legislature as shown in the Code was to facilitate the transaction of public business by affording
protection in two ways to public servants acting in the exercise of their duty. They are protected from criminal
proceedings by sections 78 and 79. They are insured against resistance by section 99 and other sections of the Code.
The intention was to give protection of this latter kind in all the cases in which, but for the immunity specially provided,
the act of the public servant would amount to an offence. The phrase ‘lawful authority’ used in section 183 does not
oblige us to hold that the cases in which the person charged may have a civil action against the public officer must be
excluded from the operation of the section. In the present case the amin had lawful authority to take in execution the
goods of the deceased. There was no mistake about his authority, but the mistake was in the mode in which he
executed his duty and the section does not require that the execution of the authority, as well as the granting of it, must
be strictly lawful. To hold that a judgment-debtor might, with impunity, resist the seizure of goods found in his house, on
the mere plea that they belonged to somebody else, honesty and good faith on the part of the attaching officer being
presumed, would reduce section 183 to a dead letter.
(c) Bombay View
The Bombay High Court has dissented from this view and has held that resistance to the act of a public officer
acting bona fide, though in excess of his authority, may well give rise to some charge in the nature of assault,
but it cannot afford any foundation for a prosecution under section 183, IPC. According to it, section 99, IPC is
designed to protect a public servant, and to limit the amount of resistance which may be offered to him.
[s 183.9] Provision not for the Protection of Public Servant
Section 183, IPC is, however, not a section meant for the protection of the public servant, but enables him to
take the offensive and prosecute anybody who resists the taking of property by lawful authority. It is one thing to
provide that a public servant who is acting bona fide in the exercise of his office, though in excess of his
authority in fact, is to be protected from acts of violence. It is quite another thing to say that such a public
servant, being in fact in the wrong, may prosecute anybody for resisting peaceably his wrongful act. Resistance
to an act of a public officer acting bona fide, though in excess of his authority, may well give rise to some
charge in the nature of assault, but it cannot afford any foundation for a prosecution under section 183. The
language of section 183 is perfectly plain. It applies to resistance to the taking of property by lawful authority of
a public servant and there are no words in that section, as there are in section 99, extending the operation of
the section to acts which are not strictly justifiable by law.533
[s 183.10] “Knowing or Having Reason to Believe that he is Such Public Servant”
There can be no offence under this section unless it is shown that the accused knew or had reason to believe534
that the person by whose authority the property was being taken was a public servant. Where it did not prima
facie appear from the record that the mamlatdar was an officer to whom, under the provisions of section 12 of
the Land Revenue Code, the powers of the collector constituted by section 87 of the Code, had been delegated
under any general or special order of the government, nor that the karkoon employed to distrain was an officer
directed to perform that duty by the commissioner, under the orders of government, a person resisting such a
karkoon by force, when the latter came to distrain some goods at his house, is not guilty of an offence under
section 183.535 It has been held that it is the intention of the law that, when a public servant attaches property
under a warrant in execution of a decree, he must have the warrant with him, otherwise the taking of the
property is not lawful.536 However, the written order need not be shown to the accused.537
[s 183.11] Property
Property in this section includes immovable property.538
The procedure to be followed is the same as in the case of an offence under section 182. The limitation
prescribed for prosecution for an offence under this section is one year.
Page 6 of 8
[s 183.13] Complaint
No court can take cognizance of an offence under this section, except on a complaint in writing of the public
servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.539 Taking
cognizance of offences under sections 182, 183, IPC, by the magistrate, on a complaint not filed by the
concerned public servant is bad in law on account of the bar of section 195, CrPC.540
No complaint for an offence under this section can be filed by a court, as section 340, CrPC, applies only to
cases falling under section 195(1), clause (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code. This excludes cases falling
under section 195(1), clause (a). This section falls under section 195(1)(a).541
[s 183.14] Complaint of Court when Necessary
Where a complaint is filed by a private person under any section of the Indian Penal Code which does not
require a complaint of the court under section 195, CrPC, but the complaint is such that it discloses other facts
which constitute an offence for which a complaint of the court is necessary, the principle to be followed in cases
of this kind is not whether the complaint discloses other facts which constitutes offences for which no complaint
of the court is necessary, but whether there is not an evasion of the provision of section 195, and the test
whether there is an evasion or not is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which
the complaint of the court is required.542
[s 183.15] Charge
I (name and office of the magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the…………….day of……………., at……………., offered resistance to the taking of the property
by the lawful authority of public servant…………….(name or official designation of the public servant), knowing, or
having reason to believe that he was such public servant, and thereby committed an offence, punishable under section
183, IPC, and within my cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by the court on the said charge.
[s 183.16] Punishment
Where the resistance by the accused has been unaccompanied by violence and has been exaggerated by the
prosecution, the case calls for no more than a nominal punishment.543

Page 7 of 8
505 See the words “lawful authority” in sections 183 to 185, “public functions” in section 186, “public duty” in section 187.
506 Abdul Gafur v R, ILR 23 Cal 896; Lilla Singh v R, ILR 22 Cal 286.
507 Durodhan Das v State, 34 Cut LT 545 : (1969) Cr LJ 85 , 86; State v Dhanraj, 1960 Nag LJ 114 .
508 E H Parakh v King-Emperor, AIR 1926 Oudh 202 : 27 Cr LJ 328 : 3 Oudh WN 160.
509 R v Alibhai, (1888) BUC 412 : Cr R No 77 of 27th September 1888.
510 Emperor v Pundilick Krishna Pai, 1 Cr LJ 262, p 263.
511 Queen-Empress v Husain Valad Tajbhai, 15 ILR Bom 564.
512 Re Rangaswami Goundan, AIR 1944 Mad 45 [LNIND 1943 MAD 182] , p 46 : 45 Cr LJ 240 : 56 Mad LW 599; SS
Poddar v State of Bihar, (1963) BLJR 375 , pp 377-78.
513 Jogendra Chandra Choudhary v Kshirode Ranjan Bhattacharjee (1961) 2 Cr LJ 564 , p 567 (Tripura).
514 Dema Mahadu Amberkar v Emperor, AIR 1936 Bom 376 , p 377 : 33 Cr LJ 37 : 38 Bom LR 790.
515 Arakkal v Ahmed Ali, (1909) 10 Cr LJ 496 .
516 Emperor v Ahmad Sheikh, AIR 1928 Cal 815 , p 816 : 48Cal LJ 288 : 33 Cal WN 174.
517 John Anderson v J McQueen, 7 WR (Cr) 12.
518 R v Gogi Aba Dore, 7 Bom HCR 83; Durga Charan Mali v Mohin Chandra, 25 ILR Cal 274.
519 Jogendra Chandra Choudhary v Kshirode Ranjan Bhattacharjee, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 564 , 567.
520 See O XXI, rule 12 and O XXXVIII, rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
521 Prabhu Dyal v R, (1906), 3 Cr LJ 75 : 6 PLR 573 : 49 PR (Cr) 1905.
522 Anand Lall v R, 10 ILR Cal 18.
523 R v Ganeshi Lal, 27 ILR All 258.
524 Mohini Mohan Banerji v Emperor, AIR 1916 Pat 272 : 18 Cr LJ 39; relying on Sheikh Naseer v Emperor, 37 ILR Cal
122 : 11 Cr LJ 128; Sabid Ali v Emperor, 40 ILR Cal 849 : (1913) 14 Cr LJ 274 .
Page 8 of 8
525 Re Iyyemeperumal Naiken, 1 Weir 127; Gopala Saminathan Ayyar, 1 Weir 123.
526 Tanuk Lal Mandar v Emperor, AIR 1920 Pat 449 , p 450 : 22 Cr LJ 222.
527 Sabid Ali v Emperor, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 274 : 40 ILR Cal 849 : 17 Cal WN 911.
528 R v Vyankatrav Shrinivas, 7 Bom HCCC 50.

529 Sections 186 and 353, IPC.
530 Lilla Singh v Queen-Empress, 22 ILR Cal 286; Queen-Empress v Tulsiram, 13 ILR Bom 168.
531 Public Prosecutor v Soosaikanna Chetti, 1 Weir 126; relying on Queen-Empress v Ramayya, 13 ILR Mad 148 : 1 Weir
67; Queen-Empress v Tiruchittambala Pathan, 21 ILR Mad 78 : 1 Weir 123.
532 Queen-Empress v Tiruchittambala Pathan, 21 ILR Mad 78.
533 Sakharam Rawaji Pawar v Emperor, AIR 1935 Bom 233 , p 234 : 59 ILR Bom 545 : 37 Bom LR 362.
534 Section 26, IPC.
535 Re Yashwant, (1837) BUC 325.
536 Emperor v Ganeshi Lal, 27 ILR All 258 : (1904) 1 Cr LJ 896 : 1 All LJ 595; (relying on Empress of India v Amar Nath,
ILR 5 All 318, p 321).
537 Tribhuwan v Emperor, AIR 1918 Oudh 162 : 19 Cr LJ 641.
538 Duryodhan Das v State of Orissa, (1969) Cr LJ 85 : 34 Cut LT 545.
539 Section 195(1)(a), CrPC.
540 Rajnath Gupta v State, IV (1999) CCR 24 (Del).
541 Mundlapudi Durgaprasadarao v C Sundar Bhutt, AIR 1952 Mad 607 [LNIND 1950 MAD 198] , p 608; For detailed
commentary on sections 195 & 340 see Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn LexisNexis.
542 Sadhuram Chimandas v Chimandas Budhuram, AIR 1937 Sind 81 : (1940) ILR Kant 275, followed in Tikaram v
Emperor, AIR 1945 Ngp 210 ; Janki Prasad v State of Bihar, (1975) Cr LJ 575 (Pat).
543 Kunhamba v Emperor, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 239 : 19 IC 335 (Mad).
End of Document
[s 184] Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of public
servant.—
Servants


[s 184] Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of public

servant.—
Whoever intentionally obstructs any sale of property offered for sale by the lawful authority of any public
servant, as such, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one
month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
[s 183.1] Scope
Page 2 of 3
[s 184] Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of public servant.—
This section deals with the offence of an intentional obstruction of a sale of property held by the lawful authority
of a public servant. To constitute an offence under this section, the sale must be by the lawful authority of a
public servant, and the obstruction to the sale must be intentional. The obstruction dealt with here is not
obstruction of a public servant as under section 186 or of any person as under section 225B, IPC, but of a
proceeding being conducted by the lawful authority of a public servant.
[s 183.2] “Obstructs”
The word “obstructs” occurs in sections 186 and 225B, IPC also, and, in some cases, dealing with offences
under those sections, it has been held that the obstructions must be physical.544 But elsewhere it has been held
that even under section 186, actual physical obstruction is not necessary to complete the offence if threats are
accompanied either by overt acts or by a menacing attitude or show of physical force or assault, as
contemplated in section 352, IPC.545
[s 183.3] “Intentionally Obstructs”
There is an essential difference in the obstructions contemplated in sections 184 and 186, IPC. Section 186
postulates some show of physical force, whereas section 184 does not. Now, this section does not deal with the
obstruction of any public servant or of any person but with the obstruction of a proceeding which is being
conducted by a lawful authority, and a proceeding can be obstructed by measures other than physical
measures taken against the person who is conducting the proceeding.
At a public auction, a concerted plan to prevent the auction being carried out by raising shouts or disturbance
which would prevent bids from being heard and necessitating the closing of the auction would certainly amount
to obstructing that auction,546 within the meaning of this section.
[s 183.4] Mere Threats do not Amount to Obstruction
In King-Emperor v Gopal Rai,547 Rennie J observed that a mere posting up of placards asserting a title to the
land claimed, cannot be regarded as obstruction under section 184, IPC, and that on the contrary, a claimant is
well advised in doing so as otherwise he might be told that he stood by and made no protest. Mere threats by
themselves would not, in all cases, amount to an obstruction, unless they are accompanied either by an overt
act or by a show of physical force.548 Where threats uttered to the actual bidder and to the audience of potential
bidders discloses an intent to prevent the sale from being held and that intention has been successfully carried
out, it amounts to an offence under this section.549
Where two persons were charged under this section, one of them for executing and the other for accepting a
deed of sale of some property which was ordered to be sold in execution of a decree of a revenue court, it was
held that the execution of the sale-deed would not amount to an obstruction of the sale, and was, therefore, not
punishable under this section.550
[s 183.5] “Lawful Authority”
The commentary under section 183 may be referred to. The lawful authority of the public servant offering the
property for sale must be proved by the prosecution; a conviction cannot be justified in the absence of such
proof.551
[s 183.6] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence under section 182. The limitation prescribed for an
Page 3 of 3
[s 184] Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of public servant.—
offence under this section is one year.
[s 183.7] Charge
That you, on or about the……………day of ……………., at……………., intentionally obstructed the sale of property,
offered for sale by the lawful authority of the public servant……(name or official designation of public servant) as such,
and thereby committed an offence, punishable under s 184 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.

544 Queen-Empress v Thimmachi, 15 ILR Mad 93 : 1 Weir 131; Ibrahim Sircar v Emperor, ILR 29 Cal 236; Darkan v
Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 827 : 29 Cr LJ 645.
545 Emperor v Tohfa, AIR 1933 All 759 : 34 Cr LJ 1211 : 55 ILR All 985 : (1933) All LJ 952.
546 Provincial Govt, CP & Berar v Balram Jagannath, AIR 1938 Ngp 529 : 39 Cr LJ 954 : (1938) Nag LJ 299 .
547 King-Emperor v Gopal Rai, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 44 : 7 PR (Cr) 1905 : 96 PLR 1905.
548 Emperor v Tohfa, AIR 1933 All 759 , 760 : 34 Cr LJ 1211 : (1933) All LJ 952.
549 Provincial Govt, CP & Berar v Balram Jagannath, AIR 1933 Ngp 529 , p 530.
550 Padam Singh v R, (1883) 3 All WN 197.
551 R v Tara Singh, 27 ILR All 480.
End of Document
[s 185] Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of
public servant.—
Servants


[s 185] Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of
public servant.—
Whoever, at any sale of property held by the lawful authority of a public servant, as such, purchases or bids for
any property on account of any person, whether himself or any other, whom he knows to be under a legal
incapacity to purchase that property at that sale, or bids for such property not intending to perform the
obligations under which he lays himself by such bidding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or
Page 2 of 3
[s 185] Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of public servant.—
with both.
[s 185.1] Scope
The last section dealt with obstructing a sale of property offered for sale by authority of a public servant. This
section deals with the illegal purchases or bids at such a sale. It makes it penal to bid at a public sale for a
property on account of a party who is under a legal incapacity to purchase it, or bid for it not intending to
complete the purchase, or as it is expressed, to perform the obligations under which the bidder lays himself by
such bidding.
[s 185.2] “At any Sale of Property”
This section is not restricted to a sale of corporeal property.552 The object of this chapter, as its heading shows,
is to punish “contempts of the lawful authority of public servants”. A party can equally show a contempt by
bidding for the lease of a ferry put up to a public auction by a magistrate, as he can, by bidding for any
corporeal property, not intending to perform the obligations under which he lays himself by such bidding. It is
his intention at the time of bidding, and not the nature of the thing to be sold, which constitutes the offence. So
a mock bidding at the sale of the lease of a ferry is an offence under this section.553
The right to sell drugs, ie, the monopoly granted for a certain area, comes within the definition of property.554
[s 185.3] Purchase or Bid on Account of Person Under Legal Incapacity to Purchase
Under section 19 of the Cattle Trespass Act, 1871, no officer of police shall directly or indirectly purchase any
cattle for sale under that Act. A sub-inspector of police is under such legal incapacity. If he purchases a pony at
a sale under that Act, he would be guilty of the offence under section 169 of this Code.555 If, instead of himself
purchasing the pony, the sub-inspector asks his friend B to make the purchase benami for himself and B
purchases the pony at the sale under the Act, knowing of the incapacity of the sub-inspector himself to make
the purchase, B would be guilty of the offence under this section.
[s 185.4] Bidding for Property “Not Intending to Perform the Obligations”
As observed earlier, it is the intention of the accused at the time of the bidding which constitutes the offence
under this section. Where an accused made bids at a sale held by the collector and gave a false name as that
of the bidder, it was held that the intention of the accused was not to perform the obligation under which he was
laying himself at the time of bidding and that he was guilty of the offence under this section.556 But where the
accused made a bona fide bid at the time of an auction sale and had no intention of shirking his obligations, it
was held that his subsequent failure, due to circumstances over which he had no control, to deposit the earnest
money which he was legally bound to do on the acceptance of his bid, could not be made a penal offence
[s 185.5] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence under section 182. The prescribed period of limitation of
an offence under this section is one year.
[s 185.6] Charge
That you, on or about the……………. day of ……………., at a sale of property, held by the authority of a public
Page 3 of 3
[s 185] Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority of public servant.—
servant….(name or official designation of public servant) as such, purchased (or bade for) the property for yourself (or
any other person, namely, …………… (give the name of that person), knowing that you (or such other person) were
under a legal incapacity to purchase the property at sale (or bade for such property not intending to perform the
obligations under which you laid yourself by such bidding), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section
185 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.

552 Queen v Reazooddeen, 2 WR 33 (Cr).
553 Ibid.
554 Bishan Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1915 All 93 (2) : 16 Cr LJ 54 : 37 ILR All 128 : 13 All LJ 109.
555 Re Raj Kristo Biswas, 16 WR 52 (Cr).
556 Bishan Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1915 All 93 : 16 Cr LJ 54.
557 Kali Charan v Emperor, AIR 1934 Oudh 186 , p 188 : 35 Cr LJ 789 : 11 Oudh WN 473.
End of Document
[s 186] Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions.—
Servants



Whoever voluntarily obstructs any public servant in the discharge of his public functions, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend
to five hundred rupees, or with both.
[s 186.1] State Amendment
Andhra Pradesh.— The offence is cognizable in Andhra Pradesh vide A.P. GO. Ms. No. 732, dated 5-12-
Page 2 of 20
1991.
[s 186.2] Scope
This section deals with the general offence of obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public
functions. It has to be distinguished from section 184, which deals with the obstruction of a proceeding
conducted by the lawful authority of a public servant.558
A person, obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, executing a warrant of
possession issued by a court, commits two offences. One offence committed is the obstruction of the public
servant punishable under this section, and the other is the offence of contempt of court by undermining its
authority.559
[s 186.3] Section 186 Distinguished from Sections 332 and 353
Sections 186 and 332, IPC relate to two separate and distinct offences. Section 186, IPC relates to a case
where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, but under
section 332, IPC, the ingredient of voluntarily causing hurt as a consequence of an assault or a use of criminal
force while the public servant is discharging his duty, with the intent to prevent or deter such public servant from
discharging his duty as such public servant, is necessary. The gravity of the two offences is, therefore, different.
It is further significant to note that while section 186 occurs in chapter 10 of the IPC dealing with contempt of
the lawful authority of public servants, section 332 falls in chapter 16 of IPC dealing with offences affecting
human body and life. The Legislature in its wisdom has made the offences under section 186 IPC as “non-
cognizable” while making the offence under section 332 IPC as a “cognizable” one.560
Though the offences, under sections 186 and 332, have some common elements, they are quite distinct in their
nature and application.561
Similarly, the allegations upon which a charge under section 353, IPC, is based, may be the same as those
constituting the charge under section 186, IPC, but both sections relate to two distinct offences; while the
offence, under the latter section, is a cognizable offence, the one under the former section, is not so. The
ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. This section is applicable to a case where the accused
voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his functions but under section 353, IPC, the ingredient
of assault or use of criminal force, while the public servant is doing his duty as such, is necessary. The quality
of the two offences is also different. This section occurs in chapter 10, dealing with contempt of the lawful
authority of public servants, while section 353 occurs in chapter 16, relating to offences affecting human
body.562
[s 186.4] Ingredients of an Offence under this Section
The ingredients, which constitute an offence under this section, are as follows:
(i) there must be an obstruction;
(ii) the obstruction must be by the accused;
(iii) the obstruction must be voluntary;
(iv) the obstruction must be of a public servant; and

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(v) the obstruction must be in the discharge of his (ie, the public servant’s) public functions.
[s 186.5] “Obstructs”
Commentary under same heading in section 184, ante may be referred to.
The word “obstructs” is not defined anywhere and baffles definition. Its derivation from the Latin “to build
against, or, to block up” shows that it has a certain passive connotation.563 But the section does not appear to
contemplate constructive obstruction to a judicial officer in the discharge of his judicial functions, even when
they are of a quasi-executive character or when the proceedings before him are in execution.564
In a Patna case, it has been held that a sufficient indication that any attempt to effect attachment by a peon
having a warrant of attachment, would be resisted by force is quite enough to constitute obstruction.565 The
Allahabad High Court has observed in a case566 that the word “obstruction” connotes some overt act in the
nature of violence or a show of violence; it connotes some positive act, which would deter the man obstructed
from carrying out his intentions. It cannot be said that a man obstructed another if that man runs away from the
other. The act of running away does not do any such thing. It may, however, have the effect of baulking a man
or cheating him of his intentions, but that would not amount to obstruction. Some courts have held that the word
“obstruction”, as used in section 186, means “physical obstruction”, ie, actual resistance or obstacle put in the
way of a public servant. The word implies the use of criminal force.567 In Kisan Krishanji Tikle v Nagpur
Conference of Society of St Vincent De Paul case,568 the physical obstruction required by the section was
explained as follows:
An illustration will bring out the point of this finding. If A endeavors to drive his motor-car down a road and B tears up
the road and places a barricade across it so that no car can proceed until the obstruction is removed, that is a physical
obstruction. It is not necessary that the car should actually crush into the barricade and attempt to break through it for
the physical element to come into being. So also here, the judgement-debtor and his men were drawn up and showed
every intention of resisting by force. That, in my opinion, constituted the physical obstruction required by s 186.
On the other hand, in some cases it has been held that the word “obstruction” in this section does not mean
“physical obstruction” and it is not necessary that there should be physical or criminal force, and that it is
sufficient if there is either a show of force or a threat or any act preventing the discharge of his public function
by a public servant.569 An obstruction to a public servant can be caused even by words of mouth.570
[s 186.6] “Voluntarily Obstructs”
In this section the word “obstructs” is used along with the word “voluntarily”, and under section 39 of the Code,
a person is said to cause an effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by mean whereby he intended to cause it, or
by mean of which, at the time of employing those means, he knew or had reason to believe that he was likely to
cause it. This implies the employment of certain means to cause a certain effect. It has accordingly been held
that the use of the word “voluntarily” seems to indicate that the Legislature contemplated the commission of
some overt act of obstruction, and did not intend to render penal a mere passive conduct.571
To constitute the offence under this section, the obstruction must be intentional and it must be direct.572 If in
causing the obstruction the accused acts intentionally, the means employed by him to cause the effect
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intended, do not matter.573
Where the accused, in the honest belief that the men doing some work on a private land, under the orders of a
magistrate, had committed trespass, prevented them from doing the work, it was held that he could not be said
to have voluntarily obstructed the public servant and could not, therefore, be convicted under this section.574
Proof of bad faith on the part of a person obstructing is not necessary to a conviction under the section.575 Refer
also the commentary under the heading “Obstructs”.
[s 186.7] Gist of the Offence
The gist of the offence, thus lies in the intention of the accused to interfere with or prevent the public servant’s
discharge of his official function.576 The obstruction may be in various ways.577 The question whether an offence
under this section has, or has not been, committed must depend upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of
each case. The real question is whether the action or attitude of the persons alleged to have obstructed a public
servant in the performance of his public functions was of such a nature so as to obstruct, that is to say, prevent
him from carrying out the duties which he had to discharge.578 To prevent, by physical means, persons willing to
be vaccinated from being vaccinated, might be obstruction of the vaccinator within the meaning of the
section.579
[s 186.8] Physical Obstruction not Necessary
The expression “obstruction” used in section 186, IPC is not consigned to physical obstruction. It need not be
an act or use of criminal force. The act complained of results in preventing a public servant in the discharge of
his lawful duties. Any act of causing an impediment, by unlawfully preventing a public servant from the
discharge of his functions, would be enough to attract section 186 of IPC. Any other interpretation would be to
encourage people to take the law into their hands, frustrate the investigation of crimes and thwart public justice.
Such an interpretation cannot be commended by the courts.580 But a shutting of the door in the face of a public
servant entering a house, to attach some property in the performance of his duty, is obstructing him.581
[s 186.9] Threats and Abuses, if Constitute Obstruction—Protest when Amounts to Obstruction
In some cases it has been held that to constitute “obstruction” within the meaning of this section there must be
a use of criminal force, and a mere threat or threatening language is insufficient.582 A different view has,
however, been taken in some other cases and it has been held that mere threats by themselves would not in all
cases amount to obstruction unless they were accompanied either by an overt act or by a show of physical
force. If it is solely a matter of threats, they must be of such a nature as to so affect the public servant
concerned as to cause him to abstain from proceeding with the execution of his duties. It seems obvious that
threats of violence made in such a way as to prevent a public servant from carrying out his duty might easily
amount to an obstruction of the public servant, particularly if such threats are coupled with an aggressive or
menacing attitude on the part of the persons uttering the threats, and still more so if they are accompanied by
the flourishing or even the exhibition of some kind of weapon capable of inflicting physical injury. Threats made
by a person holding an offensive weapon in his hands must be taken to be just as much an obstruction as that
caused by a person actually blocking a gateway or handling a public servant in a manner calculated to prevent
him from executing his duty.583 Threats of violence made in such a way as to prevent the public servant from
carrying out his duty, might easily amount to an obstruction of the public servant.584 A protest is not an
obstruction, but a strongly worded protest, verging on a threat would be an obstruction within the meaning of
this section, if there appears to be at least a likelihood of the threat being immediately carried out.585
Where a person not only refuses to give up the property but threatens to do harm to the police constable if he
should venture to carry out the warrant, the threat is an overt act sufficient in law to constitute a “voluntary
obstruction” within the meaning of this section.586
[s 186.10] Evasion of Arrest

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Evasion of arrest or a mere assertion by the person sought to be arrested that he would not live to be arrested
or that a fight would be the result of such arrest, does not constitute a voluntary obstruction.587
[s 186.11] Refusal to Obey
A mere refusal to comply with the request of a public servant discharging his functions, does not amount to a
voluntary obstruction within the meaning of this section.588 But a refusal to show goods on demand to an octroi
official discharging his official function has been held to be an obstruction within the meaning of this section.589
[s 186.12] Persuasion and Dissuasion
Persuading tenants not to pay rents to a receiver does not constitute obstruction to the receiver, when such
persuasion was addressed to the tenants in the absence of the receiver.590
Whereas a protest against a member of the depressed classes being appointed a panch, the accused, who
was a member of the panchayat, refused to work as a panch and instigated others also to do the same, it was
held that the accused was at perfect liberty to resign, and there was nothing in law to prevent his advising
others not to serve in the panchayat, and he could not be held guilty under this section.591
To prevent, by physical means, persons willing to be vaccinated from being vaccinated, might be an obstruction
to the vaccinator within the meaning of the section. But merely to dissuade people from submitting to a
vaccination is not obstruction, for it is only with regard to willing patients that the vaccinator has any duty.592
So also spreading a false report and thereby preventing people from bringing their children for vaccination does
not amount to a voluntary obstruction to the vaccinator in the performance of his duties.593
The lawful guardian not having consented to the vaccination of his child, has a perfect right to take the child
away from the vaccinator.594
[s 186.13] Running Away to Avoid Arrest
The act of mere running away to escape arrest may have the effect of baulking a public servant or cheating him
of his intentions, but that would not amount to obstruction within the meaning of this section.595
[s 186.14] Escape From Lawful Custody
Escaping from lawful custody is not obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions within
the meaning of this section.596 But where C who was arrested, whilst being conveyed to the court, called for
help and four persons rescued C in consequence, it was held that they were guilty under this section and C of
abetment.597
[s 186.15] Putting up Fence or Shutting Door to Prevent Entry
A, a district judge, sends B, a commissioner, to search and bring away certain property from the house of C, a
defendant in a suit pending before him. C shuts the doors and did not admit B. A crowd collected and B went
away. It was held that no offence under this section was committed as the object of C was not to obstruct, but
to gain time for the compromise, which later on, in the day, was effected; and further C did not voluntarily
obstruct, since “voluntarily” indicates the “commission” of some overt act of obstruction”.598 From the definition
of “voluntarily”599 it will be seen that the meaning of the word is not a question of doing or not doing something,
but of the mental attitude of the agent. If C knew that by shutting his doors or by omitting to open them he was
causing obstruction to B, by force of section 39, IPC he voluntarily obstructed B, and his motive in so doing (to
Page 6 of 20
gain time) seems to be immaterial under section 186, IPC. This case has been distinguished in the following
two cases.
Shutting of the door in the face of a public servant entering a house to attach some property in the performance
of his duty, is obstructing him.600
Where a constable entered a house and found in a room three articles alleged to have been stolen, but before
the constable could remove them the accused caused the door of the room to be shut and also threatened to
kill the constable if he removed the articles, it was held that the acts of the accused constituted obstruction of
the public servant in the discharge of his public functions.601
Where the accused put up a fence across his private property to prevent a public servant from passing through
it, for inspection in a suit to which the accused was not a party, it was held that the accused did not commit the
[s 186.15] Some Illustrative Cases
The following are some of the cases relating to obstruction of a public servant:
A traffic constable was trying to clear the congestion from a road. The accused became angry, showed him red
eyes and asked him to give him his number. The accused persisted in asking for the number of the police
constable even when the constable was engaged in clearing the congestion on the road. He placed his hand on
the uniform of the police constable and pushed him, thus obstructing him in the discharge of his public
functions. The accused was guilty of the offence under this section.603
A traffic constable is prevented by the accused from regulating the traffic. He is guilty of the offence under this
section whatever be the exact means employed by him.604
On a certain occasion, certain police constables were on duty observing and timing the speed of motor cars
driving along a certain road with a view to the prosecution of the drivers of such cars as should be travelling at
an illegal speed. The accused warned the drivers of cars, which were approaching the measured distance in
the presence of the constables and disclosed the purpose for which they were here. As a result, the drivers
slackened their speed and proceeded over the measured distance at a lawful speed. It was held that the
accused had willfully obstructed the constables in the execution of the duty.605
The pointing of the mauser gun by the accused towards the police officers prima facie suggests the commission
of an offence under sections 186 and 353, IPC, inasmuch as on seeing the mauser gun being aimed at him, the
police officer must have got terribly shaken, thus being obstructed in the discharge of his official duties. The
impugned FIR, therefore, cannot be quashed by invoking section 482, CrPC.606 Where acts complained of
prima facie amount to obstructing the public servant in the discharge of their public functions and offence under
section 186, IPC is attracted, the proceedings before the trial court cannot be quashed by taking recourse to
The accused, in order to evade payment of toll, drove a motor bus by a sidetrack and did not stop the bus when
Page 7 of 20
signalled to do so. The accused prevented the toll contractor, who was a public servant, from collecting the toll
and thus obstructed him in the discharge of his duty.608
A public servant had to search the stock of sugar in a sugar factory, and the accused, who was the general
manager of the factory, placed obstacles on the road leading to the sugar godown making any vehicular traffic
towards it impossible. It amounted to “obstruction” within the meaning of this section.609
A search party wanted to search the upstairs of the accused’s house, but he went and stood on the stairs and
blocked the way and objected to the party going up; Bagaley J of the Rangoon High Court observed:
In view of the fact that the constable says that he merely sat on a chair by the side of the stairway and the bazaar-gang
definitely says that the accused did not actually obstruct with his hand and block the way but stood by the staircase, I
must hold that he did no physical act which could be regarded as obstruction while his verbal protest, not containing
anything that could be interpreted as a threat which was likely to be immediately put into force, could not amount to
obstruction either.610
Where on account of electrocution of the daughter of a tenant of the accused, police officials visited to check
the fresh electric wiring and leakage of current with permission, the search was undertaken in exigent
circumstances. The investigating team was obstructed while taking photographs and was confined wrongfully in
the house, which amounted to obstructing them in the discharge of their public duties, thus the framing of
charges under sections 186 and 342, IPC against the accused persons was found proper.611
Commentary under section 21, ante may be referred to.
A vaccinator is a public servant within the meaning of this section and section 21(8),612 so also is a Union
Karnam possessing a general authority in writing,613 and a clerk in the cess-collection department of a district
municipality.614 Under section 21(10) of this Code read with section 11 of the Tolls on Roads and Bridges
Act,615 a toll contractor as well as his servants are public servants.616 A local board road sircar, who merely
supervises roadwork or the construction of a culvert, is not a public servant.617
By section 21, IPC, every officer of a court of justice whose duty it is to execute any judicial process, is a public
officer. The resistance of a process of a civil court is punishable under this Code.618 A commissioner appointed
by a civil court to divide the properties by metes and bounds as a result of a preliminary decree for partition, is a
public servant within the meaning of section 21 of this Code. Any obstruction to the work done by him is an
offence under this section.619 Obstructing an officer of a co-operative society from removing attached property is
not an offence under this section, as he is not a public servant.620
An officer authorised by a court to arrest a person whose evidence is deemed necessary under the Bengal
Pilots Act, 1859, section 15, and the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1883, section 14, is a public servant within
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the meaning of this section.
The section applies only to obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public functions. Obstruction to
persons called to help a public servant, is not obstruction to the public servant.621
[s 186.18] “In the Discharge of his Public Functions”
The public functions contemplated by this section mean legal or legitimately authorised public functions, and
are not intended to cover any act that a public functionary may choose to take upon himself to perform, and the
mere fact of a public servant believing that he was acting in the discharge of his duties will not be sufficient to
make resistance or obstruction to him amount to an offence within the meaning of this section.622 If a levy is
legal,623 the public servant would be performing a legal duty when attaching property, and resistance or
obstruction to him would be an offence under this section.624 But resistance to the execution of a warrant which
is illegal and without any legal force does not attract the operations of this section.625
Where the police party forcibly took the petitioner to the Government dispensary, against his will, the petitioner
has a right to resist it. If in that incident any police personnel were given some beating, they invited it. No
offence is, therefore, committed and the conviction has to be set aside.626
A warrant of attachment, which does not bear the signature627 or the seal of the court issuing it,628 is illegal and
resistance to the execution of it is no offence. A public servant who seeks to execute a warrant of arrest which
is not signed by a magistrate as required by section 70 of the CrPC, but which only bears his initials, and the
substance of which is not notified to the person to be arrested, as required by section 75 of that Code, does not
act in the discharge of his public functions in a manner authorised by law.629 So also in the case of a warrant of
attachment which has expired.630 But the authorisation of a public servant to act as such in a given case need
not necessarily be of a formal nature.631 The functions, discharged by a public servant would not, however, be
public-functions if they fall wholly outside the jurisdiction or authority which he, as a public officer, possesses.632
Where the complainant police officer entered the house of the accused in connection with the investigation of a
case, without obtaining any warrant or written permission, and the accused had not used any criminal force or
assaulted the complainant to deter her from discharging her duty, held no offence under section 186 or section
353, IPC was committed. FIR was quashed on petition filed under section 482, CrPC.633
[s 186.19] Some Illustrative Cases
A district magistrate has no authority to issue a warrant for the production of a witness at an investigation by a
police officer, but only before his own court.634 The warrant issued by him for the production of a witness for
production before a police officer is, therefore, not lawful.
The accused, who were not parties to a suit in which a public right of way was claimed, did not allow a munsif,
in whose court the suit was pending, to pass in a boat through a ditch, which was their private property, when
the munsif wanted to pass through it for the purpose of making a local inspection in connection with the suit. It
was held that the accused could not be held guilty of the offence under this section.635
An obstruction to the delivery of possession in execution of a decree by the petitioner, who was in possession
of the property and not bound by the decree, cannot be treated as an unlawful obstruction to the exercise of a
lawful authority by a public servant.636
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Prosecution evidence established that train was stopped by the accused appellant who cut the hotch pipe and
on being restrained from doing so, assaulted the complainant police constable. When the accused appellant
and other persons were taken to the guard room, they were shouting at him and threatening to throw him on the
railway track. The accused was duly identified. He had obstructed a public servant and voluntarily caused hurt
to him in order deter him from discharging his duty. He was convicted under section 186, IPC.637
Generally, an obstruction to the execution of illegal and ultra vires warrants is no offence.638
On the other hand, the authorisation of a public servant to act as such in a given case need not necessarily be
of a formal nature.639 But the functions discharged by a public servant would not be public functions if they fall
wholly outside the jurisdiction or authority, which he as a public officer possesses.640 This section does not
apply to an officer who is acting wholly outside his jurisdiction or authority.641
A warrant for the realisation of a sum, which includes an installment, which is not due, is altogether without
jurisdiction. When a distress warrant is issued without jurisdiction, no offence is committed under this section if
the execution of the warrant is resisted.642
A person resisting a warrant is not guilty of an offence under this section, where the warrant was directed by a
munsif to a place beyond his jurisdiction.643
If a public officer does no more than act upon the official instructions he has received, and if those official
instructions are not of such a kind as to be obviously and patently illegal, then he acts properly in carrying out
such orders and, resistance to a public officer carrying out orders which upon the face of them are not open to
objection and are in proper form, is an offence against the statute.644 There is no duty laid upon a bill collector
and other persons executing warrants, to make independent inquiries regarding the validity of the warrant; nor
would it be possible for him to do so.645
Where an officer had been entrusted with the execution of a search warrant, directing him to search in a
particular place, and the officer, in fact, searched in other places, it was held that resistance to him and escape
from his custody was not an offence.646
The prosecution case was that the accused persons forcibly entered the office of the DCP Traffic, gheraoed
and manhandled DCP. However, the prosecution case of causing hurt, assault or use of criminal force to deter
a public servant from discharging his duty was not proved, thus, the accused was acquitted of the charges
under sections 186, 353 and 332, IPC.647
Where a peon was apparently carrying out official instructions to sell the attached bullocks, but the instructions
were obviously and patently illegal because the certificate officer had no power to authorise the peon to sell
them, it was held that the peon was not discharging his public functions and an obstruction to him was no
offence.648
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A receiver, taking possession of property in possession of a third party, in contravention of the provisions of O
XL, Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, cannot be said to be discharging his public functions and
resistance to him is no offence.649
[s 186.20] Obstructing Public Servant Acting in Good Faith—Conflicting Views
There is a conflict of judicial opinion on the question whether a person who obstructs a public servant, acting in
good faith though his act is not strictly justifiable in law, commits an offence under this section. In Queen-
Empress v Tulsiram,650 a collector, having no legal authority to do so, ordered a surveyor to execute a decree
for possession. The surveyor, in attempting to execute the decree, was obstructed by the accused. It was held
by the Bombay High Court that the collector having no authority to issue the order to the surveyor, the surveyor
acting under the collector’s orders was not discharging a public function and that the act of the accused in
obstructing him could not be an offence under this section. Repelling an argument that the surveyor was
protected by section 99 of the Code and that the accused had no right of private defence, it was held that was
not so; for the protection given by that section to a public officer who, acting in good faith under colour of his
office, does an act not causing the apprehension of death or grievous hurt which may not be strictly justifiable in
law, does not extend to an officer whose act is altogether illegal. Nor was the surveyor protected by the second
paragraph of section 99; for though he was acting by the direction of the collector, still the collector’s order was
so entirely ultra vires as to leave no room for the operation of the section. In Emperor v Shivdas Omkar
Marwadi,651 the same court observed:
Before an offence under s 186 of the Penal Code can be said to be established against any person, it is requisite, as
the section itself expressly recites, to prove that the public servant concerned, was obstructed in the discharge of his
public functions, and that we take it as a matter of fact and not a matter of the public servant’s intentions. His intentions
may have been perfectly honest, but if in fact and in law the discharge of which he was obstructed were not public
functions, then no offence can be committed under this section. It is plain that the functions would not be public
functions if they fell wholly outside the jurisdiction or authority which he as a public officer possessed.
Following these two rulings it has been held in another Bombay case that an obstruction offered to a range
forest officer, who was acting in perfect good faith but having no jurisdiction, was not punishable under this
section.652 The Calcutta,653 Lahore654 and Patna655 High Courts, took the same view.
A contrary view has been taken by the Madras High Court in a number of cases.656 In the leading case of
Queen-Empress v Poomalai Udayan,657 it is said that if the act of the public servant, however, irregular and
illegal it may have been, was done in good faith under the colour of his office, an offence under this section
would be committed if he was obstructed. The case of Queen-Empress v Tulsiram658 was distinguished on the
ground that the public servant was in effect not a public servant. This was followed in Public Prosecutor v
Madhava Bhonjo Santo,659 where it was observed that section 99, clause 2, IPC, no doubt, in terms, applies
only to the right of private defence against the act of a public servant acting in good faith under the colour of his
office, but that section has been held by this court to throw light on and govern the interpretation of the
expression “lawful authority” and “discharge of public functions” found in sections 183 and 186, IPC. This case
was, in its turn, followed in Re Peer Masthan Rowther660 and Simhadri Naidu v Emperor.661
In Queen-Empress v Janki Prasad,662 the Allahabad High Court held that obstruction to the execution of a
warrant which was sealed but which was only initiated by the officer issuing the warrant (instead of being
signed), did render the obstructer punishable under this section, if the officer executing the warrant acted in
Page 11 of 20
good faith.
The Bombay High Court in Reg v Vyankatrav Shrinivas,663 held that if a public servant bona fide believed that
he was discharging his public functions within the scope of his authority, even though he was mistaken as to
the extent of his powers, an obstruction caused to him would be punishable under section 187 6, IPC. This
decision was approved of in Bhawoo Jivaji v Mulji Dayal.664
In Dukhan Sahu v Emperor,665 a peon having a proper warrant of attachment against J for attaching the goods
from his shop, went to the shop with two men of the decree-holder, who stated that the shop belonged to J, and
seeing J in the shop regarded in good faith, that the property belonged to J and attempted to affect attachment,
but was obstructed and threatened by J’s son who claimed that the shop belonged to him. It was held by the
Patna High Court that J’s son committed an offence under section 186, IPC, by obstructing the peon whose
duty it was to attach the property. A similar view was taken in Doman Mahto v Emperor666 and Puna Mahto v
Emperor.667
The question as to the correctness of either of the above views was raised in Santosh Kumar Jain v State,668
but was left undecided. In favour of the latter view, it must be conceded that this section speaks of a public
servant in the discharge of his “public functions” and not “lawful functions”, and a public servant acting in good
faith under colour of his office cannot be said to be acting in his private capacity and must be said to be
discharging his public functions. But, at the same time, a public servant doing something absolutely illegal
cannot be said to be discharging any of his public functions. There can be no public function to do something
illegal.
[s 186.21] Delegated Functions
Public functions may consist of delegated authority. Where a warrant of attachment was addressed to the nazir
of the court, who delegated its execution to a court peon, by an endorsement of the peon’s name on the
warrant, an obstruction of the peon in executing the warrant was held to be an offence under this section.669 So
also a nazir of a court may delegate the execution of a warrant of arrest.670 But the name of the delegate must
appear on the warrant, otherwise resistance to its execution is no offence.671
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence under section 182. The limitation for the prosecution of
an offence under this section is one year.
However, it is a well accepted proposition of law that where an accused commits some offences which are
separate and distinct from those contained in section 195; section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned
therein unless such other offences form an integral part of the same so as to amount to offences committed as
a part of the same transaction. In such a case, the other offences would also fall within the ambit of section 195,
CrPC.672
Under section 195(1)(a) no court shall take cognizance of an offence under this section except on the complaint
by the public servant concerned or by some other public servant to whom he is subordinate. The prerequisites
for taking cognizance are: (a) that there should be a complaint; (b) that the complaint should be in writing; and
(c) that it should be by the public servant concerned, or by some other public servant to whom he is
subordinate. Want of such a complaint is fatal to a prosecution under this section.673 A statement under section
161 or section 164, CrPC, would not constitute a written complaint and cannot be equated as a special
complaint in writing stipulated under section 195, CrPC.674 Cognizance taken by the magistrate on a police-
Page 12 of 20
challan is illegal and is liable to be quashed.675
[s 186.24] Section 195, CrPC Does not Bar Trial of Other Distinct Offences
The allegations upon which a charge under section 353, IPC is based may be the same as those constituting
the charge under section 186, IPC, but it cannot be ignored that sections 186 and 353, IPC, relate to two
distinct offences and while the offence under the latter section is a cognizable offence, the one under the former
section is not so. The ingredients of the two offences are also distinct. Section 186, IPC, is applicable to a case
where the accused voluntarily obstructs a public servant in the discharge of his public functions, but under
section 353, IPC, the ingredients of assault or use of criminal force while the public servant is doing his duty as
such, is necessary. Where, upon the facts, the commission of offences disclosed is such that they can come
under either section 353 or section 186, it is open to the complainant to proceed only under section 353 which
does not require a complaint from the concerned public servant or his superior authority.676
But the order taking cognizance of an offence under section 186, IPC would be bad in law as it would attract the
mischief of section 195, CrPC.677
[s 186.25] Split up not Permissible
The prosecution is, however, not entitled to split the facts of the case for the purpose of circumventing the
provisions of the said section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code.678 Where, however, a person who has been
charged under sections 186 and 504, prosecution under section 504 is not bad because no complaint has been
filed under the said section 195(1)(a).679
[s 186.26] Charge
That you, on or about the………day of………at………, voluntarily obstructed a public servant………(name or official
designation of public servant) in the discharge of his public functions………(give the details), and thereby committed an
offence, punishable under section 186, Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 186.27] Proof
The burden is on the prosecution to show that the court or officer who issued the warrant in the execution of
which the public servant was obstructed, had jurisdiction to do so,680 and that the public servant was
discharging public duties imposed on him by law.681
Defiance of the processes of law is a serious offence as it hampers the administration of justice. If allowed to be
committed with impunity, the prestige of the court is lost. The sentence should, therefore, not be lenient.682
Page 13 of 20
The incident had taken place in the year 1992, and the time of sentencing the accused had attained the age of
50 years, thus, the sentence of two years imposed was reduced to a period of three months, and a fine of Rs
5000/- was imposed.683

558 Provincial Govt, CP & Berar v Balaram Jagannath, AIR 1938 Ngp 529 : 39 Cr LJ 954 : (1938) Nag LJ 290 .
559 State v Babulal Gaurishankar Misra, AIR 1957 Bom 10 [LNIND 1956 BOM 122] , p 12 : (1957) Cr LJ 43 : (1957) ILR
Bom 80 : 58 Bom LJ 1021.
560 State of Himachal Pradesh v Vidyasagar, (1997) Cr LJ 3893 (HP).
561 State of Orisssa v BK Rao, (1962) 4 Ori JD 278 : (1962) 28 Cut LT 4, p 7.
562 Durgacharan Naik v State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 [LNIND 1966 SC 59] , p 1778 : (1966) Cr LJ 1491 ; Kuttappu v
Intelligence Officer, (1962) Ker LJ 875 , p 876 : (1962) KLJ 493 ; Narayanrao v State of Maharashtra, (1971) Mah LJ
512 .
563 Ah Choung v Emperor, AIR 1932 Rang 21 , p 24 : 33 Cr LJ 175 : ILR 9 Rang 601.
564 Thakur Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1936 Pat 74 , 75 : 37 Cr LJ 104 : 16 PLT 808.
565 Dukhan Sahu v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 633 .
566 Phudki v State, AIR 1955 All 104 [LNIND 1954 ALL 119] , p 105.
567 Darkan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 827 , p 828 : 29 Cr LJ 645; Emperor v Babulal Mushilal, AIR 1936 Ngp 86 : 37 Cr LJ
587; Kisan Krishnaji Tikle v Nagpur Conference of Society of St Vincent De Paul, AIR 1943 Ngp 334 : 45 Cr LJ 407; Ah
Choung v Emperor, AIR 1932 Rang 21 : 33 Cr LJ 175 : ILR 9 Rang 601; Janki Prasad v State of Bihar, (1975) Cr LJ
575 , p 576 (Pat).
568 Kisan Krishanji Tikle v Nagpur Conference of Society of St Vincent De Paul, (1944) 45 Cr LJ 407 , p 409.
569 State v Babulal Gaurishankar Misra, AIR 1957 Bom 10 [LNIND 1956 BOM 122] , p 12 : (1957) Cr LJ 48 : (1957) ILR
Bom 80 : 58 Bom LR 1621; Santosh Kumar Jain v State, AIR 1950 Pat 436 ; Ramlakhan Ram v State, AIR 1950 Pat
544 ; Nanhua v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 118 : 39 Cr LJ 363 : (1937) All LJ 1344; State of West Bengal v Harjit Singh
Anandpuri, (1958) 1 Cal LJ 81 ; Emperor v Suleman Abba, AIR 1935 Bom 24 : 36 Cr LJ 516 : 36 Bom LR 1124; Re
Thimmakka, AIR 1942 Mad 552 [LNIND 1942 MAD 105] : 43 Cr LJ 757; Dukhan Sahu v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 633 :
39 Cr LJ 100; Emperor v Babulal : AIR 1936 Ngp 86 : (1936) ILR Ngp 50 : 37 Cr LJ 587; Sajan v Emperor, AIR 1935
Sind 245 : 159 IC 665 : 37 Cr LJ 148.
Page 14 of 20
570 State of Bihar v Ramanand Singh, (1966) BLJR 300 .
571 Empress v Somama, 15 ILR Mad 221 : 1 Weir 134; followed in Jaswant Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 139 : 25
Cr LJ 721; Emperor v Gajadhar, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 721 .
572 UBR (1897–1901), Vol I, pp 266, 267.
573 Nanhua v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 108 : 39 Cr LJ 363 : (1937) All LJ 1344.
574 Re Todd, 1882 AWN 52.
575 Re Karuman, 1 Weir 134.
576 Emperor v Suleman Abba, AIR 1935 Bom 24 : 36 Cr LJ 516.
577 Ramlakhan Ram v State, AIR 1950 Pat 544 .
578 Nafur Sardar v Emperor, AIR 1932 Cal 871 , p 876 : 36 Cal WN 1038; Emperor v Tohfa, AIR 1933 All 759 : 34 Cr LJ
1211 : (1933) All LJ 952.
579 Queen-Empress v Thimmachi, 1 Weir 131.
580 Shikha Goel v ESIC, 2001 Cr LJ (NOC) 148 (AP) : (2000) IV CCR 431 (AP) : (2001) 2 Andh LT (Cr) 289 .
581 Re Thimmakka, AIR 1942 Mad 552 [LNIND 1942 MAD 105] : 43 Cr LJ 757; Gottumukkula Narayana Raju v King-
Emperor, AIR 1924 Mad 760 [LNIND 1924 MAD 465] : 26 Cr LJ 97; State of West Bengal v Harjit Singh, (1958) 1 Cal
LJ 81 ; Nanhua v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 118 : 39 Cr LJ 363; Emperor v Suleman Abba, AIR 1935 Bom 24 : 36 Cr LJ
516, approved in State v Babulal Gaurishankar Misra, AIR 1957 Bom 10 [LNIND 1956 BOM 122] ; Santosh Kumar
Jain v State, AIR 1950 Pat 436 .
582 Dukhan Mst v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 827 : 29 Cr LJ 645; relying on Emperor v Gajadhar, 11 Cr LJ 721; Aijaz
Hussain v Emperor, AIR 1916 All 53 : 17 Cr LJ 413 : ILR 38 All 506 : 14 All LJ 731 dissented from State v Baburam
Gaurishankar Misra, AIR 1957 Bom 10 [LNIND 1956 BOM 122] .
583 Nafur Sardar v Emperor, AIR 1932 Cal 871 , p 876 : 36 Cal WN 1038; Emperor v Tohfa, AIR 1933 All 759 , p 760 : 34
Cr LJ 1211 : (1933) All LJ 952; Dukhan Sahu v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 633 : 18 PLT 783 : (1937) Pat WN 771 ;
Abhiram Sahani v State, 26 Cut LT 596.
584 Nanhua v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 118 , p 119 : 39 Cr LJ 363 : (1937) All LJ 1344; Gottumukkala Narayana Raju v King-
Emperor, AIR 1924 Mad 750 : 26 Cr LJ 97 : (1924) Mad WN 438.
585 Ah Choung v Emperor, AIR 1932 Rang 21 : 33 Cr LJ 175 : ILR 9 Rang 601.
586 Emperor v Pundlick Krishna Pai, 1 Cr LJ 262 : 6 Bom LR 254.

Page 15 of 20
587 Aijaz Hussain v Emperor, AIR 1916 All 53 : 17 Cr LJ 413 : ILR 38 All 506 : 14 All LJ 731.
588 Queen-Empress v Somama, 15 ILR Mad 221 : 1 Weir 133 : 2 Mad LJ 120; Re Arora Maistri, 1 Weir 132; R v Bhaklidas,
5 Bom HCC (Cr) 51; Lilla Singh v R, 22 ILR Cal 286; Ramlakhan Ram v State, AIR 1950 Pat 544 ; Eh Parakh v King-
Emperor, AIR 1926 Oudh 202 : 27 Cr LJ 328 : 1 ILR Luck 133 : 3 Oudh WN 160.
589 Sajan v Emperor, AIR 1935 Sind 245 : 37 Cr LJ 148 : 29 Serv LR 54.
590 Ebrahim Sircar v Emperor, ILR 29 Cal 236.
591 Ram Ghulam Singh v Emperor, AIR 1925 All 401 : 26 Cr LJ 978 : 47 ILR All 579 : 23 All LJ 352.
592 Ram Ghulam Singh v Emperor, AIR 1925 All 401 : 26 Cr LJ 978 : 47 ILR All 579 : 23 All LJ 352.
593 Queen-Empress v Thimmachi, 15 ILR Mad 93 : 1 Weir 131.
594 Re M Jogabathudu, 1 Weir 132; Re Chitta Konaiya, 1 Weir 132; Re Thulukana Chetti, 1 Weir 129; Re Byloor Lingah, 1
Weir 130; Re Komati Ramannah, 1 Weir 131.
595 Phadki v State, AIR 1955 All 104 [LNIND 1954 ALL 119] , p 105 : (1955) Cr LJ 278 ; Jamna Das v Enmperor, AIR 1927
Lah 708 : 28 Cr LJ 753 : 9 LLJ 408; Peeru Mahommad Lebhai v Swaminathan Pillai, (1917) Mad 182 (1) : 17 Cr LJ 71.
596 Reg v Poshu, 2 Bom HCR 128; Sheikh Nasa v R, 37 ILR Cal 122.
597 Sheo Progash v Bhoop Narain, 22 ILR Cal 759; R v Thavar Issaji Boree, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 457 .
598 R v Sommanna, 15 ILR Mad 221 : 1 Weir 133.
599 Section 39, Indian Penal Code 1860.
600 Re Thurimakka, AIR 1942 Mad 552 [LNIND 1942 MAD 105] (2) : 43 Cr LJ 755 : (1942) 1 Mad LJ 585.
601 Gottumukkla Narayana Raju v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Mad 760 [LNIND 1924 MAD 465] : 26 Cr LJ 97 : 1924 Mad
WN 439.
602 Nishi Kanta Pal v Emperor, AIR 1917 Cal 180 : 18 Cr LJ 62 : 20 Cal WN 857.
603 State of West Bengal v Harjit Singh, (1958) 1 Cal LJ 81 .
604 Nanhua v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 118 : 39 Cr LJ 363 : (1937) All LJ 1344.
Page 16 of 20
605 Betts v Steevens, (1910) 1 KB 1 : 79 LJKB 17 : 73 JP 486 : 101 LT 564.
606 Madan Gopal alias Madan Bhaiya v State, (2001) II CCR 149 (Del).
607 Shikha Goel v ESIC, (2000) IV CCR 431 (AP) : (2001) Cr LJ (NOC) 148 (AP).
608 Emperor v Suleman Abba, AIR 1935 Bom 24 : 36 Cr LJ 316 : 36 Bom LR 1124; approved in State v Babulal
Gaurishankar Misra, AIR 1957 Bom 10 [LNIND 1956 BOM 122] .
609 Santosh Kumar Jain v State, AIR 1950 Pat 436 .
610 Ah Choung v Emperor, AIR 1932 Rang 10 , 24.

611 Veena Rangekar v State, (2000) Cr LJ 2543 (Del).
612 Re Sooraparazu Singayya, 1 Weir 621, relying on 1 Weir 129.
613 Re Gopalasaminatha Aiyar, 1 Weir 128.
614 R v Babulal, 33 ILR Bom 213.
615 Tolls on Roads and Bridges Act, Bombay Act 3 of 1875.
616 Emperor v Suleman Abba, AIR 1935 Bom 24 : 36 Cr LJ 516 : 36 Bom 1124.
617 Addaita Bhuia v Kali Das De, (1905) 6 Cr LJ 393 , 394 : 12 Cal WN 96; but see Regina v Ramajirav, 12 Bom HCR 1.
618 Ameen v Bhagai Duffadar, 10 WR 43, p 44.
619 Re Ramiah, AIR 1951 Mad 773 [LNIND 1950 MAD 222] : 52 Cr LJ 847 : (1951) Mad WN 200 : (1951) 1 Mad LJ 191.
620 Udayanath Bank v State, (1989) Cr LJ 2216 (Ori).
621 Mata Ram v Emperor, AIR 1924 Lah 238 (1) : 24 Cr LJ 594; Mohd Safait Hussain v State of Bihar, (1984) BLJR 132 :
(1984) Pat LJR 573 (Pat).
622 Lilla Singh v Queen-Emperor, 22 ILR Cal 286, p 290; Reg v Bhagtidas Bhagwan Das, 5 Bom HCR 51; Queen–Empress
v Tulsiram, 13 ILR Bom 168; Re Baroda Kant Pramanick, 1 Cal WN 74; Queen-Empress v Jogendra Nath Mukerjee, 24
ILR Cal 320; Gahar Mahommad Surkar v Pitamber Das, AIR 1918 Cal 4 : 19 Cr LJ 968; Jaswant Singh v King-
Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 139 : (1924), 25 Cr LJ 721.
623 Moreshwar Janardhan Gogate v Emperor, AIR 1928 Bom 497 : 30 Bom LR 1255.
Page 17 of 20
624 Ram Singh v Emperor, AIR 1935 Pat 214 ; Tribhuwan v Emperor, AIR 1918 Oudh 162 : 19 Cr LJ 641.
625 Gopal Mahton v Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 161 : 41 Cr LJ 819; Emperor v Tohfa, AIR 1933 All 759 : 34 Cr LJ 1211; King-
Empror v Himayat Ali, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 64 : 10 PR (Cr) 1905; Abdul Gafur v Queen-Empress, 23 ILR Cal 896; Gahar
Mahommad Sarkar v Pitambar Das, AIR 1918 Cal 4 : 19 Cr LJ 968 : 22 Cal WN 814; Marrigappa Naicker v Emperor,
AIR 1925 Mad 613 [LNIND 1924 MAD 511] : 26 Cr LJ 750; Badri Goope v Emperor, AIR 1926 Pat 237 : 27 Cr LJ 418 :
ILR 5 Pat 216.
626 Babulal v State of Rajasthan, (1992) CLR (Raj) 517.
627 Ramdayal v Mahtab Singh, 7 ILR All 506.
628 Khidiri Bux v Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 404 : 20 Cr LJ 139.
629 Abdul Gafar v R, 23 ILR Cal 896; Mohin Mohan Banerji v Emperor, AIR 1916 Pat 272 : 18 Cr LJ 39.
630 1 Weir 134; Sheikh Nasu v R, 37 ILR Cal 122; R v Jogendra Nath Mukerjee, 24 ILR Cal 320; Nishikant Pal v Emperor,
AIR 1917 Cal 180 : 18 Cr LJ 62; Kurugappa Naicker v Emperor, AIR 1925 Mad 613 [LNIND 1924 MAD 511] : 36 Cr LJ
750; R v Himayat Ali, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 64 ; Chepamahton v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 550 : 30 Cr LJ 175; Sahadat v State,
56 BLJR 439; Kazi Abdul Kabir Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 333 : 41 Cr LJ 103; Parshottam Dass v State,
AIR 1965 Punj 264 , pp 266-67 : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 116 ; State v Bhaurao, 1977 Mah LJ (Notes) 5 .
631 R v Abdullah, 21 ILR All 499; Birdi Chand Jaipuria v Darwarin Jayaswal, AIR 1932 Pat 276 , p 279; Dukhan Sahu v
Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 633 .
632 Emperor v Shivadas Onkar Marwadi, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 251 , p 252; Emperor v Kadarbhai Usufalli Bohsi, AIR 1927 Bom
483 ; Dharanidharjana v Kedarnatih Das, AIR 1945 Cal 48 : 46 Cr LJ 498; Suribeshwarnath v Emperor, AIR 1924 Cal
501 : 39 Cal LJ 33; Re Peer Masthan Rowther, AIR 1938 Mad 659 [LNIND 1938 MAD 266] , p 660 : 39 Cr LJ 879.
633 Aniruddha Ganesh Pathak v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 1069 (Bom).
634 R v Jogedra Nath Mukerjee, 24 ILR Cal 320.
635 Nishi Kant Pal v Emperor, AIR 1917 Cal 180 : 18 Cr LJ 62.
636 Murugappa Naiker v Emperor, AIR 1925 Mad 613 [LNIND 1924 MAD 511] : 26 Cr LJ 750.
637 Gyan Bahadur v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2013 Cr LJ 1729 p 1732 (Chh) : 2013 (2) CGLJ 131 .
638 R v Himayat Ali, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 64 : 10 PR (Cr) 1905 : 6 PLR 256.
639 R v Abdullah, 27 ILR All 499.
640 Emperor v Shivadas Omkar Marwadi, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 251 , p 252 : 15 Bom LR 315.
Page 18 of 20
641 Emperor v Kadarbhai Usufalli Bhori, AIR 1927 Bom 483 : 29 Bom LR 987.
642 Dharanidhar Jana v Kedar Nath Das, AIR 1945 Cal 48 : 46 CLR 498 : (1944) 1 ILR Cal 309 : 47 Cal WN 935.
643 Surbeshwarnath v Emperor, AIR 1924 Cal 501 : 39 Cal LJ 33.
644 Birdhi Chand Jaipuria v Darbari Jayaswal, AIR 1932 Pat 276 , p 279 : 13 PLR 480; Dukhan Sahu v Emperor, AIR 1937
Pat 633 : 1937 Pat WN 771 : 18 PLT 783.
645 Re Peer Masthan Rowther, AIR 1938 Mad 659 [LNIND 1938 MAD 266] , pp 660 : 39 Cr LJ 879 : (1938) Mad WN 418.
646 Chepa Mahton v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 550 : 30 Cr LJ 175.
647 State v Ramesh, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 556 (Del).
648 Sahadat v State, 1956 BLJR 439 .
649 Kazi Abdul Kabir Mahommad Sidik UJan v Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 333 : 41 Cr LJ 103.
650 Queen-Empress v Tulsiram, 13 ILR Bom 168; Thithi Suryanarayana v Thata Simhardi, AIR 1934 Mad 664 [LNIND
1934 MAD 415] (2) : 67 Mad LJ 510 : (1934) Mad WN 1230.
651 Emperor v Shivdas Omkar Marwadi, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 251 : 15 Bom LR 315.
652 Emperor v Kararbhai Usufalli Bohri, AIR 1927 Bom 483 : 28 Cr LJ 705 : ILR 51 Bom 896 : 29 Bom LR 987.
653 Lilla Singh v Queen-Empress, 22 ILR Cal 286, 290; relying on Reg v Bhagtidas Bhagwandas, 5 Bom HC (Cr) 51;
Queen-Empress v Tulsiram, 13 ILR Bom 168; Queen-Empress v Jogendra Nath Mukerjee, 24 ILR Cal 320 : 1 Cal WN
154 relying on 13 Bom 168 : 22 Cal 286; Re Baroda Kant Pramanick, 1 Cal WN 74.
654 Jaswant Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 139 , 141 : 25 Cr LJ 721; relying on King-Emperor v Himayat Ali, 10 PR
(Cr) 1905; Queen-Empress v Tulsiram, 13 ILR Bom 168; Abdul Gafur v Queen-Empress, 23 Cal 896.
655 Mod Narayna Rai v State of Bihar, 1963 BLJR 279 ; Tunki Singh v State, (1969) BLJR 804 , p 807 : (1969) Pat LJR 230
; B Tiwary v State, (1964) BLJR 211 .
656 Queen-Empress v Poomalai Udayan, 21 ILR Mad 296 : 1 Weir 135; Public Prosecutor v Madhava Bhonjo Santo, AIR
1917 Mad 889 (2) : 17 Cr LJ 481; Re Peer Masthan Rowther, AIR 1938 Mad 659 [LNIND 1938 MAD 266] : 39 Cr LJ
879 : (1938) Mad WN 418; and the cases cited in them.
657 Queen-Empress v Poomalai Udayan, 21 ILR Mad 296, 298; relying on Queen-Empress v Ramayya, 13 ILR Mad 148;
Queen-Empress v Bakot Koli, 19 ILR Mad 349; Queen-Empress v Tiruchittambala Pathan, 21 ILR Mad 78.
658 Queen-Empress v Tulsiram, 13 ILR Bom 168.

Page 19 of 20
659 Public Prosecutor v Madhava Bhonjo Santo, AIR 1917 Mad 889 (2).
660 Re Peer Masthan Rowther, AIR 1938 Mad 659 [LNIND 1938 MAD 266] .
661 Simhadri Naidu v Emperor, (1936) Mad WN (Cr) 35.
662 Queen-Empress v Janki Prasad, 8 ILR All 293 : 6 All WN 106.
663 Reg v Vyankatrav Shrinivas, (1870) 7 Bom HCR (Cr) 50.
664 Bhawoo Jivaji v Mulji Dayal, (1888) 12 Bom 377.
665 Dukhan Sahu v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 633 : 18 PLT 783 : (1937) Pat WN 771 .
666 Doman Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1920 Pat 482 : 21 Cr LJ 193.
667 Puna Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 315 : ILR 11 Pat 743 : 13 PLT 502.
668 Santosh Kumar Jain v State, AIR 1951 SC 201 [LNIND 1951 SC 16] , p 203.
669 Dharam v R, 22 ILR Cal 586; Abdul Karim v Bullen, 6 ILR All 385; Doman Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1920 Pat 482 : 21 Cr
LJ 193.
670 Sheo Progash v Bhoop Narain, 22 ILR Cal 759.
671 Sheikh Naseer v R, 37 ILR Cal 122.
672 Ramji Bhikha Koli v State of Gujarat, (1999) Cr LJ 1244 (Guj).
673 Lajja Ram v State, AIR 1952 HP 32 [LNIND 1951 HP 18] : 52 Cr LJ 821; Makardhwaj Sahu v State, AIR 1954 Ori 175
[LNIND 1953 ORI 39] : 55 Cr LJ 950; Basanta Kumar Gon v The State, AIR 1956 Cal 118 [LNIND 1955 CAL 193] :
(1956) Cr LJ 524 ; Inder Singh v State, AIR 1960 Punj 356 : (1960) Cr LJ 987 ; Janki Prasad v State of Bihar, (1975)
Cr LJ 575 , p 576 (Pat).
674 Gurinder Singh v State, (1996) 3 CCR 257 , 259 (Del) : (1966) 2 Ch Cr C 396.
675 Basudeva v State, (1985) CCC 97 (Del); Gurinder Singh v State, (1996) 3 CCR 257 (Del) : (1996) 2 Ch Cr C 396; For
detailed commentary, see Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn LexisNexis.
676 Durgacharan Naik v State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1775 [LNIND 1966 SC 59] : (1966) 2 SCWR 162 [LNIND 1966 SC
59] : (1966) Cr LJ 1491 : (1966) SCD 1043 [LNIND 1966 SC 59] : 32 Cut LT 1106; Jamman Singh v State of Bihar,
Page 20 of 20
(1985) Cr LJ 775 (Pat) : (1985) BBCJ 125 : (1985) Pat LJR 401 ; Bhagat Ram v State of Punjab, (1991) 2 CCC 213 , p
215 (P&H); Gurinder Singh v State, (1996) 3 CCR 257 (Del) : (1996) 2 Ch Cr C 396.
677 Pankaj Aggarwal v State of Delhi, (2001) II CCR 318 (SC).
678 Bashirul-Huq v State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] : (1953) Cr LJ 1232 ; State v Kathi Unad
Ranning, AIR 1955 Sau 10 : (1955) Cr LJ 52 ; Radhey Shyam Gupta v State, AIR 1968 All 342 [LNIND 1966 ALL 169]
: (1968) Cr LJ 1329 ; Janki Prasad v State of Bihar, (1975) Cr LJ 575 (Pat) : (1975) BBCJ 215 ; Gurinder Singh v State,
(1996) 3 CCR 257 (Del) : (1996) 2 Ch Cr C 396.
679 Rajaram Gangaram v State of Mysore, (1969) Cr LJ 1459 : (1969) Mad LJ (Cr) 22.
680 Sahadat v State, (1958) BLJR 439 : (1956) Pat LR 92.
681 Jamunadas Tharoomal v Emperor, AIR 1940 Sind 42 : 41 Cr LJ 401 (2); Emperor v Bhopo, AIR 1933 Sind 174 : 34 Cr
LJ 1147 : 27 Serv LR 209; Queen-Empress v Dalip, 18 ILR All 246.
682 Sheo Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 548 , p 550 : 40 Cr LJ 71.
683 Gyan Bahadur v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2013 Cr LJ 1729 , p 1732 (Chh) : 2013 (2) CGLJ 131 .
End of Document
[s 187] Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give
assistance.—
Servants


[s 187] Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give

assistance.—
Whoever, being bound by law to render or furnish assistance to any public servant in the execution of his public
duty, intentionally omits to give such assistance, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both,
and if such assistance be demanded of him by a public servant legally competent to make such demand for the
Page 2 of 7
[s 187] Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give assistance.—
purposes of executing any process lawfully issued by a Court of Justice, or of preventing the commission of an
offence, or of suppressing a riot or affray, or of apprehending a person charged with or guilty of an offence, or
of having escaped from lawful custody, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may
extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
[s 187.1] Scope
Section 176, IPC dealt with an intentional omission to furnish information. This section deals with an intentional
omission to render or furnish assistance to a public servant. It provides, first, in general terms, for the
punishment when a person being bound by law to render assistance to a public servant in the execution of his
public duty intentionally omits to assist; and secondly, it provides for the punishment when the assistance is
demanded for certain specified purposes and is refused.684
This section and section 188, IPC apply to a direct refusal or an omission by a person, bound by law to render
or furnish assistance to a public servant, to do so.
An omission by a landholder, bound under section 21, Regulation 20 of 1817, to nominate some person to act
as a village watchman, on the occurrence of a vacancy, to do so, was not an offence under either section 187
or section 188, IPC.685 A similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Joti Prasad v Emperor.686
In that case, an agent of a zamindar had refused to lend the gun of the zamindar to a police sub-inspector, and
some villagers refused to join an expedition of the sub-inspector of police in the search of dacoits; and the
learned judges held that in those circumstances, the accused were not guilty of an offence punishable under
section 187, inasmuch as the refusal of the accused to the public servant so to assist did not amount to a failure
of public duty required under section 37, CrPC.687
Under the English Law, every person, who refuses to assist a peace officer in the execution of his duty in
preventing a breach of the peace, when there is a reasonable necessity for calling upon that person, and he is
called upon to assist the officer and is not prevented by any physical impossibility or lawful excuse, is guilty of a
common law misdemeanour. It is immaterial that the assistance would have been useless if it had been
rendered. The punishment for this offence is fine and imprisonment.688 As regards the duty of private persons to
assist peace officers, it is said:
If a peace officer sees a breach of the peace committed, or is assaulted or obstructed in the arrest of a felon, he can, if
there is a reasonable necessity, call upon a private person for his assistance in arresting an offender, and that person
commits an indictable offence if he refuses to aid the constable. So it is the duty of magistrates at the time of a riot to
keep the peace and restrain rioters and pursue and take them, and to enable the magistrates to do this they may call
on all the Queen’s subjects to assist them, and all the Queen’s subjects are bound to do so upon reasonable
warning.689
[s 187.3] “Assistance”
This word “assistance” referred to in the former part of the section is ejusdem generis with the various forms of
assistance specified in the latter half. The word “assistance” must have some direct personal relation to the
execution of the duty by the public officer. The signing of the search-list required by section 100 is an
independent duty imposed on the witness. The word “assistance” as used in the section implies that the party
who assists in doing something which, in ordinary circumstances, the party assisted could do for himself.690 The
assistance, that can be demanded under this section is personal assistance by the individual of whom it is
demanded and not the supply of a contingent of men to assist.691 The assistance demanded may not be actual
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physical assistance.692
[s 187.4] “Bound by Law to Render or Furnish Assistance”—Meaning of the Term
The words “bound by law” must mean the same thing as “legally bound” defined by section 43. The words
“legally bound” in this section must be taken as something which it is illegal to omit, and which illegal omission
is an offence, or is prohibited by law, or would furnish ground for a civil action, and that therefore it does not
apply to omissions which are merely a breach of departmental rules.693
As to when a person is bound by law to render or furnish assistance to a public servant, see sections 37, 72,
73, 100 and 129(2), CrPC 1973.
[s 187.5] Delegation of Powers not Permissible
Under section 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when a warrant is directed to a person other than a police
officer, any other person may aid in the execution of such warrant, but it is not obligatory for him to do so.
Under section 43 a private person may himself arrest; under section 32 he must assist a police officer to arrest,
but the police officer must be present before he can demand the private person’s aid. This section does not
intend the delegation by the police of their duties.694 Police officers who are not in the raiding party set out to
search and arrest the accused, have no legal authority to give directions to private individuals to arrest the
accused.695
[s 187.6] Limitations of Police Powers
Under section 37, CrPC, every person is bound to assist a magistrate or police officer reasonably demanding
his aid in taking, or preventing escape, of any other person whom such magistrate or police officer is authorised
to arrest or in preventing or suppressing a breach of peace, etc. It would be easy to suggest cases in which a
refusal to render active assistance in the arrest of an absconding criminal, or to place at the disposal of a
responsible police officer material assistance, such as the use of a firearm or of a bicycle or other means of
locomotion urgently required by the circumstances of the case, might involve a criminal liability. But obviously
the law does not intend that police officers should have a general power of calling upon members of the public
to join them in doing the work for which they are paid, such as tracing out the whereabouts of an absconding
criminal or collecting evidence to warrant his conviction.696
In a case, two constables and two chowkidars arrested a man suspected of having taken part in a riot. On being
arrested, the man lay down on the ground and refused to move. The constables demanded the assistance of
the accused, a patwari and a mukhia, who not only refused the assistance but showed sympathy with the man
arrested. It was held that the man was lying down in order to secure his eventual escape, that the demand for
assistance was reasonable as the constables may have realised that, if left by themselves, they could have,
with the assistance of the chowkidars, tackled the recalcitrant and taken him to the police station, but it had
become another matter because people, who had collected around, were his sympathisers. They may well
therefore, have desired to have the moral, if not the actual physical assistance, of the patwari and the mukhia
as they were persons of influence in the village, and so it was held that the accused were guilty of the offence
There is no provision of law which requires a landholder “to find a clue” in a case of theft and “assist the police”,
and he cannot be convicted under this section or under section 188 for disobeying an order of a magistrate to
do so.698
A refusal to serve as a panch when called upon to do so by a forest guard,699 or to answer questions put by a
police officer under section 161,700 is not an offence under this section.
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It is incumbent, under this section that the accused concerned must be bound by law, to render or furnish
assistance and, under section 37, CrPC, such aid or assistance must have been reasonably demanded by the
officer concerned. If there is no proof of demand, the charge must fail.701
[s 187.7] Refusal to Assist in Making Search—Refusal to Sign Search List—Implications of Assistance
Sub-section (8) of section 100, CrPC, 1973 expressly provides that any person who, without reasonable cause,
refuses or neglects to attend and witness a search under this section, when called upon to do so by an order in
writing delivered or tendered to him, shall be deemed to have committed an offence under section 187 of the
Indian Penal Code.702 But, when there is nothing to indicate that an authorised officer had served or even
attempted to serve an order in writing upon any public witness, as envisaged by sub-section (8) of section 100,
CrPC,703 or that there is a vague explanation that public witnesses were approached but they declined but
neither the name of the witness has been given nor has any order in writing to that effect been preserved, nor is
it asserted that a mention about the same has been made in the case diary, then obviously, there is a
deliberate attempt to defeat the legislative safeguards.704 It has to be borne in mind that where the error,
irregularity or illegality, touching the procedure committed by the authorised officer is so patent and loudly
obtrusive, that it leaves on his evidence an indelible stamp of infirmity or vice which cannot be obliterated or
cured, then it would be hazardous to place implicit reliance on it. The aforesaid and such like circumstances
make the court to be circumspect and look for corroboration of the testimony of the said police officials from an
independent source.705 Thus, assisting a search officer by attending and witnessing a search has been made
ejusdem generis by the Legislature with the kind of assistance referred to in the second part of the section. But
it is the refusal to attend and witness the search that has been made penal and not the signing of the search
list. The assistance which a person is required to give to a public officer must have some direct personal
relation to the execution of the duty by the public officer and the signing of the search list required by section
103, is an independent duty imposed upon the witness. The word “assistance” implies that the party who
assists is doing something which, in ordinary circumstances, the party assisted could do for himself.706
[s 187.8] Public servant
Section 21 and the commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 187.9] “Legally Competent”
[s 187.10] Court of Justice
An “offence” denotes a thing punishable under this Code or under any special or local law.707
[s 187.12] Riot
[s 187.13] Affray
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence under section 172, ante. The prescribed period of
limitation for an offence under this section is one year.
Page 5 of 7
A complaint in writing, by the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is
administratively subordinate, is required under section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the
prosecution of an accused under this section.
[s 187.16] Charge
I (name and officer of the magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you, on or about ……………day of…………., at ………………, being bound, by law, to render (or furnish)
assistance to a public servant…………… (name or official designation as public servant) in the execution of his public
duty, intentionally omitted to give such assistance, and thereby committed an offence, punishable under section 187 of
[s 187.17] Burden of Proof
For conviction under this section the following must be proved:
For clause (I) that:
(i) the accused was bound by law to assist the public servant;
(ii) the person to be assisted was a public servant;
(iii) he was then in the execution of his public duty;
(iv) the accused omitted to give such assistance; and
(v) he did so intentionally;
For clause (II), it must be further proved that:
(i) the assistance required was demanded:

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(a) for the purpose of executing a legal process of a court of justice; or
(b) for the purpose of preventing the commission of an offence, or for suppressing a riot or affray; or
(c) for the purpose of apprehending an offender; and
(ii) the public servant demanding the assistance of the accused was competent to make the demand.

684 Re Ramaya Naika, 26 ILR Mad 419, p 420, 421 : 1 Weir 136 (FB).
685 Re Kali Prasanna Ghose, (1887) 7 CLR 575 .
686 Joti Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1920 All 265 : 58 IC 673 : 42 ILR All 314 : 18 All LJ 169.
687 Ram Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 403 , p 405.
688 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 10, 3rd Edn (Simons), p 635.
689 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 10, 3rd Edn (Simons), pp 345–46.
690 Re Ramaya Naika, 26 ILR Mad 419, 421 : 1 Weir 136; Ippilli Magatha v Emperor, 21 Cr LJ 33 (1); Ram Prasad v
Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 403 (FB) : 39 Cr LJ 796 : ILR 17 Pat 632 : 19 PLT 461 : (1938) Pat WN 477 .
691 Re Nandani Ramauya, 2 Weir 37.
692 Ambika Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1932 All 506 , 507 : 33 Cr LJ 736.
693 Reg v Appayya, 14 ILR Mad 484.
694 Emperor v Hafiz Murid Dood, AIR 1937 Sind 254 : 38 Cr LJ 1101 : 171 IC 672.
695 Amarendra Nath v State of Bihar, AIR 1955 Pat 106 .
696 Joti Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1920 All 265 : 42 ILR All 314 : 18 All LJ 169.
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697 Ambika Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1932 All 506 : 33 Cr LJ 736.
698 Empress v Bakshi Ram, 3 ILR All 201.
699 Queen-Empress v Babaji, 22 ILR Bom 769.
700 Emperor v Sankaralinga Kone, 23 ILR Mad 544; Empress v Jassim Khan, 7 ILR Cal 121 (FB); Gul Hasan Shah v
Emperor, (1908) 9, Cr LJ 105 : 27 PR (Cr) 1908 : 30 PWR 1908 (Cr).
701 Nathabhai Harijan v State of Gujarat, (1980) Guj LT (HC) 215.
702 Ippilli Magutha v Emperor, AIR 1920 Mad 286 : 21 Cr LJ 33 : 38 Mad LJ 27; Rattan Lal v State, (1987) 2 Crimes 29
[LNIND 1987 DEL 129] (Del); Prithvi Pal Singh alias Munna v State, (2001) 1 Ren CR 482 (Del).
703 Prithvi Pal Singh alias Munna v State, (2001) 1 Ren CR 482 (Del).
704 Rattan Lal v State, (1987) 2 Crimes 29 [LNIND 1987 DEL 129] (Del).
705 Prithvi Pal Singh alias Munna v State, (2001) 1 Ren CR 482 (Del).
706 Ram Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 403 , per majority; Re Ramayya Naika, 26 ILR Mad 419 : Weir 136 (FB).
707 Section 40, Indian Penal Code 1860.
End of Document
[s 188] Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant.—
Servants



Whoever, knowing that, by an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such
order, he is directed to abstain from a certain act, or to take certain order with certain property in his possession
or under his management, disobeys such direction,
shall, if such disobedience causes or tends to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury, or risk of obstruction,
annoyance or injury, to any person lawfully employed, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees, or with both;
Page 2 of 25
and if such disobedience causes or tends to cause danger to human life, health or safety, or causes or tends to
cause a riot or affray, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Explanation.—It is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his
disobedience as likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that
his disobedience produces, or is likely to produce, harm.
Illustration
An order is promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, directing that a
religious procession shall not pass down a certain street. A knowingly disobeys the order, and thereby causes
danger of riot. A has committed the offence defined in this section.
[s 188.1] Scope
This section deals with disobedience of orders promulgated by public servants, lawfully empowered to do so. It
is one of the several sections dealing with various offences relating to contempt of the lawful authority of a
public servant.708 It contemplates orders made by public functionaries in the public interest,709 and refers to acts
which are prima facie lawful, but which may be prohibited by a magistrate under circumstances which show a
tendency in these acts to endanger the public tranquillity, by obstruction, annoyance or injury, or the risk of
such, to other persons who are lawfully employed. The magistrate in such cases, does not create or decide on
rights; he merely forbids the exercise of those rights on the ground of public policy, viz., that their exercise
endangers or tends to endanger the public peace. As the section is enacted to ensure public tranquillity, health,
safety and convenience,710 it is obvious that the order of any public servant, whether on the executive or on the
judicial side, which is made for this purpose is governed by this section.711
[s 188.2] Constitutionality of the Section
The constitutionality of this section was challenged by the national leader, late Dr Ram Manohar Lohia, before
the Allahabad High Court and it was held that the section is constitutional and is not ultra vires of the
Constitution. What is made punishable under this section, when an order, placing constitutionally permissible
restrictions on certain fundamental rights, is disobeyed, is not the exercise of the fundamental rights, but the
transgression of the constitutionally valid restrictions imposed upon the exercise of the rights.712
[s 188.3] Views of Authors of the Code
The authors of the Code say:
We have, to the best of our ability, framed laws against acts which ought to be repressed at all times and places, or at
times and places which it is in our power to define. But there are acts which at one time and place are perfectly
innocent, and which at another time or place are proper subjects of punishments; nor is it always possible for the
legislator to say at what time or at what place such acts ought to be punishable.
Thus it may happen that a religious procession which is in itself perfectly legal, and which, while it passes through
many quarters of a town, is perfectly harmless, cannot, without great risk of tumult and outrage, be suffered to turn
down a particular street inhabited by persons who hold the ceremony in abhorrence, and whose passions are excited
by being forced to witness it. Again, there are many Hindu rites which in Hindu temples and religious assemblies the
law tolerates, but which could not with propriety be exhibited in a place which English gentlemen and ladies were in the
habit of frequenting for the purposes of exercise. Again, at a particular season hydrophobia may be common among
the dogs at a particular place, and it may be highly advisable that all people at that place should keep their dogs strictly
confined. Again, there may be a particular place in a town which the people are in the habit of using as a receptacle for
filth. In general, this practice may do no harm, but an unhealthy season may arrive, when it may be dangerous to the
Page 3 of 25
health of the population, and under such circumstances it is evidently desirable that no person should be allowed to
add to the nuisance. It is evident that it is utterly impossible for the legislature to mark out the route of all the religious
processions in India, to specify all the public walks frequented by English ladies and gentlemen, to foresee in what
months and in what places hydrophobia will be common among dogs, or when a particular dunghill may become
dangerous to the health of a town. It is equally evident that it would be unjust to punish a person who cannot be proved
to have acted with bad intentions for doing today what yesterday was a perfectly innocent act, or for doing in one street
what it would be perfectly innocent to do in another street, without giving him some notice.
What we propose, therefore, is to empower the local authorities to forbid acts which these authorities consider as
dangerous to the public tranquillity, health, safety or convenience, and to make it an offence if a person does anything
which that person knows to be so forbidden, and which may endanger the public tranquillity, health, safety or
convenience. It will be observed that we do not give to the local authorities the power of arbitrarily making anything an
offence, for unless the court, before which the person who disobeys the order is tried, shall be of the opinion that he
has done something tending to endanger the public tranquillity, health, safety or convenience, he will be liable to no
punishment. The effect of the order of the local authority will be merely to deprive the person, who knowingly disobeys
the order, of the plea that he had no bad intentions. He will not be permitted to allege that if he has caused harm, or
risk of harm, it was without his knowledge.
Thus, if in a town where no order for the chaining up of dogs has been made, A suffers his dog to run about loose. A
will be liable to no punishment for any mischief which the animal may do, unless it can be shown that A knew the
animal to be dangerous. But, if an order for confining dogs has been issued, and if A knew of that order, it will be no
defence for him to allege, and even to prove, that he believed his dog to be perfectly harmless. If the court thinks that
A’s disobedience has caused harm, or risk of harm, A will be liable to punishment. On the other hand, if the court thinks
that there was no danger, and that the local order was a foolish one, A will not be liable to punishment.
We see some objections to the way in which we have framed this part of the law; but we are unable to frame it better.
On the one hand, it is, as we have shown, absolutely necessary to have some local rules which shall not require the
sanction of the legislature. On the other hand, we are sensible that there is the greatest reason to apprehend much
petty tyranny and vexation from such rules, and this although the framers of those rules may be very excellent and able
men. There is scarcely any disposition in a ruler more prejudicial to the happiness of the people than a meddling
disposition. Yet, experience shows us that it is a disposition which is often found in company with the best intentions,
with great activity and energy, and with a sincere regard for the interest of the community. A public servant of more
than ordinary zeal and industry, unless he has very much more than ordinary judgment, is the very man who is likely to
harass the people under his care with needless restrictions. We have, therefore, thought it necessary to provide that no
person should be punished merely for disobeying a local order, unless it be made to appear that the disobedience has
been attended with evil, or risk of evil. Thus, no person will be punished for disobeying an idle and vexatious order.
To constitute an offence under this section it is essential:
(i) that there must be an order promulgated by a public servant;713
(ii) that the public servant must have been lawfully empowered to promulgate such order;714
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(iii) that a person, having knowledge of such order and directed by such order, (a) to abstain from a certain
act, or (b) to take a certain order, with certain property in his possession or under his management, has
disobeyed such direction; and
(iv) that such disobedience causes, or tends to cause, (a) an obstruction, annoyance, or injury, or risk of it,
to any person lawfully employed, or (b) a danger to human life, health or safety, or (c) a riot or affray.715
[s 188.5] Disobedience of the Order—When Punishable
The first paragraph of this section deals with the disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant
lawfully empowered to promulgate such an order, fully knowing that such an order has been promulgated. It
does not lay down any penal provision. The second paragraph deals with the consequences of such
disobedience in regard to any person lawfully employed. The third paragraph deals with the consequences
affecting human life, health, safety, riot or affray and prescribes a more severe punishment. Thus, the mere
disobedience of a duly promulgated order is not punishable unless the consequences enumerated in the
second and third paragraphs follow.716
[s 188.6] Applicability of the Section—Judicial Orders
This section applies to orders made by public functionaries for public purposes, and not to an order made in a
civil suit between two parties. Thus a disobedience of an injunction, issued in a civil proceeding, is not an
offence under this section.717 Offence under section 188, IPC is not attracted or committed if the order alleged
to be violated has been passed by Civil or Revenue Court.718
In Dalganjan Koeri v State,719 it has been held:
We are of opinion that section 188, IPC does not contemplate orders passed by civil or revenue courts in judicial
proceedings. Any breach of such orders can be adequately dealt with under the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure, but it cannot be said that they are orders promulgated within the meaning of s 188, IPC, the disobedience
of which would result into obstruction, annoyance or injury.
Our answer, therefore, to the question referred to us is that orders passed in judicial proceedings by civil, revenue or
criminal courts are not governed by s 188, IPC.
But the last observation in the said case seems to go a little too far. This section includes in its ambit both
executive as well as judicial orders. As it is enacted to ensure public tranquillity, health, safety and
convenience, the order of any public servant, whether on the executive or judicial side, which is made for this
purpose, should be governed by this section. The test is whether the order is for the purpose of maintaining
public tranquillity, health, safety or convenience, or not. If the order fulfills this requirement, its breach would be
punishable under this section. Whether the order is of a civil, revenue or a criminal court, if it affects only the
parties concerned and does not affect the public tranquillity, health, safety or convenience, the application of
this section will not be permissible. Normally, the orders of these courts affect only the parties and not the
public at large. It is therefore, right, that orders passed in judicial proceedings are normally not governed by this
section. An order under section 145, CrPC, is however, amongst the exceptions.720
[s 188.6.1] Orders under sections 133, 136 and 138, CrPC
The provisions of sections 136 and 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, themselves show that this section
Page 5 of 25
applies not only to the preliminary order under section 133, but also to orders made absolute under section 136
or section 138 of that Code. Where once an order has been made absolute under section 136, it is incompetent
for the party against whom that order has been made to go behind it and question its validity in any way,721
unless it was passed without an inquiry.722
[s 188.6.2] Judicial Discretion has a Mandatory Import—Order under this Section can be Issued against
Municipal Authorities—Prohibitory Act a Mandatory Duty
Judicial discretion, when facts for its exercise are present, has a mandatory import. Therefore, when the sub-
divisional magistrate has, before him, information and evidence, which disclose the existence of a public
nuisance and, on the materials placed, he considers that such unlawful obstruction or nuisance should be
removed from any public place which may be lawfully used by the public, he shall act. Thus, his judicial power
shall, passing through the procedural barrel, fire upon the obstruction or nuisance, triggered by the jurisdictional
facts. The magistrate’s responsibility under section 133, CrPC is to order the removal of such nuisance within a
time, to be fixed in the order. This is a public duty, implicit in the public power, to be exercised on behalf of the
public and pursuant to a public proceeding. A failure to comply with the direction will be visited with a
punishment contemplated by section 188, IPC. Therefore, the municipal commissioner or other executive
authority bound by the order under section 133, CrPC, shall obey the direction because disobedience, if it
causes an obstruction, annoyance or injury to any persons lawfully pursuing their employment, shall be
punished as prescribed in the section. The imperative tone of section 133, read with the punitive temper of
section 188, IPC, makes the prohibitory act a mandatory duty.723
[s 188.6.3] Orders under section 144, CrPC
It is well settled that this section applies to orders passed under section 144, CrPC, and the disobedience of an
order passed under that section is punishable under this section.724 In a case of dispute between two textile
unions, when it is extremely difficult for those who are in-charge of law and order, to differentiate between the
members of the public and the members of the two textile unions, the only practical way in which the particular
activities referred to in the order under section 144, CrPC could be restrained or restricted, would be by making
those restrictions applicable to the public generally.725 But if there is no proof that an order under section 144
has been duly promulgated, there would be no offence under this section.726 The penalty for infringing an order
under section 144 is that which is provided in section 188, IPC. When, therefore, a prosecution is launched
thereunder, the validity of the order under section 144, CrPC could be challenged.727
The ultimate sanction behind an order passed under section 144 is the punishment provided for its
disobedience in this section; if this section did not exist, everybody would be free to disobey the order and
nobody would be able to complain that his freedom was restricted by the order. The order by itself, does not
infringe upon any of the rights of a person guaranteed by the Constitution; it is merely an act in writing of a
magistrate which by itself, cannot affect the rights of anyone. Consequently, when a person complains that his
rights under the Constitution have been infringed upon by the passing of the order, the order must be
considered not in isolation, but in conjunction with the provisions of this section, through which it is enforced.728
It is fairly well settled that this section applies to orders under section 145, CrPC.729 But before a person can be
punished for disobedience of an order under section 145, CrPC, there should be evidence and a definite
finding, based on that evidence, that his act of disobedience caused, or tended to cause, a riot or an affray.730
Disobedience of an order under section 146, CrPC, is not an offence falling under this section.731 An order
under section 146, CrPC, directed not to the parties but to the receiver or custodian, makes a party disobeying
it, not guilty of the offence under this section.732
In Ramlubhaya v Prem Lata,733 an order under section 146, CrPC was passed by the city magistrate. In a
proceeding under section 145, CrPC, it was held by the Allahabad High Court that an order passed under
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section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is an order promulgated by a public servant within the meaning
of section 188 of this Code.
Disobedience of a lawful order under section 149, CrPC, may constitute an offence under this section or under
section 151.734
[s 188.6.7] Orders under the Police Act
Though disobedience of an order under section 23(3) of the City of Bombay Police Act, 1902 (Bombay Act 4 of
1902) is an offence punishable under section 127 of that Act, yet it would be equally punishable under this
section if all the conditions laid down by this section, are fulfilled.735
[s 188.6.8] Orders Regulating Processions
The most frequent application of this section is to cases of contemplated public processions. Prima facie, every
member of the public, and every sect, has a right to use the public streets in a lawful manner. But the right to
conduct processions in public, religious or otherwise, through the public streets is not their exclusive right, for all
members of the public enjoy such right, and no exclusive right can be obtained by any usage or custom.736 It is
this limitation to the general right that a magistrate has to consider and enforce, if necessary, by an order.737 It
is not the duty of the authorities to enforce a decree in all circumstances and at all costs. Where there is a
conflict between public interest and private right, the former must prevail.738 As to the further exposition of the
law relating to processions, see the cases mentioned in the footnote.739
[s 188.6.9] Lawful Use of Public Street—Not an Offence
No person has a right to obstruct others when making a lawful use of a public street, and customs to the
contrary, founded on religious intolerance cannot be recognised.740 If the members of any sect desire to prevent
the use of the street in the neighbourhood of their houses by the members of another sect, their proper course
is to erect their houses on streets which are private property.741 But the fact that a procession is a luxury, is not
a sufficient ground for passing an order under section 144, CrPC.742
Where the petitioners were not under any prohibition or restraint on the date when the alleged offence of
trespass, in breach of a prohibitory order, according to the complaint petition, was committed, the alleged
offence under section 188, IPC, could not have been committed by the petitioners and the order of taking
cognizance of the offence and the subsequent proceedings of the case being illegal were liable to be
quashed.743
[s 188.7] Civil and Criminal Contempt
The line between civil and criminal contempt can be broad as well as thin. Where the contempt consists in a
mere failure to comply with or carry out, an order of a court made for the benefit of a private party, it is plainly a
civil contempt and it has been said that when the party, in whose interest the order was made, moves the court
for action to be taken in contempt against the contemner, with a view to the enforcement of his right, the
proceeding is only a form of execution. In such a case, there is no criminality in the disobedience and the
resultant contempt is not criminal. If, however, the contemner adds defiance of the court to the disobedience of
the order, and conducts himself in a manner which amounts to obstruction to or interference with, the course of
justice, the contempt committed by him is of a mixed character, partaking as between him and his opponent,
being of the nature of a civil contempt and, as between him and the court or the state, of the nature of a criminal
contempt. In cases of this type, no clear distinction between civil and criminal contempt can be drawn and the
contempt committed cannot be broadly classed as either civil or criminal contempt. There is, however, a third
form of contempt which is purely criminal and which consists in a conduct tending to bring the administration of
justice to scorn and to interfere with the course of justice as administered by the courts. Contempt of this class
is purely criminal, because it results in an offence or a public wrong, whereas contempt consisting in the
disobedience of an order made for the benefit of a private individual, results only in a private injury. To put the
matter in other words, a contempt is merely a civil wrong where there has been disobedience of an order made
for the benefit of a particular party, but where it consists in setting the authority of the courts at naught and has
Page 7 of 25
a tendency to invade the efficacy of the machinery maintained by the state for the administration of justice, it is
a public wrong and consequently of criminal nature. It has been held that:
If, on the facts of a case, it appears that a party, directed to conduct himself in a certain way by an order under s 145 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not comply with the direction, but conducts himself in such a way as again
creates an apprehension of a breach of the peace, the wrong resulting from his misconduct may become a public
wrong and, therefore, the contempt may be regarded as a criminal contempt. Where, however, the only allegation
made is that the private party, in whose favour the order was made, himself made an attempt to serve the order and
was then abused and the only other complaint made is that the adverse party has not voluntarily restored possession
or returned certain goods, but nothing is said as to any contumaciousness to the court itself, nor as to any
apprehension of the breach of the peace, there cannot be any question of any criminal contempt.744
An order under section 145, CrPC, is binding not only on the actual parties to the proceedings but also on
persons who may have notice of the proceedings. Any person who, knowing that an order under that section
has been passed, disobeys it would be liable under this section, even if he was not a party to the proceedings
in which the order was made.745 In Balbhadra Jha v State,746 relying on Parmeswar Rai v King-Emperor,747 and
Umanath Prasad v Dhirendra Kumar Singh,748 however, a contrary view has been taken.
[s 188.9] “Knowing That”—Knowledge, a Necessary Ingredient
Knowledge of the order is a necessary ingredient of both the offences, namely, the offence punishable under
this section, and the one under section 32, Police Act.749 There can be no conviction under this section if there
is no finding that the accused knew of the order which he disobeyed.750 Before it can be said that the accused
had knowledge of the order under section 144, CrPC, it must be shown that its terms were communicated to
them. The mere fact that the police officer gave his own interpretation of it, is quite a different thing.751
[s 188.10] “By an Order”—What is an Order?
The word “order” here means an order made by a public functionary for a public purpose, and not an order
made in a civil suit between two parties, such as an injunction,752 or on order to a public officer to take
possession of a land under section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.753 Section 188, IPC does not
contemplate orders passed by civil or revenue courts in judicial proceedings. Any breach of such orders can be
adequately dealt with under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but it cannot be said that they are
orders promulgated within the meaning of section 188, IPC, the disobedience of which would result in an
obstruction, annoyance or injury.754 The order must be on the record,755 which should contain a clear statement
of the facts giving rise to the order.756 If no particular order has been contravened, there can be no offence.757
[s 188.10.1] Order Need not be in Writing or Addressed to any Individual
A notice under section 98 of the Madras Local Boards Act (5 of 1884), is not an order of the kind contemplated
by the section.758 But an order does not cease to be an order simply because it is misdescribed as a
notification.759 It is not necessary that the order should be in writing.760 It need not be addressed to the accused
or to any particular individual. It may be a general order directed to the public generally.761
[s 188.11] “Promulgated”—Meaning and Form of
The word “promulgated” has not been defined in the Indian Penal Code. Its ordinary meaning is “to make
known by public declaration, to publish, to disseminate or to proclaim”. Promulgation of an order connotes
publication of an order publicly and openly and it does not take in its purview private information.762 In essence,
the word connotes two ideas: (a) making known of an order; and (b) the means by which the order is made
known must be by something done openly and publicly; private information will not be “promulgation”. But the
law does not prescribe any particular mode in which an order can be made known openly and publicly. It may
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be by a beat of drum; it may be by a publication in the Gazette; it may be by reading out an order openly in
public, etc.763 Prima facie, “promulgate” seems to indicate, if not a formal document printed or written, at any
rate some form of publication. It is not necessary that the order should be in writing or printed.764 The word
“promulgation” is not used in any narrow or technical sense in this section. The question whether the
requirement of promulgation prescribed in section 188 has been complied with would depend on the particular
circumstances of each case. In some cases a proclamation by a beat of drum might be considered to be a
proper mode of promulgation of orders passed by magistrates, not in the open court, but framed in their office.
Such, for example, would be orders under 144, CrPC. The public would be unaware of such orders unless they
are announced in some form, in some open place, either by the beat of a drum or by some other form of
proclamation. In other cases, the requirement might be satisfied by affixing the order on some conspicuous
place or by publishing the same in the Gazette or some other paper. “Promulgation”, as used in this section, is
an elastic term and is deliberately not defined in the Penal Code. So long as an order is openly declared for the
purpose of notifying it to the public, or any section of the public, the requirement of law relating to promulgation
would be satisfied.765
[s 188.11.1] Essence of Word “Promulgation”
The word “promulgation”, in essence, means that the contents of the order which is promulgated, should be
known to the person against whom proceedings are taken under this section. When a judgment or order is
passed in open court, it constitutes a formal declaration to the public of the decision of the court in the case in
which the order is given or the judgment is passed. The delivery of a final order, in a case under section 145(6),
CrPC, constitutes promulgation within the meaning of this section.766 But when a person or party is asked to do
something, it is merely a direction to the party, and not a promulgation of the order.767
[s 188.11.2] The Word “Promulgated” Refers to Orders Passed under CrPC
The word “promulgated” in this section, however, refers to orders passed under the Criminal Procedure Code
and not to judgments and orders of civil courts.768 When the respondents violated the injunction order passed
by the civil courts in a suit filed by the appellant, it was, held that a criminal court can sustain a complaint filed
by the appellant, independent of a complaint filed by the civil court under this section.769
The operation of this section is confined to the promulgation by public servants of public orders relating to the
safety, the health or the convenience of the public.770
[s 188.11.3] Irregularity in Promulgation, Whether Renders the Order Invalid
If the order has not been promulgated, disobedience to it is no offence. Thus, if a temporary order under section
144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has expired, and no fresh order has been issued, to do that which was
forbidden by the old order is no offence.771 Whilst an order should be promulgated in the way prescribed for the
particular order in question, an irregularity in the method of promulgation will not render the order invalid, so
long as it has been brought to the actual knowledge of the persons sought to be affected by it.772 Even if there
has been an irregularity in the method of promulgation of the order, that in itself would not make it ultra vires, so
as to prevent the conviction of any person who, being proved to have had knowledge of the order, nevertheless
disobeyed it.773 If it is established that the matter was brought to the notice of the accused, then mere
irregularities in the method of service would have no effect on the proceedings under this section.774
A mere irregularity in the promulgation of an order under section 144, CrPC, would not make the order ultra
vires, so as to prevent a conviction of the person disobeying it, if he is proved to have had knowledge of it.775
It is necessary to distinguish carefully between the jurisdiction of the magistrate to make an order and a
possible practical difficulty in showing that it has been disobeyed. It does not follow that because it is difficult for
the state to secure a conviction, that the order itself was made without jurisdiction.776 An order passed by a
magistrate under section 144, prohibiting the holding of a rival hat on certain days near an old hat, is not ultra
vires and inoperative. Therefore, disobedience to such an order is an offence punishable under this section.777
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If the order itself is illegal, there cannot be a conviction under this section for disobeying it.778
[s 188.12] “By a Public Servant”
This section applies only when an order has been promulgated by a public servant and disobeyed.779 A receiver
appointed under section 56 of the Land Registration Act,780 is not a public servant within the terms of sections
174, 175, 186 and 188 of this Code. An order by such a receiver, forbidding persons to pay rent to any person
other than such receiver, is not an order promulgated by a public servant, lawfully empowered to do so, and
consequently disobedience to such order is not an offence under the section.781 But the sarpanch of the gram
panchayat, while passing a prohibitory order directing parties not to cut the paddy, under section 64(1) of the
Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, acts as a public servant and as such is competent to move a complaint under section
195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a violation of the order under this section.782
For the definition of a public servant, section 21 and the commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 188.13] “Lawfully Empowered to Promulgate Such Order”—Person Disobeying not Guilty, If Promulgation not
by Lawfully Empowered Person
The phrase “persons lawfully employed”, used in the second clause of this section, refers to authorities who are
entrusted to perform their functions for maintaining public peace and tranquillity.783 For a conviction under this
section, it is necessary not only that an order should have been promulgated by a public servant, but also that
the public servant should have been lawfully empowered to promulgate the order.784 To be justified in directing
a certain act to be done or not to be done is one thing and to be legally empowered to order its commission or
omission, with the consequence of the disobedience being punishable under this section, is quite another. If the
public servant was not legally empowered to promulgate the order, the person disobeying the same cannot be
held guilty under this section.785 If the order is both in substance and in its manner of publication illegal, as
being beyond the powers conferred by law, the conviction will not stand.786
When a notification is issued by an executive authority in an exercise of a power conferred by a statute, that
notification is as much a part of the law as if it had been incorporated with the body of the statute at the time of
its enactment.787 Under section 33 of the Police Act,788 the district magistrate has general control over the
matters referred to in sections 30, 31 and 32 of the Act, and an order restricting traffic on a public road
promulgated by him is not without jurisdiction.789 Orders under section 144, CrPC, are merely temporary orders
in urgent cases of apprehended danger, and cannot remain in force for more than two months, unless in certain
cases the State Government, by notification in the official Gazette, otherwise directs.790 A magistrate cannot
issue a perpetual injunction under that section.791
On a conviction under this section, for a disobedience of the order of a magistrate directing the pruning of
hedges, it was held, that as the circumstances showed that there was no necessity for a speedy remedy, the
magistrate had no power to issue the order disobeyed.792
[s 188.14] No Prosecution if the Order Disobeyed is Without Jurisdiction
Repeated recourse should not be made to the provisions of section 144 in the same dispute. If it is considered
probable that danger to public peace may remain after the expiry of two months from the date of the order
under section 144, steps should be taken in due course to obtain an order of the Government under the proviso
to sub-section (4); or recourse should be made to the provisions of section 145 or section 107, CrPC.793 Where,
upon a petition that there is a dispute regarding a piece of land and that there is a likelihood of a breach of
peace being committed, the magistrate orders the police to attach the land and report, and proceedings under
section 145 are started about three months after the attachment. The order of attachment, having been passed
without starting proceedings under section 145, is without jurisdiction and no question of prosecution under this
section for its disobedience arises.794
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Where as a result of the order passed under section 144, CrPC, conditions became peaceful, and the relations
between rival parties became normal, as they were before the dispute, but all of a sudden, after a few days,
relations between the parties become tense and it is again apprehended that a disturbance of public tranquility
may take place, the magistrate would be acting in good faith when he issues a fresh order under section 144,
CrPC. But if conditions do not become peaceful and apprehension is expected even after the expiry of the
prescribed period of two months from the date of the issue of the original order under section 144, CrPC, any
fresh order to be promulgated under this section, would be in continuation of the first, and in the eye of law, the
magistrate shall be deemed to be promulgating an order of a period exceeding two months, which would be
beyond his jurisdiction. It is a settled law that one cannot do an act indirectly which he could not do directly, or
that one cannot flout the express provisions of an enactment.795
[s 188.14] Legality of Order, When can be Questioned—On Appeal from Conviction
Although an order made under section 144, CrPC is not appealable, still, if a person is convicted for its
disobedience under this section, he might appeal on the ground of its illegality, and the validity of the
proceedings can then be inquired into.796 In King v Darbarilal Shaw,797 Sen J observed:
It is not open to the court trying an accused person for disobedience of such an order under section 144 to decide
whether he would have passed such an order in the circumstances of the case. He has to take the order as a good and
valid order, unless it is shown that the order was a nullity by reason of the fact that the magistrate had no jurisdiction,
or by reason of some other similar circumstance. He is not to superimpose his view on the propriety of the order.
It is not easy to appreciate what the learned Judge meant to hold by qualifying the statement by saying that it
was open to the accused to show that the order violated was bad by reason of want of jurisdiction or other
similar circumstances. The learned Judge appears to have held that if the order was bad for want of jurisdiction
or if it was otherwise fundamentally bad, the accused person could plead that as a circumstance, in answer to a
charge of disobedience to that order. Therefore, it is not right to say that Sen J limited the attack to jurisdiction
only. “Similar circumstances” must be circumstances of grave import, as for instance, where it is shown that the
order could not possibly have been made by any public servant in the circumstances of a particular case.
[s 188.14.1] Pleas Challenging Legality of Order, Open in Defence
A court trying a charge of a contravention or disobedience of an order of a public servant, has to proceed on the
footing that prima facie the order is a good and valid order, but that does not necessarily mean that the persons
charged can in no circumstances, show that the order, although made with jurisdiction, was otherwise
fundamentally bad. It is open to a person charged with disobedience to an order promulgated by a public
servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, to plead in defence that the order, though made with
jurisdiction, was utterly wrong or improper on the merits,798 or the order though validly made, came to an end on
the date of the alleged disobedience.799 In the case of Brojo Nath Ghose v Empress,800 it was held by a Division
Bench of the Calcutta High Court that to constitute an offence under this section, it is necessary to show, first, a
lawful order promulgated by a public servant, secondly, a knowledge of the order and disobedience of it, and
thirdly, the result that is likely to flow from such disobedience. It is indeed one thing to say that the public
servant concerned was lawfully empowered to make an order and it is a very different thing to say that the
order itself was a lawful order in the sense of being a valid and a proper order. In the case of Prem Chand Roy
v Dharmadas Singh Roy,801 it was held:
The intended prosecution was for disobedience to an order, dated 22nd September last, which amongst other things
directed that the petitioners should refrain from collecting rents from any tenants on certain lands. That order which
purported to have been made under section 144, CrPC, was not an order which could properly be made under the
Page 11 of 25
section. The order, therefore, directing the prosecution of the petitioners for disobedience to that order cannot stand.
As observed by Jackson J, in Empress v Surajanarain Dass,802
When the Code of Criminal Procedure authorises the making of orders by executive authorities with the view of
preventing a breach of the peace or for similar purpose, it has always been held, and is now enacted in the existing
Code, that the propriety of such orders is not a matter of question in that state of things for the appellate judicial
authorities. It is when the executive officers seek to enforce those orders by the infliction of penalties that the courts
have to step in and see whether the orders made were with authority or not. This was precisely the occasion on which
it was the duty of the sessions judge to consider whether that order was properly made or not.
In Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v Khodabaksh Shah,803 in proceedings under
section 133, CrPC no objection was raised as to a co-sharer not being made a party. It was held that the
objection could not be raised in subsequent proceedings. It was in that connection that it was remarked that a
question as to the validity of a final order under section 133, CrPC could not be raised in a trial for an offence
under this section. Again in the case of Rupan Singh v Emperor,804 it was remarked that if the order disobeyed
was made with jurisdiction, it would not matter if the public servant concerned had acted improperly in making
that order. But it does not appear that the learned Judge who decided the case considered the extreme point of
view, namely, whether it was at all open to the person charged with the disobedience of an order of a public
servant, to plead and prove that the order itself though made with jurisdiction, was fundamentally wrong on
merits.
[s 188.15] Orders Found Ultra Vires
The following are some examples of orders ultra vires the powers and authority of a public servant, the
provisions of CrPC, this section and Article 21 of the Constitution:
(i) A, a magistrate, issues a general order prohibiting the use of public roads between 9 pm and
sunrise.805
(ii) A, a mamlatdar, orders B not to allow water from his house to fall on C’s premises806 or directs D to
keep a gateway open.807
(iii) A, a magistrate directs B and C to remove a certain embankment, whereby the adjacent lands are in
danger of being flooded.808
(iv) A, a collector, forbids stake-nets to be placed in a river at certain places where it has been usual to
place them.809
(v) An order by a revenue officer requiring certain persons to pay their assessment to a specific individual
in future.810
(vi) A notice issued under the Madras Local Boards Act, 5 of 1884, section 98(2).811
(vii) A permit to cut and transport timber given to certain persons.812

Page 12 of 25
(viii) A fills up a water-course in his land, which supplied a neighbouring Government land, with water and
opened a new one which supplied less water. A sub-collector ordered him to fill in the new channel,
and to re-open the old one.813 (section 430).
(ix) An order, purporting to be under section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordering removal of
obstruction to the use of a right way.814
(x) An order under section 143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, passed by a magistrate having no
jurisdiction to make such an order.815
(xi) An order purporting to have been made under section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
prohibiting a person from collecting rent from tenants.816
(xii) An order by a magistrate forbidding certain persons from extending cultivation in a certain land.817
[s 188.15.1] Order Providing more than the Maximum Penalty Even Without Trial is Void and Ultra Vires
No one can be shot at for a mere breach of the curfew order issued under section 144 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The maximum penalty to which such person renders himself liable is provided by section 188
of the Indian Penal Code which, in its turn, is a trifling nothing as compared to the threatening penalty of being
shot at. It cannot be gainsaid that the executive has no power, authority or jurisdiction to threaten to inflict
punishment upon one who commits a mere breach of the curfew order greater than the maximum penalty to
which he would be liable upon a judicial trial before a court of law. The executive directions contained in the
“important announcement” insofar as they hold out to the members of the public the threat that a curfew-
breaker for a mere breach of the curfew order is liable to be shot at, is ultra vires their powers and ultra vires
section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 188 of the Indian Penal Code and Articles 20 and 21 of
the Constitution and are, therefore, void and of no effect whatsoever. The law and order forces of the state
have no authority to shoot at any one for a mere breach of the curfew order and, therefore, the executive
directions contained in the “important announcement” insofar as they direct the threat of such an action are void
and unlawful.818
[s 188.16] “He is Directed to Abstain…Under His Management”—Meaning Explained
This section speaks of an order promulgated by a public servant, which directs certain persons to abstain from
a certain act or to take certain order with certain property in their possession or under their management.819 The
liability under this section is for disobedience of the direction in the order and not for the disobedience of the
order. The main purpose of an order of attachment under section 145, CrPC is to prohibit any breach of peace
and not necessarily to restrict possession by either of the parties, unless there be a definite order to that effect.
If there is no such order of prohibition passed by the court against the accused persons from entering into
possession of the land, their alleged violation cannot be taken to be an offence coming within the purview of
this section.820
An order under section 146, CrPC is directed not against parties, but to the custodian or receiver. Such an
order does not direct the accused to abstain from any act or to take a certain order with respect to the property
in dispute. So, even if the accused person encroached upon the attached property, such encroachment will not
amount to an offence under this section.821 The Allahabad High Court has, however, taken the view that an
order passed under section 146, CrPC, by a magistrate in a proceeding under section 145, CrPC, is an order
promulgated by a public servant under this section.822
[s 188.17] “Disobeys such Direction”
Where the crop had been raised and harvested by a party to section 145, CrPC proceedings, before the
possession was restored to the opposite party, there is no disobedience of the order prohibiting the party from
interfering with the possession of the opposite party and hence, the conviction of the party under this section is
unsustainable.823
Page 13 of 25
Where the accused had grounds for questioning whether the magistrate’s order enforced a positive action on
his part, and his neglect to take that action did not appear to have been due to a deliberate defiance, the
prosecution of the accused under this section is not justified.824
[s 188.18] “If Such Disobedience Causes or Tends to Cause” Obstruction, etc—Mere Disobedience of an Order
is not an Offence—Riot or Affray Need not Actually Follow
The disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant, is not, by itself, an offence under this section.
Such disobedience, to amount to an offence under this section, should amongst others, cause or tend to cause
obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person “lawfully employed”.825 So, to justify a conviction under this
section, it is necessary to establish that the disobedience causes, or tends to cause, obstruction, annoyance, or
injury to any person lawfully employed; and to make the offence graver, it must be further established that such
disobedience causes, or tends to cause, a danger to human life, health or safety; or causes, or tends to cause
a riot or affray.826 Mere disobedience of an order promulgated by a public servant is thus, not in itself an offence
under this section unless it entails one or the other of the consequences, which the section itself mentions.827 It
is true that a riot or affray need not actually follow such disobedience so as to make a person liable, but there
must be such a tendency. Doubtless this tendency has to be inferred from the proven facts and circumstances
of each case and is not capable of direct proof.828 Before a person can be punished for disobedience of an
order under section 145, CrPC, there should be evidence and a definite finding on affray. Where there was no
such finding by the lower court in the case, the conviction of the accused for an offence under section 188 could
not be sustained by the High Court and was set aside.829
[s 188.19] “Annoyance to any Person Lawfully Employed”—Meaning of
The phrase “persons lawfully employed”, used in the second clause of section 188, refers to authorities who are
entrusted to perform their functions for maintaining public peace and tranquillity. As the prohibitory order under
section 144 is not concerned with the rights of the individual persons to that proceeding, the phrase “persons
lawfully employed” cannot refer to the first part of that proceeding.830
In Wangkheimayan Kulabindhu Singh v State,831 the Judicial Commissioner of the Manipur Judicial
Commissioner’s court, however, distinguished the Assam case cited above and observed:
The agitation was in full swing at the time. The police party and the PWs had to go round to see that there was no
disturbance to peace and that law and order were kept. They were thus engaged in their legitimate duties. If in the
midst of such duties, annoyance was caused to them by such disobedience of lawful order on the part of the
petitioners, it will certainly come within the purview of section 188, IPC.
It is submitted that this decision requires reconsideration in the light of the reasons given in the Assam decision
which it distinguishes.
Entering into possession in spite of an order under section 145(6), CrPC, has at least a tendency to annoy the
person at whose instance the order was passed, and is, therefore, an offence under this section.832
Annoyance may be Physical or Mental
Annoyance may be either physical or mental. In the case of physical annoyance, no doubt, a certain degree of
proximity between the object annoyed and the annoyance is necessary, but in the case of mental annoyance,
no question of proximity arises. A person may be as much annoyed by a defamatory statement published
Page 14 of 25
thousands of miles away as by one made in his presence.833 In order to establish that the annoyance was the
result of the disobedience of the order, there must be some proximity between the conduct of the accused and
the disobedience. The annoyance has to be proved as a fact; a mere mental annoyance of the authorities
concerned does not come within the ambit of this section. If that interpretation is to be accepted, then this
section will apply in all cases of breach of order. Where an order has been passed and if any breach is
committed of that order, the authorities can legitimately say that the breach itself has led to their annoyance.
But that is not contemplated by section 188. Unless the conduct of the accused is pointed out which, in the
circumstances of the case, would have caused annoyance or interference with the public safety, or had the
natural tendency to create annoyance or interference with the public safety, this section is not attracted.834
[s 188.20] “Injury to any Person Lawfully Employed” and “Danger to Human Life or Safety”
In the case of Emperor v Habibullah,835 Mahmood J, observed:
…the obstruction, annoyance, or injury on the one hand, and the danger to human life, health, or safety on the other
hand, are intended by the section to be applicable to cases in which the injurious results, therein contemplated, arise in
the ordinary course of lawful employment to persons who, in the exercise of their rights as ordinary citizens, may incur
such evil consequences on account of any act or omission of the accused, which act or omission occurs in
disobedience of a lawful order. In the next place, I am of the opinion that the section has no application to cases in
which a person simply neglects his property, and by allowing a wall or a gateway to remain in a dilapidated condition,
renders theft or other crime more easy of commission than would otherwise be the case. The law does not
contemplate that the physical barrier of a wall or a gate is the means of restraining persons from crime, and no order of
this nature can be made on the mere ground of any such apprehension.
[s 188.20.1] Injury to Person, Not to Property
The “injury” used in this section must be an injury to a person and not to property. Government is not a person
and therefore, where the disobedience is alleged to cause injury to the government, it cannot be said that the
ingredients of this section have been satisfied.836
[s 188.21] Riot
[s 188.22] Affray
[s 188.23] Disobedience Tending to Cause Breach of Peace
Where there is an immediate apprehension of a breach of peace between two unlawful assemblies, the officer
incharge of a police station may order either or both of the two unlawful assemblies to disperse, and failure to
obey his order would amount to an illegal act and may constitute an offence under this section.837
[s 188.24] Explanation—Mens Rea not Necessary
The explanation appended to the section, makes it clear that in order to constitute an offence under this
section, it is not necessary that the offender should intend to produce harm, or contemplate his disobedience as
likely to produce harm. It is sufficient that he knows of the order which he disobeys, and that his disobedience
produces, or is likely to produce, harm, as contemplated by the section. Mens rea is, therefore, not a necessary
ingredient of an offence under this section.
Page 15 of 25
The offence under this section is cognizable, bailable and triable by any magistrate and may also be tried
summarily. The cognizance under this section can, however, be taken only on a complaint in writing by a public
servant, and not on a police challan.838
The prescribed period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section is one year.
Under section 195(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no court can take cognizance of an offence
punishable under this section, except on a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned, that is, the
public servant whose order is disobeyed,839 or some other public servant to whom he is subordinate.840 The
complaint must state that the disobedience of the order caused, or intended to cause obstruction, annoyance,
or injury to any person lawfully employed. Where this fact is not stated, the complaint is defective.841 Before an
offence under this section is made cognizable by a magistrate, the preliminary step pointed out by section
195(1)(a) is necessary and a failure to do so vitiates the trial.842 But where the order disobeyed was
promulgated not by a public servant but by the government, no sanction or complaint is necessary.843 Where
final report was filed by police alleging violation of order passed by RDO and commission of offence punishable
under section 188, IPC, prosecution was held barred by section 195, CrPC, as such was quashed.844
For prosecution under section 188, IPC a written complaint by a public servant is necessary. Where complaint
for offence under section 188, IPC was not filed by the public servant concerned but by the SI of Police, the FIR
and the final report in the case were quashed.845
The purpose of a complaint under the section is to show that the officer concerned or his superior had
considered the matter and had moved the court. Where the charge-sheet is signed by the additional district
magistrate who promulgated the order under section 144, CrPC, as also by the district magistrate, the purpose
of a complaint is served, there is no disregard of section 195 and the trial for the offence is not without
jurisdiction.846 But where the order of the SDM, promulgated under section 144, CrPC, was violated and a
complaint was filed by the ASI of police, it was held that the case was not maintainable and the prosecution
was bad in law.847 Proceedings under section 188, IPC initiated on the basis of FIR and not on the basis of any
complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, as is required by section 195(1)(a), CrPC, is not
maintainable.848
Section 195(1)(a), CrPC mandates that no Court shall take cognizance of offence punishable under section 188
of the IPC, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or some other public servant to
whom he is administratively subordinate, except when the complaint in writing is made by the concerned public
servant. In the instant case, the status quo order alleged to be disobeyed was passed by the Additional
Commissioner. He or any officer to whom he was administratively subordinate did not file written complaint. The
Additional Commissioner sent report to concerned police station, and the investigating officer filed a charge-
sheet on which cognizance was taken. The cognizance taken by the Magistrate was illegal, thus, the criminal
proceedings were quashed.849
[s 188.26.1] Filing the Complaint is Public Duty—Not a Privilege
A change of the incumbent leaves it still the same court.850 The complaint prescribed in section 195(1)(a) is a
public duty and responsibility, and not a personal privilege and the successor-in-office of the public servant to
whom information is given, can make a complaint under section 188, IPC.851
But where the offence under section 188, IPC is committed in respect of an order by a Mandal revenue officer,
Page 16 of 25
but he, being the public servant concerned, did not file the complaint and instead the complaint was filed by the
sub-inspector of police, it was held that the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of such a complaint, not
filed by the public servant to whom he was subordinate, and the proceedings before the trial court were
quashed under section 482, CrPC.852
That you, [*] on or about the ……… day of ……………… at ………, knowing that, by a certain order, to wit ………
promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order, you were directed to abstain from
(specify the act) (or to take certain order, with certain property, to wit …. In your possession or under your
management), disobeyed such direction, such disobedience causing or tending to cause …… (mention the particular
consequence caused or was likely to be caused), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 188 of
And I hereby direct that you be tried by this court on that charge.
Where disobedience of an order is an offence both under this section as well as under a Police Act, a mention
only of the section of the Police Act, in the charge, is a defect curable under sections 215 and 464 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if the accused has not been prejudiced thereby.853
[s 188.28] Burden of Proof
It is the duty of the prosecution in a case under this section, to prove by positive evidence that the accused had
knowledge of the order with the disobedience of which he is charged. The mere promulgation of the order is not
sufficient to establish the knowledge.854 But evidence of knowledge can rarely be direct, in most cases,
knowledge can only be proved by circumstantial evidence. The question of knowledge must generally be a
matter of inference.855 It is permissible to presume knowledge of the order on the part of the accused in certain
circumstances.856 All that can reasonably be demanded of the prosecution is a proof of the circumstances from
which it may be inferred that the accused had knowledge of the order. If such proof is forthcoming, the onus is
on the accused to prove ignorance of the order, despite publication.857
In the absence of proof, it is wrong to think that selling drinks in continuation of an order promulgated by the
district collector will, as a matter of course, lead to riots or disturbance.858
[s 188.29] Convictions when can be made—Judicial Notice Cannot Fill up Gap
In order to constitute an offence under this section, it must be proved that the disobedience of the order caused
or tended to cause one or other of the consequences mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of the
section. It is only if the prohibited act when indulged in, brings about or tends to bring about, the above result, it
becomes an offence. Any violation of the order which does not cause or tend to cause the above result will not
amount to an offence.859 If no one has come forward to state that the disobedience has had this effect and it
cannot be said that the irresistible conclusion from the fact of this disobedience is that it would have the effect
Page 17 of 25
of causing or tending to cause obstruction, annoyance or injury or risk of obstruction, annoyance or injury, to
any person lawfully employed, the person disobeying cannot be punished under this section.860 Some definite
evidence on this point must be on record to support a conviction under the section.861 If there is no evidence to
show that the disobedience actually caused any obstruction, etc., and there is no finding that it tended to cause
such obstruction, etc., a conviction under this section cannot stand.862 There can be no conviction unless the
likely consequences of the breach of the order are proved affirmatively. If there is no proof, the gap cannot be
filled up by a judicial notice.863 It is also not permissible to presume the existence of these ingredients because
of the disobedience of the order.864
Where a person was not only aware of the proceedings under section 145, but acted in collusion with one party
in order to deprive the other of the fruits of their success in the section 145 case, it was held that he was liable
under this section, even though he was not a party to the proceeding in which the order was passed.865
The confiscation of tools, weapons or other articles, used by the accused in the commission of the offence, is
not wanted under this section.866 Where the offence is merely of a technical nature, token punishment under
this section would suffice.867 Where it was clear from the record that the committing of the offence by the
accused was an act of misguided, over-enthusiastic and ill-advised outburst, it was held that a lenient and
liberal view should be taken in the matter of sentence.868 Reformative justice is an accepted norm in present
times.869

708 Bachuram Koeri v State, AIR 1956 Cal 102 [LNIND 1955 CAL 186] , p 104 : (1956) Cr LJ 515 .
709 Dalganjan Koeri v State, AIR 1956 All 630 [LNIND 1956 ALL 75] : (1956) Cr LJ 1176 ; Quinn v Keshab Chandra
Mukherjee, AIR 1949 Cal 349 : 50 Cr LJ 632; Pommani Chinta Kath Mammali v Kutti Ammu, AIR 1916 Mad 640 : 16
Cr LJ 592 : 39 ILR Mad 543; Bishan Datt v Emperor, AIR 1948 All 50 : 48 Cr LJ 982 : (1947) All LJ 304.
710 Mallappa Mallappa Tavarji v Emperor, AIR 1915 Bom 22 (1) : 16 Cr LJ 668 : 17 Bom LR 676; Dalganjan Koeri v State,
AIR 1956 All 630 [LNIND 1956 ALL 75] : (1956) Cr LJ 1176 .
711 Jagpal Singh v State, (1959) All LJ 163 : (1959) All WR (HC) 178.
712 Ram Manohar Lohia v State, AIR 1968 All 100 [LNIND 1967 ALL 30] , pp 110-11 : (1968) Cr LJ 281 (DB).
713 State of Rajasthan v Gopal Krishna, (1977) Raj CrC 369 .
714 Brajanath Ghose v Emperor, 4 Cal WN 226 (DB).
715 Re Madan Kishore, AIR 1940 Pat 446 ; Chinnamuthu Ambalam v S Jagannata Chariar, AIR 1959 Mad 89 [LNIND
1958 MAD 33] : (1959) Cr LJ 328 ; Brojo Nath Ghose v Emperor, 4 Cal WN 226; Srinivasiah v Govt of Mysore, AIR
Page 18 of 25
1951 Mys 121 : 32 Cr LJ 1526; Gada Kantia v State, (1981) Cr LJ 55 (Ori); Khosi Mahton v State, (1965) BLJR 180 ;
Re Subramaniam, AIR 1970 Mad 333 [LNIND 1968 MAD 189] , p 334 : (1970) Cr LJ 1111 ; DN Ramaiah v DRA Setty,
(1972) Cr LJ 1158 , p 1159 : (1972) Mad LJ (Cr) 94; Raghubans Singh v State of Bihar, (1974) BLJR 561 : (1974) Pat
LJR 488 .
716 DN Ramaiah v Dr Aswathanarayana Setty, (1971) 2 Mys LJ 559 ; Habibar Rahman v Jagannath Mondal, (1982) Cr LJ
1652 (Cal) (DB) : (1982) 1 Cal HN 220; Sarjug Mahto v State of Bihar, (1992) 1 BLJR 347 .
717 Re Chandrakanta De, 6 ILR Cal 445 : 7 CLR 350; Mallappa Tacargi v Emperor, AIR 1915 Bom 22 (1) : 16 Cr LJ 668 :
17 Bom LR 676; Pommam Chintakath Mammali v T Kutti Ammu, AIR 1916 Mad 640 (1) : 16 Cr LJ 592 : 39 ILR Mad
543 : 2 Mad LW 410; Bishan Batt v Emperor, AIR 1948 All 50 : 48 Cr LJ 982 : (1947) All LJ 504 : (1917) ILR All 713 ;
Hira Lal v King-Emperor, AIR 1921 Oudh 123 : 22 Cr LJ 381; Quinn v Keshab Chandra Mukherjee, AIR 1949 Cal 349
: 50 Cr LJ 632; Dalganjan Koeri v State, AIR 1956 All 630 [LNIND 1956 ALL 75] : (1956) Cr LJ 1176 ; Govindan
Kunjaraman Assari v Krishnan Nair Chellappam Naik, AIR 1953 Tr & Coch 350 : (1953) Cr LJ 1421 ; Madhav Chandra
Chatterjee v King, AIR 1952 Pat 356 : (1952) Cr LJ 1410 ; Nandlal Mitra v State, AIR 1968 Cal 523 [LNIND 1968 CAL
15] : (1968) Cr LJ 1406 ; Travasiyappan v Perrasamy Nadar, (1992) Cr LJ 283 ; 2010 (3) Ker LT SN 15 (Ker).
718 Sister Ludhiya v State of Kerala, 2010 (3) Ker LT SN 15 (Ker).
719 Dalganjan Koeri v State, AIR 1956 All 630 [LNIND 1956 ALL 75] , p 632 : (1956) Cr LJ 1176 ; followed in Bhagaban
Misra v State, (1959) 25 Cut LT 265.
720 Jagpal Singh v State, (1959) All LJ 163, p 164. See, also cases discussed therein.
721 Queen-Empress v Manyan, 12 ILR Mad 475; Queen-Empress v Bishambharlal, 13 ILR All 577.
722 HK Chindaiah v MK Gopala Iyengar, (1986) 3 Crimes 94 (Kant).
723 Municipal Council, Ratlam v Vardhichand, (1980) Cr LJ 1075 (SC).
724 Thockchom Angou Singh v Union Territory of Manipur, AIR 1961 Mani 12 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 676 ; Chinnamuthu
Ambalam v S Jagannatha, AIR 1959 Mad 89 [LNIND 1958 MAD 33] : (1959) Cr LJ 328 ; Jagpal Singh v State, (1959)
All LJ 163; Raj Narain Singh v District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, AIR 1956 All 481 [LNIND 1956 ALL 22] : (1956) Cr LJ
1028 ; Bacharam Kar v State, AIR 1956 Cal 102 [LNIND 1955 CAL 186] : (1956) Cr LJ 515 ; State of Vindhya Pradesh
v Ram Lakshan, AIR 1953 VP 25 : (1953) Cr LJ 1198 ; Rupam Singh v Emperor, AIR 1944 Pat 213 : 46 Cr LJ 18.
725 Babulal Parate v The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 [LNIND 1961 SC 14] : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 516 .
726 State of Rajasthan v Gopal Krishna, (1977) Raj CrC 369 , p 371.
727 Ibid.
728 Raj Narain v District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, AIR 1956 All 481 [LNIND 1956 ALL 22] , p 483.
729 Jagpal Singh v State, (1959) All LJ 163; State v Sm Tugla, AIR 1955 All 423 [LNIND 1955 ALL 21] : (1955) Cr LJ 1111
; Ejaz Ahmad v Maheshwar Singh, AIR 1953 All 257 [LNIND 1951 ALL 180] : (1953) Cr LJ 622 ; Dulal Chandra Bhar v
Sukumar Banerjee, AIR 1958 Cal 474 [LNIND 1958 CAL 98] : (1958) Cr LJ 1162 : 62 Cal WN 595; Jaswant v State,
AIR 1951 All 828 [LNIND 1951 ALL 127] : 52 Cr LJ 1508 : (1951) All LJ 710; Ambika Thakur v Emperor, AIR 1939 Pat
611 : 18 ILR Pat 544 : 21 PLT 45 : (1939) Pat WN 747 ; Emperor v Zahir-us-Sayed Alvi, AIR 1934 Ngp 114 : 35 Cr LJ
820 : 16 Nag LJ 178; Satya Charan De v Emperor, AIR 1930 Cal 63 : 31 Cr LJ 945 : 33 Cal WN 1002; Golak Chandra
v Kali Charan, 13 ILR Cal 175; DN Ramaiah v DRA Setty, (1972) Cr LJ 1158 : (1972) Mad LJ (Cr) 94; Re V
Subramaniam, AIR 1970 Mad 333 [LNIND 1968 MAD 189] : (1970) Cr LJ 1111 ; Mata Bhikh v State, (1980) 17 All Cr
Cas 72 : (1980) Cr LJ 575.
730 Re V Subramaniam, AIR 1970 Mad 333 [LNIND 1968 MAD 189] : (1970) Cr LJ 1111 .
731 Nagoji Ramchandra v Queen-Empress, 8 Mad LJ 253; 1 Weir 143; Chattar Singh v State, AIR 1956 All 798 .
732 Chattar Singh v State, (1956) All LJ 798.
733 Ramlubhaya v Prem Lata, (1981) CLC 388 .
734 Emperor v Raghunath Vinak Dhulekar, AIR 1925 All 165 : 26 Cr LJ 599 : 22 All LJ 1049 : 47 ILR All 205.
Page 19 of 25
735 Bhalachnadra Tumbak Ranadive v Emperor, AIR 1929 Bom 433 : 31 Bom LR 1151; Ram Chandra Narayan Shastri v
Emperor, AIR 1931 Bom 520 : 33 Cr LJ 64 : 33 Bom LR 1169 (disobedience of an order under section 42 of the
Bombay District Police Act).
736 Sadagopachariar v Krishnamaoorthy Rao, ILR 30 Mad 185, 190; Kandasami Mudali v Subroya Mudali, ILR 32 Mad
478, p 483; Baslingappa v Dharmappa, 34 ILR Bom 571; Manzoor Hasan v Mahommad Zaman, AIR 1925 PC 36 ;
Martin & Co v Syed Faiyaz Hasan, AIR 1944 PC 33 ; Re P Abdul Sattar, AIR 1961 Mys 57 .
737 Sivappachari v Mahalinga, 1 Mad HCR 50; Vijiaraghava Chariar v R, 26 ILR Mad 554.
738 M Visvanadha Rao v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1049 : 30 Cr LJ 31 (FB).
739 Sundaram Chetty v The Queen, 6 ILR Mad 203; Parthasaradi Ayyangar v Chinnakrishna Ayyangar, ILR 5 Mad 304; Re
Pedda Chari, 2 Weir 74; Vijiaraghava Chariar v Emperor, 26 ILR Mad 554, pp 579, 586 (FB); Govinda Chetti v Perumal
Chetti, ILR 38 Mad 489; Ratan Lal 708; Kazi Sujaudin v Mashavdas, 18 ILR Bom 693; Murugappa v Kuppuswami, AIR
1949 Mad 212 .
740 Re Ramanuja Aiyangar, 2 Weir 89.
741 Emperor v Govind Venkatesh Yalgi, (1908), 8 Cr LJ 431.
742 Arumuga Mudali v Perumalswamy, (1914) 15 Cr LJ 30 ; Venkatasubbayya v Md Falauddin, AIR 1927 Mad 611
[LNIND 1926 MAD 12] :, 28 Cr LJ 509.
743 Nrusingha Charan Panda v State of Orissa, (1985) 59 Cut LT 70, p 73.
744 Dulal Chandra Bhar v Sukumar Banerjee, AIR 1958 Cal 474 [LNIND 1958 CAL 98] , pp 476, 479 : (1958) Cr LJ 1162 :
62 Cal WN 595.
745 Satya Charan De v Emperor, AIR 1930 Cal 63 , p 64 : 31 Cr LJ 945; Re Nathubhai Brijlal, 11 Cr LJ 64 : 11 Bom LR
377.
746 Balbhadra Jha v State, AIR 1964 BLJR 799 .
747 Parmeswar Rai v King-Emperor, AIR 1922 Pat 84 : 23 Cr LJ 387.
748 Umanath Prasad v Dhirendra Kumar Singh, AIR 1960 Pat 125 : (1960) Cr LJ 387 .
749 Re Sundara Mudaliar, AIR 1937 Mad 535 [LNIND 1937 MAD 14] : 38 Cr LJ 620 : (1937) 1 Mad LJ 473 : (1937) Mad
WN 172; Devendranath Mandal v Emperor, AIR 1932 Cal 286 : 32 Cr LJ 1005 : 35 Cal WN 187; Ram Das Singh v
Emperor, AIR 1927 Cal 28 : 28 Cr LJ 4 : ILR 54 Cal 152 : 44 Cr LJ 250; Bhoop Singh Tyagi v State, (2002) Cr LJ 2872
(Del) (DB).
750 Atar Khan v State, AIR 1960 Assam 109 , pp 111; State v Sm Tugle, AIR 1955 All 423 [LNIND 1955 ALL 21] , pp 432 :
(1955) Cr LJ 1111 ; Re Subramaniam, AIR 1970 Mad 333 [LNIND 1968 MAD 189] : (1970) Cr LJ 1111 ; K Papayya v
State, (1975) Cr LJ 1784 , p 1785 : (1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 529; Purna Chandra Patro v Sri Mrutyunjaya, (1990) 1 Crimes
78 .
751 Nirarendu Dutt Majumdar v Emperor, AIR 1939 Cal 703 : 41 Cr LJ 105 : (1939) ILR 2 Cal 507 : 43 Cal WN 1061.
752 Re Chandrakanta, 6 ILR Cal 445; Memon Haji Habib v Memon Haji Jusab, 3 Cr LJ 151 : 15 Kar LR 302; Young Hon v
R, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 56 : UBR 1907–09 II PC 23.
753 Re Nagoji Ramachander, 1 Weir 143.
754 Joseph George v State of Kerala, (2001) 2 Ren CR (Cr) (Ker).
755 R v Dwarick Misser, 18 WR (Cr) 30; R v Bithal Nath, (1914) 15 Cr LJ 177 .

Page 20 of 25
756 Re Harimohun, 10 WR (Cr) 53 : 1 Beng LR (Cr) 23.
757 Chenveerappa v Govt of Mysore, (1908) 9 Cr LJ 550 ; R v Bithal Nath, (1914) 15 Cr LJ 177 .
758 Queen-Empress v Subramaniam, 20 ILR Mad 1 : 1 Weir 740.

759 Bhal Chandra v Emperor, AIR 1929 Bom 433 , 436.
760 Emperor v Raghunath Venaik Dhulekar, AIR 1925 All 165 , pp 167, 169 : 26 Cr LJ 599 : 47 ILR All 205; Emperor v Mal
Raj, 2 Cr LJ 365 : 6 PLR 333.
761 Section 144 (3) Cr PC, Form No 22, Sch 5, Cr PC; Golock Chandra Pal v Kali Charan De, 13 ILR Cal 175.
762 Re Kothakota Pappayya, (1975) 2 Andh WR 187 : (1975) Cr LJ 1784.
763 State v Jogla, AIR 1955 All 423 [LNIND 1955 ALL 21] , p 431 : (1955) Cr LJ 1111 ; Mata Bhikh v State, (1980) Cr LJ
575 , p 580 (All); Ram Samujh v State, AIR 1967 All 579 [LNIND 1966 ALL 163] : (1967) Cr LJ 1586 ; Nand Lal Mitra v
State, AIR 1968 Cal 523 [LNIND 1968 CAL 15] : (1968) Cr LJ 1406 ; K Papayya v State, (1975) Cr LJ 1784 , p 1786 :
(1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 529; State of Rajasthan v Gopal Krishna, (1977) Cr C 369.
764 Emperor v Raghunath Venaik Dhulekar, AIR 1925 All 165 : 26 Cr LJ 599 : 22 All LJ 1049.
765 Ejaz Ahmad v Maheswar Baksh Singh, AIR 1953 All 257 [LNIND 1951 ALL 180] , pp 258, 259 : (1953) Cr LJ 623 ; Ram
Samujh v State, AIR 1967 All 579 [LNIND 1966 ALL 163] : (1967) Cr LJ 1586 .
766 Jagpal Singh v State, AIR 1959 All 163 ; Ejaz Ahmad v Maheshwar Buksh Singh, AIR 1953 All 257 [LNIND 1951 ALL
180] : (1953) Cr LJ 623 ; State v Jugla, AIR 1955 All 423 [LNIND 1955 ALL 21] : (1955) Cr LJ 1111 ; K Pappaya v
State, (1975) Cr LJ 1784 , p 1786 : (1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 529.
767 Nandlal Mitra v State, AIR 1968 Cal 523 [LNIND 1968 CAL 15] , p 534 : (1968) Cr LJ 1406 .
768 Pom Mani Chintakath Mammali v Thazhithattah Kutti Ammu, AIR 1916 Mad 640 (1) : 39 ILR Mad 543 : 16 Cr LJ 592 :
17 Mad LT 391; Re Chandra Kanta De, 6 ILR Cal 445.
769 Thavasiyappan v Periasamy Nadar, (1992) Cr LJ 283 .
770 Mallappa Mallappa Tavarji v Emperor, AIR 1915 Bom 22 (1) : 16 Cr LJ 668 : 17 Bom LR 676; Dal Ganjan Singh v
State, AIR (1956) All 630 [LNIND 1956 ALL 75] : (1956) Cr LJ 1176 .
771 R v Sheodin, 10 ILR All 115.
772 Re Parbutty Charanb, UKR 16 Cal 9; Mul Raj v Emperor, 2 Cr LJ 719, 36 PR (Cr) 1905; Bhal Chandra Trimbuk
Ranadire v Emperor, AIR 1929 Bom 433 : 31 Bom LR 1151.
773 Re Madan Kishore, AIR 1940 Pat 446 : 41 Cr LJ 414 : 21 PLT 231 : 6 BR 426.
774 King v Darbarilal Shaw, AIR 1949 Cal 677 , p 678 : 51 Cr LJ 59 : 54 Cal WN 256.
775 Re Madan Kishore, AIR 1940 Pat 446 : 41 Cr LJ 414.
776 Niharendra Dutt v Emperor, AIR 1939 Cal 703 .
777 Nagendro Nath Biswas v Rakhal Das Sinha, AIR 1919 Cal 108 (2).
778 Sardara v R, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 63 ; Rama v R, ILR 35 All 136 : 15 Cr LJ 122.
779 Emperor v Mul Raj, 2 Cr LJ 365 : 36 PR 1905 (Cr) : 6 PLR 333; Bijo Yadav v State of Bihar, (2007) Cr LJ (NOC) 522
(Pat).
780 VII BC of 1876.

Page 21 of 25
781 Ebrahim Sircar v Emperor, ILR 29 Cal 236 : 4 Mad HCR App V;1 Weir 137, 138; R v Nandkumar, 3 Beng LR App 49; R
v Govind Benkatesh Yalji, (1907), 8 Cr LJ 431 : 4 Mad LT 363; Projapat Jha v R, (1910), 11 Cr LJ 49 : 14 Cal WN 234.
782 Rama Nand Jha v Kamal Nand Jha, (1991) 2 Crimes 574 (Pat).
783 Bangshi Das v Ajit Kumar Das, (1988) 1 Crimes 763 (Cal).
784 Queen-Empress v Jamdanand, 20 ILR All 501; Ram Manohar Lohia v State, AIR 1968 All 100 [LNIND 1967 ALL 30] :
(1968) Cr LJ 281 ; Matly Majhi v State, (1970) Pat LJR 402 .
785 Emperor v Raghunath Venaik Dhulekar, AIR 1925 All 165 , pp 169–70 : 26 Cr LJ 599 : 47 ILR All 205 : 22 All LJ 1049;
Empress of India v Bukshi Ram, 3 ILR All 201; Reg v Tatya, Ratanlal 50; Reg v Bapuju Bechar, Ratnalal, 81 : (1904) All
WN 233; Matlu Manjhi v State, (1970) Pat LJR 402 .
786 Queen-Empress v Lakhmidas Makandas, 14 ILR Bom 165; Queen-Empress v Harilal, 14 ILR Bom 180; Queen-
Empress v Jasoda Nand, 20 ILR All 501.
787 Emperor v Abdul Hamid, AIR 1923 Pat 1 , 3 : 23 Cr LJ 625 : 2 ILR Pat 134 : 3 PLT 585 (FB), per Majority.
788 Police Act 5 of 1861.
789 Emperor v Abdullah, (1921) 22 Cr LJ 705 (2).
790 Madho Singh v Emperor, AIR 1942 Pat 331 .
791 Daimulla Taluqdar v Mahrulla Taluqdar, 27 ILR Cal 918; Madho Singh v Emperor, AIR 1942 Pat 331 : 43 Cr LJ 637;
Emperor v Abdullah, (1921) 22 Cr LJ 705 ; Emperor v Abdul Hamid, AIR 1923 Pat 1 , 3 : 23 Cr LJ 625 (FB).
792 Reg v Tatya Ratanlal, 50; Reg v Bapuju Bechar Ratanlal, 81.
793 Swaminatha Mudaliar v Gopal Krishna Naidu, (1915) 16 Cr LJ 892 .

794 Atar Khan v State, AIR 1960 Assam 109 , 111 : (1960) Cr LJ 891 .
795 Ram Das Gaur v City Magistrate, Varanasi, AIR 1960 All 397 [LNIND 1959 ALL 172] , p 398 : (1960) Cr LJ 865 (2),
(1960) All LJ 104.
796 Queen v Pitti Singh, 8 WR 37; Bhusan Das v Tulsi Ganguli, (1989) 2 Cal HN 87 (Cal); Nilima Bhattacharya v State,
(1984) 2 Cal HN 143 (Cal); Shaikh Mahboob v State of Maharashtra, (1982) Mah LR 168 : (1982) 2 Bom HCR 23.
797 King v Darbarilal Shaw, AIR 1949 Cal 677 , p 678 : 51 Cr LJ 59 : 54 Cal WN 256.
798 Bachuram Kar v State, AIR 1956 Cal 102 [LNIND 1955 CAL 186] , p 105 : (1956) Cr LJ 515 ; Jiaratdin Mahommad v
Emperor, (1922) 23 Cr LJ 276 : 39 Cr LJ 578.
799 Nrusingha Charan Panda v State of Orissa, (1985) 1 Crimes 451 [LNIND 1985 ORI 149] (Ori) : (1985) 89 CLT 70 .
800 Brojo Nath Ghose v Empress, 4 Cal WN 226.
801 Prem Chand Roy v Dharmadas Singh Roy, 9 Cal WN 392 (D).
Page 22 of 25
802 Empress v Surajanarain Dass, 6 ILR Cal 88.

803 Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v Khodabaksh Shah, AIR 1934 Cal 242 (1) : 35 Cr LJ 778
: ILR 60 Cal 1336.
804 Rupan Singh v Emperor, AIR 1944 Pat 213 : 46 Cr LJ 18 : 11 BR 70.
805 Re Kohmul Kisto, 12 CLR 231; R v Suckoo, BR 18 July 1889.
806 R v Bhau, 3 Bom HCR (CC) 53.
807 R v Khandoji, 5 lb 21.
808 5 Mad HCR App 19.
809 1 Weir 139.
810 Ibid.
811 R v Subramaniam, 20 ILR Mad 1 : 1 Weir 140.
812 R v Subramaniam, 20 ILR Mad 1 : 1 Weir 140.
813 Ibid, 141; Maina Servai v R, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 621 .
814 1 Weir 143.
815 Ibid, 44.
816 Prem Chand v Dharamdas Singh, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 166 : 9 Cal WN 392.
817 R v Kalian Singh, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 916 : 24 All WN 233; Dhan Singh v R, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 987 : 1 All LJ 615.
818 Jayantilal Mohanlal Patel v Eric Renison (1975) Cr LJ 661 , pp 665, 669 (Guj).
819 Unnoda Pershad Dutt v Ranee Shama Soonduree, 24 WR 20, p 21; Evaristo Antonio v State, AIR 1968 Goa 14 :
(1968) Cr LJ 313 .
820 Dibakar Talukdar v State, AIR 1961 Assam 94 , p 96; Atar Khan v State, AIR 1960 Assam 109 , p 111; Kalu Minchi v
State of Assam, AIR 1965 Assam 29 ; Mukhdeo Singh v State of Bihar, (1962) BLJR 405 ; Ram Surat Singh v State,
(1968) All WR (HC) 448 : (1968) All Cr R 287.
821 Chatter Singh v State, (1956) All LJ 798, p 799.
822 Ramlubhaya v Prem Lata, (1981) CLC 388 (All).

Page 23 of 25
823 Re Tandra Narasimhappadu, AIR 1942 Mad 275 (1) : (1941) Mad WN 1030.
824 Syed Usman Ali Mahmood Ali v Emperor, AIR 1938 Ngp 297 , p 298 : 39 Cr LJ 584 : (1938) Nag LJ 139 : (1938) ILR
Ngp 580.
825 Habibar Rahman v Jagannath Mondal, (1982) Cr LJ 1652 (Cal) (DB) : (1982) 1 Cal HN 220; Sarjug Mahto v State of
Bihar, (1992) 1 BLJR 347 (Pat).
826 Emperor v Habibullah, (1886) 6 All WN 251, p 252; Re V Subramanian, (1970) 1 Mad LJ 58.
827 Bachuram Kar v State, AIR 1956 Cal 102 [LNIND 1955 CAL 186] , p 104 : (1956) Cr LJ 515 ; Fakir Charan Das v State,
AIR 1957 Ori 214 [LNIND 1957 ORI 33] : (1957) Cr LJ 1151 : (1957) ILR Cut 233 : 23 CLT 176; Pradip Chowdhary v
State, AIR 1960 Assam 20 , (1960) Cr LJ 215 ; Atar Khan v State, AIR 1960 Assam 109 , (1960) Cr LJ 891 ; NG Sabde
v The Crown, AIR 1950 Ngp 12 : 51 Cr LJ 254; Umanath Prasad v Dhirendra Kumar Singh, AIR 1960 Pat 125 : (1960)
Cr LJ 387 ; King v Darbari Lal Shaw, AIR 1949 Cal 677 : 51 Cr LJ 59 : 54 Cal WN 256; Charan Singh v Emperor, AIR
1940 Lah 459 : 42 Cr LJ 90 : 212 PLR 786; Lachmi Devi v Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 122 : 32 Cr LJ 511; Ramgopal Daw
v Emperor, ILR 32 Cal 793 : 2 Cr LJ 760; Parmeshwar Rai v King-Emperor, AIR 1922 Pat 84 : 23 Cr LJ 381; Sarjug
Mahto v State of Bihar, (1992) 1 BLJR 347 (Pat); Sk Mahboob v The State of Maharashtra, 1982 (2) Bom HCR 23.
828 Fakir Charan Das v State, AIR 1957 Ori 214 [LNIND 1957 ORI 33] , p 215.
829 Re V Subramaniam, (1970) 1 Mad LJ 58.
830 Bangshi Das v Ajit Kumar Das, (1988) 1 Crimes 763 (Cal).
831 Wangkheimayan Kulabindhu Singh v State, (1962) 1 Cr LJ 827 , 828.
832 Jaswant v State, AIR 1951 All 828 [LNIND 1951 ALL 127] , 829 : 52 Cr LJ 1508 : (1951) All LJ 710.
833 Emperor v Ganesh Vasudeo Mavlankar, AIR 1931 Bom 135 , 138 : 32 Cr LJ 507 : 55 ILR Bom 322 : 33 Bom LR 59.
834 Pradip Chowdhury v State, AIR 1960 Assam 20 , p 22 : (1960) Cr LJ 215 ; King v Darbari Lal Shaw, AIR 1949 Cal 677
, p 679.
835 Emperor v Habibullah, (1886) 6 All WN 251, p 252.
836 King v Darbarilal Shaw, AIR 1949 Cal 677 , p 679 : 51 Cr LJ 59.
837 Jasnami v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 534 , p 536 : 37 Cr LJ 866 : (1936) All LJ 579; Re Raghunath Vinaik Dhulekar, AIR
1925 All 665 : 26 Cr LJ 509 : 47 ILR All 205.
838 Hoshiar Chand v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1979) Cr LT 79 (HP) : (1979) Sim LC 308; M Chacko v State of Kerala,
(1984) 1 Crimes 312 (Ker); State v Nur Hussain, (1981) Chand Cr C 14 (J & K); G Pantigongpou v State of Manipur,
(1994) 2 Gau LR 89 (91).
839 Chinna Muthu Ambalam v Haganatha Chariar, AIR 1959 Mad 89 [LNIND 1958 MAD 33] , p 94 : 1959 Cr LJ 328 :
(1959) 1 Mad LJ 135; Emperor v Abdullah, (1921) 22 Cr LJ 705 (2); Poulose v State of Kerala, 2013 (4) Ker LT 687
(Ker).
Page 24 of 25
840 Bachuram Kar v State, AIR 1956 Cal 102 [LNIND 1955 CAL 186] ; Evaristo Antonio v State, AIR 1968 Goa, Daman &
Diu 14 : (1968) Cr LJ 313 ; Nbatabar Samal v Bidulata Dei, (1974) Cut LT 1187, p 1191; C Muniappan v State of Tamil
Nadu, 2011 (99) AIC 220 (SC) : 2011 (72) ACC 988 .
841 Raghubans Singh v State of Bihar, (1974) BLJR 561 : (1974) Pat LJR 488 .
842 Lachmi Devi v Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 122 , p 127 : 32 Cr LJ 511 : 58 ILR Cal 971 : 35 Cal WN 257; Emperor v Ganesh
Vasudeo Mavlankar, AIR 1931 Bom 135 , 137 : 32 Cr LJ 507 : 55 ILR Bom 322 : 33 Bom LR 59.
843 Queen-Empress v South, 24 ILR Mad 70.
844 Murugan v State of Kerala, 2014 (2) Ker LJ 476 (Ker).
845 Nizam v State of Kerala, 2014 Cr LJ 2343 , p 2347 (Ker) : 2014 (2) Ker LT 467 .
846 NG Sabde v The Crown, AIR 1950 Ngp 12 , p 13 : 51 Cr LJ 254.
847 Mahendra Sharma v State of Bihar, (1996) 2 East Cr C 684, p 685 (Pat).
848 Kumar v State of Punjab, 2008 Cr LJ 3576 , p 3578 (P&H) (DB) : 2009 (1) Ren CR (Criminal) 415.
849 Bhaiyalal Patel v State of Chhattisgarh, 2012 Cr LJ 2812 , p 2815 (Chh) : 2012 (2) CGLJ 384 .
850 Re Lalit Mohan Pal, (1904) 5Cal LJ 176; Emperor v Molla Fuzla Karim, 33 ILR Cal 193 followed; Begu Singh v
Emperor, 34 ILR Cal 551 (FB); Puran Chandra Dutta v Sheikh Dhalu, AIR 58 Cal 374.
851 Government Advocate, Bihar v Kumar Singh, AIR 1938 Pat 88 : ILR 16 Pat 571; Jot Narain v Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind
164 ; Manicklal Bhagat v State, (1982) 1 Cal HN 149; following; Ajaib Singh v Jogendra Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1422
[LNIND 1968 SC 139] .
852 YVRV Anjanuililu v State, (1998) III CCR 391 (AP).
853 Ramendra Chandra Roy v Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 410 : 32 Cr LJ 844 : 58 ILR Cal 303 : 35 Cal WN 716.
854 Emperor v Abdullah, (1921) 22 Cr LJ 705 , 706; Ram Das Singh v Emperor, AIR 1927 Cal 28 : 28 Cr LJ 4; Sheikh
Abdul v King-Emperor, AIR 1927 Cal 306 : 28 Cr LJ 350 : 31 Cal WN 340.
855 Re Madan Kishore, AIR 1940 Pat 446 , p 448 : 41 Cr LJ 414 : 21 PLT 231.
856 Emperor v Turab Khan, AIR 1942 Oudh 39 : 42 Cr LJ 884 : ILR 17 Luck 32 : (1941) Oudh WN 1087.
857 Emperor v Afaq Husain Jauhar, AIR 1941 All 70 , 73 : 42 Cr LJ 298 : ILR 1941 All 186 : (1940) All LJ 885.
858 Re Yerlagadda Venkanna, AIR 1925 Mad 856 [LNIND 1924 MAD 422] : 26 Cr LJ 1556.
Page 25 of 25
859 Thokchom Angou Singh v Union Territory of Manipur, AIR 1961 Mani 12 , p 19; Thangjam Irabot Singh v State, (1961)
2 Cr LJ 584 ; Raj Narain Singh v District Magistrate of Gorakhpur, AIR 1956 All 481 [LNIND 1956 ALL 22] : (1956) Cr
LJ 1026 .
860 King v Darbarilal Shaw, AIR 1949 Cal 677 , p 679 : 4 Mad HCR App V : 1 Weir 137, p 138; R v Nundkumar, 3 Beng LR
App 49; R v Govind Benkatesh Yalgi, (1907) 8 Cr LJ 431 : 4 Mad LT 363; Projapat Jha v R, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 49 : 14 Cal
WN 234.
861 Shyamanand Das v R, 31 ILR Cal 990; Ram Gopal v R, ILR 32 Cal 793; Brojo Nath v R, 4 Cal WN 226 followed; R v
Madhul Chandra, (1903) 4 Cr LJ 479 : 3 LBR 214; Atar Khan v State, AIR 1960 Assam 109 ; Parmeshwar Rai v King-
Emperor, AIR 1922 Pat 84 : 23 Cr LJ 381 : 3 PLT 258; D Srinivasiah v Govt of Mysore, AIR 1951 Mysore 121 : 57 Cr
LJ 526 and cases cited therein.
862 Bharat Raut v State, AIR 1953 Pat 376 ; Paramasiva Mooppan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 591 [LNIND 1927 MAD 405]
: 29 Cr LJ 590 : (1928) Mad WN 70, Re V Subramanian, (1970) 1 Mad LJ 58; Habibur Rahman v Jagannath Mondal,
(1982) Cr LJ 1652 (Cal); Sarjug Mahto v State of Bihar, (1992) 1 BLJR 347 .
863 Lachmi Dei v Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 122 : 32 Cr LJ 511; NG Savde v The Crown, AIR 1950 Ngp 12 : (1951) Cr LJ
254 .
864 Raghubans Singh v State of Bihar, (1974) BLJR 561 : (1974) Pat LJR 488 .
865 Satya Charan De v Emperor, AIR 1930 Cal 63 : 31 Cr LJ 945 : 33 Cal WN 1002.
866 1872 PR (Cr) 13, 19.
867 J Choudhary v State, AIR 1963 Ori 216 [LNIND 1963 ORI 26] : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 659 .
868 Jarnail Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cr LJ 319 (Raj).
869 State of Maharashtra v Mahommad Yusuf Noor Mahommad, 1990 Mah LJ 813 .
End of Document
[s 189] Threat of injury to public servant.—
Servants



Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any public servant, or to any person in whom he believes that public
servant to be interested, for the purpose of inducing that public servant to do any act, or to forbear or delay to
do any act, connected with the exercise of the public functions of such public servant, shall be punished with
Andhra Pradesh.— The offence is cognizable in Andhra Pradesh, vide A.P. GO. Ms. No. 732, dated 5-12-
Page 2 of 5
1991.
[s 189.2] Scope
This section and section 190, IPC deal with criminal threats affecting public servants. Under this section the
threat is directed against the public servant himself, while in the next section it is directed against the person
who seeks his protection. This section is similar to section 503, IPC which defines criminal intimidation. Section
503 is general in character, while this section is particularly confined to criminal intimidation of a public servant.
It is the essence of an offence under this section that the threat or injury should have been held out for the
purpose of inducing a public servant to do any act or to forbear or delay the doing of an act. A mere threat,
uttered as an exhibition of bad temper or in the course of an altercation, is not necessarily an offence under this
section.870 What the section deals with are menaces which would have a tendency to induce the public servant
to alter his actions because of some possible injury to himself or to someone in whom the accused believes he
has an interest.871
[s 189.3] “Holds out any Threat”—Threat of Injury, a Necessary Ingredient
In order to sustain a conviction under this section, there must be a threat of injury to either the public servant or
to anyone in whom the accused believes that, public servant to be interested.872 If the threat is verbal, the exact
words used should be proven to enable the court to decide whether an injury or a lawful complaint was
threatened. It is most material in a prosecution under this section that the actual words, used by the accused
towards the public servant, be before the court to enable it to ascertain whether, in fact, a threat of injury to the
public servant was really made by the accused. Where there is a serious conflict of testimony as to the words
used by the accused regarding the public servant, it is exceedingly doubtful if a conviction could be had merely
because the witnesses are agreed as to the general effect of those words.873 Words amounting to an idle threat
uttered in anger is no threat.874
[s 188.3.1] Laws of Land to be Respected even by Politicians—Mere Raising Slogans not an Offence
A citizen of India is a citizen, whether he is a political worker or otherwise. A political worker cannot claim any
impunity in the eye of law to commit any offence, however good the motive may be. The law of the land is to be
obeyed and respected by all citizens, irrespective of their profession, vocation, status and political thinking.
Before the majesty of law, no one is either exempted from its rigour, for amenable there seriously. They are all
equal. So, even though the accused may have been the party workers of a political party, and even though a
case against was false, they had no business to threaten the police officers with injury and on that threat, to
demand their release. The case would not have been under section 189, IPC, if the case had been limited to
the raising of slogans or demanding a release.875
[s 188.3.2] Mere Use of Impolite Language not an Offence
Where an office-bearer of the revenue officials’ association, by writing a letter, requested the collector to
withdraw the prosecution against one revenue officer, without holding out any threat of injury to induce him to
do or forbear from doing any act in exercise of his public functions, the mere use of impolite language in the
letter did not amount to an offence under this section.876
[s 188.4] Injury—Injury Implies Illegal Harm
The word “injury” has been defined in section 44 of this Code as denoting any harm whatever, illegally caused
to any person in body, mind, reputation or property.877 Injury implies an illegal harm, but it is unsafe to hold that
a mere threat to bring a legal complaint either before a court or before the constable is an injury. Thus, it would
not be criminal to threaten to report to his superiors, an official, who was about to perform an illegal act, for this
would be the lawful result of the act he was committing.878 Police constables in the execution of their duty must
be protected, but when a member of the public considers that he is being harshly treated, or that a constable is
exceeding the powers given to him by law, it would be absurd to hold that a protest or oral threat to report the
matter either to the court or to the constable’s superior officers amounts to an illegal harm. If the constable is
acting within his powers, the complaint can do him no harm, if he is acting beyond his powers, he has no cause
Page 3 of 5
for complaint and the public has every right to protest.879
[s 188.5] Public Servant
[s 188.6] In Whom the Public Servant is Interested
In order to sustain a conviction under this section, the threat of injury need not be to the public servant directly.
It may be to anyone in whom the accused believes that public servant to be interested.880
[s 188.7] “For the Purpose of Inducing that Public Servant” etc—Essence of the Offence
It is the essence of an offence under this section that the threat or injury should have been held out for the
purpose of inducing a public servant to do any act or to forbear or delay the doing of an act. A mere threat,
uttered as an exhibition of bad temper or in the course of an altercation, is not necessarily an offence under this
section.881 What the section deals with are menaces, which would have a tendency to induce the public servant
to alter his actions because of some possible injury to himself or to someone in whom the accused believes he
has an interest.882
[s 188.8] Procedure
The offence is non-cognizable. Summons should ordinarily be issued in the first instance. The offence is
bailable, but not compoundable. It is triable by a magistrate and can also be tried summarily. The cognizance of
an offence under this section can be taken within three years.
[s 188.9] Charge
That you, on or about the … day of … at ……… held out a threat of injury to a public servant, to wit ……, (or to ……, in
whom you believed that a public servant, to wit ……… was interested) for the purpose of inducing that public servant to
do an act, to wit ………, (or to forbear or delay to do……), connected with the exercise of the public functions of such
public servant, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 189 of the Indian Penal Code, and within
my cognizance.
[s 188.10] Proof
To establish an offence under this section it must be proved that:

Page 4 of 5
(i) the accused held out a threat;883
(ii) the threat was directed against a public servant or a person, in whom the accused believed the public
servant to be interested;
(iii) the threat was of injury; and
(iv) the object of the threat was to induce the public servant to do or forbear, or delay doing, an act
connected with the exercise of his public functions.
[s 188.11] Separate Convictions
Separate convictions under sections 186 and 189 in a case, have been held to be bad in law.884
[s 188.12] Sentence
A court, in passing a sentence, should inflict such a sentence as the gravity or otherwise of the crime with which
the accused has been convicted, warrants and merits, irrespective of whether the sentence inflicted will involve
a right of appeal or not. A court should weigh the sentence with reference to the crime committed and the
circumstances of the case, and not with reference to anything which may happen subsequently.885 After
considering the mitigating circumstances and the long delay in the trial, a lenient view can be taken in awarding
the sentence in a case under this section.886

870 Mahommad Ahmad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 171 , p 172 : 37 Cr LJ 212; Re Kuppasami Aiyar, 16 Cr LJ 477, p
478.
871 Queen-Empress v Amir Khan, (1886) Ratanlal UC 273.
872 Ibid.
873 Queen-Empress v Maheshri Baksh Singh, 8 ILR All 380.
874 Mahommad Ahmad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 171 , p 172 : 37 Cr LJ 212.
875 Jarnail Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1982) Cr LJ 319 (Raj) : (1981) Raj CrC 325 .
876 Re Kutubuddin, (1985) Mad LJ (Cr) 105.
877 Mulai Rai v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 277 : 278 All LJ 210.
878 Mayne, Criminal Law of India, p 19.

Page 5 of 5
879 Shahbad Khan v King-Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 139 , p 140 : 27 Cr LJ 400.
880 Queen-Empress v Amir Khan, (1886) Ratanlal UC 273.
881 Mahommad Ahmad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 171 , p 172 : 37 Cr LJ 212; Re Kappusami Aiyar, AIR 1916 Mad 408
: 16 Cr LJ 477, p 478.
882 Queen-Empress v Amir Khan, (1886) Rat UC 273.
883 Emperor v Yar Mohd, AIR 1931 Cal 448 : 58 ILR Cal 392 : 32 Cr LJ 1181.
884 Jagannath Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Pat 183 , pp 184, 185 : 25 Cr LJ 1227.
885 Emperor v Yar Mahommad, AIR 1931 Cal 448 , p 450 : 32 Cr LJ 890.
886 Jarnail Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1982) Cr LJ 319 : (1981) Raj CrC 325 (Raj).
End of Document
[s 190] Threat of injury to induce person to refrain from applying for
protection to public servant.—
Servants


[s 190] Threat of injury to induce person to refrain from applying for

protection to public servant.—
Whoever holds out any threat of injury to any person for the purpose of inducing that person to refrain or desist
from making a legal application for protection against any injury to any public servant legally empowered as
such to give such protection, or to cause such protection to be given, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
Page 2 of 4
[s 190] Threat of injury to induce person to refrain from applying for protection to public servant.—
Andhra Pradesh.— The offence is cognizable in Andhra Pradesh vide amended by A.P. GO. Ms. No. 732,
dated 5-12-1991.
[s 190.2] Scope and Object
The object of the section is to protect persons against being terrorised and threatened into inaction with the
object of inducing that person to refrain or desist from making a legal application to a public servant for
protection against any injury, which that public servant is legally empowered to give. This section punishes
those holding out a threat of any injury to a person, to prevent him from seeking protection from any public
servant legally empowered, as such, to give him protection, or cause such protection to be given.
[s 190.3] Holds Out any Threat
Synopsis note 2 under the preceding section 189 may be referred to.
[s 190.4] Injury
A question may arise as to whether a threat to excommunicate, or exclude from caste, is an injury within the
meaning of this section. Now, under section 44 of this Code, the word “injury” denotes a harm illegally caused
to another. Therefore, it will not be an offence to threaten another with an action, or indictment, which might
lawfully be preferred against him.887 There can be no criminality when the sentence of excommunication is
legal, that is to say, where it is justified by the usages of the class or sect to which the complainant has
voluntarily submitted. It has been held that:
There can be no criminal intimidation where the injury of which complaint is made is the hardship arising from a
conventional punishment, which a spiritual superior, acting in the exercise of his authority as regulated by the custom
of the caste, is competent to inflict. The custom implies a common submission to his authority, and, assuming that
there was an error of judgment on his part, the error cannot be accepted as sufficient for turning a case of conventional
discipline into a criminal offence.888
A threat to institute a civil suit for a mere declaration of right against any person who objects to that right,
cannot be said to be an injury within the meaning of this section, as it cannot be said to be a harm illegally
caused in body, mind, reputation or property.889
Section 44 and the commentary thereunder and the synopsis note 3 to the preceding section 189 may be
referred to.
[s 190.6] Procedure
The procedure will be the same as in the case of an offence under section 189. The limitation prescribed for
prosecution under this section is one year.
[s 190.7] Charge
Page 3 of 4
That you, on or about the………day of………at………held out a threat of injury, to wit………to………, for the purpose
of inducing him to refrain or desist from making a legal application for protection against such injury to a public servant
legally empowered to give such protection (or to cause such protection to be given), and thereby committed an offence
punishable under section 190 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
[s 190.8] Proof
For an offence under this section the prosecution must prove the following:
(i) that the accused held out a threat;
(ii) that such threat was of an injury;
(iii) that the purpose for which such threat was held out was to induce the person threatened to refrain or
desist from making a legal application for protection against some injury;
(iv) that the person to whom such legal application was about to be made was a public servant; and
(v) that such public servant was legally empowered, as such, to give the protection or to cause the same
to be given.

887 Reg v Moroha, 8 Bom HCCC 101.
888 Queen v Sri Vidya Sankara Narasimha Bharathi Guruswamulu, 6 ILR Mad 381, p 388 : 1 Weir 595.
889 Mulai Rai v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 277 , p 278 : 27 Cr LJ 351 : 24 All LJ 314.
Page 4 of 4
End of Document
[s 191] Giving false evidence.—
> R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code > Chapter XI Of False Evidence and Offences against Public
Justice
Chapter XI Of False Evidence and Offences against Public Justice

11.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter dealt with the offence of contempt of the lawful authority of public servants. This chapter is
headed “Of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice”. An examination of the different sections in this
chapter shows that the intention of the Legislature is to punish acts and omissions—which do, or have a tendency
to, or are likely to, affect public justice.1
In India, the law relating to the offence of perjury is given a statutory definition under section 191 and chapter XI of
the Indian Penal Code, which has been incorporated to deal with the offences relating to giving of false evidence
against public justice. The offences incorporated under this chapter are based upon the recognition of the decline in
moral values and the erosion of the sanctity of oath. Unscrupulous litigants are found daily resorting to utter blatant
falsehoods in the courts and this practice has, to some extent, resulted in polluting the judicial system. It is a fact,
though unfortunate, that a general impression is created that most of the witnesses coming in the courts, in spite of
taking oath make false statements to suit the interests of the parties calling them. Effective and stern action is
required to be taken for preventing the evil of perjury, concededly let loose by vested interests and professional
litigants. The mere existence of penal provisions to deal with perjury would be a cruel joke with the society, unless
courts stop taking evasive recourses in spite of having proof of the commission of the offence under chapter XI of
the Indian Penal Code. If the system is to survive, effective action is the need of the time. The case of R Karuppan
is no exception to the general practice being followed by many of the litigants in the country.2
It has unfortunately become the order of the day, for false statements to be made in the course of judicial
proceedings even on oath and attempts are made to substantiate these false statements through affidavits or
fabricated documents. It is unfortunate when this happens, because the real backbone of the working of the judicial
system is based on the element of trust and confidence and the purpose of obtaining a statement on oath or written
pleadings from the parties is to arrive at a correct decision after evaluating the respective positions. In all matters of
fact therefore, it is not only a question of ethics, but an inflexible requirement of law that every statement made must
be verified and correct to the knowledge of the person making it. When a client instructs his learned advocate to
draft the pleadings, the basic responsibility lies on the client because the advocate, being an officer of the court,
acts entirely on the instructions given to him, though the lawyer will not be immune from even a prevention. If the
situation is uncertain, it is for his client to inform his learned advocate and consequently if false statements are
made in the pleadings the responsibility will devolve wholly and completely on the party on whose behalf those
statements are made.
It has unfortunately become common for the pleadings to be taken very lightly and for nothing but false and
incorrect statements to be made in the course of judicial proceedings or for fabricated documents to be produced,
and even in cases where this comes to the light of the court, the party seems to get away because the courts do not
take the necessary counter-action. The disastrous result of such leniency or indulgence is that it sends out wrong
signals. It creates almost a licence for litigants and their lawyers to indulge in such serious malpractices because of
Page 2 of 34
the confidence that no action will result.3
Offences under this chapter fall into two groups:
(a) Giving or Fabricating False Evidence (sections 191–200, IPC). The first group of sections 191–200 deals
with false evidence and declarations or certificates which come within the aforesaid category. Offences
relating to false evidence may be classified as follows:
(i) False Evidence

• Giving false evidence is dealt with in sections 191 and 193, IPC. Aggravated offences are covered by
sections 194 and 195, IPC. Other kindred offences are:
(i) Using as true evidence known to be fabricated (section 196, IPC).
(ii) Issuing or signing a false certificate (section 197, IPC) and using the same as true (section 198,
IPC).
(iii) Making false statement in a declaration (section 199, IPC).
(iv) Using as true such a declaration (section 200, IPC).
(ii) Fabricating False Evidence
• Fabricating false evidence is covered by sections 192 and 193, IPC, aggravated offences by sections
194 and 195, IPC and kindred offences of using as true evidence known to be fabricated by section
196, IPC.
(b) Offences against Public Justice (sections 201–229, IPC). In this second group, section 201 deals with the
causing of disappearance of evidence of an offence or giving false information to screen an offender.
Section 202, IPC relates to the intentional omission to give information of an offence by a person bound to
give information thereof, and section 203, IPC to the giving of false information in respect of an offence
which has been committed. Section 204, IPC deals with the destruction of a document to prevent its
production as evidence, and section 205, IPC with false personation in relation to a suit or a criminal
prosecution sections 206–210, IPC relate to offences which, on the face of them, affect the proper
administration of justice by protecting any property from the process of a law court by fraudulent
transactions, fraudulently suffering a decree for sum not due, dishonestly making a false claim in the court
or fraudulently obtaining decree for sum not due. Section 211, IPC deals with the false charge of an
offence made with an intent to injure sections 212, 216, 216A and 216B, IPC relate to the harbouring of
offenders. Section 213 deals with taking and section 214 with offering of gifts or gratification for concealing
an offence or succeeding any person from legal punishment for any offence. Section 215, IPC also deals
with taking gratification for help to recover movable property of which the owner was deprived by an
offence sections 217–223, IPC deal with acts or omissions on the part of public servants which affect
public justice, sections 224–225B, IPC relate to resistance, obstruction or omission in the matter of lawful
apprehension. Section 226, IPC, which dealt with unlawful return from transportation, has now been
omitted by Act 26 of 1955 by which punishment of transportation has been abolished. Section 227, IPC
refers to violation of a condition of remission of punishment. Section 228, IPC deals with intentional insult
or interruption to public servant sitting in a judicial proceeding. A new section 228A was inserted in this
Chapter by Act 43 of 1983 to prohibit the publication of names, addresses or other particulars disclosing
the identity of the victim of rape, or sexual intercourse not amounting to rape, punishable under sections
Page 3 of 34
376, 376A–376E of this Code with a view to save them from undue embarrassment and defamation.
Section 229, IPC relates to the personating of a juror or assessor. All these sections, therefore, deal with
what may be deemed to be an offence against public justice.
11.2 Evidence
Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act defines “evidence” as follows:
“Evidence” means and includes—
(1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact
under inquiry;
• such statements are called oral evidence;
(2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court;
• such documents are called documentary evidence.
11.3 False Evidence
The word “evidence” signifies in its original sense, the state of being evident, ie, plain, apparent, or notorious.4 The
meaning of the term is not confined to proof before a judicial tribunal.5 According to Stephen, the word “evidence”
as generally employed is ambiguous. It sometimes means (a) the words uttered and things exhibited by witnesses
before a court of justice, (b) at other times the facts proved to exist by those words or things, and regarded as the
groundwork of inferences as to other facts not so proved, and (c) sometimes as meaning to assert that a particular
fact is relevant to the matter under inquiry.6 The word in this Act is used in the sense of the first clause. As thus
used, it signifies only the instruments by means of which relevant facts are brought before the court (viz., witnesses
and documents), and by means of which the court is convinced of these facts.7
An evidence is false where the person giving it either knows or believes it to be false or does not believe it to be
true.

Whoever, being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth, or being bound by
law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes any statement which is false, and which he either knows or
believes to be false or does not believe to be true, is said to give false evidence.
Page 4 of 34
Explanation 1.—A statement is within the meaning of this section, whether it is made verbally or otherwise.
Explanation 2.—A false statement as to the belief of the person attesting is within the meaning of this section,
and a person may be guilty of giving false evidence by stating that he believes a thing which he does not
believe, as well as by stating that he knows a thing which he does not know.
Illustrations
(a) A, in support of a just claim which B has against Z for one thousand rupees, falsely swears on a trial
that he heard Z admit the justice of B’s claim. A has given false evidence.
(b) A being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he believes a certain signature to be the
handwriting of Z, when he does not believe it to be handwriting of Z. Here A states that which he knows
to be false, and therefore gives false evidence.
(c) A, knowing the general character of Z’s handwriting, states that he believes a certain signature to be
the handwriting of Z; A in good faith believing it to be so. Here A’s statement is merely as to his belief,
and is true as to his belief, and therefore, although the signature may not be the handwriting of Z, A
has not given false evidence.
(d) A, being bound by an oath to state the truth, states that he knows that Z was at a particular place on a
particular day, not knowing anything upon the subject. A gives false evidence whether Z was at that
place on the day named or not.
(e) A, an interpreter or translator, gives or certifies as a true interpretation or translation of a statement or
document, which he is bound by oath to interpret or translate truly, that which is not and which he does
not believe to be a true interpretation or translation. A has given false evidence.
[s 191.1] Scope of the Section
Section 191, IPC defines “giving false evidence” and section 192 defines “fabricating false evidence”. Section
193, IPC penalises giving or fabricating false evidence. That a person should always tell the truth is a moral
principle. It cannot, however, be said to be a legal principle as such. Whenever the Legislature requires a
person to tell the truth, it has so enacted in various enactments. It is only where it has been so enacted and a
person fails to tell the truth that he comes within the mischief of the provisions of this section.8
No promise or undertaking, however, formal, or however important it may be as evidence, in the ordinary
acceptance of the word, comes within the meaning of the term as used in this section. It must be a statement
made in reference to some matter to which the person is legally bound on oath, or by some express provision
of law to state the truth; or it must be a declaration which he is bound by law to make.9
The most appropriate stage for a trial Judge to take a decision relating to an alleged perjury would be at the
final stage of disposal of the main matter on its merits and not at the preliminary stage, otherwise, the decision
relating to the alleged perjury or false statement at the initial stage will prejudicially affect the fair disposal of the
main matter on its merits.10
[s 191.2] English Law
“Giving false evidence”, which expression is defined in this section is, in English Law, designated as “perjury”.
In England, perjury, which was a common law offence, has now been made a statutory offence. Under section
1 of the Perjury Act, 1911,11 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948,12 perjury is defined as follows:
Page 5 of 34
Section 1.—(1) If any person lawfully sworn as a witness or as an interpreter in a judicial proceeding willfully makes a
statement material in that proceeding, which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of
perjury, and shall, on conviction thereof on indictment, be liable to penal servitude for a term not exceeding seven
years, or to imprisonment13 [***] for a term not exceeding two years, or to a fine or to both such penal servitude or
imprisonment and fine.
(2) The expression “judicial proceeding” includes a proceeding before any court, tribunal, or person, having by law
power to hear, receive, and examine evidence on oath.
(3) Where a statement made for the purposes of a judicial proceeding is not made before the tribunal itself, but is made
on oath before a person authorised by law to administer an oath to the person who makes the statement, and to record
or authenticate the statement, it shall, for the purposes of this section, be treated as having been made in a judicial
proceeding.
(4) A statement made by a person lawfully sworn in England for the purposes of a judicial proceeding—
(a) in another part of His Majesty’s dominions; or
(b) in a British tribunal lawfully constituted in any place by sea or land outside His Majesty’s dominions; or
(c) in a tribunal of any foreign state,
shall, for the purposes of this section, be treated as a statement made in a judicial proceeding in England.
(5) Where, for the purposes of a judicial proceeding in England, a person is lawfully sworn under the authority of an Act
of Parliament—
(a) in any other part of His Majesty’s dominions; or
(b) before a British tribunal or a British Officer in a foreign country, or within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of
England;
a statement made by such person so sworn as aforesaid (unless the Act of Parliament under which it was made
otherwise specifically provides) shall be treated for the purposes of this section as having been made in the judicial
proceeding in England for the purposes whereof it was made.
(6) The question whether a statement on which perjury is assigned was material is a question of law to be determined
by the court of trial.
Page 6 of 34
Even at common law perjury consisted in giving upon oath, in (or for the purposes of) a judicial proceeding,
before a competent tribunal, whether it be a court of the common law or acting under a statute,14 evidence
which was material to some question depending in the proceeding and was false to the knowledge of the
deponent, or was not believed by him to be true.15
Save in a most exceptional case, an immediate custodial sentence should be imposed for perjury.16
[s 191.3] Canadian Law
It is an offence punishable on summary conviction for a person who, not being specially permitted, authorized
or required by law to make a statement under oath or solemn affirmation, makes such a statement, by affidavit,
solemn declaration or deposition or orally before a person who is authorized by law to permit it to be made
before him, knowing that the statement is false. This does not apply to such a statement that is made in the
course of a criminal investigation. A commissioner whose authority to take oaths was limited to work for his law
firm, who administered the oath to an affiant in unrelated litigation, was not “a person … authorized by law to
permit it to be made before him” and had no authority to take the accused's oath, and the accused could not be
convicted of an offence.17
[s 191.4] Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
Section 21 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 makes a similar provision with respect to the offences
under that Act.
[s 191.5] “Perjury” and “Giving False Evidence”
As regards the offence of “giving false evidence”, the framers of the Indian Penal Code, for reasons stated in
note G to their report, dated the 14 October 1837,18 thought it proper to discard the English Law of “perjury” and
to draft the provisions of the Indian Penal Code in this respect upon the lines of the French Code Penal
regarding faux temoignage. The Indian law commissioners were afterwards pressed to at least allow the word
“perjury” to be retained in their Code, as being one familiar to the people of India and long in use, but they
refused to give way19 on the ground that “the authors of the Code” thought it inexpedient to use the technical
terms of the English law where they did not adopt its definitions, and so materially departed from it in
substance”.20
[s 191.6] Tampering with Witnesses
The criminal justice system has been not only polluted but totally corrupted in through one practice that has
become endemic and has almost reached malignant dimensions. The number of criminal cases in which one or
more witnesses have been tampered with and has found that in over 90% of the cases one or more witnesses
have turned hostile. Nothing can be more destructive to the success of a prosecution than the obnoxious
practice of bribing or pressurising witnesses and getting them to turn hostile. The Karnataka High Court had
earlier directed the trial courts to ascertain in all cases where the witnesses turn hostile as to why this has
happened and since the majority of witnesses are gullible they have openly disclosed that it was the accused or
persons on behalf of the accused who had either used inducements or pressure and threats to get them to turn
hostile. There can be little doubt about the fact that the source of this corruption or this corrupt practice can be
traced to the accused because it is the accused who is the direct beneficiary of the failure of the prosecution
insofar as the accused secures an acquittal in cases where this is not warranted. This practice of tampering
with the witnesses has now become so widespread that the prosecutors cheerfully and openly get up and tell
the trial courts that the witnesses are hostile and that there is no purpose in examining them. The source of this
information is the police who are often a party to what is going on for obvious reasons. While in the rest of the
world the prosecuting agency takes all necessary steps to ensure that pressures and inducements do not affect
the evidence, it is unfortunate that here no such preventive steps are taken even though it is possible. The
police authorities in collusion with the accused were assisting the defense by keeping back witnesses and
falsely informing the court that they were not available and this court was required to take stringent steps to
combat this dishonest practice with considerably improved results over the last two years. The tampering with
witnesses, however, continues unabated.21
Page 7 of 34
It would be necessary, at least in a few cases, to make a thorough example of all those responsible,
irrespective of their designation or profession, for witnesses turning hostile. Whenever this happens, the trial
court shall then and there make a serious attempt to ascertain the names of the culprits and in appropriate
cases, if it becomes necessary, even by according pardon to the witness who is really the victim on the
condition that a full and true disclosure of the facts is made. It will be necessary that the courts send out the
message very clearly that nobody who tampers with witnesses will be spared and that every single guilty
person, including the witness who acted on their instructions, will be prosecuted for perjury and in appropriate
cases under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, for interfering with the course of a judicial proceeding. The trial
courts should ensure that appropriate corrective steps are taken.22 Any person found guilty of perjury has to be
dealt with seriously as it is necessary for the working of the court as well as for the benefit of the public at
large.23
[s 191.7] Difference between English and Indian Law
(a) Under the English law, in order to constitute “perjury”, the false statement must be made in (or for the
purpose of) a judicial proceeding. Under this Code it is not necessary that it should be made in a
judicial proceeding. The only distinction between false evidence given in a judicial proceeding and that
given in any other case lies in the degree of punishment.24
(b) The law of England requires that a false statement, in order to support a charge, should be material to
the question in dispute; but the Penal Code does not impose that qualification.25 It is only section 192,
which requires that the fabricated false evidence should affect a point material to the result of the
proceeding in which it appears. This provision is omitted in this section which defines the offence of
giving false evidence and does not lay down anywhere the above restrictive proviso. If the statement
made is designedly false, the accused is liable irrespective of the fact whether the statement had a
material bearing or not, upon the matter under inquiry before the court. The materiality or immateriality
can have a bearing only upon the sentence to be passed.26 The words in this section are very general
and do not contain any limitation that the statement made shall have any bearing upon the matter in
issue. It is sufficient to bring a case within that section if the false evidence is intentionally given, that is
to say, if the person making the statement makes it advisedly, knowing it to be false, and with the
intention of deceiving the court and of leading it to suppose that that which he states is true.27
(c) According to the Criminal Law of England, from which our system is so largely drawn, the assignment
of perjury must be proved by two witnesses, or by one witness and the proof of other material and
relevant facts confirming his testimony. The Indian Evidence Act does not provide that there must be
corroboration to support a conviction, but in ordinary cases, and where the provisions peculiar to Indian
law do not apply, a rule which is founded on substantial justice may well serve as a safe guide to those
who have to administer the criminal law in India.28
[s 191.8] Section 191 Considered with Section 199
Section 199 deals with statements and declarations made voluntarily, provided that they are capable of being
used as evidence and which the court is bound to receive as evidence. Whereas, section 191 deals with
statements and declaration falsely made by a person legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law
to state the truth. For example, statements under sections 161(2) and 164 of the CrPC or those under sections
13 and 14 of the Oaths Act, etc.29 Under this section the declaration is made under compulsion due to some
requirement of law, while under section 199 it is made voluntarily provided such declaration is admissible in
evidence in a court or before a public servant or other person bound or authorised by law to receive as
evidence, of any fact touching any point material to the object of declaration.30 This section read with sections
193 and 199 of the Penal Code make the making of false declarations an offence. The distinction between the
two provisions, insofar as the making of the declaration is concerned, is that under section 191 the “declaration”
is one in which a person is bound by an oath or by an express provisions of law to state the truth, or being
bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes a statement which is false. The declaration
contemplated in section 199 is not necessarily one which the person making the declaration is bound by law to
make. The essential element of the offence under section 199 is that the declaration containing the false
statement must be one which any court of justice or any public servant or other person is bound or authorised
Page 8 of 34
by law to receive as evidence of any fact.31 No oath is required under section 199. No oath is required even
under section 191 where the declaration is made by a person, when he makes one on being bound by law to do
so.
[s 191.9] Essentials
The essentials of an offence under section 193, IPC, read with this section, are:
(a) The accused must have been legally bound to speak the truth or make a declaration.
(b) He must have stated or declared what is false.
(c) He must have known or believed that what he stated or declared was false, or he did not believe it to
be the truth.32
If the false evidence is given in a judicial proceeding the offence is more severely punished under the first part
of section 193 than if given in any other case, punishable under the second part of the section.
A person may not positively know a statement to be false and he may not even believe it to be false. But if,
nevertheless, he does not believe the statement to be true, then he commits the offence of giving false
evidence.33
[s 191.10] “Whoever”—Meaning of—Whether Includes Accused
Commentary under same heading “Whoever” in section 193, post may be referred to.
On the language of this section and section 192, IPC it is not possible to hold that the accused is in any way in
a more privileged position than an ordinary person. To say so would be dangerous and would put a premium on
the giving or fabrication or manufacturing of false evidence in judicial proceedings by accused persons.34 Under
section 4 of the Indian Oaths Act, 1969, oaths or affirmations shall be made by witnesses, interpreters and
jurors. However, the sub-section (2) of that section lays down that “nothing herein contained shall render it
lawful to administer, in a criminal procedure, an oath or affirmation to the accused person, unless he is
examined as a witness for the defence”. Section 342A, Criminal Procedure Code 1898 which was inserted in
the Code by section 315 of the new Code of 1973 enables an accused person to be a competent witness for his
defence but he cannot be compelled to be a witness and cannot be called as a witness except at his own
request in writing, and his failure to give evidence cannot be made the subject of comment by the parties or by
the court.35 But once the accused offers himself as a witness and is put on oath, his position is no better or
worse than that of any other witness, and section 132 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would apply to him. That
section itself makes a distinction between those cases in which a witness voluntarily answer a question and
those in which he is compelled to answer; and gives him protection in the latter of these cases only. Protection
is afforded only to answers which a witness has objected to give, or which he has asked to be excused from
giving, and which then, he has been compelled to give, and not to answers given voluntarily.36
[s 191.11] Statements of Accused under Section 313, CrPc
Under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a court may put
Page 9 of 34
such questions to the accused as it considers necessary, “for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to
explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him”. Under sub-section (2) of that section no
oath shall be administered to the accused when he is examined under sub-section (1), and under sub-section
(3) of the section so that “the accused shall not render himself liable to punishment by refusing to answer such
questions, or by giving false answers to them”. But this protection afforded to the accused is limited to
statements made by the accused in answer to questions which are for the purpose of enabling the accused to
explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and which are put at some stage of the
inquiry or trial.37 Statements made by an accused person under section 313 of the CrPC or contained in a
written statement filed by him with the court’s permission, are not absolutely privileged, as there is nothing in
that section to give him an absolute privilege as regards defamatory statements made in the course of
examination.38 Thus, anybody who makes a false statement on oath, knowing it to be false, makes himself
liable to be prosecuted for perjury.39
Whenever a man makes a statement in court on oath, he is bound to state the truth and if he does not, he
makes himself liable under the provisions of section 193. It is no defense to say that he was not bound to enter
the witness-box.40
[s 191.12] “Being Legally Bound, by an oath to State the Truth”—Meaning of
For the essentiality of section 191, the person must have been legally bound to speak the truth or make a
declaration and he must have stated or declared what is false.41 A person is legally bound to state the truth
when the omission to do so is illegal, by which is meant an offence, that is an act made punishable by this
Code42 or an act which is prohibited by law or which furnishes ground for a civil action.43 Making false statement
on oath before the court is an offence under section 191, IPC and punishable under section 193, IPC.44
If there is no compulsion to make any declaration as required by the law, section 193 will not have any
application.45 If section 191 will not apply, section 193 immediately goes out of the picture since it deals with
false evidence as stated in section 191.46
[s 191. 12.1] “Oath”—Meaning of
The term “oath” has not been defined in this Code or in the Oaths Act, 1969. An oath is a solemn appeal to the
creator of the universe that the truth only shall be witnessed. It is an adjuration to God to punish the affiant if he
swears falsely. It is an outward pledge given by the person taking it that the attestation or promise is made
under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. An oath is a religious act by which the party invokes
God not only to witness the truth and the sincerity of his promise, but also to avenge any imposture or violated
faith. Where a person has no belief in the Supreme Being, he can do nothing which would be binding on his
conscience as an oath.47
The practice of supporting a promise by an oath is practically as old as the existence of belief in God and it
appears to have been utilised from the very earliest times to ratify and insure the fulfillment of any special
contract or undertaking, by importing into the transaction the fear of divine wrath in case of a wilful failure to
perform the obligation entered into.
Oaths are, thus, as old as the Creation. The nature of an oath is not at all altered by Christianity, or any other
religion, but only made more solemn from the sanction of rewards and punishments being more openly
declared. All oaths spoken of in the scriptures, both of the old and new testaments, are obviously regarded as
religious ceremonies.
[s 191.12.2] Object of Oath
The real object of giving an oath is the idea that there will be a super human retribution in case of a falsehood
Page 10 of 34
and consequently actual words or ceremonies are immaterial. The purpose of giving an oath is not to call the
attention of God to the party but to call the attention of the party to God.48
[s 191.12.3] Provisions of Oaths Act
Section 3 of the Oaths Act, 1969 lays down the authority to administer oaths and affirmations, and it prescribes
the courts and persons authorised to administer, by themselves or by their officers empowered in that behalf,
oaths and affirmations in discharge of the duties or in exercise of the powers imposed upon them and they are
all courts and persons having by law the authority to receive evidence. Section 4 prescribes the persons by
whom oaths or affirmations must be made and they include all witnesses, that is all persons who may lawfully
be required to give evidence on or before any court. Section 8 provides that “every person giving evidence on
any subject before any court or person hereby authorized to administer oaths and affirmations, shall be bound
to state the truth on such subject”.
[s 191.12.4] Meaning of the Phrase—Sanctity of Oath
The opening words of this section “whoever being legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to
state the truth…” do not support the submission that a man, who is not bound under the law to make an
affidavit, can, if he does make one, deliberately refrain from stating truthfully the facts which are within his
knowledge. The meaning of these words is that whenever in a court of law a person binds himself on oath to
state the truth he is bound to state the truth and he cannot be heard to say that he should not have gone into
the witness-box or should not have made an affidavit, and therefore the submission that any false statements
which he has made after taking the oath is not covered by the words of this section is not supportable.
Whenever a man makes a statement in court on oath he is bound to state the truth and if he does not, he
makes himself liable under the provisions of section 193. It is no defense to say that he was not bound to enter
the witness box. A defendant or even a plaintiff is not bound to go into the witness-box, but if either of them
chooses to do so, he cannot, after he has taken the oath to make a truthful statement, state anything which is
false. Indeed the very sanctity of the oath requires that a person put on oath must state the truth.49
[s 191.12.5] Presumption of Oath Till the Statement Concluded
Where a statement is made, on solemn affirmation, on a certain date and is continued on a later date, it must
be presumed that the oath, which is administered to the witness on the first day of his statement, continues to
bind his statement and he continues to be on oath till the evidence is concluded.50
Where a first informant turns hostile and does not support the prosecution version as set forth in FIR, he
commits no offence under sections 191 and 193, IPC.51
[s 191.13] Effect of Omission to Take Oath, or Irregularity in Administering Oath
Under the English law, for a person to be found guilty of perjury, he must have been “lawfully sworn”.52 A
person is lawfully sworn if the court or person whom the oath, affirmation, or declaration is taken, has the power
to administer it for the purpose of verifying the statement in question and the oath, affirmation, or declaration
has been administered in a form and with ceremonies which the person has accepted without objection or has
declared to be binding upon him.53 But in India, under section 7 of the Oaths Act, 1969, no omission,
intentional, accidental or negligent,54 to take an oath or make an affirmation, nor any irregularity therein shall
invalidate any proceeding or render inadmissible any evidence, nor shall it affect the obligation of a witness to
speak the truth, and every person giving evidence before any court or person authorized to administer oath or
affirmation is bound to speak the truth.55 But if there is no such authorisation, there is no such obligation on the
witness,56 as where a magistrate examining an accused person for the sake of gaining information on which
proceedings could be taken, examined him on oath.57 The administration of an oath or affirmation is, thus,
merely a ministerial function, and is no longer an essential part of evidence. Therefore, the offence of
intentionally giving false evidence may be committed, although the person has neither been sworn nor been
affirmed.58
Where statement of a juvenile is recorded under section 164, CrPC without administering oath to him, section
Page 11 of 34
191 would not be attracted. Section 193, IPC would not apply.59
[s 191.14] Power to Administer Oath
Section 3 of the Oaths Act, 1969 authorises all courts and persons having by law or consent of the parties,
authority to receive evidence, have power to administer oaths. The commanding officer of any military, naval or
air force station or shop occupied by the armed forces of the Indian Union has also power to administer oath
provided that the oath or affirmation is administered within the limits of the station. The court, judge, magistrate
or person may also administer oath and affirmation for the purpose of affidavits, if empowered in this behalf by
the High Court in respect of affidavits for the purpose of judicial proceedings, or by the State Government in
respect of other affidavits.60 Under section 3 of the Evidence Act the word “court” includes all magistrates. A
magistrate is, therefore, ordinarily empowered to administer an oath or affirmation.61
A sub-divisional officer called upon the complainant in a case pending before him to show cause why he should
not be prosecuted for an offence under section 211, IPC, and on the complainant showing cause sent the case
to an honorary magistrate for recording evidence. The latter recorded the evidence and sent the case back to
the sub-divisional officer. It was held that the preliminary inquiry required to be held under section 476 of old
CrPC 1898 (new section 340 of CrPC, 1973), could not be held by any other magistrate except the sub-
divisional officer himself who thought that the case of the complainant was a false one and gave him a chance
to show cause, that the honorary magistrate had, therefore, no jurisdiction to record the evidence of the
petitioner and that the petitioner therefore did not give false evidence at any stage of a judicial proceeding
within the meaning of section 193, IPC and could not be prosecuted for perjury.62
Where the magistrate had no power to administer an oath to a witness when he was examined as a witness in
an inquiry regarding a headman, the orders of the magistrate in respect of such matters were held to be
executive orders and the witness could not be convicted under section 193, IPC.63
[s 191.15] Statements under Sections 121, 133, 164 and 202, CrPC
A magistrate acting under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or when he is acting under
section 202,64 section 121,65 or section 13366 thereof, has the power to administer an oath, and a charge of
perjury can be framed on statements made before him on oath when he is so acting.67
A magistrate, setting out to record under section 164, CrPC, what any person has to say to him, may adopt one
of two alternatives: he may record it as a statement or as a confession, using the appropriate procedure in each
case. In either case, the record may be used, as allowed by law, for the purpose for which it was taken, but its
use for a different purpose may be open to diverse objections. For example, a confession cannot be used as
the basis of a prosecution for perjury. A statement cannot be used as a confession, that is, an admission of the
truth of the facts set out in it in a criminal prosecution based on those facts, either against the person making it
or against the person with whom he may be jointly tried. Inculpatory statements made under section 164, CrPC,
by a person who was not treated as an accused, nor subsequently tried for any offence based on such
statements, are admissible in a prosecution against him for perjury. Such statements are not confessions and
the magistrate’s failure to record them in the manner laid down under section 164 does not preclude their being
used in evidence.68
Commentary under the same heading in section 182, ante may be referred to.
[s 191.17] Contradictory Statements under Section 164 and at Trial—Effect of
A statement made on oath by a witness before a magistrate under section 164, CrPC, can be made the basis of
an alternative charge together with a statement made on oath at the trial, provided there was a common
relation between the two statements.69 There is no legal objection to framing a charge in the alternative under
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section 193, IPC, against an accused for making contradictory statements, one under this section and the other
before the court.70 A statement made under section 164, CrPC is a judicial proceeding and can constitute the
basis of prosecution for perjury71 or of a complaint under section 340, CrPC,72 when the deponent resiles
therefrom and gives a statement contradictory thereto.
Where the eye-witness made a statement which was recorded by a magistrate under section 164, CrPC and
despite all the precautions, at the trial the witness turned hostile and did not support the prosecution, even
though she had squarely implicated the accused in a statement under section 164, CrPC as the persons who
had killed the deceased in her house, a direction was issued to the trial court to issue a show cause notice to
the witness calling upon her to show cause as to the offence of perjury and in the course of the inquiry pursuant
to the show cause notice, the trial court was directed to ascertain as to who were the persons responsible for
the witness having turned hostile even after having made a statement before the magistrate on an earlier
occasion.73
Where a person was offered a pardon under section 306 and on his acceptance of the same, was placed
before a magistrate in order that his statement may be recorded, the magistrate was held to have the power to
administer an oath or solemn affirmation to him while taking his statement under section 164, CrPC, and the
statement so recorded could form the subject of an alternative charge under the perjury sections of this Code.74
[s 191.17.1] Such Contradictory Statements Show Prima Facie Case for Perjury
When a person makes two contradictory statements, one recorded under section 164, CrPC, and another as a
witness in court, a prima facie case is made out for launching a complaint for perjury. It is not necessary to
investigate and find out whether the deposition recorded under section 164, CrPC or the deposition given in the
court is false.75
[s 191.18.1] Magistrate not Competent to Record Statement—Effect of
In Queen-Empress v Bharma,76 it was held that a statement taken by a third class magistrate under section 164
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, such magistrate not having the authority to carry on the preliminary
inquiry in the case, is not evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding, within the meaning of sections 191 and
193, such that when the statement is contradicted afterwards before the magistrate having jurisdiction and
exercising it in the preliminary inquiry into an accusation of murder, it will form a sufficient basis for an
alternative charge of giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding. But now under sub-section (1) of section
164, CrPC 1973, it is not necessary that the magistrate receiving or recording a confession or statement should
be a magistrate having jurisdiction in the case. According to this sub-section a confession or statement can only
be recorded by any metropolitan magistrate or a judicial magistrate irrespective of class and not by any
executive magistrate except in Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep for which a special provision
has been made by amendment. A police officer enjoying the powers of a magistrate under any law is, however,
not empowered to record a confession.
[s 191.19] Power To Administer Oath Under Other Acts
Power to administer oaths is given not only by the Oaths Act, but also by other Acts. Thus, under section
131(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961,77 an income tax officer, appellate assistant commissioner and
commissioner of income-tax have the power to enforce the attendance of any person and examine him on
oath.78 Although an income-tax officer making an assessment is not strictly acting as a court of law, it is clear
from these sections that he is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, and he ought to conform to the mere
elementary rules of judicial procedure, and in particular to conduct the case himself, and not allow somebody
else, even his superior officer, to take the conduct out of his hands.79
[s 191.20] Statements under Indian Registration Act and Indian Stamp Act
Under section 63 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, every registering officer may, at his discretion, administer
oath to any person examined by him under the provisions of that Act. A person making a false statement before
the sub-registrar, is punishable under section 82(a) of the Registration Act and section 193, IPC.80 So also
Page 13 of 34
under sections 52 and 53 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, the collector is empowered to make certain
allowances for misused or spoiled stamps, and for this purpose, he is, under the rules framed under section 75
of that Act, empowered to require a claimant to make a declaration on oath.
[s 191.21] Want of Jurisdiction to Administer Oath—Effect of
For an offence of giving false evidence, the accused should be bound by an oath to state the truth. Now, under
section 8 of the Oaths Act, a person is bound to state the truth when he gives evidence on any subject before
any court or person authorised to administer oath and affirmations. Under section 3(1) of the Oaths Act, only
courts and persons having, by law, or the consent of the parties, an authority to receive evidence are
authorised to administer oaths and affirmations in discharge of the duties or in exercise of the powers conferred
upon them by law. It may be necessary or desirable, for the purpose of section 193 to determine whether the
statement alleged to be false was made in the course of a judicial proceeding. However, if it is held that it was
not so made, the accused might still be liable to conviction of the offence of giving false evidence. But still in
order that a person making a statement to an officer may be legally bound to speak the truth, it is necessary
that the officer should be acting in the discharge of some duty or in the exercise of some power imposed or
conferred upon him by law. If, in making an inquiry, the officer is not proceeding in the discharge of some duty
or in the exercise of some power imposed or conferred upon him, a charge of false evidence in respect of the
statements made in such an inquiry will not lie.81 No charge of false evidence can lie in respect of a statement
made in the course of proceedings which are ultra vires and illegal.82
It is no offence to make a false statement before a person purporting to act in execution of a duty under the
Indian Registration Act but not legally authorised to do so.83
A deputy magistrate, in the absence of authorisation, has no power to administer an oath to a person making a
declaration in the shape of an affidavit; and such person cannot, on the facts stated in such declaration, be
prosecuted for committing an offence either under section 193 or section 199 of the IPC.84
It is not competent to a court conducting an inquiry into the conduct of a vakil under Legal Practitioners Act to
take a statement from him on solemn affirmation, and the vakil making a false statement before the court
conducting the inquiry does not render himself liable under section 181 or section 193 of this Code.85
Where a person applied for a refund under chapter 6 of the Stamp Act, 1879, and the collector made over the
application for inquiry to a deputy collector, the deputy collector was not entitled to put the witnesses produced
by the applicant on oath, and consequently, in reference to the statements of such witnesses, no charge under
section 181 or section 193 of the IPC was sustainable.86
Where on a police report the district magistrate ordered an investigation by the superintendent of police and on
the latter’s suggestion, directed a magistrate to hold an inquiry into the case, it was held that there was no legal
authority for the inquiry by the magistrate and witnesses examined by him could not be prosecuted for giving
false evidence.87
Where a suit by A is decreed against B but dismissed against C, there is no provision in the Code of Civil
Procedure to reopen the case at the instance of C. If the case is reopened, the court’s procedure is illegal, and
witnesses examined at the re-hearing cannot be prosecuted for giving false evidence.88
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Consent given by the Attorney General of India, without due care and caution, for the prosecution of an officer
of the Indian Navy cannot lead to an inference that the document conveying the consent was a false document
or that giving of consent amounted to giving of false evidence or fabricating false evidence at any stage of the
judicial proceeding.89
[s 191.23] Deposition not Read out to Witness—Effect of
Section 278(1), CrPC provides that as the evidence of each witness taken under section 275 or section 276 is
completed, it shall be read over to him and shall, if necessary be corrected. Some courts have taken the view
that no statement by a witness, in a deposition, can be regarded as a complete statement until the deposition is
finished and corrected, if necessary, because, till then, every statement is liable to be retracted, corrected,
varied or qualified. The whole deposition must be read and construed as one and if a later statement in it is
contradictory to, or at variance with, a previous statement in the same deposition, the statement first made will
be deemed to be modified by the subsequent statement which can be regarded as a retraction or correction of
it. An intention of giving false evidence is a necessary element to constitute an offence under section 193. The
intention can only be gathered from the surrounding circumstances and the subsequent correction or retraction
by the witness of his statement, in the same deposition, might negative the existence of such an intention.90
The other view is that if a deposition is not so read over, it is merely an irregularity according to the criminal as
well as the civil law, and does not render the deposition inadmissible in evidence.91 Convictions or orders of
prosecution for perjury were, however, set aside on the ground of this irregularity on some cases,92 but
maintained in others.93
[s 191.24] Curable Irregularity Not Vitiating Trial Unless Prejudice Caused
Reviewing the entire case-law, then in existence, it was held by the Allahabad High Court that where a
deposition made by a witness contains a false statement, the deponent is guilty of perjury. The deposition is
false notwithstanding its not being read over to the witness as required under section 278, CrPC. The
provisions of the Penal Code relating to punishment for perjury do not pay any regard to the question of
whether the deposition was read over or not. If a deposition is not read over to the witness, it is only an
irregularity and the irregularity does not vitiate the conviction.94 The view is in conformity with the view
expressed by the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Singh v State of Punjab,95 following the Privy Council view taken
in Abdul Rahman v Emperor96 in which it was held that if the deposition is not read over that would only amount
to a curable irregularity in the absence of prejudice which must be disclosed in an affidavit. The Saurashtra
High Court also has taken the same view.97 But the essence of the offence of perjury consists in an attempt to
mislead and deceive the court. A deposition must be read as a whole and a witness must always be given an
opportunity of correcting any answer given by him. Where a witness makes a false statement and subsequently
corrects it in the course of his examination, it is undesirable that he should be subjected to a prosecution for
perjury as he withdraws the lie and leaves the court under the impression of the truth.98
[s 191.25] Legally Bound by an Express Provision of Law to State the Truth
The obligation to state the truth may be either by an oath or “by an express provision of law.” In order to
constitute the offence of giving false evidence, the alleged false statement must have been under the sanction
of the law.99
If a petitioner, who is legally bound by an oath to state the truth in his affidavit accompanying the writ petition,
makes a false statement which constitutes an offence of giving false evidence under section 191, IPC,
punishable under section 197, IPC, then to eradicate the evil of perjury the court can issue a direction to file a
complaint under section 193, IPC against him before the magistrate of competent jurisdiction.100
[s 191.25.1] Some Express Provisions—Present Code Contains an Express Provision
Besides section 8 of the Oaths Act, 1969 there are several other express provisions binding a person to state
the truth. Witnesses are bound to speak the truth in proceedings under sections 52 and 84 of the Bengal Land
Registration Act (Bengal Act 7 of 1876)101 and so are applicants under section 53, read with section 88 of the
same Act.102 In view of the Christian Marriage Act, 1872, section 66, as amended by section 5 of Act 2 of 1891,
false oaths or declarations and false notices or certificates made for the purpose of procuring a marriage fall
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within this section. In view of the Government Savings Bank Act, 1873, section 7, false statements by any
person claiming to be entitled to deposits belonging to deceased persons, fall within this section. A sub-registrar
is, for the purposes of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, competent to examine any person, and any false
statement by such person before an officer in any proceedings or inquiries under the Act, renders such person
liable for giving false evidence besides the liability under section 82 of that Act.103
[s 191.26] Statements Under Section 161, CrPC
Under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1861 and 1872, a person examined by a police officer was bound to
answer all material questions, but was not liable to be prosecuted for giving false evidence in respect of his
answers under section 193, IPC.104 Under section 161 of the Code of 1882, persons being examined by the
police in the course of an investigation made under chapter 14 of that Code were bound to speak the truth in
answering questions put by the police,105 and not to do so was an offence under this section.106 But the Code of
1898 restored the provision of section 118 of the CrPC of 1872, requiring the person examined simply “to
answer” instead of “to answer truly”, and this was thus not an “express provision of law to speak the truth”
within the meaning of this section.107 The provisions of section 161 of the present CrPC 1973, however, revive
the provisions of the Code of 1882 regarding the statements to be recorded by the police. Sub-section (2) of
section 161 of the present Code uses the words “person shall be bound to answer truly” and thus introduces an
express provision of law to state the truth so as to attract the provisions of section 191, IPC with the exception
of questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose the maker of the statement to a criminal
charge or to a penalty or forfeiture.108
[s 191.27] Statements under Section 175, CrPC
Section 174, CrPC empowers a police officer to inquire and report on cases of suicide. For this purpose section
175 of that Code empowers him to summon persons and examine them, and “every person so summoned shall
be bound to attend and to answer truly all questions other than those the answers to which would have a
tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture”. But under the Code of 1898, he was
only bound to answer questions truly if he had been summoned in writing to attend before the police officer.
Investigation in the nature of an inquest consist, under section 174, of the investigation into the apparent cause
of death. Such an investigation ceases when the cause of death is ascertained, that is, when it is determined
whether the death was natural, suicidal, accidental, or due to homicide.
[s 191.28] Pleadings—Verification of
Order VI, rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), requires every pleading, which means plaint or
written statement (O VI, rule 1), to be verified by the party or by one of the parties or by some person
acquainted with the facts of the case. It also requires that the person verifying should specify what he verifies
from his own knowledge and what upon information received and believed to be true. The ordinary dictionary
meaning of the word “verify” is “to confirm the truth or truthfulness of”. So it has been held that O VI, rule 15,
CPC, is an “express provision of law” requiring a party filing a plaint or written statement to confirm the truth of
the statements made in the plaint or written statement to confirm the truth of the statements made in the plaint
or written statement, and that if he does so knowing that the verification is false, he gives false evidence within
the meaning of this section.109
[s 191.28.1] False Pleading—Party and not the Counsel Responsible
It is not only a question of ethics, but an inflexible requirement of law that every statement made must be true to
the extent that it must be verified and correct to the knowledge of the person making it. When a client instructs
his learned advocate to draft the pleadings, the basic responsibility lies on the clients because the advocate,
being an officer of the court acts entirely on the instructions given to him, though the lawyer will not be immune
from even a prosecution. If the situation is uncertain, it is for his client to inform his learned advocate and
consequently, if false statements are made in the pleadings, the responsibility will devolve wholly and
completely on the party on whose behalf those statements are made.110
[s 191.28.2] Returns—Effect of Making Wrong Verification
A false verification is not “evidence” on which a decree can be founded in a civil suit, but it may be the basis of
a prosecution for perjury.111 A person filing a written statement in a civil suit is bound to speak the truth
therein.112 So is a person making a return to the income-tax commissioners, or in filing municipal assessment
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papers, or in answering questions asked by a registrar of deeds.113 In a Nagpur case114 it has been held that:
The declaration contemplated in section 199 is a species of the genus of declaration contemplated in this section. We
have therefore to study the character of the declarations mentioned in the section. They are declarations which a
person is bound by law to make. The most familiar instances of such declarations are plaint, and pleadings in a suit. A
person is under a legal obligation to verify the allegations of fact made in the plaint and pleadings. If he verifies falsely,
he comes under the clutches of this section and is liable to be punished under section 193 for giving false evidence. A
man who voluntarily and officially verifies a statement, when the law does not want him to do so, does not render
himself liable to punishment.115
So, a petition not requiring verification cannot, from the fact of its being verified unnecessarily, be made the
subject of a prosecution for giving false evidence.116 But a contrary view has been expressed by the Supreme
Court, where a false affidavit was filed, though not required.117
[s 191.28.3] A False Declaration in a Written Statement—Whether it can be Basis of Prosecution
In some cases, however, taking a contrary view, it has been held that “in many cases persons in verifying
pleadings, are often found to say something which is not strictly true, but by such action they do not render
themselves liable for prosecution for perjury for making a false statement. This by itself does not constitute an
offence under section 193, IPC”.118
In an Allahabad case,119 a learned Judge has gone to the length of saying that an allegation in a written
statement is not evidence of any fact, which a court is bound or authorised by law to receive and, therefore, a
false declaration in a written statement which is verified as required by the provisions of O VI, rule 15, Civil
Procedure Code, but of which the court has not ordered proof by affidavit, cannot be the basis of a conviction
under section 199.120 Section 139 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 provides for the furnishing of a return of income
in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner.
Section 249 of that Act requires an appeal also to be in the prescribed form and to be verified in the prescribed
manner. Section 277 of the Income Tax Act prescribes a punishment for making a statement in any verification
which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true. Therefore, a
person making the false statement even in verification would be liable for giving false evidence.
[s 191.29] Affidavit—What is
“Affidavit” means an instrument in writing containing a declaration as to certain facts, signed by the person
making it and sworn before a person having authority to administer oath. The provisions of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 are not applicable to the affidavits filed in courts or elsewhere.121 The provisions relating to affidavits
have, therefore, to be found in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
Order XIX, rules 1 to 3, CPC, lay down the procedure of filing affidavits in a civil court. By an amendment, rules
4 to 15 were added to O XIX, CPC for their application in the State of Uttar Pradesh only. Order XIX of the CPC
empowers the court to have particular facts proved by an affidavit. Under rule 1 thereof, any court may, at any
time, for sufficient reason, order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by an affidavit, or that the
affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing on such conditions as the court thinks reasonable. Under
rule 2, evidence upon any application may be given by an affidavit, but the court may, at the instance of either
party, order the attendance for cross-examination of the deponent. The combined effect of the relevant
provisions is that ordinarily, a fact has to be proved by oral evidence, but the court may, subject to the
conditions laid down in O XIX, ask a particular fact or facts to be proved by affidavits.122 The oath may be
administered to the deponents of affidavits to be filed under the CPC by (a) any court or magistrate, or (b) any
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notary appointed under the Notaries Act, 1952 or (c) any officer or other person appointed by the High Court, or
(d) any officer appointed by any other court which the State Government has generally or specially empowered
in this behalf.
[s 191.29.1] Authorities for Criminal Cases
Under section 68 of the CrPC, 1973 affidavits made before a magistrate are in certain circumstances
admissible as evidence in proof of the service of summons. Under section 296 of that Code, the evidence of
any person whose evidence is of a formal character, may be given by an affidavit and may, subject to all just
exceptions, be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the Code. Under section 295
when any application is made to any court in the course of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the
Code, and allegations are made therein respecting any public servant, the applicant may give evidence of the
facts alleged in the application by an affidavit, and the court may, if it thinks fit, order that evidence relating to
such facts be so given. Such affidavits shall be confined to, and shall state separately, such facts as the
deponent is able to prove from his own knowledge and such fact as he has reasonable ground to believe to be
true, and in the latter case, the deponent shall clearly state the grounds of such belief.123 Section 297(1) lays
down the authorities before whom affidavits to be used before any court may be sworn. They are: any Judge or
any judicial or executive magistrate, or any commissioner of oaths appointed by a High Court or a court of
session, or any notary appointed under the Notaries Act, 1952.
The above are “express provisions of law” which authorise the use of affidavits as evidence, and under which
the person making the affidavit is bound to state the truth. The filing of a false affidavit, by a witness, in
proceedings before a court, constitutes an offence under sections 191 and 192, and not under section 199,
IPC.124 But where a deponent is illiterate and the affidavit has been written in one language and signed by the
deponent in another language and the evidence is lacking to show that the contents of the affidavit were read
over to the deponent, prosecution under section 193 is not expedient.125 In Asgarali Mulla Abrahimji v
Emperor,126 a learned Judge of the Nagpur High Court classified affidavits as declarations and observed:
Declarations or verified statements are of two kinds: (i) Declarations which a person is bound by law to make such as
the verification of pleadings under the Civil Procedure Code. (ii) Declarations which a person makes for the purpose of
their being used as evidence, such as affidavits filed under O 19, CPC. Of these, the second kind of declaration alone
can be used as evidence and can therefore found a conviction of the offence under s 193, Penal Code.
It is, however, stated that when a person has to make the verification of his pleadings etc. under a specific
provision of law and if he does so knowing that that verification is false, he is said to give false evidence,
thereby making himself liable for punishment under section 193, though the verification is not used as
evidence.127
[s 191.29.2] Affidavit Attested/Sworn Before Magistrate Not Competent to Do So—Effect
Where a deputy magistrate has no power to administer an oath to a person making a declaration in the shape
of an affidavit, such person cannot, on the facts stated in such declarations, be prosecuted for committing an
offence either under sections 193 or 199 of the IPC.128 Where an affidavit by an accused in a criminal case is
sworn before a magistrate who has no jurisdiction to take evidence in the case, the accused cannot be
prosecuted under section 193 or section 199, IPC for filing a false affidavit.129 A declaration, before it can be
made the foundation of a prosecution under section 193, IPC, must be one which is admissible in evidence,
and which the court, before which it is filed, is bound or authorised by law to receive in evidence.130
[s 191.29.3] Mere Omission to State Facts in Affidavit in Examination-in-Chief, No False Evidence
Mere omission to state certain facts in affidavit in examination-in-chief about the accused’s previous conviction
does not amount to false evidence when in cross-examination, he admits of his conviction for the offence under
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section 304A, IPC.131
[s 191.29.4] Coram Non Judice
In order to found a prosecution for perjury the affidavit must be such as may be used as evidence. Where,
therefore, in support of an application for transfer of a criminal case affidavits were filed of persons who were
neither parties nor witnesses in the case; it was held that the statements were coram non judice and could not
form the subject of a charge under section 193, IPC.132 This view, however, does not appear to be sound in
Badri Prasad v Jhamman,133 disagreeing with its earlier view in Emperor v Mattan,134 the Allahabad High Court
has held that if the accused person chooses to come within the scope of this section and swears an affidavit on
false facts, he would be liable to punishment which can be inflicted upon persons who swear, such false
affidavits. Therefore, if the affidavit filed by the accused is required by law to be sworn, the accused cannot take
shelter behind the plea that the affidavit was not required135 and if he makes false allegations in an affidavit in
support of an application, he can be convicted under this section.136 It is submitted that a witness cannot
otherwise be in a better position in respect of his filing a false affidavit in any case, whatsoever.
[s 191.29.5] Affidavit to Conform to Truth Though Made Voluntarily When Not Required
It is not disputed that an affidavit is evidence within the meaning of section 191, IPC and a person swearing to a
false affidavit is guilty of perjury punishable under section 193, IPC.137 The opening words of this section do not
support the contention that a man who is not bound under the law to make an affidavit can, if he does make
one, deliberately refrain from stating truthfully the facts which are within his knowledge. The meaning of these
words is that whenever in a court of law a person binds himself on oath to state the truth, he is bound to state
the truth and he cannot be heard to say that he should not have gone into the witness-box or should not have
made an affidavit and therefore the submission that any false statement which he had made after taking the
oath is not covered by the words of this section, is not supportable.138
[s 191.29.6] Complaint by the Magistrate Before Whom Affidavit is Sworn—Not Necessary
Adducing evidence and swearing an affidavit is entirely a different concept. The swearing of an affidavit is a
form prescribed by law to be used as a piece of evidence acceptable in a court or before any other authority.139
Thus, complaint for perjury can be made by the court or the authority before whom the false affidavit is filed or
used notwithstanding the fact that the affidavit was sworn before a magistrate and not before such court or
authority.
[s 191.29.7] Principle Applicable to Affidavits
The filing of a false affidavit, by a witness in proceedings before a court, constitutes an offence under sections
191 and 192, and not under section 199, IPC.140 But where a deponent is illiterate or the affidavit has been
written in one language and signed by the deponent in another language and the evidence is lacking to show
that the contents of the affidavit were read over to the deponent, prosecution under section 193 was held to be
not expedient.141
[s 191.29.8] False Affidavit in Support of Writ Petition
In a writ petition which was supported by an affidavit, the petitioner stated that he had not used or permitted to
be used the building in any manner contrary to the terms imposed by the respondent (Delhi Development
Authority). The court found that this statement which was false, was made to mislead and overreach the court
and directed the registrar of the High Court to file a complaint for the offence of perjury in a competent court.142
Where an affidavit was filed in support of a writ petition, by a concealment of facts which misled the High Court
to pass an ad interim order, the petitioner shall be deemed to have intentionally given false evidence in a stage
of judicial proceeding and can be charged with having offended public justice under chapter XI of the IPC 1860,
particularly section 191 read with section 193 of the Code.143 Where the respondent filed an affidavit in support
of a writ petition, for the purpose of being used in judicial proceedings, and wrongly made a statement that the
age of Dr Justice AS Anand had not been determined by the President of India in terms of Article 217 of the
Constitution, the respondent being legally bound by an oath to state the truth in the affidavit accompanying the
petition was prima facie held to have made a false statement which constitutes an offence of giving false
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evidence as defined under section 191 IPC, punishable under section 193, IPC.144
Where a petitioner made a statement on oath in a writ petition supported by an affidavit that the timings of a law
college were changed by the principal arbitrarily, the true fact being that the principal had the powers to change
the timings and the change was made by him after receiving the representation of the majority of the students
of the college to the said effect, the petitioner was held liable to be prosecuted for deliberately making a false
statement before the court in a judicial proceeding, more so when he was one of the students signing the
representation.145
[s 191.30] “Or Being Bound by Law to Make a Declaration on any Subject”—Scope of
This clause is concerned with that class of cases of which the declaration to be made by a person obtaining a
marriage licence, is an example.146 The declarations contemplated in this section are declarations which a
person is bound by law to make. The Income Tax Act requires a person to deliver certain accounts or
statements and penalises the delivery of any account or statement which is false.147 It is submitted that such
statements come under this clause and the person delivering a false account or statement would be liable for
giving false evidence. In some cases, it has been held that declarations, which a person is bound by law to
make, are such as the verification of pleadings under the Civil Procedure Code.148 The Code of Civil Procedure
requires an application for execution of a decree to be in writing, signed and verified by the applicant and to
contain certain particulars, among which is a statement whether any and what payment or adjustment has been
made between the parties subsequent to the decree sought to be executed. It has been held that an intentional
omission to make such a statement or making a false statement amounts to an offence of giving false
evidence.149 A declaration, before it can be made the foundation of a prosecution must be one which is
admissible in evidence, and which the court, before which it is filed, is bound or authorised by law to receive in
evidence.150 But it need not be material to the case,151 nor need it be on oath or solemn affirmation.152
[s 191.31] A Statement Must Contain the Whole Truth
This section requires that there must be a statement made by the accused and that the statement must be
false. The statement covered by this section, must be a definite statement of fact or of belief. These must be a
definite assertion and not a statement qualified by expression of doubt or want of knowledge.153 The accused
must also know or believe what he has stated or declared is false.154 To support a prosecution for giving false
evidence it must be shown that the false statement charged against the accused is literally false. There must be
a statement of fact which is false. It is no offence if the facts stated are true but some circumstances are
suppressed, with the result that a wrong inference may be deduced.155 But the Allahabad High Court expressed
a contrary view in Narottam Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh,156 wherein it has been held that a person is guilty of
perjury not only when he does not state the truth but also when he states something which is not the whole
truth. This view seems to lay down the correct proposition of law. The statements made by the accused must
be false. It must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt that those statements are deliberately false.157 In
Queen v Ahmed Ally,158 it was observed:
It appears to us that the true rule is that no man can be convicted of giving false evidence except on proof of facts
which, if accepted as true, show not merely that it is incredible, but that it is impossible that the statements of the party
accused, made on oath can be true. If the inference from the facts proved falls short of this, it seems to us that there is
nothing on which a conviction can stand; because assuming all that is proved to be true, it is still possible that no crime
was committed. The evidence of a medical man or other skilled witness, however eminent, as to what he thinks may or
may not have taken place under a particular combination of circumstances, however, confidently he may speak, is
ordinarily a mere matter of opinion. Human judgment is fallible. Human knowledge is limited and imperfect.
[s 191.32] Contradictory Statements
The question as to whether a witness who makes contradictory statements at different stages of his
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examination by the same court, for example one in cross-examination and the other in re-examination, can be
convicted on a charge in the alternative, ie, that one or other of the two statements made by him must be false,
without proving which of them is false, has led to some difference of judicial opinion, the majority of judges
holding that such a conviction is good.159 If an accused has made two statements, which are so contradictory
and irreconcilable that both cannot possibly be true, it means that one of them is false and if the other
ingredients of the offence are made out, he can be convicted without proving which of the two statements is
false. It is only when the prosecution charges him with making a particular statement falsely that it has to prove
that that particular statement is false and not the other. In such a case, the mere fact that he made conflicting
statement would not suffice, because it may very well be that the other statement was false and not the
statement with which he was charged. When all that is proved is that one of the two statements is false, it
means that it is not proved that a particular statement is false. If the accused is charged with making that
statement falsely, naturally the charge must fail.160 The essence of the offence lies in the intention to give false
evidence, and that intention may, I think, just as well exist when the contradiction is in various stages of the
same deposition as where it is in different stages of the same proceedings. To consider whether the false
statement was made in the course of the deposition or in the course of two separate depositions seems to be
irrelevant, and calculated to obscure the real question. An intention to give false evidence is a necessary
element to constitute an offence under section 193. That intention can only be gathered from the surrounding
circumstances, and the subsequent correction or retraction by a witness of his statement in the same
deposition might negate the existence of such an intention.161
[s 191.33] Conviction Only When Two Statements are Irreconcilable
To convict an accused of giving false evidence, it is necessary to show not only that he has made a statement
which is false, but also that he either knew or believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true. It is a well-
known rule of law, applied by eminent judges to the cases of perjury arising out of contradictory statements,
that the courts dealing with them should not convict unless fully satisfied that the statements are from every
point of view irreconcilable, and if the contradiction consists in two statements opposed to each other as to
matters of inference or opinion on which a man may take one view at one time and a contrary view at another,
there can be no perjury, unless he has on oath stated facts on which his first statement was based and then
denied these facts on oath on a subsequent occasion. Where it is sought to establish the offence of perjury on
contradictory statements, although the court may believe that on the one or the other occasion the prisoner
swore what was not true, it is not a necessary consequence that he committed perjury for there are cases in
which a person might very honestly and conscientiously swear to a particular fact from the best of his
recollection and belief, and from other circumstances at a subsequent time be convinced that he was wrong
and swear to the reverse, without meaning to swear falsely either time.162
Where in an application to dismiss order on compromise petition allegedly signed by impersonating the
respondents instead of the real respondents in writ appeal an admission was made by the accused on oath that
some persons impersonated real contesting respondents in writ appeal, subsequently, however, in suo motu
proceedings for contempt of court the accused stated that he had given false statement in course of those
proceedings when his sworn statement was being recorded, it was held that the act of the accused amounts to
commission of the offence of perjury.163
[s 191.33.1] Court Cannot Assume Existence of Explanation to the Inconsistency of Two Statements
When two statements, given by the accused on two different occasions, are mutually inconsistent and the
inconsistency is nowhere resolved in the subsequent correspondence, the accused may be able to show that
the statement made by him on one of the two days was a true and correct statement and he may even have
some reasonably acceptable explanation for the apparent inconsistency between the two. But the court cannot
assume that such an explanation exists. Once the inconsistency in his subsequent statement made on oath is
brought home to the court, the court cannot just wish away the inconsistencies and cannot hold that the
accused may have some plausible explanation to the inconsistency. If the accused wants to give some
explanation, he must give it.164
[s 191.33.2] Law does not Punish a Man for Changing Opinion
The court should, however, not convict a person for perjury unless fully satisfied that the statements are from
every point of view irreconcilable;165 and if the statements opposed to each other are as to matters of inference
Page 21 of 34
or opinion on which a man may take one view at one time, and a contrary view at another, there can be no
perjury unless he has stated facts on oath which are in conflict with the facts on oath on a subsequent
occasion. The law does not punish a man because he has changed his opinion.166 A witness should always be
given an opportunity for explaining an apparently contradictory statement at the time it is made.167
[s 191.33.3] The Whole Statement must be Read as One
As observed by Bhashyam Iyendgar J in Re Palani Palgan,168 no statement by a witness in a deposition can be

regarded as a complete statement until the deposition is finished, and corrected if necessary; for till then, every
statement is liable to be retracted, corrected, varied or qualified, the whole deposition must be read and
construed as one, and if a later statement in it is contradictory to or at variance with a previous statement in the
same deposition, the statement first made will be deemed to be modified by the subsequent statement which
can be regarded as a retraction or correction of it.
Where a double record is maintained by the court and two versions are taken down of a statement—one in
English and other in vernacular—and the latter statement of such a witness in court is in accord with the
English version, then it cannot be said in law that the witness had in fact committed perjury in making a
statement in court which ran counter to the version of his earlier statement.169 The question as to whether one
of the two contradictory statements must necessarily be false is a question of construction and therefore of
law.170
[s 191.33.4] Contradictory Statements—Intention is a Question of Fact
The decisions referred to above show that the existence of contradictory statements in the same deposition or
different depositions makes no difference. It is the intention of the witness at the time of making the statements
which is material. If the first statement was made through an error or mistake or under the stress of cross-
examination, without fully understanding the implications of the question, there could be no intention on his part
to deceive the court. In such a case, the subsequent correction must be accepted as the only statement of the
witness. On the other hand, if the first statement is deliberate, the intention to deceive the court is apparent.
The subsequent statement in such a case would be equally deliberate and intended to deceive the court. The
intention is a question of fact to be decided in each case.171
[s 191.33.5] Contradictory Statements—Completion of Offence Does Not Remain in Abeyance
It has been held that it is quite immaterial that two contradictory statements were made in the course of one
deposition in one trial. If the first statement is false, the applicant committed the offence of perjury as soon as
he made it. Whether he made it deliberately and whether he knew or believed it to be false or did not believe it
to be true is to be seen with reference to the time at which he made it. If the requirements of this section are
fulfilled, he committed the offence of perjury as soon as he made it. The completion of the offence does not
remain in abeyance for a short time in order to give him an opportunity of repenting and correcting himself. It
does not remain in abeyance so long as the trial is not over or so long as he has not been cross-examined
under sections 243 or 247 of the Code or so long as he has an opportunity of being recalled and making the
correct statement later. What he does subsequently has absolutely no bearing on the offence already
committed by him. The offence is not purged or wiped off by subsequent repentance or retraction or
correction.172
A witness who endeavours to correct his evidence as recorded by a magistrate by means of an affidavit stating
what he really said, does not make any contradictory statement.173 Where a witness made a statement which
was false and at once admitted it, and stated what the real truth was, it was held that he should not be
prosecuted for giving false evidence.174 But where a witness deliberately gave false evidence and, when
confronted with incontestable proof of his falsehood, admitted it to be false, it was held that he was guilty of
perjury.175
As to a charge in the alternative, see CrPC 1973, section 221 and illustration (c) thereto. For further discussion
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of the subject see commentary under section 193.
[s 191.34] Knowledge or Belief that the Statement is False or is not True
A man cannot be convicted of perjury for having acted rashly, or for having failed to make reasonable inquiry
with regard to the facts alleged by him to be true. It must be found that he made some statement or, statements
which he knew to be false or which he believed to be false or which he did not believe to be true.70 The
accused must have known or believed that his statement was false at the time he made it, or not have believed
it to be true.176 The accused must have known or believed that his statement was false at the time he made it,
or not have believed it to be true.177 The mere fact of a person placing his signature on a written report, without
knowing its contents, is no ground for holding that he necessarily knew or had reason to believe that the
contents of the report were false; at most, the act is indiscreet and does not amount to an offence under section
193. It may be a very foolish thing for a man to attest a document and without being made aware of the
contents, however, this indiscretion does not amount to an offence under the IPC.178 A person, going into the
witness-box, must believe that all the evidence he is about to give is true, otherwise he gives false evidence.
Where the evidence is proved to be false to the knowledge of the accused, his intention to give such evidence
is proved.179 The criminal intention must always be proved.180
[s 191.34.1] Making a Statement not Believing it to be True Amounts to Perjury
The law requires that a person may not positively know a statement to be false and he may not even believe it
to be true, but if, nevertheless, he does not believe the statement to be true, then he commits the offence of
giving false evidence.181
Where in an affidavit the deponent makes certain allegations based on information conveyed to him by other
persons, even if the information which was given to him was wrong, he cannot be held liable unless at the time
he swore the affidavit he knew that it was wrong and in spite of the knowledge, he swore the affidavit.182 Even
belief would fall under expln 2 to this section.183
[s 191.35] Whether the Proceedings Must be Sanctioned or Authorised by Law
It is only when a person is legally bound by an oath or by an express provision of law to state the truth or is
bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject and he makes any statement which is false and which he
knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, that he is said to have given false evidence.184
Where a magistrate had no power to administer oath to a witness when he was examined as a witness in an
inquiry regarding a headman, the orders of the magistrate in respect of such matters were held to be executive
orders and the witness could not be convicted under section 193, IPC.185 Since a headman cannot examine a
witness in an inquiry, the statement made to the headman can be used only under sections 145 and 157,
Evidence Act, 1872.186 Where the affidavit by the accused in a criminal proceeding was sworn before a first
class magistrate who had no jurisdiction to take evidence in the particular matter in respect of which the
accused was prosecuted, the provisions of sections 4 and 5 of the Oaths Act were contravened and the
accused therefore, could not be prosecuted under sections 193 and 199 for filing a false affidavit on oath.187
[s 191.36] Abetment in Giving False Evidence
Where an accused asks a witness to suppress the mention of certain facts while giving evidence before a
magistrate in reference to a charge of defamation, it would constitute abetment of giving false evidence in a
stage of a judicial proceeding.188
Where C falsely represented himself to be U, and the writer of a document signed by U and T knowing that C
was not U, and had not written such document, adduced C as U and as the writer of that document, it was held
that T ought to have been convicted on a charge of abetting the giving of false evidence.189 There can be no
offence of abetment of giving false evidence unless the person charged with abetment intended not only that a
statement should be made, but also that the statement should be made falsely.190
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Where a person having reason to believe that a certain man has committed an offence punishable under
section 457, IPC, instigates the complainant and the witnesses in the case to make statements which he knows
to be false, he commits an offence under sections 109 and 193 and not under sections 201 and 511 of the
Code.191
[s 191.36.1] Explanation 1
A false statement made punishable under this section may be oral or in writing.192 An oral statement made on
oath before a court or a person legally authorised to receive evidence, comes within the category of verbal
statement. The statements and declarations made in any affidavit on oath or solemn affirmation or any other
statements or verification made under the requirement of any law, though not on oath, come within the category
of a statement made in writing. The expln 1 to this section, however, contemplates a statement even made
otherwise, which is neither verbal nor in writing. Signs or visible representations may fall in this category. It is,
however, submitted that to make a sign or visible representation punishable, it should fulfill the other
requirements of this section discussed above.
[s 191.36.2] Explanation 2—“Attest”—Meaning of
The dictionary meaning of the word “attesting” used in expln 2 is “certifying the validity of” and it has been used
in the sense of certifying a statement or document to be true. This may be evident from illustration (e) to this
section. It, therefore, follows that not only an interpreter or translator is liable to be prosecuted under this
section but even any other person who knowingly certifies a false document to be a true document, while being
bound by on oath or other requirement of law, will have to face the same consequences and he can be
punished for committing perjury under section 193, IPC. A voluntary act of attesting or certifying a document by
a private person may not fall under expln 2 and to bring it within the clutches of this section it must be proved
that the attestation was made while being bound by an oath or by an express provision of law.
[s 191.36.3] Effect of Statement Without Knowledge
It will appear from the foregoing discussion that it is not necessary that a statement or declaration made by the
person is true to the personal knowledge of the maker, even if it is based on belief it is sufficient to bring the
case under this section. In case the information received by a person is not believed to be true but he still uses
it as true, he commits an offence under this section.193 The Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh v State of Pepsu,194
has specifically held that even belief would fall under expln 2 to this section. The law further contemplates a
situation where a person does not know any fact, in controversy, but still says that he knows it. Illustration (d) to
this section amply explains this. Such statements are also covered under this section.
[s 191.37] Prosecution not Necessary in All Cases of Perjury
It is now well settled that the prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned by courts only in those cases where it
appears to be deliberate and conscious and conviction is reasonable, probable or likely. It is also well
recognised that there must be a prima facie case of a deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the
courts should be satisfied that there is reasonable foundation for the charge.195 Where evidence evenly
balanced in weakness and the case is one of oath against oath, the prosecution should be withdrawn.196 Where
the offence of rape was alleged to be committed, the Government doctor who examined the victim gave the
certificate of a commission of rape on the victim but turned hostile during the trial and tried to protect the
accused, the Karnataka High Court took a serious view of the matter, particularly since the man was a
Government doctor and observed that it was unfortunate that a professional, while dealing with such a serious
case, has attempted to give evidence which is nothing short of perjury, but this fact does not necessarily prove
fatal to the prosecution. The Karnataka High Court recommended that the concerned authorities take
appropriate disciplinary action against the doctor after affording him a reasonable opportunity to show cause.197
But the direction to file a complaint under section 340 read with section 195(1)(b), CrPC for offence under
section 191 read with section 193, IPC was not issued.
In a case, petitioner officer of bank was being prosecuted under section 191, IPC for giving false evidence in
writ petition. Proceedings started against the complainant, defaulter in re-payment of loan under sections 13
and 14 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The petitioner acted in good faith representing the Bank, as instructed by
Page 24 of 34
the Bank on the basis of the documents available in the Bank in respect of the transaction. If any bona fide
mistake has been made in the calculation by the petitioner, it will not amount to an offence under section 191 of
the IPC. Petitioner held protected by section 32 of the SARFAESI Act. Complaint filed under section 340, CrPC
for prosecution under section 191, IPC quashed.198
[s 191.37.1] Court to Strike Delicate Balance Between Two Extremes
While issuing notices of perjury, the court has to exercise a delicate balance between two extremes, one being
that people giving perjured evidence should not be allowed to go scot free for that would be giving a licence to
people to give perjured evidence. On the other hand, the court has to equally bear in mind that being very
sensitive on this issue and approaching every evidence scathingly and easily jumping to the conclusion that
witnesses are liars would result in people shying away from giving evidence in courts; a tendency which is on
the increase in our country.199 Thus, where a notice under section 191, IPC for perjury was issued to eye-
witnesses alleged to have committed perjury while the evidence on record did not indicate with certainty that
they were liars, the issue of a notice of perjury was found not proper and therefore, quashed by the Bombay
High Court invoking inherent powers, even though only one of the witnesses had challenged the notice both on
his behalf and that of the others.200
It is not that every case of perjury, irrespective of facts and circumstances, should form the subject of an
inquiry, but it is only in such cases where the courts are of an honest belief and opinion; on an objective
consideration of the facts and circumstances, that the interest of justice requires the laying of a complaint. It is
not mandatory, but discretionary for the court, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, either
to conduct a preliminary inquiry or to dispense with the same, to form an opinion that it is in the interests of
justice to prosecute the person or persons who committed the perjury.201
[s 191.38] Burden of Proof to Prove Falsehood
The burden of proving the falsehood of the statement lies on the prosecution. Where, therefore, in a suit for
sale on a mortgage consisted of two promissory notes, and the accused in his defense pleaded that the
promissory notes were without consideration, and he was accused of giving false evidence in respect of that
pleading, it was held that:202
For the purpose of the civil courts the Negotiable Instruments Act lays down that the presumption is that a promissory
note has been passed for consideration. That rule of law would not necessarily apply to a criminal trial in which every
element which goes to constitute a particular offence has to be proved by the prosecution. In the present case it was
necessary for the prosecution to prove that the promissory notes were for consideration and it was not for the accused
to prove the contrary.
1 Hem Chandra Mukherjee v King Emperor, AIR 1925 Cal 85 : 26 Cr LJ 345.
2 Re suo motu proceeding against Mr R Karuppan, Advocate, (2001) Cr LJ 2611 (SC).
3 A Hirriyama Gourde v State of Karnataka, (1998) Cr LJ 4756 (Kant).

Page 25 of 34
4 Johns Dict cited in Best Ev, section 11; Dharmendra Nath Shastri v Rex, AIR 1949 All 353 [LNIND 1948 ALL 53], p 355
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
5 Srinivasa v R, (1881) 4 Mad 395.
6 Steph Introd 3, 4, Goharya v Emperor, AIR 1930 Ngp 242 : 135 IC 673 : 26 Nag LJ 229(FB).
7 Norton Ev, 95, Field, Ev, 6th Edn p 11; as to instruments of evidence, Best, Ev, section 123.
8 Laxman Padma Bhagat v State, AIR 1965 Bom 195 [LNIND 1964 BOM 59] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 616 , p 629.
9 Ram Singh v Main Chand, (1972) 74 Punj LR 521 ; Ram Lal v State, AIR 1964 Punj 211 : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 544 ;
Darshan Singh v Jayanti Prasad Joshi, (1963) All LJ 404.
10 Arun Kumar Agarwal v Radha Arun, (2001) Cr LJ 3561 (Kant)(DB) : (2002) 1 CCR 192 (Kant).
11 1 and 2 Geo 5, c 6.
12 11 and 12 Geo 6, c 58.
13 Omitted by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948.

14 R v Castro, (1874) LR 9 QB 350, p 357, per Blackburn J.
15 Russell on Crime, 11th Edn p 323.
16 R v Mitchel, (2004) EWCA Crimes 1516 : (2005) 1 Cr App Rep (S) 193 ; Halsbury’s Laws of England.
17 Halsbury’s Laws of Canada.
18 Parl papers, 3 August 1838, Indian Law Commission, p 673.
19 Law Commission Report, 24 June 1847, para 130; Parl Papers, 16 May 1848, Indian Law Commission, p 330.
20 Queen-Empress v Ghulet, 7 ILR All 41 : (1884) All WN 255.
21 Anjinoppa v State of Karnataka, (2001) (I) CCR 94 (Kant) (DB).
22 Anjinoppa v State of Karnataka, (2001) (I) CCR 94 (Kant) (DB).
23 KG Pethani v State of Gujarat, 2013 (132) AIC 204 (SC) : (2014) 13 SCC 539 : 2013 (12) Scale 1 .
Page 26 of 34
24 Section 193.
25 Emperor v Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ILR 28 Bom 479, p 486 : 6 Bom LR 324 : 1 Cr LJ 305.
26 Raja Ram v Emperor, AIR 1929 All 936 : 30 Cr LJ 1154; Durga Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1933 All 318 : 34 Cr LJ 686;
Bihari Lal Sud v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 529 : 41 Cr LJ 204; Queen v Parbutty Chum Sircar, 6 WR (Cr) 84;
Mahommad Khudabux v King-Emperor, AIR 1949 Ngp 303 : 50 Cr LJ 842 : (1949) ILR Ngp 355.
27 Emperor v Babu Ram, (1926) 48 ILR 509 , p 511 : 1 Cr LJ 434 : 1 All LJ 236; Queen v Mahommad Hussain, 16 WR
(Cr) 37; Queen v Shib Prasad Giri, 19 WR (Cr) 69.
28 Emperor v Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ILR 28 Bom 479, p 493 : 6 Bom LR 324 : 1 Cr LJ 395.
29 Yellappa s/o Rangappa v Kamalourva, (1995) Cr LJ 2303 (Kant).
30 Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC 68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] .
31 Sadhu Ram v Shyam Sunder Gupta, (1975) CLR 88 .
32 Ramlal v State, AIR 1964 Punj 211 : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 544 ; Eachara Warier v Home Secy, (1977) Ker LT 526 , p 528 :
(1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 330; Ram Singh v Mainchand, (1972) 74 Punj LR 521 .
33 Echara Warier v Home Secy, (1977) Ker LT 526 , p 528 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 330.
34 Bhagirath Lal v Emperor, AIR 1934 All 1017 , p 1018 : (1934) All LJ 1064, p 1066 : 4 All WR 535; Rama Naria Hagavne
v Emperor, AIR 1922 Bom 99 : 23 Cr LJ 23 : ILR 46 Bom 317 : 23 Bom LR 987; Superintendent and Legal
Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v Tarak Nath Chatterjee, AIR 1935 Cal 304 , p 305 : 37 Cr LJ 698 (DB).
35 Anant Gopal Sheorey v State of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 915 [LNIND 1958 SC 80] : (1958) Cr LJ 1429 : (1958) Mad LJ
(Cr) 956 : (1959) SCR 919 [LNIND 1958 SC 80] : (1958) SCJ 123 ; State of Maharashtra v RB Choudhari, AIR 1968 SC
117 [LNIND 1967 SC 144] : (1968) Cr LJ 95 , 97.
36 R v Gopal Das, (1881) 3 ILR Mad 271, p 280 (per curriam; Kernan and Ayyar JJ, dissent); R v Gonu, (1888) 12 B440,
(per curriam; Birdwood J, dissent); Emperor v Cunna, AIR 1920 Bom 270 : 59 IC 324 : 22 Cr LJ 68 : 22 Bom LR 1247
(FB); R v Samiappa, (1891) 15 Mad 63; Moher v R, (1893) 21 Cal 792 , (per curriam); R v Moss, (1893) 16 All 88 , 100;
Haider v Abru, (1905) 32 Cal 356 : 2 Cal LJ 105 : 9 Cal WN 911; Kashi Ram v Emperor, AIR 1930 All 493 : 129 IC 707
: (1930) All LJ 1121; Sodoruddin v R, (1904) 31 ILR Cal 715 , 720 : 8 Cal WN 910; Bai Shanta v Umrao Amir Malik, AIR
1926 Bom 141 : ILR 50 Bom 162 : 93 IC 151 : 27 Cr LJ 423 : 28 Bom LR 1 (FB).
37 Emperor v Pir Qadir Buksh Shah, AIR 1925 Lah 312 .
38 Bai Shanta v Umrao Amir Malik, AIR 1926 Bom 141 (FB); overruling Queen-Empress v Babaji, ILR 17 Bom 12;
Queen Empress v Balkrishna Vithal, ILR 17 Bom 573 and following Satish Chandra Chakravarti v Ram Dayal, ILR 48
Cal 388.
39 Venkatarama Reddi v Shriniwasa Reddi, AIR 1936 Mad 350 [LNIND 1935 MAD 342] , p 361 : 37 Cr LJ 557.
Page 27 of 34
40 Ramjit Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1959 SC 843 [LNIND 1959 SC 63] , p 846 : (1959) Cr LJ 1121 : (1959) SCJ 905
[LNIND 1959 SC 63] : (1959) Mad LJ (Cr) 618 : (1959) ILR Punj 1709.
41 D Jothi v KP Kandasamy, (2000) Cr LJ (Mad) 292 .
42 Section 40, Indian Penal Code and section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act.
43 Section 43, Indian Penal Code.
44 Inderjit Singh Grewal v State of Punjab, (2011) 12 SCC 588 [LNIND 2011 SC 801] , p 597 : 2011 (9) Scale 295 [LNIND
2011 SC 801] : 2011 (6) Supreme 181 : 2011 (6) SLT 434 : 2012 Cr LJ 309 .
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Attorney-General v Bradlaugh, 14 QBD 667.

48 Inder Prasad v Jagmohan Das, AIR 1924 Oudh 442 : 11 Oudh LJ 485 : 84 IC 314, 1 Oudh WN 167; State of
Rajasthan v Darshan Singh, AIR 2012 SC 1973 [LNIND 2012 SC 334] : 2012 Cr LJ 2908 : (2012) 5 SCC 789 [LNIND
2012 SC 334] .
49 Ramjit Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1959 SC 843 [LNIND 1959 SC 63] , p 846 : (1959) Cr LJ 1121 : (1959) SCJ 905
[LNIND 1959 SC 63] : (1959) Mad LJ (Cr) 618 : (1959) ILR Punj 1709.
50 Ram Lal v State, (1964) 1 Cr LJ 544 .
51 Malayananauru Anantha Anandacharyulu v State of AP, 2014 (2) Crimes 486 (AP) (Short Note).
52 Section 1 of the Perjury Act, 1911 cited in note 1 above.
53 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 11 (1), 4th Edn reissue, para 300; Perjury Act, 1911, section 15.
54 R v Sewa Bhogta, 23 WR (Cr) 12.
55 Rameshwar v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 [LNIND 1951 SC 76] : 53 Cr LJ 547 : (1952) SCJ 46 : (1952) 1 Mad
LJ 440 : (1952) Mad WN 150; Mahommad Sugal Esa Mamasan Rer Alaha v King, AIR 1946 PC 3 : (1946) All LJ 100 :
(1945) 2 Mad LJ 493 : 50 CWR 98 : 48 Bom LR 138 (overruling Queen-Empress v Maru, ILR 10 All 207);
Chowkchand Balabux v Commissioner of Income Tax, Assam, AIR 1960 Assam 187 ; Queen v Sewa Bhogta, 14 Beng
LR 294 : 23 WR (Cr) 12(FB); Ram Samujh v Emperor, 10 OC 337 : 7 Cr LJ 89; Queen-Empress v Govind Chandra
Seal, ILR 19 Cal 355; State of Rajasthan v Vijayram, (1968) Cr LJ 270 , p 273 : (1968) Raj LW 1 ; State of Rajasthan v
Darshan Singh, (2012) 5 SCC 789 [LNIND 2012 SC 334] : AIR 2012 SC 1973 [LNIND 2012 SC 334] : 2012 Cr LJ 2908
: (2012) 115 AIC 14 (SC).
56 Khotha Subba Chetti v R, ILR 6 Mad 252 : 1 Weir 116 : 156; Re Iswar Chunder, ILR 14 Cal 356 : 1 Weir 176; R v
Pakiri, 1 Cr LJ 1004 : 2 LBR 272; Phulel v R, 14 Cr LJ 56.
57 Hari Charan Singh v R, ILR 27 Cal 455.
58 Gobind Chandra v R, ILR 19 Cal 355.

Page 28 of 34
59 Ramesh Singh Bisht v State of Uttarakhand, 2013 Cr LJ 4318 , p 4319 (Utr).
60 Section 3(2) of the Oaths Act, 44 of 1969.
61 Abdul Aziz v Emperor, AIR 1916 Lah 281 : 17 Cr LJ 491.
62 Sakhi Rai v Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 266 : 20 Cr LJ 245.
63 Dayaram v Emperor, AIR 1934 All 988 .
64 R v Palliyathodi, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 118 : 3 LBR 1.
65 R v Ghulam Mustafa, ILR 26 All 371.
66 Hirananda Ojha v R, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 575 : 2 Cal LJ 149.
67 R v Alagu Kone, ILR 16 Mad 421 : 1 Weir 175, followed in Suppa Tevan v R, ILR 29 Mad 89; R v Khan, ILR 22 All 115.
68 Re Maddela Ramaniyamma, AIR 1917 Mad 316 (2) : 17 Cr LJ 195 : ILR 39 Mad 977.
69 Purshottam Ishvar Amin v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 3 (FB).
70 Emperor v Tasadduk Hussain, 7 Cal LJ 302; Queen-Empress v Khan, ILR 22 All 115.
71 Pacha Devendra Rao v State of Anhdra Pradesh, (1986) 3 Crimes 38 : (1986) 2 All LT 364 (AP).
72 Maromma v Emperor, AIR 1933 Mad 125 [LNIND 1932 MAD 156] ; Re Bejjili Papamma, AIR 1948 Mad 471 [LNIND
1947 MAD 200] ; Public Prosecutor v Nagalinga Reddi, AIR 1959 AP 250 [LNIND 1958 AP 37] : (1959) Cr LJ 564 .
73 Anginappa v State of Karnataka, (2001) 1 CCR 94 (Kant) (DB).
74 Emperor v Parma Nand, AIR 1933 Lah 321 : 34 Cr LJ 469 : ILR 14 Lah 507 : 34 PLR 421.
75 Public Prosecutor v Jalayya, AIR 1954 Mad 303 [LNIND 1953 MAD 3] .
76 Queen-Empress v Bharma, ILR 11 Bom 702 (FB); Emperor v Shettepa Satapa Mundenavar, 13 Cr LJ 709; Mahommad
Sarfraz Khan v Crown, (1951) 52 Cr LJ 1425 .
77 Corresponding to section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1922.
78 Chowk Chand Balabux v Commissioner of Income-tax, Assam, AIR 1960 Assam 187 .
Page 29 of 34
79 Dinshaw Dorabshaw Shroff v Commissioner of Income-tax, AIR 1943 Bom 77 , p 80 : (1943) ILR Bom 152 : 45 Bom LR
31.
80 Re Narayanaswamy Iyer, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 102 : (1912) Mad WN 1107.
81 King-Emperor v Pakiri, 1 Cr LJ 1004 : 2 LBR 272 (FB).
82 Sumat Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1942 All 11 : 43 Cr LJ 319 : (1941) All LJ 587 : (1941) ILR All 768 ; Babu Ram v
Emperor, 8 All LJ 674; Abdul Rahman v Emperor, ILR 32 All 30 : 6 All LJ 963; Emperor v Makhni, (1890) All WN 100;
Nallasivan Pillai v N Ramalingam Pillai, AIR 1918 Mad 398 [LNIND 1917 MAD 54] : 18 Cr LJ 783 : 32 Mad LJ 402.
83 Radhika Mohan Kuri v Lal Mohan Sha, ILR 20 Cal 719; Mata Day v Queen-Empress, 24 Cal 755.
84 Re Iswar Chunder Guho, ILR 14 Cal 653.
85 Khotha Subba Chetti v Queen, ILR 6 Mad 252 : 1 Weir 116.
86 Empress v Niaz Ali, ILR 5 All 17 : (1882) 2 AWN 51.
87 Emperor v Abdul Rahman, ILR 32 All 30 : 10 Cr LJ 424 : 6 All LJ 963.
88 Babu Ram v Emperor, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 373 .
89 Buddhi Kota Subbarao (Dr) v K Parasaran, (1996) 2 East Cr C 601 : 606 (SC) : (1996) 3 Crimes 143 : (1996) 5 SCC
530 [LNIND 1996 SC 1254] .
90 Re Palani Palagan, ILR 26 Mad 55; Lachmi Narain v Emperor, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 280 ; Dasondha Singh v Emperor,
(1911) 12 Cr LJ 405 .
91 Mahommad Farooq v Rex, AIR 1950 All 501 [LNIND 1950 ALL 38] : 51 Cr LJ 1346 : (1950) All LJ 277; Bhagwan Singh
v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 214 [LNIND 1952 SC 30] ; Abdul Rehman v Emperor, AIR 1927 PC 44 .
92 Kartar Singh v Emperor, AIR 1917 Lah 192 : 18 Cr LJ 607; Kadir Pakiri v Emperor, AIR 1918 LB 129 : 18 Cr LJ 966;
Emperor v Maya Deb, 6 Cal 762 : 8 CLR 292; Nalluri Chenchiah v Emperor, AIR 1919 Mad 45 : 42 Mad 561 : 20 Cr LJ
379; Kamatchinathan Chetty v Emperor, 28 Mad 308 : 2 Cr LJ 756; Barhmdeo Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1921 Pat
149 : 22 Cr LJ 568 : 2 PLT 380; Jyotis Chandra Mukherjee v Emperor, ILR 36 Cal 955 : 14 Cal WN 82; Hariram
Jawaharlal v Emperor, AIR 1946 Ngp 38 : (1945) ILR Ngp 788 : (1945) Nag LJ 551 .
93 Tun Ya v Emperor, 20 Cr LJ 506 : AIR 1919 LB 129 ; Feroza Jan v Mirza Amir Ali, AIR 1923 Oudh 119 : 24 Cr LJ 781
(in which the perjured statement was made in civil court); Re Bogra, 11 Cr LJ 482 : 7 IC 414 (Mad); Elahi Bux v
Emperor, AIR 1918 Cal 289 : ILR 45 Cal 825 (which again was a case court); Mirza Bux v Emperor, AIR 1923 Ngp 39
: 23 Cr LJ 500 (which also was a case of perjury in a civil court); Sheo Shankar v Emperor, AIR 1940 Ngp 410 : 41 Cr
LJ 697; Koli Bhima v State, AIR 1952 Sau 7 , 8; Mahommad Farooq v Rex, AIR 1950 All 501 [LNIND 1950 ALL 38] :
51 Cr LJ; Bhagwan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 214 [LNIND 1952 SC 30] ; Abdul Rahman v Emperor, AIR
1927 PC 44 ; Ram Lal v State, AIR 1964 Punj 211 : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 544 ; Jogendra Singh v State, AIR 1968 Pat 74 :
(1968) Cr LJ 213 .
Page 30 of 34
94 Mahommad Farooq v Rex, AIR 1950 All 501 [LNIND 1950 ALL 38] .
95 Bhagwan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 214 [LNIND 1952 SC 30] , p 218.
96 Abdul Rahman v Emperor, AIR 1927 PC 44 .
97 Koli Bhima v State, AIR 1952 Sau 7 , 8; Bhagwan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 214 [LNIND 1952 SC 30] .
98 Re Pandu Namaji Govande, (1917) 18 Cr LJ 480 : 19 Bom LR 61; Narmada Shankar v Dan Pal Singh, (1966) Cr LJ
834 , p 836 : (1966) All WR (HC) 474.
99 Re Andbeen Roy, 14 WR 24; Raja Ram v Emperor, AIR 1929 All 936 : 30 Cr LJ 1154 : (1930) All LJ 251.
100 Suo motu proceedings against Mr Kanuppan Advocate, (2001) Cr LJ 2611 (SC).
101 Hiranand v R, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 15 : 9 Cal WN 127 : 2 Cal LJ 149.

102 Naloo Patra v R, ILR 33 Cal 368.
103 Queen v Juggat Chunder Dutt, 6 WR (Cr) 81.
104 Empress v Kassim Khan and Empress v Dahia, ILR 7 Cal 121; Nathu Sheikh v Queen-Empress, ILR 10 Cal 405.
105 R v Parshram, ILR 8 Bom 216; Nathu Shaikh v Queen-Empress, ILR 10 Cal 405; R v Baikanta Bauri, ILR 16 Cal 349; R
v Bhagwantia, ILR 15 All 11.
106 Queen-Empress v Bhagwantia, ILR 15 All 11 : (1892) 12 All WN 141; Nathu Shaikh v Queen-Empress, ILR 10 Cal 405;
Empress v Baikanta Bauri, ILR 16 Cal 349; Queen-Empress v Ismail, ILR 11 Bom 659.
107 R v Kassim Khan, ILR 7 Cal 121 : 1 Weir 166; R v Sankaralinga Kone, ILR 23 Mad 544 : 1 Weir 166; R v Nga Aung Po,
(1910) 11 Cr LJ 474 : (1905) UBR 13.
108 Sub-section (2) of section 161 of the CrPC 1973; Vittappan v State, (1987) 2 Ker LT 174 .
109 Emperor v Padum Singh, AIR 1930 All 490 , p 492 : 31 Cr LJ 954 : ILR 52 All 856 : (1930) All LJ 955; Raja Ram v
Emperor, AIR 1929 All 936 : 30 Cr LJ 1154 : (1930) All LJ 251; Durga Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1933 All 318 : 34 Cr LJ
686; Queen-Empress v Mehrban Singh, ILR 6 All 626 : (1884) 4 All WN 253; Kali Shankar Chatterjee v Sarat Chandra
Day, 81 Cal WN 797, 799.
110 AN Gouda v State of Karnataka, (1998) Cr LJ 4756 .

111 JB Ross & Co v CR Scriven, AIR 1917 Cal 269 (2) : ILR 43 Cal 1001 : 20 Cal WN 1192; Rasbehari Roy v Emperor,
AIR 1930 Cal 639 : 32 Cr LJ 238; Janki Rai v Emperor, AIR 1927 All 383 : 23 Cr LJ 323; Asgar Ali Mulla Ibrahimji v
Emperor, AIR 1943 Ngp 17 , 18 : 44 Cr LJ 313, Mahommad Khan v Gaurishankar Misra, AIR 1954 Ori 193 [LNIND
1953 ORI 40] , p 194 : 55 Cr LJ 1201.
112 Queen-Empress v Mehrban, ILR 6 All 626 : 1 Weir 174.
113 R v Juggut, 6 WR (Cr) 81; Act II of 1877, section 82.
Page 31 of 34
114 Asgaralli Mulla Ibrahimji v Emperor, AIR 1943 Ngp 17 , p 18 : 44 Cr LJ 313 : (1943) ILR Ngp 547 : (1942) Nag LJ 547 ;
relying on Queen-Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288; Emperor v Padam Singh, AIR 1930 All 490 : 31 Cr LJ
954 : (1930) All LJ 955.
115 JB Ross & Co v CB Scriven, AIR 1917 Cal 269 (2).
116 Re Kazi Chunder Mozumdar, ILR 6 Cal 440 : 7 CLR 330; Queen-Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288; Queen
v Kartick Chunder Haldar, 9 WR 58; Purendar Jha v Nanulal Jha, AIR 1927 Pat 197 : 28 Cr LJ 518 : ILR 6 Pat 184 : 8
PLT 412.
117 Ranjit Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1959 SC 843 [LNIND 1959 SC 63] : (1959) Cr LJ 1124 : (1959) ILR Punj 1709.
118 Mahommad Khan v Gourishankar Misra, AIR 1954 Ori 193 [LNIND 1953 ORI 40] , p 194 : 55 Cr LJ 1201; Rashbehari
Roy v Emperor, AIR 1930 Cal 639 : 32 Cr LJ 238.
119 Janki Rai v Emperor, AIR 1927 All 383 : 28 Cr LJ 323 : ILR 49 All 482 : 25 All LJ 327.
120 Emperor v Padam Singh, AIR 1930 All 490 : 31 Cr LJ 954 : (1930) All LJ 955.
121 Section 1, Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
122 Khandesh Spg and Wvg Mills Co Ltd, Jalgaon v Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, Jalgaon, AIR 1960 SC 571 [LNIND
1960 SC 1] , p 574.
123 Sub-section (2) of section 297, CrPC 1973.

124 Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC 68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] : (1967) Cr LJ 6 ; Kannummal v Narayana, AIR
1970 Ker 15 [LNIND 1968 KER 164] , p 16 : (1970) Cr LJ 53 ; MP Paul v Ali Mahommad, (1973) Cr LJ 1284 , p 1287 :
(1973) Ker LT 850 ; Afzal v State of Haryana, AIR 1996 SC 2326 [LNIND 1996 SC 130] : (1996) 1 Supreme Today
397, p 415 : (1996) CLR (SC) 434.
125 Ravuri Manohar Babu v State of AP, (2005) Cr LJ 3562 (AP)
126 Asgarali Mulla Abrahimji v Emperor, AIR 1943 Ngp 17 , p 19.
127 Kali Shankar Chatterjee v Sarat Chandra Dey, (1976-77) 81 Cal WN 797, pp 799, 801, 803.
128 Re Iswar Chunder Guho, ILR 14 Cal 653.
129 Nandu Lal Ghose v Emperor, AIR 1944 Cal 283 : 45 Cr LJ 748 : 43 Cal WN 469.
130 Ram Parshad v Emperor, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 769 , p 770 : ILR 35 All 5 : 10 All LJ 357; the cases cited therein.
131 Ravuri Manohar Babu v State of AP, (2005) Cr LJ 3562 (AP).
132 Emperor v Dital Safar, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 563 : 5 Serv LR 102 relying on Imperator v Baksho, 10 IC 622; Re Iswer
Chunder Guho, ILR 14 Cal 653.
133 Badri Prasad v Jhamman, AIR 1933 All 47 : 34 Cr LJ 457 : ILR 55 All 114.
134 Emperor v Mattan, ILR 33 All 163.
135 Mehtab Singh v Emperor, AIR 1941 All 337 .
136 Vedree CP v State, (1966) Cr LJ 825 (All).
137 Suo motu proceedings against Mr Karuappan Advocate, AIR 2001 SC 2611 [LNIND 2001 SC 1372] .
138 Ranjit Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1959 SC 843 [LNIND 1959 SC 63] , p 846 : (1959) Cr LJ 1121 : (1959) SCJ 905
[LNIND 1959 SC 63] : (1959) ILR Punj 1709.
139 Annasaheb Ramchandra Kunnuro v Parvati Parihar, (1999) Cr LJ 161 (Bom).
140 Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC 68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] : (1967) Cr LJ 6 ; Kannummal v Narayana, AIR
1970 Ker 15 [LNIND 1968 KER 164] , p 16 : (1970) Cr LJ 53 ; following Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC
68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] ; MP Paul v Ali Mahommad, (1973) Cr LJ 1284 , p 1287 : (1973) Ker LT 850 .
141 Ramchand v Munshi Ram, (1969) Punj LJ 74 : (1969) 71 Punj LR 404 , p 413.
142 Rajendra Saina Towers Pvt Ltd v DDA, (1988) 14 1 DRJ 125 : (1987) 33 DLT 216 [LNIND 1987 DEL 330] .
143 Gulshan Kumar v The Collector, Ghaziabad, AIR 1994 All 243 [LNIND 1993 ALL 329] (DB).
144 Suo motu proceedings against Karuppan Advocate, (2001) Cr LJ 2611 (SC).
Page 32 of 34
145 Gulshan Rai Nagpal v Principal, Govt Law College, (2002) Cr LJ 171 (Sik) (DB).
146 Empress v Kassim Khan, ILR 7 Cal 121 : 4 Shome LR 71 : 8 CLR 300 (FB), per Field, J.
147 Section 277, Income Tax Act, 1961.
148 Asgarali Mulla Ibrahim Ji v Emperor, AIR 1943 Ngp 17 , p 19 : 44 Cr LJ 605 : (1943) ILR Ngp 547 : (1942) Nag LJ 547 ;
Darshan Singh v Jayanti Prasad Joshi, (1963) All LJ 404.
149 Queen-Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288; Emperor v Hakikar Singh Khushiram, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 450 : 7
Serv LR 75.
150 Ram Parshad v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 769, p 770 : 16 Cur LJ Cur LJ Cal LJ 453 : 17 Cal WN 379; the cases cited therein.
151 Hariram Jawaharlal v Emperor, AIR 1946 Ngp 38 : (1945) ILR Ngp 788 : (1945) Nag LJ 351 ; Beharilal Sud v Emperor,
AIR 1939 Lah 529 : 41 Cr LJ 204 : 41 PLR 652; Emperor v Baoyu Ram, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 484 : ILR 26 All 509 : 1 All LJ
296; Durga Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1933 All 318 : 34 Cr LJ 686; Jugal Chandra Dalal v Emperor, 42 Cal WN 31;
Queen Empress v Aidrus Sahib, 1 Weir 146 : 1 Mad HCR 38.
152 2 WR Letters 9(1).
153 Re Makanji Anandji, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 486 , p 487 : 14 KLR 157.
154 D Jothi v KP Kandasamy, (2000) Cr LJ 292 (Mad).
155 Ratansi Daya v Emperor, AIR 1916 Sind 70 (2) : 17 Cr LJ 96 : 9 Serv LR 170.
156 (1963) 7 FLR 30 .
157 Lalmoni Nonia v Emperor, AIR 1924 Pat 276 , p 280 : 24 Cr LJ 321.
158 Queen v Ahmed Ally, 11 WR Cr 25; relied on in SC Gupta v Emperor, AIR 1924 Rang 17 , p 20 : 25 Cr LJ 185 : ILR 1
Rang 290.
159 Re Palani Palagan, ILR 26 Mad 55; Habibullah v R, ILR 10 Cal 937; R v Bankartam, ILR 28 Bom 533; R v Palani
Chetti, 4 Mad HCR 510 : 1 Weir 156, 165; Re Rabari, 2 Cr LJ 590 : 15 KLR 148; R v Tasaduk Hussain, 7 Cr LJ 302.
160 Umrao Lal v State, AIR 1954 All 424 [LNIND 1953 ALL 240] , 425; R v Mahommad, 21 WR (Cr) 72; Queen-Empress v
Ghulet, UKR 7 All 44 : 1884 AWN 258; overruling Empress v Niaz Ali, 5 All 17; and following R v Zumeerun, 6 WR Cr
65; R v Palani Chatty, 4 Mad HCR 510; R v Mahommad Hometown Shaw, 13 Bom LR 324; Mahommad v Emperor,
AIR 1928 Lah 125 : 29 Cr LJ 212. As observed by Benson J Re Palani Palagan, 26 Mad 55, 65 : 1 Weir 166; Umrao
Lal v State, AIR 1954 All 434 [LNIND 1954 ALL 4] ; Habibullah v R, ILR 10 Cal 937.
161 Lachhmi Narain v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 280 : 16 OC 81; Dasondha Singh v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 405 : 24 PWR (Cr) 1911.
Page 33 of 34
162 Emperor v Bankatram Lachiram, 1 Cr LJ 390 : ILR 28 Bom 53 : 6 Bom LR 379; Re Narayanan Nair, 11 Cr LJ 353;
Jamna Das v Sabapathy Chetty, 12 Cr LJ 545; R v Haji Alu, 12 Cr LJ 23; Imam Bux v R, 15 Cr LJ 564.
163 Advocate General, Karnataka High Court v Chidambara, (2004) Cr LJ 493 (Kant) (DB).
164 KK Gupta v Devkumar Aggarwal, (1983) 2 Bom CR 707 [LNIND 1983 BOM 82] (Bom).
165 Re Narayanan Nair, 11 Cr LJ 353; Maung Thaw Na v R, 11 Cr LJ 734, 3 Burma LT 119; R v Barkar Ram, 12 Cr LJ
216; Jamna Das v Sabapathy Chetty, 12 Cr LJ 545; R v Haji Alu, 12 Cr LJ 23; Imam Bux v R, 15 Cr LJ 564.
166 R v Bankatram, ILR 28 Bom 533, 542 : 1 Weir 164; Fattu v Fattu, ILR 26 All 564.
167 Harnam Singh v R, 7 Cr LJ 460; Re Narayanan Nair, 11 Cr LJ 353; Rattan Singh v R, 12 Cr LJ 265; Lachhmi Narain v
R, 14 Cr LJ 280.
168 Re Palani Palgan, ILR 26 Mad 55.
169 Didar Singh v State of Punjab, (1981) Cr LJ 245 (Punj).
170 R v Bankatram, ILR 28 Bom 533, 545.
171 State v Dhanna Sewa, AIR 1959 MP 35 [LNIND 1958 MP 129] , 36.
172 Umrao Lal v State, AIR 1954 All 424 [LNIND 1953 ALL 240] : (1954) Cr LJ 860 .
173 Re Jhala Nayabhai, 7 Cr LJ 65.
174 Dasondha Singh v R, 12 Cr LJ 405.
175 Public Prosecutor v Arumugam Chetty, 13 Cr LJ 752.
176 Mahommad Ishaq v Emperor, AIR 1914 All 170 [LNIND 1914 ALL 20] , p 171 : 15 Cr LJ 579 : (1936) ILR All 362 : 12 All
LJ 550; Ashutosh Gangoli v Brij Narain Lal, 22 Cr LJ 393.
177 R v Mahommad Ishaq, ILR 36 All 362 (For examples of the latter, see illusts (d) and (e)); Ranjit Singh v State of Pepsu,
AIR 1959 SC 843 [LNIND 1959 SC 63] , p 847; Eachhara Warrier v Home Secry, (1977) Ker LT 526 , p 528 : (1977)
Mad LJ (Cr) 330.
178 Jai Jai Ram v Emperor, AIR 1919 All 316 .
179 R v Ameer Ali Khan, 3 NWP 133; Abdul Rashid v R, 15 Cr LJ 221.
180 R v Aidrus Sahib, 1 Mad HCR 38; R v Mahommad Hussain, 16 WR (Cr) 37; R v Mahraj, 7 Ben LR App 66; R v Sidhoo,
13 WR (Cr) 56; Azibulla v Udoy Sonthal, 9 Cr LJ 282; Gopalaswami Naidu v R, 10 Cr LJ 7; Rattan Singh v R, 12 Cr LJ
265; Lachhmi Narain v R, 14 Cr LJ 280.
181 Eachhara Warrier v Home Secy, (1977) Ker LT 526 , p 528 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 330; Dwarkanath Varma v Emperor,
AIR 1933 PC 124 , p 129 : 34 Cr LJ 322.
182 State v Nihar Ranjan Guha, AIR 1955 All 608 [LNIND 1954 ALL 180] : (1955) Cr LJ 1439 .
183 Ranjit Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1959 SC 843 [LNIND 1959 SC 63] , p 847; Emperor v Lachmi Narain, AIR 1947 All
235 : (1947) UKR All 155 held not to be good law.
184 U Mister Wallang Nangseh v Ka Ephreban Wallang Nangseh, AIR 1954 Assam 295 (DB) : (1954) Cr LJ 1838 (DB).
185 Dayaram v Emperor, AIR 1934 All 988 (DB).
186 Mi Choke v Emperor, AIR 1933 Rang 119 : (1934) Cr LJ 781 .

Page 34 of 34
187 Nandlal Ghose v Emperor, AIR 1944 Cal 283 : (1945) Cr LJ 748 (DB).
188 Re Andichetti, 11 Mad HCR 438 : 1 Weir 114.
189 Queen v Chundi Churn Nauth, 8 WR 5(1).
190 Queen v Nim Chand Mookerjee, 20 WR 41.
191 Queen Empress v Rawji, (1893) Unrep Cr Cases 632.
192 Hira Nand Ojha v Emperor, 4 Cr LJ 227, p 229 : 10 Cal WN 1099.

193 Eachhara Warrier v Home Secy, (1977) Ker LT 526 , p 528 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 330.
194 Ranjit Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1959 SC 843 [LNIND 1959 SC 63] , p 847.
195 D Jothi v KP Kundaswamy, (2000) Cr LJ 292 (Mad); Gortimukkala Suryanarayana Raju v State, (1987) Cr LJ 118 (AP);
Chajoo Ram v Radhey Shyam, AIR 1971 SC 1367 [LNIND 1971 SC 195] : (1971) 1 SCC 774 [LNIND 1971 SC 195] ;
Dr SP Kohli v High Court of Punjab and Haryana, AIR 1978 SC 1753 [LNIND 1978 SC 235] .
196 Choke v Emperor, AIR 1933 Rang 119 .
197 S Krishna v State of Karnataka, (1998) Cr LJ 785 (Kant) (DB).
198 A Nalinkshan v Abulaise, 2014 Cr LJ 101 (Ker) : 2013 (4) KHC 284 .
199 State of Maharashatra v Manohar Yeshwant Patil, (1997) Cr LJ 3114 (Bom) (DB).
200 Ibid.
201 SS Subramaniam v Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Iringalakuda, (1998) Cr LJ 4738 .
202 Sakhawat Haider v Emperor, AIR 1920 All 242 (1) : 22 Cr LJ 54 : 18 All LJ 1151.
End of Document
[s 192] Fabricating false evidence.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 18
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 18
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever causes any circumstance to exist or 203[makes any false entry in any book or record or electronic
record or makes any document or electronic record containing a false statement], intending that such
circumstances, false entry or false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding, or in a
proceeding taken by law before a public servant as such, or before an Arbitrator, and that such circumstance,
Page 4 of 18
false entry or false statement so appearing in evidence, may cause any person who in such proceeding is to
form an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result
of such proceeding, is said “to fabricate false evidence”.
Illustrations
(a) A puts jewels into a box belonging to Z, with the intention that they may be found in that box, and that
this circumstance may cause Z to be convicted of theft. A has fabricated false evidence.
(b) A makes a false entry in his shop-book for the purpose of using it as corroborative evidence in a Court
of Justice. A has fabricated false evidence.
(c) A, with the intention of causing Z to be convicted of a criminal conspiracy, writes a letter in imitation of
Z’s handwriting, purporting to be addressed to an accomplice in such criminal conspiracy, and puts the
letter in a place which he knows that the officers of the Police are likely to search. A has fabricated
false evidence.
The words “makes any false entry in any book or record, or electronic record or makes any document or
electronic record containing a false statement” were substituted by Information Technology Act, 2000, section
91 and sch I, for “makes any false entry in any book or record, or makes any document containing a false
statement” (w.e.f. 17-10-2000).
[s 192.2] Scope
This section defines “fabricating false evidence”, which is made an offence under section 193. The offence
consists in “perverting the course of justice”. Under the English Law “steps taken for the manufacture or
fabrication of false evidence may be indicated as attempts to commit the misdemeanor of perverting the course
of justice”.204
Unlike sections 211 and 463, this section does not require an “intent to cause injury to any person”; nor does it
require that the fabrication of evidence should be done dishonestly or fraudulently within the meaning of sub-
section (2) of section 464.205
If the principal motive of the action was to make a false document with the object that an erroneous opinion be
formed in some judicial proceeding, whether actually pending or likely to come into existence subsequently, the
provisions of this section are attracted. The proximity to a judicial proceeding, pending or likely to come into
existence, is the test by which the applicability of this section is to be determined.206
A judicial proceeding may not be pending at the time of the fabrication.207
To constitute this offence three things must exist:
(a) The circumstance, entry or document must be false;

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(b) An intention, that the one or the other should appear in one or other of the three kinds of proceedings
specified;
(c) An intention to cause the person, who is to form an opinion on the evidence, to form an erroneous one
“on any point material to the result”.208
Neither section 192, IPC nor section 199, IPC, incorporate the principle of vicarious liability, and therefore, it is
incumbent on the complainant to specifically aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint.209
Commentary under same heading in section 193, post may also be referred to.
The word “whoever” would include an accused person. It is not possible to accept the proposition that as a
matter of law an accused person can use as genuine fabricated evidence so long as he uses it for his defence.
There is no legislative provision to that effect. Section 313 of the CrPC provides that the accused shall not be
liable to be prosecuted for giving false evidence in respect of any statement by him as an accused person. But
there is no provision giving him such immunity as regards the use of fabricated evidence, and no such immunity
can be implied in his favour simply because he uses it as an accused person in his defence.210
[s 192.4.1] Police, Public Servants and Citizens, all Fall within the Term “Whoever”
“The police are too often tempted to introduce padding in a case in their overzealousness to establish a charge,
which they believe to be true in support of which the evidence in their possession is weak. But this practice has
to be condemned in no uncertain terms” observed Dixit J of the Madhya Pradesh High Court while delivering
the judgement on behalf of the Division Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh v Babulal Ram Ratan.211 His
Lordship found it useful to quote the warning which Young CJ gave in Ashiq Mahommad v Emperor,212 to those
who try to procure and use false and fabricated evidence of recoveries, etc. It runs as follows:
It may be well that we should give a warning to anyone who may hereafter be tempted to interfere with the course of
justice by the procuring of false evidence or the fabrication of evidence of recoveries, that the duty of everyone, police
officers or constables, government officials and plain citizens, is to allow a case to come before the court as it is
without fabrication, or ‘padding’. It is for the courts to decide whether an accused person is innocent or guilty, and not
for the prosecution to determine his guilt in advance and attempt to deceive the court into giving a verdict based on
false evidence. Anyone procuring false evidence runs the risk of imprisonment and degradation from office, and what is
still more serious, may have the burden on his shoulder of sending an innocent man to the gallows.
When the Investigating Officer deliberately manipulates the statements of witnesses under section 161(3),
CrPC to be used as evidence in the court, the investigating officer would be guilty of committing the offence
punishable under section 192, IPC.213
[s 192.5] “Fabricates False Evidence”—Meaning of

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“Fabricate” means “to frame, to construct, to manufacture, to forge, or to devise falsely”. The fabrication
contemplated by this section is (a) the causing of any circumstance to exist, or (b) making any false entry in any
book or record, or (c) making any document containing a false statement. The section contemplates the actual
fabrication and not merely a preparation or an attempt to fabricate false evidence. For an example of causing a
circumstance to exist, see illustration (a) to this section. For an example of making a false entry, see illustration
(b) and for making a document containing a false statement, see illustration (c). In a Madras case one A owed
B a certain amount of money. He sent a registered and insured packet to B, purporting to contain currency
notes in settlement of the debt and got an acknowledgement of the receipt of the packet. The packet was found
to contain waste paper. B sued A for the recovery of the money due to him. A applied to the court to admit the
acknowledgement in evidence. It was held that the postal acknowledgement was a circumstance caused to
exist with the intention of causing an erroneous opinion within the meaning of this section.214
Hiding stolen railway pins in a man’s field intending that they may be found there and that the circumstance of
their being found there might appear as evidence in a judicial proceeding and lead the magistrate to believe
that the man was connected with the theft, would be fabricating false evidence.215 So also putting stolen goods
in a man’s house to serve as evidence of theft against him.216
One C, whose brother was an accused person, applied to the court on behalf of the accused asking that the
witnesses for the prosecution might first of all be made to identify D. The court assenting to this request, he
produced before the court ten or twelve persons, none of whom could be identified as D by any of the
prosecution witnesses. Upon being asked by the court where D was, C pointed out another man who, upon
further investigation, was discovered to be wearing a false moustache and to be not D but one M. It was held
that C, by placing before the magistrate a person who was not D, and representing that he was D, caused a
circumstance to exist.217 The tutoring of a man to give false evidence also amounts to the causing of a
circumstance to exist within the meaning of section 192.218
The accused petitioner had obtained interim order staying the election to the post of President Town Panchayat
by filing forged and fabricated documents and swearing false affidavit. A prima facie case for proceeding under
sections 192 and 193, IPC against the petitioner was held made out.219
[s 192.5.1] False Recitals in Documents
A document containing recitals implying a false statement is a fabricated false evidence,220 but a true copy of a
mortgage-deed, though not containing a copy of endorsements subsequently made on the original, is not a
false document.221 Consent given for prosecution even if it is false cannot amount to a “false document” or
“fabricating false evidence”.222
An entry would be a false entry or a statement in a record or document would be a false entry if it, either by
reason of some false additions or of some material omissions, misrepresents the truth. The omission may or
may not be illegal. The thing to be considered is the effect of the omission on the entry as made or on the
statement as occurring in a document.223
[s 192.5.2] False Statement Need Not be in Express Terms
The false statement need not be in express terms. Where the accused made a document containing many false
recitals implying that certain persons executed a sub-lease when, as a matter of fact, no such sub-lease was
executed, it was held that he was guilty of fabricating false evidence.224
To sign a statement in an application for the execution of a decree under O XXI, rule 11(2) of the CPC, 1908,
Page 7 of 18
which contains a false statement, is punishable under this section, and it makes no difference that at the time of
signature, the document was blank.225
[s 192.5.3] Attestation of a Document
A person who attests a document knowing that it was forged and was intended to prove the discharge of a
decree debt, is guilty of fabricating a false document, even if the document was not required to be attested.226
However, mere attestation is not sufficient to justify an inference that the person attesting knew that he was
attesting a forged document.227
It cannot be concluded that because the accused put his signature to a written report, he necessarily knew or
had reason to believe that the contents of the report were false. It is for the prosecution to prove that the written
report was a false report and that the accused countersigned it with this knowledge and with the intention that
the report should be used as evidence in a judicial proceeding.228
A, the servant of B, at B’s instigation, personated before a stamp-vendor and obtained a stamp-paper in C’s
name for the purpose of forging a deed in C’s name. The endorsement on the paper in C’s name would be
evidence that C had executed the deed. It was held that A was guilty of fabricating false evidence, and B of
abetment thereof.229
Where a medical officer, while giving evidence as an expert, produced a fabricated diploma in a court with the
object that the court may believe him as an expert in criminology, the Supreme Court held that an offence under
this section was made out.230 The filing of a false affidavit by a witness in a proceeding before a court also
constitutes an offence under this section.231 If a false entry is made in a book or a record and that circumstance
assists the court in forming an opinion upon that evidence in favour or against somebody, that is enough to hold
that false evidence was fabricated. If such evidence is used in a judicial proceeding, the offence made out is
Where the accused fabricated an endorsement in the promissory note so as to bring a claim within limitation, it
was held that the act of the accused constituted an offence under this section.233
Where a police officer who took the delivery of a draft of a counter-affidavit from the standing counsel for being
signed by his superior for filing in the Supreme Court, asked a police official to forge the signature of his
superior on a carbon copy of the counter affidavit. On refusal, he contacted his superior and the latter directed
the official asked to forge his signature. The official asked accordingly and the accused sent the carbon copy
with other affidavits for filing in the Supreme Court. The said affidavit contained false documents. The accused
officer was present in the Supreme Court premises along with the officer whose signature was forged on the
date of filing the affidavit. The accused was held guilty of an offence under section 193, IPC as he abetted the
officer to forge the signature of his superior.234
[s 192.6] “Intending that Such Circumstance etc. May Appear as Evidence”—Meaning of
The second essential of the offence of fabricating false evidence is the intention to use what is fabricated as
evidence. The gist of the offence lies in the intention to cause a failure of justice by the use of the false thing in
evidence.235 The judicial proceeding may not be pending at the time of fabrication. It is enough if the object of
the fabrication is that it may appear in evidence.236 But if there is no evidence to prove that the accused
intended, at the time he made a false entry in a record, that it should appear in evidence, he cannot be held
guilty of fabricating false evidence.237 It is well-established, and indeed this section and section 193 make it
perfectly clear, that the mere fabrication of a false statement is not punishable under section 193. In order that
the offence may be committed, it must be established that the person fabricating the false evidence, intended to
Page 8 of 18
use that false evidence in a judicial proceeding or in a proceeding taken by law before a public servant as such
or before an arbitrator, etc.238 It has been held that where an accused person fabricates false evidence with the
sole object of diverting suspicion from himself and concealing his guilt, he cannot be convicted under section
193, IPC. Of course, the mere intention to divert suspicion and concealing his guilt need not necessarily amount
to fabricating evidence which may appear in a judicial proceeding or in a proceeding taken before a public
servant or before an arbitrator so that such authorised person would form a different opinion.239 But if the act of
an accused person comes within the language of this section, it is difficult to see how he can take shelter
behind the circumstance that he is an accused person.240
An application or interlocutory application filed by either party for some relief is not evidence within the meaning
of section 3, Indian Evidence Act, as same would not fall within the meaning of section 294, CrPC. No offence
is committed under section 193 or section 194, IPC.241
[s 192.6.1] Judicial Proceeding Need Not be Pending
It is not necessary for the purpose of the application of this section that the judicial proceeding in which the
person intends to use the false evidence be pending at the date of the fabrication.242
[s 192.6.2] Fabrication of Documents Not Admissible in Evidence
It has, however, been held in several cases that what is fabricated must be capable of being used as evidence
and that the offence of fabricating false evidence cannot be committed in respect of a document which is not
admissible in evidence, the reason being that a document which is inadmissible in evidence can never be
produced for the purpose of enabling an officer to arrive at any conclusion, erroneous or otherwise, upon a
relevant point.243 Thus, it has been held that a police officer who fabricates a police special diary does not
commit an offence under this section since such a document is not evidence under the provisions of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, section 172,244 but under section 218.245 So too a false report made by an amin of a civil
court, deputed to deliver possession of a certain property in execution of a decree, as to his having been
obstructed in so doing, and a similar report made to the police, do not constitute offences under this section.246
[s 192.6.3] Actual Use of Fabricated Evidence Not Necessary
It has been held, however, in other cases that the words of the section show that it is the intention that creates
the criminal offence and not the fact as to whether, under the terms of the law, the document is admissible in
evidence, and that the mere fact that an entry or document is not admissible in evidence does not necessarily
take it out of the mischief of section 193.247
It is not necessary, in a charge based upon this section to show that any actual use has been made of the
evidence so fabricated. Mere fabrication is punishable under section 193. The use of the fabricated article is
punishable under section 196.
[s 192.7] “Judicial Proceeding”—Meaning of
The expression “judicial proceeding” is not defined in this Code, but in section 2(i) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, and it includes “any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on
oath”. The definition in the CrPC is only for the purpose of that Code.248 Section 1(2) of the English Perjury Act,
1911, also lays down that the expression “judicial proceeding” includes a proceeding before any court, tribunal,
or person, having by law power to hear, receive and examine evidence on oath.
[s 192.7.1] Characteristics of Judicial Proceedings
In one of the earliest cases in which the question as to the meaning of a “judicial proceeding” arose, Scotland
CJ, said: “It is nothing more nor less than a step taken by the court in the course of the administration of justice,
in connection with a case pending”.249 In Queen-Empress v Tulja,250 West J observed that “an inquiry is judicial
if the object of it is to determine a jural relation between one person and another, or a group of persons; or
between him and the community generally; but, even a judge, acting without such an object in view, is not
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acting judicially”. The power to take evidence on oath is the characteristic test of a judicial proceeding.251 A
judicial proceeding is not deprived of its character as such merely because it becomes abortive owing to the
incompetency of one of the jurors, and the giving of false evidence in the course of such proceeding is an
offence under section 193.252 But where the proceeding is such under which no evidence can be legally taken,
then it is not a judicial proceeding.253 A mere irregularity in a judicial proceeding does not alter its character as
such.254 But no inquiry or trial held without jurisdiction is a judicial proceeding.255 The criterion for deciding
whether an order is a judicial or an administrative order is not whether the authority acts under a statute; it is, as
pointed out by Sapru J, in Mahommad Buksh v State of Uttar Pradesh,256 whether it is required to act judicially
in passing the order or not. If it is required to act judicially, the order is judicial or quasi-judicial, and if it is not, it
is administrative. A sub-divisional magistrate is a judicial authority and, therefore, his order would be either
judicial or executive. As an order passed by him under section 45(3) of the old CrPC, 1898 (having no
corresponding provision in the CrPC of 1973) has been held to be not a judicial order, it can only be an
administrative order.257 Section 136 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, provides that proceedings under that Act
before an income tax authority shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193
and 223 and for purposes of section 196 of the IPC but the filing of a return is not a stage of a judicial
proceeding.258
[s 192.7.2] Pendency of Judicial Proceeding Not Essential
Section 37(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 makes the proceedings before the income tax officer judicial
proceedings within the meaning of section 228, IPC.259 It could not have been the intention of the Legislature in
making the offence committed during the cause of a proceeding before an income tax officer more serious
without affording a corresponding safeguard provided by section 195(1)(b), CrPC in respect of complaints
which can be made in this behalf. Where, therefore, an offence under section 193, IPC is committed in respect
of the proceedings before the income tax officer, the complaint by the officer is a condition precedent, as
prescribed under section 195(1)(b), CrPC to a magistrate taking cognizance of the offence.260
It is not essential for the purpose of section 192 of IPC that there should be any judicial proceeding pending at
the time of the fabrication. It is enough that there is a reasonable prospect of such a proceeding, having regard
to the circumstances of the case, and that the document in question is intended to be used in such a
proceeding.261
[s 192.7.3] Instances of Judicial Proceedings
The following have been held to be judicial proceedings:
(a) proceedings in which a magistrate comes to his determination as to the fitness of sureties under
chapter VIII of the CrPC;262
(b) an inquiry held by a magistrate before issuing an order under section 144, CrPC;263
(bc) Recording of a statement under section 161, CrPC is a judicial proceeding;264
(c) a proceeding in which the statement of a witness is recorded under section 164, CrPC;265 (some High
Courts have expressed a contrary view on this point).266
(d) an investigation under chapter 12 of the CrPC, 1973 by a magistrate;267
(e) investigation proceedings under section 202, CrPC, conducted by a subordinate magistrate on a
complaint which was taken cognizance of by another magistrate and sent to him for inquiry and report
under the old Code;268
(f) issue of process under section 202, CrPC is a judicial determination (Order).269
(g) proceedings under section 299, CrPC, 1973;270
(h) the proceedings of a court holding a preliminary inquiry under section 340, CrPC 1973;271
(i) maintenance proceedings under chapter 9, CrPC, 1973;272
(j) proceedings under section 446, CrPC, 1973;273
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(jj) Bail proceeding;274

(k) an inquiry conducted by a magistrate into the truth of an allegation against a subordinate official
contained in a petition presented to the deputy commissioner;275
(l) proceedings in execution of a decree;276
(m) proceedings under section 8 of the Reformatory Schools Act, 1876 (V of 1876) (now Act 8 of 1897);277
(n) an inquiry under the Legal Practitioners’ Act, 1879 (18 of 1879);278
(o) an inquiry under the Coroners Act, 1871 (4 of 1871);
(p) an inquiry under the Income Tax Act hearing objections to assessment;279
(q) inquiry by the registrar of the Presidency Court of Small Causes as to proper service of summons;280
(r) a proceeding before a magistrate for the recovery of municipal cesses under the Bombay Municipal
Act;281
(s) an inquiry into a claim under section 83(6), CrPC, 1973;282
(t) an inquiry by a magistrate under Police Order No. 157 (Madras) in which statements of witnesses are
taken on oath;283
(u) examination of an insolvent by the official assignee conducted under section 33(2) of the Presidency
Towns Insolvency Act, 1909;284
(v) a trial before a court-martial;285
(w) an investigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a court of justice, though not made
before a court of justice;286
(x) an investigation directed by a court of justice according to law and conducted under its authority,
though may not take place before it;287
(y) proceedings before an income tax officer under section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 (Act 11 of
1922);288
(z) affidavit filed in support of a writ petition by concealing facts and obtaining interim order from High
Court.289 Affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of writ petition with false statement to mislead and
overreach the court;290
(za) false counter affidavit in proceedings before the Supreme Court.291
[s 192.7.4] Proceedings Not Considered Judicial Proceedings—Instances
The following have been held not to be judicial proceedings:
(a) examination by a police officer under section 161, CrPC;292

(b) giving a sanction under section 197, CrPC, by the local government;293
(c) a preliminary inquiry held by a sub-divisional magistrate at the direction of a district magistrate, into the
circumstances of a complaint against the police with a view to ascertain whether or not the district
magistrate should grant sanction under section 197;294
(d) the proceedings of a district magistrate under section 123(9), CrPC for cancelling a bond for keeping
the peace or for good behaviour,295 in the case of an order passed under section 117 by an executive
magistrate;
(e) a departmental inquiry falling within section 197 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (Act 5 of 1879);296
(f) where telegraph authorities, having had a claim made against them by the heir of a deceased
employee, referred it to the district Judge for verification, his inquiry into such claims;297
(g) where the person conducting the proceedings was coram non judice;298
(h) proceedings under section 83, CrPC;299
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(i) an inquiry by a magistrate to find out the writer of an anonymous letter,300 or of a petition,301 or to
discover the truth of statements made to the telegraph department by a person claiming money in their
hands as heir to an employee therein;302
(j) proceedings in which evidence is taken before a police patel;303
(k) an inquiry in regard to refunds for spoiled stamps conducted by a deputy collector;304
(l) proceedings directed by a district registrar to inquire into certain matters regarding the registration of a
document;305
(m) proceedings before a district Judge calling upon a person to show cause why he should not hand over
documents relating to property over which a common manager had been appointed under the Bengal
Tenancy Act, there being no provision in the act authorising such an inquiry.306
[s 192.8] “Taken By Law”—Meaning of
For an offence under this section it is not necessary that the fabricated evidence should be intended to be used
only in a judicial proceeding. It is enough if it is intended to be used in any proceeding taken by law before a
public servant as such. All that is necessary under this clause is that the proceeding must be taken by law and
that it should be before a public servant as such. The section thus contemplates even a proceeding which is
non-judicial. The expression “taken by law” in the section only means taken under the provisions of any law;
similarly the word “evidence” as used in the section is used in its ordinary sense, namely, “information (given
personally or drawn from documents, etc.) tending to establish a fact”.307 Thus, the police having power to
investigate the circumstances of a person’s death, the accused caused a circumstance to exist intending that it
should cause the investigating officer to form an erroneous opinion as to how the deceased met her death. It
was held that he was guilty of fabricating false evidence.308
[s 192.9] “Material”—Meaning of
The word “material” means “of such a nature as to affect in any way, directly or indirectly, the probability of
anything to be determined by the proceeding, or the credit of any witness,309 and a fact may be material
although evidence of its existence was improperly admitted”.310
In a case, A sells goods to B, but omits to enter the sale in his books. Subsequently, he makes the entry
intending it to be used as evidence in a judicial proceeding relating to the sale. The question whether the
vendor’s books contained such an entry is a material point. A has fabricated false evidence.311
A, a vakil, forges a magistrate’s authentication of his genuine signature to a vakalatnamah. The vakalatnamah
is not an evidence in the case, and the error (if any) induced in the mind of the Judge as to its genuineness
could not affect his decision of the case, and therefore, A is not guilty under section 193.312
Where the accused prepared certain receipts in respect of sales of cattle actually effected but antedated them,
and the receipts were intended to be produced before a sub-inspector of police who wanted to ascertain
whether the cattle were stolen property it was held that the receipts could not possibly cause the sub-inspector
to entertain an erroneous opinion touching a point material to the result of the inquiry he was making, and that
the accused could not be held guilty of fabricating false evidence.313
[s 192.9.1] Fabricated False Evidence Should Help in Formation of Erroneous Opinion
It is not merely the making of a document containing a false statement which is relevant, but that the making of
a document containing a false statement should be such as to lead any person, who in a judicial proceeding is
to form an opinion on evidence, to entertain an erroneous opinion touching the point material to such a
proceeding. Where, therefore, in a proceeding between a raiyat and his bataidar under section 144, CrPC, the
raiyat produces a deed of exchange of title between him and another raiyat but which contains no recital as to
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past possession, the deed of exchange, even if antedated, cannot be said to have any prejudicial effect upon
the interest of the bataidar who claims to be in possession, and therefore, the deed of exchange, even if
antedated, cannot amount to fabricating false evidence.314 Since the executive officer of a municipality has no
authority to investigate whether an applicant for permission to build has a right to build on the land in question,
production of a false document in such an inquiry by the applicant would not make him fall within the mischief of
section 192.315
[s 192.9.2] Actual Failure of Justice is not the Gist of the Offence
Whether the accused could or could not succeed in carrying out his intention is immaterial. The gist of the
offence does not consist in actually causing a failure of justice but in the intention to cause a failure of justice by
misleading the court, and with such intent causing the existence of any circumstances which might appear in
evidence.316 Of course the materiality of the fabricated evidence must always be shown.317
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
203 Subs. by the Information Technology Act, 2000 (Act 21 of 2000), section 91 and Sch I (w.e.f. 17-10-2000), for the words
“makes any false entry in any book or record, or makes any document containing a false statement”. The words
“electronic record” have been defined in section 29A.
205 Re Mir Ekram Ali, ILR 6 Cal 482; Empress v Mazhar Hussain, ILR 6 All 553.
206 Hukum Singh v State, (1970) All Cr Case 265; Kamla Prasad Singh v Harinath Singh, AIR 1968 SC 19 [LNIND 1967
SC 170] : (1968) Cr LJ 68 .
207 Emperor v Mala, ILR 2 All 105; Re Govind Pandurang, AIR 1921 Bom 366 : 22 Cr LJ 49; Rajaram Bhavanishankar v
Emperor, AIR 1920 Bom 319 , p 320 : 22 Cr LJ 23.
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208 R v Zakir Hussain, ILR 21 All 159, p 160; R v Cheda Lal, ILR 29 All 351, p 353; Kailasam Pattar v R, 4 Mad HCR 373 :
1 Weir 175; R v Ganeshi, 2 Cr LJ 100, p 101 : 25 All WN 52; R v Po Shin, 6 Cr LJ 283 : 4 LBR 45; Jatindra Nath Sahu v
Emperor, AIR 1937 Cal 42 , p 44 : 38 Cr LJ 700.
209 Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgear Ltd, 2011 Cr LJ 8 (SC) : 2010 AIR SCW 6151 :
(2010) 10 SCC 479 [LNIND 2010 SC 979] : 2010 (10) Scale 691 [LNIND 2010 SC 977] .
210 Rama Nana v Emperor, AIR 1922 Bom 99 , p 101 : 23 Cr LJ 23 : ILR 56 Bom 317 : 23 Bom LR 987; Bhagirath Lal v
Emperor, AIR 1934 All 1017 : (1934) All LJ 1064; explaining and distinguishing Emperor v Ram Khilawan, ILR 28 All
705 : 4 Cr LJ 66.
211 State of Madhya Pradesh v Babulal Ram Ratan, AIR 1958 Cr LJ 190 : (1957) MPLJ 837 .
212 Ashiq Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1936 Lah 330 , p 333 : 37 Cr LJ 562.
213 Babu v State of Karnataka, 2007 Cr LJ 3802 , p 3805 (Kant) (DB).
214 Kunju v King-Emperor, AIR 1927 Mad 199 [LNIND 1926 MAD 322] , p 201.
215 Empress v Rameshar Rai, ILR 1 All 379.
216 Queen v Soonder Patnaik, 3 WR (Cr) 59.
217 Emperor v Chheda Lal, ILR 29 All 351 : 4 All LJ 237.
218 Sur Nath Bhaduri v Emperor, AIR 1927 All 721 : 28 Cr LJ 950 : 25 All LJ 1077; but see Durga Prasad v Emperor, AIR
1915 All 388 (1) : 16 Cr LJ 667.
219 Ibrahim Sab Imam Sab Mulla v State of Karnataka, 2006 Cr LJ 2738 , p 2742 (Kant).
220 Mahadeo Misser v Narayan Ram Sha, 3 Cr LJ 196 : 10 Cal WN 220.

221 Kalyan Singh v R, 11 Cr LJ 601 : 80 PLR 1910.
222 Dr Budhi Kata Subbarao v K Parasan, (1996) 5 SCC 530 [LNIND 1996 SC 1254] : (1996) 2 East Cr C 601, p 606 (SC)
: (1996) 3 Crimes 143 .
223 Jatindra Nath Sahu v Emperor, AIR 1937 Cal 42 , p 44 : 38 Cr LJ 700.
224 Mahadeo Misser v Narayan Ram Sha, 3 Cr LJ 196 : 10 Cal WN 220.
225 R v Ratanchand, 1 Cr LJ 959 : 6 Bom LR 886.
226 Re P Rama Naidu, AIR 1942 Mad 92 (1) : 43 Cr LJ 227 : (1941) 2 Mad LJ 746.
227 Chinna Veera Reddi v Emperor, AIR 1939 Mad 730 : 41 Cr LJ 11 : (1939) Mad WN (Cr) 86.
228 Jai Jai Ram v Emperor, AIR 1919 All 316 : 20 Cr LJ 268 : 17 All LJ 574.
229 R v Durgacharan, ILR 25 All 75; following R v Mula, ILR 2 All 105.
230 Dutt v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 523 [LNIND 1965 SC 195] , p 526 : (1966) Cr LJ 459 .
231 Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC 68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] : (1967) Cr LJ 6 ; Kunnummal v Narayana, AIR
1970 Ker 15 [LNIND 1968 KER 164] , p 16 : (1970) Cr LJ 53 ; MP Paul v Ali Mahommad, (1973) Cr LJ 1284 , p 1287 :
(1973) Ker LR 214 : (1973) Ker LT 850 .
232 Nanjudaiah v Rangaiah, (1977) 2 Kant LJ 374 , p 376; Dutta v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 526 , p 527 :
(1966) Cr LJ 459 .
233 Subramania v Swamikannu, AIR 1933 Mad 413 [LNIND 1933 MAD 53] , p 415 : 34 Cr LJ 800.
Page 14 of 18
234 Afzal v State of Haryana, (1996) Cr LJ 1679 (SC).

235 Chheda Lal v R, ILR 29 All 351; Mahommad Siddiq v R, 6 Cr LJ 162 : 11 Cal WN 911; Mahesh Chandra Chaudhary v
Emperor, AIR 1918 Cal 61 : 19 Cr LJ 971 : 28 Cal LJ 213.
236 Emperor v Mula, ILR 2 All 105.
237 Jatindra Nath Sahu v Emperor, AIR 1937 Cal 42 , p 44 : 33 Cr LJ 700.
238 Abdul Mutlab v Emperor, (1947) 48 Cr LJ 632 , p 633.
239 Emperor v Ram Khilawan, ILR 28 All 705 : 4 Cr LJ 66; Superintendant & Remembrance of Legal Affairs v Tarak Nath
Chatterjee, AIR 1935 Cal 304 : ILR 62 Cal 666.
240 Bhagirath Lal v Emperor, AIR 1934 All 1017 , p 1018 : (1934) All LJ 1064.
241 Anil Kumar Mishra v State of Jharkhand, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 44 (Jhar).
242 Re Govind Pandurang, AIR 1921 Bom 366 : 22 Cr LJ 49 : ILR 45 Bom 668; Rajaram Bhavanishankar v Emperor, AIR
1920 Bom 319 , p 320 : 22 Cr LJ 23 : 22 Bom LR 1229.
243 Queen-Empress v Zakir Hussain, ILR 21 All 159, 161 (relying on Empress v Gauri Shankar, ILR 6 All 42); Mahommad
Kajim Ali v Jarabdi Nahskar, AIR 1919 Cal 430 : 20 Cr LJ 574 : ILR 46 Cal 986 : 29 Cal LJ 522; Rajaram
Bhavanishankar v Emperor, AIR 1920 Bom 319 ; Fazl Ahmad v Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 433 : 15 Cr LJ 344 : 139 Punj
LR 1914 : 1 PR 1914 (Cr); Emperor v Chandra Kumar Missir, 2 Cr LJ 383 : 2 Cal LJ 46.
244 R v Zakir Hussain, ILR 21 All 159.
245 Ibid, at 163.
246 R v Ajudhia Prasad, ILR 17 All 436.
247 Mahesh Chandra Dhupi v Emperor, AIR 1940 Cal 449 : 42 Cr LJ 93 : (1940) ILR 1 Cal 465; Baroda Kanta Sarkar v
Emperor, AIR 1916 Cal 553 : 16 Cr LJ 620; Amolak Ram v Emperor, AIR 1918 Lah 192 : 19 Cr LJ 141 : 56 Punj LR
1918 : 13 PWR (Cr) 1918; Reg v Gibbons, 31 LJMC 48 : SCL & C 109.
248 Queen-Empress v Tulja, ILR 12 Bom 36.
249 Reg v Venkatachallum Pillai, 2 Mad HC 43, p 55.

250 Queen-Empress v Tulja, ILR 12 Bom 36, 43.
251 Report of the Select Committee on the CrPC, 1898, para 3; Mahommad Buksh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 All
739 [LNIND 1951 ALL 205] ; Basant Singh v Januk Singh, AIR 1954 All 447 [LNIND 1953 ALL 280] ; Reg v
Venkatachallum Pillai, 2 Mad HC 43, p 55.
252 R v Virasami, ILR 19 Mad 375.
253 Babu Ram v R, 12 Cr LJ 373.
254 R v Berry, 8 Cox CC 121; R v Hughes, ILR 10 Cal 604.
255 1 Weir 151.
256 Mahommad Buksh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1953 All 739 [LNIND 1951 ALL 205] .
257 Basant Singh v Janak Singh, AIR 1954 All 447 [LNIND 1953 ALL 280] .
258 Re Hazarilal, 29 Nag LJ 214.
259 Lalji Haridas v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 1154 [LNIND 1964 SC 34] : (1964) 2 Cr LJ 249 .
260 Ibid.
Page 15 of 18
261 Rajaram Bhavani Shankar v Emperor, (1921) Cr LJ 23 (Bom) (DB).

262 Imperator v Mahro, 2 Serv LR 11 : 10 Cr LJ 225; referring to Queen-Empress v Sheikh Beari, ILR 10 Mad 232; Queen-
Empress v Matha, ILR 20 Mad 339; Jhojha Singh v Queen-Empress, ILR 24 Cal 155; Emperor v Ghulam Mustafa, ILR
26 All 371.
263 Queen-Empress v Tirunarasimha Chari, ILR 19 Mad 18.
264 Joseph v State of Kerala, 2014 (4) Ker LT 322 : 2012 (4) KLJ 436 .
265 Emperor v Andal, 5 Serv LR 174 : 13 Cr LJ 33; Emperor v Vishwanath Krishna Sethi, 8 Bom LR 589; Empress v Algu
Kone, ILR 16 Mad 421; Suppa Tevan v Emperor, ILR 29 Mad 89; Maromma v Emperor, AIR 1933 Mad 125 [LNIND
1932 MAD 156] , 126.
266 Emperor v Tasadduk Hussain, 7 Cr LJ 302; Sheoraj v State, AIR 1964 All 290 [LNIND 1963 ALL 155] : (1964) 2 Cr LJ
1 ; Puroshottam Ishar Amin v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 3 : 22 Cr LJ 241; Sajawal v Emperor, 33 Cr LJ 413; Iboton
Singh v Yaima Singh, AIR 1963 Mani 21 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 284 .
267 Suppa Tevan v Emperor, 29 Mad 89; Queen-Empress v Alagu Kone, ILR 16 Mad 421; Public Prosecutor v Nagallinga
Reddi, AIR 1959 AP 250 [LNIND 1958 AP 37] ; Puroshottam Ishwar Amin v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 3 (FB); Sajawal v
268 Kanchan Gorhi v Ram Kishun Mundal, ILR 36 Cal 72 : 2 Cr LJ 118; but see Queen-Empress v Venkatarama, ILR 23
Mad 223.
269 Rajendranath v Dy Supdt of Police, AIR 1972 SC 470 [LNIND 1971 SC 613] .
270 Gangawwa v State of Mysore, AIR 1969 Mys 114 : (1969) Cr LJ 496 .
271 Abdullah Khan v Emperor, ILR 37 C 52; Sakhi Rai v Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 266 : 20 Cr LJ 245.
272 Laraiti v Ram Dial, ILR 5 All 224.
273 Queen-Empress v Har Chandra Chowdhury, ILR 25 Cal 440.
274 Abdul Rehman v Anees-Ul Hag, 2012 Cr LJ 1060 : 2011 (12) Scale 609 [LNIND 2011 SC 1156] : 2011 (4) Ker LT SH
142 (SC).
275 Emperor v Kuna Sah, ILR 28 All 89; where Hara Charan Mookerjee v King-Emperor, ILR 32 Cal 367 was
distinguished.
276 Bhola Nath Dey v Emperor, 10 Cal WN 55; Dakineshwar Misra v Haris Chundra Chatterjee, 10 Cr LJ 564 : 10 Cal LJ
450; Chanan and Raghu Ram v Crown, 1 PR 1910 : 11 Cr LJ 90; Shioshankarpuri v Emperor, 16 Cr LJ 161; Queen-
Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288. The cases Hara Charan Mookerjee v King-Emperor, ILR 32 Cal 467 and
Kanto Ram Das v Gobardhan Das, ILR 35 Cal 133; are overruled and Jadu Nath Mahta v Jagadish Chandra Deb, 7
Cal WN 423 is no longer good law.
Page 16 of 18
277 Queen-Empress v Manaji, ILR 14 Bom 381.
278 Khotha Subba Chetty v Queen, ILR 6 Mad 252; Gauri Shanker Lal v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 190.
279 Emperor v Rup Singh, 3 Cr LJ 128.
280 Balchand v Tarak Nath Sadhu, 18 Cal WN 1323.
281 Municipality of Ahmedabad v Jumma Punja, ILR 17 Bom 731.
282 Hameed Khan v State, AIR 1957 All 121 [LNIND 1956 ALL 148] .
283 Re Veerappan, AIR 1944 Mad 37 [LNIND 1943 MAD 133] .
284 Soundarajan & Co Ltd v AK Sankarapandia Nadar, AIR 1958 Mad 69 [LNIND 1956 MAD 304] : (1958) Cr LJ 197 .
285 Explanation, 1 to section 193.
288 Lalji Haridas v State of Maharashatra, AIR 1964 SC 1154 [LNIND 1964 SC 34] : (1964) 2 Cr LJ 249 .
289 Gulshan Kumar v Collector of Ghaziabad, AIR 1994 All 243 [LNIND 1993 ALL 329] (DB).
290 Rajendra Jaina Towers Pvt Ltd v DDA, (1988) (14) DRJ 125 [LNIND 1987 DEL 330] : (1987) 33 DLT 216 [LNIND 1987
DEL 330] (DB); Gulshan Rai Nagpal v Principal, Govt Law College, (2002) Cr LJ (Sik) 171 (DB); Suo motu proceeding
against R Kauppan, Advocate, (2001) Cr LJ 2611 (SC); Ahiriyanna Gowda v State of Karnataka, (1998) Cr LJ 4756
(Kant).
291 Afzal v State of Haryana, (1996) Cr LJ 1679 (SC).
292 Queen-Empress v Ismail, ILR 11 Bom 659.
293 Re Kalagava Bapaiah, ILR 27 Mad 54.
294 Queen-Empress v Venkataramanna, 23 Mad 223, but see sub-note (c) to note above.
295 Dayanath Thakur v Emperor, 37 Cal 72.

Page 17 of 18
296 Re Chotalal Mathuradas, 22 Bom 936.
297 Empress v Chaitram, 6 All 103; Chandrasangji Himatsangji v Mohan Sangji, ILR 30 Bom 523 (PC); Chandra Sangh v
Emperor, 4 Cr LJ 181.
298 Radhika Mohan Kuri v Lal Mohan Sha, ILR 20 Cal 719; Abdul Majid v Krishna Lal Nag, ILR 20 Cal 724; Phulal v
Emperor, ILR 35 All 102; Abdoola Haroon & Co v Calcutta Corp, AIR 1950 Cal 36 .
299 R v Sheodihal Rai, ILR 6 All 487.
300 R v Bykunt, 5 WR (Cr) 72.
301 R v Jibhai, 11 Bom HCR 11.
302 R v Chaitram, ILR 6 All 103 : 1 Weir 154.
303 R v Irbasapa, ILR 4 Bom 479; R v Venkayya, ILR 11 Mad 375.
304 R v Niaz Ali, ILR 5 All 17 : 1 Weir 116.
305 Radhika Mohan Kuri v Lal Mohan Sha, ILR 20 Cal 719; Abdul Majed v Krishna Lal, Ngp ILR 20 Cal 724.
306 Abdul Majed v Krishna Lal Nag, supra.
307 Abramayi v Joseph, (1960) Ker LJ 1307 ; cases cited therein.
308 Emperor v Ismail Khadirshah, AIR 1929 Bom 130 : 29 Cr LJ 403 : ILR 52 Bom 459 : 30 Bom LR 330.
309 SD Article 148; R v Gibbon L&C, 109; cf R v Tyson, LR 1 CCR 107; R v Mullany L&C, 593; R v Baker, LR 1895 : 1 QB
797.
310 Ibid.
311 Mayne, Criminal Law of India, p 366.
312 R v Kailasam, 5 Mad HCR 373.
313 Badri Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1918 All 326 : 19 Cr LJ 2 : 15 All LJ 819 : ILR 40 All 25.
314 Mangal Singh v State, AIR 1956 Pat 154 : (1956) Cr LJ 647 .
315 Abramayi v Joseph, (1960) Ker LJ 1307 , per Raman Nayar J.
316 Emperor v Chheda Lal, ILR 29 All 351 : 5 Cr LJ 285 : 4 All LJ 237.
Page 18 of 18
317 R v Damodhar, 5 Bom HCR 68.
End of Document
[s 193] Punishment for false evidence.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 39
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 39
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for
the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
Page 4 of 39
and whoever intentionally gives or fabricates false evidence in any other case, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation 1.—A trial before a Court-martial is a judicial proceeding.
Explanation 2.—An investigation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before a Court of Justice, is a
stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place before a Court of Justice.
Illustration
A, in an enquiry before a Magistrate for the purpose of ascertaining whether Z ought to be committed for trial,
makes on oath a statement which he knows to be false. As this inquiry is a stage of a judicial proceeding, A has
given false evidence.
Explanation 3.—An investigation directed by a Court of Justice according to law, and conducted under the
authority of a Court of Justice, is a stage of a judicial proceeding, though that investigation may not take place
before a court of Justice.
Illustration
A, in an enquiry before an officer deputed by a Court of Justice to ascertain on the spot the boundaries of land,
makes on oath a statement which he knows to be false. As this enquiry is a stage of a judicial proceeding, A
has given false evidence.
[s 192.1] Scope
This section prescribes the punishment for the two offences defined in the preceding two sections. Paragraph 1
of this section provides higher punishment for giving false evidence, or for fabricating false evidence for the
purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding and para 2 provides lighter punishment for giving
false evidence, or fabricating false evidence in any other case. It may be noted that section 191 defines the
offence of giving false evidence. This section provides for the punishment. It does not say that there are two
kinds of perjury, but that if perjury is committed in the stage of a judicial proceeding it may be punished more
severely than if committed in any other case. The offence is perjury wherever it may be committed.318 The
gravity of the offence is then measured, not by its nature and character, but by the nature and character of the
tribunal before whom it is committed.319 The argument that this section applies only to false evidence given in a
judicial proceeding applies only to para (1) of the section. It does not apply to para (2).320 The developments are
of some consequence and of concern insofar as the proceedings before the court are concerned; that the
parties and the persons seeking for relief do come with material which is suspect, which is fabricated, which is
forged and seek for orders, interim or final, on the basis of such concocted documents and further if they further
embolden themselves to swearing to an affidavit indicating that such documents are either true copies or
certified copies, then matter calls for an appropriate action at least to send a right message to such errant and
irresponsible persons.321
Where a candidate at an election does not furnish required information or knowingly furnishes false information
or conceals any information, he is liable to be prosecuted for offence under section 125A of the Representation
of the People Act, 1951 but he cannot be prosecuted for offence under section 193, IPC.322
Making false statement on oath before the court is an offence under section 191, IPC, and punishable under
Tendering of false evidence as well as threats and intimidation to any person to give false evidence have been
made penal offences under sections 193 and 195(A), IPC.324
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In expln 1, the words “or before a Military Court of Inquest” between “court-martial” and “is” were repealed by
the Cantonments Act, 1889, section 2 and schedule.
Section 193, IPC is a penal provision. Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in a judicial proceeding or
fabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in a judicial proceeding is made punishable under this
section. The offence of giving false evidence is constituted if the following ingredients are satisfied or found to
exist:
(a) A person is legally bound:
(i) by an oath or any express provision of law to state the truth, or
(ii) to make a declaration upon any subject.
(b) He must make a false statement;

(c) He must:
(i) know or believe it to be false, or
(ii) not believe it to be true.
The offence of fabricating false evidence is constituted if the following ingredients are satisfied:
(a) Causing any circumstance to exist or making any false entry in any book or record or making any
document containing a false statement.
(b) Doing one of the above acts with the intention that it may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding or
in a proceeding taken by law before a public servant or an arbitrator.
(c) Doing such act with the intention that it may cause any person who in such proceeding is to form an
opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of
such proceeding.325
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Commentary under same heading in sections 191 and 192, ante may be referred to.
To hold a person guilty under section 193, IPC, it must be determined as to whether the earlier statement was
false or true.326
[s 192.5] Distinction Between Sections 167 and 193
[s 192.6] Section 193 Distinguished from Section 199
Section 191 read with sections 193 and 199 of this Code make the making of false declarations an offence. The
distinction between the provisions of these two sections, insofar as the making of the declaration is concerned,
is that under section 191, the declaration is one in which a person is bound by an oath, or by an express
provision of law, to state the truth, or being bound by law to make a declaration upon any subject, makes a
statement which is false. The declaration contemplated in section 199 is not necessarily one which the person,
making the declaration is bound by law, to make. The essential element of the offence under section 199 is that
the declaration, containing the false statement must be one which any court of justice or any public servant or
other person is bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence of any fact.327
[s 192.7] Section 193 Distinguished from Section 218
The offence under this section is a general one and does not specify the person or the kind of document. It may
be any person and the fabricated evidence may be in any form. Section 218, on the other hand, deals with the
intentional preparation of a false record by a public servant with the object of saving or injuring any person or
property. Under this section, the evidence is intended to be used in a judicial proceeding whereas, section 218
deals with public servants and the gist thereunder is the intentional preparation of a false record with a view to
saving or injuring any person or property. This need not have any relation to a judicial proceeding as such.328
[s 192.8] Sections 193 and 195 Distinguished from Section 211
A statement on oath falsely supporting the prosecution case against an accused person more appropriately
amounts to an offence under sections 193 and 195, IPC and not under section 211, IPC. The offences
contemplated by sections 193 and 195, IPC on the one hand and section 211, IPC on the other were not
intended by the Legislature in this context to overlap so as to make it optional whether to proceed under one or
the other.329
[s 192.9] Sections 193 and 108 of Customs Act
The requirement to state the truth, enacted under sub-section (3) of section 108 of the Customs Act must be
read in the light of the penalty provided for its breach, that the person summoned is liable to be prosecuted
under section 193 as also under section 228, IPC. It should, however, be kept in mind that section 108 of the
Customs Act does not compel a person summoned to incriminate himself. In other words, he can maintain a
studied silence if the answers to the questions put to him are likely to incriminate him. In such a situation,
section 193, IPC is not attracted. The right of silence is also not an offence and it cannot be said to be an
obstruction to the proceedings referred to under section 108 of the Customs Act.330
[s 192.10] Distinction between Sections 463, 465, 471 and Sections 193, 196
[s 192.11] Show Cause Notice to Hostile Witness
Where hostile witnesses stated before the court that the investigating officer had not recorded their statements
as per their say but did not point out as to why he recorded their statements falsely, there was reason to believe
Page 7 of 39
that they have given false evidence before the court. It was held that such incidents need to be taken seriously
and show cause notice as to why proceedings under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 should not be
initiated against them, was directed to be issued to them.331
Commentary under same heading in sections 191 and 192, ante may be referred to.
The word “whoever” is quite general and includes an accused person.332 Anybody who makes a false statement
on oath knowing it to be false makes himself liable to be prosecuted for perjury.333
[s 192.13] “Intentionally”—Meaning of
In order to sustain an indictment for perjury the prosecution must establish, inter alia, two things: (a) that the
statement was false, and (b) that it was known or believed to be false or not believed to be true. In other words,
the statement must be intentionally false.334 False evidence is intentionally given if the persons, making the
statement, makes it advisedly, knowing it to be false, and with the intention of deceiving the court and leading it
to be supposed that that which he states is true.335 Even under the English Perjury Act, 1911,336 the false
statements must be willfully made, that is, the false evidence must be given intentionally.337 Mens rea is an
essential ingredient of the offence of perjury and it is the intention that creates the offence.338 The mere fact that
a statement made by a witness turns out to be wrong or inaccurate, does not make him liable to punishment.
He must make the statement deliberately and must know or believe it to be false or must not believe it to be
true. It is not difficult to imagine a witness making two statements which are contradictory to each other and one
of which he does not know or believe to be false.339 Mere contradiction is not sufficient. The deponent’s
intention to give false evidence or fabricated false evidence is necessary.340 To sustain a conviction under this
section, among other things it must be proved beyond doubt that the statements of the accused are deliberately
false.341 The essence of the offence is the intention.342 The primary ingredient of section 193 of the Code is
intentionally giving false evidence in any stage of judicial proceedings or intentionally fabricating false evidence
for the purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceedings.343
Where in petition filed under section 482, CrPC, the petitioner filed affidavit that he had not approached the
Supreme Court or the High Court earlier, but the petitioner had filed application for anticipatory bail before the
court of Sessions, held, it does not amount to perjury so as to call for action for offence under section 193,
IPC.344
[s 192.13.1] Intention is a Question of Fact
Intention is a question of fact to be decided in each case.345 The offence described in this section is the offence
of intentionally giving false evidence and the intention can only, as a rule, be judged by the surrounding
circumstances. If the matter deposed to was irrelevant or of minor importance, the court cannot infer that there
was any deliberate intention.346 In Queen v Aidrus Sahib,347 Scotland CJ, observed:
For the giving of false evidence, to come within section 193, must be an intentional giving; and in deciding whether or
not the subject-matter of the statement were material to the result of the proceeding, inasmuch as if that subject-matter
were wholly immaterial, they might well attribute the statement to indifference or carelessness on the part of the
prisoner.
Corrupt intention may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances.348 If the statement was false and known
to the accused to be false, it may be presumed that in making it the accused intentionally gave false
Page 8 of 39
evidence.349
[s 192.14] Giving False Particulars of his Educational Qualifications on Website
Where a person gives false particulars of his educational qualifications on website, even if he is a MLA, he
cannot be prosecuted under section 193, IPC. Likewise, where biodata of members of the Legislative Assembly
are published by the Legislative Secretariat, no offence under section 193, IPC is committed.350
[s 192.15] “Gives False Evidence”—Words Refer to Oral Evidence
The words “whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any state of a judicial proceeding” used in this section,
refer only to oral evidence given by a person in any state of judicial proceedings. Accordingly, merely because
a false or fabricated document has been produced before a court it cannot be said that the person producing
the document has given “false evidence” as contemplated by section 193, IPC in the case.351 But giving false
evidence before the High Court by swearing a false affidavit in support of a writ petition has been held to be an
A close scrutiny of sections 191–193 shows that they deal with false evidence.353 An affidavit can be termed to
be an evidence within the ambit of section 3 of the Evidence Act only in those cases when the same is filed at
the instance and under the direction of the court.354
Thus, an affidavit filed suo motu by a party and not under the direction of any court, does not attract sections
191–193, IPC.
[s 192.16] “In any stage of a Judicial Proceeding”—Whether Existing or Foreseen
This section consists of two paragraphs. The first applies to intentionally giving false evidence in any stage of a
judicial proceeding or fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used at any stage of a judicial
proceeding. The giving of false evidence in a judicial proceeding plainly contemplates a judicial proceeding
being in existence; while fabricating false evidence for the purpose of using it at any stage of a judicial
proceeding contemplates some definite judicial proceeding being foreseen.355 If an accused can be found to
have intentionally given false evidence at the stage of trial, his act would obviously fall within the mischief of this
section.356
The accused petitioner had obtained interim order staying the election to the post of President Town Panchayat
by filing forged and fabricated documents and swearing false affidavit. A prima facie case for proceeding under
sections 192 and 193, IPC against the petitioner was held made out.357
[s 192.16.1] Meaning of any Stage
By “any stage of a judicial proceeding” is meant “any step taken by the court in the course of administration of
justice in connection with a case pending”.358 It is immaterial that the trial in which false evidence is given
subsequently becomes abortive for any reason.359
An investigation under chapter 12 of the CrPC, 1973 has been held to be a stage of a judicial proceeding.360
The Kerala High Court has, however, held that every investigation conducted by the police is not a judicial
proceeding unless it is an investigation directed by a law preliminary to a proceeding before a court of justice or
it is an investigation directed by a court of justice.361 Committal proceedings are a stage of the judicial
proceedings before the sessions judge.362
[s 192.16.2] Proceedings Without Jurisdiction

Page 9 of 39
A preliminary inquiry under section 476 of old CrPC 1898 (new section 340 of the CrPC 1973), conducted by a
magistrate having no jurisdiction to conduct it, is not a “stage of judicial proceeding” within the meaning of this
section.363
Proceedings before the income-tax authorities are judicial proceedings,364 but the filing of a return is not a stage
of a judicial proceeding.365 Section 37(4) of the Income Tax Act makes the proceedings before the income tax
officer judicial proceedings under section 193, IPC.
Where, therefore, an offence under section 193, IPC is committed in respect of the proceedings before the
income tax officer, the complaint by the officer is a condition precedent prescribed under section 195(1)(b),
CrPC before a magistrate can take its cognizance.366
[s 192.17] “In any Other Case”—Meaning of
These words have been used in the second paragraph of this section and mean in any case, other than a
judicial proceeding, in which the giving or fabricating false evidence is an offence. Such cases have been dealt
with in sections 191 and 192. A statement recorded under section 164, CrPC, in the course of an investigation
has been held to be an “evidence in any other case”.367
[s 192.18] Explanations to the Section
The first para of this section uses the term “judicial proceeding” twice but it has not been defined anywhere in
the Code. Clause (i) of section 2 of the CrPC, 1973 deals with this term but does not define it exhaustively.
It simply states that a “judicial proceeding” includes any proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may
be legally taken on oath. Explanation 1 to section 193 states and clarifies that a trial before a court-martial is a
judicial proceeding.
For a detailed discussion the commentary under section 192 may be referred to.
[s 192.18.1] Investigation and Inquiry—Explanation 2
Again for the definition of the term “investigation” used in expln 2 we have to fall back on the provisions of
clause (h) of section 2, CrPC 1973 which defines “investigation” as follows:
Investigation’ includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer
or by any person (other than a magistrate) who is authorized by a magistrate in this behalf.
Like the definition of a “judicial proceeding”, even this definition of investigation is not exhaustive but one thing
is clear from it that an investigation cannot be conducted by a magistrate. It is, therefore, submitted that the
illustration appended to expln 2 does not appear to be very appropriate. Though this explanation also speaks of
an investigation which may not take place before a court of justice, the illustration, however, speaks of an
inquiry before a magistrate for the commitment of the accused for trial. According to clause (g) of section 2,
CrPC, “inquiry” means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a magistrate or court.
Thus, an inquiry has to be conducted by a magistrate while an investigation cannot be conducted by any
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magistrate. The word “inquiry” mentioned in the illustration to expln 2, therefore, cannot be read as an
“investigation” mentioned in this explanation. An investigation directed by section 156, CrPC may be cited as an
appropriate illustration to expln 2.
[s 192.18.2] Explanation 3
Again expln 3 speaks of an investigation but the illustration thereto is in respect of an inquiry. This illustration,
however, cannot be termed to be inappropriate as it is not conducted by a magistrate. An investigation
contemplated and ordered by a magistrate under sub-section (2) of section 155 in a non-cognizable case or the
one directed under sub-section (3) of section 156 or sub-section (1) of section 202, CrPC in other cases may be
other illustrations to expln 3. Though the police is not authorised to administer oath to persons during the
course of an investigation and their statements are not recorded on oath, the persons interrogated by the police
are bound to answer truly, as required by sub-section (2) of section 161, CrPC and they are liable to be
prosecuted for making a false statement as discussed above under section 191. It seems to be the reason for
treating the investigation as a judicial proceeding for a limited purpose under this explanation.
The offence is non-cognizable but a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable but not
compoundable. The first part of the offence, namely, giving or fabricating false evidence in a judicial proceeding
is triable by a magistrate of the first class. The second part regarding giving or fabricating false evidence in any
other case is triable by any magistrate.368 But the cognizance can be taken by the magistrate only on the
complaint of the court concerned under section 195(1)(b), CrPC. The entire proceeding is violated if the
complaining magistrate himself takes the cognizance.369 If the complaint is not filed by the court, the court
cannot take cognizance thereof by virtue of section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.370
It is well settled that a complaint under section 195 of the Code must be a regular formal complaint in writing.
Where the Chief Judicial Magistrate was the complainant, he should have filed complaint in some other Court to
which he was subordinate. Since he filed complaint in his own Court, the conviction of the accused appellant
under section 193, IPC was set aside.371
Where a false affidavit is filed in a judicial proceeding pending before an additional district judge, Delhi, which is
a serious matter, any action to be taken in the matter is primarily a matter of the court’s discretion. The offence
under section 193, IPC is attracted and the appellant court cannot examine the defence of the accused or the
appellant and record the finding thereon.372
The procedure for warrant cases has to be followed in the cases under this section. To try such case as a
summons case is an illegality.373
In case forged affidavits are filed before the Supreme Court, it cannot try and punish the accused, and the order
of the Supreme Court convicting the accused and sentencing him to 3 months” imprisonment under section
193, IPC is liable to be set aside for non-compliance with the procedure under section 195, CrPC read with
section 304, CrPC and also account of want of original jurisdiction to try a criminal offence under section 193,
IPC.374
Section 340, CrPC prescribes the procedure as to how a complaint may be preferred under section 195, CrPC.
While under section 195, CrPC it is open to the court before which the offence was committed to prefer a
complaint for the prosecution of the offender, section 340 CrPC prescribes the procedure as to how that
complaint may be preferred. Provisions under section 195, CrPC are mandatory and no court can take
cognizance of offences referred to therein. It is in respect of such offences that the court has jurisdiction to
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proceed under section 340, CrPC and a complaint outside the provisions of section 340, CrPC cannot be filed
by any civil, revenue or criminal court under its inherent jurisdiction.375
As no complaint was filed by any public servant or court concerned, charges under section 193, IPC were not
sustainable.376
Offences under section 193, IPC and section 344, CrPC are distinct offences, thus, conjunction of the two
offences and prosecution of the accused at one trial is neither permissible nor proper.377
[s 192.20] Limitation
There is no period of limitation for an offence following under the first para of this section as the offence of
giving false evidence in a judicial proceeding or fabricating false evidence for the purpose of being used in any
judicial proceeding is punishable with imprisonment extending to seven years. Before the enactment of section
468, CrPC 1973 the courts discouraged prosecution or proceedings for prosecution under this section in
belated cases. The observations of the Supreme Court in KN Mishra v Jiwaji University378 made in this respect
are reproduced below:
It is not expedient in the interest of justice that a complaint should be laid against the appellant after so many years.
The laying of a complaint at this belated stage would make the prosecution a veritable prosecution. It is not possible to
agree that since the appellant had obtained a decree against University for a large amount by making a false statement
on oath the interest of justice required that a complaint should be laid against him and that unless a complaint was laid
the University would not be able to get back its money from the appellant.
It is not the function of the court hearing an application under section 476379 to cater to the acrimonious and vengeful
attitudes taken up by the parties and to advance their interest elsewhere. It is not expedient to permit the continuance
of proceedings for the laying of a complaint in regard to a state matter which took place years ago.
These observations were made by the Supreme Court while dealing with a proceeding under section 476 of the
CrPC, 1898. It is submitted that these observations now no longer hold good and cannot be relied upon while
dealing with the cases governed by the Code of 1973 and no complaint for an offence punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding three years can now be thrown away merely on the ground of delay unless
it is not otherwise expedient to proceed with it.
[s 192.20.1] Exclusion and Extension of Time
The period of limitation for an offence falling under the second para of this section is three years. If after
concluding the preliminary inquiry, if any, under section 340, CrPC the complaint in such cases is not made well
before the expiry of three years and the cognizance is not taken by the court before the expiry of such period,
the cognizance cannot be taken thereafter unless any period is excluded under sections 470 and 471 or the
limitation is extended by the court under section 473, CrPC.380
[s 192.21] Merger of the order in the order of Higher Court or Authority
The merger of the judgement or order of the trial court in the judgment or order of the court of appeal or revision
does not affect the powers of the trial court to file a complaint for prosecution under this section. Where the
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offences under sections 193 and 196 were committed, according to the complainant, at the time of the
proceedings before the first income-tax officer, the fact that subsequently the order of the income tax officer has
merged in the order of the tribunal does not in any manner obliterate the guilt of the offence and as such, the
officer, who is the successor to the office of the forum from where the complaint had been made, retains the
jurisdiction to make the complaint. Furthermore, after the disposal of the appeal by the tribunal, the income-tax
officer gets seisin of the matter for the purpose of implementing the order of the tribunal. It is not possible to
accept the contention that because there was an appeal before the appellant assistant commissioner and
thereafter before the tribunal, the income tax officer concerned has lost jurisdiction to proceed to make the
complaint. It is true that the original income tax officer had not made the complaint. But his successor to the
office, who has filed the complaint, was competent to make the complaint.381
[s 192.22] Complaint Necessary only if Offence Committed in or in Relation to Any Proceeding in Court
Commentary in section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be referred to.382
[s 192.22.1] Any Proceeding in Court
So far as the provisions of section 195, CrPC are concerned, it is significant that clause (b) refers to “any
proceeding in any court”, and is not confined to a judicial proceeding. It is, therefore, not necessary for its
application that the court should be engaged in a judicial proceeding. It is also clear from sub-section (3) that
the term “court” in section 195, CrPC is used in a very wide sense. The word “includes” indicates that there may
also be courts other than civil, revenue or criminal courts. The recording of a confession under section 164,
CrPC has been held to be a proceeding in a court within the meaning of this section.383
Mutation proceedings before a mamlatdar or muktiarkar are not judicial procee-dings,384 but they are
proceedings before a court within the meaning of section 195, CrPC.385 A proceeding for a composition or
scheme under the Insolvency Act is in relation to the original insolvency proceedings itself which is a
proceeding in court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b), CrPC. Consequently the use by the insolvent of an
affidavit, showing a person as his creditor in a composition, which to his knowledge was false, constitutes an
offence committed in relation to a proceeding in a court within the meaning of section 195(1)(b).386
The accused filed forged and fabricated documents before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. Prima facie
offence under section 193, IPC was committed. No separate complaint by the public servant was held
necessary, and bar of section 195, CrPC was not attracted. Inquiry under section 340, CrPC was also not
required.387
Where a false charge was made to the police and on the report of the police after investigation, a magistrate
discharged the accused and cancelled his bail bond, it was held that the offence under section 211 was
committed in relation to a proceeding in court and a complaint of the magistrate was necessary.388
A prosecution for offence under section 193, IPC was initiated by the complainant and not by any court or a
public servant, as contemplated under sub-clause (i) of sub-section 1(b) of section 195, CrPC. If the complaint
had come to be filed without their being a case pending in the court, the matter would have been different.
However, this being not the case, the discretion exercised by the magistrate in issuing the process was held
capricious and arbitrary and such complaint suffered from a fundamental legal defect.389 Offence punishable
under section 193, IPC cannot be taken cognizance of on the basis of a private complaint.390
Where an offence is committed by a constable in a transaction which arose out of the execution of a warrant
issued by a court, the offence is committed in relation to a proceeding in court and a complaint of the court is
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necessary.391
[s 192.22.2] Offence in or in Relation to a Court Proceeding
The offence committed must be in connection with “any proceeding” in any court.392 Clause (b) of section
195(1), CrPC applies not only when an offence mentioned in it is committed in a proceeding in any court but
also when it is committed in relation to a proceeding in a court. It has been held by the Allahabad High Court
that it is not possible to hold that an offence is committed in relation to a proceeding when in fact there has
been no proceeding, and to hold it to be in relation to the proceedings in a court retrospectively because
subsequently some proceedings did go into court.393 But some of the offences enumerated in the clause are
capable of being committed in relation to a judicial proceeding which did not exist. False evidence, for instance,
may be fabricated for a contemplated suit, or property may be fraudulently concealed in contemplation of an
execution proceeding. The clause applies if a judicial proceeding is in existence at the time when it is sought to
prosecute the offender for the offence in question. As held in Re Indrachand Bacharai394 the crucial date for the
purpose of section 195, CrPC, is the date when the court takes cognizance of the offence.395 The words “in
relation to” make it clear that section 195(1)(b) is sufficiently wide to cover cases where the offence alleged was
committed in relation to proceedings subsequently instituted in court.396 It is, however, necessary that the
“proceeding in any court” referred to in the clause should be actually instituted before the criminal court is asked
to take cognizance of the offence.397
The clause does not apply to a prosecution for the offence of making a false charge which had not reached any
court of law.398 No complaint of court is required under clause (b) of sub-section (1) to prosecute a person for
having fabricated false evidence during a police investigation and when there was no proceeding pending in
any court in relation to which the alleged false evidence was said to have been fabricated.399
Section 195(1)(b), CrPC also does not apply to an offence committed under section 193, IPC, in respect of
proceedings in a court of law which are contemplated but which in fact are never started.400
If a false charge to the police is the basis of subsequent proceedings in court, a complaint of the court is
necessary even if the accused is discharged in the proceedings,401 or the proceedings are withdrawn.402
A returning officer deciding on the validity of a nomination paper under section 36 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951, is not a court for the purpose of section 195, CrPC. An offence under section 193, IPC
proceeding before him is not committed in relation to a proceeding before a court so as to require a complaint
by him. But there is no legal impediment to the returning officer himself filing a complaint under sections 181–
182, IPC, as provided in clause (a) of that section and charging the accused therein with also an offence under
[s 192.22.3] When Offences Falling Under section 195, CrPC and Other Offences are Inseparable
When offences under sections 420, 464, 466, 468 and 471 of the IPC are, on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, so intermingled with offences under sections 193 and 209 of the IPC and they are
alleged to have been committed in the same transaction and it is not possible to separate the trial in respect of
some of the offences which do not attract the provisions of section 195(1)(b) of the Code, it is well settled that it
is not open to a court to proceed with the trial by dropping the charge for offences which attract the provisions
of section 195 of the Code.404
[s 192.23] First Information Statement under Section 154, CrPC
First information statement is the only information on which the concerned police officer has to start the
investigation, to find out the truth and collect the materials. It can be given on hearsay information also. A wrong
first information statement purposely made for initiating action may be of consequence under some other
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provision, for example in an action for malicious prosecution, but it is not penal under section 193 on the basis
of section 191.405
To hold a person guilty under section 193, IPC, it must be determined as to whether the earlier statement was
false or true. Merely because an informant does not support the allegations made in the FIR, he commits no
offence punishable under section 193, IPC.406
[s 192.24] Prosecution of an Approver for Perjury
Provisions of sections 195 and 340, CrPC 1973 do not apply to an offence committed by an approver under this
section. In one case, a petitioner had turned approver but at the trial he resiled from the earlier statement made
by him before the magistrate, by whom the pardon was tendered to him. On a certificate issued by the public
prosecutor, he was tried for the main offence. The sessions judge, while acquitting him, passed an order
directing that he shall be prosecuted under section 193, IPC for giving false evidence and filed a complaint to
that effect in the court of the magistrate. The High Court held that the complaint could not be filed as there was
no sanction of the High Court as required by the second proviso to sub-section (1) of section 308, CrPC.407
[s 192.25] Distinguishing Features of Sections 340 and 344, CrPC408
There is nothing in section 344 which makes a distinction between flagrant offences and offences which are not
flagrant, or between serious offences and offences which are not serious. If the court does not form and
express an opinion that the witness has intentionally given false evidence or intentionally fabricated false
evidence or it is not satisfied that it is necessary and expedient in the interest of justice that the witness should
be tried summarily for giving or fabricating false evidence, no question of taking an action under section 344
can arise. Even under section 340, the court must, before making a complaint, be satisfied that it is expedient in
the interests of justice to make an inquiry into the offence committed by the witness. The court has an option to
proceed either under section 344 or section 340 and if it does not take action under section 344, it can do so
under section 340. The power of the court to this effect has been specifically saved by sub-section (3) of
section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. But where no complaint is filed under section 340, CrPC
and the requisite opinion is not expressed in the judgement, no action under section 344 is permissible.
Whereas section 340 is a general provision dealing with the procedure to be followed in respect of a variety of
offences affecting the administration of justice, insofar as certain offences falling under sections 193 to 196 and
section 471, IPC, etc. are concerned, every court before which that person has appeared as a witness and
which disposed of the case can make a complaint.
For the purpose of section 340 a court means a civil, revenue or criminal court, and includes a tribunal (sections
340(4) and 195(3), CrPC 1973) but an action under section 344 can be taken only by a court of sessions or a
magistrate of the first class. An order passed under section 340, CrPC is appealable under section 340(1),
CrPC and even when no order for making a complaint or rejecting an application for making a complaint is
made under section 340(1), CrPC the superior court can exercise such power under sub-section (2) of section
340. Unlike section 340, no such powers have been given to a superior or appellate court against an order
passed or omission to pass an order under section 344 for the trial of a witness for committing perjury or
fabricating false evidence.409 If on summary trial by the concerned court of session or the magistrate of first
class, before whom the offence was committed by the witness, he is convicted, the general provisions of appeal
or revision against such conviction shall apply. In case an appeal or revision is preferred against the judgment
or order, in which the opinion for trying the witness was expressed, the trial has to be stayed until the disposal
of the appeal or revision and thereupon, the further proceedings of the trial shall abide by the result of the
appeal or revision.410
An essential prerequisite for proceedings under section 344, CrPC is that at the time of the delivery of the
judgment, the court should have formed an opinion about the falsity of the evidence of the witness. It will not
apply where the court cannot form such an opinion as the perjury is discovered after the delivery of the
judgment.411
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[s 192.25.1] Successor Magistrate cannot act under section 344, CrPC Without Required Observations in
Judgment
It will also not apply where the predecessor magistrate did not manifest in his judgment that he was proceeding
to try the offenders for an offence under section 193, IPC. The steps taken by the successor magistrate to have
the accused summoned before him under section 344, CrPC therefore, cannot be allowed to sustain.412
[s 192.26] Whether Offence Cognizable under Section 344, CrPC Different from the Offence under this Section
The relevant part of para 1 of section 193 runs:
Whoever intentionally gives false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding, or fabricates false evidence for the
purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonment … which may extend
to seven years, and … fine.
On the other hand, the relevant part of section 344(1), CrPC runs:
(1) if, at the time of delivery of any judgment or final order disposing of any judicial proceeding, a court of session or
magistrate of the first class expresses an opinion to the effect that any witness appearing in any such proceeding had
knowingly or fully given false evidence should be used in such proceeding it or he may, if satisfied that… The witness
should be tried summarily for giving or fabricating … false evidence, take cognizance of the offence and may,…. Try
such offender summarily and sentence him to imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or to fine …
or with both.
[s 192.26.1] Difference in Procedure—Forum and Quantum of Punishment only
A close scrutiny of the provisions of both the sections cited above reveals that the nature of the offence and its
ingredients are the same in both the sections. The real difference in the two sections is regarding the
procedure, forum and quantum of punishment. An offence under para 1 of section 193 is triable by a magistrate
of the first class413 on the complaint being filed by the concerned court under section 195(1)(b), CrPC.
On the other hand, if such offence is committed in any judicial proceeding before a court of session or
magistrate of the first class and at the time of finally disposing of such proceeding, the sessions Judge or the
magistrate expresses an opinion in his judgment or order to the effect that a particular witness appearing in
such proceeding had knowingly or willfully given false evidence or had fabricated false evidence with the
intention that such evidence should be used in such proceeding and on his satisfaction that it is necessary and
expedient in the interest of justice that the witness should be tried summarily for giving or fabricating false
evidence. He may himself take cognizance of the offence if the concerned court feels that it is expedient in the
interest of justice that the person committing an offence under section 193 should be punished, or after making
the necessary inquiry as provided by section 340, CrPC, it may make a complaint for his prosecution in the
court of the magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. Such court may be a civil court, criminal court,
revenue court or a tribunal. Sub-section (3) of section 344 leaves no room for any controversy or doubt about
the nature of the offence dealt with by these two sections (ie, sections 340 and 344, CrPC) as it clearly provides
that nothing in section 344 shall affect the power of the court to make a complaint under section 340 for the
offence, where it does not choose to proceed under section 344. It means that section 344 provides the
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summary trial of the same offence for which a provision has been made in section 340.
In Ismail Khan v State,414 while acquitting the accused of offences punishable under section 143 and section
506, IPC, the trial magistrate ordered to issue notice to the complainant, who had appeared as PW1 before him
to show cause as to why he should not be punished for giving false evidence in the judicial proceedings. Not
satisfied with his reply, the magistrate came to the conclusion that he should be tried for having committed the
offence punishable under section 193, CrPC. On a petition under section 482, CrPC by PW1 before the
Karnataka High Court, MM Mirdhe J, constituting the single bench, quashed the order of the magistrate
initiating the proceeding against the petitioner. The following observations made by Mirdhe J, are relevant:
The offence under s 193, IPC is punishable with imprisonment for seven years in maximum whereas the offence for
which the person can be tried summarily by a court under s 344 CrPC is punishable in maximum with imprisonment for
3 months or fine which may extend to Rs 500 or with both. Looking to the punishment prescribed for the offence of
giving false evidence contemplated under s 344, CrPC it is clear that the offence for which a person can be summarily
tried under s 344, CrPC is not the offence punishable under s 193, IPC and if the magistrate is to proceed under s 344,
CrPC against a person no complaint will be necessary. But, in the instant case, the magistrate has proceeded against
the petitioner for the offence under s 193, IPC when there is no complaint by the court itself.
[s 192.26.2] Quantum of Sentence not the Yardstick to Determine the Offence
With respect it is submitted that section 344, CrPC prescribes the procedure for the summary trial of the offence
punishable under section 193, IPC and merely on the basis of sentence the conclusion that the offence of
giving false evidence contemplated under section 344, CrPC is not the offence punishable under section 193,
IPC is not correct. These observations completely overlook the concept of summary trials meant for the speedy
disposal of cases. In general, all offences not punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding two years can
be tried summarily but certain offences punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to three years or even
seven years can be tried summarily.415 The maximum sentence that can be passed in the case of conviction on
summary trial is three months only.416 If the yardstick of sentence is to be applied to determine the nature of an
offence as done by the Karnataka High Court, the provisions of section 260(1), CrPC will be rendered nugatory
or at least inconsistent or irreconcilable. To quote one more example, under para 4 of section 174, IPC non-
attendance in a court of justice in obedience to a summons is an offence punishable with simple imprisonment
extending to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both. If the summoned
person had to appear before any criminal court, instead of making a complaint against the offender, the court
has been empowered by section 350, CrPC to take cognizance of the offence itself and try him summarily but
in that case the maximum punishment that can be awarded is a fine not exceeding one hundred rupees. The
punishment that can be awarded in summary trials is thus always less than the punishment to be awarded in
regular trials under other provisions of CrPC though the offence is the same.
[s 192.26.3] Offence is same under section 193, IPC and section 344, CrPC
After the above discussion, it is evident that both section 193, IPC and section 344, CrPC make provisions for
the punishment of one and the same offence under two different procedures and there seems to be no reason
to say that the offence of which the cognizance can be taken under section 344, CrPC is a new or different
offence, other than one punishable under section 193, IPC and the Karnataka case has not been correctly
decided on this point.
[s 192.27] Factors to be Considered before Making Complaint—Expediency
“Expediency in the interest of justice” does not correspond to “interests of justice”. The court must be satisfied
about expediency and must clearly record that jurisdictional finding before taking any step for prosecution.
Where on notices being issued to the petitioners to show cause as to why they should not be prosecuted under
section 193, IPC, they filed a joint reply and it was submitted on their behalf that whatever they stated before
the committing court and at the trial was truthful. They were illiterate persons and the police gave them beating
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and forced them to give their statements against their will before the sub-divisional magistrate, and accordingly
they gave their statements under section 164, CrPC, as directed by the police. Their statements before the
committing court as well as before the session judge, according to them, were the correct statements. The
sessions Judge was not satisfied with the reply made by these petitioners and recorded the order that separate
complaints be made against them for having given false evidence. On appeal, the High Court held that in the
circumstances of the case, it shall not be in the interest of justice to prosecute the petitioners under section 193,
IPC. It is also not expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute a person under section 193, IPC, who in the
witness-box resiles from his statement made under section 164, CrPC, and says that he was forced by the
police to make that statement, specially when the person is an illiterate and it is impossible to rule out the
possibility that he was forced to make the statement.417
[s 192.27.1] Court not to Become the Handle in the Hand of any Party
The court should also see that it does not become the handle in the hands of the parties who move in the
matter out of spite or grudge which they bear against their opponents.418 Where the account books called upon
by the income tax officer, which are proved to be in existence, are not produced and where the person called
upon to do so, does not give any reason for not producing them, but makes the statement that he had no
account books other than those already produced by him, which was clearly false, the statement being a wrong
statement, his conviction under section 193 of Indian Penal Code was held to be correct.419
[s 192.28] Other Facts to be taken into account in Making a Complaint for Perjury—Statement must be
Intentionally False
In making a complaint for perjury against a witness, the magistrate should remember that the statement must
be intentionally false in order to justify a prosecution. When the question is neither material to the issue in the
case nor goes to the credit of the witness, proceedings ought not to be started. Further, prosecution for perjury
should be launched only in cases wherein it appears to be deliberate and conscious and conviction is
reasonably probable or likely.420 Some allowance ought to be made to a witness seeking to evade some matter
relating to, for instance, his past history.421 It has been held that it is not necessary that the statements which
form the subject matter of a charge under section 193, IPC should be material for the decision of the suit and
the question can only be considered for the purpose of the sentence, in the event of a conviction.422 But if the
statement is not material in the sense that it did not hamper the course of justice, it is not in the interests of
justice to prosecute the witness for perjury.423 The materiality of the evidence to the matter in issue is not the
only point to be considered.424 Where the evidence of a witness was disbelieved by the trial court but was
accepted by the appellate court, it is not in the interest of justice to prosecute him for perjury.425
[s 192.28.1] Prosecution on Merely Disbelieving the Case and the Witnesses not Justified
The mere fact that the court does not accept the complainant’s version or does not rely upon the evidence of
the persons produced as witnesses in the case, cannot justify prosecution under sections 211 and 193, IPC.
Such prosecutions can be ordered only when the record shows unmistakably that a false complaint was filed
with the knowledge that there was no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or that a witness intentionally
gave false evidence.426
[s 192.28.2] Interest of the State also to be Considered—Nature of Litigation and Motive
In dealing with an application to prosecute for perjury, courts are entitled, in doubtful cases, to consider the
grounds on which the Government may suggest that a prosecution is inexpedient. Although the scheme of
procedure adopted in this country recognises the right of a private person to institute criminal proceedings, it
also recognises the right of the state which is a party to all criminal trials as representing the public, to intervene
and procure a stay of proceedings.427 The explanation furnished by the offender has also to be given due
consideration.428 The circumstance that the false statements were made in a family dispute is not a sufficient
reason for refraining from action by prosecution under section 340 against those who made those false
statements. If the false statements have been made from motives not in themselves evil, that circumstance can
be taken into account when awarding punishment.429
Where an advocate created a false evidence before the High Court by appending a false certificate to the effect
that no revision was filed earlier, it was observed that it is the incumbent duty of the court to rise to the occasion
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in the interest of orderliness in the society and directed a complaint to be filed against him.430
Where the petitioner made a false statement on oath in a writ of habeas corpus filed in the High Court and also
obtained an interim order in his favour, the High Court ultimately found that the petition amounted to an abuse
of the process and the facts stated in the petition on oath were fabricated and false. The petitioner, who had
made a false statement on oath, was accordingly directed to be prosecuted by the registrar of the High Court
for the offence punishable under section 191 read with sections 193 and 199, IPC.431
[s 192.28.3] Panchnama not a Record of Statement of Attesting Witnesses
It is to be noted that a panchnama or a mahazar is not a record of the statement made by the attesting witness.
It is intended to contain the minutes or a record of what the investigating officer sees or witnesses. It is the
contemporaneous record of his actions and not that of the attesting witnesses. Just because there is a conflict
between the evidence of a witness in court and the recitals in the panchnama, it cannot be concluded that what
the witness said in the court is untrue because the real facts would be just the other way round. It is possible
that the witness was tendering true evidence and the contents of the mahazar were wrong. Therefore, unless
there are other materials before the court to determine that the witness perjured in court, proceedings are not to
be taken against him for perjury.432
[s 192.28.4] Where Proceedings are Illegal
If, during the course of proceedings which were ultra vires and illegal, any offence under section 193 or section
471, IPC was committed, it cannot be said that it was committed in or in relation to, or by a party to, any judicial
proceedings, and no complaint can be made under this section in respect of that offence.433
Offending Portions of Statements to be Set Out in an Annexure
Where the notice besides being not happily worded was laconic and did not satisfy the essential requirements
of law, nor did it specify the offending portions in the appellant’s lengthy statement, which in the opinion of the
High Court, were false, it was held that in cases of this nature, it is highly desirable and indeed very necessary
that the portions of the witness’s statement in regard to which he has, in the opinion of the court, perjured
himself, should be specifically set out in or form an annexure to the notice issued to the accused, so that he is
in a position to furnish an adequate and proper reply in regard thereto and be able to meet the charge.434
[s 192.28.5] No Inquiry Where it is Tantamount to Abuse of the Process of Court
Where the remarks or observations made by the trial Judge against the petitioners were perverse and against
the record and the trial Judge had exceeded in exercising his jurisdiction for holding an inquiry under section
340, CrPC for the prosecution of the petitioners for the offences under sections 193 and 195, IPC, it was held
that the order directing an inquiry is tantamount to abuse of the process of court and deserves to be
quashed.435 The proceedings under section 340 of the CrPC, 1973 should not be initiated as a matter of course,
even when the witnesses give contradictory evidence. In a case where there is no legal evidence for its
success, prosecution should be avoided. The courts should act with utmost circumspection in launching a
prosecution.436
[s 192.28.6] Most Appropriate Stage for Deciding Complaint of Perjury
If the particular judicial or legal proceeding relates to a trial of civil proceeding or the contentious issues in a
legal proceeding, raised therein by the respective pleadings of the parties, to which the final adjudication of the
trial court is required, on the merits of the evidence to be let in on record by the parties in support of their
respective case, there it goes without saying that the most appropriate stage for the trial Judge in such a trial
proceeding is to formulate his opinion on the filing or non-filing of complaint contemplated under section 340 of
CrPC, would be at the final stage of disposal of the main matter on merits.437 Otherwise if the presiding officer
of a trial court is to take a decision relating to an alleged perjury or a false statement at the initial stage of the
proceeding, then in all probability, it will prejudicially affect the fair disposal of the main matter on its merit and
therefore, it would certainly deflect the course of justice.438
[s 192.29] “Locus Paenitentiae”—Meaning of

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The term “locus paenitentiae” according to Law Lexicon, means a place or chance of repentance. It also means
a power of drawing back from a bargain before any act has been done to confirm it in law. No question of locus
paenitentiae should arise when an accused is prosecuted for making two contradictory statements.439 But
where the question is whether a complaint for perjury shall or shall not be made, the safest rule is to give the
witness as far as possible a locus paenitentiae, and if the witness avails himself thereof, a prosecution for
perjury is inexpedient.440 The fact that the person making a wrong statement applied for withdrawal of it as soon
as he found that the statement was wrong is a factor in his favour. A prosecution for perjury is hardly desirable
in such a case.441 But though it is true that a witness must be allowed a locus paenitentiae in the interests of
justice, there must be some reasonable limit as to its extent. Where a witness, several weeks after giving false
evidence, fearing a prosecution, applied to the court to be recalled so that he might correct a certain answer he
had given at the time of the previous examination, it was held that the previous statement was a deliberate
falsehood calculated to deceive the court and it was a proper case for a complaint of court being made.442
[s 192.30] Contradictory Statements—Outlook at Trial not the same as in Proceedings under Section 340,
CrPC
The questions which are in issue when a person is prosecuted for perjury are quite different from those which
arise in proceedings under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973. In the latter, the court has to
see whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to prosecute the witness for committing perjury, whereas in
the former the court has only to see whether the ingredients of the offence of perjury are proved by the
prosecution, and it is not at all concerned with the question of the expediency. A court may refuse to hold that it
is expedient to prosecute a witness who has deliberately made two contradictory statements, at least one of
which is false, but cannot refuse to convict him of perjury when that is proved. In a prosecution for perjury, it is
quite immaterial that the two contradictory statements were made in the course of one deposition in one trial. If
the first statement is false, the applicant committed the offence of perjury as soon as he made it. Whether he
made it deliberately and whether he knew or believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true is to be seen
with reference to the time at which he made it. Where the witnesses were examined in 1983 and 1986 and the
incident had taken place in 1977, it was held that it cannot be said that they gave false statements.443 If the
requirements of section 191 are fulfilled, the witness committed the offence of perjury as soon as he made it.
Section 191 does not take into consideration the fact that the false statement was subsequently in the same
deposition or in the same trial, admitted to be incorrect and replaced by the correct statement or that the
deposition was not finished before the accused corrected himself.444
[s 192.30.1] Contradictions in Statements in the Cases of Grave Nature
In a capital case, where irreconcilable or totally contradictory statements are made by witnesses to the crime at
different stages of time and the only explanation offered is that at one stage they were threatened by the
prisoners and at another stage by the police, the witnesses in such a case should be proceeded against under
section 193, IPC read with section 340, CrPC and a complaint should made in order to determine whether they
are liable to be convicted of the offence of perjury.445 It has been repeatedly pointed out how the fact that a
witness appears to have made contradictory statements at two different stages of a case is not by itself always
sufficient to justify his prosecution for perjury. The fact that the evidence is given in a case of a grave nature
should only make the court all the more careful is weighing all the circumstances before embarking on
prosecutions for perjury on the basis of contradictions.446
[s 192.30.2] Witnesses to be Encouraged to Tell the Truth
It is in the interests of the State as well as that of justice that prosecution witnesses be free to tell the truth to
the court of session irrespective of whatever evidence they may have given in the court of the committing
magistrate.447 A Division Bench of the Kerala High Court has gone to the extent of saying that a witness is
expected to speak the truth and he must be encouraged to do so even if the statement before the court is
against his previous statement, without the danger of exposing himself to a prosecution for perjury.448 Where a
witness made a false statement under section 164 and then told the truth at the trial, it is not expedient in the
interests of justice that he should be prosecuted.449
[s 192.30.3] Deposition as a Whole has to be Considered
The deposition should be considered as a whole and regard should be given to the circumstances in which the
contradictory answers were made.450 Usually it would not be expedient to prosecute a witness who had made
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contradictory statements in the course of the same deposition, because the presumption is that the witness is
trying to correct a false statement by his subsequent statement, and in such cases some locus paenitentiae
should be given to the witness, but this does not apply where different depositions are recorded after an interval
of time.451 It would be most undesirable that a witness should be afraid to correct a mistake made in his
deposition for fear of rendering himself liable to prosecution for perjury. Prosecution for contradiction in the
same deposition is maintainable if the contradiction was made not to correct a bona fide error, but with a
dishonest intention.452
[s 192.30.4] Mere Contradiction not Sufficient for Inquiry
The mere fact that the statement made by a witness before the magistrate under section 164 and before the
committing magistrate were undoubtedly contradictory to those made in the sessions court does not make it
incumbent on the court to order prosecution. The court must exercise proper judicial discretion, giving due
regard to its reaction on the administration of justice.453 There may be cases where offences like perjury
complained of against a particular person may not be of a kind in which prosecution should be resorted to,
because in every case a mere contradiction by itself will not attract the operation of the provisions of section
340, CrPC, but there may be cases where contradictions made in the depositions were conscious and
deliberate, made in order to thwart the administration of justice, or to obstruct the court in coming to a correct
conclusion. In such cases, the court has to consider whether, in the light of the evidence before it, it is a fit case
or that it is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry be made into the offence.454 The court should
consider how it has come about that there are contradictions and why the witness has resiled from his
statements before the magistrate. The High Court refused to grant a sanction in one case though it found that
the witness had made false statements before the committing magistrate, but deposed truly in the trial court.455
[s 192.30.5] Prosecution in Doubtful Cases
It, however, cannot be laid down as a general rule that a witness is exempt from prosecution with regard to a
statement made in the sessions court differing from a previous statement made by him before the committing
magistrate even though the subsequent statement is considered to be true. There may be good reasons for not
prosecuting the witness in many cases should the subsequent statement be held to be true; but where it is
doubtful which of the two statements is true and where it may be held with some degree of certainty that the
subsequent statement is the false one, a complaint for giving false evidence should, as a rule, be made. Other
matters, it is true, should of course be considered, such as any compulsion brought to bear on the witness in
making either of the statements, but where no compulsion has been shown, the courts should not refrain from
making a complaint except for good reasons.456
[s 192.30.6] Contradictory Statements When not to be Viewed Leniently
Where a report was made by the petitioner to the Director, ACB, Hyderabad against the sanitary inspector of
Warangal municipality for demanding illegal gratification and on his supporting the report in his statement
recorded under section 164, CrPC, the sanitary inspector was trapped with the assistance of the petitioner. In
the trial against the inspector the petitioner appeared as PW 1 and rescinding from his report and statement
under section 164, CrPC, he stated that he himself had tried to put the money in the pocket of the inspector.
The trial Judge acquitted the accused inspector but made an observation in the judgment that the petitioner be
prosecuted under this section for his giving a totally variant version as PW 1. He was accordingly tried and
convicted and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for six months under this section by the magistrate and it
was held that out of his three versions, at least one was known to him to be false. His appeal failed and
thereafter the revision filed by him was also dismissed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court with the observation
that no interference was called for with the findings arrived at by the two courts below.457
[s 192.30.7] Presumption in Favour of Reconciliation of Contradictory Statements
Whether a sanction should be granted on a complaint made for giving false evidence on the mere fact that the
witness made contradictory statements depends on the circumstances.458 The practice of charging a man with
making two mutually contradictory statements should be adopted only where the two statements are
necessarily and irreconcilably contradictory.459 Every possible presumption must be made in favour of the
reconciliation of the two statements.460 No sanction should be granted or complaint made when a witness has
corrected his false statement in his cross-examination.461
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In Ismail Khan v State462 a Special Bench of the Karnataka High Court has held:
The learned magistrate has perused the complaint given by the accused and his deposition and then came to the
conclusion that the petitioner has committed perjury. It is necessary that in order to make a person liable for perjury he
should have made a statement on oath regarding the facts on which his statement was based and then deny those
facts on oath on a subsequent occasion. His earlier statement regarding the facts must be on oath and his subsequent
statement also must be on oath and if both the statements are opposed to each other and they cannot be reconciled,
then a person may be liable to be proceeded against for perjury under section 344, CrPC or under section 193, IPC.
[s 192.31] Contradictory Statements Made in two different Courts—Deposition which is false to be Ascertained
Where the evidence given before the committing magistrate was contradicted by the same witness before the
sessions judge, it is not competent for the sessions court to order the trial of the accused for perjury without
specifying which of the depositions made by the accused was false, especially when there is nothing on the
record to show that the Judge was satisfied that the evidence given before himself was false.463
A view has been taken that when prosecution is ordered in respect of two contradictory statements made in two
different courts, an order under section 340, CrPC of one of the courts is insufficient. Both courts must make an
order under this section in respect of the alternative charge,464 or, at all events, the courts which desire to take
action should obtain the sanction of the court before which the other statements were made, unless it is itself a
court to which the other is subordinate.465
[s 192.31.1] When Statement Before Committing Court Contradicts Statement Before Sessions Court
When a person makes one statement in the committing court and contradicts it in the sessions court, the
sessions Judge can complain in the alternative that one or other of the statements must be false. If the
statement in the sessions court is true, the sessions Judge can complain of the statement in the committing
court. A statement made by a witness at the preliminary inquiry leading up to the trial in the sessions court is to
be regarded as having been in relation to the subsequent proceedings in the sessions court.466
In Tilak’s case,467 an offence under section 211, IPC alleged to have been committed in the court of the Poona
city magistrate was brought to the notice of the district court of Poona in the course of a civil judicial proceeding.
The district Judge acted under this section and sent the case down to the first class magistrate, Poona. It was
held that the offence was not cognizable by the first class magistrate, as there was neither the previous
sanction nor the complaint of the Poona city magistrate or of the sessions court to which he is subordinate. The
fact that the district court and the sessions court are represented by one and the same individual will not in any
way cure the illegality.468
[s 192.32] Complaint in Respect of Fabricating False Evidence
Cognizance of an offence in respect of documents produced in court can be taken only on a written complaint
of the court concerned.469 If a litigant is suspected of having fabricated false evidence, it is the duty of the court
to direct an inquiry into the matter. Whenever it appears to the court that it is expedient in the interest of justice
that the attempted fabrication should be penalised and punished, the court should not hesitate to adopt that
course. But, on the other hand, a distinction must always be drawn between a document which does not appear
to the court to be genuine on the evidence produced and a document which may be regarded as fabricated.
This distinction is of considerable importance in deciding whether criminal proceedings should be started
against a party or not.470
[s 192.32.1] When False Entry Amounts to Fabrication

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If a false entry is made in any book or record and that circumstance assists the court to form an opinion upon
that evidence in favour or against somebody, that is enough to hold that false evidence was fabricated. If such
false evidence is used in a judicial proceeding, the offence made out is under section 193.471
When during a pendency of proceeding for assessment of compensation under Bihar Land Reforms Act, the
accused persons (clerks of the office of DCLR) submitted false and collusive reports and made interpolations in
collectible demands and altered touri numbers for facilitating a false payment to a land owner, it was held to
amount to fabricating false evidence within the meaning of section 192, IPC, more so when ad interim payment
of compensation in excess was actually made to the land owner. In such a case, offences under sections 193
and 209, IPC were clearly made out and the provisions of section 195(1)(b), CrPC were attracted for the
prosecution of the accused for those offences.472
[s 192.33] Charge—Particulars of
Where the witnesses who had taken oath named one of the four accused causing injuries to deceased when
they appeared against the other accused but changed their version with regard to participation of said accused
when they appeared against him, the changed version of witnesses prima facie attracts the provisions of
section 193 and they need to be prosecuted for the offence under section 193.473 A charge in a criminal trial is
framed with a view to enable the accused person to understand what the prosecution alleges against him and
what they are seeking to prove and what it is that he has got to meet in order that he may be acquitted. By
failure to convey to the accused and inform him what he is being charged with, what he has to meet and
against what he has to defend himself, whether by framing an unintelligible charge or not framing a charge at
all, prejudice is assumed and the conviction is to be set aside.474
It was alleged that the accused R made some overwriting in the bed-head-tickets and the accused M made
false entries in the call register of the employees of the hospital, but the two documents, despite court’s order,
were not produced before the court, and as the charge was without evidence, the two accused R and M were
discharged.475
[s 192.33.1] Charge—Contradictory Statements not the only Material to Prove Perjury
Charges of perjury should contain a distinct assertion with regard to each statement intended to be
characterised as perjury, that it was made, that it is untrue in fact, and the accused knew it to be so when he
made it,476 when the perjury is sought to be established on the basis of contradictory statements made on oath.
Even in Emperor v Bankatram Lachiram,477 on which reliance was placed by the Karnataka High Court, the
controversy before the Bombay High Court was in a case of perjury arising out of contradictory statements. It is,
therefore, not correct to say that whenever perjury is sought to be established it can be done only by proving
two contradictory statements of a person made on oath. It can also be established in other ways as discussed
above. While drawing up a charge, the following points should be kept in mind:
(i) Date must be given—The charge should disclose the exact date on which the offence was
committed.478
(ii) Court—The court or other officer before whom the offence was committed must be specified.479
(iii) Stage of the judicial proceeding—The particular stage of the judicial proceeding should be specified.480
(iv) Exact words of the statement alleged to be false must be set out in the charge. See the cases as
mentioned in the footnote.481
Where the charge was that “You, on or about the 7 May 1904, at L, gave false evidence in a judicial
proceeding, namely, in a case under section 133, IPC and thereby committed an offence punishable under
Page 23 of 39
section 193”, it was held that the charge was vague and the conviction was set aside.482 Where an accused
makes numerous false statements in a case, there should be a separate charge for each statement, but all
such charges can be tried at one trial if they form part of one and the same transaction.483 But compare Re
Chan Hang Kin,484 wherein it was stated that the whole evidence of a witness was a tissue of falsehood and it
was held that the charge did not admit of being formulated in a series of specific allegations of perjury, but the
gist of the accusation was sufficiently clear to the accused.
[s 192.33.2] Charge in a Case of Contradictory Statements—Not Necessary to Allege which of the

Contradictory Statements is False
Section 221(1), CrPC settled the law that contradictory statements by a witness which are irreconcilable
constitute the offence of intentionally giving false evidence, though it cannot be proved which of the two
statements is false.485 In a charge under section 193, IPC it is not necessary to allege which of the two
contradictory statements upon oath is false, but it is sufficient (unless some satisfactory explanation of the
contradiction should be established) to warrant a conviction of the offence of giving false evidence to show that
an accused person has made one statement upon oath at one time and a directly contradictory statement at
another.486 The cases mentioned in footnote,487 in which a contrary view was expressed, now stand superseded
to this extent. Illustration (c) to section 221, CrPC adopts the full bench view in Queen Empress v Muhomed
Hymayoon Shah.488
Applicability of Illustration (c) to Section 221, CrPC
In Babari Bhura case,489 it is laid down that this illustration must be strictly confined to the case of two
contradictory statements of the same kind and cannot be applied to statements falling under the two different
parts of this section. Therefore, the accused making a false statement in an investigation under section 175,
CrPC and a contradictory statement before a magistrate, could not be convicted in the alternative.490 The
illustration is, however, subject to the condition that the several acts for which a charge in the alternative can be
framed must form a series of acts, which means that the facts should have something in common between
them. There must be a common link to connect the one fact with the other.491
Where a magistrate makes a complaint under section 193, IPC in respect of the statement made in his court on
the definite allegation that a particular portion of that statement was false, the provisions of section 195, CrPC
are fully complied with and the accused can only be charged on the definite allegation that he had intentionally
given false evidence before the magistrate. The accused cannot be charged in the alternative that his previous
statement in a certain suit before the civil Judge was false, as such a charge requires a complaint in respect of
the statement by the civil judge. In the absence of such a complaint from the civil judge, the offence in the
alternative in respect of the statement before the civil Judge made in the other proceeding could not be the
subject of the charge.492
[s 192.33.3] Charge—Contradiction in the Same or Different Depositions is Immaterial
The language of section 22(1), CrPC is general enough to justify alternative charges under section 193, IPC for
contradictory statements, whether they be in the same or in different depositions. The illustration is only a
particular instance of the principle given in the section and does not limit it to depositions in different courts. The
existence of contradictory statements in the same deposition or different depositions makes no difference.493
[s 192.34] Alternative Charge in Case of Contradictory Statements
In Emperor v Ningappa Banappa,494 the first statement made by the witness was in the course of the police
investigation under section 164, CrPC, and when the case went to the committing magistrate, he resiled from
the statement. It appears that the learned additional sessions Judge who ultimately tried the case was disposed
to think that the statement made under section 164, CrPC was false and that the subsequent statement at the
trial was true. In those circumstances, it was held that it would not be expedient in the interests of justice to
compel a witness to stick to a false statement which had been made by him in the course of the investigation.
This ruling does not lay down that in a proper case a charge in the alternative as contemplated by illustration (c)
to section 221, CrPC cannot be framed or prosecution for such a charge should not be sanctioned.495 The same
remark applies to the ruling in Keramat Ali v Emperor.496
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[s 192.34.1] Proof of Alternative Charge
Prosecution on alternative charges of persons who make contradictory statements to the police and to a court
has its convenience, but it has also its drawbacks. It is not a prosecution to be encouraged and is justifiable
only when the prosecution is unable to prove which of the contradictory statements was false.497 The accused
must have been under a legal obligation to speak the truth on both the occasions.498 It must be remembered
that the accused might have made two statements, in perfect good faith, and yet quite irreconcilable.499 Where
a person was convicted of giving false evidence upon an alternative charge, it was held by the majority of a Full
Bench (Jackson and Phear JJ, dissenting), that the conviction was good, notwithstanding that the jury had not
distinctly found which of the two statements charged was false.500 If no alternative charge is framed, it is difficult
to find which of the two statements made by a person, who is admittedly a liar, is true, in the absence of other
evidence besides the statements of the accused, the liar, himself.501
[s 192.35] Evidence in any other Case—Meaning of
Although a statement which is made in the course of a police investigation under section 164 of the IPC502 is
not evidence in a stage of judicial proceeding, it comes within the words “evidence in any other case” in section
193, IPC. However, it can be linked with a statement which is in evidence in a stage of the judicial proceeding
following on the investigation, so that the two can be said to be a series of acts on which an alternative charge
can be framed for intentionally giving false evidence under section 193, IPC.503
Form Nos. 32 I(5) and II(4) in Sch II, CrPC, 1973, which are supposed to be model charge and alternative
charge under this section, run as follows:
(I) Charge:
I, (name and office of the magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused person) as follows:
That you, on or about the………day of………at………in the course of the trial of………before………stated in evidence
that ‘………’ which statement you either knew or believed to be false, or did not believe to be true, and thereby
committed an offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of this Court.
(II) Alternative charge:
I (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused person) as follows:
That you, on or about the day of………at………in the course of the inquiry504 into………before………stated in evidence
Page 25 of 39
that ‘………’ and that you, on or about the………day of………, at………in the course of the trial of………
Before………stated in the evidence that ‘………’., one of which statements you either knew or believed to be false, or
did not believe to be true, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code,
and within the cognizance of session/within my cognizance.
(III) For fabricating false evidence following form of charge may be adopted:
I (name and office of the magistrate, etc) hereby charge (name of accused person) as follows:
That you, on or about the day of………at………, fabricated false evidence, to wit………for the purpose of being used in
pending/prospective judicial proceeding (or in a proceeding taken by law before a public servant or before an arbitrator)
intending that the person conducting such proceeding they entertain an erroneous opinion.
[s 192.37] Accused should have an Opportunity of Explaining Contradictory Statements
Where there is a trial on a charge of giving false evidence by reason of contradictory statements, it is of the first
importance (a) that there should be the clearest and most precise evidence of what the statements alleged to
be contradictory really are; and (b) that the accused should have every possible opportunity of explaining the
statements in question and of showing that the alleged contradiction does not really exist. Where in a case the
accused had no such opportunity, the High Court ordered a re-trial.505 Extreme care has to be taken that the
accused person really understands the nature of the case against him, and the circumstances which he is
asked to explain.506 Every presumption in favour of the possible reconciliation of the statements must be
made.507
[s 192.38] Proof
For a conviction under this section, the following points have to be proved:
(1) For giving false evidence:
(a) the accused was legally bound to state the truth either by an oath or by an express provision of
law;
(b) the accused made the statement or declaration;

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(c) he did so intentionally;
(d) the statement was false;
(e) the accused either knew or believed it to be false, or did not believe it to be true;
• The following aggravating circumstance may be added where applicable:
(f) such statement or declaration was made in a stage of a judicial proceeding. (section 191, IPC)
(2) For fabricating false evidence:
(a) the accused caused certain circumstance to exist, or made a false entry, or made a document
containing a false statement;
(b) he did so intending that such circumstance, entry or statement should appear in evidence in a
judicial proceeding pending or prospective508 or in a proceeding taken by law before a public
servant509 or before an arbitrator;510
(c) the person conducting the judicial or other proceeding had to form an opinion upon the evidence in
which such false evidence appeared;
(d) the accused intended that person conducting the proceeding may entertain an erroneous opinion
upon that evidence;
(e) such erroneous opinion touched a point material to the result of such proceedings. (section 192,
IPC).
[s 192.38.1] Proof—False Statement must be Literally False
The prosecution must establish all the ingredients of the offence and the decision is to be based only on the
evidence and materials placed before the criminal court.511 To support a prosecution for giving false evidence, it
must be shown that the false statement charged against the accused is literally false. There must be a
statement of fact which is false. It is no offence if the fact stated is true but some circumstance is suppressed,
with the result that a wrong inference may be deduced.512 In a prosecution under sections 193 and 199 it is not
sufficient for the prosecution to show that the statement is false and thus throw the burden of proof on the
accused to establish good faith as a defence, but the prosecution must show affirmatively the knowledge that
the evidence given or declaration made was false or else show the belief in its being false or an absence of a
belief in its truth.513 To punish one under section 193, IPC among other facts, it has to be proved that one had
intentionally given false evidence in any stage of judicial proceeding.514
In Queen v Ahmed Ally,515 Norman J pointed out the true rule on the subject to be that:
No man can be convicted of giving false evidence except on proof of facts which, if accepted as true, show not merely
that it is incredible, but that it is impossible that the statements of the party accused made on oath can be true. If the
inference from the facts proved falls short of this, it seems to us that there is nothing on which a conviction can stand;
because assuming all that is proved to be true, it is still possible that no crime was committed. The evidence of a
medical man or other skilled witness, however eminent, as to what he thinks may or may not have taken place under a
particular combination of circumstances, however confidently he may speak, is ordinarily a mere matter of opinion.
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Human judgment is fallible. Human knowledge is limited and imperfect.
The same view has been taken in the cases as mentioned in the footnote.516 But dissenting from this, it has
been held in an Oudh case that:
The definition of proof in the Evidence Act is of little positive assistance, but it is of some negative assistance. Its
meaning clearly is that a fact may be held proved even though it is impossible to show that its existence is a
mathematical or scientific certainty. This definition is of general application and thus applies to a case where the
offence is one of perjury. I have no hesitation in saying that it is certainly sufficient if the statement of the accused party
is proved to be incredible.517
[s 192.38.2] Reasons Given in the Judgment and Opinion Expressed in the Order not to Weigh with the Trial
Court
In a prosecution for perjury, the criminal court must form its own opinion, it must not arrive at its conclusions by
reference to some other decision.518 When the trial of the accused commences under section 193, IPC the
reasons given in the main judgment of the High Court or those in the order passed under section 340(1), CrPC
should not weigh with the criminal court in coming to its independent conclusion as to whether the offence
under section 193, IPC has been fully established against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It will be for
the prosecution to establish all the ingredients of the offence under section 193, IPC against the appellant and
the decision will be based only on the evidence and the materials produced before the criminal court during the
trial and the conclusion of the court will be independent of opinions formed by the High Court.519
In a prosecution under section 193, it is incumbent on the prosecution to show first, that the statement made by
the accused was false and secondly, that he knew it or believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true at
the time he made the statement.520
The intention of the accused is an essential ingredient in the constitution of the offence of perjury.521 In order to
sustain an indictment for perjury the prosecution must establish inter alia, two things: (a) that the statement was
false; and (b) that it was known or believed to be false or not believed to be true. In other words, the statement
must be intentionally false.522
An accused could be guilty under section 193, IPC only if he had the intention of fabricating evidence in order
that it should appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding or in a proceeding taken by law before a public
servant, as such, or an arbitrator as laid down in section 192. The prosecution must, therefore, show that there
was such an intention and that the accused did not fabricate evidence merely to screen himself in the belief that
his conduct would result in no proceeding being taken.523
[s 192.38.3] Mere Fabrication of Accounts not an Offence
The mere fabrication of accounts is not in itself a criminal offence. For instance, if a man prepares false
accounts for his own edification, to persuade himself that he possesses more money than he actually does,
although that may be a proceeding lacking in wisdom, it is not a criminal offence; you must show that the false
accounts were to be used in some proceedings pending or contemplated at the time when the offence was
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committed.524
Where the food inspector obviously made false statements in his sworn statements that the court had not fixed
any further date of hearing and had taken up the case on the date in question without notice to the police
prosecutor or the complainant and on the date neither of these two persons were present in court, it was held
that prima facie, he seems to have committed an offence under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code.525
Nowadays a peculiar trend has developed. Witnesses change their statement during different stages of the
criminal proceeding at their own sweet will and thereby affecting the course of justice, though under the law,
they are bound to state truth and truth only. The witnesses try to pollute the course of justice by taking a
complete turn from his original version of the occurrence at later stage of the proceeding/trial. This trend should
be arrested and such witnesses should not be allowed to escape consequences of their sin.526 The perjury in
judicial proceedings must be punished severely.527 Where the accused files a false affidavit in court with the
object of securing an admission of an appeal,528 or in support of a transfer application,529 it would be dangerous
to take a lenient view. The court should not take into account the effect of a conviction or prosecution on the
dependants of the accused.530 The measure of punishment depends upon the gravity of the offence. A
deliberate mis-statement whether it tends to endanger the life and property of others, or to defeat and impede
the progress of justice, is not an offence which should be lightly passed over. But for a simple mis-statement
from which no such inferences can be drawn, a comparatively light sentence will suffice, particularly where the
prisoner pleads guilty and throws himself on the mercy of the court.531 In the instant case, the accused
appellant very foolishly, under the influence of some other persons made the report and the statement in
question, and at the earliest brought to the notice of the court that she had been misled and unduly influenced
in making the false report and the statement. From the defence documents it did appear that the appellant was
misled and unduly influenced in making a false report and the statement. In the circumstances, the conviction of
the appellant was maintained under sections 193 and 211, IPC, but the sentence awarded to her was set aside
and she was ordered to be released on probation.532 A false statement by a witness as to his position or
character, ought not to be punished so severely as a false charge on a false claim.533 Where the accused, when
he gives false evidence, was on bail and it appeared that he gave false answers to the questions put to him
either under the influence of the police or because he was under the impression that if he gave such evidence,
he would be able to obtain a discharge in the case which was then pending before him, it was held that under
the circumstances no severe sentence was called for.534 Where the trial has been pending for a long time, the
court should take a lenient view of the offence.535 In a case, the imprisonment, on an admission of having made
interpolations in books of account, which was committed 8 years ago, was reduced by the Andhra Pradesh
High Court to one week while the fine was retained.536 Where no counsel was provided to the accused at state
expense during the trial, his sentence of imprisonment under this section was reduced to the period already
undergone.537
Where a person representing the company was assistant secretary of the complainant company before its
amalgamation and general manager in the new company, signed a vakalatnama without mentioning his
designation and the name of the company, he could not be said to have committed any offence under section
467, section 471 or section 193 of the Penal Code.538
Where in a writ petition against the housing board, the plea by the housing board was that the matter was
settled and there was an agreement between the parties, however, the official of the housing board who signed
the agreement on its behalf, subsequently retracted from the agreement even before the decision of the petition
was taken, on the ground that he was not authorised to act, it was held that such an act of unsettling settled
issues or wrongfully settling issues without sanction interferes with public justice and amounts to perjury and
contempt of the court. But since the record shows that the contemnor himself noticed the higher authorities, and
the said defect was found to be rectified by the housing board and the contemnor sought forgiveness for the
action of perjury and apologised in the contempt proceeding, the contempt action was consigned after
admonishing the contemnor.539
Page 29 of 39
In one case the police officials made interpolation in entries of the case diary to keep the sequence of the
entries in order and prove the time of arrest and thereby cooked up false stories of possession of illegal arms
by the accused to justify his detention after receiving an order of the magistrate directing the station house
officer to give a report. On these facts, the apex court not only acquitted the accused but also intended an
inquiry under section 340(1), CrPC into a commission of offence under sections 193, 195 and 211, IPC and
directed for the issuance of a show cause notice to the police officials through the commissioner of police as to
why they should not be proceeded against for the said offences.540 Where the accused officer-in-charge of the
police station prepared false statement said to be given to the deceased, he was prosecuted for offences under
sections 193 and 194,541 IPC.
Where a certified copy of a judgment appeared to be interpolated ex facie, the inquiry revealed that it was
forged by changing its date of delivery, the court directed the petitioner to face a criminal trial for perjury. The
petition pleaded innocence stating that the accused depended on her advocate who might have done it and the
lawyer who represented the petitioner in the trial court had since died. On these facts, the Orissa High Court
recalled its order to SDJM, Bhubaneshwar for a criminal trial and gave a benefit of doubt to the petitioner.542
Where the petitioner made a statement on oath in a writ petition supported by an affidavit that the timings of a
law college were changed by the principal arbitrarily, but the fact was that the principal had the powers to
change the timings and the change was made by him after receiving representation of a majority of the
students of college to the said effect, and the petitioner was one of the students signing the said representation,
it was expedient in the interest of justice to eradicate the evil of perjury and the petitioner was ordered to be
prosecuted under section 193, IPC for making the said false statement in the writ petition supported by the
affidavit.543
Where in case under sections 489B and 489, IPC, the prosecution witness on being threatened by the higher
police officers did not to support the prosecution case, filed affidavits before the court and resiled from the
prosecution case, the High Court directed the Presiding Officer of the trial court to file complaint for offences
under sections 193 and 195A, IPC.544
A sub-inspector gave a false affidavit in support of a petition to mislead the court with a view to obtain
condonation of a delay in filing the appeal, which may amount to an offence under the relevant provisions of
IPC. On these facts, the Andhra Pradesh High Court directed its registrar (judicial) to file a complaint under
section 195 of the CrPC against the sub-inspector of police, who gave such false affidavit, for the offences
under sections 191–193, IPC before the concerned magistrate having the jurisdiction.545
The respondent converted to religion of Christianity and married the daughter of his maternal uncle. After
conversion, the marriage did not fall under “Sapinda relationship”, thus, the married couple had not filed false
declaration in Church, and had not committed offence under section 193, IPC.546

Page 30 of 39
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
318 Purshottam Ishvar Amin v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 10 , p 11 : 22 Cr LJ 241 : ILR 45 Bom 334 : 23 Bom LR 1 (FB) : per
Macleod LJ.
319 Bhagirath Lal v Emperor, AIR 1934 All 1017 , p 1018 : (1934) All LJ 1064.
320 Sundararajan & Co v Shankarapandia Nadar, (1957) Mad LJ (Cr) 520 : (1957) 2 Mad LJ 348 : 70 Mad LW 666.
321 Ibrahim Sab Imam Sab Mulla v State of Karnataka, (2006) Cr LJ 2738 (Kant).
322 Ganesh Kumar v Raju, 2013 (2) Ker LT 434 , p 440 : 2013 (2) KLJ 605 (Ker).
323 Inderjit Singh Grewal v State of Punjab, (2011) 12 SCC 588 [LNIND 2011 SC 801] , p 597.
324 Court on its own Motion v State of Punjab, 2012 Cr LJ 2440 , p 2450 (P&H).
325 Kirit Kumar K Jani v State of Gujarat, (1998) III CCR 115 (Guj).
326 Bimal Das v State of Tripura, 2012 Cr LJ 1252 (Gau).
327 Sadhuram v Shayam Sunder Gupta, (1975) CLR 88 .
328 Kamla Pradad Singh v Harinath Singh, AIR 1968 SC 19 [LNIND 1967 SC 170] : (1968) Cr LJ 86 .
329 Santokh Singh v Izhr Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] .
330 NSR Krishna Prasad v Directorate of Enforcement, (1991) 3 Crimes 652 (AP) (DB) : (1992) Cr LJ 1888 (AP).
331 Ramesh Parasram Kawane v State of Maharashtra, (2007) Cr LJ (NOC) 442 (Bom) (DB).
Page 31 of 39
332 Bhagirath Lal v Emperor, AIR 1934 All 1017 ; refer to notes under section 191.
333 Venkarrama Reddi v Srinivasa Reddi, AIR 1936 Mad 350 [LNIND 1935 MAD 342] , p 351 : 37 Cr LJ 557 : (1936) Mad
WN 291.
334 Taj Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 125 , p 127 : 29 Cr LJ 212 : 29 Punj LR 14.
335 Janki Lal v Emperor, AIR 1929 Ngp 193 , p 194 : 30 Cr LJ 655 relying on Babu Ram v Emperor, ILR 26 All 509 : 1 All
LJ 236.
336 Refer to section 1 of the Perjury Act, 1 and 2 Geo, 5 c 6.
337 R v Ryan, (1914) 24 Cox 135, 10 App R 4.
338 Mahesh Chandra Dhupi v Emperor, AIR 1940 Cal 449 : 42 Cr LJ 93 : (1940) ILR 1 Cal 465; Baroda Kant Sarkar v
Emperor, AIR 1916 Cal 553 : 16 Cr LJ 620; Chandra Prakash Bhargava v GT Industries, (1980) CLR (MP HCN) 91, p
93.
339 Umrao Lal v State, AIR 1954 All 424 [LNIND 1953 ALL 240] , p 425 : (1954) Cr LJ 860 .
340 KTMS Mohd v UOI, (1992) 3 JT (SC) 129.
341 Lalmoni Nonia v Emperor, AIR 1924 Pat 276 , p 280 : 24 Cr LJ 321 : 4 PLT 683; Parmeshwar Sahaiv State, 1966 All
WR (HC) 761; Shanti Devi v State, (1970) All LJ 206, p 213; Badri Prasad Sharma v Shanti Prasad Sharma, (1982) All
Cr R 9; Chandrashekhar v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1981) Jab LJ 122 .
342 Habibullah v Queen-Empress, ILR 10 Cal 937.
343 Shiv Raman Gaur v Madan Mohan Kanda, (1990) Cr LJ 1033 (P&H).
344 Rajkumar Dhanuji Bombarde v Madhukar Wankhede, 2008 Cr LJ 661 (Bom).
345 State v Dhanna Sewa, AIR 1959 MP 35 [LNIND 1958 MP 129] , 36.
346 Nga Yon v Emperor, 19 Cr LJ 726, 727 : (1918) 3 UBR 84; Khajumal Burmal v Emperor, AIR 1920 Sind 59 .
347 1 Weir 146, 149 : 1 Mad HCR 38.
348 Queen v Rhutten Ram, 2 WR 63(3); Mahommad Ishaq v Emperor, ILR 36 All 362 : 12 All LJ 550; Legal
Remembrancer v Ahilal Mandal, AIR 1921 Cal 426 ; Chaina v State of Rajasthan, (1981) CLR (Raj) 148.
349 Re Amir Ali Khan, 3 NWPHC 133; Jankilal v Emperor, AIR 1929 Ngp 193 , p 194 : 30 Cr LJ 655.
350 Ganesh Kumar v Raju, 2013 (2) Ker LT 434 (440) : 2013 (2) KLJ 605 (Ker).
351 Dano v Shanker Lal, (1973) All Cr R 355 : (1973) All WR (HC) 532 : (1974) All LJ 46.
Page 32 of 39
352 Manphool v Manphool, (1983) Raj LW 153 : (1983) 1 CLC 431 (Raj); Mahommad Hussain Kasau Motiwala v State of
Maharashtra, (1995) Cr LJ 2364 (Bom).
353 Delhi Lotteries v Rajesh Aggarwal, AIR 1998 Del 332 [LNIND 1997 DEL 854] .
354 Ibid.
355 Mohamed Siddique v Emperor, 6 Cr LJ 162, p 163 : 11 Cal WN 911; Kamla Prasad Singh v Hari Nath Singh, AIR 1968
SC 19 [LNIND 1967 SC 170] : (1968) Cr LJ 86 ; Har Prasad v Hans Ram, AIR 1966 All 124 [LNIND 1964 ALL 94] :
(1966) Cr LJ 244 ; Parmeshwar Sahai v State, (1966) All WR (HC) 761; Gangadhar Parida and Khandla Jena v State,
(1965) Cut LT 925; Nanjundaiah v Rangaiah, (1977) 2 Kant LJ 374 , p 376.
356 Gangadhar Parida and Khandla Jena v State, (1965) Cut LT 925.
357 Ibrahim Sab Imam Sab Mulla v State of Karnataka, 2006 Cr LJ 2738 , p 2742 (Kant).
358 R v Aidrus Sahib, 1 Mad HCR 38, p 43.

359 1 Weir 154.
360 Suppa Tevan v R, ILR 29 Mad 89; R v Alahbachauo, 3 Cr LJ 190 : SC Rulings (1906); Public Prosecutor v Nagalinga
Reddi, AIR 1959 AP 250 [LNIND 1958 AP 37] ; Purshottam Ishwar Amin v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 3 : 22 Cr LJ 241 :
23 Bom LR 1 (FB); Sajawal v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 254 (1) : ILR 13 Lah 228 : 33 PLR 126.
361 Jose John v KC Kuruvilla, (1996) 1 Ker LT 62 .
362 Shabir Hussain Bhola v State of Maharashatra, AIR 1963 SC 816 [LNIND 1962 SC 32] , p 821 : (1963) Cr LJ 803 :
(1963) All LJ 844 : 65 Bom LR 341 : (1963) Mad LJ 574.
363 Sakhi Rai v Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 266 : 20 Cr LJ 245.
364 Refer to section 136, Income Tax Act, 1961.
365 Re Hazarilal, 29 Nag LJ 214.
366 Lalji Haridas v State of Maharashatra, AIR 1964 SC 1154 [LNIND 1964 SC 34] : (1964) 2 Cr LJ 249 .
367 Puroshattam Ishwar Amin v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 3 (FB).
368 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, Sch I.
369 Harikrishna Sahu v State of Orissa, (1985) 2 Crimes 978 (Ori); Rit Lal Khatway v State of Bihar, (2007) Cr LJ 593 (Pat);
Suresh Babu v Superintendent of Police, 2009 (2) Ker LT 212 : 2009 (78) AIC 652 (Ker).
370 Rajkumar Indarchand Agrawal v State of Maharashtra, (2005) Cr LJ 4673 (Bom); Narasimhaiah v State of Karnataka,
(2002) Cr LJ 4795 (Kant).
371 Rit Lal Khatway v State of Bihar, 2007 Cr LJ 593 , p 595 (Pat).
372 A-one Industries v DP Garg, (1999) III CCR 716 (Del); See also Ibrahim Sab Imam Sab Mulla v State of Karnataka,
2006 Cr LJ 2738 (Kant).
373 R Vankat Reddy v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1991) 2 All LT 302.

Page 33 of 39
374 Randhir Singh v State of Haryana, (2000) Cr LJ 755 (SC).
375 Ahlawat v State of Haryana, (2000) Cr LJ 388 (SC); For detailed commentary on sections 195 and 340 refer Sohoni’s
Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn LexisNexis.
376 Arvind Kumar Jain v State of Rajasthan, 2015 Cr LJ 2908 (Raj).
377 Jaskaran v State of Haryana, 2008 Cr LJ 4261 , p 4263 (P&H).
378 KN Mishra v Jiwaji University, (1980) Cr AR 370 (SC) : (1980) CLR (SC) 654.
379 Now section 340, CrPC 1973.

380 Refer to sections 468, 469, 470, 471 and 473, CrPC, 1973.
381 Mulachand Bothra v UOI, (1975–76) 80 Cal WN 804.
383 Har Narain v Hoshiar Singh, AIR 1935 All 341 ; Manoramma v Emperor, AIR 1933 Mad 125 [LNIND 1932 MAD 156] .
384 Nirman Singh v Rudra Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1926 PC 100 .
385 Assudomal Ramandas v Jhamandas Hotchand, AIR 1940 Sind 100 .
386 Kedar Nath v Amulya Ratan, AIR 1942 Cal 79 .
387 Sushanta Sarkar v State of Nagaland, 2012 Cr LJ 4467 , p 4470 (Gauh); Iqbal Singh Marwah v Meenakshi Marwah,
AIR 2005 SC 2119 [LNIND 2005 SC 261] : (2005) 4 SCC 370 [LNIND 2005 SC 261] : (2005) 2 SCR 708 [LNIND 2005
SC 261] relied on.
388 JD Boywalla v Sarab Rustomji, AIR 1941 Bom 294 .
389 Manju Nath Dr v NS Nagarathna, (1998) II CCR 73 (Kant).
390 Shaji Thamas v State of Kerala, 2014 (1) Ker LT 697 (Ker).
391 Ganga Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1941 Cal 263 .
392 Krishna v Goverdhanaiah, AIR 1954 Mad 822 [LNIND 1954 MAD 33] .
393 Kashi Ram v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 All 779 ; Prag Dutt v Emperor, AIR 1928 All 765 .
394 Re Indrachand Bacharai, ILR 56 Bom 213.
395 Bajaji Appaji Kote v Emperor, AIR 1946 Bom 7 ; Re Indrachand Bacharaj, AIR 1932 Bom 185 ; Daroga Gope v King-
Emperor, AIR 1925 Pat 717 ; Subhag Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 152 ; Sarup Singh v Emperor, AIR 1939 Ngp 226 ;
Samir v Sajidar Rahman, AIR 1927 Cal 95 ; Re K Parameswara Nambudri, AIR 1916 Mad 72 [LNIND 1915 MAD 281] ;
Chuhermal v Emperor, AIR 1929 Sind 132 ; Rambhrose v Emperor, AIR 1928 Rang 254 ; Ram Chandra Rango v
Emperor, AIR 1939 Bom 129 .
396 Emperor v Nabibux, AIR 1940 Sind 209 .
397 Re K Parameswara Nambudri, AIR 1916 Mad 72 [LNIND 1915 MAD 281] ; Hariram v Radha, AIR 1943 Ngp 327 .
398 King v Ma E, AIR 1939 Rang 148 .
399 Sheo Bilas v State, AIR 1959 All 14 [LNIND 1958 ALL 102] ; Jagat Chandra Mazumdar v Queen-Empress, ILR 26 Cal
786 (where Chandra Mohan Banerjee v Balfour, ILR 26 Cal 359 is distinguished); Emperor v Ismail Khadirsab, AIR
1928 Bom 130 : ILR 52 Bom 385; Govt of Bengal v Gokool Chander Chowdhry, 24 WR 41; Ram Runjun Bhandari v
Madhub Ghose, 25 WR 33; but see Re Vasudeo Ramachandra Joshi, AIR 1923 Bom 105 .
400 Re Indrachand Bacharaj, AIR 1932 Bom 185 : 56 Bom 213.
401 Nazir Ahmad v Emperor, AIR 1927 Cal 478 ; Re Eswaradoss, AIR 1945 Mad 461 .
402 Re Indrachand Bacharaj, AIR 1932 Bom 185 .
Page 34 of 39
403 Virinder Kumar v State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 [LNIND 1955 SC 105] .
404 CK Sha v State of Bihar, (1975) Cr LJ 1939 (Pat) (DB).
405 Vittappan v State, (1987) Cr LJ 1994 (Ker).
406 Bimal Das v State of Tripura, 2012 Cr LJ 1252 , p 1263 (Gauh).
407 Nadigadla Ananda Rao v State, (1991) 2 Crimes 611 [LNIND 1991 AP 84] : (1991) 1 Andh LT 18 (AP).
409 Subbarayan Chettiar Narayanan Chettiar v Varied Puthiya Veetial Cheeku, AIR 1964 Ker 157 [LNIND 1963 KER 61] ;
Manalinga Bhatta v Venkataraman Bhatta, AIR 1963 Ker 215 [LNIND 1962 KER 261] .
410 Sub-section (4) of section 344, CrPC 1973.
411 Re Gnanamuthu, AIR 1964 Mad 446 [LNIND 1963 MAD 310] .
412 Banarsi Dass, Retired Inspector of Police v Mohan Lal, (1985) 12 Cr LT 285.
413 The First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
414 Ismail Khan v State, 1992 Cr LJ 3566 : 1991 (4) Kar LJ 262 [LNIND 1991 KANT 505] .
415 Section 260, CrPC, 1973.
416 Section 262(2), CrPC, 1973.
417 Parmananda Mohapatra v State, (1968) 34 Cut LT 627, p 636; Surendranath v Kumendracharan Mishra, AIR 1930 Cal
352 .
418 D Revla v R Chhila, (1970) Cr LJ 425 , p 427 (Guj); Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973
SC 160] : (1973) Cr LJ 1176 ; Rangaswami v Gunnammal, AIR 1966 Mad 456 [LNIND 1965 MAD 166] , p 459 : (1966)
Cr LJ 1457 ; Audi Narayanamma v State, AIR 1970 AP 119 [LNIND 1969 AP 54] : (1970) Cr LJ 443 .
419 Chikanna Silk House, Elampilli Sotem v State of Madras, (1974) LW (Cr) 39.
420 Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) Cr LJ 1176 ; SP Kohli v High Court
of Punjab & Haryana, (1978) CLR (SC) 447, p 452; State v Bhubaneshwar Nayak, (1975 Cut LT 841.
421 Sheodahin Singh v Bandhan Singh, 3 Cr LJ 45; where Emperor v Babu, ILR 26 All 509 is distinguished; Umrao Lal v
State, AIR 1954 All 424 [LNIND 1953 ALL 240] ; Mohd Khan v Gourishankar Misra, AIR 1954 Ori 193 [LNIND 1953 ORI
40] ; U Anug Myin U v District and Sessions Judge of Henzada, AIR 1940 Rang 148 ; Bandeb Misra v Laxmi Malla, AIR
1963 Ori 179 [LNIND 1963 ORI 24] : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 526 , p 527.
422 Judgal Chandra Dalal v Emperor, 42 Cal WN 31; Emperor v Babu Ram, ILR 26 All 509 : 1 Cr LJ 434; Behari Lal v
Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 529 ; Balakrishan Pal v Emperor, AIR 1945 Pat 295 , p 296; Suba Singh v Emperor, AIR 1941
Pat 165 .
423 Balakrishna Pal v Emperor, AIR 1945 Pat 295 ; Suba Singh v Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 165 .
424 Queen-Empress v Subbaraya Pillai, 2 Weir 165; Re Kani Papayamma, 2 Weir 652; Raklal Chandra Shah v Damodar
Shah, 12 Cr LJ 11.
Page 35 of 39
425 Re Appaji Goundan, AIR 1939 Mad 779 .
426 Badri Prasad Sharma v Shanti Prasad Sharma, (1982) All Cr R 9.

427 Emperor v Ganga Sahal, 2 Weir 193.
428 Jamna Prasad v State of Rajasthan, (1991) 3 Crimes 65 .
429 Dipomal Murijmal v Emperor, AIR 1942 Sind 98 , p 99.
430 Ranbir Singh v State, (1991) JCC 528 (Del).
431 Mahommod Hussain Kasau Matiwala v State of Maharashtra, (1995) Cr LJ 2364 , pp 2368, 69 (Bom).
432 Kuriakosa v State of Kerala, (1995) Cr LJ 1751 , p 1753 (Ker).
433 Sumat Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1942 All 11 .
434 Ibid,; Jagdish Prasad Singhal (Dr) v State of Rajasthan, (1994) 2 Crimes 252 : (1994) Cr LJ 759 (Raj).
435 Jalsingh (Dr) v State of Rajasthan, (1995) 1 WLC (Raj) 608; Vijay Kumar v Bachna, (1992) 2 Crimes 419 [LNIND 1992
PNH 74] (P&H); Brijendra Kumar v Prakash, (1984) Cr LJ 421 (Bom).
436 Kuriakose v State of Kerala, (1995) Cr LJ 1751 , p 1754.
437 Arun Kumar Agarwal v Radha Arun, (2001) 1 Cr LJ 3561 (Kant) (DB).
438 Ibid.
439 Umrao Lal v State, AIR 1954 All 424 [LNIND 1953 ALL 240] , p 426.
440 Emperor v Ganga Sahal, (1903) All WN 68.
441 Liaqat Husain v Vinay Prakash, AIR 1946 All 156 , p 158.
442 Teoomal Gerimal v Pir Ali Mahommad Shah Rashidi, AIR 1937 Sind 116 .
443 Hari Shankar Sharma v State of Rajasthan, (1994) 2 Crimes 265 (Raj).
444 Umrao Lal v State, AIR 1954 All 424 [LNIND 1953 ALL 240] , pp 426, 427.
445 Re Bijili Papamma, AIR 1948 Mad 471 [LNIND 1947 MAD 200] , p 472; Haji v State, AIR 1950 Ajmer 37 (2).
446 Suba Singh v Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 165 .
447 Pragi v Emperor, AIR 1936 Oudh 373 : 37 Cr LJ 885; Habibullah v Queen-Empress, 10 Cal 937; Re Palani Palangan,
ILR 26 Mad 55; Girdharimal v Emperor, 17 Cr LJ 240.
448 Kuriakose v State of Kerala, (1995) Cr LJ 1751 , 1754.
449 Emperor v Nirigappa Ramappa, AIR 1941 Bom 408 ; Karamat Ali v Emperor, AIR 1928 Cal 862 ; Re Madiga
Narasigadu, AIR 1949 Mad 502 ; Chanbasayya Rachyya v Emperor, AIR 1947 Bom 161 : 48 Cr LJ 474; Sawa v State,
(1974) Raj LW 19 .
450 Emperor v Jitsing Umrao Singh Khatri, AIR 1935 Ngp 145 : 36 Cr LJ 935; Karamat Ali v Emperor, AIR 1928 Cal 862 ;
Local Govt v Gambhir Bhujua, AIR 1927 Ngp 189 : 28 Cr LJ 845.
451 Emperor v Jitsingh Umrao Singh Khatri, AIR 1935 Ngp 145 : 36 Cr LJ 935.
452 Habibullah v Queen-Empress, ILR 10 Cal 937; Re Palani Palagan, ILR 26 Mad 55, referred to; Girdharimal v
453 Bajirao Balvant v Emperor, AIR 1933 Ngp 179 : 34 Cr LJ 649; Ghanshamdas Pumamal v Emperor, AIR 1933 Sind
412 ; Jari v Emperor, AIR 1934 Sind 155 : 36 Cr LJ 10.
Page 36 of 39
454 Kailashpati Mishra v Nand Lala Ahir, AIR 1952 Pat 70 , 72.
455 Emperor v Tripura Shankar, ILR 37 Cal 618.
456 Emperor v Jitsing Umrao Singh Khatri, AIR 1935 Ngp 145 .
457 M Somaiah v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1992) 1 Andh LT 464 (AP).
458 Emperor v Tripura Shankar, ILR 37 Cal 618 approved; Nga, Lu Pe v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 56; Queen-Empress v Ghulet,
ILR 7 All 44; Pananganti Parthasarthy Nayanim Garu v Pallikapu Venkataswami Reddy, 11 Cr LJ 353.
459 Re Parvataneni Kamayya, 16 Cr LJ 14.
460 Queen-Empress v Ghulet, ILR 7 All 44; Imambux v Emperor, 15 Cr LJ 379; Queen-Empress v Ramji Sajabarao, ILR
10 Bom 124; Emperor v Tikam Lakhi, 15 Cr LJ 488(1).
461 Hukum Chand v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 862 : 29 Cr LJ 679.
462 Ismail Khan v State, (1992) Cr LJ 3566 , p 3568.
463 Dalabi v Emperor, 4 Cr LJ 469.
464 Rami Reddi v Public Prosecutor Kurnool, AIR 1915 Mad 508 [LNIND 1914 MAD 316] : 15 Cr LJ 612; Ganesh Mull
Marwari v Emperor, AIR 1931 Mad 778 : 33 Cr LJ 48.
465 Government v Karimdeo, ILR 6 Cal 496; Re Balgangadhar Tilak, 4 Bom LR 750; Girwar Prasad v Emperor, 9 Cr LJ
219.
466 Ganesh Mall Marwari v Emperor, AIR 1931 Mad 778 ; Athi Ambalagaran v Emperor, AIR 1932 Mad 494 [LNIND 1932
MAD 34] .
467 Re Balgangadhar Tilak, 4 Bom LR 750.
468 But see Girwar Prashad v Emperor, 9 Cr LJ 219.
469 Usha Khurana v State of Rajasthan, (1994) RCC 168 (Raj).
470 Parwat Vedu Patil v Sukdev Shivram Patil, AIR 1958 Bom 617 , p 618.
471 Nanjundaiah v Rangaiah, (1977) 2 Kant LJ 374 , p 376.

472 CK Sha v State of Bihar, (1975) Cr LJ 1939 (Pat) (DB).
473 Aziz v State of Rajasthan, (2005) Cr LJ 3056 (Raj) (DB).
474 Re Bhupalli Mulliah, AIR 1959 AP 477 [LNIND 1959 AP 30] .
475 State of MP v Ramlakhan Singh, 2010 Cr LJ 1574 , p 1580 (MP) : 2009 (3) Jab LJ 173 .
476 Queen v Kalichurun Lahooree, 9 WR 54.

477 Emperor v Bankatram Lachiram, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 390 (Bom).
478 Queen v Moharaj Misser, 16 WR 47 : 7 Beng LR Appx 66.
479 Ibid.
480 Re Roman Audheekaree, 10 WR 37.

Page 37 of 39
481 Queen v Mungul Das, 23 WR 28; Queen v Womesh Chunder Ghose, 5 WR 71; Queen v Feojdar Roy, 9 WR 14; Queen
v Soonder Mohoree, 9 WR 25; Rakhal Chandra Laha v Emperor, ILR 36 Cal 808; Crown v Mi Shwe Ke, 1 LBR 268.
482 Hira Nand Ojha v Emperor, 4 Cr LJ 227.

483 State of Gujarat v Ramesh Bhai Pamanand Shah, (1966) 4 Guj LR 439.
484 Re Chan Hang Kin, 13 Cal WN 685.
485 Statement of Objects and Reasons, illustration (c) to section 221, CrPC.
486 Queen-Empress v Ghulet, ILR 7 All 44; Public Prosecutor v Atchamma, AIR 1948 Mad 487 [LNIND 1947 MAD 38] ;
Chanbassayya Rachayya v Emperor, AIR 1947 Bom 161 ; Gangawwa v State of Mysore, AIR 1969 Mys 114 : (1967)
Mad LJ (Cr) 421.
487 Queen-Empress v Annia Ratanlal, 518; Queen-Empress v Kabhai Ratanlal, 336; Queen-Empress v Sadanand
Narayan, ILR 18 Bom 377.
488 Queen Empress v Muhomed Hymayoon Shah, 21 WR 72 (FB).
489 Babari Bhura, case (1904) 2 Cr LJ 590.
490 Queen-Empress v Mugapa Bin Ningapa, ILR 18 Bom 377; Emperor v Bankatram Lachiram, ILR 28 Bom 533 relied
on.
491 Trijumal v State, AIR 1958 Raj 240 [LNIND 1957 RAJ 180]; Re Ayyalu Reddi, 5 Mad LT 358; Queen-Empress v Khem,
ILR 22 All 115; Emperor v Tassadduk Husain, 28 All WN 73.
492 Taijumal v State, AIR 1958 Raj 240 [LNIND 1957 RAJ 180].
493 State v Dhanna Sewa, AIR 1959 MP 35 [LNIND 1958 MP 129] , 36; Umrao Lal v State, AIR 1954 All 424 [LNIND 1953
ALL 240] .
494 Emperor v Ningappa Banappa, AIR 1941 Bom 408 .
495 Chandbasayya Rachayya v Emperor, AIR 1947 Bom 161 .
496 Keramat Ali v Emperor, AIR 1928 Cal 862 .
497 Hamam Singh v Empress, 27 PR 1890; Maung Thaw Na v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 734; Dolabi v Emperor, 4 Cr LJ 469.
498 Hari Charan Singh v Queen-Empress, ILR 27 Cal 455; Queen-Empress v Ramji Sajabarao, ILR 10 Bom 124; Queen-
Empress v Bharma Bin Ningappa, ILR 11 Bom 702; Queen-Empress v Mugapa Bin Ningapa, ILR 18 Bom 377 (FB).
499 Emperor v Bankatram Lachiram, ILR 28 Bom 533.
500 Queen-Empress v Mahommad Humayoon Shah, 21 WR 72 (FB).
501 Repealed by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (49 of 1988), section 31.
502 Charan Das v Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 170 .
503 Chief Justice Pratt, Fawcett and Setalved JJ, (Shah J dissenting) in Macleod Purshottem Ishwar Amin v Emperor, AIR
1921 Bom 3 (FB); overruling Queen-Empress v Mugapa Bin Ningapa, ILR 18 Bom 377 (FB).
504 If both the contradictory statements are made in the same inquiry or trial the charge may be suitably modified
accordingly upon the said evidence on a point material to be result of such proceeding, and thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Page 38 of 39
505 Queen-Empress v Puran, 1899 All WN 39, per Strachey CJ.
506 Ibid, per Knox J.
507 Queen-Empress v Ramji Sajabarao, ILR 10 Bom 124; Queen-Empress v Ghulet, 7 ILR All 44; Re Munni Buksh, 3 Cal
WN 81.
508 Re Indrachand Bachraj, AIR 1932 Bom 185, p 186 : 33 Cr LJ 386; Mahommad Sadiq v Emperor, 6 Cr LJ 162 : 1 Cal
WN 911.
509 Emperor v Ismail Khadirsab, ILR 52 Bom 385, 392.
510 Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v Taraknath Chatterjee, AIR 1935 Cal 304, p 306.
511 K Karunakaran v TV Eachara Warrier, (1977) Cr AR (SC) 411 : (1977) CLR (SC) 521.
512 Ratansi Daya v Emperor, AIR 1916 Sind 70 (2), p 71 : 17 Cr LJ 96 : 4 Serv LR 170; Queen v Ahmad Ally, 11 WR 25,
27; Padarath Singh v Ratan Singh, (1920) Pat 419 : 21 Cr LJ 145; SC Gupta v Emperor, AIR 1924 Rang 17 : 25 Cr LJ
185; Asgarall v Emperor, AIR 1942 Ngp 80 : 43 Cr LJ 649.
513 Jagdat Singh v Emperor, AIR 1934 Pat 133 , p 134 : 34 Cr LJ 917; Shahzad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 513 : 34
Cr LJ 912; Emperor v Mahommad Ishaq, AIR 1914 All 170 [LNIND 1914 ALL 20] : 15 Cr LJ 579 : 36 ILR All 362;
Ramdeni Pathak v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 145 , p 146 : 39 Cr LJ 358.
514 Chandrasekhar v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1981) Jab LJ 122 .
515 Queen v Ahmed Ally, 11 WR 25, p 27.
516 Padarath Singh v Ratan Singh, AIR 1920 Pat 419 : 21 Cr LJ 145 : 5 Pat LJR 23; SC Gupta v Emperor, AIR 1924 Rang
17 : 25 Cr LJ 185 : ILR 1 Rang 290; Asgarali v Emperor, AIR 142 Ngp 80 : 43 Cr LJ 649 : (1942) ILR Ngp 695 : (1942)
Nag LJ 257 .
517 Mahommad Ismail Khan v Emperor, (1920) 21 Cr LJ 12, p 14.
518 Ram Lakhan Singh v State of Bihar, (1972) BLJR ix (Summary of case).
519 K Karunakaran v TV Eachara Warrier, (1977) Cr AR (SC) 411, p 416 : (1977) CLR (SC) 521.
520 Ramdeni Pathak v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 145 , p 146 : 39 Cr LJ 358.
521 Anandi Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1934 Oudh 65 , 66 : 35 Cr LJ 390 : 1 Oudh WN 87; Takasi Satyanarayana v State of
Andhra Pradesh, (1985) 1 Crimes 60 (AP).
522 Taj Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 125 , p 127 : 29 Cr LJ 212 : 29 PLR 14; Gopinath Panda v Emperor, AIR
1917 Pat 499 : 18 Cr LJ 772.
523 Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v Taraknath Chatterjee, AIR 1935 Cal 304 , p 305 : ILR 62
Cal 666; Chandraskhekhar v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1981) Jab LJ 122 (MP).
524 Re Indrachand Bachraj, 33 Cr LJ 386 : ILR 56 Bom 213 : 34 Bom LR 294; Mahommad Siddiq v Emperor, 6 Cr LJ 162 :
11 Cal WN 911.
525 State of Maharashtra v Jivan Govindarao Shedge, (1977) CLR (Mah) 11, p 13.
526 Ashok Kumar Rout v State of Bihar, (2006) Cr LJ 3362 (Pat).
527 Rangaswami v Gunnammal, AIR 1966 Mad 456 [LNIND 1965 MAD 166] , p 459 : (1966) Cr LJ 1457 .
528 State v Shigara Singh, (1964) 66 Punj LR 53 .

Page 39 of 39
529 CP Vedia v State, (1966) Cr LJ 825 , 826 (All).
530 Narmada Shankar v Danpal Singh, (1966) Cr LJ 834 , p 837 : (1966) All WR (HC) 474.
531 Queen v Gurjoon Aheer, 7 WR 37 (Cr).
532 Chaina v State of Rajasthan, (1981) CLR (Raj) 148.
533 Queen v Rewah Goallah, 5 WR 95 (Cr).
534 Williams Luis v State, AIR 1956 Bom 185 [LNIND 1955 BOM 204] , p 186.
535 Bhawani Singh v State, (1971) Raj LW 392 .
536 Thakasis Satyanarayana v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1985) 1 Crimes 60 (AP).
537 Mool Chand v State, (1990) 1 Chand Cr C 163 (Del) : (1990) 40 DLT 326 [LNIND 1989 DEL 417] .
538 Mannath Balchandran v Forbes Compbell & Co Ltd, (1996) Cr LJ 2131 (Bom).
539 Baij Nath Dubey v Awas Evam Vikas Parioned Lucknow, (1997) Cr LJ 2681 (All).
540 Mohd Zahid v Govt of National Capital Territory of Delhi, (1998) Cr LJ 2908 .
541 Madan Prasad Kharwar v State of Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 619 (Jhar).
542 Swarnalata Bhiyan v State of Orissa, (1998) Cr LJ 4520 .
543 Gulshan Rai Nagpal v Principal, Govt Law College, (2002) Cr LJ (Sik) 171 (DB).
545 Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh v Purushotham Reddy, (1999) I CCR 406 (AP).
546 OP Gogne v State (NCT of Delhi), 2012 Cr LJ 1718 (Del).
End of Document
[s 194] Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction
of capital offence.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 9
[s 194] Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of capital offence.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 9
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

of capital offence.—
Whoever gives or fabricates false evidence, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will
thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence which is capital by the law for the time being in force in
Page 4 of 9
India, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;
if innocent person be thereby convicted and executed.—and if an innocent person be convicted and
executed in consequence of such false evidence, the person who gives such false evidence shall be punished
either with death or the punishment hereinbefore described.
The words “by the law of British India or England” were substituted for the words “by this Code” by the India
Railways Act, 1890, section 149, which is now repealed. The words “by the laws for the time being in force in
the Provinces” were substituted for the words “Law of British India or England” by the Adaptation of Laws Order
1948. The words “the Provinces” were substituted by the words “the States” by the Adaptation of Laws Order,
1950. The words “the States” were substituted by the word “India” by Act 3 of 1951. The words “imprisonment
for life” were substituted for the words “transportation for life” by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule.
This and the next section deal with two aggravated forms of giving or fabricating false evidence: (a) where the
intention is to procure the conviction of a person for a capital offence (section 194, IPC), or (b) for an offence
punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven or more than seven years (section 195, IPC). If
in the first case the capital punishment is actually awarded and carried out, and the person executed was
innocent, then the giver or fabricator of the false evidence can also be punished with death under the latter part
of this section.
To constitute an offence under this section, the accused must give or fabricate false evidence, intending
thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, any person to be convicted of a capital
offence.
An application/interlocutory application filed by either party for some relief is not evidence within the meaning of
section 3, Indian Evidence Act, and as such, would not fall within the meaning of section 294, CrPC. No offence
is committed under section 193 or section 194, IPC.547
[s 194.3] Tutoring of Person is Fabricating False Evidence
In one case, the Allahabad High Court held that the tutoring of a man to give false evidence is not fabricating
false evidence,548 but dissenting from this, it has been held in a subsequent case that the tutoring of a man to
give false evidence amounts to the “causing of a circumstance to exist” and therefore, amounts to fabricating
false evidence within the meaning of section 192.549 If a police officer coerces a person to make a false
statement under section 164, CrPC, 1973, he fabricates false evidence and is liable to be punished under this
section.550
[s 194.4] “Intending Thereby to Cause”—Meaning of
The words “in any stage of a judicial proceeding” which occur in section 193 are not repeated in this section. In
this respect the terms of this section are wider than those of section 193. According to one view, this section
refers only to the final stage, that is the trial of the case.551 So, a witness, who gives false evidence in the
committing proceedings against an accused person subsequently committed to the sessions on a charge of
murder, would not be guilty of an offence under this section, the reason being that it is difficult to affirm the
existence of an intention to cause, or of knowledge that the false evidence is likely to cause, a person to be
convicted of a capital offence, when the proceeding in which the evidence is given, is one in which such a
conviction is not legally possible.552 It would follow from this a fortiori that the offence of a person accusing
another falsely of murder to a head constable in an inquiry under section 174, CrPC, would not fall under this
section.553
Page 5 of 9
In a Calcutta case, however, it has been held that it is not necessary under this section that the false evidence
which is given should be evidence given in a court of justice. Such statement, if made to a police officer, would
amount to the offence of giving false evidence as defined by section 191, taking section 118 of the Code into
consideration.554
Where the accused officer-in-charge of the police station prepared false statement said to be given to the
deceased, he was prosecuted for offences under sections 193 and 194, IPC.555
An inspector of police, while making the investigation in respect of the murder of A, falsely implicated the
accused with the connivance of two sarpanchas and a village witness by concocting the whole evidence and
got the accused convicted by the trial court. In the appeal, the alleged deceased A appeared in the High Court
and he was not found murdered. The High Court held that the inspector, sarpanchas and other witnesses were
liable to be prosecuted under section 194, IPC read with section 340, CrPC.556
[s 194.5] Fabrication in Investigation Papers by Investigating Officer
Time was not mentioned in the documents prepared during investigation. Time was inserted later by the
appellant, Investigating Officer in the case. His purpose was to see that the accused persons were convicted in
the case. Appellant was convicted under section 194, IPC.557
[s 194.6] “Likely”—Meaning of
To bring a case within the section, it must at least be possible that a conviction may be the result of giving or
fabricating false evidence. A is being tried for murder, B falsely swears that A did not commit the murder, but
that C (not in custody) did. His evidence being inoperative to secure the conviction of any one for the capital
offence, B has not committed an offence under section 194, though he has committed one under section
193.558
[s 194.7] Capital Offence —What is?
Capital punishment means the penalty of death inflicted in pursuance of judicial sentence, it being a cardinal
constitutional principle that no one is to be put to death without being brought to answer in due process of
law.559 Capital offence is that offence for which death penalty may be inflicted.
The following are capital offences under this Code:
(a) Waging, etc, a war against the Government of India (section 121, IPC).
(b) Abetment of mutiny in the Army, Navy, or Air Force, if mutiny is committed in consequence thereof
(section 132, IPC).
(c) An offence under the second paragraph of section 194, IPC.
(d) Murder (section 302, IPC).
(e) Murder by a person sentenced to imprisonment for life (section 303, IPC).
(f) Abetment of suicide by a child, insane person, etc (section 305, IPC).
Page 6 of 9
(g) Hurt caused in an attempt to commit murder by a life convict to murder (section 307, IPC).
(h) Murder in dacoity (section 396, IPC).
Offences capital by the Law of England are the following:
(i) High treason.560
(ii) Murder.561
(iii) Piracy within violence.562
(iv) Burning or destroying ships of war, arsenals, magazines, etc.563
(v) Numerous offences in the Navy.564
(vi) Numerous offences in the Army.565
[s 194.8] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable but a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
non-bailable and non-compoundable and is triable only by a court of session. There is no period of limitation to
prosecute a person for committing an offence under this section.
Based on a judgment of acquittal, the investigating officer was sought to be proceeded against for the offence
under section 194, IPC. During the progress of preliminary inquiry under section 340, CrPC, a notice was
issued to the investigating officer who sought summoning for the production of the case diaries relating to the
matter. The prayer was refused. It was held that the court having summoned the proposed the accused it,
ought not to shut him out when he wanted to aid the court in determining the question before it.566
[s 194.9] Complaint
Section 195(1)(b), CrPC provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this
section when committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court except on the complaint in writing of
that court, or some other court to which that court is subordinate. So a complaint by the concerned court is
necessary for the prosecution of an offender under this section.
For detailed commentary Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, twenty-first edn, LexisNexis may be referred to.
[s 194.10] Stage of Sanction under Section 197, CrPC
Whether a sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may
reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case. The complaint may not disclose that the act constituting
the offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of public duty, but facts that may come to light
subsequently in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial or otherwise, may establish the necessity for
a sanction. In that event, the court shall dismiss the complaint on the ground that the accused could not be
prosecuted without a sanction of the State Government under section 197, CrPC.567
[s 194.11] Charge
Page 7 of 9
I (name and office of the sessions judge etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the day of………at………in the course of trial of………before………gave false evidence (or
fabricated false evidence), intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely that you will thereby cause……… (give the
name of the person) to be convicted of an offence, which is capital by the law in force in India. (Where the charge is
under the second part of section 194) and an innocent person……… (give the name of the person) has been convicted
and executed, and thereby committed an offence, punishable under section 194 of the Indian Penal Code, and within
my cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge by this court.
[s 194.12] Proof
In addition to the points mentioned under the last section, the following further points must be proved:
The accused, when giving or fabricating false evidence, intended thereby to cause or knew that it was likely that
he would thereby cause the person in question to be convicted of the capital offence, by the laws for the time
being in force in India.
For the second clause, prove further:
(i) that the capital punishment was awarded and carried into effect;
• and
(ii) that the person executed was an innocent person.

Page 8 of 9
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
547 Anil Kumar Mishra v State of Jharkhand, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 44 (Jhar).
548 Durga Prasad v Emperor, 16 Cr LJ 677.
549 Sut Nath Bhaduri v Emperor, AIR 1927 All 721 : 28 Cr LJ 950 : 25 All LJ 1077; relying on Emperor v Chheda Lal, ILR
29 All 351 : 4 All LJ 237).
550 Ram Nath v Salig Ram, AIR 1967 All 519 [LNIND 1966 ALL 113] , 520 : (1957) Cr LJ 1463 .
551 Reg v Gokal Das, Rat Unrep Cr Cases 80, p 81.
552 Emperor v Mahommad, (1886) 32 PR 1886 (Cr).
553 Mahommad Hayat v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah 133 : 23 Cr LJ 82 : 6 PWR (Cr) 1922.
554 Queen v Nim Chand Mookerjee, 20 WR (Cr) 41.
555 Madan Prasad Kharwar v State of Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 619 (Jhar).
556 Darshan Singh v State of Punjab, (1985) Cr LJ 71 (NOC) (P&H); See also Madan Prasad Kharwar v State of
Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 619 (Jhar); Suresh Chandra Sharma v State of MP, 2009 Cr LJ 4288 : AIR 2009 SC
3169 [LNIND 2009 SC 849] .
557 Suresh Chandra Sharma v State of MP, 2009 Cr LJ 4288 (SC) : AIR 200 SC 3169 : 2009 (5) Scale 699 [LNIND 2009
SC 849] .
558 R v Hardayal, 3 Beng LR Ap (Cr) 35.
559 Mag Car c 39, 28 the Crown, I, 497 Ed III, c 3; Hale, Pleas of.
560 32 Geo, III, c 48, 54 Geo III, c 146, 33 and 34 Vic c 23, section 31.
Page 9 of 9
561 24 and 25 Vic c 100, section 1.
562 7 Will IV and 1 Vic c 88, section 2.
563 12 Geo III, c 24.
564 29 and 30 Vic c 109, sections 2–7, 10–13, 19, 30, 34 and 52(1).
565 44 and 45 Vic c 53, sections 4, 6(1), 7, 8(1), 9(1) and 12(1).
566 Karnail Singh v Tirath Singh Sobti, (1982) Cr LJ (NOC) 155 (P&H) : (1982) Chand Cr C 252 (P&H).
567 Ram Nath v Salig Ram Sharma, (1967) All 519 [LNIND 1966 ALL 113] : (1967) Cr LJ 1463 ; Matajoj Dobey v HC Bhari,
AIR 1956 SC 44 [LNIND 1955 SC 89] : (1956) Cr LJ 140 .
End of Document
of offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 7
[s 195] Giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of offence punishable with
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 7
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

of offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment.—
Whoever gives or fabricates false evidence intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will
thereby cause, any person to be convicted of an offence which 568[by the law for the time being in force in
Page 4 of 7
569[India]]
is not capital, but punishable with 570[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for a term of seven years
or upwards, shall be punished as a person convicted of that offence would be liable to be punished.
Illustration
A gives false evidence before a Court of Justice, intending thereby to cause Z to be convicted of a dacoity. The
punishment of dacoity is 571[imprisonment for life], or rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten
years, with or without fine. A, therefore, is liable to 572[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment, with or without
fine.
[s 195.1] Scope
The offence under this section is an aggravated form of an offence under section 193573 but is an attenuated
form of the offence under the last section. This section applies only to cases where the intention is to procure
conviction for an offence which is neither capital nor punishable with imprisonment for less than seven years.
Statement on oath falsely supporting the prosecution case against an accused amounts to an offence under
sections 193 and 195, IPC.574 To sustain a conviction under this section it must be proved that the accused,
when giving or fabricating the evidence, intended thereby to cause, or knew that it was likely that he would
thereby cause, the person in question to be convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of seven years or upwards under this Code.575 If the charge is of giving false evidence,
it must be proved not only that the accused spoke falsely, but also knew that he was speaking falsely.576 Merely
persuading a person to give false evidence in a case does not amount to fabrication of false evidence under
this section, unless the person persuaded is produced as a witness and he gives false evidence in the case.577
On the basis of answer given in examination under O II, rule 2, CPC, a party cannot be prosecuted for offence
under section 195, IPC as a party is not examined on oath or affidavit in examination under O II, rule 2, CPC.578
Where prosecution of one of the PWs under section 195, IPC was filed on allegations that in case under the
Prevention of Corruption Act he had given evidence before the court contrary to his statement under section
164, CrPC, when the statement of the PW was recorded after lapse of four years, held that the prosecution of
the PWs was not proper, especially when the case under section 195, IPC was filed after a lapse of 11 years
from the date of giving false evidence.579
The words “by the law of British India or England” were substituted for the words “by this Code” by the Indian
Railways Act, 1890,580 section 149. The same section, ie section 149 was repealed by the Repealing Act 1 of
1938. The words “by the law for the time being in force in the Province” were substituted for the words “Law of
British India or England” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1948. The words “the Provinces” were substituted by
the words “the States” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950 and the words “the States” were substituted by
the word “India” by Act 3 of 1951. The words “imprisonment for life” were substituted for the words
“transportation for life” by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule. In the illustration the words “transportation
for life” were substituted by the words “imprisonment for life” by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule with
effect from 1 January 1956.
Where a man burns his own house, it is the causing of a circumstance to exist within the meaning of section
192, and he may be liable under this section if he intended thereby to procure the conviction of another person.
But if the act was committed in a most public manner and not in a way calculated to lead to the conviction of
that person, he cannot be held guilty under this section.581 If he burnt the house and charged another with the
offence of doing so, he should be convicted and sentenced under section 211 (making a false charge) and not
Where the accused concealed certain stolen property in another’s field with a view to having that innocent
Page 5 of 7
person punished as an offender, it was held that the accused committed the offence under this section.583 So
also, when the accused coined false rupees not for the purpose of making a gain by passing them off as good
coins but for the purpose of getting the coins secretly into the house of their enemies, against whom they were
making to the police a false charge of theft, accompanied by a request for a house search, it was held that the
accused were guilty of the offence under this section.584
The accused who owed a certain amount to another, sent a registered and insured packet, purporting to
contain currency notes, in settlement of the debt, but actually containing waste paper and in a suit by the
creditor, applied to the court to admit the acknowledgment receipt in evidence. It was held that the accused was
guilty of the offence under this section.585
[s 195.4] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence under the preceding section 194, IPC. There is no
period of limitation for taking cognizance under this section also.
[s 195.5] Complaint by the Court
Cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken only on the written complaint of the concerned court
as provided by section 195(1)(b), CrPC, 1973. For a detailed commentary on this point, the commentary under
section 193, ante may be referred to.
The successor-in-office of a magistrate can file a complaint under this section in respect of an offence
committed before his predecessor.586
Where forgery in a document was committed prior to it being produced in Court, a private complaint is not
barred.587
[s 195.6] Trial for other Distinct Offence not Barred
Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not bar the trial of an accused for a distinct offence
disclosed by the same set of facts but not so stated therein. Section 195 also does not provide further that if in
the course of the commission of that offence, other distinct offences are committed, the magistrate is debarred
from taking cognizance in respect of those offences as well.588
[s 195.7] Charge
I (name and office of the sessions judge etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you, on and about the day of………at………in the course of trial of………before………gave false evidence (or
fabricated false evidence), intending thereby to cause (or knowing it to be likely that you will thereby cause)
………(give name of the person) to be convicted of an offence………punishable with imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of seven years or upwards, and thereby committed an offence, punishable under section 195
of the India Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Page 6 of 7
And I hereby direct that you be tried, on the said charge, by this court.
[s 195.8] Proof
In order to prove the guilt under this section the prosecution has to prove that the accused when giving or
fabricating false evidence intended thereby to cause or knew that it was likely that he would thereby cause, the
person in question to be convicted of an offence (other than capital) punishable with imprisonment for life, or
imprisonment for a term of seven years or more.
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
568 Subs. by the AO 1948, for “by the law of British India of England”.
569 Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and Schedule, for “the States”.
570 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule, for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
571 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule, for “such transportation” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
572 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule, for “such transportation” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
573 RK Kapoor v Pratap Singh Kairon, AIR 1966 All 66 [LNIND 1965 ALL 4] : (1966) Cr LJ 115 .
574 Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) Cr LJ 1178 , p 1180.
Page 7 of 7
575 Re Naurang, (1906) 3 ALJR 11.
576 Gopalaswami Naidu v Emperor, 10 Cr LJ 7.
577 Durga Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1915 All 388 : 16 Cr LJ 667; See also Kapil Corepacks Pvt Ltd v Harbans Lal, AIR 2010
SC 2809 [LNIND 2010 SC 697] : (2010) 8 SCC 452 .
578 Kapil Corepacks Pvt Ltd v Harbans Lal, AIR 2010 SC 2809 [LNIND 2010 SC 697] : (2010) 8 SCC 452 : JT 2010 (8) SC
124 [LNIND 2010 SC 697] : 2010 AIR SCW 4593 : (2010) 94 AIC 72 (SC).
579 Vidadala Maruthi Hari Prasad Rao v Special Judge, SPE&ACB Cases, 2007 Cr LJ 710 (AP).
580 Now repealed by the Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989).
581 Re Shib Dayal, 5 NWP 128.
582 Queen v Bhagwan Ahir, 8 WR (Cr) 65(1).
583 Empress of India v Rameshar Rai, ILR 1 All 379.
584 Lal Chand v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 252 : 43 PLR 1912 : 17 PWR 1912 (Cr).
585 Kunju v King-Emperor, AIR 1927 Mad 199 [LNIND 1926 MAD 322] : 28 Cr LJ 70 : (1926) 51 Mad LJ 800.
586 Ajaib Singh v Joginder Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1422 [LNIND 1968 SC 139] , p 1424 : (1969) Cr LJ 4 ; Mulchand Bohra v
UOI, (1975–76) 80 Cal WN 804.
587 Shahab Uddin Mazumdar v State of Assam, 2011 (101) AIC 868 (Gauh); Jagannath Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh,
2011 (103) AIC 846 : 2011 Cr LJ 3008 (MP); Chintamani v State of UP, 2010 (91) AIC 669 (All).
588 Pravinchandra Jagivandas Gandhi v Ibrahim Mahommad Merchant, (1987) Cr LJ 1795 : (1987) 89 Bom LR 304 :
(1987) Mah LJ 855 : (1987) 3 Bom HCR 29; Basir-ul-Haq v State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC
145] ; Gir Raj v Sulla, AIR 1965 All 597 [LNIND 1964 ALL 90] .
End of Document
[s 195A] Threatening any person to give false evidence.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 4
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 4
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
589[s 195A] Threatening any person to give false evidence.—

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of
any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause that person to give false evidence shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or
with both;
and if innocent person is convicted and sentenced in consequence of such false evidence, with death or
imprisonment for more than seven years, the person who threatens shall be punished with the same
punishment and sentence in the same manner and to the same extent such innocent person is punished and
Page 4 of 4
sentenced.]
This section is inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act of 2005, w.e.f. 16-04-2006.
[s 195A.2] Scope
Tendering of false evidence as well as threats and intimidation to any person to give false evidence have been
made penal offences under sections 193 and 195A, IPC.590
Where in case under sections 489B and 489, IPC, the prosecution witness, on being threatened by the higher
police officers did not support the prosecution case, and filed affidavits before the court resiling from the
prosecution case, the High Court directed the Presiding Officer of the trial court to file complaint for offences
under sections 193 and 195A, IPC.591 Where the accused gave speech that no false evidence should be given
against the workers of party in murder case against the accused, held it did not amount to holding threat to any
witness, and section 195A, IPC was not directed in the case.592
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
589 Ins. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2005 (2 of 2006), section 2 (w.e.f. 16-4-2006).
592 Abdul Wahals v State of Kerala, 2013 (4) Ker LT SN 29 (Ker).
End of Document
[s 196] Using evidence known to be false.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 10
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 10
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true or genuine evidence any evidence which he knows to be
false or fabricated, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave or fabricated false evidence.
[s 196.1] Scope
Page 4 of 10
This section deals with (a) the corrupt use of false or fabricated evidence or (b) an attempt to use as true or
genuine evidence, any evidence which the accused knows to be false or fabricated. It must be read with
sections 191 and 192, and can only apply to the use of evidence which was false evidence within the meaning
of section 191 or fabricated evidence as laid down in section 192. False evidence is not always fabricated
evidence unless there was, at the time of making it, an intention that it should appear in evidence.593 The gist of
an offence under this section is the procuring of false circumstances or the making of a document containing
false statement, so that the court may form a wrong opinion in a judicial proceeding, on the basis of such false
evidence.594 The section makes it punishable not only to use but also to attempt to use false or fabricated
evidence corruptly. So, to constitute the offence under this section it is necessary that the false or fabricated
evidence should be used or attempted to be used as true or genuine evidence.595
[s 196.2] Evidence must be in Existence
An offence under this section can be held to have been committed only if it is shown that the evidence which
the accused used or attempted to use as true or genuine was in existence at the material time.596 A mere
attempt to get a false medical certificate, which is refused, does not fall under this section.597
[s 196.3] “Uses or Attempts to use”—Explained
The offence under this section is the using or attempting to use corruptly as true or genuine evidence knowing it
to be false or fabricated. “Fabricated” means so fabricated as to constitute an offence. Evidence fabricated out
of India, consequently, is not “fabricated” in the sense of this section, and a person who uses such evidence,
however corruptly, is not subject to punishment for it. He, in fact, commits no offence.598 Where an assessee
fabricated his account books for producing before the income tax officer and also produced the same before
him, his act thereby attracts the provisions of sections 193 and 196.599
[s 196.4] Production of a Summoned Document does not Amount to user
The production of a copy is an attempt to use the original.600 The production of a document, which a person is
summoned by a court to produce, however, does not amount to using the document as genuine. The
expression “using a document” is apparently used in the sense of its being put forward in some way for one of
the purposes mentioned in section 463, IPC.601 The production by a party of a document, which he is bound by
law to produce, cannot by itself constitute a user of that document by him. He cannot be put to the risk of
having to consider whether a document answering the description contained in the summons is in fact genuine,
and whether there is any reason to believe it to be not genuine. The mere production of a document in answer
to a command of court can in no case be regarded as fraudulent in law.602
The giving of false evidence by the accused that a witness delivered the document to him with a fraudulent
intention does not amount to a fraudulent user of the document with reference to which the evidence was given,
though it might expose him to a prosecution for perjury.603
[s 196.5] Knowledge and its Burden of Proof
The mere production of false evidence throws on the producer the burden of proving his innocent knowledge,
and the production may be made either by himself personally, or through another.604 If the evidence was
produced through another person or persons, it must be proved that he or they knew it to be false, as well as
the producer, it being necessary that the witnesses should have the same knowledge, for, otherwise, the
evidence is not false.605 Where a person produced in evidence an account book, one page of which had been
extracted and another substituted in its place, it was held that he could not be guilty under this section unless
he knew of the forgery, and intended to use the forged evidence for the purpose of affecting the decision on the
point at issue when the book was tendered.606 The document sought to be used may have been fabricated for a
different purpose. Thus, where the accused, in a suit upon a bond, sought to support his claim by a letter
fabricated for the purpose of enabling him to get the bond registered, it was held that the fact that the letter was
fabricated for use before the registrar was no objection to his conviction under this section.607
[s 196.6] Forged and Fabricated—Not the Same

Page 5 of 10
It has been held that the offence imputed against an accused, who, in a civil suit, is alleged to have used as
genuine a document which he knew to be a forged document, is one cognizable under section 471 of the IPC.
Such accused should, therefore, be charged under that section, and not under this section.608
[s 196.7] “Corruptly”—Not Confined to Bribes
The word “corruptly” has not been defined in the Code. It must, therefore, be given its ordinary dictionary
meaning. According to the Webster’s Dictionary, “corruptly” means “without integrity”, “contrary to parity”,
“viciously”, “wickedly”. Accordingly to Black’s Law Dictionary609 corruptly, when used in a statute, generally
imports a wrongful design to acquire some plenniary or other advantage.610 According to Morgan and
Macpherson’s Indian Penal Code, the word “corruptly” is used in sections 196, 198, 200, 219 and 220, IPC to
denote that those whose duty it is to submit evidence for the consideration of judicial and other functionaries on
behalf of clients do not incur the penalties for using false evidence unless they use the evidence corruptly. In
Bhan Singh v Jalan Singh611 it is said that the word is not used in the sense of “dishonestly” or “fraudulently”.612
It is of a wider import and is not confined to the taking of bribes.613 Convictions have been made under this
section where the word was not confined to the restricted sense indicated above.614 “Corruptly” is, therefore, not
the same as “dishonestly or fraudulently”. The user of false evidence, with the knowledge that it is false, must
ordinarily be corrupt from its very nature, and the onus lies on the accused to show that there are
circumstances in the case which prevent its being corrupt. The fact that he was defending himself against a
criminal charge is not enough. Where a public servant has been induced by an accused person to produce a
fabricated document in order to support his false defence, it is not difficult to support the inference as to the
corrupt use by him of the fabricated evidence as being within the scope of this section.615 The word “corruptly”
is not intended to connote a motive necessarily connected with the passing of money as an inducement to the
person impugned to use or attempt to use the fabricated evidence. An intention to procure a false conviction is
also a corrupt intention.616
A brought a suit upon a bond, and at the trial supported his claim by a letter fabricated for use before a
registrar.617 A is guilty of the offence under section 196.
A, a debtor, procures B as a witness to swear falsely that he witnessed a payment made by A to his creditor. A
is guilty.618
A accused B of having assaulted him with a pitna, which he produced, and which bore some red stains alleged
by A to be bloodstains. On being chemically examined, it was found that the stains were not of blood. It was
held that A committed an offence under this section.619
A, a minor, was present at the time a false swearing was committed in his favour. It did not appear that he was
concerned in procuring such evidence. It was held that A had no guilty knowledge and was therefore not
liable.620
[s 196.9] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable. It is bailable or non-bailable depending on whether the
offence of giving such evidence is bailable or non-bailable and is triable by the court by which the offence of
giving or fabricating false evidence is triable.621
Page 6 of 10
In other words, if the giving or fabricating of false evidence, which is corruptly used or attempted to be used, is
punishable under section 193, the offence under this section is bailable and triable by a magistrate. The period
of limitation for taking cognizance of such offence is three years if the offence falls under para 2 of that section.
In case such offence is punishable under section 194 or section 195, the offence under this section is non-
bailable and is triable by the court of session. There is no period of limitation for taking cognizance of an
offence under this section if the offence of giving or fabricating false evidence, which is used, is punishable
under para 1 of section 193 or under section 194 or section 195 of this Code.
Where the income tax department instituted a prosecution against the assessee under sections 276(c) and 277
of the Income Tax Act and under sections 193 and 196 of the Penal Code, the prosecutions are maintainable
and the pendency of the reassessment proceedings cannot act as a bar to the institution of such criminal
prosecution.622
[s 196.10] Complaint by Court
In view of the prohibition contained in clause (b) of section 195(1), CrPC the cognizance of an offence under
this section can be taken only on the written complaint of the court if it is committed in, or in relation to, any
proceeding of that court. The provisions of section 195, CrPC are mandatory. Registration of a case against a
public servant under sections 196 and 208, IPC without following the proceedings of sections 195 and 240,
CrPC was illegal and as such the proceedings were quashed on petition filed under section 482, CrPC.623
Where the offence, under this section, has been committed before an income tax officer, the magistrate can
take cognizance of the offence, as the income-tax officer has been held to be a court.624
Where on the court’s direction to hold an inquiry, a deputy superintendent of police reported that the girl
produced before the court was not the girl whose production was directed, the custodian, by producing another
girl, evidently gave false evidence with a view to mislead the court to make it believe that the girl produced was
the petitioner’s daughter. It was held that the conduct of the custodian is one which immediately attracted
sections 193, 196, 199 and 201 of the IPC. These offences, however, are covered by section 195 of the CrPC,
which states that no court shall take cognizance of such an offence except on the complaint in writing by that
court, or some other court to which that court is subordinate, when such offence is alleged to have been
committed in or in relation to, to any proceedings in any court. Therefore, a direction was given to the registrar
to lodge a complaint against the custodian.625
[s 196.11] Distinction between Sections 463, 465 and 471 and Sections 193 and 196, IPC
The gist of this provision is that an offence of forgery of a document as described in section 463, IPC and of
using such forged documents, if produced or given in evidence by a person other than a party to a proceeding
in a court, do not require a complaint in writing by the court concerned, but prosecution in respect of offences
under sections 193–196, 199 and 200 (among others), committed in a judicial proceeding by a person (whether
a party or not), requires a complaint in writing of the court before which the offence is committed or of some
other court to which such court is subordinate. It is this difference which has apparently induced the selection of
sections 463–471 rather than sections 193 to 196, IPC. The former do not require a complaint by the court but
the latter do, and this is the main point of controversy before us also.626 The broad distinction between offences
under the two groups is that section 405 deals with an offence of forgery by making of a false document and
section 471 with the offence of using forged document dishonestly or fraudulently. Section 193 deals with the
giving or fabricating of false evidence and section 196 with corruptly using evidence known to be false. The gist
of the offences in the first group is in the making of a false document and the gist of the offences in the second
group is in the procuring of a false circumstance or the making of a document containing a false statement so
that a judicial officer may form a wrong opinion in a judicial proceeding on the faith of the false evidence.
Another important difference is that whereas section 471 requires a user to be either fraudulent, dishonest or
both, section 196 is satisfied if the user is corrupt. The IPC defines the expressions “fraudulently” and
Page 7 of 10
“dishonestly” but not the expression “corruptly”.627
[s 196.12] Charge
The charge should specify whether the accused used or attempted to use the false or fabricated evidence.628
I (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused), as follows:
That you, (*) on or about the …….day of……at……corruptly used (or attempted to use) as true or genuine evidence,
the evidence, to wit…….which you knew to be false (or fabricated) and as such punishable under s 193 (or 194 or 195)
of the Indian Penal Code, and thereby committed an offence under s 196 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my
cognizance.
[s 196.13] Proof
The prosecution has to prove that:
(a) the accused used or attempted to use some evidence;
(b) it was false or fabricated;
(c) he used or attempted to use such evidence as true or genuine evidence;
(d) he then knew it to be false or fabricated evidence; and
(e) he used or attempted to use it corruptly.

Page 8 of 10
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
593 Ma Ain Lon v Ma on Nu, AIR 1925 Rang 191 , 26 Cr LJ 309.
594 Shanti Devi v State, (1970) All LJ 206, p 213; S, Dutt v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 523 [LNIND 1965 SC 195]
, p 527 : (1966) Cr LJ 459 .
595 Ma Ain Lon v Ma On Nu, AIR 1925 Rang 191 : 26 Cr LJ 309 : 3 ILR Rang 26.
596 Kumar Chowdhury v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 467 : 38 Cr LJ 1011 : 16 ILR Pat 21 : 18 PLT 271 : (1937) Pat WN 288 ;
R v Suffrudeen Ind Jur OS, 122; Re Katari Veeranna, AIR 1917 Mad 686 .
597 Re Katari Veeranna, (1916) 17 Cr LJ 38 .
598 Empress v Moorga Chatty, 5 ILR Bom 338 : 359 (FB), per Melville J.
599 UOI v Gopal Engineering Works, (1988) 15 Reports (Mad) 701.
600 Fazl Ahmad v Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 433 , p 436 : 15 Cr LJ 344; Queen v Najim Ali, 6 WR (Cr) 41; Malat Singh v
Emperor, 3 Cr LJ 255 : 3 All LJ 190.
601 Assistant Sessions Judge of North Arcot v Ramammal, 13 Cr LJ 35 : 10 Mad LT 563 : 36 ILR Mad 337 : 22 Mad LJ
141; Re Muthaih Chetty, 13 Cr LJ 46 : 36 ILR Mad 392 : 22 Mad LJ 171 : (1912) Mad WN 453; Ma Ain Lon v Ma On
Nu, AIR 1925 Rang 191 .
602 Re Muthiah Chetty, 13 Cr LJ 46.
603 Ibid.
604 Government v Jumal, IM Dig 172 and 475; Government v Muteeool, IM Dig 174 and 493.
605 R v Gungommah, 3rd Mad Sess 1860.
606 Queen v Muddoo Soodun Shaw, 7 WR (Cr) 3 (1).

Page 9 of 10
607 Lakshmiji v Queen-Empress, 7 ILR Mad 289 : 1 Weir 177.
608 The Empress v Kherode Chunder Mozumdar, (1880) ILR 5 Cal 717 : 6 CLR 118.
609 Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edn 1990, p 345.
610 Yellappa s/o Rangappa v Kamalara, (1995) Cr LJ 230 (Kant).
611 Bhan Singh v Jalan Singh, Cr Revn no 26 of 1909.
612 Empress v Kherode Chunder Mozumder, (1880) 5 Cal 717 : 6 CLR 118.
613 Rama Nana Hagavne v Emperor, AIR 1922 Bom 99 , (101) : 3 Cr LJ 23 : ILR 46 Bom 317 : 23 Bom LR 987; S Dutt v
State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 523 [LNIND 1965 SC 195] , 527 : (1966) Cr LJ 459 .
614 Queen v Muddoo Soodan Shaw, (1867) 7 WR (Cr) 23; Lakshmaji v Queen-Empress, (1884) 7 Mad 289 : 1 Weir 177.
615 Rama Nana Hagavne v Emperor, AIR 1922 Bom 99 : 23 Cr LJ 23.
616 Fazl Ahmad v Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 433 , p 436 : 15 Cr LJ 344 : 1 PR (Cr) 1914 : 139 PLR 1914; S Dutt v State of
Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 523 [LNIND 1965 SC 195] , p 527 : (1966) Cr LJ 459 .
617 R v Ramdyal, 1 M Dig 173 and section 485.
618 Government v Jumal, 1 M Dig 172 and section 475; Government v Muteeool, 1 M Dig 174 and section 493.
619 Bholanath Dutt v Hari Mohan Dutt, 7 Cr LJ 196 : 7 Cal LJ 169; Fazl Ahmad v R, 15 Cr LJ 344.
620 R v Gungammah, 3rd Mad Sess 1860.
621 The First Schedule to the CrPC 1973.
622 P Sayappai v SK Perumal, First Income Tax Officer, Tuticorin, AIR 1984 SC 1693 [LNIND 1984 SC 216] : (1984) Tax
LR 1197 .
623 Balappa v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 4804 , p 4809 (Kant).
624 CK Nagesh v Panchapakesan, (1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 263; relying on Balwant Singh v LC Bharupal, (1968) 70 ITR 89
(SC); UOI v Gopal Engineering Works, (1988) 15 Reports (Mad) 701.
625 R Rathinam v Kamala Vaiduriam, (1993) Cr LJ 2661 (Mad)(DB); For detailed commentary on section 195, CrPC,
Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn LexisNexis may be referred to.
Page 10 of 10
626 S Dutt v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 523 [LNIND 1965 SC 195] All (FB).
627 S Dutt v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 523 [LNIND 1965 SC 195] All (FB).
628 Refer to 2 WR (Letters) 9.
End of Document
[s 197] Issuing or signing false certificate.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 10
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 10
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever issues or signs any certificate required by law to be given or signed, or relating to any fact of which
such certificate is by law admissible in evidence, knowing or believing that such certificate is false in any
material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
Page 4 of 10
[s 197.1] Scope
Sections 197 and 198, IPC relate to false certificates. This section penalises issuing or signing a false
certificate and the next section penalises its use as a true one. The offence is similar to the giving or fabricating
of false evidence. In order to constitute the offence under this section (a) the certificate must be one required by
law to be given or signed, or it must relate to any fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence,
and (b) it must be given or signed knowing or believing that it is false on a material point.
[s 197.2] “Issues”—Meaning of
As the words “required by law to be given or signed” show, the word “issues” simply means “gives” or “delivers”.
[s 197.3] “Any Certificate”—What is?
A “certificate” is a testimony given in writing to declare or verify the truth of anything.629 The word “certify”
means primarily, to assure, to vouch, to make certain. Every act of certifying does not necessarily result in a
“certificate”, meaning thereby a signed document vouching a particular fact. The word “certificate” may no doubt
be used as synonymous with “certification”630 but that is clearly not its meaning in sections 197 and 198.
The certificate contemplated by this section is a certificate which is required by law to be given or signed for use
in the course of administration of justice.631
As per section 197, a certificate contemplated therein is a certificate, which is required not to be given or signed
for the use in the court’s administration of justice.632
In order that a statement in writing may amount to a certificate within the meaning of section 197, IPC, it would
not be sufficient that the makes of the certificate should describe it as a certificate. In order to treat such a
statement as a certificate it would be necessary that there should be a law requiring the issue of such certificate
or providing that such written statement may be treated as a legal statement without formal proof and without
formal scrutiny.633
[s 197.4] Requisites of such Certificates—Documents which are not Certificate
The certificate issued should be as required by some law and it has some reference to some statutory
requirements.634 The certificate in respect of which a man may be punished, if it is false to his knowledge or
belief, must be either (a) one which is required by law to be given or signed, or (b) one which relates to any fact
of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence. One or other of these requirements must be fulfilled
before a man can be dealt with under sections 197 and 198.635 The certificate contemplated by this section is a
certificate which is required by law to be given or signed for the purpose of being used in evidence in the course
of administration of justice. The offence of issuing a false certificate is one which is intimately connected with
the administration of justice.636 Various instances are given in textbooks of the class of certificates
contemplated by these sections. They are no doubt for the most part official or quasi-official certificates, to be
given by officials or others, as prescribed in various statues. There is, however, no particular limitation to the
character of the certificate meant, except that which we find in the section itself. It must fulfil one of the
requirements there set out. If it does not, a man cannot be punished under these sections in respect of it. Thus,
a signed petition filed in a court by the accused purporting to represent the decree-holder and falsely stating
that the judgment-debtor had paid off the decretal amount to the decree-holder, is not a certificate within the
meaning of this section, as there is no provision of law which requires a decree-holder or his agent to give or
sign a certificate of payment or adjustment. Nor is there any provision of law which makes the statement of the
decree-holder or his agent as to the payment or satisfaction admissible in evidence as such a certificate, that is,
without further proof.637 A written statement, filed in a civil suit, is also not a certificate within the meaning of this
section.638
[s 197.5] Statement Amounting to or not Amounting to Certificate under Section 197, IPC
Page 5 of 10
There is substantial distinction between a mere statement in writing not amounting to a certificate contemplated
by section 197, IPC and a statement in writing amounting to a certificate contemplated by section 197, IPC. The
distinction between the statements in writing not amounting to certificate and the statement in writing amounting
to certificate, is that the former cannot be used as legal evidence of the facts mentioned in the certificate, but
the statement in writing which amounts to a certificate can be used as legal evidence of the facts mentioned in
the certificate. Having this distinction in view between the two statements in writing, one which can be used as
evidence without any formal proof and the other which cannot be used as legal formal proof is given according
to law and the statement is subjected to scrutiny by cross-examination or otherwise, it would be proper to hold
that no statement in writing can amount to a certificate within the meaning of section 197, IPC unless the law
enacted by a competent Legislature permits the issue of such a certificate or provides that the certificate shall
be receivable as legal evidence of the fact mentioned therein. The mere fact that the document is described as
a certificate does not make it a certificate in the eyes of law. This distinction must be kept in view by all those
persons who have to deal with written statements of other persons. The hazard of dispensing with formal proof
and the necessity of scrutinising the veracity of the statements cannot be overestimated, particularly when
unscrupulous persons frequently indulge in making false certificates for the purpose of obtaining wrongful gain
or causing wrongful loss to others.639
[s 197.6] “Required by Law to be Given or Signed”—Meaning of
The phrase “required by law”, occurring in this section, has reference to some statutory requirement.640 Several
Acts of the Legislature provide for such certificates. A certificate issued by a registered medical practitioner is
required by section 509 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 to be given before a corpse can be interned or
cremated.641 A certificate may be given by the administrator-general,642 entitling the claimant to the estate of a
deceased person to recover any sum belonging to him up to the extent of Rs 1,000. A similar certificate may be
given by a court under the Indian Succession Act,643 which has the effect of indemnifying all persons making
payments on its strength.644 The registrar of companies is empowered to issue a certificate of incorporation.645
Section 61 of the Indian Christian Marriage Act646 provides for the giving of a marriage certificate. The registrar
of assurances is, on completion of the registration of an assurance, empowered to indorse thereon a certificate
containing the word “registered”. “Such certificate shall be signed, sealed and dated by the registering officer
and shall then be admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in the
manner provided by the Registration Act, and that the facts mentioned in the endorsements, referred to in
section 59 (of the said Act) have occurred as therein mentioned”.647
In a case, the petitioner, a qualified doctor, had issued a certificate which he knew to be false in respect of the
death of a person under section 509 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, to satisfy the authorities of the burning ghat
that the death was not due to any unnatural causes. By virtue of the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act,
that certificate is admissible in evidence without further proof and the petitioner can be successfully prosecuted
A civil court may certify a payment of adjustment of a decree made out of court,649 or grant a certificate of sale
to an auction-purchaser,650 or of a case being a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.651
A person giving a certificate which is not required by law to be given or signed, may be convicted for giving
false information to a public servant but not under this section.652
A copyist preparing an incorrect copy of a document and thereby enabling the applicant of the copy to use it in
a suit would be liable to be convicted under this section and not under section 167.653
A certificate given under rule 18 of the rules framed under section 14 of the Government Savings Bank Act,654 is
Page 6 of 10
not a certificate required by law to be given or signed for the purpose of being used in evidence in the course of
administration of justice and is not covered by this section.655 A caste certificate issued by a member of
legislative assembly for the purpose of enabling the students to obtain pre-matric scholarships without
specifying the caste or tribe of the applicant cannot be held to be a certificate within the meaning of section 197
of the Indian Penal Code. The expression “required by law” refers to some statutory requirements and there
being no statutory requirement requiring the member of legislative assembly to issue the certificates in
question, section 197 cannot have any application.656
[s 197.7] Certificate Relating to any fact of which such Certificate is by law Admissible in Evidence on any
Material Point
What this expression contemplates is that the certificate should, by some provision of law, be admissible in
evidence as such a certificate without further proof. A certificate issued by the chairman of a municipality is not
such a certificate as it cannot be used in evidence unless it is formally proved by the chairman.657 Similarly, a
medical certificate is not admissible in evidence without further proof. Consequently, the issuing and uses of a
medical certificate, in a criminal proceeding stating, contrary to the fact, that the accused was ill would render
neither the accused nor the issuer of the certificate liable under section 197 or section 198.658
Where a false medical certificate is obtained from a doctor for the purpose of a life insurance by a false
personation of the real person, who intends to apply for a policy of life insurance and the doctor issues such a
medical certificate of fitness in ignorance of the false personation, the doctor is not guilty under this section.659
The principal of a college gave a certificate in respect of the age of a student so that he may take part in sports.
The principal was not required by any law to give such a certificate and therefore, he cannot be said to have
committed an offence under section 197.660
[s 197.8] “Knowing or Believing it to be False in any Material Point”—Meaning of
For a conviction under this section, the certificate must be false on a material point, and the person issuing or
signing it, must do so knowing or believing that the certificate is false on a material point. In the absence of
such knowledge or belief, a person cannot be convicted of this offence or its abetment.661 It may be noted that
under section 79 of the Evidence Act, there is a presumption of the genuineness of a certificate issued by an
officer of the Government but that presumption does not extend to its truth or falsity.
[s 197.9] Certificate Issued in Good Faith on the Basis of Earlier Certificate
Where the accused Sarpanch issuing a false certificate stated therein that the complainant had died, however,
the said certificate was issued on the basis of earlier certificate issued by a former Sarpanch in which the
complainant was shown as dead, it can be said that the accused issued certificate in good faith and he was not
aware that it was false. On these facts the accused was held entitled to acquittal.662
An offence under this section is non-cognizable, but a warrant should ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable, and is triable by the court by which the offence of giving false evidence is
triable. See also commentary on the previous section. For the purposes of limitation section 468, CrPC may be
referred to.
No complaint by any court is required for the prosecution of a person under this section.
[s 197.11] Charge

Page 7 of 10
That you, on or about the…….day of ………at……issued (or signed) a certificate required by law to be given (or
signed) (or relating to a fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence) which was false in a material
point, to wit…….and known or believed by you to be false and thereby committed an offence punishable under section
[s 197.12] Proof
To obtain a conviction under this section the following points have to be proved:
(a) that the accused issued or signed a certificate;
(b) that the certificate was required by law to be given or signed, or that it related to a fact of which such
certificate is by law admissible in evidence;
(c) that the certificate is false in any material point; and
(d) that the accused issued or signed the certificate knowing or believing it to be false in any material
point.
A person committing an offence under this section and section 198, IPC is punishable in the same manner as if
he had given false evidence sections 193, 194 and 195 of this Code prescribed the punishment for giving false
evidence, the severity of the punishment depending on the intention of the giver and the nature of the
proceedings where it is given. A certificate, say a succession certification, may be required to be filed in a court
or/and in any bank post office or any other office. After such a certificate is issued, which is false in any material
point, it may not be used at all by the person in whose favour it is issued, for fear of prosecution under section
198, IPC. A marriage certificate issued by the marriage officer falsely showing the minor girl as a major to
validate her marriage, may not be required to be produced anywhere by the parties to the marriage, at being
obtained only by way of abundant precaution. A difficulty may arise in such cases in ascertaining the exact
amount of punishment prescribed by law for issuing or signing a certificate which is not used at all for any
reason. The offence committed by the presiding officer of a court or other authority under this section, or its
gravity, cannot remain suspended till the certificate, so issued, is used. The commission of an offence under
this section is also not subject to the fulfilment of any subsequent condition. Thus, there appears to be some
ambiguity in this section in this respect.
Following the rule of harmonious interpretation of statutes, it is stated that in case it is apparent from the nature
of the certificate, attending circumstances and the intrinsic evidence if any, that it has been issued or signed for
being produced in any judicial proceeding, the offence may fall under para 1 of section 193 or under section
194 or section 195, IPC and may be punishable accordingly. On the other hand, if it appears to have been
issued or signed for producing in any other case or it is not ascertainable as for what purpose it has been so
issued or signed, the offender should be liable to be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
Page 8 of 10
which may extend to three years and also with a fine under the second paragraph of section 193, IPC.
Where the amount of an alleged evasion of tax on the income of Rs 16,000 was meagre, without going into the
merits of the case, the complaint filed under sections 276(c)(1) and 277 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and
section 197 read with section 120-B, IPC for the assessment year 1982–83 was quashed, as even according to
the instructions of the board, the prosecution in cases where the income concealed is less than Rs 25,000 is
not warranted now.663 But the pendency of a civil suit with respect of forged documents cannot be a ground for
quashing the complaint under sections 193, 196, 197, 406, 465, 468, 471, IPC by invoking section 482, CrPC
as the onus of proving the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases is not applicable in civil
proceeding, which can be decided merely on the basis of probabilities with respect to the acts complained of.664
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
629 Wharton’s, Law Lexicon, 14th Edn reprint, 1978, p 171.
630 Saadoolah Shaikh v Kalee Chum, (1869) 12 WR 358 .
631 S Dutt v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 523 [LNIND 1965 SC 195] : (1966) Cr LJ 459 .
632 K Jothi v KP Kandasamy, (2000) Cr LJ 292 (Mad).
633 Premlata v State of Rajasthan, (1998) Cr LJ 1430 (Raj).
634 K Jothi v KP Kandasamy, (2000) Cr LJ 292 (Mad).
635 Mahabir Thakur v Emperor, AIR 1917 Cal 466 , p 467 : 17 Cr LJ 140 : 20 Cal WN 520 : 23 Cal LJ 423.
Page 9 of 10
636 Birendra Nath Chatterjee v Umananda Mukherjee, AIR 1926 Cal 258 , 259 : 30 Cal WN 12; Hasankhan Kalekhan v
State of Gujarat, (1972) Guj LR 444.
637 Mahabir Thakur v Emperor, AIR 1917 Cal 466 , p 467; Birendra Nath Chatterjee v Umananda Mukherjee, AIR 1926 Cal
258 , p 259 : 30 Cal WN 12; Hasan Khan Kalekhan v State of Gujarat, (1972) Guj LR 444.
638 Nathia v Nathu Singh, (1972) All Cr R 503.
640 Hasankhan Kalekhan v State of Gujarat, (1972) Guj LR 444.
641 Re Shaik Nimatullah, (1982) 2 Cal HN 170.
642 Section 36(1), Act II of 1874 and section 31(34) of Act III of 1913.
643 Sections 371 and 374, Succession Act, 1925.
644 Section 16 of 39 of 1925.
645 Section 35 of Indian Companies Act 1 of 1956.
646 Act 15 of 1872.
647 Section 60, Act 3 of 1870 (now Act 16 of 1903).
648 Re Shaik Niamatullah, (1982) 2 Cal HN 170.
649 Order 21, rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908).
650 Order 21, rule 94, Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908).
651 Order 45, rule 3. Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908).
652 Queen-Empress v Mulharji, Ratanlal Unrep Cas 182; Birendra Chatterjee v Umananda Mukherjee, AIR 1926 Cal 258 :
30 Cal WN 12.
653 Re Dwan Singh, 15 PR 1879 (Cr).
654 Government Savings Bank Act, Act 5 of 1873.

Page 10 of 10
655 Birendra Nath Chatterjee v Umananda Mukherjee, AIR 1926 Cal 258 .
656 Haladhara Karji v Dileswar Subudhi, (1989) Cr LJ 629 (Ori).
657 Kumar Chowdhury v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 467 : 38 Cr LJ 1011 : 16 ILR Pat 21 : 18 PLT 271.
658 Profulla Kumar Khare v Emperor, AIR 1943 Cal 40 , p 41 : 44 Cr LJ 292 : (1942) ILR 2 Cal 573.
659 PR Sidhaya v State, (1965) 3 Law Rep 284, 323.
660 Radha Raman Bhargava v Keshav Dutt Panday, (1982) All LJ 1231, p 1232 : (1982) All WC 382.
661 Queen v Hissamuddeen, 3 WR 37.
662 Mangtu Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2003) Cr LJ 4733 (Raj).
663 Madan Lal v Income Tax Officers, (1998) II CCR 669 (Raj).
664 M Krishna v Vijay Singh, (2001) II CCR 117 (SC).
End of Document
[s 198] Using as true a certificate known to be false.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 6
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 6
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use any such certificate as a true certificate, knowing the same to be
false in any material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
[s 198.1] Scope
Page 4 of 6
Section 198 must be read with the last section. The words “such certificate”, occurring in this section, refer to
the certificate contemplated in section 197.665 The last section dealt with the issuing or signing of a false
certificate and this section deals with using it corruptly. The certificate which is referred to in this section, must
be one which is either required by law to be given or signed or is by law admissible in evidence.666
The section penalises not only corruptly using, but even the attempt to use a false certificate, knowing it to be
false. In the absence of such knowledge a prosecution under this section is misconceived.667 If the falsity of the
certificate is not established, its use cannot attract this section.668
[s 198.2] Meaning of “Corruptly”
[s 198.3] Procedure
The procedure to be followed under this section is the same as in the case of an offence under section 17. A
delay in the prosecution and trial may be fatal.669
[s 198.4] Charge
I (name and office of magistrate, etc.) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the………day of ……….at………corruptly used (or attempted to use) as true a certificate
required by law to be given and signed (or relating to fact of which such certificate is by law admissible in evidence),
which was false in a material point, to wit…….and known or believed by you to be the same, and thereby committed an
offence, punishable under s 8 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Where a false certificate was issued by the co-accused, the head of the institution, to the accused, enabling her
to obtain an appointment as “Pracheta”, the headmaster not being authorised by law to issue such a certificate,
the same cannot be admissible as legal evidence of facts mentioned therein, but since the accused used the
said certificate to obtain an appointment, a prime facie charge under section 198, IPC would be said to be
made out against the accused.670
[s 198.5] Proof
The following points have to be proved to establish a charge under this section:
Page 5 of 6
(a) that the document in question purports to be a certificate;
(b) that it was either required by law to be given or signed, or that it related to some fact of which such
certificate is by law admissible in evidence;
(c) that the certificate is false on a material point;
(d) that the accused used or attempted to use such certificate;
(e) that he did so corruptly; and
(f) that he so used it knowing or believing it to be false in a material point.
Where it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused used a duplicate certificate with some
changes as a true certificate, knowing it to be false in material particulars and thereby got admission, a
conviction of the accused under sections 198, 420 and 471, IPC was found proper but keeping in view the
nature of the offence and that the accused’s past and present record had been good and the fact that he had
already lost his career and was now married, the apex court reduced the sentence to that already undergone.671
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
665 Hasankhan Kalekhan v State of Gujarat, (1972) Guj LR 444.
666 Kumar Chowdhury v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 467 , p 468 : 38 Cr LJ 1011 : 16 ILR Pat 21 : 18 PLT 271 : (1937) Pat WN
286 ; Refer to notes under section 197.
667 Emperor v Chuni Lal De, AIR 1944 Cal 448 .
668 Mehboob v State of Rajasthan, (1987) CLR (Raj) 198.

Page 6 of 6
669 Ajit Singh v State, (1988) C Cr J (MP) 7.
671 Tulsibhaii Jivabhai Changani v State of Gujarat, (2001) I CCR 32 (SC).
End of Document
[s 199] False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as
evidence.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 15
[s 199] False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as evidence.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 15
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 199] False statement made in declaration which is by law receivable as

evidence.—
Whoever, in any declaration made or subscribed by him, which declaration any Court of Justice, or any public
servant or other person, is bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence of any fact, makes any statement
Page 4 of 15
which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, touching any
point material to the object for which the declaration is made or used, shall be punished in the same manner as
if he gave false evidence.
[s 199.1] Scope
This and the next section deal with declarations as sections 197 and 198, IPC deal with certificates. This
section penalises the making of a false statement in a declaration and the next section penalises the using as
true of such a declaration knowing it to be false. This section subjects any person, who makes a false
declaration, which declaration may be used as an evidence of the matters stated in it, to the penalties for
perjury.672 It is intended to make the penalty attached to this offence of giving of false evidence applicable to
declarations which, although not compellable, have, on being made, the same effect as the compulsory
declarations referred to in sections 51 and 191.673 In other words, the section intends to extend the penalty
attached to compulsory declarations referred to in sections 51 and 191, IPC, to voluntary declarations also,
provided that such declarations are capable of being used as evidence. A court of justice cannot use any
declarations as evidence, unless they are of the nature of declarations contemplated in O XIX of the CPC
1908,674 ie, in the form of affidavits. Declarations or verified statements are of two kinds: (a) declarations which
a person is bound by law to make, such as the verification of pleadings under the CPC; and (b) declarations
which a person makes for the purpose of their being used as evidence, such as affidavits filed under O XIX of
the CPC. Of these, the second kind of declarations alone can be used as evidence and can form the basis of a
conviction for an offence under section 199.675 This section is wider than section 192, and applies to every kind
of affidavit which the court is bound or authorised to receive by the CPC or by circular orders of the High
Court.676 Under O XXXVIII of the CPC, evidence may be given by an affidavit in support of an application for
attachment before judgment and if such an affidavit is intended to be used in a judicial proceeding before a
court of justice, and the declarant has made a statement for which the affidavit is to be used, the declarant will
be guilty of an offence under section 199.677
Where false affidavits were sworn to obtain a leave and licence to run a sales counter granted on
compassionate grounds, a direction was issued by the apex court to the notary to show cause why he should
not be prosecuted and punished for attesting a false affidavit furnished by the respondent. No such notary,
however, was found available in Tis Hazari Court, Delhi. Then direction was given to the respondent through
his counsel, to name the oath commissioner who had allegedly attested the affidavits. No response was
received from the respondent, and consequently, the respondent who had given a false affidavit in the court
was convicted under section 199, IPC for producing false certificates and false affidavits and was sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months in addition to the payment of a fine of Rs 1,000 and in default to
undergo a further sentence of six weeks.678
Where a rent control petition was dismissed in default, the plea taken by the petitioner was that he was out of
station and could not appear before the court on the stipulated date. However, an affidavit sworn by him before
the other court in the same town, on the same date, indicated his presence in the town. On a complaint being
filed against him, the petitioner was convicted under sections 199 and 200, IPC. On these facts it was held that
the oral evidence by the petitioner against the contents of the affidavit cannot be accepted, the conviction of the
petitioner under sections 199 and 200, IPC was found proper.679
Neither section 192, IPC nor section 199, IPC, incorporate the principle of vicarious liability, and therefore, it
was incumbent on the complainant to specifically aver the role of each of the accused in the complaint.680
This section is somewhat analogous to section 5 of the English Perjury Act, 1911,681 which runs as follows:
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S. 5. False statutory declarations and other false statements without oath.—If any person knowingly and wilfully
makes (otherwise than on oath) a statement false in a material particular, and the statement is made
(a) in a statutory declaration; or
(b) in an abstract, account, balance-sheet, book, certificate, declaration, entry, estimate, inventory, notice, report,
return or other document which he is authorised or required to make, attest, or verify, by any public general
Act of Parliament for the time being in force; or
(c) in any oral declaration or oral answer which he is required to make by, under, or in pursuance of any public
general Act of Parliament for the time being in force,
he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour and shall be liable on conviction thereof on indictment to imprisonment, 682[***] for
any term not exceeding two years, or to a fine or to both such imprisonment and fine.
By section 15(2) of the same Act, a statutory declaration is defined as follows:
(2) In this Act—
• …
• The expression “statutory declaration” means a declaration made by virtue of the Statutory Declarations Act
1835, or of any Act, Order in Council, rule or regulation applying or extending the provisions thereof.
[s 199.3] Swearing in False Affidavit
In Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh,683 the Supreme Court has, however, ruled that the swearing of false affidavits
constitutes an offence under sections 191 and 192, and not under this section. In its view the offence defined
by section 191 is constituted by swearing falsely when one is bound by oath to state the truth. An affidavit is a
declaration made under an oath. The definition of the offence of giving false evidence thus applies to affidavits
also. The offence may also fall within the ambit section 192. It was held that the offence of making false
declarations in the affidavits tendered in a court, to be taken into consideration as evidence in a judicial
proceeding, came within the words of sections 191 and 192 rather than section 199 of the IPC. All decisions to
the contrary are, therefore, no longer good law.
[s 199.4] Verified Applications
Apparently, there is no express provision of law which binds or authorises a court to receive a verified
application as “evidence of any fact” although for the purposes of sections 191 and 193, a false averment in
such an application is regarded as a false evidence. Such applications are, therefore, not covered by this
section.684
[s 199.5] Ingredients of an Offence under Section 199

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The ingredients to constitute an offence under this section are:
(a) making of a declaration which a court or a public servant or other person is bound or authorised by law
to receive in evidence;
(b) making of a false statement in such declaration knowing or believing it to be false; and
(c) such false statement should be touching any point material to the object for which the declaration is
used.685
[s 199.6] Intention is an Important Ingredient
For an offence under section 199 or section 200 of this Code the punishment is in the same manner as if the
accused gave false evidence under section 193 of the Code. The primary ingredients of section 193 of the
Code is intentionally giving false evidence at any stage of judicial proceedings or intentionally fabricating false
evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of judicial proceedings. Thus, the intention is also a major
ingredient for the offence under section 199 or section 200 of the Code.686
[s 199.7] Reckless Statement—when it does or does not Constitute an Offence
The section requires three essentials—(a) making of a declaration which a court or a public servant is bound or
authorised by law to receive in evidence, (b) making of a false statement in such declaration knowing or
believing it to be false, and (c) such false statement should be touching any point material to the object for
which the declaration is made or used. There must be a deliberate false statement. Statements made in a
reckless and haphazard manner, though untrue in fact, may not constitute any offence when the person,
making such statements, immediately admits the mistake and corrects the statement. If, however, a person
makes a reckless and false allegation against a Judge in his affidavit, he lays himself open to a prosecution
[s 199.8] Section 199 and Section 200
In order to attract section 200 the declaration has not only to be false, but also one which any court of justice or
public servant is bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence. Section 199, IPC makes punishable, the
making of a false declaration whereas, section 200 punishes the use of or an attempt to use a false declaration.
To attract the application of this section, the declaration must be used or attempted to be used corruptly.688 The
words “such declaration” appearing in section 200, have reference to the declaration dealt with by section 199,
with all its requirements. Section 199 deals with a declaration which a person is not bound under the law to
make, but which if made, is admissible under an express provision of law in evidence and the facts declared
without any further proof. It is possible, as stated already, that in some cases the declaration may be both, one
which a person is bound by law to make as well as one which by law is receivable as evidence as part of the
facts stated therein without any other proof.689 In order to fall within the purview of section 200, the declaration
must not only be false but also receivable by law as evidence by a court of justice or a public servant or other
persons.690
[s 199.9] Similarity with Section 193
The offence under section 199 or section 200, IPC, the punishment is in the same manner as if the accused
gave false evidence under section 193 of IPC. The primary ingredient of section 193 of IPC is intentionally
giving false evidence in any stage of judicial proceedings or intentionally fabricating false evidence for the
purpose of being used in any stage of the judicial proceedings. Thus, the intention is also a major ingredient for
the offence under section 199 or section 200 of the IPC.691
[s 199.10] Section 199 and Sections 191, 193 Distinguished
The distinction between the two provisions insofar as the making of the declaration is concerned, is that under
Page 7 of 15
section 193, read with section 191, the declaration is one in which a person is bound, by oath or by an express
provision of law, to state the truth, or, being bound, by law, to make a declaration upon any subject, makes a
statement which is false. The declaration contemplated in section 199 is not necessarily one which the person
making the declaration is bound, by law, to make. The essential element of an offence under section 199 is that
the declaration, containing the false statement, must be one which any court of justice or any public servant or
other person is bound or authorised, by law, to receive as evidence of any fact.692 In the words of the Supreme
Court693 the difference between sections 191 and 199 is as follows:
Section 191 deals with statements and declarations falsely made by a person legally bound by an oath or express
provision of law to state the truth. Section 199 deals with statements and declarations made voluntarily provided they
are capable of being used as evidence and which court is bound to receive as evidence.
Section 199 deals with a declaration and does not state that the declaration must be on oath. The only condition
necessary is that the declaration must be capable of being used as evidence and which any court of justice, or any
public servant or other person, is bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence. Section 191 deals with evidence
on oath.
[s 199.11] “Declaration”—Meaning of
The declaration contemplated in this section, as explained in the Madras case of A Vedamutu,694 is a statement
of fact in the form simply of a declaration, which, for the purpose of proof of the fact declared, has, by itself, all
the legal force of evidence given on oath or solemn affirmation. It must be a declaration which, having been
made, is afterwards receivable as evidence of the fact declared. Examples of the kind of declarations
contemplated in this section are affidavits in civil suits, statutory certificates under section 2 of the Banker’s
Book Evidence Act, and declarations and certificates under the Special Marriage Act, 1872.695 A declaration
may be in an affidavit in cases in which evidence may be given by affidavit.696 In view of the explanation to
section 200, an affidavit, not fully complying with the provisions of O XI, rule 3 of the CPC is more or less a
declaration within the meaning of this section.697 There is no provision of law which makes the recitals made in
a sale-deed admissible as evidence of any fact by any court of justice or any public servant. It has accordingly
been held that the alleged declaration in the sale deed will not be a declaration within the meaning of section
199, IPC.698
[s 199.12] Identification of a Surety by a Lawyer is not a Declaration
A declaration by a lawyer to identify a person, for the purposes of acceptance of such person as surety, is not a
declaration which a court is bound or authorised by law to receive as evidence within the meaning of section
199, IPC. It is necessary that the declaration must be admissible in evidence as proof of the fact declared under
any law, in consequence of which the court is bound or authorised to receive it as such. It is not enough that
there is no prohibition against the reception of such a declaration as evidence by the court. No law provides for
a declaration of the identity of a surety by a lawyer; it is a matter wholly discretionary with the court, and, in
appropriate cases, the court is fully competent to reject such a declaration.699
[s 199.13] A Declaration need not be on Oath
A declaration contemplated in this section, need not be on oath. But it must be capable of being used as
evidence and which any court of justice or any public servant or other person is bound or authorised by law to
receive as evidence.700 Where a person, in swearing an affidavit, only repeats what another person had written
on a notice,701 or what the prosecution witnesses say,702 it will not have the same effect as of swearing a false
affidavit. This section has no reference to the examination of a witness in a judicial proceeding.703 False
statements in applications for execution are not punishable under this section but they are under section 193.704
A person who makes false statements in the course of a voluntary declaration in the shape of an affidavit to a
magistrate, cannot be charged under either section 199 or section 193, though the magistrate administers an
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oath to him, such a course being ultra vires.705 A false report made to a revenue surveyor for a mutation of
names in the revenue register is not a declaration within the meaning of this section.706 Making, signing or
attesting false declarations or certificates of marriage are punishable under section 199, read with section 21 of
the Special Marriage Act. Where a person, not being the natural or legal guardian of a girl, subscribed to a
declaration by her that the consent of her guardian to her marriage, as required by section 2(3) of the Special
Marriage Act, 1872 (3 of 1872), had been obtained, it was held that he was guilty of the offence under this
section read with section 21 of the Special Marriage Act.707
[s 199.14] “Made or subscribed”—Meaning of
According to the Oxford Dictionary the word “subscribe” means to write one’s name at the foot of or sign a
document, picture etc, express one’s adhesion to an opinion or resolution. According to Aiyar’s Judicial
Dictionary,708 “subscribe” means “to write under”; “to make oneself liable for some thing”. In Shabbir v State,709
the Allahabad High Court has observed that the word “subscribed” would show that the statement made on
oath orally should be reduced to writing and be signed by the person making it in token of his adhesion to what
is written. The word is not co-related with the particular form but with what is said in the oath and what is
reproduced in writing.
A verbal declaration may be made, but when reduced to writing, it must be subscribed by the person making it
in token of the correctness of the facts contained therein.
[s 199.15] “Bound or Authorised by law to Receive as Evidence”—Documents Fulfilling the Requirements
A declaration, before it can be made the foundation of a prosecution under this section, must be one which is
admissible in evidence, and which the court before which it is filed, is bound or authorised by law to receive in
evidence. The mere fact that there is no prohibition against the reception of such declaration in evidence does
not render it admissible or the declarant amendable to the provisions of this section.710 Where the declaration
contained in the affidavit in question is not of the type mentioned in sections 199 and 200, IPC, ie, it is not a
declaration which any court or public servant or any other person is bound or authorised by law to receive as
evidence of any fact, the petitioner could not be said to have committed any offence falling under section 199 or
section 200 of the IPC, even if that declaration was false to the petitioner’s knowledge. The charge framed
against the petitioner under sections 199 and 200, IPC, in such a case, cannot be sustained.711 Where the false
declarations were made with a view to facilitate an offence under Imports and Exports (Control) Act, the false
declarations were not such as would be received as evidence of facts before any court or public servant, and so
it was held that no offence under section 193 or section 199, IPC is made out.712
An affidavit sworn to in the court of a munsif is a declaration which a court of justice is bound to receive as
evidence of the facts stated in it.713 Before effecting a mutation, the officer of DDA is authorised by law, to seek
and receive information regarding legal heirs of the allottee, the declaration in that behalf prima facie falls within
the ambit of section 199, IPC.714
The statements in a petition of insolvency are very analogous to statements made in ordinary civil pleadings—
statements which are verified by law on the part of the person who places them on the record. But they
certainly do not constitute evidence which is bound to be accepted by the court.715
Neither under Act I of 1876, nor under any other law, is a Mahommadan registrar of marriages bound or
authorised to receive the statements of any person in evidence. Therefore, this section does not apply to
them.716
There is no provision of law authorising the use of affidavits, or the administration of an oath to a person called
Page 9 of 15
upon by a district Judge to show cause as to why he should not hand over the papers relating to some property
over which a common manager has been appointed under the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885.717
[s 199.16] Swearing False Affidavit before an Unauthorised Magistrate or Oath Commissioner—No Offence
Committed
Except as specifically provided,718 the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 does not contain a general provision to
prove a matter by affidavits. It has been held that affidavits filed in support of an application for the transfer of a
case cannot, therefore, form the subject of a charge under this section.719 An affidavit sworn before a
magistrate having no jurisdiction in the particular matter to which it relates, is not admissible in evidence and
the person swearing it cannot be prosecuted under section 193 or section 199.720 Similarly, where an accused
swore an affidavit before an oath commissioner, who was not authorised to administer an oath, it was held that
the accused could not be convicted under section 199 because such an affidavit was not admissible in
evidence.721
[s 199.17] “Knows or Believes to be False”—Burden of Proof
In order to convict a person under this section, the prosecution has to prove that he either knew or believed his
statement to be false or that he did not believe it to be true. If there was a reasonable possibility that the
defence story was true, then these essential ingredients of the prosecution case would not be established.722
The burden of proof is clearly on the prosecution to show that at the time of making the affidavit, the accused
either knew or believed it to be false, or did not believe it to be true, and it is not upon the accused to prove the
correctness of the statement and his good faith in making it.723 The prosecution must bear the burden of proving
every ingredient which is comprised in the definition. And the difficulty in proving the ingredients of an offence is
no good reason for exempting the prosecution from the duty of proving them before a conviction is recorded.724
The ingredients of the offence are, however, to be established at the trial, and not at the stage when
cognizance is taken.725
“Or does not believe it to be true”, eg, swearing to the truth of the contents of a false document, without
knowing what the contents are, because of an ignorance of the language, which is not translated.726
[s 199.18] Touching any Point Material to the Object
To hold a person liable under this section for making or subscribing to a false declaration, it is necessary to
prove that the said declaration is touching a point material to the object for which the declaration has been
made. Where the accused, in a petition under O I, rule 10, CPC gave a wrong date of birth of his son, but the
wrong date of birth did not touch any material point involved in the suits and he stood to gain no advantage by
giving a wrong date, it was held that no offence under section 199, IPC was committed.727
The procedure to be followed is the same as in the case of an offence under section 197.
Where the complaint was made under section 199, IPC on the ground that certain averments made in the
affidavits filed before a rent control officer were false but no specific averment was singled out in the complaint,
the complaint was held not entertainable.728
Under section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no court shall take cognizance of an
offence under section 199 when such an offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to, any
proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of that court, or of some other court to which that
court is subordinate.
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When it is alleged that a false statement has been made in a declaration which is receivable as evidence in any
court of justice or before any public servant or other person, the statement alleged to be false has to be set out
and its alleged falsity with reference to the truth, found in some document, has to be referred to, pointing out
that the two situations cannot co-exist, both being attributable to the same person and, therefore, one to his
knowledge must be false. Rival contentions set out in affidavits, accepted or rejected by courts, with reference
to onus probandi do not furnish foundation for a charge under section 199, IPC. Acceptance or rejection of
evidence by itself is not a sufficient yardstick to dub the one rejected as false. Falsity can be alleged when truth
stands out glaringly and to the knowledge of the person who is making the false statement. Day in and day out
in courts, averments made by one set of witnesses are accepted and the counter averments are rejected. If in
all such cases, complaints under section 199, IPC, are to be filed, not only will they open up floodgates of
litigation but it would unquestionably be an abuse of the process of the court.729
The view that no proceedings can be initiated under section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 if a
document is forged before its production before a court would not apply in case where offence under section
199 or section 200, IPC is made out during consideration of the application under section 340.730
[s 199.21] Section 195, CrPC not attracted to other Offences Clubbed with Sections 199 and 200, IPC
In one case, the offences under sections 199 and 200, IPC as mentioned in the private complaint, related to
separate transactions, which were separable from the main offence alleged to have been committed by the
accused in some other transaction. Then embargo under section 195, CrPC was not held to be applicable for
other offences except under sections 199 and 200, IPC.731
Therefore, when the lower court discharged the accused of the offences under sections 166, 167, 199, 200,
213, 344, 345, 347, 379, 380, 387, 323, 448, 506(2), IPC read with section 34, IPC merely on the basis that
under section 195, CrPC, the court cannot take cognizance in respect of offences under sections 199 and 200,
IPC the order passed by the lower court discharging the accused in respect of all the offences was held to
suffer from infirmity and was set aside. The case was remitted back to the trial court to proceed with the trial
against the accused in respect of the remaining offences.732
For further discussion on this topic, the commentary under section 193 may be referred to.
[s 199.22] Charge
I (name and office of magistrate, etc), hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, (*) on about the……… day of……… at…… made (or subscribed) a declaration, which a court of justice to
wit…, (or any public servant or other person to wit…………) was bound (or authorised by law) to receive as evidence
of a fact, and therein you made a statement, to wit…… which is false, and which you knew or believed to be false (or
did not believe to be true), on a point material to the object, for which the declaration was made (or used), and thereby
committed an offence under section 199 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
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[s 199.23] Rival Contentions do not Furnish Foundation for a charge
Rival contentions set out in affidavits, accepted or rejected by courts, with reference to onus probandi do not
furnish a foundation for a charge under section 199, IPC. Acceptance or rejection of evidence by itself is not a
sufficient yardstick to dub the one rejected as false. Falsity can be alleged when truth stands out glaringly and
to the knowledge of the person who is making the false statement.733
Before a declaration can be made the foundation of charge under section 199, IPC it is necessary that it must
be admissible in evidence as proof of the fact declared under any law in consequence of which the court is
bound or authorised to receive it as such.734
[s 199.24] Proof
The following points should be proved for establishing an offence under this section:
(a) that the accused made, or subscribed, the declaration in question;
(b) that a court of justice, etc., was bound or authorised to receive such declaration as evidence;
(c) that the accused made the statement in question contained in such declaration;
(d) that such statements is false;
(e) that such false statement touched a point material to the object of such declaration; and
(f) that when making such false statement, the accused knew or believed that it was false, or did not
believe it to be true.735
[s 199.24.1] Mere Making of False Declaration Sufficient—Its use not Material
The mere making of a false declaration is punishable under this section. The fact whether such declaration is or
is not used in the evidence is not a relevant consideration under this section.736
Conviction for an offence under this section may be based on purely circumstantial evidence.737

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: 50 Cr LJ 350.
672 Chandi Prasad v Abdur Rahman, ILR 22 Cal 131, p 137.
673 Re Vedamuthu, 4 Mad HCR 185 : 1 Weir 159.
674 Now as per the amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 effective from 01-07-2002 vide, O 18, rule 4 of the
Code of Civil Procedure 1908, affidavit in evidence is required to be filed in lieu of examination-in-chief.
675 Asgarali Mulla Ibrahimji v Emperor, AIR 1943 Ngp 17 , p 19 : 44 Cr LJ 313 : (1943) ILR Ngp 547 : (1942) Nag LJ 547 .
676 Kari Gope v Manmohan Das, AIR 1928 Pat 161 : 29 Cr LJ 111 : ILR 6 Pat 760.
677 Palaniappa Chetti v Annamalai Chetti, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 321 , p 326 : ILR 27 Mad 223 : 2 Weir 208 : (1904) 14 Mad LJ 74.
678 Dy General Manager (Redesignated as Dy Director) ISBT v Sudarshan Kumari, (1997) Cr LJ : 1931 (SC).
679 Gadhi v Kaishuraja, (2000) Cr LJ 1590 (Mad).
680 Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co Ltd v Datar Switchgear Ltd, 2011 Cr LJ 8 (SC) : 2010 AIR SCW 6151 :
2010 (10) Scale 591 [LNIND 2010 SC 979] : (2010) 10 SCC 479 [LNIND 2010 SC 979] .
681 1 & 2 Geo 5, c 6.
682 Omitted by Criminal Justice Act, 1948.

683 Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC 68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] : (1967) Cr LJ 6 , 8; Dy General Manager
(Redesignated as Dy Director), Inter State Bus Terminal v Sudarshan Kumari, (1997) 1 Crimes 24 , p 25 (SC).
684 Queen-Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288, p 298.
685 Kari Gope v Manmohan Das, AIR 1928 Pat 161 : 29 Cr LJ 111; Palaniappa Chetti v Annmalal Chetti, (1904) 1 Cr LJ
321 , p 326 : ILR 27 Mad 223; Queen-Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288, p 298.
686 Shiv Raman Gour v Madan Mohan Kanda, (1990) Cr LJ 1033 , p 1034 (P&H).
Page 13 of 15
687 MS Jaggi v Registrar, High Court, (1983) Cr LJ 1527 : (1982) 54 Cut LT 601.
688 Yellappa s/o Rangappa v Kanalavva, (1995) Cr LJ 20 (Kant).
689 Ibid.
690 Ibid.
691 Shiv Raman Gaur v Madan Mohan Kanda, (1990) Cr LJ 1033 (P&H).
693 Badan Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC 68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] : (1967) Cr LJ 6 , p 8.
694 4 Mad HCR 185, 1 Weir 159; Darshan Singh v Jayanti Prasad Joshi, (1963) All LJ 404; Shri Sadhu Ram v Shyam
Sunder Gupta, (1975) CLR 88 ; Jothi v KP Kandasamy, (2000) Cr LJ 292 (Mad).
695 Ismail v Emperor, 15 Cr LJ 603, 604.
696 Palaniappa Chetti v Annamalai Chetti, ILR 27 Mad 223.
697 Shahzad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 513 : 34 Cr LJ 912 : 14 PLT 679; Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC
68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] : (1967) Cr LJ 6 .
698 Shri Sadhu Ram v Shyam Sunder Gupta, (1975) CLR 88 .
699 Ram Asrey Tripathi v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1984) All Cr R 342 : (1984) All LJ 1177 (All).
700 Public Prosecutor v PC Raju, (1968) Cr LJ 1378 : (1968) Mad LJ (Cr) 197; Baban Singh v Jagdish Singh, AIR 1967 SC
68 [LNIND 1966 SC 47] : (1967) Cr LJ 6 .
701 Qutubuddin v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 211 , p 214 : 38 Cr LJ 216 : 17 PLT 835.
702 Parmananda Mohapatra v State, AIR 1968 Ori 144 [LNIND 1968 ORI 28] : (1968) Cr LJ 1092 .
703 R v Vedamuttu, 4 Mad HCR 185, p 187 : 1 Weir 159.
704 R v Bapuji, ILR 10 Bom 288.
705 Re Iswar Chunder, ILR 14 Cal 653.

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706 Ismail v Emperor, 15 Cr LJ 603.
707 State v Randya Mangubhai, AIR 1956 Bom 439 [LNIND 1955 BOM 237] : (1956) Cr LJ 861 .
708 Aiyar, Judicial Dictionary, 11th Edn Law Book Co (Pvt) Ltd, Allahabad.
709 Shabbir v State, AIR 1965 All 97 [LNIND 1963 ALL 195] .
710 Ram Prasad v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 769, 770 : ILR 35 All 58 : 10 All LJ 462; Re Iswar Chander Guha, ILR 14 Cal 653;
Abdul Majid v Krishna Lal Nag, ILR 20 Cal 724; Chandi Prashad v Abdur Rahman, ILR 22 Cal 131; Hariram Jawaharlal
v Emperor, AIR 1946 Ngp 38 : (1945) ILR Ngp 788; Beharilal Sud v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 529 : 41 Cr LJ 204;
Emperor v Bapuram, 1 Cr LJ 484 : 1 All LJ 296; Durga Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1933 All 318 : 34 Cr LJ 686; Jugal
Chandra Dalal v Emperor, 42 Cal WN 31; Queen-Empress v Aidrus Sahib, 1 Weir 146.
711 Anil Kapoor v Finance-cum-Health Secy, Chandigarh Administration, Chandigarh, (1973) CLR 601 .
712 Public Prosecutor v PC Raju, (1968) Cr LJ 1378 (Mad).
713 Re Kottayya Pillai, AIR 1915 Mad 1069 , p 1070 : 16 Cr LJ 111.
714 Jaswant Kaur v Harnam Kaur, (1999) 77 DLT 343 [LNIND 1999 DEL 26] (Del) : (1999) 48 DRJ 543 [LNIND 1999 DEL
26] .
715 Chhoteram Sarup Sha v Emperor, AIR 1936 Cal 801 , p 802.
716 Yasin Sheikh v Emperor, 2 Cr LJ 8, 11 : 9 Cal WN 69.
717 Abdul Majid v Krishna Lal Nag, ILR 20 Cal 724.
718 Sections 68, 295 and 296 : CrPC 1973.
719 Imperator v Baksho, 10 IC 622; Re Iswar Chander Guha, ILR 14 Cal 653; Emperor v Dital Safar, 12 Cr LJ 563 : 5 Serv
LR 102; Ram Prasad v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 769.
720 Nandlal Ghose v Emperor, AIR 1944 Cal 283 : 45 Cr LJ 748 : 48 Cal WN 469; Public Prosecutor v PC Raju, (1968) Cr
LJ 1378 , p 1384 : (1968) Mad LW (Cr) 39 ; Ram Singh v Mam Chand, (1972) 74 Punj LR 521 (DB).
721 Ram Singh v Mam Chand, (1972) 74 Punj LR 521 (DB); Nandlal Ghose v Emperor, AIR 1944 Cal 283 : 45 Cr LJ 748;
Public Prosecutor v PC Raju, (1968) Cr LJ 1378 , p 1384 : (1968) Mad LW (Cr) 39 .
722 Adikanda Swain v Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 251 , p 252 : 47 Cr LJ 317; Kali Shankar Chatterjee v Sarat Chandra Dey,
(1977) Cal HCN 538, p 542 : 81 Cal WN 797, p 799.
Page 15 of 15
723 MS Jaggi v Registrar, High Court, (1982) 54 Cut LT 601 : (1983) Cr LJ 1527.
724 Shahzad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 513 : 34 Cr LJ 912 : 14 PLT 679; Emperor v Mahommad Ishaq, AIR 1914 All
170 [LNIND 1914 ALL 20] : 36 ILR All 362 : 15 Cr LJ 579.
725 MS Jaggi v Registrar, High Court, (1982) 54 Cut LT 601 : (1983) Cr LJ 1527.
726 R v Petricus, (1903) 67 JP 378 .
727 Jotish Chandra v State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 7 [LNIND 1968 SC 131] , p 8 : (1969) Cr LJ 257 ; Kamb Pani Samal v
Munsif, (1919) 47 Cut LT 19 (SN); R v Vedamuthu, 1 Weir 159; Darshan Singh v Jayanti Prasad Joshi, (1963) All LJ
404.
728 Chandrapal Singh v Maharaj Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1238 : (1982) CLR (SC) 126 : (1982) Cr LJ 1731 (SC).
729 Chandrapal Singh v Maharaj Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1238 : 1982 CLR (SC) 126 : (1982) 1 SCC 466 : (1982) UJ (SC) 517
: (1982) Cr LJ 1731 (SC) : (1982) All LJ 507 (SC) : (1982) SCC (Cr) 249 : (1982) 2 Ren CR 476 (SC) : (1982) All RC
348 (SC) : (1982) Cr App Rep (SC) 65 : (1983) SC Cr R 70.
730 KA Kuttiah v Federal Bank Ltd, Ernakulam, (2006) Cr LJ 3541 (Ker).
731 Ayyappan v Krishnapillai, (1997) Cr LJ (Mad) 3692 .
732 Ayyappan v Krishnapillai, (1997) Cr LJ (Mad) 3692 .
733 Chandrapal Singh v Maharaj Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1238 : (1982) 1 SCC 466 : (1982) Cr LJ 1731 : (1982) All LJ 507 :
(1982) SCC (Cr) 249 : (1982) CLR (SC) 126.
734 D Jothi v KP Kandasamy, (2000) Cr LJ 292 (Mad).
735 Shahzad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 513 : (1933) 14 PLT 679 : 34 Cr LJ 912; MS Jaggi v Registrar, Orissa High
Court, (1983) Cr LJ 1527 .

737 Ganwar v Emperor, AIR 1944 Sind 155 , p 160 : (1944) ILR Kant 133; Arjun Singh v Emperor, AIR 1931 All 362 : 32
Cr LJ 780 : ILR 53 All 598; Miran Baksh v Emperor, AIR 1931 Lah 529 : 22 Cr LJ 1032 : 32 PLR 461.
End of Document
[s 200] Using as true such declaration knowing it to be false.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 6
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 6
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever corruptly uses or attempts to use as true any such declaration, knowing the same to be false in any
material point, shall be punished in the same manner as if he gave false evidence.
Explanation.—A declaration which is inadmissible merely upon the ground of some informality is a declaration
Page 4 of 6
within the meaning of sections 199 and 200.
[s 200.1] Scope
This section penalises the using or attempting to use corruptly, as true, any such declaration as is referred to in
section 199, knowing the same to be false on any material point. This section bears the same relation to section
199 as section 198 bears to section 197, IPC.
The ingredients to constitute an offence under this section, are:
(a) that the declaration is false;
(b) that a court of justice, etc. was bound or authorised by law, to receive the same in evidence;
(c) that such declaration is false on a material point;
(d) that the accused made such false declaration or attempted to do so; and
(e) that he did so in the declaration corruptly.738
Where a rent control petition was dismissed in default, the plea taken by the petitioner was that he was out of
station and could not appear before the court on the stipulated date. However, the affidavit sworn by him before
another court in the same town on the same date indicated his presence in the town. On a complaint being filed
against him the petitioner was convicted under sections 199 and 200, IPC. On these facts it was held that the
oral evidence by the petitioner against the contents of the affidavit cannot be accepted and the conviction of the
petitioner under sections 199 and 200, IPC was found proper.739
[s 200.2] “Corruptly”—Meaning of
Commentary under section 196, ante may be referred to. The declaration must be used corruptly in order to
attract the application of section 200, IPC.740
[s 200.3] “Uses or Attempts to use as true”—Meaning of
The commentary under section 196, ante may be referred to.
[s 200.4] “Declaration”—Meaning of
[s 200.5] “Knowing the same to be false in any Material Point”—Meaning of
[s 200.6] Procedure
The procedure to be followed is the same as in the case of an offence under section 197.
[s 200.7] Complaint by the Court
As provided by section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC, cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken only on a
complaint in writing of the court concerned when an offence under this section is committed in or in relation to,
Page 5 of 6
any proceedings in the court.
In one case, the offences under sections 199 and 200, IPC, as mentioned in the private complaint, related to
separate transactions which were separable from the main offences alleged to have been committed by the
accused in some other transaction. The embargo under section 195, CrPC was not held to be applicable for
other offences except under sections 199 and 200, IPC.741 Therefore, when the lower court discharged the
accused of the offences under sections 166, 167, 199, 200, 213, 344, 345, 347, 379, 380, 387, 323, 448,
506(2), IPC read with section 34, IPC merely on the ground that under section 195, CrPC, the court cannot take
cognizance in respect of offences under sections 199 and 200, IPC, the order passed by the lower court
discharging the accused in respect of all the offences, was held to suffer from infirmity and was set aside and
the case was remitted back to the trial court to proceed with the trial against the accused in respect of the
remaining offences.742 The view that no proceedings can be initiated under section 340 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 if a document is forged before its production before a court would not apply in case where
offence under section 199 or section 200, IPC is made out during consideration of the application under section
340.743
The commentary under section 193, ante may be referred to.
[s 200.8] Charge
I (name and office of magistrate etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the………day of ……at…….corruptly used (or attempted to use) as true the declaration as is
referred to in section 199 of the Indian Penal Code, knowing the same to be false in any material point, and thereby
committed an offence, punishable under section 200 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried, on the said charge, by this court.
[s 200.9] Proof
The points requiring proof for an offence under this section are:
(a) that there is a declaration such as is referred to in section 199;
(b) that the accused used or attempted to use it as true;
(c) that he did so corruptly; and
(d) that he did so knowing the declaration to be false on a material point.

Page 6 of 6
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
738 Kambhu Panisamal v Munsif, (1979) 47 Cut LT 19 (SN); Dy General Manager, Redesignated as Dy Director, Inter
State Bus Terminal etc v Sudershan Kumari, (1997) 1 Crimes 24 , p 25 (SC).
739 Gadhi v Krishnaraja, (2000) Cr LJ Mad 1590 .
740 Jotish Chandra v State of Bihar, AIR 1969 SC 7 [LNIND 1968 SC 131] , p 8 : (1969) Cr LJ 257 .
741 Ayyappan v Krishnapillai, (1997) Cr LJ 3692 (Mad).
742 Ayyappan v Krishnapillai, (1997) Cr LJ 3692 (Mad).
743 KA Kuttiah v Federal Bank Ltd, Ernakulam, (2006) Cr LJ 3541 (Ker).
End of Document
[s 201] Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false
information to screen offender.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 50
[s 201] Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 50
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 201] Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false

information to screen offender.—
Page 4 of 50
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the
commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or
with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false,
if a capital offence.—shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable
with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years,
and shall also be liable to fine;
if punishable with imprisonment for life.—and if the offence is punishable with 744[imprisonment for life], or
with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
if punishable with less than ten years’ imprisonment.—and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment
for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the
offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the
offence, or with fine, or with both.
Illustration
A, knowing that B has murdered Z, assists B to hide the body with the intention of screening B from
punishment. A is liable to imprisonment of either description for seven years, and also to fine.
[s 201.1] Scope
Section 201, IPC presents a case of accessory after the fact. “An accessory after the fact” said Lord Hale, “may
be, where a person knowing a felony to have been committed, receives comforts, or assists the felon”.745
Therefore, to make an accessory ex post facto it is in the first place requisite that he should know of the felony
committed. In the next place, he must receive, relieve, comfort, or assist him. In short, generally any assistance
whatever given to a felon to hinder his being apprehended, tried or suffered punishment, makes the assister an
accessory. What section 201 requires is that the accused must have had the intention of screening the
offender. To put it differently, the intention to screen the offender, must be the primary and sole object of the
accused. The fact that the concealment was likely to have that effect is not sufficient, for section 201 speaks of
intention as distinct from a mere likelihood.746
Sections 191–200 dealt with giving or fabricating false evidence sections 201–209 deal with offences against
public justice. Of these, sections 201–203 themselves form a group. Section 201 deals with causing the
disappearance of evidence or an offence of giving false information to screen the offender, and sections 202
and 203 deal with the giving or omitting to give information regarding the commission of an offence.
For considering the application of sections 201 and 202, the subsequent result of the trial cannot be taken as
the basis ie whether the offences were proved or not. It is enough if the fact shows that the evidence was made
to disappear and there was an intentional omission in giving information on the basis of the information
available at that point of time, indicating that the accused knew or had reason to believe that an offence had
been committed.747 Screening the offender is a pre-requisite of this section and a person cannot be convicted of
screening an offender when the offender himself has been tried and acquitted of the offence. Once it is held
that the alleged offender is not guilty, any other person cannot be convicted for screening him from
punishment.748
Provisions of section 201 would not apply to a person who has committed an offence.749
Section 201 is an attempt to define the position known in England as that of an accessory after the fact.750
According to Lord Hale, “an accessory after the fact may be, where a person knowing a felony to have been
Page 5 of 50
committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the felon”. Therefore, to make an accessory ex post facto, it
is in the first place requisite that he should know of the felony committed. In the next place, he must receive,
relieve, comfort or assist him. Besides, generally any assistance whatever given to a felon to hinder his being
apprehended, tried or suffering punishment makes the assister an accessory.751
[s 201.3] History of the Section
Aiders and abettors have been classified in English law as accessories before the fact, accessories at the fact,
and accessories after the fact. The first two are reached by the Code under the law of abetment. The Indian law
commissioners dealt with them as “subsequent abettors”. But the English law commissioners found no
justification for the tripartite division of accession of English law and this was agreed to by the Indian law
commissioners, and section 201 with its illustration, which formed section 106 of the original bill as part of the
chapter on abetment, was transposed to this place.752
[s 201.4] Policy of the Section Underlined
The offence of an accessory after the fact was never regarded so serious as that of other accessories, as such
an accessory might have been moved by feelings of love or pity to assist the felon, in which case his
prosecution was seldom ordered, and it was always discouraged. That policy has led to the elimination of that
class of offenders from the Code, but there still remained persons whose offence could not be similarly
overlooked. There are those who know of the felony committed and that it is complete and still assist the felon
not only by relieving, comforting or assisting him, but also by weakening the prosecution against him. Such a
case is made punishable by section 201, the policy of which is to prevent such accessories from tampering with
justice.753
[s 201.5] Three Groups of Sections Relating to Information
There are three groups of sections in the Code relating to the giving of information. First, sections 118–120 deal
with the concealment of a design to commit an offence; secondly, sections 176, 177, 181 and 182, IPC deal
with the omission of giving information and with the giving of false information, and thirdly, sections 201–203
deal with the giving of false information with the intention of screening the offender. Section 201 is intended to
include acts to which sections 193–196 do not extend and not to include acts falling under those sections.754
[s 201.6] Section Deals with two Offences
Section 201 is designed to penalise attempts to frustrate the course of justice.755 It deals with two offences:
(a) Causing the disappearance of an offence committed, with the intention of screening the offender from
legal punishment.
(b) Giving false information respecting an offence committed with the intention of screening the offender
from legal punishment.
In either case the intention must be to screen the offender.756
[s 201.7] Three Important Considerations
There is no law which casts a duty on a criminal to give information which would incriminate himself. Secondly,
the language used in sections 201 and 202 does not suggest that the sections would apply to a person who has
committed an offence. Thirdly, the phrase “knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been
committed” clearly indicates that the actual culprit is a person other than the one who knows or has reason to
believe that an offence has been committed, as was observed by the apex court in the case of
Harishchandrasing Sajjansing Rathod v State of Gujarat.757 In other words, the language of the said section
does not suggest that the section would apply to a person who has committed an offence. In this connection,
Page 6 of 50
the case in Bhagwan Swarup v State of Rajasthan758 may well be referred to. Hence, there was no scope for
framing charge under section 201, IPC against the accused in this case.759
[s 201.8] Offence Means Real one not Imaginary
The first paragraph of section 201 lays down the essential ingredients of the offence under that section. By the
second, third and fourth paragraphs, the measure of the punishment is made to depend upon the gravity of the
offence. The word “offence”, wherever used in the first, second, third and fourth paragraphs, means some real
offence, which, in fact, has been committed and not some offence which the accused imagines has been
committed. The punishment depends upon the gravity of the offence which was committed by the offender
intending to be screened and which the accused knew or had reason to believe to have been committed.760
[s 201.9] Section 201 and Section 313, CrPC
Where some incriminating material appearing in the prosecution evidence against some accused who were
charged for an offence under section 201, IPC only, was not put to them in their statements recorded under
section 313, CrPC and no opportunity was afforded to them to explain these circumstances, they had been
seriously prejudiced and no conviction could, therefore, be recorded against them for the offence under section
201, IPC.761
[s 201.11] False answers by accused in Statement under Section 313, CrPC—Effect
When the answer given by both the accused-respondents to all the questions put to them appear to be contrary
to the materials on record and as such not correct, the adverse inference against both the accused-
respondents is warranted in the circumstances of the case for giving false answers to the questions regarding
facts which are established on the basis of evidence on record.762 In the case of Mani Kumar Thapa v State of
Sikkim763 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that where the accused gives false answers to the questions
under section 313, CrPC, the court will have to proceed on the basis that the accused has not explained the
inculpating circumstances established by the prosecution against him and such failure to explain would form an
additional link in the chain of circumstances. In State of Maharashtra v Suresh,764 the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has held that a false answer offered by the accused when his attention was drawn to any inculpating
circumstance would render such circumstance as capable of inculpating him. In such a situation, it was further
held that a false answer can also be counted as providing “a missing link” in completing the chain. To the
similar effect are the observations of the apex court in Mohibur Rahman v State of Assam.765 It has been held in
that case that accused’s failure to offer any reasonable explanation of any of the inculpating circumstances
would be sufficient to conclusively point to the commission of the alleged offence by the accused.766
In this regard, a useful reference can also be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Joseph
v State of Kerala.767 The Supreme Court held that if the accused flatly denies all the incriminating
circumstances, then such a flat denial is an additional link in the chain of the circumstances. In the case of
Deonandan Mishra v State of Bihar,768 it was held by the Supreme Court that where various links have been
satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the accused as the probable assailant, with reasonable
definiteness and in proximity to the deceased as regards time and situation, and he offers no explanation,
which if accepted, though not proved, would afford a reasonable basis for a conclusion on the entire case
consistent with his innocence, such absence of explanation, or false explanation would itself be an additional
link which completes the chain.
[s 201.12] Essential Ingredients
The necessary ingredient of an offence under section 201, IPC is actually causing any evidence of the
commission of an offence to disappear with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment.769
The essential ingredients of an offence under this section are that:
Page 7 of 50
(i) an offence has been committed;770
(ii) the accused knows or has reason to believe that the offence has been committed;
(iii) with such knowledge or belief the accused has:
(a) caused any evidence of the commission of the offence to disappears, or
(b) given any information respecting the offence, which he knew or believed to be false; and
(iv) the accused has done so with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment;771 and
(v) if the charge be of an aggravated form, as in the given case, it must be proved further that the offence
in respect of which the accused did as in (c) and (d) was punishable with death, or with imprisonment
for life or imprisonment extending to ten years.772
There was no evidence to show that after committing the murder, the accused buried the body to screen
possible evidence of alleged offence, thus, the accused was acquitted of the charge under section 201, IPC.773
[s 201.13] Two Indispensable Ingredients
Two most important ingredients out of three of the offence under section 201, IPC are that (1) the accused
knew or had reason to believe that such an offence had been committed; and (2) the accused caused evidence
thereof to disappear with the intent of screening the offender from legal punishment or had given any false
information respecting the offence.774
The necessary ingredient of an offence under section 201, IPC is actually causing any evidence of the
commission of an offence to disappear with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. Oral
threat or inducement allegedly given by the two lady lawyers to approver not to give any statement against the
petitioner cannot amount to commission of an offence under the section 201.775
The gravest degree contemplated in section 201 is punishable with a maximum sentence of imprisonment for
seven years. The minimum requirement for the offence to reach the said peak degree is that the offender
should have caused the disappearance of evidence of another offence which is punishable with death, and that
should be established in addition to the above mentioned two basic ingredients. Even if the two basics are
established, and the prosecution failed to establish the next requirement, the court cannot convict the accused
for the highest tier specified in the section.776
[s 201.14] “Whoever”—Meaning of
In some earlier cases, it was held that this section applies merely to the person who screens the principal or
actual offender and not to the principal or actual offender himself.777 But it is now well-settled that the section is
not restricted to the case of a person who screens the actual offender, it can be applied even to a person guilty
of the main offence, and the offence under this section.778
[s 201.15] “Offence”—What is?

Page 8 of 50
“Offence” means a thing punishable under the Indian Penal Code or under any special or local law, if
punishable thereunder with imprisonment for a term of six months, or upwards, whether with or without fine.779
A thing is not an offence if it falls within any of the sections in chapter IV.780
“Offence”, in this section and sections 202 and 203 of this Code, includes any act, committed at any place out
of India, which, if committed in India, would have been punishable under any of the following sections, namely,
302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 450, 457, 458, 459 and 460.781 The word
“offence” wherever used in the first, second, third and fourth paragraphs of the section means, some real
offence, which, in fact, has been committed, and not some offence which the accused imagines, has been
committed.
The word “offence” as used in this section does not contemplate that the accused should know the particular
section of the Penal Code under which the offence falls, or the precise character of the offence committed.
What the court has to decide is what offence, the accused knew, or had reason to believe, had been
committed. When section 201 refers to an “offence”, it refers to the offence as it appeared to the accused,
crediting him with the knowledge that can reasonably be expected of him. By section 309 of the Code, an
attempt to commit suicide is punishable but there is no section in the Code making suicide itself an offence,
obviously because in that case there would be no offender who could be brought within the purview of the law.
Under certain circumstances covered by section 40, CrPC the concealment of a suspicious death might be
punishable under section 176, IPC but a person not bound to communicate an occurrence of that sort would not
be liable. The removal or concealment of the body of a man not proved to be murdered does not amount to an
offence under this section.782 There was no evidence to prove the fact that it was the accused appellant who
had concealed the dead body of the deceased in the water of “Tumki Darha” of river Bheden and that the shawl
tied to the waist of the deceased belonged to him, hence, the accused appellant was acquitted of the charge
The evidence showed that the accused appellant a guide took a young girl of a foreign country to his village,
committed her murder and buried the dead body in his own house. The skeleton of the deceased was
recovered from the house of the accused on the disclosure statement made by him. The DNA sample got from
the skeleton matched with the blood sample of the father of the deceased. The conviction of the accused
appellant concurrently recorded by the courts below under sections 302 and 201, IPC was affirmed.784
A killed B in the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. C and D helped A to dispose of the body. No
offence was committed by C and D.785
[s 201.16] Section Presupposes Actual Commission of an Offence
The disappearance of the evidence should be after the commission of the offence.786Sections 201, 203, 213
and 214 all imply that the offence screened has been committed and not the guilt of the person screened.
Where no principal offence has been committed, there can be no conviction under these sections.787 B was
killed by A in the lawful exercise of his right of self-defence. C and D helped A in the disposal of the body. It was
held that no offence was committed by C and D.788 “Concealing an offence and screening any person from legal
punishment for any offence, therefore, presupposes the actual commission of an offence.789 As pointed out by
their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Palvinder Kaur v State of Punjab,790 in order to establish the charge
under this section, it is essential to prove that an offence was committed, mere suspicion that it has been
committed not being sufficient, and that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been
committed. In this case a lady was charged under sections 302 and 201 on the allegations that she killed her
husband by administering potassium cyanide to him and caused the disappearance of his body. The evidence
proved only that the husband had died and that his body was found in a trunk and was discovered in a well and
that the accused took part in the disposal of the body. It was held that as there was no evidence to show the
cause of the death or the manner or circumstance in which it came about, the accused could not be convicted
Page 9 of 50
even under this section.791 Where both the appellant accused and the deceased had gone together on motor
cycle, only the appellant returned, and the appellant sold the motorcycle within two days of the occurrence, and
the dead body of the deceased was found lying near the bridge, the appellant accused was convicted under
sections 300 and 201, IPC.792
Where the accused was charged under sections 465 and 201 for forging some bills and attempting to destroy
the bills by setting fire to them, but the charge under section 465 failed, it was held that he could be convicted
even under this section.793
[s 201.17] An Offence must have been Committed
In order to justify a conviction under this section it is necessary that an offence, for which some person has
been convicted or is criminally responsible within the definition of section 40, should have been committed.794
There can be no offender liable to legal punishment, unless some offence has been committed, and the thing,
which a person causes to disappear, cannot be said to be evidence of an offence unless an offence has been
committed.795 The cremation of a dead body when the death was natural, cannot amount to an offence under
section 201, IPC.796 In the absence of any positive material to show that the accused persons were aware of
any offence having been committed, their act in cremating the dead body cannot amount to an offence under
section 201, IPC.797 The terms used in the section “knowing or having reason to believe” conclusively negate
and preclude the view that its provisions are applicable in cases in which an offence has not been committed.
For it is impossible for anyone to know or to have reason, or sufficient cause, to believe that an offence has
been committed when it has not been committed. A person may fancy that he knows or has reason to believe
that an offence has been committed when it has not been committed, but he is mistaken in so fancying. He
may, under the influence of such a mistake, remove something which he imagines to be an evidence of the
offence which he supposes to have been committed, and he may be morally blameable for so doing. But it is
beyond the province of criminal legislation to punish a man for a delusion or even for an act which has not
caused any actual harm to the public or any individual member of the society.798
Where an accused has been acquitted of all the charges, he cannot be convicted for offence under section 201,
IPC.799
[s 201.18] “Knowing or Having Reason to Believe that an Offence has been Committed”—Meaning of
Assuming that an offence was committed, and that there is an offender awaiting justice, the next thing which
the prosecution has to prove, for invoking the provisions of this section, is that the accused knew, or had reason
to believe, that an offence had been committed.800 But he may not have much knowledge about the offence. He
may believe a person to be guilty, but he may have no reason for his belief. In that case, he does not
transgress the provision of this section by doing what is here condemned. The section only punishes him who
either knew or had reason to believe that an offence had been committed. Now, no one can be said to have
reason to believe a thing unless he had sufficient cause to believe that thing. It lies on the prosecution to prove
that the accused had such sufficient cause for his belief. This must depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case.801
In the absence of reliable evidence which would show that the accused had such knowledge and they
knowingly became privy to the destruction of evidence, a conviction under section 201 cannot be based.802
[s 201.18.1] Question of Fact
Whether the circumstantial evidence in a particular case is sufficient and safe enough to warrant a finding that
an offence has been committed, is a question which belongs to the realm of facts and not of law. So is the
question whether the accused knew or had reason to believe that such an offence had been committed. It is
true that this question further depends on the assessment of the accused’s mind. Nevertheless, it is a question
of fact.803
Page 10 of 50
[s 201.18.2] Mere Probability not Sufficient
“May have known or may have reason to believe that an offence has been committed” is not enough to warrant
a conviction under this section. Where there is a possibility that the accused may not have known, or may not
have had reason to believe, and he may have had only a suspicion that an offence had been committed, he is
entitled to the benefit of doubt.804
[s 201.18.3] Presumption as to Deemed Knowledge
There must be direct and legal evidence to prove a charge under section 201. Merely because the accused are
the brothers of the deceased’s husband, it cannot be presumed, as a matter of legal proof, that they must be
deemed to have knowledge of the murder of the deceased, by her husband.805 But a person, who secretly
buries the headless body of a man just murdered, is prima facie guilty under this section unless he can
establish that his act was innocent.806
In one other case the accused was alleged to have intentionally caused the disappearance of the evidence by
helping in the burial of the dead body. It was not shown that he had knowledge of the offence alleged to have
been committed by his co-accused in the murder trial. It was held that conviction under section 201 read with
section 34, IPC was not sustainable.807
In a case, the prisoner was present at a murder without being aware that such an act was to be committed.
Because of fear he not only did not interfere to prevent the commission of the crime, but also joined the
murderers in concealing the body. It was held that he was guilty, not of abetment of murder, but of causing the
disappearance of evidence of a crime under section 201 of the IPC.808
[s 201.18.4] Knowledge of Offender’s Identity not Necessary
The section does not say that the accused should be aware of the identity of the offender whom he intends to
screen.809
[s 201.18.5] Two Expressions Explained
Explaining the expressions “knowing or having reason to believe” and “knows or believes” used in this section,
their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:810
Section 201 is somewhat clumsily drafted, but we think that the expression ‘knowing or having reason to believe’ in the
first paragraph and the expression ‘knows or believes’ in the second paragraph are used in the same sense. Take the
case of an accused who has reason to believe that an offence has been committed. If the other conditions of the first
paragraph are satisfied, he is guilty of an offence under section 201. If it be supposed that the word ‘believes’ was used
in a sense different from the expression ‘having reason to believe’, it would be necessary for the purpose of inflicting
punishment upon the accused to prove that he believes in addition to having reason to believe. We cannot impute to
the legislature an intention that an accused who is found guilty of the offence under the first paragraph would escape
punishment under the succeeding paragraphs unless some additional fact or state of mind is proved. If an accused, on
seeing blood marks on the ground made as a result of an offence punishable under s 323, erases the blood marks with
the intention of screening the offender whom he erroneously believes to have committed the offence of murder, he
could be convicted only on the footing that an offence under s 323 was committed and that he acted with the intention
of screening such an offender believing that such an offence was committed, and he may be punished accordingly
under the fourth paragraph with imprisonment extending to three months; but he could not be convicted on the basis of
his having screened a murderer merely because he wrongly imagined that an offence of murder had been committed.
[s 201.19] Knowledge to be Distinguished from Intention and Motive

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A distinction must be drawn between motive, intention and knowledge. A motive is something which prompts a
man to form an intention, and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases
intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean more or less, the same thing and intention can be
presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin, but it is not
difficult to perceive that they connote different things.811
Knowledge, as contrasted with intention, would properly signify a state of mental realisation in which the mind is
a passive recipient of certain ideas and impressions arising in it or passing before it. It would refer to a bare
state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which human mind might itself remain supine or inactive. On
the other hand, intention connotes a conscious state in which the mental faculties are roused into activity and
summoned into action for the deliberate purpose of being directed towards a particular and specified end which
the human mind conceives and perceives before itself. Mental faculties which might be dispersed in the case of
knowledge are, in the case of intention, concentrated and converged on a particular point and projected in a set
direction. The difference between the shades in the meaning of the two words is fine but clear and the use of
the one in place of the other by the Legislature cannot be without purpose. The words used by the Legislature
must, therefore, be given their full effect. An accused, though he may have known that, if discovered, his act
would be likely to cause annoyance to the owner of the house cannot be said to have intended either actually or
constructively to cause such annoyance. It is one thing to entertain a certain intention and another to have the
knowledge that one’s act may possibly lead to a certain result.812
[s 201.20] “Reason to Believe”—Rumour or Suspicion not Knowledge
A person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not
otherwise.813 It is not enough that the accused was aware of a rumour or of a suspicion relating to the
commission of an offence.814
[s 201.21] Causing Disappearance of Evidence—Active Participation Required
The dictionary meaning of the expression “cause” clearly envisages some active step on the part of the doer of
the act.815 The word “disappear” means “cease to be visible”, “vanish” “pass from sight or existence”. A thing
may cease to be visible or it may be out of sight when it is either moved from one place to another without
actually concealing it or is concealed somewhere for the time being or its condition or shape is changed or it is
destroyed completely. This section deals with the destruction or disappearance of material or tangible evidence.
It does not relate to withholding of oral evidence or tampering with witnesses,816 or anything that is likely to
make the crime evident, such as the existence of a wounded corpse or of blood-stains, fabricated documents,
or similar material objects indicating that an offence has been committed.817 In view of this the disappearance of
the evidence will be caused if the evidence ceases to be visible or traceable.818
To make out an offence under this section it is necessary to prove that the person charged, among other facts,
knew that an offence had been committed and that he caused the evidence thereof to disappear. Where the
accused persons had participated in taking away the victim’s body, their conviction under section 201, IPC was
found proper.819 So, in the matter of causing a disappearance of the evidence relevant to a particular offence,
the person charged must be proved to have actively participated in the matter of the disappearance of the
evidence and a mere sufferance by him or her, of the removal of such evidence by others, is not sufficient. A
mere knowledge on the part of the accused about the removal of the dead bodies does not bring the case
within the ambit of section 201, IPC, as that section’s essential requirement is causing any evidence of the
commission of an offence to disappear. Unless the prosecution can establish that the accused had caused any
evidence to disappear, the charge under section 201, IPC, would not be sustainable.820 Where there was no
evidence that the two appellants A and G made attempt to destroy the evidence, they were acquitted of the
charge under section 201, IPC.821
Where the accused had taken the dead body of the deceased from his house to that of his parents-in-law in the
presence of everyone, he was not convicted under section 201, IPC.822 He should be instrumental in the
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disappearance of the evidence of the crime. As stated above, the words “cause disappearance” imply some
positive act and not a mere passive acquiescence or neglect.823 Seven accused persons assaulted the victim
by stones, caused his death, and burnt the dead body. Held, the accused persons caused the evidence of the
commission of offence to disappear to screen the offenders from legal punishment. They were convicted under
Where the appellant accused had committed the murder of the deceased by strangulation, burnt the dead body
and had thrown it into a well, and the dead body of the deceased was recovered at the instance of the appellant
accused, he was convicted under sections 302 and 201, IPC.825
Where the accused gave beatings to his wife (deceased) with handle of axe and presuming her to be dead
dumped her in septic tank; blood stained clothes were recovered from the house of the accused; his son and
daughter deposed against him; accused was convicted under sections 302/201, IPC.826
Where the report of FSL test showed that the victim girl was murdered and thrown into water, and there was
reliable evidence that on the day of occurrence, the respondent accused was seen carrying the deceased on
his bicycle carrier, the respondent accused was convicted under section 201, IPC.827
The act of dragging the body for some distance and leaving the same in an open field cannot be termed to be
causing a disappearance of the evidence.828 In the absence of evidence showing that the dead bodies were
buried or made to disappear by the accused persons, their conviction under section 201 is liable to be set
aside.829
It must be, therefore, positively proved that it was the accused, who had caused the evidence of the
commission of the offence to disappear.830 The accused appellants gangraped the deceased and when she
was dead, threw her into pit. The evidence of wife of co-accused was found reliable. The conviction of the
appellants under sections 302 and 201 read with section 34, IPC was found proper.831
There was evidence that the accused husband caused the death of his wife by giving beating and burnt her
dead body to destroy evidence of commission of offence. Accused husband was convicted under section
201.832 The evidence proved that the appellants accused persons committed the murder of the deceased by
strangulation and threw the dead body in well. The dead body of the deceased was recovered from the well.
There was extra judicial confession of the accused also. Appellants were convicted under sections 302 and
201, IPC.833 It was the prosecution case that the accused appellant committed murder of the minor son of the
informant and threw the dead body in the maize filed of another person. There was evidence that the deceased
minor son was last seen in the company of accused appellant, and no explanation was furnished by the
accused as to what happened to the deceased thereafter. Accused appellant was convicted under sections 201
and 302, IPC.834
Hacked pieces of dead body of the deceased were recovered from the field of the appellant accused for which
he could not give an explanation. Further, cell phone of the deceased was also recovered at the instance of the
appellant accused, thus, conviction of the appellants under section 201, IPC was upheld.835
Evidence showed that accused husband had strangulated his wife causing death. But there was no evidence
Page 13 of 50
that he concealed or screened the evidence of the case. He was acquitted of the charge under section 201,
IPC.836
Mere production of bottle containing poison allegedly consumed by the deceased could not raise any
presumption that the same had been done to remove evidence of homicidal throttling.837
There was nothing on the record to show that appellant husband tried to make the dead body of the deceased
disappear with an intention to screen himself from legal punishment and only because the appellant is husband
of the deceased and the dead body of the deceased was found under the jurisdiction of the police station, it
cannot be said that dead body of the deceased had been thrown by the appellant. Conviction of the accused
husband on charge under section 201, IPC was set aside.838
[s 201.21.1] Illustrative Cases
(a) Where the accused merely allowed a dead body to remain near the fields and gave no information of
the crime to the police, but no positive act of concealment was proved against him, it was held that he
was not guilty under this section.839
(b) The failure of some doctors to give information about an admission of a burnt patient and that the
patient may die, cannot be said to screen the evidence of the burns, unless it had been a statutory or
moral duty or even a duty according to the rules for doctors to inform the police. Non-information by
them will not amount to causing the disappearance of evidence.840
(c) Where the evidence showed and proved the incident of carrying of the dead body towards the river
Gandak and thereafter throwing the same into the rivers, the conviction of the accused under sections
201 and 34, IPC must be confirmed, but since the accused was 18 years of age and staying with his
brother at the time of the incident, the possibility of his having been pressurised by his brother cannot
be ruled out. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of seven years imprisonment
was reduced to the period already undergone.841 In a case of gang rape and murder of a minor girl, the
evidence showed that the accused concealed and took steps to destroy vital pieces of evidence of the
rape and murder. They threw the body as well as the cycle in the septic tank, removed the blood
stains, concealed the clothings having blood marks on them and the semen marks in the fodder room
as also the knife in a cow dung heap. Thus, they caused the evidence of the commission of the offence
to disappear with the intention to screen themselves from punishment and their conviction under
section 201, IPC was upheld.842
(d) There was reliable evidence that the accused appellant was last seen in the company of the deceased.
Half burnt discarded clothes of the accused were recovered by the police. The alibi taken by the
accused appellant was not established. Appellant accused was convicted for offence under sections
201 and 302, IPC.843
(e) Where the evidence showed that the accused handed over a set of clothes to the witness for the main
accused and the accused also resisted the police and the other witnesses from searching her house,
upon which the blood stained clothes of the main accused were recovered from her (accused) house,
the conviction of the accused under section 201, IPC was held proper.844
(f) The evidence proved that the appellants accused persons committed the murder of the deceased by
strangulation and threw the dead body in well. The dead body of the deceased was recovered from the
well. There was extra judicial confession of the accused also. Appellants were convicted under
sections 302 and 201, IPC.845 It was the case of the prosecution that the accused appellant committed
the murder of the minor son of the informant and threw his dead body in the maize filed of another
person. There was evidence that the deceased minor son was last seen in the company of the
accused appellant, and no explanation was furnished by the accused as to what happened to the
deceased thereafter. Accused appellant was convicted under sections 201 and 302, IPC.846
(g) In one case the accused was proved to have caused the death of his wife by throttling her and caused
the evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear by putting the dead body on fire. He gave
a false report to the police in respect of the offence in order to screen himself from legal punishment,
and so the conviction of the accused under section 201, IPC was upheld.847
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(h) Where the appellant husband committed the murder of his wife for non-fulfillment of dowry demand
and threw her dead body in a well, he was convicted under section 201, IPC.848 The accused appellant
had committed rape of a minor girl aged about 10 years and thereafter, committed her murder. After
the murder, he had concealed the dead body by covering it with branches and leaves. He was
convicted under sections 376, 302 and 201, IPC.849
(i) In another case the accused, along with other co-accused, were charged with the offence of causing a
dowry death and the disappearance of the evidence of the offence. The co-accused was acquitted,
simply because the accused was the husband of the deceased and was with her on the night of the
incident. That by itself will not lead to any presumption that after the murder of his wife her body was
thrown in the well by the accused only. There should have been cogent and convincing evidence to
prove that it was the accused and no one else who caused the disappearance of the evidence of the
offence of murder by throwing the dead body in the well. The conviction of the accused, under Pt I of
section 201, IPC was set aside.850
(j) Where in a case of kidnapping and murder, the dead body of one boy was found in a decomposed
state in a flat and that of the other in a pit, the keys of the said flat were in the exclusive possession of
the accused. He used a perfume to put the neighbours off track when they started becoming curious
about the foul smell emitting from the said flat. The prosecution witnesses had seen the accused while
he was disposing of the second dead body in a pit near a village and reliable evidence on record also
showed that the accused had made purchases of certain items which were to be used by him while
removing the dead bodies and he had also purchased a perfume (aattar) to reduce the foul smell. On
these facts, the accused was held under section 201, IPC for causing the disappearance of evidence
and other offences.851
(k) In a case of kidnapping and murder, one of the accused was detected by the informant while he was
disposing of the dead body in a pond. Later, the same accused made an extra–judicial confession
about the offence, before the informant. The recovery of pooja materials for the purpose of sacrificing
the child he had kidnapped and murdered also strengthened the prosecution case. The conviction of
the accused under section 201, IPC and other offences was found proper.852 In a case, the assertion
by the accused was that the death of his wife occurred on account of a brief illness, though he did not
produce the evidence of the doctor attending on the deceased or the evidence of co-villagers in
support of his defence version. He also did not inform about the death of the deceased to her parents.
The dead body was cremated surreptiously, in the absence of her family members. The accused was
convicted under the third part of section 201, IPC.853 Where the accused beheaded the victims,
severed their limbs and threw their bodies in a raging fire, their conviction under sections 201 and 149,
IPC was upheld.854 Where the deceased and the husband were living in the upstairs home, the death
took place in the bedroom of the spouse and an attempt was made to destroy the evidence of the
murder by burning the dead body. The unnatural conduct of the husband immediately after the
occurrence, the false plea of suicide and the absence from the house were material relevant
circumstances which would complete the chain of circumstantial evidence, leading to only one
conclusion, that the husband himself committed the ghastly offence of the murder of his wife and was
liable to be convicted under sections 302 and 201, IPC.855
(l) The deceased, wife of the accused was inmate in his house, therefore, after the incident occurred in
the house of the accused, the dead body of the deceased could be expected lying in the house of the
accused but the dead body was taken by the accused to a well belonging to uncle of the deceased.
Thus, the criminal intention of the accused is established to cause disappearance of the dead body
and the accused was held guilty of the offence under section 201.856
(m) Where the appellant husband had buried the dead body of his wife in a dry portion of the pond located
in his house, he was convicted under section 201, IPC.857
(n) Where it was proved that the accused person abducted the deceased and disposed of his body at
Singla, on the other side of the river which falls within the West Bengal side, the conviction of the
accused under sections 364, 300, 201, IPC was upheld.858
(o) The accused persons kidnapped the victim, chopped off head, buried trunk of body and threw head in
river. There was reliable evidence of the eye-witnesses that the deceased was last seen in the
company of the accused. Accused were convicted under sections 201, 302 and 364, IPC.859
(p) In a multiple murders case the co-accused was found not involved in offences punishable under
section 302, IPC. However, he had seen his father committing multiple murders and when he
destroyed the evidence related to those murders by throwing the articles from the Mhatre bridge on two
Page 15 of 50
separate occasions, it was absolutely clear that he did this with the primary object of saving his father
and therefore, he was held to be liable to be convicted for the offence under section 201, IPC.860
(q) Where there was no material to suggest that by getting his car washed five days after the murder, the
accused caused any blood or other evidence related to the murder of the deceased to disappear, the
mere washing of the car could not, by any stretch of imagination, be prima facie evidence of the factual
ingredients of the offence and he could not be convicted of an offence under section 201.861
(r) Where the accused appellant had killed his son aged 5 years, had strangulated him and buried his
dead body as he suspected that the deceased was not born to him, he was convicted under sections
302 and 201, IPC.862
(s) Accused persons committed the murder of the deceased boy aged 5 years and concealed her dead
body in the cave. On search, the dead body of the boy was found in the cave. Accused persons were
convicted under sections 302 and 201, IPC.863
(t) Charge under section 201, IPC against the accused appellant was that he threw the dead body of the
deceased at a different place and tried to make the evidence against him disappear. However, the
evidence established that he took the prosecutrix to the field of one R and he was found coming back
from that field by some witnesses. It was possible that the rape was committed upon the prosecutrix at
the same place where her dead body was found. Her underwear was also found near her body. Hence
the prosecution could not establish the fact that the appellant killed the prosecutrix at a different place
and threw her body at the spot where her body was found. There was no specific evidence produced
by the prosecution to show that the appellant did something to make the evidence disappear. Under
such circumstances, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant committed an offence under
(u) The accused committed the murder of a lady and her two children, and concealed their bodies. He
committed offence under section 201, IPC.865
(v) Accused husband strangulated his wife, and set her on fire along with her infant child. Accused
husband was convicted under sections 201, 302, 398A, IPC.866
(w) The accused after committing rape on deceased girl aged 8 years threw her dead body in a well. The
dead body was recovered from the well. Eye-witness deposed that he had seen something being
thrown into the well the previous night. Accused was convicted under sections 376, 302 and 201,
IPC.867
(x) Where there was no satisfactory evidence regarding recovery of the articles allegedly belonging to the
deceased from the possession of the accused appellant, and there was no satisfactory evidence
regarding the recovery of the bones and human skeleton from the land over which the accused
appellant and his family members had exclusive possession, the accused appellant was acquitted of
the charge under sections 201, 302 and 364, IPC.868
(y) Appellant accused was alleged to have committed the murder of the deceased as the accused
suspected illicit relationship of his wife with the deceased. Dead body of the deceased was found at the
distance of half a kilometer. There was no evidence of dragging of the body of the deceased by the
accused. Accused was acquitted of the charge under section 201, IPC.869
• (z) The accused persons had burnt the dead body and had dumped the dead body, they were
convicted under section 201, IPC.870
• (za) Accused took his two minor daughters from house, killed them and threw their dead bodies in
river. He was found guilty convicted for the offence of murder and for causing the evidence of murder
to disappear under sections 302 and 201, IPC.871
(zb) Family members of the deceased were present when deceased was cremated. Complaint was filed
after 3 months of the death. Accused’s husband was acquitted of the charge under section 201 IPC.872
[s 201.22] Acts not amounting to causing disappearance
The section contemplates concealment or destruction of evidence of a crime,873 but it is not confined to the
destruction of the evidence alone.874 Merely delaying the discovery of the evidence of the crime is not causing
its disappearance. So, where an accused, finding in her house the dead body of a girl who had been murdered
by her son, locked the outer door without moving the corpse or concealing it, it was held that she was not guilty
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of an offence of causing a disappearance of the evidence of a crime under this section.875 The taking of
measures to keep a person, such as a witness, possessed of the knowledge of the occurrence of a crime, out
of the way, does not amount to causing disappearance of evidence with the meaning of this section.876
Where the body of the deceased was alleged to have been burnt, but the serologist failed to give any opinion in
respect of the origin, sex or age of the deceased from the bones recovered and the other evidence regarding
burning of the body was not found to be reliable, the conviction of the accused under section 201, IPC was set
aside.877 Where according to the disclosure statement of the accused, the dead body was lying buried in the
courtyard of younger brother of the informant, the dead body, however, was recovered from the courtyard of the
informant, the accused being the members of the same family, the possibility of confusion about the courtyard
of one or other was ruled out and the dead body cannot be said to be recovered pursuant to alleged disclosure
statements made by the accused.878
Where the dead body of the deceased and a sickle, the offence weapon, were found lying in the house of the
deceased in unhidden condition, conviction of the accused appellant for offence under section 201, IPC was set
aside.879
In case of dowry demand, the dead body of the deceased was cremated after the members of the family of the
deceased had arrived, the respondents accused had not concealed the dead body of the deceased, thus, they
were acquitted of the charge under section 201, IPC.880
In some cases it has been held that, in a case of murder, moving the corpse of the victim from one place to
another in order to divert suspicion does not amount to causing evidence of the murder to disappear.881 Mere
knowledge of the removal of the dead body to another place also does not, by itself, necessarily amount to
causing the disappearance of the evidence of the offence. It is a matter of evidence in each case.882 But in
some cases it has been held that the mere removal of a body from one place to another, so as to remove the
traces of the place where the murder took place, or indications which might implicate a particular individual,
even though such removal does not remove undoubted evidence that a murder has taken place, is within the
section.883
Accused A1 to A5 were alleged to have committed the murder of the deceased. A6 and A7 were driver and
cleaner of the truck. It was alleged that A6 and A7 caused the disappearance of evidence to protect the
accused persons by washing the truck so as to free it from bloodstains. It had come in evidence that the
deceased was bleeding profusely and there was blood in the cabin and, therefore, the truck was washed. The
investigating agency had collected sample of blood from the seat in the rear part of the driver’s seat and from
the wooden strip on the lower portion and same was found to contain human blood of group “A”, which was of
the deceased. Therefore, A6 and A7 cannot be said to have caused disappearance of evidence because
evidence was collected from the truck, the disappearance of which was alleged against them. They were both
drivers of the truck and were not connected in any manner with the other accused. From the prosecution
evidence, it transpired that when the deceased was assaulted, the driver objected to his being beaten and the
reply given by the accused was that he was their man and they were beating him. A6 and A7 were acquitted of
the charge under section 201, IPC.884
[s 201.23] Disposal of dead body in mysterious circumstances
Where the accused persons secretly and clandestinely cremated the deceased to wipe out the entire evidence
of murder, this clearly attracted section 201, IPC.885 Where the accused killed a child, buried the corpse of the
child and proclaimed that the child had died a natural death, the conviction of the accused under section 201,
IPC and other offences was upheld.886
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Where the death of the wife was not natural and was caused in mysterious circumstances and the dead body
was disposed of by the accused and other persons hurriedly on the same night, it was held that the prosecution
had been able to substantiate the charge under section 201, IPC against the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.887 In a dowry death case if the appellants after committing murder of the victim of dowry demand,
hurriedly cremate the dead body without informing her parents, they would be guilty of offence under section
201.888
The deceased died unnatural death within seven years of her marriage at her matrimonial home as ligature
marks were found on her neck, the in-laws used to quarrel with her, she wanted to go to her husband who was
serving outside the village, and as the appellants father-in-law and mother-in-law cremated the dead body
without informing the parents of the deceased and post mortem of the deceased, the in-laws were convicted
under sections 302 and201, IPC.889
Where in a dowry death case the deceased died unnatural death within nine months of marriage, and the
appellant accused cremated the dead body of the deceased without informing her parents or relatives, the
appellant was convicted for offence under section 201, IPC.890
Where the appellant husband after committing the murder of his wife, had buried the dead body in a soakpit
near his house, and the dead body of the deceased was recovered in decomposed condition from the pit on the
disclosure made by the appellant, and the appellant had not informed the parents of the deceased about the
deceased being missing, the appellant accused was convicted for offences under sections 302 and 201, IPC.891
The body of the deceased may give certain clues as to cruelty and harassment and consequently, the
destruction of the body without information to the police would attract the provisions of sections 201 and 202,
IPC.892
[s 201.24] Deceased Clandestinely Cremated—Conviction under Section 201, IPC
In Ram Badan Sharma v State of Bihar, the deceased was killed by poison being administered to her during the
night. Neither the deceased was taken to any doctor nor was any doctor called to examine her, further, no
medical treatment of any kind was given to the deceased. This was extremely unnatural human conduct. The
dead body was secretly and clandestinely cremated causing disappearance of evidence of offence, without
even intimating the parents of the deceased who were living only a few miles away from their village. They
learnt about the murder of the deceased from a barber after about three days. The appellants secretly and
clandestinely cremated the deceased to wipe out the entire evidence of murder. Held, section 201, IPC was
attracted in the case, and the appellants were convicted under section 201, IPC.893
[s 201.25] Discovery of dead body on the Statement of Accused—three Possibilities—Effect of Non Explanation
of Accused
When the dead body is recovered on the statement of an accused then three possibilities can be adduced: (i)
that the accused would have seen someone else concealing the dead body at that place; (ii) he would have
been told by someone else that the dead body was concealed there; and (iii) he himself concealed the dead
body.894 The Supreme Court further held that if the accused does not tell the court about the happening of any
of the two possibilities, then the court can presume that the accused had himself concealed the dead body. This
is because according to the prosecution, the accused is the only person who could offer an explanation as to
how he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the court as to how he
came to know about it, the presumption is a well justified course to be adopted by the criminal court that the
concealment was made by the accused and such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle
Page 18 of 50
embodied in section 27 of the Evidence Act.895
Where there was evidence that the appellant husband suspected the fidelity of his deceased wife, cut her with
aruvamanai over the left side of her neck, put the dead body in a gunny bag and placed it on the railway track,
recovery of blood stained bed sheet from the house of the appellant husband established that the murder was
committed inside the house, and the appellant having not lodged FIR with the police about his wife being
missing, he was convicted under sections 201 and 304, Pt I, IPC.896
The husband accused was having strained relations with his wife. There was evidence that the he was last
seen with his wife and son in the village, thereafter his wife deceased was not seen. On the disclosure
statements made by the accused the parts of the dead body of the deceased were recovered. Held, the
accused appellant was guilty of having committed the murder of his wife and causing disappearance of the
evidence of offence. He was convicted under sections 302 and 201, IPC.897
The three appellants accused had strangulated the deceased, chopped off her head, cut the body into pieces
and disposed of the body. The deceased had gone to the accused to demand money, her share in the property
sold, as her husband was inside the jail in connection with a case under the NDPS Act. The human skeleton of
the deceased and her garments were recovered at the instance of the accused appellants. Accused appellants
were convicted under sections 302 and 201, IPC.898
Where there was circumstantial evidence of last seen, but the dead body was recovered after a gap of fifteen
days, the participation of the accused in the commission of offence was found doubtful, thus, conviction of the
accused appellant under sections 302 and 201, IPC was set aside.899
Where the accused tenant after killing the victim boy had concealed the dead body in his room, and the
separated head of the deceased body wrapped in polythene cover was recovered from the room of the
accused, accused was convicted for offence under sections 302 and 201, IPC.900
[s 201.26] Mere Discovery of Dead Body not Sufficient—Nature of Evidence Explained
The recovery of the body of a person murdered, on its being pointed out by the accused, would be very strong
evidence of an offence under this section.901 Where the accused failed to explain as to how the body of the
deceased came to be exhumed from his house, despite his admission that the house from where the body of
the deceased was exhumed belonged to him, the conviction of the accused under section 201 was
confirmed.902 Where the severed head of the deceased, lying concealed under shirts, was recovered on the
information furnished by the accused and on being shown by him the conviction of the accused under section
201, IPC was held proper.903 But in the absence of some other evidence, the mere discovery of the dead body,
only at the instance of the accused, cannot fasten him with the offence of a concealment of the dead body with
the intention of screening himself from an offence under section 201, IPC.904 When the dead body of the
deceased put inside a truck was recovered from a room of the house of the two accused and further the part
played by the accused in the placing of the dead body in that trunk was evidently not proved, the accused
persons were not liable to be convicted under section 201, IPC read with section 34, IPC.905 In some cases it
has been held that concealing the bloodstained weapon, with which the murder has been committed, would
amount to causing evidence of the offence to disappear within the meaning of this section.906 But in Jogta Kikla
v State907 it has been held that:
The expression ‘any evidence of the commission of that offence’ clearly refers, not to evidence in the extensive sense
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in which that word is used in the Indian Evidence Act but to evidence in its primary sense, as meaning anything that is
likely to make the crime evident, such as the existence of a wounded corpse or of bloodstains, fabricated documents,
or similar material objects indicating that an offence had been committed.
In Chunder Giani v State908 it was observed:
I can well visualise to myself that in certain cases a corpse may be removed from one place to another without the
intention or object of causing disappearance of evidence of the offence; and again, there can be cases in which
removal to an unknown obscure, out of the way, or a distant place may be with a view to cause disappearance of
evidence within the meaning of section 201, Indian Penal Code.
The question thus depends upon whether what is removed or concealed is “evidence of the commission of that
offence” within the meaning of the section. This question will be separately considered presently. What is to be
noted is that for the application of this section what is caused to disappear must be evidence of the commission
of the offence.909 There was no evidence that the death of the deceased wife was unnatural or the appellant’s
husband and in-laws committed the murder of the deceased wife and to conceal the evidence of offence,
consigned her dead body to flames. Appellants were acquitted of the charge under sections 201 and 304, Pt I,
IPC.910
In case of dowry demand, the dead body of the deceased was cremated after the members of the family of the
deceased had arrived, and the respondents accused not having concealed the dead body of the deceased,
were acquitted of the charge under section 201, IPC.911
The removal or concealment of the body of a man, not proved to be murdered does not amount to an offence
under this section.912 So also where the accused helped in the burial of a dead body without any knowledge of
the offence committed, it was held that the conviction under the section was not sustainable.913
Where the accused father-in-law had no knowledge of the commission of offence in respect of his daughter-in-
law by his son accused, held the appellant accused A2 father-in-law could not be convicted for offence under
section 201, IPC. Mere presence of the appellant A2 in the house was not sufficient to draw inference that he
had the knowledge of the commission of offence by his son appellant A2, and his conviction for offence under
Where all that the prosecution could establish was that the dead body of the deceased was recovered from the
well situated in the compound of her marital home and that the cremation was hurried through after physically
keeping her kith and kin away from the scene. No doubt, such a culpable haste enkindles fumes of suspicion
which can be regarded as an incriminating circumstance against those who showed such a haste, but that
circumstance stands isolated and unconnected with any other circumstance. The prosecution did not even
attempt to show, much less to prove, that any offence had been committed by anyone in respect of the death of
the deceased, which should have been the foundation for establishing the offence under section 201, IPC. On
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these facts, the order convicting the accused and imposing a maximum sentence of seven years was set
aside.915
Where the allegation was that the accused killed his mother and after cutting her body into pieces, he had
packed the same into different packs and thrown some bags in a rivulet (naala) and buried some in a pit used
for stacking or placing cow-dung, the circumstantial evidence was not convincing. The body of the deceased
was recovered before a memorandum of the accused under section 27 of the Evidence Act was prepared. The
recovery of the head and the stump of the deceased from the pit at the instance of the accused was doubtful,
so the conviction of the accused under sections 301 and 201, IPC was set aside.916
Mere helping the authority for discovering the dead body/skeleton cannot itself establish that a person is
involved unless by way of evidence it is established that the person is aware and he had/has reason to believe
that an offence has been committed, and he is causing the disappearance of the evidence of the commission of
offence with an intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any
information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false. In the instant case, there was no
evidence that the appellant tried to shield the offender intentionally and also had gone for helping the evidence
relating to commission of offence disappear as required under section 201, IPC. Appellant accused was
acquitted of the charge under section 201, IPC.917
[s 201.27] Discovery of Incriminating Article at the Instance of Accused
Where on information given by the accused, incriminating articles were discovered by the police at the place
pointed out by the accused, the investigating police officer may prove the fact of the discovery without proving
the statement of the accused and without relying on section 27 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the police
officer would no doubt show that the accused knew of the existence of the fact discovered in consequence of
the information given by him. But that would not necessarily show his direct connection with the offence. It
would merely be a link in the chain of evidence which, taken along with other pieces of evidence, might go on to
establish his connection therewith.918
An accused, in police custody, led the police party and witnesses to the grove, dug out the earth from near a
mango tree and took out a human chopped head of the deceased which was identified by his father. Soon after
the aforesaid recovery the accused led the party to another mango tree situated in the same grove, dug out
earth from there and took out the beheaded body of the deceased. The accused then took the police to a tube
well which was locked from the outside and then he himself opened the lock with a key which he himself took
out from a concealed place and recovered some articles including one yellow coloured handkerchief (towel
type) belonging to the deceased. The motive of the murder and other circumstantial evidence were also
established and the conviction of the accused under sections 302, 364 and 201, IPC as recorded by the trial
court was thus maintained.919
Where the appellant was the real brother of the main accused charged and convicted under section 302, IPC,
and was seen with the main accused in the forest, and rope used in the commission of the offence was
recovered on the disclosure statement made by him, he was convicted under section 201, IPC.920
[s 201.28] Each Case Depends on Variety of Facts
The decision on the question whether when an accused person leads the police to a place not his own or in his
exclusive possession and from there disinters some incriminating article, the court is entitled or not to infer that
the accused himself must have put that article there. Each case depends on a variety of facts. No absolute rule
on the point can be laid down. Where the evidence in such a case is circumstantial, it must in order to sustain
conviction, be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation on any other
reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt. The hypotheses that are possible in such a case are: (a) that the
accused saw someone bury the article there; (b) that someone told the accused that the articles lay buried in
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that place; and (c) that the accused himself alone or with others buried the article there. The third hypothesis is
undoubtedly the most natural and prominent in such a case and if the other two hypotheses are excluded, or
are not reasonably possible, there is no reason why the court should not hold the third hypothesis proved. In
determining which of these three possible hypotheses is more probable and presents such a degree of certainty
that the court, like a reasonable man, ought to act upon the assumption of its existence, the court shall have to
consider a variety of circumstance in each case.
[s 201.29] Question as to Inference is a matter for Judge to Decide
No general rule can be laid down that in such cases the court is not justified in drawing the inference that the
accused himself placed the incriminating article at the place pointed out by him. The true position is that it is for
the court in each case to draw any such inference as may be legitimate or reasonable in the circumstances.
The question as to what inference from a relevant fact may be drawn as to the existence or otherwise of a fact
in issue and with what degree of certainty is, in each case, a matter for the Judge to determine on the facts of
that case and cannot be regulated by a generalisation. The outstanding fact in such cases is that the discovery
of the incriminating article from a place which is hidden from public view, but is pointed out by the accused,
unmistakably shows that the accused was in some way privy to the felony. This is the most natural and
prominent inference which the court will draw under section 114, Evidence Act, and the fact being within the
peculiar knowledge of the accused, it is for him to show that he acquired the knowledge of the place of
concealment in some other way. If, therefore, the prisoner makes no attempt to explain how he acquired the
knowledge of the place, leaving aside the question of proving the truth of the explanation if given, there is
nothing in law to prevent the court from convicting him, if after considering all the surrounding circumstance and
bearing in mind the other possible hypotheses and the principle that it is better that ten guilty men should
escape than one innocent man be punished, the court comes to the conclusion that the accused himself must
have put the article or articles there, and then it not only may but it is its duty to convict.921 From the mere fact
that the accused pointed out the existence of parts of the body of a murdered person, it cannot be inferred that
he caused the disappearance of those portions of the body.922 The conduct of the accused in pointing out the
spot, where the dead body was, would show, at the most, that he had knowledge that a dead body was lying
there. That knowledge could be acquired in various ways. Without any further evidence, it is not sufficient to
hold that the dead body was thrown there by him.923 The fact of discovery, of course, proves knowledge on the
part of the person discovering the fact, that a certain thing had been discovered by him. But a mere knowledge
of the existence of such a fact is not sufficient to make him guilty under this section. To make him guilty under
this section, it must be proved that he had caused the evidence of the commission of the offence to disappear
and not merely that he knew that some other person had caused the evidence of the commission of the offence
to disappear. It must be positively proved that it was he who had caused the evidence of the commission of the
offence to disappear.924 But where there is sufficient evidence to show that the accused knew as to how the
dead body of the deceased was carried for disposal by other accused persons and that she refrained from
informing the police about the missing of the deceased, she can be held guilty under sections 201 and 34,
IPC.925
[s 201.30] Attempt to cause Disappearance
Where the accused persons were found carrying the dead body of a murdered man and on being confronted
and questioned, the accused left the body at a place which was near the public path and disappeared and most
of them were arrested only the next day, it was held that there was only an attempt to cause the disappearance
of the evidence of the offence and the accused were liable to punishment only under this section read with
section 511.926
[s 201.30.1] Mere Preparation of a Document not an Attempt
However, a different view was taken by the Allahabad High Court. Where the removal of the dead body to the
cremation ground was intercepted on the way, it was held that the commission of the offence under section 201
was prevented and the accused could not be convicted under section 201.927 An appellant, who was a doctor
by profession, was found guilty, by the trial Judge and the High Court, of an attempt to cause the
disappearance of the evidence by issuing false certificates regarding the cause of death of a deceased body.
The first certificate indicated his inability to express any opinion about the cause of death, the other certificate
indicated same cause of death. The dead body was sent for a regular post-mortem and a case of murder was
registered against the husband of the deceased. It was held by the Supreme Court that there was a marked
difference between the preparation and an attempt and in this case it was highly doubtful as to whether the
appellant had attempted to commit an offence under section 201, IPC or not. There was absolutely no material
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to show whether anybody had seen the second certificate earlier and whether there was any attempt to put the
same to use for facilitating the cremation. His appeal was accordingly allowed.928
[s 201.31] “Any Evidence of the Commission of that Offence”—Evidence Explained
Withholding of oral evidence or tampering with witnesses does not fall within the purview of this section. It
relates to destroying or making to disappear material that is, tangible evidence.929 As pointed out above, what is
caused to disappear must be evidence of the commission of the offence that has been committed. The
expression “any evidence of the commission of that offence”, refers not to evidence in the extensive sense in
which that word is used in the Evidence Act, but to evidence in its primary sense as meaning anything that is
likely to make the crime evident, such as the existence of a wounded corpse or of bloodstains, fabricated
documents, or similar material objects indicating that an offence had been committed. The statement of a
witness and panchanamas do not constitute such evidence.930
A pushed B violently into a boat, B was killed thereby. A set the boat adrift. A committed no offence under this
section.931
A and B killed C in the presence of D. A removed the razai on which the deceased had been sleeping, and
concealed it in a stack in D’s presence. It was held that as the presence or existence of the razai would have
been no evidence of the murder, D committed no offence under this section.932
Appellant accused had committed the murder of his wife by firing katta on her, had dropped her dead body in a
culvert by the side of the road, sprinkled petrol over the dead body and set fire to it, hence, he was convicted
under sections 302 and 201, IPC.933
[s 201.31.1] Particular Evidence has to be Disclosed
Where it is not disclosed in the complaint as to what existing evidence was destroyed by the accused in respect
of an offence which has been committed, with the intention of screening the offender, no case under this
section is made out.934
[s 201.32] Removing Corpse from one Place to another—whether Amounts to an Offence
When an offence is committed, there may be evidence of various types: (a) evidence to show that the offence
had been committed; (b) evidence to show that the offence had been committed at a particular place; and (c)
evidence to show that the offence had been committed by a particular person or persons. In a case of murder,
the wounded corpse of the victim would be the evidence of the commission of the offence of murder. If the
corpse is caused to disappear with the necessary knowledge and intention, it would be an offence under this
section. But if the corpse is only removed from one place to another in order to divert suspicion, the corpse
itself existing, it cannot be said that the evidence of the commission of “that offence” has been caused to
disappear within the meaning of this section. The removal of the corpse from one place to another however,
may be evidence of the place where, or of the person by whom, the murder was committed. The question then
arises whether the removal of the corpse amounts to causing disappearance of any evidence of the
commission of that offence within the meaning of this section. There is a conflict of judicial opinion on this
question.
[s 201.32.1] Allahabad View
In Empress of India v Kishna,935 the Allahabad High Court had earlier held that by removing the corpse from his
own field to that of another, the accused did not cause the evidence of the murder, which that corpse afforded,
to disappear. But dissenting from this, in subsequent cases the court held that the mere removal of a body from
one place to another so as to remove traces of the place where the murder took place, or indications which
might implicate a particular individual, even though such removal does not remove undoubted evidence that a
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murder has taken place, is within the section.936
[s 201.32.2] Calcutta View
The Calcutta High Court has taken a different view and it was held that the essence of the offence under this
section “is the causing of evidence of the commission of an offence to disappear and it cannot be considered
correct to say that the mere moving of a body amounts to causing disappearance of evidence of an offence”.937
In Nagendra Bhakta v Emperor938 it was observed that:
The offence that was committed in the present case was an offence of murder and the evidence that was caused to
disappear was the fact that the corpse was lying at Sarat’s house. This fact, namely that the corpse was lying at
Sarat’s house and at no other place, was no evidence of the commission of the offence of murder. It may be some
evidence of where the offence was committed or who had committed it, but it was no evidence of the fact that a murder
had been committed. It is not impossible to conceive of the commission of an offence apart from where and when and
by whom it was committed.
[s 201.32.3] Gujarat View on Concealment of Weapon
Similarly, the Gujarat High Court has held that:
When section 201 uses the expression ‘whoever causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear,
it refers to a person who causes the evidence of actual commission of the offence to disappear and not to a person
who causes the disappearance of evidence as to by whom the offence was committed, and that the removal or
concealment of the weapon used for the commission of an offence and the bloodstained clothes of the accused, is not
causing the disappearance of the evidence of the commission of the offence within the meaning of this section.939
[s 201.32.4] Punjab View
According to the Punjab High Court
….there cannot be the slightest doubt that the weapon with which an offence is committed is a very valuable piece of
evidence of its commission. More so when the offence is said to be of murder and that the weapon is bloodstained,
and if a person conceals that weapon, provided his intention in doing so is to screen the offender, he is, in my opinion,
guilty of causing that evidence to disappear, etc.940
This section does not refer exclusively to causing the disappearance of the corpus delicti, but to causing the
disappearance of “any evidence” of the commission of the offence.941 The words “any evidence of the
commission of that offence” clearly include any evidence of the commission by the offender of that offence.942
[s 201.32.5] Orissa View—Act of Removal of Dead Body or Hanging it on a Tree
The Orissa High Court has held that even if the appellant was the author of the removal of the dead body of the
deceased from the place of murder to another place where the dead body was found, section 201 of the Code
would be inapplicable as merely removing the dead body of the murdered person from the scene of occurrence
to another place and throwing or keeping it there or hanging it on a tree to give a colour of suicidal hanging,
Page 24 of 50
would not amount to causing the disappearance of the evidence of the causing of the offence of murder.943
[s 201.33] ‘With the Intention of Screening the Offender from Legal Punishment’—Meaning of
The essence of the offence under this section is the intention to screen the offender from legal punishment. In
the absence of such intention, the accused cannot be convicted under this section. The requirements of the
section are not fulfilled if the disappearance of the evidence was merely likely to have the effect of screening
the offender.944 A person causing the disappearance of the evidence of an offence under compulsion cannot be
said to have caused such disappearance with the intention of screening the offender.945
[s 201.33.1] Awareness of the Identity of the Offender not Necessary
It is necessary, in order to justify a conviction under this section, that an offence for which some person has
been convicted or is criminally responsible should have been committed.946 But the section does not say that
the accused should be aware of the identity of the offender whom he intends to screen. The expression “with
the intention of screening the offender” excludes cases where there was no active criminal intent, but merely a
knowledge that a possible result of the act would be the screening of the offender. Such a case was that of
Queen v Toolshee Rai947 where a corpse was removed with no other intention than a desire to prevent the
blame attaching to the village. But the fact that the section requires a positive criminal intention does not imply
that the intention must have reference to an individual known to the accused. For instance, in case of a house
trespass, the facts might lead to the inference that the accused intended to annoy the inmate of the house
although he was unaware of their identity.948
[s 201.33.2] Intention a Question of Inference
The intention of a person causing the disappearance of the evidence is a matter of inference. If persons are
found carrying the dead body of a murdered man from a particular house to a piol of a mosque and leaving it
there, that by itself cannot lead to an inference that they had an intention to screen the offender or to hide the
scene of the crime.949 Where the accused stated that he had hidden the shoes of the deceased, the intention to
screen the offender from punishment must be inferred.950
Where the witnesses consistently deposed that with regard to the death of the deceased woman, her father
was never informed and the cremation had been done behind the back of the parents of the deceased, both the
accused could not escape from the liability under section 201, IPC because they wanted to screen themselves
from the legal punishment, fully realising that the offence under section 498A, IPC had been committed by the
accused as he had been causing harassment to the deceased along with his father.951
But where the accused persons were found carrying the dead body of a murdered man and on being
confronted and questioned, they left the body at a place which was near the public path and disappeared and
most of them were arrested only the next day, it was held that their intention was to commit an offence under
this section, and that since the causing of disappearance of the evidence was not completed, they were guilty
of an attempt to commit the offence under this section.952
In a multiple murder case, the co-accused was found not involved for offences punishable under section 302,
IPC, however, he had seen his father commit the multiple murders and when he destroyed the evidence related
to those murders by throwing the articles from Mhatre bridge on two separate occasions, it was absolutely clear
that he did this with primary object of saving his father and therefore, he would be liable to be convicted for the
offence under section 201, IPC.953
Where the accused removed the body of a murdered person from the village and left it by the side of the Grand
Trunk Road in order to divert suspicion of the crime from themselves and to make it appear that the man was
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done to death by some passerby, it was held that they were guilty under this section.954
Where the circumstantial evidence established the commission of a murder of the victim by the father-in-law
and brother-in-law and the third accused helped them in the removal of the dead body in order to screen the
offenders, the conviction of the first two accused under sections 302, 201 and 34, IPC was held proper and the
third accused was convicted under sections 201 and 34, IPC.955
Appellant husband, present in the house, had caused the homicidal death of the wife and to conceal evidence,
had burnt her dead body. He was convicted for offences under sections 302 and 201, IPC.956
[s 201.33.3] Wife Shielding Husband—Permissibility
Under the law, a wife is completely privileged in the matter of disclosing any communication made by her
husband to her during the subsistence of their marriage. It is the policy of the law as well that a wife should not
be guilty of harbouring her felonious husband because the law conceives a legal unity between the spouses.
No doubt it cannot be said that if a wife causes the disappearance of the evidence of a crime committed by her
husband she will not be guilty under section 201, IPC. But where the wife finds the dead body of a person who
has been murdered by her husband in the house, but, without removing the dead body, locks up the door and
does not allow anyone to enter the house in the absence of her husband, she cannot be said to commit an
offence under this section. From her refusal to disclose information, no inference can be deduced, so as to
ascribe to her any criminal intention or motive.957 Where there is not an iota of evidence on record, not even a
whisper to the effect that it was the wife of the accused who helped him in concealing or causing the evidence
of the commission of the offence to disappear, simply because she is the wife of the accused and as such is
supposed to be living in the same house, it cannot be assumed that she was guilty of the offence under
sections 201 and 34, IPC.958 The accused may or may not have taken her help in concealing the dead body.
Her being the wife of the accused is not sufficient to prove the charge under sections 201 and 34, IPC against
her.959
[s 201.34] “Giving False Information with Intention to Screen Offender”—Meaning of
Sections 201 and 203 contemplate the giving of information in respect of an offence which the accused person
knows or believes to be false. For the offence under this section the false information should also be furnished
with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. Unlike section 182 which deals with giving
false information to any public servant, this section and section 203 do not refer to whom the false information
should be given; it would include private persons as well as public servants including the police.960 For the
application of this part of the section, the false information need not be given to the police or a magistrate.961 It
is immaterial whether the information is volunteered or given in reply to inquiries.962 A person is guilty under this
section if he gives any information in respect of an offence which he knows or believes to be false.963 If any
person gives the first information statement to the police, even though not voluntarily, which is recorded under
section 154, CrPC and if it ultimately turns out to be false, it would amount to giving false information and the
offender would be punishable under section 201, IPC provided the requisite intention is proved.964 Where the
accused, driver of lorry, caused the death of the cleaner, crushed the head by running the vehicle over the head
of the deceased twice in order to screen evidence and gave false statement that the cleaner deceased had got
down from the lorry for the purpose of taking tea, he was convicted under sections 201 and 302, IPC.965
Where the accused gave false information that the deceased died natural death, though had caused death by
fist blows, he was convicted under section 201, IPC.966
[s 201.34.1] Keeping silence about the commission of offence
Where a suspect dies in police station, but the police officials keep silence, and do not disclose or divulge facts
about the cause of death, it indicates that the accused police official caused disappearance of the evidence to
screen the real offenders, such that accused police officials commit offence under section 201, IPC.967
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[s 201.34.2] Refusal to Give Information
There is, however, a distinction between a case of refusing to give correct information and a case of giving false
information. Where an accused refuses to give information, his act does not amount to giving false information
and he cannot be convicted under section 201.968 The information given to a neighbour that someone died,
cannot be taken as false. It will become false only if it is shown that the cause of the death was stated to be
anything other than what actually happened. A mere omission to narrate the circumstances of the death cannot
be taken as false information. It must be proved that an offence was committed. The accused must know or
have reason to believe that the offence has been committed. With such knowledge or belief, he must give
information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false. So also the accused must have
acted with the intention of screening the offender. The intention must be to screen the offender, whether himself
or somebody else, from legal punishment.969 It is not necessary that the offender himself should have been
found guilty of the main offence for the purpose of convicting him of an offence under section 201. Nor is it
absolutely necessary that somebody else should have been found guilty of the main offence. Nonetheless, it is
imperative that the prosecution should have established two premises. First, that an offence has been
committed and second, that the accused knew about it or he had reasons to believe the commission of that
offence. Then and then alone the prosecution can succeed provided the remaining postulates of the offence are
also established.970 Where the offence of the murder of his wife by the accused, with the assistance of
somebody else had already taken place and the co-accused, is the father of the accused, was not one of the
participants, he at least knew that the lady had been murdered as he was living in the same house. The severe
beating given to the lady must have caused enough noise because she had been definitely resisting, as
appeared from the injuries that she had sustained on the hand. Then she was hanged and this could not be
done without the assistance of some other member of the family. Hence, it would be reasonable to hold that the
co-accused knew or had reason to believe that the offence of murder had been committed and with that
knowledge and belief he directed the choukidar to go and lodge a report about a suicide by the deceased, a
fact which he must be held to have believed to be false. The only reason for all this could be that he wanted to
screen the offender namely, his sons from legal punishment. There is no evidence to show that the accused
and his mother did anything which might attract section 201 to their case. The charge under section 201, IPC
was clearly established against the co-accused and it was not so established against the accused and his
mother.971 The accused persons, with a definite intention, calculatively poured kerosene oil on the person of the
deceased to give a colour of suicidal death. In doing so, the accused number 1 and number 2 were deeply
interested. They did this to escape from justice inasmuch as they are also guilty for the offence punishable
under section 201 of the Indian Penal Code. It was held that giving false explanation in the incriminating
circumstances shows the involvement of the accused in the crime.972
The accused had strangulated his deceased wife and threw her dead body into the well. The accused took the
plea that the deceased fell into the well accidentally. After the body of the deceased was taken out from the
well, no water came out from her mouth when her dead body was pressed. The defence theory of accidental
fall was ruled out. The accused was convicted under sections 302 and 201, IPC.973
Where the husband of the accused died and at the time of his death, the accused wife and their minor child
were the only inmates of the house where the incident occurred, the version of the accused wife was that
deceased tried to commit suicide by putting a rope around his neck and while doing so he fell on a blunt object
and died. However, on a subsequent discovery and search, a crow bar was found from the said house with
human blood on it which proved to be the blood of the deceased. The circumstances under which the deceased
died were within the special knowledge of the accused wife and so the falsity of information given by her cannot
but warrant a punishment under section 201, IPC, since there was a deliberate attempt on her part to screen
the offender from legal punishment by way of providing false information regarding the offence.974 Appellant 1
husband and his second wife appellant 2 committed the murder of the wife of the appellant 1 and buried the
dead body of the deceased in the cattle shed of the house. The prosecution witnesses deposed before the
court that the two appellants were present in the house on the day of the incident. The two appellants failed to
furnish any explanation as to how the deceased was murdered and how the dead body was buried in the cattle
shed. On the pointing out of the accused appellants, the dead body of the deceased was recovered. The two
appellants were convicted under sections 302 and 201, IPC.975
Page 27 of 50
There was convincing and trustworthy evidence of the witnesses that after committing the murder of the child,
the appellant accused concealed the dead body. It was the appellant and the appellant alone who caused the
death of the deceased, an innocent child, by strangulating him and then concealing his body inside a tin box in
the inner room of the quarter exclusively occupied by the appellant. Appellant accused was convicted under
In the case of Kalawati v State of Himachal Pradesh977 the accused made a statement to a head constable that
some unknown dacoits had invaded her house, killed her husband and robbed her of jewellery. This statement
which was treated as first information statement was found on investigation to be false, and it was proved that
she knowingly gave the false information to screen the real offender who was her paramour. She was,
therefore, convicted under this section.
In an old case, it had been held by the Calcutta High Court that a person who gives false information to the
police, accusing another of an offence of murder in order to screen the real offender, commits offences not only
under sections 201 and 203, IPC but also under section 211.978
But where the first information has already been laid and investigation already started, the witnesses who are
questioned by the police cannot be proceeded against under sections 182, 201 or 203, for giving false
information.979
[s 201.34.3] Screening of Specified Offender not Necessary
To convict a person under section 201, IPC, it is not necessary that the accused should be aware of the identity
of the offender whom he intends to screen. It is sufficient if he had the knowledge that by this act he was likely
to save a person from legal punishment. There is nothing in section 201 to require the prosecution to prove that
the accused intended to screen a specified offender,980 or the offender must be named or identified or convicted
of the principal offence.981
[s 201.35] Notwithstanding Acquittal under Section 302, IPC, Accused can be Convicted under Section 201,
IPC
Even though the accused has been acquitted under section 302, IPC, his conviction under section 201, IPC is
permissible.982
The offence under clause 1 of this section is cognizable or non-cognizable according as the offence in relation
to which the disappearance of evidence is caused is cognizable or non-cognizable. It is bailable and triable by a
court of session. An offence under clause 2 is non-cognizable, bailable and triable by a magistrate of the first
class. The offence under clause 3 is also non-cognizable and bailable and is triable by the court by which the
principal offence is triable.
There is no period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under clause 1. The period of limitation for
taking cognizance of an offence falling under clause 2 is three years and for an offence under clause 3, the
period of limitation may be one year or three years depending on the sentence provided for the offence
committed.
No complaint of the court is required for taking cognizance of an offence punishable under this section.
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[s 201.37] Charge
I (name and office of magistrate, etc.) hereby charge you (name of accused), as follows:
That you (*) on or about the……day of……at …………knowing (or having reason to believe) that a certain offence, to
wit……punishable with….has been committed, did cause certain evidence of the said offence to disappear, to wit…(or
knowingly gave false information, to wit……) with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, and
thereby committed an offence punishable under s 201 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
In a complaint filed under section 201, there was not a single word as to what existing evidence was destroyed
by the accused individually or conjointly, in respect of an offence which was already committed, with the
intention of screening the offender. Therefore, on the averment of the complainant himself in the complaint no
court could have taken cognizance of an offence under section 201, IPC. It was held that the complaint, in
respect of an offence under section 201, IPC is liable to be quashed on the ground that there is not even the
slightest allegation to constitute an offence.983
Where the deceased died out of electric shock received from the naked electric wire laid down by the
respondents and the respondents threw the dead body near the road, prima facie case for framing charges
under sections 304 and 201, IPC was made out, thus, the order of discharge was set aside.984
Where looking at the condition of the patient, the accused doctor had given treatment and thereafter referred
the patient for further treatment to a Government hospital, the accused had not committed any offence. There
was no ingredient available in the charge sheet and the allegation levelled by the prosecution for establishing
the second ingredient that the accused was knowing or had reason to believe that the offence was committed
was also not proved. The third ingredient that the accused must either cause any evidence of commission of
that offence to disappear or give any information respecting the offence which he knew or believed to be false
was also not present. The applicant had not given any incorrect or false information to anybody and also did not
cause the disappearance of evidence of any offence. As per the direction of the Supreme Court above it was
the duty of the accused doctor to give the patient who was brought to her hospital in serious condition
immediate treatment. However, no prima facie case worth punishable under section 201, IPC was made out
against the accused. Therefore, framing of the charge for the said offence by the trial court was quashed.985
Where the allegation against the accused was that he removed and made the weapon of the offence disappear,
there was no evidence that the accused had gone to the spot of recovery and retrieved the weapon of offence,
the disclosure statement of the accused was inadmissible in the absence of any recovery, and hence no charge
could be proved under section 201 read with section 120, IPC against the co-accused on that count.986
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Also the commentary under the head “Whoever” on the point of charge may be referred to.
[s 201.37.1] Charge in the Alternative—Applicability of section 354(2), CrPC
The proper approach in such cases should be that a person be charged first with having committed a murder
and in the alternative, if the evidence does not show that he has committed the murder, for causing evidence to
disappear with the intention of screening the offender; in other words, of having been an accessory after the
fact. If he is acquitted of murder, he can be convicted of the offence under this section.987 It has been held that
where a person is charged under sections 302 and 201, the sessions Judge should not record a finding of
acquittal on the charge under this section without going into that question and taking the evidence into
consideration, on the mere ground that the accused has been convicted under section 302. If the evidence
discloses an offence under this section, he may be convicted under it even if acquitted under section 302 or
when the appellate court sets aside the conviction under section 302.988 But in an appeal before them, their
Lordships of the Privy Council have held that the proper avenue of approach in such a case is first and
foremost, to consider whether the case under section 302 has been made out. If so, that is an end of the
matter. If, on the other hand, the case under that section is not made out, then and only then, would it be proper
to consider whether an offence under section 201 has been established.989 Where the charge is framed in the
alternative in respect of offences under sections 302 and 201, a position may arise as contemplated by section
72, IPC. It may be open to the court to give the judgment that a person is guilty of one of the several offences
specified in the judgment, but that it is doubtful of which of these offences he is guilty. Such a finding is in
accordance with section 254(2), CrPC990 and will have the consequence that under section 72, IPC, the
offender is to be punished for the offence for which the lowest punishment is provided, the same punishment
not being provided for all.991
[s 201.38] Proof
In order to bring home an offence under this section, the prosecution has to prove:
(a) that an offence has been committed;
(b) that the accused knew or had reason to believe the commission of such offence;
(c) that with such knowledge or belief he—
(i) caused any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, or
(ii) gave any information respecting that offence which he then knew or believed to be false; and
(d) that he did so as aforesaid with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment; and
(e) if the charge be of an aggravated form, it must be proved further that the offence, in respect of which
the accused did, as in (iii) and (iv) was punishable with death, or with imprisonment for life or
imprisonment extending to ten years.992
Where the charge against police officers, accused numbers 14–17, was that as a part of a criminal conspiracy
with Bhai Thakur and his men, they had caused the evidence of the commission of the offence to disappear
and by that dishonest investigation had tried to screen the real offenders from legal punishment, they were held
to have committed offences punishable under sections 201, 217 and 218 read with section 120B, IPC and also
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under TADA. However, except the confessional statement of a co-accused, there was no other independent
evidence to show the involvement of the accused numbers 14–17 as alleged the confession, no doubt, created
a strong suspicion that these accused numbers 14–17 were maintaining good relations with Bhai Thakur and
they had possibly helped Bhai Thakur and Manik Patil in screening the real offender. However, it was not safe
to convict them on the basis of the confession of a co-accused.993
Where the prosecution case was that the appellant accused kidnapped a 12 year old girl, raped her, committed
her murder and threw her dead body in the bushes, the evidence of last seen was found not reliable, and the
identity of the appellant accused not being fully established, the appellant accused was not convicted of
offences under sections 363, 376, 302 and 201, IPC.994
Where evidence was lacking to show that the appellant accused T had beheaded the deceased or concealed
the blood stained head part of the deceased in a cave in the forest, the appellant accused T was acquitted of
the charge under section 201 read with section 34, IPC.995
Where the oral evidence of the PWs that the appellant accused after committing the murder of his brother-in-
law had dumped the dead body of the deceased in the septic tank was found not reliable, appellant accused
was acquitted of the charge under section 201, IPC.996
An offence under this section is established when the approver’s deposition relating to the offence, is coupled
with very reliable material in proof of the recovery of the dead body of the deceased at the instance of the
accused and the recovery is believed by the court for good reasons.997 Where there was no evidence to show
that any attempt was made by the appellants A and G to destroy the evidence of rape, they were acquitted of
the charge under section 201 read with section 34, IPC.998
In one case, charges against the accused were of offences of criminal conspiracy and causing the
disappearance of evidence, under sections 120B and 201, IPC respectively, and the evidence on record
corroborated the evidence of the approver. The apex court upheld the conviction of the accused for these
offences.999
[s 201.38.1] This Offence can be Proved by Circumstantial Evidence
An offence under this section can also be established by circumstantial evidence.1000 The fact that a
photographer had been sent for and his arrival was awaited before the discovery of the dead bodies tells its
own story. The police were so sure about the dead bodies that they had decided to secure the presence of a
photographer beforehand. The fact that they were so sure about the presence of the dead bodies is suggestive
that the presence of the dead bodies was known to them already. It was held that the prosecution evidence
regarding the alleged recovery of the dead bodies at the instance of the accused does not inspire confidence
and their conviction under section 201, IPC, was not maintainable.1001
Where the accused made a statement to the sub-inspector that he had buried the dead body of his wife in the
forest, which statement was not admissible in evidence under section 27, Evidence Act as the police sub-
inspector had already come to house on the basis of a prior first information report by prosecution witness 1
that the dead body of the wife of the accused had been buried in the forest, there could not be any conviction
under section 201, IPC on the basis of evidence which was legally inadmissible.1002
[s 201.39] Conviction when Accused not Found Guilty of Main Offence

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The fact that since the accused persons have been acquitted of the primary charges, recording of guilt under
sections 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, which were the ancillary charges, was not of much
consequence. So the accused persons are entitled to be acquitted on the charges under sections 201 and 34
Indian Penal Code, 1860 as well.1003 The charge under section 201, IPC, namely the destruction of evidence
relating to the commission of an offence is intrinsically interlinked with the first head of charge under section
302, Indian Penal Code 1860 and it was submitted that if the first charge fails, automatically the conviction
under the second head would also have to go. In the majority of cases this position would hold good. There
could, however, be a category of cases in which the charge under section 201, IPC, could result in an
independent conviction even if for technical reasons the charge as regards the main offence has not resulted in
a conviction. Undoubtedly, this would be in a microscopically small number of cases.1004
In Reg v Kashinath Dinkar,1005 the illustration appended to this section was relied on for showing that the
section was intended to apply exclusively to a person other than the offender himself. But illustrations rank only
as cases decided on the section;1006 and it has often been decided that they ought never to be allowed to
control the plain meaning of the section itself.1007 The true principle seems to be that there is no law preventing
the main offender from being convicted under sections 201–203, but in practice no court will convict an accused
both of the main offence and under these sections. It has been held that where in a case of murder, the
disposal of the bodies is a separate transaction from the murder, the conviction of the murderers under this
section in addition to a conviction under section 302 is not illegal, although a separate sentence is not called
for.1008 In a particular case, notwithstanding that the accused was acquitted of offences under sections 304B
and 498A, IPC he has to be convicted of the offence punishable under section 201, IPC inasmuch as the body
of the deceased who had committed suicide was cremated without informing the police.1009 There is no quarrel
with the legal principle that notwithstanding acquittal with reference to offence under section 302, IPC,
conviction under section 201 is permissible, in a given case.1010
If the commission of the main offence by the accused is not brought home to him, then he can be convicted
under sections 201–203.1011 A conviction on a charge of having been an accessory to an offence under section
201 is not illegal merely because it is suspected, but not proved or admitted, that the accused committed, or
was one of the several persons, who committed the principal offence.1012 In Nazru v Emperor,1013 it was
remarked:
We are not prepared to propound the extreme view that mere suspicion that an individual is the actual murderer would
prevent his conviction under section 201, Indian Penal Code, on proof that he had made away with evidence of
murder, and we do not think that the rulings, all of which deal with the special circumstances of particular cases go so
far as that. We think that if there is clear and independent proof that any person has caused evidence to disappear in
order to screen some ‘person or persons unknown’, the mere fact that he had been suspected, or even tried and
acquitted of the crime itself, would not, in itself, prevent his conviction under section 201. A person who has been
acquitted of a crime is in the eye of the law not the principal offender, who, if no one has been convicted, would be
some person unknown.
[s 201.40] Conviction when Main Accused is Acquitted of Main Offence
When the main accused is acquitted of the charge under section 302, IPC, conviction of a co-accused under
section 201, IPC cannot be sustained.1014
But subsequently the same apex court took a contrary view when it held that it was not absolutely necessary
that somebody else should have been found guilty of the main offence so as to convict the accused under
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Mere removal of the dead body at the instance of the main accused from one place to another would not
amount to causing disappearance of evidence particularly when main accused was ultimately acquitted of not
only principal offence under section 304 but also offence under section 201.1016
When the main accused against whom the allegations were levied under sections 302, 201, c 109 and 34,
Indian Penal Code 1860 were acquitted and only the allegation against the petitioner accused was that he
assisted in cremating the body, in such circumstances, it was held that the order taking cognizance under
section 201 cannot be sustained, so the proceedings against the absconding accused were quashed under
section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.1017
[s 201.41] Conviction—Two Premises
It is not necessary that the offender himself should have been found guilty of the main offence for the purpose
of convicting him of an offence under section 201. Nor is it absolutely necessary that somebody else should
have been found guilty of the main offence. Nonetheless, it is imperative that prosecution should have
established two premises. First is that an offence has been committed and second is that the accused knew
about it or he had reasons to believe the commission of that offence. Then and then alone the prosecution can
succeed, provided the remaining postulates of the offence are also established.1018
[s 201.42] Conviction without Charge
Even if there is no charge under section 201, a man may be convicted of the offence under it if the evidence is
such as to establish a charge that might have been made1019 and where a person is acquitted of the charge of
murder and other cognate charges, with which he is charged, his conviction under section 201 without any
further charge is not illegal.1020
A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has also held that it is a well settled proposition that where
a charge under section 302, IPC has been framed and the prosecution has failed to prove the same and where
the screening of offence has been made out and the accused person has got knowledge about the death and
purposely misled the police and public, conviction under section 201, IPC can be made even without framing a
charge.1021
[s 201.43] Accused Charged under Sections 302, 201, 324 and 34, IPC can be Convicted under Sections 302
and 201, IPC
Even if charge has been framed under sections 302, 201, 324 and 34, IPC conviction can be made under
sections 302 and 201, IPC unless prejudice is shown to have been caused to the accused.1022
[s 201.44] Sentence
The offence under this section is not punishable more severely than the principal offence. The punishment
varies according to the gravity of the offence and the punishment for the principal offence. The erroneous belief
or delusion of the accused does not furnish the measure of punishment under this section.1023
The first paragraph of the section contains the postulates for constituting the offence while the remaining three
paragraphs prescribe three different tiers of punishments depending upon the degree of offence in each
situation. The two indispensable ingredients for all the three tiers in section 201, IPC are: (a) the accused
should have had the knowledge that an offence has been committed or at least that he should have had
reasons to believe so; and (b) he should then have caused the disappearance of the evidence of the
commission of that offence. The prosecution cannot escape from establishing the aforesaid two basic
Page 33 of 50
ingredients for conviction of the accused under section 201.
The gravest degree contemplated in section 201 is punishable with the maximum sentence of imprisonment for
seven years. The minimum requirement for the offences to reach the said peak degree is that the offender
should have caused the disappearance of evidence of another offence which is punishable with death, and that
should be established in addition to the above mentioned two basic ingredients. Even if the two basics are
established, and the prosecution failed to establish the next requirement, the court cannot convict the accused
for the highest sentence specified in the section.1024
Before a person may be convicted of an offence under this section, it must be found what the original offence
committed was, evidence of which was done away with, and before he could be sentenced thereunder, the part
of this section applicable to the case must be determined. Without doing this, a conviction and sentence under
this section cannot be sustained.1025
In a case of gangrape and murder of a minor girl where the accused caused the evidence of commission of the
offence to disappear with the intention of screening themselves from punishment, their conviction under section
201, IPC was upheld and since they knew that the offence committed by them was punishable with death, they
could be punished under section 201, pt II, IPC with imprisonment up to seven years, and their sentence of
seven years rigorous imprisonment each under this provision was confirmed.1026
Where accused were found guilty for offences under sections 304B, 498A and 201, IPC, the sentences were
directed to run concurrently.1027
[s 201.45] Sentence Undergone
Considering the fact that all the appellants accused were above 70 years of age, and they were not connected
with the first part of the occurrence, in the interest of justice, sentence was reduced to the period already
undergone. One appellant had been in custody for about five months and another appellant had been in
custody for three months fifteen days.1028
A person causing the disappearance of the evidence of two offences commits two separate offences under this
section. But the court should not ordinarily award two separate punishments for the same act constituting two
such offences under this section.1029 The court should not also award the maximum sentence in each and every
case. Unless there are very aggravating circumstances, a sentence of three to five years in cases falling under
clause 1 would meet the ends of justice though there cannot be any hard and fast rule about it.1030 In Sugni v
State of Rajasthan,1031 the appellant, when her appeal was heard by the High Court, was aged about 64 years
and remained under custody for a period of eight months and ten days. Looking at her old age, her sentence of
three years simple imprisonment was reduced to the period of her custody.
The Division Bench of the same Rajasthan High Court in Heeru Das v State of Rajasthan, where the age of the
accused lady was 83 years, reduced her sentence under section 201, IPC to the period already undergone,
keeping in view the age of the accused.1032 Keeping in view the age and family background of the accused,
sentence of five years imposed by the courts below was reduced to two years RI.1033
In case of dowry death, where the appellants accused were relatives of the husband of the deceased, and the
accused had already served 10 months imprisonment during trial, the occurrence being 12 years old, sentence
Page 34 of 50
was reduced to the period already undergone.1034
In the Mumbai Bomb Blast case, the co-accused A124 was convicted under section 25(1-B), Arms Act and
section 201, IPC for destroying the arms of the co-accused. The co-accused was aged 82 years, so,
considering his age and also the fact that there was no substantive evidence for convicting him for offence
under section 25(1-A) of the Arms Act, the Supreme Court reduced the sentence to one year and also directed
that the sentences shall run concurrently.1035
The sentence of a woman accused and convicted under section 201, IPC was reduced by the apex court from
7 years rigorous imprisonment to already undergone imprisonment of about four years and eight months.1036
Where the accused was 18 years of age and staying with her brothers at the time of the incident, the possibility
of his having been pressurised by his brothers for causing the disappearance of evidence cannot be ruled out
and on these facts and circumstance, the sentence of seven years of imprisonment awarded to the accused
was reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone by him.1037
Where the accused persons convicted under sections 201 and 120B, IPC were Government employees, their
substantive sentence was reduced to the period of imprisonment which they had already undergone.1038
[s 201.46] Probation
The accused 1 had committed rape on his cousin, his wife, accused 2, when apprised by the prosecutrix, asked
her not to disclose the incident to any one and cleaned the blood stained clothes of the prosecutrix, blood
stained door, took her to the hospital for medical aid, and informed her parents also. Considering the conduct of
the accused, she was granted probation under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.1039
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
744 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
Page 35 of 50
745 See 1 Dale 618.
746 Vijaya v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2003 SC 3787 [LNIND 2003 SC 739] : (2003) Cr LJ 4318 (SC).
747 Sunkara Suri Babu v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) Cr LJ 1480 (AP).
748 State of Orissa v Chintai Reddy, 47 Cut LT 293, p 294 : 1979 Cut LR (Cr) 30; Re Venkatasuryanarasinha Rao, AIR
1955 AP 82 [LNIND 1954 AP 22] ; SR Mulani v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] : (1968)
All WR (SC) 651, p 652 : (1968) Cr LJ 1013 ; State of Orissa v Trinath Dash, (1982) Cr LJ 942 (Ori) (DB).
749 Md Siddique Ali Sardar v State of West Bengal, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 299 (Cal) (DB).
750 Sumanta Dhupi v Emperor, (1916) 17 Cr LJ 4 , p 5.
751 1 Hale 618, 4 BL Com 37.
752 Seventh Report, sections 103–08 cited in First Report, section 220, reprint, p 242; Re Kuttayan, AIR 1960 Mad 9
[LNIND 1959 MAD 219] , p 12, (1960) Cr LJ 65 , (1959) ILR Mad 654, 72 Mad LW 522.
753 Re Kottayan, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] , p 12.
754 Re Kottyan, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] , p 12; Re Shami, (1884) PR No 42.
755 Emperor v Rino Sobedar, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 721 , p 722 : 6 Serv LR 76.
756 Re Kottayan, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] , p 12 : (1960) Cr LJ 65 .
757 Harishchandrasing Sajjansing Rathod v State of Gujarat, AIR 1979 SC 1232 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] : (1979) Cr LJ 1025
(SC).
758 Bhagwan Swarup v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1991 SC 2062 [LNIND 1991 SC 416] : (1991) Cr LJ 3123 (SC).
759 State of West Bengal v Hari Ramalu, (2004) Cr LJ 2659 (Cal) (DB).
760 Roshan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413 [LNIND 1964 SC 339] , p 1418 : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 26 ; Harbans Lal v
State, AIR 1967 HP 10 [LNIND 1965 HP 8] : (1967) Cr LJ 62 ; Suleman Rahiman Mulani v State of Maharashtra, AIR
1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] : (1968) Cr LJ 1013 ; K Puran Chandra Rao v Public Prosecutor, AIR 1975 SC
1925 [LNIND 1975 SC 316] , (1975) Cr LJ 1671 ; Re Sumitra Sherpani, (1975) Cr LJ 169 (Gau); Chan v State of
Rajasthan, (1977) CLR (Raj) 649; Bharat Samantra v State, (1974) Cut LT 400.
761 State of Madhya Pradesh v Shyamsunder Trivedi, (1995) 4 SCC 262 [LNIND 1995 SC 644] .
Page 36 of 50
762 State of Sikkim v Milan Kumar Diyali, (2005) Cr LJ 4097 (Sik) (DB).
763 Mani Kumar Thapa v State of Sikkim, AIR 2002 SC 2920 [LNIND 2002 SC 508] : (2002) 7 SCC 157 [LNIND 2002 SC
508] ; see also State of Sikkim v Milan Kumar Diyali, (2005) Cr LJ 4097 (Sik) (DB); Tejinder Singh v State of Punjab,
2013 Cr LJ 3130 : (2013) 12 SCC 503 [LNIND 2013 SC 438] ; Sukhram v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 3050
[LNIND 2007 SC 969] : 2007 (3) Crimes 354 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 426 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] .
764 State of Maharashtra v Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 [LNIND 1999 SC 1126] ; see also State of Sikkim v Milan Kumar
Diyali, (2005) Cr LJ 4097 (Sik) (DB).
765 Mohibur Rahman v State of Assam, AIR 2002 SC 3064 ; see also State of Sikkim v Milan Kumar Diyali, (2005) Cr LJ
4097 (Sik) (DB).
766 State of Sikkim v Milan Kumar Diyali, (2005) Cr LJ 4097 (Sik) (DB).
767 Joseph v State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 1608 [LNIND 2000 SC 746] : (2000) 2 SCC (Cr) 926 : (2000) Cr LJ 2467; see
also State of Jharkhand v Suresh Prasad Mehta, (2006) Cr LJ 2498 (Jhar) (DB).
768 Deonandan Mishra v State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 801 [LNIND 1955 SC 67] : (1955) Cr LJ 1647 ; see also State of
Jharkhand v Suresh Prasad Mehta, (2006) Cr LJ 2498 (Jhar) (DB).
769 Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal v State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) Cr LJ 4626 (SC).
770 Palvinder Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354 [LNIND 1952 SC 54] : (1953) SCR 94 [LNIND 1952 SC 54] ;
Empress v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279 (FB); State of Orissa v Chintal Reddy, (1979) 47 Cut LT 293, p 294.
771 Chau v State of Rajasthan, (1977) CLR (Raj) 649; Vijaya v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2003 SC 3787 [LNIND 2003 SC
739] : (2003) Cr LJ 4318 (SC).
772 Koshali Puranchander Rao v The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1925 [LNIND 1975 SC 316] :
(1975) Cr LT 1671; Keshave Kishore Sinha v State of Bihar, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 7 (Pat).
773 State of Rajasthan v Ramjilal, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 539 (Raj).
774 State of West Bengal v Hari Ramalu, (2004) Cr LJ 2659 (Cal) (DB); State of Karnataka v Madesha, (2007) 7 SCC 35
[LNIND 2007 SC 918] : 2007 (9) Scale 523 [LNIND 2007 SC 918] : 2007 (5) Supreme 746 : 2007 (7) SLT 320 : 2007
(3) SCC(Cr) 292 : 2007 (3) Crimes 298 (SC).
775 Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal v State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 Cr LJ 4626 , p 4632 : AIR 2006 SC 6 [LNIND 2005 SC
815] : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1 .
776 Ram Saran Mohto v State of Bihar, (1999) Cr LJ 4311 (SC) : (1999) III CCR 223 (SC).
777 Torab Ali v Queen-Empress, ILR 22 Cal 638; Queen v Ramsoonder Shootar, 7 WR (Cr) 52; Reg v Kashinath Dinkar, 8
Bom HCR (Cr) 126; Queen-Empress v Lalli, 7 ILR All 749; Queen-Empress v Dungar, ILR 8 All 252; Queen-Empress v
Krishna, ILR 2 All 713; Empress v Behela Bibi, 12 CPLR (Cr) 17; Emperor v Ghunsham Ramchandra Mantru, 4 Cr LJ
89 : 8 Bom LR 538; Kudaon v Emperor, AIR 1925 Ngp 407 ; Ahmed v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 209 : 27 Cr LJ 109; Rup
Page 37 of 50
Narain v Emperor, AIR 1931 Pat 172 : 32 Cr LJ 975 : ILR 10 Pat 140 : 12 PLT 746; State v Laikham Pradhan, AIR
1956 Ori 108 [LNIND 1955 ORI 16] : (1956) Cr LJ 638 ; the decisions in (1); State v Mohanlal, AIR 1958 Raj 338
[LNIND 1955 RAJ 319] (2); Dharma v State, (1966) Raj 74 and (3); Lai Khan Khatia v State, (1966) Cut LT 1155, do not
lay down the correct law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Kalawati v State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR
1953 SC 131 [LNIND 1953 SC 5] : (1953) Cr LJ 668 .
778 Kalawati v State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 131 [LNIND 1953 SC 5] , p 135 : (1953) Cr LJ 668 ; Ranchod v
State, AIR 1956 MB 262 ; Re Kottayan, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] ; Re Madupula Jeremiah, AIR 1957
AP 611 : (1957) Cr LJ 1071 : (1956) ILR AP 173; Nebti Mandal v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 289 : 41 Cr LJ 910 : ILR 19
Pat 369; Mahadeo Nath Khetri v Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 550 : 42 Cr LJ 603 : 22 PLT 1035; Mata Din v Emperor, AIR
1930 Oudh 113 : 31 Cr LJ 575 : 5 ILR Luck 255.
780 Section 6, IPC.
781 Explanation to section 203, IPC.
782 Thakri v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 425, 426 : 17 PWR (Cr) 1911.
783 Netrananda Naik v State of Orissa, 2011 Cr LJ 813 , p 817 (Ori) (DB).
784 Dharam Deo Yadav v State of UP, 2014 Cr LJ 2371 (SC) : (2014) 5 SCC 509 [LNIND 2014 SC 395] : (2014) 138 AIC
30 (SC).
785 R v Pelkoo Nushyo, 2 WR (Cr) 43; Matuki v R, ILR 11 Cal 619; R v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279; R v Joy Narain Patro, 20
WR (Cr) 66.
786 Emperor v Ghanasham Ramchandra Maitri, 4 Cr LJ 89 : 8 Bom LR 338.
787 Anverkhan Mahamadkhan v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 115 , 117 : 22 Cr LJ 609 : 23 Bom LR 823; Emperor v Sevalal,
ILR 37 Bom 658 : 15 Bom LR 694.
788 R v Palkoo Nushyo, 2 WR (Cr) 43; Matuki v R, ILR 11 Cal 619; R v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279; R v Joy Narain Patro, 20
WR (Cr) 66.
789 Queen-Empress v Saminath, ILR 4 Mad 400, 403 : 1 Weir 195 : 1 Mad LJ 163; SR Mulani v State of Maharashtra, AIR
1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] : (1968) All WR (SC) 651, 652; Kota Subba Reddy v State of Andhra Pradesh,
(1996) 2 Andh LT (Cr) 64 , 66 (AP) : (1996) 2 AP LJ 341 (HC).
790 Palvinder Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354 [LNIND 1952 SC 54] , p 356.
791 Re Antappa, AIR 1959 Mys 250 ; Manji Prasad v State, (1996) JIC 769 (All) where the above decision of the Supreme
Court was followed.
792 Prasanta Kumar Chhotray v State of Orissa, 2008 Cr LJ 4268 (Ori) (DB).
Page 38 of 50
793 Re Venkatasuryanarasimha Rao, AIR 1955 AP 82 [LNIND 1954 AP 22] .
794 Empress of India v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279 (FB); Matuki Misser v Queen-Empress, ILR 11 Cal 619; Adho v Emperor,
AIR 1925 Sind 257 : 26 Cr LJ 897; Emperor v Maduranath De, AIR 1932 Cal 850 : 33 Cr LJ 657; Roshanlal v State of
Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413 [LNIND 1964 SC 339] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 426 , p 428; SR Mulani v State of Maharashtra, AIR
1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] : (1968) Cr LJ 1019 ; B Nath v State of Orissa, AIR 1973 SC 2337 : (1973) Cr LJ
1585 ; Re Sumitra Sherpani, (1975) Cr LJ 169 , 170 (Gau); Mazahar Ali v State, (1976) Cr LJ 1629 , p 1640 : (1976)
Kash LJ 179 ; State of Orissa v Chinta Reddy, (1979) 47 Cut LT 293; Sharwan Kumar Biruduram v State of Rajasthan,
2017 Cr LJ 269 (Raj).
795 Dashrath Mahadeo Borate v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 2 B Cr C 22 , p 33 (Bom).
796 Gati Behera v State of Orissa, (1997) Cr LJ 4331 (Ori).
797 Ibid.
798 Empress of India v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279 (FB), per Oldfield, J; Pratap Singh v State, (1967) 69 Punj LR 630 , p
637.
799 Sharwan Kumar Biruduram v State of Rajasthan, 2017 Cr LJ 269 (Raj).
800 Nathu v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1245 : (1979) Cr LJ 1066 : (1979) 3 SCC 574 : (1979) UJ (SC) 298;
State v Rudra, (1985) 1 Crimes 125 .
801 Re Kuttayan, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] , p 13.
802 Arbind Singh v State of Bihar, (1994) Cr LJ 1227 (SC).
803 Kodali Puranchandra Rao v The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1925 [LNIND 1975 SC 316] :
(1975) Cr LJ 1671 : (1975) CLR (SC) 544 : (1975) 2 SCC 570 [LNIND 1975 SC 316] : (1975) Cr App Rep (SC) 330 .
804 Shamim Rahman v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1883 [LNIND 1975 SC 175] , p 1890 : (1975) SCC (Cr) 297 :
(1975) CLR (SC) 407 : (1975) Cr App Rep (SC) 233 : (1975) Cr LJ 1654 ; Ram Chandra v State, (1980) All LJ 762
(DB); Nathu v State, AIR 1979 SC 1245 : (1979) Cr LJ 1066 .
805 Nathu v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1245 : (1979) Cr LJ 1066 : (1979) CLR (SC) 167 : (1979) SCC (Cr) 733 :
(1979) UJ (SC) 298 : (1979) 3 SCC 574 .
806 Nawab Din v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 516 , p 517 : 34 Cr LJ 683; Ali Baksh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Sind 28 , p 30 : 38 Cr
LJ 363.
807 Kushaba v State of Maharashtra, (1985) Cr LJ 1369 (Bom).
808 Queen v Gouburdhun Bera, 6 WR (Cr) 80(2).
809 Emperor v Rino Sobedar, 13 Cr LJ 722; Rup Narain Kurmi v Emepror, AIR 1931 Pat 172 , p 174; Besista Jani v State,
(1974) Cut LR (Cr) 242.
810 Roshan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413 [LNIND 1964 SC 339] , p 1417.
811 Basdev v State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 [LNIND 1956 SC 34] , p 490.
812 Re Kuttayan, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] , p 13; Emperor v Rino Sobedar, 13 Cr LJ 721.
Page 39 of 50
813 Section 26 and the commentary thereunder.
814 Re Kandipuri Lakshmanna, 1 Weir 180.
815 Re Sumitra Sherpani, (1975) Cr LJ 169 (Gau).
816 Ashok Dhariwal v State of Rajasthan, (1983) CLR (Raj) 436.
817 Jogata Kikla v State, AIR 1962 Guj 225 [LNIND 1961 GUJ 47] : (1982) 2 Cr LJ 66 .
818 Harbanslal v State, AIR 1967 HP 10 [LNIND 1965 HP 8] : (1967) Cr LJ 62 .
819 Sudam Bind v State of Bihar, (2000) Cr LJ 2158 (Pat) (DB); State of Karnataka v Madesha, (2007) 7 SCC 35 [LNIND
2007 SC 918] .
820 Re Sumitra Sharpani, (1975) Cr LJ 169 (Gau).
821 Meeraj Alam v State of Bihar, 2008 Cr LJ 4384 , p 4388 (Pat).
822 Mohammad Adil v State (Through Public Prosecutor), 2009 (1) Mah LJ (Cri) 596 (Bom).
823 Ibid; Ramu v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) CLR (MP HCN) 352.
824 Baburao Rajaram Bhairat v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 272 (Bom) (DB) : (2010) 1 Bom CR (Cri) 638) .
825 Sachin v State, 2007 Cr LJ 3947 (Del) (DB).
826 Ranjodh Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2015 Cr LJ 3857 (HP) (DB).
827 State of Gujarat v Koli (Makwana) Chhaganbhai Laxmanbhai, 2009 Cr LJ 3557 (Guj) (DB).
828 Rajendran & etc v State of Tamil Nadu, (1997) Cr LJ 4344 (Mad) (DB).
829 Hawa Hembram v State of West Bengal, (1998) Cr LJ 3990 (Cal) (DB).
830 Jogta Kikla v State, AIR 1962 Guj 225 [LNIND 1961 GUJ 47] , p 226 : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 66 ; Ramu v State of Madhya
Pradesh, (1980) CLR (MP HCN) 352, p 353.
831 State of Rajasthan v Hanif Khan, 2009 Cr LJ 1765 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 2043 [LNIND 2009 SC 430] : (2009) 3 SCC 549
[LNIND 2009 SC 430] ; see also Pawan v State of Uttaranchal, 2009 Cr LJ 2257 (SC) : 2009 (3) Scale 195 [LNIND
Page 40 of 50
2009 SC 464] : (2009) 15 SCC 259 [LNIND 2009 SC 464] (Rape and murder — Case based on- circumstantial
evidence — Conviction held proper).
832 Ram Chandra v State, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 670 (All) (DB).
833 Ashok v State of Rajasthan, 2009 Cr LJ 2467 (Raj) (DB).
834 State of Bihar v Nand Kishore Yadav, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 403 (Pat) (DB).
835 Somdas Khuman Das Goswami etc v State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 737 (Chh) (DB).
836 Raju Yadav v State of Chhattisgarh, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 152 (Chh) (DB).
837 Benulal Debnath v State of Tripura, 2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 212 (Gauh).
838 Jatashankar Sah v State of Bihar, 2013 Cr LJ 1992 (Pat).
839 Re Mir Afzal, 25 PR 1881 (Cr); Ramu v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) CLR (MP) 352, p 353.
840 KK Patnayak (Dr) v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) Cr LJ 4911 (MR).
841 Mahesh Mahto v State of Bihar, (1997) Cr LJ 4402 (SC).
842 State of Madhya Pradesh v Molai, (1999) Cr LJ 2698 (MP) (DB); B Ganesh v State of Karnataka, 2015 Cr LJ 3343
(Kant) (DB) (Accused killed the deceased, cut his dead body into pieces and threw into river.).
843 Ranjeet Kumar Jha v State of Bihar, 2012 Cr LJ 759 (Pat) (DB); Mahadeo Mondal v State of Chhattisgarh, 2017 Cr LJ
1058 (Chh) (DB).
844 Sanjiv Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1999) Cr LJ 1138 (SC).
845 Ashok v State of Rajasthan, 2009 Cr LJ 2467 (Raj) (DB).
846 State of Bihar v Nand Kishore Yadav, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 403 (Pat) (DB).
847 Nihal Singh & etc v State of Punjab, (2000) Cr LJ 3298 (P&H); see also Ram Badan Sharma v State of Bihar, AIR 2006
SC 2855 [LNIND 2006 SC 632] : 2006 Cr LJ 4070 .
848 Suresh Sao v State of Jharkhand, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 626 (Jhar).
849 State v Duryodhan Rout, 2008 Cr LJ 2876 (Ori) (DB).

Page 41 of 50
850 Narayan Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2001) Cr LJ 3725 (Raj).
851 Ramesh Kumar Bhaverlal Jain v State of Gujarat, (2001) Cr LJ 4069 (Guj) (DB).
852 Subash Chandra Pande v State of Orissa, (2001) Cr LJ 4108 (Ori) (DB); Tara Singh v State, Thr. Home Secretary,
Uttrakhand, 2014 Cr LJ 2154 , (2014) 12 SCC 383 . (Concealed the dead body in cane)
853 Dhura v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1995 SC 1963 .
854 State of Uttar Pradesh v Karan Singh AIR 1975 SC 455 [LNIND 1974 SC 320] : (1975) Cr LJ 425 .
855 Mulakh Raj etc v Satish Kumar AIR 1992 SC 1175 [LNIND 1992 SC 322] .
856 Mallareddi Madana Mohanarao v State of Andhra Pradesh (2006) Cr LJ 2332 (AP).
857 Suman Rajowar v State of Assam, 2011 Cr LJ 2984 , p 2988 (Gauh) (DB).
858 Mani Kumar Thappa v State of Sikkim, (2002) Cr LJ 876 (Sik).
859 Madhu v State of Karnataka, AIR 2014 SC 394 [LNIND 2013 SC 1011] : (2014) 12 SCC 419 [LNIND 2013 SC 1011] :
(2014) 133 AIC 87 (SC).
860 Prakash Dhawal Khernath (Patil) v State of Maharashtra, (2002) Cr LJ 928 (SC).
861 Col Mohan Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1980 SC 1560 [LNIND 1979 SC 305] : (1980) Cr LJ 1098 : (1979) SCC
(Cr) 882 : (1979) 4 SCC 11 [LNIND 1979 SC 305] ; Moti v State of Rajasthan, (1980) Raj Cr Cas 122, p 124 (DB).
862 Velayutham v State, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 845 (Mad) (DB).
863 Tara Singh v State Thr Home Secretary, Uttarakhand, 2014 Cr LJ 2154 , p 2157 (SC) : (2014) 137 AIC 195 : (2014) 12
SCC 383 .
864 In ref received from Sessions Judge Narsinghpur (MP), 2014 Cr LJ 4024 , p 4031 (MP) (DB).
865 State of Jharkhand v Alber Oraon, 2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 336 (Jhar) (DB).
866 State of Karnataka v K Gopalakrishna, 2005 Cr LJ 1436 , pp 1439, 1440 (SC) : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1237 [LNIND 2005 SC
58] : AIR 2005 SC 1014 [LNIND 2005 SC 58] .
867 Ramesh v State through Inspector of Police, AIR 2014 SC 2852 [LNIND 2014 SC 738] , p 2861.
868 Bani Israil Zinnatunnessa Bibi v State of West Bengal, 2007 Cr LJ 1859 , p 1864 (Cal) (DB).
Page 42 of 50
869 Sivan v State of Kerala, 2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 273 (Ker).
870 Charandas Swami v State of Gujarat, 2017 Cr LJ 2904 (SC) : (2017) 7 SCC 177 [LNIND 2017 SC 170] : (2017) 3 SCC
(Cri) 343 : AIR 2017 SC 1761 [LNIND 2017 SC 170] : (2017) 174 AIC 32 (SC).
871 State of West Bengal v Rakesh Singh, 2015 Cr LJ 3847 (Cal) (DB).
872 Dinesh kumar kalidas Patel v State of Gujarath, AIR 2018 SC 951 : 2018 (3) SCC 472 .
873 Queen-Empress v Lalli, 7 ILR All 749 : (1885) 5 All WN 165.
874 Emperor v Autar, AIR 1925 All 315 , p 316 : 26 Cr LJ 676 : ILR 47 All 306 : 25 All LJ 25.
875 Emperor v Rajan Mst, 3 Cr LJ 136, 138 : 16 PLR 674 : 53 PR (Cr) 1905; Lali Devi v Emperor, AIR 1949 Pat 80 : 50 Cr
LJ 124 : 29 PLT 171.
876 Re Mahommad Buksh, 21 PR 1882 (Cr).
877 Bhupendra Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1083 [LNIND 1991 SC 151] : 1991 Cr LJ 1337 .
878 Kuldip Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 2002 SC 3023 [LNIND 2002 SC 498] : (2002) Cr LJ 3944 (SC).
879 Khilawan Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 764 (Chh) (DB).
880 State of Orissa v Giribara Ada, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 225 (Ori) (DB).
881 Empress of India v Kishna, ILR 2 All 713; Nagendra Bhakta v Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal 144 : 35 Cr LJ 535.
882 Phika Ishan v State, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 886 , p 888 : 63 Punj LR 526.
883 Emperor v Autar, AIR 1925 All 315 , p 316 : 26 Cr LJ 683 : ILR 47 All 306; Emperor v Har Piari, AIR 1926 All 737 : 27
Cr LJ 1068 : 24 All LJ 258.
884 Riyasatali Mohammedsafi Musalman v State of Gujarat, 2011 Cr LJ 4702 , p 4708 (Guj) (DB).
885 Ram Badan Sharma v State of Bihar, (2006) Cr LJ 4070 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 2855 [LNIND 2006 SC 632] .
886 Syed Gani v State of Maharashtra, (2002) (VI) AD (SC) 163.
887 Bhuneshwar Prasad Chaurasia v State of Bihar, (2001) Cr LJ 3541 (Pat).

Page 43 of 50
888 Mahendra Sao v State of Jharkhand, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 169 (Jhar).
889 Diwan Singh v State of Uttaranchal, 2012 Cr LJ 3256 (Utr) (DB).
890 Mukesh v State of MP, 2008 Cr LJ (NOC) 106 (MP); Sudhir Kumar v State of Bihar, 2008 Cr LJ 13 (Pat) (DB).
891 Rajesh Panwar v State of Rajasthan, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 863 (Raj) (DB).
893 Ram Badan Sharma v State of Bihar, 2006 Cr LJ 4070 , p 4077 : AIR 2006 SC 2855 [LNIND 2006 SC 632] .
894 Maharashtra v Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 [LNIND 1999 SC 1126] ; State of Jharkhand v Suresh Prasad Mehta, (2006)
Cr LJ 2498 (Jhar) (DB).
895 Maharashtra v Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 [LNIND 1999 SC 1126] ; State of Jharkhand v Suresh Prasad Mehta, (2006)
Cr LJ 2498 (Jhar) (DB).
896 Kumaravel v State, 2009 Cr LJ 262 (Mad) (DB).
897 State of HP v Sant Ram, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 552 (HP) (DB).
898 Nanhe Singh v State of Uttarakhand, 2012 Cr LJ 3128 (Utr) (DB).
899 Poshakadantha alias Poshi v State of Karnataka, 2008 Cr LJ (NOC) 72 (Kant) (DB).
900 State of Assam v Anupam Das, 2008 Cr LJ 1276 (Gauh) (DB).
901 Re Kuttayaan, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] , p 14; relying on Re Koricha Venkataswami, 39 Cr LJ 977
(Mad); Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 104 [LNIND 1954 SC 142] , p 117 : (1955) Cr LJ
196 ; Daddulla v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 690 : (1961) MPLJ 1291 ; Sher Mahommad v Emperor, AIR
1945 Lah 27 : 46 Cr LJ 407; Nagan v Emperor, 1937 Mad WN 544; Emperor v Ponnushami Thevan, (1936) Mad WN
1389; Re Periasami Thevan, (1934) Mad WN 128; Muthu Goundan v Emperor, (1931) Mad WN 785; Re Parasa
Mangadu, AIR 1949 Mad 270 [LNIND 1948 MAD 143] : (1948) Mad WN 683.
902 Damodar v State of Karnataka, (2000) Cr LJ 175 (SC).
903 Sujaya Kanta Deb v State of Tripura, (2001) Cr LJ 3249 (Gau).
904 Bhima Dehuri v State, (1995) 2 Crimes 230 (Ori); Palvinder Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354 [LNIND 1952 SC
54] ; Rahiman Mulan v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] ; Mangla Ram v State of
Rajasthan (1978) CLR 638 , p 641 (Raj); Nathu v State, AIR 1958 All 467 [LNIND 1957 ALL 211] , p 473 : (1958) Cr LJ
821 ; Dadulla Dhanukai Ram v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 690 : (1961) MPLJ 1291 ; S Siddappa v State,
(1966) 8 Law Rep 334, p 348 (Mys); State of Rajasthan & etc v Deva Ram, (2001) Cr LJ 2353 (Raj) (DB).
Page 44 of 50
905 State of Uttar Pradesh v Kapi Deo, AIR 1991 SC 2257 [LNIND 1991 SC 397] : (1991) Cr LJ 3321 .
906 Chunder Giani v State, AIR 1958 Punj 183 : (1958) Cr LJ 659 ; Lal Singh v Crown, 48 Cr LJ 786.
907 Jogta Kikla v State, AIR 1962 Guj 225 [LNIND 1961 GUJ 47] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 66 .
908 Chunder Giani v State, AIR 1958 Punj 183 , p 186.
909 Queen-Empress v Lall, 7 ILR All 749 : (1885) 5 All WN 165.
910 Chandan Singh v State of Uttaranchal, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 471 (Utr) (DB).
911 State of Orissa v Giribara Ada, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 225 (Ori) (DB).
912 Thakri v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 425, p 426 : 17 PWR 1911 (Cr); Re Venkatasurayanarasimha Rao, AIR 1955 AP 821 ;
Vishwanath v State of Maharashtra, (1981) CLR (Mah) 150; Mazhar Ali v State, (1976) Cr LJ 1629 ; following Rahiman
Mulani v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] : (1968) Cr LJ 1013 (SC); B Nath v State of
Orissa, AIR 1973 SC 2337 : (1973) Cr LJ 1585 (SC).
913 Kushaba v State of Maharashtra, (1985) Cr LJ 1369 (Bom) : (1983) Mah LR (Bom) 522.
914 Sukhram v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 4327 , p 4332 (SC) : AIR 2007 SC 3050 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] : 2007 (5)
Supreme 926 : 2007 (10) Scale 60 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] .
915 Ram Saren Mahto v State of Bihar, (1999) Cr LJ 4311 (SC).
916 State of Madhya Pradesh v Bhim Mohd, (2002) Cr LJ 1906 (Chhatisgarh).
917 Udaimanik Jamatia v State of Tripura, 2011 Cr LJ 4167 , p 4178 (Gauh) (DB).
918 Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 104 [LNIND 1954 SC 142] , p 117.
919 Anil v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2002) Cr LJ 2694 (All).
920 Pradeep Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2015 (3) Supreme 67 (SC).
921 Sher Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1945 Lah 27 : 46 Cr LJ 407.
922 Nathu v State, AIR 1958 All 467 [LNIND 1957 ALL 211] , p 473 : (1958) Cr LJ 821 .
923 Dadulla Dhanukai Ram v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 690 .

Page 45 of 50
924 Jogta Kikla v State, AIR 1962 Guj 225 [LNIND 1961 GUJ 47] , p 226 : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 66 .
925 Suryamani Del v State of Orissa, AIR 1979 SC 1534 : (1979) Cr LJ 959 .
926 Re Parasa Mangadu, AIR 1949 Mad 270 [LNIND 1948 MAD 143] : 50 Cr LJ 324 : (1948) 2 Mad LJ 375.
927 Jagdish Kumar v State, (1974) Cr LJ 133 , p 135 : (1973) All Cr R 280; but see Re Parsa Mangadu, AIR 1949 Mad
270 [LNIND 1948 MAD 143] : 50 Cr LJ 324.
928 Balal Chandra Biswas v State of West Bengal, AIR 1994 SC 914 : (1994) 2 East Cr Cases 143 (SC) : (1994) Cr LJ
1035, p 1037.
929 Ashok Dhariwal v State of Rajasthan (1983) CLR (Raj) 486.
930 Anverkhan Mahamadkhan v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 115 , 118 : 22 Cr LJ 609 : 23 Bom LR 823; followed in Chunder
Giani v State, AIR 1958 Punj 183 : (1958) Cr LJ 689 : (1957) ILR Punj 1985; Jogta Kikla v State, AIR 1962 Guj 225
[LNIND 1961 GUJ 47] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 66 .
931 R v Ramsoonder, 7 WR (Cr) 52.
932 R v Lalli, 7 ILR All 749.
933 Biren Changmai v Golap Changmai, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 855 (Gauh); Hemanta Kumar Behera v State of Orissa, 2010 Cr
LJ 3206 (Ori).
934 Chandrapal Singh v Maharaj Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1238 : (1982) Cr LJ 1731 : (1982) All RC 348 : (1982) All LJ 507 :
(1982) SCC (Cr) 249 : (1983) SC Cr R 70 : (1982) UJ (SC) 517.
935 Empress of India v Kishna, ILR 2 All 713.
936 Emperor v Har Piari, AIR 1926 All 737 , p 740 : 27 Cr LJ 1068 : 24 All LJ 958; Emperor v Autar, AIR 1925 All 315 , 26
Cr LJ 676 : ILR 47 All 306.
937 Upendra Chandra Poddar v Emperor, AIR 1941 Cal 456 , p 458 : 42 Cr LJ 796 : 45 Cal WN 633; Nagendra Bhakta v
Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal 144 : 35 Cr LJ 535 : 37 Cal WN 348.
938 Nagendra Bhakta v Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal 144 .
939 Jogta Kikla v State, AIR 1962 Cuj 225 : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 66; dissenting from Chunder Giani v State, AIR 1958 Punj
183.
940 Lal Singh v Crown, (1948) Cr LJ 786 per Teja Singh J; followed in Chunder Giani v State, AIR 1958 Punj 183.
941 Aung Kyaw Zan v Crown, 1 LBR 316.

942 Emperor v Autar, AIR 1925 All 315 , p 316, per Sulaiman, J.
943 Batapa Bada Seth v State, (1987) Cr LJ 1976 : (1987) 1 Crimes 365 [LNIND 1986 ORI 96] (Ori); State of Orissa v
Trinath Dash, (1982) Cr LJ 942 (Ori) (DB) : (1982) Cut LR 20; Bhagaban Kirsani v State, (1985) Cr LJ 868 (Ori) : (1984)
2 Crimes 645 : (1984) 58 Cut LT 591 (Ori).
944 Queen v Toolshee Rai, 5 NWPHCR 186; Jamnadas Parusram v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1963 MP 106 [LNIND
1962 MP 173] : (1962) Jab LJ 876 ; Nathu v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1245 .
Page 46 of 50
945 Bakhtawari v Emperor, AIR 1930 All 45 , p 48 : 31 Cr LJ 37; Bachchanlal v State, AIR 1957 All 184 [LNIND 1956 ALL
165] : (1957) Cr LJ 344 : (1957) All LJ 20; Sumanta Dhupi v Emperor, (1916) 17 Cr LJ 4 : 20 Cal WN 166 : 23 Cal LJ
333.
946 Empress v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279 (FB).

947 Queen v Toolshee Rai, 5 NWP 186.
948 Emperor v Rino Sobedar, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 721 , p 722 : 6 Serv LR 76.
949 Nagendra Bhakta v Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal 144 : 35 Cr LJ 535; Re Parasa Mangadu, AIR 1949 Mad 270 [LNIND
1948 MAD 143] : (1948) 2 Mad LJ 375 : (1948) Mad WN 683 : 50 Cr LJ 324; Lalita Devi v Emperor, AIR 1949 Pat 80 , p
81 : 50 Cr LJ 124.
950 Vali Isa Mahommad v State, AIR 1963 Guj 135 [LNIND 1961 GUJ 86] : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 756 , p 759.
951 Krishna v State of Haryana, (2000) I CCR 218 (P&H).
952 Re Parasa Mangadu, AIR 1949 Mad 270 [LNIND 1948 MAD 143] .
953 Prakash Dhawal Khernath (Patil) v State of Maharashtra, (2002) Cr LJ 928 (SC).
954 Chunder Giani v State, AIR 1958 Punj 183 .
955 State of Uttar Pradesh v Bal Kishan Das, (1997) Cr LJ 73 (SC).
956 Chandra Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 391 (Chh) (DB).
957 Lalita Devi v Emepror, AIR 1949 Pat 80 , p 81 : 50 Cr LJ 12.
958 Sardar Singh etc v State (Delhi Admn, Delhi), AIR 1993 SC 1696 [LNIND 1993 SC 153] : (1993) Cr LJ 1489 .
959 Ibid.
960 State of Kerala v Markose, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] , p 135 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 610 : (1962) ILR Ker 224;
Kalawati v State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 131 [LNIND 1953 SC 5] .
961 Queen v Subramanya Pillai, 3 Mad HCR 251 : 1 Weir 179; Ali Baksh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Sind 28 ; Re Pattammal,
AIR 1940 Mad 898 [LNIND 1940 MAD 162] : 41 Cr LJ 950 : (1940) 2 Mad LJ 315; Re Kuttenjan, AIR 1960 Mad 9
[LNIND 1959 MAD 219] ; K Ravindra v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1995) 1 Crimes 463 (AP).
962 Queen-Empress v Ramji Sajaba Rao, ILR 10 Bom 124.
963 Raghav Prapanna v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 74 [LNIND 1962 SC 233] : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 70 , 86.
964 State of Kerala v Markosa, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] , p 135.
965 Boopalan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 706 (Mad) (DB).
966 Chandrabhan Singh v State of Chhattisgarh, 2017 Cr LJ (NOC) 246 (Chh) (DB).
967 Gandikota Venkateswarlu v State of AP, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 601 (AP).

968 Jagdish Kumar v State, (1974) Cr LJ 133 , p 135 : (1973) All CrR 280 : (1973) All Cr Cas 363 : (1973) All WR 436.
969 Sivaraman Divakaran v State of Kerala, (1989) 1 Ker LJ 305 .
970 Ram Saran Mahto v State of Bihar, (1999) Cr LJ 4311 (SC).
971 Brijkishore v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1989) All Cr R 201.
972 Bhujangrao Anandrao Deshmukh v State of Maharashtra, (1993) II CCR 1046, para 13 (DB).
973 Rohit Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 178 (Chh) (DB).
Page 47 of 50
974 VL Tresa v State of Kerala, (2001) Cr LJ 1171 (SC).

975 Sk Waheed v State of Bihar, 2010 Cr LJ 1870 , p 1876 (Pat) (DB); See also Narayan Debnath v State of Assam, 2010
Cr LJ 275 (Gauh).
976 Yogesh Narain Saxena v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 2282 , p 2291 (SC) : 2007 (4) Scale 247 [LNIND 2007 SC
305] .
977 Kalawati v State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 131 [LNIND 1953 SC 5] .
978 Taprinessa v Emperor, AIR 1919 Cal 679 : 19 Cr LJ 903 : 46 ILR Cal 427; Chunder Giani v State, AIR 1958 Punj 183
: (1958) Cr LJ 689 .
979 State of Kerala v Mankose, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] ; case-law discussed therein.
980 Basista Jani v State, (1974) Cut LT 242 : (1974) Cut LR (Cr) 242.
981 Alibaksh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Sind 28 , p 31.
982 Sukhram v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2007 SC 3050 [LNIND 2007 SC 969] : (2007) 7 SCC 502 [LNIND 2007 SC 969]
.
983 Chandra Pal Singh v Maharaj Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1238 : (1982) CLR (SC) 126 : (1982) 1 SCC 466 : (1982) UJ (SC)
517 : (1982) Cr LJ 1931 : (1982) All LJ 507 : (1982) SCC (Cr) 249 : (1982) 2 Ren CR 476 : (1982) All RC 348 : (1982)
Cr AR (SC) 65 : (1983) SC Cr R 70; Amrit Lal v State of Rajasthan, (1987) 1 Crimes 621 .
984 Satendra v Ramjilal, 2008 Cr LJ 945 (Raj).
985 Madhu Chhabra v State, (2002) III CCR 141 (MP).
986 State v Siddharth Vashisht alias Manu Sharma, (2001) Cr LJ 2404 (Del).
987 Hanmappa Rudrappa v Emperor, AIR 1923 Bom 262 ; Durlav Namasudra v Emperor, AIR 1932 Cal 297 : 33 Cr LJ
546 : ILR 59 Cal 1040 : 36 Cal WN 373; Mata Din v Emperor, AIR 1930 Oudh 113 ; Sohan v Emperor, AIR 1933 All 178
(2) : 34 Cr LJ 107 : ILR 54 All 702 : (1932) All LJ 801; Andal Shah v Emperor, AIR 1925 Sind 306 .
988 Adi Bhumiani v State, AIR 1957 Ori 216 [LNIND 1957 ORI 32] ; Onkar v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1974) Jab LJ 377 :
(1974) MPLJ 429 ; Sugani v State of Rajasthan, (1980) Raj Cr Cas 376.
989 Mangal Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1937 PC 179 , p 181 : 39 Cr LJ 573 : (1937) ILR Lah 371; Adi Bhumanl v State,
AIR 1957 Ori 16 .
990 Emperor v Har Piari, AIR 1926 All 737 : 97 IC 44 : 40 All 57 : 27 Cr LJ 1067 : 24 All LJ 958.
991 Nabti Mandal v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat, 289, p 290 : 41 Cr LJ 910 : ILR 10 Pat 369 : 22 PLT 98.
992 Kodali Puranchandra Rao v The Public Prosecutor, Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1925 [LNIND 1975 SC 316] :
(1975) Cr LJ 1671 : (1975) CLR (SC) 544 : (1975) 2 SCC 570 [LNIND 1975 SC 316] ; Phika Ishar v State, (1961) 2 Cr
LJ 886 , p 887, 63 Punj LR 526; Rahiman Mulani v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 829 [LNIND 1967 SC 354] ;
Palvinder Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354 [LNIND 1952 SC 54] ; Re Sumitra Sherpani, (1975) Cr LJ 169
(Gau); Nathu v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1245 .
993 SN Dube v NB Bhair, (2000) I CCR 1999 (SC) : (2000) 2 SCC 254 [LNIND 2000 SC 73] ; Daulat Ram v State of
Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 2639 (SC) : (2015) 11 SCC 378 [LNIND 2015 SC 174] : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 432 (Accused
acquitted of charges under sections 302, 201, IPC).
994 Sheo Kumar v State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 Cr LJ 3165 (Chh) (DB).
995 Rati Ram Khadiya v State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 Cr LJ 2563 , p 2566 (Chh) (DB).
Page 48 of 50
996 Goverdhan v State, 2009 Cr LJ 3349 , p 3352 (Del) (DB).
997 Baldev Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1280 , p 1283 : (1979) Cr LJ 871 ; Chandu Kalyan Rathod v State of
Gujarat, (1980) Cr LJ (NOC) 31 (Guj) : (1979) CLR (Guj) 441.
998 Meraj Alam v State of Bihar, 2008 Cr LJ 4384 , p 4388 (Raj).
999 Niranjan Singh v State of Punjab, (1996) Cr LJ 2506 (SC).
1000 Ashoka Kumar Chatterjee v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 2 Crimes 423 : (1989) CLR (SC) 462 : (1989)
SCC (Cr) 566 : (1989) 2 JT (SC) 451; Bakhora Chowdhary v State of Bihar, (1991) Cr LJ 71 (Pat); Fekan Bind v State
of Bihar, (1988) BLJR 29 : (1988) East Cr C 203 : (1988) 1 Crimes 740 (Pat); Shri Ashok Gavade v State of Goa,
(1995) Cr LJ 943 (Bom); Sukhram v State of Rajasthan, (1995) Cr LJ 257 (Raj); Tej Prakash v State of Haryana, (1996)
1 East Cr C 348 (SC); Tejbhan v The State of Rajasthan, (1995) AIHC 3295 , p 3305; Chandrashekar Rai v State of
Bihar, (1996) 1 BLJR 127 , p 134; Baburam v State, (1996) 1 CCC 319 (P&H); Dhura v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1995
SC 1063 ; Rajeshwari Devi v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1996 SCC (Cr) 887, p 890 : (1996) 5 SCC 121 [LNIND 1996 SC
1561] : (1996) 3 CCC 103 (SC) : (1996) 2 Andh LT (Cr) 596 .
1001 Bam Singh v State of Punjab, (1978) Cur LJ 253 (P&H).
1002 Ram Gopal v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2000) III CCR 522 (MP).
1003 Ambika Singh v State of Bihar, (2003) Cr LJ 4051 (Pat); Chandrakant Jha v State of Bihar, (2000) (1) Pat LJR
375 .
1004 Suresh v State of Karnataka, (2002) Cr LJ 3273 (Kant) (DB).
1005 Reg v Kashinath Dinkar, 8 Bom HCR (Cr) 126.
1006 Reg v Rahimat, ILR 1 Bom 147.
1007 Emperor v Rino Sobedar, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 721 : 6 Serv LR 76.
1008 Ghulam Mahommad v Emperor, AIR 1942 Lah 271 : 44 Cr LJ 77; Emperor v Har Piari, AIR 1926 All 737 .
1010 Vijaya v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2003 SC 3787 [LNIND 2003 SC 739] : (2003) Cr LJ 4318 (SC).
1011 Chinna Gangappa v Emperor, AIR 1930 Mad 870 , p 872 : 32 Cr LJ 263 : 59 Mad LJ 677 : ILR 51 Mad 68.
1012 Queen-Empress v Limbya, (1895) Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cases 799; Tepreinessa v Emperor, AIR 1919 Cal 679 :
19 Cr LJ 963; Emperor v Hanmappa Rudrappa, AIR 1923 Bom 262 ; Re Sumanta Dhupi, AIR 1916 Cal 919 ; Dilta v
1013 Nazru v Emperor, (1902) PR 6 (SC) : 154 PLR 1901.
1014 Perumal Asari v State, (1997) Cr LJ 3147 (Mad) (DB).

Page 49 of 50
1015 Ram Saran Mahto v State of Bihar, (1999) Cr LJ 4311 (SC) : (1999) III CCR 223 (SC).
1016 Kajju Lal v State of Rajasthan, (2006) Cr LJ 4386 (Raj).
1017 Rajkishore Singh v State of Orissa, (2003) Cr LJ 4160 (Ori).
1018 Ram Saran Mahto v State of Bihar, (1999) Cr LJ 4311 (SC); Narayan Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2001) Cr LJ
3725 (Raj).
1019 Begu v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 130 , p 131 : 26 Cr LJ 1059.
1020 Kashmira Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159 [LNIND 1952 SC 15] ; Kalawati v State of
Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1953 SC 131 [LNIND 1953 SC 5] ; Chander Giani v State, AIR 1958 Punj 183 ; Re Kottayan,
AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] ; Re Kalia Perumal, AIR 1954 Mad 1088 ; Re Madugula Jeremiah, AIR 1957
AP 611 ; Rannu v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 88 ; Bucha v King-Emperor, 1 PR 1904 (Cr) : 30 PLR 1904 : 1 Cr LJ 113.
1021 Annisetti Sivaprasada Rao alias Sivayya v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1994) Cr LJ 1760 , p 1764 : (1994) 2
Andh LT 13 (NRC) (AP).
1022 Babu v State of Orissa, (2005) Cr LJ 865 (Ori) (DB).
1023 Roshan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413 [LNIND 1964 SC 339] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 426 , p 430.
1024 Ram Saran Mahto v State of Bihar, (1999) Cr LJ 4311 (SC).
1025 Govt of Kutch v Rabari Shava Jiva, AIR 1950 Kutch 54 : 51 Cr LJ 1178; Chinna Gangappa v Emperor, AIR
1930 Mad 870 , p 873 : 32 Cr LJ 263 : ILR 54 Mad 68 : 59 Mad LJ 677.
1026 State of Madhya Pradesh v Malai, (1999) Cr LJ 2698 (MP) (DB).
1027 Indradeo Sao v State of Bihar, 2015 Cr LJ 2892 (SC) : (2015) 11 SCC 278 [LNINDU 2015 SC 74] : (2015) 4
SCC (Cri) 403 : 2015 (151) AIC 163 (SC).
1028 Budhan Singh v State of Bihar, 2006 Cr LJ 2451 , p 2455 : AIR 2006 SC 1959 [LNIND 2006 SC 300] : (2006)
4 SCC 740 [LNIND 2006 SC 300] : 2006 (4) Scale 570 [LNIND 2006 SC 300] .
1029 Roshan Lal v State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1413 [LNIND 1964 SC 339] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 426 , p 430.
1030 Pandu Krishna Bhingada v State of Maharashtra, (1977) Cr LJ 187 , p 194 (Bom); Ravindra Trimbak
Chouthmal v State of Maharashtra, (1996) 2 Supreme Today 272, (1996) ITC 702.
1031 Sugni v State of Rajasthan, (1980) Raj Cr Cas 376.

Page 50 of 50
1032 Heeru Das v State of Rajasthan, (2002) Cr LJ (NOC) 41 (Raj).
1033 Pradeep Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2015 (3) Supreme 67 , p 70 (SC).
1034 Raj Kumar alias Raju v State of Haryana, 2008 Cr LJ (NOC) 584 (P&H).
1035 Sanjay Dutt v State of Maharashtra, 2013 Cr J 3538, p 3576 (SC) Para 88.
1036 Sanjiv Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1999) Cr LJ 1138 (SC).
1037 Mahesh Mahto v State of Bihar, (1999) Cr LJ 4402 (SC).
1038 Ram Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) Cr LJ 1829 (SC).
1039 Jyoti Prasad Joshi v State of Uttaranchal, 2013 Cr LJ 4720 (Utr).
End of Document
[s 202] Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound
to inform.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 10
[s 202] Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound to inform.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 10
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 202] Intentional omission to give information of offence by person bound

to inform.—
Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, intentionally omits to give
any information respecting that offence which he is legally bound to give, shall be punished with imprisonment
Page 4 of 10
of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
[s 202.1] Scope
This section deals with an offence of not giving any information,1040 and punishes those who knowing or having
reason to believe that an offence has been committed, and being legally bound to give information respecting it,
intentionally omit to give that information.
This section should be read with sections 39 and 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Under section 39
of the said Code every person is bound to give information of the commission of certain offences or of the
intention of any other person to commit the same to the nearest magistrate or police officer. Under section 40 of
the same Code, every officer employed in connection with the affairs of a village and every person residing in a
village are also bound to give some such information. This section penalises the intentional omission to do so.
Section 39 of the CrPC mentions the offences of which every person, who is aware of the commission of or of
the intention of any other person to commit the same, is bound to give information to the nearest magistrate or
police officer, and his failure to do so is made punishable under section 202 of this Code. The crime of murder
is one such offence of which every person is required, under the law, to give information, either to the
magistrate, or to the police at once.1041
Unless the alleged offence(s) come within clause (i) to clause (xii) of sub-section (1) of section 39, CrPC, an
offence under section 202, IPC is not attracted. As the offence under sections 363, 465, 466 and 471, IPC did
not come within clause (i) to clause (xii) of sub-section (1) of section 39, CrPC, section 202, IPC would not be
attracted in the case.1042
For considering the application of sections 201 and 202, we cannot take as the basis the subsequent result of
the trial as to whether the offences were proved or not. It is enough if the evidence shows that the evidence is
caused to disappear and there is an intentional omission to give information on the basis of the information
available at that point of time indicating that the accused knew or had reason to believe that offences had been
committed.1043
Sections 202 and 203 are very similar to sections 118–20, 176, 177 and 182. These groups of sections may be
thus distinguished sections 202 and 203 refer only to cases where offences have actually been committed, the
motive of the accused being immaterial;1044 whereas under sections 118–120, the fact concealed is a design to
commit an offence, and the motive is to facilitate the commission thereof sections 176 and 177 are much wider,
inasmuch as they refer to “information on any subject”, and under section 182 the motive is to cause a public
servant to use his lawful powers to the injury or annoyance of others sections 176, 177 and 182 contemplate
only information given to public servants, sections 201–203 contemplate information given to private persons as
well as to public servants.1045
This section punishes the illegal omission of those who, under law, are bound to give information in respect of
an offence which he is legally bound to give particularly, being the head of the family.1046 To constitute an
offence under this section (a) the accused must have had knowledge or reason to believe, that an offence has
been committed; (b) he must be legally bound to give information respecting that offence, and (c) he must have
intentionally omitted to give such information.1047
[s 202.4] “Whoever”—Principal Offender not Included
It has been held that the word “whoever” in this section means any person other than the offender. It has no
application to the person who is alleged to have committed the principal offence because there is no law which
Page 5 of 10
casts a duty on a criminal to give information which would incriminate himself.1048
However, the fact that the accused himself was made an accused in other offences subsequently does not
absolve him of his complexity in respect of the offence punishable under section 202, IPC.1049
[s 202.5] An Offence must have been Committed
This section can apply only where, in the first instance, an offence has been committed. There can be no
conviction for intentional omission to give information of an offence which has not been proved to have been
committed.1050 It is necessary for the prosecution to establish the main offence before making a person liable
under this offence.1051
Where a police patel failed to report the arrival of dacoits at his village and supplied them with food and drink, it
was held that he could not be convicted under this section as there was nothing to show that an offence was
committed by the person who visited his village.1052
The commentary on this point under section 201 may be referred to.
[s 202.6] “Knowing or having Reason to Believe that an Offence has been Committed”—Mere Probability Not
Enough
After an offence is committed, this section can be applicable only where the accused “knowing or having reason
to believe that an offence has been committed” intentionally omits to give information of the crime.1053 It must be
shown that the accused knew or had reason to believe that an offence had been committed, that he might have
though it very probable is not enough.1054
When a doctor gives treatment to an injured assailant involved in a crime, but does not inform the police about
the commission of the crime, he commits offence under section 202, IPC.1055
Where no material had been placed on record to show that the accused doctors knew that in the burn injuries of
the victim lady, some offence was involved, these doctors cannot be convicted under section 202, IPC for non-
furnishing of information to the police about the admission of the burnt patient.1056
[s 202.7] Intention is Gist of the Offence
The main consideration under this section is whether the omission is intentional. There may be knowledge or a
reason to believe that an offence has been committed; there may also be an omission to give any information,
but it is clear that the gist of the offence is the intention.1057 A request by a villager to the Ywagaung, to whom
an offence has been reported, not to report the offence, is not such an intentional omission to give information
as deserves punishment under this section.1058
Where the accused had knowledge or at least had reason to believe that an offence has been committed even
if, at that stage he thought that it was only a suicide, therefore it was his binding duty, particularly as the head of
the family, to inform the authorities, he omitted to do so and on the other hand, he told others that the deceased
Page 6 of 10
was still alive but her condition was serious. The accused told the brother of the deceased that the body would
be cremated and he intended to do so without informing the authorities. All the ingredients of section 202 were
made out against the accused and he clearly committed the offence under this section at that stage.1059
Where from the fact of the police patel ordering the kulkarni to write a report regarding a suspicious death in his
village, his good faith was apparent, and it did not seem that he had an intention to omit the report, it was not
proper to convict him under this section for an intention to evade the law about the first report.1060
[s 202.8] Reasonable Excuse—Whether a Defence
This section deals with the negative offence of not giving any information.1061 A person is not bound to give
information of a murder of which he is aware, if he has reasonable excuse for not making a report, as where the
accused had no reason to believe that his informant had himself committed the offence when he came and told
him of the murder as having been committed by someone else and where there was clearly no attempt at
concealment of the fact of murder, and where the probability, as it would present itself to the mind of the
accused at the moment, was that the husband of the murdered woman, after giving the alarm to his neighbours,
would go on to the police station.1062
Certain wheat was stolen from the grain-pit of the accused who was a lambardar. He did not report the theft to
the police. It was held that as he was bound to give such information to the police under section 90, CrPC 1872,
and he was rightly convicted of an offence under section 202, IPC.1063
The word “offence” in this section has to be interpreted in the light of the explanation to section 203, IPC.
The offence under this section is non-cognizable. Summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable and is triable by any magistrate. The magistrate, mentioned in section 260,
CrPC may also try an offence under this section in a summary way and offence under section 202, IPC is a
bailable offence.1064
The limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section is one year.1065
It is clear that an offence under section 202, IPC cannot be tried along with the charge of sections 306 and
498A, IPC. It doesn’t fall under section 223, CrPC or with any other provision thereof. The accused could not be
tried jointly in the assumed offence in the section 202, IPC along with those who committed an offence under
section 306 or section 498A, IPC.1066
[s 202.12] Charge

Page 7 of 10
I (name and office of magistrate, etc) do hereby charge you (name of the accused), as follows:
That you (*) knowing, or having reason to believe that on or about the…….day of ………. At…… the offence of
………was committed (by………), intentionally committed to give information respecting its commission, which you
were legally bound to give and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 202 of the Indian Penal Code,
and within my cognizance.
The offence under this section cannot be treated as a minor offence included under section 201, because an
essential ingredient of the offence under this section is the legal duty of the accused to give information, which
is no part of the offence under section 201. Consequently, an accused against whom only a charge under
section 201 is framed cannot be convicted of an offence under this section without a charge to that effect being
framed against him.1067
[s 202.13] Proof
This section punishes the illegal omission of those who are bound by law to give information in respect of an
offence. Under this provision it is necessary for the prosecution to prove:
(a) that the accused had knowledge or reason to believe that some offence had been committed;
(b) that the accused had intentionally omitted to give information respecting that offence; and
(c) that the accused was legally bound to give the information.1068
For a conviction under the section, the prosecution has to prove the following facts:
(a) that the offence of which no information was given, was committed;1069
(b) that the accused knew, or had reason to believe, that such offence had been committed;
(c) that he omitted to give information thereof;
(d) that such omission was intentional; and
(e) that the accused was legally bound to give the information which he omitted to give.1070
Page 8 of 10
Proof of intention as well as omission is essential.1071 In a prosecution under section 202 of the IPC, it is
necessary for the prosecution to establish the main offence before making a person liable under this section.1072
An offence under section 202, IPC has also to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.1073
The body of the deceased may give certain clues as to cruelty and harassment and consequently, the
destruction of the body without information to the police should attract the provisions of sections 201 and 202,
IPC.1074
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1040 Prabhu v R, (1905), 6 Cr LJ 141 : 2 PWR (Cr) 55.
1041 Ram Balak Singh v State, AIR 1964 Pat 62 , p 65; Ramachandra Pillai v State of Kerala, 2009 (2) Ker LT 949
(Ker).
1042 Ramchandra Pillai v State of Kerala, 2009 (2) Ker LT 949 (Ker).
1043 Sunakara Suri Babu v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) Cr LJ 148 (AP).
1044 R v Cheetour, 1 WR 18; Re Ramaswami Udayan, 1 Weir 181.
1045 State of Kerala v Markose, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] , p 135.
Page 9 of 10
1046 Bhagwan Swarup v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1991 SC 2062 [LNIND 1991 SC 416] : (1991) Cr LJ 3123 ;
Ramachandra Pillai v State of Kerala, 2009 (2) Ker LT 949 (Ker).
1047 Re Woodoy Chand Mookhopadhya, 18 WR (Cr) 31; Harischandra Singh Sajjan Singh Rathod v State of
Gujarat, AIR 1979 SC 1232 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] : (1979) Cr LJ 1025 : (1979) UJ (SC) 389 : (1979) CLR (SC) 216 :
(1979) 2 AP LJ (SC) 26 .
1048 Ram Khilawan v R, ILR 28 All 705; R v Chanasham Ramchandra, 8 Bom LR 538; Harishchandra Singh Sajjan
Singh Rathod v State of Gujarat, AIR 1979 SC 1232 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] , p 1233 : (1979) Cr LJ 1025 : (1979) UJ (SC)
389 : (1979) CLR (SC) 216 : (1979) 2 AP LJ (SC) 26 ; Bhagwan Swarup v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1991 SC 2062
[LNIND 1991 SC 416] : (1991) Cr LJ 3123 .
1049 Bhagwan Swarup v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1991 SC 2062 [LNIND 1991 SC 416] : (1991) Cr LJ 3123 .
1050 Queen v Ram Ruchea Singh, 4 WR 29, p 30.
1051 Harischchandra Singh Sajjan Singh Rathod v State of Gujarat, AIR 1979 SC 1232 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] , p
1233 : (1979) Cr LJ 1025 .
1052 Re Bala, (1881) Un Rep GC 160.
1053 Re Ramaswami Udayan, 1 Weir 81; Harischandra Singh Sajjan Singh Rathod v State of Gujarat, AIR 1979 SC
1232 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] , p 1233 : (1979) Cr LJ 1025 : (1979) UJ (SC) 389 : (1979) CLR (SC) 216 : (1979) 2 AP LJ
(SC) 26 ; Bhagwan Swarup v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1991 SC 2062 [LNIND 1991 SC 416] : (1991) Cr LJ 3123 .
1054 Nga Saw v Emperor, 2 Cr LJ 133, p 141 : 11 Bom LR 8.
1055 State of Kerala v Raneef, 2011 Cr LJ 982 , p 984 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 340 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] : (2011) 1 SCC
784 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] : 2011 (1) Scale 8 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] .
1056 KK Patnayak Dr v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999), Cr LJ 4911 (MP).
1057 Re Woodoy Chand Mookhopadhya, 18 WR 31, p 32.
1058 (1807–1901) UBR Vol 1, 276.
1060 Re Mahatu Balaji, (1895) Unrep Cr Cas 783.
1061 Prabhu v R, (1915) 6 Cr LJ 141 : 2 PWR (Cr) 55.
1062 (1893–1900) LBR 382.

Page 10 of 10
1063 9 AWN 1883; Lata v State of Goa, (1990) 3 Crimes 464 (Bom).
1064 State of Kerala v Raneef, 2011 Cr LJ 982 : AIR 2011 SC 340 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] .
1065 Section 468, CrPC 1973.
1066 KK Patnayak (Dr) v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) Cr LJ 4911 (MP).
1067 Imperator v Rino, 13 Cr LJ 18.
1069 Re Ramaswami Udayan, (1894) 1 Weir 181.
1070 Harishchandra Singh Sajjan Singh Rathod v State of Gujarat, AIR 1979 SC 1232 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] , p
1233 : (1979) Cr LJ 1025 : (1979) Cr LJ (SC) 216 : (1979) 4 SCC 502 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] : (1979) Guj LR (SC) 829 :
(1979) 2 AP LJ (SC) 26 .
1071 Re Woodoy Chand Mookhopodhya, 18 WR 31.
1072 Harishchandra Singh Sajjan Singh Rathod v State of Gujarat, AIR 1979 SC 1232 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] , p
1233 : (1979) Cr LJ 1025 : (1979) Cr LJ (SC) 216 : (1979) 4 SCC 502 [LNIND 1979 SC 43] : (1979) Guj LR (SC) 829 :
(1979) 2 AP LJ (SC) 26 : (1979) Guj LR (SC) 829.
1073 State of Kerala v Raneef, 2011 Cr LJ 982 , p 984 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 340 [LNIND 2011 SC 3] : (2011) 1 SCC
1074 Sunhara Suri Babu v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) Cr LJ 1480 (AP).
End of Document
[s 203] Giving false information respecting an offence committed.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 8
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 8
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, gives any information
respecting that offence which he knows or believes to be false, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Page 4 of 8
Explanation.—In sections 201 and 202 and in this section the word “offence” includes any act committed at any
place out of Indian, which, if committed in India, would be punishable under any of the following sections,
namely, 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459 and
460.
[s 203.1] Scope
This section penalises the giving of false information respecting an offence. It prohibits the giving of misleading
information by persons who may or may not be under a legal obligation to give that information. In this respect it
differs from section 202, IPC. The section also does not require that the information be given with any particular
intention as under section 202.
But as observed by Jackson J:
In order to establish an offence under section 203, it is necessary that there should have been some offence
committed; that the accused should have known or had reason to believe that such offence has been committed and
that so knowing or believing or having reason to believe that it has been committed he should have given some
information respecting that offence which he knew or believed to be false. The object of the legislature is not to insure
general veracity or the making of correct statements in regard to supposed, offences, or to offences the commission of
which might be falsely or incorrectly reported, but to discourage and punish the giving of false information to the police
in regard to offences which had been actually committed, and which the person charged knew or had reason to believe
had been actually committed.1075
The commentary under sections 40 and 201 may be referred to.
The explanation to this section was added by section 6 of the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1894 (III
of 1894). The words “British India” in the Explanation were substituted by the words “the Provinces” by the AO
1948. Subsequently by the AO 1950 the words “the Provinces” were substituted by the words “the States”. The
words “the States” were ultimately substituted by the word “India” by Act 3 of 1951.
[s 203.4] Ingredients of the Offence
The main ingredients necessary to be satisfied to constitute an offence under section 203 of the Indian Penal
Code are:
(a) that an offence has been committed;
(b) that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such an offence had been committed;
Page 5 of 8
(c) that he gave the information with respect to that offence;
(d) that the information so given was false; and
(e) that when he gave such information he knew or believed it to be false.1076
See commentary under the same heading in section 182, ante.
Commentary under section 202 may be referred to.
[s 203.7] “Knowing or Having Reason to believe”—Meaning of
Commentary under sections 26 and 201 may be referred to.
A belief that an offence has very probably been committed is not enough.1077
[s 203.8] “Offence”—Meaning of
Under this section “offence” signifies a thing punishable under the Code, or under any special or local law, and
even though it is committed out of India in the cases specified in the explanation.
In one case1078 it was observed, with respect to sections 201, 202 and 203, that “If a person has reason to
believe (refer to section 26, IPC) that an offence has been committed, and acts in the manner described in
either of those sections, he would be liable to punishment, even although it might subsequently transpire that
he was mistaken in his belief”.
[s 203.9] False information without knowledge is punishable
By the words “gives information” is meant volunteering information or at least the making of positive
statements.1079 If a person make a false statement, having in all probability, no knowledge whatever on the
subject one way or the other—still the offence will equally be a giving of false evidence under the law as he
could not have believed what he deposed as true.1080
[s 203.10] Information must be Proved to be False
A bare perusal of this section shows that the offence under section 203 relates to the giving of a false
information about the commission of an offence, though no such offence has been committed. The most
essential ingredient for an offence under this section is the giving of information known to be false. The
information contemplated under this section must be proved to be false to the knowledge of the accused.
Where there was no material on record to show that the petitioner had given a false information, the
prosecution of the petitioner under section 203 was held not justified.1081
A person giving false information to the police, charging another person of an offence of murder in order to
screen the real offender, commits offences under sections 201, 203 and 211, IPC.1082 The husband even
though knowing that death of his wife was not natural but nevertheless, gives false information in the complaint
filed to police, is liable to be convicted under section 203.1083
Appellant accused had beaten his wife brutally leading to her death, but he made false declaration before the
Page 6 of 8
police that his wife had fallen down from the water tank due to sickness and had died. The testimony of the
child witness and the medical evidence was found reliable, thus, he was convicted for offence under section
203, IPC.1084
[s 203.11] Statement to Police During Investigation not Information
Section 203 is not intended to apply to the case of a person who gives false evidence as a witness to the police
in the course of investigation, and that too in reply to questions put to him.1085 A statement made by a witness to
the police does not amount to “information” within the meaning of the word as used in this section.
A complaint to prosecute petitioners/accused for the offence under section 203 of the IPC would lie only in a
case where such accused had voluntarily given false information in respect of an offence committed knowing or
believing it to be false. Statement given by the accused to the police during investigation of the crime and
recorded under section 161 of the Code, even if it is false, will not constitute an offence under section 203 of
the IPC. Criminal proceedings against the petitioners for offence under section 203, IPC being abuse of the
process of the court, were quashed on petition under section 482, CrPC.1086
The procedure will be same as in the case of an offence under section 202.
The limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section is three years.
[s 203.13] Charge
That you, knowing or having reason to believe that on or about the………day of……, at ……, the offence of
……….was committed, (gave information respecting the said offence) committed the offences punishable under
section 203 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 203.14] Proof
To prove an offence under this section the prosecution has to prove:
(a) that an offence was committed;1087
(b) that the accused knew or had reason to believe that such offence had been committed; and
Page 7 of 8
(c) that he gave information which he knew or believed to be false.1088
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1075 Queen v Jaynarain Patro, 20 WR 66.

1076 Nagireddi Siva v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1992) Cr LJ 1339 (AP).
1077 Nga Saw v R, 2 Cr LJ 133, II Bur LR 8.
1078 2 WR (Letters) 1.
1079 Queen v Jaynarain Patro, supra; Emperor v Akhtar, 14 Cr LJ 252; State of Kerala v Markose, AIR 1962 Ker
133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 610 ; Sarju Sarun v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 438.
1080 Queen v Echan Meeah, 1 WR 47.
1081 Debi Ram v State of Rajasthan, (1993) 1 WLC 346 , 348 (Raj) : (1993) II CCR 1398 : (1993) Raj CrC (Raj)
189.
1082 Taprinessa v Emperor, AIR 1919 Cal 679 , p 680 : 19 Cr LJ 903 : ILR 46 Cal 427.
1083 Datta Kisan More v State of Maharashtra, AIR Bom R 98 (DB) : (2007) Cr LJ (NOC) 433 (Bom) (DB).
1084 Bhurabhai Jinabhai Chauhan v State of Gujarat, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 888 (Guj).
Page 8 of 8
1085 State of Kerala v Markose, AIR 1962 Ker 133 [LNIND 1961 KER 332] ; Sarju Sarun v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 438;
Emperor v Nga Po Liwein, AIR 1917 UB 20 : 21 Cr LJ 700.
1086 Jiji Joseph v Tomy Ignatius, 2013 Cr LJ 828 , p 831 (Ker) : 2012 (4) Ker LT 713 .
1087 R v Ram Ruchea, 4 WR (Cr) 29.
1088 R v Joy Narain, 20 WR 66; R v Akhtiar, 14 Cr LJ 252; Bhaggu Ram v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1982) Cr LJ
106 (MP).
End of Document
[s 204] Destruction of [document or electronic record] to prevent its
production as evidence.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 10
[s 204] Destruction of [document or electronic record] to prevent its production as evidence.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 10
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 204] Destruction of1089 [document or electronic record] to prevent its

production as evidence.—
Whoever secretes or destroys any 1090[document or electronic record] which he may be lawfully compelled to
produce as evidence in a Court of Justice, or in any proceeding lawfully held before a public servant, as such,
Page 4 of 10
or obliterates or renders illegible the whole or any part of such 1091[document or electronic record] with the
intention of preventing the same from being produced or used as evidence before such Court or public servant
as aforesaid, or after he shall have been lawfully summoned or required to produce the same for that purpose,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine,
or with both.
[s 204.1] Scope
This section deals with secreting, destruction and obliteration of a document to prevent its production as
evidence. Section 175, IPC deals only with the omission to produce or deliver a document to a public servant,
but this section requires the secreting, destruction or obliteration of a document to prevent the same from being
produced or used as evidence.
To secrete or destroy or obliterate a document, which can be used as evidence, would be causing a
disappearance of evidence. Section 201 deals with the causing of the disappearance of evidence, but it is
limited to causing disappearance of evidence of the commission of an offence which has been committed. This
section is not so limited. The evidence caused to disappear may be relevant in any proceeding, civil, criminal or
revenue.
Section 477 also deals with secreting, destruction or defacing of a document but it is limited only to three kinds
of documents. The document secreted, destroyed or obliterated must be a will or an authority to adopt or a
valuable security. But there is no such limitation with this section. The document contemplated by it may be any
document which may be used as evidence in any proceeding. But it must be a document which the offender
may be compelled to produce in evidence.1092 If in a case under section 477 it is found that the document
destroyed is not one of the three kinds of documents mentioned therein, the case may still fall under section
204.1093 Again the secreting, destruction or obliteration must be with the intention of preventing the document
from being used as evidence.
The word “document” has been substituted by words “document or electronic record” by Information
Technology Act, 2000, section 91 and Sch I w.e.f. 17-10-2000.
The essential ingredients of the offence under this section are: (a) that the accused secreted, destroyed or
obliterated a document; (b) that he was legally compellable to produce that document as evidence in a
proceeding lawfully held before a public servant;1094 and (c) that the secreting, destruction or obliteration was
with the intention of preventing the document from being used as evidence.
[s 204.4] Meaning of Secretion of Document
The expression “secretes any document” means to put the document into a place of concealment or not to
make it known or exposed to view. A person may secrete a document not only when the existence of the
document is unknown to other persons and for the purpose of preventing the existence of the document coming
to the knowledge of anybody, but also when the existence of the document is known to others. In the latter case
he may secrete it for the purpose, for example, of preventing it from being produced in evidence or for the
purpose of raising difficulties in the way of its being produced in evidence. But it is not necessarily enough to
show that upon an occasion upon which it became his duty to produce the document, he failed to discharge
that duty, though this may be a cogent piece of evidence in certain circumstances. The fact that a man perjures
himself by denying the existence of a document which to his knowledge, is in his custody would be a still more
cogent piece of evidence. But whether the offence of secreting the document is committed or not must depend
in each case upon the facts.1095 An honest refusal to produce a document is obviously not a “secretion” of a
document within the meaning of the section. But where there is a refusal coupled with a secret dealing with the
document or with a dealing intended to be kept secret, it amounts to an offence under this section.1096
Page 5 of 10
[s 204.5] Mere Refusal May Amount to Secretion
The Madras High Court has, however, held that it is wrong to say that a mere refusal to produce could never
amount to secreting, as that term is used in this section. The court must consider the whole case. If a search
warrant had been issued, the result of the search and any evidence which may be adduced on behalf of the
accused upon that material must be considered and the court must come to a conclusion whether or not there
has been any secreting.1097 Before holding a person guilty for refusal to produce a document the provisions
contained in sections 130 and 131 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 should also be examined.
[s 204.6] Snatching a Document May Amount to Secreting
Where the plaintiff in a suit referred to an arbitration by consent, with a view to prevent a witness from referring
to an endorsement on a bond (which tended to show that the defendant had paid more than it was allegedly
paid by him), snatched up the bond which was lying beside the arbitrator, ran away, and refused to produce it, it
was held that the offence committed was not theft, but secreting a document under this section.1098
[s 204.7] “Destroys” any Document—Meaning of
The offence of destroying public reports is a serious one. In the interest of the public, it is necessary that these
reports should be recorded faithfully and truly by police officers. It is detrimental to the public interest, peace
and tranquillity that offences be concealed by the police and the reports falsely recorded.
[s 204.8] Non-Production of Original will in the Case Amounts to its Destruction
Where the evidence showed that the will in question was a forged one and was got prepared by the co-accused
and relatives of the accused, and this forged will was presented before the sub-registrar for registration by the
accused, further evidence showed that the original will was returned to the accused who had not produced it in
the case meaning thereby, the same had been destroyed by the accused, hence, the finding of the court below
convicting the accused for the offence under section 204, IPC was confirmed.1099
[s 204.9] Replacing a False Report after Destroying the Original—Effect of
Where a report of the commission of a dacoity was made at a thana and the police officer in charge of the
thana at first took down the report which was made to him, but subsequently destroyed that report and framed
another and a false report of the commission of a totally different offence to which he obtained the signature of
the complainant and which he endeavoured to pass off as the original and the correct report made to him by the
complainant; it was held that on the above facts, the police officer was guilty of the offences under this section
for having secreted or destroyed the first signed report.1100 In the course of a certain investigation in a case of
theft, a police officer had a certain document drawn up and signed by a panch. When, however, he came to
look at this document he found it so disfigured by interlineations and scratches that he thought it desirable to
have the document fairly written out again. Therefore, employing the same writer and the same panch, he had
the document re-written in textually the same form as the untidy notes which had first been drawn. The rough
document was thereupon destroyed and its place was taken by the fair document. It was held that, on a true
view of the facts, the fair document, which was preserved and ultimately presented to the court, must be
regarded as the only document which the police officer was lawfully compelled to produce as evidence, that the
original writing must be regarded merely as rough notes designed for the preparation of the fair original
document, and that the conviction of the police officer under this section could not be sustained.1101
[s 204.10] “Document”—Meaning of
[s 204.11] Provisions Compelling Production in Court
Before any proceedings may be taken under this section against the accused, it has to be determined whether
the document in question is one which he could be compelled to produce.1102 The Legislature has endowed the
courts with wide powers of ordering the production of documents necessary for the determination of matters
before the court and for directing inspection of those documents. Thus, section 91 of the CrPC empowers a
criminal court to issue a summons to a person to produce a document in his possession. So also rules 6 and 7
of O XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure empower a civil court to require a person to produce a document in his
Page 6 of 10
possession.
[s 204.12] Provisions Compelling Production before Public Servants
Not only courts, but some public servants also are, by some provisions of law, empowered to require the
production of documents. Thus, under section 171A of the Sea Customs Act, 1878,1103 an officer of the
customs, duly empowered, has the power to require any person to produce documents in his possessions. So
also section 13A of the Bombay Money Lenders’ Act, 1946, authorises the officers mentioned therein to direct
the production of books which they require. An officer in charge of a police station can also require the
production of documents before him, if found necessary for investigation etc, as authorised by section 91,
CrPC.
Refusal to produce a document without reasonable excuse is punishable under section 175, IPC and also
under section 349 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
[s 204.13] Whether Accused May be Compelled to Produce a Document
The power to be exercised by a court in summoning a person to produce a document in any criminal
proceeding is contained in section 91, CrPC. The word “person” in sub-section (1) of that section does not
include an accused person and no process can, therefore, be issued against him for the production of a
document.1104 The accused, therefore, cannot be compelled to produce a document which may be used as an
evidence against him.
[s 204.14] Constitutional Protection to Accused
An accused enjoys full protection in this respect even under Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Under Article
20(3) of the Constitution “no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”.
Whether or not the order requiring the production of a document by an accused person is hit by the prohibition
contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution would depend upon the nature of that document. If the document is
not such as his statement, conveying his personal knowledge relating to the charge against him, he may be
called upon by the court to produce that document. But if the order relates to a document which contains any
statement of the accused based on his personal knowledge, the order for its production will attract the
constitutional bar against testimonial compulsion.1105
Article 20(3) of the Constitution will come into play only when two facts are established:
(a) the individual concerned was a person accused of an offence; and
(b) he was compelled to be a witness against himself.
If only one of these two facts and not the other is established, the requirements of Article 20(3) will not be
fulfilled.1106 The law prohibits a summons to be issued under this section against an accused person requiring
him to produce documents in support of a prosecution case, as to produce a document in a criminal case in
support of the prosecution, is a testimonial act.1107
[s 204.15] Protection from Civil Proceedings or Future Prosecution not available
The immunity granted by Article 20(3) does not extend to civil proceedings. In order that the protection of this
article be available to a person, he must be accused of an offence, which would mean that an information is laid
against him before an officer or a court entitled to take cognizance of the offence and proceed upon the
Page 7 of 10
information to investigate into it. Merely because the evidence might disclose some crime and it might form the
subject matter of a future prosecution, would not enable the person, who is asked to furnish the evidence, to
claim protection under that article in any proceedings other than where he is accused of any offence.1108
[s 204.16] “Court of Justice”—Meaning of
[s 204.17] “Public Servant”—Meaning of
[s 204.18] Intention under Section 204 Must be to Prevent Production of Document
In order to convict a person under this section, it must be proved that he destroyed the document with the
intention of preventing it from being used or produced as evidence.1109 The intention of the secretion,
destruction, obliteration, etc. must be to prevent the document from being used as evidence,1110 and this
intention is presumed conclusively if the secretion, etc. takes place after a lawful requisition to produce the
same has been made.
A, a plaintiff in a suit referred to arbitration, snatches up a document and runs away with it, in order to prevent a
witness from referring to it. A is guilty under this section.1111
The offence is non-cognizable. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The offence is bailable but
not compoundable. It is triable by a magistrate of the first class. The magistrate, mentioned in section 260 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 may also try an offence under this section in a summary way.
The period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section is three years.
[s 204.20] Charge
That you, on or about the……day of………at………secreted (or destroyed) a document, to wit……….which you could
be lawfully compelled to produce as evidence in a court (or in any proceeding lawfully held before a public servant, to
wit…….), or obliterated (or rendered illegible) the whole (or a part) of such document after you were lawfully
summoned (or required) to produce the same, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 204 of the
Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
[s 204.21] Proof
Page 8 of 10
In order to bring home the guilt under this section the prosecution has to prove:
(a) that the accused secreted or destroyed a document; or that he obliterated, or rendered illegible, the
whole or any part of such document;
(b) that he was lawfully compellable to produce the same as evidence (a) in a court of justice or (b) in
proceedings lawfully held before a public servant; and
(c) that he did so with the intention of preventing the same from being produced or used as such evidence
or he did so after he had been lawfully summoned or required to produce the same for that purpose.
Whoever secretes or destroys any document to prevent its production as evidence is made punishable under
section 204, IPC. For establishing such offence, the prosecution has to show that:
(a) the accused secreted or destroyed the document or that he obliterated or rendered illegible the whole
or any part of such documents;
(b) the accused did the same with the intention of preventing the same from being produced or used as
such evidence or he did the same after he had been lawfully summoned or required to produce the
same for that purpose;
(c) the accused was lawfully compellable to produce the same as evidence in a court of justice or in the
procedure lawfully held by a public servant.1112
Where, out of seven accused persons before the trial courts, only the accused numbers 2–4 were convicted
under section 204, IPC and the remaining of the accused, including the accused appellant, were convicted
under section 204, IPC, read with section 34, IPC. After the appeal and revision to High Court all the accused
persons were acquitted and the accused appellant was convicted under section 204, read with section 34, IPC.
Even on facts emerged from the evidence, the only part in respect of the offence under section 204, IPC which
was attributed to the accused-appellant was that he was present on the scene of occurrence. The apex court
held that when the accused numbers 2–4, who were convicted for their acts constituting an offence under
section 204, IPC had been acquitted of the substantive offence, it was not possible for the apex court to sustain
the conviction of the accused appellant under section 204 read with section 34, IPC.1113

Page 9 of 10
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1092 Emperor v Gangaram Tukaram, 13 Cr LJ 912.
1093 Debendra Nath Upadhaya v Bhagirath Mahto, 38 Cr LJ 158 : 76 IC 391.
1094 State v Devsi Dosa, AIR 1960 Bom 443 [LNIND 1959 BOM 117] , p 444 : 61 Cr LJ 131.
1095 Susen Behary Roy v Emperor, AIR 1931 Cal 184 , p 187 : 32 Cr LJ 836 : 35 Cal WN 425.
1096 Takhtram Tulsidas v Emperor, AIR 1938 Sind 217 , p 218 : 40 Cr LJ 75.
1097 Satya Kinkar Roy v Nikhil Chander Jyotishopadhaya, AIR 1951 Cal 101 [LNIND 1951 CAL 75] , p 105 : 52 Cr
LJ 946 (FB).
1098 Subramania Ghanapati v Queen, 3 ILR Mad 261.
1099 Jagdish v State of Rajasthan, (2002) Cr LJ 2171 (Raj).
1100 Queen Empress v Mahommad Shah Khan, ILR 20 All 307.
1101 Emperor v Gangaram Tukara, 13 Cr LJ 912.
1102 Bhogabat Prasad Singh v King-Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 450.
1103 Sea Customs Act, 1878 has been repealed by the Customs Act, 1962.
Page 10 of 10
1104 State of Gujarat v Shyamlal Mohanlal, AIR 1965 SC 1251 [LNIND 1964 SC 352] : (1965) CR LJ 256 ;
Raghunath Prasad v Bisram, (1982) CLR 48 (MP) (Notes); Samrath v Khemji, (1983) Raj LW 77 ; Kuttan Pillai v
Ramkrishnan, AIR 1980 SC 185 [LNIND 1979 SC 377] : (1980) Cr LJ 196 : (1980) All Cr C 120 : (1980) Mad LJ (Cr)
402; see the commentary under section 91in Sohoni’s, Code of Criminal Procedure , 21st Edn LexisNexis.
1105 State v Prabhu Singh, AIR 1964 Punj 325 .
1106 Mahommad Dastgir v State of Madras, AIR 1960 SC 756 [LNIND 1960 SC 57] : (1960) Cr LJ 1150 ; State v
Devsi Dosa, AIR 1960 Bom 443 [LNIND 1959 BOM 117] : (1960) Cr LJ 1317 .
1107 State of Maharashtra v Nagpur Electric Light & Power Co, AIR 1961 Bom 242 [LNIND 1960 BOM 116] :
(1961) 2 Cr LJ 200 ; Ranchhoddas Khimji Ashrare v Tempton Jahangir, AIR 1961 Guj 137 [LNIND 1960 GUJ 97] :
(1961) 2 Cr LJ 228 .
1108 MP Sharma v Satish Chandra, AIR 1954 SC 300 [LNIND 1954 SC 40] : (1954) Cr LJ 865 ; M Suryanarayana
v Visya Commercial Bank Ltd, AIR 1958 AP 756 ; State v Devsi Dosa, AIR 1960 Bom 443 [LNIND 1959 BOM 117] .
1109 Re Amin Chand, 1889 PR 24 .
1110 R v Gangaram Tukaram, 13 Cr LJ 912.
1111 Subramania Ghanapati v Queen, 3 ILR Mad 261 : 1 Weir 409.
1112 Kirit Kumar K Jani v State of Gujarat, (1998) III CCR 115 (Guj).
1113 BS Narayanan v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1987) (Supp) SCC 172.
End of Document
[s 205] False personation for purpose of act or proceeding in suit or
prosecution.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 9
[s 205] False personation for purpose of act or proceeding in suit or prosecution.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 9
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 205] False personation for purpose of act or proceeding in suit or

prosecution.—
Whoever falsely personates another, and in such assumed character makes any admission or statement, or
confesses judgment, or causes any process to be issued or becomes bail or security, or does any other act in
Page 4 of 9
any suit or criminal prosecution, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 205.1] Scope
This section deals with a false personation in relation to a suit or a criminal prosecution. The offence under this
section consists, not merely in falsely personating another, but in doing certain acts as such assumed
character.1113 The act of impersonating the prosecutrix for the purpose of giving evidence in court in sessions
trial was an offence under section 205, IPC.1114 Such an act does not fall under sections 419, 420, 467 and 468
of the IPC. Section 419, IPC relates to punishment for cheating by personation. Cheating is defined under
section 415, IPC wherein there has to be a fraudulent or dishonest inducement of any person to deliver any
property to any person. Section 420 of the IPC relates to cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.
Section 467, IPC relates to forgery of valuable security, will, etc. and section 468, IPC relates to forgery for
purpose of cheating.1115 The section does not require any fraudulent intent.1116 Fraudulent gain or benefit to the
offender is not an essential element of the offence of false personation, and a conviction may be upheld even
where the personation is with the consent of the person personated.1117 The offence under the section is
essentially an offence against public justice and consists in deceiving the court and falsifying its records.
This section deals with false personation for the purpose of doing certain acts in a suit or criminal prosecution.
Other cases of false prosecution have been dealt with under sections 140, 170, 171, 171D, 229, 416 and 419,
IPC. Section 140 deals with the case of a person who poses to be a soldier, sailor or airman by wearing the
garb, or carrying the token, resembling one used by a soldier etc. Section 170 deals with the case of a person
pretending to be or falsely personating a public servant. Section 171 speaks of the case of a person who, with
fraudulent intent, wears the garb, etc. resembling one used by a public servant. Section 171D deals with
personation at an election. Section 229 deals with the case of a person who allows himself to be empanelled or
sworn as a juryman or assessor knowing that he is not entitled to be so empanelled or sworn. Section 416
deals with the case where a person cheats by pretending to be some other person or by knowingly substituting
one person for another or by representing that he or any other person is a person other than he or such other
person really is, and the explanation under this section says that the offence is committed whether the
individual personated is a real or imaginary person. Section 419 provides the punishment for cheating by
personation.1118
False personation and, in such assumed character, doing certain acts under the Indian Registration Act, 1908,
is also an offence under section 82 of the said Act.
In England, the False Personation Act, 1874 (37 and 38 Vict, c 36), section 1 provides as follows:
If any person shall falsely and deceitfully personate any person or the heir, executor, or administrator, wife, widow,
next-of-kin, or relation of any person with intent fraudulently to obtain any land, estate, chattel, money, valuable
security, or property, he shall be guilty of felony, and upon conviction shall be liable … to be (imprisoned) for life…
[s 205.3] “Falsely Personates Another”—Meaning of
In the case of Kadar Ravuttan v Ayangana Ravuttan,1119 it was held:

Page 5 of 9
To constitute the offence of false personation under Section 205 of the Penal Code it is not enough to show the
assumption of a fictitious name. It must also, we think, appear that the assumed name was used as a means of falsely
representing some other individual. It is not an uncommon thing for men to pass under names not their own for the
purpose of disguise, in some instance from blameless and in other instances indifferent or bad motives: ‘incog’ as the
disguise is often termed in the former, and ‘with or under an alias’ in the latter instance. But whatever the motive, the
use of an assumed name without more is not a criminal offence. It only becomes a crime when connected by proof with
some other act or piece of conduct; and the gist of the offence of false personation under section 205, we think, is the
feigning to be another known person.
[s 205.3.1] Personation of Imaginary/Fictitious Person
No doubt the explanation to section 416, IPC says that “the offence is committed whether the individual
personated is a real or imaginary person”, but the offence referred to therein is the offence of “cheating by
personation” which is quite different from the offence under this section. As observed in the case of Kadar
Ravuttan v Ayangana Ravuttan1120:
There are sections of the Penal Code under which the false assumption of appearance or character may be an
offence, though no individual is meant to be represented, or only an imaginary person. Such are the sections 140, 170,
171 and 415, but they have no application to the present case, and the last section is made applicable to personation
of an imaginary person by an express enactment.
A contrary view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in State v Inder Sen,1121 wherein it has been held
that the decision in the case of Kadar Ravuttan v Ayangana Ravuttan,1122 is not an authority in support of the
proposition that there can be no personation if the personality assumed is that of a fictitious person. In that
case, the accused was proved not to have been guilty of personation because nothing else was proved than
mere assumption of another name. But it is submitted that the judgment in Kadar Ravuttan’s case has not been
properly read. Towards the end of that judgment it was said:
Then as to the evidence here: it shows no more than that first prisoner used a name different from that by which he
was commonly known, and had recently before been examined as a witness in another suit. He no doubt had a
purpose, and most probably an improper one, in so acting, but there is nothing in the case to show that he was
personating any other person.
There was, therefore, no question of the accused not acting on the assumed character, and the decision was
based on the fact that the accused assumed only a fictitious name and not the name of any existing or known
person.
[s 205.3.2] Mere use of Assumed Name without an Act not an Offence
The mere use of an assumed name without more is not a criminal offence. It only becomes a crime when
connected by proof with some other act or piece of conduct. The whole language of this section clearly imports,
acting the part of another person, the actor pretending that he is that person.1123
[s 205.3.3] No False Personation without assuming the Name or Character of another

Page 6 of 9
Where a person does not assume the name or character of another but merely a character which he does not
possess, he cannot be said to personate falsely. Thus, where the accused, representing himself as a servant of
another, accepted a notice to be served on that other person signing his own name on the receipt and saying
that he received the notice addressed to his master, it was held that no offence under this section was
committed as the accused, having signed his own name, did not assume the name or character of another, and
the only thing that was false was the status which the accused gave to himself.1124
Where the accused presented a petition in the name of his uncle, who was ill, but, when asked his name, he
gave his own name, it was held that there was no false personation.1125
[s 205.3.4] False Personation and assuming Fictitious Name—Position under this section and section 82(c),
Registration Act
In all the material parts, the wording of section 82(c), Registration Act, 1908 is identical with that of this section
and in a case under that section, the Madras High Court held that falsely assuming a fictitious name is not false
personation. The wordings of both this section and section 82(c) of the Registration Act are: “Whoever falsely
personates another”. This is quite different from saying “whoever falsely assumed a fictitious name”.1126
A person personated must be someone in existence and the mere assumption of a fictitious name is not an
offence under section 82(c).1127 Neither fraud nor dishonesty is an essential ingredient to constitute the offence
of false personation under section 82(c).1128 On a charge under section 82(c), it is not improper for the court to
take fingerprints of the accused in its presence and to have them compared by an expert with the disputed
fingerprints.1129
Where an illiterate village lady impersonated as the first wife of her husband and appeared as witness before
the court, but she had deposed without any fraudulent intention, she disclosed her name and also the name of
the first wife, no action for alleged impersonation against her was taken.1130
A person who has been tried and acquitted under the Indian Penal Code 1860, of offences of forgery and
abetment thereof cannot be retried on the same facts for a separate offence under section 82(c) of the
Registration Act.1131 However, if the trial is on two counts, for forgery and for an offence under section 82(c) and
the charge of forgery fails for want of sanction, the accused may be convicted on the other count under section
82(c) of the Registration Act.1132
[s 205.3.5] Bona fide Mistake not an Offence
Where, what was actually done by accused woman was to put her own signature to a counter statement that
was to have been signed by her son, the son did not disown the mother, he did endorse the statement signed
by his mother and the courts below were convinced by the stand of the mother and the son that the mother’s
act was only a bona fide mistake and not an offence and were also convinced that designs of the petitioner in
seeking initiation of criminal proceedings against the accused sister-in-law and nephew was not to uphold the
honour and purity of the justice administration system but instead to wreak vengeance on his accused sister-in-
law and nephew who had successfully launched a civil litigation against him. The order acquitting the accused
of false personation was found.1133
[s 205.4] Suit and Proceedings Distinguished
By the ordinary rule of construction all the acts detailed in section 205 are acts “in any suit or criminal
prosecution”. Proceedings under the Succession Act and such other proceedings are not acts in any suit.1134
Page 7 of 9
It is beyond question that “case” is not synonymous with “suit”; while every suit is a case, it cannot be said that
every case is a suit. The word “case” is a more comprehensive expression and includes not only a suit but
other proceedings which cannot be described as a suit, for example, proceedings under the Guardians and
Wards Act, Probate and Administration Act, Succession Certificate Act, Provincial Insolvency Act, Religious
Endowments Act, etc.1135
[s 205.5] Procedure
The offence is non-cognizable. Warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The offence is bailable but not
compoundable and is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
[s 205.6] Lok Adalat has no Jurisdiction
It is clear from section 19(5) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 that if the offence in respect of which
the accused were being tried was not compoundable under any law, the lok adalat had no jurisdiction to decide
the said case. When undisputedly the offences under sections 205, 419, 468 and 471, IPC, for which the
accused were being tried were not compoundable, lok adalat had no jurisdiction to pass any order in the case.
The decision of the magistrate in such a case, being without jurisdiction, is liable to be set aside.1136
[s 205.7] Complaint
An offence under sections 205–211, IPC falls under section 195(1)(b)(i) of the CrPC and no court shall take
cognizance of any of these offences, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to
any proceeding in any court, except on a complaint in writing of that court,1137 or of some other court to which
that court is subordinate. There are many offences of which cognizance can be taken without any complaint
from the court. In case any such offence is so integrated with section 205 or any other offence requiring a
complaint from the court, for which the accused is jointly put up for trial and the trial for that offence cannot be
separated from the trial for the rest of the offences and if the trial in respect of the offence under section 205 or
under any other section requiring a complaint from the court is not competent for want of a proper complaint,
then the trial for such offence, would also be incompetent.1138
The commentary on this point under section 201 may be referred to.
[s 205.8] Charge
That you, on or about the …….day of………at…….falsely personated (name) and, in such assumed character, did
(specify the admission or statement made, or judgment confessed, or process caused to be issued, or bail or security
given or any other act done), in……(specify) the suit or criminal prosecution) and that you thereby committed an
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[s 205.9] Proof
For a conviction under this section it must be proved:
(a) that the accused falsely personated another; and
(b) that, in such assumed character, he made any admission or statement, or confessed judgment, or
caused some process to be issued, or became bail or security, or did some other act, in a suit or
criminal prosecution.
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1113 Kadar Ravuttan v Ayanagana Ravuttan, 4 Mad HCR 18 : 1 Weir 182.
1114 Jawahar Yadav v State of Chhattisgarh, (2006) Cr LJ 2078 (Ch’garh).
1115 Jawahar Yadav v State of Chhattisgarh, (2006) Cr LJ 2078 (Ch’garh).
1116 Emperor v Kalya Naraputil, 5 Bom LR 138; Loothi v Bewa, 2 Beng LR 25 : 11 WR (Cr) 24; Emperor v Tun
Aung Gyan, 4 Cr LJ 483 : 3 LBR 22.
Page 9 of 9
1117 Re Andi Servai, 1 Weir 182 : 1 Mad HCR 450.
1118 Qutubuddin v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 211 , p 213 : 38 Cr LJ 216 : 17 PLT 692.
1119 Kadar Ravuttan v Ayangana Ravuttan, 4 Mad HCR 18 : 1 Weir 182, 183 dissenting from Reg v Bhillo Kuhar,
1 Ind Jur 123.
1120 Kadar Ravuttan v Ayangana Ravuttan, 4 Mad HCR 18 : 1 Weir 182.

1121 State v Inder Sen, AIR 1961 All 62 [LNIND 1960 ALL 85] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 30 .
1122 Kadar Ravuttan v Ayangana Ravuttan, 4 Mad HCR 18.
1123 Re Kadar Ravuttan, 1 Weir 182, 183; State v Inder Sen, AIR 1961 All 62 [LNIND 1960 ALL 85] , 63.
1124 Qutubuddin v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 211 : 38 Cr LJ 216 : 17 PLT 692.
1125 Queen v Narain Achar, 8 WR 80.
1126 Emperor v Rangammal, AIR 1935 Mad 913 [LNIND 1935 MAD 223] , p 914 : 1935 Mad WN 1162 : 42 Mad
LW 662.
1127 Emperor v Rangammal, AIR 1935 Mad 913 [LNIND 1935 MAD 223] : 159 IC 155.
1128 Baburam v Emperor, (1905) 32 Cal 775 , p 781; Emperor v Kalya, (1903) 5 Bom LR 138 .
1129 Basgit Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 129 : (1926) 6 Pat 305 : 104 IC 626.
1130 Gangadhar Mandal v State of Jharkhand, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 786 (Jhar).
1131 Maung Saing v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Rang 213 : (1923) 1 Rang 299 : 76 IC 431.
1132 Montajaddin v Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 481 : 143 IC 15; For further details refer to commentary on section 82
in Mulla, The Registration Act, 11th Edn published by LexisNexis, Butterworths.
1133 KM Chitharanjan v PM Kunhunni, (2005) Cr LJ 4434 (Ker).
1134 Qudh Behari Lal v Emperor, AIR 1940 Lah 514 , p 515 : 42 PLR 683.
1135 Lal Chand Mangal Sain v Behari Lal Meharchand, AIR 1924 Lah 425 : 5 ILR Lah 288 (FB).
1136 Sukhal v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2002) Cr LJ (All) 1523 .
1137 Jawahar Yadav v State of Chhattisgarh, (2006) Cr LJ 2078 .
1138 Sheikh Bannu v State of Maharashtra, (1973) Mah LJ 800 .
End of Document
[s 206] Fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its
seizure as forfeited or in execution.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 13
[s 206] Fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in execution.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 13
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 206] Fraudulent removal or concealment of property to prevent its seizure

as forfeited or in execution.—
Whoever fraudulently removes, conceals, transfers or delivers to any person any property or any interest
therein, intending thereby to prevent that property or interest therein from being taken as a forfeiture or in
satisfaction of a fine, under a sentence which has been pronounced, or which he knows to be likely to be
pronounced, by a Court of Justice or other competent authority, or from being taken in execution of a decree or
order which has been made, or which he knows to be likely to be made by a Court of Justice in a civil suit, shall
Page 4 of 13
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
[s 206.1] Scope
Sections 206, 207 and 208, IPC, which deal with fraudulent transfers and suits, aim at rendering criminal, all
contrivance by which the owner of a property withdraws it from a liability to seizure under a sentence or
judgment of court. It is impossible that anyone can allow a decree to be passed, or process to be executed
against him, for property which is his own, or money which is not due by him, except to cheat someone else.
When he does so, it is not necessary to allege or prove any special intention. The offence consists in
fraudulently employing the machinery of the court. Section 206 penalises the removal or concealment of
property, or any dealing with it, in order to prevent its being taken in execution of an order of forfeiture or a
sentence of fine passed or likely to be passed by a criminal court, or in execution of a decree or order passed
or likely to be passed by a civil court. “Here, the accused is an owner dealing with his own property, and his
acts which would otherwise be innocent, are rendered criminal if done for certain specified purposes and with
that state of mind which is described by the word “fraudulently”.1139 Both these elements must co-exist. To bring
the offence within this section there must be a fraudulent removal, sale or transfer of property, or of some
interest therein, intending thereby to prevent that property from being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a
fine, or from being taken in execution of a decree.1140 This section does not penalise all fraudulent transfers, but
only those made with the particular intent specified in it.
[s 206.2] Principle
It has been pointed out:
(ii) As given in section 162—it is an offence against justice in a culprit to escape from custody, in order to avoid
execution of a sentence of imprisonment, and an offence to harbour, or imprison him and that such offences are fit
subjects of punishment, upon the same grounds that the removal or concealment, of property or any dealing with it in
order to prevent the execution of a sentence of fine, for example, instead of imprisonment, is an offence against justice
and fit subject of punishment.1141
[s 206.3] Sections 206 and 406, IPC—Difference between
The criminal intention necessary for an offence punishable under this section is that of a fraudulent prevention
of property or any interest therein from being forfeited or taken in execution of a decree or order. Such an
intention is certainly materially different from the intention required in an offence punishable under section
406,1142 Therefore, an offence punishable under section 406, is substantially an offence different from the one
punishable under this section.
The section is not restricted to the transfer, removal or concealment of one’s own property. The word
“whoever”, therefore, means any person and not necessarily the owner of the property.
[s 206.5] “Fraudulently”—Meaning of
The general nature of fraud has already been explained under section 25. As the late Sir JF Stephen said:1143
There has always been a great reluctance amongst lawyers to attempt to define fraud, and this is not unnatural when
we consider the number of different kinds of conduct to which the word is applied in connection with different branches
of law, and especially in connection with the equitable branch of it. I shall not attempt to construct a definition which will
meet every case which might be suggested, but there is little danger in saying that whenever the words “fraud” or
“intent to defraud”, or “fraudulently” occur in the definition of a crime, two elements at least are essential to the
Page 5 of 13
commission of the crime: namely, first, deceit, or an intention to deceive or in some cases mere secrecy; and,
secondly, either actual injury or possible injury or an intent to expose some person either to actual injury or to risk of
possible injury by means of that deceit or secrecy. This intent, I may add, is very seldom, the only or the principal
intention entertained by the fraudulent person, whose principal object in nearly every case is his own advantage. The
injurious deception is usually intended only as a means to an end, though this, as I have already explained, does not
prevent it from being intentional.
Where, therefore, there is an intention to deceive, and by means of the deceit to obtain an advantages, there is
fraud.1144
The word “fraudulently” in this section is not equivalent to “dishonestly”. Where there is no intention to deceive
and there is no secrecy, a removal may be dishonest but not fraudulent.1145 There is nothing whatever in law to
prevent a judgment-debtor from disposing of his interest such as it may be in an attached debt. The court has
no right to presume a fraudulent intent because a person does what he is legally entitled to do.1146
[s 206.5.1] Fraud is the Gist of Offence under this Section
An intention to cause injury clearly exists in a case where the accused judgment-debtor gives an undertaking to
the court not to transfer certain property and immediately transfers the same by a sale-deed in favour of his son
with the knowledge that the son would be in a position to claim the property as his own. The object of the
transfer is thus to injure the creditor and to prevent execution against the property. Therefore, such a case falls
clearly under section 206 and it does not matter whether or not the creditor might, by taking troublesome
proceedings in civil courts, circumvent the fraudulent transfer.1147 Fraud is the gist of the offence under this
section and there can be no conviction in the absence of fraud.1148
[s 206.6] Fraudulent Removal or Concealment—Transfer under Mistake not an Offence
Fraudulent removal or concealment is the essence of an offence under this section. Under rule 45(2) of O XXI,
CPC, judgment-debtors are at liberty, notwithstanding the attachment of a growing crop, to cut, gather and
store the produce, in default of any conditions imposed, or orders passed, by the civil court to the contrary. This
does not of course entitle them and their men to take the produce away as is apparent from sub-rule (3) of Rule
45. If the judgment-debtor not only cuts, gathers and stores the crops, but removes or conceals them
fraudulently, they would be liable under this section. If the removal of the crop is not fraudulent, he may be
liable for theft.1149 Before a person can be ordered to be prosecuted under this section, there must be some
evidence to show that he had fraudulently removed, concealed, transferred or delivered to any person, any
property or any interest therein, intending thereby to prevent the property or interest from being taken in the
execution of a decree which was passed against him. The mere harvesting of crops, which have been attached
in the execution of a decree, would not bring the person doing so within the scope of this section unless it is
shown that he did one of the things mentioned above with a fraudulent intent. It must further be shown that he
harvested the crops with the intention of preventing them from being taken in execution of the decree and not
merely with the intention of saving them.1150 Where an amin was sent by the court to harvest the crop which
was attached and the accused, in order to forestall the action of the court, went openly to the field and
harvested the same crop, it was held that as there was no deceit or intention to deceive or secrecy on the part
of the accused, the action of the accused, though dishonest, could not be held to be fraudulent within the
meaning of this section.1151 The cutting and carrying off of crops, which the accused knew to be under
attachment in the execution of a certificate under the Public Demands Recovery Act of 1895, is an offence
under the latter part of this section. The amount due under the certificate cannot be regarded as a forfeiture or
fine, but is money due under a decree, the certificate having the force and effect of a decree of a civil court.1152
A person who, in order to protect his own property, not legally liable for a decree, from confusion with property
which is so liable, makes it over to another person, does not commit an offence under this section.1153
[s 206.7] Fraudulent Transfer—Meaning of
There is no definition of the word “transfer” in the IPC, but it has the same meaning as “transfer of property”
Page 6 of 13
defined in section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads thus:
S. 5. “Transfer of property” defined.—In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living
person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more
other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but
nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by
companies, associations or bodies of individual.
The word “transfer” has long been recognised to be a technical term of law in all countries where English is the
language of the Legislature and courts of justice. It is often used as a convertible term with “alienation”,
“conveyance” and “assignment”. Whether any distinction exists between the technical meanings of these
expressions—and, if so, what that distinction is—it is not necessary to determine exactly. But it may be safely
taken that the word “transfer” is used in law in the most generic signification, comprehending all the species of
contract which pass real rights in property from one person to another.1154
[s 206.8] Fraudulent Preference—What is?
For a transfer to come within section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, the intention must be to defeat or delay
the creditors in general and not merely to defeat or delay one creditor.1155 The transfer which defeats or delays
creditors is not an instrument which prefers one creditor to another, but an instrument which removes property
from the creditors to the benefit of the debtors. The debtor must not retain a benefit for himself. He may pay one
creditor and leave another unpaid.1156
The word “preference” imports and involves freedom of choice, and no transfer which is not voluntary in the
sense that it is a free act of the insolvent, is a preference which can be deemed to be fraudulent and void.1157
[s 206.8.1] Determination of Fraudulent Preference
The question whether there has been a fraudulent preference depends, not upon the mere fact that there had
been a preference, but also on the state of mind of the person who made it. It must be shown not only that he
has preferred a creditor but that he has fraudulently done so. It is not necessary to threaten criminal
proceedings, to constitute pressure. The threat of civil suits is enough. If it is established that the transaction
was the result of real pressure brought to bear by a creditor on his debtor, it cannot be deemed as a
spontaneous act.1158 If a debtor sells his property in order to pay some debts for which pressure was the
greatest, the other creditors may be defeated or delayed, and it may be a case of fraudulent preference liable to
be impugned under the insolvency law, but not a fraud on creditors for which section 53, Transfer of Property
Act makes provision.1159 Until the insolvency laws are put into operation, a man is the master of his own money,
and may pay any creditor, in the order he wishes, provided he really does pay him, and does not merely
pretend to pay him. Apparently then, no payment by way of preference by a man in difficulties would be
punishable under this section merely because the insolvency law calls it a fraudulent preference.
In order to satisfy this section, a definite intention must be found to prevent the property dealt with from being
seized under an impending decree, or execution of a court of justice. When the intention is to prevent the
property from being distributed according to law amongst the creditors, the offence may be one under section
421, but not under this section.1160
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[s 206.9] A Transfer may not be in Writing
A transfer may or may not be in writing.1161 There are various forms of transfer, such as gift, sale, mortgage,
pledge, will, grant, etc. In the case of a movable property, a transfer may be effected by a mere delivery.
[s 206.10] What is Sham Transaction?
This section contemplates a real transfer and not a sham transaction. A fraudulent transaction is not a sham
transaction. But the fact that a transaction or a transfer of an immovable property without consideration does
not make it either a sham transaction or a bogus transaction.1162 A sham transaction by which title was never
intended to pass is no transfer at all. It is devoid of operation. Where such a colourable document is brought
into existence for the purpose of defeating and delaying creditors, it may be simply ignored by the creditors who
need not take proceedings to avoid them. If it is a colourable partition, the creditors can proceed to enforce their
claims as if there was no partition.1163
[s 206.11] Fraudulent Transfer—Void, Voidable and Sham Transactions and their Consequences
Sections 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, render void every agreement, of which the consideration
or object is fraudulent and therefore unlawful. It has been repeatedly held that, “where there is a real
transaction between the parties for valuable consideration, whether it be by way of sale or mortgage, the
transaction is valid even as against a creditor, though the object may have been to defeat an expected
execution”.1164 And so, “if a man owes another a real debt, and in satisfaction thereof sells to his creditor an
equivalent portion of his property, transferring it to the vendee and thereby extinguishing the debt, the
transaction cannot be assailed, though the effect of it is to give the selected creditor a preference”.1165 Such
transactions, though made with a view to defeat a probable execution, are not void under sections 23 and 24 of
the Contract Act, 1872, as being forbidden by law, or fraudulent, or involving injury to the property of another, or
opposed to public policy. They involve no dealing with a man’s own property which the law does not allow.1166
But if the sale of mortgage be only a colourable transaction or a mere sham, and not intended to confer upon
the alleged grantee or mortgagee any beneficial interest in the property, and simply (for the purpose of
screening it from execution) to substitute such grantee or mortgagee as nominal owner, in lieu of the real owner
(the debtor), and to make such nominal owner nothing more than a trustee for the real owner (the debtor), and
thus to endeavour to preserve the property for the latter, such a sale or mortgage would be invalid as against
the creditor, and he would be entitled to attach and sell the property.1167 It would also undoubtedly be an
offence punishable under this section. There is nothing in sections 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
to support the opinion that a sale, made with the view of defeating a probable execution, is a sale with a
fraudulent and unlawful object, and, therefore, void within the meaning of those sections.1168
Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, also deals with fraudulent transfers. The section runs thus:
S. 53. Fraudulent transfer.—(1) Every transfer of immovable property made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors
of the transferor shall be voidable at the option of any creditor so defeated or delayed.
Nothing in this sub-section shall impair the rights of a transferee in good faith and for consideration.
Nothing in this sub-section shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to insolvency.
A suit instituted by a creditor (which term includes a decree-holder whether he has or has not applied for execution of
his decree) to avoid a transfer on the ground that it has been made with intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the
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transferor shall be instituted on behalf of, or for the benefit of, all the creditors.
(2) Every transfer of immovable property made without consideration with intent to defraud a subsequent transferee
shall be voidable at the option of such transferee.
For the purposes of this sub-section, no transfer made without consideration shall be deemed to have been made with
intent to defraud by reason only that a subsequent transfer for consideration was made.
Nothing contained in this section shall impair the rights of any transferee in good faith and for consideration.
[s 206.11.1] Intention Determines the Guilt
Where a debtor effects a sale in order to convert some immovable property, which was capable of being
attached and brought to sale for the realisation of the amounts due to the creditors, into cash, which could
either be secreted or used for the vendor’s own purposes, the transaction is not a sham but a real one, and if
the purchaser purchased the property in good faith, and for consideration, his rights will not be affected by
section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. He will also be protected by section 55 of the Provincial Insolvency
Act, 1920. If, on the other hand, the purchaser is not a transferee in good faith and the transfer itself was a
scheme by the transferor, with the knowledge and connivance of the transferee, to put the property out of the
reach of the creditors, the sale would be voidable at the option of the creditor defeated or delayed.1169 In either
case, however, the intention of the vendor being to prevent the property from being taken in execution of a
decree against him, it would appear that he would be liable under this section.
Under section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure a debtor is free to make any private alienation of his property,
until an actual attachment of the property has been made. A creditor commits no fraud if he anticipates other
creditors and obtains a discharge of his debt by the assignment of any property, which has not already been
attached by another creditor.1170
[s 206.11.2] Fraudulent Intent cannot be Inferred in a Lawful Act
Where a judgment-debtor had sold a decree for a large amount for considerably less than half of its amount in
cash, it was held that there was nothing whatever in law to prevent a judgment-debtor from disposing of his
interest such as it may be in an attached debt. The court has no right to presume a fraudulent intent because a
person does what he is legally entitled to do.1171 On the other hand, an intention to cause injury clearly exists in
a case where the accused judgment-debtor gives an undertaking to the court not to transfer certain property
and immediately after, transfers the same by a sale deed in favour of his son with the knowledge that the son
would be in a position to claim the property as his own. The object of the transfer is thus to injure the creditor
and to prevent the execution against the property. Therefore, the case falls clearly under this section and it
does not matter whether or not the creditor might, by taking troublesome proceedings in civil courts, circumvent
the fraudulent transfer.1172
[s 206.11.3] Benami Transactions—Nature of
Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act postulates that when the impugned transfer was genuine and real,
but made with an intent to defeat or delay the creditors of the transferor, then the provisions of section 53 are
inapplicable to a case where the transaction is impugned as farzi or benami, that is to say a fictitious and
colourable transaction. In some benami transactions, the transfer effected is real though the document stands
in the name of another. But in the other class of benami transactions, the transfer is fictitious and colourable. In
the latter cases the benami transactions are also fraudulent, because the object of the transferor is to defeat the
subsequent transferees of the property.1173 Benami transaction has now been defined by clause (a) of section 2
Page 9 of 13
of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Though the said Act does not affect the provisions of
section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and any other law relating to transfers for an illegal purpose, entering
into a benami transaction (except the purchase of property in the name of one’s wife and unmarried daughter)
has been made a non-cognizable offence thereunder, punishable with an imprisonment extending to three
years.1174 (For further reference, the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 may be referred to).
[s 206.12] “To Prevent that Property or Interest Therein”—Meaning of
The expression means the transferor’s interest in the property fraudulently removed, transferred or delivered or
in an attached debt.1175
[s 206.13] “Taken”—Meaning of
The word “taken” in this section has been used in the sense of “seized” or “taken possession of”. This is
indicated by the marginal note to the section which defines it as a “fraudulent removal or concealment of
property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in execution”. Where property had already been attached and
handed over to the decree-holder, it is difficult to see how it could again be taken in the execution of a decree or
be prevented from being taken, in execution. Where the accused, who were entrusted with some articles
distrained for arrears of land revenue, produced inferior articles of the same description on the date of sale, it
was held that a conviction under section 206 of the Indian Penal Code was wrong: (a) since the distraint had
already been made; and (b) since the distraint of the property by a collector was neither a forfeiture, the rights
of the owner being only held in abeyance by such distraint, nor effected under a sentence pronounced by a
court of justice or other competent authority.1176
[s 206.14] “As a Forfeiture”—Meaning of
“Forfeiture of property” is a recognised form of punishment under section 53 (Fifthly) for certain specified
offences such as those under sections 126, 127 and 169.1177 Section 452, CrPC also makes a provision for a
forfeiture (confiscation) of certain property. A certificate issued under the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1895
has the force and effect of a decree of a civil court, as regards the remedies for enforcing the same. Money due
under such a certificate must be regarded as money due under a decree of a civil court. It cannot be regarded
as a forfeiture or a for fine. A removal of crops under attachment, in execution of such a certificate, amounts to
an offence under the latter part of section 206.1178
[s 206.15] “In Execution of a Decree or Order”—Meaning of
The phrase “taken in execution” in this section should be more widely interpreted as meaning something
equivalent to the credit amount to be appropriated towards execution or utilised effectively in the aid of
execution.1179 Where a person fraudulently removes property intending thereby to prevent that property from
being taken in execution of a decree of order which has been made by a collector, who is a court of justice in a
civil suit, ie, a suit for rent, he commits the offence described under this section.1180
The offence under this section is non-cognizable. A warrant should issue in the first instance. It is bailable, but
not compoundable and is triable by any magistrate. A magistrate specified in section 260, CrPC can also try
this offence in a summary way.
[s 206.17] Complaint1181
Under section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC a complaint in writing of the court concerned, when such an offence is alleged
to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court or of some other court to which that
court is subordinate, is necessary to institute proceedings under this section.1182 If such an offence is not
committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any court, then the question of that court filing the complaint
does not arise and even a private person can file a complaint.1183
[s 206.18] Charge
Page 10 of 13
That you fraudulently removed [or concealed or transferred or delivered to (name the person)] property, to wit
……(specify it) intending thereby to prevent the said property from being taken as a forfeiture (or in satisfaction of fine),
under the sentence which had been pronounced (or which you knew to be likely to be pronounced) by (specify the
court of Justice etc) in criminal case No……, or from being taken in execution of the decree which had been made (or
which you knew to be likely to be made) by (specify the Court) in Civil Suit No……and that you thereby committed an
[s 206.19] Proof
The prosecution must prove that the accused fraudulently removed, concealed or transferred the property, in
order to prevent its being available in satisfaction of the fine or decree,1184 or for being taken as forfeiture.
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1139 Mayne’s Criminal Law of India, p 575.
1140 Re Balmokoond Borjobasi, 18 Wr 65.

Page 11 of 13
1141 2nd Rep section 162.

1142 Sahebrao Baburao v Emperor, AIR 1937 Bom 46 , p 48 : 38 Cr LJ 272.
1143 SHCLE II, 121 referred to and adopted in R v Ali Hasan, ILR 28 All 328, p 363; R v Tha Byaw, 9 Cr LJ 15 : 4
LBR 315; Ramaswamy Ambalam v Nagasubramenia Iyer, (1936) Mad WN (Cr) 210; Kothandarama Reddi v Balarami
Reddi, AIR 1937 Mad 713 [LNIND 1937 MAD 100] : (1937) Mad WN (Cr) 194; Palani Kudumban v Dinakaran, (1962) 2
Cr LJ 555 .
1144 R v Mahommad Saeed Khan, ILR 21 All 113, p 115; R v Soshi Bhushan, ILR 15 All 210; R v Ali Hasan, ILR 28
All 358, p 364; Abudul Rashid v R, 15 Cr LJ 221.
1145 Y Kothandarama Reddi v Kandra Balarami Reddi, AIR 1937 Mad 713 [LNIND 1937 MAD 100] , p 714; Palani
Kudumban v Dinakaran, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 555 , p 557.
1146 Ram Narain v Jokhai Ram, 3 Cr LJ 92, p 93 : 3 All LJ 1.
1147 Crown Prosecutor v T Sellamuthu, AIR 1940 Mad 271 [LNIND 1938 MAD 198] , p 272 : 41 Cr LJ 397 : (1940)
1 Mad LJ 761; Ram Narain v Jokhai Ram, 3 Cr LJ 92, p 93 : 3 All LJ 1.
1148 Re Balmokoond Brojobasi, 18 WR 65.
1149 Mahabir Sah v Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 136 , p 137 : 42 Cr LJ 25 : 22 PLT 662.
1150 Sheik Dawood Rowther v Abdul Kadar Rowther, AIR 1938 Mad 976 [LNIND 1938 MAD 124] , p 977.
1151 Y Kothandarama Reddi v Kandra Balarami Reddi, AIR 1937 Mad 713 [LNIND 1937 MAD 100] ; Ramaswami
Ambalan v Nagasubramanya, AIR 1938 Mad 471 : 37 Cr LJ 627; Sidhaya v Chinnamathyan, (1936) Mad WN 212.
1152 Yond v Yond, ILR 28 Cal 217.
1153 Re Basappa Shivappa, 18 Cr LJ 784.
1154 Gopal Pandey v Parsotam Das, 5 ILR All 121, p 137.
1155 Bhagwani v Kedari, 25 Bom 202 : 2 Bom LR 86; Kedarwati v Radhey Lal, AIR 1937 Pat 609 ; Kisami v
Parasram, 1936 AMLJ 118 ; Kashiba v Anand Rao, AIR 1937 Ngp 9 ; Parmanand v Jairamdas, AIR 1938 Sind 215 ;
Tan San Mar v U Kya Zin, AIR 1933 Rang 162 : 145 IC 330.
1156 Middleton v Pollock, (1876) 2 Ch D 104 : 45 Cr LJ (Ch) 29; Musahar Sahu v Hakim Lal, AIR 1915 PC 115 , p
116 : ILR 43 Cal 521 : 14 All LJ 198 : 18 Bom LR 378 : 20 Cal WN 393 : 30 Mad LJ 116.
1157 Sholapur Spg and Wg Co Ltd v Pandharinath Martand Sulakhe, AIR 1928 Bom 341 , p 343 : 30 Bom LR 893;
Sharp v Jackson, (1899) AC 119 : 68 LJQB 866.
1158 Sharp v Jacksan, supra; Nripendra Nath Sahu v Ashutose Ghose, AIR 1916 Cal 975 : ILR 43 Cal 840;
Sholapur Spg and Wg Co Ltd v Prandharinath Martand Sulakhe, AIR 1928 Bom 341 , p 343.
Page 12 of 13
1159 C Abdul Shukoor Saheb v Arji Papa Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1150 [LNIND 1962 SC 445] , p 1156.
1161 Section 9, Transfer of Property Act.
1162 Rainibai v Khemraj, AIR 1944 Ngp 133 : (1944) Nag LJ 85 .
1163 Firm Schwebo v Subbiah, AIR 1944 Mad 381 [LNIND 1944 MAD 78] : 1 Mad LJ 384.
1164 Sankarappa v Ramayya, 3 Mad HCR 231; Pullen Chetty v Ramalinga, 5 Mad HCR 368; Ishar Chunder v
Bishan Sirdar, 24 Cal 825.
1165 Suba Bibi v Balgobind Das, ILR 8 All 178; Narayana v Viraraghavan, ILR 23 Mad 184.
1166 Rajan Harji v Ardeshir, ILR 4 Bom 70.
1167 Tilakchand v Jitamal, 10 Bom HC 206; Joshua v Alliance Bank of Simla, 22 Cal 185; Nana Mansaram v
Rautmal, 22 Bom 255; section 53, Transfer of Property Act, 4 of 1882, as to the evidence of fraud.
1168 Rajan Harji v Ardeshir Hormusji Wadia, ILR 4 Bom 70.
1169 C Abdul Shakoor Saheb v Arji Papa Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1150 [LNIND 1962 SC 445] .
1170 Reg v Appa Mallya, (1876) Unrep Cr Ca 110.
1171 Ram Narain v Jokhai Ram, 3 Cr LJ 92, p 93 : 3 All LJ 1.
1172 Crown Prosecutor v T Sellamuthu, AIR 1940 Mad 271 [LNIND 1938 MAD 198] , p 272.
1173 Mahendra Mahto v Suraj Prasad Ojha, AIR 1958 Pat 568 , p 571; relying on Pathaperumal Chetty v
Muniandy Chetty, ILR 35 Cal 557 (PC).
1174 Sections 3 and 6 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 45 of 1988.
1175 Ram Narain v Jokhai Ram, 3 Cr LJ 92, p 93.
1176 Emperor v Murli, (1888) All WN 237.
1177 RS Joshi v Ajit Mills Ltd, AIR 1977 SC 2279 [LNIND 1977 SC 260] .
1178 Sundar Dusadh v Setal Mahto, ILR 28 Cal 217.
1179 Sidhaya v Chinnamatty, (1936) Mad WN 212; Y Kothandarama Reddi v Kandra Balarami Reddy, AIR 1937
Mad 713 [LNIND 1937 MAD 100] ; Palani Kuddumban v Dinakaran, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 555 .
1180 Gaurchunder Chuckarbutty v Kishan Mohan Singh, 10 WR 46.
1181 For detailed commentary on section 195, see Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn LexisNexis.
Page 13 of 13
1182 Bhagat Jethsur Jiva v Shah Amrat Lal Sanchand, 4 Cr LJ 375; Queen-Emperor v Dala Jiva, ILR 10 Bom 190;
AR Palanisami Gounder v Bagavati Gounder, AIR 1942 Mad 675 [LNIND 1942 MAD 222] (1) : (1942) Mad WN 492.
1183 Nadeem Mian v State, (1977) Cr LJ 1329 , p 1330 (AP).
1184 Re Balmokoond, 18 WR (Cr) 65.
End of Document
[s 207] Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in
execution.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 5
[s 207] Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in execution.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 5
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 207] Fraudulent claim to property to prevent its seizure as forfeited or in

execution.—
Whoever fraudulently accepts, receives or claims any property or any interest therein, knowing that he has no
right or rightful claim to such property or interest, or practises any deception touching any right to any property
Page 4 of 5
or any interest therein, intending thereby to prevent that property or interest therein from being taken as a
forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine, under a sentence which has been pronounced, or which he knows to be
likely to be pronounced by a Court of Justice or other competent authority, or from being taken in execution of a
decree or order which has been made, or which he knows to be likely to be made by a Court of Justice in a civil
suit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.
[s 207.1] Scope
The last section dealt with persons fraudulently removing, concealing or transferring property to prevent its
being taken as a forfeiture or in satisfaction of a fine or in execution of a decree or order of a court of justice.
This section deals with their accomplices who fraudulently accept or receive the property so removed,
concealed or transferred or who falsely claim the property or practise any deception touching such property or
interest therein with the same intent. For further details, the commentary under the last section may be referred
to.
The commentary under sections 25 and 206, IPC may be referred to.
[s 207.3] “Court Of Justice”—Meaning of
Section 20, IPC and the commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 207.4] Procedure
The procedure will be the same as in the case of an offence under section 206, IPC.
[s 207.5] Complaint
Complaint of the court is necessary for taking cognizance of an offence even under this section. For details,
commentary under section 206, IPC may be referred to.
[s 207.6] Charge
I (name and office of magistrate etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you fraudulently accepted (or received or claimed) property to wit……(or any interest therein, to wit…), knowing
that you had no right or rightful claim to it [or you practised deception, to wit………touching the rights to property to
wit……(or any interest therein) intending thereby to prevent (or interest therein) from being taken as a forfeiture (or in
satisfaction of a fine) under a sentence which had been pronounced (or which you knew to be likely to be pronounced)
by the court of ……….or by a competent authority, to wit…………(or from being taken in execution of a decree or order
which had been made on……(or wit…… in Civil Suit No………of…….) and thereby committed an offence under
section 207 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
(i) And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge.
[s 207.7] Proof
Page 5 of 5
For a conviction under this section, it must be proved that:
(a) the accused fraudulently accepted, received or claimed any property or any interest therein, or
practised any deception touching any right to any property or an interest therein;
(b) the accused knew that he had no right or rightful claim to it;
(c) he intended thereby to prevent that property or interest therein, from being taken as a forfeiture, or in
satisfaction of a fine or in an execution of a decree or order of a court of justice;
(d) he then knew that such forfeiture, fine or execution was pending or was likely to be made; and
(e) the forfeiture fine or execution was under the orders of a court of justice or a competent authority.
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
End of Document
[s 208] Fraudulently suffering decree for sum not due.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 5
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 5
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever fraudulently causes or suffers a decree or order to be passed against him at the suit of any person for
a sum not due, or for a larger sum than is due to such person or for any property or interest in property to which
such person is not entitled, or fraudulently causes or suffers a decree or order to be executed against him after
it has been satisfied, or for anything in respect of which it has been satisfied, shall be punished with
Illustration
A institutes a suit against Z. Z, knowing that A is likely to obtain a decree against him, fraudulently suffers a
Page 4 of 5
judgment to pass against him for a larger amount at the suit of B, who has no just claim against him, in order
that B, either on his own account or for the benefit of Z, may share in the proceeds of any sale of Z’s property
which may be made under A’s decree. Z has committed an offence under this section.
[s 208.1] Scope
This section is intended to prevent the abuse of the machinery of the court for causing or suffering collusive
decrees to be passed or executed in order to secure property from being available for the satisfaction of first
debts. The Law Commissioners remarked that the section was drafted to prevent an abuse, then said to be
prevalent, by getting someone to file a collusive suit for the recovery of the whole of one’s property and
suffering a decree to be passed. As mentioned in section 159:
No one at the time, is either injured or annoyed. It is only in the course of years, when unsuccessful in his speculations,
and at the time his creditors press their claims against him that the original plaintiff, the man of straw, appears, not with
a naked claim, but with a decree in his favour, adjudging him with the whole of the defendant’s property. This property,
he will acknowledge, he has nevertheless left the whole time in the defendant’s possession; but he pleads his rights
under a decree of court.1185
Section 25, and the commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 208.3] “To be Executed”—Meaning of
An application for an execution of a decree, which is refused, is not an offence under this section.1186
[s 208.4] “Satisfied”—Meaning of
The word “satisfied” bears its ordinary meaning and does not only refer to decrees, the satisfaction of which has
been certified to the court.1187
[s 208.5] Procedure
The procedure to be followed will be the same as in the case of an offence under section 206, IPC, with the
difference that the offence under this section is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
[s 208.6] Complaint
No court shall take cognizance of an offence under this section when such an offence is alleged to have been
committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court except on a complaint in writing of the court before
which the offence is committed, or of some other court to which it is subordinate.1188
The provisions of section 195, CrPC are mandatory. Registration of a case against a public servant under
sections 196 and 208, IPC without following the proceedings of sections 195 and 240, CrPC was illegal and as
such the proceedings were quashed on petition filed under section 482, CrPC.1189
[s 208.7] Charge
The following form may be adopted in framing a charge:

Page 5 of 5
That you, on or about the …….day of……at…….fraudulently caused (or suffered) a decree (or order) to wit…… in suit
No…….of the Court of………to be passed against you and which has for a sum of not due (or for a larger sum than
was due) to such person [or (for any property or interest in property to which the decree-holder was not entitled) (or
fraudulently caused or suffered) a decree (or order, to wit………), passed in Suit No….passed by the Court ……on
…to be executed against you, after it had already been satisfied in full (or in part)] and thereby committed an offence
under section 208 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1185 2nd Report, section 159.

1186 Shama Charan v Kasi Naik, ILR 23 Cal 971.
1187 R v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288; Madhub v Novodeep, 16 ILR Cal 121.
1188 Section 195(1)(b).
1189 Balappa v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 4804 , p 4809 (Kant).
End of Document
[s 209] Dishonestly making false claim in court.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 8
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 8
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly, or with intent to injure or annoy any person, makes in a Court of Justice
any claim which he knows to be false, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Page 4 of 8
[s 209.1] Scope
This section punishes persons who fraudulently or dishonestly or with an intent to injure or annoy any person,
make any claim, having full knowledge of its falsity, in a court of justice. This section is wider than the preceding
section as it applies to persons who are acting fraudulently or dishonestly. The offence is complete the moment
a false claim is filed. The section is not limited to cases where the whole claim made by the accused is false. It
applies even where a part of the claim is false.1190
The offence under this section relates to false and fraudulent claims in a court of justice and is confined to the
civil court in which an original suit was brought.1191
Where affidavits alleged to have been filed by accused in suit in which complainant was defendant, issue in
said suit was about seniority to officiate as headmaster which vacancy occurred due to retirement of the
headmaster, no contention to the effect was taken by the complainant in suit that School Committee was not
properly represented and that affidavits filed by the accused declaring himself as Secretary of Committee are
false and there was no decision on merits on this question in the suit, it was held that the complainant failed to
prove offences alleged against the accused and the accused was entitled to acquittal.1192
Falsely attesting the plaint in a false case is an essential ingredient of fraudulently and dishonestly making a
false claim in a court of justice and a person cannot be convicted of both.1193
For details, section 25, and the commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 209.4] “Dishonestly”—Meaning of
[s 209.5] “With Intent to Injure or Annoy”—Meaning of
The question of fraud or dishonesty or intent to injure or annoy must be decided like any other question of fact
on the basis of evidence.1194 The mere dismissal of a suit in the absence of a clear finding as to whether the
suit was false and was brought with an intent to injure the defendant, is not a justification for directing the
prosecution of the plaintiff under this section.1195
[s 209.6] “Makes any Claim”—Meaning of
The expression “claim” in this section does not include a claim made in an execution. An attempt to execute a
decree cannot correctly be described as making a false claim.1196 The word “claim” cannot refer to a document
produced in evidence to substantiate the relief asked for in the suit.1197 An attempt to execute a decree which
has been satisfied also cannot be correctly described as a false claim.1198
[s 209.7] Remedy of the Aggrieved Defendant
The ordinary remedy of a person who has had a false suit brought against him is to apply to the court to
prosecute the plaintiff under this section. And in that case one has the benefit of the court’s opinion as to
whether the plaintiff was acting with any sinister and improper intention. As a general rule, it is undesirable that
people should be hampered in their access to the courts and in getting justice by the fear that if they are
unsuccessful, they may be prosecuted for defamation, and therefore, all courts should be careful when a
complaint of defamation is filed in respect of proceedings in a civil court to see whether the provisions of this
section and those of the Code of Criminal Procedure generally have not been evaded.1199
[s 209.8] Mere Belief not Sufficient per Offence under Section 207
Page 5 of 8
In order to establish an offence under this section, it is essential to prove that the claim made is one which the
person making it knew to be false, and it is not sufficient to show that the claim is one which he believed or had
reason to believe to be false, or did not believe to be a true claim.1200
A person, who brings a claim in the civil court, which he knows to be false, commits an offence punishable
under this section but he does not, by so doing, commit an offence either of extortion, if he succeeds or, of
attempting to commit extortion if he fails.1201
[s 209.9] “In a Court of Justice”—Meaning of
The court of justice intended here is a civil court,1202 and not a persona designata.1203 The essential
characteristic of a court is that it is authorised by law to decide, in accordance with law, disputes between
parties before it.
In dealing with claims against an estate under the Chhota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, the manager was
not deciding a dispute between two parties who appeared before him for the determination of their dispute. The
manager, in dealing with a claim under the Chhota Nagpur Encumbered Estates Act, was therefore, not a court
of justice.1204
For further details, section 20 and the commentary thereunder may be referred to.
The offence under this section is non-cognizable. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable, not compoundable and triable by a magistrate of the first class. It can also be tried summarily as
provided by section 260, CrPC.
The period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section is three years.
A complaint in writing by the court in which the false claim was made or of some other court to which it is
subordinate, is necessary1205 for taking cognizance of an offence under this section. In the absence of a
complaint in writing of the court concerned or other court to which that court is subordinate, cognizance cannot
be taken.1206 Cognizance cannot be taken as the basis of private complaint.1207 The proceeding in relation to a
prosecution under section 209, IPC is covered by clause (b)(ii) of section 195(1). When the offence is
committed in proceedings in any court, normally no cognizance of any of these offences coming under sections
209, 471 or 466, IPC could be taken without a complaint of the concerned court.1208
[s 209.12] Charge
The following form may be adopted in framing the charge:
That you on or about the……day of…….at………fraudulently (or dishonestly or with an intent to injure or annoy any
Page 6 of 8
person) made a claim, to wit……(specify the claim) in Suit No…….of ………in the court of ………which you knew to be
false, and thereby committed an offence under section 209 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
A person cannot be convicted both of fraudulently and dishonestly making a false claim in a court of justice and
of falsely attesting the plaint in the false case, the latter being an essential ingredient of the former offence.1209
[s 209.13] Proof
For a conviction under this section, it must be proved that:
(a) a false claim was made by the accused in a court of justice; and
(b) the accused had made such claim: (i) knowing that it was a false claim, and (ii) intending thereby to
defraud or to cause a wrongful gain or loss, or to injure or annoy, any person.
It is essential to prove that the claim made is one which the person making it knew to be false.1210 The burden
of proof lies on the prosecution. It will not be enough in a criminal proceeding to show that the plaintiff in the
civil suit failed to discharge the burden of proof. It will also not be enough to show that in the evidence adduced
for the plaintiff, there were discrepancies or improbabilities which made it impossible for the court to rely with
confidence on their evidence or even which made it improbable that the fact alleged was true. The onus is on
the prosecution to prove affirmatively that the claim was false to the knowledge of the accused, who was the
plaintiff in the civil suit.1211 The question of fraud or dishonesty or intent to injure or annoy must be decided like
any other question of fact, on the evidence.1212
Where the oral and documentary evidence on record adduced by the complainant before the trial court did not
prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused had committed the offences punishable under sections 182 and
209, IPC, the appellant accused was acquitted of the charges under sections 182 and 209, IPC.1213

Page 7 of 8
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1190 Queen-Emperor v Bulaki Ram, (1890) All WN 1.
1191 Queen v Begum Mahtoon, 12 WR 37.
1192 T Revanna v H Chandrappa, (2007) Cr LJ 1995 (Kant).
1193 King Emperor v Zer Mahommad Khan, (1901) All WN 187.
1194 Motilal v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 154 , p 165 : 37 Cr LJ 420.
1195 Chakauri Rai v Emperor, AIR 1920 Pat 548 : 21 Cr LJ 58 : 54 IC 686.
1196 Bismilla Khan Pathan Khan v Rambhau Maroti, AIR 1948 Ngp 350 : 47 Cr LJ 1031 : (1946) Nag LJ 402 ;
Queen v Begum Mahtoon, 12 WR 37.
1197 Boddu Ramayya v Chituri Surayya, 16 Cr LJ 439, p 440.
1198 Queen v Begum Mahtoon, 12 WR 37; Bismilla Khan Pathan Khan v Rambhau Maroti, AIR 1946 Ngp 350 ;
Bashir Dagadu Maner v State of Bihar, (1978) CLR (Mah) 69.
1199 Ganumal v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Sind 263 : 26 Cr LJ 941 : 18 Serv LR 83.
1200 Baisakhi v Empress, (1830) 7 PR 38 ; CK Jha v State of Bihar, (1975) Cr LJ 1939 (Pat).
1201 Ganesh v Empress, (1884) 25 PR 1884 (Cr); Khushal v Emperor, AIR 1947 Oudh 117 , p 118 : 18 Cr LJ 651;
Hikmatullah Khan v Sakena Begum, AIR 1931 All 305 : 32 Cr LJ 367 : (1931) All LJ 117.
1202 Queen v Begum Mahtoon, 12 WR 37.
1203 Kewal Ram v Emperor, AIR 1935 Pat 515 , p 520.
1204 Ibid.
Page 8 of 8
1205 Section 195, CrPC; Rajkumar Singh v Emperor, AIR 1916 Pat 97 : 18 Cr LJ 135 : 1 Punj LJ Punj LR 298.
1206 Muzaffar Hasan v Surajmal, (1984) Raj Cr case 364 (Raj); Sardul Singh v State of Haryana, (1992) Cr LJ 354
(P&H); Ratan Singh v Kanta Devi, (1992) Cr LT 411 (P&H).
1207 Shaji Thomas v State of Kerala, 2014 (1) Ker LT 697 : 2014 (2) KLJ 21 (Ker).
1208 Babu Lal v State of Rajasthan, (1998) Cr LJ 3595 (Raj).
1209 King-Emperor v Zer Mahommad Khan, (1901) All WN 187.
1210 Baisakhi v Empress, (1888) 7 PR 38 .
1211 Hiralal Sarda v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 243 , p 244 : 33 Cr LJ 860 : 13 PLT 370.
1212 Moti Lal v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 164 , p 165 : 37 Cr LJ 420 : (1936) All LJ 71.
1213 T Revanna v H Chandrappa, 2007 Cr LJ 1995 , p 1997 (Kant).
End of Document
[s 210] Fraudulently obtaining decree for sum not due.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 8
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 8
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever fraudulently obtains a decree or order against any person for a sum not due, or for a larger sum than
is due, or for any property or interest in property to which he is not entitled, or fraudulently causes a decree or
order to be executed against any person after it has been satisfied or for anything in respect of which it has
been satisfied, or fraudulently suffers or permits any such act to be done in his name, shall be punished with
Page 4 of 8
[s 210.1] Scope
This section really comprises of three offences, viz (a) fraudulently obtaining a decree for a sum not due, or for
a larger sum than is due, or for any property or interest in property to which the accused is not entitled; (b)
fraudulently causing a decree or order to be executed after it has been satisfied, or for anything in respect of
which it has been satisfied; and (c) fraudulently suffering or permitting any such act to be done in his name.
This section is a counterpart of section 208, the two sections together deal with the plaintiff and the defendant
in a fraudulent or collusive suit or execution proceeding. Both are treated alike as principal offenders. While
section 208, IPC punishes the fraudulent defendant, this section punishes the fraudulent plaintiff.
[s 210.2] “Fraudulently Obtains a Decree or Order”—Implication of
The meaning of “fraudulently” has been discussed under sections 25 and 206, IPC. An offence under this
section is committed when a decree is fraudulently obtained. It, therefore, makes no difference whether the
decree alleged to be fraudulent has, or has not, been subsequently set aside at the instance of the parties
against whom it was made. The fact that the decree has not been set aside might be evidence to prove that
there was no fraud, but that fact cannot be, in any way, a bar to the prosecution under this section. At the same
time, even if the decree has been set aside by a civil court on the ground of fraud, that fact would not be
evidence in the criminal court of the existence of fraud.1214 The question of jurisdiction, whether the court had
power to pass a decree or not, is immaterial.1215 A bona fide mistake negatives the conduct being fraudulent.1216
[s 210.3] Section Applies to both Decree and Order
The section applies not only to fraudulently obtaining a decree but also to fraudulently obtaining an order.
Where therefore, the accused obtained an order of attachment for a sum not due to him from his judgment-
debtor, it was held that this section applied.1217
[s 210.4] “Fraudulently Causing a Decree or Order to be Executed”—Meaning of
In order that an offence under this section may be completed, a decree-holder must cause a decree to be
executed fraudulently. The mere filing of an application for execution is not enough. If after making the
application by mistake, the decree-holder gets the application for execution dismissed, he cannot be said to
have caused the decree to be executed within the meaning of this section.1218 So also, if the application for
execution is dismissed on the ground that the decree had been satisfied out of court, it cannot be said that the
decree was caused to be executed against the opposite party.1219
[s 210.5] Consequences of Unfructuous Execution Application
In Queen v Begum Mahtoon,1220 after a decree had been fully satisfied, the decree-holder applied for an
execution of the decree against the judgment-debtor who produced a receipt signed by the decree-holder
showing full satisfaction of the decree. The decree-holder at first denied, but eventually admitted the receipt and
the decree was not executed. The decree-holder was then prosecuted and convicted under section 209. His
conviction under that section was set aside on the ground that the section was not applicable to such a case,
and the conviction was altered to one under this section read with section 511, for attempting to execute the
decree fraudulently, after it was executed.
[s 210.6] Execution Against Third Party
Where in the execution of a partition decree the tenant, who was not a party to the decree, was physically
dispossessed by the court commissioner, contrary to the provisions of the CPC, with the collusion of the
landlord decree-holder, the question arose whether the decree-holder had committed an offence under section
210, IPC and the cognizance was barred without a complaint from the court. It was held by the Allahabad High
Court that “neither the complainant, who lodged the report, was a party to the civil suit in question, nor a decree
was obtained against him. Section 210, IPC would not be attracted by any stretch of imagination”.1221 Apart
from these considerations this section could not be attracted in the said case as it has not been shown that the
Page 5 of 8
decree in the execution of which the tenant was dispossessed, had already been satisfied earlier in any manner
as discussed below.
[s 210.7] “After it has been Satisfied”—Meaning of
For the application of this section not only must a decree have been executed, but it must have been done so
“after it has been satisfied”.
The words “after it has been satisfied” indicate only the fact of the satisfaction of the decree. The fact that the
satisfaction of the decree is of such a nature, that the court executing it could not recognise it, would not take
the case out of the purview of this section.1222 In construing this section, it is necessary to attach to the word
“satisfied” its ordinary meaning and not to understand it as referring only to decrees, the satisfaction of which
has been certified.1223 Order XXI, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no payment or
adjustment of a decree not certified to the court shall be recognised by any court, does not debar a criminal
court from recognising such payment where the decree-holder is charged with fraudulently executing a satisfied
decree.1224 Where the provisions of section 258 of the old Code of Civil Procedure corresponding to O XXI, rule
2 of the Code of 1908 had not been complied with, it was held that a civil court is not debarred from admitting
evidence that the decree has been satisfied out of court, for the purpose of an investigation with a view to
sending the judgment-creditor to a magistrate.1225 The words “any court” in that clause have no application to a
criminal court investigating a charge of fraudulently executing a decree under this section. Those words do not
bar any criminal remedy which an injured judgment-debtor may have against a fraudulent decree-holder,
whether by a prosecution under sections 193, 210, 406 or any other section of the Indian Penal Code.1226 The
Rajasthan High Court, however, quashed the prosecution under this section for an earlier payment which was
never got verified in the execution court, terming it as wholly unjustified.1227
[s 210.8] Procedure
The offence is non-cognizable, bailable and not compoundable. It can be tried by a magistrate of the first class,
and can also be tried summarily under section 260, CrPC. The period of limitation for taking cognizance of an
offence under this section is three years.
[s 210.9] Complaint
A complaint in writing by the court where such offence is committed in, or in relation to any proceeding in that
court or by some other court to which it is subordinate, is required under section 195(1)(b) of the CrPC for
taking cognizance of the offence under this section.
Where the facts primarily and essentially disclose an offence under section 210, IPC, the other offences alleged
being merely subsidiary to the main offence, the complainant could not be permitted to evade the provisions of
section 195, CrPC, by omitting this section from the complaint.1228 It is essential in the public interest that
persons who have decrees in their favour be warned that they must not attempt to deceive the courts and
thereby get money from their judgment-debtors to which they are not entitled. So, the sanction (court complaint)
to prosecute a decree-holder under this section for failing to give credit in execution for a sum paid to him
should not be withheld, merely on the ground that the judgment-debtor making the payment has not been
prejudiced or that there is no satisfactory proof of the payment on the file.1229
[s 210.10] Competence to Make Complaint
Where a plaintiff first instituted a suit in one court and obtained a decree for a part of his claim and then
proceeded to present a fresh plaint in another court in respect of the items disallowed by the first court and
obtained an ex parte decree, the action for making a complaint under this section for obtaining the second
decree by fraudulent means, if proved, can only be taken by the court to which both the trial courts are
subordinate, as the filing of the second suit cannot be held to be an offence committed in relation to any
proceeding in the first court.1230
[s 210.11] Charge
Page 6 of 8
The following form may be adopted in framing a charge:
That you, on or about the………day of………at………fraudulently obtained a decree (or order) in suit
no………of………against………for Rs………which was not due (or which was a larger sum than was due) (or for
property or interest in property viz………(specify) to which you were not entitled) (or fraudulently caused a decree (or
order) to be executed against………after it has been satisfied, or fraudulently suffered or permitted………(specify any
such act) to be done in your name), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 210 of the Indian
Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 210.12] Proof
For a conviction under this section, the following points must be proved:
(a) the accused obtained a decree or order, or suffered or permitted the same to be done in his name;
(b) the decree or order was for a sum not due, or for a larger sum than was due, or for any property or
interest in property to which the accused was not entitled;
(c) or the accused fraudulently caused a decree or order to be executed against any person after it had
been satisfied, or for anything in respect of which it had been satisfied; and
(d) the accused did so fraudulently.1231
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
Page 7 of 8
1214 Emperor v Mulla Fuzla Karim, ILR 33 Cal 193 : 3 Cr LJ 365.
1215 Badri v Emperor, AIR 1919 All 323 : 20 Cr LJ 898.
1216 Mangat Rai v R, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 202 : 7 All LJ 93; Dayaram v R, AIR 1914 Lah 254 (2) : 15 Cr LJ 263 : 11
PWR 1914.
1217 Hikmatullah Khan v Sakina Begum, AIR 1931 All 305 , p 306 : 32 Cr LJ 367 : (1931) All LJ 117 : ILR 53 All
416.
1218 Bismillah Khan Pathan Khan v Rambhau Maroti, AIR 1946 Ngp 350 , p 352 : 47 Cr LJ 1013.
1219 Shama Charan Das v Kasi Naik, ILR 23 Cal 971; Naurang Mal v Emperor, 13 PC (Cr) 1902.
1220 Queen v Begum Mahtoon, 12 WR (Cr) 37.7
1221 Bal Krishan Gaur v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1985) All Cr R 528 : (1985) All WC 1012 : (1985) All LJ 495 :
(1985) All Cr Cas 455.
1222 Modhub Chunder Mazumdar v Novodeep Chunder Pandit, 16 ILR Cal 126.
1223 Queen-Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288.
1224 Queen-Empress v Pillala, ILR 9 Mad 101; Queen-Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288; Mulla Mal v
Rahman, (1884) PR 8 (FB); Re Balu, (1885) PR 7 ; Re Naurangonal, (1902) PR 13 ; Ram v Deramal, (1899) 1 UBR
(1897-1901) 278.
1225 Queen v Mutturaman Chetti, ILR 4 Mad 325.
1226 Queen-Empress v Bapuji Dayaram, ILR 10 Bom 288.
1227 Bhawani Singh v Ram Swaroop, (1987) CLR (Raj) 236.
1228 Sadhuram Chimandas v Chimandas Budhuram, AIR 1937 Sind 81 : 38 Cr LJ 742; Bhimamal v Emperor, AIR
1936 Sind 123 : 37 Cr LJ 107; Tarachand Madhumal v Emperor, AIR 1936 Sind 130 , p 132; Bashirul Huq v State of
West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 [LNIND 1953 SC 145] : (1953) Cr LJ 1232 ; S Dutt v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1966
SC 523 [LNIND 1965 SC 195] : (1966) Cr LJ 459 ; CK Jha v State of Bihar, (1975) Cr LJ 1939 , p 1945 (Pat).
Page 8 of 8
1229 Bur Singh v Ishar Singh, AIR 1917 Lah 209 (2) : 18 Cr LJ 619; Chiman Lal v Ghulam Mohi-ud-din, (1911) 12
Cr LJ 189 .
1230 Vishnu Ram v Crown, AIR 1925 Lah 524 : 26 Cr LJ 1588.
1231 Hari Ram v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 676 , p 677 : 30 Cr LJ 666.
End of Document
[s 211] False charge of offence made with intent to injure.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 28
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 28
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever, with intent to cause injury to any person, institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceedings
against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, knowing that there is no
just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge against that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
Page 4 of 28
and if such criminal proceeding be instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death,
1232[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for seven years or upwards, shall be punishable with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 211.1] Scope
This section is divided into two distinct parts. The first part contemplates two offences viz, (a) the institution of
criminal proceedings wrongly, and (b) making a false charge, with intent to cause injury to any person. All cases
of false criminal proceedings and of false charges fall under the first part of the section, except those specified
in the second part of the section. The purview of the second part of the section is, however, limited to the
institution of criminal proceedings on a false charge, and does not include the making of a false charge, which
falls short of the institution of criminal proceedings.1233 Under the latter part, if criminal proceedings are
instituted on a false charge of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven
years or upwards, the offence is more severely punishable. The former of the two offences, contemplated by
the first part, necessarily assumes the latter, but the latter may be committed even where no criminal
proceedings follow. To constitute the offence of preferring a false charge contemplated in this section, it is not
necessary that the charge should be before a magistrate. It is enough if it appears that the charge was
deliberately made before a police officer with a view to its being brought before a magistrate. Of course, a mere
random conversation or remark would not amount to a charge.1234 A false charge laid before the police, and
never intended to be prosecuted in court, may obviously subject the accused party to very substantial injury, as
defined in section 44.1235 It has been held that a person may be charged under two heads, for making a false
charge and for instituting criminal proceedings, the two offences being different.1236 It would appear that the
Legislature must have meant different things when it spoke of “instituting proceedings” and “making a charge”.
In a full bench case of the Calcutta High Court,1237 Wilson J, delivering the judgment of the court, observed:1238
I agree in this reasoning in one sense and not in another. I agree that we must take it that the legislature did not regard
the two phrases as co-extensive in meaning, but considered that there were, or might be, cases to which the one
would apply and not the other. But I do not think we are to suppose that the legislature meant the phrase to be mutually
exclusive in meaning, so that the instituting of criminal proceedings must be by something which is not a charge, and a
charge must be something which is not the institution of criminal proceedings. This cannot, I think, be for two reasons.
First, because there is no mode by which a private accuser can institute criminal proceedings except by making a
charge; and if he does not do it by the charge, he never does it at all, to whatever length the proceedings may go. And
secondly, because the last part of the section speaks of ‘proceedings instituted on a false charge.
To constitute an offence under this section the following ingredients must exist, namely:
(a) the accused intended to cause injury to any person;
(b) with that intention, he instituted or caused to be instituted, a criminal proceeding against that person or,
in the alternative, falsely charged him with having committed an offence; and
(c) when he did as above, he knew that there was no just or lawful ground for such criminal proceeding or
false charge against that person.1239
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There are thus three elements in each of the offences under this section.
The intention and knowledge in (a) and (c) respectively constitute the mental elements in each offence.
The ingredients of this section go a good deal further than the mere absence of proof of the guilt of the person
said to have been falsely charged with an offence. The complainant must have falsely charged such person
with having committed an offence, that is to say, the person must be innocent.
The complainant must have known that there is no just or lawful ground for the proceeding or charge, that is to
say, there is no penalty in this section for incautious or negligible acceptance of information which the
complainant might have learnt by inquiry to be unreliable.
Thirdly, there must have been an intention to cause an injury to the person. This can in some cases be inferred
from the relation of the parties when the other two elements are established. As regards the other two
ingredients, it is important to remember that there is a difference between suspicion and evidence. The
prosecution will have to establish facts irreconcilable with the innocence of the accused.1240 The criminal
proceedings and false charges contemplated by this section must mean proceedings instituted and charges
made according to the provisions of the criminal law in force in India. The section occurs in a chapter relating to
offences against public justice, which under the Code must mean public justice in India, unless it is expressly
otherwise provided.1241
The commentary under the same heading in section 182, ante may be referred to.
It is true that an offence under section 182 is distinct from one under section 211, though the latter is more
serious and may include the offence under the former section.1242 The criminal law makes a clear distinction
between a false charge which falls under this section, and false information given to the police, falling under
section 182. A person prosecuting another for an offence under the latter section need not prove malice and a
want of reasonable and probable cause except so far as they are implied in the act of giving information known
to the police, with the knowledge or likelihood that such information would lead a public servant to use his
power to the injury or annoyance of the complainant. In an inquiry under this section, on the other hand, the
absence of just and lawful grounds for making the charge is an important element.1243 Section 182 relates only
to cases of information given to officials with the intention of causing, or with the knowledge that it is likely to
cause, that official to do or omit to do something, which he ought not to do or omit to do, or to use his lawful
power to the injury or annoyance of any person. This is a distinct offence from that described in this section,
which relates to an attempt to put the criminal courts in motion against another person. The action which this
section renders penal, is an action entailing very serious consequences, and, therefore, more serious
consideration is required by the individual who takes it. It is sufficient therefore, in such cases, for the
prosecution to establish that there was no just or lawful ground for the action taken and that the accused knew
this. But something more is required in the case of action referred to in section 182. To bring a case within that
section, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove, not merely the absence of a reasonable or probable cause
for giving the information, but a positive knowledge or belief of the falsity of the information given.1244 An
accused can commit offences both under sections 182 and 211 in the pursuit of the same purpose, one after
the other, but their circles are clearly separated and they do not overlap each other.1245
Where the information conveyed to the police amounts to a false institution of criminal proceedings against a
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defined person, or amounts to falsely charging a defined person, with an offence as defined in the Indian Penal
Code, then the person giving such information has committed an offence under this section. In such a case, this
section is, and section 182 is not, the appropriate section under which to frame the charge. Section 182, when
read with this section, must be understood as referring to cases where the information given to the public
servant falls short of amounting to the institution of criminal proceedings against a defined person or to the false
charging of a defined person with an offence as defined in the Indian Penal Code.1246
The petitioner filed a complaint against the opposite party alleging that his son was kidnapped by the opposite
party. The kidnapped boy appeared before the court and stated that he was not kidnapped by the opposite
party but he himself had gone voluntarily to marry a girl. The girl in statement under section 164, CrPC also
stated that, she had married the petitioner’s son. The petitioner had filed a false case of kidnapping.
Cognizance of the offences under sections 182 and 211, CrPC taken by the Magistrate was held proper.1247
[s 211.4] Essence of the Two Offences under Sections 211 and 182
The essence of the offence under section 182 is a contempt of the lawful authority of a public servant, whereas
the offence under this section is an offence against public justice.1248
[s 211.5] When Offence is covered under Section 211, Proceeding under Section 182 cannot continue
The magistrate can take cognizance of an offence under section 182 on a complaint in writing by the police
officer by virtue of the provisions contained in section 195(1)(a) of the CrPC. But it would virtually lead to the
circumvention of the provisions of section 195(1)(b) if the proceedings under section 182 can continue where
the offence disclosed is covered by section 211, IPC and a complaint is pending, which has been filed by the
informant on the same facts and allegations as were contained in his first information report (FIR).1249
For more details, commentary under section 182 may be referred to.
[s 211.6] “Whoever”—Person Liable
The word “whoever” is wide enough to cover not only private individuals but also public servants. If the
accused, in bad faith, and knowing that he had no just or lawful grounds for instituting the proceedings, led his
superior officer to believe that he had just and lawful grounds and so induced the latter to direct the institution of
criminal proceedings against a person, he would be liable under this section, notwithstanding that he was a
police officer and in a sense instituted the proceedings by order of his superior officer.1250 If the mere fact of
being in a subordinate position is to shield a man from the consequences of official acts originated by himself,
no one will be safe from false and malicious charges.1251
[s 211.7] Intention to Cause Injury Necessary
It is essential for a conviction for either of the offences under this section, that the accused intended to cause
injury to the person he charged or proceeded against.1252 By “injury” is meant any harm illegally caused to any
person, in body, mind, reputation or property.1253
[s 211.7.1] Malice is the Foundation
“The foundation of the action is malice, and malice may be shown at any time in the course of inquiry”.1254 As
Cockburn CJ, said in Fitz Jogn v Mackinder1255
A prosecution, though in the outset not malicious, as having been undertaken at the dictation of a judge or magistrate,
or, if spontaneously undertaken, from having been commenced under a bona fide belief in the guilt of the accused,
may nevertheless become malicious in any of the stages through which it has to pass, if the prosecutor, having
acquired positive knowledge of the innocence of the accused, perseveres malo animo in the prosecution, with the
Page 7 of 28
intention of procuring per nefas a conviction of the accused.
[s 211.8] “Criminal Proceeding”—What is?
When the proceeding is before a magistrate, and it is one which may end in conviction, it must be considered to
be a criminal proceeding. If there be a provision in a statute that that which is merely a civil liability may be
enforced by a proceeding in its nature criminal, that proceeding is nonetheless criminal because it is applied to
a civil liability.1256
[s 211.8.1] Code of Criminal Procedure is not Exhaustive of Criminal Proceedings—Contempt Proceedings are
Criminal Proceedings
A contempt of court can be punished by imprisonment and fine, and that brings an accusation charging a man
with contempt of court within the wide words “criminal proceedings”. Such proceedings were described as
quasi-criminal proceedings by the privy council because such proceedings are not tried under the CrPC. That
does not render it any the less a criminal proceeding because the CrPC is not exhaustive of criminal
proceedings and punishments for contempts by summary procedure, before the superior courts are special
criminal proceedings which the CrPC does not even seek to regulate. An application to take proceedings under
the Contempt of Courts Act, undoubtedly can be regarded as causing a criminal proceeding to be instituted.1257
[s 211.8.2] Offence—Not Confined to Criminal Proceedings
When the section says that an offence under it may be committed by falsely charging a person with the
commission of an offence, it does not intend that the offence must be one which gives rise to a criminal
proceeding. There is no authority for a contrary view. Indeed, the definition of the word “offence” in section 40 of
the IPC shows that such a contrary view would be wrong. Under that definition, the word “offence” in this
section, means an offence punishable under this Code or under any special or local law as defined in it. Section
41 defines a special law as a law applicable to a particular subject. Now, the Contempt of Courts Act is an Act
dealing with the subject of contempt of courts and is, therefore, a special law. It also provides for punishment
for a contempt of court with simple imprisonment up to six months, subject to certain conditions mentioned.1258
[s 211.8.3] Two Ways to put the Criminal Law into Motion
According to the CrPC now in force, there are two modes in which the aggrieved person may seek to put the
criminal law in motion. He may make a charge or, in the language of the Code, give information to the police as
provided by section 154. If the information discloses a cognizable offence, the proper police officer may
proceed to make an investigation; and if the result of that investigation is adverse to the accused, he is, in due
course, brought before a magistrate. All this forms the subject of chapter XII of the CrPC. If the information
does not disclose a cognizable offence, the police cannot take any step of their own authority. Secondly, the
aggrieved person may lay a charge by way of filing a complaint1259 under section 200 before a magistrate or
before a Judge under the provisions of some special Act.
Whichever of these methods is adopted, the thing done by the accuser is the same, that which is called in the
one case giving information, and in the other, making a complaint. In each case, the steps that follow are
governed by the CrPC. In each the first step taken by the accused is ordinarily also the last, for from that time
the control of the investigation or inquiry passes out of his hands into those of the constituted authorities;
subject to this, that if, after an information before the police, the result of their investigation is adverse to the
complainant, he may renew his complaint to the magistrate. The procedure by information to the police is by far
the more common course of proceeding, especially where any grave offence is alleged.1260
[s 211.9] “Institutes or Causes to be Instituted any Criminal Proceeding”—Scope of Statement
This section refers to three matters: falsely charging a person, instituting criminal proceedings against that
person, and causing criminal proceedings to be instituted against that person.
Page 8 of 28
To “institute” is to originate or found, to begin or commence. It does not require any further steps to be taken.
To “institute criminal proceedings” means to set the criminal law in motion. “Criminal proceedings” are defined
neither in this Code nor in the CrPC. Section 2(i), CrPC, defines judicial proceedings as including any
proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally taken on oath. So, no investigation by the
police can be a judicial proceeding, although it is a criminal matter. Chapter XIV of the CrPC 1973 is headed as
“Conditions Requisite for Initiation of Proceedings”. These proceedings, of course, are inquiry proceedings or
trials, but they are certainly criminal proceedings as well.1261 Proceedings to compel any one to give security, by
reason of an anticipated breach of peace under section 107, or because he is concealing himself, or has no
ostensible means of subsistence under section 109 of the CrPC, are apparently criminal proceedings, but they
do not necessarily involve a charge of any offence. On the other hand, a charge to the police of a non-
cognizable offence may, very possibly, be a charge within the meaning of the section, but could hardly be
called the institution of criminal proceedings. So a charge made to the Judge of a civil court, or to public officers
of other kinds, in order to obtain a sanction to prosecute may well be a charge, but it is not the institution of
criminal proceedings.1262
[s 211.9.1] Mere Investigation does not amount to institution of Criminal Proceedings
In the case of Re Thakur Tewary,1263 where a police officer made a coloured or false report that a certain
offence investigated by him was proved, sanction to prosecute him under this section was refused, not because
he was a police officer and acted under orders of his superior, but because it could not be said that the accused
instituted any criminal proceedings against any person.
[s 211.9.2] Report and Complaint as Criminal Proceedings
A person actually institutes criminal proceedings not only upon making a complaint as defined in section 2(d) of
the CrPC 1973 but also upon reporting the commission of a cognizable offence to the police under section 154
of the same Code. Under section 2(d) a “complaint” means an allegation made orally or in writing, to a
magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the CrPC, that some person, whether known or unknown, has
committed an offence, but does not include a police report. There must be an express or implied request to the
magistrate to take action. It is of the essence of a complaint that the accusation should have been made with a
view to action being taken under the Code. An express request to that effect is not, however, necessary.
Whether the statement was made with a view to action being taken upon it as upon a complaint or not, must be
determined in the light of the circumstances.1264
[s 211.9.3] A Departmental Complaint not Contemplated under this Section
A petition addressed to a collector was directed against an official of the court of wards and asked for a
redressal of the petitioner’s grievances. It was held that the complaint was purely departmental and that the
collector was not justified in treating it as a criminal complaint and ordering a prosecution of the petitioner under
this section.1265
Where a person sent a telegram to the deputy superintendent of police alleging that a certain sub-inspector of
police had committed certain offences against him, it was held that in the absence of proof, that the person sent
the telegram with the intention of making a report for investigation with a view to prosecution, he could not be
held guilty under this section.1266
[s 211.9.4] Report of Non-Cognizable Offence to the Police is not Criminal Proceeding
Turning to a report made to the police, it is settled law that as the police have no power to take any proceedings
in non-cognizable cases, without the order of a magistrate, a false charge of such an offence made to the police
is not an institution of criminal proceedings.1267 It may, however, amount to making a false charge.1268
[s 211.9.5] Option in Case of Cognizable Offence
If a person feels aggrieved by the commission of a cognizable offence, he may either (a) lodge the first
information report before the police under section 154, or (b) approach the competent judicial magistrate or
court directly and file a complaint under section 200 of the CrPC. The choice is left entirely to his discretion at
Page 9 of 28
that stage. The police, after due investigation, may submit a report under section 173, which is usually known
as charge-sheet if a prima facie case is made out against the accused, or a final report if no such case is made
out. If a charge-sheet is submitted, the magistrate takes cognizance of the same under section 190(1)(b). If the
police submits a charge-sheet and sends the accused for trial, then criminal proceedings have been instituted
against a person, and the person who has set the police in motion has caused those criminal proceedings to be
instituted.1269
[s 211.9.6] Submission of Final Report—Whether amounts to Institution of Criminal Proceedings
If, however, the police finds that no case is made out against the accused and accordingly submits a final report
and the magistrate accepts the same, the accused, that is, the person against whom the report to the police
was made, is not sent up for the trial and is discharged, it can be said that criminal proceedings were instituted
on a false charge. On this question, there is a conflict of opinion. The answer to the question depends upon the
meaning of the two phrases, “institution of criminal proceedings” and “making a false charge.” So far as the first
part of the section is concerned, the question whether the two phrases are different and mutually exclusive has
no material bearing, for whether a given act amounts to a false charge or the institution of criminal proceedings,
the penalty is the same. The difference between the two phrases becomes material when the applicability of the
second paragraph of the section has to be considered.
One view is that although criminal law may be set in motion by giving information to the police of a cognizable
offence, yet unless proceedings are instituted in a court of law, it is not correct to say that criminal proceedings
were instituted.1270 According to this view, where on a false charge of a cognizable offence made to the police,
there has only been an investigation by the police and no proceedings have been taken in any court, there has
been no institution of criminal proceedings on a false charge within the meaning of the second part of this
section, and the person making the false charge is liable only under the first part of the section, even if the
offence charged is punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for seven years or upwards.
The other view is that to prefer a complaint (report) to the police in respect of an offence with which they are
competent to deal, is to institute a criminal proceeding within the meaning of this section.1271 Hence, a person
who sets the criminal law in motion by making a false charge to the police of a cognizable offence, institutes
criminal proceedings within the meaning of this section, even though the person charged may not be arrested
or the matter may not go further than the police inquiry, and if the offence falls within the description in the latter
part of the section, he is liable to the punishment provided for.1272
The weight of authorities is in favour of this latter view which also finds support from the Supreme Court.1273
[s 211.10] Statements which do not Amount to Institution of Criminal Proceedings [s 211.10.1] Mere Statement
of Suspicion is not enough
A mere statement of facts or a communication of a suspicion cannot amount to an institution of criminal

proceedings within the meaning of this section.1274
[s 211.10.2] Statement made to Police during Investigation
Where a complaint of a cognizable offence was made by a person other than the accused, any statement made
to the police officer by the accused, after that complaint had been received, however false it might have been,
is a statement made in police investigation and cannot be made the foundation of a prosecution under this
section, as it is not this statement which set the law in motion, nor can the prosecution be said to have been
instituted by it.1275
[s 211.10.3] Statement of Witness
The mere fact of giving evidence by a witness in a court alone cannot, by any stretch of reasoning, be
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tantamount to the institution of proceedings within the meaning of this section.1276
[s 211.10.4] Statement of Counsel
An advocate filing a complaint on behalf of a client, cannot be said to have instituted criminal proceedings. An
advocate cannot be expected to constitute himself a judge, either of the law or facts, of his client’s case. He is
his client’s adviser and must act according to his instructions, provided always that those instructions do not
require that he should be guilty of an offence or of misconduct or that he should institute in a court, criminal
proceedings which to his own certain knowledge are false. Moreover, it is his bounden duty to put into the
complaint all the material facts upon which the complaint is based and not wilfully, by acts of omission, to
deceive the court.1277
[s 211.11] ‘Or Falsely Charges any Person with having Committed an Offence’—Meaning of
The Code of Criminal Procedure does not define what constitutes “making of a charge” and what amounts to
the “institution of criminal proceedings”. It must, therefore, follow that these expressions have been used in their
ordinary or popularly understood meaning and not in any restricted or technical sense. Thus, whereas “making
a charge” may mean and imply a false accusation with regard to the commission of an offence, made with a
view to take action against the person complained of, to an authority bound by law to move in the matter, the
causation and institution of criminal proceeding may also include the setting of criminal law thus in motion.1278
[s 211.11.1] Bombay View
In Raya Kutti v Emperor,1279 it was observed:
Now it is obvious that the word ‘charges’, as used in the section, means something different from ‘give information’. We
think, the words ‘falsely charges’ must be construed with reference to the words which speaks of the institution of
proceedings. The true test seems to be: does the person, who makes the statement which is alleged to constitute the
‘charge’, do so with the intention and object of setting the criminal law in motion against the person against whom the
statement is directed. Such object and intention may be inferred from the language of the statement and the
circumstances in which it is made.
[s 211.11.2] Madras View
So also, in Queen-Empress v Karigowda,1280 Ranade J observed that:
The words ‘falsely charging’ used in that section must be construed along with the words which speak of the institution
of proceedings. These latter words are obviously used in a technical and exclusive sense, and by parity of reasoning,
the same restricted sense must be given to the words which relate to a false charge.
But this narrow construction has not been accepted in other cases. In Sessions Judge, Tinnevelly v Sivan
Chetti,1281 a full bench of the Madras High Court held:
A false ‘charge’ in this section must not be understood in any restricted or technical sense, but in its ordinary meaning,
of a false accusation made to any authority bound by law to investigate it or to take any steps in regard to it, such as
giving information of it to superior authorities with a view to investigation or other proceedings, and the institution of
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criminal proceedings includes the setting of the criminal law in motion.
[s 211.11.3] Calcutta View
Expressly dissenting from the above Bombay decision, in Dasrathi Mondal v Hari Das,1282 it was observed:
With due deference to their Lordships, we are unable to accept this narrow construction of section 211, IPC. If the
legislature had intended that the words ‘falsely charging’ should be read ejusdem generis with the words that precede,
viz, ‘institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding’ there was hardly any necessity for using the
expression ‘or falsely charges’ because that would have been covered by the words the precede them, namely,
‘institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceedings.
[s 211.11.4] Supreme Court’s View
This view has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Hari Das v State of West Bengal,1283 where Mudholkar J
observed at p 1779:
In my judgment it would not be right to read the words ‘or falsely charges’ as being in any way restricted by the words
‘institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding’. The legislature has clearly provided for two kinds of acts:
one, the institution of proceedings and the other of making a false charge, and I see no compelling reason for reading
the section as if it is limited to the institution of a complaint upon a false charge. Such an interpretation would
completely shut out criminal proceedings in which no charge of offence has been made.
[s 211.11.5] Words Refer to Initial Accusation—Intention should be to set Criminal Law in Motion
In the latter case the Supreme Court has observed that the expression “falsely charges” in this section cannot
mean giving false evidence as a prosecution witness against an accused person during the course of a criminal
trial. To “falsely charge” must refer to the original or initial accusation, putting or seeking to put in motion the
machinery of criminal investigation in motion and not when seeking to prove the false charge by making a
deposition in support of the charge framed at the trial. The words “falsely charges” have to be read along with
the expression “institution of criminal proceeding”. Both these expressions, being susceptible to analogous
meaning, should be understood to have been used in their cognate sense. They seem to have been used in a
technical sense as commonly understood in our criminal law. The false charge must be embodied either in a
complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or an officer having authority over the
person against whom the allegations are made. The statement in order to constitute a “charge” should be made
with the intention and object of setting criminal law in motion. A statement on oath, falsely supporting the
prosecution case against an accused person, more appropriately amounts to an offence under sections 193
and 195, IPC and not under section 211, IPC.1284
[s 211.11.6] Offence Complete when Charge has been Made
So then the meaning of the expression “falsely charges” is simply “falsely accuses”, and as the section stands,
there is no necessity of this false accusation being made in connection with a criminal proceeding.1285 The
offence is complete when the false charge has been made, and even though no criminal proceedings follow, for
example, owing to the police, on investigation, referring the charge as false.1286
[s 211.11.7] Definite Accusation Necessary
To constitute a charge, there must be a definite accusation. The section requires a good deal more than a mere
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suggestion of an inference. There must be a charge of some specific offence made with the intention and object
of setting the criminal law in motion, against the man who is said to have committed the offence.1287 The
accusation must be that a certain defined person has committed an offence, otherwise, it would only amount to
giving information of an offence within the meaning of section 182.1288
[s 211.11.8] Test Identification does not Constitute a Charge—Report and Charge Distinguished
A mere suggestion to the police that certain houses should be searched because there is reason to suspect the
conduct of the owners of those houses does not amount to a “charge” within the meaning of this section.1289
The mere expression of a suspicion is, therefore, not enough.1290 Identification of an accused at test
identification parades also does not amount to a false charge.1291 In one case it was held:
If the complainant confines himself to reporting that he knows of the facts, stating his suspicions, and leaving the
matter to be further investigated by the police, or leaving the police to take such course as they think right in the
performance of their duty, he may be making a report, but he is not making a charge. But if he takes the further step,
without waiting for any official investigation, of definitely alleging his belief in the guilt of a specified person, and his
desire that the specified person be proceeded against in court, that act of his, whether verbal or written, if made to an
officer of the law authorised to initiate proceedings based upon the complainant’s statement, whether amounting to an
expression of the complainant’s belief in the guilt of the specified person or his desire that court proceedings be taken
against him, amounts to making a charge.1292
[s 211.11.9] Report not Reduced to Writing—Effect of
The fact that the statement made by the accused to the police officer was not reduced to writing in accordance
with the requirements of section 154 of the CrPC, does not prevent the statement made from being a false
charge within the meaning of this section.1293
[s 211.11.10] Charge—Where to be Made
As held by the Supreme Court in Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain,1294 a false charge has to be made initially to a
person in authority or to someone who is in a position to get the offender punished by appropriate proceedings.
It must be embodied either in a complaint or in a report of a cognizable offence to the police officer or an officer
having authority over the person against whom the allegations are made.
A false charge may be made in a court or outside it.1295 For this section to apply, the false charge must be
made to a court or an officer who has power to investigate and send it up for trial,1296 or to take any step in
regard to it.
[s 211.11.11] Some Illustrative Cases
Information of an offence given by a person to a village munsif (village headman), who communicated it to the
police, which in turn when investigated found it to be false, may be made the basis of a charge against the
informant under this section.1297
It must be made to a competent magistrate or other person with a statutory standing in the matter and must
further be made with the object of setting the criminal law in motion.1298 A resolution condemning the police
action in not taking effective steps to apprehend the culprits of a criminal case was passed in a public meeting.
The copies of the resolution were sent to various higher authorities. It was held that no offence under section
211 was committed thereby.1299
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A charge which is untrue, but which is made to a person who has no official duty in the matter, cannot amount
to a “false charge”1300 though it may be defamation. “It is not necessary, however, that the charge should be
before a magistrate. It is enough if it appears that the charge was deliberately made before an officer of police
with a view to its being brought before a magistrate”.1301 The criminal intention involved in this offence, is to
cause injury to the person accused, not merely by a loss of reputation, as in defamation, but by subjecting him
to a criminal prosecution and the consequences thereof, and this object can be brought about only by making
the false charge to those whose office it is to investigate, and proceed upon an information of the crime—the
police and the magistracy. If then A, intending to injure B, by subjecting him to a criminal prosecution, falsely
charges him before a policeman or magistrate with having committed an offence, he has falsely charged B, and
nothing further is necessary to render him liable to punishment under the first part of this section.1302 As pointed
out in Rayan Kutti v Emperor,1303 the true test is; does the person who makes the statement which is alleged to
constitute the charge, do so with the intention and object of setting the criminal law in motion against the person
against whom the statement is directed? Such an object and intention may be inferred from the language of the
statement and the circumstances in which it is made.1304
Where an accusation of murder is made, in the first instance to a village magistrate, who has authority to arrest
any person whom he suspects of having committed the murder of a person, and whose body is found within his
jurisdiction, the accusation is a “charge”, within the meaning of this section, even though it does not amount to
the institution of criminal proceedings and even though no criminal proceedings follow it owing to the police, on
investigation, referring the charge as false.1305
When the accused, in order to protect themselves from the oppression of a sub-inspector of police, sent a
petition to the superintendent of police, alleging that the sub-inspector committed bribery and extortion, it was
held that the object of the accused could only be that the superintendent might punish the sub-inspector
departmentally, by transferring him to some other station or by some other act of a like nature, and that as it
could not be said with certainty that their intention was to set the criminal law in motion, the accusation did not
amount to a false charge.1306
A petition was presented with the object of bringing to the knowledge of the authorities certain matters
regarding which the petitioner had received information, in order that there might not be a repetition of an
alleged tutoring of witnesses, and not with the object that the authorities should institute criminal proceedings. It
was held that the petition did not amount to a charge within the meaning of this section.1307
It has been held that a false accusation against a subordinate judge, that he committed an offence under
section 196, made to a district judge, in order to obtain a sanction for a prosecution, amounts to making a
charge within the meaning of this section, as the object in making the accusation is to set the criminal law in
motion and the district Judge has the statutory power to further that object by means of a complaint, though the
sanction of the local Government is also necessary before any criminal court can take cognizance of the
offence.1308
[s 211.11.12] To bring Vexatious Charge not an Offence
For a conviction under this section the charge made must be false. To bring a vexatious charge is not an
offence under this section.1309 Compounding of a false charge made to the police is not a conclusive answer to
a charge under this section.1310
[s 211.12] Charge Partly True and Partly False—Test to be Applied in Such Cases
This section contemplates a charge which is indivisible in its nature. To Judge whether a complaint, part of
which is true and part false, falls under the section or not, the nature of the complaint or charge made by the
accused has to be considered; in other words, no precise rule or principle, to decide whether the complaint is
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substantially true or substantially false, can be laid down, and each case must depend upon its own
circumstances.1311 It has to be considered whether the complaint is substantially true and what is false is a
mere fringe to the complaint or whether the substantial complaint is false and what is true is a mere fringe, or a
mere accessory circumstance.1312
[s 211.13] Charge must be of an offence
Under section 40 of the IPC the word “offence” denotes a thing punishable under the Code or under any special
or local law, and there is no reason why a thing made punishable by the Workmen’s Compensation Act should
not be taken to be an offence within the meaning of this section. The Contempt of Courts Act, being a special
law, a charge of having committed a contempt of court has been held to be an offence within the meaning of
this section.1313
[s 211.14] Charge should be Wilfully False
Another essential ingredient of an offence under this section is that the accused must have known that there
was no just or lawful ground for the criminal proceeding or charge. A mere finding that he made a false report or
charge is not sufficient.1314 The prosecution is bound to prove that the charge was wilfully false to the
knowledge of the maker of the charge. A mere proof of the falsity of the complaint or the failure to prove its truth
is not enough. To adduce evidence of such knowledge may be very difficult, but it is still the unavoidable duty of
the prosecution to prove it, if the accused is to be convicted under this section.1315 In a case under this section,
two principles must be kept in view, first, that a failure on the part of a complainant to establish the truth of his
allegation does not by any means justify the inference that the complaint was false, and second, that to secure
a conviction in this class of cases, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt, that the circumstances are
not merely consistent with the guilt of the accused but also entirely inconsistent with his innocence.1316
Where an FIR is lodged containing false and baseless allegations, prima facie to injure and harm the reputation
of the complainant and the falsity of the said allegations is proved from the statement of the accused recorded
under section 313, CrPC and corroborated from the evidence of independent witnesses on record, the order
acquitting the accused of the offences under sections 500 and 211 was set aside.1317
[s 211.14.1] Presumption in Some Cases—Defence in Such Cases
Where the accused knows that there is no just or lawful ground for his instituting proceedings or making a
charge, a conclusive presumption of an intent to injure at once arises. Such a knowledge can only be proved on
the facts of each individual case, as they existed, or were supposed to exist, or were known by the accused, at
the time the charge was made, and the accused in his defence should be allowed to show the nature of the
information he had, and the rumours that he heard, etc.1318 Proof that the accused, upon reasonable grounds
sufficient to satisfy a cautious man, honestly believed that the person he accused was probably guilty is a good
defence1319 as wholly negativing a presumption of an intent to injure on his part. Rashness in making a charge
honestly believed, is not itself indictable.1320 But want of any inquiry (and hence rashness) is important in
determining whether there was a reasonable and probable ground for the alleged belief.1321 The prosecution
must prove such knowledge on the part of the accused, and, if this is not established, he must be acquitted.1322
[s 211.14.2] Making Charge when Justified—Purpose behind the Exception
A false charge may be made in two circumstances:
(a) the person making the charge may come forward and say that he had himself seen the offence being
committed; or
(b) he may say that he was making the charge on the basis of information received by him.
If the charge is made on the basis of personal knowledge, it would not be difficult for the prosecution to show
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that there was no just or lawful ground for such charge, if it is able to prove that no such offence was ever
committed. That fact alone would be sufficient to show that the person concerned had no just or lawful ground
for the charge. But where the charge is made on information supplied to the informant, different considerations
arise, and the mere fact that the offence was never committed is not enough to establish that the person
making the charge had no just or lawful ground for such charge. If the mere fact that no offence was committed
were enough for the purpose, it would block a large source of information to the police where crimes may be
suspected in such cases, sometimes the suspicion may prove to be incorrect. But that thing by itself should not
be sufficient to make the person informing the Police on suspicion liable to prosecution under this section. It
was for the purpose of safeguarding this channel of information to the police that the words “knowing that there
is no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge” were put in this section. If the charge is therefore,
made on the basis of information supplied to the person making the charge, two further considerations arise
which might go to prove that the person concerned knew that there was no just or lawful ground for such
charge. In the first place, the person making the charge may have been supplied with a certain information, but
in his complaint or report to the police he says falsely that he was supplied with certain other information which
on the face of it, justifies his making the charge. In such a case, it is the duty of the police, if they know who the
informant of the person making the charge was, to produce that information so that it may be known what
information was given to the person making the charge. The other way, in which the prosecution can show that
the person making the charge knew that there was no just or lawful ground for it would be to show that, on the
basis of the facts put down in the report or complaint making the charge, no person of ordinary prudence would
make such a charge. A person may in good faith make a charge, which is subsequently found to be false,
believing that there are good grounds for making the charge. In such a case, he does not commit an offence
under this section as it is for the prosecution to show that the person making the charge knew that there was no
just or lawful ground for such a charge.1323 In Murdad v Queen-Empress,1324 Plowden SJ observed:
Unless the person making a charge actually knows that there is no just or lawful ground for it, he is not guilty of the
offence, and cannot properly be convicted of it. It is not enough to find that he has acted in bad faith, that is, without
due care or inquiry or that he has acted maliciously, or that he had no sufficient reason to believe or did not believe the
charge to be true. The actual falsity of the charge, recklessness in acting upon information without testing it, or
scrutinising its sources, actual malice towards the persons charged, these are all relevant evidence, more or less
cogent, but the ultimate conclusion must be, in order to satisfy the definition of the offence, that the accused knew that
there was no just or lawful ground for proceedings. It may be difficult to prove this knowledge, but however difficult it
may be, it must be proved, and unless it is proved the informer must be acquitted.
In a Patna case, Rowland J observed that there is no penalty in this section for incautious or negligible
acceptance of information which the complainant might have learnt by inquiry to be unreliable.1325
The offence under this section is non-cognizable but a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The
offence is bailable but not compoundable. If the false charge is of an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, it is triable only by a court of sessions. In other cases it is triable by a magistrate of the
first class.
The limitation for taking cognizance of the offence described in the first para of this section is three years. There
is no limitation for taking cognizance of the offence described in the second para of the section.
[s 211.16] Complaint of Court—When Necessary
Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prohibits taking of cognizance of certain offences,
including an offence under this section, “when such offences is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation
to, any proceeding in any court, except on the complaint in writing of that court or of some other court of which
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that court is subordinate.” The prohibition is, therefore, not an absolute prohibition, and does not preclude the
magistrate concerned from taking cognizance of the offences mentioned in the clause without the complaint of
the court or a superior court if the offences are not alleged to have been committed “in, or in relation, to any
proceeding in any court”.1326 When an offence under the sections referred to in clause (b) is not committed in or
in relation to any court, a complaint of such an offence can be made by a private individual.1327 It is significant
that clause (b)(i) refers to “any proceeding” and is not confined to a judicial proceeding. It is, therefore, not
necessary for its application that the court should be engaged in a judicial proceeding. Again the clause applies
not only when an offence mentioned in it is committed in a proceeding in any court but also when it is
committed in relation to a proceeding in a court.
Therefore, when a complaint against some accused persons for making false charges in a petition under
section 144, CrPC before the executive magistrate was filed, not by the concerned executive magistrate, who is
a court for the purpose and meaning of section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC, but by the aggrieved person, for prosecution
under section 211, IPC in relation to a proceeding before the executive magistrate, the cognizance of the said
complaint, taken by the chief judicial magistrate was held illegal and without jurisdiction, being hit by the
mischief of section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC.1328 Cognizance in relation to an offence punishable under section 211,
IPC when such offence is alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any court,
cannot be taken except on the complaint in writing of such court in view of the bar created by section 195(b)(i),
CrPC.1329 An accused acquitted by a judicial magistrate in a complaint case under section 407 read with section
34, IPC, cannot file a private complaint against the complainant of the case in which he was acquitted, due to a
bar of section 195(1)(b)(i) of the CrPC and it is only the court of judicial magistrate, which passed the acquittal
who is empowered to file such a complaint under section 211, IPC. The cognizance of the private complaint of
such acquitted accused by the court was erroneous, and so the order of the issuance of process by the said
court of the judicial magistrate, who took cognizance of the complaint under section 211, IPC, was quashed in a
criminal writ petition.1330 When a private complaint under section 407, IPC was found to be false by the
magistrate, the aggrieved party filed a private complaint under section 211, IPC against the complainant. It was
held that such a complaint was not maintainable in view of the bar of section 195(1)(b)(i) of the CrPC and the
complaint can be filed only by the magistrate who gave the finding that the complaint was false.1331 A Station
House Office (SHO) cannot suo motu register a crime under section 211, IPC without the order of the
Magistrate.1332
Section 195, CrPC is a bar for taking cognizance of an offence punishable under section 211, IPC at the behest
of the victim or the aggrieved person.1333
Where an offence under this section is alleged to have been committed in relation to making of a statement
under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, clause (b) of section 195 of that Code would come
into play, which clearly bars cognizance of the offence except on a complaint in writing of that court or a court to
which that court is subordinate.1334
[s 211.16.1] Conflict of Opinion as to the Interpretation of the Phrase—Point of Controversy
There is a conflict of opinion as to the interpretation of the words “in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any
court”. The question on which the controversy centres may be stated as follows:
When a report is made to the police charging any person with the commission of an offence and the police, after
investigation, finds that the report is false and gets the case cancelled under the provisions of s 173, CrPC is the order
of the magistrate accepting the police report (commonly known as final report) sufficient to bring the offence in respect
of the false charge or false information to the police under ss 211 and 182, IPC, within the categories of offences
committed in relation to proceedings in court.
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[s 211.16.2] Affirmative View
One view is that any proceeding that comes into existence or is taken before a court even before the
cognizance of the offence has been taken, is a proceeding contemplated by section 195(1)(b), CrPC. A
proceeding held by a magistrate on receipt of an investigating officer’s report made under section 167(1), CrPC
is a proceeding contemplated by the Code. When a person accused of any non-bailable offence is arrested
without a warrant or is brought before a magistrate, he may be released on bail.1335 When he applies to the
magistrate for bail, the magistrate has to consider various matters and then decide whether or not he should
release him on bail. When an accused applies for bail, a proceeding does come into existence, terminating in
the order granting or refusing the bail. Therefore, even though it may be true that no proceeding comes into
existence when the magistrate considers a final report submitted to him by an investigating officer under section
173, it comes into existence when he passes a remand order or passes orders on an application for bail.
Section 195(1)(b) does not require that the proceeding must be one from which it can be found out whether an
offence was committed or not, or that it must be such as to give material to the court for deciding whether to
make a complaint or not. It is not essential that the proceeding must be one for an inquiry into the very act
which is alleged to be an offence. Section 195(1)(b) simply requires that there should be some relationship
between the offence alleged to have been committed and the proceeding; no particular kind of relationship is
required. The words “in relation to” do not mean that the offence must have been committed after the
proceeding had started. Even if the offence was committed prior to the proceeding, it can be said to be in
relation to the proceeding if the proceeding was undertaken in consequence of it. If a proceeding is related to
an offence, the offence itself is related to the proceeding because, if A is related to B, it means that B is related
to A. Where, therefore, a person makes a false report to the police against certain persons, resulting in their
being arrested and being remanded to custody and leading to an application for bail being made by them, the
remand proceedings and the bail proceedings are connected with the false report made by the person and the
offence committed by him by making it must be held to be an offence committed in relation to those
proceedings. As the proceedings are related to the offence in the manner mentioned above, the offence must
be said to have been committed in relation to them. Section 195(1)(b) is, therefore, applicable and no
cognizance of the offence can be taken without a complaint by the magistrate and on a complaint by a private
person.1336
In Bajaji Appaji v Emperor,1337 which was a case under the Code of 1898, it was observed at p 11:
Where information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is given to an officer in charge of a Police Station
under section 154, Criminal Procedure Code, and is followed by an investigation by him, he is bound under section
173(1) to complete it without any unnecessary delay, and as soon as it is completed, to forward his final report to a
magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, in the form prescribed by the local
government. That report may be in Form A when the complaint is true, or in Form B when the information is found to
be false, or in Form C when the information is neither true nor false and no case is sought to be sent up. An order
passed by the said magistrate on such report would dispose of the complaint made to the police. That order, as
pointed out by Beaumont CJ is not merely an administrative order but a judicial order of the court. Hence, if the
complaint be held to be false and a B summary is issued, the offence under section 211, Penal Code, will have to be
alleged to have been committed by the complainant in relation to the proceedings in the magistrate’s court which
ended in an issue of the B summary.
It has been held in a series of decisions that once a complaint goes to court and the accused is discharged,
thereafter, for any complaint by the discharged person in respect of the complaint made against him to the
court, the complaint of the court is necessary for an offence under this section.1338
A similar view was taken in MP Sirajudeen v M Ganesan,1339 where one A had filed a complaint under sections
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147, 448 and 379, IPC against B, before the magistrate, which was referred by him to the police for
investigation. On investigation, the dispute was found to be of a civil nature and the report of the police to this
effect having been accepted by the magistrate, no process was issued against the accused B. B then made a
complaint against A under section 211, IPC assailing the falsity of the allegations made by him in the aforesaid
complaint under sections 147, 448 and 379, IPC. On trial, A was acquitted as the charge was not found
established. On appeal, the Madras High Court, upholding the finding of acquittal further held that the complaint
of B was not maintainable and the complaint of the court for the prosecution of A under section 211, IPC was
necessary.
As police cannot investigate a non-cognizable case without the permission of a magistrate under section
155(2), CrPC 1973 and after investigation if it is reported by the police that the FIR is false and the informant
has committed an offence under section 211, IPC, the magistrate is not competent to take cognizance of this
offence without a proper complaint.1340
Where a complaint filed under sections 211 and 500, IPC before him, was referred by the magistrate under
section 156(3), CrPC to the police for investigation, the police submitted a challan for offences under sections
211 and 500. The High Court quashed the proceedings in respect of the offence under section 211 and held
that the same were not maintainable without the complaint of the court.1341
Where the application under section 156(3), CrPC of the accused, filed before the additional chief judicial
magistrate (ACJM), for sending his complaint for an investigation by the police, was dismissed by the ACJM on
the basis of an inquiry report submitted by the police, as directed by him, the complaint filed against the
accused under section 211, IPC was held barred by the provision of section 195(1)(b), CrPC. The filing of a
complaint for an offence under section 211, IPC was within the competency of the court suo motu, and the
complainant himself could also have applied to the magistrate for an initiation of such an action.1342
Where the applicant, after filing a complaint of dacoity before a magistrate, repeated the charges before the
police, and the police found the complaint to be false and at the instance of the police, the applicant was put on
his trial under this section, it was held that the offence, if any, was committed in relation to proceedings in court
and a complaint in writing of such court was necessary.1343
The same view has been taken in the cases as mentioned in the footnote.1344
[s 211.16.3] Contrary View
The other view is that when a report is made to the police, charging any person with the commission of an
offence and the police, after investigation, finds that the report is false and gets the report cancelled under the
provisions of section 173, CrPC, the magistrate receiving the information and accepting it does not act as a
court and the act of the magistrate in accepting the police report does not give rise to judicial proceedings. The
offence of a false charge preferred against the information in respect of such report cannot be in relation to
proceedings of a court and a complaint of the court is not necessary for his prosecution under this section.1345
[s 211.16.4] Supreme Court’s View
Magistrates are specially labelled as courts by section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. When a
magistrate acts judicially, he cannot but be regarded as a court. On a complaint lodged with the police, the
magistrate bailed out the accused and ultimately discharged him on the basis of the final report submitted by
the police. The Supreme Court held that the magistrate acted as a court and the proceeding before the
magistrate was covered by the expression “any proceeding before the court”, and therefore, a subsequent
complaint under section 211, IPC by the accused, against the complainant, was not maintainable in the
Page 19 of 28
absence of a written complaint by the magistrate concerned.1346
Before a court can grant sanction or make the complaint, the record must show that it has exercised its own
judgment on the facts proved before it.1347
[s 211.16.5] Consideration for making Complaint
Where the case is taken on file after investigation by the police under section 202, CrPC the subsequent
discharge of the accused would not justify the making of a complaint under this section.1348 It is settled law that
no person should be proceeded against for making a false charge against another unless he has been given an
opportunity of substantiating his allegations by the tribunal before which the charge is made and which
proposes to take action against him. It is the duty of the tribunal which makes a complaint under section 340,
CrPC to come to a judicial finding that the allegations made before it are prima facie false, and it is obvious that
a tribunal cannot come to such a decision without giving an opportunity to the person concerned to prove his
allegations before it.1349
Thus, where some false entries in the case diary were made by the police officials, by making interpolation in
the entries of the case diary, thereby cooking up a false story against the accused, the apex court opined that it
is expedient in the interest of justice that an inquiry be made in accordance with sub-section (1) of section 340,
CrPC, into the commission of offences under sections 193, 195 and 211, IPC by the police officials. So, in the
exercise of powers conferred under section 340(2), CrPC, a show cause notice was issued by the apex court to
the police officials as to why a complaint should not be made against them for the aforesaid offences.1350
Before granting sanction for a prosecution under this section, the court should be satisfied that: (a) the charge
was really a false one, (b) there is reasonable probability that this can be established;1351 and (c) a prosecution
is desirable in the interests of justice.1352
The dismissal of a complaint under section 203 of the CrPC is no bar to granting a sanction to prosecute under
section 195.1353 If the facts proved do not amount to an offence under this section, but disclose an offence
under section 182(a), IPC, it is the duty of the magistrate to frame a charge against the accused under the latter
section and try him accordingly.
The person accused of an offence under this section ought to be given an opportunity of substantiating the
charge which he has brought, before sanction is given.1354
[s 211.16.6] Criminal Proceedings when not to be Stayed
Where the court is of the opinion that it is in the highest degree desirable, that the inquiry be conducted both, in
the interests of justice as well as of the accused and of all the parties concerned, as speedily as possible, the
High Court would not be justified in staying the proceedings merely because a civil appeal from the judgment,
out of which the criminal proceedings were initiated, is pending in the High Court.1355
[s 211.16.7] Criminal Proceedings when to be Stayed
On the other hand, if the charge in the criminal proceedings is in respect to a question which is a principal issue
in the civil suit (eg the genuineness or otherwise of a document) the criminal proceedings ought to be stayed
pending the decision in the suit.1356
[s 211.17] Charge
Page 20 of 28
Where there is positive knowledge of the falseness of a charge, a prosecution for a false charge may be made
under section 182, or this section,1357 but if the false charge is a serious one, the graver section 211 should be
applied, and the trial should be full and fair.1358 Where the case is not a serious one, it is quite legal to
prosecute under section 182.1359
The communication of a false accusation is, in fact, the laying of a false charge and unless the matter is
actually communicated to a superior officer, it cannot be said that a false charge has been made out.
Where therefore, a complaint that a certain village munsif had received illegal gratification, was written and
posted at Kumbakonam and addressed to the inspector-general of police, Madras, and the complaint was, on
investigation, found to be false and groundless, it was held that it could not be said that by posting the letter at
Kumbakonam the complainant even attempted to commit the offence under this section, and the magistrate at
Kumbakonam had no jurisdiction to try him for the offence under this section.1360
Where a false complaint is lodged and dismissed, the magistrate dismissing the complaint is not competent to
proceed against the complainant under this section. He should make a complaint under section 195 of the
CrPC.1361
An acquittal under this section will bar a second prosecution for an offence under section 182.1362
That you, (*) on or about the…….day of……at…….with intent to cause injury to one …instituted criminal proceedings
before……charging the said ……with having committed the offence of ……(or falsely charged the said……
before…………with having committed the offence of…….) knowing at the time that there was no just or lawful ground
for such proceeding (or charge) against the said…and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under section
[s 211.19] Proof
This section requires the proof of (a) an intention of the accused to cause injury to any person and (b) an
initiation of any criminal proceeding, or the making of a false charge with having committed an offence, against
a person, knowing that there was no just or lawful ground for such proceeding or charge.1363 The duty of the
prosecution in a case under this section is to prove by satisfactory evidence that the charge was wilfully false to
the knowledge of the maker of the charge. It is for the prosecution to establish their case, and if they fail to
Page 21 of 28
supply that proof which is required to secure the conviction of the accused, the failure on the part of the latter to
examine only a particular person as a defence witness will not imply the guilt as having been proved.1364 Where
a person is charged with instituting a criminal proceeding with an intent to cause injury, knowing that there was
no just or lawful ground for such proceeding, it is for the prosecution to make out a distinct case against him,
not for the accused, in the first instance, to show that he had just or lawful grounds. Where the facts are as
consistent with an accused’s innocence as with his guilt, innocence must be presumed; and criminal intent for
knowledge is not necessarily imputable to every man who acts contrary to the provisions of the law.1365 It is not
for the person charged to make out that his report was true, until it has been clearly traversed by evidence
produced by the prosecution showing that it was false.1366
The offences under section 182, IPC and this section are distinct. The offence under this section is much more
serious. This being so, the positive knowledge or belief of the falsity of the information given, which must be
established on a charge under section 182, is not essential under this section, it being enough to establish the
negative viz that there was no just or lawful ground for the action taken, and that the accused knew this.
Knowledge of the falseness of the information is essential under section 182; an insufficient foundation for the
professed knowledge or belief is enough under this section.1367
If a false charge only has been made, it matters not what kind of offence has been charged; it may be the most
grievous or the least serious, but the false charge in every case is punishable alike.1368 This is, however, not the
case with a criminal proceeding, for under the second part of this section, if a false charge of an offence
punishable with death etc, has been made, and criminal proceedings are instituted upon such a charge, the
false accuser is liable to a considerably enhanced punishment. So, if A falsely charges B to the police with
having committed a cognizable offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, etc, he is liable to the
enhanced punishment under the second part of the section.1369
The offence under this section is one which should ordinarily be punished with a substantive sentence of
imprisonment. The age of the accused is a factor to be taken into consideration in deciding the nature of the
sentence. But if, for that reason, the magistrate deems fit only to impose a fine instead of an imprisonment, the
amount of the fine should be determined so as to inflict on the accused a punishment comparable with what he
would suffer had he been a younger man.1370
Where a grave charge was made deliberately by persons who said that they were eye-witnesses of what they
knew perfectly well that they had not seen, the case calls for a severe punishment.1371
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
Page 22 of 28
1232 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and schedule, for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
1233 Empress v Pitam Rai, 5 ILR All 215.
1234 Queen v Subhama Goundan, 1 Mad HCR 30; Emperor v Abdul Hasan, ILR 1 All 497.
1235 Ashrof Ali v Empress, 5 ILR Cal 281.
1236 Queen v Nobokisto Ghose, 8 WR (Cr) 87.
1237 Karim Buksh v Queen-Empress, ILR 17 Cal 574, 578 (FB).
1238 Re Kankanampati Nagayya, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 719 ; Albert v State of Kerala, (1965) Ker LT 865 , p 869.
1239 Management of Bombay Co Pvt Ltd v Its Workmen, AIR 1964 SC 1770 [LNIND 1964 SC 103] , p 1778;
Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) Cr LJ 1176 : (1973) SCC (Cr) 828 :
(1973) 2 SCC 406 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) SCD 611 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) Cr AR 316; PA Nallapemmal
v PR Muthiah, (1973) Cr LJ 541 , p 542 : (1972) LW (Cr) 201.
1240 Pachu Singh v Tribeni Sah, AIR 1939 Pat 178 , p 179 : 40 Cr LJ 157 : (1938) Pat WN 904 ; Sew Ratn Lal
Binani v Emperor, AIR 1939 Cal 288 : 40 Cr LJ 605; U Po Thein v Buta Khan, AIR 1936 Rang 473 .
1241 Re Rambharthi Hirabharthi, AIR 1924 Bom 51 , p 53.
1242 State of Punjab v Brij Lal Palta, AIR 1969 SC 355 [LNIND 1968 SC 240] .
1243 Raghvendra v Kashinathbhat, ILR 19 Bom 717, p 725.
1244 Emperor v Ramkrishna Yesawant Adarkar, 5 Cr LJ 105, p 109, 110 : ILR 31 Bom 204 : 9 Bom LR 33.
1245 Dujai v State, (1962) 1 Cr LJ 627 , p 628.
1246 Apaya Tatoba Munde v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 491, p 492; Ram Raneu Chhattoraj v Emperor, AIR 1941 Cal 288 :
12 Cr LJ 624.
1247 Chintamani Paul (Kumhar) v State of Jharkhand, 2009 Cr LJ 2283 (Jhar).

Page 23 of 28
1248 Muthu Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1925 Mad 400 : 26 Cr LJ 962 : (1925) UWN 108.
1249 State of Punjab v Brij Lal Palta, AIR 1969 SC 355 [LNIND 1968 SC 240] .
1251 Queen v Hredoy Nath Biswas, 2 WR (Cr) 44, 45.
1252 Handeo Singh v Hanumandat Narain, 1 Cr LJ 7 : 24 All WN 10; R v Gopal Dhanuk, 7 ILR Cal 96; Niaz Ali v R,
5 Cr LJ 396 : 4 All LJ 361; Bholanath Dutt v Hari Mohan Dutt, 7 Cr LJ 196 : 7 Cur LJ Cur LJ Cal LJ 169; Ahmed Kutty v
State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 152 .
1254 Gaya Prasad v Bhagar Singh, ILR 30 All 525 (PC) : 5 All LJ 665 : 10 Bom LR 1080 : 12 Cal WN 1017 : 8 Cur
LJ Cur LJ Cal LJ 337 : 18 Mad LJ 394 : 11 OC 371; Kapoor v Kairon, AIR 1966 All 66 [LNIND 1965 ALL 4] : (1966) Cr
LJ 115 .
1255 Fitz Jogn v Mackinder, (1961) 9 CBNS 505 , p 531.
1256 Samun v Burby, (1896) 2 QBD 344 ; relied on in Karupanna v Mada Nandan, 1 Cr LJ 1018, p 1020 : 2 LBR
300.
1257 Hari Das v State of West Bengal, AIR 1964 SC 1773 [LNIND 1964 SC 84] , p 1776 : (1964) 2 Cr LJ 737 , per
Hidayatulla J.
1258 Sections 3 and 4.
1259 Section 199(2), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
1260 Karim Buksh v Queen-Empress, ILR 17 Cal 574, p 577 (FB).
1261 King v Ma Ban Gyi, AIR 1938 Rang 397 , p 399.
1262 Karim Buksh v Queen-Empress, ILR 17 Cal 573, p 579 (FB).
1263 Thakur Tewary, 4 Cal WN 347.

1264 Banti Pande v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 550 : 129 IC 87.
1265 Jogubandhu v Emperor, ILR 30 Cal 415; Ahmed Khan v Emperor, 1 Cr LJ 1957 : 109 PLR 1904.
1266 Hidayat Ullah v Emperor, AIR 1936 Pesh 66 : 37 Cr LJ 604.
1267 Abdul Hakim Khan Chaudhauri v Emperor, AIR 1932 Cal 511 : 33 Cr LJ 631 : ILR 59 Cal 334; Karim Buksh v
Queen-Empress, ILR 17 Cal 574 (FB); Faiz Alam v Emperor, AIR 1934 Pesh 112 : 36 Cr LJ 1410.
1268 Rayan Kutty v Emperor, ILR 26 Mad 640.
1269 King v Ma Ban Gyi, AIR 1938 Rang 397 , p 399.
1270 Emperor v Karsan Jasang, AIR 1941 Bom 414 , p 415 : 43 Bom LR 858; Sultan Ahmed v Emperor, AIR 1931
Ngp 134 : 32 Cr LJ 1009 : 27 NLR 275 (FB) (overruling Emperor v Chhoti Bi, 4 Cr LJ 240 : 2 NLR 119); Emperor v
Hayat Fateh Din, AIR 1948 Lah 184 : 49 Cr LJ 531 (FB); Mahommad Hayat v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah 133 : 23 Cr LJ
82 : 6 PWR (Cr) 1922; Sultan v Empress, 3 PR 1888 (Cr); King v Ma Ban Gyi, AIR 1938 Rang 397 ; Satish Chandra
Sadhukhan v Balaram Banerjee, (1968) Cr LJ 1534 (Cal); Re TM Sivaprakasam Pillai, AIR 1948 Mad 292 , p 293 : 49
Cr LJ 385.
1271 Queen v Bonomally Sobai, 5 WR (Cr) 32.
Page 24 of 28
1272 Karim Baksh v Queen-Empress, ILR 17 Cal 574 (FB); Sessions Judge of Tinnevelly Division v Sivan Chetti,
ILR 32 Mad 258 : 9 Cr LJ 170 (FB); Re Kankanumpati Nagayya, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 719 ; Parameshwar Lal v Emperor, AIR
1925 Pat 678 : 27 Cr LJ 373 : ILR 4 Pat 472; Nanhkoo Mahton v Emperor, AIR 1936 Pat 358 : 37 Cr LJ 862; Balak
Ram v Emperor, AIR 1942 Oudh 100 : 42 Cr LJ 833; Faiz Alam v Emperor, AIR 1934 Pesh 112 : 35 Cr LJ 1410;
Dharam Das Hiranand v Emperor, AIR 1938 Sind 213 : 40 Cr LJ 12 : ILR (1939) Kar 241 ; Jhammatmal Ahamad v
Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 274 : 41 Cr LJ 8; Albert v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 Ker 11 [LNIND 1965 KER 172] : (1956)
Ker LT 865 : (1966) Cr LJ 26 (FB).
1273 Kamlapat v State of West Bengal, AIR 1979 SC 777 [LNIND 1978 SC 383] : (1979) Cr LJ 679 : (1979) All Cr
Cas 49 : (1979) Mad LJ (Cr) 56 : (1979) BBCJ (SC) 25 : (1979) CLR (SC) 128, this decision of the Supreme Court
finally settles the above controversy and the case-law upholding the contrary view is now no more good law.
1274 Ahmed Kutty v State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 152 , p 154 : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 597 : (1963) Mad LJ (Cr) 396;
Shankar Lal Tewari v Abdul Rahman, AIR 1953 Assam 204 : (1953) Cr LJ 1598 ; Saminatha Thevan v Emperor, 13 Cr
LJ 303 : (1912) Mad WN 1125; Re Mallala Obiah, AIR 1918 Mad 731 [LNIND 1917 MAD 197] : 19 Cr LJ 38; Kashi
Ram v Emperor, AIR 1924 All 779 : 25 Cr LJ 1239.
1275 Patil Subba Reddi v Emperor, AIR 1936 Mad 160 [LNIND 1935 MAD 334] : 37 Cr LJ 357 : (1935) Mad WN
1197; (relying on Re Krishna Baipadithaya, 11 Cr LJ 286 : 20 Mad LJ 132; and distinguishing Public Prosecutor v
Chidambaran, AIR 1928 Mad 791 [LNIND 1927 MAD 424] : 29 Cr LJ 717 : 55 Mad LJ 231); Guruswami Naidu v Villis
Guruswami Naidu, AIR 1951 Mad 812 [LNIND 1951 MAD 30] : (1951) 52 Cr LJ 857 : (1951) 1 Mad LJ 426 : (1951)
Mad WN 255 : (1951) Mad WN (Cr) 83.
1276 Master Zodpa v Emperor, AIR 1936 Lah 828 , p 829 : 37 Cr LJ 1043 : 38 PLR 16; Santokh Singh v Izhar
Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] , p 2194 : (1973) Cr LJ 1176 : (1973) SCC (Cr) 828.
1277 Emperor v Ivar Henry Bridgnell, AIR 1937 Sind 193 , p 196 : 38 Cr LJ 1002 : 31 Serv LR 150.
1278 Re Kankanampati Nagayya, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 719 , p 720; Sessions Judge v Sivan Chetti, ILR 32 Mad 258 (FB).
1279 Raya Kutti v Emperor, ILR 26 Mad 640 : 1 Weir 190.

1280 Queen-Empress v Karigowda, ILR 19 Bom 51.
1281 Sessions Judge, Tinnevelly v Sivan Chetti, ILR 32 Mad 258 : 9 Cr LJ 170 (FB).
1282 Dasrathi Mondal v Hari Das, AIR 1959 Cal 293 [LNIND 1959 CAL 1] : (1959) Cr LJ 837 .
1283 Hari Das v State of West Bengal, AIR 1964 SC 1773 [LNIND 1964 SC 84] : (1964) 2 Cr LJ 737 .
1284 Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) SCC (Cr) 828 : (1973) 2
SCC 406 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) SCD 611 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) Cr AR 316 : (1973) CLR 473 : (1973)
Cr LJ 1176 .
1285 Dasarathi Mondal v Hari Das, AIR 1959 Cal 293 [LNIND 1959 CAL 1] : (1959) Cr LJ 837 .
1286 Chenna Malli v R, ILR 27 Mad 129 : 1 Weir 193; Hardes Singh v Hanuman Das, 1 Cr LJ 7 : 24 All WN 10 :
ILR 6 All 244; Nga Ba Shein v Emperor, AIR 1934 Rang 21 : 35 Cr LJ 1259; Kashi Ram v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 All
779 ; Emperor v Hayat Fateh Din, AIR 1948 Lah 184 (FB) : 49 Cr LJ 531; Empress v Abdul Hasan, ILR 1 All 497; Prag
Datt v Emperor, AIR 1928 All 765 : 29 Cr LJ 938, ILR 51 All 382; Subhag Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 152 : 33 Cr LJ
153 : ILR 11 Pat 155; Brown v Ananda Lal Mullick, ILR 44 Cal 650.
1287 Nga Bon She v Emperor, AIR 1917 LB 108 , p 109 : 18 Cr LJ 362; Rayan Kutti v Emperor, ILR 26 Mad 640;
Govt Advocate v Kumar Singh, AIR 1938 Pat 83 , p 87 : 39 Cr LJ 314; Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, AIR 1973 SC
2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) SCC (Cr) 828 : (1973) Cr LJ 1176 : (1973) SCD 611 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] .
1288 Apaya Tatoba Munde v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 491, p 492.
1289 Solaimuthu Pillai v Murugaih Moopan, 16 Cr LJ 423 : (1915) Mad WN 272.
1290 Ganpatram Dinanath Agrawal v Ramabai, AIR 1950 Ngp 20 : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 267 : (1950) ILR Ngp 208 :
(1949) Nag LJ 604 ; Abdul Ghafur v Crown, AIR 1925 Lah 325 : 26 Cr LJ 1165; Mathura Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1917
All 223 : 18 Cr LJ 1017 : ILR 39 All 715 : 15 All LJ 767.
1291 Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] , p 2194 : (1973) Cr LJ 1176 :
(1973) Cr AR 316 : (1973) SCD 611 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] .
1292 Kashi Ram v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 All 779, p 780 : 25 Cr LJ 1239 : ILR 46 All 906 : 22 All LJ 829; Nag Ba
Shein v Emperor, AIR 1934 Rang 21 : 35 Cr LJ 1259.
1293 Malappa Reddi v Emperor, ILR 27 Mad 127 : 1 Weir 192 : 2 Weir 117.
Page 25 of 28
1294 Santokh Singh v Izhar Hussain, AIR 1973 SC 2190 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) SCC (Cr) 828 : (1973) 2
SCC 406 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) SCD 611 [LNIND 1973 SC 160] : (1973) Cr AR 316 : (1973) Cr LJ 1176 .
1295 Emperor v Hayat Fateh Din, AIR 1948 Lah 184 , p 187 : 49 Cr LJ 531 (FB).
1296 Re Jamoona, ILR 6 Cal 620; Munipan Chetti v Balayan Chetti, ILR 31 Mad 505 : 19 Mad LJ 222; Chenna Mal
Gowda v Emperor, ILR 27 Mad 129 : 1 Weir 193; Re Subban Samben, AIR 1944 Mad 391 [LNIND 1943 MAD 254] (1)
: (1944) 1 Mad LJ 379; Mathura Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1917 All 223 : 18 Cr LJ 1017 : ILR 39 All 715 : 15 All LJ 767;
Bhawani Sahal v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 246 : 33 Cr LJ 409 : ILR 13 Lah 568 : 33 All LR 174; Amanat Ali v Emperor,
AIR 1929 Cal 724 : 31 Cr LJ 420.
1297 Session Judge of Tinnevelly v Sivan Chetty, ILR 32 Mad 258 : 9 Cr LJ 170 (FB); Chintamani Paul (Kumhar) v
State of Jharkhand, 2009 Cr LJ 2283 (Jhar).
1298 Banti Pande v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 550 , p 554; Hidayatullah v Emperor, AIR 1936 Pesh 66 : 37 Cr LJ
604; Govt Advocate, Bihar v Kumar Singh, AIR 1938 Pat 83 : 39 Cr LJ 314 : 16 ILR Pat 571 : 19 PLT 51; Queen-
Empress v Karigowda, ILR 19 Bom 51.
1299 Shiv Kumar Prasad Singh v State of Bihar, (1984) Cr LJ 1417 .
1300 R v Jamoona, ILR 6 Cal 620.
1301 R v Subbanna, 1 Mad HCR 30 : 1 Weir 184, per, Scotland CJ; R v Abdul Hassan, ILR 1 All 497; R v Salik, ILR
1 All 527; R v Jijibhai Govind, ILR 22 Bom 596, p 599.
1302 R v Abdul Hassan, ILR 1 All 497.
1303 Rayan Kutti v Emperor, ILR 26 Mad 640 : 1 Weir 122.
1304 Zorawar Singh v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 433 : 8 All LJ 1106; Mathura Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1917 All 223 ;
Bhawani Sahai v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 246 ; Queen-Empress v Kangowon, ILR 19 Bom 51; Banti Pandey v
Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 550 .
1305 Chenna Malli Gowda v Emperor, ILR 27 Mad 129 : 1 Cr LJ 426 : 1 Weir 193.
1306 Abdul Hakim Khan Chaudhuri v Emperor, AIR 1932 Cal 511 .
1307 Rayan Kutty v Emperor, ILR 26 Mad 640.
1308 Government Advocate, Bihar v Kumar Singh, AIR 1938 Pat 83 , p 87 : 39 Cr LJ 314.
1309 Re Tatia Hari, 1 Bom LR 11.
1310 Queen Empress v Atar Ali, ILR 11 Cal 79.
1311 Girdhari Naik v Empress, (1901) 5 Cal WN 727.
1312 Sahadeo Karan Singh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 84 , p 85 : 38 Cr LJ 462 : (1937) Pat WN 243 ; Ahmed Kutty v
State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 152 : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 597 .
1313 Hari Das v State of West Bengal, AIR 1964 SC 1773 [LNIND 1964 SC 84] , p 1776.
1314 Sew Ratan Lal Binani v Emperor, AIR 1939 Cal 288 : 40 Cr LJ 605.
1315 Ahmed Kutty v State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 152 , 154 : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 597 : (1962) Ker LT 564 : (1963) Mad
LJ (Cr) 396; Hassan Mirza v Emperor, 15 Cr LJ 355 : 18 Cal WN 391.
1316 Ram Prasad v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 897, 904 : 17 Cal WN 379 : 16 Cal LJ 453.
1317 AN Gupta v State, (1999) Cr LJ 4933 (Raj).
1318 R v Navalmal, 3 Bom HCR 16.

1319 Hicks v Faulkner, LR 8 QBD 167; Abrath v NE Rly Co, 11 App Cases 247 (HL).
Page 26 of 28
1320 Re Vridda Chetti Pillai, 1 Weir 185.

1321 Perryman v Lister, LR 3 Ex 197; Lister v Perryman, LR 4 HL 521; R v Pran Kissen, 6 WR (Cr) 15; Ram
Prasad v R, 15 Cr LJ 897.
1322 Karrim Buksh v R, 2 Cr LJ 67 : 12 PR (Cr) 1905 : 6 PLR 278; Mirza Hassan v R, 15 Cr LJ 355.
1323 Abdul Shakoor v State, AIR 1953 Raj 115 [LNIND 1951 RAJ 14] , p 116 : 54 Cr LJ 829.
1324 Murdad v Queen-Empress, 29 PR 95 (Cr).
1325 Bachu Singh v Triveni Sah, AIR 1939 Pat 178 : 40 Cr LJ 157 : (1938) Pat WN 904 .
1326 Sheo Bilas v State, AIR 1959 All 14 [LNIND 1958 ALL 102] ; Emperor v Raja Kushal Pal Singh, AIR 1931 All
443 (FB); Virindar Kumar v State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153 [LNIND 1955 SC 105] ; Karunakaran Nambiar v State of
Kerala, 2012 (3) KLJ 685 : ILR 2012 (4) Ker 361 .
1327 Raji v Allaudin M Samo Mukhtiarkar, AIR 1939 Sind 65 ; Nyan Chand v State, AIR 1951 Assam 54 : (1951) Cr
LJ 394 ; ML Sethi v RP Kapur, (1965) All LJ 506 : (1965) All WR 132.
1328 Robin Ray Choudhary v State, (1998) Cr LJ 1699 (Cal).
1329 Harish Chandra Pathak v Anil Vats, 2008 Cr LJ 2965 , p 2966 (All).
1330 Amitabh Adhar v NCT of Delhi, (2000) Cr LJ 4772 (Del).
1331 Subhash Ramchandra Durga v Deepak Annasaheb Gat, (2001) I Ren CR 368 (Bom); Dongari Venkatram v M
Tirpathanna, (2006) Cr LJ 2697 (AP); Rajkumar Indarchand Agrawal v State of Maharashtra, (2005) Cr LJ 4673 (Bom).
1332 Karunakaran Nambiar v State of Kerala, 2012 (3) KLJ 685 : ILR 2012 (4) Ker 361 (Ker).
1333 Rajkumar Malpani v Akella Sreenivasa Rao, 2011 Cr LJ 2997 , p 2998 (AP).
1334 Re Adhir Chandra Tiwary alias Adhru Tiwari, (1996) 2 East Cr C 613, p 615 (Pat).
1335 Section 437, Code of Criminal Procedure.

1336 Badri v State, (1963) 2 Cr LJ 64 : (1963) ILR All 359 (Cr) : (1963) All LJ 334; approved in PC Gupta v State,
(1974) Cr LJ 945 (All) (FB); Daulat Ram v Rajinder Motwani, (1992) JCC 544 , p 548 (Del).
1337 Bajaji Appaji v Emperor, AIR 1946 Bom 7 .
1338 Re PM Kamath, AIR 1954 Mad 561 [LNIND 1953 MAD 125] ; Dholiah v Sub-Inspector of Police, AIR 1931
Mad 702 [LNIND 1931 MAD 84] : 32 Cr LJ 1215.
1339 MP Sirajudeen v M Ganesan, (1987) 1 Crimes 561 .
1340 Prayag Sao and Uday Shankar Ojha v State of Bihar, (1996) 1 East Cr C 10, pp 14, 19 (Pat) (DB).
1341 Sis Ram v State of Haryana, (1993) 1 CCC 349 (P&H).
1342 Imtiaz Ahmad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2001) III CCR 98 (All).
1343 Ghaslawan Sing v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 613 : 27 Cr LJ 1014; Sheikh Samir v Sajidar Rehman, AIR 1927
Cal 95 : 25 Cr LJ 86 : ILR 53 Cal 824.
1344 JD Boywalla v Sorab-Rustomji Engineer, AIR 1941 Bom 294 : 42 Cr LJ 814; State v Vipra Khunji, AIR 1952
Sau 67 : (1952) Cr LJ 1084 ; Chuhermal Nihalmal v Emperor, AIR 1929 Sind 132 : 30 Cr LJ 732; Ghulam Rasul v
Emperor, AIR 1936 Lah 238 : 37 Cr LJ 426; EP Subba Reddy v State, AIR 1969 AP 281 ; Narayan v State, (1972) Cr
LJ 1446 (FB)(Del).
Page 27 of 28
1345 Pukhraj v Sheshmal, AIR 1961 Raj 231 [LNIND 1960 RAJ 93] : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 691 ; Emperor v Hayat Fateh
Din, AIR 1948 Lah 784 (FB) : 49 Cr LJ 531; Emperor v Birdichand Chunilal, AIR 1948 Ngp 244 : 49 Cr LJ 326;
Registrar, High Court v Kodangi, AIR 1932 Mad 363 (FB) : 33 Cr LJ 479; Raji v Allauddin M Samo, AIR 1939 Sind 65 :
40 Cr LJ 461; Mochamvelli Kunhammad v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 Ker 242 [LNIND 1966 KER 18] : (1966) Cr LJ
1136 ; Satish Chandra Sadhukhan v Balaram Banerjee, (1968) Cr LJ 1534 .
1346 Kamlapat v State of West Bengal, AIR 1979 SC 777 [LNIND 1978 SC 383] : (1979) Cr LJ 679 : (1979) All Cr
Cas 49 : (1979) Mad LJ (Cr) 56 : (1979) BBCJ (SC) 25 : (1979) CLR (SC) 128, this decision of the Supreme Court
finally settles the above controversy and the case-law upholding the contrary view is now no more good law.
1347 Tayab Ullah v King-Emperor, 24 Cal LJ 134 : 20 Cal WN 1265; FA Brown v Ananda Lal Mullick, 18 Cr LJ 25 :
20 Cal WN 1347.
1348 Re CR Seshadri Ayyangar, 43 Cr LJ 32.
1349 Bhawani Sahai v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 246 , p 248 : 33 Cr LJ 409 : ILR 13 Lah 568 : 33 PLR 174.
1350 Mohd Zahid v Govt of NCT of Delhi, (1998) Cr LJ 290 (SC).
1351 Jadunandan v R, 11 Cr LJ 37 : 10 Cal LJ 564.
1352 Budh Ram v R, 3 Cr LJ 121 : 6 PLR 627; Shiv Ram v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1992) 1 Sim LJ 1054 (HP).
1353 Surya Harlani v R, 6 Cal WN 295; Chiragh Din v Zahur Din, 6 Cr LJ 258 : 2 PWR 63 (Cr).
1354 Jogendra Lal v Babu Ballabh, 2 Cr LJ 615 : 2 CLR 228; R v Tula, ILR 29 All 587; Zain-ul-abdin v Nawab Din,
9 Cr LJ 152 : 4 PWR 2 (Cr); R v Tabarak Zaman, ILR 30 All 521.
1355 Hem Chandra Ray v Atal Behari Ray, ILR 35 Cal 909; followed in Brojobashi Panda v R, 13 Cal WN 398.
1356 Shashi Bhushan v R, ILR 38 Cal 106.
1357 1 Weir 120; Barkatulla v Sadho Kalwar, 13 Cr LJ 855.
1358 Apaya Tatoba Mundse v R, 14 Cr LJ 491.
1359 Bhokteram v Heera Kolita, 5 ILR Cal 184; Re Russick Lal Mullick, 7 CLR 282; R v Sarada Prasad, ILR 32 Cal
180, pp 185, 186, where all the cases are noticed; Gati Mandal v R, 4 Cr LJ 68 : 4 Cal LJ 88; Thakar Singh v Chattar
Pal, 20 PR 1910 (Cr).
1360 Re TM Sivaprakasam Pillai, AIR 1948 Mad 292 , pp 293 : 49 Cr LJ 385 : (1948) ILR Mad 893 : (1948) 1 Mad
LJ 21.
1361 Ambika Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1926 Pat 368 : 27 Cr LJ 987 : 5 ILR Pat 450 : 7 Punj LJ 716.
1362 Re K Ganapathi Bhattu, ILR 46 Mad 308 : 14 Cr LJ 214 : 24 Mad LJ 463.
1363 PA Nallaperumal v PR Muthiah, (1973) Cr LJ 541 , p 542 : (1972) Mad LW (Cr) 201 .
1364 Hassan Mirza v Emperor, 15 Cr LJ 355 : 18 Cal WN 391.
1366 Re Sankaram Serval, AIR 1929 Mad 496 [LNIND 1928 MAD 243] : 30 Cr LJ 167 : 30 Mad LW 795.
1367 R v Ramachandra, ILR 31 Bom 204; Thakar Singh v Chattar Pal, 11 Cr LJ 420 : 20 PR 1910 (Cr); R v
Ramakrishna, 5 Cr LJ 105 : 9 Bom LJ 33; Raghavendra v Kashinath Bhat, ILR 19 Bom 717; Walaiti Ram v State of
Punjab, 1977 Ch LR 149 , 151 (Punj).
Page 28 of 28
1368 R v Pitam Jai, 5 ILR All 215.
1369 Karim Buksh v R, ILR 17 Cal 574 (FB).
1370 Emperor v PRS Muthia Chetti, AIR 1917 Mad 667 (2) : 17 Cr LJ 158 : (1916) 1 Mad WN 1, per Ayling J.
1371 Mahommad Hayat v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah 133 , p 134 : 23 Cr LJ 82 : 6 PWR (Cr) 1922.
End of Document
[s 212] Harbouring offender.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 14
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 14
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whenever an offence has been committed, whoever harbours or conceals a person whom he knows or has
reason to believe to be the offender, with the intention of screening him from legal punishment;
Page 4 of 14
if a capital offence.—shall, if the offence is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine;
if punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment.—and if the offence is punishable with
1372[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year, and not to ten years, shall be
punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-
fourth part of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.
1373[“Offence” in this section includes any act committed at any place out of 1374[India], which, if committed in
1375[India],would be punishable under any of the following sections, namely, 302, 304, 382, 392, 393, 394, 395,
396, 397, 398, 399, 402, 435, 436, 449, 450, 457, 458, 459 and 460; and every such act shall, for the purposes
of this section, be deemed to be punishable as if the accused person had been guilty of it in 1376[India]].
Exception.—This provision shall not extend to any case in which the harbour or concealment is by the husband
or wife of the offender.
Illustration
A, knowing that B has committed dacoity, knowingly conceals B in order to screen him from legal punishment.
Here, as B is liable to 1377[imprisonment for life], A is liable to imprisonment of either description for a term not
exceeding three years, and is also liable to fine.
From the definition it is manifest that it is only harbouring and concealing a person who the person harbouring
thinks or has reason to believe to be the offender that the provision is attracted subject to the condition that
such harbouring and concealment should be with the intention of screening him from legal punishment given in
section 212.1378 The object of section 212, IPC as it appears from the language of the provision is to prevent
intentional harbouring or concealing of an offender with the criminal intention of screening him from legal
punishment.1379
This section applies to the harbouring of persons who have actually committed an offence and it does not apply
to the harbouring of persons not being criminals, who merely abscond to avoid or delay a judicial investigation.
The section says nothing about the harbouring of an absconder or an accused person. It renders punishable
only the harbouring of a person when it is known, or there is reason to believe that he is the offender.1380 Until
the offender has been convicted of the offence he is alleged to have committed, no prosecution can be
launched under this section for harbouring him.1381
To attract the provisions of section 212, IPC it is necessary to establish the commission of an offence, the
harbouring or concealing of the person known or believed to be the offender, and such concealment must be
with the intention of screening him from legal punishment.1382
For convicting a person under section 212, the following essential ingredients must be established:
(i) the offence must have been committed, ie, completed and there must be an offender;
Page 5 of 14
(ii) there must be harbouring or concealment of a person by the accused;
(iii) the accused knows or has reason to believe that such harboured or concealed person is the offender;
(iv) there must be an intention on the part of the accused to screen the offender from legal punishment.1383
A mere help given to a person for absconding without any knowledge that he has committed a crime is not
enough. The person accused of section 212 must harbour or conceal the person by providing him shelter or
otherwise. He must have given shelter to him with knowledge that he is an offender or has reason to believe to
be an offender. The word used is “offender” and not “accused” or a person convicted for that offence. The
person who is sheltering or harbouring or concealing that person must have knowledge or has reason to
believe that he is the “offender”.1384
For attracting section 212 also, it is essential to prove that an offence has been committed and mere suspicion
that it has been committed is not enough and accused knew or has reason to believe that such offence had
been committed and with requisite knowledge and with the intention to screen the offender from legal
punishment, he must have harboured or concealed the offender, but, the intention cannot be presumed. If the
accused did not know that an offence has been committed or is not aware or has no reason to know the identity
of the offender, section 212 is not attracted and burden of proof is on the prosecution.1385
The clause defining “offence” under this section was introduced by section 7 of the Indian Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1894. In para 5, the words “the Provinces” were substituted for the words “British India” by the
Adaptation of Laws Order 1948. The words “the States” were substituted for the words “the Provinces” by the
Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. The word “India” was substituted for the word “The States” by Act 3 of 1951.
The words “imprisonment for life” were substituted for the words “transportation for life” by section 177 and the
Schedule of Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1955 (Act 26 of 1955).
The offence of “harbouring”, which is dealt with in this section, is that which under English Law, renders a
person an “accessory after the fact” to the crime committed by the person harboured. An accessory after the
fact is a person who, knowing a felony to have been committed by another receives, relieves, comforts or
assists the felon, eg in the case of a murder, by assisting the murderer to conceal the death or to evade the
pursuit of justice.1386 Similar offences under special circumstances are dealt with under sections 130, 136, 157
and 216. The only exception is in the favour of the husband or wife as the case may be.
[s 212.4] Section 212, IPC Considered with Section 3(4) of the TADA Act
A careful analysis of the ingredients of section 212, IPC and section 3(4) of the TADA Act would make it clear
that there is a clear distinction between them. Under section 212, IPC an offence must be alleged to have been
committed and the offender must be alleged to have committed that offence; whereas under section 3(4) of
TADA Act what is made an offence is the harbouring or concealing or the attempt to harbour or conceal any
terrorist and no more. If a person is alleged to be a terrorist and ultimately he is proved to be so, it is enough. It
is not necessary to have established that even at the time of filing of the charge sheet the offence must have
been proved to have been committed. The further ingredient, that the persons who are harboured are known to
the harbourer, or he has reason to believe to be the offenders, with the intention of screening them from legal
punishment, is also absent. Therefore, the two sections, section 212, IPC, and section 3(4), TADA Act, are
different and not identical.1387 (The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) has now
been repealed.)
[s 212.5] Essential Ingredients of the Offence
There are three essentials of an offence under this section:

Page 6 of 14
(a) The offence must have been committed, ie, completed, and hence there must be an offender;
(b) Harbouring or concealment of the person known or reasonably believed to be the offender; and
(c) Intention to screen the offender from legal punishment ie the mere giving of food and shelter as a
matter of humanity to a person in distress is not punishable.1388
A reading of section 212, IPC will disclose that three things have to be proved by the prosecution viz: (a) there
must be an offender, (b) the offender should have already committed an offence and (c) the person accused
under the section should have harboured the offender knowing that he is an offender.1389
Where the prosecution witness had given shelter to the accused, but he had no knowledge that murder had
been committed, held the prosecution witness could not be prosecuted for the offence of harbouring an
offender under section 212, IPC.1390
[s 212.6] Offence
The word “offence” denotes a thing made punishable under this Code.1391 For the purposes of this section the
word “offence” also includes an act committed out of India, if it is punishable under any of the sections of the
Indian Penal Code specified in the second paragraph of this section, or under any special or local law, if
punishable thereunder with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards whether with or without fine.
[s 212.7] “Harbours”—Meaning of
“Harbours” means to shelter, afford lodging or protection to, to give refuge to. It also includes “to conceal”.
Harbour or conceal involve an element of secrecy.1392 According to section 52A the word “harbour” includes
supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunitions or means of conveyance, or
assisting a person by any means, whether of the same kind as those enumerated in the section or not, to evade
apprehension.1393
In Emperor v Husain Baksh,1394 the Allahabad High Court took a restricted view of the definition of “harbouring”
and held that it did not include assisting an accused person to escape by merely telling lies and misleading the
police as to his whereabouts. So also in Damri v King-Emperor,1395 where a pony was lent to some dacoits to
facilitate them in removing the loot, another Judge of the same court held that as the pony was not lent to the
dacoits with any of the objects comprised in the definition of “harbour” in section 216B1396 of the Code, the act
of lending the pony did not amount to harbouring. But this view has not been accepted by the Calcutta and
Lahore High Courts. In Muchi Mian v Emperor,1397 the accused, while answering an inquiry of an inspector of
police, replied that his brother, who was wanted on a charge under section 411, IPC was in the house and
promised to produce him. He then went inside the house and after a delay of 15 minutes returned with his
brother’s son, and said that he had made a mistake and that it was the son who had come to the house the
preceding evening. The inspector, however, subsequently reached the house and found the wanted brother
hiding in the thatch of the roof of the house. On these facts it was held that as the accused, by the methods he
employed, gave time and opportunity for the offender to conceal himself or effect his escape and thereby gave
him material assistance in evading apprehension, he was guilty of harbouring. Following this, in Tara Singh v
King-Emperor,1398 the Lahore High Court has held that when a person gives false information to the Police with
respect to a proclaimed offender, or warns him of the approach of the Police, in order that the said offender
may make good his escape, he is guilty of the offence of harbouring him.
Page 7 of 14
Where in a murder case the co-accused knew the involvement of the accused in the commission of the offence
of murder, the co-accused being one of the directors in the company where the main accused was also a
director, the act of the co-accused of sending his car to pick up the accused from the city of occurrence to
facilitate the escape of the accused, renders him liable to be charged under section 212, IPC.1399 In the
assassination case of the former Prime Minister of India, Sh. Rajiv Gandhi, the accused (namely Irumbori)
assisted the main accused persons by concealing them in a house to evade their apprehension, so his
conviction under section 212, IPC was confirmed by the Apex Court.1400
In framing the new definition in section 52A, IPC, the Legislature in effect, overruled the Allahabad view and
approved the view taken by the Calcutta and Lahore High Courts.
[s 212.8] Mere Knowledge of Whereabouts is not Harbouring
A mere knowledge of the whereabouts of an offender does not amount to harbouring. Where, therefore, a
father who was asked to produce his son, who was charged with an offence and was absconding, produced
him when the police demanded him, it was held that the father was not guilty of harbouring his son.1401
A man who employs another person to harbour or assist the principal, may be convicted as an accessory after
the fact, although he himself did no act of relieving or assisting the principal.1402 And a man may make himself
an accessory after the fact to a larceny of his own goods or to a robbery on himself by harbouring or concealing
the thief or assisting in his escape.1403
Section 52A and the commentary thereunder may also be referred to.
[s 212.9] “Conceals a Person”—Meaning of
In a Patna case, certain offenders were found concealing themselves in the courtyard (dalan) of the accused
and were arrested by the villagers. When asked by the villagers how the offenders came to be there, the
accused gave no answer. In his defence the accused pleaded that it was he himself who arrested the
offenders, but his story was not believed. It was held that these facts were not sufficient to warrant his
conviction on the footing that he had concealed the offenders.1404
[s 212.10] “Whom he Knows”—Meaning of
A person can be supposed to “know” where there is a direct appeal to his senses.1405 It is necessary for a
receiver to have had notice, either express or implied, of the felony having been committed.1406
Where the name of the accused was not mentioned as an accused in an FIR, that she harboured her son, there
was also no evidence on record collected by the prosecution that it was in the knowledge of the accused that
her son had committed the offence. Even if the son, after committing an offence, came to the house of the
accused, and it is not in the knowledge of the accused, even then no offence is made out against the accused
(mother). Therefore, criminal proceedings under sections 212 and 216 etc against the accused were
quashed.1407
[s 212.11] “Reason to Believe”—What is
A person has “reason to believe” if he has sufficient cause to believe the thing but not otherwise.1408
Page 8 of 14
[s 212.12] “To be the Offender”—Meaning of
This section is attracted only when it is established that the person had harboured or concealed a person,
whom he knew or reasonably believed, to be an offender.1409 The word “offender” used in this section means a
person who has contravened the provision of any criminal law, which is punishable either with death,
imprisonment for life, imprisonment or fine. Where there is neither any affirmative nor any circumstantial
evidence to bring home the fact that the accused knew or had reason to believe that the person he was
harbouring was an offender within the meaning of this section, his conviction under it cannot be sustained.1410
“Offender” in section 212 does not mean “convicted offender”. Even when the main offender is not punished by
the court, the persons who harboured or concealed the offender would be tried and convicted if the other
ingredients of section 212, IPC are satisfied in the case.1411
This section says nothing about the harbouring of an absconder or an accused person. It renders punishable
only the harbouring of a person when it is known, or there is reason to believe, that he is the offender. The first
thing to be proved in a case under this section is that an offence has been committed by the person harboured.
Until actually convicted, a person is entitled to the presumption that he is innocent. He becomes an offender
only when he has been convicted of an offence. Until he has been actually convicted and pronounced to be an
offender, a prosecution for harbouring him is premature.1412
As seen above, one of the ingredients of the offence under this section is that the person who harbours an
“offender” should know or should have reason to believe that he is an offender and such harbouring should be
with the intention of screening such person from legal punishment but all the same, the requirement is that the
person whom he harbors, should be believed to be an offender and this character of the person can be proved
only when he has been judicially found to be a person guilty of an offence. If he is ultimately acquitted or found
innocent or falsely roped in, it cannot be said that the person who was harbouring the said “offender” was
actually harbouring an “offender” within the meaning of section 212.1413
In a Patna case, it was in evidence, that after a dacoity in the neighbourhood, three persons, known as domes,
were found concealed in the dalan of the accused and were arrested by the villagers. It was also in evidence
that in connection with this dacoity, not only were processes under sections 87 and 88, (now sections 82 and
83) CrPC taken out and served against the three domes, but proclamations by the beat of a drum were made.
But the proclamations did not name these particular domes as the offenders, nor specified the particular dacoity
of which evidence had been given in the case as the dacoity of which they were suspected. On a charge under
this section, the accused pleaded that it was he himself who had arrested the domes but his story was not
believed. It was held that suspicion would be aroused by seeing armed domes so as to lead to their arrest; but
this is not enough for the section to apply and that the facts established were insufficient to warrant the
conclusion that the accused had concealed persons, whom he knew or had reason to believe as the offenders,
in relation to the particular dacoity in question.1414
[s 212.13] Intention to Screen Offenders
Another essential ingredient to the application of the section is that the harbouring or concealing must be with
the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. There can be no conviction under this section
until such an intention is established.
[s 212.14] Special Provision for Husband or Wife

Page 9 of 14
The exception to the section makes a special provision for husband and wife. This exception in favour of the
husband or wife of the offender is wider than that of the English law, under which only the wife is exempted
from liability. Under the English law, except under special statutory provisions,1415 a married woman does not
become an accessory after the fact to a felony committed by her husband by receiving him, nor does she
become a principal in receiving her husband when his offence is treason, the law considering that she is bound
to receive him and not to discover him.1416 Nor is she liable criminally, for receiving jointly with her husband, any
offender. This, however, applies to no other relation except a wife to her husband; therefore, a husband can be
guilty as an accessory after the fact to his wife,1417 or a daughter to her father, and so on. But if the wife, acting
alone, receives a felon, her husband being ignorant, she is the accessory and not the husband.1418
The position in India is different. The “exception” appended to section 212, IPC, clearly provides that the
provision of harbouring or concealing the offender does not apply to any case in which the harbour or
concealment is by the husband or wife of the offender.
The offence under this section is cognizable and a warrant may ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable. It is triable by a magistrate of the first class.1419
The allegation under section 212, IPC is not a separate offence and it can be tried along with main sessions
case.1420
Where the accused against whom offences under sections 212 and 216, IPC were alleged, was produced
before the judicial magistrate, the judicial magistrate remanded him to police custody under section 167(3),
CrPC without recording the reasons, despite the fact that the offences alleged were bailable offences, the order
of remand for police custody was held illegal and against the provisions of section 436, CrPC and so the same
was quashed.1421
The limitation for taking cognizance of the offence falling under paragraph three of this section is three years
and that of an offence falling under paragraph four may be six months or one year, depending on the
punishment prescribed for the offence actually committed as provided by section 468 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. There is however, no limitation prescribed for the offences mentioned in paragraph two of the
section.
[s 212.16] Charge
That on or about the… day of… the offence of… (specify it) was committed at……. (specify the place) by AB, and that
you on or about the….day of……at….harboured (or concealed) the said AB, knowing (or having reason to believe) at
Page 10 of 14
the time of the said harbouring (or concealing), that the said AB had committed the said offence of….; and that you
thereby committed an offence punishable under section 212 of the India Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Where in a murder case, the co-accused knew the involvement of the accused in the commission of an offence
of murder, the co-accused being one of the directors in the company where the main accused was also a
director, the act of the co-accused of sending his car to pick up the accused form the city of occurrence to
facilitate the escape of the accused, renders him liable to be charged under section 212, IPC.1422
Where the material on record didn’t even prima facie indicate that the accused A harboured or concealed B and
C, and it was only the opinion expressed by the witnesses that A had the motive to harbour or conceal the
offender and he might have done so, the evidence is not sufficient to frame a charge under section 212 of
IPCagainst A.1423
[s 212.17] Proof
To establish a charge under this section the following points have to be proved:
(a) That an offence has been committed by the person harboured;
(b) that such offence is punishable with: (a) death, or (b) imprisonment for life or imprisonment not
exceeding ten years, or (c) imprisonment from one to ten years.
(c) that the accused had harboured or concealed the offender;
(d) that the accused did so knowing or having reason to believe him to be so; and
(e) that the accused thereby intended to screen such offender from legal punishment.
In order to support a charge of receiving, harbouring, comforting, assisting or maintaining a felon, there must be
some active steps proved to have been taken to assist the felon personally; it is not enough to prove
possession of various sums of money derived from the disposal of the property stolen.1424 For an offence under
section 212, IPC, for harbouring an offender, it has to be proved that an offender was harboured or concealed
by a person with the knowledge or having reason to believe that such person was the offender and such
harbouring or concealment has to be with the intention of screening him from legal punishment.1425 To support
a conviction under this section, there must be evidence of an offence committed in which the accused could
have intended to screen the offender as well as harbouring or concealing the offender.1426
A reading of section 212, IPC will disclose that three things that have to be proved by the prosecution, viz: (a)
there must be an offender, (b) the offender should have already committed an offence and (c) the person
accused under this section should have harboured the offender knowing that he is an offender.1427
Page 11 of 14
Three degrees of punishment are provided in the section, the harbourer’s punishment varying with that which
can be inflicted on the principal offender.
The law makes harbouring of an offender punishable, but the punishment provided for against the harbourer is
made to conform with the gravity of the offence committed by the person who is being harboured, for in the
case of the harbourer, the offence does not in its essence vary in gravity. The fact that the law makes a
difference in the punishment of the harbourer, according to the to the nature of the offence committed by the
absconder, or if we may say, the harbouree, indicates that the more serious the offence committed by the
absconder, the greater is the disfavour shown by law to an accused who harbours or screens him from legal
punishment.1428
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1372 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
1374 The words “British India” have successively been subs. by the AO 1948, the AO 1950 and Act 3 of 1951,
section 3 and Schedule to read as above.
1377 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
Page 12 of 14
1378 Parichan Singh v Emperor, (1944) Pat WN 521 ; Kuriakose Chacko v State, AIR 1951 Tr & Coch 90 : 52 Cr LJ
470; Ghulam Waris v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) All WC 250 : (1983) All Cr Cas 175 : (1983) All Cr R 134.
1379 Sujit v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 , p 831 (Ker) (DB).
1380 Ibid.
1381 Sanjiv Kumar etc v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1999) Cr LJ 1138 (SC).
1383 Sujit v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 , p 831 (Ker) (DB) : ILR 2007 (4) Kerala 773 [LNIND 2007 KER 617] .
1387 Prem Kumar v State of Karnataka, (1994) 2 Crimes 429 , p 433 (Kant)
1388 R v Fateh Singh, ILR 12 All 432; cf R v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279; Niranjan Ojha v State of Orissa, (1991) 3
Crimes 796 (Ori) : (1992) Cr LJ 1863 , p 1864 : (1991) 72 Cut LT 711 (DB); Sumati Vijay v State of Madhya Pradesh,
(1992) CLR (MP) 368 (Notes); Sujit v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 , p 831 (Ker) (DB)
1389 Aleem v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1995) Cr LJ 866 (AP); Surjit v State of Kerala, 2007 (4) Ker LT 987 ; State
v Sushil Sharma, 2007 Cr LJ 4008 (DB).
1390 State v Sushil Sharma, 2007 Cr LJ 4008 , p 4042 (Del) (DB).
1391 Section 40 of the Code.
1392 Niranjan Ojha v State of Orissa, (1991) 3 Crimes 796 : (1992) Cr LJ 1863 , p 1864 (Ori) : (1991) 72 Cut LT 711
(DB).
1393 Section 52(A), IPC.
1394 Emperor v Husain Baksh, ILR 25 All 261.
1395 Damri v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 All 676 (1) : 26 Cr LJ 151 : 22 All LJ 496.
Page 13 of 14
1396 Section 216(B) is no more on the statute book as it was repealed by section 3 of the IPC (Amendment) Act 8
of 1942. The new section 52A was ins. by the same amendment act to define “harbour”.
1397 Muchi Mian v Emperor, AIR 1918 Cal 826 : 18 Cr LJ 731 : 26 Cal LJ 141 : 21 Cal WN 1062.
1398 Tara Singh v King-Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 206 : 27 Cr LJ 563 : 7 ILR Lah 30.
1399 State v Sidaharth Vashisth alias Manu Sharma, (2001) Cr LJ 2404 (Del).
1400 State of Tamil Nadu v Nalini, (1999) Cr LJ 3124 (SC).
1401 Jagadish Chandra Maity v Emperor, AIR 1935 Cal 550 : 39 Cal WN 317.
1402 R v Jarvis, (1837) 2 M&Rob 40.
1403 Fost 123, Cromp Just 41b, PI 4 and 5.
1404 Shivarekha Panda v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 358 : 39 Cr LJ 768 : (1938) Pat WN 468 .
1405 Emperor v Latoor, AIR 1930 All 33 , p 34 : 31 Cr LJ 40.
1407 Rajbobo v State of Haryana, (2001) IV CCR 39 (P&H).
1408 Emperor v Latoo, AIR 1930 All 33 , p 34 : 31 Cr LJ 40.
1409 Niranjan Ojha v State of Orissa, (1991) 3 Crimes 796 (Ori) : (1992) Cr LJ 1863 : (1991) 72 Cut LT 711; Sujit v
State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 (Ker) (DB).
1410 Emperor v Latoo, AIR 1930 All 33 , p 34 : 31 Cr LJ 40.
1411 Sujith v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 , p 835.
1412 Ram Raj Choudhury v Emperor, AIR 1946 Pat 74 : 47 Cr LJ 573 : ILR 24 Pat 604; Parichan Singh v Emperor,
1944 Pat WN 521 ; Kuriakose Chacko v State, AIR 1951 Tr & Coch 90 : (1952) Cr LJ 801 .
1413 Gulam Waris v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1983) All WC 250 : (1983) All Cr Cas 175 : (1983) All Cr R 134.
1414 Shivarekha Pande v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 358 .

Page 14 of 14
1415 For example if he is a deserter from the armed forces (Army Act, 1881) (44 and 45 Vict, C, 58, section 153 (3);
R v Davis, (1945) Jour Crimes Law IX, 81).
1416 1 Hawk, Cr 1 section 10, 2 Hawk, Cr 29 section 34, 1 Hale 47, 621; R v Good, (1842) 1 C&K 185.
1417 1 Hale 621; R v Jones, (1949) 1 KB 194 .
1418 1 Hale 621.
1419 First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
1420 Sujith v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 824 , p 835.
1421 Harvinder Pal Singh v State of Punjab, (1982) CCC 443 (P&H).
1422 State v Sidaharth Vasisth alias Manu Sharma, (2001) Cr LJ 2404 (Del).
1423 Sunativijay v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1992) 1 Crimes 467 MP : (1992) Cr LJ 97 , p 100 (MP).
1424 R v Chapple, (1840) 9 Cr&P 365, contra, in Roman-Dutch Law where merely passive conduct is enough,
provided the intention of the inactivity is to aid the principal to escape; Majara v R, (1954) AC 235 .
1425 Sumativijay v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1992) 1 Crimes 467 (MP) : (1992) Cr LJ 97 , p 100 (MP).
1426 Queen-Emperor v Fateh Singh, ILR 12 All 432; Empress v Abdul Kadir, 3 ILR All 279.
1427 Aleem v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1995) Cr LJ 866 (AP).
1428 Tahsildar Singh v State, AIR 1958 All 214 [LNIND 1957 ALL 201] , p 222 : (1958) Cr LJ 324 : (1957) All LJ
857.
End of Document
[s 213] Taking gift, etc., to screen an offender from punishment.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 9
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 9
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever accepts or attempts to obtain, or agrees to accept, any gratification for himself or any other person, or
any restitution of property to himself or any other person, in consideration of his concealing an offence or of his
screening any person from legal punishment for any offence, or of his not proceeding against any person for
the purpose of bringing him to legal punishment,
Page 4 of 9
and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment not extending to ten years, shall be punished with
imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the
longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.
The offence constituted by this section or section 214, IPC consists in the corrupt motive which is brought into
play as much as in the delay to criminal justice. It consists in the compounding of an offence by some
agreement not to bring the criminal to justice, and these sections intend to punish those who make a profit out
of a public wrong. If the facts found in the case prove that there has been an actual compounding of an offence
and there is superadded to it an acceptance of, an attempt to obtain, or an agreement to accept, a gratification
or restitution as a consideration for the compounding, the offence is made out.
Once a person accepts a gratification and the consideration for accepting that gratification is his concealing the
offence or screening the person from legal punishment, the offence is complete.1430
Section 213 is similar to the old sections 161 and 162 (since omitted and replaced by sections 7 and 8 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act (49 of 1988)). Section 213 is the section applicable when the person accepting the
gratification is not a public servant. If he is a public servant, there would appear to be no advantage in referring
to this section and the offence might more properly be dealt with as one under section 161 or section 162 (now
section 7 or section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) as may be appropriate.1431
Section 320, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after laying down in its sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) which
offences may be compounded, enacts in sub-section (9) that “no offence shall be compounded except as
provided by this section”. Compounding an offence other than those made compoundable by section 320, CrPC
will be illegal as such compounding is a thing prohibited by section 320(9), CrPC.1432 The exception to section
214 provides that “the provisions of sections 213 and 214 do not extend to any case in which the offence may
be lawfully compounded” that is, as provided in section 320 of the CrPC.
Under the English law, agreements not to prosecute or to stifle a prosecution for a criminal offence are in
certain cases criminal.
It is well recognised that agreements not to prosecute a felony or misdemeanour are illegal and
unenforceable.1433 This offence is distinct from that of misprision of felony. It was stated by Lord Westbury in
Williams v Bayley,1434 when speaking of misprision of felony: “If you are aware that a crime has been committed
you shall not convert that crime into a source of profit or benefit to yourself”.
By section 34 of the Larceny Act, 1916,1435 it is felony to take any reward for helping a person to recover any
property stolen or obtained by false pretences, and by section 102 of the Larceny Act, 1861,1436 to advertise a
Page 5 of 9
reward for the return of things stolen, the penalty of which involves a forfeiture of fifty pounds.1437
[s 213.3] Section not Applicable to Compoundable Offences
This section occurs in chapter XI which is headed “Of False Evidence and Offences against Public Justice”. An
examination of the different sections to be found in this chapter shows that the intention of the Legislature was
to punish acts—including of course omissions—which do or have a tendency to, or are likely to, affect public
justice.1438 Both the sections 213 and 214 are intended to prevent the suppression of prosecutions in cases in
which the public is thought to be deeply interested in the punishment of the offender. Penalties are imposed on
transactions entered into with this view in mind. But after the rules have been laid down in terms extending to all
compromises of offences, an exception is made that the provisions of these two sections do not extend to any
case in which the offence may lawfully be compounded.1439
[s 213.4] “Whoever”—Includes a Third Party
This term is wide enough to include not only the victim of an offence who accepts gratification for abstaining
from prosecuting the offender, but also any other person who receives gratification for concealing the offence or
screening the offender. He may be the person who committed the offence in question or a third party.1440 The
offence of compounding a felony applies to all felonies, and is not limited to larceny. It may be committed by a
person other than the owner of the stolen goods or a material witness for the prosecution.1441
[s 213.5] “Agree”—Meaning of
Under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 every agreement of which the object or consideration is
unlawful is void. It is, however, not necessarily punishable as an offence. According to section 40 of this Code
only a thing made punishable by this Code, is an offence. It therefore follows, that only such agreements are
punishable, which have been so declared by this Code. When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be
done, an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means, such agreement is punishable under section 120B as a
criminal conspiracy. This section and section 214 further furnish the species of such agreements, which are
punishable as an offence. An agreement to accept any gratification for himself or any other person, or any
restitution of property to himself or any other person, in consideration of his concealing an offence, or of his
the purpose of bringing him to legal punishment, is void and is not enforceable under the law, nevertheless, it is
an offence punishable under this section.
[s 213.6] “Gratification”—Meaning of
“Gratification” has not been defined by this Code. The expln 2 to the omitted section 161 and expln (b) to
section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 simply explain this term as follows:
(b) “Gratification”.—The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in
money.
[s 213.6.1] Gratification need not be in Money
It is apparent from this explanation that a gratification need not be in money or in the form of a thing estimable
Page 6 of 9
in money. The literal dictionary meaning of gratification is the satisfaction of appetite or desire.1442 Accepting the
same, it has been held that the expression has been used in the sense of anything which gives satisfaction to
the recipient.1443 But a gift is not a gratification, though it also gives pleasure or satisfaction to its recipient.1444
Section 161, IPC (since omitted) and section 7, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, both use the expression
“any gratification whatever other than legal remuneration”, which has been interpreted to mean “any
gratification whatever and apart from legal remuneration”, and thus there is no scope for the interpretation that
the gratification received should be an illegal one, and not a legal one, and must be prohibited by law.1445 This
expression has, however, not been used in sections 213 and 214.
[s 213.7] “In Consideration of”—A Discussion of the Phrase [s 213.7.1] Calcutta View
In enacting this section, the evil sought to be eradicated by the Legislature is accepting, or agreeing or
attempting to accept, illegal gratification in consideration of doing any of the three things mentioned in the
section, namely, (a) concealing any offence, (b) screening the offender from legal punishment, or (c) not
proceeding against him. In Hem Chandra Mukherjee v Emperor,1446 a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court
held that there must be an actual concealment of an offence or screening of a person from legal punishment, or
an abstention from proceeding criminally against a person, in order to attract the application of this section, and
that there would be no offence if a gratification was accepted merely on a promise to conceal, screen or abstain
and nothing more. Such was also the contention of the defence in Queen v Bargess,1447 but was rejected, Lord
Coleridge CJ pointing out the extraordinary position which would arise if that construction was accepted,
namely, that if the maker of an agreement kept the agreement, he was guilty of an offence; but if, in addition to
making such an illegal agreement he is guilty of the further fraud towards the other party by breaking it, he was
guilty of no offence at all.
[s 213.7.2] Bombay View
The Calcutta decision has also been dissented from by the Bombay High Court in Behari Lal Kalacharan v
Emperor.1448 As pointed out by Chagla CJ in that case, in law a consideration may be as much a promise as
something actually done or achieved. The neutral word “consideration” used by the Legislature is wide enough
to cover both cases, the case of something having been done or achieved in the past and also the case of
something to be done in future. So the consideration contemplated by this section may be either a promise to
conceal an offence or screen the person from legal punishment or it may be a past consideration, the person
having already concealed the offence or screened the person from legal punishment and receiving gratification
for having rendered that service. The section, however, does not require the actual concealment of an offence
or the screening of any person from legal punishment or the actual forbearing of taking any proceeding. It is
sufficient if an illegal gratification is received in consideration of a promise to conceal an offence or screen any
person from legal punishment or desist from taking any proceeding. The offence is then complete and cannot
be undone by subsequently doing that which ought to have been done before, for example, by a subsequent
prosecution of the principal offender.1449 It may be added that concealing or screening an offender is already an
offence under the preceding section, and the offence under this section consists in accepting or agreeing to
accept illegal gratification for such concealing or screening.
[s 213.8] “Screening”—Meaning of
According to the Oxford Dictionary, the meaning of the word “screen” is “to shield or protect from hostility or
impending danger; especially to save (an offender) from punishment or exposure; to conceal (a person’s
offence)”. In this sense, a mere abstention from giving evidence or merely keeping away from the court, would
be sufficient to constitute screening. It is not necessary that the accused should physically keep away the
offender from the arm of the law or that he should, again, physically destroy some evidence on which the
prosecution relies. However, if the accused in the original case is discharged or acquitted of the charge, there
can be no screening.1450 In sections 217 and 218, the Legislature has used the word “saving” instead of
“screening” but that does not mean that the two words must have different meanings. There are occasions
when the Legislature does use two different expressions without meaning to make any distinction between
them.1451
Page 7 of 9
The term “offence” has been judicially interpreted to mean an actual offence and not an imaginary one. If there
is no offence, there is no application of this section.1452 The words “concealing an offence” and “screening any
person from legal punishment for any offence” presuppose the actual commission of an offence, or the guilt of
the person screened from punishment. The intention of the Legislature was, in framing these sections, “to
discourage malpractices, when offences have really been committed, or when persons really guilty are
screened, and not to ensure general veracity on the part of the public in regard to imaginary offences or
offenders”.1453 In the case of Girish Myte v Queen-Empress,1454 it was observed that this section would seem to
be applicable only when it is proved that the person screened or attempted to be screened from legal
punishment has been guilty of an offence.
The offence under this section is cognizable, but a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The
offence is bailable but not compoundable. It is triable by a magistrate of the first class. Limitation for taking
cognizance of the offence under this section, if the principal offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or
with imprisonment extending to ten years is three years; if the principal offence is punishable with imprisonment
not extending to ten years, it may be six months or one year depending on the limitation for taking the
cognizance, if the principal offence is a capital offence.
[s 213.11] Charge
That on or about the…day of…at…one AB committed the offence of ……punishable with…….and that you on or about
the…….day of………at ……….accepted (or attempted to accept or agreed to accept) any gratification for yourself or X,
or any restitution of property, to wit…to yourself (or X) in consideration of your concealing the said offence of…….(or
screening the said AB from legal punishment for the said offence or not proceeding against the said AB), for the
purpose of bringing him to legal punishment and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 213
of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
[s 213.12] Proof
The points requiring proof are:
(a) that an offence had been committed;

Page 8 of 9
(b) that the accused either: (a) concealed such offence; or (b) screened the offender from legal
punishment; or (c) omitted to proceed against such offender so as to bring him to punishment;
(c) that the accused accepted, or attempted to obtain, or agreed to accept, some gratification or restitution
of property; and
(d) that the accused accepted, attempted to obtain or agreed to accept, the same in consideration of such
concealment, screening or omission.
Where there was no offence as the complaint was cleared of the original charge, there could be no screening of
the offender or preventing him from being exposed to the consequence of the offence. Unless every ingredient
of the charge is established, the conviction is not possible.1455
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1430 Biharilal Kalacharan v Emperor, AIR 1949 Bom 405 , p 406 : 51 Cr LJ 84 : 51 Bom LR 564.
1431 SB Hossain v Emperor, AIR 1947 Cal 29 , p 30 : 47 Cr LJ 623.
1432 London and Lanchasire Insurance Co Ltd v Binoy Krishna Mitra, AIR 1945 Cal 218 , p 234 : 78 Cal LJ 129.
1433 Re Fivaz v Nicholls, (1846) 2 CB 501 ; Rawlings v Coal Consumers’ Association, (1874) 43 LJMC 111;
Windhill Local Board v Vint, (1890) 45 Ch D 351 .
1434 Williams v Bayley, (1866) LR 1 HL 200, 220.

Page 9 of 9
1435 6 & 7 Geo, 5, Ch 50.
1436 24 and 25 Vict C 96.
1437 Common Informers Act, 1951, section 1.
1438 Hem Chandra Mukhejree v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Cal 85 : 26 Cr LJ 345 : ILR 52 Cal 151 : 40 Cal LJ 278;
R v Burgess, (1880) 16 QBD 141 .
1439 Rev v Rahimat, ILR 1 Bom 147 (FB); exception to section 214, IPC.
1440 Re Karuppanna, 1 Weir 194.
1441 Russell on Crime, 11th Edn p 381 citing R v Burgess, (1886) 16 QBD 141 .
1442 Sallendra Nath Bose v State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 1292 [LNIND 1968 SC 83] , p 1296 : (1968) Cr LJ 1484 :
(1968) Pat LJR 17 : (1968) Lab IC 1412 [LNIND 1968 SC 83] ; State v Pundlk Bhikaji Ahire, AIR 1959 Bom 543
[LNIND 1958 BOM 175] Pramod Chandra Shekhar v Rex, AIR 1951 All 546 [LNIND 1949 ALL 86] followed.
1443 State v Pundlik Bhikaji Ahire, AIR 1959 Bom 543 [LNIND 1958 BOM 175] , p 547; Trilochan Singh v Karnail
Singh, AIR 1968 Punj 416 (FB) : (1968) Cr LJ 1199 , p 1204; Rameshwar v State, (1981) CLR (MP HCN) 13.
1444 Re Varadadesikachariar, AIR 1950 Mad 93 [LNIND 1949 MAD 92] , p 94 : 51 Cr LJ 386; Re MS Mohiddin,
AIR 1952 Mad 561 [LNIND 1951 MAD 235] , p 563 : (1952) Cr LJ 1245 .
1445 Subramanya v State, (1975) 1 Ker LJ 178 : (1976) Mad LJ (Cr) 31.
1446 Hem Chandra Mukherjee v Emperor, AIR 1925 Cal 85 : 26 Cr LJ 345.
1447 Queen v Bargess, (1885) 16 QBD 141 .
1448 Behari Lal Kalacharan v Emperor, AIR 1949 Bom 405 .
1449 R v Burgess, (1885) 16 QBD 141 , p 146.
1450 Mir Faizali Shaheen v State of Maharastra, (1992) Cr LJ 1034 , p 1039 (Bom) : (1992) Mah LJ 598 .
1451 Bihari Lal Kalacharan v Emperor, AIR 1949 Bom 405 , p 408.
1452 Mir Faizali-Shaheen v State of Maharashtra, (1992) Mah LJ 98 : (1992) Cr LJ (Bom) 1034 : (1992) 1 Bom
HCR 226.
1453 R v Saminatha, ILR 14 Mad 400; Girish Myte v Queen-Empress, ILR 23 Cal 420; Queen v Joynarain Patro, 20
WR 66; Emperor v Sana Lal Lallubhai, ILR 37 Bom 658; Hem Chndra Mukherjee v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Cal 85 .
1454 Girish Myte v Queen-Empress, (1896) ILR 23 Cal 420.
1455 Mir Falzali-Shaheen v State of Maharashtra, (1992) Cr LJ 1034 (Bom) : (1992) Mah LJ 598 : (1992) 1 Bom CR
226 [LNIND 1991 BOM 164] .
End of Document
[s 214] Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening
offender.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 8
[s 214] Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening offender.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 8
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 214] Offering gift or restoration of property in consideration of screening

offender.—
Whoever gives or causes, or offers or agrees to give or cause, any gratification to any person, or 1456[restores
or causes the restoration of] any property to any person, in consideration of that person’s concealing an
Page 4 of 8
offence, or of his screening any person from legal punishment for any offence, or of his not proceeding against
any person for the purpose of bringing him to legal punishment;
and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment not extending to ten years, shall be punished with
imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the
longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.
1458[Exception.—The provisions of sections 213 and 214 do not extend to any case in which the offence may
lawfully be compounded.]
1459[*****].
The preceding section dealt with the receiver and this section deals with the offerer of illegal gratification in
consideration of concealing an offence, or screening the offender from legal punishment or abstaining from
prosecuting the offender. Otherwise the scope and object of this section is the same as that of the preceding
section. Synopsis note 2 under section 213, IPC may be referred to.
There cannot be even a slightest doubt that a lawyer appearing for an accused who is facing a murder charge,
cannot perform his professional duty as is required of him when he himself is faced with criminal prosecution,
for a serious charge like under sections 201 and 214, IPC, which are punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to seven years and also fine.1460
[s 214.2] Legislative changes
As originally enacted, the section contained the following exception and illustrations:
Exception.—The provisions of sections 213 and 214 do not extend to any case in which the offence consists only of an
act irrespective of the intention of the offender, and for which act the person injured may bring a civil action.
Illustrations
(a) A assaults B with intent to commit murder. Here, as the offence does not consist of the assault only,
irrespective of the intention to commit murder, it does not fall within the exception, and cannot, therefore, be
compounded.
(b) A assaults B. Here, as the offence consists simply of the act, irrespective of the intention of the offender, and
as B may have a civil action for the assault, it is within the exception, and may be compounded.
(c) A commits the offence of bigamy. Here as the offence is not the subject of civil action, it cannot be
compounded.
(d) B commits the offences of adultery with a married woman. The offence may be compounded.
Page 5 of 8
The courts found various difficulties in construing the exception, and the illustrations to the exception which, far
from throwing light on its meaning, created the chief difficulties in its constructions.1461 Both the exception and
the illustrations were therefore repealed in 1882, the former by section 6 of the Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Act, 1882 (8 of 1882) and the latter by Sch I to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (10 of
1882), and the present exception was inserted in place of the old one by Act 8 of 1882.
The words “restores or causes the restoration of” were substituted for the words “to restore or cause the
restoration of” by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1953 (12 of 1953), section 4 and the third schedule. The
words “imprisonment for life” were substituted for the words “transportation for life”, by Act 26 of 1955, section
117 and the schedule.
This term is wide enough to include the person who committed the offence, sought to be concealed or
screened, as well as a third party. The section, therefore, includes the offer of a bribe by the person who has
committed the offence that he desired to screen.1462
[s 214.4] “Agrees to give”—Meaning of
The word “agree” involves the idea of something of the nature of a demand. But even if the bribe is solicited,
the giving or agreeing to give it, is no less an offence under this section.1463
[s 214.5] “Gratification”—Meaning of
Synopsis note 6 under section 213 may be referred to.
[s 214.6] “In consideration of”—What is?
[s 214.7] “Offence”—What is
Synopsis note 9 under section 213 and the commentary under section 40 may be referred to.
[s 214.8] Concealing an Offence
In an old case it was held that the words “in consideration of that person’s concealing any offence or his
the purposes of bringing him to legal punishment” are applicable not only to the case of a completed offence,
but also to the case of an offence in progress, and an offence proposed but not yet commenced.1464 But in
subsequent cases it has been held that the words “concealing an offence” and “screening any person from
legal punishment for any offence” presuppose the actual commission of an offence, or the guilt of the person
screened from the punishment.1465 The intention of the Legislature in framing these sections was “to discourage
malpractices, when offences have really been committed, or when persons really guilty are screened, and not
to ensure the general veracity on the part of the public in regard to imaginary offences or offenders.”1466
[s 214.9] Exception
The exception to this section also applies to the preceding section 213 and it provides that the provisions of
sections 213 and 214 are not applicable to compoundable offences. Section 320, CrPC enumerates the
offences which may be compounded with or without the permission of the court.
[s 214.10] “Compounded”—What is
Compounding an offence is more than a mere promise to withdraw a prosecution. It supposes an arrangement
Page 6 of 8
by which the parties have settled their differences, and in the more usual acceptance of the term, implies that
the prosecutor has received some consideration or gratification dropping the prosecution. Although the
provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 may not apply, the proof of the arrangement must be similar to that which
the court requires for the proof of any agreement which is in issue. Unless it appears that the parties were free
from influence of every kind and were fully aware of their respective rights, it would be impossible to give effect
to a so-called arrangement or composition. It signifies that the person against whom the offence has been
committed has received some gratification, not necessarily of a pecuniary character, to act as an inducement
for his desiring to abstain from a prosecution, and the law1467 provides that if the offence be compoundable, a
composition shall have the effect of an acquittal.1468
Sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 320 of the CrPC specify the offences which may be compounded. Those
specified in sub-section (1) may be compounded only by certain persons. Those specified in sub-section (2)
can also be compounded only by certain persons, but with the permission of the court trying the offence. Sub-
section (9) of that section lays down that “no offence shall be compounded except as provided by this section”.
[s 214.11] Offence under Special or Local Laws not Compoundable
Offences created by special or local laws, not being specified in section 320, CrPC, are not compoundable.1469
Compounding an offence, other than those made compoundable by section 320 will be illegal, as such
compounding is a thing prohibited by section 320(9), CrPC.1470
The offence under this section is not cognizable, but a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable. It is triable by a magistrate of the first class. Provisions as to the limitation
applicable to an offence under the previous section also apply to an offence under this section.
[s 214.13] Charge
That on or about the….day of……at…….you have (or caused or offered or agreed to give) a gratification to wit…… to
AB (or restored or caused the restoration of a property, to wit…to AB) in consideration of the said AB’s concealing the
offence of ……under section……of…….and which offence is punishable with…….(or of his screening you or any
person to wit…….from legal punishment for the offence of……or of his not proceeding against you or any person, to
wit……for the purpose of bringing you (or him to legal punishment, for the offence punishable under s …….), and you
thereby committed an offence under section 214 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
[s 214.14] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, the following points must be proved:
Page 7 of 8
(a) that an offence was committed;
(b) that the accused offered or gave, or caused or agreed to give or cause, any gratification, or restored, or
caused restitution of, any property; and
(c) that he did so in consideration of the other’s concealing an offence, or of his screening the offender
from legal punishment for an offence, or of his not proceeding against the offender for the purpose of
screening him from legal punishment.
A conviction under this section cannot be upheld in the absence of a proof of the theft for the hushing of which
the bribe is alleged to have been offered.1471
[s 214.15] Earlier Decision not to be questioned
A court dealing with a charge under this section is not entitled to question or review the correctness of the
decision of another court acquitting a person charged with having committed the offence which the person
before it is charged with having attempted to conceal.1472
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1456 Subs. by Act 42 of 1953.
1457 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch., for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
1458 Subs. by Act 8 of 1882, section 6 for the Original Exception.
1459 Illustrations repealed by the CrPC 1882 (10 of 1882), section 2 and Sch I.
Page 8 of 8
1460 Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal v State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) Cr LJ 4626 (SC).
1461 Reg v Rahimat, ILR 1 Bom 147 : 11 Mad Jur 427 : 1 Mad LR 116 (FB); Refer to the case cited therein, Reg v
Madan, 6 NWPNCR 302.
1462 Re Karuppanna, 1 Weir 194.
1463 Re Ma Ka, (1892-96) 1 UBR 158.
1464 Re Soyapo, (1894) 1 UBR 196.
1465 R v Saminatha, ILR 14 Mad 400 : 1 Weir 195, p 196; Girish Myte v R, ILR 23 Cal 420; Queen v Joynarain
Patro, 20 WR 66; Emperor v Sanalal Laulubhai, ILR 37 Bom 858; Mohd Aslam v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981
SC 1735 : (1981) Cr LJ 1285 .
1466 Ibid.
1467 Section 320, CrPC 1973.
1468 Murray v Queen-Empress, ILR 21 Cal 103.
1469 Trikam Das Udeshi v Bombay Municipal Corp, AIR 1954 Bom 427 [LNIND 1953 BOM 130] ; Hari Chandran
Pagadar v Thangaswami Nadar, AIR 1949 Mad 501 [LNIND 1948 MAD 59] ; but see Emperor v Kyasone, 13 Cr LJ 48,
contra.
1470 London Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd v Binoy Krishna Mitra, AIR 1945 Cal 218 , p 234.
1471 Re Peddu Reddi, 1 Weir 196; Mir Faizali Shaheen v State of Maharashtra, (1992) Cr LJ 1034 (Bom) : (1992) 1
Bom HCR 226 : (1992) Mah LJ 598.
1472 Baleshwar Bhagat v Emperor, AIR 1946 Pat 101 : 47 Cr LJ 801; R v Saminatha, ILR 14 Mad 400; Emperor v
Sanalal Lallubhai, ILR 37 Bom 658.
End of Document
[s 215] Taking gift to help to recover stolen property, etc.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 14
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 14
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever takes or agrees or consents to take any gratification under pretence or on account of helping any
person to recover any moveable property of which he shall have been deprived by any offence punishable
under this Code, shall, unless he uses all means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended and
convicted of the offence, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, or with fine, or with both.
The primary aim of the section is to punish all trafficking in crime, by which a person knowing that property has
Page 4 of 14
been obtained by crime, and knowing the criminal, makes a profit out of the crime, while screening the offender
from justice. It is not an offence to take money from another in order to help him to find the property and to
convict the thief. It is an offence for one who knew of the commission of the crime, and who could at once have
informed the offender, to wait till a reward is offered, and then to take money from the owner of the property
under colour of getting the property back for him. It is an offence for one who is mixed up with the original crime
to receive or to bargain for money as reward for the restitution of the property.1473 The offence under this
section consists in any person taking, or agreeing or consenting, to take any gratification under pretence, or on
account of helping any person to recover any movable property of which he shall have been deprived, by any
offence punishable under this Code, unless such person uses all means in his power to cause the offender to
be apprehended and convicted of the offence.1474 The section aims primarily at professional trackers and other
persons who, being usually in league with thieves or well aware of their proceedings, obtain money for recovery
of stolen property without making any effort to bring the offenders to justice.1475 The section is not intended to
punish a person who receives consideration bona fide for helping the owner to recover property which he lost
by theft, criminal misappropriation, etc. It is intended to deal with cases which are similar to collections, in the
nature of “Thuppukooli” made by the person, who, from the circumstances of their offer to help the owner, are
expected to contact the thief and pay him a portion of the money on the understanding that he won’t be
exposed if he would release the concerned property to the owner. There is thus, besides the promise by the
accused to recover the stolen property, an implied association between him and the thief or the means on his
part of discovering the thief and recovering the property, but without at the same time any undertaking on his
part to do what the law expects every honest citizen to do in his situation, namely, to help in the prosecution of
the person who has committed a cognizable and non-bailable offence like theft or an offence in regard to a
movable property.1476
This section is borrowed from a series of English Statutes, the first of which, 4 Geo, 1, cr 11, section 4, was
passed to put a stop to the trade of the notorious Jonathan Wild who was ultimately convicted under it and
executed.1477 In England, section 102 of the Larceny Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict, cr 96) provided that:
Whoever shall publicly advertise a reward for the return of any property whatsoever,1478 which shall have been taken or
lost, and shall in such advertisement use any words purporting that no questions will be asked or shall make use of any
words in any public advertisement purporting that a reward will be given or paid for any property which shall have been
stolen or lost, without seizing or making any inquiry after the person producing such property, or shall promise or offer
in any such public advertisement to return to any pawn broker or other person who may have bought or advanced
money by way of loan upon any property stolen or lost the money so paid or advanced or any other sum of money or
reward for the return of such property, or shall print or publish any such advertisement, shall forfeit the sum of fifty
pounds for every such offence (to any person who will sue for the same by action of debt, to be recovered with full
costs of suit).1479
The Larceny Act, 1916,1480 section 34,1481 which substantially re-enacts section 101 of the Larceny Act, 1861
provides that:
S. 34 Corruptly taking a reward.—Every person who corruptly takes any money or reward, directly or indirectly,
under pretence or upon account of helping any person to recover any property which has, under circumstances which
amount to felony or misdemeanour, been stolen or obtained in any way whatsoever, or received, shall (unless he has
used all due diligence to cause the offender to be brought to trial for the same) be guilty of felony and on conviction
thereof liable to penal servitude for any term not exceeding seven years,…
Page 5 of 14
The section has three essential ingredients: (a) taking, or agreeing or consenting to take, any gratification under
pretence, or on account of helping any person to recover any movable property; (b) that the owner of such
property must have been deprived of it by an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code; and (c) that the
person in question, having taken or agreed to take the gratification, must not have used all means in his power
to cause the offender to be apprehended and convicted of the offence.
[s 215.3.1] Mere Omission may Complete the Offence
It is a peculiar section inasmuch as once it is shown that the person charged has taken or agreed to take
money, which in itself is no way wrong or illegal if the intention is honest, then the completion of the offence
follows not necessarily from any further overt act but merely from an omission, namely as the section puts it,
the failure to use all means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended and convicted.1482
[s 215.3.2] Knowledge of Offender not Necessary
The knowledge of the offender is not a necessary ingredient of an offence under this section. There is not one
word in the section that suggests that such knowledge is necessary. It may well be that a person who receives
money for discovering a stolen property may, in the course of his investigation, obtain information which if
followed up, would lead to the apprehension of the offender. If he withholds that information from the proper
authorities, it is obvious that it cannot be said that he used his best endeavour to cause the offender to be
apprehended.1483
[s 215.3.3] Screening the Offender also not Necessary
To bring a case within the purview of this section it is enough to prove that money was demanded and paid for
helping the person to recover the property of which he had been deprived of by means of a punishable offence.
Screening or attempting to screen an offender is not a further necessary ingredient.1484
[s 215.4] “Whoever”—If Includes Thief or Suspected Thief
There is a conflict of judicial opinion on this question. In an early Madras case, it was held that this section is
not applicable to the case of the offender himself taking a gratification. This is seen from the part of the section
which speaks of his using all the means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended and convicted of
the offence.1485 So also, in one of its earlier decisions the Allahabad High Court held that this section was not
intended to apply to the actual thief, but to someone who, being in league with the thief, receives some
gratification on account of helping the owner to recover the stolen property without at the same time using all
the means in his power to cause the thief to be apprehended and convicted.1486 And this decision was followed
by the Madras1487 and the Rangoon1488 High Courts. A similar view was taken by a Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in Mangu v Emperor,1489 without reference to any previous decision, but only relying on
an observation of Mayne1490 to the effect that the section is not intended to apply to the actual thief, but to
someone who, being in league with the thief, receives some gratification on account of helping the owner to
recover stolen property without at the same time using all the means in his power to cause the thief to be
apprehended and convicted of his offence.
[s 215.4.1] Old View Overruled
The Allahabad ruling in Queen-Empress v Mahommad Ali,1491 which was followed by the Madras and Lahore
High Courts, was dissented from in Emperor v Mukhtara,1492 and was finally overruled by a Full Bench of that
court in Deo Suchit Rai v Emperor.1493 So also in Burma, the correctness of the decision in Twet Pe v King-
Emperor,1494 was doubted in Emperor v Nga Nyan U,1495 and in King v Nga V Nyein,1496 this question was
thoroughly considered by a Judge who followed Emperor v Mukhtara,1497 which had dissented from Queen-
Empress v Mahommad Ali.1498 In the course of the judgment, the learned Judge observed:
It does not appear to me to be correct to say as Fox, CJ said in 4 LBR 1998 that the section does not apply to the
actual thief because he is under no legal obligation to bring himself to justice. All that the section says is that the
person who takes the gratification shall be punished unless he uses all means in his power to bring the actual thief to
justice. No doubt the wording of the section makes it apply in the majority of cases to offenders other than the actual
Page 6 of 14
thief. But cases may well occur, as was pointed out by Aston JC in (1893–1900) PJLBR 226 where a thief having
stolen cattle without a view to obtain money by restoring them to the owner, may offer to restore them for a gratification
merely because he knows that detection is becoming imminent.
In Ramanand Telt v Emperor,1499 a Division Bench of the Patna High Court also followed the decision in
Emperor v Mukhtara1500 and held that a person suspected of theft may, if the prosecution fails to prove the fact
of theft by him, be convicted under section 215.
[s 215.4.2] Thief is Covered—Settled Law
It can, therefore, be taken as settled law now, that the accused can be convicted under this section even if he
was the thief or a suspected thief. There is nothing in this section which should exclude an actual thief from a
liability under it if, in addition to committing the theft, he also tried to realise money by a promise to return the
stolen article. Such an act, which is independent of the act of stealing, constitutes a different offence. There is
no reason why a thief should not be punishable for an additional offence. The only reason for the view that a
thief cannot be held guilty under this section is the fact that it is unnatural for a thief himself to use all means in
his power to cause himself to be apprehended and convicted for theft. But the language of the section does not
contemplate any exception. The earlier part of the section which really describes the ingredients of the offence,
does not lend support to the view that the thief cannot be prosecuted under this section. The latter part of the
section is really in the nature of a provision by way of a concession in favour of one who helps, though for
personal gain, both in recovering the stolen property, and in bringing the thief to book. An actual thief or a
person suspected to be the thief can be convicted under this section.1501
[s 215.5] “Takes, or Agrees or Consents to take any Gratification”—Meaning of
In order to constitute the offence punishable under this section, it is necessary that the person who is willing to
take and the person who is willing to give, the illegal gratification, must agree not only as to the object for which
the gratification is to be given, but also as to the shape or form the gratification is to take. If a person has
actually taken a gratification from another, it must be assumed that he agreed to take, and the other to give it, in
that particular form or shape; but where the gratification has not actually passed and there is a disagreement as
to the form or shape that the gratification is to take, the idea of agreement or consent is negatived.1502
[s 215.6] “Attempt”—When Complete?
In Queen-Emperor v Chittar,1503 Dillon J held that an attempt to take a gratification within the meaning of this
section, necessarily includes the idea of concurrence of wills between the giver and taker; with this much
superadded thereto, that some act has been done preliminary to the act of taking. In other words, an attempt is
a stage in the commission of the offence which is intermediate between the agreement or consent and the
actual taking. But this has been dissented from in the cases as mentioned in the footnote.1504 Under section 2 of
the Indian Contract Act, 1872, when one person signifies to another his willingness to do, or to abstain from
doing, anything with a view to obtaining the assent of that other to such act or abstinence, he is said to make a
proposal.1505 The assent to a proposal amounts to a promise.1506 The proposals as above defined which are
inseparable from the establishment of contractual arrangements are attempts to complete an agreement, or in
other words, to arrive at the mutually expressed view of two wills whereby the legal bond called a “contract” is
constituted. When once a proposal has been made for the payment of an illegal gratification, whether or not it
fructifies into an agreement, the offence of an attempt to commit an offence under this section is complete.1507 If
an attempt to take a gratification within the meaning of this section necessarily includes the idea of a giver and
taker, it is no more an attempt to commit an offence, but a substantive offence on the language of the
section.1508 In the substantive offence there is a giver and a taker; in an attempt to commit the offence there is
merely a proposal or an attempt to enter into an agreement to take from a person who is being induced to
give.1509
[s 215.7] Gratification
[s 215.8] Movable Property

Page 7 of 14
[s 215.9] Deprived—Meaning of
There is no reason to give the word “deprived” a restricted interpretation so as to mean “taken out of the
possession of”. To deprive a person of any article may be either to take it away from him or to prevent him from
getting possession of it if he would have done so in the normal course of events.1510 Thus, if an animal
belonging to a person strays away and he does not know its whereabouts, he may be said to have lost the
actual possession or control of the animal, but he cannot be said to have been deprived of it. The judicial
possession of the animal remains with him. Temporary loss of property, as by straying of cattle, cannot amount
to a deprivation as contemplated by this section. It is only when somebody also takes possession of the animal
and misappropriates it, that the owner can be said to have been deprived of it.1511 The deprivation of the
property must be by an offence punishable under the Code, but it is not confined to one resulting from an act of
theft. A person who commits a criminal misappropriation of a property, also deprives the owner of the
possession of the property.1512
[s 215.9.1] Deprived by any Offence Punishable under this Code
One of the important ingredients of an offence under this section is that the owner of some movable property
must have been deprived of it by any offence punishable under this Code. The property for the recovery of
which gratification has been taken or promised must be one of which the owner has been deprived of by any
offence punishable under the Penal Code.1513 There can be no conviction for an offence under this section until
it is proved that a person has been deprived of movable property by an offence punishable under the Code.
The mere fact that property has disappeared does not necessarily raise a presumption that the disappearance
is due to an offence, eg when a buffalo has disappeared.1514 Where the accused merely undertakes to
endeavour to trace out and restore the lost property on payment of some remuneration, then upon this
circumstances alone the accused cannot be said to be guilty of an offence under this section, unless over and
above that, the prosecution proves that the property has been lost by the commission of an offence and that the
accused is endeavouring to screen the offender from justice and is not using all means in his power to cause
the offender to be apprehended and convicted of the offence which he has committed.1515
[s 215.9.2] Offence may be Committed even after the Possession is Lost
It is not necessary that the offence should have been committed at the time the property had gone out of the
possession of the owner. If an animal belonging to a person goes astray and is subsequently misappropriated
by another person, the owner is deprived of the property when it became the subject of criminal
misappropriation, but still, he may be said to have been deprived of his property by an offence punishable
under the Code.
[s 215.9.3] No Inference to be made in Case of Direct Evidence
Where an offence is committed at the time the owner lost the property or was deprived of it, no further evidence
is necessary and the courts can straight away hold that the owner was deprived of the property by an offence,
say of theft, punishable under the IPC; but where no offence was committed at the time of the loss of the
property, as in the case of criminal misappropriation, there must be material on record, direct or circumstantial,
to show that the offence of criminal misappropriation was committed and that as a result thereof, the owner was
deprived of the property. Where the person finding the lost property has the intention to return it to the rightful
owner, he shall not be guilty of the offence of criminal misappropriation, even though he is not prompt and
wants to make money by making a demand from the owner. Wherever a direct evidence is adduced by the
prosecution, it shall have to be assessed to find out if the offence of criminal misappropriation had been
committed. If no direct evidence is adduced, the circumstances of the case must be looked into to find out if
they lead to only one inference, namely, that the offence of criminal misappropriation had been committed.1516
[s 215.9.4] Inference is a Question of Fact and not of Law
In such cases there can be no question of any presumption. It is a question of inference from the facts, and
what inference may properly be made is not a question of law but a question for the conscience of the person
who is supposed to make the inference.1517 In some cases,1518 it was remarked that it must be proved that the
deprivation of possession was the result of an offence under the Indian Penal Code and that there can be no
inference merely from the disappearance of cattle that any such offence was committed. They were all cases in
Page 8 of 14
which the stolen cattle were never recovered; and, very likely, it was not a fair inference in any of these cases
that the cattle had ever been stolen or misappropriated. They had strayed and were never found and there was,
therefore, nothing whatsoever to suggest that any person had ever taken possession of them. But if a bullock
strays at night, the person who ties it up to a tree is depriving the owner of its possession, as normally such a
bullock would return to its owner in the ordinary course and by being tied up, it is prevented from so doing. The
court is entitled quite fairly to make the inference that the bullock had either been stolen or misappropriated
dishonestly by some person. In either case some offence is committed, which prevented the owner from
retaining or obtaining possession of his property so that he was deprived of the possession of it. Hence, a
person taking money for pointing out such a bullock is guilty under this section.1519
[s 215.9.5] No Offence when there is no Theft or Misappropriation
A charge to the effect that the accused had taken a sum of money from the complainant as a gift in
consideration of returning him his donkey which had gone astray, does not disclose an offence under this
section, when there is no evidence that the donkey was a stolen donkey, and a conviction under this section
cannot be sustained, although the accused pleads guilty to the charge.1520
Where an accused represents to the owner of a missing animal that it was stolen, and promises, for
consideration, to help him in recovering it, but it is found that the animal was only missing and there was no
evidence showing that it was stolen, the accused cannot be convicted under this section. His representation
that the animal was stolen and that he was helping him to recover it does not itself show that the animal was
really stolen.1521 But in an Allahabad case, where the accused demanded a price for the return of some missing
bullocks, it was held that the act of the accused was punishable under this section.1522
[s 215.10] “Abetment”—Advertisement when may Amount to Abetment
To advertise a reward for the return of any property stolen or lost, and to use therein words purporting that no
questions will be asked from the person claiming the reward, would constitute an abetment of the offence by
instigation.1523
[s 215.11] Exception—to be Proved by the Accused
This section does indeed contain a saving clause to the effect that a person, taking a gratification of the nature
mentioned in it, shall not be punished if he uses all means in his power to cause the offender to be
apprehended and convicted of the offence; but this is clearly an exception to the generality. Once the elements
of an offence under this section are established by evidence, the onus of proving that the person charged is
entitled to the benefit of the exception referred to above is on the defence.1524 The object of the Legislature in
the clause “unless he uses all means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended and convicted of
the offence” was to exempt from the liability to punishment, a person who is acting honestly, and not to exempt
the thief.1525 The clear meaning of the section is that it is an offence to receive money for helping any person to
recover property stolen or misappropriated and that there is an exception only in favour of a man who can show
that he used all means in his power to cause the apprehension of the offender. Under the provision of section
105, Evidence Act where a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of
circumstances bringing the case within any special exception or proviso contained in the Code or in any law
defining the offence, is upon him, and the courts shall presume the absence of such circumstances.1526
Merely demanding a gratification to help the complainant to recover his buffaloes, without making any attempt
to get the person, who had stolen the buffaloes or the person who was retaining them, to be prosecuted and
convicted, clearly amounts to an offence under this section.1527
An offence under this section is cognizable and a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable
but not compoundable. It is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
[s 215.13] Charge
Page 9 of 14
I (name and office of the magistrate, etc), hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That A, the owner of………., a movable property, was deprived of it by an offence, namely………., punishable under
the Indian Penal Code, that you, on or about the………. day of……… at ……… took (or agreed or consented to
take)…… as gratification, under the pretence of (or on account of) helping to recover the property, deprived of but you
failed to use all means in your power to cause the offender apprehended and convicted, and that you thereby
committed an offence, punishable under section 215 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 215.14] Proof
To establish an offence under this section the following points must be proved:
(i) that the owner of some movable property was deprived of it by an offence punishable under this Code;
(ii) that the accused took, or agreed or consented to take, some gratification;
(iii) that the taking of such gratification was under the pretence of, or on account of, helping to recover such
property; and
(iv) that the accused failed to use all means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended and convicted.
[s 215.14.1] No Conviction when Loss not Due to any Offence
To sustain a conviction under this section there must be evidence to show that the loss of the article
complained of, was by means of the commission of an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. If there
is no such evidence on record, there can be no conviction under this section.1528
To bring a case within the purview of this section it is enough to prove that money was demanded and paid for
helping the person to recover the property of which he had been deprived of by means of a punishable
offence.1529
[s 215.14.2] Exception—Initial Facts have to be Proved by the Prosecution
The first part of the section has to be read in conjunction with the last part, containing the words “unless he
uses all means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended”. Therefore, the first part of the section
itself is really intended to deal with persons who impliedly have means of contacting the offender and
recovering the property, and who then undertake to recover the property from the thief on payment of a sum
which will serve to remunerate them and also square up the thief. It is only when this state of affairs has been
established by the prosecution, the onus of proof can be thrown on the accused person to prove the terms of
the exception, namely, that he had used all means in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended and
convicted of the offence. These being the facts within his knowledge, the statute has placed the onus on him to
establish them. Therefore, though it is clear that the clause “unless he uses all means in his power to cause the
Page 10 of 14
offender to be apprehended and convicted of the offence” is in the nature of a special exception or proviso
within the meaning of section 105 of the Evidence Act for which the onus of proof is on the accused, the
juxtaposition of this clause with the other ingredients of the offence specified in the first portion of the section,
shows that the prosecution has initially to establish that the circumstances of the taking of the money were such
that the accused received it without any intention of tracing the offender and bringing him to book, assuming
that he had the means of getting at the offender.1530
[s 215.14.3] Negative not to be Proved by Prosecution
In a prosecution under this section, it is not for the prosecution to prove the negative, that the accused did not
use all in his power to cause the offender to be apprehended. It is for the defence to establish the positive fact
that they did all in their power to cause the offender to be apprehended. Hence, a conviction under this section
can be maintained even if there is no evidence to prove that the accused did not use all means in his power to
cause the offender to be apprehended and convicted of the offence.1531 Once the elements of an offence under
this section are established by evidence, the onus of proving that the person charged is entitled to the benefit of
the exception, is on the defence, particularly so where there has been a spontaneous demand by the accused
of money, indicating an intention not to bring the offender to justice. Thus, where the accused themselves
accosted the complainant, who had lost his cycle, and told him that if he spent Rs 10, his cycle could be
recovered, and the very terms in which the complainant was approached implied that no questions would be
asked as to the actual offender and no attempt made at his apprehension or conviction, and on the
complainant’s paying Rs 2, the accused told him that the cycle would be restored to him on a particular day, but
it was not done, it was held that the accused were guilty under this section.1532 Once it is established by the
prosecution that the accused accepted the gratification for restoring the stolen property, he must be found guilty
under the section, unless and until he successfully proves that he did everything within his means for the
apprehension and conviction of the real culprits.1533
[s 215.15] Conviction in the Alternative
A person charged with theft under section 379, can be charged in the alternative with demanding illegal
gratification for the return of the same. The court can convict the accused of either offence even if the accused
has not been charged with it.1534
Where a person, who was charged alternatively with offences under sections 379 and 215, was convicted of
the offence under section 215 alone and the appellate court, finding that there was no evidence for the offence
under section 215 but that there was satisfactory evidence for the offence under section 379, acquitted the
accused altogether, it was held that the appellate court ought to have altered the conviction to one under
section 379 and maintained the sentence.1535
On the other hand, where there was no evidence on record to show that either of the applicants was in
possession of the buffaloes, the mere fact that the applicants offered to get the buffaloes restored to the
complainant, cannot necessarily lead to the inference that the applicants or either of them was in possession of
the buffaloes. The mere circumstance that the applicants offered to get the buffaloes restored, is not conclusive
to show that the applicants were in possession, for this circumstance is also consistent with the hypothesis that
the applicant might have known who was in possession of the buffaloes, and he may have offered to help the
complainant. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the charge under section 411, IPC is made out
against the applicants. Their demanding gratification to help the complainant to recover his buffaloes without
making any attempt to get the person who had stolen the buffaloes or the person who was retaining them, to be
prosecuted and convicted, clearly amounted to an offence under section 215, IPC. So the conviction of the
applicants under section 215, IPC was upheld.1536
A person in possession of stolen property, entering into an agreement with the owner for the restoration of such
property, without actually helping to bring the thief to justice, cannot be convicted of an offence under this
section, but only of an offence under section 211.1537
Page 11 of 14
Where the question is likely to arise whether a person who has accepted a gratification for the return of stolen
property is the actual thief or not, alternative charges should be framed under section 221(1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.1538
[s 215.16] Double Conviction
As stated above, it cannot be said that this section does not apply to the actual thief because he is under no
legal obligation to bring himself to justice. All that the section says is that the person who takes the gratification
shall be punished unless he uses all means in his power to bring the actual thief to justice. No doubt the
wording of the section makes it apply, in the majority of cases, to offenders other than the actual thief. But
cases may well occur where a thief, having stolen cattle with a view to obtain money by restoring them to the
owner, may offer to restore them for a gratification merely because he knows that detection is becoming
imminent. There is, therefore, nothing illegal in the double conviction of the actual thief who also takes a
gratification.1539
[s 215.17] Sentence
It is only in such exceptional cases that a severe sentence should be passed for both offences than could have
been inflicted for the theft alone.1540 Where the accused was an old man and had already served a sentence of
two months, a sentence of six months was reduced to that already undergone.1541
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1473 Mayne on Criminal Law, pp 493, 494, citing Reg v King, 1 Cox CC 36; Mangu v Emperor, AIR 1928 All 22 : 29
Cr LJ 21.
1474 Babu v Emperor, AIR 1936 Sind 145 : 37 Cr LJ 1038; Re Seeni Thewar Thanga Thewar, (1972) LW (Cr) 73.
1475 Biswanath Dubey v Gharbigan Chamar, AIR 1940 Pat 548 : 41 Cr LJ 902.
1476 Pachakutty Thondumpirim v State, 78 Mad LW 110.

Page 12 of 14
1477 2 East, PC 770; Mayne on Criminal Law, p 493.
1478 Dogs are included in the words “any property whatsoever.” Mirams v Our Dog’s Publishing Co Ltd, (1901) 2
KB 564 : 70 LJKB 879.
1479 Common Informers Act, 1951 (14 & 15 Geo 6, Cr 39).
1480 6 & 7 Geo 5, Chapter 50.
1481 As amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo, 6, Cr 58.
1482 Biswanath Dubey v Gharbigan Chamar, AIR 1940 Pat 548 : 41 Cr LJ 902; Mohan v State, (1965) 2 Cr LJ 273
; Nazar Ali v State, (1977) All Cr R 63, p 64.
1483 Yusuf Mian v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 440 , p 442 : 39 Cr LJ 808.
1484 Arman Ulla v Jainulla, AIR 1933 Cal 599 , p 600 : 34 Cr LJ 1015 : 37 Cal WN 360.
1485 Re Kudumbam, 1 Weir 196.
1486 Queen-Empress v Mahommad Ali, ILR 23 All 81 : (1900) AWN 205.
1487 Re Nalli Veerathevan, AIR 1914 Mad 121 (1) : 15 Cr LJ 471 : 26 Mad LJ 598; Kehr Singh v Emperor, AIR
1925 Lah 563 : 26 Cr LJ 1121 : 26 PLR 303 : 7 LLJ 477; Godha v Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 500 : 28 Cr LJ 670 : ILR 8
Lah 263 : 28 PLR 433.
1488 Twet Pe v Emperor, 7 Cr LJ 464 (FB) : 14 Bur LR 67 : 4 LBR 19; Nga Ok Gyi v Queen-Empress, 5 JLB 449.
1489 Mangu v Emperor, AIR 1928 All 22 : 29 Cr LJ 21 : ILR 50 All 186 : 25 All LJ 866.
1490 Mayne’s Criminal Law in India, p 271.
1491 Queen-Empress v Mahommad Ali, ILR 23 All 81.

1492 Emperor v Mukhtara, AIR 1924 All 783 : ILR 46 All 915 : 26 Cr LJ 481 : 22 All LJ 838.
1493 Deo Suchit Rai v Emperor, AIR 1947 All 225 : 48 Cr LJ 640 : (1947) All LJ 48 (FB).
1494 Twet Pe v King-Emperor, 4 LBR 199 : 14 Bur LR 67 (FB).
1495 Emperor v Nga Nyan U, AIR 1914 UB 43 : 16 Cr LJ 421.
1496 King v Nga V Nyein, AIR 1941 Rang 340 : (1941) PLR 582 .
1497 Emperor v Mukhtara, AIR 1924 All 783 : ILR 46 All 915 : 26 Cr LJ 481 : 22 All LJ 838.
1498 Queen-Empress v Mahommad Ali, ILR 23 All 81.
1499 Ramanand Telt v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 590 : ILR 17 Pat 677 : 39 Cr LJ 887 : 19 PLT 776.
1500 Emperor v Mukhtara, AIR 1924 All 783 : ILR 46 All 916.
1501 Deo Suchit Rai v Emperor, AIR 1947 All 225 (FB).
1502 Queen-Empress v Chittar, ILR 20 All 389 : (1898) All WN 84; Emperor v Nga Nyo, 1 Cr LJ 1116 : 2 LBR 310;
Hargayan v King-Emperor, AIR 1923 All 83 : 25 Cr LJ 127 : ILR 45 All 159 : 20 All LJ 925.
1503 Queen-Emperor v Chittar, ILR 20 All 389.

Page 13 of 14
1504 Emperor v Nga Nyo, 1 Cr LJ 1116; Hargayan v King-Emperor, AIR 1923 All 83 ; King v Naung Hla Pe, AIR
1941 Rang 295 : 43 Cr LJ 67.
1505 Act 9 of 1872, section 2(a).
1506 Ibid, section 2(b).
1507 Emperor v Nga Nyo, 1 Cr LJ 1116, p 1117.
1508 Hargayan v Emperor, AIR 1923 All 83 , p 84.
1509 King v Maung Hla Pe, AIR 1941 Rang 295 , p 296.
1510 Yusuf Mian v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 440 , p 441 : 39 Cr LJ 808 : (1938) ILR All 81 : (1938) All LJ 531.
1511 Mohan v State, (1965) 2 Cr LJ 273 .
1512 State v Karan Singh Gujar, AIR 1953 MB 191 : (1953) Cr LJ 1189 .
1513 State v Karan Singh Gujar, AIR 1953 MB 191 : (1953) Cr LJ 1189 .
1514 Hemraj v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 295; Sharfa v Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 551 (1) : 16 Cr LJ 541; Akhan v Emperor,
AIR 1931 Lah 157 : 32 Cr LJ 729; Bageshwari Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 241 : 33 Cr LJ 709; Mangu v Emperor,
AIR 1928 All 22 : 29 Cr LJ 21; Balu v Emperor, AIR 1936 Sind 145 ; Biswanath Dubey v Gharbigan Chamar, AIR 1940
Pat 548 : 41 Cr LJ 902.
1515 Ram Naresh Rai v Emperor, AIR 1931 All 710 , p 711 : 32 Cr LJ 1072; Bageshwari Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1932
Pat 241 : 33 Cr LJ 709 : ILR 11 Pat 392; Biswanath Dubey v Gharbigan Chamar, AIR 1940 Pat 548 .
1516 Mohan v State, (1965) 2 Cr LJ 273 .
1517 Yusuf Mian v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 440 , p 442.
1518 Sarla v Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 551 : 29 IC 669 : 9 PR 1915 (Cr) : 28 PLR 1916; Bageshwari Ahir v Emperor,
AIR 1932 Pat 241 : (1932) Cr C 638 : 139 IC 76 : 33 Cr LJ 709 : 11 Pat 39 : 13 PLT 732; Mangu v Emperor, AIR 1928
All 22 : 106 IC 437 : 29 Cr LJ 21 : ILR 50 All 186 : 25 All LJ 866.
1519 Yusuf Mian v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 440 .
1520 Balu v Emperor, AIR 1936 Sind 145 : 37 Cr LJ 1038.
1521 Radha Mohan Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 138 : 41 Cr LJ 922; Bageshwari Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat
241 : 33 Cr LJ 709.
1522 Yasin v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1970) All Cr Cas 240 : (1970) All WR (HC) 368.
1523 Mirams v Our Dogs Publishing Co, 2 KB 564.
1524 Arman Ulla v Jainulla, AIR 1933 Cal 599 , p 600 : 34 Cr LJ 1015 : 37 Cal WN 360; Dewa Kalu Balai v State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1959 MP 418 [LNIND 1959 MP 4] : (1959) Cr LJ 1438 ; Deo Suchit Rai v Emperor, AIR 1947 All
225 : 48 Cr LJ 640 : (1947) All LJ 48 (FB) overruling Emperor v Ram Naresh Rai, AIR 1931 All 710 : ILR 54 All 55;
Yusuf Mian v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 440 : 39 Cr LJ 880 : (1938) ILR All 681 : (1938) All LJ 531; Ramanand Teli v
Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 590 : 39 Cr LJ 887 : ILR 17 Pat 677 : (1938) Pat WN 679 .
1525 Queen-Empress v Nga Tun Bya, (1893–1900) LBR 226; Emperor v Nga Pa Nyein, AIR 1941 Rang 340 .
Page 14 of 14
1526 Yusuf Mian v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 440 , p 442.
1527 Nazar Ali v State, (1977) All Cr R 63, p 64.
1528 Bageshwari Ahir v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 241 : 33 Cr LJ 709.

1529 Arman Ulla v Jainulla, AIR 1933 Cal 599 , p 600 : 34 Cr LJ 1075.
1530 Pachakutty Thondampiriar v State, 78 Mad LW 110.
1531 Deo Suchit Rai v Emperor, AIR 1947 All 225 , p 228 : 48 Cr LJ 640 (FB); overruling Emperor v Ram Naresh
Rai, AIR 1931 All 710 : 32 Cr LJ 1072.
1532 Ramanand Teli v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat 590 , p 591 : 39 Cr LJ 887.
1533 Dewa Kalu Balai v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1959 MP 418 [LNIND 1959 MP 4] : (1959) Cr LJ 1438 ;
State v Karan Singh Gujar, AIR 1953 MP 191 , p 192 : (1953) Cr LJ 1189 ; Arman Ulla v Jainulla, AIR 1933 Cal 599 :
34 Cr LJ 1015; Yusuf Mian v Emperor, AIR 1938 All 440 : 39 Cr LJ 808.
1534 King v Maung Hla Pe, AIR 1941 Rang 295 , p 296 : 43 CR LJ 57; Ramanand Teli v Emperor, AIR 1938 Pat
590 , p 591 : 39 Cr LJ 887; Emperor v Mukhtara, AIR 1924 All 738 : 26 Cr LJ 481.
1535 King v Nga Po Nyein, AIR 1941 Rang 340 .
1536 Nazar Ali v State, (1977) All Cr R 63, p 64.
1537 Re Nalli Veerathevan, AIR 1914 Mad 121 (1) : 15 Cr LJ 471.
1538 Twet Pe v Emperor, 7 Cr LJ 464 (FB).
1539 King v Nga Po Nyein, AIR 1941 Rang 340 ; Twet Pe v Emperor, 7 Cr LJ 464 (FB).
1540 Ibid.
1541 Doongia v State, 1954 PLW 329 .
End of Document
[s 216] Harbouring offender who has escaped from custody or whose
apprehension has been ordered.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 12
[s 216] Harbouring offender who has escaped from custody or whose apprehension has been ordered.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 12
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 216] Harbouring offender who has escaped from custody or whose

apprehension has been ordered.—
Whenever any person convicted of or charged with an offence, being in lawful custody for that offence, escapes
from such custody,
Page 4 of 12
or whenever a public servant, in the exercise of the lawful powers of such public servant, orders a certain
person to be apprehended for an offence, whoever, knowing of such escape or order for apprehension,
harbours or conceals that person with the intention of preventing him from being apprehended, shall be
punished in the manner following, that is to say,
if a capital offence.—if the offence for which the person was in custody or is ordered to be apprehended is
punishable with death, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
if punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment.—if the offence is punishable with
1542[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for ten years, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years, with or without fine;
and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year and not to ten years, he shall
be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence for a term which may extend to one-
fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for such offence, or with fine, or with both.
1543[“Offence” in this section includes also any act or omission of which a person is alleged to have been guilty
out of 1544[India], which, if he had been guilty of it in 1545[India], would have been punishable as an offence, and
for which he is, under any law relating to extradition,1546[* *] or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained
in custody in 1547[India]; and every such act or omission shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be
punishable as if the accused person had been guilty of it in 1548[India].
Exception.—This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour or concealment is by the husband
or wife of the person to be apprehended.
This section deals with harbouring an offender who escaped from custody and whose apprehension has been
ordered. It is analogous to section 212, IPC. That section applies only to harbouring an offender who, after the
commission of an offence, absconds before his conviction, while this section deals with harbouring an offender,
who has escaped from custody, after being actually convicted of, or charged with an offence or where his
apprehension has been ordered. It is thus an aggravated form of the offence under section 212. In the case of
an offence under section 212, the offender escapes to avoid his possible arrest. Here he escapes from an
arrest, or at any rate, after his arrest has been ordered.
This section provides for the punishment of harbourers where the person harboured is wanted for an offence for
which certain punishments are provided. No provision whatever is made in the section for the punishment of a
harbourer where the man harboured is wanted for an offence punishable with imprisonment of less than one
year.1549
The purpose of the section is to penalise acts designed to obstruct or defeat the course of justice, which
requires that suspected persons should be arrested whether they may eventually prove to be guilty or innocent,
and that it is not necessary to show that the offence in respect of which orders of apprehension were issued,
was actually committed.1550
The paragraph relating to the definition of “offence” was inserted by section 23 of Act 10 of 1886. The words
“British India” were replaced by the words “the Provinces” by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1948.
Subsequently, by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, the words “the Provinces” were replaced by the words
“the States”. Finally, the words “the States” were replaced by the word “India”. The words “or under the Fugitive
Offenders Act, 1881” were deleted by Act 3 of 1951. The words “imprisonment for life” were substituted for the
words “transportation for life” by act 26 of 1955, section 117 and the schedule.
Page 5 of 12
[s 216.3] Section 216 and Section 224, IPC
In Ajab v State of Maharashtra,1551 12 persons apprehended for gaming, had escaped from police custody and
there was no evidence of harbouring. The apex court held that section 216, IPC is not attracted and the
conviction of the accused ought to be under section 224, IPC. The following observation were made by the
highest court of the land:
Taking the last point first, we see merit in the contention that the conviction under section 216, IPC is wrong. Under
that section a person who harbours or conceal an offender who has escaped from custody or whose apprehension is
ordered, is liable for punishment, if he has done so to prevent the offender’s apprehension. In the present case,
although the 12 persons who were apprehended for gaming had escaped, there was no evidence to show that any of
the appellants was guilty of harbouring any of them. We are, therefore, of the opinion that their conviction under section
216, IPC is not proper. The correct section to apply would be section 224, IPC which inter alia provides for punishment
if a person escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained. We are, therefore, of the
opinion that the conviction under section 216, IPC is not proper and it ought to be under section 224, IPC.1552
[s 216.4] Ingredients of the Offence under this Section
The essential ingredients of the offence under this section are: (a) that a person, convicted of or charged with
an offence, being in lawful custody for that offence, escapes from such custody, or that there has been an order
for the apprehension of a certain person for an offence, (b) knowledge by the accused of such escape or the
order for apprehension; and (c) the harbouring or concealing by the accused of the said person with the
intention of preventing him from being apprehended.1553
It is not an essential ingredient of the offence under this section that the person harboured should be found
guilty. It is enough to show that against the person harboured an order of apprehension was issued for an
offence, that is to say, for an offence alleged against him.1554 The harbourer is liable for punishment under this
section, only if he has done so to prevent the offender’s apprehension.1555
[s 216.5] “Convicted or Charged with”
This expression makes it clear that, for the application of the section, it is not necessary that the person
harboured should have been convicted of an offence. It is enough if he is charged with an offence and an order
for his apprehension has been issued.1556
Under the general definition of the word “offence” in section 40, IPC, it denotes a thing made punishable by this
Code, but this is subject to certain qualifications. The first is that in certain chapters and in certain sections the
word also denotes a thing punishable under the Code, or under any special or local law as defined by sections
41 and 42, IPC. Secondly, in certain other specified sections the word has the same meaning, that is, a thing
punishable under the Code, or under any special or local law, only when the thing punishable under the special
or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards. This section is
included among the latter sections, and from this it would appear that it would apply to a case in which the
person harboured is wanted for an offence under a special or local law for which he is punishable under that
law with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards. But the section very clearly provides for the
punishment of harbourers only where the person harboured is wanted for an offence for which certain
punishments are provided. No provision whatever is made in this section for the punishment of a harbourer
where the man harboured is wanted for an offence punishable with imprisonment of less than one year. The
definition of the word “offence” in section 40 cannot, therefore, affect the clear provision made in this section for
the punishment of a person who harbours an offender and the section does not apply to a case where the
person harboured is wanted for an offence under a special or local law for which he is punishable only with
Page 6 of 12
imprisonment for six months. To this extent this section has overriding effect over section 40.1557
The definition of the word “offence” as given in this section, further shows that if an act or omission is committed
by a person out of India, with a view to harbour or conceal a person who is punishable in India as contemplated
by this section, subject to the law relating to extradition, he is liable to be apprehended and punished for such
act or omission in India. In this connection, sections 3, 4 and 40 may be referred to.
[s 216.8] “Orders a Certain Person to be Apprehended for an Offence”—Explained
The order of apprehension may be for enforcing a punishment inflicted on conviction, or it may be for an
offence only alleged and not yet proved with a view to facilitate a trial or to procure his presence for any
purpose when avoiding the appearance is an offence. Harbouring or concealing a person for whose
apprehension an order has been passed by a public servant for the purpose of enforcing a punishment already
inflicted on him for having committed an offence, is an offence under this section.1558 But the purpose of this
section is to penalise acts designed to obstruct or defeat the course of justice, which requires that suspected
persons should be arrested whether they may prove eventually to be guilty or innocent, and for the application
of this section, it is not necessary to show that the offence in respect of which orders of apprehension were
issued was actually committed. It is enough to show that against the person harboured an order of
apprehension had been issued for an offence, that is to say, for an offence alleged against him, and acquittal of
the person harboured cannot affect the legality of the conviction.1559
[s 216.9] “Knowing of such Escape or Order for Apprehension”—Presumption as to Knowledge
In order to establish an offence under this section it must be proved that a public servant, in the exercise of his
lawful authority, ordered a certain person to be apprehended for an offence, and that the person charged with
harbouring him did so knowing of such order, with the intention of preventing his apprehension.1560 Such
knowledge cannot be presumed from the mere publication of the name of the offender in the Criminal
Intelligence Gazette, nor can it be inferred from the offender adopting a false name and the harbourer
misdescribing him as his relation.1561
[s 216.9.1] “Knowing” and “Having Reason to believe” are Different Things
The word “knowing” in this section means something more than and different from the words “had reason (or
sufficient cause) to believe”. The latter words might be satisfied even though no warrant has in fact been
issued. “Knowing”, however, implies a fact which can be known. It does not necessarily import actual evidence
of the senses, but it does import knowledge of something actual by means of authentic or authoritative
information. Where warrants of arrest could not be executed and proclamations under section 82, CrPC, are
issued, the proclamations cannot be deemed to establish that the accused “knew” of the issue of the warrants.
The distinction between “knowing” and “having reason to believe” cannot be disregarded. To read this section
as if it contained the latter words would vitiate the judgment, conviction and sentence.1562 The mere fact that an
absconder is found in the house of another person is not sufficient to involve the owner of the house in an
offence under this section, unless the knowledge of the accused person as required by the section is proved,
and here too the fact that a proclamation had been made sometime before the arrest, is not conclusive
evidence of the knowledge of the offender.1563
[s 216.9.2] Mere Knowledge is Sufficient
This section may be compared with section 212. If the harbourer knows1564 of the escape or order, it is
immaterial whether he knows that the offence has been committed or not, and he will be liable even though no
offence has, as a fact, been committed, or no fresh offence, as where the order is to surrender and serve out
the remaining portion of a sentence, has been committed.1565
Page 7 of 12
Where the name of the accused was not mentioned as an accused in the FIR that she harboured her son, there
was also no evidence on record, collected by the prosecution, that it was in the knowledge of the accused that
her son had committed the offence, even if the son, after committing the offence, came to the house of the
accused without the knowledge of the accused, even then no offence is made out against the accused
(mother). Therefore, criminal proceedings under sections 212 and 216 etc, against the accused, were
quashed.1566
[s 216.10] “Harbours or Conceals”—What is?
As to the general definition of the term “harbour”, see notes to section 52A. The word “harbour” includes
supplying a person with shelter, food, drink, money, clothes, arms, ammunition, or means of conveyance, or
assisting him in any way to evade apprehension. The last words are general and will include every kind of
assistance.1567
When a person gives false information to the police, in order that an offender may make good his escape, he is
guilty of the offence of harbouring him.1568
It has been held that the word “harbour” in this section must be construed liberally. The person, at whose
instance harbouring is effected, commits the offence, although the house in which the harboured person stays
may belong to a different person.1569
[s 216.11] Intention to Prevent Apprehension Necessary
The mere fact of harbouring a person, who has committed a dacoity, is not an offence under this section. In
order to constitute an offence, it must be done with the intention of preventing the apprehension of such
person.1570
[s 216.12] Punishable
The word “punishable” is used in the latter part of the section in reference to the offence, merely for the purpose
of describing particular classes of offences in relation to which the punishment indicated in the section is to be
inflicted, and, it does not indicate that in a particular case the offence must have been punished.1571
[s 216.13] Exception
This special provision appears to have been made in this section and section 212, IPC to maintain the
harmonious relationship between the husband and wife and to safeguard the interest of their children. This
section does not apply to any other member of the family and according to this exception, if the wife harbours or
conceals her husband or she is harboured or concealed by her husband, the provisions of this section will not
apply to them and they cannot be held guilty of any offence under this section.
The offence under this section is cognizable, and a warrant should ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable. It is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
Limitation for taking cognizance of the offence under this section is the same as for the offence under section
213, IPC.
Where the accused against whom offences under sections 212 and 216, IPC were alleged, was produced
before the judicial magistrate, the judicial magistrate remanded him to police custody under section 167(3),
Page 8 of 12
CrPC without recording the reasons, despite the fact that the offences alleged were bailable offences. The
order of remand for police custody was held illegal and against the provisions of section 436, CrPC so the same
was quashed.1572
[s 216.15] Charge
That on or about the…………… day of……………., at ……………., one AB was charged with or convicted of an
offence under s …………… by the court of,……………. (or one AB was ordered to be apprehended for an offence
punishable under s ……………. by……………a public servant) and that you knowing of the escape of AB (or knowing
of the said order for apprehension) on or about the…………… day of…………… at……………, harboured (or
concealed the said) AB with the intention of preventing him from being apprehended, and that you thereby committed
an offence, punishable under s 216 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 216.16] Proof
For a conviction under this section, the following points must be proved:
(a) Where the Offender Escapes:
(i) that a certain person had been convicted of, or charged with, an offence;
(ii) that the said person was in lawful custody for the same;
(iii) that he escaped from such custody;
(iv) that the accused knew of such escape;
(v) that he, with such knowledge, harboured or concealed such offender;
(vi) that he did so, with intent to prevent him from being apprehended;
(vii) that the offence in question was punishable with (a) death, or (b) imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for ten years, or (c) with imprisonment from one to ten years.
(b) Where the Offender is Ordered to be Apprehended—

Page 9 of 12
(i) that a person had been ordered to be apprehended;
(ii) that such order was passed by a public servant;
(iii) that it was passed in the exercise of the lawful power of such public servant;
(iv) that the accused knew of such order for apprehension;
(v) that with such knowledge he harboured or concealed such offender;
(vi) that he did so with the intention of preventing him from being apprehended.
[s 216.17] Evidence
With regard to an order for the apprehension of a person as being guilty of an offence, there must be
admissible evidence to show that lawful warrants or orders for arrest were issued by the proper authorities
sections 62, 64 and 65 of the Evidence Act prescribe the only evidence which the law permits in order to prove
a warrant of arrest under section 62 of the Act, the production of the original order, or, under the conditions
specified in section 65, of a certified copy. A warrant of arrest is a public document which affects the personal
liberty of the subject. The statute prescribes its form. It has to bear the appropriate signature and seal. Any
laxity of proof might have serious consequences. It might, for instance, lead to error as to the identity of the
person to be apprehended. Secondary evidence, other than a certified copy, would not necessarily or even
obviously show that the statutory form had been complied with.
In the case of proclamation under section 82, CrPC, sub-section (3) of that section provides that a statement in
writing by the court issuing the proclamation, to the effect that the proclamation was duly published on a
specified day, shall be conclusive evidence that the requirements of that section were complied with, and that
the proclamation was published on such day. But this cannot be read as overriding the requirements of the
Evidence Act or as making the proclamation evidence that the warrants had been issued. The method of
proving the warrants is not a requirement of the section, which is merely dealing with the proclamation itself and
the mode of publishing it and the like. Nor does section 82 expressly, or by implication, make the proclamation
equivalent to a notice of its contents to the public or even to the inhabitants of the town or village where it is
published.1573
The section provides that if the person harboured is wanted for an offence punishable with death, the person
harbouring him shall be punishable with sentence extending up to seven years; if the man is wanted for an
offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment up to ten years, the person shall be liable to be
punished with imprisonment for a term of three years; if the man is wanted for an offence punishable with
imprisonment which may extend to one year and not to ten years, the man harbouring him shall be punishable
with imprisonment up to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence. It
seems quite clear from this that the section only takes into consideration cases where the man who is
harboured is wanted for an offence for which a maximum sentence of at least one year’s imprisonment is
provided. No provision is made in the section for cases where he is wanted for offences for which the maximum
sentence is less than one year.1574
The acquittal of the person harboured cannot affect the legality of the conviction; but it may well be taken into
consideration in awarding the sentence.1575
Page 10 of 12
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
section 3 and schedule to read as above.
1546 The words “or under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 1881” were repealed by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and
schedule.
1549 Deo Bakhash Singh v Emperor, AIR 1943 Oudh 51 , 52 : 44 Cr LJ 90.
1550 Rangaswami Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1147 [LNIND 1928 MAD 155] : ILR 52 Mad 73 : 55 Mad LJ
503.
1551 Ajab v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 827 : (1989) Cr LJ 954 .

Page 11 of 12
1552 Ibid.
1553 KR Easwaramurthi Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 54 , p 55 : 45 Cr LJ 721; Re A Subramanya Ayyar, AIR
1947 Mad 303 [LNIND 1946 MAD 211] , p 304 : 48 Cr LJ 287.
1554 Rangaswami Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1147 [LNIND 1928 MAD 155] : ILR 52 Mad 73.
1555 Ajab v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 827 : (1989) Cr LJ 954 : (1989) 1 SCJ 568 : (1989) SCC (Cr) 602 :
(1989) 1 Crimes 725 .
1556 Rangaswami Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1147 [LNIND 1928 MAD 155] .
1557 Deo Baksh Singh v Emperor, AIR 1943 Oudh 51 , p 52 : 44 Cr LJ 90.
1558 Satanji Koer v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 95.
1559 Rangasami Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1147 [LNIND 1928 MAD 155] ; Re Subramanya Ayyar, AIR
1947 Mad 303 [LNIND 1946 MAD 211] : 48 Cr LJ 287 : (1946) 2 Mad LJ 482 : (1947) ILR Mad 793.
1560 Ajab v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 827 : (1989) Cr LJ 954 : (1989) 1 Crimes 725 : (1989) SCC (Cr)
602.
1561 Balwant Singh v Emperor, AIR 1914 Oudh 204 : 15 Cr LJ 349.
1562 KR Easwaramuthi Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 54 , p 57 : 45 Cr LJ 721.

1563 Moola v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 19 , p 20 : 40 Cr LJ 243 : 40 PLR 934.
1564 Balwant Sing v R, 15 Cr LJ 249.
1565 Satanji Koer v R, 11 Cr LJ 95 : 11 Cal LJ 109.
1566 Rajbala v State of Haryana, (2001) IV CCR 389 (P&H).
1567 Balakaran Singh v Emperor, AIR 1925 Oudh 423 : 26 Cr LJ 1288; Emperor v Sarwan Singh, AIR 1923 Lah
223 : 24 Cr LJ 659.
1568 Tara Singh v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 206 : 27 Cr LJ 563; Muchi Mian v Emperor, AIR 1918 Cal 826 : 18 Cr
LJ 731; Akbar Ali v Emperor, 24 Cr LJ 485; Vir Singh v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 99 (2) : 31 Cr LJ 772; contra Emperor v
Hussain Baksh, ILR 25 All 561.
1569 R v Bhujabali Akappa Goundi, 13 Cr LJ 701.
1570 Nga Myat Gyi, (1872–1892) LBR 174.
1571 Satanji Koer v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 95.
1572 Harminder Pal Singh v State of Punjab, (1982) CCC 443 (P&H).
Page 12 of 12
1573 KR Easwaramurthi Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1944 PC 54 , p 57 : 45 Cr LJ 721 : (1944) All LJ 388 : 46 Bom
LR 844 : 48 Cal WN 477 : (1944) 1 Mad LJ 515; Re Shripad G Chandavankar, AIR 1928 Bom 184 : 39 Cr LJ 317.
1574 Deo Baksh Singh v Emperor, AIR 1943 Oudh 51 , p 52.
1575 Rangaswami Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1147 [LNIND 1928 MAD 155] , p 1148.
End of Document
[s 216A] Penalty for harbouring robbers or dacoits.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 7
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 7
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
1576[s 216A] Penalty for harbouring robbers or dacoits.—

Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that any persons are about to commit or have recently
committed robbery or dacoity, harbours them or any of them, with the intention of facilitating the commission of
such robbery or dacoity or of screening them or any of them from punishment, shall be punished with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Page 4 of 7
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section it is immaterial whether the robbery or dacoity is intended to be
committed, or has been committed, within or without 1577[India].
Exception.—This provision does not extend to the case in which the harbour is by the husband or wife of the
offender.]
[s 216A.1] Scope
This section was inserted by the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1894.1578 This was enacted with a view
to empower the court to inflict an enhanced punishment where the persons harboured are dacoits or robbers or
where they intend to commit dacoity or robbery. The section is analogous to section 212, which is not
appropriate in dealing with the case of robbers and dacoits.
The section requires that no one should harbour any persons who are about to commit a dacoity, with the
intention of facilitating the commission of such dacoity. It would appear, therefore, that to attract the penalty of
the section it is not enough that a person should be harbouring dacoits in general, but the section renders it
penal to harbour persons who intend to commit a particular dacoity,1579 or robbery.
In the explanation, the words “British India” were substituted by the words “the provinces” by the Adaptation of
Laws Order 1948. The words “the provinces” were substituted by the words “the states” by the Adaptation of
Laws Order 1950. The words “the states” were substituted by the word “India” by Act 3 of 1951.
[s 216A.3] “Reason to Believe”—Meaning of
[s 216A.4] Robbery
[s 216A.5] Dacoity
[s 216A.6] Harbours
Section 52A and the commentary thereunder may be referred to.
The mere fact that a dacoit or robber was seen talking to the accused is not an evidence of harbouring him.1580
[s 216A.7] With the Intention of Facilitating the Commission of such Robbery or Dacoity
When a person charged with the substantive offence of dacoity or robbery, has been acquitted of that offence,
another person who is said to have intended to screen him from legal punishment in respect of that offence,
cannot be held guilty of harbouring the alleged offender under this section.1581 The reason is that no person can
be screened from legal punishment if he has not rendered himself liable to it by his conduct.1582
[s 216A.8] Procedure
An offence under this section is cognizable and bailable.1583 It is not compoundable and is triable by a
magistrate of the first class.
Page 5 of 7
There is no limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section.
[s 216A.9] Charge
That you, on or about the ………… day of………… at………… knowing (or having reason to believe) that AB was
about to commit robbery (or dacoity) [or that he had on or about the………… day of………… committed robbery (or
dacoity) at…………] harboured him, with the intention of facilitating the commission of robbery (or dacoity) by the said
AB (or with the intention of screening him from punishment) and that you thereby committed an offence punishable
under section 216A of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 216A.10] Proof
In a prosecution under this section, the prosecution has to establish the following facts:
(i) that certain persons were about to commit or had recently committed a robbery or a dacoity;
(ii) that the accused knew that fact;
(iii) that the accused harboured them or some of them; and

(iv) that the accused did so with the intention of—
(a) facilitating the commission of robbery or dacoity, or
(b) screening them or any of them from punishment.1584
The accused was prosecuted on allegations that upon receiving intimation about the movement of the dacoits
in the ravines (with live cartridges, rifle and large cash amount), an ambush was set up for apprehending them
by the Station House Officer of Police Station. A known dacoit R, against whom prize money was also declared,
was moving in the territories of Kwaari River Ravines, where respondent was found to be in possession of arms
and ammunition, for supplying the same to the declared dacoit R. The entries of the Roznama which is one of
the most important documentary evidence were not filed by the prosecution to establish the timings of receiving
information as also the details of the information, for connecting the present respondent with the offence. The
Page 6 of 7
licence of the gun alleged to be recovered from the possession of the respondent was in the name of the
respondent and was subsisting. Respondent was acquitted of the charge under section 216A.1585
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1578 Section 8 of the said Act.
1579 Emperor v Sunderdas, AIR 1925 Sind 295 , p 296 : 26 Cr LJ 28.
1580 Man Singh v State of Haryana, (1993) 2 Chand Cr C 41, p 42 : (1993) 3 CR 335 (P&H).
1581 Re A Subramanya Ayyar, AIR 1947 Mad 303 [LNIND 1946 MAD 211] : 48 Cr LJ 287.
1582 Rangaswami Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1147 [LNIND 1928 MAD 155] .
1583 Shriya v State, (1989) Raj CC 189.
1584 Brindaban v State, (1958) MPLJ (Notes) 94.
1585 State of Madhya Pradesh v Veeru Singh, 2010 Cr LJ 2896 , p 2899 (MP).
Page 7 of 7
End of Document
[s 216B] Definition of “harbour" in sections 212, 216 and 216A.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 4
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 4
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
1586[s 216B] Definition of “harbour" in sections 212, 216 and 216A.—

[Repealed by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1942 (8 of 1942), section 3].

Page 4 of 4
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
End of Document
[s 217] Public servant disobeying direction of law with intent to save person
from punishment or property from forfeiture.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 9
[s 217] Public servant disobeying direction of law with intent to save person from punishment or property from
forfeiture.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 9
forfeiture.—
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 217] Public servant disobeying direction of law with intent to save person
from punishment or property from forfeiture.—
Page 4 of 9
forfeiture.—
Whoever, being a public servant, knowingly disobeys any direction of the law as to the way in which he is to
conduct himself as such public servant, intending thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby
save, any person from legal punishment, or subject him to a less punishment than that to which he is liable, or
with intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or any charge to
which it is liable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to two years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 217.1] Scope
The four sections, sections 217–220, IPC, deal with the disobedience of the direction of law and disregard of
their duties by public servants. They relate to offences by public servants, and could have, as such, formed a
part of chapter IX. But they have been included in this chapter as they deal with acts or omissions on the part of
public servants which affect public justice.1587
This section deals with disobedience on the part of a public servant, in respect of his official duties. The
dereliction of any duty must be committed in the discharge of the functions of the public servant concerned.1588
Section 218 punishes public servants framing incorrect records or writing. Section 219 punishes public servants
corruptly making, in a judicial proceeding, any report, order, verdict or decision, knowing it to be contrary to law.
Section 220 punishes public servants making illegal commitments for trial or confinement.
The section makes punishable, a certain dereliction of duty, quite apart from the question as to whether any
bribe was paid to induce such dereliction. The dereliction must clearly, from the nature of the definition of the
offence, be committed in the discharge of the functions of the person charged.1589
[s 217.2] Direction of Law—Direction Means Positive Direction of Law
The direction of law mentioned in this section means a positive direction of law, such as those contained in
sections 39 and 40 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and cannot be made to extend to the more general
obligation by which every subject is bound not to stifle a criminal charge.1590
Before a person can be convicted under this section, it must be shown that there is a direction of law as to the
way in which a public servant is to conduct himself, as such public servant, and this direction must be a
direction to be found in some positive statute or some rules or regulations which are declared by a statute to
have the force of law.1591 Thus, under section 457, CrPC, it is the duty of a police officer seizing property,
suspected to be a stolen property, to report the seizure forthwith to a magistrate. So, where a police constable,
who retained for himself a piece of gold found in a search for stolen property, but not proved to be a part of the
stolen property, and failed to report his possession to his superior officers under section 457 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, it was held that he was guilty of the offence under this section.1592 But where despite the
report lodged with the police with regard to the commission of an offence, an FIR was not registered, no offence
under sections 217 and 218, IPC is made out against the SHO for not registering the case.1593
In RN Kulkarni v VV Kanabar, the corporation allowed the telephone authorities to do some digging work for
laying down new cables and pipe-lines, and the telephone authorities did not restore the road for a long time.
On complaint by a citizen, the process was issued under section 217, IPC against municipal officers. It was
held that the municipal authorities had failed in their duty to prosecute the telephone authorities under section
417 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (3 of 1888). The complaint not only makes out a prima facie case
under section 217, IPC, for which the process had been issued, but also under section 166, IPC. The process
issued, it was held could not be quashed.1594
Page 5 of 9
forfeiture.—
Where the court directed the prosecuting inspector to produce the police diary in the court and, on his failure,
filed a complaint, under this section, against the prosecuting inspector, it was held that the police diary being
not in the possession of the prosecuting inspector, he did not disobey the direction given to him by the court
and, as such, the complaint did not disclose any offence under this section or under any other law, against the
accused.1595
[s 217.3] “Intending Thereby to Save” etc—Intention is Material
For a conviction under this section, it is not only necessary that a public servant should have “knowingly”
disobeyed a direction of law, but also that he should have done so with a particular intention, namely, to save a
person from legal punishment or minimise his punishment, or with a knowledge that his disobedience is likely to
save a person from legal punishment or to minimise his punishment. The intention contemplated under the
section is to screen persons believed to be guilty, and thereby to obstruct the course of justice.1596 It is not
necessary as in the case of a charge under section 201, IPC, to establish that an offence has actually been
committed.1597 It would be sufficient if the circumstances are such that a reasonable inference can be drawn
therefrom that the accused had a certain knowledge at the time he did the act, namely, a knowledge that he
was likely by his act to save a person from legal punishment.1598
A police officer, who apprehends several persons at night, on a suspicion that they committed a culpable
homicide, and keeps them in the village where they were arrested, after tying them together by the hands, is
not guilty of an offence under this section if the prisoners escape in the course of the night.1599
[s 217.4] Disobedience of Direction of Law should be Knowingly
In a Bombay case, an old and illiterate police patel, on receiving a complaint of an offence of rape, made some
investigation and prepared a panchnama of the scene and arrested the two persons against whom the
accusation was laid. He sent them with a report to the police station, but on the way, the parties, presumably to
save the girl’s reputation, came to a settlement and all of them returned to the village. The relatives of the girl,
who were responsible for lodging the proceedings, informed the patel that they had no desire to continue them,
and the patel thereupon tore up the panchnama which he had made. It was held that under the circumstances,
the patel could not be convicted under this section, inasmuch as it could not be fairly said, in these
circumstances, that the patel knowingly disobeyed any direction of the law as to the way in which he should
conduct himself or that he intended or knew it to be likely that by tearing up the panchnama he would save any
person from legal punishment.1600
[s 217.5] “Any person”
“Any person” means some person other than the public servant or the public servant himself.1601
[s 217.6] Legal Punishment
“Legal punishment” does not involve departmental punishment. It also does not apply to a fine inflicted on a
chaukidar by his superior officer.1602 It means the prescribed punishment for the offence committed by the
person sought to be helped.
[s 217.7] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable and a summons should ordinarily issue in the first instance. It
is bailable, but not compoundable, and is triable by any magistrate. It can also be tried in a summary way by the
magistrate stated in section 260 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
The limitation within which the cognizance of the offence under this section can be taken is three years.
[s 217.8] Sanction
Page 6 of 9
forfeiture.—
The very nature of the offence defined in this section makes it clear, having regard to the ratio decidendi in the
cases as mentioned in the footnote,1603 that a sanction as required by section 197, CrPC for a prosecution for
this offence, is a pre-requisite.1604 Proceedings commenced in respect of the offence under this section, without
first obtaining such sanction are null and void, and a subsequent sanction is not sufficient to validate them.1605
[s 217.9] Charge
That on or about the…………. day of…………. at…………., you being a public servant knowingly disobeyed the
direction of law as to the way, in which you were to conduct yourself as such public servant, to wit…………., (specify
the direction of law) intending thereby to save…………. (or knowing it to be likely that you would thereby
save………….) from legal punishment (or subject him to a less punishment than that to which he was liable or with
intent to save or knowing that you were likely thereby to save some property, to wit…………. from forfeiture (or any
charge to which it is liable by law)), and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 217 of the
Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
When a charge has been expressed in vague terms, the prosecution should be limited to the particular sense in
which these terms have been understood in the actual trial. The mere circumstance that some evidence was
given about an omission to send a report in order to afford a collateral corroboration to the testimony going to
prove a criminal breach of duty of another kind, does not make the accused liable to punishment for the offence
thus incidentally deposed to, but with which he was not clearly and directly charged.1606
Before a person can be proceeded against under this section, there must be some material to show that there
was a direction of law as to the way in which the person was supposed to conduct himself as such public
servant and that he deliberately disobeyed any such direction of law, intending thereby to save, or knowing it to
be likely that he would thereby save, any person from legal punishment or subject him to a lesser punishment,
to which he was liable, or that he would save some property from forfeiture or a charge to which it was liable by
law. It must also be shown that the direction, which the public servant knowingly disobeyed, was a direction to
be found in some positive statute or some rules or regulations which have the force of law.1607
[s 217.10] Proof
To make out an offence under this section, the following points require proof:
(a) that the accused is a public servant;

Page 7 of 9
forfeiture.—
(b) that there was a direction of law as to the way in which he was to conduct himself;
(c) that he disobeyed that direction of law;
(d) that he disobeyed it knowingly;
(e) that such disobedience was in conducting himself as such public servant; and
(f) that he did so intending thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he would thereby:
(i) save any person from a legal punishment or;
(ii) subject him to a lesser punishment than what he is legally liable to; or
(iii) save any property form forfeiture, or any charge to which it is liable by law.
Where the charge against the police officers, accused numbers 14–17, was that as a part of a criminal
conspiracy with Bhai Thakur and his men, they had caused the evidence of the commission of an offence to
disappear, and by that dishonest investigation had tried to screen the real offenders from legal punishment,
they were held to have committed offences punishable under sections 201, 217 and 218, IPC read with section
120B, IPC as well as an offence under TADA. However, except the confessional statement of the co-accused,
there was no other independent evidence to show the involvement of accused numbers 14–17 as alleged. The
confessions, no doubt, create a strong suspicion that the accused numbers 14–17 were maintaining good
relations with Bhai Thakur and accused number 8 (Prashant) and they had possibly helped Bhai Thakur and
Manik Patil in screening the real offenders, however, it was not safe to convict them on the basis of the
confessions of the co-accused.1608
[s 217.11] Sentence
When the offence comes under section 161, IPC as well as section 217, IPC the accused can be sentenced
either by imprisonment or fine or both. An offence was committed 12 ½ years ago where the accused had taken
small amounts for pushing up cases. The accused had since retired from service. The Bombay High Court
opined that an imposition of a sentence of fine would meet the ends of justice.1609
: 50 Cr LJ 350.

Page 8 of 9
forfeiture.—
1587 Hem Chandra Mukherjee v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Cal 85 : 26 Cr LJ 345 : ILR 52 Cal 151 : 28 Cal WN 755.
1588 Kesar Dev v State of Rajasthan, (1976) Raj CrC 122 .
1589 SB Hussain v Emperor, AIR 1947 Cal 29 , p 30 : 47 Cr LJ 623.
1590 Re Raminihi Nayar, ILR 1 Mad 266 : 1 Weir 196.
1591 Re Ram Prasad, (1902) 22 AWN 16; Kesar Dev v State of Rajasthan, (1976) Raj Cr Cas 122.
1592 Re B Dasappa, AIR 1916 Mad 1109 : 16 Cr LJ 453.
1593 Vijay Kumar v Ramesh Kumar, (2002) II Ren CR (Cr) 677 (P&H).
1594 RN Kulkarni v VV Kanabar, (1998) AIHC 1192 (Bom).
1595 Kesar Dev v State of Rajasthan, (1976) Raj CrC 122 , 123; Re B Dasappa, AIR 1916 Mad 1109 : 16 Cr LJ
453.
1596 R v Hurdut Sarma, 8 WR (Cr) 68; Empress v Amiruddeen, 3 ILR Cal 412.
1597 Empress v Amiruddeen, 3 ILR Cal 412 : 1 CLR 483.
1598 Emperor v Mathuranath De, AIR 1932 Cal 850 , p 854 : 33 Cr LJ 657.
1599 Re Ottam Chand, (1871) PR 18 .
1600 Naranbhai Bhulabhai v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 441.
1601 R v Nand Kishore, ILR 19 All 305, quoad hoc, overruling R v Gauri Shankar, ILR 6 All 42.
1602 R v Jungle Lall, 19 WR (Cr) 40.
1603 Hori Ram Singh v Emperor, AIR 1939 FC 43 , p 55 : 43 Cal WN (FR) 50 : (1940) ILR Lah 400 : (1939) FCR
159 : 181 IC 317 : 43 Cal WN (FR) 50 (FC); Vijay Kumar v Ramesh Kumar, (2002) II Ren CR (Cr) 677 (P&H).
Page 9 of 9
forfeiture.—
1604 SB Hossain v Emperor, AIR 1947 Cal 29 , p 30 : 47 Cr LJ 623.
1605 Ibid; Basdeo Agarwalla v Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 16 : 46 Cr LJ 510.
1606 Imperatrix v Baban Khan, ILR 2 Bom 142, p 144.
1607 SB Hossain v Emperor, AIR 1947 Cal 29 , p 30 : 47 Cr LJ 623 in the absence of such material the accused is
entitled to a discharge and no charge is to be framed.
1608 SN Dube etc v NB Bhoir, (2000) I CCR 1999 (SC).
1609 Rajnikant Jaiwant Londhe v State of Maharashtra, (2000) III CCR 129 (Bom).
End of Document
[s 218] Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save
person from punishment or property from forfeiture.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 14
[s 218] Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save person from punishment or property
from forfeiture.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 14
from forfeiture.—
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 218] Public servant framing incorrect record or writing with intent to save
person from punishment or property from forfeiture.—
Page 4 of 14
from forfeiture.—
Whoever, being a public servant, and being as such public servant, charged with the preparation of any record
or other writing, frames that record or writing in a manner which he knows to be incorrect, with intent to cause,
or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, loss or injury to the public or to any person, or with intent
thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save, any person from legal punishment, or with
intent to save, or knowing that he is likely thereby to save, any property from forfeiture or other charge to which
it is liable by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
three years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 218.1] Scope
This section deals with the wilful falsification of public records with the intention of (a) injuring any person, (b)
saving any person from legal punishment or (c) saving any property from forfeiture or other charge.
The offence under this section is quite distinct from the one under section 193, IPC. All the necessary
ingredients of the one are not included in the other. This section is concerned with bringing erring public
servants to book for falsifying public records in their charge; while section 193 makes no reference to public
servants or their records but punishes falsification of evidence (whether in public records or otherwise) by any
person (whether or not a public servant) for the purpose of being used in a judicial proceeding. These offences
may at times overlap, but that would not make them any the less distinct.1610
[s 218.1.1] Gist of the Section is Stifling of Truth
Section 217 and this section are wider than section 201. This section embraces cases other than those in which
a principal offender is screened. But even as to such cases, the criminal intent is expressed in the following
words: “With intent thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby save any person from legal
punishment”. These words also imply that an offence has been committed. The gist of the section is the stifling
in cases where an offence has been committed. It is not necessary even to prove the intention to screen any
particular person. It is sufficient that he knows it to be likely that justice will not be executed and that someone
will escape punishment for the offence. It would be sufficient if the circumstances are such that a reasonable
inference can be drawn therefrom that the accused had a certain knowledge at the time he did the act, namely,
a knowledge that he was likely by his act to save a person from legal punishment. Further, it is not necessary to
show that in point of fact the person so intended to be saved had committed an offence or was justly liable to
legal punishment.1611
[s 218.1.2] Essence of the Offence
In fact, the essence of the offence under section 218 is the intent to cause a loss or injury to any public or
person or thereby save any person from legal punishment or save any property from forfeiture or any other
charge.1612
[s 218.2] Ingredients of the offence
To constitute an offence under this section, the following ingredients must exist:
(i) the offender must be a public servant, charged with the preparation of a record or writing;
(ii) he must have framed that record or writing incorrectly as such public servant;
(iii) he must have done so with an intent to, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby:
(a) cause loss or injury to the public or any person; or

Page 5 of 14
from forfeiture.—
(b) save any person from legal punishment; or
(c) save any property from forfeiture or other charge to which it is legally liable.1613
[s 218.4] Distinct Features of Sections 218 and 193
The first question is what the distinct features of sections 193 and 218 of the Indian Penal Code are. Section
198 states the punishment for giving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding or fabricating false
evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of judicial proceeding. Section 191 defines the offence of
giving false evidence and section 192, the offence of fabricating false evidence. We may ignore section 191
because here admittedly, there is no giving of false evidence as defined in the Indian Penal Code. The offence
of fabricating false evidence comes into existence when a person causes any circumstances to exist, makes
any false entry in any book or record or makes any document containing a false statement, intending that such
circumstances, false entry or false statement may appear in evidence in a judicial proceeding etc, and such
appearance causes an erroneous opinion to be formed, touching a point material to the result of such
proceeding. The offence is a general one and does not specify the person or the kind of document. It may be
any person and the fabricated evidence may be in any form. Section 218 on the other hand, deals with the
intentional preparation of a false record by a public servant with the object of saving or injuring any person or
property. The differences between the two sections are clearly noticeable. Section 192 deals with a judicial
proceeding and the false evidence is intended to be used in the judicial proceeding. Section 218 deals with
public servants and there the gist is the intentional preparation of a false record with a view to saving or injuring
any person or property. This need not have a relation to a judicial proceeding as such.1614
Offences under section 218, IPC, are quite distinct from that under section 193. Section 218 is concerned with
bringing erring public servants to book for falsifying the public records in their charge; while section 193, on the
other hand, makes no reference to public servants or their records but punishes the falsification of evidence
(whether in public records or not) by any person (whether a public servant or not) for the purpose of being used
in a judicial proceeding. These offences may at times overlap, but that does not make them any the less
distinct. There is, therefore, no justification for refusing to allow the accused to be prosecuted under section
218, IPC, for his misdeeds (false entry in the birth and death register) as a public servant merely because the
falsification of the records in his charge happens also to constitute an offence punishable under section 193,
IPC.1615
[s 218.5] “Charged with the preparation of any record or writing”—Meaning of
The words “charged with the preparation” are not restricted to the narrow meaning of “enjoined by a special
provision of law”. It is sufficient if the document was prepared in accordance with a practice to which it was the
official duty of the public servant to conform.1616 To render a public servant liable under this section, he must
have been charged with the preparation of a record or writing. A public servant who frames a false document of
a character which it was not his duty to prepare, is not punishable under this section.1617
So also a patwari, who is directed by a revenue court to prepare a fard, prepares a false fard, is not guilty as he
is not a public servant charged with the preparation of such a fard.1618
A pay-sheet drawn up in a railway office and setting out certain sums as due by the railway to certain coolies
described as working in a special gang, is a record within the meaning of this section and the railway clerk who
Page 6 of 14
from forfeiture.—
prepares a false pay-sheet is liable under the section.1619
A patwari is responsible for the accuracy of all entries in the khasra and must satisfy himself of the facts by
inquiries from the persons concerned as well as by the field inspections. So a patwari who, knowing that a
particular person was in possession, fails to enter his name in the khasra, knowingly makes a wrong entry, and
if he makes the wrong entry with the intention of causing a loss to the person, he is liable under this section.1620
[s 218.6] “Frames that Record or Writing in a Manner which he knows to be Incorrect”—Not the use, mere
Preparation Sufficient to Constitute Offence
To constitute an offence under this section, it is not necessary that the incorrect document should be submitted
to another person or be otherwise used by the writer. The requirements of the section are satisfied, if it is
shown that the document has been prepared by a public servant, charged with its preparation, in a manner
which he knows to be incorrect and with the knowledge that he is thereby likely to cause loss to the public.1621
[s 218.6.1] Mere making of incorrect entries when not Punishable
If a lekhpal makes entries in revenue records in an exercise of the powers reserved to him by law, and these
entries are incorrect, it would be an erroneous exercise of his power which can be corrected by the higher
revenue authorities. Such entries cannot, however, be made a ground for the prosecution of the lekhpal under
this section.1622 The lekhpal, not being required to make a very detailed inquiry on the point of possession, it
could not be inferred from his act in making those entries that he had acted dishonestly in order to cause a
wrongful gain to any party and wrongful loss to others. Since there was already a dispute between the parties
regarding the possession of a plot, a very heavy burden lay on the prosecution to establish that the lekhpal had
acted dishonestly when he had made the entries.1623
Where the accused, a deputy commissioner of a district, was alleged to have got some land registered in the
name of his daughter, by under valuing the price, causing a loss in the stamp duty to the government, the
allegations were also that mutation was sanctioned in violation of revenue rules. As per the annual five years
average statement, it could not be said that the land was sold for inadequate consideration. For five years since
the registration of the case, there was no progress in the investigation. The offence under section 218, IPC and
other offences alleged were not made out, so FIRs were quashed by the High Court qua the accused in the
petition under section 482, CrPC.1624
The accused Chairman and member of a Subordinate Staff Selection Board in conspiracy with the accused
candidate increased the numbers awarded in viva voce test and included him in the list of selected candidates
for pecuniary benefits. The act of the three accused persons did not amount to offence of forgery. The accused
persons prepared false record of the final result also and therefore were guilty of offences under sections 218,
420, 477A and 120B, IPC.1625
[s 218.6.2] Mere making of Incorrect Entries when Punishable
But where a patwari who was present when the possession of certain plots was delivered by the court amin to
the mortgagees and actually signed the dakhalnama, entered in the khasra the names of the mortgagors as
being still in possession of the plots, he must be deemed to have made the entry knowing it to be false.1626
[s 218.6.3] Mode of Preparation not Material
It is not material what mode is adopted for incorrect preparation of the record. Substitution of one leaf in a
record, by another, so as to omit a given entry from the page, is penal within the meaning of the section.1627
[s 218.6.4] Mere Motive is not Incriminating

Page 7 of 14
from forfeiture.—
A conviction under this section can be maintained for framing the record of an investigation incorrectly only
where it is established that during the investigation, the accused recorded statements, which were not made
before him, or destroyed the statements that were actually made or made a record of circumstances which, as
a matter of fact, did not transpire before him. Where a sub-inspector recorded what was stated before him and
he recorded what he actually witnessed, he cannot be held guilty under this section merely because he may
have a motive for recording the statement made before him knowing them to be false.1628
[s 218.6.5] Issue Estoppel
But where the sub-inspector, in his capacity as a public servant, wrongly prepared certain notes in order to
concoct a false defence, he was to be convicted under section 218 simpliciter and not with the aid of section
149.1629
Where the accused was charged under sections 201 and 218, IPC and it was alleged that he fabricated false
evidence records and initiated false cases to screen certain offenders in a murder trial, the prosecution against
the said offenders in the murder trial was quashed in view of the rule of issue estoppel and the proceedings
against the accused under sections 201 and 218, IPC were held not maintainable, there being no chance of
ultimate conviction of the accused.1630
[s 218.7] “With Intent to Cause Loss to the Public or to any Person”—Intention is Dominant
In order to sustain conviction under this section, it is not sufficient that the entries are incorrect, but it is
essential that the entry should have been made with the intention mentioned in that section. Where direct
evidence proving the necessary criminal intention is lacking in the case, and the circumstantial evidence is too
meagre to support any safe conclusion as to the intention with which the accused made the entry complained
of, it must be held that the prosecution had failed to prove the necessary criminal intention.1631
Where the accused made a certain false abstraction and read it over to another, a public servant charged with
the preparation of a certain record, and thereby an incorrect record was prepared, it was held that the accused
could not be guilty of abetment of such offence and not the less so, because the person charged with the
preparation of the record had no guilty knowledge or intention in the matter.1632
[s 218.7.1] Bona fide Mistake Rule out Intention
Where the wrong entry has been made due to a bona fide mistake, an intention to cause harm cannot be
inferred.1633
[s 218.7.2] Substitution of Fresh Matter when amounts to framing Incorrect Record
When a police-inspector was charged with framing an incorrect record in that he entered in his diary that certain
cartmen told him that they were not beaten by dacoits, while in fact, they had told him that they were beaten by
dacoits, it was held that this of itself would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction under this section but, where,
without endeavouring to inquire into the truth of the said entry in his diary, he had destroyed certain records
which falsified it and substituted fresh note-books, his bona fides were open to question and he must be
deemed to have framed an incorrect public record intentionally.1634
Where a patwari knows that a particular person was in possession and he fails to enter his name in the khasra,
he is making an entry which he knows to be false, and if such false entry is made with a criminal intention of
causing a loss to the person, an offence under this section is committed.1635
[s 218.7.3] Destruction of Correct Report and Preparation of Incorrect Report

Page 8 of 14
from forfeiture.—
A report of the commission of dacoity was made at a thana. The police officer in charge of the thana at first took
down the report which was made to him, but subsequently destroyed that report and prepared another and a
false report of the commission of a totally different offence, to which he obtained the signature of the
complainant, and which he endeavoured to pass off as the original and correct report made to him by the
complainant. It was held that the police officer was guilty of offences punishable under section 204 and this
section.1636 But where a report was lodged with the police with regard to the commission of an offence, but FIR
was not registered, no offence under sections 217 and 218 is made out against the SHO, for not registering the
case.1637
Where the two accused, whose joint duty was to prepare panchanamas and valuation of fees, knowingly
prepared false panchanamas in common concert, with the dishonest intention of benefitting themselves and
some other persons and causing loss to the government, it was held that they were guilty under this section.1638
[s 218.7.4] Intention and not the chance of Success Material
The question under this section is not whether the accused was or will be able to accomplish the object he had
in view, but whether he made the entries in question with the intention to cause, or knowing it to be likely that
he will thereby cause, loss and injury. The fact, therefore, that the accused conceived a foolish plan of injury is
no ground for exculpating him from the offence which he has committed.1639
[s 218.8] Injury or loss must not be remote
This section contemplates the wilful falsification of a public document with the intent thereby to cause loss or
injury, and this means by the document itself or by some transaction with which it is essentially connected. An
accused must not be convicted on a remote and speculative chain of possibilities; otherwise the most innocent
acts might, by the exercise of a little ingenuity, be perverted into the initial steps of great crimes.1640
[s 218.8.1] Remote Intention not Material
Where a chowkidar was charged under this section with having made a false entry in his attendance book, with
a view to support a charge which was made against a sub-inspector of having made a false report regarding
the length of absence from duty of another chowkidar, and thereby to cause loss or injury to the sub-inspector,
it was held that the intention was too remote to fall within this section.1641
[s 218.9] “Or with Intent Thereby to save any Person from Legal Punishment”—Meaning of
It was been held that a public servant is not punishable under this section, if his object in preparing the false
document was to screen himself from punishment, by concealing the fact that he had committed a breach of
duty,1642 unless the mode in which he framed the false document had, and must have been known by him to
have, the effect of causing injury to the public or to others.1643 In a later case, however, the same court held that
if the act charged would tend to save any person from legal punishment, it was equally an offence where the
accused intended to save himself. If the Legislature had intended that this section should only apply when the
intention was to save some person other than the public servant, it would have been easy to insert the word
“other” between the words “any” and “person”. A public servant who does that which, if done to save another
from legal punishment, would bring the public servant within this section has equally committed the offence
punishable under the section if the person whom he intends to save from legal punishment is himself.1644 To
support a conviction under this section it is necessary to prove that the accused believed, or had reason to
believe, that the person concerned had committed an offence, though it was not necessary to prove that such
an offence had, as a matter of fact, been committed.1645
A, a kulkarni, falsely reports on an offence committed in his village, intending to save B from punishment. A is
guilty under this section.1646
Page 9 of 14
from forfeiture.—
A, a patwari, alters an entry in his official diary, falsely in order to save himself from punishment. He commits an
A, whose duty it was to make certain reports, made false ones with an intent to prevent the discovery of a fraud
previously perpetrated by him. He committed an offence under this section.1648
A, a sub-inspector in his capacity as a public servant, wrongly prepares certain notes in order to concoct a false
defence, he was to be convicted under section 218 simpliciter.1649
Where a person is charged under this section with framing a report incorrectly, or under section 201, for giving
false information, with an intent to save offenders from punishment, the issue to be tried is not whether or not
such alleged offenders were in fact guilty, but merely the belief and intention of the accused in respect to their
guilt.1650
For the purpose of obtaining a previous sanction of the Governor under section 197, CrPC, an offence under
this section cannot be distinguished from an offence under section 447A, IPC.1651 No complaint of the court is,
however, necessary for a prosecution under this section.1652
[s 218.10] Legal Punishment
The expression “legal punishment” means the punishment prescribed by law for the offence committed and
does not include departmental punishment. It does not apply to a fine inflicted on a chowkidar by his superior
officer.1653
The offence under this section is cognizable and a warrant should ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable and is triable by a magistrate of the first class. The limitation for taking
cognizance of the offence under this section is three years. The cognizance cannot be taken beyond the period
of limitation unless the court holds that it was necessary to do so in the interest of justice or the delay in taking
cognizance is held to have been properly explained.1654
[s 218.12] Sanction
No court can take cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed by a Government servant, not
removable from his office, save by or with the sanction of the government, while acting or purporting to act in
the discharge of his official duty.1655 A medical officer is supposed to issue a medical certificate based on an act
done by him while discharging his duty as a medical officer and not without performing his duty as a medical
officer. Issuance of a medical certificate without performing his duty as a medical officer, that is with false
allegations, does not amount to an act done while discharging his official duty. Such act does not fall within the
ambit of section 197(1), CrPC and no sanction for the prosecution for an offence under this section is required
under the law.1656 Where an FIR was not registered, no offence under sections 217 and 218, IPC was made out
against the SHO for not registering the case, moreover the SHO cannot be prosecuted without a sanction from
the authority.1657
Where a public servant posted in the traffic police was alleged to have framed an incorrect record or writing to
save a person from punishment or from forfeiture of a property, the prosecution against the police official is
barred under section 140, Delhi Police Act, if initiated after more than three months or within a year with the
Page 10 of 14
from forfeiture.—
previous sanction of the Administrator. The alleged acts were committed by the said public servant in 1977 and
the case was instituted in the court against him on 16 April 1979, thus the institution of the prosecution was
obviously time barred.1658
Where the accused, a patwari being a public servant, was charged for committing forgery and using the forged
documents as, a genuine one by erasing and manipulating the khasra girdawari register and jamabandhi, the
offences being committed by him while discharging his official duties and when this was the petition, the benefit
of section 197, CrPC was available to him and his conviction was set aside.1659
[s 218.13] Charge
That on or about the……day of…you being a public servant charged with the preparation of a record (or writing), to
wit…….framed the said record (or writing) in a manner which you knew to be incorrect (specify the incorrectness of the
statement) and which you made with intent to cause (or knowing it to be likely that you will thereby cause) loss (or
injury) to the public (or to……specify the person) [or with intent thereby to save, or knowing it to be likely that you will
thereby save any person from legal punishment] [or with intent to save or knowing that you are thereby likely to save
any property, to wit……from forfeiture (or other charge) to which it was liable by order of the court in case
No….of……….] and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under s 218 of the Indian Penal Code, and
within my cognizance.
The charge must set out the manner in which the offence was committed.1660 The material point for establishing
the charge is the intention of the accused which should be specifically stated in the charge.1661
The primary ingredient of offence under section 218, IPC is to frame incorrect record to save any person from
legal punishment. As there was no iota of evidence to show that the petitioner had acted in any way to save any
person from legal punishment, charge framed under section 218, IPC was misconceived, charge was
quashed.1662
[s 218.14] Proof
Where the charges against police officers, accused numbers 14–17, was that as a part of criminal conspiracy
with Bhai Thakur and his men, they had caused the evidence of the commission of the offence to disappear,
and by that dishonest investigation they had tried to screen the real offenders from legal punishment and
thereby they had committed offences punishable under sections 201, 217 and 218 read with section 120B, IPC
as well as an offence under TADA. However, except a confessional statement of a co-accused, there was no
other independent evidence to show the involvement of the accused numbers 14–17 as alleged. The
confessions, no doubt, cast a strong suspicion that the accused numbers 14–17 were maintaining good
Page 11 of 14
from forfeiture.—
relations with Bhai Thakur and that the accused number 8 (Prashant) and they had possibly helped Bhai
Thakur and Manik Patil in screening the real offenders, however, it was not safe to convict them on the basis of
the confessions of a co-accused.1663
[s 218.15] Sentence
In Harish Chandra Krishna Gadkar v State of Maharashtra,1664 upholding the conviction of the accused for an
offence under this section and some other offence, the Supreme Court held that an admonition was sufficient
punishment, considering the fact that he cannot be taken back in service, nor is he entitled to any backwages
from the date of suspension to the date of retirement. Earlier these grounds were not found sufficient by the
Maharashtra High Court in a case, for taking a lenient view in the matter of sentence.1665
Where the police took a person from the place where he was alleged to have been causing nuisance to the
public, under the influence of liquor, to the civil hospital, and the doctor of the civil hospital gave a certificate
stating that the accused had consumed liquor but was not under intoxication, since he was conscious and well-
oriented to time and space and his speech was normal there was nothing to show the result of the blood test of
the accused. The police even failed to record statements of members of the public who had felt annoyance on
account of the conduct of the accused, and the only witnesses cited were the police officials who had arrested
him and the doctor who had examined him. On these facts, the Himachal Pradesh High Court, taking a lenient
view, did not direct a registration of a criminal case against the police authorities for the abuse of their power on
account of illegal arrest and unlawful confinement under sections 465 and 218, IPC after following due
procedure and instead, directed the competent disciplinary authority to hold a departmental inquiry against
them.1666
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1610 Ganga Singh v State, AIR 1962 All 150 [LNIND 1961 ALL 115] , p 151 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 240 .
1611 Queen-Empress v Krishnaja, Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cas 405; Empress v Amiruddeen, 3 ILR Cal 412 : 1 CLR 483;
Anverkhan Mahommad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 115 , p 118 : 22 Cr LJ 609; Emperor v Mathuranath De, AIR
1932 Cal 850 , pp 854–55 : 33 Cr LJ 657; Moti Ram v Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 461 : 26 Cr LJ 857 : 26 PLR 594.
Page 12 of 14
from forfeiture.—
1612 Biraja Prasad Roy v Ngendra Nath Dash, (1985) 1 Crimes 446 [LNIND 1985 ORI 182] , p 448 (Ori) : (1985)
59 Cut LT 144; Arvind Kumar Jain v State of Rajasthan, 2015 Cr LJ 2908 (Raj).
1613 Biraja Prasad Roy v Ngendra Nath Dash, (1985) 1 Crimes 446 [LNIND 1985 ORI 182], p 448 (Ori) : (1985) 59
Cut LT 144.
1614 Kamla Prasad Singh v Hari Nath Singh, AIR 1968 SC 19 [LNIND 1967 SC 170] .
1615 Ganga Singh v State, AIR 1962 All 150 [LNIND 1961 ALL 115] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 240 .
1616 Queen-Empress v Deodhar Singh, ILR 27 Cal 144, 151; Nathu Mal v Abdul Haq, AIR 1930 Lah 159 : 31 Cr LJ
584.
1617 Empress v Mazhar Hussain, 5 ILR All 553; R v Nand Kishore, ILR 19 All 305; Arvind Kumar Jain v State of
Rajasthan, 2015 Cr LJ 2908 (Raj).
1618 Meherban Ali Khan v Sita Ram, AIR 1929 All 374 : 30 Cr LJ 874 : (1929) All LJ 512; Sitaram v State, AIR
1968 All 207 [LNIND 1967 ALL 37] : (1968) Cr LJ 721 , 726; Re Chinnakannu Udayan, 1 Weir 197.
1619 Kesari Mal v Emperor, AIR 1914 Oudh 361 : 15 Cr LJ 502.
1620 Chandra Bhan Lal v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 968 : 37 Cr LJ 131 : (1935) All LJ 1088; Ishaq v State, (1981) All
LJ 871.
1621 Re Megraj, (1881) PR 13 .
1622 Ram Gopal v State, (1970) Cr LJ 384 (All) : (1968) All WR (HC) 192 : (1968) All Cr R 127.
1623 Sitaram v State, AIR 1968 All 207 [LNIND 1967 ALL 37] (DB) : (1968) Cr LJ 721 (DB).
1624 Rajmani Tripati v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1998) 1 Crimes 422 (HP) : (1997) 3 Sim LC 226 (HP).
1625 Rakesh Kumar Chhabra v State of HP, 2012 Cr LJ 354 , p 357 (HP).
1626 Chandra Bhan Lal v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 968 , p 969.
1627 Madan Lal Lamba v Inderjit Mehta, AIR 1970 Punj 200 : (1970) Cr LJ 726 , p 729.
1628 Moti Ram v Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 461 : 26 Cr LJ 837 : 26 PLR 594.
1629 Sarju Singh v State, (1978) Cr LT (NOC) 286 All.
1630 Ramesh Chandra Biswas v State, (1994) Cr LJ 1134 (Cal).
1631 Raghubansh Lal v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 486 [LNIND 1957 SC 21] : (1957) Cr LJ 595 ;
Raghunath Lal v State, (1964) All Cr R 244; Attar Singh v State, (1967) 69 Punj LR 89 (SN); Jaswant Singh v State,
AIR 1966 J&K 96 : (1966) Cr LJ 901 .
1632 Queen v Brij Mohan Lal, 7 NWP 134; Maulad Ahmed v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1964) 2 Cr LJ 71 : 72 : (1964)
1 SCJ 164 .
1633 Jaswant Singh v State, AIR 1966 J&K 96 : (1966) Cr LJ 901 ; SC Ramaswami Iyengar v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ
455.
1634 SC Ramaswami Iyengar v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 455.
Page 13 of 14
from forfeiture.—
1635 Chandrabhan Lal v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 968 .

1636 Queen-Empress v Mahommad Shah Khan, ILR 20 All 307.
1637 Vijay Kumar v Ramesh Kumar, (2002) III Ren CR (Cr) 677 (P&H).
1638 Dattajirao Bhausaheb Patel v State of Maharashtra, (1971) UJ (SC) 476, 478–79.
1639 Re Naraparaddi Seshareddi, AIR 1938 Mad 595 : 39 Cr LJ 825.
1640 Queen-Empress v Ramchandra, Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cases 201–02.
1641 Queen v Jungle Lall, 19 WR 40.

1642 Empress v Gauri Shankar, ILR 8 All 42.
1643 Reg v Girdhari Lal, ILR 8 All 653.
1644 Queen-Empress v Nand Kishore, ILR 19 All 305.
1645 Queen-Empress v Krishnaji, Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cases, 405; See also notes above under the heading “Scope”.
1646 R v Mathar Ramchandra, 7 Bom HCCC 64.
1647 R v Nand Kishore, ILR 19 All 305.
1648 R v Girdhari Lal, ILR 8 All 653.
1649 Sarju Singh v State, (1978) Cr LJ (NOC) 286 (All).
1650 Queen v Hurdut Surma, 8 WR 68.
1651 Sita Ram v State, AIR 1968 All 207 [LNIND 1967 ALL 37] : (1968) Cr LJ 721 .
1652 Karan Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1985) Raj LW 682 .
1653 Re Jungle Lall, 19 WR 40.
1654 Dalpat Singh (Dr) v State of Rajasthan, (1989) CLR (Raj) 238; State of Punjab v Sarwan Singhai, AIR 1981
SC 1054 [LNIND 1981 SC 201] .
1655 See section 197 and the commentary thereunder in Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn
LexisNexis.
1656 DV Venkateswara Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh rep by Public Prosecutor, (1997) Cr LJ 919 (AP) : (1996) 2
Andh LT (Cr) 613 , p 617 (AP); Ashfaq Ahmed v State, (1981) All LJ 871, p 875 (Luc).
Page 14 of 14
from forfeiture.—
1657 Vijay Kumar v Ramesh Kumar, (2002) II Ren CR (Cr) 677 (P&H).
1658 State v Shiv Charan, (1999) I CCR 86 (Del).
1659 Ram Prakash v State of Haryana, (2000) Cr LJ 3395 (P&H).
1660 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 213, illustration (f).
1661 Ram Sawrup v State of Punjab, (1987) 1 Punj LR 95 : (1987) CCC 448 .
1662 Arvind Kumar Jain v State of Rajasthan, 2015 Cr LJ 2908 (Raj).
1663 SN Dube etc v NB Bhair, (2000) 1 CCR 1999 (SC).
1664 Harish Chandra Krishna Gadkar v State of Maharashtra, (1994) SCC (Cr) 1709.
1665 State of Maharashtra v Harikishan, (1989) 3 Crimes 364 [LNIND 1989 BOM 195] , pp 378–79.
1666 Padam Dev v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1989) Cr LJ 383 (HP)(DB).
End of Document
[s 219] Public servant in judicial proceeding corruptly making report etc.
contrary to law.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 7
[s 219] Public servant in judicial proceeding corruptly making report etc. contrary to law.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 7
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 219] Public servant in judicial proceeding corruptly making report etc.

contrary to law.—
Whoever, being a public servant, corruptly or maliciously makes or pronounces in any stage of a judicial
proceeding, any report, order, verdict, or decision which he knows to be contrary to law, shall be punished with
Page 4 of 7
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 219.1] Scope
Sections 219 and 220, IPC relate to corrupt or malicious exercise of the power of a public servant, in judicial
proceedings.
Where a village court judge, charged with the preparation of the register of suits filed in his court, frames that
register in a manner which he knew to be incorrect, namely, by making an entry therein that a certain suit had
been filed when in fact it was not so filed, and also by making an entry of a judgment purported to have been
pronounced, when it was in fact not pronounced, he cannot be convicted under this section but can be
convicted only under section 218.1667
Where the judicial officers acting in official capacity and not in individual capacity have passed judicial orders,
such orders can be challenged by filing appeal or revision, but they cannot be prosecuted for offences under
No cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken if the proceeding concerned is not a judicial
proceeding, but only an arbitration proceeding, conducted as per the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative
Societies Act.1669 As the submission of a report by the police under section 112, or 145(1), CrPC is not a judicial
proceeding section 219 is not attracted even if the report is corruptly or maliciously furnished.1670
[s 219.2] Essence of the Offence
The essence of the offence under this section is (a) that there must be a judicial proceeding, that is, a
proceeding actually commenced and pending, wherein a party claims relief against another and invites the
decisions of the court in regard thereto, and not a fictitious one where there is no party litigating, and (b) that
there must be the making of a real report or a real pronouncement of an order, verdict or decision.1671
[s 219.3] Public servant
[s 219.4] Corruptly
[s 219.5] “Maliciously”—Meaning of
The meaning of the term “malice” has been the subject of much controversy and “maliciously” has been
characterised as an unhappy expression by a high judicial authority.1672 The word “malice” seldom has any
meaning except a misleading one. It refers not to an intention but to a motive; and in almost all legal inquiries,
intentions as distinguished from motive, is the important matter.1673 The sense of the word as employed in law
seems to vary according to the subject matter and the context, and the only sense in which it is never used, is
the popular sense of spite, whilst it also includes the elements of negligence or mischance.1674 The word
“maliciously”, though not defined in this Code, has been interpreted to mean where a person wilfully does an
act which is injurious to another without a lawful excuse, he does it maliciously. In other words, the term
“maliciously” implies an intention to do an act which is wrongful to the detriment of another.1675 “Maliciously”,
said Bowen LJ in Mogal Steamship Co v Mc Gregor Cow & Co1676 “means and implies an intention to do an act
which is wrongful to the detriment of another”, and by “wrongful” is “meant an act done without lawful
excuse”.1677
Page 5 of 7
In the interpretation of the statutory provisions, the courts have attributed so many different meanings to
“malice” that it is impossible at the present time to find in judicial authority any precise and universal definition of
the word. In this confused situation the late Professor Kenny,1678 in 1902, enunciated a principle which,
although it lacked any definite judicial authority, has been repeated ever since without adverse criticism, and
has now been approved by the court of Criminal Appeal,1679 in the following terms:
In any statutory definition of a crime, ‘malice’ must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general but as
requiring either: (i) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done, or (ii) recklessness as to
whether such harm should occur or not, ie, the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done,
and yet has gone on to take the risk of it. It is neither limited to, nor does it indeed require, any ill-will towards the
person injured.
[s 219.5.1] Presumption and Inference
The word “maliciously” is used in section 219, IPC. In order to establish malice as contemplated by this section,
it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the accused bore ill-will or enmity against a specific person,
but if the injurious act was done voluntarily without a lawful excuse, malice may be presumed. Malice is often
not capable of direct and tangible proof and in almost all cases has to be inferred from surrounding
circumstances having regard to the setting, background and connected facts.1680
[s 219.5.2] “Malice” is contrasted with “Corruptly”
In this section the word is contrasted with “corruptly” and thus, read together, the effect would seem to be that a
report, order, etc, deliberately given contrary to law is punishable, whether the public servant’s conduct in so
doing has been induced by corruption, or prompted by any other feeling.
[s 219.6] Judicial Proceedings
[s 219.7] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable, but a warrant may issue in the first instance. It is bailable but
not compoundable, and is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
There is no period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section.
[s 219.8] Sanction for Prosecution is Required in Cases Falling under Section 197, CrPC
Where there were no mala fides on the applicant’s part and the whole action of the applicant (the trial
magistrate) against the non-applicant, being purely and solely in discharge of his official duties, previous
sanction of the State Government was necessary for taking cognizance of the particular offence against him, as
enjoined by section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; and as such, in the absence of such compliance,
the proceedings initiated under the private complaint, deserve to be quashed. Further, there being nothing on
record to show any corruption or malice on the part of the applicant, the offence under section 219 of the IPC
could not even be prima facie made out against him.1681
[s 219.9] Charge

Page 6 of 7
That, on or about the………day of ……you being a public servant, corruptly (or maliciously) made (or pronounced), in
any stage of the judicial proceeding, to wit……a report (or order, or verdict, or decision, to wit…….), which you knew to
be contrary to law, and thereby committed an offence, punishable under section 219 of the Indian Penal Code, and
[s 219.10] Proof
The essential ingredients of the section, which require proof for establishing an offence under this section are:
(a) that the accused was a public servant;
(b) that he made, or pronounced in a stage of a judicial proceeding, a report, order, verdict or decision;
(c) that he did so corruptly or maliciously;
(d) that the report, order, verdict or decision was contrary to law; and
(e) that the accused was then aware of it.1682
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
Page 7 of 7
1667 Re Narapareddi Seshareddi, AIR 1938 Mad 595 , pp 597–98 : 39 Cr LJ 875.
1668 Pravin Sawant v JB Anandgaonkar Saheb, Ex JMFC, Ichalkaranji, 2008 Cr LJ 984 , p 986 (Bom) : 2007 (5)
MhLj 838 [LNIND 2007 BOM 574] .
1669 Dilip Kumar Velji Kanji v Kristagonda Hanmantagonda Patil, (1979) Cr LJ (NOC) 64 (Kant).
1670 Ram Narain v State, (1980) Cr LJ (NOC) 55 : (1979) All WC 361 : (1979) All Cr R 233 (All).
1671 Re Narapareddi Seshareddi, AIR 1938 Mad 595 , pp 597–98 : 39 Cr LJ 875.
1672 Allen v Flood, LR (1898) ACI 144 , per Lord Macnaughten J.
1673 Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, p 454.
1674 4 Black Com 222.
1675 Birja Prasad Roy v Nagendra Nath Dash, (1985) 59 CLT 144 : (1985) 1 Crimes 446 [LNIND 1985 ORI 182] , p
448 (Ori).
1676 Mogal Steamship Co v Mc Gregor Cow & Co, LR 23 QB 598, p 612.
1677 Per Blackburn J, R v Pembliton, LR II CCR 119, p 122; cited in Peary Lal v Emperor, AIR 1917 All 317 (1) :
18 Cr LJ 527 : 15 All LJ 106; Notes to section 153.
1678 Outlines of Criminal Law, 1st Edn 1902, pp 47, 168.
1679 R v Cunninghanm, (1957) 2 QB 396 .
1680 The Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust, Petitioner v Govt of NCT, Delhi, (2001) Cr LJ (Del) 3689 .
1681 Devendra Singh Rai v Khokan Rohit, (1983) 2 Crimes 97 (MP).
1682 Brija Prasad Roy v Nagendra Nath Dash, (1985) 1 Crimes 446 [LNIND 1985 ORI 182] , p 448 : (1985) 59 CLT
114 (Ori).
End of Document
[s 220] Commitment for trial or confinement by person having authority
who knows that he is acting contrary to law.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 10
[s 220] Commitment for trial or confinement by person having authority who knows that he is acting contrary to
law.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 10
law.—
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 220] Commitment for trial or confinement by person having authority who

knows that he is acting contrary to law.—
Page 4 of 10
law.—
Whoever, being in any office which gives him legal authority to commit persons for trial or to confinement, or to
keep persons in confinement, corruptly or maliciously commits any person for trial or confinement, or keeps any
person in confinement, in the exercise of that authority, knowing that in so doing he is acting contrary to law,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with
fine, or with both.
[s 220.1] Scope
This section is enacted to prevent abuse of their powers by persons holding any office which gives them
authority to commit persons for trial or to confinement. To constitute an offence under this section there must be
an illegal commitment for trial or to confinement, plus a guilty knowledge. If the act is legal, there can be no
guilty knowledge, and hence no offence.1683 The provisions of this section will apply only when there has been
excess by an officer of his legal power.1684
Where the judicial officers acting in official capacity and not in individual capacity have passed judicial orders,
such orders can be challenged by filing appeal or revision, but they cannot be prosecuted for offences under
[s 220.2] “Being in any office”—Meaning of
This section applies to those persons who hold certain, public offices. It does not apply to private persons who
have the right to confine persons accused of certain offences under certain circumstances, as provided in
sections 43 and 60 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
[s 220.3] “Legal Authority to Commit Persons for Trials”—Meaning of
Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prescribes the procedure to commit cases to the court of
sessions by the magistrate having jurisdiction to do so. The competence or jurisdiction of the magistrates to try
or commit cases is determined by the various provisions contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.1686
[s 220.4] Authority to Commit Persons to Confinement—Relevant Provision Analysed
Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 authorises a police officer to arrest persons without a
warrant in certain cases. A police officer making an arrest under that section may either release the arrested
person on bail or, without unnecessary delay, produce him before a magistrate who alone can authorise his
further detention (sections 167 and 309, CrPC). A person arrested can in no case be detained by a police
officer for more than 24 hours (section 57, CrPC).
A police officer may also arrest a person in execution of a warrant of arrest. When he does so, he must produce
the arrested person before the court before which he is required by law to produce such person (subject to the
provisions of sections 80 and 81, CrPC) without unnecessary delay (section 76, CrPC). The magistrate or the
court issuing the warrant of arrest, may then order the further detention of the person (sections 167 and 309,
CrPC), if necessary.
Where an offence is committed in the presence of a magistrate, he may himself arrest or order any person to
arrest the offender and may thereupon, either release him on bail or commit him to custody (section 44, CrPC).
When a person is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, a warrant for the execution of the sentence is
directed to the officer in charge of a jail and that officer is authorised to keep the person in confinement in the
jail.1687
Page 5 of 10
law.—
Order XXI, rule 39(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure also authorises the detention of a judgment-debtor in a civil
prison in execution of a decree for payment of money.
Some local Acts also authorise certain officers to arrest and detain persons under certain circumstances. Thus
section 70(i) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise 1915, empowers an excise officer to arrest without warrant, any
person found committing an offence punishable under certain sections of the Act, and clause (iii) of that section
empowers him to detain any person upon whom he may have reasonable cause to suspect any article liable to
confiscation under the Act, or any other law relating to the excise revenue, to be. Section 75(2) of that Act
requires every police officer to give reasonable aid to any excise officer in carrying out the provisions of the Act
when called upon to do so.1688
[s 220.5] Malice not to be Inferred from every Wrongful Confinement
Under section 220, IPC, it is necessary to establish that the officer, who committed any person for trial or to
confinement, must have acted corruptly or maliciously and knowing that he was doing that act contrary to law.
In absence of these conditions and circumstances, a person cannot be held guilty under section 220 of IPC,
merely because he has confined or committed any person to confinement in exercise of the authority given to
him under the law.1689
For the meaning of the words “corruptly and maliciously” refer to notes to section 219, IPC. The words
“corruptly and maliciously” in this section are wide enough to cover confinement for the purpose of extortion
under section 347, IPC. Where a police sub-inspector wrongfully confines certain persons on charges of
gambling and extorts money from them by putting them in fear of being challaned and called in court upon
offences which he knew to be fictitious, the offence falls under this section.1690 Where the unlawful commitment
to confinement is wilful, without any excuse and with a view to put pressure on the person confined to come to
terms with a certain person in whom the accused is interested, the accused can safely be said to have acted
“maliciously”.1691 But every unlawful commitment to confinement will not, by itself, warrant the legal inference of
malice. In order to bring a case under this section, it should be alleged and proved that the person in office
corruptly and maliciously confined the person wrongfully.1692
[s 220.5.1] Excess by Police Officer attracts the application of the Section
It is only when there has been an excess by a police officer of his legal powers of arrest, that it becomes
necessary to consider whether he has acted corruptly or maliciously and with the knowledge that he was
“acting contrary to law”.1693
[s 220.6] “Or Keeps any Person in Confinement”—Meaning of
This phrase makes it clear that, apart from the legality of the arrest of a person, the keeping of him in
confinement even by a person, who had legal authority to do so, would be an offence under this section, if in
the exercise of that authority, a person kept another in confinement, knowing that in so doing he was acting
contrary to law.1694
[s 220.7] No Guilty Knowledge when the Arrest Made is Legal
If the arrest was legal, there could be no guilty knowledge “superadded to an illegal act”, such as it would be
necessary to establish against the accused to justify a conviction under this section.1695 It is only when there
has been an excess by a police officer of his legal powers of arrest that it becomes necessary to consider
whether he has acted corruptly or maliciously and with the knowledge that he was “acting contrary to law”.1696
[s 220.7.1] Arrest only on Credible Information1697
It must be remembered that before any arrest can be made by the police without a warrant, either under section
Page 6 of 10
law.—
41 or under section 157, CrPC it must be shown that there was credible information given to the police, or that
the officer in charge of a police station had reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. The
arrest has also to be made in accordance with the procedure laid down by law sections 46 and 49, CrPC are
material in this respect.
[s 220.7.2] Application of Handcuffs and Fetters not allowed for making Arrest
In a landmark case1698 after a thorough consideration of the fundamental rights of a detenue in the light of well
recognised human rights, the Supreme Court has held that:
when there is no compulsive need to fetter a person’s limbs it is sadistic, capricious, despotic and demoralizing to
humble a man by manacling him. Such arbitrary conduct surely slaps Article 14 on the face. The minimal freedom of
movement which even a detainee is entitled to under Article 19 cannot be cut down cruelly by application of handcuffs
or other hoops. It will be unreasonable so to do unless the state is able to make out that no other practical way of
forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and desperate and the circumstances so hostile to
safe keeping.
In another judgment in Citizens for Democracy v State of Assam,1699 the Supreme Court taking a more strict
view in the matter, totally prohibited the handcuffing or fettering of prisoners—convicted or under trial—while
lodged in a jail or transporting or in transit from one jail to another or from the jail to the court and back, without
the permission of the magistrate concerned. Laying down the norms for granting such permission by the
magistrates, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:
Where the police or the jail authorities have well-grounded basis for drawing a strong inference that a particular
prisoner is likely to jump jail or break out of the custody, then the said prisoner be produced before the magistrate
concerned and a prayer for permission to handcuff the prisoner be made before the said magistrate. Save in rare
cases of concrete proof regarding proneness of the prisoner to violence, his tendency to escape, he being so
dangerous and desperate and the finding no other practical way of forbidding escape is available, the magistrate may
grant permission to handcuff the prisoner.
In another case, the Judge observed:
What is a reasonable complaint or suspicion must depend on the circumstance of each particular case; but it must be
at least founded on some definite fact tending to throw suspicion on the person arrested, and not on mere vague
surmise or information. Still less have the police any power to arrest persons as they appear sometimes to do, merely
on the chance of something being proved hereafter against them. Any wilful excess by a police officer of his legal
powers of arrest is, by section 220 of the Penal Code, an offence punishable by imprisonment for seven years.1700
A police officer is not empowered to detain, without question, any accused person for a period not exceeding 24
hours, but rather he is in no case justified in detaining a person for one single hour except on some reasonable
Page 7 of 10
law.—
ground warranted by the circumstances of the case.1701
[s 220.7.3] Knowledge is a Question of Fact not of Law
Proof of an unlawful confinement will not, of itself, warrant the legal inference of malice; knowledge that such
confinement is contrary to law is a question of fact and not of law and must be proved to satisfy the
requirements of this section.1702 In the case of Budroo Hossain,1703 where there was no malice, no intention of
doing any act of the nature spoken of in section 339 or section 340, IPC and no voluntary obstruction or
restraint, though there was probably excessive and mistaken exercise of powers not civilly excusable in a police
officer, the arrest was held not to amount to criminal offence of wrongful restraint.1704 It has, however, been held
that where the release of a person arrested and detained by an excise sub-inspector, was obtained by a
payment of illegal gratification, the court was entitled to infer that the explanation of the excise sub-inspector,
that he was all the time considering whether the statement of the arrested person as to his innocence should be
accepted or not, was not true and that he must have known from the beginning that there was no justification in
law or fact for arresting or detaining him.1705
[s 220.7.4] Acting under the Instructions of Superiors—Consequence of
The circumstances that the accused were acting under the instructions of their superior officers and that they
were not known before to the complainant and had no particular personal grudge of their own against him, may
be taken into consideration on the question of sentence, but cannot justify the illegal arrest and detention of the
complainant.1706
An honest mistake precludes the knowledge contemplated by the section, because the official then acts in good
faith.1707
[s 220.8] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable, but a warrant should ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable, and is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
There is no period of limitation fixed for taking cognizance of the offence under this section.
[s 220.9] Sanction
Where the accused is a judge, magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the
sanction of the Union or State Government, no court can take cognizance of the offence under this section
except with the previous sanction of such Government (section 197, CrPC).
Where the accused were members of the Bombay police force, the acts constituting the offences under
sections 220, 342, IPC etc were committed by them in their capacity, but the requisite sanction was not
obtained, the apex court held that the accused persons were entitled to protection under section 197(2) of the
CrPC.1708
[s 220.10] Charge
I (name and officer of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
Page 8 of 10
law.—
That, on or about the….day of…you, being in office, to wit…….which gave you legal authority to commit persons for
trial (or to confinement) (or to keep persons in confinement), corruptly (or maliciously) committed….for trial [(or to
confinement) (or kept in confinement)] in the exercise of that authority, knowing that, in so doing, you were acting
contrary to law, and thereby committed an offence, punishable under section 220 of the Indian Penal Code, and within
my cognizance.
[s 220.11] Proof
In order to bring home the charge under the said provision, it must be shown that accused held an office which
empowered him to convict any person for trial or to confinement or to keep such person in confinement.
It must next be shown that the accused corruptly or maliciously committed such person for trial or to
confinement or kept him in confinement in exercise of that authority, knowing that in so doing he was acting
contrary to law.1709
To establish an offence under this section the following points require proof:
(a) that the accused held an office which empowered him to: (i) commit persons for trial; (ii) commit
persons to confinement; or (iii) keep persons in confinement;
(b) that he corruptly or maliciously committed a person for trial or to confinement or kept a person in
confinement in exercise of such powers;
(c) that he, in doing so, was acting contrary to law;
(d) that he, at the time, knew that he was acting contrary to law.
It is necessary for the prosecution to prove a case that certain officers have acted corruptly, maliciously and
with the knowledge that they were acting contrary to law, then only there would be a justification for a conviction
under this offence. Where the arrest or confinement is illegal but there is no knowledge, then in such cases, the
conviction cannot be made. Therefore, it is necessary that the onus is on the prosecution to prove that the
respondent has kept the accused in confinement in excess of his power and he was acting contrary to law and
at the time of acting contrary to law, he was acting corruptly or maliciously.1710

Page 9 of 10
law.—
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1683 Queen-Empress v Amarsang, ILR 10 Bom 506; Priya Dubey v State of Jharkhand, 2014 (3) Crimes 101
(Jhar).
1684 State of Bihar v Deonath Singh, (1988) Pat LJR 524 , p 528.
MhLj 838 [LNIND 2007 BOM 574] .
1686 Sections 2(j), 11–19, 26, 27, 32, 35, 190–192, 201, 323 etc CrPC.
1687 Section 419, CrPC.
1688 Afzalur Rahman v Emperor, AIR 1943 Pat 229 , p 235.
MhLj 838 [LNIND 2007 BOM 574] .
1690 Mansharam Gianchand v Emperor, AIR 1941 Sind 36 : 42 Cr LJ 460.
1691 Sita Ram Chand Lall v Malkiat Singh, AIR 1956 Pepsu 30 , p 31 : (1956) Cr LJ 412 .
1692 TM Appu Nair v Earnest, AIR 1967 Mad 262 [LNIND 1966 MAD 11] : (1967) Cr LJ 903 .
1693 Queen-Empress v Amarsang Jetha, ILR 10 Bom 506, p 511; State of Bihar v Deonath Singh, (1988) Pat LJR
524 , p 528.
1694 Afzalur Rahman v Emperor, AIR 1943 FC 18 , p 24 : 44 Cr LJ 466 : ILR 22 Pat 349 : 24 PLT 139.
1695 Reg v Narayan Babaji, 9 BHCR 346.

Page 10 of 10
law.—
1696 Queen-Empress v Amarsang Jetha, ILR 10 Bom 506, p 511; State of Bihar v Deonath Singh, (1988) Pat LJR
524 , p 528.
1697 For detailed commentary refer to sections 41, 157, 46, 49 in Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st Edn
LexisNexis.
1698 Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi Administration, (1980) SCC (Cr) 815, pp 826–27 : (1980) 3 SCC 526 [LNIND
1980 SC 215] : (1980) Cr LJ 930 .
1699 Citizens for Democracy v State of Assam, (1995) 4 JT (SC) 475, pp 482–83.
1700 Queen v Behary Singh, 7 WR (Cr) 3, p 5.
1701 Queen v Suprosunno Ghosaul, 6 WR (Cr) 88.

1702 Reg v Narayan Babaji, 3 BHCR 346.
1703 Budroo Hossain, 24 WR 51.
1704 Bhawoo Jivaji v Mulji Dayal, 12 Bom 377.
1705 Afzalur Rahman v Emperor, AIR 1943 CF 18 , p 24 : 44 Cr LJ 66 : ILR 22 Pat 349 : 24 PLT 193.
1706 Pandhikhan Nandokhan v Emperor, AIR 1948 Sind 67 : 49 Cr LJ 178.
1707 Notes to section 52; R v Daya Shankar, 1 Cr LJ 146 : 13 Ker LR 332; Bhawoo Jivaji v Mulji Dayal, ILR 12
Bom 377.
1708 Rizwan Ahmed Javed Sheikh v Jammal Patel, (2001) II CCR 281 (SC).
1709 Suryamoorthi v Govindswamy, AIR 1989 SC 1410 [LNIND 1989 SC 232] .
1710 State of Bihar v Deonath Singh, (1988) Pat LJR 524 , p 528.
End of Document
[s 221] Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of public servant
bound to apprehend.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 8
[s 221] Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of public servant bound to apprehend.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 8
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

bound to apprehend.—
Whoever, being a public servant, legally bound as such public servant to be apprehend or to keep in
confinement any person charged with or liable to apprehended for an offence, intentionally omits to apprehend
Page 4 of 8
such person, or intentionally suffers such person to escape, or intentionally aids such person in escaping or
attempting to escape from such confinement, shall be punished as follows, that is to say,—
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, with or without fine, if the
person in confinement, or who ought to have been apprehended, was charged with, or liable to be
apprehended for, an offence punishable with death; or
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, with or without fine, if the
apprehended for, an offence punishable with 1711[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment for a term which may
extend to ten years; or
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, with or without fine, if the
apprehended for, an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term less than ten years.
[s 221.1] Scope
Sections 221–223, IPC deal with omissions to apprehend offenders and acts of suffering or aiding escape of
offenders from confinement, on the part of public servants, which affect public justice. This section and section
222, IPC deal with intentional omissions to apprehend offenders and intentional suffering or aiding the escape
of offenders from confinement. The difference between these two sections is that this section deals with
persons charged with or liable to be apprehended for an offence, whereas section 222 deals with persons
under sentences of court of justice for an offence or lawfully committed to custody. Section 223 deals not with
an intentional omission to apprehend, but to negligently suffer the escape of an offender from confinement.
Section 224, IPC punishes not the public servant but the offender himself for escaping from custody. The
common object of all the four sections is to prevent the escape of offenders from justice.
[s 221.2] Applicability
For the application of this section, the accused must be a public servant legally bound as such public servant,
to apprehend or keep in confinement a person who is charged with or is liable to be apprehended, for an
offence. And then the accused must do one of the three things, namely: (a) omit to apprehend such person if he
has not yet been arrested and kept in confinement, (b) if he has already been arrested and kept in confinement,
suffer him to escape, or (c) aid him in escaping. Lastly, such omission to apprehend or suffering or aiding the
escape must be intentional. Where a court moharrir, whose duty it was to prepare remand papers in respect of
a suspect, produced in a court, and also to issue the release order and direct the police escort to release the
suspect, after the grant of bail to the suspect by the magistrate, directed the release of the suspect even prior to
the grant of bail to him in clear violation of his legal duties, he was held liable to be punished under section 221,
IPC.1712
A convict was entrusted in the custody of the accused appellant a Police Officer for escorting him to hospital.
On way the convict escaped from custody. The escaped convict was closely related to the accused. Conduct of
the accused showed that the accused intentionally allowed the convict to escape, did not take any steps to
arrest him, nor immediately informed the higher authorities. Accused appellant was convicted under sections
221, 222 and 223, IPC.1713
[s 221.4] “Legally Bound to Apprehend or Keep in Confinement”—Meaning of
In order to render a public servant liable under this section, he must, in the first instance, be legally bound to
apprehend a person or to keep him in confinement. A mere power to arrest or keep a person in confinement, as
Page 5 of 8
under section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not enough. He must be under an obligation to do so,
as when he is directed to execute a warrant of arrest issued by a court or when a police officer sees a person
committing a cognizable offence1714 or suspects that he has committed such an offence.1715
A chaukidar, or a village-watchman, is not legally bound as a public servant, to apprehend a person accused of
committing murder outside the village of which he is chaukidar, such person not being a proclaimed offender,
and not having been found by him in the act of committing such murder, and consequently such chaukidar, if he
refuses to apprehend such person on such charge at the instance of a private person, is not punishable under
this section.1716 A dafadar (head chowkidar), bound to arrest a person found in possession of stolen property,
took him in custody under the provisions of Bihar and Orissa Village Administration Act, 1922 but instead of
taking him to the police station, the dafadar allowed the accused to escape. It was held that he was guilty under
this section.1717 A convict was entrusted in the custody of the accused appellant a police custody for escorting
him to hospital. On way the convict escaped from custody. The escaped convict was closely related to the
accused. Conduct of the accused showed that the accused intentionally allowed the convict to escape, did not
take any steps to arrest him, nor immediately informed the higher authorities. Accused appellant was convicted
under section 221, IPC.1718
[s 221.4.1] Escape from Unlawful Custody is no Offence
Where neither the original arrest nor the subsequent custody by the chaukidar was lawful, the chaukidar could
not properly be convicted under section 223 of the India Penal Code.1719
[s 221.4.2] Chaukidar’s Duties as a Private Citizen and as a Public Servant not to be Confounded
The duties of a chaudkidar, as a private citizen, ought not to be confounded with his duties as a public servant.
Where the legal obligation of the chaukidar to arrest or detain has not been established, there is no dereliction
from his statutory duty within the purview of this section and the chaukidar cannot be penalised for intentionally
suffering a pilferer to escape from his detention.1720
[s 221.5] “Intentionally Omits”—Meaning of
When the accused, who were public servants, were legally bound to arrest a man, who had committed murder
in their presence, omitted to apprehend him, it was held that:
There can be no doubt that they did it intentionally. There was nothing involuntary about it. Their motive may not have
been that they wanted the man to escape, but that they were afraid of getting hurt, but motive must always be
distinguished from intention. They certainly intended not to apprehend the man, and legally they were guilty of the
[s 221.6] “Intentionally Aids”—Meaning of
[s 221.7] Offence
[s 221.8] Offence under this Section as well as under the Police Act
An offence falling under the Police Act and also under the Penal Code should be punished under the latter
enactment.1722
[s 221.9] Procedure
Page 6 of 8
The offence under the first part of this section is cognizable or non-cognizable according as the offence in
relation to which such omission has been made is cognizable or non-cognizable, but a warrant should ordinarily
issue in the first instance. It is bailable but not compoundable and is triable by a magistrate of the first class.1723
There is no period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offence falling under punishment clause 1 of this
section. For the offence falling under clauses 2 and 3, the cognizance can be taken within three years.
[s 221.10] Sanction
In a case falling under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a previous sanction for a prosecution under
this section is necessary.
For detailed commentary on section 197, see Sohoni’s Code of Criminal Procedure, twenty-first edn,
LexisNexis.
[s 221.11] Charge
That you being a public servant, to wit…and being as such public servant, legally bound to apprehend (or keep in
confinement) one AB, who was on or about the…….day of……at……….charged with (or liable to be apprehended for)
the offence of…….punishable with………did intentionally omit to apprehend such person [(or intentionally suffer the
said AB to escape) (or intentionally aid the said AB in escaping) (or attempting to escape)] from such confinement, and
that you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 221 of the India Penal Code, and within my
cognizance.
[s 221.12] Vicarious Liability
A person must be told as to what offence he is being directly charged with and to what others, if any, he is
being sought to be vicariously made liable. There is no rhyme or reason to seek to make a person who had
committed a criminal act with his own hand, liable constructively for that act under any of the sections of the
Penal Code relating to vicarious responsibility. As the principal offender, the charge and the conviction against
him must be for the substantive offence he committed and not for that offence, by virtue of any vicarious
responsibility.1724
[s 221.13] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it must be proved:

Page 7 of 8
(a) that a certain person was charged with, or liable to be apprehended for, some offence, ie, a breach of
the Code, or of a special or local law (section 40);
(b) that the accused was a public servant (section 21), whose legal duty it was as such to apprehend or
keep in confinement such offender;
(c) that the accused actually had the offender in custody (if the charge is one of escape); and
(d) that there was an intentional omission to apprehend, or intentional suffering to escape, or intentional
aiding to escape or attempt to escape.
[s 221.14] Conviction
Where the suspect was not granted bail and was remanded to custody, the duty of the accused court moharrir
was to have the suspect sent to jail custody. When the accused, instead of sending the suspect to jail custody,
directed the police escort to release the suspect, the accused was held guilty of the offence under this
section.1725
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1712 Ram Pal v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1184 , p 1188 : (1979) Cr LJ 711 : (1979) SCC (Cr) 735 :
(1979) 3 SCC 601 .
1713 Yonus Khan v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ 1040 (Kar) : 2013 (1) AKR 515 : ILR 2012 Karnataka 6556
[LNIND 2012 GULBRG 3] : 2012 (6) KarLJ 643 [LNIND 2012 GULBRG 3] .
1714 Ram Lal v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 651 : 37 Cr LJ 1019 : (1936) All LJ 1006.
Page 8 of 8
1715 Section 157, CrPC.
1716 Empress of India v Kallu, 3 ILR All 60.
1717 Durga Singh v Mohd Isa, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 827 : (1962) BLJR 438 .
1718 Younus Khan v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ 1040 (Kant) : 2013 (1) AKR 515 : ILR 2012 Karnataka 6556
1719 Emperor v Debi, ILR 29 All 377 : 4 Cr LJ 277; King-Emperor v Johri, ILR 23 All 266; Kalia v Kallu Chawkidar,
ILR 27 Cal 366.
1720 Bhagwandin v Emperor, AIR 1929 All 935 , p 936 : 31 Cr LJ 12 : (1930) All LJ 242.
1721 Ram Lal v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 651 , p 652 : 37 Cr LJ 1019 : (1936) All LJ 1006.
1722 Re Fatteh Khan, (1874) PR 12 ; Dooloo Mul v Dewa Singh, (1868) PR 2 .
1723 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sch 1.
1724 Krishna Pillai Vasu v State, AIR 1956 Tr & Coch 230, p 233 : (1956) Cr LJ 1358 .
1725 Rampal v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1184 : (1979) Cr LJ 711 : (1979) SCC (Cr) 735 : (1979) 3
SCC 601 .
End of Document
bound to apprehend person under sentence or lawfully committed.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 7
[s 222] Intentional omission to apprehend on the part of public servant bound to apprehend person under
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 7
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

bound to apprehend person under sentence or lawfully committed.—
Page 4 of 7
Whoever, being a public servant, legally bound as such public servant to apprehend or to keep in confinement
any person under sentence of a Court of Justice for any offence 1726[or lawfully committed to custody],
intentionally omits to apprehend such person, or intentionally suffers such person to escape, or intentionally
aids such person in escaping or attempting to escape from such confinement, shall be punished as follows, that
is to say:
with 1727[imprisonment for life] or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
fourteen years, with or without fine, if the person in confinement, or who ought to have been apprehended, is
under sentence of death; or
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, with or without fine, if the
person in confinement, or who ought to have been apprehended, is subject, by a sentence of a Court of Justice,
or by virtue of a commutation of such sentence, to 1728[imprisonment for life] 1729[* * *] 1730[* * *] 1731[* * *] 1732[* *
*] or imprisonment for a term of ten years or upwards; or
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, if
the person in confinement, or who ought to have been apprehended, is subject, by a sentence of a Court of
Justice, to imprisonment for a term not extending to ten years 1733[or if the person was lawfully committed to
custody].
[s 222.1] Scope
This section is identical with the last section, except that the person to be apprehended has already been
convicted or committed for an offence. It is an aggravated form of the offence made punishable under the last
section. Commentary under section 221 may be referred to.
The words “or lawfully committed to custody” in the first paragraph, and “or if the person was lawfully committed
to custody” at the end, were inserted by section 8 of the Indian Penal Code Amendment Act (27 of 1870). The
words “or penal servitude for life” and the words “or penal servitude” which occurred in paragraph three, were
omitted by section 2 of Act 17 of 1949. The words “imprisonment for life” were substituted for the words
“transportation for life” by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and schedule.
[s 222.4] “Legally Bound”—Meaning of
Section 43 and synopsis note 4 to section 221 may be referred to.
A convict was entrusted in the custody of the accused appellant a police custody for escorting him to hospital.
221, 222 and 223, IPC.1734
Where the accused, a police constable, was proved to have intentionally allowed a prisoner to escape from his
custody, but there was no evidence to prove that the prisoner had been lawfully committed to the custody of the
Central Jail, the accused was not legally bound to keep the prisoner in custody.1735
[s 222.5] “Court of Justice”—Meaning of

Page 5 of 7
[s 222.6] Offence
[s 222.7] Lawfully Committed to Custody
The prosecution must prove that the offender had lawfully been committed to the custody of the jail, before an
accused can be convicted for offence under this section. From the mere fact that the offender had been given in
the custody of the accused, the court should not presume that the offender had lawfully been committed to the
custody of the jail.1736
[s 222.8] “Intentionally Aids”—Success of the Attempt is not Material
The meaning of this phrase may be seen from section 107, expln 2 of the IPC, wherein it is explained that
“whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the
commission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commission thereof is said to aid the doing of that act”. If the
accused did acts which were done in order to facilitate the attempt of certain prisoners to escape, it cannot be
gainsaid that he did thereby facilitate an attempt to escape, and he can be properly convicted under this
section. It makes no difference that the attempt was in fact frustrated by other circumstances.1737
[s 222.9] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, and a warrant should ordinarily issue in the first instance. An
offence under the first and second punishment clauses is not bailable; but one under the third is. The offence is
not compoundable. An offence falling under the first punishment clause is triable by a court of session. That
under the second and third clause it is triable by a magistrate of the first class.1738 The limitation for taking
cognizance of an offence falling under the third punishment clause of this section is three years. There is no
limitation for the offence falling under the other clauses.
[s 222.10] Sanction
Only in cases falling under section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a sanction is required to
prosecute a person under this section.
[s 222.11] Charge
I (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused), as follows:
That you on or about the……………… day of……………… were a public servant (state the office) and as such public
servant, you were legally bound to apprehend (or keep in confinement) one AB, a person under sentence
of……………… of the court of……………… for the offence of……………… under section……………… of the (state
IPC or the local or special law, whichever may be the case) (or who had been lawfully committed to custody
by………………), you intentionally omitted to apprehend the said AB (or intentionally suffered the said AB to escape)
(or intentionally aided him in escaping or attempting to escape) from such confinement] and that you thereby
committed an offence punishable under section 222 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Page 6 of 7
[s 222.12] Proof
The following points require proof for a conviction under this section:

(b) that, as such, he was legally bound:
(i) to apprehend or
(ii) to keep in confinement any person who was under sentence of a court of justice for some offence;
or had been lawfully committed to custody;
(c) that the accused omitted to apprehend him, or intentionally suffered him to escape, or intentionally
aided him in escaping or attempting to escape; and
(d) that the person who ought to have been apprehended was:
(i) under sentence of death, or
(ii) under any sentence of imprisonment.
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
Page 7 of 7
1729 The words “or penal servitude for life” were repealed by section 2 of the Criminal Law (Removal of Racial
Discriminations) Act, 1949 (17 of 1949) (w.e.f. 6-4-1949).
1730 The words “or to” omitted by Act 36 of 1957, section 3, Sch II.
1731 The word “transportation” omitted by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
1732 The words “or penal servitude” omitted by Act 17 of 1949, section 2 (w.e.f. 6-4-1949).
1735 Sant Lal v State of Delhi, (1975) 3 CLR (Del) 429.
1736 Sant Lal v State of Delhi, (1975) Cut LR 429.
1737 Maula Baksh v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 631 , p 634 : 30 Cr LJ 1103.
1738 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sch I.
End of Document
[s 223] Escape from confinement or custody negligently suffered by public
servant.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 10
[s 223] Escape from confinement or custody negligently suffered by public servant.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 10
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 223] Escape from confinement or custody negligently suffered by public

servant.—
Whoever, being a public servant legally bound as such public servant to keep in confinement any person
charged with or convicted of any offence 1739[or lawfully committed to custody], negligently suffers such person
Page 4 of 10
to escape from confinement, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 223.1] Scope
This section is supplementary to and further extends the principles laid down in the two preceding sections. It
punishes a public servant who negligently suffers any person charged with an offence to escape from
confinement. The last two sections dealt with cases of an intentional omission to apprehend such person or
suffering them to escape.
The words “or lawfully committed to custody” were added by section 8 of the Indian Criminal Law Amendment
Act (27 of 1870).
[s 223.3] Essential Ingredients of the Section
In order to constitute an offence under this section:
(a) the accused must be a public servant;
(b) he must be legally bound to keep in confinement a person charged with or convicted of an offence, or
lawfully committed to custody; and
(c) he must negligently suffer such person to escape.
Convict-warders are “public servants” within the meaning of this section.1740 A watchman in the Kaira
collectorate, who does the work of rakha, though not entered on the village records as a village servant, and
receives a portion of the emoluments assigned as remuneration for the services of a rakha, is a person in
actual possession of the situation of a public servant within the meaning of expln 2 of section 21 of the Indian
Penal Code.1741 A village revenue servant, as distinguished from a village police servant, is not a “public
servant” within the meaning of the section.1742
The offence, envisaged in terms of this section, is one of which a public servant is guilty only while acting as a
public servant, and not otherwise. He cannot be guilty of an offence under this section unless he was acting as
a public servant.1743
[s 223.5] “Legally Bound to Keep in Confinement”—Meaning of
For the meaning of the expression “legally bound”, notes to section 43 may be referred to.
[s 223.5.1] When Public Servant not Entitled to Custody
An offence under this section is committed when the custody is lawful. If a public servant is not authorised to
keep a person in custody, he is not guilty of an offence under this section for suffering that person to
escape.1744
Page 5 of 10
The Patna High Court has held that it is only when the letting off is from a lawful confinement, that an offence
under this section can be said to have been committed. Therefore, when an authority, not authorised to confine
a person, but only to detain, lets off such person from his custody, no offence under this section is
committed.1745
A village chaukidar is not a police officer entitled to arrest and keep in custody a person without warrant.1746
[s 223.5.2] Escape from Unlawful Custody is no Offence
In Kalai v Kalu Chowkidar,1747 it was held that where a person had committed a theft and had been made over
to the custody of a village chaukidar, the accused could not be convicted under section 225, for rescuing the
alleged thief from lawful custody. The court held that the chaukidar was not “lawfully detaining” the alleged thief.
The same view was taken in the case of King-Emperor v Johri.1748
Where the police of a former native state arrested in an adjoining territory, a person suspected of having
committed an offence in the native state, and made him over to one Debi, a chaukidar, from whose custody he
escaped, it was held that neither the original arrest, nor the subsequent custody by the chaukidar was lawful,
and, therefore, the chaukidar could not properly be convicted under this section.1749
In a Bombay case, a complaint by a private person was presented to a magistrate that a certain person was
concerned in a murder, and the magistrate arrested him, and, after hearing the complainant and such person,
sent him to the superintendent of the police. He, in turn, sent him to a sub-inspector. It was held, that the
magistrate’s order might be held to have been passed under section 167, CrPC, and the sub-inspector was
bound to detain him in custody, until released by due course of law, and that he was guilty of an offence under
section 222, IPC, by negligently suffering him to escape from the custody.1750
[s 223.6] “Charged with”—Meaning of
The words “charged with an offence” in this section are used only in the sense of inculpation or accusation of
an offence and do not mean “against whom a charge has been framed”.1751 Where the person who escapes, is
neither charged nor convicted of any offence, no offence under this section is made out.1752
[s 223.7] Offence
[s 223.8] “Lawfully Committed to Custody”—Whether Custody and Confinement Co-Extensive
This phrase and the phrase “legally bound to keep in confinement” though distinct, are somewhat overlapping.
No public servant can be legally bound to keep any one in confinement unless he is lawfully committed to
custody. It has been held that in sections 220 and 225, IPC the words “custody” and “confinement” have been
used as co-extensive.1753 The custody must be lawful; for, if a man is arrested for a supposed crime, when no
such crime was committed, and the party is neither indicted nor charged, or for such a slight suspicion of an
actual crime and by such an irregular process as will not justify an arrest or detention, the officer is not guilty of
an escape by suffering the prisoner to go at large. But if the warrant of commitment plainly and expressly
charges a man with treason or felony, though it be not strictly formal, the custodian suffering an escape is
punishable, and where commitments are good in substance, the custodian is as much bound to observe them
as if they were made ever so exactly. Whenever an imprisonment is so far irregular that it will be no offence in
the prisoner to break from it by force, it can be no offence in the officer to suffer him to escape. It is generally
Page 6 of 10
considered that the imprisonment must be for some criminal matter.1754 But a person may be “lawfully
committed to custody” even though he is not charged with or convicted of an offence. Thus, a person lawfully
arrested on suspicion, eg, under section 41, CrPC, is lawfully committed to custody, though not actually
charged with any offence.1755 So also a person failing to give security under sections 106, 116 or section 117,
CrPC, and detained in prison under section 122, CrPC, is lawfully committed to custody, although he has not
been charged with or convicted of an offence.
[s 223.9] “Negligence”—What is?
In criminal law, negligence is a subjective state of mind. It connotes inadvertence. It consists not merely in
omitting to do what ought to have been done, but in not thinking of the result which one’s conduct might
produce.1756
[s 223.9.1] Escape should be Natural and Probable cause of Negligence
In Durga Prasad v Emperor,1757 it was held by the Allahabad High Court that before a person can be convicted
under section 223, IPC, it must be shown not only that he was guilty of negligence, but that the escape was at
least the natural and probable consequence of his negligence. In a case, a police officer A, incharge of a police
station had been ordered to send certain prisoners to a certain place. He went out on some other work leaving
orders with the head constable to send the prisoners off. The head constable complied, but the prisoners
escaped from the custody of those sent in charge of them. It was held that the escape of the prisoners was not
the natural and probable consequence of A’s negligence and he could not be convicted under this section.1758
Where the accused happened to be in overall charge of the case but was not a co-conspirator in the escape of
the person in custody, the very conduct of the accused in making a hectic search for the escaped accused
shows that the accused was not a co-conspirator in the escape of the said accused from lawful custody, and
therefore, charges framed under section 223, IPC and sections 132–137, Customs Act, 1962, framed against
the accused, were quashed.1759
[s 223.9.2] Escape should not be a Remote Consequence
The escape of the prisoner must not be too remote a consequence of the negligence of the accused. Where all
that was shown was that the accused marched the prisoner by night and he was rescued, it was held that as
there was no evidence that the accused had any reason to expect that any attempt would be made at a rescue,
no offence under this section was made out.1760
[s 223.9.3] Negligence to be Determined with Reference to Duties
It must be shown that there was negligence on the part of the accused and that the escape of the prisoners was
the consequence of this negligence. Before the court can decide the question of negligence, it must know what
the duties of the accused were, and unless they are known exactly, it is impossible to find whether he was
negligent in the performance of his duties and whether the escape of the prisoners was due to that
negligence.1761
[s 223.9.4] Special Duties Require Special Care—Places Burden on Accused
In the case of a prison-guard, the escape of a prisoner is a prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the
guard on duty. Where a person undertakes a special duty which requires extra vigilance, he must satisfactorily
establish that he took all reasonable care in performing his duty, which is expected of a person performing
similar duties. If he fails to establish it, he would render himself liable under this section.1762
Where a daffadar in charge of one of the gates of a jail, suffered certain convict prisoners to pass out of the
gate and they escaped, it was held that the daffadar was guilty under this section, even if he did not intend that
the prisoners should escape and allowed them to pass out of the gate to have an interview with their friends.1763
In a Lahore case, a jail warder was placed in charge of a gang of prisoners who were sent off to do agricultural
works. Contrary to his orders, he permitted a convict-warder to take two of the convicts to a cemetery to water
Page 7 of 10
the trees there. The cemetery was at some distance and was not within sight, and the accused made no
attempt to patrol in that direction. Owing to the negligence of the convict-warder, one of the convicts escaped. It
was held that the accused was guilty of an offence under this section.1764
Two policemen were conveying a prisoner from one place to another in a camel-cart. The prisoner was secured
by two pairs of handcuffs and a rope round the waist. He wanted to be let down from the cart to answer the call
of nature and thereupon, one set of handcuffs was removed and he was let down. He suddenly raised an alarm
of a snake and in the confusion, jerked at the waist rope and ran away. It was held that the policemen were not
guilty of negligently suffering the prisoner to escape within the meaning of this section.1765
A convict was entrusted in the custody of the accused appellant a police custody for escorting him to hospital.
221, 222 and 223, IPC.1766
[s 223.10] Confinement—Meaning of
The word “confinement” in this section, should not be restricted to confinement within circumscribing limits. In
sections 220 and 225, the Legislature appears to have used the words “custody” and “confinement” as co-
extensive.1767
[s 223.11] “To Escape from Confinement”—Meaning of the Expression
The expression “escape from confinement” in this section is not limited to escape from the particular sort of
place of confinement to which a prisoner is subjected to or in which he is restrained at the time of the
occurrence. A prisoner cannot be said to have escaped from confinement until he has regained his liberty. In
one case, the accused public servants were posted to keep guard on certain cells in a jail where certain
prisoners were confined. When the accused were relieved, the prisoners were not in their cells but were found
crouching on the roofs of their cells and were immediately recaptured. It was held that, under the
circumstances, the accused were not guilty of the offence under this section, for the prisoners were still in
confinement and crouching upon the roofs of their cells, inasmuch as they were still within the prison walls and
were not at liberty. An attempt to escape from confinement had no doubt been made, but negligently suffering
such an attempt is not an offence within the provision of this section.1768
The offence under the section is non-cognizable, and a summons should ordinarily issue in the first instance. It
is bailable but not compoundable, and is triable by any magistrate.
[s 223.13] Sanction
Sanction is only necessary in cases falling under section 197, CrPC, for a prosecution under this section.
[s 223.14] Charge

Page 8 of 10
I (name and office of magistrate, etc), hereby charge you (name of accused), as follows:
That you, on or about…………. day of…………. were posted as…………. (state the office) and as such a public
servant, were legally bound to keep in confinement one AB, who was charged with (or convicted of) an offence
of…………. under section…………. of the Indian Penal Code [(or of a special or local law (specify)] (or lawfully
committed to custody) but negligently suffered the said AB to escape from confinement and that you thereby
[s 223.15] Proof
In order to establish the charge under this section the following facts have to be established:
(b) as such public servant he was bound to keep in confinement any persons;
(c) such person was: (i) charged with; (ii) convicted of an offence; or (iii) lawfully committed to custody;
(d) the accused suffered such person to escape; and
(e) the escape was due to the negligence of such public servant.1769
[s 223.16] Sentence
The sentence of imposing only fine in a case of an inexcusable dereliction of duty, leading to the escape of
prisoners from a well-guarded prison, is out of all proportion to the gravity of the offence. Officers guarding a
prison must know that if they are negligent in the performance of their duty, and this negligence leads to the
escape of any prisoner under their charge, the consequences will be very serious for them. A sentence of fine
will tend to create a belief that their negligence is not likely to be visited with anything more serious than the
loss of service and a few visits to the court. The sentence of the court is as important as the trial itself. It should
be commensurate with the gravity of the crime, though it may not be harsh and should not amount to useless
cruelty. It must, however, serve as a deterrent to other members of the public services, who are charged with
looking after the security of the community.1770

Page 9 of 10
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1739 Ins. by Act, 27 of 1870, section 8.
1740 Queen v Kallachand Moitree, 7 WR 63.
1741 Queen-Empress v Fula Bhana, Ratanlal’s Unrep Cr Cases 388.
1742 Re Bodapati Pentadu, 1 Weir 197.
1743 Girja Shankar v State of Bihar, (1972) Cr LJ 988 , p 989 : (1972) PLR 64 .
1744 Empress v Kallu, 3 ILR All 60.

1745 Girja Shankar v State of Bihar, (1972) Cr LJ 988 , pp 990–91 : (1972) PLR 64 .
1746 Empress v Kallu, 3 ILR All 60.
1747 Kalai v Kalu Chowkidar, ILR 27 Cal 366.
1748 King-Emperor v Johri, ILR 23 All 266.
1749 Emperor v Debi, ILR 29 All 377 : 5 Cr LJ 277.
1750 Queen-Empress v Jaglia, 1 Bom LR 349.
1751 Nural Har v Obayadulla, 46 Cal WN 163.
1752 Girja Shankar v State of Bihar, (1972) Cr LJ 988 , p 999 : (1972) Pat LJR 64 .
1753 Re Imamuddin, (1891) PR 2 (FB).
1755 5 WR Lett 9; Empress v Ashraf Ali, ILR 6 All 129.
1756 Russell on Crime, Vol I, 12th Edn p 43.
1757 Durga Prasad v Emperor, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 478 : 7 IC 411.

1758 Durga Prasad v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 478 : 7 All LJ 907.
Page 10 of 10
1759 Vimal Narain v State of Rajasthan, (1999) I CCR 672 (Raj).

1760 Re District Magistrate of Nellore, 10 Cr LJ 293.
1761 R Singh v Emperor, 37 Cr LJ 918 : 40 Cal WN 61.
1762 Kutch State v Bachu Sama, AIR 1951 Kutch 89 , p 90 : (1952) Cr LJ 22 .
1763 Ghulamali v Empress, 19 PR (1883) (Cr).
1764 Ashan Ali v Emperor, AIR 1919 Lah 229 : 20 Cr LJ 350.
1765 Girdhari v Emperor, AIR 1918 All 282 : 19 Cr LJ 78 : 15 All LJ 883.
1767 Re Imamudin, (1891) PR 2 (FB).
1768 Albal Singh, 32 PR (Cr) 1890, per Rivaz J.
1769 Bansidhar Swain v State of Orissa, (1987) Cr LJ 1819 : (1987) 63 Cut LT 99.
1770 Kutch State v Bhachu Sama, AIR 1951 Kutch 89 , p 90 : (1952) Cr LJ 22 .
End of Document
[s 224] Resistance or obstruction by a person to his lawful apprehension.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 16
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 16
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of himself for any
offence with which he is charged or of which he has been convicted, or escapes or attempts to escape from any
custody in which he is lawfully detained for any such offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
Page 4 of 16
Explanation.—The punishment in this section is in addition to the punishment for which the person to be
apprehended or detained in custody was liable for the offence with which he was charged, or of which he was
convicted.
[s 224.1] Scope
Sections 221–223, IPC dealt with public servants, intentionally or negligently, omitting to apprehend or keep in
confinement offenders, or suffering them to escape or aiding them in their escape. This section deals with the
offender himself, who offers resistance or illegal obstruction to his lawful apprehension, or escapes or attempts
to escape from lawful custody. Section 225, IPC deals with other persons who offer resistance or illegal
obstruction to the lawful apprehension of an offender or rescue or attempt to rescue him from lawful custody.
Where the accused ran away while in the custody of the police authorities, the plea by the accused that he
never escaped from the custody but left the place to answer call of nature and on his return, finding no police at
office left that place, was dispelled by the fact that on the following day he was caught by the police personnel
while trying to escape on seeing them, he had thus escaped intentionally, and hence, his acquittal in the case in
which he has been arrested will not negate charge of his intentional escape from custody so he is guilty under
section 224.1771
The accused, a wanted criminal, attacked police squad when they surrounded the hut in which he was hiding
and apprehended him. The accused pelted bottles and glasses and also tried to give blow on head of PSI with
a heavy chopper but he warded off the blow. Attempt on his part to commit murder amply proved, police officers
had no reason to tell falsehood in their deposition, as medical evidence proved that the accused sustained
injuries in the scuffle with the police, conviction of the accused for offences punishable under sections 224, 332,
307 was found proper.1772
[s 224.1.1] Two Parts of the Section First Part
This section itself is in two parts and deals with two offences. The first deals with the offence of intentionally
offering resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of himself for an offence with which he is
charged or of which he has been convicted. For the application of this part of the section:
(a) the accused must have been charged with or convicted for an offence;
(b) there should have been an attempt to lawfully apprehend him for that offence;
(c) he must have offered resistance or illegal obstruction to such apprehension; and
(d) he must have done so intentionally.1773
Second Part
The second part of the section deals with the offence of intentional escape or attempt to escape from lawful
custody. For the application of this part of the section:
(a) the accused must have been charged with or convicted of an offence;
Page 5 of 16
(b) he must have been lawfully detained in custody for such offence; and
(c) he must have intentionally escaped or attempted to escape from such custody.1774
So, the essential ingredients for the second part of section 224, IPC are that the accused must have been
detained in custody lawfully and that he escaped from such custody intentionally.1775
Common Features
Both the parts have two common features viz: (a) the accused must have been charged with or convicted of an
offence; and (b) the resistance, obstruction or escape must be intentional.
[s 224.2] Sections 224 and 216, IPC
[s 224.3] “For any Offence with which he is Charged or of which he has been Convicted”—Meaning of
The words “for any offence” in this section mean for any offence with which a person is charged, or of which he
has been convicted. It would be an offence to escape from lawful custody before the trial, just as it would be an
offence to escape from lawful custody after conviction. The word “charged” is used in the popular sense as
implying inculpation of an alleged offence as distinguished from a charge formulated after trial. It would,
therefore, be an offence for a man to escape from custody after he has been lawfully arrested on a charge of
having committed an offence, although he may not have been subsequently convicted of such latter offence.1776
So, even if the person in custody is declared afterwards to be innocent, the offence of escape from custody will
be complete, provided only the custody be lawful.1777
The mere fact that a sub-inspector of police put his hand on the applicant’s shoulder or caught hold of his wrist
without the least intimation to the applicant for what offence he was being arrested, can hardly amount to the
applicant being “charged” with any offence.1778
[s 224.3.1] Arrest or Detention must be in Connection with Some Offence
The section has no application if the apprehension or detention is not for any offence. An escape from custody,
when being taken before a magistrate for the purpose of being bound over to be of good behaviour, is not
punishable under either this section or section 225, as the person is not charged with or convicted of any
offence.1779 So also is an escape from custody in execution of a civil process.1780
The word “offence” as used in this Code is defined in section 40, IPC. In clause 2 of that section it is said that in
section 224, IPC the word “offence” denotes a thing punishable under this Code or under any special or local
law as hereinafter defined.
Under section 41, IPC, a “special law” is a law applicable to a particular subject and under section 42, IPC a
“local law” is a law applicable only to a particular part of India. Reading this section with these sections, the only
conclusion which can be arrived at is that for its application the apprehension or detention should necessarily
be for any of the offences mentioned in the Indian Penal Code or under any local or special law applicable to
any part of India.
[s 224.5] Proper Attempt to Arrest
There must be a proper attempt to arrest a person before he can be said to offer resistance or obstruction to
Page 6 of 16
it.1781 Sections 41, 46, 49 and 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731782 may be referred to.
[s 224.5.1] Resistance and Obstruction Explained
“Resistance” and “obstruction” imply some active opposition to the arrest by the use or show of force. A mere
evasion of arrest1783 by running away1784 or by shutting oneself in the house,1785 does not amount to resistance
or illegal obstruction to the arrest.
[s 224.5.2] Obstruction Must be Illegal
Where the accused, a lady, on seeing the peon entrusted with a warrant of arrest, goes inside her house and
shuts the door, it amounts to obstruction. But this section requires that the obstruction should be illegal, and in
construing the term “illegal”, regard must be given to the definition of “illegal” in section 43 of the Code. The
legality or illegality of the obstruction would also depend upon the legality of the arrest, having regard to the
provisions of the Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes relating to arrest and imprisonment.1786
In a Lahore case, the accused was arrested by the police under section 17(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, 1908, and it was found that at the time of arrest, he resisted being apprehended by not allowing the police
to remove him and by kicking out. No case under section 17(1) or section 17(2) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act was made out, and it was contended by the accused that, under the circumstances, his arrest
was illegal and therefore, he could resist it. The contention was not seriously considered, the court remarking
that the argument was only half-heartedly advanced and that there was no force in it. The conviction of the
accused under section 224 was maintained but the sentence was reduced.1787
[s 224.5.3] Resistance or Obstruction must be Intentional
The resistance or illegal obstruction, in order to constitute an offence under this section, must be intentional. A
resistance or illegal obstruction when, one who resists or illegally obstructs, does so with the intention that there
should be no apprehension notwithstanding that such apprehension, to his knowledge, is lawful.1788
[s 224.5.4] Magistrate’s Duty to check abuse of Powers by Police
When the offence against an accused is a bailable one, the police have no authority to attempt to put handcuffs
on him in the first instance, and would only be justified in using them, if, for some special reason, there is
reasonable ground for believing that he, after a proper arrest, would attempt to escape and is likely to do so, or
he cannot be made to go to the police station except by such, amongst other, means. Trivial resistance to
unlawful force on the part of an arresting officer does not constitute an offence under this section. It is highly
important that magistrates should check any abuse by police officers of their powers and should insist on the
plain provisions of the law being carried out.1789
[s 224.6] “To the Lawful Apprehension”—What is Lawful Apprehension
For this section to apply, it is necessary that the accused, who is charged under it, must have been lawfully
apprehended or detained in custody, which in its turn depends on whether the magistrate ordering the arrest of
the accused had power to do so.1790 Sections 224 and 225 deal with a resistance to, or an escape from, lawful
apprehension, and section 353 deals with an assault to deter a public servant from discharging his duty. It thus
becomes essential for convictions under these sections that the prosecution should show that the apprehension
or arrest made or attempted was lawful in every way.1791
No offence is committed by resisting or obstructing an arrest which is not lawful.1792 An arrest in court for a
contempt of court is a lawful arrest.1793 In Jagpat Koeri v Emperor,1794 a warrant of arrest signed, not by the
magistrate who had taken cognizance of the case, but by an honorary magistrate who lived in the same town,
was held invalid under section 70, CrPC. If the apprehension is under a warrant of arrest, the person executing
it must notify the substance thereof to the person to be arrested, and, if so required, shall show him the
warrant.1795 But section 75 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not require the fact of the notification to be
mentioned in the report.1796 The provision in section 75, CrPC does not extend to arrests without a warrant
Page 7 of 16
under section 55 of that Code.1797 Under that section, an arrest by a chaukidar in pursuance of a written order
from an officer in charge of a police station is legal, and its resistance is an offence under this section.1798
Where a police officer who is not present on the spot asks the constables to bring a certain person to the thana
with some papers, the order does not amount to a direction for arrest as contemplated by section 55, unless the
order is given in writing. The use of force by the constables, therefore, is illegal, and if the person against whom
force is used resents it and a scuffle ensues in the course of which brickbats are thrown, the person cannot be
convicted under this section, nor can the persons assisting him be convicted under sections 225 and 353.1799
Section 41, CrPC authorises any police officer, without an order from a magistrate and without a warrant, to
arrest any person who has been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable complaint
has been made or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been
so concerned. In Appaswami Mudaly v Emperor,1800 it was observed that if a constable, in effecting an arrest,
specifies a certain power which proves to be wanting, resistance to him or escape from his custody constitutes
no offence. To hold that section 41, CrPC applies in such cases without any intimation to the accused, and
without any allegation by the constable in his deposition that he proceeded under the section, would be to
nullify several salutary provisions contained in Pt B, chapter VI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relating to
the execution of warrants of arrest. Where the constable purports to act under a warrant which is found to be
invalid, and where there is no allegation by the constable in his deposition that he proceeded under sections
41(1), 41(1) does not apply.1801
[s 224.6.1] Arrest without Endorsement on Warrant of Arrest
Under the terms of section 74 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the endorsement on the warrant of arrest
should be regularly made by name to a certain person in order to authorise him to make an arrest. Where there
is no such endorsement, the arrest is not a legal arrest so as to make the accused liable for an offence under
this section or section 225.1802 If a warrant allows bail, that fact must be stated at the time it is executed,
otherwise the arrest may become illegal.1803
[s 224.6.2] Lack of Good Faith, whether affects Legality of Arrest
If the apprehension is lawful, it does not matter whether that apprehension was not made, or attempted to be
made, in good faith.1804
[s 224.7] Of himself—Meaning of
This section requires that the accused person must offer resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful
apprehension of himself, for any offence with which he has either been charged or of which he has been
convicted. If the resistance or illegal obstruction is to the lawful apprehension of himself, when not charged with
or convicted of any offence, the offence would fall under section 225B, IPC and not under this section. The
distinction between the two sections is not merely academic. This section empowers a magistrate to inflict an
imprisonment for two years whereas under section 225B, the maximum term of imprisonment is six months.1805
[s 224.8] Escape
An escape is where one who is arrested, gains his liberty before he is delivered by due course of law.1806 It is
distinct from flight from justice before arrest, for which a provision is made separately.
Escaping from legal custody is an offence under section 224 of the IPC.1807
[s 224.8.1] Escape how Effected
The term “escape” is usually applied where the liberation of the prisoner is effected either by himself or others,
without force. Where it is effected by the prisoner himself with force, it is called prison-breaking; and where it is
effected by others, with force, it is commonly called a rescue. A person legally arrested for an offence must
submit to be tried and dealt with according to law. If he gains his liberty before he is delivered by due course of
law, he commits the offence of escaping from lawful custody under this section.1808
[s 224.8.2] Escapes Fall into Three Classes

Page 8 of 16
Escapes fall into three classes—escapes by the prisoner, escape suffered by an officer of the law, and escape
suffered by a private person who has the prisoner in custody.1809
[s 224.9] Section is Confined to Escape by Accused Himself
In this section we are concerned with escapes by the prisoner. It is his voluntary act.1810 A person forcibly
snatched away from custody cannot be said to have intentionally escaped from custody, and, therefore, cannot
be convicted under this section.1811 As all persons are bound to submit themselves to the judgment of the law,
those who, when lawfully arrested on criminal process, free themselves from custody before they are put in a
prison or other legal place of detention, are guilty of a misdemeanour, punishable by fine and imprisonment.1812
When the accused was arrested, the grounds of his arrest were communicated to him and his arrest was legal
but the accused police official resisted the arrest by the raiding party, he was guilty under section 224 IPC.1813
Cogent evidence on the record proved that the accused facing trial in as many as 22 cases escaped from the
jail custody, which was also proved by the entry of missing in the roll call, the accused was convicted under
section 224, IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of one year.1814
[s 224.10] Escape by Consent or Neglect, or with Knowledge of Keeper
It has been long established that even when the escape is effected by the consent or the neglect of the person
that kept the prisoner in custody, the latter is no less guilty, as neither such illegal consent nor neglect absolves
the prisoner from the duty of submitting to the judgment of the law.1815
When the escape is effected by the consent or with the knowledge of the person escorting the prisoner in
custody, the accused is no less guilty.1816 But, where a person arrested in execution of a civil process was
allowed to go by the decree-holder and the process-server who had arrested him; it was held that there was no
offence of escape from lawful custody committed by the person who was arrested.1817
[s 224.11] Resistance or Escape must be Intentional
The word “intentionally” governs both the parts of the section. In order, therefore, to warrant a conviction under
this section, it is essential to prove that the accused intentionally escaped or attempted to escape from lawful
custody.1818
[s 224.11.1] Escape not Intentional when Forcibly Rescued
A person forcibly snatched away from custody cannot be said to have intentionally escaped from custody, and
cannot therefore be convicted under the section.1819 Where two constables, when on patrol duty, wanted to
apprehend a person, some persons surrounded the two constables, assaulted and obstructed them in taking
the accused to the police station, the facts of offences under section 224, IPC and other offences were not
proved beyond reasonable doubt, the accused persons were held entitled to be acquitted under sections 307,
149, 332 and 224, IPC.1820
[s 224.12] Acquittal of Accused in the Case in which he was Arrested—No Effect on his Intentional Escape
Law nowhere provides that acquittal in a case in which an accused is arrested will by itself be sufficient to hold
that the arrest was unlawful or to negate a charge under section 224, IPC. If it is established by the prosecution
that the accused, who had been taken to custody on the allegation of commission of an offence, escaped from
such custody intentionally, he would be guilty of offence under section 224, IPC despite the fact that he gets an
order of acquittal in the case in which he had been arrested.1821
[s 224.13] Disappearance after being Rescued—Consequences of
Where an accused was rescued by a number of his friends from the lawful custody of the process-server, and
he took advantage of this and disappeared, and thus got out of the way of the process-server, it was held that
Page 9 of 16
the accused escaped within the meaning of section 225B, although it was due to no fault of his that the accused
was released by his friends and that he surrendered himself the next morning.1822
[s 224.14] Escape must be “from any Custody in which he is Lawfully Detained”
In order to warrant a conviction under this section, it is necessary to prove that the accused intentionally
escaped or attempted to escape from a lawful custody.1823 He cannot be convicted if his detention in custody
was illegal.1824 An escape from custody under a civil process must be distinguished from an escape by a person
arrested on a criminal charge. The mere fact that a constable in charge of the accused, who was detained in a
jail, became insensible, could not determine the lawful custody of the accused, and escape from such custody
is an offence under this section.1825
[s 224.15] Lawful Custody how Determined
In construing the terms, “lawfully detained in custody” in the section, regard must be given to the nature of the
custody itself, as well as to the circumstances under which the authority to arrest and keep in custody arises.
The “stocks” were intended by the Regulation (11 of 1816) to be employed for a specific purpose, namely, the
infliction of conviction for petty offences as a form of punishment, on the people of lower castes. It was held that
detention in stocks, otherwise than as a punishment, was not legal custody, and escape from it was not
punishable under this section.1826
[s 224.16] Custody in Non-Cognizable Cases
Where a person, apprehended on a charge of a cognizable offence, escapes from lawful custody, his liability to
punishment is not affected by the circumstances that a competent court determines his offence to be other than
that with which he had been charged. However, if charged with a non-cognizable offence, the police officer,
who apprehends him without warrant, does not have him in lawful custody, and his escape is not punishable
[s 224.17] Arrest and Custody in a case of Mistaken Identity
A, a police officer, arrested B (bearing the same name as C) thinking that he was C, against whom there was a
warrant of arrest. B escaped, but was re-arrested. On being tried for the offence for which he was arrested on
suspicion, he was acquitted on the ground that he was not C, the person charged. It was held that he was not
lawfully detained in custody, since he (B) had not been charged with the offence and the arrest was therefore
unlawful, and therefore he committed no offence under this section.1828
A, having arrested B in the act of stealing, takes him to the village magistrate, who sends him in the custody of
two village servants to the nearest police station. B escapes from the servants’ custody. He is guilty of escaping
from legal custody.1829
[s 224.18] Custody when Arrest by Private Person
In order to convict the accused under this section, the prosecution must prove that there was a lawful arrest
within the meaning of section 41 or section 55, CrPC. Under section 43 of the CrPC a private person can arrest
any person, but only if that person is a proclaimed offender or is found actually committing a non-bailable
cognizable offence in his presence. Arrest by a private person in any other circumstances is illegal and escape
from his custody is not an offence under this section.1830
[s 224.19] Failure to show Authority before Arrest
It may be desirable or even obligatory that, if called upon, the police officer making the arrest should show the
person arrested, the authority under which he is acting, but to hold that he is bound to do so before he can
properly arrest and detain in custody such a person, so as to make the arrest and the detention lawful, would
be to extend the law beyond what the Legislature has thought proper to declare it.1831
[s 224.20] Custody when Arrest made without Proper Endorsement in Warrant

Page 10 of 16
An endorsement in a warrant of arrest should be made in accordance with the law. In Abdul Sikdar v Mathu
Singh, the court, while it pointed out that initials ought not to be used to authenticate an endorsement upon a
warrant, held that a warrant was not invalid when the endorsement was made by initials only, such initials being
shown to be those of the proper person to make the endorsement. The endorsement referred to, should be
regularly made by name to a certain person in order to authorise him to make the arrest and when there is no
endorsement by a person having authority to do so, the arrest is not legal, so as to make any attempt at
obstruction or escape, an offence punishable with the terms of this section.1832
[s 224.21] “For any such Offence”—Meaning of
The word “for any such offence” must mean for any offence with which he is charged or of which he has been
convicted. The expression “charged with” means not that a charge had been framed against the accused by a
court of law under the CrPC, but that he was accused of having been involved in an offence.1833 Thus, it would
be an offence for a man to escape from custody after he had been lawfully arrested on a charge of having
committed an offence, although he may not have been convicted of such latter offence. An accused person is
no less guilty than a convicted person, if he escapes from lawful custody.1834 An escape from custody when
such detention is not for an offence, is not punishable under this section.1835 The detention contemplated should
necessarily be for any of the offences mentioned in the Code or under any local or special law applicable to
India. Hence, where an accused arrested for an offence committed in an erstwhile native state, escaped in
India while in custody of the state police, he could not be convicted under section 224 even if that state had
adopted the Indian Penal Code as its own Code.1836
[s 224.22] Explanation—Sentence need not be Consecutive
As the act of offering resistance or illegal obstruction to lawful apprehension or an escape or the attempt to
escape is an additional offence punishable under this section, the punishment to be imposed for this offence is
also in addition to the punishment for which such person was liable for the offence with which he was charged
or of which he was convicted. There is, however, nothing in the explanation to require that a sentence of
imprisonment under this section must be made to run consecutively to a sentence imposed for the main offence
of which the accused was convicted. A concurrent sentence is nonetheless an additional sentence.1837
The offence under this section is cognizable. A warrant should ordinarily issue in the first instance. The offence
is bailable but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate.
[s 224.24] “Place of Trial”
The offence of escaping from custody may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction the
offence is committed or the accused person is found.1838
Sections 177 to 189 of the Code of Criminal Procedure1839 may be referred to.
[s 224.25] Charge
I (name of office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
Page 11 of 16
That you, on or about the ………day of……at……intentionally offered resistance (or illegal obstruction) to your lawful
apprehension for the offence of …….with which you were charged [(or of which you had been convicted) (or escaped,
or attempted to escape from the custody of……in which you were lawfully detained for the offence of ……)], and
thereby committed an offence punishable under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 224.26] Proof
Section 224, IPC has two distinct parts. The first relates to resistance to apprehension and the second part
relates to escape from custody. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused under the first part, the
prosecution is to prove the following ingredients:
(a) that the accused was charged or convicted;
(b) that he offered resistance or obstruction to his apprehension;
(c) that such resistance or obstruction was illegal; and
(d) that the accused offered such resistance or obstruction illegally.
When the offence charged is that of escape or attempt to escape from custody, the prosecution is to prove the
following:
(a) that the accused was taken into custody for commission of an offence;
(b) that such detention in custody was lawful;
(c) that the accused escaped from such custody or made an attempt to do so; and
(d) that the accused did so intentionally.1840
In a prosecution under this section, what would be proved is that the person who escaped from lawful custody,
had been charged with an offence, not in the sense that a charge had been framed against him, but in the
ordinary sense of that expression, namely that he was accused of having been involved in an offence. It is not
necessary that proof should be produced of any formal announcement having been made by the person who
apprehended the accused, that he had committed an offence. The question whether a person was or was not
charged with an offence should depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the inference to be
drawn from such facts and circumstances.1841
It is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the accused was in lawful custody and he escaped from that
Page 12 of 16
custody. When there is no evidence even to indicate that the accused was lawfully arrested and that he
escaped from the lawful custody, his conviction under this section cannot be sustained.1842
The punishment under this section being in addition to the original sentence, the courts when passing the
sentence must comply with the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.1843 A person, who offers resistance to his lawful apprehension, and persons, who manhandle a public
servant in discharging his duty and secure the release of a person from lawful custody, can plead no
circumstance in extenuation.1844
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1771 State of Orissa v Purna Chandra Jena, (2006) Cr LJ 505 (Ori).
1772 Jamil Ahmed v State of Maharashtra, (2003) Cr LJ 3663 (Bom).
1773 Re Kulandaivalu, AIR 1969 Mad 408 [LNIND 1968 MAD 116] : (1969) Mad LW (Cr) 214 .
1774 Re Kulandaivalu, AIR 1969 Mad 408 [LNIND 1968 MAD 116] : (1969) Mad LW (Cr) 214 .
1776 Kalia Amra v Emperor, AIR 1927 Bom 96 : 28 Cr LJ 380 : 29 Bom LR 168; Queen-Empress v Kutia Ala,
Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cases 298; Nurul Haq v Obeyadulla, 46 Cal WN 1630; Deo Sahay Lal v R, ILR 28 Cal 253, p 255;
Re Sidda Basavaiya, 7 Cr LJ 179 : 12 MCCR 50; Mahommad Qazi v Emperor, AIR 1916 Cal 421 (1); Emperor v Po
Hle, 4 Cr LJ 381; GK Kumar v State of Mysore, (1963) 2 Cr LJ 466 .
1777 Queen-Empress v Chokhu Yesu, 24 WR 45; Queen-Empress v Tafaullan, ILR 12 Cal 190; Queen v Bajigan, 5
ILR Mad 22.
Page 13 of 16
1778 Muneshwar Bux Singh v Emperor, AIR 1939 Oudh 81 , p 83 : 40 Cr LJ 221.
1779 1 Weir 198 : 7 Mad HCR App 41; Empress v Shasti Churan Napit, ILR 8 Cal 331 : 106 LR 290; Queen-
Empress v Kandhaia, 7 ILR All 87 : (1884) 4 AWN 267.
1780 Re Public Prosecutor, 11 Cr LJ 477 : (1910) Mad WN 592.
1781 Re Nooruboobu, 1 Weir 204, 205.
1783 Re Nanjan, 1 Weir 205.

1784 Bati Daim v Crown, 52 Cr LJ 1031, p 1032.
1785 Emperor v Gun Pal Me Ya, 4 Cr LJ 287 : UBR Cr 1906 : 12 Burt LR 340.
1786 1 Weir 211; Mad HC Proceedings, 14 May 1979, No 848.
1787 Pratap Singh v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 615 (2) : 34 Cr LJ 25 : 33 PLR 1071.
1788 Hamjisab v State of Mysore, AIR 1966 Mys 20 , 21 : (1966) Cr LJ 36 ; GK Kumar v State of Mysore, (1963) 2
Cr LJ 466 , 467 (Mys).
1789 Re Tan Sein, (1901) 1 LBR 173; Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration, (1978) 4 SCC 494 [LNIND 1978 SC 215] :
(1979) SCC (Cr) 155; Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi Administration, (1980) SCC (Cr) 815 : (1980) 3 SCC 526 [LNIND
1980 SC 215] ; Dhananjay Sharma v State of Haryana, (1995) 4 JT (SC) 483.
1790 Muneshwar Bux Singh v Emperor, AIR 1939 Oudh 81 : 40 Cr LJ 221.
1791 Queen-Empress v Dalip, (1896) 19 ILR All 246 : (1896) All WN 48; Sampat v Emperor, (1917) 18 Cr LJ 803 :
41 IC 323; Durga Charan v Queen-Empress, (1900) 27 ILR Cal 457 ; Raman Singh v Queen-Empress, (1901) 28 ILR
Cal 411 : 5 Cal WN 134.
1792 R v Taik Pya, 10 Cr LJ 188 : 5 LBR 2; Bolai De v R, ILR 35 Cal 361; Safdar v State, (1974) All Cr R 10 :
(1974) All WR (HC) 26; State v Indra Pradhan, AIR 1960 Ori 23 [LNIND 1959 ORI 3] : (1960) Cr LJ 267 ; Kesar v
Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 263 ; Gokul Tatwa v Emperor, AIR 1926 Pat 23 : 26 Cr LJ 1462.
1793 Re Mahommad Kassim, I Weir 204.
1794 Jagpat Koeri v, Emperor, 2 Pat LJR 487.
1795 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 75; Mann Lal v Emperor, AIR 1918 Pat 52 ; notes to section 225B.
1796 Bankey Behary Singh v Emperor, 8 PLR 493.
1797 R v Basant Lall, ILR 27 Cal 320.
1798 Bahubal v R, 3 Cr LJ 201 : 10 Cal WN 287.
1799 Gulabi Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 361 : 41 Cr LJ 742.
1800 Appaswami Mudaly v Emperor, AIR 1924 Mad 555 : 81 IC 51 : 25 Cr LJ 563 : ILR 47 Mad 442.
Page 14 of 16
1801 Kartik Chandra v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 171 , 174 : 33 Cr LJ 706 : 13 PLT 135; Re Appasway Mudaly, AIR
1924 Mad 555 : 25 Cr LJ 563; Mousi Lal v Emperor, AIR 1918 Pat 252 : 19 Cr LJ 1000.
1802 Kochu Kunju v State of Kerala, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 437 ; Durga Tewari v Rahman Buksh, 4 Cal WN 85.
1803 Shyama Charan Majumdar v R, 13 Cr LJ 590; See notes to section 225.
1804 Hamjisaan v State of Mysore, (1966) Cr LJ 36 .
1805 King-Emperor v Khanu Kori, AIR 1925 Sind 193 (1) : 25 Cr LJ 462 : 18 Serv LR 501.
1806 Termes de la Ley.
1807 Shalik Maruti Kowe v State of Maharashtra, 2014 Cr LJ 3922 , p 3927 (Bom) (DB) : 2014 ALL MR (Cri) 2116 :
2014 (3) Bom CR (Cri) 230 .
1808 Kalia Amra v Emperor, AIR 1927 Bom 96 : 28 Cr LJ 380; Empress v Muppan, ILR 18 Mad 401; Public
Prosecutor v Ramaswami Konan, ILR 31 Mad 271; Shalik Mareeti Kowe v State of Maharashtra, 2014 Cr LJ 3922
(Bom) (DB) : 2014 ALL MR(Cri) 2116 : 2014 (3) Bom CR (Cri) 230 .
1809 Russel on, Crime, 11th Edn p 359.
1810 Re Kulandaivelu, AIR 1969 Mad 408 [LNIND 1968 MAD 116] , pp 409–10 : 1969 Cr LJ 1406 .
1811 Re Retta Koravan, AIR 1957 Mad 714 [LNIND 1957 MAD 59] ; King-Emperor v Lachhu Kamara, AIR 1950 Ori
62 [LNIND 1949 ORI 17] .
1812 Russel on Crime, Vol I, 11th Edn p 359.
1813 Ami Lal v State of Rajasthan, (1996) Cr LJ 1585 (Raj).
1814 State of Madhya Pradesh v Suresh Singh, 2013 Cr LJ 848 , p 851 (Chh) : 2013 (1) CGBCLJ 122.
1815 Queen-Empress v Muppan, ILR 18 Mad 401 : 1 Weir 203 (citing 1 Russel on, Crimes, 5th Edn p 567
corresponding to Russel on Crime, 11th Edn p 35; Roscoe, 11th Edn p 453 and Bishop’s Criminal Law, 7th Edn section
1104); Public Prosecutor v Ramaswami Konan, ILR 31 Mad 271 : 8 Cr LJ 200 : 18 Mad LJ 540; Public Prosecutor v
Sennimalai Goundan, 20 Cr LJ 208 : (1919) Mad WN 695 : 9 Mad LW 216 : 25 Mad LT 290.
1816 State of Hyderabad v Kan Kadu, AIR 1954 Hyd 89 , p 90 : (1954) Cr LJ 651 .
1817 Re Public Prosecutor, 11 Cr LJ 477 : (1910) Mad WN 592 : 8 Mad LT 286.
1818 State v Indra Padhan, AIR 1960 Ori 23 [LNIND 1959 ORI 3] , 25 : (1960) Cr LJ 267 : (1959) ILR Cut 504 : 25
CLT 244; Re Kulandaivelu, AIR 1969 Mad 408 [LNIND 1968 MAD 116] , p 410 : (1969) Cr LJ 1406 .
1819 Re Retta Koravan, AIR 1957 Mad 714 [LNIND 1957 MAD 59] : (1957) Cr LJ 1234 (1) : (1957) 1 Mad LJ (Cr)
405; King-Emperor v Lachhu Kamara, AIR 1950 Ori 62 [LNIND 1949 ORI 17] : 51 Cr LJ 679.
1820 Kundan Singh v State, (1990) Cr LJ 1660 (All).
Page 15 of 16
1822 Attiya v King-Emperor, AIR 1923 Rang 133 : 24 Cr LJ 307.
1823 State v Indra Padhan, AIR 1960 Ori 23 [LNIND 1959 ORI 3] , p 25 : (1960) Cr LJ 267 ; Re Kulandaivelu, AIR
1969 Mad 408 [LNIND 1968 MAD 116] : (1969) Cr LJ 1406 .
1824 Re Uppala Kotayya Nagaram, AIR 1916 Mad 686 (1) : 16 Cr LJ 672 : 18 Mad LT 310.
1825 Re Sandeya, 1 Weir 203, distinguishing Re Sarahaiya, 1 Weir 202.
1826 Mad HC Proceedings, 23 September 1878; no 1533; 1 Weir 199; Re Uppala Kotayya Nagaram, AIR 1916
Mad 686 (1) : 16 Cr LJ 672.
1827 Queen v Ram Saran Tewary, 24 WR 45.
1828 Ganga Charan v R, ILR 21 Cal 337; Deo Sahay Lal v R, ILR 28 Cal 253, p 255.
1829 R v Potadu, ILR 11 Mad 480 : 1 Weir 200; Parsidhan v R, ILR 29 All 575; King-Emperor v Johri, ILR 23 All
266.
1830 State v Indra Padhan, AIR 1960 Ori 23 [LNIND 1959 ORI 3] : (1960) Cr LJ 267 ; Kesar v Emperor, AIR 1932
Lah 263 ; Gokul Tatwa v Emperor, AIR 1926 Pat 53 : 26 Cr LJ 1462 : 7 PLT 65.
1831 Queen-Empress v Basant Lal, ILR 27 Cal 320.
1832 Durga Tewari v Rahaman Buksh, 4 Cal WN 85.
1833 GK Kumar v State of Mysore, (1963) 2 Cr LJ 466 .
1834 Deo Sahay Lal v R, ILR 28 Cal 253, p 255; Re Sidda Basavaiya, 7 Cr LJ 179 : 12 MCCR 50; Mahommad Qazi
v Emperor, AIR 1916 Cal 436 (1); Emperor v Po Hle, 4 Cr LJ 341; Halim Amin v Emperor, AIR 1927 Bom 76 .
1835 Ganga Charan Singh v Queen-Empress, ILR 21 Cal 337.
1836 Billu v Emperor, AIR 1940 Lah 44 , p 45 : 41 Cr LJ 378.
1837 Emperor v Chokhu Yesu, AIR 1934 Bom 462 (1).
1838 Section 181(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Page 16 of 16
1841 GK Kumaran v State of Mysore, (1963) 2 Cr LJ 466 ; State v Indra Pradhan, AIR 1960 Ori 23 [LNIND 1959
ORI 3] , p 25 : (1960) Cr LJ 267 .
1842 State of Madhya Pradesh v Dayaram, (1980) CLR (MP) 14 (SN) : (1980) MPLJ (SN) 9.
1843 Re Chinna Madakudumban, 1 Weir 203, 204; Queen v Dhoonda Bhooya, 8 WR 85.
1844 Hamjisab v State, AIR 1966 Mys 20 , p 21 : (1966) Cr LJ 36 .
End of Document
[s 225] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension of another
person.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 13
[s 225] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension of another person.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 13
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 225] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension of another

person.—
Whoever intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of any other person
for an offence, or rescues or attempts to rescue any other person from any custody in which that person is
Page 4 of 13
lawfully detained for an offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
or, if the person to be apprehended, or the person rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is charged with or
liable to be apprehended for an offence punishable with 1845[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment for a term
which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
or, if the person to be apprehended or rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is charged with or liable to be
apprehended for an offence punishable with death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
or, if the person to be apprehended or rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is liable under the sentence of a
Court of Justice, or by virtue of a commutation of such a sentence, to 1846[imprisonment for life], 1847[***] 1848[***]
1849[***] or imprisonment for a term of ten years or upwards, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
or, if the person to be apprehended or rescued, or attempted to be rescued, is under sentence of death, shall
be punished with 1850[imprisonment for life] or imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 225.1] Scope
From bare perusal of the provision it appears that the person from whose custody the rescue is effected must
have authority to detain lawfully the person rescued. Otherwise, no offence is committed for effecting the
rescue. It is not necessary that the custody from which offender is rescued should be that of a police man, it is
enough that the custody is one which is authorised by law and it must be proved that the person rescued was in
lawful custody at the time. It would be very apt to mention that under section 43 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 even a private individual can have authority to take the culprit in custody. But that power is not
unlimited, rather it is a limited one which would be evident from the provision as enshrined in section 43 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.1851
The last section dealt with offenders offering resistance to their lawful apprehension or escaping from custody.
This section deals with others who do the same thing to rescue the offenders. Like the last section, this section
also is in two parts and deals with two offences: (a) intentionally offering resistance or illegal obstruction to the
lawful apprehension of an offender, and (b) rescuing or attempting to rescue an offender from any custody in
which he is lawfully detained.1852 Offering resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of a
person should not be confused with an attempt to rescue him. The former comes in before the actual
apprehension or arrest, and the latter only after the apprehension or arrest. An offence, under this section, can
be said to have been committed if a person tries to rescue an arrested person.1853 It is not necessary that the
person who effects the rescue of another from lawful detention, should be aware of the facts leading to that
detention.1854
The person from whose custody the rescue is effected must have authority to lawfully detain the person
rescued. Otherwise, no offence is committed for effecting the rescue. It is not necessary that the custody from
which offender is rescued should be that of a police man, it is enough that the custody is one which is
authorised by law and it must be proved that the person rescued was in lawful custody at the time. The
petitioners were alleged to have rescued the accused while the witnesses were taking him to the police station
after the commission of the offence. Where there was no eye-witness to the occurrence, as such the witnesses
had no authority to arrest the petitioners. No overt act was attributed to the petitioners. Their conviction under
The words “imprisonment for life” were substituted by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and schedule for
“transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956). The words “or to” in para 4 were omitted by Act 36 of 1957, section 3
Page 5 of 13
and Sch II. The word “transportation” in the same para was omitted by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and
schedule (w.e.f. 1-1-1956). The words “penal servitude” in para 4 were omitted by section 2, Act 17 of 1949
(w.e.f. 6-4-1949).
[s 225.3] Section 225 Distinguished from Sections 130 and 225B
Section 130, IPC also deals with rescue, but that relates to the rescue of a state prisoner or a prisoner of war,
whereas this section relates to the rescue of an offender. Another section in the Code dealing with rescue is
section 225B, IPC, which deals with rescue in cases not provided for in this section. This section deals with the
rescue of a person who is charged with or convicted of an offence within the meaning of section 40 of this
Code, and is lawfully detained in custody for such an offence. On the other hand, section 225B deals with the
rescue of a person who is not charged with or convicted of an offence, but is detained in custody for being
bound over to be of good behaviour,1856 or in execution of a civil process.1857 In Abdul Rahiman Sahib v
Emperor,1858 it was held that a person rescuing a person arrested in execution of a civil warrant was guilty
under section 225. It is, however, submitted that in fact, section 225B should have been applied to the case and
not section 225.
[s 225.4] Demand for Release of Accused
Where though the accused was found uprooting the crops in the land of the victim’s family and caught in the
action, the intention and resolve of those who detained him and the victim was not to release him till subjected
to a village panchayat and it was not as though they were bent upon handing the accused over to police for
further lawful custody or action, in the light of such evidence coming to light even from the prosecution case, a
conviction under section 225, merely because there was a demand to release him, is rendered impossible, all
the more so when except a demand so made, nothing further was done in this direction to get him released.1859
[s 225.5] Intention is an Important Ingredient
Intention is an important ingredient in an offence under this section, as under almost every criminal offence, and
it is for the prosecution to establish with what intention the accused acted. Unless it is proved by the evidence
on record that the intention of the accused was to prevent the arrest, or that the pursuers were lawfully
empowered to arrest him, persons stopping them from doing so are not liable under this section.1860 Resistance
or illegal obstruction is intentional when those who resist or obstruct, do so with the intention that there should
be no apprehension, notwithstanding that such apprehension is, to their knowledge, lawful.1861
[s 225.6] Power of Arrest and Resistance are Co-related
Any police officer may, without an order or warrant from a magistrate, arrest a person against whom suspicion
exists of his having been concerned in theft, under section 41(1)(a), CrPC, but he cannot send persons who are
not police officers to make an arrest which he himself can lawfully make. So, when private persons are sent by
a person having the powers of a police officer, to arrest a person suspected of theft, they have no lawful
authority to arrest him, and any resistance to such persons does not constitute an offence under this
section.1862 Section 43, CrPC gives to a private person the power to arrest any person who, in his view,
commits a non-bailable and cognizable offence. But where the man escaping was a thief running away after the
theft, an arrest of the offender by a private person in whose presence the theft was not committed, is not
justified.1863
If the offence is not committed in one’s presence, a private person can arrest an offender only if he is a
proclaimed offender.1864
A, a private person, arrests B in the act of stealing. C rescues B. C is guilty of an offence under this section.1865
During an unlawful assembly, A, a police officer, arrests B, a member of the assembly. C and D rescue B; they
Page 6 of 13
are guilty of an offence under this section.1866
[s 225.7] Mere Threat may Amount to Resistance
Threatening a sub-inspector of excise, in order to prevent him from making an arrest, amounts to offering
resistance and an illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of an offender.1867 But resistance to an unlawful
arrest does not constitute an offence under this section.1868 Notes under section 224 may be referred to.
[s 225.8] Illegal Obstruction
[s 225.9] “Rescue”—Meaning of
The word “rescue” though not defined in the Code will always mean an act of getting a person free forcibly from
custody against the will of person in whose lawful custody he was. Therefore, some overt act needs to be there
if one is said to have rescued a person from the lawful custody.1869
The word “rescue” is not defined in the Code. Rescue is the act of forcibly freeing a person from custody,
against the will of those who have him in custody.1870 “Rescue, or an attempt to rescue is the offence of a
person who forcibly frees another from a lawful arrest, whether the arrest is by a constable or a private person,
or whether the person rescued is in prison or not”.1871 In other words, rescue is the offence of forcibly and
knowingly freeing another from arrest or imprisonment.1872 The term “rescue” in this section implies intention
and the use of violence or criminal force to achieve the object desired. Rescuing would certainly indicate some
positive overt act on the part of the accused by which the liberation of the person arrested is effected. Whether
there is any such act done by the accused in a particular case would depend on the facts of each case.1873
Where, except for a demand to release the accused, nothing further was done in the direction of getting him
released, the conviction and sentence under section 225, IPC was set aside by the Apex Court.1874
[s 225.9.1] Intention not Necessary for Rescue
Rescue from lawful custody, which is made punishable under the section, however, need not be an intentional
rescue. It is only the resistance or illegal obstruction to apprehension that has to be intentional before it can
amount to an offence.1875
[s 225.9.2] Intention may Sometimes be Material
Where a daffadar, in charge of one of the gates of a jail, allowed certain convicts to pass out of the gate to have
an interview with their friends, but the convicts, taking advantage of the daffadar’s over-confidence, effected
their escape, it was held that the daffadar was not liable to be convicted under this section as it was not his
intention to rescue the convict prisoners.1876
The use of force is a part of the offence of causing rescue. The accused cannot therefore, be convicted of both,
for the illegal act of rescuing the prisoner, as well as for using force.1877 Notes under section 225B may be
referred to.
[s 225.10] Detention must be Lawful
One can be held guilty for an offence under section 225 if he rescues a person who was detained lawfully.1878
For the application of this section, the rescue must be from custody in which the person rescued is in lawful
Page 7 of 13
detention. The person from whose custody the rescue is effected must have authority to lawfully detain the
person rescued. It must be shown that the person rescued was in lawful custody at the time. If the warrant of
arrest is to arrest a particular person, it must be shown that the person arrested and rescued is that particular
person.1879
Where the arrest is unauthorised by law, the person effecting the rescue, cannot be held guilty under this
section.1880 When the accused can never be said to have been lawfully detained by the witnesses and once
detention of the accused was not lawful, question of committing offence by other accused for rescuing under
section 225 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 never arises.1881
[s 225.10.1] Consequences of Unlawful Arrest and Detention—Some Illustrative Cases
A warrant of arrest not signed by the magistrate issuing it, is defective, and an arrest made under the warrant is
illegal, so that the rescue of the person arrested is not a rescue from lawful custody, and the persons effecting
the rescue cannot be held guilty under this section.1882 But where the lower half of the warrant, which provides
for the release of the arrest person on bail, has not been filled in, this omission would not make the
apprehension unlawful.1883 A warrant addressed to the process server of the court is not invalid merely because
it is not addressed to a particular person by name. The accused rescuing the person arrested under the warrant
would be guilty of the offence under this section.1884 Where the record shows that the magistrate directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest on 8 July 1874 for the appearance of the petitioner, in fact, no such warrant was
ever issued. On the next date fixed in the case, the bench clerk of the magistrate, finding the petitioner moving
in the court compound under the impression that a warrant of his arrest has already been issued, asked the
court constable to arrest him. Upon such asking, the petitioner was arrested but he managed to escape from
the custody of the court constable. On his complaint, the magistrate took cognizance under sections 225 and
353, against the petitioner. Such cognizance being challenged before the Patna High Court, it was held that the
conduct of the constable in putting the petitioner under arrest or taking him into custody cannot be a lawful act,
rather the arrest in such a circumstance must be deemed to be illegal and unjustified. The petitioner as such did
not commit any offence in running from such unauthorised custody or detention and no offence as such under
section 225 of the Code is made out. There appears to be a grave error on the part of the learned magistrate in
ignoring the provisions of law with respect to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and he has committed an error
in the case of Saryug Prasad v State of Bihar in taking cognizance of the offence and issuing processes against
the petitioner on the allegations made out in the petition of complaint.1885
A complaint under sections 323 and 329, IPC was lodged by the complainant against some persons. The head
constable investigating the case demanded a bribe from the complainant for arresting those persons. A trap
was laid to apprehend the head constable red handed. The complainant gave the agreed amount to the head
constable, who in turn gave it to a constable, who was present there. On a signal by the complainant, the
raiding party appeared on the scene. However, the head constable and constable resisted the raiding party
from taking further steps; they shouted for help; one of them ran away and returned along with some villagers
and at the instance of the head constable, attacked the raiding party, snatched their belongings and looted the
currency notes which were used for giving the bribe. They rescued the head constable, intentionally assaulted
the members of the raiding party, used criminal force and prevented the members of the raiding party, who
were public servants, from discharging their lawful duties. The head constable was convicted under section 395
read with section 109, sections 353, 109 and 224, the constable under section 395 and the villagers under
sections 353, 149, 225 and 147, on the basis of cogent and reliable evidence.1886
Section 41, CrPC does not give an unqualified power in all cases to any police officer, to arrest without an
authorisation in writing, a person concerned in a cognizable offence. The provisions of section 41 are limited by
those of section 55, CrPC. Hence, a police constable who is merely deputed by his superior officer to arrest
someone concerned in a cognizable offence and not acting independently, cannot arrest without complying with
the formalities mentioned in section 55. An arrest made without complying with the provisions of section 55,
CrPC is illegal and the custody of the person’s arrest is not lawful.1887 But it is otherwise if the police officer
making the arrest has independent information of the offence and has power to arrest under section 41,
Page 8 of 13
CrPC.1888
[s 225.10.2] Custody need not be of Police
A village chaukidar is not a police officer within the meaning of section 41, CrPC and is not entitled to arrest as
a police officer under that section.1889 To support a conviction under this section, it is not necessary that the
custody from which the offender is rescued should be that of a policeman, it is enough that the custody is one
which is authorised by law.1890 Rescue from the custody of a private person who had arrested a thief in the act
of stealing is an offence under this section.1891 But under section 43, CrPC, a private person can arrest only a
person who, in his view, that is, in the sight or presence, commits a non-bailable cognizable offence, or is a
proclaimed offender. If the person arrested is not a proclaimed offender and has committed no offence in the
presence of the private person arresting him, the arrest is illegal and a charge of rescuing him from lawful
custody cannot be sustained.1892
Under section 43, CrPC where a private person arrested an offender, he must, without delay, make over the
person so arrested to a police officer or take him to the nearest police station.
A, a private person arrested B, who was alleged to have committed theft, but not in A’s presence, and handed
him over to C, a village chaukidar for custody. D rescued him therefrom. It was held that D did not commit an
offence since the village chaukidar was not a “police officer within the meaning of section 59 of the CrPC
1898,1893 then in force.
Under section 129(2), CrPC a police officer dispersing an unlawful assembly, is fully competent to arrest any
member of the unlawful assembly, and a person rescuing the person so apprehended is liable under this
section.1894
[s 225.11] Offence
An offence denotes a thing punishable under the IPC or any special or local law.1895 An escapee from a
custody, when being taken before a magistrate for the purpose of being bound over to be of good behaviour, is
not punishable under either section 224 or section 225.1896
The offence under this section is cognizable. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable if
it falls under the first paragraph of the section. The offence falling under the other paragraphs is non-bailable. It
is not compoundable.1897 The cognizance of the offence falling under paragraphs one and two of this section
can be taken within three years from the date of the offence while there is no period of limitation for taking
cognizance of the offence falling under the other paragraphs of this section.1898
[s 225.13] Jurisdiction
The offence is triable as follows:
(a) If it is under the first clause—by any magistrate;
(b) if it falls under clauses (2), (3) or (4)—by a magistrate of the first class;
(c) if it falls under the last clause—by the court of session.

Page 9 of 13
[s 225.14] Charge
That you, on or about the…day of……at…intentionally offered resistance (or illegal obstruction) to the lawful
apprehension of AB for the offence of…under section…of ………[or rescued (or attempted to rescue) the said AB from
the custody in which the said AB was lawfully detained for the offence of…], and that you thereby committed an
offence under section 225, clause….of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
The person who escapes from a lawful apprehension commits an offence punishable under section 224, IPC
and not under this section. Where such a person was charged and convicted under this section and was not
charged under section 224, his conviction was set aside and he was acquitted of the offence.1899
To convict a person of rioting, with a view to attacking the police and obstructing them in the discharge of their
duties, and also to convict him of the substantive offence of so attacking and obstructing, is illegal.1900 Similarly,
a person, who rescues another from lawful custody, must not be sentenced both for the illegal act of rescuing
as well as of using force.1901 Where an accused is convicted under sections 225 and 353 for offences
committed in the course of the same transaction and the magistrate feels that a sentence of imprisonment is
necessary, the proper course for him is to inflict a sentence of imprisonment for each offence and to direct that
the two sentences run concurrently.1902 But where the obstruction has not been such as to constitute a serious
offence, the case does not call for heavy punishment.1903 Where the accused persons, convicted under this
section, were young boys of 18 years, a sentence of one and a half years was held severe and it was reduced
to a rigorous imprisonment of six months only.1904 But the persons who manhandle a public servant in
discharging his duty, and secure the release of a person from lawful apprehension, can plead no circumstance
in extenuation.1905 In a case falling under this section, it is wrong in principle to take recourse to the provisions
of the Probation of Offenders Act in a territory where the law and order situation is alarming.1906 After the
decision of this case the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which was then in force, was repealed with effect
from 1 April 1973 and the provisions of sections 360 and 361 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 have to
be kept in view in disallowing the benefit of being a first offender in appropriate cases thereafter.

Page 10 of 13
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1845 Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Sch, for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
1847 The words “or to” omitted by Act 36 of 1957, section 3 and Sch II.
1848 The word “transportation” omitted by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and schedule (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
1849 The words “penal servitude” were repealed by section 2 of the Criminal Law (Removal of Racial
Discriminations) Act, 1949 (17 of 1949) (w.e.f. 6-4-1949).
1851 Radha Sah v State of Jharkhand, (2007) Cr LJ 2805 (Jhar).
1852 Bhima Gowda v State of Mysore, (1962) Mys LJ 381 .
1853 Salim Mahommad v State of Gujarat, (1972) Cr LJ 1454 , p 1456 (Guj).
1854 Golak Chandra Dutta v State, (1971) Cr LJ 1454 , p 1456 (Guj).
1855 Radha Sah v State of Jharkhand, 2007 Cr LJ 2805 : 2007 (2) BLJR 922 [LNIND 2007 JHAR 2] : 2007 (4) JCR
615 (Jhar).
1856 Satish Chandra Rai v Jadunandan Singh, ILR 26 Cal 748 : 3 Cal WN 741.
1857 Rajani Kanta Pal v Emperor, 5 Cal WN 843.
1858 Abdul Rahiman Sahib v Emperor, AIR 1914 Mad 55 : 15 Cr LJ 439.
1859 Malhu Yadav v State of Bihar, (2002) Cr LJ 2819 (SC).

Page 11 of 13
1860 Alawal v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah 73 , p 74 : 23 Cr LJ 3.
1861 Hamjisab v State, AIR 1966 Mys 20 , p 21 : (1966) Cr LJ 36 .
1862 Taik Pyn v Emperor, 10 Cr LJ 115 (Low Bur) : 5 LBR 21.
1863 Alawal v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah 73 , p 74 : 23 Cr LJ 3; Balai Dey v Emperor, ILR 35 Cal 361; Kalai v Kallu
Chawkidar, ILR 27 Cal 366.
1864 Emperor v Taik Pyn, 1 Weir 210.
1865 R v Kutti, ILR 11 Mad 441; Queen v Degambar Aheer, 21 WR 22.
1866 R v Assam Shureff, 13 WR (Cr) 75.
1867 Bechu Mian v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 344 , p 345 : 31 Cr LJ 465.
1868 Emperor v Taik Pyn, 10 Cr LJ 118; Alawal v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah 73 , p 74 : 23 Cr LJ 32; Balai Dey v
Emperor, ILR 35 Cal 361; Kalai v Kallu Chowkidar, ILR 27 Cal 366.
1870 Stephen’s Digest, Article 162.
1871 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 11(1), 4th Edn reissue, para 326.
1872 Russell on Crime, Vol 1, 12th Edn p 335.
1873 Thangal v State of Kerala, AIR 1961 Ker 331 [LNIND 1960 KER 261] , p 334 : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 774 ; Hamjisab v
State, AIR 1966 Mys 20 , p 21 : (1966) Cr LJ 36 ; Golak Chandra Dutta v State, (1971) Cr LJ 910 , p 911 (Tripura).
1874 Malhu Yadav v State of Bihar, (2002) II CCR 236 (SC).
1875 Bhima Gowda v State of Mysore, (1962) Mys LJ 380 , p 381; Awadhesh Mahto v State of Bihar, (1979) Cr LJ
1275 , p 1278 (Pat) : (1979) BLJ 443 : (1979) BLJR 449 ; Re Kulundalvelu, AIR 1969 Mad 408 [LNIND 1968 MAD 116]
: (1969) Cr LJ 1406 ; Radha Shah v State of Jharkhand, 2007 Cr LJ 2805 : 2007 (2) BLJR 922 [LNIND 2007 JHAR 2] :
2007 (4) JCR 615 (Jhar.).
1876 Re Ghulam Ali, (1883) PR 19 .
1877 The Queen v Chunder Kant Lahore, 12 WR 29; Kallu v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah 3 , p 32 : 23 Cr LJ 449; Golak
Chandra Dutta v State, (1971) Cr LJ 910 (Tripura).
Page 12 of 13
1879 Queen v Degambar Aheer, 21 WR 22.
1880 Mumtaz Khan v State, (1971) All Cr R 213, p 214 : (1970) All WR (HC) 345; Mousi Lal v Emperor, AIR 1918
Pat 252 : 19 Cr LJ 1000; Shayama Charan Majumdar v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 590 : 16 Cal WN 549; Mahommad Ismail v
Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 119 : 37 Cr LJ 462; King v Sridhar, AIR 1941 Rang 180 : 42 Cr LJ 629; Gulabi Mahto v
Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 361 : 41 Cr LJ 742.
1882 Mousi Lal v Emperor, AIR 1918 Pat 252 : 19 Cr LJ 1000 : 5 PLW 226; Mumtaz Khan v State, (1971) All Cr R
213, p 214 : (1970) All WR (HC) 345.
1883 Magna v State, AIR 1954 HP 68 [LNIND 1954 HP 30] , p 69.
1884 Abdul Rahiman Sahib v Emperor, AIR 1914 Mad 55 : 15 Cr LJ 439 : 1 Mad LW 500.
1885 Saryug Prasad v State of Bihar, (1984) BLJ 264 : (1984) Pat LJR 779 .
1886 Ami Lal v State of Rajasthan, (1996) Cr LJ 158 (Raj).
1887 Mahommad Ismail v Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 119 : 37 Cr LJ 462 : ILR 13 Rang 154; King v Sridhar, AIR
1941 Rang 180 : 42 Cr LJ 629; Gulabi Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 361 : 41 Cr LJ 742 : 27 PLT 144.
1888 Keshavlal Harilal v Emperor, AIR 1937 Bom 56 : 39 Cr LJ 267 : (1937) ILR Bom 127 : 38 Bom LR 971;
Krishun Mandar v Emperor, AIR 1926 Pat 424 : 27 Cr LJ 1310 : 5 ILR Pat 533 : 8 PLT 287.
1889 Kalai v Kallu Chawkidar, ILR 27 Cal 366 : 4 Cal WN 252; Purna Chandra v Emperor, AIR 1914 Cal 272
[LNIND 1913 CAL 92] : 14 Cr LJ 494 : ILR 41 Cal 17 : 17 Cal WN 978; Empress of India v Kallu, 3 ILR All 60; Emperor
v Bhagwan Din, AIR 1929 All 435 : 31 Cr LJ 12 : ILR 52 All 203 : (1930) All LJ 242; Jograj Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1940
Pat 693 : 42 Cr LJ 199.
1890 Queen-Empress v Kutti, ILR 11 Mad 441.
1891 Ibid.
1892 Gokul Tatwa v Emperor, AIR 1926 Pat 53 : 26 Cr LJ 1462 : 7 PLT 65; Kesar v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 263 ;
State v Indra Pradhan, AIR 1960 Ori 23 [LNIND 1959 ORI 3] : (1960) Cr LJ 267 ; Bolai De v Emperor, ILR 35 Cal 361.
1893 Kalai v Kallu Chawkidar, ILR 27 Cal 366; Purna Chandra Kundu v Emperor, AIR 1914 Cal 272 [LNIND 1913
CAL 92] : 14 Cr LJ 494; Taik Pyn v Emperor, 10 Cr LJ 118 (Low Bur) : 5 LBR 21.
1894 Queen v Assam Shurreff, 13 WR 75.
1896 Empress v Shasti Chum Napit, ILR 28 Cal 331; Satish Chandra Rai v Jadunandan Singh, ILR 26 Cal 748 : 3
Cal WN 741.
1897 Re Venkatrasubbier, 1 Weir 210.
1898 Sections 468 and 469, CrPC 1973.
1899 Khalaksingh v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) III CCR 465, p 470 (MP).
1900 Kallu v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah 31 , p 32 : 23 Cr LJ 449.
1901 Golak Chandra Dutta v State, (1971) Cr LJ 910 , p 911–12.
1902 Magna v State, AIR 1954 HP 68 [LNIND 1954 HP 30] , p 70–72 : (1954) Cr LJ 1472 .
Page 13 of 13
1903 Bechu Mian v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 344 , p 345 : 31 Cr LJ 465.
1904 Bindeshwari Mehta v State, (1973) Pat LJR 432 .
1905 Hamjisab v State, AIR 1966 Mys 20 , 21 : (1966) Cr LJ 36 .
1906 Golak Chandra Dutta v State, (1971) Cr LJ 910 , p 911 (Tri).
End of Document
[s 225A] Omission to apprehend, or sufferance of escape, on part of public
servant, in cases not otherwise provided for.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 6
[s 225A] Omission to apprehend, or sufferance of escape, on part of public servant, in cases not otherwise
provided for.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 6
provided for.—
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
1907
[s 225A] Omission to apprehend, or sufferance of escape, on part of
public servant, in cases not otherwise provided for.—
Page 4 of 6
provided for.—
Whoever, being a public servant legally bound as such public servant to apprehend, or to keep in confinement,
any person in any case not provided for in section 221, section 222 or section 223, or in any other law for the
time being in force, omits to apprehend that person or suffers him to escape from confinement, shall be
punished—
(a) if he does so intentionally, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both; and
(b) if he does so negligently, with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with
fine, or with both.]
[s 225A.1] Scope
This section is analogous to and supplements sections 221, 222 and 223 and punishes public servants who
intentionally or negligently omit to apprehend, or suffer the escape, of persons liable to be apprehended or
detained in custody, in cases not provided for in those sections or in any other law for the time being in force.
This being a general provision for cases not provided for elsewhere, it is necessary before it is applied, to see
that there is no other specific provision, in this Code or elsewhere, applicable to the case.
Chapter IV (General Exception), chapter V (of Abetment) and chapter XXIII (of Attempts to Commit Offences)
apply to sections 225A and 225B1908 also.
Section 225A which was first inserted in the IPC by section 9 of the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1870
(27 of 1870), ran as follows:
Whoever escapes or attempts to escape, from any custody in which he is lawfully detained for failing, under the Code
of Criminal Procedure, to furnish security for good behaviour, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
It was intended to supplement the provisions of section 224, which extend only to resistance to, or escape from
custody for an offence under the IPC, and not to custody under section 123, CrPC for failing to furnish security
for good behaviour.
By section 24 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1886 (10 of 1886), it was substituted by the present
section 225A and the old section was absorbed in the newly inserted section 225B.
[s 225A.3] “Public Servant”—Meaning of
[s 225A.4] “Legally Bound”—Meaning of
Notes to sections 43 and 223 may be referred to.

Page 5 of 6
provided for.—
[s 225A.5] “Confinement”—Meaning of
Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is independent of chapter VIII of the IPC, although
proceedings under that chapter may follow an arrest under section 41 as a natural sequence. An officer in
charge of a police station can, therefore, arrest or cause to be arrested, without a warrant or order of a
magistrate, any person who is by repute a habitual robber, house-breaker or thief, or otherwise comes within
the scope of section 110.1909 And where such a person is arrested, without a warrant or order of a magistrate,
the confinement of that person is legal custody within the meaning of section 225A.1910
[s 225A.6] “Negligently”—Meaning of
Where a person properly arrested is confined in a room, an omission to secure the door of the room, thereby
allowing the prisoner to escape from custody, amounts to negligence.1911
The offence under this section is not cognizable. If the offence is under clause (a) a warrant shall ordinarily
issue in the first instance and if it is under clause (b), a summons will issue. The offence is bailable but not
compoundable. An offence under clause (a) is triable by a magistrate of the first class and the one under clause
(b) is triable by any magistrate.1912 The period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this
section is three years.
[s 225A.8] Charge
That you, on or about the………day of………at………being a public servant legally bound as such public servant to
apprehend (or to keep in confinement) one AB intentionally (or negligently) omitted to apprehend the said AB (or
suffered the said AB to escape from confinement) and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under section
225A of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried (by this court) on the said charge.
[s 225A.9] Proof
In order to establish an offence under this section the prosecution has to prove:
(b) that he was legally bound to apprehend, or keep in confinement, the person in question;
(c) that he omitted to apprehend that person, or suffered him to escape from confinements;
Page 6 of 6
provided for.—
(d) that he did so intentionally [or negligently for clause (b)];
(e) that the offence does not fall under sections 221, 222 or 223 or any other law for the time being in
force.
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1907 Sections 225A and 225B subs. by Act 10 of 1886, section 24(1), for section 225A, which had been ins. by Act
27 of 1870, section 9.
1908 Section 13 of Act 27 of 1870 as amended by Act 2 of 1891.
1909 Emperor v Nepal, ILR 35 All 407.
1910 Ramnandan Singh v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 103 , p 104 : 31 Cr LJ 717.
1911 Ibid.
1912 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Sch I.
End of Document
[s 225B] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension, or escape or
rescue, in cases not otherwise provided for.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 14
[s 225B] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension, or escape or rescue, in cases not otherwise
provided for.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 14
provided for.—
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
1913
[s 225B] Resistance or obstruction to lawful apprehension, or escape or
rescue, in cases not otherwise provided for.—
Page 4 of 14
provided for.—
Whoever, in any case not provided for in section 224 or section 225 or in any other law for the time being in
force, intentionally offers any resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of himself or of any
other person, or escapes or attempts to escape from any custody in which he is lawfully detained, or rescues or
attempts to rescue any other person from any custody in which that person is lawfully detained, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with
both.]
[s 225B.1] Scope
This section is analogous to, and supplements sections 224 and 225. It applies to cases not provided for in
sections 224 and 225. It was added in order to fill up the lacuna referred to in Empress v Shasti Churn Napit1914
and Queen-Empress v Kandhaia,1915 in which it was held that an escape from custody, when being taken
before a magistrate for the purpose of being bound over to be of good behaviour, is not punishable under either
section 224, or section 225 of the IPC. Now a person, who escapes from police custody while proceedings
under section 109, CrPC are pending against him, commits an offence under this section and not under section
224.1916 This section penalises not only the resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of
oneself, but also that of another. So also it penalises not only the escape from lawful custody but also the
rescue of another from such custody.
The gist of the offence under this section is a resistance or obstruction to a lawful apprehension or an escape or
rescue from a lawful custody or an attempt to secure such an escape or rescue. For a forcible escape from the
custody of a process-server to amount to an offences under this section, two prerequisites must be satisfied
and they are: (a) that the process-server had the legal authority to arrest the accused and (b) that the warrant
on the authority of which he was making the arrest had been legally issued by a competent authority.1917
[s 225B.2] Legislative Changes
This section was inserted in the IPC by section 24 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (10 of 1886), and
absorbs the old section 225A which was originally inserted in the Code by section 9 of the Indian Penal Code
Amendment Act (27 of 1870), and section 65 of the old Civil Procedure Code, which provided for a resistance
to apprehension and an escape from custody in the execution of a process issued by a civil court.
[s 225B.3] Section 225 Distinguished from Sections 130 and 225B
[s 225B.4] Meaning of Intentional Resistance
The meaning of the word “illegal” has been discussed in section 43. An offence under this section is committed
only when the resistance to arrest is intentional, and that can only be when the person who makes the
resistance knows that he is being, or is about to be arrested.1918
[s 225B.4.1] Mere Evasion of Arrest not enough—Some Overt Act Necessary
To constitute the offence of intentionally offering resistance or illegal obstruction to the lawful apprehension of
himself, something more than mere absconding is required; there must be an overt act of resistance or
obstruction, some active opposition by the use or show of force.1919
Merely running away into the house to avoid his arrest in execution of a civil court’s warrant could not be
regarded as a resistance or obstruction.1920 Something more than an evasion of arrest or a mere assertion by
the person sought to be arrested that he would not like to be arrested or that a fight would be the result of such
an arrest, is required to constitute an offence under this section.1921 A person who intentionally resists or
illegally obstructs a police officer in the apprehension of a deserter from the Army or rescues or attempts to
rescue him from the custody of such officer, is guilty of an offence punishable under this section.1922
Page 5 of 14
provided for.—
[s 225B.4.2] Resistance to Arrest by Choukidar
It may seem anomalous that while the law punishes a person who absconds in order to avoid being served with
a summons, notice or order, there should be no provision for punishing one who absconds to avoid arrest under
a warrant. But in the latter case, the law provides certain coercive procedures which may be followed in the
alternative and hence, the recalcitrant does not enjoy impunity. In the case of a warrant issued by a criminal
court, there is the coercive procedure by proclamation and attachment, under sections 82 and 83, CrPC.1923 An
arrest by a choukidar under section 55, CrPC, in pursuance of a written order from an officer in charge of a
police station, is legal; and its resistance is an offence under this section.1924
[s 225B.5] “Lawful Apprehension”—Meaning of
In order to constitute an offence under this section, the apprehension and detention must be lawful, that is to
say, the warrant on which the arrest was made and detention was ordered must satisfy all the due formalities of
law. It does not matter whether that apprehension was not made out, or attempted to be, in good faith.1925 The
statutory rules which involve penal consequences for infringement must be strictly interpreted, and it is the duty
of the prosecution to prove all the essential ingredients that constitute the offence.1926 It must be shown that the
process-server had legal authority to make the arrest, and the warrant of arrest on the authority of which he
was making the arrest was legally issued by a competent authority.1927
[s 225B.5.1] Failure of Charge does not effect Validity of Apprehension
The person from whose custody the rescue is effected or escape made, must have authority to lawfully detain
the person rescued. If the apprehension or detention is not lawful, then his own escaping as well as the
rescuing of such a person by others, is no offence.1928 But where a person, authorised to make an
apprehension makes one, such an apprehension, if it is otherwise within the power and authority of the person
making it, does not become unlawful by reason of the failure of the charge for which the apprehension was
made or attempted.1929
[s 225B.5.2] Arrest—Requirements of
An arrest is a restraint of the liberty of the person and unless there is a submission, an actual contact is
necessary to effect it. There must be a touch or confinement or else an acquiescence. Mere words cannot
constitute an arrest.1930 An arrest under a civil process is not effected unless either the person to be arrested
submits to the arrest or the officer making the arrest actually touches or confines the body of the person to be
arrested. A request to the judgment-debtor by the amin to accompany him to the court is not an arrest as
required by law, where the judgment-debtor is not informed that he is being put under an arrest.1931
[s 225B.6] Resistance to Improper Warrant
Resistance or obstruction to the apprehension of a person is made punishable only if the apprehension was
“lawful”, but where the imposition of a tax, for the non-payment of which warrants are issued, is itself illegal and
ultra vires, the resistance to their execution cannot be punishable.1932
Similarly, a warrant of arrest issued by a magistrate who neglects to record his reasons for issuing the same, as
required by section 87 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is illegal and a person rescuing a witness
arrested on such a warrant is not guilty of an offence under the section.1933
A warrant of arrest which contains a wrong description of the accused, or is not addressed to the person
attempting to execute it, is not a valid warrant, and a conviction under sections 225B and 358, of the accused,
who resisted or used criminal force upon his being arrested under such warrant, is illegal.1934
Where a warrant does not contain the name of the person to be apprehended, the apprehension is not lawful
Page 6 of 14
provided for.—
within the meaning of this section.1935 Under section 70, CrPC every warrant must bear the seal of the court.
Omission of the seal on a warrant renders it void, and a person offering resistance to apprehension under such
a warrant does not commit an offence under this section.1936
Where the warrant of arrest is signed by the deputy nazir, who had not been empowered legally or given any
lawful authority to sign warrants, the fact that it had been the practice for a considerable time for such warrants
to be signed by the deputy nazir cannot make the signing of them by that officer legal, in the absence of due
authorisation, and resistance to such a warrant is not an offence under this section.1937
Where a warrant of arrest was signed by the sheristadar of a civil court, duly authorised to sign them, the
judgment-debtor resisting its execution would be guilty of an offence under this section. But it cannot be
presumed from the mere fact of the sheristadar signing such warrant that he had been duly appointed to sign
warrants. Evidence of the fact of appointment should be given.1938 Even if a notice as well as a warrant for the
arrest of the judgment—debtor were issued simultaneously by the executing court, the apprehension of the
judgment-debtor by the peon executing the warrant of arrest is a lawful apprehension, however mistaken the
executing court may have been in exercising its discretion to direct that apprehension, and escape from and
obstruction to that apprehension are unlawful acts under this section.1939
The powers given by section 1 of the CrPC, to the police officer to arrest without a warrant, are only in respect
of cognizable offences. If the person arrested is a child under seven years of age, who under section 82 of the
IPC cannot commit an offence, it is difficult to see how such an arrest can be a lawful apprehension within the
[s 225B.7] Resistance to Arrest without Notifying Substance of Warrant
An arrest by a police officer, acting under a warrant, who does not notify the substance of the warrant to the
person to be arrested, is not a lawful arrest, and resistance to such arrest is not an offence under this
section.1941 An officer armed with a warrant of arrest should produce the warrant before the person sought to be
arrested and make an attempt to arrest him, and if the officer is in fact resisted, then the person sought to be
arrested would be guilty of an offence under this section.1942
[s 225B.8] Bailiff to Show Warrant to Person Arrested
It is not necessary that a bailiff, executing a civil court warrant, should in the first instance show the warrant. It is
sufficient that he should apprise the person to be arrested of the contents of the warrant and show it, if desired.
If the warrant is not shown to the person to be arrested, nor the contents thereof appraised to him before or at
the time of arrest, there is no lawful arrest and as such a resistance does not amount to an offence under this
section.1943
[s 225B.9] “Escape”—Meaning of
A man legally arrested for an offence must submit to be tried and dealt with according to law. If he gains his
liberty before he is delivered by the course of law, he commits the offence of escape. It has been long
established that even when the escape is effected by the consent or the neglect of the person that kept the
prisoner in custody, the latter is no less guilty, as neither such illegal consent nor neglect absolves the prisoner
from the duty of submitting to the judgment of the law.1944
[s 225B.9.1] What amounts to an attempt to Escape
Where the offence is under the first part of the section, there must be an overt act of resistance or
obstruction.1945 But for an offence under the second part, once a man has been apprehended and he effects an
escape, it is immaterial whether at the time of apprehension, he used any force or not and whether the bailiff
was actually present or temporarily absent. What has to be considered is whether he escaped or attempted to
Page 7 of 14
provided for.—
escape. What amounts to an attempt to escape is a matter of inference. Where the action of the accused
person is passive and consists of either standing still or sitting down, it is impossible to hold that an attempt to
escape has begun.1946
[s 225B.9.2] Escape when not Charged with or Convicted of any Offence etc
When the person who escapes or attempts to escape has not been charged with or convicted of an offence and
has not been detained for any offence, his conviction should be under this section and not under section 224.
Where a person escapes from a jail in which he was confined under a warrant, by reason of his having failed to
find security to be of good behaviour, he commits an offence under this section.1947
Where a tahsildar issued a warrant under section 146 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, against certain
defaulting co-sharers, and they were arrested but subsequently they escaped from detention, it was held that
this was an escape from lawful custody within the meaning of this section.1948
A person escaping from police custody while proceeding under section 109, CrPC are being taken against him,
commits an offence under this section and not under section 224 of the Indian Penal Code.1949
[s 225B.10] There can be no custody without arrest
What the section penalises is an escape or an attempt to escape from custody, and there can be no custody if
there was no arrest. An arrest under a civil process is not effected unless either the person to be arrested
submits to the arrest or the officer making the arrest actually touches or confines the body of the person to be
arrested. A mere request by the amin or process-server to the accused, who is to be arrested, to accompany
him to the court, does not amount to an arrest in the absence of any evidence to show that the amin had
informed the accused that he was being arrested and that he submitted to the arrest or that the amin in fact
touched the body of that accused to evidence the fact of arrest.1950
[s 225B.10.1] Custody to be Lawful
This section requires that the custody from which a man tries to escape must be a lawful custody, he must have
been lawfully arrested and detained; then only he is liable to conviction under this section.1951
If a person, who is not under lawful custody or lawful detention, escapes from such detention, he commits no
offence.1952
The person from whose custody the rescue is effected or escape made, must have an authority to lawfully
detain the person rescued, otherwise no offence is committed in effecting the rescue.1953
[s 225B.10.2] Right of the Person Sought to be Arrested
A person about to be arrested is entitled to know under what power the constable is arresting him, and if he
specifies a certain power, which he knows that the constable has not got, he is entitled to object to such arrest
and escape from custody, such custody not being a lawful one.1954
Page 8 of 14
provided for.—
Where an inspector of police catches hold of the wrist of the accused without informing him for what offence he
was being arrested, the accused wrenching himself free is not guilty of any offence under the Indian Penal
Code.1955
Sections 41, 42, 43, 49, 50A, 56 and 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731956 may be referred to.
[s 225B.10.3] Delegation of Power to Sign Warrant
When a district munsif passes a general order that all warrants of arrest ordered by the court should thereafter
be signed by the head clerk of his office, the delegation of the power to sign the warrants is made by the court,
and not by the district munsif personally, and the delegation is made to the head clerk and to any particular or
one time head clerk. A warrant of arrest ordered by the successor of the district munsif and signed by the
person holding the office of the head clerk at the time, is a valid warrant and a person arrested under the
warrant, and escaping from custody is liable under this section.1957 A civil court is not empowered to have a
judgment-debtor in custody of a peon after giving him time to pay up a decretal amount, and if he does so,
detention in the custody of the peon is not lawful within the meaning of this section, so that escape from such
custody is no offence.1958
[s 225B.10.4] Opportunity for Furnishing Fresh Security Necessary
Where a surety giving security under O XXXVIII, rule 1, CPC applies to be discharged, the court shall, under O
XXXVIII, rule 3, “direct the surety to be discharged from his obligation, and shall call upon the defendant to find
fresh security”. If without directing him to find fresh security, the defendant is arrested and detained, the
detention is illegal, and he cannot be convicted under this section for escaping from the custody.1959
A warrant must be issued to some person for execution; and where no name or description of that person is
given in the warrant, the person arrested can have no knowledge that the persons who present the warrant, are
legally authorised to do so. It may be that the person who is arrested is unable to read the warrant and has no
knowledge as to whether the warrant is or is not properly filled up, but it is the duty of the court to issue a
warrant in proper form, and where a warrant is incomplete, it has been held by more than one High Court, that
the subsequent release (escape or rescue) of a person arrested under such a warrant is not an offence under
this section.1960
[s 225B.10.5] Endorsement on Warrant when Necessary
A warrant had been issued to the nazir, and the nazir, without any endorsement, made it over to a subordinate
official. It was held that the warrant was defective and did not authorise the person who directed the peon to
make the arrest, and that accordingly, an escape from custody in such a case was no offence.1961
[s 225B.11] Rescue
For the definition of “rescue”, the commentary under section 225 may be referred to.
[s 225B.11.1] Rescue indicates Some Overt Act
“Rescuing” indicates some positive overt act on the part of the accused by which the liberation of the person
arrested is effected. Whether there is any such act done by the accused in a particular case would depend on
the facts of each case. When the accused escaped on the instigation of another, it amounts to an abetment of
escape punishable under this section, read with section 109.1962 The person from whose custody the rescue is
effected or escape made must have authority to lawfully detain the person rescued.1963
[s 225B.11.2] Lawful Custody Necessary
It is not illegal for a magistrate to issue a warrant under section 97, CrPC without confining it to any particular
Page 9 of 14
provided for.—
place. But an officer to whom a warrant for searching a person at a particular place is directed, has no power to
make a search outside that place and take the person into custody from a different place. If he does so, the
custody is illegal and rescue from such custody is not an offence under this section.1964 A search warrant was
issued to a police officer to search a house of a particular person to find out a woman who was alleged to be
unlawfully detained. She was not found in that house, but was found in a field and was taken custody of. The
accused rescued her from police custody. It was held that the search not being in accordance with the warrant,
the accused could not be convicted under this section as they did not rescue the woman from lawful custody
within the meaning of this section.1965
Under section 74 of the CrPC, a warrant directed to a police may be executed only by him or by another police
officer whose name is endorsed upon the warrant by the officer to whom it is directed or endorsed, and not by
any other person. When a warrant of arrest is directed to a court sub-inspector for execution, a court head
constable cannot, in his absence, by an order in writing signed by himself, endorse such warrant over to any
process-serving peon for execution. If such peon is obstructed in its execution, a conviction under section
225B, IPC will not stand.1966 A person in lawful custody cannot rescue himself and hence, he cannot be
convicted for rescuing himself from lawful custody.1967
[s 225B.12] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable. A warrant may ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable
but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate. The period of limitation prescribed for taking
cognizance of an offence under this section is one year.
[s 225B.13] Complaint
Sections 195 and 340, CrPC have no application to an offence under this section. In a case under this section,
the proper person to make the complaint is the officer from whom the escape or rescue has been effected, but
a complaint by another person aware of the facts is not a nullity.1968 Every person including the presiding officer
of a court has power to make a complaint as a rule.1969 The High Court did not interfere, in revision, with an
order of acquittal passed by a magistrate of competent jurisdiction, on a prosecution for an alleged offence
under this section, irregularly instituted on a report sent in by the munsif, which was treated as a complaint.1970
[s 225B.14] Charge
That on or about the………day of………you………intentionally offered resistance (or illegal obstruction) to the lawful
apprehension by………of yourself (or of AB), [or escaped from the custody of………in which you were lawfully
detained (or rescued (or attempted to rescue) one AB from the custody of………in which the said AB was then lawfully
detained)], and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 225B of the Indian Penal Code and
[s 225B.15] Proof
Page 10 of 14
provided for.—
In the case of resistance or illegal obstruction, the prosecution must prove:
(a) that there was an attempt to lawfully apprehend the accused or another person;
(b) that the accused offered resistance or illegal obstruction to such apprehension;
(c) that he did so intentionally; and
(d) that the case is not provided for in section 224 or section 225, IPC or in any other law for the time
being in force.
In the case of escape or attempt to escape, the prosecution has to prove
(a) that the accused was lawfully detained in custody;
(b) that he intentionally escaped, or attempted to escape, from such custody; and
(c) that the case is not provided for in section 224 or section 225, IPC or in any other law for the time
being in force.
In the case of rescue or attempt to rescue, the prosecution should prove:
(a) that a certain person was lawfully detained in custody;
(b) that the accused intentionally rescued or attempted to rescue that person from such custody; and
(c) that the case is not provided for in section 224 or section 225, IPC or in any other law for the time
being in force.
[s 225B.16] Onus
The onus to show that the accused is the person against whom the warrant was issued is on the prosecution. It
is not for the accused to show that he is not the person against whom the warrant was issued.1971

Page 11 of 14
provided for.—
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1913 Sections 225A and 225B subs. by Act 10 of 1886, section 24(1), for section 225A, which had been ins. by Act
27 of 1870, section 9.
1914 Empress v Shasti Churn Napit, ILR 8 Cal 331.
1915 Queen-Empress v Kandhaia, 7 ILR All 67.
1916 King Emperor v Khanu Kori, AIR 1925 Sind 193 (1).
1917 Kunhambu Nambiar v State of Kerala, AIR 1957 Ker 174 [LNIND 1957 KER 115] : (1957) Cr LJ 1264 .
1918 GPC Holmes v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 324 : 29 Cr LJ 286.
1919 King-Emperor v Annawadin, AIR 1923 Rang 231 , p 232 : 24 Cr LJ 848.

1920 Emperor v Gajadhar, 11 Cr LJ 721 : 7 All LJ 1174; Emperor v Gun Pal Me Ya, 4 Cr LJ 287.
1921 Aijaz Hussein v Emperor, AIR 1916 All 53 , p 54 : 17 Cr LJ 419; Dewa Singh v Emperor, AIR 1919 Lah 475
(1) : 20 Cr LJ 64; Emperor v Gajadhar, 11 Cr LJ 721.
1922 Emperor v Rahman Ali, 13 Cr LJ 234 : 20 PR 1911 Cr : 47 PWR 912 (Cr).
1923 King-Emperor v Annawadin, AIR 1923 Rang 231 , p 232 : 24 Cr LJ 848.
1924 Bahubal Sircar v Emperor, 3 Cr LJ 201.
1925 Hamjisab v State of Mysore, AIR 1966 Mys 20 , p 21 : (1966) Cr LJ 36 .
1926 State of Kerala v Devassy, AIR 1962 Ker 258 [LNIND 1961 KER 281] , p 261 : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 372 ; King v
Maung Po Shein, AIR 1939 Rang 320 : 40 Cr LJ 845; Dasandhi v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 332 (2) : 29 Cr LJ 265;
Venkayya v State, (1973) Cr LJ 245 , p 246 (AP).
1927 Kunhambu Nambiar v State of Kerala, AIR 1957 Ker 174 [LNIND 1957 KER 115] : (1957) ILR Ker 1586 :
(1957) Cr LJ 1264 ; Kunwar Sen v State, (1968) All WN (HC) 629; Durga Charan Jemadar v Queen-Empress, ILR 27
Cal 457; Re Yedama Subbaramiah, AIR 1934 Mad 206 [LNIND 1934 MAD 4] , p 207 : 35 Cr LJ 782; Venkayya v State,
(1973) Cr LJ 245 (AP); Dy Legal Remembrancer v Mir Sarwar Jan, 6 Cal WN 845.
Page 12 of 14
provided for.—
1928 Public Prosecutor v Annadhan Annamalai, AIR 1954 Mad 321 [LNIND 1952 MAD 176] ; Bolai De v Emperor,
ILR 35 Cal 361; Kesar v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 263 ; King v Shridhar, AIR 1945 Rang 141 ; Vijoy Narain Singh v
Emperor, 22 Pat LT 29; King-Emperor v Lacchu Kamara, AIR 1950 Ori 62 [LNIND 1949 ORI 17] .
1929 Hamjisab v State, AIR 1966 Mys 20 , p 21 : (1966) Cr LJ 36 ; for contrary view, see Ram Chandra Turah v
State of Bihar, AIR 1966 Pat 286 : (1966) Cr LJ 938 ; State of Orissa v Purna Chandra Jena, (2006) Cr LJ 505 (Ori).
1930 Aludomal v Emperor, AIR 1916 Sind 19 , p 20 : 17 Cr LJ 87; Russan v Lucas, (1827) 1 C&P 153; Granger v
Hill, (1838) 4 Bing (NC), 21; Sandon v Jervis, (1859) 28 LJ Ex 156 .
1931 State v Heer Singh, AIR 1961 Raj 156 [LNIND 1960 RAJ 162] , p 157 : (1961) 21 Cr LJ 161 ; Rajni Kanto Pal
v Emperor, 5 Cal WN 843.
1932 Dasondhi v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 382 (1) : 29 Cr LJ 265.
1933 Sukheswar Phukan v R, ILR 38 Cal 789.
1934 Debi Singh v R, ILR 28 Cal 399; Mahommad Bakhshy v R, 1 Cr LJ 1091; R v Gaman, 14 Cr LJ 142; Ghasita
Mal v Emperor, 22 Cr LJ 145; Ulahaman v State of Kerala, (1961) Mad LJ (Cr) 795 : (1961) Ker LJ 695 .
1935 Jogendra Nath Laskar v Hiralal Chandra Paddar, AIR 1924 Cal 959 : 26 Cr LJ 2.
1936 Dasondhi v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 332 , p 333 (2) : 29 Cr LJ 265; Mahajan Sheikh v Emperor, ILR 42 Cal
708; Alter Caufman v Govt of Bombay, ILR 18 Bom 636; Re Phipps, 11 WR 730; Badre Gope v Emperor, AIR 1926 Pat
237 ; Maung Po Shain v Emperor, AIR 1939 Rang 320 ; Re James Hastings, 9 Bom HCR 184; Re Abdul Rahim Beg,
AIR 1920 Mad 352 ; Pangin Bajgir Gossin v State, (1962) 1 Cr LJ 91 : (1960) Raj LW 637 .
1937 Yadama Subbaramaih v Emperor, AIR 1934 Mad 206 [LNIND 1934 MAD 4] , p 207 : 35 Cr LJ 782; Venkayya
v State, (1973) Cr LJ 245 , p 246 (AP).
1938 Dy Legal Remembrancer v Mir Sarwan Jan, 6 Cal WN 845; Venkayya v State, (1973) Cr LJ 245 , p 246 (AP).
1939 Puna Mahton v Emperor, AIR 1932 Pat 315 : ILR 11 Pat 743 : 13 PLT 502.
1940 Re Santa Cruz Morais, 16 Cr LJ 602, p 603.
1941 Satish Chandra v Jodu Nandan, ILR 26 Cal 748; Abdul Gafur v R, ILR 23 Cal 896.
1942 Aijaz Husain v Emperor, AIR 1916 All 53 , p 54 : 17 Cr LJ 17.
1943 Rajani Kanta Lal v Emperor, 5 Cal LJ 439 : 5 Cal WN 843; Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs
v Barada Kanta Majumdar, AIR 1921 Cal 79 : 23 Cr LJ 247.
1944 Queen-Empress v Mappan, ILR 18 Mad 401 (relying on Russel, 5th Edn p 567; Rosco, 11th Edn p 453 and
Bishop’s Criminal Law, 7th Edn section 1104); Public Prosecutor v Ramasami Konan, ILR 31 Mad 271 : 8 Cr LJ 200;
Jamna Das v Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 708 : 28 Cr LJ 753; Re Mammad Beary, (1955) Cr LJ 569 ; Attiya v Gounden,
AIR 1919 Mad 864 (2) : 20 Cr LJ 208.
Page 13 of 14
provided for.—
1945 Deva Sing v Emperor, 20 Cr LJ 64 : 33 PR 1918 (Cr).

1946 Santa Singh v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 128 (1) : 34 Cr LJ 632 : 34 PLR 668; but see Re Mahommad Beary,
AIR 1955 Mad 157 [LNIND 1954 MAD 161] : (1955) Cr LJ 569 where it has been held to amount to an attempt to
escape.
1947 Muli v Emperor, AIR 1921 All 281 : ILR 43 All 185.
1948 Emperor v Gulab Singh, ILR 32 All 116 : 11 Cr LJ 137.
1949 Emperor v Khanu Kori, AIR 1925 Sind 193 : 25 Cr LJ 462.
1950 State v Heer Singh, AIR 1961 Raj 156 [LNIND 1960 RAJ 162] , 157 : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 151 : (1961) ILR 11 Raj
243 : (1961) Raj LW 227 .
1951 Re Appaswamy Mudali, AIR 1924 Mad 555 , p 556 : 25 Cr LJ 563 : ILR 47 Mad 442 : 46 Mad LJ 447;
Emperor v Ramara, 7 Cr LJ 74 : 4 LBR 103; Emperor v Kham Kori, AIR 1925 Sind 193 (1) : 25 Cr LJ 462; Gograj
Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 696 : 42 Cr LJ 199; Public Prosecutor v Annadham Annamalai, AIR 1954 Mad 321
[LNIND 1952 MAD 176] : (1956) Cr LJ 396 .
1952 Showkat-un-nissa Begum v State of Hyderabad, AIR 1950 Hyd 20 (FB).
1953 Bolai De v Emperor, ILR 35 Cal 361; Kesar v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 263 ; King v Shridhar, AIR 1941 Rang
180 ; Vijoy Narain Singh v Emperor, 22 Pat LT 29; King-Emperor v Lachhu Kamara, AIR 1950 Ori 62 [LNIND 1949 ORI
17] ; Re Somalah, AIR 1945 Mad 409 [LNIND 1944 MAD 245] ; Public Prosecutor v Annadham Annamalai, AIR 1954
Mad 321 [LNIND 1952 MAD 176] ; Emperor v Jaman, 14 Cr LJ 142 : 153 PLR 1913 Cr : 20 PWR 1913 Cr : 16 PR 1913
(Cr).
1954 Public Prosecutor v Annadham Annamali, AIR 1954 Mad 321 [LNIND 1952 MAD 176] , p 324; relying on
Charistie v Leachins Ky, (1947) AG 573; Re Appaswamy, AIR 1924 Mad 555 : 25 Cr LJ 563; Ramji v Emperor, AIR
1936 All 120 : 39 Cr LJ 360.
1955 Moneshwar Bux v Emperor, AIR 1939 Oudh 81 : 40 Cr LJ 221.
1957 Public Prosecutor v Abdul Rajak, AIR 1938 Mad 536 [LNIND 1938 MAD 273] : 39 Cr LJ 685 : (1938) 1 Mad
LJ 667.
1958 Emperor v Madho Singh, AIR 1925 All 328 (2) : 26 Cr LJ 86 : ILR 47 All 409 : 23 All LJ 189.
1959 Gopal Singh v Crown, AIR 1929 Lah 163 : 30 Cr LJ 653 : 30 PLR 147.
1960 Fattu v Emperor, AIR 1932 All 692 : (1932) All LJ 1073; Bansropan Singh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pat 603 : 18
PLT 760.
1961 Jagannath v Emperor, AIR 1932 All 227 : 3 Cr LJ 387 : (1932) All LJ 179.
1962 Thangal v State of Kerala, AIR 1961 Ker 331 [LNIND 1960 KER 261] , p 334 : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 774 .
1963 Public Prosecutor v Annadham Annamalai, AIR 1954 Mad 321 [LNIND 1952 MAD 176] , 324; Bolai De v
Emperor, ILR 35 Cal 361; Kesar v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 263 ; King v Shridhar, AIR 1941 Rang 180 ; Vijoy Narain
Singh v Emperor, 22 Pat LT 29; King-Emperor v Lachhu Kamara, AIR 1950 Ori 62 [LNIND 1949 ORI 17] ; Re Somaiah,
AIR 1945 Mad 409 [LNIND 1944 MAD 245] .
1966 Durga Charan Jemadar v Queen-Empress, 27 Cal 457.
1967 Moti Dusadh v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 479 , p 480 : 41 Cr LJ 381.
1968 Mehr Singh v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 884 , p 885 : 35 Cr LJ 86 : 34 PLR 1020.
1969 Emperor v Balmukund, AIR 1928 Lah 510 : 29 Cr LJ 652 : ILR 9 Lah 678.
1970 Emperor v Madho Singh, AIR 1925 All 318 (2) : 26 Cr LJ 86 : ILR 47 All 409 : 23 All LJ 189.
Page 14 of 14
provided for.—
1971 Debi Singh v R, ILR 28 Cal 399.
End of Document
[s 226] Unlawful return from transportation.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 4
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 4
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
1972[s 226] Unlawful return from transportation.—

This section dealt with unlawful return from transportation, and was omitted by Act 26 of 1955, by which
transportation as a form of punishment itself was abolished, and imprisonment for life substituted in its place.
See Notes to Section 55.]
Page 4 of 4
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1972 Repealed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1995 (26 of 1995), section 117 and Schedule
(w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
End of Document
[s 227] Violation of condition of remission of punishment.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 8
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 8
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever, having accepted any conditional remission of punishment, knowingly violates any condition on which
such remission was granted, shall be punished with the punishment to which he was originally sentenced, if he
has already suffered no part of that punishment, and if he has suffered any part of that punishment, then with
Page 4 of 8
so much of that punishment as he has not already suffered.
[s 227.1] Scope
As Breadt observed, this section deals with the violation of any condition of a remission of punishment, sub-
section (3) of section 432, CrPC also provides for such a violation. Under that sub-section, the effect of the
violation is that the appropriate Government may cancel the remission, and thereupon the person in whose
favour the sentence was remitted may, if at large, be arrested without warrant and remanded to undergo the
unexpired portion of the sentence. This is all that this section also provides for. It does not provide any
punishment for the violation in addition to the punishment to which the person violating was originally
sentenced. The effect of the section is only to cancel the remission, so that the original sentence which was
remitted may be carried out.1973
To this extent this section and section 432, CrPC may appear to overlap each other. But the latter only lays
down the procedure to be followed on a violation of any condition of remission. It provides only for the
cancellation of the remission, but a mere cancellation of the remission cannot revive the sentence remitted, and
there is no sentence to undergo, which the person violating may be remanded to under the latter part of sub-
section (3) of section 432, CrPC. This is why this section is enacted as a piece of substantive law, enabling the
court to re-impose the unexpired portion of the original sentence as a punishment for the violation. No such
difficulty arises with regard to a suspension of sentence. And that is why this section deals only with the
remission of sentence, whereas section 432, CrPC deals with both suspension and remission of sentence.
Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution also provide for a remission of punishment, and such remission may be
on condition. There seems to be no reason why this section should not apply to the violation of the conditions of
such remission.
Section 360 of the CrPC provides for the release of certain offenders on probation of good conduct, instead of
sentencing them to punishment, and sub-sections (8) and (9) of that section provide that if the offender so
released violates any condition of his re cognizance, the court which convicted him, may order his arrest, and
after hearing the case, pass a sentence on him. But the release on probation is not a remission of sentence and
so this section can have no application to it.
This section deals with the violation of the conditions of a remission of punishment. There is a similar provision
in section 432(1)–(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which runs as follows:
S. 432. Power to suspend or remit sentences.—(1) When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an
offence, the appropriate government may, at any time, without conditions or upon any conditions which the person
sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which
he has been sentenced.
(2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the
appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or
confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for
such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such
record thereof as exists.
Page 5 of 8
(3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the appropriate
Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate Government may cancel the suspension or remission, and thereupon the
person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police
officer, without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence.
(4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section may be one to be fulfilled by the
person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will.
(5) The appropriate Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of
sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with:
Provided that in the case of any sentence (other than a sentence of fine) passed on a male person above the age of
eighteen years, no such petition by the person sentenced or by any other person on his behalf shall be entertained,
unless the person sentenced is in jail, and—
(a) where such petition is made by the person sentenced, it is presented through the officer in charge of the jail; or
(b) where such petition is made by any other person, it contains a declaration that the person sentenced is in jail.
(6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any
section of this Code or of any other law which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his
property.
Section 432, CrPC gives the power of remission to the central and state governments, arts 72 and 161 of the
Indian Constitution also give the power of remission to the President of the Union and the governors of states
respectively. There is no mention of any conditional remission in these articles, but it has been held that the
power to suspend a sentence would include the power to attach lawful conditions to it,1974 and so the power to
remit a sentence must be taken to include the power to attach conditions to it.
[s 227.3] Section 227, IPC Distinguished from Section 432(3), CrPC
While section 432(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages the arrest of a person who violates the
conditions of a remission and remand him straightway to jail, section 227 of the Indian Penal Code also
envisages the same act of violation of conditions, prosecution and punishment. If the prosecution succeeds the
result is the same as the consequence contemplated under section 432(3), CrPC, namely remanding of the
person concerned to jail for the rest of his term. In one case, the person is subjected to an executive handling
resulting in his being sent to jail, and in the other he has a trial in a criminal court and he is sent to the jail for an
identical period, but only if he is found guilty. On the other hand, there is a fair trial in a court, and in the other,
there is not even an executive trial. Whether the provisions of section 432(3), CrPC can operate in such
circumstances, is a question for serious deliberation. It cannot be that a person is subjected to a prosecution
Page 6 of 8
under section 227 of the IPC and simultaneously action is taken against him under section 432(3), CrPC. That
would make no sense, however, if it is not cumulative but alternative. To choose between an action under this
Code and an executive action under the CrPC would lead to an arbitrary choice which may result in a violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is difficult to reconcile these provisions. That process is none too easy.1975
[s 227.4] Remission of Punishment
A remission is a reduction in the amount of a sentence, without changing its character. In the case of a
remission, the guilt of the offender is not affected, nor is the sentence of the court affected, except in the sense
that the person concerned does not suffer incarceration for the entire period of the sentence, but is relieved
from serving out a part of it.1976
[s 227.5] Remission and Suspension are not the Same
Remission should not be confused with suspension. Suspension clearly means that the sentence has not been
remitted and it is only kept in abeyance at the pleasure of the person who is authorised to suspend the
sentence, and if no conditions are imposed, then the state Government has the right to have the accused
person re-arrested and direct that he should undergo the rest of the sentence without assigning any reason.
Even a suspension of sentence without any condition, does not amount to a remission of sentence.1977
[s 227.6] “Knowingly Violates any Condition”
In order to make out an offence under this section, it must be proved not only that the accused was granted a
conditional remission of punishment, that he accepted the conditions of the remission, and that he violated one
or more of those conditions, but also that he did so “knowingly”. If the conditions are clear and unambiguous,
and he violates any of them, he may be considered to have done so knowingly. But if the conditions are vague
or ambiguous, the question whether the accused violated them “knowingly” would be a matter of inference from
the nature of the conditions, the status of the accused and the circumstance of the violation.
[s 227.7] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and triable by the court by which
the original offence was triable.1978 In case an accused, convicted of theft and sentenced to a rigorous
imprisonment for six months by the judicial magistrate sadar at Allahabad, after undergoing imprisonment for a
month only, was granted remission on certain conditions and was released but commits the breach of those
conditions at Kanpur then, he is to be tried for committing the offence under this section by the judicial
magistrate sadar, Allahabad or at any other place, where breach of the condition of remission is committed, and
the breach being proved he can be sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five months.
The provisions of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section will be the same as were
applicable to the original offence and have to be determined with the aid of section 468, CrPC.
[s 227.8] Charge
That you, on or about the………day of………were convicted in case No………of………by the court of………and
sentenced to………(mention the punishment) and which punishment was remitted on………by the order of………on
Page 7 of 8
the condition, to wit………and which you accepted and which you knowingly violated in that on or about the………day
of………you………(state the nature of the violation), and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under
[s 227.9] Proof
In a case under this section, it is necessary to prove the following:
(a) the accused person had been convicted and sentenced; (the conviction and its date and the sentence
passed should, under chapter V, Evidence Act, be proved by documentary evidence, ie, by judgment in
the case, the judgment being a public document, it may, under section 65(e), Evidence Act, be proved
by a certified copy; but oral evidence to prove it is not admissible);
(b) the accused person was granted a remission of punishment, on his accepting certain conditions; (again
this must be proved by documentary evidence, that is, by the order granting the remission. Here also a
certified copy of the order is admissible, but no other form of secondary evidence);
(c) the conditions on which the remission was granted; (this again is provable only as above, ie by a
certified copy of the order of remission. The bond executed by the accused should also be put in, or a
certified copy of it.)
(d) the fact that the accused is the person convicted, sentenced and granted remission must be proved
(for this oral evidence is admissible); and
(e) the fact that the accused has knowingly committed a breach of a condition of the remission. (This may
also be proved by oral evidence, but obviously no breach can be proved until the condition itself has
been proved as set out in head (c) above).1979
It is for the court to decide whether a conditionally released prisoner has violated the conditions on which
remission was granted to him or not. Until he has been found guilty under this section, it is not for the jail
authorities to say that he has committed an offence.1980

Page 8 of 8
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1973 Section 2 of Burma Act, 3 of 1928 which provides that “whoever is convicted of absconding in violation of a
condition of a remission of punishment under section 227, Penal Code, shall in addition to the punishment prescribed
by that section, be punished by the convicting magistrate with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to
one year”.
1974 State v Kawas Manichkshaw Nanawati, AIR 1960 Bom 502 [LNIND 1960 BOM 32] , p 508 (FB) : (1960) Cr LJ
1558 : 62 Bom LR 383 : (1960) Nag LJ 371 [LNIND 1960 BOM 32] .
1975 Krishnan Nair v State of Kerala, (1984) Cr LJ 84 , pp 91–92.
1976 Khagendranath Nath v Umesh Chandra Nath, AIR 1958 Assam 183 , p 187.
1977 Jagdish Prasad v Rex, AIR 1949 All 626 [LNIND 1949 ALL 60] , p 627 : 50 Cr LJ 999 : (1950) All LJ 219.
1978 First Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Re RV Ahone Akong, (1872) 9 Bom HCR 356.
1979 Nga Po Ngwe v Emperor, AIR 1929 Rang 278 : 31 Cr LJ 1724 : 7 ILR Rang 355.
1980 Emperor v Nga Po Min, AIR 1933 Rang 28 , p 29 : 34 Cr LJ 447.
End of Document
[s 228] Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial
proceeding.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 19
[s 228] Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding.—
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 19
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
[s 228] Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial

proceeding.—
Whoever, intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public
servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
[s 228.1] Scope
Page 4 of 19
Chapter X of IPC deals with contempt of the lawful authority of public servants in general, whether judicial
officers or not. This section, which is contained in chapter XI, dealing with offences against public justice,
contemplates cases of contempt of court occurring in the presence of the court by insulting the officer or
interrupting the business of the court.1981 This is the only section of the Indian Penal Code which specifically
deals with contempts committed against a judicial officer, that is to say, a court.1982 But as pointed out by the
Supreme Court in Bathina Rama Krishna Reddy v State of Madras,1983 offences under sections 175, 178, 179
and 180 may also, IPC, as section 480 of old CrPC 1898 (new section 345 of the CrPC 1973), shows, amount
to contempt of court if the “public servant” referred to in these sections happens to be a judicial officer in a
particular case. The expression “contempt of court” has not been used as a description of any offence in the
Indian Penal Code, though certain acts which would be punishable as contempt of court in England, are made
offences under it. It is well known that the aim of the contempt proceedings is “to deter men from offering any
indignities to a court of justice”. And an essential feature of the proceeding is the exercise of a summary power
by the court itself in regard to the delinquent. Thus, section 345 of the CrPC, 1973 empowers any civil, criminal
or revenue court to punish summarily, a person who is found guilty of committing any offence under sections
175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 of the IPC, in the view or presence of the court.
An authority presiding over a judicial proceeding is competent to file complaint under section 228 IPC, even
though it does not par take nature of a court. (Amith Vashista v Suresh, 2017 (3) Crimes 405 (SC).
Somewhat similar provisions, with some wider scope, appear in section 345 of the CrPC 1973, which provides
that when such offence (as described in section 228, IPC) is committed in the view and presence of any civil,
criminal or revenue court, the offender may be punished by that very court the same day. In such a case, the
maximum sentence that can be inflicted is a fine of Rs 200, and in default of the payment of the fine, the
offender can be sentenced to a simple imprisonment extending to one month. The court itself acts as a
prosecutor under section 345, CrPC.
[s 228.3] Object
The gravity of the offence under this section is clear from the fact that the court, in such cases, has been given
the extraordinary power of being the complainant, the prosecutor and the judge. The Legislature has thus
manifested its anxiety to maintain and uphold the dignity and prestige of the courts of justice.1984 Such a
summary jurisdiction for contempt is essential to the proper administration of justice, and it is exercised not from
any exaggerated notion of personal dignity, but to prevent instances of indecorum occurring in courts.1985
[s 228.4] Averments Scandalising the Court are Beyond the Scope of this Section
If the averments go beyond and scandalise the court itself, and further impair the administration of justice, they
amount to a contempt of court, and not merely to an offence under this section.1986 What is punishable under
section 228, IPC, is an intentional insult or interruption to any public servant, and not a contempt of court. If the
act complained of, in addition to insulting a judge, also scandalises the court or lowers the authority of the court,
it can be punished as a criminal contempt. Section 228 gives remedy to an aggrieved Judge as an individual.
The contempt of court is not personal to the judge. It is a wrong done to the public.1987
[s 228.5] Criminal Contempt—Object of
The object of a contempt proceeding is therefore, not to afford protection to judges personally, from imputations
to which they may be exposed to as individuals; it is intended to be a protection to the public, whose interests
would be very much affected, if by the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the
sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it, is weakened.1988
[s 228.6] Scandalising the Court—What is?
There are indeed innumerable ways by which attempts can be made to hinder or obstruct the due
administration of justice in courts. One type of such interference is found in cases where there is an act or
publication which amounts to scandalising the court itself. This scandalising might manifest itself in various
ways, but, in substance, it is an attack on the individual judges, or the court as a whole, with or without
Page 5 of 19
reference to particular cases, casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions upon the character or ability of
the judges. Such conduct is punished as contempt for the reason that it tends to create a distrust in the popular
mind and impair the confidence of people in the courts, which are of prime importance to litigants, for the
protection of their rights and liberties. When attacks or comments are made on a Judge or judges, which are
disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a
libel on the Judge and what amounts really to a contempt of court. The fact that a statement is defamatory so
far as the Judge is concerned, it does not necessarily make it a contempt. A defamatory attack on a Judge may
be a libel, so far as the Judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a
proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to
interfere with the due course of justice or the proper administration of law by such court, it can be punished
summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the Judge personally, while the other is a wrong done to the
public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding
the integrity, ability or fairness of the judge, or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete
reliance upon the court’s administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the
Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties.1989
[s 228.7] Section 228 and Contempt of Court—Distinction
What is made punishable under section 228, IPC is the offence of intentional insult to a Judge or interruption of
court proceedings but not as a contempt of court. The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include
any act by a person which would either scandalise the court or which would tend to interfere with the
administration of justice. It would also include any act which lowers the authority of the court or prejudices or
interferes with the due course of any judicial proceeding. It is not limited to the offering of intentional insult to the
Judge or interruption of the judicial proceedings.1990
[s 228.8] Powers to be Used in Exceptional Cases
The power conferred under this section, would be used only in exceptional cases. The courts, taking action
under this section, ought not to give room for the impression that they are unduly sensitive about their dignity.
Proceedings under this section on trivial matters will have a tendency to interfere with the proper administration
of justice, as they would put the party in fear of possible summary punishment for acts which may be innocently
committed.1991
Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (1971 Act) defines “contempt of court”. Clauses (b) and (c) of
section 2 define “civil contempt” and “criminal contempt” respectively. Section 10 of the 1971 Act, which
corresponds to section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, states that every High Court shall have and
exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in
respect of contempt of courts subordinate to it, as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself. The
proviso to section 10 of the 1971 Act provides that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged
to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it, where such contempt is an offence punishable
under the Indian Penal Code.
The words “where such contempt is an offence” as used in the proviso to section 10 of the 1971 Act, came for
interpretation before the Supreme Court in some cases and it has been held that the proviso excludes the
jurisdiction of the High Court only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute a contempt of a subordinate
court, are punishable as contempt under the specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not where these
acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian
Penal Code.1992 In another case the Supreme Court observed:
The true test is: Is the act complained of an offence under section 228, Indian Penal Code, or is it something more than
that? If in its true nature and effect, the act complained of is really ‘scandalising the court’ rather than a mere insult
then….the jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted.1993
Page 6 of 19
Where an act is not punishable as a contempt of court under the provisions of this Code, or for any technical
reason (eg for want of intention), the act does not fall under this section and the proviso to section 10 of the
Contempt of Courts Act has no application.1994 In such cases, the jurisdiction of a High Court to take an action
under section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, is not ousted.
Where the offence of contempt was committed when the matter was before the session court and the same
was covered by the provisions of section 228, IPC, the session court made a reference of contempt of court to
the High Court under sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The High Court sent
back the reference to the session court concerned, for taking action under section 228, IPC against the
contemnor, as the session court had full jurisdiction and the subsequent closure of the case would not take
away the jurisdiction of the court.
[s 228.9] Courts Cannot be Compelled to give “Command Orders”
A judicial officer of the rank of district Judge was attacked in a pre-planned and calculated manner in his court
room and when he tried to protect himself from physical harm by retiring to his chambers, was chased till there
causing injuries to him. The raising of slogans and demanding unconditional bail for accused further
compounded the offence. On three facts, it was held by the Supreme Court that the courts cannot be compelled
to give “command orders”. The act committed amounts to deliberate interference with the discharge of duty of a
judicial officer by intimidation apart from scandalising and lowering the dignity of the court and interference with
the administration of justice. The effect of such an act is not confined to a particular court or a district, or the
State, it has the tendency to effect the entire judiciary in the country. It is a dangerous trend. Such a trend has
to be curbed. If for passing judicial orders to the annoyance of the police the presiding officers of the courts are
to be assaulted and humiliated the judicial system in the country would collapse.1995
[s 228.10] Essential Ingredients of Offence
The essential ingredients of the office under this section are (a) intention, (b) insult or interruption to a public
servant, and (c) the public servant insulted or interrupted must be sitting in any stage of a judicial
proceeding.1996
[s 228.10.1] Essence of the Offence
Thus, the essence of the offence is that the offender must do something physical, namely, insult or interrupt a
public servant in any stage of a judicial proceeding, but that is not enough. There is a mental part of the
offence, which should also be taken into consideration, and that mental part is that the offender had the
intention to cause the said insult or interruption. Both these elements must co-exist in order to constitute an
offence under section 228, IPC. The fact that the court feels insulted, is no reason for inferring contempt when
no insult is intended. To put it in a short compass, the elements of an offence under this section are both
objective and subjective. Objective in the sense that the factum or interruption must be there and subjective,
because the same, has to be accompanied by an intention on the part of the offender to commit the same, and
the entire thing must take place against the back-drop of a judicial proceeding.1997
[s 228.11] Section 228, IPC and Section 345, CrPC Distinguished
The difference between the two sections is that while section 345 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers
a civil, criminal or revenue court to take action when an offence as described in sections 175, 178, 179, 190 or
228 of the IPC is committed in its presence, section 228 of the Indian Penal Code empowers any public servant
to take action when a person intentionally offers insult or causes interruption to him, while he is sitting in any
stage of a judicial proceeding. Section 345, CrPC empowers the courts referred to therein to take action not
only when offence is committed under section 228 of the IPC but also under the other sections referred to
therein whereas the power conferred under section 228 on a public servant is limited only to the extent that if
any person offers insult or causes any interruption to him while he is sitting in any stage of a judicial
proceeding, he can punish such person.1998
[s 228.12] “Intentionally Offers any Insult or Causes any Interruption”— Meaning of

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To constitute an offence under this section, the act must be done intentionally and with intent to insult the
court.1999 It has been repeatedly held that the chief ingredient of the offence contemplated by this section is the
intention of the offender, and that the question is not whether a judicial officer felt insulted, but whether an insult
was actually offered and intended. A judicial officer is no doubt fully entitled to maintain the dignity of the court,
but, as often pointed out, he should not be too sensitive and too ready to take offence where none is
intended.2000 The mere fact that a judicial officer feels insulted is of no consequence. The intention of the
alleged offender must be looked into. The Allahabad High Court has held that in order to render an accused
liable under section 228 of the IPC, it is not merely necessary that the judicial officer felt insulted, but it has to
be seen whether any insult was intended. This section makes it quite clear that the insult or interruption must be
intentional. It is not enough that the work of the court was in fact interrupted.2001 If the facts and circumstances
show that he intended to cause an insult or interruption, his act may amount to an offence under this section. If
they show that he had no such intention, his act cannot be held to amount to that offence.2002 It is, therefore,
essential that a judicial officer, while exercising the extraordinary powers of convicting a person for contempt of
court, must never allow his personal feelings to have any weight or importance, because those powers have
been conferred on him exclusively for the purpose of supporting the dignity of his important office, and not for
upholding his own vanity. A judicial office, being in sacred trust of the presiding officer, is expected never to be
influenced or swayed in making its decisions in this connection, by feelings of personal retaliation. It is only by
sustaining and keeping in view this high standard, that public confidence in the integrity of the courts, which is
so vital to our form of government, can be maintained.2003
[s 228.12.1] Intention not to be Confused with Knowledge
Intention should not be confused with knowledge. There must be clear proof of intention to insult. The mere fact
that the accused knew that such would be the consequences of his act, is not sufficient to hold him guilty of an
[s 228.12.2] Merely Uttering Words without Intending to Insult or Interrupt not an Offence
Merely uttering words, or not keeping silence, can hardly be construed as an intentional insult or
interruption.2005 Where a magistrate said that the proceedings in his court were interrupted by an audible
remark made by the accused, and there are no materials on which the magistrate could have come to the
conclusion that the accused intended to insult him or interrupt his proceedings, it cannot be said that an offence
under this section has been committed.2006
[s 228.12.3] Intention is to be Inferred from Conduct
An intention is a state of mind which has to be inferred from the conduct of a person. No extraneous evidence
can possibly be led to read the state of the mind of a person. Inferences are to be drawn keeping in view the
ordinary human conduct, the feelings and the working of the mind. Hurling of an abuse on an adversary, in the
view and within the hearing of the presiding officer of the court, suggests an intention to insult the court. The
intention, therefore, in such a case, has to be imputed to the contemner and it cannot be said that it was an
innocent conduct of him, without realising the sanctity and the authority of the court.2007 A contrary view has
been expressed by some High Courts and it has been held that where, however, the remark is not addressed to
a court, even if it is rude or vulgar, it cannot be made the subject matter of an offence under section 228, IPC,
though the court overhears it.2008
[s 228.12.4] Sometimes a Direction may not Amount to an Order of Court
Where a magistrate dismissed a complaint without hearing the complainant’s witnesses or his vakil and then
asked the complainant to call his vakil so that he may go through the order passed, the complainant expressed
surprise at this, and inquired how his complaint could be dismissed without any examination of his witnesses,
and he repeated this several times; it was held that:
whatever, that be, it is clear that after having pronounced the order of dismissal, the Magistrate lost seisin of the matter
and his direction to the complainant to bring his vakil cannot be regarded as an order of the court trying the matter. It
was not unnatural for the petitioner whose case had been summarily dismissed by the magistrate, without hearing his
witnesses or his vakil, to have remarked that the presence of a vakil at that stage was unnecessary. Any disappointed
litigant is likely to make such a statement in such circumstances and there appears to be no justification to import any
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intention to insult the magistrate. After all, courts cannot be over-touchy in such matters.2009
Where a lady litigant, who had a prolonged litigation with her husband, seemed to be very much mentally upset
and made derogatory remarks to the learned magistrate, though there was no justification for such remarks
against the learned magistrate the Allahabad High Court opined that it would have been better if the learned
magistrate had ignored them, considering the mental state of the litigant. It was also held that often, the court
should overlook even unfair, malicious and totally unjustified remarks, as the person making such remarks often
wants publicity for himself and by ignoring them, the court denies him the publicity which he wants.2010 Where a
witness for prosecution in a case being heard by a magistrate, had a scuffle with another person on the
verandah of the court-room, it was held that the witness could have no idea whatever of intentionally insulting
the magistrate and could not be held liable under this section.2011
[s 228.12.5] Aspersions in Transfer Application—Effect of
Where an accused person made an application for the transfer of a case pending against him and inserted in
such application aspersions of a defamatory nature concerning the magistrate who was trying the case, it was
held that there was no intention on the part of the applicant to insult the court, but the intention was merely to
procure a transfer.2012
Where the appellant prayed that he should be given a week’s time for bringing a stay order from the High Court
because he had no hope of getting justice from the court of the district judge, the district Judge stopped
dictating the judgment in the miscellaneous civil appeal, and started proceedings under section 345, CrPC, on
his coming to the conclusion that this application had been moved by the appellant for blackmailing the court
and with an intention of impeding the court of justice, and convicted the appellant. On an appeal before the
High Court, it was held that there was absolutely no question of blackmailing the court and under the
circumstances of the case, it was most natural for the appellant to infer that he would not get justice from that
court. In that application he therefore, expressed his genuine feelings and, therefore, there could be no
intention of blackmailing the court. Such a conclusion can be said to have been drawn by the learned district
Judge only because he developed some prejudice against him. The conviction of the appellant was, therefore,
held to be wholly unjustified.2013
[s 228.12.6] Intention to Offer Insult to be Decided on the Facts etc of each Case
In the similar case of Narotam Das v Emperor,2014 however, York J held that there was an intention to insult the
court and observed that it must be a matter for consideration in each individual case how insulting the
expressions that are used are and whether there was any necessity for the applicant to make use of those
expressions in the application which he was actually making to the court. But in State of Madhya Pradesh v
Ravishankar,2015 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have not accepted these tests and observed: “Whether
there is an intention to offer insult to the magistrate trying the case or not must depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and we do not consider it necessary, nor advisable to lay down any inflexible rule
thereto”. Intention is an inference attaching to the words themselves, and this inference is not rebutted by any
excuse as to the motive with which the accused used the words, or the object that he thought would be attained
by so doing. Intention should not be confused with motive.2016
[s 228.12.7] Coming to Court Badly Drunk—Effect of
Where all that was shown against the accused was that he appeared in the court badly drunk and talked
irrelevantly, and there was nothing to show that he had taken liquor of his own free will before coming to the
court, it was held that it could not be presumed that he had deliberately taken liquor before coming to the court,
and consequently, it could not be held that he intentionally offered insult to, or caused interruption in the
court.2017
Merely appearing in a drunken state in a court is neither offering an insult, nor causing an interruption to the
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presiding officer of the court. Sometimes it is seen that such like persons show more respect to the court than
others who may not have taken liquor. The sine qua non of the offence is the causing of intentional insult to the
court and obstruction to its proceedings. Where these essential factors of this offence are totally missing, this
section is not attracted.2018
If a counsel appears in the court drunk, without any idea of insulting the court, even if the court feels insulted by
his appearing before it in that state, it cannot be said that the he has intentionally insulted it. It cannot be said
that the court’s feeling insulted by his appearing drunk is a natural and probable consequence of the act which
must be presumed to have been intended by him. He cannot be said to have intentionally caused an
interruption; there is nothing to suggest that he ever knew or thought that interruption would be caused by his
appearing drunk before the court.2019
[s 228.12.8] Intentional Disobedience amounts to Offering Insult
An intentional disobedience of an order of the presiding officer of a court, in his presence, must lead to the
conclusion that the person responsible intended, at least, to offer insult to that officer.2020
[s 228.12.9] Refusal to Vacate Seat on being Directed
In this case the petitioner, a party in a civil suit, in the court of a munsif, occupying the front seat in the court
hall, declined to obey the verbal direction of the learned munsif to move out of the seat for accommodating
senior lawyers then standing for want of seats. The petitioner, who was conducting his case without the aid of a
counsel, persisted in claiming the right to sit at the same place. This conduct of the petitioner was treated as an
intentional insult or interruption during the judicial proceedings by the munsif and, exercising his powers under
section 345, CrPC, the petitioner was sentenced to a fine of Rs 150 under section 482, CrPC. The High Court
observed that in a court room, members of the bar have certain privileges, being officers of the court, and even
among the members of the bar, certain special privileges have been conferred on such among them as holding
special position and ranking. Thus, when members of the bar are to stand inside a court room due to lack of
seating facilities, members of the public, even if they are litigants in the same court, cannot claim any right to
occupy the seating facilities available inside the court. It is open to the presiding officer to direct such persons to
vacate, for accommodating members of the bar, if there is no other seating facility available. The above must
be regarded as a rule of practice to be followed in the court hall for the upkeep of discipline and decorum of the
court proceedings. It is held that the learned munsif was right in asking the petitioner to move out of the seat in
the front row as senior advocates were standing in the court, without seating accommodation. As the petitioner
openly defied obeying the said direction given by the court, his conduct amounted to an offence as specified in
section 228 of the IPC. It was further held that the learned munsif was not oversensitive in reacting to the
contumacious conduct of the petitioner. The cussedness, unabashedly and persistently displayed by the
petitioner in open court, warranted the steps adopted by the learned munsif.2021
[s 228.12.10] Whether Delay amounts to Interruption
Where the presiding officer of the court sent for the accused, working as a stenographer in his court, and the
accused told the daffadar, who called him, that he would come after typing the issues dictated by the presiding
officer and the accused went to the presiding officer after typing the issues, it was held that though there was
some delay in this process, there was no intentional interruption to the court by the accused and the accused
could not be convicted under section 228, IPC.2022
[s 228.12.11] Threatening a Witness in the Witness Box—Effect of
In an Allahabad case,2023 an accused person made a threat to a prosecution witness in the box and the
magistrate convicted him under this section. The magistrate himself found that though there was no intention to
insult him, this conduct of the accused had the effect of the magistrate starting at once the proceedings under
section 228 and was taken to amount to an interruption to him while sitting as a court. The sessions Judge in
revision, was of the opinion that if the magistrate thought it his duty to take notice of the threat and start
proceedings under this section, it could not be said that an interruption was caused by the accused himself, and
referred the case to the High Court with a recommendation that the conviction might be quashed. Stuart J
rejected the reference, observing that “the learned sessions Judge has misapprehended the scope of the
section. An accused person, who, during the hearing of the case, makes an impertinent threat to a witness in
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the box, has clearly committed an offence under section 228, IPC.
[s 228.12.12] Only Wilful Error and not Error of Judgment is Material
In all offences in the Indian Penal Code, where the intention is an essential ingredient of the offence, that
intention must be strictly made out by the prosecution and this rule applies to the offence under this section
also.2024 Where a magistrate, misconceiving his powers and exercising a jurisdiction not vested in him by law,
passed an unjustifiable order under section 144, CrPC, restraining a civil court peon from executing a warrant
of arrest, it was held that:
it is not sufficient in such cases for the purpose of visiting a judicial officer with the penal consequences of proceeding
in contempt, simply because he committed an error of judgment, or the order passed by him is in excess of the
authority vested in him. The error must be a wilful error proceeding from improper or corrupt motives in order that the
may be punished for contempt of court.2025
[s 228.12.13] Improperly Dressed
Where a sessions Judge fined an assessor for being “improperly dressed”, it was held that there being no rule
as to the dress of assessors, and there being no suggestion that his dress offends public decency, or was
intended to be insulting to the court, the learned sessions Judge had no jurisdiction to fine the assessor.2026
[s 228.12.14] Disobedience of Court Order by Marrying a Minor
A mere disobedience of an order of the court, by marrying a minor girl while she is in the custody of a guardian
appointed by the court, is not intentionally offering insult or causing interruption within the meaning of this
section.2027
[s 228.13] What Amounts to Insult or Interruption
It has been held that if a remark is not addressed to a court, however rude or vulgar it may be, it cannot be
made the subject of an offence under this section, even if the court happens to overhear it.2028 Vulgar abuse
addressed to the court is certainly an offence under this section.2029 Where on hearing the judgment, one of the
accused addressed the court uttering filthy abuses, making contemptuous statements, which amounted to an
insult to the court, the court had jurisdiction to sentence the accused under section 228, IPC.2030 The use of
vulgar language by a villager to emphasise a denial does constitute an offence under this section.2031 Contempt
may be shown either by language or by manner; and language which may otherwise be unobjectionable if
uttered in a temperate manner, may become highly improper, constituting a punishable contempt, if uttered in a
different and disrespectful manner.2032 Even if the words used are innocuous, the tone employed may change
their innocent character.2033
[s 228.13.1] Prevarication, Retraction or Refusal to give answer to Questions while giving Evidence
Though a mere prevarication, a retraction in giving evidence or a persistent refusal to give direct answers to
questions, do not necessarily constitute an offence under this section, it may, in particular circumstances,
constitute such an interruption to a public servant sitting in a stage of a judicial proceeding as to constitute an
[s 228.13.2] Bidding in Auction Sale without Money
A person who bids at a sale in execution of a decree, knowing that he cannot deposit the earnest money,
commits an offence under this section.2035
[s 228.13.3] Acts not Falling under this Section
Leaving the court when ordered to remain or making signs from outside to a prisoner on his trial2036 or an
absence from the court in disobedience to a summons,2037 or listening to the evidence having been directed to
go away until required as witness,2038 or the walking out of court by a party when asked if he is going to call
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witnesses2039 are not offences under this section. In Re Bhavani Mudalia2040 a person was fined under this
section for chewing betel while under examination as a witness at a trial. In one case it was observed that:
To wilfully impede, hinder, embarrass, interrupt or obstruct the judicial proceedings, or to insult the court, in its
presence, in the course of adjudication of some cause, amounts to undue interference with the administration of justice
and therefore to contempt, and, as such, it can never be tolerated or countenanced by this court. The status or the
official position of the person who chooses to so interrupt is wholly irrelevant. Indeed, the higher the status of a person,
the more responsible conduct and behaviour is expected from him.2041
The mere act of addressing the presiding officer of a court during the pendency of a proceeding does not
amount to culpable interruption. Where the court peon maltreated a gentleman entering the court-room, a
pleader appealed to the presiding officer against the rude behaviour of the peon. It was held that interruption”
as used in this section, contemplates something far more serious and far more obstructive than what was done
by the pleader.2042 Every protest made, in fact, does interrupt the court, but it is its duty to listen to protests how
much so ever they may delay its proceedings. So long as they are made bona fide they do not constitute the
interruption which the section punishes as contempt.2043
Where the letter allegedly written and addressed to the court which interfered with the course of justice but
mostly likely was opened only in chambers by the magistrate when he retired after judicial work, it cannot be
said that letter was received by the magistrate when he was in any stage of the proceedings, hence offence
under section 228 was held not made out.2044
[s 228.13.4] Every Act of Disrespect is not Contempt
If a counsel appears before a court while under the influence of liquor, it may be an act of disrespect to the
court, but as observed in Joseph Orakwrie Izoura v R,2045 not every act of disrespect is contempt. A counsel
appearing in court after consuming liquor, but without being under its influence, does not affect its dignity or
amount to contempt. Even if he argued irrelevantly or incoherently, he does not commit direct contempt. It is a
far-fetched argument that interruption is caused because the counsel cannot work normally, or he argues
irrelevantly, or incoherently, and has to be pulled up by the presiding officer at the expense of some time if the
pending officer’s attention is diverted from the proceeding that he is conducting, either to the appearance or
behaviour of the counsel or to the behaviour of those standing close to him.2046
[s 228.14] Insult or Interruption by Counsel
In a Bombay case2047 it was observed:
The section requires that the insult or interruption of the court should be intentional. In this case there is no evidence of
any intention on the part of the pleader to insult or interrupt the court. The whole affair has been given undue
importance and might have been more quietly settled. Some latitude should be allowed to a member of the bar,
insisting in the conduct of his case upon his question being taken down or his objections noted, where the court thinks
the question inadmissible or the objections untenable. There ought to be a spirit of give and take between the bench
and the bar in such matters and every little persistence on the part of a pleader should not be turned into an occasion
for a criminal trial unless the pleader’s conduct is so clearly vexatious as to lead to the inference that his intention is to
insult or interrupt the court.
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Relying upon the said case, Bombay High Court reaffirmed this position and held that there is no doubt that a
judicial officer is entitled to maintain the dignity of the court, but he should not be too sensitive and too ready to
take offence where none is intended. The law allows some latitude to a member of the bar acting bona fide in
the discharge of his professional duty, so long as his conduct is not so gross as to lead to an inference that his
intention is to insult or interrupt the court.2048
[s 228.14.1] Procedure for Recording Evidence when an Objection is Raised
If a witness, in response to a question put by the court, gives an answer appearing to be different from the one
previously given in response to a question put by the counsel, it is quite natural for the counsel to request the
court to record the previous one also, and the appropriate course for the court would be to record both the
answers. While it is true that the court has the power, and indeed it is its duty, to see that undue advantage is
not taken of the ignorance of witnesses or parties, it is no less the duty of the court to see that there is a faithful
record of the proceedings in court. If, for any reason, the court does not see its way to accept the position
contended for by a counsel, there is nothing unnatural or wrong in the counsel requesting the court to place on
record its ruling. While it cannot be said that the court is bound to record all contentions, objections or
representations, even if they are of a trivial or a frivolous character, it is undoubtedly the court’s duty to record
its decision on any matter of substance that arises in a case. If some time was taken by the counsel in looking
up authorities to satisfy the court about the correctness of the position contended for by him, and if the
discussion took some time and if all this occupied about 20 minutes, it can hardly be said that the petitioner
interrupted the court’s proceedings. If the court refuses to record the question put by the counsel and the
answer to it, and it also refuses to note his objection to the non-recording of that answer, and the counsel
expresses his desire to retire from the case and applies for time to move for a transfer of the case, his conduct
cannot be said to constitute a threat or insult. When under some exceptional provisions the court itself is
constituted both the prosecutor and the judge, it is all the more incumbent upon the presiding officer not to lose
a sense of perspective. While there can be no doubt that it is the duty of all those appearing in court, and more
particularly of the counsel, to conduct themselves with becoming decorum and restraint and to do nothing which
is likely to bring down the prestige or dignity of the court, it is equally essential that no occasion should be given
for any party to feel that he has not been given the fullest opportunity to present his case or that there is not a
fair, substantial and faithful record of the proceedings in court.2049
[s 228.14.2] Mere Persistence in Putting Question not an Insult or Interruption
The mere persistence of an advocate in putting a question again and again to the witness, during cross-
examination could not, by any stretch of imagination, be said to be done with an intention of offering any insult
or to cause any interruption to the court within the meaning of section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, where it is
not suggested that the tone employed by the advocate in persisting the question was such as to create an
impression in the court hall that the decorum of the court was not maintained and insult was being offered to the
court. When no remark was made by the appellant-advocate to derogate the status of the presiding officer of
the court; no gesture was done which would even indirectly suggest that the advocate concerned wanted to run
down the presiding officer of the court or in any manner show any disrespect to the court, it could hardly be said
that such interruption would be an interruption within the meaning of section 228, IPC, so that the offence under
that section could be said to have been established.2050
[s 228.14.3] Hypersensitiveness on One Side and Rudeness on the Other and Ideas of Domination or Servility
to be Avoided
It is true that a lawyer should always conduct himself properly in a court of law, and exert his best at all times to
maintain the dignity of the court, but the court has also a reciprocal duty to perform, and should be not only not
discourteous to a lawyer, but should also try to maintain his respect in the eyes of his clients and the general
public with whom he has to deal in his professional capacity. Hypersensitiveness on the one side or rudeness
on the other must be avoided at all costs. Both the bench and the bar are two arms of the same machinery and
unless they work harmoniously, justice cannot be properly administered. Mutual adjustment, and not mutual
antagonism, should be the end in view on both sides, eliminating all ideas either of domination or of servility.2051
[s 228.14.4] Action under this Section and section 345, CrPC can be taken against Counsel in Appropriate
Cases
The complaint made against the respondent advocate in the order for taking proceedings for committing
contempt of a subordinate court was that the respondent, time and again, appeared in court and that a loud and
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thundering voice was used by him. When asked not to speak in such a loud voice, he responded that he could
not put a silencer in his throat. It was observed by the Delhi High Court that it is desirable that in future, if
anything transpires in a court, which in the view of the presiding officer of the court, amounts to a contempt of
court within the meaning of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the conduct of the contemnor should be reflected
in the order sheet of the court so as to make it possible for the High Court to peruse the order-sheet and come
to a proper conclusion. The High Court further observed: “In any case we would like to remind the court below
that provisions of section 228 of Indian Penal Code, read with section 345, CrPC, can in appropriate cases, be
utilised to the court with due discretion and care, and when their application becomes necessary”. No action for
contempt was taken.2052
[s 228.15] “To any Public Servant”—Meaning of
An offence under this section can arise only in the case of a public servant, while he is sitting in a judicial
proceeding. As to the meaning of “public servant”, see section 21 and notes thereunder. Although an advocate
is a part of the machinery of the administration of justice, he is not a public servant within the meaning of that
expression in this section. So, where a threat was addressed, not to the judge, but to an advocate in his
presence, it was held that the contempt was not punishable under this section.2053
[s 228.16] “Judicial Proceeding”—Meaning of
The expression “judicial proceeding” occurs in section 192, IPC and is explained therein. See notes under
section 192. The expression “in any stage of a judicial proceeding” occurs in section 193, IPC and is explained
therein. Notes under section 193 may be referred to.
[s 228.16.1] “Sitting in a Judicial Proceeding”—Meaning of
This section relates merely to an insult or interruption to a public servant while sitting in a stage of judicial
proceedings. It does not provide against a contempt of court committed by the publication of a libel out of court,
when the court is not sitting.2054 It contemplates only cases of contempt of court occurring in the presence of the
court, by insulting the officer or interrupting the business of the court.2055 What the section requires is that the
public servant must be actually dealing with the matter pertaining to the judicial proceeding at the moment when
insult is offered. When a judicial proceeding is pending on the file of a public servant, he cannot be said to be
sitting over that judicial proceeding all the time, if he is not actually dealing with it.2056 A private interview with a
district magistrate cannot be regarded as a “stage of a judicial proceeding”, even if in consequence of the
interview, he expressed his intention to examine the complainant in whose behalf the interview was sought.2057
It cannot be said that the judicial proceedings of a court, in a particular case, are at an end the moment the
sentence has been passed, and that a prisoner may then insult the Judge with impunity. The judicial
proceedings continue until the prisoner is discharged or removed in custody.2058
Where an order, binding an accused under section 107, CrPC, was pronounced by a magistrate and thereupon,
the person bound down, remarked that the court had acted with zulm, it was held that he was guilty of contempt
of court, and the magistrate was sitting at a stage of a judicial proceeding when the utterance was made by the
accused.2059
Where panches assemble on a particular day to pronounce the judgment in a case, they should be deemed to
be sitting in a stage of a judicial proceeding till their dispersal, unless, of course, the dispersal was delayed.
Where, therefore, the pronouncement of the judgment and the utterance of the threat and abuses to the
panches were almost simultaneous events, it could not be said that the threat and abuses were hurled at a
stage which was not a stage of a judicial proceeding.2060
An insult to a Judge or magistrate may be contained in an application or affidavit presented to him. The practice
as to the filing of applications and affidavits varies from court to court, and in some courts, application and
affidavits are filed within stated hours before the reader or the bench clerk; they are so filed even when the
Judge or magistrate is in the chamber or pre-occupied with some administrative duties. So, in order to establish
the offence under this section, it must be shown that the Judge or magistrate was doing some judicial work
Page 14 of 19
when the application or affidavit was presented.2061
[s 228.16.2] All Proceedings of a Judge are not Judicial
All proceedings of a Judge are not necessarily judicial proceedings. In order to be judicial, a proceeding must
relate in some way to the administration of justice or to the ascertainment of any right or liability.
Demarcation proceedings under the Himachal Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act do not relate, in any way, to the
administration of justice, nor are they directed towards an ascertainment of any right or liability, and are not
therefore, judicial proceedings within the meaning of this section.2062
[s 228.16.3] Functions of Registrar not Judicial
The functions assigned to a registrar and a sub-registrar, in the matter of registering documents, are purely
administrative, and not judicial. A sub-registrar is not, for general purposes, a court and he does not become
one by making an inquiry for the purposes of ascertaining whether he is justified in registering a document
presented for registration. Much less is he a judge.2063 Section 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
however, empowers the state governments to direct that any registrar or sub-registrar appointed under the
Registration Act, 1908 shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 345 and 346 of that
Code.
[s 228.16.4] Public Servant not held to be Court
A settlement officer, appointed under the provisions of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention
of Fragmentation) Act, 19482064 or an assistant settlement officer, appointed under the Bihar Tenancy Act,2065 is
not a civil, criminal or revenue court, and as such, a conviction recorded by him under section 228, IPC, is
without jurisdiction. But an assistant registrar, functioning as a registrar under section 48 of the Bihar and
Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, has been held to be a court, subordinate to the High Court, for the purpose
of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act.2066
An offence under this section is non-cognizable and a summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable. It is triable by the court in which the offence is committed, subject to the
provisions of chapter XXVI of the CrPC, 1973. This offence can also be tried summarily under section 260,
CrPC.2067
The period of limitation prescribed by section 468, CrPC for taking cognizance of an offence under this section
is one year.
[s 228.18] Special Procedure under Sections 345–351, CrPC
Abovementioned sections in CrPC, 19732068 may be referred to.
[s 228.19] Charge
That you on or about the………day of………at………intentionally offered insult (or caused interruption), to
wit………(specify the insult, or interruption) to………a public servant while he was sitting in a stage of a judicial
Page 15 of 19
proceeding, namely………(specify the proceeding), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 228 of
the Indian Penal Code, and within any cognizance.
A presiding officer of a court of justice in this country, representing, as he does, the Indian Republic, is entitled
to respect, and any disrespectful or undue hindrance or interruption in the course of judicial proceeding
constituting, as it does, a challenge to the court’s authority deserves to be severely dealt with.2069
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
1981 Jogendra Narayan Majumdar Chowdhary v Syama Charan Ukil, 6 Cr LJ 405, p 406 : 6 Cal LJ 713.
1982 Jnanendra Prasad Bose v Gopal Prasad Bose, AIR 1933 Pat 204 , p 206 : ILR 12 Pat 172 : 14 PLT 77.
1983 Bathina Rama Krishna Reddy v State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149 [LNIND 1952 SC 6] , p 151 : (1952) Cr LJ
832 : 90 Cur LJ 14 : (1952) 1 Mad LJ 73 : (1952) Mad WN 393.
1984 Capt Gurbakhsh Singh v State, AIR 1960 Punj 211 , p 213 : (1960) Cr LJ 511 ; Re Ramaswamy Gounden,
AIR 1916 Mad 648 [LNIND 1915 MAD 223] : 16 Cr LJ 610.
1985 King v Darson, (1821) 4 B & Ald 329 : 106 ER 958; cited with approval in Emperor v Venkatarao, AIR 1922
Bom 261 : 23 Cr LJ 325 : 24 Bom LR 386.
Page 16 of 19
1986 Advocate General v Amanullakhan, AIR 1967 Mad 162 [LNIND 1966 MAD 53] : (1967) Cr LJ 551 .
1987 Court on its own motion v RK Garg, (1981) Cr LJ 239 , p 241–42 (HP) (DB) : (1980) Cr LT 304; Bathina
Ramakrishna Reddy v State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149 [LNIND 1952 SC 6] : (1952) Cr LJ 832 .
1988 Brahma Prakash Sharma v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 10 [LNIND 1953 SC 59] , pp 13, 14 : (1954)
Cr LJ 238 ; reversing State v Brahma Prakash Sharma, AIR 1950 All 556 [LNIND 1950 ALL 140] (FB).
1989 Brahma Prakash Sharma v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 10 [LNIND 1953 SC 59] , pp 13, 14 : (1954)
Cr LJ 238 ; reversing State v Brahma Prakash, AIR 1950 All 556 [LNIND 1950 ALL 140] (FB); State of Madhya
Pradesh v Revashankar, AIR 1959 SC 102 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] ; Malabar Hill Co-op Housing Society Ltd v KL
Jaubar, AIR 1964 Bom 147 [LNIND 1963 BOM 1] : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 652 : 65 Bom LR 533.
1990 Daroga Singh v BK Pandey, (2004) Cr LJ 2084 (SC).
1991 SN Murthy v State of Mysore, (1974) Cr LJ 211 : (1973) 2 Mys LJ 266 : (1973) Mad LJ (Cr) 598.
1992 Bathina Ramkrihna Reddy v State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 149 [LNIND 1952 SC 6] : (1952) Cr LJ 832 .
1993 State of Madhya Pradesh v Ravashankar, AIR 1959 SC 102 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] : (1959) Cr LJ 251 ; Re
DB, Vohra, (1974) 2 Cr LJ 899 , 901 : (1974) ILR 1 Del 466 (FB).
1994 State of Punjab v Mast Ram Advocate, (1974) CLR 174 ; State v Shankara Charan Sahu, AIR 1952 Ori 215
[LNIND 1952 ORI 34] , p 218 : (1952) Cr LJ 1106 ; State of Uttar Pradesh v Deg Raj Singh, (1983) All Cr R 65 : (1983)
Cr LJ 866 (All) (DB); State v Ratan Shukla, AIR 1956 All 258 [LNIND 1955 ALL 125] (DB) : (1956) Cr LJ 679 .
1995 Daroga Singh v BK Pandey, (2004) Cr LJ 2084 (SC).
1996 State of Madhya Pradesh v Ravashankar, AIR 1959 SC 102 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] , p 105 : (1959) Cr LJ 251 :
(1959) 1 Mad LJ 84 : 61 Punj LR 343 : (1959) SCJ 86 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] ; KC Nanda v Certificate Officer, (1971) Cr
LJ 742 , p 743 : (1970) 36 Cut LT 1282; Court on its own motion v RK Garg, (1980) 7 Cr LT 3304 (HP).
1997 Sahrangshu Kanti v State, AIR 1968 Cal 249 [LNIND 1967 CAL 132] : (1968) Cr LJ 621 ; Court on its own
motion v RK Garg, (1980) 7 Cr LT 304 : (1981) Cr LJ 239 (HP); KC Nanda v Certificate Officer, (1971) Cr LJ 742 , p
743 : (1970) 36 Cut LT 1282; State of Uttar Pradesh v Deg Raj Singh, (1983) Cr LJ 866 , p 870.
1998 Chinubhai Keshavlal Nanavatt v KJ Mehta, (1978) Cr LJ 1040 .
1999 Kiran N Makasare v State of Maharashtra, (1998) ULJ 1939 (DB) : (1999) I CCR 769 (DB).
2000 Purshotam Lal v The Crown, AIR 1925 Lah 210 , p 216; Re Dattatraya Venkatesh Belvi, 1 Cr LJ 612 : 6 Bom
LR 541; State of Uttar Pradesh v Ratan Sukla, AIR 1956 All 258 [LNIND 1955 ALL 125] ; Chhagum Lal Ishwar Das
Shah v Emperor, AIR 1933 Bom 478 : 35 Cr LJ 107 : 25 Bom LR 1025; State v Bhabesh Chandra, AIR 1963 Tripura
50 , p 52 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 668 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v Panna Lal, 1966 Cr LJ 1087 , p 1088 : (1966) MPLJ 373 .
2001 State of Uttar Pradesh v Deg Raj Singh, (1983) Cr LJ 866 , p 870.
2002 Rameshwar Mandal v State, AIR 1960 Pat 309 , p 310 : (1960) Cr LJ 976 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v Panna
Lal, (1966) Cr LJ 1087 , p 1088 : (1966) MPLJ 3373 ; Sahasrangshu Kanti v State, AIR 1968 Cal 249 [LNIND 1967
Page 17 of 19
CAL 132] : (1968) Cr LJ 621 ; Queen Empress v Abdullah Khan, (1898) All WN 145; Murlidhar v Emperor, AIR 1916 All
330 [LNIND 1916 ALL 36] : 17 Cr LJ 163; Salig Ram v Emperor, AIR 1937 All 17 : 38 Cr LJ 416; Ram Nath v State,
AIR 1953 All 59 [LNIND 1952 ALL 59] , 61; Sant Ram Bhatia v State, (1967) All WR (HC) 833; State of Uttar Pradesh v
Ratan Shukla, AIR 1956 All 258 [LNIND 1955 ALL 125] , p 262 : (1956) Cr LJ 679 .
2003 Capt Gurbaksh Singh v State, AIR 1960 Punj 211 , p 213.
2004 (1972) I Cut LR (Cr) 422 : (1972) ILR Cut 692.

2005 Re Surendra Nath Banerjee, 4 Cr LJ 210, 212 : 10 Cal WN 1062.
2006 Re Ramasamy Gounden, AIR 1916 Mad 648 [LNIND 1915 MAD 223] : 16 Cr LJ 610 : 29 Mad LJ 274.
2007 Dhiraj Singh v State, (1974) Kash LJ 245 .
2008 Bamadev Misra v DC Das, (1973) Cr LJ 1064 , p 1065 (Ori) : (1972) 38 Cut LT 1286; Jit Singh v Emperor, 13
Cr LJ 567 : 23 PWR 1912 (Cr); Re Ramasamy Gounden, (1915) 29 Mad LJ 274 : 16 Cr LJ 610; Manghai Ram v
Emperor, AIR 1919 All 330 : 20 Cr LJ 777; Hukumat Rai v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 14 , p 18 : 44 Cr LJ 181.
2009 Puma Chandra Majhi v State, AIR 1956 Ori 28 [LNIND 1955 ORI 10], p 29 : (1954) ILR Cut 706.
2010 Usha Pandey v ACJM II, Basti, (2001) Cr LJ 2836 (All) (DB).
2011 Mangai Ram v Emperor, AIR 1919 All 330 : 20 Cr LJ 777.
2012 Queen-Empress v Abdullah Bhan, (1898) All WN 145; Emperor v Murli Dhar, AIR 1916 All 330 [LNIND 1916
ALL 36] : ILR 38 All 284 : 17 Cr LJ 165 : 14 All LJ 247; Salag Ram v Emperor, AIR 1937 All 171 : 38 Cr LJ 416.
2013 Choudhary Beniram v Ghanshyam Das, (1977) UP Cr C 261.
2014 Narotam Das v Emperor, AIR 1943 All 97 , 99 : (1943) ILR All 186 : 44 Cr LJ 360 : (1942) All LJ 677.
2015 State of Madhya Pradesh v Ravishankar, AIR 1959 SC 102 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] , p 107.
2016 Emperor v Venkatarao Bajirao Mudvedkar, AIR 1922 Bom 261 , p 266 : 23 Cr LJ 325 : ILR 46 Bom 973 : 24
Bom LR 386.
2017 Ramnath v State, AIR 1953 All 59 [LNIND 1952 ALL 59] , p 61.
2018 Ramesh Chand v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1990) 1 Sim LJ 458, p 460 (HC) : (1989) 2 SCJ 1 (HP); State
of Uttar Pradesh v Ratan Shukla, AIR 1956 All 258 [LNIND 1955 ALL 125] relied on.
2019 State of Uttar Pradesh v Ratan Shukla, AIR 1956 All 258 [LNIND 1955 ALL 125] , p 261 : (1956) Cr LJ 679 .
2020 Rameshwar Mandal v State, AIR 1960 Pat 309 , p 310 : (1960) Cr LJ 976 , explaining and distinguishing
High Court Proceedings, 30 November 1878, 1 Weir 215; Re Papa Naiken, 1 Weir 217.
2021 PC Jose v Nanda Kumar, (1994) Cr LJ 682 , pp 683, 686 (Ker).
2022 SN Murthy v State of Mysore, (1974) Cr LJ 211 : (1972) Mad LJ (Cr) 598.
2023 Allas v Emperor, AIR 1923 All 193 (2) : ILR 43 All 272 : 24 Cr LJ 756 : 21 All LJ 72.
2024 Emperor v Venkatarao Baji Rao Mudvedkar, AIR 1922 Bom 261 , p 266.
2025 SS Roy v State of Orissa, AIR 1960 SC 190 : (1960) Cr LJ 282 : (1959) ILR Cut 385 (reversing State v
Sankarcharah Sahu, AIR 1952 Ori 215 [LNIND 1952 ORI 34]), relying on Barton v Field, 4 Moo PCC 273 : 13 ER 307.
2026 Chhaganlal Ishwardas Shah v Emperor, AIR 1933 Bom 478 , p 479 : 35 Cr LJ 107 : 35 Bom LR 1025.
2027 Kaulashia v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 142 , p 143 : 24 Cr LJ 770 : ILR 12 Pat 1 : 14 PLT 605.
2028 Ajit Singh v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 567 : 23 PWR 1912 (Cr); Mahant Hukumat Rai v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 14 , p
18 : 44 Cr LJ 181 : (1943) ILR Lah 791 : 44 PLR 511.
2029 Re Kunhutti, (1934) Mad WN 398.
2030 Re Ram Vishal, (1997) Cr LJ 3736 (MP) (DB).

Page 18 of 19
2031 1 Weir 216.
2032 Capt Gurbakhsh Singh v State, AIR 1960 Punj 211 , p 214.
2033 Mahant Hukumat Rai v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 14 , p 18.
2034 Gopi Chand v Emperor, AIR 1918 Lah 65 : 19 Cr LJ 676 : 90 All LR 1918 : 14 PR 1918 Cr : 24 PWR (Cr)
1918; Queen-Empress v Devji Asa, Unrep Cr C 473; Reg v Jaimal Shravan, 10 Bom HCR (Cr) 69; explaining Reg v
Amba Bin Bhivrao, 4 Bom HCR (Cr) 6; Reg v Pandu Bin v Thaji, 4 Bom HCR 7.
2035 Re Mohesh Chunder, WR 1864, Misc 3.
2036 1 Weir 215.
2037 Ibid.
2038 Ibid.
2039 Ibid.
2040 Re, Bhavani Mudalia, 1 Weir 217.
2041 Capt Gurbaksh Singh v State, AIR 1960 Punj 211, p 214 : (1960) Cr LJ 511.
2042 Mahant Hukumat Rai v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 14 , p 18.

2043 Vijay Rao v State, AIR 1953 Hyd 285 , p 286 : (1953) Cr LJ 1856 , p 1857.
2044 CR Rajasekaran v Judicial Magistrate, Nagapattinam, (2003) Cr LJ 4024 (Mad).
2045 Joseph Orakwrie Izoura v R, (1953) AC 327 , p 336.
2046 State of Uttar Pradesh v Ratan Shukla, AIR 1956 All 258 [LNIND 1955 ALL 125] , pp 262-263.
2047 Re Dattatraya Benkatesh Belvi, 1 Cr LJ 612, p 613 : 6 Bom LR 541; S Narayanabhatta v Special First Class
Magistrate, Sreerangapatna, AIR 1956 Mys 602 .
2048 Kiran N Makasare v State of Maharashtra, (1998) Cr LJ 1939 ; Mustafa Khan v State, (1954) Cr LJ 1008 (Raj).
2049 S Narayanabhatta v Special First Class Magistrate, Sreerangaptna, AIR 1956 Mys 602 , p 612 : (1956) Cr LJ
1415 : (1956) ILR Mys 371.
2050 HB Joshi v State of Gujarat, (1972) Guj LR 548, p 552.
2051 Mahant Hukumatrai v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 14 , p 17.
2052 Court on its own motion v Virinder, (1977) Chandi LR 105.
2053 Damayanti G Chandiramani v S Vaney, AIR 1966 Bom 19 [LNIND 1964 BOM 39] , p 29 : (1965) ILR Bom 619
: 67 Bom LR 380.
2054 Surendra Nath Benerjee v Chief Justice of Bengal, ILR 10 Cal 109, p 130 (PC); Nand Singh v Gram
Panchayat, (1962) 64 Punj LR 868 .
2055 Jogendra Narayan Majumdar Chowdhury v Shyama Charan Ukil, 6 Cr LJ 405 : 6 Cal LJ 713.
2056 KC Nanda v Certificate Officer, (1971) Cr LJ 742 , p 744 : (1970) 36 Cut LT 1282.
2057 Newandram Vishnudas v Emperor, AIR 1948 Sind 97 .
2058 1 Weir 214.
2059 Queen-Empress v Salig Ram, 16 PR 1897.
2060 Asharfi Lal v State, AIR 1952 All 306 [LNIND 1951 ALL 95] .
Page 19 of 19
2061 Section 481(2), CrPC; State of Madhya Pradesh v Revashankar, AIR 1959 SC 102 [LNIND 1958 SC 110] .
2062 Dhani Ram v Sub-Divisional Judge, Theog, AIR 1965 HP 25 [LNIND 1964 HP 4] .
2063 Queen-Empress v Tulja, ILR 12 Bom 36.
2064 Ram Sarup v State, AIR 1965 Punj 454 , p 455 : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 669 .
2065 Nand Singh v Sita Ram Prasad, (1976) BLJR 1 : (1976) Pat LR 149.
2066 Jugal Kishore Sinha v Sitamahi Central Co-op Bank Ltd, AIR 1967 SC 1494 [LNIND 1967 SC 70] : (1967) Cr
LJ 1380 .
2067 Asharfi Lal v State, AIR 1952 All 306 [LNIND 1951 ALL 95] , p 307.
2069 Capt Gurbakhsh Singh v State, AIR 1960 Punj 211 , p 214 : (1960) Cr LJ 571 .
End of Document
[s 228A] Disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences, etc.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 10
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 10
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
2070 [s 228A] Disclosure of identity of the victim of certain offences, etc.—*
(1) Whoever prints or publishes the name or any matter which may make known the identity of any person
against whom an 2071[offence under section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C, section
376D or section 376E] is alleged or found to have been committed (hereafter in this section referred to
Page 4 of 10
as the victim) shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) extends to any printing or publication of the name or any matter which may
make known the identity of the victim if such printing or publication is—
(a) by or under the order in writing of the officer-in-charge of the police station or the police officer
making the investigation into such offence acting in good faith for the purposes of such
investigation; or
(b) by, or with the authorisation in writing of, the victim; or
(c) where the victim is dead or minor or of unsound mind, by, or with the authorisation in writing of, the
next of kin of the victim:
Provided that no such authorisation shall be given by the next of kin to anybody other than the
chairman or the secretary, by whatever name called, of any recognised welfare institution or
organisation.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “recognised welfare institution or

organisation” means a social welfare institution or organisation recognised in this behalf by the
Central or State Government.
(3) Whoever prints or publishes any matter in relation to any proceeding before a court with respect to an
offence referred to in sub-section (1) without the previous permission of such court shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and shall also be
liable to fine.
Explanation.—The printing or publication of the judgment of any High Court or the Supreme Court
does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section.]
[s 228A.1] Scope and Object
An alarmingly large increase in crime against women in the recent past in India, necessitated some drastic
changes in this Code and by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983 and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act,
2013, section 376, IPC, the only section dealing with rape, was substituted by a more effective, rigorous and
exhaustive new section and other new sections 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D and 376E, IPC, were introduced to
deal with sexual intercourse with women not amounting to rape, by persons occupying dominating position in
certain peculiar circumstances. As many sexual offences used to go unpunished for want of information to the
police and other authorities, for fear of humiliation in the public eye, this section was enacted to save the victims
of sexual assaults, punishable under sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C, 376D or 376E, IPC, from undue publicity
and defamation.
The section imposes a ban on the publication of the names or other particulars disclosing the identity of the
victims of the aforesaid offences, without the permission of the police, the victims themselves, or recognised
welfare institutions or organisations. Even the proceedings of cases relating to such offences, before the courts,
and their judgments, except the judgments of High Courts and Supreme Court, cannot be printed or published
without the previous permission of such courts. The breach of these provisions has been made a cognizable
offences by this new section.
[s 228A.2] Rape and Sexual Intercourse—Definition of
The section applies when either there is an allegation or it is found that rape or sexual intercourse as stated
above has been committed with a female. The word ““rape” has been defined by section 375, IPC and means a
sexual intercourse with a woman under the circumstances falling under any of the six clauses of that section.
The term “sexual intercourse” has however, not been defined by this Code. Explanation to section 375 simply
states that penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. This
Page 5 of 10
explanation should also apply to sexual intercourse mentioned in sections 376A, 376B, 376C and 376D, though
the same does not amount to rape. An attempt to commit rape or sexual intercourse or any other sexual
activity, short of penetration, though it may be an offence falling under sections 354, 509 or any of the sections
376, 376A, 376B, 376C or 376D with the aid of section 511, cannot amount to sexual intercourse and the
restrictions imposed by this section will not apply to printing and publishing the name etc. of the victim of that
offence.
By the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013, the definition of rape has been expanded, but the essential
ingredients of the offence of rape remain the same, while the sentence has been enhanced. See commentary
under sections 375, 376, and 376A-E.
[s 228A.3] “Prints or Publishes”—Meaning of
The terms “prints” and “publishes” have not been defined by this Code. The word “print” commonly means to
produce a book, picture or other matter by applying inked types, blocks or plates to paper, vellum etc, and
includes cyclo-styling.2072
The word “publish” according to its dictionary meaning, denotes “to make generally known, make known to a
third party, announce formally, issue copies of books, etc for sale to the public”. According to the Supreme
Court, “publication” is the act of publishing anything; offering it to public or rendering accessible to public
scrutiny; making known of something to the public for a purpose.2073 Publication necessarily implies some act
and the mere knowledge of a person cannot be regarded as publication.2074
Section 499, IPC contemplates that one can publish an imputation by words spoken or intended to be read, or
by signs or by visible representation. Here what is to be published is the name or the particulars sufficient to
disclose the identity of the victim of rape or sexual intercourse contemplated by sub-section (1) and section 499
may not be of any help in the interpretation or appreciation of the provisions of section 228A, and the printing
and publication made punishable under this section should be understood to be made by any common mode of
printing and publication.
When section 228A, IPC has been enacted keeping in view the social object of preventing social victimisation
or ostracism of the victim of a sexual offence, publishing the photographs of such victims in newspapers,
journals and magazines would certainly fall under the category of making disclosure of the identity of the victim
and thereby such act would fall under section 228A, IPC.2075
[s 228A.3.1] Name of Rape Victim should be Avoided in Judgment
The name of a rape victim should not be disclosed.2076 Of course, if it is absolutely unavoidable as, for example,
when framing the charge, the identity of the victim may be disclosed, but not otherwise. Sessions judges would
be well advised to ensure that when they are dealing with cases of sexual offences, the name of the victim
should not be disclosed unless it is unavoidable.2077
Section 228-A of the IPC makes disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences punishable. Printing or
publishing name of any matter which may make known the identity of any person against whom an offence
under sections 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is alleged or found to have been committed can be
punished. The restriction, no doubt, does not relate to printing or publication of judgment by High Court or the
Supreme Court. But keeping in view the social object of preventing social victimisation or ostracism of the victim
of a sexual offence for which section 228-A has been enacted, it would be appropriate that in the judgments, be
it of the Supreme Court, High Court or lower court, the name of the victim should not be indicated. The
Page 6 of 10
Supreme Court had chosen to describe her as “victim” in the judgment.2078
[s 228A.4] Sub-section (2)—Exceptions to the Section
This sub-section serves as an exception to sub-section (1) and permits the printing and publication of the name
or other particulars, making known the identity of the victim of a sexual assault by the following:
(a) the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station or the investigating officer of the case, provided he
does so in good faith and for the purposes of investigation; or
(b) the victim herself; or
(c) the next-of-kin of the victim if she is dead or minor or of unsound mind; or
(d) the chairman or secretary of a recognised welfare institution or organisation, in case he has been
authorised in writing by her next of kin; if the victim is dead or a minor or of unsound mind.
[s 228A.4.1] Authorisation to be in Writing
Where the victim is dead or a minor or of unsound mind, if her next of kin, does not himself resort to printing or
publishing her name and identity, he may disclose the same to the chairman or secretary of a recognised
welfare institution or organisation, authorising him in writing to get the same printed or published. The proviso to
sub-section (2) makes it clear that the next of kin of the deceased or a legally disabled victim cannot authorise
any person or institution other than the chairman or secretary of a recognised welfare institution or organisation,
which according to the explanation to sub-section (2) means a social welfare institution or organisation
recognised in this behalf by the central or state government. Clauses (a) and (b) above also speak of the
authorisation in writing. Such further authorisation in writing by the chairman or secretary of the recognised
welfare institution or organisation is not inferrable from this sub-section, if he decides to act on the authority of
the next-of-kin of the deceased or legally disabled victim. It appears that this sub-section is not happily worded
in some respects.
[s 228A.5] An Offence Referred to in Sub-section (1)
This expression used in sub-section (3) means an offence under section 376, or section 376A, or section 376B,
or section 376C or section 376D of the IPC, mentioned in sub-section (1) and not the offence of printing and
publishing, defined by that sub-section.
[s 228A.6] Sub-section (3)—Court Proceedings not to be Printed or Published
The yellow press, with a profit earning motive, is always interested in covering the day-do-day proceedings of
sensational cases pending in courts and giving wide publicity to such cases and the judgments ultimately
delivered therein. This many a times causes a lot of embarrassment to the victims and also adversely affects
their marriage prospects, if unmarried. To save them from such embarrassment etc, the printing and publishing
of proceedings before a court with respect to offences under sections 376, 376A, 376B, 376C or section 376D,
without the previous permission of such court, has been made a cognizable offence.
[s 228A.6.1] Sub-Section (3) Applies to Certain Judgments also
One commits an offence under this sub-section even while printing or publishing, any matter in relation to any
proceeding before a court, the accused may neither name the victim, nor otherwise disclose her identity. The
explanation to sub-section (3) makes it clear that this sub-section is not confined to the proceedings before a
court up to their termination, but also applies to judgments of trial courts or other subordinate courts. The only
exception permitted by the explanation is that the judgments of the High Courts and the Supreme Court can be
printed or published with immunity, without any prior permission.
[s 228A.6.2] Consideration for Permission

Page 7 of 10
While granting permission, the courts are expected to act with restraint and circumspection, and the permission
to print and publish any matter in relation to such proceeding is not to be granted on a mere asking, otherwise
the very purpose of enacting this sub-section is likely to be defeated. The interest of the victim and the likely
prejudice and embarrassment to her and her family members should be given due consideration when a
permission to print or publish such matters is sought.
An offence under this section is cognizable and bailable, but is not compoundable. It is triable by any
magistrate.
[s 228A.8] Complaint
The general principle is that anybody can set the law in motion, in order to bring to the notice of the court, the
offence committed by the person concerned. According to section 2(d), CrPC, a “complaint” means any
allegation made orally or in writing to a magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some
person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence. Any person, as a public interest litigant, can
approach the court to file the complaint against the accused requesting it to take action against the offence
committed by him under the Code of Criminal Procedure. So, this definition section also makes it clear that
unless there is a specific prohibition, the locus standi of the complainant cannot be questioned.2079 Locus standi
of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence, save and except cases where the statute
creating an offence, provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication and the general
principle gets excluded by such statutory provision.2080
The question arises whether the complaint under section 228A, IPC can be made by any person or by only
either of the three persons mentioned in the sub-section of section 228A, who alone are competent to give
authorisation to publish the name of the victim.
The whole reading of section 228A would only disclose the eligibility of the person who can give an
authorisation or permission to make a publication. It does not provide for the eligibility of the persons who could
file the complaint. In fact, there are so many other sections found available in the CrPC which provide for the
eligibility of the persons who alone can launch a prosecution against the accused. Some of the sections are
sections 195 and 198, CrPC, etc. This provision, namely, section 228A(2) cannot be construed to be analogous
of the same. So, in the absence of any specific prohibition for the filing of a complaint by persons other than
those eligible, it cannot be held that the complaint is not filed by a competent person.2081
[s 228A.9] Charge
I (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name and the accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the………day of………at………printed (or published) the name………(or the particulars sufficient
to ascertain the identity of………) ………(mention the mode or medium) against whom an offence under
section………IPC was alleged (or found to have been committed) without the authority of the person competent to give
Page 8 of 10
such permission, [or printed (or published) a matter………(specify) in relation to case no………before………in respect
of an offence under section………IPC (or the judgment delivered by that court in that case)………(mention the mode or
medium of printing or publishing) without the previous permission of that court] and that you thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 228A(1) (or section 228A(3) as the case may be) of the Indian Penal Code, and
within the cognizance of this Court.
[s 228A.10] Proof
To establish an offence under this section the prosecution has to prove:
(a) that the accused printed or published (a) the name, or (b) some matter sufficient to establish the
identity of the woman;
(b) that against such woman an offence under section 376, or section 376A, or section 376B, or section
376C, or section 376D, IPC was alleged or found to have been committed; and
(c) that the name or the particulars establishing the identity of such woman were printed or published,
without a written order or authorisation by (a) the concerned officer-in-charge of the police station; (b)
the police officer investigating into the case; (c) the victim; (d) the next-of-kin of the victim if she is
dead, or minor or of unsound mind (nor otherwise by any of them); or (e) the chairman or secretary of a
social welfare institution or organisation recognised by the central or state government, duly authorised
in writing by the next-of-kin of the victim, in case she is dead or minor or of unsound mind.
In case the offence falls under sub-section (3) of this section, the prosecution has to prove:
(a) that the accused printed or published any matter in relation to any proceeding before a court, with
respect to an offence under section 376, or section 376A, or section 376B, or section 376C, or section
376D, IPC or the judgment delivered in such case by any court other than a High Court or Supreme
Court; and
(b) that such printing or publication was made without the previous permission of the concerned court.
In either case the burden to prove the order or authorisation or the permission required by sub-section (2) or
(3), shall be on the accused. A mere allegation that rape or sexual intercourse, as contemplated by sub-section
(1), was committed against a particular woman, is sufficient for a prosecution under this section and it is not
necessary to prove that such act, in fact, was committed with her.
Page 9 of 10
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
* See also “The Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2018 (Ord. 2 of 2018)”, published in the Gazette of India, Extra.,
Pt II, section 1, No. 22, dated 21-4-2018 [Appendix].
2071 Subs. by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 (13 of 2013), section 4 (w.e.f. 3-2-2013) for the words,
figures and letters “offence under section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C or section 376D”.
2072 Habibunnissa Begum v LI Corp, AIR 1980 All 147 (DB).
2073 State of Madhya Pradesh v Shri Ram Raghubir Prasad Agarwal, (1979) 4 SCC 686 [LNIND 1979 SC 102] , p
695.
2074 Sporsomanik Siem v Rokendro, AIR 1955 Assam 83 .
2075 National Federation of Indian Women v Govt of Tamil Nadu, 2007 Cr LJ 3385 , p 3387 (Mad) (DB).
2076 State of Punjab v Gurmit Singh, AIR 1996 SC 1393 [LNIND 1996 SC 2903] : (1996) Cr LJ 1728 ; Dinesh v
State of Rajasthan, AIR 2006 SC 1267 [LNIND 2006 SC 151] : (2006) 3 SCC 771 [LNIND 2006 SC 151] : (2006) Cr LJ
1679 (SC); State of Orissa v Sukru Gouda, 2009 Cr LJ 831 (833) (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 1019 [LNIND 2008 SC 2429] :
2008 (16) Scale 189 [LNIND 2008 SC 2429] : (2009) 2 SCC 118 [LNIND 2008 SC 2429] ; Satya Pal, Anand v State of
MP, 2013 (10) Scale 88 [LNINDORD 2014 SC 14442] : II (2015) CCR 7 (SC) : (2014) 4 SCC 800 (Addl. Superintendent
of Police disclosed the identify of the victim of gang rape. Supreme Court issued show cause notice to the Additional.
Superintendent of Police as to why case under section 228A, IPC be not registered against him); Gansu Fatturam v
State of Chhhattisgarh, 2017 Cr LJ 907 (Chhat).
2077 Mohd Alam v State (NCT of Delhi), (2007) Cr LJ 803 (Del) (DB).
2078 Dinesh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 2006 SC 1267 [LNIND 2006 SC 151] : (2006) 3 SCC 771 [LNIND 2006 SC
151] : (2006) Cr LJ 1679 (SC); Hayat Singh v State, (2005) Cr LJ 2473 (Uttaranchal); Bhupinder Sharma v State of HP,
(2004) Cr LJ 1 (SC); State of Karnataka v Puttaraja, (2004) Cr LJ 579 (SC).
2079 R Lakshmipathi v S Ramalingam, (1998) Cr LJ 3683 (Mad).
Page 10 of 10
2080 AR Antulay v Ramdas Srinivas Nayak, AIR 1984 SC 718 [LNIND 1984 SC 42] : (1984) Cr LJ 647 : (1984)
SCC (Cr) 277.
2081 R Lakashmipathi v S Ramalongam, (1998) Cr LJ 3683 (Mad).
End of Document
[s 229] Personation of a juror or assessor.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 6
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 6
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.

Whoever, by personation or otherwise, shall intentionally cause, or knowingly suffer himself to be returned,
empanelled or sworn as a juryman or assessor in any case in which he knows that he is not entitled by law to
be so returned, empanelled or sworn, or knowing himself to have been so returned, empanelled or sworn
contrary to law, shall voluntarily serve on such jury or as such assessor, shall be punished with imprisonment of
Page 4 of 6
either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 229.1] Scope
This section deals with the false personation as a juror or assessor. For other offences dealing with false
personation, see section 140, IPC (personation of soldier or airman), sections 170 and 171, IPC (personating a
public servant); section 171F, IPC (personation in an election) and section 205, IPC (false personation for the
purpose of the act or proceeding in a suit or prosecution).
The system of trial with the aid of assessors was abolished by Act 26 of 1955 and that of trial with the aid of
jury, went with the CrPC 1898 and no similar provision in this respect was made in the CrPC 1973, replacing it
with effect from 1 April 1974. As a matter of fact, the provision regarding juryman and assessor in clause “fifth”
of section 21, IPC and this section should be deleted as they are of mere academic interest now.
The section is in two parts. The first part makes it an offence to intentionally cause, or knowingly suffer oneself
to be returned empanelled or sworn as a juryman, knowing that he is not entitled by law to be so returned,
empanelled or sworn. The second part makes it an offence to voluntarily serve as a juror or assessor, knowing
himself to be returned, empanelled or sworn contrary to law. In the former, he has guilty knowledge before
being returned, empanelled or sworn, whereas in the latter, he has the guilty knowledge after he was returned,
empanelled or sworn.
[s 229.2] “By Personation or Otherwise”—Meaning of
To constitute an offence under this section, it is not necessary that the accused should personate another. It is
enough if he is not entitled to serve as a juror or assessor, and acts in that capacity.
[s 229.3] “Empanelled”—Meaning of
A person was “empanelled” when he was chosen to serve as a juror as provided in sections 276–279, CrPC
1898.
[s 229.4] “Sworn”—Meaning of
Section 281, CrPC, 1898 provided for the jurors chosen, to be sworn under the Indian Oaths Act, 1873, and the
word “sworn” occurring in this section refers to that requirement.
[s 229.5] “Not Entitled by Law to be Returned” etc—Meaning of
Under section 319, CrPC 1898, all persons between the ages of 21 and 60 years were, unless exempted under
section 320 of that Code, liable to serve as jurors. Under section 321, CrPC 1898, the sessions Judge and the
collector or any other officer appointed by the State Government, had to prepare and make out a list of persons
liable to serve as jurors and qualified in the judgment of the sessions Judge and collector or the other officer so
appointed, to serve as such, and not likely to be successfully objected to under section 278, clauses (b)–(h),
both inclusive of the old CrPC. Only the persons included in this list were entitled to serve as jurors. Others
were not so entitled. The section does not apply to persons exempted under section 320, CrPC 1898.
[s 229.6] Procedure
The offence under this section is not cognizable and a summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable and is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
The period of limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this section is three years as prescribed by
section 468, CrPC 1973.
Page 5 of 6
[s 229.7] Charge
That on or about…day of……you (*) intentionally caused (or knowingly suffered yourself) to be returned (or
empanelled or sworn) as a juryman (or assessor) in case No ……of ……tried by…….when you knew that you were not
entitled to be so returned (or empanelled or sworn) (or you, knowing yourself to have been so returned (or empanelled
or sworn) contrary to law, voluntary served on such jury (or as such assessors)], and that you thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 229 of the Indian Penal Code, within my cognizance.
And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge.]
[s 229.8] Proof
In order to establish a charge under this section, the prosecution has to prove:
(a) that the accused was returned, empanelled or sworn as a juror or assessor;
(b) that he was not entitled by law to be so returned or empanelled, or sworn;
(c) that he caused or suffered himself intentionally or knowingly to be so returned, empanelled, or sworn
by personation, or otherwise; and
(d) that he, at the time when he was so returned or empanelled or sworn, knew that he was not entitled to
be so returned or empanelled, or sworn.
Or prove points (i) and (ii) as above, and further:
(a) that the accused knew that he had been returned or empanelled, or sworn contrary to law; and
(b) that he nevertheless voluntarily served in that capacity.

Page 6 of 6
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
End of Document
[s 229A] Failure by person released on bail or bond to appear in Court.—
Justice

11.1 Introduction
Page 2 of 4
(i) False Evidence

IPC).
196, IPC.
Page 3 of 4
11.2 Evidence
under inquiry;
11.3 False Evidence
true.
2082[s 229A] Failure by person released on bail or bond to appear in Court.—

Whoever, having been charged with an offence and released on bail or on bond without sureties, fails without
sufficient cause (the burden of proving which shall lie upon him), to appear in Court in accordance with the
terms of the bail or bond, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to one year, or with fine, or with both.
Page 4 of 4
Explanation.—The punishment under this section is—
(a) in addition to the punishment to which the offender would be liable on a conviction for the offence with
which he has been charged; and
(b) without prejudice to the power of the Court to order forfeiture of the bond.]
Where the trial of the case is not due to the absence of the accused, the accused cannot be prosecuted for
offence under section 229A, IPC.2083
In, the instant case PW1 was examined five years and PW2 was examined seven years after the framing of the
charge, the case was adjourned as the Presiding Officer was on leave, the witnesses had not turned, the trial of
the case could not be said to be delayed due to the absence of the accused, charge under section 229A, IPC
was not framed against the accused.2084
: 50 Cr LJ 350.
2082 Ins. by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 (25 of 2005), section 44(c) (w.e.f. 23-1-2006).
2083 Uddhavrao Nivrutti Sarkale v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1058 (Bom).
2084 Uddhavrao Nivrutti Sarkale v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 1058 (Bom).
End of Document
[s 230] “Coin” defined.—
> R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code > Chapter XII Of Offences Relating to Coin and Government
Stamps
Chapter XII Of Offences Relating to Coin and Government Stamps

12.1. Topical Introduction
Two groups of offences have been dealt with in this chapter: (a) offences in relation to coins (sections 230–254);
and (b) offences in relation to stamps (sections 255–263A).
The offences comprised in this chapter, though very different in character, agree on the point that the intention of
the offender is to produce or to pass off upon another, something which he professes to be what it really is not.
12.1.1 Aim and Object of the Provisions
The authors of the IPC at first proposed to deal with coins in this chapter, but the chapter was afterwards revised to
include stamps.
With regard to offences relating to coins the authors of the Code said:
We have proposed that the Government of India should follow the general practice of governments in punishing more
severely the counterfeiting of its own coin than the counterfeiting of foreign coin. It appears to us peculiarly advisable, under
the present circumstances of India, to make this distinction. It is much to be wished that the Company’s currency may
supersede the numerous coinages which are issued from a crowd of mints in the dominions of the petty Princes of India. It
has appeared to us that this object may be in some degree promoted by the law as we have framed it. That coinage, in
purity of which is guarded by the most rigorous penalties, is likely to be the most pure; and that coinage which is likely to be
the most pure will be the most readily taken in the course of business.
It is not very probably that any person in this country will employ himself in making counterfeit sovereigns or shillings; but
should so improbable an event occur, we think that the King’s coin should have the same protection which is given to the
coin of the local government… It appears to us, however, that the offence of coining, though, in an arbitrary classification, it
may be called by the technical name of treason, is in substance an offence against property and trade, that it is an offence
of very nearly the same kind with the forging of a bank note, and that it would be an offence of exactly the same kind if the
bank note, like the notes of the Bank of England formerly, were in all cases legal tender, or if the coin, like the Company’s
gold mohur at present, were not legal tender. We do not, therefore, conceive that in proposing a law for punishing the
counterfeiting of the King’s coin, we are proposing a law which can reasonably be said to affect any of the royal
prerogatives.1
The offences relating to coins fall into two classes, viz: (a) “Counterfeiting”; and (b) “Alteration”. The sections
relating to each class may be classified as follows:
Page 2 of 8
(I) Counterfeit Coin
(1) Counterfeiting coin Any coin Imprisonment for seven years

(section 231) Imprisonment
Indian coin for Life (section 238) Five
years (section 239)
(2) Possesing counterfeit coin Known to be counterfeit at the Any coin

time of the first possession
thereof.
Known to be counterfeit at the Indian coin Ten years (section 240)

there of.
Not known to be counterfeit Any coin Two years (section 241)
(3) Possession of counterfeit coin known to be counterfeit at Any coin Three years (section 242)
the time of the first possession thereof.
Indian coin Seven years (section 243)
(4) Importing or exporting counterfeit coin Any coin Three years (section 237)
Indian coin Ten years (section 238)
(5) Making or mending, buying or selling instruments for Any coin Three years (section 233)
counterfeiting coin.
(6) Possession of such instruments Any coin Three years (section 235)
(7) Abetment in India of counterfeiting coin out of India Punishable as if the

counterfeiting was done in
India
(II) Offences in Regard of Mints
(1) An employee making coin of wrong weight and Seven years (section 244)
composition.
2) Any person unlawfully removing coining tools from a mint. Seven years (section 245)
(III) “Alteration” of Coin
(1) To diminish weight or change Any coin Three years (section 246)
composition of
(2) To change appearance to pass as of Any coin, Three years (section 248)
different description
Page 3 of 8
(3) Passing altered coin with knowledge Any coin Five years (section 250)
(4) Possession of altered coin with Any coin Three years (section 252)
knowledge
Indian coin Five years (section 253)
(5) Delivery as genuine of an altered Two years (section 254)

coin, but not known to be altered when
first possessed
12.2. Extradition Offences
All offences in this chapter are extradition offences. section 2(c) of the Extradition Act, 1962, defines extradition
offence which means (a) an offence provided for in the extradition treaty, with a foreign state having such treaty,
and (b) in relation to other foreign states and commonwealth countries, an offence specified in the second schedule
or in the notification issued under that schedule. Item 11 of the second schedule relates to “offences relating to
coins and stamps” (sections 230–263A).
This chapter deals with two sorts of money, viz: (a) coin, and (b) Indian coin as defined in section 230, and different
degrees of penalties are in general applied to the same offence when committed as regards the Indian coin.
12.3. History of Coinage in India
The following are a few facts in connection with the Indian coinage which are gleaned from Prinsep’s Indian
Antiquities and also from the historical outline to the catalogue of the coins of the Moghul Emperors in the British
Museum by Mr Stanley Lane Poole. James II by Letters Patent, dated the 12 April 1686, empowered the East India
Company (hereinafter referred to as the Company) to issue at all their forts, copies of the current native coins, and
the Bombay factory was directed to use “such stamps, dies and tools as were common in the country”. For a length
of time, however, all coining by the Company at their own mints was carried on with difficulty. In Bengal, the
Company was for a long time obliged to send their bullion to be coined at the mints of the Nawab of the Province at
Dacca, Patna and Murshidabad, but in 1759, the then Nawab gave the Company permission to establish a mint at
Calcutta. After the battle of Buxar in 1764, when the Moghul Emperor, Shah Alam submitted to the English, the
Company assumed the right of coinage, and the mints at Patna, Dacca and Murshidabad were shortly afterwards
abolished and all the coins for Bengal were struck at Calcutta. Up to 1793, there appears to be little or no distinction
between the Nawab’s and the Company’s coins, but in that year Acts 33 and 34, Geo III, chapter 52 were passed,
by section 24 whereof the civil and military Governments of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal and all the
territorial acquisition and revenues in the kingdoms or provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa were vested in a
governor-general and three counsellors, and by section 40, the governor-general-in-council at Fort William was
empowered to superintend the other Presidencies. Under Regulation 35 of 1793 passed by the governor-general-
in-council on 1 May 1793, rules were made for the reform of the gold and silver coins in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa,
and prohibiting the currency of any gold and silver coins in those provinces, except the 19th san, sikkah rupee and
gold mohur and their respective sub-divisions, and for preventing the counterfeiting or defacing of the coin.
Amongst the rupees mentioned in these Regulations were the Murshidabad and Farrukhabad rupees. A standard
currency was thus established, the coinage struck at Murshidabad in the 19th year of Shah Alam’s reign being
selected as the standard; the result was the coin known as the “19th san” or “sikkah” rupee of Murshidabad. The
standard rupee so adopted had oblique milling on the edges. This milling was continued until the year 1818, when
the milling was changed and straight milling was adopted, and later on, namely from 1832–35, milling was
discarded and a dotted rim on the face of the coin took its place. The upper country in Bengal had been served from
other mints, of which Benaras and Farrukhabad were the chief. The Company’s Farrukhabad mint was founded in
1803 and it issued a rupee in imitation of what was known as the “Lucknow 45 san sikkah” struck at the Fatehgarh
mint of the Moghul, the 45th year of Shah Alam. The mint at Farrukhabad was closed in 1824. These rupees were
also struck at Benares, which was under native control and this mint coined the Company’s coin up to 1830. After
1830, the native mint at Sagar and the Company’s mint at Calcutta issued Farrukhabad coins up to the year 1835.
In September, 1835, the Company established the English coinage with the head of King William IV in place of the
Page 4 of 8
name of the Moghul Emperor and the older issues were ordered to be suppressed.2

3[Coinis metal used for the time being as money, and stamped and issued by the authority of some State or
Sovereign Power in order to be so used.]
Indian coin.—4[Indian coin is metal stamped and issued by the authority of the Government of India in order to
be used as money; and metal which has been so stamped and issued shall continue to be Indian coin for the
purposes of this Chapter, notwithstanding that it may have ceased to be used as money.]
Illustrations
(a) Cowries are not coin.
(b) Lumps of unstamped copper, though used as money, are not coin.
(c) Medals are not coin, in as much as they are not intended to be used as money.
(d) The coin denominated as the Company’s rupee is 5[Indian coin].

6[(e) The “Farrukhabad rupee”, which was formerly used as money under the authority of the
Government of India, is 7[Indian coin] although it is no longer so used.]
[s 230.1] Scope
The IPC draws a distinction between “coins” and “Indian coins”. A “coin” is defined as a metal used for the time
being as money, and stamped and issued by the authority of some State or sovereign power in order to be so
used.8 An “Indian coin” is defined as metal, stamped and issued by the authority of the Government of India in
order to be used as money; and metal which has been so stamped and issued shall continue to be an Indian
coin for the purposes of the IPC,9 notwithstanding that it may have ceased to be used as money.
This section only defines “coin” and “Indian coin”. If an offence is committed in relation to the “Indian coin”
(section 231, IPC), it is almost invariably more heavily punished than if it was committed in relation to money
stamped and issued by a foreign sovereign power.
Before the amendment of this section by the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1872, coin was defined as
“metal stamped by the authority of some government”. At that time section 17 of the IPC defined “government”
as denoting “the person or persons authorised by law to administer the executive Government of any part of
British India”. It thus happened that the coin of the native states of India was not “coin” within the meaning of
the IPC. The definition of “coin” was amended by the Amendment Act of 1872, in order to check the practice of
counterfeiting the copper coin of the Indian states. The words “for the time being” were introduced as it was
suggested that the definition might possibly be held to include old coins, such as those that Graeco-Bactrian
states formerly used as money, but which were now regarded only as a curiosity.
The section was again amended by Act 6 of 1896. The reasons for the amendment were stated as follows:
Page 5 of 8
At present ‘coin’ is defined as metal used for the time being as money, and the consequence is that, if any offence
under these sections has to be proved, it has to be shown that the coin was in use at the time of the offence as money.
There is a process in coinage which is provided for by law, namely, in the Indian Coinage Act, which is termed the
calling in of coin. This gives government an authority which it exercises under certain circumstances to call in coin and
to cause it after a certain time to cease to be used as money. It is extremely doubtful whether if the coin so called in
has been counterfeited, a court would hold that it was in use as money after the date of the proclamation which had
called it in. After a certain time it would certainly cease to be in use as money. This power to call in money has been
exercised in one case—and I think in only one,—namely, that of the Farrukhabad rupee which immediately preceded
the existing government rupee, or, as it was at first called, the Company’s rupee. It was called in 1877. We have
ascertained that this coin has been recently largely manufactured in Bombay. The manufacture has been carried on
perfectly openly, and it has been brought to our notice by some of our Political officers who showed that it was being
imported into Central India and Rajputana in considerable quantities. This manufacture, we are unable, under the
present law, to stop, because that particular coin is not in use at present as money. The immediate practical object of
the change which I propose to the Council to make in the Indian Penal Code is to put a stop to this particular coinage.
But it is obvious that the same necessity may arise in any future case. We may, at any time, find reason to call in any
particular issues of the rupee, and it would be an extremely peculiar state of the law if an act which is today reckoned
so harmful as to be punishable with ten years’ imprisonment should tomorrow become a perfectly innocent one. It is to
protect our action against a consequence of this kind that the measure is proposed
But there is a special necessity peculiar to India which arises in this connection. In a great part of the Native states of
India coin is not current in the same legal sense in which it is current in British India; that is to say, there is no law of
legal tender; and the consequence is that many kinds of coins pass in those Native states from hand to hand, not by
reason of being legal tender, but by reason of each person who receives them knowing that they are customarily
current in his own or other Native states, and that any other person will receive them in the same way as he receives
them. From the fact that these Farrukhabad rupees were imported in such large quantities into Rajputana and Central
India…it seems to me, therefore, that we are under some obligation to the Native states in this matter not to permit a
coin which passes, or which certainly might pass, there from hand to hand as an ordinary circulating coin, to be
fabricated by private individuals in British India.10
Illustration (e) also was added by the same Act.
The word “Central” was added before “Government” and the words “of India” were omitted after the word
“Government” by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Laws) Order 1937. The original second
paragraph was substituted by the present paragraph by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950. The word “had”
was substituted for the word “as” by the Adaptation of Laws Order (Third Amendment) 1951. In illustration (d)
and (e), the words “Indian coin” were substituted for the words “the Queen’s coin” by the Adaptation of Laws
Order 1950.
[s 230.3] Essentials of a Coin
The essentials of a “coin” are: (a) metal used as money; and (b) stamped, and issued under state authority.
section 3 of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906, empowers the Central Government to establish or abolish a mint,
and under section 6 of that Act, coins may be coined at the mint for issue, under the authority of the Central
Government, of such denominations, of such dimensions and designs, and of such metals or of mixed metals,
of such composition as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, determine.
[s 230.4] No Metal to be used as Money without the Authority of the Central Government
Section 3 of the Metal Tokens Act, 1889, prohibits the making of copper or bronze or of any other metal or
Page 6 of 8
mixed metal, whether stamped or unstamped, intended to be used as money except by the authority of the
Central Government. section 6 of the said Act prohibits receipt by local authorities and railways as money or
metal which is not coin.
No piece of copper or bronze or of any other metal or mixed metal, which, whether stamped or unstamped, is
intended to be used as money, shall be made except by the authority of the Central Government.
Section 7 of the Coinage Act, 1906 authorises the Central Government to prescribe the standard weight and
remedy (ie, variation from standard weight and fineness).
[s 230.5] “Used for the Time being as Money”
The word “coin” in this section means a coin which is used for the time being as money, ie, which is current. A
coin which is not current will not be deemed a coin.11
To counterfeit a coin of Emperor Akbar’s time is not an offence under section 231, as the test of “money” is the
possibility of it being used as a current medium of exchange in the market.12 Ancient coins which are out of
circulation are not coins.13
A coin of the time of Emperor Akbar or a gold mohur of the reign of Shah Jahan cannot be deemed to be a
coin, inasmuch as it is not used for the time being as money.14 But in the case of an Indian coin the section
expressly states that the metal which has been stamped and issued by the Government of India shall continue
to be the Indian coin for the purposes of this chapter notwithstanding that it may have ceased to be used as
money. Now a coin may have ceased to be used as money in various ways. It may, for instance, be a coin
which has been superceded, or it may pass into territories of some independent chief where it is not accepted
as legal tender, or it may be that it has been defaced so badly that no one would accept it as a current coin. But
it may still, within the meaning of this section, be deemed to be Indian coin, even though it has ceased to be
used as money. Furthermore, the mere fact that a coin is being used as in an ornament by soldering a ring to it
does not transform it absolutely into a new article. By removal of that ring the coin in a defaced form will re-
appear and may be capable of being accepted by ignorant villagers.15
Illustration (c)—This illustration makes it clear that a medal is not a coin. If a person fraudulently represents it to
be money to an ignorant villager and the latter is deceived thereby, he would be guilty of cheating.
Illustration (e)—The Murshidabad rupee stood on the same footing as the Farrukhabad rupee and are,
therefore, “Indian coins”.16
[s 230.6] Legal Tender not Necessary
It is not necessary, to satisfy the ordinary definition of money, that a coin should be a legal tender receivable at
a value in rupees fixed by the law. Gold mohurs having absolutely no fixed value, but having a current value,
which is not ascertained merely by weighing them as lumps of gold, but attaching to them as coins, are “coin”
for the time being used as money.17
[s 230.7] Extradition
All offences in this chapter18 are “extradition offences”.19 Extradition means delivery of a fugitive criminal or
accused person to another state. Fugitive criminal means an individual who is accused or convicted of an
Page 7 of 8
extradition offence committed within the jurisdiction of a foreign state or a commonwealth country and is, or is
suspected to be, in some part of India.20 Extradition offence has been defined by section 2(c) of the Extradition
Act, 1962 and means an offence provided for in the extradition treaty, in relation to a foreign state having such
treaty and in relation to any other foreign state or a commonwealth country an offence specified in the second
schedule or in the notification issued thereunder.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
2 Emperor v Deni, ILR 28 All 62 : 2 All LJ 498 : (1905) 2 Cr LJ 395.
3 Subs. by Act 19 of 1872, section 1, for the original first paragraph.
4 Subs. by the AO 1950, for the former paragraph.
5 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “the Queen’s coin”.
8 Indian Penal Code, 1860, section 230, para 1.
9 Ibid, sections 230-263A.
10 Gazette of India, 1895, Pt 6, p 320.

11 R v Bapu Yadav and Rama Tulshiram, 11 Bom HCR 172; Emperor v Khushali, ILR 29 All 141 : (1906) 4 Cr LJ 453 .
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Emperor v Khushali, (1907) ILR 29 All 141 : (1906) 29 All 141 : 4 All LJ 453.
15 Mehtab Rai v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 321 , p 323.
16 R v Deni, ILR 28 All 62; Baman v Emperor, 1 PR 1903 (Cr).
17 Regulation v Kunj Beharee, 5 NWPHC 18.

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18 Indian Penal Code 1860, sections 231–263A.
19 See the Extradition Act, 1962.
20 Ibid, 2(f).
End of Document
[s 231] Counterfeiting coin.—
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include stamps.
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thereof.

there of.

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Whoever counterfeits or knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting coin, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
Explanation. —A person commits this offence, who intending to practise deception, or knowing it to be likely
that deception will thereby be practised, causes a genuine coin to appear like a different coin.
[s 231.1] Scope
This section penalises counterfeiting “coin”, and the next section penalises counterfeiting “Indian coin”. In either
case the counterfeiting must be of “coin” and “Indian coin” respectively as defined in section 230, IPC.
The offence of counterfeiting consists in the mere fact of counterfeiting.21 It is not necessary that the counterfeit
coin should be made with the primary intention of it being passed as genuine; it is sufficient if the resemblance
to the genuine coin is so close that it is capable of being passed as such.22 For the detection of counterfeit
coins, one need not be an expert. Experience shows that many have a knack and capacity to mark it out readily
even though the same is mixed up with the good ones.23
The accused appellant was convicted for circulating fake currency notes as guilt of accused had been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.24
[s 231.2] “Counterfeits”
For the meaning of the term “counterfeit”, section 28, IPC and notes thereunder may be referred to.
[s 231.3] Counterfeiting Involves an Intention to Deceive
To be counterfeit within the meaning of the statute, the coin must resemble or be apparently intended to
resemble or pass for a genuine coin,25 but this resemblance is a matter of fact which the court has to Judge
upon the world.26 Thus, counterfeiting with some small variation in the inscription, effigies, or arms, done
probably with intent to evade the law, is yet within it; and so is counterfeiting in a different metal, if in
appearance it be made to resemble the true coin.27 The word “counterfeiting” involves an intention to practise
deceit by causing one thing to resemble another thing28 and when a counterfeit coin is such an imitation of a
genuine one as might deceive people, the presumption of an intention to deceive arises.29 The limitation need
not be exact30 but must be sufficient to deceive persons using customary caution in receiving money. Thus, a
trifling variation in effigies or arms31 or the absence of all marks of this kind, in order to imitate worn coin,32 will
not prevent the coin being counterfeit. But the absence of any apparent resemblance33 is a good defence,
unless it is due to the fact that the process of manufacture has been imperfectly carried out or interrupted at an
early state.34
Thus, where a person was apprehended whilst dipping round blanks of brass silver to aqua fortis which gave
them the appearance of lead, but, when rubbed, they gave the appearance of silver, it was held that he was
guilty of counterfeiting coin.35
[s 231.4] Worn out Impression—Effect

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A blank that is smooth and made like a piece of legal coin, the impression of which is worn out and yet sufficient
to remain in circulation, is sufficiently counterfeited to the similitude of the current coin of the realm to bring the
coiners of such blanks within the statute; these blanks having some reasonable likeness to that coin which has
been defeated by time, and yet passed in circulation.36
A files a genuine sovereign round the edge so as to reduce it by 1/24, and adds a new milling. A is guilty of
counterfeiting coin.37
[s 231.5] Consequences of Restoring a Coin to its Original State
To restore a coin to its original state does not amount to counterfeiting, unless the coin had been materially
altered at any time, eg, to remove a ring from a coin which has formed part of the necklace or other ornament
and to work up the face of the coin where the ring had been attached.38
It is not necessary that the counterfeit coin should be counterfeit of a current coin.39 To counterfeit a coin of
Emperor Akbar’s time is, however, not an offence under sections 230-231 of the IPC, since the test of “money”
is the possibility of its being used as a current medium of exchange in the market.40
[s 231.6] “Performs any Part of the Process of Counterfeiting”
The offence of uttering or putting in circulation is deemed complete even if the counterfeiting is not finished or
perfected, nor is the coin in a fit state to be uttered.41
[s 231.7] Procedure
An offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by a magistrate of
the first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no time limit for taking cognizance of
[s 231.8] Charge
I, (name and officer of magistrate, etc), hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the………… day of………… at…………, counterfeited (or knowingly performed any part of the
process of counterfeiting, to wit…………) a coin to wit………… and that you thereby committed an offence punishable
[s 231.9] Proof
To establish an offence under this section the prosecution must prove:

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(i) that the accused knowingly counterfeited or performed any part of the process of counterfeiting; and
(ii) that the article counterfeited, or intended to be counterfeited, was a coin.
[s 231.10] Extradition
Offences under this section and all succeeding sections of the chapter are extradition offences.42 Synopsis note
7 under section 230 may be referred to.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
21 1 Hale PC 228–29.
22 Emperor v Qadir Bakhsh, ILR 30 All 93 : (1907) 4 All LJ 776 : (1907) 6 Cr LJ 395 ; Amrit Soner v Emperor, AIR 1919
Pat 330 : (1919) 20 Cr LJ 439 .
23 Nava v State of Mysore, AIR 1957 Mys 24 , p 25 : (1957) Cr LJ 381 .
24 C Ronald v UT of Andaman Nicobar Islands, 2012 Cr LJ 672 : (2011) 12 SCC 428 [LNIND 2011 SC 757] : 2011 (9)
Scale 59 [LNIND 2011 SC 757] .
25 1 Hawk, c 17, section 81.
26 1 Hale 178, pp 184, 211, 215.
27 Russel on Crime, 11th Edn p 1733.
28 Lal Chand v R, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 252 .
29 Indian Penal Code 1860, section 28, expln 2; Emperor v Quadir Baksh, ILR 30 All 93.
30 Public Prosecutor v Konazirumala Reddi, 1 Weir 219.
31 R v Robinson, 34 LJMC 176.
32 Walsh’s case, East PC 164.

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33 R v Varley, (1914) 10 Cr App Rep 125 (CCA).
34 Madras HC Rules, 17 November 1863 : 1 Weir 71.
35 R v Case, 1 Leach 145; R v Lavey, 1 Leach 153 (CCR).
36 R v Wilson, (1783) 1 Leach 285.
37 R v Hermann, LR 4 QBD 284.
38 R v Mahommad Hussain, ILR 23 All 420.
39 Re Kandanury Annappa, 1 Weir 221.
40 Re Premsookh Dass, 1870 PR 38 .
41 R v Harris, (1776) 1 Leach 135; R v Varley, (1771) 1 Leach 76.
42 Indian Extradition Act 15 of 1903, Sch I. Now, repealed.
End of Document
[s 232] Counterfeiting Indian coin.—
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include stamps.
prerogatives.1
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years (section 239)

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Whoever counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting 43[Indian coin], shall be
punished with 44[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 232.1] Scope
This section penalises counterfeiting the Indian coin. The only difference between this and the preceding
section is that this section imposes a heavier penalty than the previous section. The protection of the coin of the
country is greater, hence the offence under this section is visited with heavier penalties.
Commentary under the same heading in section 235 may be referred to.
The words “Queen’s coin” were replaced by the words “Indian coin” both in the margin and in the body of the
section by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950. The words “imprisonment for life” were substituted for the words
“transportation for life” by Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule.
If coins are made to resemble genuine coins and the intention of the makers is merely to use them in order to
foist a false case upon their enemies, those coins do not come within the definition of “counterfeit coins” given
in the IPC.45
[s 232.4] Coining of False Rupee not for Gain—Effect
Where coining of false rupees was not done for the purpose of making gain by passing the false coins off on
the public as good ones, but for the purpose of getting them secretly into the houses of the enemies of the
accused against whom they were making false charge to the police of theft accompanied by a request for a
house search; it was held that there was no counterfeiting of Indian coin and that the accused could not be
convicted under this section, though they might be convicted under section 235 for possessing instruments or
material for counterfeiting.46
[s 232.5] Intention to Deceive Sufficient
In order to constitute offences under sections 232 and 235, it is not necessary to prove that the specious coins
should go into circulation and be used as money. It is sufficient that there was an intention to practise deception
by means of the imitation.47
It is not an offence under this section to remove the ring from a coin which has been used to form part of a
necklace or other ornaments and to work up the face of the coin wherefrom the ring has been removed.48
[s 232.6] “Knowingly”
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Where a person was charged with having parted with a double piece coin, whitened with quick-silver, for the
purpose of changing it for copper-coins as rupees; it was held that he was not liable to be convicted under
section 241, unless, at the time of whitening the coin, he intended thereby to practise deception, or knew it to
be likely that deception would thereby be caused. Otherwise, the accused could be convicted of abetting the
person, to whom the coin was given, to cheat the person to whom he was sent with the counterfeit rupee.49 The
fact that the accused has previously uttered counterfeit money, may be proved to show guilty knowledge under
this section.50
[s 232.7] “Performs any Part of the process”
Notes to section 231 may be referred to.
[s 232.8] “Indian Coin”
Section 230 and discussion thereunder may be referred to.
[s 232.9] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by a court of
session. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no time-limit for taking cognizance of an
[s 232.10] Charge
I, (name and office of sessions judge, etc), hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the ………… day of………… at…………, did counterfeit (or knowingly performed any part of the
process of counterfeiting) an Indian coin, to wit…………, and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under
section 232 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of this court.
[s 232.11] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, the prosecution has to prove:
(i) that the accused counterfeited or knowingly performed any part of the process of counterfeiting;
(ii) that the article counterfeited or intended to be counterfeited was an Indian coin.
Asking the accused to give a demonstration of preparing the counterfeit coin was held amounting to be witness
Page 6 of 7
against himself,51 and as such is not punishable in law.
The minimum that would be required for prosecution to establish a charge under sections 232 and 235, IPC is
that it establishes that the coins seized resembled the original and that the resemblance is such that it would
deceive a person or that the accused knew that if the coin is used it would be likely to deceive a person. Merely
by seizing the equipment and the coins found in the flat, the prosecution cannot establish its case against the
accused. There cannot be a presumption that the equipment was being used for counterfeiting coins or that the
coins found in the flat resemble genuine coins. Unless there is intrinsic evidence on record to show that the
coins indeed resemble genuine coins, it is difficult to accept the case of the prosecution.52
In order to sustain a conviction under this section, the prosecution must show that the accused himself
counterfeited, or knowingly performed any part of the process of counterfeiting the Indian coin. Direct evidence
on such point is difficult and sometimes it is a matter of inference in the circumstances.53
[s 232.12] Sentence
Separate sentences cannot be passed on an accused person for offences under this section and section 235
for counterfeiting an Indian coin and having in his possession instruments used for counterfeiting such coin.54 It
is not incumbent that when substantive terms of imprisonment are awarded any fine should be super added to
those sentences. The fine imposed by the lower court in respect of all the three offences was accordingly
cancelled.55
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
44 Subs. by the Act 26 of 1955, section 117 and Schedule, for “transportation for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).
45 Velayudham Pillai v Emperor, AIR 1937 Mad 711 [LNIND 1937 MAD 129] , p 712 : (1938) 39 Cr LJ 51 ; Sahebrao
Awadhut Maratha v Emperor, AIR 1938 Ngp 444 : (1938) 39 Cr LJ 838 .
46 Lal Chand v Emperor, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 252 : 43 PLR 1912 : 17 PWR 1912 (Cr).
47 1899 PR 4 .
48 King-Emperor v Mahommad Husain, ILR 23 All 420.
49 Re Mahabiran, 1883 PR 84 , contra; Emperor v Qadir Bakhsh, ILR 30 All 93 : (1907) 6 Cr LJ 395 .
50 R v Weeks, (1861) Le & Ca 18.

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51 State of Rajasthan v Ram Kumar, (1986) CLR 273 (Raj).
52 Shahid Sultan Khan v State of Maharashtra, (2007) Cr LJ 568 (Bom) (DB).
53 Ranchhod Mulu v State, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 472 , p 474 (Guj).
54 Hayat v King-Emperor, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 946 ; Queen v Nazur Ali, 6 NWPHCR 39; Bishan Das v King-Emperor, AIR 1924
Lah 78 ; King-Emperor v Johri, ILR 23 All 267 : (1925) 24 Cr LJ 236 : (1901) AWN 77; Zamir Hussain v Crown, AIR
1950 Lah 97 .
55 Krishnan Asari Gangadharan Asari v State of Kerala, (1957) Ker LT 215 , p 219.
End of Document
[s 233] Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting coin.—
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include stamps.
prerogatives.1
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years (section 239)

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Whoever makes or mends, or performs any part of the process of making or mending, or buys, sells or
disposes of, any die or instrument, for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having reason to believe that it
is intended to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
[s 233.1] Scope
Making or selling any die or instrument for the purpose of being used for counterfeiting coin or Indian coin is
punishable under sections 233 and 234, IPC respectively. Such conduct might, however, be justified under
section 76 or section 79, eg, a die-sinker acting in concert with the police56 or mint authorities.57 A prisoner went
to a die-sinker and ordered four dies of the size of a shilling to be made, stating them to be for two whist clubs.
Before making them, the die-sinker communicated with the officers of the mint, who directed him to execute the
prisoner’s order, which he did by making the first and third dies, and from these counterfeit shillings could be
coined. It was held that the prisoner was the principal as the die-sinker was an innocent agent.58 It is not
necessary to show that a coin has actually been made with the instrument.59
This section is analogous to section 9 of the English Coinage Act, 194660 under which:
Every person who, without lawful authority or excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on the person accused), knowingly
makes or mends, or begins or proceeds to make or mend, or buys or sells, or has in his possession, any puncheon,
counter-puncheon, matrix, stamp, die, pattern or mould in or upon which there is made or impressed, or which will
make or impress, or which is adopted and intended to make or impress, the figure, stamp or apparent resemblance of
both or either of the sides of any current gold or silver (Cupro-nickel) coin or any part of both or either sides, shall be
guilty of felony and on conviction thereof liable to imprisonment for life.
[s 233.3] “Performs any Part of the Process”
It is enough if the puncheon, etc., impress a resemblance, whether exact or not, to the genuine coin such as
would impose upon the world.61
If one is found to be associated with the performance of any part of the process of making or mending of any
die or instrument, which is used, or which he knows, or has reason to believe, is intended to be used, for the
purpose of counterfeiting coin, he is punishable under this part of the section. The offence of uttering or putting
in circulation is deemed complete even if the counterfeiting is not finished or perfected, nor the coin is in a fit
state to be uttered.62
[s 233.4] “Reason to Believe”
[s 233.5] “Counterfeiting”
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Commentary under sections 28, 231 and 232 may be referred to.
[s 233.6] “Instruments of Counterfeiting”
The following are common instruments used for counterfeiting:
(i) a galvanic battery;63
(ii) a press for coinage;64
(iii) a puncheon for coining, though without a counter-puncheon;65
(iv) a collar for gaining edges of coin;66
(v) a lead mould bearing a stamp of a coin.67
[s 233.7] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by a magistrate of
the first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. Cognizance of an offence under this section
can be taken within three years.68
[s 233.8] Charge
I, (name and office of magistrate, etc), hereby charge you (name of accused), as follows:
That on or about the…………day of………… at ………… you made (or mended or performed any part of the process
of making or mending or bought or sold or disposed of) a certain die (or instrument) to wit………… for the purpose of
being used (or knowing or having reason to believe that it was intended to be used) for counterfeiting a coin, to wit
………… (or a piece of Indian coin, to wit…………), and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under
section 233, and within my cognizance.
[s 233.9] Proof
In a prosecution under this section, the following facts have to be proved that:
Page 6 of 7
(i) the accused made, or mended, or performed some part of the process of making or mending any die
or instrument or that he bought, sold or disposed of it; and
(ii)
(a) the accused did so intending or knowing that such die or instrument would be used for the purpose
of counterfeit coin; or
(b) he knew, or had reason, to believe that the same was intended to be used for such purpose.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
56 Arch 655.
57 R v Bannon, Mood CC 309.
58 Ibid; R v Valler, (1944) 1 Cox 84.
59 R v Ridgely, 1 East PC 172.
60 9 & 10 Geo 6, c 74, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948 : section 1.
61 R v Ridgeley, (1778) 1 Leach 189.
62 R v Harris, (1776) 1 Leach 135; R v Varley, (1771) 1 Leach 76.
63 R v Gover, 9 Cox CC 282.
64 R v Bell, 1 East PC 169.
65 R v Ridgely, 1 East PC 172.
66 R v Moore, 2 C&P 235.
67 R v Lennard, 1 Leach CC 90.

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68 Section 468–469, Code of Criminal Proedure 1973.
End of Document
[s 234] Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting Indian coin.—
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include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 6

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
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first possessed
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Whoever makes or mends, or performs any part of the process of making or mending, or buys, sells or
disposes of, any die or instrument, for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having reason to believe that it
is intended to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting 69[Indian coin], shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 234.1] Scope
This section deals with the same offence which is covered by the preceding section, the only difference being
that this section relates to Indian coin and provides for an enhanced punishment.
The words “Indian coin” were substituted for the words “Queen’s coin” both in the margin and the body by the
Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950.
This section is analogous to section 3 of the English Coinage Act, 194670 which runs as follows:
Every person who, without lawful authority or excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on the person accused), knowingly
makes or mends, or begins or proceeds to make or mend, or buys or sells, or has, in his possession, any instrument,
tool or engine adapted and intended for the counterfeiting of any current copper coin, shall be guilty of felony and on
conviction thereof liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.
[s 234.4] “Performs any Part of the Process”
If one is found to be associated with the performance of any part of the process of making or ending of any die
or instrument, which is used, or which, he knows, or has reason to believe, is intended to be used, for the
purpose of counterfeiting coin, he is punishable under this part of the section. It is enough if the puncheon, etc.,
impress a resemblance whether exact or not, to the genuine coin such as would impose upon the world.71
[s 234.7] Procedure
session. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no time limit for taking cognizance of an
[s 234.8] Charge
Page 5 of 6
I, (name and office sessions judge, etc), hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the ………… day of………… at…………, did make (or mend or perform any part of the process
of making or mending, to wit…………, or buy, sell or dispose of) a certain die (or instrument for the purpose of being
used or knowing, or having reason to believe that it was intended to be used) for counterfeiting an Indian coin, to
wit…………, and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 234 of the Indian Penal Code, and
within the cognizance of this court.
[s 234.9] Proof
In a prosecution under this section, the following facts have to be established:
(i) that the accused made, or mended, or performed some part of the process of making or mending any
die or instrument or that he bought, sold or disposed it of; and
(ii)
(a) that the accused did so intending or knowing that such die or instrument might be used for the
purpose of counterfeiting Indian coin; or
(b) that he knew or had reason to believe that the same was intended to be used for such purpose.
It is not necessary to allege or prove any intent. The felony consists of knowingly being in possession of a die or
instrument and the guilty knowledge required is merely that of being in possession of the die or instrument
contrary to the provisions of the Act of Parliament, ie, without lawful authority or excuse. A guilty intention to use
the die is not necessary.72
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
Page 6 of 6
69 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “the Queen’s coin.”
70 9 and 10 Geo 6, c 74 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, section 1.
71 R v Ridgeley, (1778) 1 Leach 189.
72 R v Harbey, (1871) LR 1 CCR 284.
End of Document
[s 235] Possession of instrument or material for the purpose of using the
same for counterfeiting coin.—
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include stamps.
prerogatives.1
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[s 235] Possession of instrument or material for the purpose of using the same for counterfeiting coin.—

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[s 235] Possession of instrument or material for the purpose of using the

same for counterfeiting coin.—
Whoever is in possession of any instrument or material, for the purpose of using the same for counterfeiting
coin, or knowing or having reason to believe that the same is intended to be used for that purpose, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be
liable to fine;
if Indian coin.—and if the coin to be counterfeited is 73[Indian coin], shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 235.1] Scope—Legislative Changes
Before an offence could be made out under section 235, IPC it is obligatory on the prosecution to prove not
only the possession of the instrument or the material mentioned therein, but also to prove that the possession
was with the intention of using the same for the purpose of counterfeiting coins or with full knowledge and belief
that it was intended to be used for that purpose. If the necessary intention, knowledge or belief is not proved, a
person could not be convicted under this section by a mere proof of physical possession of an instrument or
material.74
The words “Indian coin” were substituted for the words “Queen’s coin” both in the margin and the body by the
Adaptation of Laws Orders, 1950.
This section is analogous to section 9(2) of the English Coinage Act, 194675 which runs as follows:
Every person who, without lawful authority or excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on the person accused), makes or
mends, or begins or proceeds to make or mend, or buys or sells, or has in his possession—
(a) any edger, edging or other tool, collar, instrument or engine adapted and intended for the marking of coin
round the edges with letters, grainings or other makes or figures apparently resembling those on the edges of
any current gold or silver coin, knowing it to be so adapted and intended as aforesaid; or
(b) any press for coinage, or any cutting engine for cutting by force of a screw or of any other contrivance round
blanks out of gold, silver or other metal or mixture of metals, or any other machine, knowing the press to be a
press for coinage or knowing the engine or machine to have been used or to be intended to be used for the
false making or counterfeiting of any current gold or silver coin.
[s 235.3] Possession under English Law
Under section 17(c) of the English Coinage Act, 1946,76

Page 5 of 11
A thing shall be deemed to be in the possession of any person, if he himself has it in his personal custody or
possession, and also if he knowingly and wilfully has it in the actual custody or possession of some other person, or in
some building or place (whether belonging to or occupied by himself or not), and whether he has it for his own use or
benefit or for that of any other persons.
[s 235.4] What Is Possession?
The following are instances of “custody or possession”:77
(i) a person acting in association with another who has pleaded guilty to having the “matter” in his
possession;
(ii) a person who being the tenant or occupier of a house knowingly sublets a room to another who has the
“matter” in his possession; or who
(iii) knows that a lodger in his house has in his possession, and makes use of the “matter” in the room
which he (the lodger) occupies.
[s 235.4.1] Connotation of Possession
The word “possession” connotes the intention to exercise power or control over the object possessed (animus
sibi habendi) and, therefore, necessarily implies that the possessor has been conscious of the possibility of
exercising that power or control. The mere physical relation arising from the possession of the object is
insufficient.
It is clear from the wording of section 235, IPC, that it is the possession of an instrument or material for the
purpose counterfeiting that is made punishable, not the knowledge that someone else is in such possession.78
The mere possession of such instrument or material is not enough, such possession should be coupled with
intention of using the same for the purpose of counterfeiting coins or with full knowledge and belief that it was
intended to be used for that purpose.79
[s 235.4.2] Possession to be Voluntary and Conscious
The possession contemplated in this section is not possession, which has never been voluntary, and for the
purpose of bringing home to any person the voluntary possession of any object, the mere proof of a fact, of
which he knows nothing, would be valueless. The section no doubt also requires, in the accused person,
intention or knowledge as to the use to be made of the objects in possession, and these might be implied from
the nature of the objects themselves. But before that stage is reached, there must be some circumstance
indicating such intention or knowledge as is inseparable from the notion of conscious retention implied in the
word “possession”. Such indication may arise from the position of the object in a place which is constantly used
by the person accused and which could not be overlooked by him or from the bulk of the object itself or from
any circumstance, such as the locking up of the object, which would point to voluntary and conscious
possessions.80
[s 235.4.3] Possessor of Material need not be Owner of Building
All that is required to convict a person under this section is that he should be in possession of material for
counterfeiting. It is not necessary that he should be the owner of the building in which the material was found
Page 6 of 11
stored.81
Where a person, who was passing counterfeit Indian coins, was, on being chased, found in possession of
instruments or metals used for counterfeiting coin, it was held that he should be convicted under section 235
and not under section 240, as the latter did not apply to the actual coins.82
[s 235.4.4] Possession must be Exclusive
“Possession” in this section means an exclusive possession. A man is not in possession of instruments which
are found in a box to which others also have access.83
[s 235.4.5] Possession of Wife or Servant
Under section 27 of the IPC, the possession of a wife, clerk or servant on account of a husband or master is
deemed by law to be the possession of the latter.84 But it is not so if a servant, eg, has physical possession for
his own purposes as distinguished from the interest of his employers.85
The police searched A’s house in his absence and found his wife and three other persons in a room, on the
table of which was a coining mould. A was arrested on his return. He had passed a bad half-crown thirteen
days earlier. A was held guilty of possession.86
[s 235.4.6] Mere Knowledge of Someone’s Possession not Punishable
It is clear from the wordings of this section, that it is the possession of any instrument or material for the
purpose of counterfeiting that is made punishable, not the knowledge that someone else is in such possession.
The mere fact that a wife knows that certain implements and materials are in the possession of her husband
and the place where those implements and materials are kept, does not necessarily indicate that she herself is
in possession of those articles and she cannot be convicted under this section.87
[s 235.4.7] Possession of Member of Joint Family
The observation of their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Queen-Empress v Sangam Lal,88
may possibly lend support to the view that presumption as to possession and control of articles found in a
house may be made against the housemaster. The presumption that a managing member of a joint family is in
possession of the family house is not irrebuttable. It depends upon the circumstances of each case. Where the
articles found are large properties and placed in a conspicuous place to which the managing member may have
access and over which he could exercise control and which could not be overlooked by him, the presumption
against him may fairly be made.89 But in a case where the articles are small, the presumption cannot be
properly raised. Although the managing member as the head of the family is supposed to have control over the
house, it is impossible for him to know of tiny things placed by a junior member in a place which is not shown to
have been in direct control of the managing member.90
When instruments and materials for counterfeiting coins are found in a house and it is sought to fix
responsibility upon any member of the family, except the head of the family, it is necessary to prove that the
possession and control were not only with the head of the family but with the subordinate members also. The
mere fact that a wife knows that certain implements and materials are in the possession of her husband and the
place where those implements and material are kept, does not necessarily indicate that she herself is in
possession of those articles and cannot be convicted under section 235 of the IPC.91 This view of the Patna
High Court was approved and followed by the Lahore High Court.92 It has been observed in Queen-Empress v
Sangam Lal93 as follows:
We are not disposed in the present case to depart from the well known rule of law that where articles are found in a
Page 7 of 11
house in such place or place as several persons living in the house may have access to there is no presumption as to
possession and control that those articles are in the possession and control of any other person than the housemaster.
But their Lordships further observed:
We do not lay it down as an invariable rule that where weapons are found in a house occupied by a Hindu family living
jointly, possession is necessarily that of the managing member, and the managing member only; but we do lay down
that in all such cases where it is sought to establish that possession and control are with some member of the family
other than the managing member, there must be good and clear evidence of the fact before we can in an act of this
kind, arrive at such a conclusion.
[s 235.5] “Instruments of Counterfeiting”
The court has to be convinced of the fact, which may of course be by a necessary inference (but the inference
must be the only possible inference) that the dies are capable of striking a complete coin which the accused
intended to manufacture.94
[s 235.6] “Knowing”
Before an offence can be made out under this section, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove not only
the possession of the instrument or material, but also to prove that the possession was with the intention of
using the same for the purpose of counterfeiting coin or with full knowledge and belief that it was intended to be
used for that. If the prosecution fails to prove the necessary intention, knowledge or belief, a person cannot be
convicted under the section by a mere proof of physical possession of an instrument or material.95 The fact
within the knowledge of one that someone else is in possession of such instrument or material does not make
the former liable under this section.96 Mere possession of instruments and materials capable of counterfeiting
coins is no offence. To constitute an offence under this section possession of such instrument should be with
the intention of counterfeiting coins and the intention must be proved to establish the charge. Where false coins
are made only for the purpose of passing them secretly into the house of the coiner’s enemy in order to get him
into trouble, the persons making those coins and in possession of the instruments and materials used therefore
are neither guilty under section 232 nor under this section.97
Merely by seizing the equipment and the coins found in the flat, the prosecution cannot establish its case
against the accused. There cannot be presumption that the equipment was being used for counterfeiting coins
or that the coins found in the flat resemble genuine coins. The conviction of the appellants under section 237,
IPC was set aside.98
[s 235.7] “Having Reason to Believe”
Section 26 and the notes thereunder may be referred to.
[s 235.8] “For that Purpose”
The offence under this section consists in the possession of moulds etc., capable of being used to manufacture
a counterfeit coin. The prosecution is bound to adduce evidence to show that the moulds were capable of
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producing a counterfeit coin. Broken moulds are of no use for such purpose, though there may be evidence of
coining having been previously carried on.99 In R v Macmillan,100 Maule J, seems to have ruled that a mould
must be something with which a coin can be made and to have directed an acquittal where a mould, having a
perfect impression of one side of a shilling, had no channel through which the metal could run.
intended to manufacture. The fitness of the material for the purpose of counterfeiting a coin has also to be
proved by the prosecution.101
Section 230 may be referred to.
The offence under this section is cognizable, non- bailable, non-compoundable and is triable by a court of
session, if the coin is an Indian coin, otherwise by a magistrate of the first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue
in the first instance. The limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under para 1 of this section is three
years. There is no time limit for taking cognizance of the offence under the second para.
[s 235.11] Charge
I, (name and office of sessions judge, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That on or about the……day of…….at ……….you were in possession of a certain instrument (or material) to
wit……(mention it) for the purpose of using the said instrument for counterfeiting a coin, (or Indian coin) to wit……or
knowing (or having reason to believe) that the said instrument was intended to be used for the purpose of
counterfeiting, etc, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 235 of the Indian Penal Code, and
[s 235.12] Proof
For a conviction under this section, the following facts have to be established that:
(i) the accused was in possession of an instrument or material; and
(ii) the instrument or material was for the purpose of using for counterfeiting coin, or Indian coin, or, the
accused knew or had reason to believe that the same was intended to be used for that purpose.
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The minimum that would be required for prosecution to establish a charge under sections 232 and 235 is that it
establishes that the coins seized resembled the original and that the resemblance is such that it would deceive
a person or that the accused knew that if the coin is used it would be likely to deceive a person. Merely by
seizing the equipment and the coins found in the flat, the prosecution cannot establish its case against the
accused. There cannot be a presumption that the equipment was being used for counterfeiting coins or that the
coins found in the flat resemble genuine coins. Unless there is intrinsic evidence on record to show that the
coins indeed resemble genuine coins, it is difficult to accept the case of the prosecution.102
It is obligatory on the prosecution to prove not only the possession of the instrument or the material mentioned
in section 235, IPC, but also to prove that the possession was with the intention of using the same for the
purpose of counterfeiting coins or with full knowledge and belief that it was intended to be used for that
purpose. If the necessary intention, knowledge or belief is not proved, a person cannot be convicted under this
section by mere proof of physical possession of an instrument or material.103
intended to manufacture. The fitness of the material for the purpose of counterfeiting coin has also to be proved
by the prosecution.104
To deprive the court of the benefit of looking at dies and moulds (on account of non-production) is a serious
infirmity which must be held to be fatal to the prosecution case.105
[s 235.13] Sentence
Having regard to section 71, separate sentences cannot be passed under section 232 and under this section
for possession of instruments used for counterfeiting the coins in question.106 The offence of counterfeiting a
coin is no doubt very serious and an exemplary sentence should be given. At the same time when a man is
being convicted for being in possession of instruments or materials for counterfeiting coin, it is hardly right to
convict and sentence him separately for being in possession of various parts of such instruments or
materials.107
In the case of NV Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh,108 the appellant was convicted for the offence under section
235, IPC and was sentenced to 10 years RI. In appeal, the Supreme Court, keeping in view the guilt, need for
rehabilitation and deterrence, opined that the prisoner/appellant may serve a sentence of five years which may
be long enough for correctional treatment at the same time not unduly long to be regarded as repugnantly
harsh sentence. The sentence was accordingly reduced to five years RI.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.

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74 Mohd Ibrahim v State, AIR 1969 Del 315 [LNIND 1968 DEL 115] .
75 9 and 10 Geo 6, c 74 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, section 1.
76 9 and 10 Geo 6, c 74.
77 R v Queen, 53 JP 822.
78 Zamir Hussain v Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 97 .

80 Emperor v Hari Maniram Sonar, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 960 , p 963; Queen-Empress v Sangam Lal, ILR 15 All 129; Amrit
Sonar v Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 330 , p 333; Lachminiya v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 272 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 9 .
81 Kashi Prasad v State, AIR 1950 All 732 [LNIND 1950 ALL 171] , p 733 : (1950) All LJ 516.
82 Re Ahmad Shah, (1892) PR 10 ; Ranchod Phula v State, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 472 , p 473 (Guj).
83 Abdul Majid v R, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 40 : 5 PLR 14; Queen-Empress v Sangam Lal, ILR 15 All 129; Emperor v Hari
Maniram Sonar, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 690 : 6 Bom LR 887.
84 Fateh Chand Agarwalla v Emperor, AIR 1917 Cal 123 , p 136 : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 385 (FB).
85 Anglo-American Oil Co v Manning, (1908) LR 1 KB 536.
86 R v Weeks, 30 LJMC 141.
87 Lachminiya v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 272 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 9 ; Zamir Husain v Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 97 , p 100 :
(1950) 51 Cr LJ 717 .
88 Queen-Empress v Sangam Lal, (1893) 15 ILR All 129 .
89 Emperor v Hari Maniram Sonar, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 690 : 6 Bom LR 887.
90 Amrit Sonar v Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 220 , p 333.
91 Lachhmimiya Thakurain v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 272 .
92 Zamir Hussain v Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 97 : (1951) 52 Cr LJ 717 .
93 Queen-Empress v Sangam Lal, (1893) 15 ILR All 129 .
95 Re Morrsan, AIR 1938 Mad 393 [LNIND 1937 MAD 361] : (1938) 39 Cr LJ 344 ; Nga San Nyein v Emperor, AIR 1915
LB 64 : (1915) 16 Cr LJ 264 ; Shahid Sultan Khan v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 568 (Bom) (DB).
96 Zamir Hussain v Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 97 .
97 Khadim Hussain v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 22 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 247 ; Lal Chand v Crown, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 252 .
98 Shahid Sultant Khan v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 568 , p 570 (Bom) (DB).
99 Public Prosecutor v Kona Terusula Reddi, 1 Weir 219.
100 R v Macmillan, (1843) 1 Cox 41.

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102 Shahid Sultan Khan v State of Maharashtra, (2007) Cr LJ 568 (Bom) (DB).
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Hayat v R, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 946 : 5 PLR 404 : 14 PR Cr (1904); Bishan Das v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Lah 78 ; King-
Emperor v Johri, ILR (1923) All 267 : (1924) Cr LJ 236 ; Zamir Hussain v Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 97 .
107 Allah Wadhya v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 51 , 52 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 529 .
108 NV Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 480 [LNIND 1977 SC 346] : (1978) SCC (Cr) 99 : (1978) Cr LJ 641 .
End of Document
[s 236] Abetting in India the counterfeiting out of India of coin.—
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Whoever, being within 109[India], abets the counterfeiting of coin out of 110[India], shall be punished in the same
manner as if he abetted the counterfeiting of such coin within 111[India].
[s 236.1] Scope
This section provides for punishment for abetment in India of an offence of counterfeiting coin committed
outside India. The person abetting the offence may be an Indian citizen or a foreigner, but he must be in India
and the abetment in India must be complete.
The words “British India” were substituted by the words “the Provinces” by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1948,
which were later substituted by the words “the States” by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950. The word “India”
was subsequently substituted for the words “the States” by Act 3 of 1951.
[s 236.3] “Abets”
[s 236.4] “Counterfeiting”
Sections 28 and 231 and commentary thereunder may be referred to.
[s 236.5] Procedure
session. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance.
[s 236.6] Charge
I, (name and office of sessions judge, etc) here charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That on or about the…day of…….at…you being in India abetted…….the counterfeiting of coin out of India at…and you
thereby committed an offence under section 236 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of this court.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by this Court on the said charge.
[s 236.7] Proof
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For a conviction under this section, the following facts have to be established that:
(i) the accused abetted the commission of the offence of counterfeiting coin;
(ii) the counterfeiting of coin was out of India; and
(iii) at the time of such abetment, the accused was in India.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
End of Document
[s 237] Import or export of counterfeit coin.—
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Whoever imports into 112[India], or exports therefrom, any counterfeit coin, knowing or having reason to believe
that the same is counterfeit, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
The words “British India” were replaced by the words “the Provinces” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1948.
Subsequently, by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950, the words “the Provinces” were replaced by the words
“the States”. Finally, the words “the States” were substituted by the word “India” by Act 3 of 1951.
[s 237.2] Analogous law
The offence under this section consists of importing or exporting any counterfeit coin, knowing, or having
reason to believe, that the same is counterfeit.
[s 237.3] “Counterfeit”
Synopsis notes to sections 28 and 232 may be referred to.
Synopsis notes to section 26 may be referred to.
[s 237.5] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and triable by a magistrate of
the first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance.
[s 237.6] Charge
The following form of the charge maybe adopted:
That on or about the……day of…….at…….you imported into (or exported from) ………a place in India, certain pieces
of coins (or Indian coins) to wit…….(mention the coins) then knowing (or having reason to believe) that the same were
counterfeit, and that you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 237 of the Indian Penal Code, and
within my cognizance or the cognizance of this Court.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge.
[s 237.7] Proof
Page 5 of 5
For a conviction under this section the following points have to be proved:
(i) that the accused imported into, or exported from, India some coins;
(ii) that such coins were counterfeit; and
(iii) that the accused knew or had reason to believe that they were counterfeit.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
End of Document
[s 238] Import or export of counterfeits of Indian coin.—
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Whoever imports into 113[India], or exports therefrom, any counterfeit coin which he knows or has reason to
believe to be a counterfeit of 114[Indian coin], shall be punished with 115[imprisonment for life], or with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 238.1] Scope
This section deals with the import and export of Indian coins just as the last section dealt with import and export
of other coins. The punishment prescribed by this section is heavier than that prescribed by the previous
section as the import or export is of Indian coins.
The words “British India” were substituted by the words “the Provinces” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1948.
The words “the Provinces” were substituted by the words “the States” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950.
The words “the Queen’s coin” both in the margin and the body were substituted by the words “Indian coin” by
the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950. The word “India” was substituted for the words “the States” by Act 3 of
1951. The words “imprisonment for life” were substituted for the words “transportation for life” by Act 26 of
1955, section 117 and Schedule.
[s 238.3] Procedure
session. A warrant shall ordinarily issue at the first instance. There is no time limit prescribed for taking
cognizance of an offence under this section.
[s 238.4] Charge
I, (name and office of sessions judge, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That on or about the…….day of……at………you imported into (or export from) India, counterfeit Indian coins (specify
the amount and name of the coins) knowing (or having reason to believe) that the said coins were counterfeit, and that
you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 238 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance
of the Court of Sessions (or High Court).
And I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charge.
[s 238.5] Proof
In a prosecution under this section, the following points have to be proved:

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(i) that the accused imported into, or exported from India, Indian coins;
(ii) that such coins were counterfeit; and
(iii) that the accused knew, or had reason to believe, that they were counterfeit.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
End of Document
[s 239] Delivery of coin, possessed with knowledge that it is counterfeit.—
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Whoever, having any counterfeit coin, which at the time when he became possessed of it he knew to be
counterfeit, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed delivers the same to any person, or attempts
to induce any person to receive it, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Three classes of offences are created by sections 239–243, IPC, which deal with possession and delivery of
coins:
(i) passing off coin known to be counterfeit from the time of obtaining it (sections 239–240, IPC).
(ii) passing off such coin which was for the first time discovered to be counterfeit after its receipt (section
241, IPC); and
(iii) being in wrongful possession of coin known all along to have been counterfeit (sections 242–243, IPC).
Further sub-divisions of classes first and third arise, according to the fact that the counterfeit coin is Indian or
otherwise.116
The offence for which punishment is provided by this section is not the offence committed by the coiner. It is
directed against a person other than the coiner, who procures or obtains or receives counterfeit coin and not to
the offences committed by the coiner.117
The object of sections 239–241, IPC is to penalise all fraudulent circulation of false coin. A distinction, is
however, made between a professional and a casual utterer of false coins, in the matter of punishment, as the
former is subject to the penalties in this and the next section, whereas, the casual offender is made subject to
the more lenient penalties of section 241, IPC. The distinction between these two classes of offenders was
explained by the authors to be very material:
A professional utterer is a helpmate of the professional coiner and is, therefore, an offender in equal degree. A causal
receiver of false coins may, however, be himself imposed upon; but, if he tries to retrieve his loss by passing it on to
another, he would naturally be guilty of dishonesty, but the authors regarded it as comparatively venial, and hence the
difference in punishment.118
Page 5 of 7
The authors of the Code say:
An utterer by profession, an utterer who is the agent employed by the coiner to bring counterfeit coin into circulation, is
guilty of a very high offence. Such an utterer stands to the coiner in a relation not very different from that in which a
habitual receiver of stolen goods stands to a thief. He makes coining a far less perilous and a far more lucrative pursuit
than it would otherwise be. He passes his life in a systematic violation of the law, and in the systematic practice of
fraud in one of its most pernicious forms. He is one of the most mischievous, and is likely to be one of the most
depraved of criminals. But a causal utterer, an utterer who is not an agent for bringing counterfeit coin into circulation,
but who having heedlessly received a bad rupee in the course of his business takes advantage of the heedlessness of
the next person with whom he deals, to pay that bad rupee away is an offender of a very different class. He is
undoubtedly guilty of a dishonest act, but of one of the most venial of dishonest acts. It is an act which proceeds not
from greediness for unlawful gain, but from a wish to avoid, by unlawful means it is true, that what to a poor man may
be a severe loss. It is an act which has no tendency to facilitate or encourage the operations of the coiner. It is an
occasional act, an act which does not imply that the person who commits it is a person of lawless habits. We think,
therefore, that the offence of a causal utterer is perhaps the least heinous of all the offences into which fraud enters.
We considered whether it would be advisable to make it an offence in a person to have in his possession at one time a
certain number of counterfeit coins, without being able to explain satisfactorily how he came by them. It did not, after
much discussion, appear to us advisable to recommend this or any similar provision. We entertained strong objections
to the practice of making circumstances which are in truth only evidence of an offence part of the definition of an
offence; nor do we see any reason for departing in this case from our general rule.
Whether a person who is possessed of bad money knows the money to be bad, and whether, knowing it to be bad, he
intends to put it in circulation, are questions to be decided by the tribunals according to the circumstances of the case,
circumstances of which the mere number of the pieces is only one and may be one of the least important. A few bad
rupees which should evidently be fresh from the stamp would be stronger evidence than a greater number of bad
rupees which appeared to have been in circulation for years. A few bad rupees all obviously coined with the same die,
would be stronger evidence than a greater number obviously coined with different dies. A few bad rupees placed by
themselves, and unmixed with good ones, would be far stronger evidence than a much larger number which might be
detected in a large mass of treasure.119
[s 239.2] Counterfeit
Commentary under section 28 may be referred to. It is not necessary that the counterfeit coin should be the
counterfeit of a current coin.
[s 239.3] “Which, at the Time when he became Possessed of it, knew to be Counterfeit”
The words “which at the time when he became possessed of it he knew to be counterfeit” point to a person
other than the coiner, that is to say, the person who procures or obtains or receives a counterfeit coin. It is
against such a person that the section is directed.120
[s 239.4] Direct Proof of Fabrication not Necessary
Where the charge is one of counterfeiting Indian coin, direct proof of fabrication is not necessary to render the
person punishable under the sections of the IPC with reference to the uttering of false coin. All that is required
is a guilty knowledge of the spuriousness of the coin at the time of receiving possession of it or the absence of
Page 6 of 7
such guilty knowledge at first.121
Where the accused persons were goldsmiths, it was presumed that when they became possessed of the
pagodas in question, they knew them to be counterfeit.122
[s 239.5] “Fraudulently”
[s 239.6] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non- bailable, non-compoundable and is triable by a magistrate of
[s 239.7] Charge
The charge under this section may be worded as follows:
That on or about the…day of……at…….you had a piece or…….(specify the number) of counterfeit coins to
wit……which at the time you became possessed of it (or them), you knew to be counterfeit, and which you fraudulently
(or with intent that fraud may be committed) delivered to AB (or attempted to induce AB to receive it or them) and you
[s 239.8] Proof
Evidence of the possession and attempted disposal of coins of the unusual kind is relevant to a charge of
uttering such coins soon afterwards when the factum of uttering is denied.123 In 2 and 3 Will 4 Cr 34 section 7
(Rep), where the prisoner had entered a shop and asked for tea and sugar, and had in payment placed on the
counter a counterfeit shilling but on being told that it was bad, had left the shop and left the coin behind, it was
held that a charge of uttering and putting off was proved by evidence.124
Offences made punishable under this section and section 240 are separate and distinct offences and section
220, CrPC, permits of double conviction and consecutive sentences as section 71, IPC, is obviously not
applicable.125
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
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116 Mayne’s Criminal Law of India, para 595.
117 R v Sheobux, 3 NWP 150.
118 Note 1, Reprint, pp 135–136.

119 Note 1, Reprint, pp 135–136.
120 R v Sheobux, 3 NWP 150.
121 Parushullah Mundul v Heroo Mundul, 23 WR 4.
122 Re Kandamutu Annappa, 1 Weir 221.
123 Queen-Empress v Nur Mahomed, ILR 8 Bom 223.
124 R v Welch, (1851) 2 Den 78; cf R v Jon, (1851) 3 Den 475.
125 Gopichand v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pesh 99 , p 100.
End of Document
[s 240] Delivery of Indian coin, possessed with knowledge that it is
counterfeit.—
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[s 240] Delivery of Indian coin, possessed with knowledge that it is counterfeit.—

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[s 240] Delivery of Indian coin, possessed with knowledge that it is

counterfeit.—
Whoever, having any counterfeit coin which is a counterfeit of 126[Indian coin], and which, at the time when he
became possessed of it, he knew to be a counterfeit of 127[Indian coin], fraudulently or with intent that fraud may
be committed, delivers the same to any person, or attempts to induce any person to receive it, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
[s 240.1] Scope
The offence under this section is an aggravated form of the offence under the preceding section. The only
difference between section 239, IPC and this section is that while section 239 is in relation to any counterfeit
coin other than the Indian coin, this section is in relation to counterfeit Indian coin. It is obviously impossible for
a person who commits an offence under section 239 to commit a further act in respect of the same coin which
will make him liable under this section. In other words, there is no part of section 240, IPC which if absent,
would leave an offence under section 239.128
The words “the Queen’s coin” were substituted by the words “Indian coin” both in the margin and the body of
the section by the Adaptation of Laws Orders 1950.
Sections 28 and 231 ante, may be referred to.
[s 240.4] “Knew to be a Counterfeit of Indian Coin”
Knowledge on the part of the accused that the coin was counterfeit, when they first came to possess it, is an
element of the offence defined in sections 240 and 243.129 The fact that the accused delivered certain
counterfeits of the Indian coin knowing them to be counterfeit is not enough for a conviction under this section.
The knowledge that the coins were counterfeit at the time the accused became possessed of them has also to
be established.130 For a conviction under this section the point of time to be considered in connection with the
offence is the time when the accused became possessed of the false coins and it has to be shown that at that
particular time the accused knew that the coins were not genuine.131 The prosecution may bring out
circumstances which might indicate or from which a reasonable presumption could be raised that the accused
ought to have known at the time that he became possessed of the coins that they were counterfeit.132
[s 240.6] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and triable by a court of session.
A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no limitation for taking cognizance of an offence
under this section.
[s 240.7] Charge
Page 5 of 6
That you, on or about the………….day of……at……having in your possession pieces of counterfeit Indian coins,
known as…knowing at the time when you became possessed of the said coins that they were counterfeit, fraudulently
(or with intent that fraud might be committed) delivered the same to one AB (or attempted to induce AB to receive the
same), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 240 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the
cognizance of this Court.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by this Court, on this said charge.
[s 240.8] Proof
The following facts have to be proved in order to prove an offence under this section:
(i) the accused became possessed of counterfeit coin;
(ii) the coin in question is a counterfeit of an Indian coin;
(iii) at the time he became possessed of it, the accused had knowledge that it was a counterfeit Indian
coin;
(iv) the accused delivered to some person or attempted to induce someone to receive it; and
(v) the accused delivered the same with intention to defraud or intended that a fraud might be committed.
[s 240.8.1] Proof of Guilty Knowledge
It is not always possible or necessary that the particular knowledge be proved by positive evidence. The
prosecution may bring out circumstances which might indicate or from which a reasonable presumption could
be raised that he knew at the time he became possessed of the coins that they were counterfeit.133 In a case of
this nature it is not always possible or necessary that the particular knowledge should be proved by positive
evidence. The prosecution may bring out circumstances which might indicate or from which a reasonable
presumption could be raised that the accused ought to have known at the time that she became possessed of
the coins that they were counterfeit.134 Guilty knowledge may be proved either directly or indirectly from
surrounding circumstances.135
[s 240.9] Separate Conviction under Sections 240 and 243, Indian Penal Code 1860—Whether and when
Permissible
A conviction for an offence under section 243 is no bar to a subsequent trial under section 240, the offence
under the two sections being distinct offences.136 A person having four counterfeit coins in his possession, but
uttering only one of them, cannot be separately convicted under this section with respect to one coin and under
section 243 regarding the possession of the other three, as an offence, under this section implies prior guilty
Page 6 of 6
possession. If such separation were allowable, there might be a conviction for the possession of each coin. The
physical acts, though capable of separate existence and perception, coalesce when coincident in time, space
and purpose.137
[s 240.10] Sentence
Tampering with an Indian coin is a very serious offence; and to punish it with two months rigorous imprisonment
is not calculated to deter coiners from committing it.138
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
126 Subs. by the AO 1950 for “the Queen’s coin”.
127 Subs. by the AO 1950 for “the Queen’s coin”.
128 Gopichand v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pesh 99 , p 100.
129 1 Weir 222.
130 Dost Mohammad v Emperor, AIR 1936 Ngp 242 , p 243; Bhan Singh v Emperor, (1930) 31 Cr LJ 736 (1).
131 Kishan Lal v State, AIR 1953 Pepsu 43 : (1953) Cr LJ 452, p 453.
132 Ganga v State (1957) All LJ 283 (All).
133 Kishan Lal v State, AIR 1953 Pepsu 43 : (1953) Cr LJ 452 , p 453.
134 Ibid,.
135 Parushullah Mundul v Kheroo Mundul, 23 WR 4; Ranchhod Mula v State, (1961) 2 Cr LJ 472 , p 474 (Guj).
136 R v Prasanna Kumar, ILR 31 Cal 1007.
137 Queen-Empress v Lakshin, Ratanlal’s Un Cr Cas 202.
138 Parushullah Mundul v Kheroo Mundul, 23 WR 4, p 5.
End of Document
[s 241] Delivery of coin as genuine, which, when first possessed, the
deliverer did not know to be counterfeit.—
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include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 6
[s 241] Delivery of coin as genuine, which, when first possessed, the deliverer did not know to be counterfeit.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 6
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 6

deliverer did not know to be counterfeit.—
Whoever delivers to any other person as genuine, or attempts to induce any other person to receive as
genuine, any counterfeit coin which he knows to be counterfeit, but which he did not know to be counterfeit at
the time when he took it into his possession, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine to an amount which may extend to ten times the value of the
coin counterfeited, or with both.
Illustration
A, a coiner, delivers counterfeit Company’s rupees to his accomplice B, for the purpose of uttering them. B sells
the rupees to C, another utterer, who buys them knowing them to be counterfeit. C pays away the rupees for
goods to D, who receives them, not knowing them to be counterfeit. D, after receiving the rupees, discovers
that they are counterfeit and pays them away as if they were good. Here D is punishable only under this
section, but B and C are punishable under section 239 or 240, as the case may be.
[s 241.1] Scope
While section 239, IPC dealt with professional utterers, this section deals with a casual utterer of base coin. The
offence under this section consists in trying to pass off as genuine a coin which the accused has honestly
received, but has subsequently found out to be counterfeit.139
[s 241.2] Essence
The essence of the offence in section 241, IPC, is the delivery of counterfeit coin to any person and three
deliveries of counterfeit coin to three different persons are clearly offences of the same kind within the meaning
of that term as set out in section 234 of the CrPC.140
[s 241.3] “As Genuine”—Illustrative Cases
The coin must be delivered as genuine otherwise there will be no offence under this section. If A, in possession
of a counterfeit coin, hands it over to a friend in order to prevent its discovery by the police, he commits no
offence under the section.141
A vagrant entered a shop for drink. The shopkeeper supposing that he had come to commit theft, shut the door
and called for a watchman. The vagrant ran away and meeting one Munglee put some coins into his hand and
told him to keep them for him. The coins turned out to be counterfeit. A conviction under this section was set
aside, as it did not appear that he had passed the coins as genuine or induced Munglee to receive them as
genuine.142
Notes under sections 28, 231, 232 may be referred to.
[s 241.5] Meaning of “Which he knows”
The ignorance of the accused as to the nature of the coin when he took it into his possession should be alleged
in the charge, though it need not be proved, for if alleged the ignorance will be presumed. A false statement as
Page 5 of 6
to how a coin was obtained is prima facie evidence that the accused knew that it was counterfeit,143 so is the
fact that the coin was first tendered for change and was refused on the ground that it was counterfeit.144 If a
person is found in possession of counterfeit coins separated from the genuine ones and he tries to deliver the
genuine ones first and the counterfeit ones afterwards and he is unable adequately to explain the purpose
behind the separation, it can be inferred that he had knowledge of the counterfeit character of the coins.145
[s 241.6] Possession
[s 241.7] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by any magistrate.
A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The cognizance of an offence under this section can be
taken within three years.
Where two persons were jointly charged with and convicted under section 241 of the IPC, of passing counterfeit
coins on three different occasions on the same day to three different persons it was held that the trial was not
illegal within the meaning of sections 234 and 239, CrPC.146
[s 241.8] Charge
The charge under this section should run thus:
That on or about the……day of……….at ………you delivered to AB as genuine (or attempted to induce AB to receive
as genuine) a coin. Ex……which was counterfeit, and which you then knew to be counterfeit though you did not know it
to be counterfeit at the time when you took it into your possession, and you thereby committed an offence punishable
[s 241.9] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it will have to be established that:147
(i) the accused delivered or attempted to induce another person to receive a coin;
(ii) the said coin was counterfeit;
(iii) the accused delivered or attempted to deliver it as genuine; and

Page 6 of 6
(iv) at the time of delivery he knew it to be counterfeit though he did not know that it was counterfeit when
he took it into his possession.
[s 241.10] Sentence
When a person of position passes off counterfeit coins to others who are not as well off as he is, the matter
cannot be dealt with leniently, especially as it is a kind of offence which is difficult to detect.148
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
139 Mayne on Criminal Law, p 804.
140 Kovaganti alias Nalldgonda Appiah v Crown, AIR 1923 Mad 181 [LNIND 1922 MAD 141] .
141 R v Soorut, 4 NWP 62.
142 Ibid.
143 Ram Ruttun Saha v Bawool Mundul, 23 WR (Cr) 4.
144 Ebrahim v R, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 79 .
145 State of Uttar Pradesh v Lal Chand, (1965) All WR (HC) 837.
146 Kovaganti alias Nalldgonda Appiah v Crown, AIR 1923 Mad 181 [LNIND 1922 MAD 141] .
147 Re Bhan Singh, 124 IC 688.
148 Dost Mohammad v Emperor, AIR 1936 Ngp 242 .
End of Document
[s 242] Possession of counterfeit coin by person who knew it to be
counterfeit when he became possessed thereof.—
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include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 6
[s 242] Possession of counterfeit coin by person who knew it to be counterfeit when he became possessed
thereof.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
Page 3 of 6
thereof.—
composition of Indian coin Seven years (section 247)
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 6
thereof.—
[s 242] Possession of counterfeit coin by person who knew it to be

counterfeit when he became possessed thereof.—
Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of counterfeit coin, having
known at the time when he became possessed thereof that such coin was counterfeit, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 242.1] Scope
The mere possession of counterfeit coin is an offence under this section and section 243, IPC, even though no
attempt is made to pass it off, provided it can be shown that it was kept for a fraudulent purpose, and was
originally obtained with a guilty knowledge. The mere fact of a single base coin being found in a party’s
possession would not, without further evidence, be sufficient to create a presumption that he knew it to be
counterfeit when he obtained it, and intended to make a fraudulent use of it. But where a considerable number
of base coins are found in a man’s possession, the presumption of guilt would be sufficient to make a conviction
lawful, unless the possession could in some manner be explained or accounted for.149
[s 242.2] Fraudulent
[s 242.3] “Possession”
Notes under section 235 may be referred to. For a conviction under this section it must be proved that the
accused was in possession of a counterfeit coin with intent to defraud. It must also be shown that at the time he
became possessed of the coin he knew it was counterfeit.150
Section 28 and notes thereunder may be referred to.
[s 242.5] Procedure
the first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The limitation for taking cognizance of an
[s 242.6] Charge
The following form of charge under this section may be adopted:
I, (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
Page 5 of 6
thereof.—
That on or about the ………day of ……….at………you fraudulently (or with intent that fraud might be committed) were
in possession of Ex……being counterfeit coins, knowing at the time when you became possessed of the same that
they were counterfeit, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 242 of the Indian Penal Code, and
[s 242.7] Proof
To establish an offence under this section the prosecution must prove that:
(i) accused was in possession of a coin;
(ii) the coin was counterfeit;
(iii) he was in possession of it with intent to defraud, or with intent that fraud might be committed; and
(iv) at the time he became possessed of it, he knew it to be counterfeit.
Illustration (e) to s 21 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 reads thus:
A is accused of fraudulently having in his possession counterfeit coin which he knew to be counterfeit.
He offers to prove that he asked a skilful person to examine the coin as he doubted whether it was counterfeit or not,
and that the person did examine it and told him it was genuine.
A may prove these facts in his defence as they are explanatory of conduct influenced by facts in issue.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
Page 6 of 6
thereof.—
149 Mayne on Criminal Law, pp 804–805.
150 Fateh Chand v R, 21 Cal WN 33; Ebrahim v R, 4 Bur LT 9.
End of Document
[s 243] Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be counterfeit
when he became possessed thereof.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 7
[s 243] Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be counterfeit when he became possessed
thereof.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
Page 3 of 7
thereof.—
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 7
thereof.—
[s 243] Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be counterfeit

when he became possessed thereof.—
Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of counterfeit coin, which is a
counterfeit of 151[Indian coin], having known at the time when he became possessed of it that it was counterfeit,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall
also be liable to fine.
[s 243.1] Scope
This section provides that whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of
a counterfeit coin, which is a counterfeit of an Indian coin, having known at the time when he became
possessed of it that it was counterfeit, shall be punished as stated in the section.152
The words “the Queen’s coin” both in the margin and the body of the section were replaced by the words
“Indian coin” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950.
To constitute an offence under this section it must be proved that: (a) the accused was in possession of coin;
(b) the coin was a counterfeit of the Indian coin; (c) the accused was in such possession fraudulently or with
intent to defraud; and (d) at the time he became possessed of such coin he knew it to be counterfeit.
[s 243.3.1] “Fraudulently”
Where in the course of a search of the house of the accused in connection with an offence, counterfeit coins
were recovered from a bundle of cloth kept inside a box under lock and key, and it was found that the coins
were part of an estate and were sold as such and were purchased by the accused openly in an auction sale
and there was no attempt at concealment, and no attempt was made to pass on the coins to other persons as
genuine, it was held that it could not be held that the accused was in possession of the coins fraudulently or
with intent that fraud may be committed and therefore, the charge under this section was not proved.153
[s 243.3.2] Possession of Coin must be with Knowledge of its Being Counterfeit
In order to find an accused guilty of an offence under this section, it must be proved, inter alia, that at the time
of coming into possession of the counterfeit coins, he knew that the coins were counterfeit. If a person who
innocently comes into possession of counterfeit coins, discovers later that the coins are counterfeit, he does not
thereby become liable to punishment under this section if he retains possession of the coins with him.154
[s 243.3.3] Possession—Personal and Constructive

Page 5 of 7
thereof.—
An accused charged under this section may be proved to be in possession if he is in possession in either of two
modes, namely: (a) he may be in possession of the coin himself, or (b) he may be in possession of the coin on
his account. It is plain that whichever mode of possession is established, it is essential to prove that at the time
the accused became possessed of the coin, he knew it to be counterfeit. section 27, IPC defines constructive
possession and the court is bound to interpret the expression “in possession” according to that definition.
Possession through Servant
The master becomes possessed, when he personally takes possession on his own account, or when, he
authorises the servant to take a thing for him, for his benefit or on his account, or when he consents to, or
sanctions, the retention of the thing received by the servant, or knowingly allows the servant to retain in custody
for him. If there be prior authority to the servant or arrangement with him to receive, the time when the servant
receives is the time when the master becomes possessed. In other cases, the time when the master comes to
know or consent or allows the thing to remain with the servant, is the time when he becomes possessed. The
master, for purposes of this section, may be in possession in two ways: (a) time when he becomes possessed,
and (b) when it can be held that he was “conscious” of his possession.155 It is certainly not intended that no
person in possession of a house shall be convicted of being in possession of stolen property or counterfeit coin
or anything of that kind, if there happen to be other people living in the house and if it cannot be positively
established that the person convicted had put the incriminating articles in the place where they were found. It
must be shown in the first place that the incriminating articles were found in a place in the possession of the
person to be convicted. In the next place it must be shown, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, from
which a reasonable inference can be drawn, that the person to be convicted knew that these particular things
were in the place where they were found.156
Commentary for section 27 may be referred to.
Possession of Large Number of Coins
Merely because the number of counterfeit coins was 85, it would not be conclusive for proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused had come into possession of these coins knowing that they were counterfeit
and that he was in possession of these coins fraudulently or with an intent that fraud may be committed.157
Innocent Possession
Where the accused was a tea-vendor and if customers had been coming to him to tender the counterfeit coins
for buying tea, and the coins were not so clearly counterfeit as to make him suspicions of these coins, he may
well be considered to have come into possession of these coins innocently.158
[s 243.4] “Counterfeit Coin”
This section requires that the person must be in possession of counterfeit coin and that the person who was
possessed of it must have known at the time when he became possessed of it that it was counterfeit. section
28, IPC, defines the expression “counterfeit”, and the essential ingredient of that section is that there must be a
resemblance such as to practice deception, although according to expln (1) of that section the imitation need
not be exact. But, although the resemblance need not be exact, it is essential that the counterfeit must be of
such a character that it would be possible to pass it off as a genuine coin, and unless that is so, it would not be
possible to practice deception; and to practice deception is one of the ingredients of the definition of counterfeit
in section 28.159
[s 243.6] Procedure
Page 6 of 7
thereof.—
[s 243.7] Charge
The following form of the charge under this section may be adopted:
That you, on or about the……day of……at………fraudulently (or with intent that fraud might be committed) were in
possession of……pieces of counterfeit Indian coin; knowing at the time when you became possessed of the said coins
that they were counterfeit, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 243 of the Indian Penal Code,
[s 243.8] Proof
To sustain a conviction under this section the prosecution must prove that:
(i) the accused was in possession of coins;
(ii) the said coins were counterfeit coins;
(iii) the accused was in possession of them with intent to defraud; and
(iv) the accused at the time he became possessed of the coins knew that they were counterfeit.
It has to be established by the prosecution that the accused fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be
committed, came into possession of counterfeit coins which were counterfeit of Indian coins, having known at
the time he became possessed of them, that they were counterfeit.160
[s 243.9] Knowledge at the time of Obtaining Possession—Presumption and Proof
It is difficult to establish, by positive evidence that a man in whose possession a counterfeit coin is found knew
when it came into his possession that it was counterfeit. This difficulty is enhanced when the accused who is in
a position to give an explanation refuses to give one. In such a case the guilty knowledge of the accused has to
be inferred from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused.161 The fact that at the time
when the accused came into possession of the counterfeit coin for the first time, the accused knew that it was
counterfeit need not necessarily be proved by any positive evidence, specially when the accused refuses to
give any explanation of his possession and can be inferred from the conduct of the accused and the
circumstances of the case. Thus onus in such cases lies on the prosecution to prove that the accused became
possessed of the counterfeit coin knowing it to be counterfeit.162 section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 does not
Page 7 of 7
thereof.—
entitle the prosecution to throw the onus as regards the time of knowledge on the accused without any
qualification, but if the prosecution has succeeded in establishing circumstances suggesting that the petitioner
knew at the time he became possessed of the coins that they were counterfeit, then and in that case alone, it
would be necessary for the accused to lead evidence to show that it was not at that time he became aware of
their counterfeit character.163
[s 243.10] Separate Conviction under Sections 240 and 243, Indian Penal Code 1860—Whether and when
Permissible
Commentary under same heading in section 240 may be referred to.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
152 Gulam Rabbani Gulam Uman v State, AIR 1956 Bom 511 [LNIND 1956 BOM 67] : (1956) Cr LJ 881 .
153 Gudar Sao v Emperor, AIR 1936 Pat 533 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 114 ; distinguishing Emperor v Sangaram, AIR 1933
Oudh 85 : (1933) 34 Cr LJ 545 where some of the coins were found in a box which was concealed, inside a heap of
bhusha evidently with the object of concealment; Mohd Ibrahim v State, AIR 1969 Del 315 [LNIND 1968 DEL 115] :
(1969) Cr LJ 1377 .
154 Kashi Prasad v State, AIR 1950 All 732 [LNIND 1950 ALL 171] , p 733 : (1950) All LJ 516; Kesho Bania v Emperor,
AIR 1941 Pat 26 : (1941) 42 Cr LJ 301 ; JK Devaiya v State of Coorg, AIR 1956 Mys 51 : (1956) Cr LJ 904 ; Fateh
Chand Agarwalla v Emperor, AIR 1917 Cal 123 : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 385 (FB).
155 Fateh Chand Agarwalla v Emperor, AIR 1917 Cal 123 , p 136 : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 385 (FB).
156 Tulsi Ram v Emperor, AIR 1936 All 650 , p 651 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 1019 .
159 Gulam Rabbani Gulam Uman v State, AIR 1956 Bom 511 [LNIND 1956 BOM 67] : (1956) Cr LJ 881 .
161 Emperor v Dhanna Singh, AIR 1943 Oudh 335 , p 337 : (1943) 44 Cr LJ 542 ; Emperor v Sangram, AIR 1933 Oudh 85
: (1933) 34 Cr LJ 545 ; Kashi Prasad v State, AIR 1950 All 732 [LNIND 1950 ALL 171] , p 733.
162 Emperor v Dhanna Singh, AIR 1943 Oudh 335 , p 337.
163 Kesho Bania v Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 26 , p 27 : (1941) 42 Cr LJ 301 .
End of Document
[s 244] Person employed in mint causing coin to be of different weight or
composition from that fixed by law.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5
[s 244] Person employed in mint causing coin to be of different weight or composition from that fixed by law.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 5
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 5
[s 244] Person employed in mint causing coin to be of different weight or

composition from that fixed by law.—
Whoever, being employed in any mint lawfully established in 164[India], does any act, or omits what he is legally
bound to do, with the intention of causing any coin issued from that mint to be of a different weight or
composition from the weight or composition fixed by law, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
This section provides drastic penalties for pilfering of bullion used at the mint for the coinage of money. The
provisions of the section apply to those who are employees at the mint, whatever may have been their duties
and responsibilities. section 6 of the Coinage Act,165 1906, as amended by the Amending Acts 4 of 1942 and 28
of 1947, provides for coining the coins of such denominations, dimensions, designs and composition as may be
prescribed and section 7 provides for prescribing the standard weight and remedy (i.e. variation from the
standard weight and fineness) of the coins, which alone can, under section 13 of that Act, be legal tender.
The words “the Provinces” were substituted for the words “British India” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1948.
The words “the Provinces” were substituted by the words “the State” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950.
The word “India” was substituted for the words “the states” by Act 3 of 1951.
[s 244.3] Object is to Ensure Purity of Coining
The object of this section is to ensure the purity of the coinage and secure its conformity to the legal standard
against the acts or omissions of persons employed in the mint. A similar provision is to be found in England
also. Not only those who counterfeit coin without authority but even persons employed in the mint or its
branches are within the Coinage Offences Act,166 if for their own lucre they make the money of baser alloy, or
lighter than they are authorised and bound by law to do; for they can only justify coining at all under the
Coinage Acts and proclamations, and the terms of their appointment; and if they have not pursued that
authority it is the same as if they had none. But mere mistake in weight or alloy will not make them guilty; the
act must be wilful, corrupt and fraudulent.167
[s 244.5] Procedure
the first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no limitation for taking cognizance of
[s 244.6] Charge
The following form of the charge may be adopted in a prosecution under this section:
Page 5 of 5
That, on or about the……day of………at……you being employed as………in the………….mint lawfully established in
India did an act to wit……….(specify the act) or omitted what you were legally bound to do (specify the omission) with
the intention of causing the coin issued from the said mint to be of a different weight or composition from the weight or
composition fixed by law, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 244 of the Indian Penal Code,
[s 244.7] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it will have to be proved that:
(i) the accused was employed in any mint lawfully established in India;
(ii) as such, he did some act or omitted what he was legally bound to do; and
(iii) the act or omission was with the intention of causing any coin issued from that mint to be of a different
weight or composition from the weight or composition fixed by law.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
165 The word “Indian” of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906, was omitted by Act 47 of 1975, section 2 (w.e.f. 12-8-1975). Now
repealed.
166 Coinage Offences Act (1936) 26 Geo, 5 & 1 Edw 8, cr 16.
167 Russell on Crime, Vol 2, 11th Edn p 1939.
End of Document
[s 245] Unlawfully taking coining instrument from mint.—
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include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 5
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 5

Whoever, without lawful authority, takes out of any mint, lawfully established in 168[India], any coining tool or
instrument, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 245.1] Scope
The section penalises “unlawfully taking” coining instruments out of the mint lawfully established in India.
Intention is no part of the offence. All that is required is that coining instruments should be taken out of the mint
without lawful authority.
The word “the Provinces” were substituted for the words “British India” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1948.
The words “the Provinces” were substituted by the words “the States” by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950.
The word “India” was substituted for the words “the States” by Act 3 of 1951.
[s 245.3] “Without Lawful Authority”
If the authorities, knowing of a person’s intention to remove any coining instrument, allow him to do so, in order
to ensure his detention, such authority does not justify the act of the accused.169
[s 245.4] Procedure
the first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no time limit to take cognizance of
[s 245.5] Charge
That you, on or about the…….day of ………at………without lawful authority, did take out of a mint lawfully established
in India to wit, the mint…….a certain coining tool (or instrument), to wit……and thereby committed an offence
punishable under section 245 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of my Court.
And I hereby direct that you be tried by this court, on the said charge.
[s 245.6] Proof
Page 5 of 5
(i) the tool or instrument in question is a coining tool or instrument;
(ii) it belonged to a mint lawfully established in India; and
(iii) the accused took it out of the mint without lawful authority.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
169 R v Hervay, LR 1 CC 284.
End of Document
[s 246] Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering
composition of coin.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 6
[s 246] Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering composition of coin.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
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[s 246] Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering

composition of coin.—
Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly performs on any coin any operation which diminishes the weight or alters
the composition of that coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—A person who scoops out part of the coin and puts anything else into the cavity alters the
composition of that coin.
[s 246.1] Scope
This section and section 247 of the IPC deal with the tampering of coin either by sweating or other means
which diminishes its weight or alters its composition.
Sections 246 and 247 correspond with section 3 of the English Coinage Act, 1946 (as amended by the Criminal
Justice Act, 1948)170 which runs as follows:
(1) Every person who impairs, diminishes or lightens any current gold or silver (cupro-nickel) coin with intent that the
coin so impaired, diminished or lightened, may pass, for a current gold or silver (cupro-nickel) coin, shall be guilty of
felony, and on conviction thereof liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years…
Section 2(a) of the Coinage Act, 1906171 as amended by the Indian Coinage (Amendment) Act, 1947 defines
the word “deface” as follows:
(a) “deface”, with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, includes clipping, filing, stamping, or such other
alteration of the surface or shape of a coin as is readily distinguishable from the effects of reasonable wear.
…
Page 5 of 6
Section 16 of the Coinage Act, 1906 provides that any person authorised by the Central Government shall by
himself or another, cut or break the silver coin; if it has been diminished in weight or has been defaced.
Sections 17 and 18 of the said Act provide for the return or payment of the coins so cut to their owners, unless
he believes that the coin has been fraudulently defaced. It is provided in the Explanation to section 18 to the
said Act that defacing a coin by sweating is deemed to amount to fraudulent defacement.
[s 246.4] “Dishonestly”
[s 246.5] Procedure
The offence is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and is triable by a magistrate of the first class. A
warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this
[s 246.6] Charge
The following form of the charge may be adopted for a prosecution under this section:
That you, on or about the……day of………at……fraudulently (or dishonestly) performed on the coin, to wit …….an
operation which diminished its weight (or altered its composition), and you thereby committed an offence punishable
[s 246.7] Proof
(i) the accused performed an operation;
(ii) the thing on which the operation was performed was a coin;
(iii) the operation was performed fraudulently or dishonestly; and

Page 6 of 6
(iv) it diminished its weight or altered its composition.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
170 11 & 12 Geo 6, c 58, section 1.
171 The word “Indian” of the Indian Coinage Act, 1906 was omitted by Act 47 of 1975, section 2 (w.e.f. 12-8-1975). Now,
repealed.
End of Document
[s. 247] Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering
composition of Indian coin.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
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[s. 247] Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering composition of Indian coin.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
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[s. 247] Fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering

composition of Indian coin.—
Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly performs on 172[any Indian coin] any operation which diminishes the weight
or alters the composition of that coin, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 247.1] Scope
The only difference between section 246, IPC and this section is that the former deals with the tampering with a
coin while this, section deals with the tampering with the Indian coin, either by sweating or other means so as to
diminish its weight or alter its composition.
The words “any of the Queen’s coin” were replaced by the words “any Indian coin” in the body of the section by
the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950. By the same order the words “Queen’s coin” were replaced by the words
“Indian coin” in the margin of the section also.
[s 247.3] Coin with respect to which Offence Defined in Section 247 or Section 249 has been Committed
[s 247.5] “Dishonestly”
The word “dishonestly” which occurs in this section has been defined in section 24, IPC thus:
Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person, or wrongful loss to another person,
is said to do that “thing dishonestly”.
[s 247.5.1] Dishonesty with Banks
The banks are not authorised to accept coins which have been fraudulently defaced. If, therefore, a person
intentionally defaces a coin and conceals this fact from the bank in order to persuade the bank to accept the
coin, he has the intention of causing wrongful gain to himself, even though the bank may not be put to a
wrongful loss inasmuch as it has to pay price according to the present weight of the coin. But there would be a
wrongful loss to the bank if some silver has been taken away by cutting clipping or filing and the weight is
brought up to the required minimum by soldering. The person would therefore be liable under this section.173
[s 247.6] Procedure
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The offence is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable and, is triable by a magistrate of the first class. A
warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no time limit for taking cognizance of an offence
under this section.
[s 247.7] Charge
That you, on or about the…day of…….at……fraudulently (or dishonestly) performed on an Indian coin, to wit………an
operation which diminished its weight (or altered its composition), and you thereby committed an offence punishable
[s 247.8] Proof
(i) the accused performed an operation;
(ii) the thing on which the operation was performed was an Indian coin;
(iii) the operation was performed fraudulently or dishonestly; and
(iv) it diminished its weight or altered its composition.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
172 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “any of the Queen’s coin”.
173 Mehtab Rai v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 321 , p 323 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 426 .
Page 6 of 6
End of Document
[s 248] Altering appearance of coin with intent that it shall pass as coin of
different description.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 6
[s 248] Altering appearance of coin with intent that it shall pass as coin of different description.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
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knowledge

first possessed
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[s 248] Altering appearance of coin with intent that it shall pass as coin of
different description.—
Whoever performs on any coin any operation which alters the appearance of that coin, with the intention that
the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different description, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
[s 248.1] Scope
Any performance or operation which alters the appearance of a coin with the intention that the said coin shall
pass as a coin of a different description is an offence under this section. The alteration must not diminish the
weight of the coin. If so, then sections 246 or 247 will apply.
This section is analogous to section 2 of the English Coinage Act, 1946 (as amended by Criminal Justice Act,
1948, section 1), which reads thus:
Every person who:
(a) Gilds or silvers, or, with any wash or materials capable of producing the colour or appearance of gold or silver
by any means whatsoever, washes, cases over or colours:
(i) any coin whatsoever resembling any current gold or silver (cupro-nickel) coin; or
(ii) any current copper coin, with intent to make it resemble or pass for any current gold or silver (cupro-
nickel) coin; or
(iii) any piece of silver or copper or of coarse gold or coarse silver or of any metal or mixture of metals; being
of a fit size and figure to be coined, with intent that it shall be coined into false and counterfeit coin
resembling any current gold or silver (cupro-nickel) coin; or
(b) Gilds, or with any wash or materials capable of producing the colour or appearance of gold or by any means
whatsoever, washes, cases over or colours, any current silver (cupro-nickel) coin with intent to make it
resemble or pass for any current gold coin;
(c) Files or in any manner alters
(i) any current silver (cupro-nickel) coin with intent to make it resemble or pass for any current gold coin; or
(ii) any current copper coin with intent to make it resemble or pass for any gold or silver (cupro-nickel) coin;
Page 5 of 6
shall be guilty of felony and on conviction thereof be liable to imprisonment for life.
[s 248.3] Procedure
[s 248.4] Charge
For a charge under this section, the following form may be adopted:
That you, on or about the…….day of………at ……… performed an operation on the coin, Exhibit……which altered the
appearance of the said coin, with the intention that the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different description and you
And I there direct that you be tried by this court on the said charge.
[s 248.5] Proof
To establish an offence under this section the prosecution has to prove that:
(i) the accused performed an operation on any coin;
(ii) it altered its appearance; and
(iii) he did so with the intention that the altered coin should pass as a coin of a different description.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.

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End of Document
[s 249] Altering appearance of Indian coin with intent that it shall pass as
coin of different description.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
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[s 249] Altering appearance of Indian coin with intent that it shall pass as coin of different description.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
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composition of
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[s 249] Altering appearance of Indian coin with intent that it shall pass as
coin of different description.—
Whoever performs on 174[any Indian coin] any operation which alters the appearance of that coin, with the
intention that the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different description, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 249.1] Scope
The only difference between the previous section and this section is that in this section the coin altered is an
Indian coin and it provides a higher penalty, in other respects, the ingredients of this section are the same as
those of the last section.
The words “any Indian coin” were substituted for the words “any of the Queen’s coin” by the Adaptation of Laws
Order, 1950.
Section 230 may be referred to.
[s 249.4] Coin with respect to which the Offence Defined in Section 247 or Section 249 has been Committed
[s 249.5] Procedure
[s 249.6] Charge
For a charge under this section, the following form may be adopted:
I, (name and Office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That on or about the……day of……at ……….you performed an operation on the Indian coin, Exhibit……which altered
the appearance of the said coin, with the intention that the said coin shall pass as a coin of a different description and
you thereby committed an offence punishable under section 249 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
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[s 249.7] Proof
In order to establish an offence under this section, the prosecution has to prove that:
(i) the accused performed any operation on an Indian coin;
(ii) it altered its appearance; and
(iii) he did so with the intention that the altered coin should pass as a coin of a different description.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
174 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “any of the Queen’s coin”.
End of Document
[s 250] Delivery of coin, possessed with knowledge that it is altered.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
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knowledge

first possessed
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Whoever, having coin in his possession with respect to which the offence defined in section 246 or 248 has
been committed, and having known at the time when he became possessed of such coin that such offence had
been committed with respect to it, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, delivers such coin to
any other person, or attempts to induce any other person to receive the same, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 250.1] Scope
Sections 250 and 251, IPC are meant to punish persons who trade in spurious or altered coins, and correspond
to sections 239 and 240, IPC. In both sections possession with knowledge and fraudulent delivery is essential.
[s 250.3] Coin
Coin refers to a coin in respect of which an offence under sections 246 or 248, IPC has been committed.
section 246, IPC deals with an offence of fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing the weight or altering the
composition of a coin. section 248, IPC deals with an offence of altering the appearance of a coin with the
intention that it shall pass as a coin of different description. This section deals with offences relating to trading in
such spurious or altered coins.
[s 250.4] Procedure
[s 250.5] Charge
I, (name and office of magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused), as follows:
That on or about the……day of………at………you had in your possession a coin, to wit………with respect to which the
offence defined in section 246 (or section 248) of the Indian Penal Code had been committed, and having known at the
time when you became possessed of the said coin, that such offence had been committed with respect to it, you
fraudulently or with intent that fraud might be committed, delivered such coin to AB (or attempted to induce the said AB
to receive the same), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 250 of the Indian Penal Code, and
Page 5 of 5
[s 250.6] Proof
(i) the coin in the case was one in respect of which an offence under sections 246 or 248 had been
committed;
(ii) the accused was in possession of it;
(iii) at the time when he became possessed of it, he knew that any of the said offences had been
committed with respect to it;
(iv) he delivered it to some other person, or attempted to induce him to receive the same; and
(v) he did so fraudulently, or with intent that fraud might be committed.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
End of Document
[s 251] Delivery of Indian coin possessed with knowledge that it is
altered.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
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[s 251] Delivery of Indian coin possessed with knowledge that it is altered.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
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Whoever, having coin in his possession with respect to which the offence defined in section 247 or 249 has
been committed, and having known at the time when he became possessed of such coin that such offence had
been committed with respect to it, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, delivers such coin to
any other person, or attempts to induce any other person to receive the same, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 251.1] Scope
This section deals with Indian coins. The difference between the last and the present section is that the coin
possessed in this section is “Indian coin” for which a higher penalty is prescribed. In all other respects the two
are the same.
The word “Queen’s” in the margin of the section was replaced by the word “Indian” by the Adaptation of Laws
Order 1950.
[s 251.3] “Delivers such Coins”
The mere fact that a coin is used as an ornament by soldering a ring to it does not transform it absolutely into a
new article. By removal of the ring, the coin in a defaced form will re-appear and may be capable of being
accepted as a coin by ignorant villagers. If these coins are tendered to a bank, they are not tendered as
ornaments or other articles into which coins have been transformed, but they are tendered as coins which have
been defaced. If, therefore, any person clips and cuts away such coins, makes up their deficient weight by
solder and delivers them to a bank, he would be guilty of the offence under this section.175
[s 251.4] Coin with respect to which the Offence Defined in Section 247 or Section 249 has been Committed
Sections 247 and 248, IPC both deal with Indian coins. That is the reason for not repeating the word “Indian” in
the body of this section. section 247, IPC deals with fraudulently or dishonestly diminishing weight or altering
composition of Indian coins, while section 249, IPC deals with the altering of appearance of an Indian coin with
the intention that it shall pass as coin of different description. This section deals with offences relating to trade
in such spurious or altered Indian coins.
[s 251.5] Procedure
session. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no limitation for taking cognizance of an
[s 251.6] Charge
The following form of the charge may be adopted in a case under this section:
Page 5 of 6
That you, on or about the…day of……at…had in your possession an Indian coin, to wit……and in respect of which the
offence defined in section 247 (or section 249) of the Indian Penal Code, had been committed, and knowing at the time
when you became possessed of the said coin that such offence had been committed, you fraudulently (or with intent
that fraud may be committed) delivered such coin to AB (or attempted to induce the said AB to receive the same) and
thereby committed an offence punishable under section 251 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of
this court.
[s 251.7] Proof
To establish an offence under this section it will have to be proved that:
(i) the coin in question was one with respect to which the offence defined in sections 247 or 249, IPC was
committed;
(ii) the accused was in possession of it;
(iii) at the time when he became possessed of it, he knew that any of the said offences had been
committed;
(iv) he delivered it to someone, or attempted to induce someone to receive it; and
(v) he did so with intent to defraud or with intent that fraud might be committed.
[s 251.8] Sentence—“And Shall also be Liable to Fine”
The law did not require a sentence of fine as well as imprisonment to be inflicted. The sentence of fine was
optional.176
The maximum sentence prescribed under this section, is ten years” rigorous imprisonment coupled with a fine.
Therefore, a sentence of one years” rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1000 on one accused and six
months rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs 500 on another cannot be said to be severe.177
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
175 Mehtab Rai v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 321 , p 323 : ILR 48 All 603 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 426 .
Page 6 of 6
176 Re Joseph alias Thavasi, 1 Weir 223.
177 Mehtab Rai v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 321 , p 324 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 426 : ILR 48 All 603 : (1926) 24 All LJ 842.
End of Document
[s 252] Possession of coin by person who knew it to be altered when he
became possessed thereof.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5
[s 252] Possession of coin by person who knew it to be altered when he became possessed thereof.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
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[s 252] Possession of coin by person who knew it to be altered when he

became possessed thereof.—
Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of coin with respect to which
the offence defined in either of the section 246 or 248 has been committed, having known at the time of
becoming possessed thereof that such offence had been committed with respect of such coin, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
1. Scope
This section punishes persons who possess debased or altered coins with fraudulent intention. This section
and section 253, IPC correspond to sections 242 and 243, IPC. Under this section possession of a debased
coin in respect of which an offence defined in either sections 246 or 248, IPC has been committed is made an
offence.
2. “Fraudulently”
3. Possession
4. Procedure
5. Charge
That you, on or about the…day of……at………fraudulently (or with intent that fraud might be committed) had in your
possession a coin, to wit…………in respect of which the offence defined in section 246 (or 248) IPC had been
committed having known at the time of becoming possessed thereof, that such offence had been committed with
respect to the said coin, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 252 of the Indian Penal Code and
within any cognizance.
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6. Proof
(i) the accused was in possession of a coin;
(ii) it was a coin with respect to which the offence defined in sections 246 or 248 had been committed;
(iii) the accused knew of it when he became possessed of the coin; and
(iv) he was in possession of the coin with intent to defraud, or with intent that fraud might be committed.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
End of Document
[s 253] Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be altered when
he became possessed thereof.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
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[s 253] Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be altered when he became possessed thereof.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
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knowledge

first possessed
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[s 253] Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be altered when

he became possessed thereof.—
Whoever, fraudulently or with intent that fraud may be committed, is in possession of coin with respect to which
the offence defined in either of the section 247 or 249 has been committed, having known at the time of
becoming possessed thereof that such offence had been committed with respect to such coin, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
[s 253.1] Scope
The only difference between this and the last section is that in this section the same offence is in respect of an
Indian coin and the penalty prescribed is higher than the preceding section. In other respects, there is no
difference.
The words “Queen’s coin” in the margin were replaced by the words “Indian coin” by the Adaptation of Laws
Order 1950.
[s 253.3] Procedure
the first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. No period of limitation is fixed for taking
cognizance of an offence under this section.
[s 253.4] Charge
That you on, or about the……day of……….at……fraudulently (or with intent that fraud might be committed) had in your
possession an Indian coin, to wit…….in respect of which the offence defined in section 247 (or 249) IPC had been
committed having known at the time of becoming possessed thereof, that such offence had been committed with
respect to the said coin, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 253 of the Indian Penal Code and
[s 253.5] Proof
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(i) the accused was in possession of an Indian coin;
(ii) it was a coin with respect to which the offence defined in section 247 or 249, IPC has been committed;
(iii) the accused knew of it when he became possessed of the coin; and
(iv) he was in possession of the coin with intent to defraud, or with intent that fraud might be committed.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
End of Document
deliverer did not know to be altered.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5
[s 254] Delivery of coin as genuine, which, when first possessed, the deliverer did not know to be altered.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
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first possessed
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deliverer did not know to be altered.—
Whoever delivers to any other person as genuine or as a coin of a different description from what it is, or
attempts to induce any person to receive as genuine, or as a different coin from what it is, any coin in respect of
which he knows that any such operation as that mentioned in sections 246, 247, 248 or 249 has been
performed, but in respect of which he did not, at the time when he took it into his possession, know that such
operation had been performed, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years, or with fine to an amount which may extend to ten times the value of the coin for which the
altered coin is passed, or attempted to be passed.
[s 254.1] Scope
The section makes it an offence to deliver as genuine what is spurious or a coin of one description as a coin of
another description, but which has been subjected to an operation described in any of the sections 246–249,
IPC, which he did not know when he took the coin into his possession. It corresponds to section 241, IPC.
The offender under either section comes into possession of the coin innocently, ie, without knowing that it has
been altered. He then comes to know of it and then delivers or attempts to deliver it to another as genuine. In a
great majority of coin offences, the false coin is substantially worthless. It would, however, be a very profitable
transaction to make and circulate silver or copper coins of exactly the same intrinsic value as those issued by
Government. Such an act would undoubtedly come within the meaning of “counterfeit coin” under the previous
section of this chapter. It is specifically provided for by the Metal Tokens Act, 1889, which forbids the making or
issuing of metal intended to be used as money, but not authorised by the Indian Government.
Section 3 of the Metal178 Tokens Act, 1889 provides:
S. 3 Prohibition of making by private persons of pieces of metal to be used as money.—No piece of copper or
bronze or of any other metal or mixed metal, which, whether stamped or unstamped, is intended to be used as money,
shall be made except by the authority of the Central Government.
[s 254.2] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non- compoundable and is triable by any magistrate.
A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under this
[s 254.3] Charge
Page 5 of 5
That on or about the…….day of……at……you delivered to AB (or attempted to induce the said AB to receive) as
genuine a coin to wit……(or as a coin of a different description to what it is), in respect of which you then knew (though
not at the time when you took the same in possession) that an operation such as is mentioned in section 246 (or
sections 246, 247, 248 or 249) of the Indian Penal Code, to wit…….had been performed, and you thereby committed
an offence punishable under section 254 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 254.4] Proof
(i) the coin in question is one with respect to which any such operation as that mentioned in sections 246–
249, IPC has been performed;
(ii) at the time the accused took possession of it, he did not know that the coin was so operated upon;
(iii) the accused delivered it to someone; or he attempted to induce someone to receive it, as a genuine
coin, or as a coin of a different description; and
(iv) at the time he did so, he knew that it had been so operated upon.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
178 Mayne on Criminal Law, 2nd Edn, p 129.
End of Document
[s 255] Counterfeiting Government stamp.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 6

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
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knowledge

first possessed
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Whoever counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting, any stamp issued by
Government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished with 179[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—A person commits this offence who counterfeits by causing a genuine stamp of one
denomination to appear like a genuine stamp of a different denomination.
[s 255.1] Scope
Sections 255–263A, IPC, of this chapter deal with offences relating to Government stamps. These sections
correspond to section 13 of the English Stamp Duties Management Act, 1891,180 under which every person who
does or causes to be done, or knowingly aids, abets or assists in doing certain acts in relation to stamps or dies
used for the purpose of the collection of stamp duties under the care and management of the Commissioner of
Inland Revenue, or for the collection of postage (income-tax, national insurance and industrial injuries
insurance contributions and entertainments duty) is guilty of felony.181
This section deals with counterfeiting Government stamps. It corresponds to section 241, IPC, which deals with
counterfeiting coins.
The words “imprisonment for life” were substituted for the words “transportation for life” by Act 26 of 1955,
section 117 and Schedule, with effect from 1 January 1956.
Sections 28, 231 and 232, and commentary thereunder may be referred to.
An exact resemblance or facsimile is not required to constitute the crime of forgery; it is adequate if there be a
sufficient resemblance to show that a false making was intended and that the false stamp is so made as to
have an aptitude to deceive.182
[s 255.4] “Any Stamp”
“Stamp” means a stamp impressed by means of a die as well as an adhesive stamp for denoting any duty or
fee.183 Impressed stamp includes: (a) labels affixed and impressed by the proper officer, and (b) stamps
embossed or engraved on stamped paper.184 The word “stamp” signifies some impression or mark set upon
paper or parchment as a token of the payment of some charges, eg, tax revenue. It includes postage stamps.185
[s 255.5] “Government”
In sections 255 and 263A, IPC the word “Government”, when used in connection with or in reference to, any
stamp issued for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage shall, notwithstanding anything in section 17, be
deemed to include the person or persons authorised by law to administer executive Government in any part of
India, and also in any part of Her Majesty’s dominions or in any foreign country.186
Page 5 of 6
[s 255.6] Procedure
session. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no limitation for taking cognizance of an
[s 255.7] Charge
The following form of the charge may be adopted in case of a prosecution under this section:
That you, on or about the…day of……at……counterfeited (or knowingly performed a certain part of the process of
counterfeiting, to wit….) a certain stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, to wit……and thereby
committed an offence punishable under section 255 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of this court.
[s 255.8] Proof
(i) the accused counterfeited, or knowingly performed any part of the process of counterfeiting; and
(ii) the counterfeiting was that of a stamp issued by the Government for the purpose of revenue.
In the instant case the accused appellants were caught red-handed when they were processing counterfeit
stamps. The printing machinery was also seized from the possession of the accused appellants. Their
conviction under sections 255 and 256, IPC was held proper.187
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.

Page 6 of 6
180 54 and 55 Vic of English c 38 as amended by the Forgery Act, 1913 and by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948.
181 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn, (Simonds), p 860.
182 R v Callicutt, (1812) 2 Leach 1048, 4 Taunt 300.
183 Section 27, Stamp Duties Management Act, 1891 (54 and 55 Vict, c 38).
184 Section 2(13) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899.
185 Sections 16 and 17 of the Indian Post Office Act, 1898.
186 Section 263A(4) of the Indian Penal Code 1860.
187 Manmit Saggu v State of Maharashtra, 2009 (2) Mah LJ (Cri) 95 (Bom).
End of Document
[s 256] Having possession of instrument or material for counterfeiting
Government stamp.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5
[s 256] Having possession of instrument or material for counterfeiting Government stamp.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 5
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 5
[s 256] Having possession of instrument or material for counterfeiting

Government stamp.—
Whoever has in his possession any instrument or material for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having
reason to believe that it is intended to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting any stamp issued by
Government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 256.1] Scope
This section deals with possession of instruments or material for counterfeiting stamps, and corresponds to
section 235, IPC, with the difference that while the present section deals with stamps, section 235, IPC deals
with coins. The object of both sections is the same.
In the instant case the accused appellants were caught red-handed when they were processing counterfeit
stamps. The printing machinery was also seized from the possession of the accused appellants. Their
conviction under sections 255 and 256, IPC was held proper.188
[s 256.2] Possession
[s 256.3] “For the Purpose of Counterfeiting”
The expression “for the purpose of counterfeiting” means “for the purpose of causing one thing to resemble
another, intending by means of that resemblance to practise deception.
[s 256.4.] Procedure
[s 256.5] Charge
I, (name and office of the magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the…….day of……at…….had in your possession, an instrument (or material) to wit………for the
purpose of being used, (or knowing or having reason to believe that it was intended to be used), or the purpose of
counterfeiting stamp to wit…issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, and thereby committed an offence
Page 5 of 5
punishable under section 256 of the Indian Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 256.6] Proof
(i) the accused had in his possession an instrument or material;
(ii) the said instrument or material was for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having reason to
believe that it was intended to be used, for the purpose of counterfeiting a Government stamp;
(iii) the stamp to be counterfeited was one, issued by the Government for revenue; and
(iv) the instrument or material was so usable.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
188 Manmit Saggu v State of Maharashtra, 2009 (2) Mah LJ (Cri) 95 (Bom).
End of Document
[s 257] Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting Government
stamp.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5
[s 257] Making or selling instrument for counterfeiting Government stamp.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 5
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 5

Whoever makes or performs any part of the process of making, or buys, or sells, or disposes of, any instrument
for the purpose of being used, or knowing or having reason to believe that it is intended to be used, for the
purpose of counterfeiting any stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 257.1] Scope
This section deals with making, buying, selling, or disposing of instruments for counterfeiting Government
stamp. It is similar to section 234, IPC.
[s 257.3] Stamp
Synopsis notes under section 255 may be referred to.
[s 257.4] Government
Synopsis notes under sections 17 and 263A(4) may be referred to.
[s 257.5] Procedure
[s 257.6] Charge
I, (name and office of the magistrate, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That on or about the………day of………at………you made (or performed any part of the process of making or bought
or sold or disposed of) an instrument, to wit………for the purpose of being used (or knowing or having reason to
believe that it was intended to be used) for counterfeiting a stamp, to wit………issued by Government for the purpose
of revenue, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 257 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my
cognizance.
Page 5 of 5
[s 257.7] Proof
(i) the accused made or performed any part of the process of making; or bought, or sold, or disposed of,
an instrument;
(ii) the said instrument was intended to be used for the purpose of counterfeiting any stamp issued by
Government for the purpose of revenue; and
(iii) the accused did so in order that such instrument might be used for the purpose of counterfeiting such
stamp, or he knew or had reason to believe that the same was intended to be used for such purpose.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
End of Document
[s 258] Sale of counterfeit Government stamp.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 5
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 5

Whoever sells, or offers for sale, any stamp which he knows or has reason to believe to be a counterfeit of any
stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 258.1] Scope
This section deals with the sale of a counterfeit Government stamp and is similar to section 239, IPC.
[s 258.2] “Knowledge” or “Reason to Believe”—Distinction
“Knowledge” is an awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. “Reason to
believe” is another facet of the state of mind. “Reason to believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” or “doubt”
and mere seeing also cannot be equated to believing. “Reason to believe” is a higher level of a state of mind.
Likewise “knowledge” will be slightly on higher plane than “reason to believe”. A person can be supposed to
know where there is a direct appeal to his sense and a person is presumed to have a reason to believe if he
has sufficient cause to believe the same.189
[s 258.2.1] Reason to Believe—What is?
What section 26, IPC means is that a person must have reason to believe if the circumstances are such that a
reasonable man would by probable reasoning conclude or infer regarding the nature of the thing concerned.
Such circumstances need not necessarily be capable of absolute conviction or inference; but it is sufficient if
the circumstances are such as creating a cause to believe by chain of probable reasoning leading to the
conclusion or inference about the nature of the thing. These two requirements, ie, “knowledge” and “reason to
believe” have to be deduced from various circumstances of the case.190
Inference of Knowledge or Reason to Believe
Where the appellant was a licensed vendor and admittedly used to purchase stamps from the treasury, but
there was absolutely no material, whatsoever, to show that the counterfeit stamps were in fact purchased by
the accused from the treasury. A bare allegation by way of an explanation by the accused-appellant that he
purchased all the stamps including the counterfeit ones from the treasury, appeared on the face of it to be false,
as he had neither produced registers maintained by him nor had he made even an effort to summon the
treasury records. There is no material, whatsoever, even to probablise such a plea. In these circumstances, the
only inference, that can be drawn is that he had “knowledge” and “reason to believe” that the stamp which he
had in his possession and which he was selling or offering to sell, were counterfeit ones. These two ingredients
of provisions of law are fully established.191
[s 258.3] Procedure
[s 258.4] Charge
Page 5 of 5
That you, on or about the……day of……at………sold (or offered for sale) a stamp, to wit……which you knew (or had
reason to believe) to be counterfeit of the stamp issued by government for the purpose of revenue and thereby
[s 258.5] Proof
(i) the accused sold or offered for sale, a stamp;
(ii) the stamp sold or offered for sale was a counterfeit Government stamp; and
(iii) the accused then knew, or had reason to believe, that the stamp was counterfeit.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
189 Joti Prashad v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1167 : (1993) All Cr 101 (SC) : (1993) Cr LJ 413 , p 415.
190 Joti Prashad v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1167 : (1993) All Cr 101 (SC) : (1993) Cr LJ 413 , p 415.
191 Ibid.
End of Document
[s 259] Having possession of counterfeit Government stamp.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 5
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 5

Whoever has in his possession any stamp which he knows to be a counterfeit of any stamp issued by
Government for the purpose of revenue, intending to use, or dispose of the same as a genuine stamp, or in
order that it may be used as a genuine stamp, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
[s 259.1] Scope
This section deals with possession of a counterfeit Government stamp with the intention of using it as genuine.
It is similar to section 243, IPC.
[s 259.2] “Knowledge” or “Reason to Believe”
Synopsis notes under sections 27 and 235 may be referred to.
[s 259.4] “Stamp”
Notes under sections 28 and 231 may be referred to.
Notes under sections 17 and 263A may be referred to.
[s 259.7] Procedure
An offence under this section is cognizable, bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by a magistrate of the
first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. There is no time limit for taking cognizance of an
[s 259.8] Charge
That you, on or about the………day of………at………were in possession of a stamp to wit………which you knew to be
counterfeit of a stamp, to wit………issued by government, for the purpose of revenue, intending to use (or dispose of)
the same as a genuine stamp, (or in order that the same might be used as a genuine stamp), and thereby committed
Page 5 of 5
[s 259.9] Proof
(i) the accused had in his possession a counterfeit of a Government revenue stamp;
(ii) the accused knew that the stamp was a counterfeit of the revenue stamp; and
(iii) he had it in his possession intending to use or dispose of the same as a genuine stamp, or in order that
it may be used as a genuine stamp.
The possession of Government stamps by the accused stamp vendor was established and the accused barely
alleged by way of explanation that he purchased all the stamps including the counterfeit ones from the treasury,
appeared on the face of it to be false, as he had neither produced registers maintained by him nor had he made
even an effort to summon the treasury records. In these circumstances the only inference that can be drawn is
that he had the “knowledge” and “reason to believe” that the stamps which he had in his possession and which
he was selling or offering to sell, were counterfeit ones. The conviction of the accused under sections 258, 259,
IPC was upheld.192
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
192 Joti Prashad v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1167 : (1993) All Cr C 101 (SC) : (1993) Cr LJ 413 (SC).
End of Document
[s 260] Using as genuine a Government stamp known to be counterfeit.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 5
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 5

Whoever uses as genuine any stamp, knowing it to be a counterfeit of any stamp issued by Government for the
purpose of revenue, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 260.1] Scope
This section deals with using as genuine a Government stamp known to be a counterfeit. It corresponds to
section 254, IPC. Under this section the stamp used as genuine must be a counterfeit. A person passing off a
one-anna stamp as a one-rupee stamp was held to be not counterfeiting a one-rupee stamp.193
[s 260.2] Counterfeit
Where a stamp-vendor of certain forest stamps caused some used stamps to resemble genuine ones and
attached them to the licenses issued for grazing cattle. It was held that this act amounted to counterfeiting
within the meaning of section 28 and the stamp-vendor was guilty under section 260, IPC.194 Under section 260
the stamp used as genuine must be a counterfeit. A person passing off a one-anna stamp as a one-rupee
stamp was held to be not counterfeiting a one-rupee stamp.195
[s 260.3] Procedure
The offence under this section cognizable, bailable but not compoundable and can be tried by a magistrate of
[s 260.4] Charge
That you, on or about the………day of………at………used as genuine a stamp, to wit………knowing it to be a

counterfeit of a stamp issued by government for the purpose of revenue, to wit………and thereby committed an
[s 260.5] Proof
In order to establish an offence under this section, it will have to be proved that:
Page 5 of 5
(i) the accused used as genuine a counterfeit stamp;
(ii) the said stamp was counterfeit of a Government revenue stamp; and
(iii) the accused used the said stamp knowing that the stamp used was counterfeit.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
193 Queen v Shuroop Chunder Doss, 2 WR 65.
194 Ramlal v Emperor, AIR 1921 Ngp 86 (2).
195 Queen v Shuroop Chunder Doss, 2 WR 65.
End of Document
[s 261] Effacing, writing from substance bearing Government stamp, or
removing from document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to
Government.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 6
[s 261] Effacing, writing from substance bearing Government stamp, or removing from document a stamp used
for it, with intent to cause loss to Government.—

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
Page 3 of 6
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 6
[s 261] Effacing, writing from substance bearing Government stamp, or

removing from document a stamp used for it, with intent to cause loss to
Government.—
Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the Government, removes or effaces from any substance,
bearing any stamp issued by Government for the purpose of revenue, any writing or document for which such
stamp has been used, or removes from any writing or document, a stamp which has been used for such writing
or document, in order that such stamp may be used for a different writing or document, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 261.1] Scope
This section deals with alteration and defacement of Government revenue stamps and is similar to sections 246
and 248, IPC.
The intention with which the acts named in this section are done, may be either fraudulent generally or done
with a view to cause loss to the government. Therefore, a conviction would be good where the intention was
merely to efface a document with a view to injuriously affect the rights of another person. No intention to cause
loss to Government can be assumed unless it is shown or inferred that the intention of the party was to use the
stamp as a stamp, a second time. Therefore, no conviction will be supported, if the object of removing the
writing from a stamped paper was merely to write upon the blank space something which required no stamp.196
The essential ingredients on an offence under this section are:
(i) fraudulent removal or effacement of any writing or substance, from a document bearing a Government
stamp, or
(ii) causing such removal or effacement with intent to cause loss to the government; or
(iii) with a view to defraud or cause loss to the Government by removing from, any writing or document, a
stamp used thereon to use it again.
[s 261.3] Re-use of Removed Stamp not Necessary
Under the above clause (3) the mere removal of the stamps with a view to use it again is sufficient to constitute
an offence under this section. The actual re-use is a separate offence falling under section 262, IPC. Acts
contemplated under this section should be committed either to cause loss to the Government or to defraud
Page 5 of 6
someone not necessarily the government.
[s 261.4] “Fraudulent”
[s 261.5] “Document”
[s 261.6] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by a magistrate of the
first class. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The limitation for taking cognizance of an offence
under this section is three years.
[s 261.7] Charge
That you, on or about the………day of………at………fraudulently (or with intent to cause loss to the Government)
removed (or effaced) from any substance bearing any stamp issued by government for the purpose of revenue, any
writing or document for which such stamp had been used [or removed from any writing (or document) a stamp which
had been used for such writing (or document)] in order that such stamp may be used for a different writing (or
document), and thereby committed the offence punishable under section 261 of the Indian Penal Code and within my
cognizance.
[s 261.8] Proof
(i) a Government revenue stamp was used on a writing or document;
(ii) the accused removed or effaced any writing or document on which such stamp had been used; or the
accused removed from any writing or document a stamp which had been used for such writing or
document, in order that such stamp may be used for a different writing or document; and
(iii) the accused did so fraudulently, or with intent to cause loss to the Government or in order that such
stamp may be used for a different writing or document.
Page 6 of 6
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
196 Mayne’s Criminal Law, 2nd Edn p 132.
End of Document
[s 262] Using Government stamp known to have been before used.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 5

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 5
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 5

Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the Government, uses for any purpose a stamp issued by
Government for the purpose of revenue, which he knows to have been before used, shall be punished with
[s 262.1] Scope
This section penalises fraudulent use of a Government stamp which has already been used. The gist of the
offence lies in the use of a stamp which has already been used, not only with the knowledge that it has been
used before, but also fraudulently or with intention to cause loss to government. The intent to defraud or cause
such loss cannot be assumed.197
[s 262.2] Use of Postage Stamp
Under section 37 of Act 14 of 1866, postage stamps shall be considered to be stamps issued by the
Government for the purpose of revenue. Hence, fraudulent use of a postage stamp would also be an offence
The mere affixing to a letter a postal stamp, which has been previously used does not itself prove a fraudulent
intent to cause loss to the Government within the meaning of this section.199 It has to be proved by the
prosecution.
[s 262.3] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by any magistrate and
can also be tried summarily. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The limitation for taking
cognizance of an offence under this section is three years.
[s 262.4] Charge
That you, on or about the …day of……at…fraudulently (or with intent to cause loss to Government) used for the
purpose of…….a stamp issued by the Government for the purpose of revenue, which you knew to have been before
used, and thereby committed the offence punishable under section 262 of the Indian Penal Code and within my
cognizance.
Page 5 of 5
[s 262.5] Proof
(i) the stamp in question was issued by the Government for the purpose of revenue;
(ii) it had already been used;
(iii) the accused used it again knowing that it had been used already; and
(iv) he did so fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the government.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
197 Re Niaz Ahamad, 1881 All WN 56.
198 Re Sita Ram, 5 CPLR (Cr) 43.
199 Queen-Empress v Murlidhar, Ratanlal, Un Cr Cas 145.
End of Document
[s 263] Erasure of mark denoting that stamp has been used.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 7

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 7
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 7

Whoever, fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to Government, erases or removes from a stamp issued by
Government for purpose of revenue, any mark, put or impressed upon such stamp for the purpose of denoting
that the same has been used, or knowingly has in his possession or sells or disposes of any such stamp from
which such mark has been erased or removed, or sells or disposes of any such stamp which he knows to have
been used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 263.1] Scope
This section is in three parts and deals with three offences, namely:
(i) erasing or removing marks of cancellation of a stamp to defraud or cause loss to the government;
(ii) knowingly possessing or selling or disposing of a stamp from which such mark has been erased or
removed; and
(iii) selling or disposing of such stamp knowing it to have been used.
The endorsements of the names of the vendor and vendee and of the date of the sale of a stamp, which are
made upon a stamp by the stamp-vendor, are not put upon the stamp for the purpose of showing that it has
been used, and therefore do not come under the purview of this section.200
[s 263.2.1] “Fraudulently or With Intent to Cause Loss to Government”
The first part of the section makes it an offence to erase or remove, from a stamp issued by the Government for
the purpose of revenue, any mark put upon it for the purpose of denoting that it has been used, if that erasing
or removing is done fraudulently or with intent to cause loss to the government. Therefore, for an offence under
the first part of the section, it is necessary to prove fraud or intent to cause loss to the government.201
[s 263.3] “Mark Put or Impressed for the Purpose of Denoting that the Stamp has been Used”—Purpose of
Cancellation
The ordinary purpose for which the stamps are used is collection of revenue. For the application of the first part
of the section there must be some mark put on the stamps for the purpose of denoting that they had been so
used and the mark must have been erased or removed. It must be proved that the stamp in question had some
mark denoting that it had been used and that the same has been erased or removed. The mark erased or
removed must be such as to denote that the stamp has been used. Erasure or removal of any other mark does
not come under this part of the section. If the stamps had in fact been used for the purpose of revenue, the fact
that they bore no marks would go to show that the marks had been erased. If there are slight marks, but they
do not necessarily indicate that the stamp had been used for the purpose of revenue, the section does not
apply.202
Page 5 of 7
[s 263.4] Mere Possession of Cancelled Stamp with Knowledge Sufficient
Under the second part of the section it is an offence to have in possession any stamp, from which the mark put
upon it for the purpose of denoting that it has been used, has been erased or removed, if those facts are known
to the person having such a stamp in his possession. That is to say, it is sufficient to prove that the person in
whose possession the stamp was found knew that such a mark had been erased or removed from it; it is not
necessary under this part of the section to prove that his possession was fraudulent or with intent to cause loss
to the government.203
[s 263.5] Accused Need not Remove the Marks Himself
There is no necessity under this part of the section for the prosecution to prove that the erasure of the marks or
impressions had been done by the accused person or that he had any connection with them. It is sufficient to
show that he had in his possession such stamps knowing that such marks had been so erased.204
[s 263.6] Effect of Stamps not Punched
Section 30 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 requires, that the officer of the court or the head of the office, on
receiving any document requiring to be stamped under the Act, shall forthwith effect a cancellation of the stamp
by punching out the figurehead so as to leave the amount designated on the stamp untouched and the part
removed by punching shall be burnt or otherwise destroyed. But the fact that the stamps were not punched
does not, of course, necessarily show that an offence could not be committed in respect of them, as there have
been a number of cases in which stamps which have been used have been left unpunched and, subsequently
removed probably for nefarious purposes. Of course, if the procedure laid down in the Stamp Act is properly
carried out, every stamp ought to be punched, but experience has shown that punching is often omitted.205
[s 263.7] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by a magistrate of the
first class. The cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken within three years of the date of the
commission of the offence. In Shankarlal Bhargava v State of Uttar Pradesh,206 it was held under this section
that the power to condone delay under section 473, CrPC is an overriding power and is not limited to the time-
factor of condonation and can be exercised at any time (even after cognizance is taken) when full facts are
brought on record.
[s 263.8] Charge
The following form of the charge may be adopted in case of an offence under this section:
I, (name and office of the magistrate, etc) do hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the………day of…….at……. fraudulently (or with intent to cause loss to government) erased or
removed from a stamp issued by the Government for the purpose of revenue, a mark put (or impressed) on such
stamp for the purpose of denoting that the same has been used, [or knowingly had in your possession (or sold) (or
disposed of) such stamp from which such mark had been erased or removed] [or sold (or disposed of) a stamp which
you knew to have been used], and thereby committed the offence punishable under section 263 of the Indian Penal
Code and within my cognizance.
Page 6 of 7
[s 263.9] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it will have to be proved:
(i) In the case of erasing or removing marks of cancellation:
(a) that the stamp in question was issued by the Government for the purpose of revenue;
(b) that it had been so used;
(c) that it bore a mark or impression denoting that it had been so used;
(d) that the accused removed or erased such mark or impression; and
(e) that he did so with intent to defraud or cause loss to government.
(ii) In the case of possessing, selling or disposing of such stamp:
(a) to (c) as in case of (i):
(b) that the mark or impression, denoting that the stamps had been used, was erased or removed;
(c) that the accused had possession of such stamp in such cancelled condition; or that the stamp, in
such cancelled condition, was sold or disposed of by the accused; and
(d) that the accused at that time knew that such mark or impression had been so removed or erased
(iii) In the case of selling or disposing of used stamp:
(a) to (c) as in case of (i) above:
(b) that the accused sold or disposed of such stamp; and
(c) that he, when selling or disposing of the same, knew that it had been so used.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
Page 7 of 7
200 Supdt and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, Bengal v Bazlar Rahman, (1936) 37 Cr LJ 923 : 39 Cal WN 542.
202 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
206 Shankarlal Bhargava v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1985) (1) Crimes 265 [LNIND 1984 ALL 235] (All) : (1986) All Cr C 15.
End of Document
[s 263A] Prohibition of fictitious stamps.—
Stamps

include stamps.
prerogatives.1
Page 2 of 6

years (section 239)

thereof.

there of.

India
composition.
composition of
Page 3 of 6
knowledge

first possessed
Page 4 of 6
207[s 263A] Prohibition of fictitious stamps.—
(1) Whoever—
(a) makes, knowingly utters, deals in or sells any fictitious stamp, or knowingly uses for any postal
purpose any fictitious stamp, or
(b) has in his possession, without lawful excuse, any fictitious stamp, or
(c) makes or, without lawful excuse, has in his possession any die, plate, instrument or materials for
making any fictitious stamp,
shall be punished with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.
(2) Any such stamp, die, plate, instrument or materials in the possession of any person for making any
fictitious stamp 208[may be seized and, if seized], shall be forfeited.
(3) In this section “fictitious stamp” means any stamp falsely purporting to be issued by Government for
the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, or any facsimile or imitation or representation, whether on
paper or otherwise, of any stamp issued by Government for that purpose.
(4) In this section and also in sections 255 to 263, both inclusive, the word “Government” when used in
connection with, or in reference to, any stamp issued for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage,
shall, notwithstanding anything in section 17, be deemed to include the person or persons authorized
by law to administer executive Government in any part of India, and also in any part of Her Majesty’s
dominions or in any foreign country.]
[s 263A.1] Scope and Object
The section deals with making, uttering, selling, using or dealing in fictitious postal stamps. The object is to curb
the growing traffic in fictitious postage stamps. The proprietor of a newspaper, which circulated amongst stamp
collectors, had in his possession a die, which he had ordered to be made for him abroad. From this die
representations of a current Cape of Good Hope postage stamp could be produced. The only purpose for which
he had ordered, or had in his possession, the die, was for making upon the pages of an illustrated stamp
catalogue, or newspaper, illustrations in black and white, and not in colours, of the stamp in question, such
catalogues being intended for sale only to stamp collectors and others as a part of the newspaper. Upon a
special case, the court held that the possession of the die for making a false stamp, known to be such to its
possessor, was, however innocent the use that he intended to make of it, a possession without lawful excuse,
within section 7(c) of the Post Office (Protection) Act, 1884.209
This section was added by section 2 of the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1895 in consequence of the
resolution of the International Postal Congress held at Vienna on 20 May 1891, by which it was agreed to make
an organised attempt to prohibit the growing traffic in fictitious stamps, the use of which on postal articles
posted abroad resulted in much loss and inconvenience to the post office.210
The words “may be used and, if seized” in sub-section (2) were substituted for the words “may be seized, and”
by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1953, Sch III.
[s 263A.3] Analogous Law
This section corresponds to section 7 of the English Post Office (Protection) Act, 1894211 re-enacted as section
Page 5 of 6
6(5), the Post Office Act, 1908.212
[s 263A.4] “Fictitious Stamp”
Fictitious stamps as defined by sub-section (3) of this section means:
(i) any stamp falsely purporting to be issued by the Government for the purpose of denoting a rate of
postage, or
(ii) any fascimile, or imitation or representation whether on paper or otherwise, of any stamp, issued by the
Government for that purpose.
Any imitation of a Government stamp which does not fulfil the requirements of this sub-section, cannot be a
fictitious stamp dealt with by this section.
[s 263A.5] “Government”
Section 17, IPC, defines Government and states that the word “government” denotes the Central Government
or the Government of a state. Overriding this definition, sub-section (4) of this section gives a special definition
for the limited purposes of sections 255–263A, IPC and states that the word “government”, when used in
connection with or in reference to, any stamp issued for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, shall be
deemed to include the person or persons authorised by law to administer executive Government in any part of
India, and also in any part of Her Majesty’s dominions or in any foreign country. This definition is not of general
application to govern all the provisions of the said sections and only when the question arises or is raised about
the authority of issuing a stamp for the purpose of denoting a rate of postage, the word “government” shall be
deemed to include the person or persons authorised to administer executive Government in any part of India or
foreign country.
The offence under this section is cognizable, bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by any magistrate. The
cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken within six months.
[s 263A.7] Charge
I, (name and office of magistrate, etc) do hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That, on or about the……day of……….you made, knowingly uttered, dealt in, or sold fictitious stamps (or knowingly
used for any postal purpose any fictitious stamp or had in your possession without lawful excuse any fictitious stamp or
made or without lawful excuse, had in your possession any die, plate, instrument or materials for making any fictitious
stamp) and thereby committed an offence under section 263A of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Page 6 of 6
[s 263A.8] Proof
(i) the accused made, knowingly uttered, dealt in or sold the fictitious stamp in question or knowingly used
it for any postal purposes; or
(ii) he had in his possession, without lawful excuse, such stamps; or
(iii) he made, or, without lawful excuse, had in his possession any die, plate, instrument, or materials for
making such stamp.
1 Note 1, pp 134–35.
208 Subs. by Act 42 of 1953, section 4 and Sch III, for “may be seized and” (w.e.f. 23-12-1953).
209 Dickins v Gill, (1896) 2 QB 310 ; see now Post Office Act, 1953 (1 & 2 Eliz 2, c 36) section 63.
210 Report of Select Committee on the Amending Bill of 1895, dated 1-1-1895, Gazette of India, Pt V, dated 2-2-1895, pp
19–20.
211 47 & 48 Vict, c 76.
212 8 Edw 7, c 48.
End of Document
[s 264] Fraudulent use of false instrument for weighing.—
> R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code > Chapter XIII Of Offences Relating to Weights and
Measures
Chapter XIII Of Offences Relating to Weights and Measures

This chapter deals with offences relating to weights and measures. In India, standards of weights and measures
were established by the Indian Weights and Measures of Capacity Act, 1871 and the Measures of Lengths Act,
1889. The Standard of Weights and Measures Act of 1871 was repealed and replaced by the Standards of Weights
Act, 1939, which prescribed the units of weight then in use, viz: the tolah, seer, maund, pound, ounce, hundred-
weight and ton. Now, the standards of weights and measures are regulated by the Standards of Weights and
Measures Act, 1956,1 which repealed the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1939 and also the Measures of
Lengths Act, 1889.2 This new Act of 1956 (as amended by Act 54 of 1964) establishes a uniform standard of
weights and measures, based on the metric system, in terms of primary units of length (metre), weight (kilogram)
and capacity (litre). The Act has also repealed the corresponding provisions of the following Local Acts:
(i) The Assam Adoption of Standard Weights Act, 1955 (9 of 1955)

(ii) The Bhopal State Weights and Measures Act, 1953 (15 of 1953)
(iii) The Bihar Weights Act, 1947 (17 of 1947)
(iv) The Bombay Weights and Measures Act, 1932 (15 of 1932)
(v) The Central Provinces and Berar Weights and Measures of Capacity Act, 1928 (2 of 1928)
(vi) The Cochin Weights and Measures Act, 1912 (63 of 1912)
(vii) The Coorg Act, 1954 (7 of 1954)
(viii) The Hyderabad Weights and Measures Act, 1356 Fasli (14 of 1356 Fasli)
(ix) The Madhya Bharat Weights Act, 1954 (21 of 1954)
(x) The Madras Weights and Measures Act, 1948 (22 of 1948), as in force in the State of Madras or of Andhra.
(xi) The Mysore Weights and Measures Act, 1902 (3 of 1902)
(xii) The Orissa Weights and Measures Act, 1943 (7 of 1943)
(xiii) The Punjab Weights and Measures Act, 1941 (12 of 1941)
(xiv) The Rajasthan Weights and Measures Act, 1954 (19 of 1954)
(xv) The Travancore Weights and Measures Act, 1085 (6 of 1085)
(xvi) The United Provinces Weights and Measures Act, 1947 (23 of 1948);
The sections comprised in this chapter, however, make no mention of any standard weights and measures. For the
purposes of this chapter, it is sufficient if the weights and measures current in any locality in India are deviated from
and false weights and measures are represented to be the current ones.

Page 2 of 4
Whoever fraudulently uses any instrument for weighing which he knows to be false, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
[s 264.1] Scope
This section deals with fraudulent use of any instrument of weighing. The instrument used must not only be
known to be false, but must also be fraudulently so used, that is, it must be used for the purpose of passing off
short weight upon persons who are entitled to full weight. In general, the mere possession of false balance,
which is used as a true one, will be sufficient evidence of a fraudulent intention. The scales used in markets in
the mofussil are of the very crudest construction and are seldom equally balanced. Such defects are generally
visible to a purchaser, and the scales are made to balance by putting some substance, generally a piece of
earth or a stone, into the lighter scale. In the absence of any intention to use the scales fraudulently, the offence
under this section cannot be said to have been committed.3
[s 264.2] “Fraudulently uses any Instrument for Weighing”
Intention is an essential part of the offence of fraudulently using false instruments of weighing.4 The intention,
however, must be alleged in laying the charge, though it may be a matter of inference only, from the fact of the
possession, and the attending circumstances as manifesting the purpose, and the inference may, of course, be
rebutted. But where the incorrectness of the scale is visible, and there is no attempt to cover or conceal it, there
can be no ground for imputing fraud from the defect alone; the circumstances negative the intention of fraud,
and no charge would lie against the party using such a balance.5
Where the weight was a seer weight (now out of use) and was one tolah,6 or one rupee short, it was held that
the weight in question could not be regarded as a false weight in the sense of the IPC.7
“Fraudulently” has been defined by section 25, IPC. Commentary under that section may be referred to.
[s 264.3] Meaning of “False Instrument of Weighing”
According to the ordinary use of language, if a measure is described as false, that means that it is something
other than what it purports to be. The word false in this and the next section means different from the
instrument, weight or measure, which the offender and the person defrauded have fixed upon, expressly or by
implication, with reference to their mutual dealings.8 The offence, under this section, is not committed unless
there is proof that the accused knew that his weighing balance was false.9
[s 264.4] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable, bailable, non-compoundable, and is triable by any Magistrate.
It can also be tried summarily,10 by a Magistrate competent to try cases summarily. A summons shall ordinarily
issue in the first instance.
[s 264.5] Inspection and Seizure of Weights and Measures
Under section 153 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without a warrant, enter any place within the limits of such station for
Page 3 of 4
the purpose of inspecting or searching for any weights or measures or instruments for weighing, used or kept therein,
whenever he has reason to believe that there are in such place any weights, measures or instruments for weighing
which are false.
(2) If he finds in such place any weights, measures or instruments for weighing which are false, he may seize the
same, and shall forthwith give information of such seizure to a Magistrate having jurisdiction.
[s 264.6] Charge
The following form of the charge may be adopted in a case of prosecution under this section:
That you, on or about the……day of.………, at……, fraudulently used a certain instrument for weighing, to
wit…………. knowing it to be false at the time of using it, and thereby committed an offence, punishable under section
[s 264.7] Proof
To establish an offence under this section the following facts have to be proved:
(i) that the accused used an instrument of weighing;
(ii) that the instrument was false;
(iii) that the accused knew it to be false; and
(iv) that he used it fraudulently.
1 Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1956 has been repealed by the Standards of Weights and Measures Act,
1976 and further, the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 has been repealed by the Legal Metrology Act,
2009.
2 Section 18 of Act, 89 of 1956.
3 Govt v Kangalee Muduk, 18 WR 7 (Cr).
4 Ibid.
Page 4 of 4
5 Second Report 1847, sections 220 & 221.
6 One seer was equal to 80 tolahs or 80 one rupee coins.
7 Empress v Bikka Mal, (1883) All WN 224.
8 Kanaya Lal Mohanlal Guljar v Emperor, AIR 1939 Bom 455 : 41 Bom LR 977 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 172 ; citing Stokes
Anglo Indian Code, Vol 1, p 404.
9 Raj Kumar v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1967) Jab LJ 86 (SN).
10 Refer to section 260(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
End of Document
[s 265] Fraudulent use of false weight or measure.—
Measures



Page 2 of 4
Whoever fraudulently uses any false weight or false measure of length or capacity, or fraudulently uses any
weight or any measure of length or capacity as a different weight or measure from what it is, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
[s 265.1] Scope
The offence under this section is similar to that under the last one. The only difference between the two
sections is that whereas the last section dealt with fraudulent use of false instruments of weighing, this section
deals with fraudulent use of false weights and measures.
[s 265.2] Principal Ingredient
The principal ingredient of this offence is the use of a false weight, measure of capacity with intent to defraud.11
“Fraudulently” has been defined by section 25, IPC, notes thereunder may be referred to. If a person proposes
to use weights of a certain standard, it is incumbent upon him to see that the weights he uses come up to the
proper standard. A magistrate is at liberty to infer fraud from the existence of a deficiency in weights used,
unless the accused can account for it.12
[s 265.4] Test of “False Weight or Measure”
The section has no application in cases in which the accused did not profess to sell by any standard weight or
measure, eg, a sale by the measure of a coconut shell.13 The weight of grain that a measure is found to hold is
no evidence of its capacity, as compared with that of another measure, unless the very same grain is used.
Grains of rice may be large or small, light or heavy. One sample of rice may contain more large and light grains
than another and would therefore measure more, though weigh less than the latter. To ascertain whether a
measure is false or not, the only proper test to apply is that of measure, and the same article must be measured
in each case, and proof should be adduced that this had been done.14
[s 265.5] Effect of False Misrepresentation of Capacity
The accused who sold liquor, measuring it with a glass which was not a prescribed measure and of which they
fraudulently misrepresented the capacity, were convicted of the offence of fraudulent use of a false measure
under this section. It was held that they would more appropriately have been tried for the offence of cheating.15
Where a tradesman supplied milk, which he sent in his own churns by train, the churns being fitted with a
gauge to show how many gallons they held, and the gauge indicated a greater amount than was actually
contained, the churns were held to be measures within the meaning of an English Act, similar to sections 265–
266 of the IPC.16
[s 265.6] Small Deficiency not to be Counted
In considering whether a weight used is false or not, a small deficiency, for instance, a deficiency of one tolah17
in a five-seer weight, should not count.18
[s 265.7] Procedure
Same as under section 264, IPC. A magistrate detecting the offence cannot himself take cognizance of this
offence.19
[s 265.8] Complaint
The CrPC does not require any complaint by any particular persons for taking cognizance of an offence under
this section, but it has been held that a conviction under this section cannot be maintained where there is no
Page 3 of 4
complaint by a purchaser.20
[s 265.9] Charge
That you, on or about the……day of…….at……frequently used a false weight (or false measure of length or capacity)
[or fraudulently used a weight (or measure of length or capacity) as a different weight (or measure) from what is/was],
and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 265 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 265.10] Proof
(i) the weight or the measure or length or capacity used by the accused was false; or
(ii) the weight or the measure of length or capacity used by the accused was a different weight or measure
from what it is; and
(iii) that the accused did so fraudulently.21
[s 265.11] Fraud, is not Presumed has to be Strictly Proved
It is the duty of the prosecution to lead some evidence to show that the accused knew the weight or measure in
question to be incorrect or that before he used them, he tampered with them. In the absence of any evidence to
that effect, the fraudulent intent required by the section cannot be presumed.22 Where standard weights are
prescribed, a bazaar seller would no doubt be bound to take reasonable care that the weights used by him are
not defective according to the standard, and if any of his weights varied from the standard so as to give the
seller a substantial advantage, the court would probably infer fraud. But where no standard is prescribed, it is
clear that no presumption of fraud can arise, and a conviction under sections 265–266, IPC cannot be obtained
unless the element of fraud is strictly proved.23
2009.
Page 4 of 4
11 Bakhat Lal v Emperor, AIR 1929 Ngp 239 , p 240 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 692 ; Suwalal v State, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 693 ; State of
Maharashtra v Sahijram Hiranand Sindhi, (1980) 2 Mah LJ 67 , p 68.
12 Re Meetalagath, Poker 1 Weir 223.
13 Re Achi, 1 Weir 223.
14 Queen-Empress v Lakshman Martind, Ratanlal Un Cr Cas 989, p 990.
15 Queen-Empress v Nurodin, Ratan Lal Un Cr Cas 386.
16 Harris v London County Council, (1895) 1 QB 240 .
17 Tolah and seer weights are now out of use. There used to be 80 tolahs in a seer.
18 Empress v Bikka Mal, (1883) All WN 224.
19 Din Dahal Poddar v State of Tripura, (1994) (1) East Cr C 263, p 264 : (1994) 1 Crimes 654 (Gau).
20 Sobha v Emperor, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 4 , p 5.
21 Suwalal v State, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 693 ; State of Maharashtra v Sahijram Hiranand Sindhi, (1980) 2 Mah LR 67, p 68.
22 Bakhat Lal v Emperor, AIR 1929 Ngp 239 , p 240 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 692 .
23 Emperor v Mi Ya Pyan, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 415 .
End of Document
[s 266] Being in possession of false weight or measure.—
Measures



Page 2 of 4
Whoever is in possession of any instrument for weighing, or of any weight, or of any measure of length or
capacity, which he knows to be false, 24[***] intending that the same may be fraudulently used, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with
both.
[s 266.1] Scope
This section is similar to sections 235, 239, 240 and 259, IPC, and penalises the possession of any instrument
for weighing, or any false weight or measure, knowing it to be false and intending that it may be used
fraudulently. For an offence under this section, mere possession of false scales, weight or measures is not
enough. The prosecution must prove that the accused knew them to be false and intended to use them
fraudulently.25
The word “and” before the word “intending” was omitted by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1953 (42 of
1953), section 4 and Third Schedule.
[s 266.3] False Instrument, Weight or Measure
According to the ordinary use of language, if a measure is described as false, it means that it is something
other than what it purports to be.26 An actual shortage of weight, etc., cannot be determined until a comparison
is made with standard weights or measures and some reasonable allowance should, in any case, be made for
wear and tear and for the rough and ready methods of bazaar shopkeepers.27
[s 266.4] “Which he knows to be False”
For a conviction under this section it is not enough to prove that the accused was in possession of a false
instrument for weighing or a false weight or measure. It must further be proved that the accused knew them to
be false and intended to use them fraudulently.28 From the mere fact that a measure in possession of the
accused is found to be false, it cannot be presumed that he knew it to be false.29 The knowledge is an
awareness on the part of the person concerned indicating his state of mind. A person can be supposed to know
where there is direct appeal to his senses.30
[s 266.5] Intending that the same may be Fraudulently used
Fraudulent intent is a necessary ingredient of the offence under this section. Where everybody, both purchaser
and seller, are well aware of the actual measure being used, there can be no question of fraudulent intent. It is
only when the seller purports to sell according to a certain standard and sells below that standard, that he can
be said to be guilty of fraud.31 A person in possession of false weights cannot be convicted under this section
unless fraudulent intention is charged and proved.32
[s 266.6] Inference or Presumption Against Accused when may arise
A person who represents himself as using weights or a measure of a particular standard, eg, weights of a
certain English standard33 is bound to see that the weights or measures are correct according to the standard,
and if they vary so as to give the seller a considerable advantage, the court is justified in inferring fraud.34
Where standard weights are prescribed, a bazaar seller would no doubt be bound to take reasonable care that
the weights used by him are not defective according to the standard, and if any of his weights varies from the
standard so as to give the seller a substantial advantage, the court would probably infer fraud. But where no
standard is prescribed, no presumption of fraud can arise, and a conviction under sections 265 and 266 cannot
be obtained unless the element of fraud is strictly proved.35 It has been held that from the mere fact that certain
measures in the possession of the accused are found to be false no presumption arises that he knew them to
be false and that he intended them to be fraudulently used.36 But, doubting this, it has been held that the only
way in which knowledge and fraudulent intention can be proved in such a case is by the possession and the
use of the false weights concerned, and that where it is not the case that the weights were very old ones which
the accused had neglected to verify, or that they were new ones which he had accepted as correct, and the
weights in his possession were weights which he had kept in his shop for the purposes of his trade and was
regularly using, the only reasonable inference is that he knew they were deficient and was using them
Page 3 of 4
fraudulently.37
Where the accused who carried on the business of selling opium, was found sitting on a gunny bag near which
was a box of opium and the scales for weighing it, and false weights were found beneath the gunny bag, it was
held that the only inference that could be drawn from these circumstances was that the accused possessed
false weights knowing them to be false and intending that they may be falsely used.38
[s 266.7] Procedure
Same as in the case of an offence under section 264, IPC.
[s 266.8] Charge
That you, on or about the ………day of……at……were in possession of a certain instrument for weighing (or a certain
weight, or a certain measure of length or capacity), to wit…….which you knew to be false, intending that the same
might be fraudulently used, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 266 of the Indian Penal Code,
[s 266.9] Proof
(i) the instrument for weighing, weight or measure of length or capacity in question is false;
(ii) the accused was in possession of the same;
(iii) he knew the same to be false; and
(iv) he intended that such false weight, etc., should be used to defraud someone.
[s 266.10] Sentence
The offence under this section is an offence against society, and in such cases, any leniency in the matter of
sentence will be misplaced.39
Page 4 of 4
2009.
24 The word “and” omitted by Act 42 of 1953, section 4 and Sch III (w.e.f. 23-12-1953).
25 Queen-Empress v Hamirmal, Ratan Lal Un Cr Cas 514; Reg v Kangulee Muduk, 18 CWR 7; Reg v Damodhar, 1 BHCR
181; Re Elukuri Seshapani Chettiar, AIR 1937 Mad 209 : ILR (1937) Mad 258 : (1937) 38 Cr LJ 323 .
26 Kanayalal Mohanlal Gujar v Emperor, AIR 1939 Bom 455 , p 456.
27 Emperor v Nanak Chand, AIR 1914 Lah 42 (2), p 44 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 11 : 20 PR (1913) (Cr).
28 Queen-Empress v Hamirmal, Ratan Lal Un Cr Cas 514, p 515; Re Elukuri Seshapani Chetti, AIR 1937 Mad 209 .
29 Re M Abdul Latiff, AIR 1943 Mad 589 : (1943) 1 Mad LJ 352.
30 Joti Parshad v State of Haryana, (1993) All Cr C 101 : (1993) Cr LJ 413 , p 415 (SC).
31 Emperor v Harak Chand Marwar, AIR 1918 All 174 , p 175 : ILR 40 All 84 : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 145 ; Kanayalal Mohanlal
Gujar v Emperor, AIR 1939 Bom 455 .
32 Re Elukuri Seshapani Chetti, AIR 1937 Mad 209 ; Reg v Damodhar, 1 Bom HCR 181.
33 Re Kandamuru Annappa, (1883) 1 Weir 221.
34 Re Venkata Chetti, 1 Weir 225; Re Appasami, 1 Weir 225; Emperor v Mi Ya Pyan, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 415 .
35 Emperor v Mi Ya Pyan, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 415 .
36 Re M Abdul Latiff, AIR 1943 Mad 589 .
37 Re Challur Seshayya, AIR 1945 Mad 8 [LNIND 1944 MAD 85] , p 9 : (1944) 2 Mad LJ 249.
38 Bansidhar v State, AIR 1959 Raj 191 [LNIND 1958 RAJ 98] : (1959) ILR Raj 36 : (1959) Cr LJ 1112 .
39 Bansidhar v State, AIR 1959 Raj 191 [LNIND 1958 RAJ 98] : (1959) ILR Raj 36 : (1959) Cr LJ 1112 .
End of Document
[s 267] Making or selling false weight or measure.—
Measures



Page 2 of 3
Whoever makes, sells or disposes of any instrument for weighing, or any weight, or any measure of length or
capacity which he knows to be false, in order that the same may be used as true, or knowing that the same is
likely to be used as true, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to one year, or with fine, or with both.
[s 267.1] Scope
This section penalises making or selling of false instruments for weighing weights or measures. The offence lies
in putting false scales, weights or measures in circulation with the knowledge that they may be used as true.
[s 267.2] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable, non-bailable, non-compoundable, and triable by any magistrate.
The magistrate, mentioned in section 260(1) of the CrPC 1973, may also try this offence in a summary manner.
The cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken within one year.
[s 267.3] Charge
That you, on or about the……day of…….at…….made (or sold, or disposed of) certain instrument for weighing (or a
certain weight, or a certain measure of length or capacity), to wit……knowing it at the time of making (or selling or
disposing of) it, to be false, in order that the same might be used as true (or knowing that the same was likely to be
used as true) and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 267 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my
cognizance.
[s 267.4] Proof
(i) the instrument for weighing, weight or measure of length or capacity in question is false;
(ii) the accused either made, sold, or disposed of the same;
(iii) he then knew it to be false; and
(iv) he so made, sold, or disposed of it in order that it might be used as true; or that he knew that it was
likely to be used as true.
Page 3 of 3
2009.
End of Document
[s 268] Public nuisance.—
> R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code > Chapter XIV Of Offences Affecting the Public Health,
Safety, Convenience, Decency and Morals
Chapter XIV Of Offences Affecting the Public Health, Safety,

Convenience, Decency and Morals
The heading of this chapter is a general description of this kind of offences which constitute “public nuisance”,
defined in section 268, IPC.
14.1 Definition of “Nuisance”
The term “nuisance” has so far baffled all attempts at an exact definition. Derivatively, it is the Latin nocumentum
and the French nuire, to do hurt or to annoy. Blackstone describes nuisance (nocumentum) as something that
worketh “hurt” inconvenience or damage and Stephen as anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands,
tenements or hereditaments of another and not amounting to a trespass.1 According to Prof Winfield, a nuisance
may be described as an unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or of some right over, or in
connection with it.2
The definition given by Pollock is as follows:
Nuisance is the wrong done to a man by unlawfully disturbing him in the enjoyment of his property or in some cases in the
exercise of a common right. The wrong is in some respects analogous to trespass, and the two may coincide, some kinds
of nuisance being also continuing trespasses. The scope of nuisance, however, is wider.
According to Clerk and Lindsell, nuisance is an act or omission which is an interference with, or disturbance of, or
annoyance to a person in the exercise or enjoyment of: (a) a right belonging to him as member of the public, when it
is “public” nuisance; or, (b) his ownership or occupation of land or of some easement, quasi-easement, or other
right used or enjoyed in connection with land, when it is a “private” nuisance.3
14.2 Two Kinds of Nuisance
Nuisances are of two kinds: public or common nuisance, which materially affects the public, and is a substantial
annoyance to all the Queen’s subjects; and private nuisance which may be defined as anything which causes
material discomfort and annoyance, to a man in the use for ordinary purposes of his house or property. Public or
common nuisance, as they affect the whole community in general and not merely an individual, form the subject of
public remedies.4
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This chapter deals with public nuisances and not with private nuisances. The remedy for the latter is a civil suit,
although what constitutes the nuisance may be common to both classes. “Public nuisance” may be considered as
offences against the public, by either doing a thing which tends to the annoyance of all the King’s subjects, or by
neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires.5
14.3 Absence of Action under CrPC no bar to a Prosecution under this Chapter
This chapter deals with public nuisance considered as offences sections 133–144 of the CrPC 1973 also deal with
nuisance. But they only prescribe the proceedings for abatement of nuisances, and the fact that no proceedings
were taken under the CrPC is no bar to a prosecution under this chapter.6
Of the sections comprised in this chapter, the first section, section 268, IPC, only defines a “public nuisance” and
the remaining sections with the exception of sections 290 and 291, IPC, define and prescribe punishments for
certain kinds of public nuisances. Section 290 provides the punishment for public nuisances not otherwise
punishable by the Code and section 291, IPC deals with the repetition or continuance of public nuisance. The
offences under this chapter may be grouped as follows:
(i) Spread of infection (sections 269–271)
(ii) Fouling water (section 277)
(iii) Making atmosphere noxious to health (section 278)
(iv) Adulteration of food, drink and drugs (sections 272–276)
(v) Rash driving (section 279)
(vi) Rash navigation (section 280 and 282)
(vii) Endangering public ways (sections 281 and 283)
(viii) Negligent handling of poisons, combustibles and explosives (sections 284–286)

(ix) Negligence with respect to:
(a) machinery (section 287)

(b) building (section 288)
(c) animals (section 289)
(x) Spread of obscenity (sections 292–294)

(xi) Keeping lottery office (section 294A)

A person is guilty of a public nuisance, who does any act, or is guilty of an illegal omission, which causes any
common injury, danger, or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy property in
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the vicinity or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger, or annoyance to persons who may
have occasion to use any public right.
A common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience or advantage.
[s 268.1] Scope
This section only defines the offence of “public nuisance”. Particular kinds of public nuisances are made
punishable by other sections of this chapter, and section 290 provides the punishment for public nuisances not
falling and hence, not punishable under those sections.
A plain reading of section 268, IPC, would indicate that in order to amount to a public nuisance, a person must
have acted in a manner which may cause any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the
people in general who might dwell in a certain area or in occupation of any property in the vicinity necessarily
causing injury or obstruction or danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to exercise any public
right in respect of that locality or property.7
The offence involves any act or illegal omission causing common injury, danger or annoyance to the public.
Such ingredient against the people in general who reside or occupy property in the vicinity is also sufficient to
make out an offence. It is also sufficient if the acts must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or
annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right.8
The definition of “public nuisance” as given in section 268, IPC applies to the Code of Civil Procedure by virtue
of section 3(44) of the General Clauses Act.9
[s 268.2] English Law [s 268.2.1] Public Nuisance
Nuisances may be divided into those which are public and those which are private. A public nuisance is one
which inflicts damage, injury or inconvenience on all the Queen's subjects or on all members of a class who
come within the sphere or neighbourhood of its operation. It may, however, affect some to a greater extent than
others. The question whether the number of persons affected is sufficient to constitute a class is one of the
facts. The character of the neighbourhood is relevant for determination of the question whether a particular
activity constitutes a public nuisance, and it has been held that the grant of planning permission for a change of
use may therefore have the effect of rendering lawful an activity which would have been actionable if carried out
in an earlier period before the character of the neighbourhood had changed. There is no requirement that an
activity must in itself be unlawful to constitute a public nuisance, and disturbance caused by lawful use of the
highway may constitute such a nuisance in an appropriate case.
[s 268.2.2] Nuisance, Negligence and Trespass Distinguished
Some varieties of nuisance closely resemble acts classed under the head of trespass. The distinction between
the two is that in trespass the immediate act which constitutes the wrong causes an injury to the sufferer’s
person or damage to his property or amounts to dispossession, whereas in nuisance the act itself often does
not directly affect the person or property of another, but has consequences which become or are prejudicial to
his person or property. Nuisance must also be distinguished from negligence although many acts which
constitute a nuisance involve an element of negligence and may also be actionable as such.
In addition to the Road Traffic Regulation Act, 1984 and other modern legislation regulating behaviour in
highways, there are several other enactments, mainly contained in the Town Police Clauses Act, 1847 and
equivalent London legislation of 1839, which regulate behaviour and occupations in streets and other public
places by creating offences.
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Under section 54(17) of the English Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, it is an offence to play a game in any
thoroughfare or public place in the metropolitan police district or the City of London to the annoyance of the
inhabitants or passengers.10
Section 54 of the English Metropolitan Police Act, 1839 provides as follows:
Prohibition of nuisances by persons in the thoroughfares.—Every person shall be liable to a penalty not more
than level 2 on the standard scale, who, within the limits of the metropolitan police district, shall in any thoroughfare or
public place, commit any of the following offences; (that is to say,)
1 Every person who shall, to the annoyance of the inhabitants or passengers expose for show or sale (except in
a market lawfully appointed for that purpose) or feed or fodder any horse or other animal, or show any
caravan containing any animal or any other show or public entertainment, or shoe, bleed, or ferry any horse
or animal (except in cases of accident), or clean, dress, exercise, train, or break any horse or animal, or
clean, make, or repair any part of any cart or carriage, except in cases of accident where repair on the spot is
necessary:
2 Every person who shall turn loose any horse or cattle, or suffer to be at large any unmuzzled ferocious dog, or
set on or urge any dog or other animal to attack, worry, or put in fear any person, horse, or other animal:
3 Every person who by negligence or ill-usage in driving cattle shall cause any mischief to be done by such
cattle, or who shall in anywise misbehave himself in the driving, care, or management of such cattle, and also
every person not being hired or employed to drive such cattle who shall wantonly and unlawfully pelt, drive, or
hunt any such cattle:
4 Every person having the care of any cart or carriage who shall ride on any part thereof, on the shafts, or on
any horse or other animal drawing the same, without having and holding the reins, or who shall be at such a
distance from such cart or carriage as not to have the complete control over every horse or other animal
drawing the same:
5 Every person who shall ride or drive furiously, or so as to endanger the life or limb of any person, or to the
common danger of the passengers in any thoroughfare:
6 Every person who shall cause any cart, public carriage, sledge, truck, or barrow, with or without horses, to
stand longer than may be necessary for loading or unloading or for taking up or setting down passengers,
except hackney carriages standing for hire in any place not forbidden by law, or who, by means of any cart,
carriage, sledge, truck, or barrow, or any horse or other animal, shall wilfully interrupt any public crossing, or
wilfully cause any obstruction in any thoroughfare:
7 Every person who shall lead or ride any horse or other animal, or draw or drive any cart or carriage, sledge,
truck, or barrow, upon any footway or curbstone, or fasten any horse or other animal so that it can stand
across or upon any footway:
8 Every person who shall roll or carry any cask, tub, hoop, or wheel, or any ladder, plank, pole, showboard, or
placard, upon any footway, except for the purpose of loading or unloading any cart or carriage, or of crossing
the footway:
9 Every person who, after being made acquainted with the regulations or directions which the commissioners of
police shall have made for regulating the route of horses, carts, carriages, and persons … for preventing
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obstructions during public processions and on other occasions herein-before specified, shall wilfully disregard
or not conform himself thereunto:
10 Every person who, without the consent of the owner or occupier, shall affix any posting bill or other paper
against or upon any building, wall, fence, or pale, or write upon, soil, deface, or mark any such building, wall,
fence, or pale with chalk or paint, or in any other way whatsoever,…:
11 …
12 Every person who shall sell or distribute or offer for sale or distribution, or exhibit to public view, any profane,
… book, paper, print, drawing, painting or representation, or sing any profane, indecent, or obscene song or
ballad, … or use any profane, indecent or obscene language to the annoyance of the inhabitants or
passengers:
13 …
14 Every person … who shall blow any horn or use any other noisy instrument, for the purpose of calling persons
together, or of announcing any show or entertainment, or for the purpose of hawking, selling, distributing, or
collecting any article whatsoever, or of obtaining money or alms:
15 Every person who shall wantonly discharge any fire-arm or throw or discharge any stone or other missile, to
the damage or danger of any person, or make any bonfire, or throw or set fire to any firework:
16 Every person who shall wilfully and wantonly disturb any inhabitant by pulling or ringing any door-bell or
knocking at any door without lawful excuse, or who shall wilfully and unlawfully extinguish the light of any
lamp:
17 Every person who shall fly any kite or play at any game to the annoyance of the inhabitants or passengers, or
who shall make or use any slide upon ice or snow in any street or other thoroughfare, to the common danger
of the passengers.
In R v Williams11 the court observed that where public health endeavours fail to provide adequate protection to
individuals like the complainants, the criminal law can be effective. It provides a needed measure of protection
in the form of deterrence and reflects society’s abhorrence of the self-centered recklessness and the callous
insensitivity of the actions of the respondent and those who have acted in a similar manner.
[s 268.3] Definition of Public Nuisance in the Section
Various definitions of nuisance are given elsewhere,12 but here we are concerned only with the offence of public
nuisance as defined in this section. This definition has been made applicable to all Central Acts and
Regulations made on or after 14 January 1887, when the General Clauses Act was passed.13
“Public nuisance” includes an act which causes or which must necessarily cause injury, obstruction or
annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right, eg, an individual has a public right to
pass along a public highway practicing his religious observance peacefully and if anyone interferes with his
right, he commits public nuisance. A body of persons have the same right as an individual.14 The definition of
“public nuisance” in this section is wide enough to cover cases of obstruction to village pathway.15 It is,
however, a matter of common experience that, for temporary purposes, the villagers stack logs and fuels on a
public road; such an act though causes obstruction on a public road, is not an offence under this section.16
[s 268.4] Analysis
The offence defined in this section may be analysed thus:

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(i) it may be caused either by an act or illegal omission;
(ii) the effect thereof must be either injury,17 danger or annoyance;
(iii) it may actually caused either to the public in general, or to that portion of the public who “dwell or
occupy property in the vicinity”; or
(iv) threatened of necessity to “person who may have occasion to use any public right.”18
[s 268.5] Spreading Infectious Disease is a Public Nuisance
[s 268.6] Nuisance—Public and Private
The Supreme Court says:19
Nuisance is an inconvenience which materially interferes with the ordinary physical comfort of human existence. It is
not capable of precise definition. It may be public or private nuisance. As defined in s 268 IPC, public-nuisance is an
offence against public either by doing a thing which tends to the annoyance of the whole community in general or by
neglect to do anything which the common good requires. It is an act or omission which causes any common injury,
danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who dwell or occupy the property in the vicinity on the
alternative it causes injury, obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use public right. It
is the quantum of annoyance or discomfort in contradistinction to private nuisance which affects an individual is the
decisive factor.
According to Pollock, “Nuisance is the wrong done to a man by unlawfully disturbing him: (a) in the enjoyment
of his property, or, in some cases, (b) in the exercise of a common right.”
In Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort,20 public nuisance has been defined as follows:
A public or common nuisance is one which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class
of Her Majesty’s subject who come within the sphere or neigbourhood of its operation. But this definition is vague and it
has been rightly said that nuisance covers a multitude of sins, great and small. Public nuisance of common law include
diverse activities as carrying on an offensive trade, keeping a disorderly house, selling food unfit for human
consumption, obstructing public highways, throwing fireworks about in the streets and holding an ill advised pop-
festival.21
Sir Arthur Underhill in his Law of Torts,22 describes public nuisance as under:
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A public nuisance is some unlawful act, or omission to discharge some legal duty, which act or omission endangers the
lives, safety, health or comfort of the public or by which the public are obstructed in the exercise of some common
right.
No action can be brought by a private person of public nuisance unless he has suffered substantial particular
damage beyond that suffered by the public generally.
A private nuisance has been described as under:
A private nuisance is some unauthorised user or a man’s own property causing damage to the property of another or
some unauthorised interference with another’s enjoyment of his property, causing damage.
Any private nuisance whereby sensible injury is caused to the property of another, or whereby the ordinary
physical comfort of human existence in such property is materially interfered with, is actionable.
Harry Street, in his Law of Tort23 observes as follows:
The essence of the tort of nuisance is the interference with enjoyment of land…the generic conception of nuisance can
readily be illustrated. It covers interference with use and enjoyment of land by water, foul smoke, smell, fumes, gas,
noise, heat, electricity, disease or any other like thing which may cause such an inconvenience. Nevertheless, the term
‘nuisance’ is used in different senses by the Judges and this has caused confusion both in the development and in the
exposition of this branch of the law of torts.
Salmond in Law of Torts,24 states as follows:
Nuisance is commonly a continuing wrong that is to say, it consists in the establishment or maintenance of some state
of affairs which continuously or repeatedly causes the escape of noxious things into the plaintiff’s land (eg a streak of
foul water or the constant noise of small factory). An escape of something on a single occasion would not ordinarily be
termed a nuisance. Nuisance are of two kinds, public and private. A private nuisance is a civil wrong and a public or
common nuisance is a criminal offence.25
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[s 268.6.1] Same Act may Constitute Public as well as Private Nuisance
Private nuisance affects only private individuals in contradistinction to the public at large. In other words it is an
act or omission intended to hurt or create annoyances, injury or discomfort to private individual or to the
property possessed by a private individual. In brief, in some cases the same act may constitute a public
nuisance as well as a private nuisance. Very often it is evident, that the private nuisance and public nuisance
may in few instances, be overlapping. It is the quantum of annoyance or discomfort or injury which
distinguishes private nuisance from public nuisance.26
[s 268.6.2] When Injury etc. to be actually caused and when mere Threat is enough
Where the nuisance affects the public or the people who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, the injury,
danger or annoyance must be actually caused, and must affect a number of persons. Where, however, the
nuisance affects only the person who may have occasion to use any public right, the injury, danger or
annoyance need not be actually caused; it is enough if it is threatened. Again it need not affect the public or the
people dwelling or occupying property in the vicinity, generally. It is enough if any individual, who may have
occasion to use a public right, is threatened to be affected.
[s 268.6.3] Where can Nuisance be Committed
The wording of the section, which is not aimed at mere private nuisances implies that an offence of causing a
public nuisance can only be committed in a neighbourhood which is dwelt in or occupied by people in general,
that is, by a body of a considerable number of persons.27
[s 268.6.4] Whether Nuisance may be Committed by One on his Own Land
The acts, done by a person on his own land, may amount to a public nuisance, when they cause any common
injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general, who dwell or occupy property in the
vicinity. It is not necessary that the nuisance must have been committed on the land belonging to the public.28
[s 268.6.5] Lawfulness of an act upon One’s own Land is no Defence
Where an act is a nuisance to the public, it is no defence that it is in itself a perfectly lawful act, and that it is
done upon a man’s own ground, in a convenient place, and in a proper manner, for the illegality consists in
using one’s own property so as to harm the public.29
[s 268.7] Nuisance Distinct from Trespass and Negligence
Nuisance is distinct from trespass and negligence, and, as a general rule, in cases of public nuisance the
grievance lies in the inconvenience, in fact, caused,30 and not in the intent or knowledge of the person
responsible as occupier of the premises on which the nuisance is created, or of the owner, if the premises are,
in fact, unoccupied.31
[s 268.8] “Act”
By section 33, the word “act” in this Code, includes an “illegal omission”, except where a contrary intention
appears from the context. The contrary intention does appear in this section, viz, by expressly contrasting the
words “illegal omission” with the word “act”. Thus, the word “act” in this section bears its natural sense of
positive conduct, doing something, as contrasted with “omission” or negative conduct, not doing something.32
“Act”, however, includes a series of acts and “omission” includes a series of omissions.33
[s 268.9] “Illegal Omission”
By section 43, IPC the word “illegal” has a three-fold meaning: (a) anything which is an offence under the
Code;34 (b) anything prohibited by law; and (c) anything which furnishes ground for a civil action. Thus, an
omission which is either in itself an offence under the Code, or which is prohibited by law, or which furnishes a
ground for a civil action, is an “illegal omission”.
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A public nuisance may be caused by acts or omissions causing terror or danger to the public in general. It is said that a
mastiff going in the street unmuzzled, from the ferocity of his nature being dangerous and a cause of terror to the
general public, seems to be a common nuisance; and that, consequently the owner may be indicted for suffering him to
go at large, and it is said to be a public nuisance to keep ‘a ferocious dog’ and noisy dog so near a highway as to be
likely to frighten horses owing to its barking. Negligently blasting stone in a quarry and thereby projecting large pieces
of stone, so as to endanger the safety of persons in houses and on highways adjoining the quarry, is a misdemeanour
indictable at common law. So is allowing a house near a highway to become a dangerous building; and while a man
who burns down his own house is not guilty of arson at common law, he commits public nuisance if the house is so
situate that its burning causes danger to others.35
A, whose duty it is by law to see to the burial of a corpse, omits to do so. This is an illegal omission, and the
injury, danger or annoyance caused or threatened thereby is a public nuisance.36
A, the occupier of a house in ruins, dangerous to the public, is bound to repair it, and his omission to do so is
illegal and causes a public nuisance.37
A, the occupier of a house, is bound to prevent the soil in the privy from trespassing. His omission to do so is
illegal and causes a public nuisance.38
A has a well in his private ground within eight yards of the highway and open thereto. A is not bound to fence
the well in, and his omission to do so is not illegal.39 But, the filling up of the private well from where inhabitants
of the village were drawing water for a long time would clearly result in common injury to the public or to the
people of the village who dwell or occupy the property in the vicinity of the well, constitute public nuisance.40
Where the lambardars, who used to make sanitary arrangement on the occasion of the holding of a fair at a
certain village, were found to have omitted to make the arrangement in a certain year, it was held that they
could not be convicted of an offence under this section.41
Allowing a prickly-pear to spread from his own property on to the public road was held to be a public nuisance
within the meaning of this section on the principle that no man shall so use his property as to injure his
neighbour and it makes no difference that the neighbour is the public and not an individual.42 Omission on the
part of the owners of pigs to prevent them from straying and committing nuisance in a public place is not an
illegal omission and does not, therefore, constitute a public nuisance punishable under section 290.43 The
omission of a person to keep his ponies from straying is not a public nuisance punishable under section 290 of
the Indian Penal Code.44
Letting loose one’s cattle on the public road has been held to be doing an act which must necessarily cause
obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who have occasion to use the public road at night.45
[s 268.10] Offences Affecting the Public and not an Individual
The persons affected by the nuisance, by the terms of the section, must comprise either the public generally, or
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a section of the public resident near the locality of the nuisance or persons in the exercise of a public right.46
Thus, the essence of the offence is that it affects the public, and is not merely injurious or annoying to an
individual. A nuisance which merely affects an individual or a few individuals is a ground for a civil action for
damages, but is not indictable. The inhabitants of three sets of chambers in Clifford’s Inn, London, were
annoyed by the noise made by a tinman carrying on his trade in the immediate neighbourhood. When the
windows were shut the noise was greatly lessened. It was held that this was not an indictable nuisance, but if
anything, a private one.47
[s 268.11] Public
The first part of the section refers to injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people in general who
dwell or occupy property in the vicinity. The word “public” has been defined in the Code in section 12 as
including any class of the public, or any community. The Muslim community or the Muslims of the
neighbourhood would, therefore, be included in the word “public” which is used in the expression “public
nuisance” in this section.48 The public is a body different from the panchayat.49 In section 133, CrPC, which
deals with abatement of a public nuisance, the word used is “community”, and it has been held to mean the
public at large or the residents of an entire locality and not merely the residents of a particular house.50
[s 268.12] “Common Injury, Danger or Annoyance”
The words “public”, “in general” and “vicinity” clearly indicate that there can be no public nuisance unless the
general public of the locality is affected by the nuisance. Injury, danger or annoyance caused to residents of a
particular house is not enough.51 What the section in this chapter aims at is general annoyance or danger to
persons in the vicinity. When no injury or annoyance is caused to persons in the vicinity, there can be no public
nuisance, even if it tends to cause some injury to some owners of property.
There is no manner of doubt that filling up of the well from which the public at large was drawing water would
clearly result in common injury to the public or the people of the village to dwell or occupy the property in the
vicinity of the well.52
Where riparian owners of land on one bank of a river throw up an embankment on their own land to protect
their fields from flood, and this results to accumulation of water on the fields of the owners of land on the other
side of the river, it cannot be said that the embankment causes a common injury to the public in the vicinity.
Hence, an embankment of this kind, even if it tends to cause injury to some owners of property, cannot be
described as a public nuisance.53
[s 268.12.1] Every Member of Public need not be Affected by Injury etc.
Because the residents of a single house are annoyed by the noise of a theatre, the householder is not entitled
to prosecute, unless he can show that the noise annoys other people living in the vicinity.54 But the annoyance
or injury need not affect every member of the public. It is sufficient if it should affect people in general who dwell
in the vicinity.55
[s 268.12.2] Individual Versus General Public
It is sufficient even if one person is annoyed, and as the act complained of can hardly be proved except by
some person who comes forward to complain, the annoyance is almost necessarily involved in the complaint. It,
therefore, comes to this that all that is required is that the act was done in such a way as to annoy a person
who complained of it.56 But when the trade of the non-applicant is causing nuisance only to the applicant and
there is no evidence that other neighbours also are troubled, section 133, CrPC, has no application.57 Similarly,
where the noise of the ice-cream making machinery constitutes a nuisance to the residents of the building
whose flats are adjacent to the place where the machine is running and not to all the residents of the building,
finding to this effect, is not a finding that a public nuisance exists, therefore, section 133, CrPC, has no
application is such cases.58 The public which one must have in view is the general public of a locality, ie, the
villagers in the case of a village, and not an individual of particularly refined susceptibilities.59
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Whether an annoyance or injury is sufficiently widespread to amount to public nuisance is a question of fact.60
[s 268.12.3] Injury or Annoyance to some Persons Drawn from a Higher Class or Society not Sufficient
What is likely to be an annoyance to persons in a town may not be an annoyance to people living in a village.
Thus, passing urine in a public place in a village is not likely to cause annoyance, to the villagers. Similarly,
quarrelling in a public place, though it might be a source of annoyance in a town, is not likely to cause
annoyance to villagers or inhabitants of a village.61 Regard must be had to the character of the locality, and the
class of persons of whom the public is composed. To make a nuisance indictable, it must be a nuisance to the
public or to the people in general, not merely to a few persons drawn from a higher class and accustomed to a
higher standard of comfort than their neighbours.
[s 268.12.4] Other Persons Committing Other Nuisance is no Defence
Where any act or occupation causes an undoubted public nuisance, a person who is charged with such a
nuisance cannot plead that a number of other persons are committing other nuisances as bad as, or worse than
his own, and that his contribution to the general annoyance is merely an imperceptible addition.62
[s 268.12.5] Smell Injurious to Senses and not to Health—Effect
In order to constitute an offence under this section, it is not necessary that the alleged nuisance should produce
smells injurious to health, it is sufficient if they are offensive to the senses.63 In order to constitute a nuisance,
there must be “not merely nominal, but such a sensible and real damage as a sensible person…would find
injurious.”64
[s 268.12.6] Smell Rendering Living Uncomfortable, Though not Unwholesome
As regards personal discomfort arising from noxious fumes, smells and the like, it was long ago laid down by
Lord Mansfield CJ: “It is not necessary that the smell should be unwholesome; it is enough if it renders the
enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable”.65 The vitiation of the atmosphere so as to make it noxious to
health is specially punishable by section 278, IPC.
[s 268.12.7] Degree of Discomfort Required to Constitute Nuisance
As to the degree of personal discomfort which constitutes a nuisance, Knight Bruce VC said:
The important point for decision may properly be thus put: Ought this inconvenience to be considered as more than
fanciful, or as one of mere delicacy or fastidiousness, or as an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary
comfort, physically, of human existence, not merely according elegant or dainty modes and habits of living, but
according to plain, sober, and simple notions amongst English people.66
Where the annoyance neither did, nor could, cause any sensible or real damage, it cannot amount to an
offence under this section merely by reason of its hurting the feelings of the members of a particular
community. Thus, where the accused cut up, on his verandah, meat that was to be cooked for a dinner party,
exposing it to the sight of persons passing along the road, among whom were some Jains, whose temple was
close by, it was held that the act of the accused was an annoyance merely by reason of its hurting the feelings
of Jains, who have a repugnance to killing of animals, and did not constitute an offence under section 290.67
Similarly where certain Mohammedans killed and cut up two cows before sunrise in a private compound, partly
visible from the road, and one Hindu saw them doing so, it was held that there was no public nuisance.68 So
also where certain Mohammedan villagers erected a temporary shed near a Hindu temple during Mohurrum,
and placed a religious symbol therein, it was held that this did not constitute a public nuisance.69
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[s 268.12.8] Sentimental Injury or Annoyance not Sufficient
The effect of the act or illegal omission must be any common injury,70 danger, obstruction or annoyance, but
these do not include a sentimental injury or annoyance arising from the susceptibilities of others.71 Playing the
radio loudly at a particular time did not constitute public nuisance.
It was too trivial for being pursued in a court of law. The conviction under section 290, IPC, was, therefore, set
aside.72 A places cakes of cow-dung on the roadside to dry in the sun. This is not a public nuisance, unless a
material annoyance is caused to the public.73 Gambling of itself is not a public nuisance, especially gambling in
a private house.74 But where a lessee of a house permits disorderly people to use it for gambling and thereby
causes annoyance to the public, he is guilty of the offence under section 290.75
[s 268.12.9] Some Examples of Public Nuisance
The following are some examples of public nuisance:
(i) Keeping filth upon premises.76

(ii) Using a shop as a slaughter house.77
(iii) Offensive smells, though not injurious to health,78 eg a hartshorn manufactory,79 and brick burning.80
(iv) Trades dangerous to human life, eg keeping gunpowder, etc.81
(v) Bringing horses with glanders into a public place.82
(vi) Taking a plague patient to a house where several persons are living.83
(vii) Erecting a privy84 or placing putrid carrion85 near the highway.
(viii) Keeping swine near a street86 and boiling the entrails and offal of beasts.87
(ix) Violently blowing a speaking trumpet at night,88 and keeping dogs which make noises at night.89
(x) Brothels90 and common gambling houses.91
(xi) Indecent exposure of the person in a public place, with intent to cause annoyance to persons dwelling
or being near, or passing by.92
(xii) Gambling in a public place.93
[s 268.13] “Which must Necessarily Cause Injury…Public Right”
Under the second part of the section actual injury or annoyance need not have been caused. It is enough if the
act or illegal omission of the accused is such as must necessarily cause injury, obstruction, danger or
annoyance to any person who may have occasion to use any public right.94 If any portion, however small, of a
public street is encroached upon, the inevitable result must be to cause obstruction to persons who may have
occasion to use the highway, for the public is entitled to use every inch of a road that has been dedicated to the
public.95 The obstruction must be the direct and necessary consequence of the act or the illegal omission of the
accused. Where the accused was selling satta tickets at his ship with the result that 10 or 15 customers
collected outside and obstructed the traffic in the public street adjoining the shop, it was held that the
assembling of 10 or 15 customers and the obstruction of traffic cannot be considered to be the direct or
necessary consequence of the offer of satta tickets for sale, that the mere offer of satta tickets for sale by the
accused could not itself be the source of any nuisance to the public. Obviously, it should be possible for the
customers to purchase tickets in an orderly manner without crowding in front of the shop or blocking the traffic;
and therefore, the accused could not be convicted under section 290.96
Levy of registration fees of Rs 5/- for indoor patients and Rs 2/- for outdoor patients in Government Hospital
Page 13 of 22
imposed by a society providing diagnosis facilities was held as not “public nuisance”.97
[s 268.13.1] Private Right to yield to Public Right
In one other case the accused, the master and servant of a toy shop exhibited in the windows of the shop,
overlooking the public road, certain clock-work toys during the Diwali festival. The result of the exhibition was
that thousands of people collected on the road to witness the toys. There were dangerous crowds in
consequence; people were knocked down and great obstruction and danger were caused to those using the
road. The accused were asked by the police to stop the exhibition, but they would not obey. It was held that the
cause of this nuisance was the act of the accused. It consisted of the manner in which they worked the toys in
their shop; their object was to attract a crowd; they knew that a crowd would be, and as a matter of fact was,
attracted by what they did, and they must be regarded as having intended that consequence. It follows that the
nuisance was caused by them.98 Ordinarily every shopkeeper has a right to exhibit his wares in any way he
likes in his shop, but he must exercise the right so as not to cause annoyance or nuisance to the public.99 As
was said by Romer LJ, in Attorney-General v Brighton and Hove Co-op Supply Association,100 “It does not
follow that, because the user is necessary or useful for the purpose of carrying on the business, it must of
necessity be held to be a reasonable user”. And the law, as explained by Lindley MR, in the same case, is that,
“In a case of doubt or difficulty, the private reasonable right of a householder to carry on his business must yield
to the public right of user of the street”. No man shall so use his property as to injure his neighbour, and it
makes no difference that the neighbour is the public and not an individual.101
In yet another case, the accused placed a board in the front of his house over the water channel and on to a
considerable portion of the road leaving only a small space by which persons could pass by his house. On this
board he sat writing and delivering to a large crowd of persons vouchers for bets which they made with him
about the Government opium sales. It was held that the placing of the board in the way by the accused did
necessarily caused obstruction to persons who might have occasion to use the public right of passage past the
shop of the accused.102 It has been held that merely placing a charpoy on the road in a bazaar temporarily does
not amount to an offence of causing public nuisance.103 When the accused raised the level of the public way in
front of his house and also constructed a cross-bund across it and the result was stagnation of water leading to
breeding of mosquitoes and giving rise to offensive smell, causing to persons living in the vicinity danger to their
health and annoyance to persons using that part of the way, it was held that it was a clear case of public
nuisance.104
Allegation was that the respondent factory had created public nuisance by creating a wall by which the flow of
the water by nala has been obstructed and thereby the water is accumulated in the residential houses
constructed by petitioner Housing Board for public. The Assistant Engineer of the Housing Board produced in
the court admitted that the blockage was due to non-making of proper sewage line by the Housing Board up to
the nala. The plea of creating public nuisance was rejected. Order rejecting petition under section 133, CrPC
was upheld.105
[s 268.13.2] Frequently Causing not the same as Necessarily Causing
Although soliciting by prostitutes in a public place frequently causes annoyance to persons using such place,
annoyance is not necessarily caused thereby, and therefore, such soliciting does not fall within this section.106
[s 268.14] Legalised/Recognised Nuisances
There is a limited class of nuisances recognised by law, which are so recognised because they are
compromises belonging to social life, by which some apparent natural right is invaded or some enjoyment
abridged to provide for the more general convenience or necessities of the whole community; eg, the cremation
of the dead. But it does not follow that the cremation of the dead under any circumstances whatsoever is
innocent, for if, on the one hand, the use of a ground for the purpose of cremation, in a manner neither unusual
nor calculated to aggravate the inconveniences naturally incident to such an act as it is generally performed in
India, is perfectly lawful; on the other hand, a ground kept and used in such a manner as to be offensive or a
source of injury or annoyance to people in general who dwell in the vicinity will constitute a nuisance under this
section.107 It is, of course, an answer to an indictment for a public nuisance that the acts or omissions on which
Page 14 of 22
the indictment is based are authority by statute.108 This defence has been much discussed in many cases of
public and private proceedings for nuisance. The decisions frequently turn on the particular wording of the
statute involved, ie, on the question whether what is complained of was specifically authorised or whether the
terms of the statute preserve the common law liability in the case of negligence or nuisance.109
[s 268.14.1] Smoking—Use of Cigarette Trademark by another Company, section 91, CPC
Injury, damage or annoyance contemplated in section 268, IPC does not comprehend the injury, damage or
annoyance which may result from smoking, smoking being regarded as injurious to health. Even though
smoking is injurious, neither is manufacture, nor sale, nor advertisement, nor consumption of cigarettes
prohibited. Therefore, the use of the cigarette trademark of one company by another company which results in
an increase in the sale of cigarettes does not give a cause of action for an action of public nuisance. Nor does
that act amount to any other wrongful act. Section 91 does not create any new legal right. It only provides for
the procedure in cases of public nuisances and other wrongful acts affecting the public, where no special
damage has been caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act. There are
many forms of harm of which the law takes no account. Damage so done and suffered is called damnum sine
injuria. Undoubtedly, such a harm is not comprehended within the expression, “other wrongful act” affecting the
public, occurring in section 91.110
[s 268.14.2] Non-Payment of Tax not an Offence under this Section
Non-payment of tax does not necessarily cause injury, danger or annoyance to the public, and does not,
therefore, constitute an offence under this section.111
[s 268.15] “Licensed Trade Causing Nuisance”—No Right to Continue when its user Becomes Nuisance
A previous sanction of the public authorities to the establishment of a trade, eg, the running of a slaughter-
house, does not entitle the trader to continue the business after it has become a public nuisance to the
neighbourhood.112
[s 268.16] No Prescriptive Right to Maintain Nuisance
No length of enjoyment can legalise a public nuisance involving actual danger to the health of the community.113
A public nuisance is indictable however long it has existed.114 In R v Cross,115 Ellenborough CJ said:
It is immaterial how long the practice may have prevailed, for no length of time will legitimate a nuisance. A shell fishery
across a river had been established for a vast number of years, but Buller, J held that it continued unlawful, and gave
judgement that it should be abated.
Although no length of enjoyment can legalise a public nuisance,116 yet the long possession or enjoyment of
what is said to be a nuisance may give to the objection of the person so possessing or enjoying it the character
of a bona fide dispute as to title such as might have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the magistrate under
sections 133 and 138 of the CrPC, and making the question a proper one for the civil court.117
[s 268.17] Some Convenience or Advantage, no Defence
The section itself says that a common nuisance is not excused on the ground that it causes some convenience
or advantage. To a charge of public nuisance, it is no answer that the injury to the public is more than counter-
balanced by the benefits resulting from the act or occupation complained of to the general community, or to the
locality itself.118
[s 268.18] Master’s Liability for Acts acts of Servant

Page 15 of 22
Under the English law it is no defence to an indictment for nuisance against a master or employer that the
nuisance was caused by acts of his servants, if they were done in the course of their employment.119 But in
India the general rule is that a principal is not criminally answerable for the acts of his agent.120 Where the
accused, the manager of a school, had a building put up at a cost of Rs 35,000 employing masons therefor,
and the masons constructed the same with excess of sand in the mortar thereby resulting in collapse of the
building and killing several inmates. On these facts, the Madras High Court held that it was not the case of the
prosecution that the accused himself constructed the building and, it was not disputed that he sought the
assistance of the masons and the masons constructed the building. If the masons had not done the work
properly and if they had been negligent in not mixing the lime mortar in proper proportions, the accused could
not be made liable for the negligence of those persons who actually constructed the building who were
supposed to be skilled. The accused was a layman, he, therefore, could not be held liable for the negligence of
the persons who actually constructed the building, which is the cause for the collapse of the building. The
acquittal of the accused by the sessions court in appeal for offences under section 304A, 337, 338 and 290,
IPC, was found proper.121
[s 268.19] Lessor’s Liability for Nuisance Caused by the Lessee
So long as a tenancy continues, the lessor may have no control over the premises leased. But it is always open
to the landlord to terminate the tenancy, if the lessee commits public nuisance. If he fails to do so, he may be
held liable for the nuisance committed by the lessee.122
[s 268.20] Lessee’s Liability for acts of Lessor
If platforms built by owners of houses or shops cause injury, danger or annoyance to the public or to the people
in the vicinity, it is the owners who built the platforms that are guilty of causing public nuisance and not the
shopkeepers who merely sit on the platforms.123
[s 268.21] Liability of Joint Owner
A joint owner is responsible in law for nuisances caused by his joint property.124
[s 268.22] Abatement of Nuisance
There is a broad distinction between removing an obstruction wrongfully placed in a highway and abating a
nuisance created by the non-feasance of persons charged with the duty of repairing a highway or public
bridge.125 In a case in which the defendant had gone on the land of another to re-erect a bridge alleged to be
public which had fallen into decay, it was held that this proceeding could not properly be described as
abatement.126 There seems to be no instance in which an individual has been held entitled to abate a public
nuisance caused by omission except perhaps in cutting trees allowed to obstruct a highway.127 In the latter case
are discussed the rights of individuals to abate private nuisances caused by the growth of trees. At the present
time, save in exceptional circumstances, the only lawful mode of abating a public nuisance is by obtaining an
order of a competent court.128 In the case of easements, section 24 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, gives a
dominant owner an accessory right to do all acts necessary to secure the full enjoyment of an easement. But
section 36 of the same Act lays down that “notwithstanding the provisions of section 24, the dominant owner
cannot himself abate a wrongful obstruction of an easement”. A summary procedure for abatement of a public
nuisance is laid down in sections 133–144 of the CrPC.
[s 268.23] Remedies Available against Public and Private Nuisance
Sections 133 and 144 of the CrPC 1973, deal with public nuisance. It is inconceivable that the provisions of
sections 133–144 can be made applicable to private nuisance. The remedies available are both in civil and
criminal nature. Against a private nuisance a civil remedy is available under section 91 of the CPC 1908, by
filing a civil suit for declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances
of the case and in that suit the plaintiff need not prove, that he has sustained any special damage. The other
remedy available is under criminal law by prosecution of the person responsible under different sections
provided under chapter XV of the IPC. The next remedy is in the form of summary proceedings in urgent
matters pertaining to public nuisance etc, and the same has been provided under sections 133–144 of the
Code. One more remedy is also available against public nuisance that is as provided under special or local
laws, including section 405 of UP Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, section 126 of the Cantonments Act,
Page 16 of 22
1952 etc. In the instant case, as the nuisance complained of was affecting the public at large inasmuch as while
manufacturing wheel-panas, some unusual noise or disturbance was created which certainly affected the public
at large and as alleged if cracks were formed in the buildings of the locality that affected the public in general
and not only any private individual. Therefore, in the present case nuisance was certainly public nuisance and
the remedy available in the summary proceedings was by way of an application under section 133 of the Code.
It may be clarified that the remedy against public nuisance under section 133 was essentially a civil remedy but
as the matter pertains to an urgent situation the power to pass an appropriate order was given to the magistrate
concerned. Otherwise, if for similar purposes some urgent remedy was provided in summary proceedings in a
civil court that would have prolonged the proceedings.129
Chapter X of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with “public nuisance” and not with “private nuisance” the
remedy for the latter is a civil suit, although that constitutes nuisance may be common to both classes. Section
133, CrPC provides a speedy and summary remedy in case of urgency where danger to public interest or
public health is concerned. In all others cases, the party should be referred to the remedy under the ordinary
law.130 As a rule, a public nuisance is only punishable on indictment, and is no ground for a civil action for
damages as well.131 But if an individual member of the public suffers some special damage thereby, but not
otherwise, he may bring a civil action.132 It is competent to a person to bring an action in the civil court for
obtaining an order for the removal of a building erected on a portion of waste land belonging in common to all
the houses in a street or upon a road, provided he is injured by it, without in the first instance applying to the
magistrate for its removal.133
An individual has a public right to pass along a public highway practising his religious observances peacefully
and if anyone interferes with this right, he commits public nuisance. A body of persons has the same right as an
individual. A suit for declaration of such a right and formation restraining those who interfere with it, is a suit for
removal of such public nuisance.134
A digs a hole in high road. This is a public nuisance, and A may be punished for causing it. But if B falls into the
hole and injures himself he may bring an action for damages as well.135
1 Stephen III, p 499.
2 PH Winfield, Law of Torts, 4th Edn, pp 436, 1948.
3 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, 1947 Edn, p 544.
4 Russell on Crime, 11th Edn, p 1589.
5 1 Hawk c 75, section 1; Anon (1752) 3 Akt 750; Lord Hardwicke; 2 Bl Com 166; Rolle Abr 83.
6 Reg v Suklal, Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cas 23.
7 S Venktaramaiah v State, (1989) Cr LJ 789 (Kant).

Page 17 of 22
8 Santosh v State of Kerala, (1985) Cr LJ 756 : (1985) 2 Crimes 58 [LNIND 1985 KER 76] (Ker).
9 Firm Pyarlal Satpal v Santlal, AIR 1972 Raj 103 (DB).
10 Halsbury’s Laws of England.

11 R v Williams, (2001) NJ No 274 (Vide Halsbury’s Laws of England).
12 “Topical Introduction” to the Chapter may be referred to.
13 General Clauses Act (10 of 1897), section 3(48) and section 4(2).
14 Firm Pyarelal Satpal v Santlal, AIR 1972 Raj 103 (DB).
15 Chandrawati v Ramaeshwar, AIR 1968 Pat 422 , p 432 : 47 ILR Patna 326.
16 Moochia Naik v State, AIR 1967 Ori 36 [LNIND 1965 ORI 90] : (1967) Cr LJ 393 , p 394; Kamla Prasad v Emperor,
(1912) 13 Cr LJ 380 : (1912) 10 All LJ 362.
17 Section 44, IPC.
18 This analysis has been adopted, though not acknowledged in Achammagan Venkata Reddi v State, (1953) Cr LJ 500 ;
S Venkataramaiah v State, (1989) Cr LJ 789 .
19 Vasant Manga Nikumba v Baburao Bhikanna Naidua, (1996) SCC (Cr) 27.
20 Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 12th Edn, 1984, pp 378–79.
21 South Port Corp v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd, (1954) 2 QB 182 per Denning LJ; AG for Ontario v Orange Production Ltd,
(1971) 21 DLR 257.
22 Sir Arthur Underhill, Law of Torts, 16th Edn, p 118.
23 Harry Street, Law of Tort, 7th Edn, 1983, p 229.
24 Salmond, Law of Torts, 16th Edn, p 52.
25 Wali Uddin v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1988) All LJ 134.

26 Ibid.
27 Re Nga Tan Ze, 1 LBR 219.
28 Debi Sahai Tewari v Gram Sabha, (1955) All WR 269, p 270 (HC) : (1955) NUC (All) 1725.
29 Bomford v Turnley, 3 B&S 62 (1) (SC) : 31 LJ QB 286; Cavey v Ledbitter, 13 CBNS 470 : 32 LJCP 107; Rajmohun
Bose v EI Rly Co, 10 Beng LR 253.
30 Barber v Penley, (1893) Ch 447 ; R v Moore, (1832) 3 B & AP 184; R v Carlile, (1834) 6 C & P 636.
Page 18 of 22
31 AG v Tod Heatley, (1897) 1 Ch 560 ; Russell on Crime, 11th Edn, p 1593, citing the above footnote.
32 Notes under section 32, IPC.
33 Section 33, IPC.
34 Section 40, IPC.

36 R v Vann, 2 Den C 331.

37 R v Watts, 1 Salk 357.
38 Tenant v Goldwin, (1704) 1 Salk 21, 360.
39 R v Anthony, ILR 6 Mad 280 : 1 Weir 245.
40 Bhagwan v Sub-Divisional Magistrate, (1986) All LJ 1388 (All).
41 Re Gaj Singh, 11 PR 1875 (Cr).
42 Molaiappa Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1235 [LNIND 1928 MAD 181] : ILR 52 Mad 79 : 55 Mad LJ 715.
43 Re Vallapoo Kotadu, 1 Weir 244.
44 Joynath Mundul v Jamul Seikh, 6 WR 71.
45 Re Kasayi Ahmed, 1 Weir 239.
46 Onooram v Lamessor, 9 WR (Cr) 70.
47 R v Lloyd, 4 Esp 200 : 1 Russ 318; R v Byers, (1907) 71 JP 205 .
48 Raghubar v Madari, AIR 1936 Oudh 154 , p 155 : (1935) Oudh WN 899; Re Vedagiri Perumal, AIR 1937 Mad 130
[LNIND 1936 MAD 237] : (1937) 38 Cr LJ 120 .
49 Sheo Narain Lal v AN Rastogi, AIR 1964 All 16 [LNIND 1963 ALL 126] , p 17 : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 24 (1).
50 Shaukat Hussain v Sheo Dayal Saksaria, AIR 1958 MP 350 [LNIND 1957 MP 8] , p 351 : 58 Cr LJ 1319; Dwarika
Prasad v Dr BK Roy Chowdhary, AIR 1950 Cal 349 : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 1315 .
51 Dwarika Prasad v Dr BK Roy Chowdhary, AIR 1950 Cal 349 : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 1315 ; Awadh Kishore Sinha v State,
(1980) BLJR 50 .
52 Bhagwant v Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mata, (1986) All LJ 1388 (All).
53 Joy Krushna Mohanty v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 577 : (1941) 42 Cr LJ 72 ; RT Hing v JN Silas, AIR 1930 Cal 713 , p
714 : 32 Cr LJ 185.
54 RT Hing v JN Silas, AIR 1930 Cal 713 , p 714 : (1931) 32 Cr LJ 185 : ILR 57 Cal 849.
55 Phiraya Mal v Emperor, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 513 .
Page 19 of 22
56 Lallu Ram v Crown, AIR 1924 All 194 , p 195 : (1924) 25 Cr LJ 332 : 21 All LJ 772.
57 Shaukat Hussain v Sheodayal Saksaina, AIR 1958 MP 350 [LNIND 1957 MP 8] : (1958) Cr LJ 1319 (MP).
58 Dwarika Prasad v Dr BK Roy Chowdhary, AIR 1950 Cal 349 : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 1315 (DB).
59 Re Vedagiri Perumal Naidu, AIR 1937 Mad 130 [LNIND 1936 MAD 237] : (1937) 38 Cr LJ 120 .
60 Smith and Hogan on Criminal Law, 4th Edn, 1978, p 766.
61 Perumal Naidu v Emperor, AIR 1937 Mad 130 [LNIND 1936 MAD 237] : (1937) 38 Cr LJ 120 ; Re Govinda Naidu, AIR
1959 Mad 513 [LNIND 1959 MAD 19] , p 514 : (1959) Cr LJ 1440 .
63 Berkefeld v Eemperor, (1907) 5 Cr LJ 45 : 34 ILR Cal 73 : 5 Cal LJ 40.
64 Scott v Firth, 4 F&F 349.
65 R v White, I Burr 337, per Abhott CJ; R v Neil, 2 C&P 485; Malton Board of Health v Malton Manure Co, 4 Ex D 302.
66 Walter v Selfe, 4 De G & Sm 315, 322 : (1919) 20 Cr LJ 433.
67 Queen-Empress v Byramji Edalji, 12 ILR Bom 437.

68 R v Zakuiddin, 10 ILR All 44; cf R v Byramji Edalji, 12 ILR Bom 437.
69 Muttumira v R, 7 ILR Mad 590 : 1 Weir 246.
70 See section 44.
71 Shahbaz Khan v Umrao Puri, 3 ILR All 1181.
72 Iivour Heyden v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1984) Cr LJ (NOC) 16 (AP).
73 R v Bapu Jaga, (1886) Cr R No 42 of 1886 : Unrep Cr C 297.
74 Mad HC Proceedings, 25 February 1879 and 17 July 1880; 1 Weir 240; Managal Karuvan, 1 Weir 2440.
75 Queen-Empress v Thandarayadu, 14 ILR Mad 364 : 1 Weir 241; Venkataramaiah v State, (1989) Cr LJ 789 .
76 AG v Bradford Canal, LR 2 Ex 71; Benjamin v Storr, LR 9 CP 400.
77 1 Russ Cr 733.
78 R v White, 1 Burr 333; R v Neil, 2 C&P 485; Berkefeld v Emperor, 34 ILR Cal 73.
79 1 Russ Cr 733.
80 Bomford v Turnleey, 31 LJQB 286; Wanstead v Hill, 32 LJMC 135.
81 Hepburn v Lordon, 34 LJ Ch 293; R v Lister, 26 LJMC 196; Act 11 (Arms) of 1878.
82 R v Henson, Dears CC 24.
83 Re Chabumian Saheb, (1913) 14 Cr LJR 45.
84 3 West 225.
85 4 West 213.
Page 20 of 22
86 1 Russ Cr 732.
87 R v White & Ward, (1757) 1 Burr 333.
88 R v Smith, 1 Str 704.
89 1 Russ 452.
90 R v Stannard, 34 LJMC 61; R v Rice & Wilson, LR 1 CCR.
91 Jenks v Turpin, LR 13 QBD 505; R v Hau Nagji, 7 Bom HCC 74; R v Thandavarayadu, 14 ILR Mad 364; 1 Weir 2241.
92 R v Webb, 1 Den CC 338; R v Watson, 2 Cox CC 376; R v Farrel, 9 Cox CC 446; R v Holmes, Dears, CC 207; R v
Tallman, 33 LJNSMC 58; R v Orchard, 3 Cox CC 248; R v Harris, LR 1 CCR 282; R v Elliot, 1 L and C 103; R v
Crudden, 2 Camp 89.
93 Santhosh v State of Kerala, 1985 Cr LT 756 (Ker).
94 Re Umesh Chandra Kar, 14 ILR Cal 656.
95 Emperor v Nisar Mahommed Khan, AIR 1925 Lah 454 , p 455 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 942 : 6 ILR Lah 203 : 226 PLR 127;
dissenting from Jugal Das v Queen-Empress, 20 ILR Cal 665 and relying on Empress v Verappa Chetti, 20 ILR Mad
433 : 1 Weir 233; Re Umesh Chandra Kar, 14 ILR Cal 656.
96 Nanak Chand v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 801 (1).
97 Rajasthan Medicare Releif Society v Rajesh Gulati, 2013 AIR CC 258 (Raj).
98 Emperor v Noor Mohamed Suleman, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 2258 : 13 Bom LR 2209.

99 Ibid.
100 AG v Brighton and Hove Co-op Supply Association, (1900) 1 Ch 276 : 69 LJ 204 : 48 WR 314 : 81 LT 762 : 16 TLR
304.
101 Moliappa Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1235 [LNIND 1928 MAD 181] .
102 Emperor v Maddho Ram, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 492 : 26 All WN 317.
103 Kamla Prasad v Emperor, (1912) 13 Cr LJ 830 : 10 All LJ 362.
104 Achammagari Venkata Reddy v State, (1953) Cr LJ 500 .
105 MP Housing Board v Chhagan Lal Kishanlal Factory, 2011 Cr LJ 4697 , p 4698 (MP).
106 R v Nann, 22 ILR All 113.
107 R v Saminadha Pillai, 19 ILR Mad 464; Mahommed Mohidin v Madras Municipal Commissioners, 25 ILR Mad 118, p
130, 1 Weir 247; Indra Nath Banerji v R, 25 ILR Cal 425.
108 LB & SCRY v Truman, (1885) 11 AC 45 .

Page 21 of 22
109 The decisions collected in Hardcastle on Statutes, 4th Edn (ed Craies), pp 245, 247.
110 ITC v Krishna Moktan, AIR 1992 Sikkim 1 .

112 Municipal Commrs of Suburbs of Calcutta v Mahomed Ali, 16 WR 6, p 10.
113 Ibid; but see Joy Krishna Mohanty v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 577 .
114 Weld v Hornley, (1806) 7 East 195; Forter v Warblington Urban Council, (1906) 1 KB 648 .
115 R v Cross, (1812) 3 Camp 227.
116 Municipal Commrs of Calcutta v Mahomed Ali, 7 Beng LR 499.
117 Preonath Dey v Goborddhone Malo, 25 ILR Cal 278.
118 R v Ward, 4A & E 384 (404); Reg v Train, 2B & sections 640 : SC 31 LJMC 169.
119 R v Stephens, (1866) LR 1 QB 702 : 35 LJQB 251, a case of obstruction of a navigable river by acts and defaults of the
defendant’s servants.
120 Bhuban Ram v Bibhuti Bhushan Biswas, AIR 1919 Cal 539 , p 540 : 14 Cr LJ 915 : 46 ILR Cal 515; Prem Pandhi v
Mahesh Garg, (1980) Jab LJ 45 , 51 : (1980) MPLJ 453 .
121 Public Prosecutor v Pitchaiah Moopanar alias Pitchaiah Pillai, AIR 1970 Mad 198 [LNIND 1968 MAD 161] : (1970) Cr
LJ 705 (Mad).
122 Diwarka Das Jivraj v State, AIR 1956 Bom 163 [LNIND 1955 BOM 180] : (1956) Cr LJ 380 .
123 Puranmashi v Waliullah, AIR 1936 All 156 : (1936) 37 Cr LJ 269 : ILR 58 All 694 : (1936) All LJ 200.
124 Molaippa Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Mad 1235 [LNIND 1928 MAD 181] .
125 Campbell Davys v Lloyd, (1901) 2 Ch 518 , pp 523, 525.
126 Ibid.
127 Earl of Lonsdale v Nelson, (1823) 2 B&C 302; Lemmon v Webb, (1895) AC 1 .
129 Wali Uddi v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1988) All LJ 134.

Page 22 of 22
130 Shaukat Hussain v Sheodayal Saksaina, AIR 1958 MP 350 [LNIND 1957 MP 8] : (1958) Cr LJ 1319 (MP).
131 Winterbottom v Derby, LR 2 Ex 316.
132 Baroda Prosad v Gora Chand Mustaff, 3 BLRAC 295 : 12 WR 160; Raj Narain Mitter v Ekadasi Bag, 27 ILR Cal 793;
Bhawan Singh v Narottam Singh, 31 ILR All 444.
133 Jain Panchod v Jadho Shah, 1 BHC 1.
134 Firm Pyarelal Satpal v Santlal, AIR 1972 Raj 103 (DB).
135 Ramphal Rai v Raghunandan, 10 ILR All 498.
End of Document
[s 269] Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to
life.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 10
[s 269] Negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life.—




Whoever unlawfully or negligently does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be,
likely to spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
Page 3 of 10
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
This and the next two sections deal with the subject of infectious diseases. This section and section 270, IPC
make it an offence to do any act which is, and which the accused knows, or has reason to believe to be likely to
spread the infection of any disease dangerous to life. It is further necessary under the former section that the
act should have been done “unlawfully or negligently”, and under the latter section “malignantly”. The object of
these sections is the prevention of the spreading of infectious diseases.
It has been illustrated in Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s Law of Crime,136 that if a man is attacked by a contagious and
deadly disease and needlessly goes abroad with it in a public way or if a person carries about a child so
infected, he does what he may be supposed to know to be likely to spread the infection. And unless some
lawful occasion or reason for this conduct can be shown, as that the sick person had been directed to be
removed to a hospital and that the removal was performed with due caution, the act will be an offence
punishable under this section. It must be shown that the accused had knowledge that the disease was
infectious. Where the disease is generally known to be infectious there will be no difficulty. The infection which
is likely to be spread must be of a disease dangerous to life.137
[s 269.2] Legal Obligation of the Sick and his Attendants
Legal rule with respect to infectious diseases has been laid down by Lord Blackburn thus:138
Where the disease is infectious, there is a legal obligation on the sick person, and on those who have the custody of
him, not to do anything that can be avoided, which shall tend to spread the infection; and if either do so, as by bringing
the infected person into public thoroughfare, it is an indictable offence, though it will be a defence to an indictment if it
can be shown that there was a sufficient cause to excuse what is prima facie wrong, causing them to be carried along
the public street.139
[s 269.3] Spreading Infectious Disease is a Public nuisance
In R v Vantandillo,140 in which a woman was indicted for carrying her child, infected with small-pox, along a
public highway, Le Blane J, in passing sentence, observed that although the court did not find upon its records
any prosecutions for this specific offence, yet there could be no doubt, in point of law, that if anyone unlawfully,
injuriously and with full knowledge of the fact, exposes in a public highway a person infected with a contagious
disorder, it is a common nuisance to all the subjects and indictable as such.
These two sections spell out two separate and distinct offences by providing that if a person, negligently or
unlawfully, does an act which he knew was likely to spread the infection of a disease, dangerous to life, to
another person then, the former would be guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for the term
indicated therein. Therefore, if a person suffering from the dreadful disease “AIDS” knowingly marries a woman
and thereby transmits infection to that woman, he would be guilty of the offences indicated in sections 269 and
270 of the IPC.
The above statutory provisions thus impose a duty upon the appellant not to marry as the marriage would have
the effect of spreading the infection of his own disease, which obviously is dangerous to life, to the woman
whom he marries apart from being an offence.141
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Section 269, IPC makes the negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life an offence. The
essential ingredients are that the accused does any act unlawfully or negligently; that such act is likely to
spread infection of any disease dangerous to life; and that he knows or has reasons to believe that the act is
likely to cause such infection.142
[s 269.6] “Unlawfully or Negligently”
If a person, in doing anything which he knows, is in itself likely to spread an infectious disease, dangerous to
life, adopts means, which he has no right to adopt, or does not use due care and caution in doing what he is
engaged upon, he acts unlawfully in the first case, and “negligently” in the second. These words qualify the
word “does”, and refer to the manner in which the prima facie dangerous act is performed, and do not refer to
the act itself, which may be “any” act. Thus, the gist of the unlawful act is that there must be danger of the
infection spreading. If care is taken to avoid such an infection, the act cannot be said to be unlawful or
negligent.143
• Illustrations
(i) A, suffering from a dangerous infectious disease, exhibits himself in the public streets for the purpose
of eliciting pity and gaining alms thereby.144
(ii) A exhibits in the public streets a child suffering from small-pox.145
(iii) A injuriously inoculates children with small-pox, and while they are sick, causes them to be carried
through the public streets.146
(iv) A knowing that he is suffering from cholera, enters a railway carriage as a passenger without informing
the railway officials.147
In each of the above cases, A has committed an offence under s 269.
(v) In a Bombay case, A, a prostitute suffering from syphilis, encouraged and allowed B to have sexual
intercourse with her, after assuring him that she was healthy, thereby communicating the disease to B;
A was held to be not guilty of the offence under this section. Justifying the decision, West J observed:
• Assuming that there was dangerous disease, and culpable negligence still accused’s act of sexual
intercourse would not spread infection without the intervention of the complaining party, himself, a
responsible person and himself generally an accomplice.148
[s 269.7] “Does any act”
“Act” here means one or more acts, or one or more illegal omissions.149
[s 269.8] Doctor’s Negligence during Operation
Where during the course of operation the accused doctor left a cotton bundle in the patient’s stomach which
caused pain and the patient had to undergo subsequent operation, held a prima facie case for offence under
section 269, IPC was made out.150
[s 269.9] Gist of Unlawful act
The gist of the unlawful act is that there must be danger of the infection spreading. If care is taken to avoid such
an infection, the act cannot be said to be unlawful or negligent. To bring the offender within it, he should have
unlawfully or negligently done an act which he knew or had reason to believe to be likely to spread the infection
of any disease dangerous to life.151
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[s 269.10] “Knows or has Reason to Believe”
It is not enough that the act in question is done in an unlawful or negligent manner; the act must be one which
the accused knew or had reason to believe,152 to be likely to spread infection, eg, section 116, but it does not
come within this section unless the accused knew or had reason to believe that his act was likely to spread
infection.153 Where A, living in a house together with her only daughter B and a friend, refused, on B being
attacked by small-pox, to allow her to be removed to the small-pox hospital, as ordered by the district
magistrate, it was held that in so doing, A had reason to believe that the infection was likely to be spread
thereby and that A committed no offence under this section.154
[s 269.11] Infectious Diseases
Infectious diseases have been defined in the Public Health (London) Act, 1891 to include small-pox, cholera,
diphtheria, membranous croup, erysipelas, the disease known as scarlatina, or scarlet fever and the fevers
known by any of the following names, typhus, typhoid, enteric, relapsing continued or puerperal. The section is
confessedly inexhaustive but the diseases named may be taken to be those which are regarded as
undoubtedly infectious.
[s 269.11.1] Defence in Cases of Infectious Disease
The duty not to spread infectious illness and the limitations upon that duty, were fully examined by Lord
Blackburn in the case of the Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill,155 where it had to be decided whether a small-
pox hospital was a public nuisance. He pointed out that prima facie it was an indictable offence to take an
infected person into any place where he would come into contact with other persons, but that it would be a
defence to an indictment if it could be shown that there was sufficient reason to excuse what is prima facie
wrong. As, for instance, where those who have charge of a person suffering from an infectious disorder, have
no means of isolating him from others; or where they can in no other way discharge their legal obligation of
doing their best to procure advice and assistance for him, or where some overwhelming necessity, such as a
fire in the house, compels them to carry the patient through a crowd.
Where the allegation in the complaint was that the wife of the complainant was examined by the doctors in a
nursing home at regular intervals but she was never informed that the position of the child in her womb was not
normal. This fact was told by the doctors only when she was admitted for the purpose of delivery. The
complainant gave his consent and thereafter a caesarian operation was performed and the child was born.
Further allegation in the complaint was that on account of giving of enema the wife had loose motions about six
times due to which her condition deteriorated and the doctor suspected some heart problem and advised the
complainant to bring a heart specialist. It was held that these facts by themselves do not at all constitute an
offence under section 269, IPC. There is neither any allegation nor there is any material to show that the act of
the applicants was likely to spread any infections disease. Thus, necessary ingredient for commission of an
offence under section 269, IPC, is not at all made out.156
A person who keeps a member of the family who is attacked with small-pox in the house, and refuses to allow
his removal to hospital, does not commit an offence under this section.157
A doctor who caused death of complainant’s wife due to negligent acts, by use of wrong medicines and
injections and overdose of anaesthesia could be said to have committed offence as described under section
269.158
[s 269.11.2] Liability of Shipping Company in Some Cases
A similar question arose in Bombay, where an action was brought against a steamship company for breach of
contract in not shipping five hundred pilgrims from Bombay to Jeddah. The plea was that the persons had
arrived at Bombay from Singapore in a ship in which small-pox had broken out on the voyage, and that on the
day on which they should have been shipped, fresh cases were occurring not amongst the five hundred
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pilgrims tendered for shipment, but amongst the others, and that the shipment of five hundred pilgrims would
have been an act punishable under this section. This plea was held to be insufficient, apparently on the ground
that the company might, by taking sufficient precautions, have shipped the five hundred pilgrims so as not to
endanger anyone else, and that their contract bound them to do so, if it was in any way possible.159
[s 269.11.3] Small-pox
It is an offence to carry a child suffering from small-pox through the public streets, or into any place of public
resort, without necessity.160
Where the health officer of the city of Madras directed the removal of a small-pox patient to an isolation
hospital, but the patient’s father, under advice of his own medical advisor, removed the patient to an isolated
house; it was held that as proper precautions were taken to prevent infection and to provide a suitable lodging
for the person infected, the mere failure to carry out an order which could otherwise have been bona fide
obeyed by the avoidance of the danger of infection, could not be regarded as an offence under this section.161
It is not an offence to inoculate with small-pox, when done bona fide as a remedial measure.162 Inoculation is
not in itself an illegal or negligent act, unless it is proved that any act has been done negligently in respect of
the persons when inoculated, with the knowledge or belief that it is likely to spread the infection of a disease
dangerous to life. It is, however, possible for the operator or a third person to be punishable under the section,
on proof of a negligent dealing with the patient or patients after inoculation, with the knowledge or belief
required by the section. Whether there has been such negligence accompanied by such knowledge or belief is
always a question of fact.163
[s 269.11.4] Plague
Hale discusses the question, whether if a person infected with the plague should go abroad with intent to infect
another, and another be thereby infected and die, it would not be murder by the common law,164 and seems to
consider it as clear, that though where no such intent appears it cannot be murder, yet if another should be
affected by an action of such a person it would be a misdemeanour.165 Where a person, who was removed to a
plague shed against orders, and travelled by rail to another place, it was held that he was rightly convicted
under this section as he had sufficient reason to believe that his act was dangerous and likely to spread the
infection of a dangerous disease.166
[s 269.11.5] Cholera
K, knowing that he was suffering from cholera entered a train as a passenger without informing the erstwhile
railway company’s servants of his condition. M knowing of K’s condition bought K’s ticket and travelled with
him. It was held that K was properly convicted under this section for negligently doing an act which was, and
which he had reason to believe was likely to spread infection of a disease dangerous to life, and M of abetment
of K’s offence.167
[s 269.11.6] Glanders
It is an indictable misdemeanour at common law to bring a horse infected with glanders into a public place to
the danger of infecting the people there; and an indictment, which alleges that the defendant knew that a horse
was infected with a contagious and infectious disease called the glanders, and that he brought it into a public
place among diverse subjects of the King to the great danger of infecting the said subjects with the said
disease,168 has been held sufficient after verdict, though it did not allege that the defendant knew that the
disease was communicable to man.169
[s 269.11.7] AIDS
If a person suffering from the dreadful disease “AIDS” knowingly marries a woman and thereby transmits the
infection to that woman he would be guilty of offences indicated in sections 269 and 270 of IPC. The above
statutory provision thus impose a duty upon the appellant not to marry as the marriage would have the effect of
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spreading the infection of his own disease, which obviously is dangerous to life, to the woman whom he marries
apart from being an offence.170
[s 269.11.8] Venereal Disease
Under section 4 of the Venereal Diseases Act, 1917,171 the expression “venereal diseases” means syphilis,
gonorrhoea, or soft chancre.
[s 269.11.9] Syphilis and Gonorrhoea
Syphilis and gonorrhoea are contagious diseases.
A prostitute who, while suffering from syphilis communicates the disease to a person who has sexual
intercourse with her, has been held to be not liable to punishment under this section for a negligent act and one
likely to spread infection of any disease dangerous to life.172
[s 269.12] “Dangerous to Life”—Life Means Human Life
Under section 45, IPC, “life” denotes the life of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context.
There is nothing in this section to indicate the contrary. So “life” in this section must mean human life.
The offence under this section is cognizable but a summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a
bailable but non-compoundable offence. It is triable by a magistrate.
[s 269.14] Charge
The following form of the charge may be adopted in the case of a prosecution under this section:
That you on or about the………day of………at………unlawfully or negligently did an act which you knew (or had
reason to believe) to be likely to spread the infection of………a disease dangerous to life, and thereby committed an
offence punishable under s 269 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Where the allegations were that accused was negligent and careless while injecting needles twice for
performing amniocentesis test as a result of which the patient had to undergo forced abortion as septic had
developed while performing test, no consent of patient and her spouse had been taken by the accused as
required as per practice before conducting the said test, in the circumstances, even if the patient had
Page 8 of 10
consented, she could not be assumed to have consented for insertion of needle which can cause infection, the
prima facie case against the accused was held made out and order framing the charge under sections 313 read
with 269, IPC against the accused was held proper.173
[s 269.15] Proof
(i) the accused did an act unlawfully or negligently; and
(ii) the accused knew or had reason to believe that the said act was likely to spread the infection of a
disease dangerous, to life.
136 Ratanlal and Dhirajlal’s Law of Crime, Vol 2, 25th Edn.
137 Raman Kumar v State of Jharkhand, (2006) Cr LJ 4496 (Jhar).
138 R v Instan, (1893) 1 QB 450 ; R v Senior, (1899) 1 QB 283 .
139 R v Bumett, (1815) 4 M&S 272.

140 R v Vantandillo, (1815) 4 M&N section 73.
141 Mr X v Hospital Z, AIR 1999 SC 495 [LNIND 1998 SC 1239] .
142 Meeru Bhatia Prasad (Dr) v State, (2002) Cr LJ 1674 (Del).

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143 Re P Kandaswami Mudaliar, AIR 1920 Mad 420 , p 421 : (1919) 20 Cr LJ 785 : 43 ILR Mad 344.
144 Mayne PC, 14th Edn, p 241.
145 R v Vatandillo, 4 M&S 73.
146 R v Burnett, (1815) M&S 272.
147 R v Krishnappa, 7 ILR Mad 276 : 1 Weir 276, p 277.
148 R v Rukma, 11 ILR Bom 59.
149 Sections 32 and 33 and notes thereto.
150 Mohd Javed Khan v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 732 : 2012 (110) AIC 409 (All) (DB).
151 Re P Kandaswami Mudaliar, AIR 1920 Mad 420 , p 421 : (1919) 20 Cr LJ 785 .
153 Re Polina Padmanabhswami, 1 Weir 226.
154 Cahoon v Mathews, 24 ILR Cal 494; Joti Parshad v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1167 : (1993) Cr LJ 413 , p 415
(SC) : (1993) 1 Ori LR 81 : (1993) Cr App R 85 (SC) : (1993) SCC (Cr) 691 : AIR 1993 SCW 224 : (1992) 3 Crimes 256
.
155 Metropolitan Asylum District v Hill, 3 AC 193, pp 204, 205.

156 Prabha Malhotra (Dr) v State, (2000) Cr LJ 549 .
157 Cahoon v Mathews, 24 ILR Cal 494.
158 Raman Kumar v State of Jharkhand, (2006) Cr LJ 4496 (Jhar).
159 Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co v Rubbattino Co, 14 ILR Bom 147.
160 Rex v Vantanadillo, 4 M&S 73; Rex v Burnett, (1815) 4 M&S 272.
161 Re P Kandaswami Mudaliar, AIR 1920 Mad 420 , p 422 : (1919) 20 Cr LJ 785 .
162 Rex v Burneff, 4 M&S 272; sections 81, 87–99, Indian Penal Code; Madras HC Rulings, 10 July 1867 (SC); 1 Weir 71,
p 96.
163 Re Sau Hla, (1900) 1 UBR (1897–1901) 290.
164 1 Hale 432.
165 Metropolitan Aslyum District Managers v Hill, (1881) 6 AC 199 , p 204.
166 Re Niadar Mal, (1902) PR 22 ; following S Cahoon v A Mathews, 24 ILR Cal 492; Queen-Empress v Krishnappa
Murugappa, 7 ILR Mad 276; Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co Ltd v Rubattino Co Ltd, 14 ILR Bom 147; Re
Kandaswami Mudaliar, AIR 1920 Mad 420 : (1919) 20 Cr LJ 785 .
167 Queen-Empress v Krishnappa & Murugappa, 7 ILR Mad 276.
168 Which is dangerous to human life, Baird v Graham, (1852) 14 Dunlop (SC) 615.
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170 Mr X v Hospital Z, AIR 1999 SC 495 [LNIND 1998 SC 1239] .
171 7 & 8 Geo 5 Ch 21 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948.
172 Queen-Empress v Rakma Kom Sadhu, 11 ILR Bom 59.
173 Meeru Bhatia Prasad (Dr) v State, (2002) Cr LJ 1674 (Del).
End of Document
[s 270] Malignant act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to
life.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 5
[s 270] Malignant act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life.—



[s 270] Malignant act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to

life.—
Page 3 of 5
Whoever malignantly does any act which is, and which he knows or has reason to believe to be, likely to spread
the infection of any disease dangerous to life, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 270.1] Scope
The offence under this section is an aggravation of the offence which is punishable under section 269, IPC.
Under that section the act is done either “unlawfully” or “negligently” while under this section it is done
“malignantly”. The Law Commissioners observed:
If any person died of the plague and his death could be traced to infection so caused maliciously, the person who
caused it, we apprehend, would be chargeable with homicide…It is contrary to the principle of the Code to punish acts
which the doer when he committed them knew to be likely to cause certain evil results, if in the same manner as if such
evil consequences had actually flown from them.174
Synopsis note 4 of section 269, ante may be referred to.
[s 270.3] No Effect of Repealing Provision of Section 25, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (37 of 1954)175
It is necessary to see the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The object of the Act as it is
stated in the preamble is to make provisions for the prevention of adulteration of food. The Act defines what is
meant by adulteration and also lays down specific procedure for purchasing a sample of suspect adulterated
foods, for getting them examined from public analysts, for getting sanction from the prosecution and for
prosecuting the accused thereafter. The Act gives certain rights to the accused and from the scores of
judgments that have been delivered under this Act those rights of the accused have been scrupulously
protected. However, the crucial question is whether this Act repeals the provisions of the Indian Penal Code or
has the effect of repealing this provision viz, sections 270–273, and 337 read with section 34 of the IPC, section
25 of the Act provides for repealing and saving and it says that if, immediately before the commencement of
this Act, there is in force in any state to which this Act extends any law corresponding to this Act, that
corresponding law shall upon such commencement stand repealed.176 The Indian Penal Code is not a state law
but it is a Central legislation. What is repealed by section 25 is the state law relating or controlling adulteration.
Provisions of the Indian Penal Code are applicable to all the states including the State of Maharashtra, but it is
not state law and these repealing provisions, therefore, do not affect sections 270–273, and section 337 of the
IPC.177
[s 270.4] “Malignantly”
Notes to section 153 may also be referred to. The word “malignantly” involves a deliberate intention to do harm,
and in performing the act in question the offender adopts means calculated and intended to produce the prima
facie dangerous consequences, known, or believed to be likely in any case. “Malignantly” means
“maliciously”.178
[s 270.5] “Does any act”
Notes under sections 32, 33 and 269 may be referred to.
[s 270.7] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable. A summon shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a bailable
Page 4 of 5
offence, but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate.
The cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken within three years.
[s 270.8] Charge
That on or about the………day of………at………you malignantly did an act which you knew or had reason to believe to
be likely to spread the infection of disease (name of the disease) dangerous to life and thereby committed an offence
punishable under section 270 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 270.9] Proof
(i) the accused did some act malignantly;
(ii) his act was likely to spread a disease, dangerous to life; and
(iii) the accused then knew, or had reason to believe, that his act was likely to spread the infection of a
disease, dangerous to life.
The most important ingredient of this offence is that the act attributed to the accused which constitutes the
offence, must be shown as likely to spread disease which is both infectious and dangerous to life. The bottle of
Bluseal whisky found in possession of the petitioner had traces of methyl alcohol, a poisonous substance. As
there was no suggestion, whatever, if this substance was likely to spread the infection of any disease
dangerous to life, the conviction and sentence recorded against petitioner for his offence were held not
sustainable.180

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174 Second Report, section 226, p 465.

175 Now repealed by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006).
176 Mahesh Ramchandra Yadav v State of Maharashtra, (1999) Cr LJ 231 (Bom).
177 Ibid.
178 Queen-Empress v Kahanji, ILR 18 Bom 758.
179 Joti Prashad v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1167 : (1993) Cr LJ 413 , p 415 (SC) : (1993) 1 Ori LR 81 : (1993) Cr
App R 85 (SC) : (1993) (Cr) 691 : AIR 1993 SCW 224 : (1992) 2 Crimes 256 .
180 Wallaiti Ram v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1985) 1 Crimes 598 , p 599 (HP).
End of Document
[s 271] Disobedience to quarantine rule.—

public remedies.4
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Whoever knowingly disobeys any rule made and promulgated 181[by the 182[***] Government 183[***] for putting
any vessel into a state of quarantine, or for regulating the intercourse of vessels in a state of quarantine with the
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shore or with other vessels, or for regulating the intercourse between places where an infectious disease
prevails and other places, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
[s 271.1] Scope
This section provides punishment for breach of a quarantine rule. The motive for disobedience is immaterial.
The person who, knowing the rule, disobeys it, does so intentionally, and such disobedience is per se
punishable irrespective of any injurious test.
The words “by the Central or any Provincial Government or the Crown Representative” was replaced by the
words “by the Government of India or by any Government” by virtue of the Government of India (Adaptation of
Indian Laws) Order 1937. Subsequently, the words “or the Crown Representative”, were deleted by the
Adaptation of Laws Order 1948. Finally, the words “Central or any Provincial” were dropped by the Adaptation
of Laws Order 1950.
[s 271.4] “Any Rule made and Promulgated”
The Indian Ports Act, 1901 which repeals the Indian Quarantine Act, 1870 provides for the promulgation by the
Government of India and the local Government of quarantine rules, which are to be published, and taken as
rules made and promulgated under this section. A similar provision is to be found in section 2(1) of Epidemic
Diseases Act, 1897 which runs as follows:
(1) When at any time the State Government is satisfied that the State or any part thereof is visited by, or threatened
with, an outbreak of any dangerous epidemic disease, the State Government, if it thinks that the ordinary provisions of
the law for the time being in force are insufficient for the purpose, may take, or require or empower any person to take,
such measures and, by public notice, prescribe such temporary regulations to be observed by the public or by any
person or class of persons as it shall deem necessary to prevent the outbreak of such disease or the spread thereof,
and may determine in what manner and by whom any expenses incurred (including compensation if any) shall be
defrayed.
[s 271.6] Procedure
The offence under this section is not cognizable. A summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a
bailable offence but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate.
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[s 271.7] Charge
I (name and office of the magistrate) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That on or about the………day of………at………you knowingly disobeyed the quarantine rule (mention the rule) made
and promulgated by the Government for putting any vessel into a state of quarantine with the shore (or other vessels),
(or for regulating the intercourse between placed, where an infectious disease prevailed, and other places) and thereby
committed an offence punishable under s 271 of the Indian Penal Code or within my cognizance.
[s 271.8] Proof
(i) the rule of quarantine in question, exists;
(ii) the rule was made and promulgated by the government;
(iii) the rule was for one of the purposes mentioned in the section;
(iv) the accused knew of the rule;
(v) he disobeyed it; and
(vi) he did so knowingly.

Page 5 of 5
181 Subs. by the AO 1937, for “by the Government of India or by any Government”.
182 The words “Central or any Provincial” omitted by the AO 1950.
183 The words “or Crown Representative” omitted by the AO 1948.
End of Document
[s 272] Adulteration of food or drink intended for sale.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 9




Whoever adulterates any article of food or drink, so as to make such article noxious as food or drink, intending
to sell such article as food or drink, or knowing it to be likely that the same will be sold as food or drink, shall be
Page 3 of 9
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
[s 272.1] State Amendments
Orissa.—In its application to the State of Orissa, in s 272, for the words “shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees, or with both”, the following shall be substituted namely:—
“shall be punished with imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the Judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for life.”185
Uttar Pradesh—In s 272, for the words “shall be punished with imprisonment of either description, for a term
which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both” the
following shall be substituted, namely:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a
West Bengal—In its application to the State of West Bengal in sections 272, for the words “of either description
for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with
both”, the following shall be substituted, namely:
“for life with or without fine:
[s 272.2] Scope
This section deals with adulteration of food or drink, and the next section deals with the sale of noxious food or
drink. To make out an offence under this section, it is necessary to show that an article of food or drink was
adulterated so as to make such article noxious as food or drink, and that it was intended to sell such article, or
that it was known that it would be likely to be sold, as food or drink.188
This section is not the only provision which penalises the sale and exposure for sale of adulterated articles of
food or drink, but there were several State enactments providing for the punishment of the said or similar
offence, which have not been repealed by the Central enactment, the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (37
Page 4 of 9
of 1954).
Under the English Law also it is an indictable misdemeanour knowingly to sell food unfit for human
consumption, or to mix unwholesome ingredients in anything made and supplied for the food of man. The
offence may be classified either as a public nuisance or as a common law cheat. The common law remedy by
indictment is not affected by the provision of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act or the Public Health Acts.189
[s 272.5] “Adulterate”
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, “adulterate” means “debase (especially foods) by admixure of
other substances”. According to the Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary, “adulterate” means “to debase,
falsify, by mixing with something inferior or spurious”. Thus, “adulteration” refers to infusion of some foreign
substance or mixing up, with food, drink or drugs, other articles of inferior quality or of deleterious character, the
object of such mixing being to increase the bulk, weight or apparent size of the article or to give it a deceptive
appearance.191 In this way adulteration involves an alteration in the nature of a substance by the addition of
some foreign substance. Hence, mere inferiority in the quality never amounts to adulteration under this section.
Under this section the adulteration must be such as to render it injurious to health. Section 2(ia) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (37 of 1954),192 however, defines adulteration as follows:
(ia) “adulterated”—an article of food shall be deemed to be adulterated—
(a) if the article sold by a vendor is not of the nature, substance or quality demanded by the purchaser and is
to his prejudice, or is not of the nature, substance or quality which it purports or is represented to be;
(b) if the article contains any other substance which affects, or if the article is so processed as to affect,
injuriously the nature, substance or quality thereof;
(c) if any inferior or cheaper substance has been substituted wholly or in part of the article so as to affect
injuriously the nature, substance or quality thereof;
(d) if any constituent of the article has been wholly or in part abstracted so as to affect injuriously the nature,
substance or quality thereof;
(e) if the article had been prepared packed or kept under insanitary conditions whereby it has become
contaminated or injurious to health;
(f) if the article consists wholly or in part of any filthy, putrid, rotten, decomposed or diseased animal or
vegetable substance or is insect-infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption;
(g) if the article is obtained from a diseased animal;
(h) if the article contains any poisonous or other ingredient which renders it injurious to health;
(i) if the container of the article is composed, whether wholly or in part, of any poisonous or deleterious
substance which renders its contents injurious to health;
Page 5 of 9
(j) if any colouring matter other than that prescribed thereof is present in the article or if the amounts of the
prescribed colouring matter which is present in the article are not within the prescribed limits of
variability;
(k) if the article contains any prohibited preservative or permitted preservative in excess of the prescribed
limits;
(l) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in
quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability, which renders it injurious to health;
(m) if the quality or purity of the article falls below the prescribed standard or its constituents are present in
quantities not within the prescribed limits of variability but which does not render it injurious to health;
Provided that where the quality or purity of the article being primary food, has fallen below the
prescribed standard or its constituents are present in quantities not within the prescribed limits of
variability, in either case, solely due to natural causes and beyond the control of human agency
then, such article shall not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this sub-clause.
Explanation.—Where two or more articles of primary food are mixed together and the resultant
article of food—
(a) is stored, sold or distributed under a name which denotes the ingredients thereof; and
(b) is not injurious to health,
then such resultant article shall not be deemed to be adulterated within the meaning of this
clause.
The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (37 of 1954) is a special law enacted with more stringent and
exhaustive provisions after about a century of the enactment and enforcement of this Code with a specific
object in view and they are to be interpreted and applied independently. Mixing water with milk, also leaves with
tea, or chicory with coffee, would not be punishable under section 272, while it clearly amounts to an offence
under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.
[s 272.6] Noxious as Food or Drink—Expression Explained
A bare glance through section 272, IPC leaves no doubt that a person who adulterates any article of food or
drink so as to make it noxious as food or drink, shall be punished with certain terms of imprisonment mentioned
therein. The term “noxious” has not been defined in the Code or the CrPC. Thus, the ordinary dictionary
meaning of this term has to be taken into consideration. According to Oxford English Dictionary,193 the word
“noxious” means injurious, hurtful, harmful and unwholesome.194 The word “noxious” means harmful or injurious
to health. In section 2(xv) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, it is said that the words “unwholesome”
and “noxious” when used in relation to an article of food, mean respectively that the article is harmful to health
or repugnant to human use. But this section does not use the word “unwholesome” and the expression “noxious
Page 6 of 9
as food”, in it obviously means unwholesome as food or injurious to health and not repugnant to one’s feeling.
The mixing of pig’s fat with ghee and selling the mixture would be noxious to the religious and social feeling of
both Hindus and Mohammedans, but such an act was held not to come within the meaning of the expression
“noxious as food” which occurs in this section.195 The article of food or drink must be rendered noxious as food
or drink, ie, injurious to health, eg paddy soaked in dirty water,196 or toddy in which worms have germinated,197
or vegetable oil to ghee.198
But mere presence of non-permitted red oil solvable coal tardy, the%age of which has not been given in the
report of the public analyst, would not make the spices as noxious because it will neither amount to injurious or
hurtful nor can be said that it has made the spices as unwholesome.199
[s 272.7] Vicarious Liability of Directors
Where “Rajnigandha Pan Masala” was found to be containing Magnesium Carbonate, a banned substance,
incorrect assertion was made by company in newspaper advertisement and in application made for grant of
licence that “Rajnigandha Pan Masala” does not contain Magnesium Carbonate, it cannot be without
knowledge and permission of company’s directors, therefore, proper investigation of matter would be in the
interest of public and proceeding against directors cannot be quashed.200
[s 272.8] Procedure
The offence under this section is not cognizable. A summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a
bailable offence but not compoundable. It is triable by any magistrate. In Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal there
is no period of limitation fixed for taking cognizance of this offence.
[s 272.9] Charge
The following form of the charge may be adopted for an offence under this section:
I, (name of the magistrate with his designation etc) do hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That on or about the………day of………in the year………at………you adulterated an article, namely……… (specify the
article), which is an article of food (or drink), so as to make the same noxious as food (or drink) intending to sell such
article as food (or drink), and thereby committed an offence punishable under s 272, of the Indian Penal Code and
And I, hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge by this court.
In Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal the charge may be suitably amended. Where there is no allegation either in
the FIR or in the charge sheet of adulterating food or drink intended for sale so as to make the same noxious,
there can be no charge or prosecution under this section.201
When there is no evidence on the file that the accused had in fact mixed the adulterating material in the packets
sold to the complainant, it cannot be said that a prima facie case would be made out against the accused for an
Page 7 of 9
offence under section 272, IPC, even if the entire allegation of the prosecution is taken to be true.202
[s 272.10] Proof
(i) the article of food or drink in question was adulterated;
(ii) it was thereby rendered noxious; and
(iii) the person who adulterated the article intended to sell it as food or drink, or knew that it was likely to be
sold as such.
The Supreme Court has held that to establish that an offence under section 273, IPC, has been committed, the
prosecution has to prove that the article involved was food or drink meant to be consumed by live persons, that
the accused adulterated it, that he intended to sell such article as food or drink, or knew it to be likely that such
article would be sold as food or drink. The offence is complete on introduction of the adulterant in the food or
drink, provided it is meant for the purpose of sale, actual or likely.203
The knowledge of the adulteration will seldom be capable of direct proof. Where the article is, in fact,
adulterated, and when it is shown that the vendor purchased it at a price below that for which the genuine
article could be procured, such knowledge may safely be inferred. The presumption would be strengthened if it
could be shown that the vendor had several articles of the same species on hand, at different prices, some
adulterated and some not, or adulterated to different degrees.204
[s 272.11] Evidentiary Value of Report of Scientific Expert
Section 293(1), CrPC 1973, provides that any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a
Government scientific expert (which includes a chemical examiner or assistant chemical examiner to the
government), upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the
course of any proceeding under the Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding
under this Code. But a report of a municipal analyst cannot be used as evidence without formal proof; he
should be called as a witness to prove his report.205
Where one of the allegations was that the petitioners were manufacturing spurious soda water, this charge was
quashed keeping in view the fact that the contents of the alleged soda water were never chemically tested.206
[s 272.12] Destruction of Noxious Food or Drink
Section 455(2) of the CrPC, 1973, provides:
The Court may, in like manner, on a conviction under s 272, s 273, s 274 or s 275 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) order the food, drink, drug or medical preparation in respect of which the conviction was had, to be destroyed.
Page 8 of 9
185 Vide Orissa Act, 3 of 1999, section 2 (w.e.f. 27-1-1999).
186 Vide UP Act, 47 of 1975, section 3 (w.e.f. 15-9-1975).
187 Vide WB Act No 42 of 1973, section 3 (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
188 Suleman Shamji v Emperor, AIR 1943 Bom 445 : 45 Bom LR 895; EK Chandrasenan v State of Kerala, (1995) 1 All LT
(Cr) 460 (SC).
189 Russell on Crime, 11th Edn, pp 1605–06.
191 42 LJMC 32.
193 Oxford English Dictionary, Vol 2, 3rd Edn.
194 Raj Kumar v State (UT Chandigarh), 1991(2) Crimes 217 (P&H).
195 Ram Dayal v King-Emperor, AIR 1925 All 214 (1) : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 220 .
196 Re Cunnyappa, 1 Weir 227.
197 Re Ediga Narasappa, 1 Weir 228.

Page 9 of 9
198 Chokraj Marwari v R, Cr LJ 405 : 12 Cal WN 609.
199 Raj Kumar v State (UT Chandigarh), (1991) 2 Crimes 217 (P&H).
200 Rajiv Kumar Gupta v State of Maharashtra, (2006) Cr LJ 581 (Bom) (DB).
201 Satya Narayan Kejriwal v State of Bihar, (1989) East Cr C 604 (Pat).
202 Raj Kumar v State (UT Chandigarh), (1991) 2 Crimes 217 (P&H).
203 Joseph Kurian & Phillip Jose v State of Kerala, (1995) 1 Ch Cr Cas 137, p 140 (SC) : (1995) 1 East Cr C 487 (SC) :
(1995) Mad LJ (Cr) 203.
205 Suleman Shamji v Emperor, AIR 1943 Bom 445 , p 446.
206 Purshotam Das v State of Haryana, (1987) 2 Crimes 278 : (1987) Ch Cr Cas 122 (P&H).
End of Document
[s 273] Sale of noxious food or drink.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 10




Whoever sells, or offers or exposes for sale, as food or drink, any article which has been rendered or has
become noxious, or is in a state unfit for food or drink, knowing or having reason to believe that the same is
Page 3 of 10
noxious as food or drink, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Orissa—In its application to the State of Orissa, in s. 273, for the words, “shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with a fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees or with both”, the following shall be substituted namely:—
Uttar Pradesh—In s 273, for the words “shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both”, the
Provided that the Court may, for the adequate reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of
imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for life.”208
West Bengal—In its application to the State of West Bengal in s. 273, for the words “of either description for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both”, the
following shall be substituted namely:
[s 273.2] Scope
This section deals with the sale, or exposure for sale as food or drink of an article which is noxious or unfit for
human consumption. It is more comprehensive than the previous one and includes not only articles adulterated,
but also those which have become noxious or unfit for human consumption by lapse of time, such as tinned
provisions kept for a long time or those articles which have become unfit for human consumption due to long
exposure, neglect or contamination.
[s 273.3] No Effect of Repealing Provision of Section 25, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act of 1954
Page 4 of 10
For an offence under this section:
(i) there must be a sale, or offer or exposure for sale, of some article as food or drink;
(ii) the article must have been rendered, or become noxious, or it must be in a state unfit for use as food
or drink by a human being; and
(iii) the sale or exposure of such article must have been made with a knowledge or reasonable belief that
the article is noxious as food or drink.
The ingredients for constituting offence under section 273 are: (1) accused commits act of sales, or offers or
exposes for sale, as food or drink, (2) such article has been rendered or has become noxious or has become
unfit for food or drink, and (3) during the sale or offer for sale or exposing for sale, accused knew or has reason
to believe that the article is noxious as food or drink.210
[s 273.4.1] Noxious Article
The word “noxious” as stated in Advance Law Lexicon by P Ramanatha Aiyar,211 when used in relation to article
of food is to mean that the article is poisonous, harmful to health or repugnant to human use. In the instant case
the report of the State Public Health Laboratory did not indicate that the “gutka” seized was obnoxious article
within the meaning of section 273, IPC. The accused was therefore discharged of offence under section 273,
IPC, alleged to be committed by him.212
[s 273.4.2] Mere Sale etc. of Noxious Article not Punishable
What is punishable under this section is the sale or offer or exposure for sale of noxious articles “as food or
drink”, and not the mere sale or offer or exposure for sale of noxious articles. A sale for the purpose of trade
other than as food or drink does not fall within the section.213
[s 273.5] “Sells or Offers or Exposes for Sale, as Food or Drink”
Section 47 of the English Public Health Act (London, 1891) (now section 8 of the Food and Drugs Act, 1955)214
provided for punishment of persons in whose possession were found articles intended for the food of man, but
unsound, unwholesome, or unfit for the food of man. But this section provides only for the sale or offer or
exposure for sale of noxious food or drink. Where a butcher had killed a sheep and hung it up, and on
inspection the flesh was found unfit for food, but the flesh was neither removed to the shop nor was exposed or
offered for sale, it was held that the accused could not be convicted under this section, because the offence
was incomplete.215 But where from the evidence on record, it is clearly established that both the accused who
were running the shop have knowingly sold a noxious liquor, they were held guilty for an offence punishable
Where evidence proved that the accused appellant sold spurious liquor which resulted in the death of the
deceased, he was convicted under sections 273 and 304, Pt II, IPC.217
[s 273.6] Offer as Food or Drink in its Existing Condition
What is punishable under this section is the sale or offer or exposure for sale of noxious articles as food or
drink, and not the mere sale or offer or exposure for sale of noxious articles. A sale for purposes of trade other
than as food or drink does not fall within the section.218 The article must be material offered for sale as food or
drink in its existing condition, and not material which in the ordinary course of things would be cleaned, ground
Page 5 of 10
and cooked before being consumed. It has been held that the food or drink may be for the use of animals, and
not necessarily for human beings,219 but seeing that chapter XIV deals with offences relating to public health
etc, and having regard to section 12 which explains the word “public” the sale of noxious food for the use of
animals clearly does not fall within the section.220
A person is not indictable at common law for sending meat unfit for human food to a salesman in a market,
unless he intends it to be sold for human food.221
[s 273.7] Law in England
Under the English statute, somewhat similar to this section, it has been held that the offence is only committed
by the sale of an article which, at the time of sale, professes to be either food or drink. An article such as baking
powder, which is not itself food, though used in the preparation of food is not within the Act.222 But a person is
not indictable at common law for sending meat unfit for human food to a salesman in a market, unless he
intends it to be sold for human food.223 Where it was proved that the prisoner was a wholesale fruit dealer, and
received for sale a large consignment of foreign nuts, a large proportion of which proved to be bad and he,
without examining their condition, sold a quantity of them to retail dealers, who were, however, warned by him
to examine the nuts, and destroy such (if any) as were bad, before offering them for sale to the public, it was
held that he could not be convicted, since it was not shown that he intended to sell the bad nuts for human
food.224
[s 273.8] “Which has been Rendered or has become Noxious or is in a State Unfit for Food or Drink”
The noxiousness of the article in cases falling under section 272, IPC must be caused by adulteration, whereas
under this section, it may be caused either by adulteration, or by natural decay, “or has become noxious”. Thus,
a butcher attempting to sell meat which from natural decay or disease is unfit for human consumption could be
prosecuted under this section. The word “noxious” in this section means harmful to health and unwholesome.225
[s 273.9] Mere Adulteration not an Offence
In the absence of evidence to show that the adulteration of ghee with vegetable oil was such as to render it
noxious in the above sense, such adulteration cannot be held to constitute an offence under this section.226
Milk is not rendered noxious or unfit for drinking within the meaning of this section by being mixed with water.227
[s 273.10] Sale after due Notice of Defect
Where the accused sold atta at the rate of 18 seers per rupee, whereas its ordinary price was 15 seers per
rupee, informing the purchaser that it was sold cheap because it was bad or of inferior quality, it was held that
the accused was not liable to be convicted under this section.228
A person cannot be convicted of an offence under this section for selling wheat containing a large admixture of
extraneous matter, eg, dirt, wood matches, charcoal, black-seeds and other matters,229 as the foreign matter is
separable and wheat is not consumed in its existing condition.
[s 273.11] “Knowing or Having Reason to Believe”
The necessary ingredient of section 273, IPC is that the offender should know or should have reason to believe
the commodity to be noxious.230 This section is somewhat peculiarly worded. But it appears that before a
person can be convicted thereunder it must be shown that the article which he has sold or exposed for sale
was, to his knowledge or belief, noxious as food or drink.231 For the meaning of the expression “reason to
believe” notes under section 26 may be referred to.
Page 6 of 10
As Mayne points out:
Little difficulty can ever be felt where the bad quality of the article arises, not from any adulteration which might possibly
escape notice, but from its own intrinsic defects, for instance, where unsound meat is sold. And, even though the
defect has escaped the notice of the purchaser, it must be remembered that the seller has generally such an accurate
knowledge of the qualities of his ware, and of the previous history of each particular article, as renders it very unlikely
that he could be ignorant of any fault of a glaring character.232
According to Russell:
Victuallers, butchers and other common dealers in victuals, are not merely in the same situation that common dealers
in other commodities are, and liable under the same circumstances that they are, so that if an order be sent to them to
be executed, they are presumed to undertake to supply a good and merchantable article, but they are also liable to
punishment for selling corrupt victuals by virtue of an ancient statute, certainly if they do so knowingly, and probably if
they do not.233
When the accused is summoned by the magistrate under section 273, IPC for selling noxious oil, in the
summon trial it is absolutely necessary to explain the particulars of the offence under section 273, IPC to the
accused in order that he may have an opportunity of showing to the court that whatever the condition of the oil
may have been in his shop, the circumstances disclosed by him would establish that he neither knew nor had
reasons to believe the same to be noxious as food.234
[s 273.12] Vicarious Liability
Synopsis note 6 of section 272, ante may be referred to.
[s 273.13] Master’s Liability under the Section
If a servant adulterates an article of food so as to make it unwholesome, within the knowledge of the master,
the master would be answerable criminally. It is for the master to see that more than the required quantity of a
foreign matter is not mixed with an article of food so as to make it unwholesome.235 In the case of public
nuisance or breach of status relating to the sale of goods, there is a disposition to treat the master as liable for
the acts of his agents.236
The Madhya Pradesh and Calcutta High Courts have, however, held that the concept of constructive liability
cannot be attracted to the provisions of this section.237
As to liability of a husband for the acts of his wife, refer to Lyons v Martin.238
Page 7 of 10
The procedure is the same as under section 272.
The offence under this section being one for which the police may not arrest without a warrant, an order of a
magistrate to a constable to “bring” before him persons selling unwholesome fruits is plainly illegal.239
A case under this section being a summons case, it is absolutely necessary, where a formal charge is not
framed, to explain the particulars of the offence to the accused so that he may have an opportunity to show that
he neither knew nor had reason to believe that the article he kept for sale in his shop was noxious as food;
otherwise his conviction would be illegal.240
[s 273.15] Charge
I (name and office of the magistrate etc) do hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
That you on or about the date of………in the month of………in the year……… at……… sold [(or offered for sale) (or
exposed for sale)] as food (or drink), an article namely, …… (specify the article), which had been rendered noxious [(or
which had become noxious) (or which was in a state, unfit)] for food (or drink) knowing (or having reason to believe)
that the same was noxious as food (or drink), and thereby committed an offence punishable under s 273 of the Indian
Penal Code and within my cognizance, (or the cognizance of this Court) where triable by a Court of Session.
And I, hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge by this court.
[s 273.16] Proof
(i) the accused sold or offered for sale or exposed for sale;
(ii) the things so sold, offered or exposed was an article of food or drink;
(iii) the said article had been rendered noxious or had become noxious, or was in a state, unfit, for food or
drink; and
(iv) the accused then knew or had reason to believe that the same was noxious or unfit for food or drink.241
[s 273.17] Destruction of Noxious Food or Drink
By virtue of section 455(2), CrPC, the court may, on a conviction under this section, order the food or drink, in
Page 8 of 10
respect of which the conviction was had, to be destroyed.
208 Vide UP Act 47 of 1975, section 3 (w.e.f. 15-9-1975).
209 Vide WB Act 42 of 1973, section 3 (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
210 Dilipsingh Ramsingh Bhatia v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 2014 , p 2016 : 2010 (2) Mah LJ (Cri) 386 (Bom).
211 P Ramanatha Aiyar, Advance Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn, reprint 2009.
212 Dilipsingh Ramsingh Bhatia v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 2014 , p 2017 : 2010 (3) Bom CR (Cri) 507 (Bom).
213 R v Salig Ram, 28 ILR All 312; Prem Pandhi v Mahesh Garg, (1980) Jab LJ 45 , p 50 : (1980) MPLJ 453 .
214 4 and 5 Eliz 2 c 16.
215 Madar Sahib, 1 Weir 227.
216 Radhakrishna v State, (2007) Cr LJ 1282 (Uttaranchal).
217 Radhakrishna v State, 2007 Cr LJ 1282 (Utr) : 2007 (3) UC 1470 .
218 R v Salig Ram, 28 ILR All 312; Prem Pandhi v Mahesh Garg, (1980) Jab LJ 45 , p 50 : (1980) MP LJ 453 .
219 R v Narumal, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 618 : 6 Bom LR 520.

Page 9 of 10
220 Sita Ram v R, (1908) 7 Cr LJ 278 : 3 PWR (Cr) 10 : 3 PR (Cr) 1908.
221 R v Crawley, (1862), 3 F&F 109.
222 James v Jones, (1894) 1 QB 304 .
223 R v Crawley, (1862) 3 F&F 109.
224 R v Dennis, (1894) 2 QB 458 (per Hawkins, Cave, Grahtham, Charles, Vaughan Villams, Lawrence, Wright, Collins,
Bruce and Kennedy JJ), Mathew J, dissenting. This decision was criticised in Grivell v Malpas, (1906) 2 KB 32 ; R v
Dennis, (1894) 2 QB 458 .
225 KN Sarkar v State, (1967) Cut LT 1158.
226 Chokraj Marwari v Emperor, (1908) 7 Cr LJ 405 .
227 Chinniah, 1 Weir 228; Bhawa v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 49 , 50 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 1393 .
228 Ganesha, (1873) PR 15 .
229 Emperor v Barumal Jawarmal, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 618 .
230 Kailash Chand Gupta v State, (2005) Cr LJ 2846 (Del).
231 Emperor v Sheo Lal, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 210 : ILR 26 All 287; Awadh Prasad v State, AIR 1952 Pat 77 ; Prem Pandhi v
Mahesh Garg, (1980) Jab LJ 45 , p 50.

233 Russell on Crime, 11th Edn, pp 1606, 1607.
234 Awadh Prasad v State, AIR 1952 Pat 77 .
236 R v Stephens, (1866) LR 1 QB 702, ante, p 1593; Police Commr v Cartman, (1896) 1 QB 655 ; Coppen v Moore,
(1898) 2 QB 306 .
237 Prem Pandhi v Mahesh Garg, (1980) Jab LJ 45 , p 51 : (1980) MPLJ 453 ; Bhuban Ram v Bibhuti Bhushan Biswas,
AIR 1919 Cal 539 , p 540 : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 915 .
238 Lyons v, Martin, (1838) 8 A&E 512.
239 Re Perumalu, 1 Weir 344.

Page 10 of 10
240 Awadh Prasad v State, AIR 1952 Pat 77 .
241 KN Sarkar v State, (1967) Cut LT 1158.
End of Document
[s 274] Adulteration of drugs.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 6




Whoever adulterates any drug or medical preparation in such a manner as to lessen the efficacy or change the
operation of such drug or medical preparation, or to make it noxious, intending that it shall be sold or used for,
Page 3 of 6
or knowing it to be likely that it will be sold or used for, any medicinal purpose, as if it had not undergone such
adulteration, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
Orissa—In its application to the State of Orissa, in s 274, for the words, “shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees or with both”, the following shall be substituted namely:—
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both,” the
Provided that the Court may, for adequate, to be mentioned in the judgement, impose a sentence of
imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for life.”243
West Bengal—In its application to the State of West Bengal in s 274 for the words “of either description for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both”, the
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgement, impose a
sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for life”.244
[s 274.2] Scope
This and the next section deal with adulteration of drugs and the sale of adulterated drugs. The efficacy of a
drug as a medicine must have been lessened, or its operation changed, or the drug rendered noxious, as the
result of adulteration and therefore, adulteration of drugs with ingredients, which although harmless, have the
effect of weakening the effect of the genuine drug, is punishable.
Under this and the next section, it is not necessary to show that the drug was so adulterated as to render it
noxious to life. It is sufficient if its efficacy is lessened. The necessity for this enactment is obvious enough. All
Page 4 of 6
drugs are of a recognised average strength, and prescriptions are made upon the understanding that they
possess such strength. If, however, the drug which a physician prescribes proves to be only half the strength on
which he calculated, it may prove wholly useless, and death may ensue before the error is remedied. The
section only speaks of the efficacy of the drug being lessened, or its operation charged. It would, however, be
necessary to show that the difference in the drug was of so considerable a character as to make an appreciable
and important change in its character and effect.245
In England, the Food and Drugs Act, 1955,246 which consolidated previous Acts of 1938, 1950 and 1954 and
certain other enactments, covers offences committed in the preparation and sale of injurious foods and
adulterated drugs, falsity in labelling and advertising foods and drugs, and the sale of food unfit for human
consumption.
[s 274.4] Adulteration
The use of the word “adulteration” implies the mixture of some foreign element. A merely inferior quality of the
same medicine, therefore, will not amount to adulteration. For instance, there are different varieties of cod liver
oil, and the same oil prepared in different ways may produce different degrees of effect. But, if a chemist having
been asked to supply a bottle of the same produces a bottle of the most inferior oil of that description, it would
not be an act indictable either under this or the next section, provided the oil, however inferior in quality, is
genuine oil.
[s 274.5] Drug or Medical Preparation
Drug means any substance primarily used for medical purposes. Sometimes kerosene oil is used as an
embrocation for muscular rheumatism. But it is not its primary use and it is submitted that it cannot, therefore,
be a drug or medical preparation within the meaning of this section.
[s 274.6] Intention and Knowledge
The essence of the offence under this section lies not so much in the adulteration, as in the passing off the
adulterated article as unadulterated. The accused must not only have adulterated a drug or medical
preparation, but should also have intended that it should be sold or used for, or should also have known it to be
likely that it would be sold or used for, any medical purpose, as if it had not been so adulterated. As Mayne
points out:247
If a druggist were to sell compounded medicine to an apothecary, communicating exactly its real nature to him, he
could not be rendered criminally answerable, because the apothecary sold it again as genuine, even though his
knowledge of the apothecary’s morals made it very probable that such might be the result. But it would be very
different if it could be shown that he supplied the spurious commodity, by mutually understanding for the purpose of
being issued to the world as something different.
[s 274.7] Procedure
The procedure is the same as in the case of an offence under section 272, IPC.
[s 274.8] Charge
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I (name and office of the magistrate etc) do hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you on or about the………Day in the month of………in the year………at……… adulterated the drug (or medical
preparation), namely………(specify the drug or medical preparation) in such a manner as to lessen the efficacy (or to
change the operation) of such drug (or medical preparation) (or to make it noxious), intending that it shall be sold (or
used for) [(or knowing it to be likely that it will be sold (or used) for] any medical purpose as if it had not undergone
such adulteration, and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 274 of the Indian Penal Code and
within my cognizance (or within the cognizance of this court) where offence is triable by the Court of Session.
And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge by this court.
[s 274.9] Proof
(i) the article in question is a drug or a medical preparation;
(ii) the accused adulterated it;

(iii) the adulteration:
(a) lessened the efficacy; or
(b) changed the operation of the drug or medicine; or
(c) made it noxious; and
(iv) the accused intended or knew it likely:
(a) that it would be sold or used for any medicinal purpose; or
(b) that it would be so used as if it were unadulterated.
[s 274.10] Destruction of Drug

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Commentary under sections 272 and 455(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 may be referred to.
244 Vide West Bengal Act, 42 of 1973, section 3 (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
245 Mayne’s Criminal Law, p 133.
246 4 and 5 Eliz 2 c 16.
End of Document
[s 275] Sale of adulterated drugs.—

public remedies.4
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Whoever, knowing any drug or medical preparation to have been adulterated in such a manner as to lessen its
efficacy, to change its operation, or to render it noxious, sells the same, or offers or exposes it for sale, or
Page 3 of 6
issues it from any dispensary for medicinal purposes as unadulterated, or causes it to be used for medicinal
purposes by any person not knowing of the adulteration, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees,
or with both.
Orissa—In its application to the State of Orissa, in section 275, for the words “shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to
one thousand rupees, or with both”, the following shall be substituted namely:—
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both”, the
Provided that the Court may, for adequate reasons to be mentioned in the judgement, impose a sentence of
imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for life”.249
West Bengal—In its application to the State of West Bengal in section 275 for the words “of either description
for term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both”
the following shall be substituted namely:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgement, impose a
sentence of imprisonment which is less than imprisonment for life”.250
[s 275.2] Scope
This section deals with the sale, etc of adulterated drugs. It bears the same analogy to section 274 as section
273 does to section 272, IPC. But there is a noteworthy difference between this section and section 273. The
latter punishes only the sale, or offer or exposure to sale, of noxious food or drink, but this section punishes not
only the sale, or offer or exposure for sale, but also issue from any dispensary for medical purposes, of
adulterated drugs.
[s 275.3] Object
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The object of the section is to prevent the issue and sale of adulterated or noxious drugs, and thus to protect
public health by penalising persons who trade in the sale and issue of adulterated, inefficacious and noxious
drugs. The section applies to persons who deal in dispensing and selling adulterated preparations not
complying with the standards of the recognised pharmacopoeia.251
[s 275.4] “Whoever Sells”
The expression “whoever sells” has been held to include one who sells, be he a master or servant, principal or
a person to whom the conduct and management of sale is delegated.252 But a canvasser getting only
commission for receiving orders is not a seller, and he is not liable as he is a mere intermediary who brought
the seller and the buyer together, who merely communicated the seller’s offer to intending purchasers. He
cannot be regarded as offering anything for sale.253
[s 275.5] Knowing any Drug or Medical Preparation to have been Adulterated–Noxious
Knowledge that a drug or medical preparation has been adulterated in order to lessen its effect or to change its
operation or render it noxious is essential for the offence under this section.254 Where a purchaser ordered to be
supplied with an ointment containing a lesser proportion of mercury than that prescribed by the pharmacopoeia,
it was held that the person supplying the ointment was guilty of the offence punishable under this section.255
[s 275.6] “Exposes for Sale”
The words “exposes it for sale” have been held to mean “exposed to view in the shop in the sight of the
purchaser”.256 It does not mean that the article should be exposed to view. The exposure is sufficient if the
article is exhibited in the shop for sale in packets.257
If the drug is stored in a room or a cellar, there is no exposure of the article for sale.258
[s 275.7] Procedure
[s 275.8] Charge
I, (name and office of the magistrate etc) do hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you on or about the………Day in the month of………in the year………at……… knowing the drug (or medical
preparation), namely……… (specify drug or medical preparation) to have been adulterated in such a manner as to
lessen its efficacy [(or to change its operation) (or to render it noxious)] sold the same [(or offered) (or exposed) for
sale] [(or issued it from the dispensary, to wit………, for medical purposes, by any person, not knowing of the
adulteration)] and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 275 of the Indian Penal Code and within my
cognizance (or within the cognizance of this court). Where the offence is triable by the Court of Session.
Page 5 of 6
[s 275.9] Proof
(i) the article in question was a drug or medical preparation;

(ii) it had been adulterated in such a manner as to:
(a) lessen its efficacy, or
(b) change its operation; or
(c) render it noxious;
(iii) the accused:
(a) sold it, or
(b) offered it for sale, or
(c) exposed it for sale, or
(d) issued it, from any dispensary for medicinal purposes, or
(e) caused it to be used for medicinal purposes, by any person not knowing of the adulteration, as
unadulteration; and
(iv) the accused then knew that it had been adulterated in the manner mentioned in (ii) above.
[s 275.10] Destruction of Adulterated Drug
Commentary in sections 272 and 455(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 may be referred to.

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249 Vide UP Act, 47 of 1975, section 3 (w.e.f. 15-9-1975).
250 Vide WB Act, 42 of 1973, section 3 (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
251 White v Bywater, (1887) 19 QBD 582 .
252 Pharmaceutical Society v London and Provincial Supply Association, 5 AC 857; Hotchin v Hindmarsh, (1891) 2 QBD
187 .
253 Pharmaceutical Society v White, (1901) 1 UB 601.
254 White v Bywater, (1887) 19 QBD 582 .
255 Dickins v Ramesan, (1901) 1 KB 437 .
256 Crane v Lawrence, 25 QBD 152, p 155.
257 Wheat v Brown, (1892) 1 QBD 418 .
258 Crane v Lawrence, (1890) 25 QBD 152 .
End of Document
[s 276] Sale of drug as a different drug or preparation.—

public remedies.4
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Whoever knowingly sells, or offers or exposes for sale, or issues from a dispensary for medicinal purposes, any
drug or medical preparation, as a different drug or medical preparation, shall be punished with imprisonment of
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Orissa—In its application to the State of Orissa, in s 276, for the words “shall be punished with imprisonment of
rupees, or with both”, the following shall be substituted namely:—
Uttar Pradesh—In s 276 for the words “shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both” the
West Bengal—In s 276 for the words “of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with
fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with the both” substitute the following:
Provided that the court may for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a
[s 276.2] Scope
The offence under this section is not the sale or attempt to sell an adulterated or inferior article, but the sale or
attempt to sell something which is not what it purports to be, and the essence of the offence is the false
pretence involved. Thus, if a chemist were to discover a drug which he considered to be just as effective as
quinine, and which could be procured for half the price, he would not be justified in selling it as quinine, even
though it answered precisely the same purpose. The fraud consists, not in the injury done, but in the false
pretence by which persons, who suppose that they are using one medicine, are forced to use another against
their will.
The section deals with medical preparations only; the case of food and drink is not within the purview of the
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section.
[s 276.3] Procedure
[s 276.4] Charge
I (name and office of the magistrate etc) do hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you on or about the………day………in the month of………in the year…at……, knowingly sold or offered (or
exposed) for sale (or issued from dispensary to wit………) for medicinal purposes, the drug (or medical preparation),
namely………(specify the drug or medical preparation) as a different drug (or medical preparation), and thereby
committed an offence punishable under section 276 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. Where his
offence is triable by the court of session (or within the cognizance of this court).
[s 276.5] Proof
(i) the accused sold an article or offered or exposed it for sale, or issued it from a dispensary for medicinal
purposes;
(ii) the article so sold, etc, was a drug or medical preparation;
(iii) the accused sold, etc, the said drug or medical preparation as a different drug or medical preparation;
and
(iv) he knew of such difference at the time it was so sold, etc.

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261 Vide West Bengal Act 42 of 1973, section 3 (w.e.f. 29-4-1973).
End of Document
[s 277] Fouling water of public spring or reservoir.—

public remedies.4
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Whoever voluntarily corrupts or fouls the water of any public spring or reservoir, so as to render it less fit for the
purpose for which it is ordinarily used, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
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which may extend to three months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
[s 277.1] Scope
Under this section, the offence consists in voluntarily fouling the water of a public spring or reservoir, making it
less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used. The water of a public reservoir or spring belongs to the
public, and they have a right to use it as it is, and no one is entitled to disturb its enjoyment by an act
inconsistent with its beneficial use.
The corrupting or fouling of the water contemplated by this section may not affect the public health or safety,
but it affects the “convenience” of the public and is, therefore, a public nuisance.
[s 277.2] Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974
The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 has not repealed the provisions of section 277, IPC.
The accused can be prevented both under the provisions of the Water Act and section 277, IPC.262
[s 277.3] Two Relevant Considerations
• With reference to a charge under this section, the two questions to be considered are:
(a) whether the water of the tank has been ordinarily used for drinking purposes; and
(b) whether the accused voluntarily corrupted or fouled the water so as to render it less fit for drinking.263
This section does not apply to a public river,264 or to a continuous stream of water running along the bed of a
river.265 It does not apply to mere bathing in a tank, not set apart by any lawful order for bathing purposes.266
[s 277.4] “Essentials of the Offence”
To constitute an offence under this section, the following three ingredients are necessary, viz:
(i) there must be voluntary corruption or fouling of water;
(ii) the water must be of a public spring or reservoir; and
(iii) the water must be rendered less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used.
To attract section 277, IPC it is sufficient if a person voluntarily corrupts or fouls water to render it unfit for which
it is ordinarily used. It need not be for drinking water alone.267
[s 277.5] “Voluntarily”
To constitute an offence under this section, the act of corrupting or fouling the water must be done “voluntarily”.
Under section 39, IPC a person is said to cause an effect “voluntarily” when he causes it by means, whereby he
intended to cause it, or by means which, at the time of employing those means, he knew, or had reason to
believe to be likely to cause it. Intention or knowledge that the act done will corrupt or foul the water is thus
essential. If the accused did not intend to foul the water, he must at least have known that his act would foul the
Page 4 of 8
water.
[s 277.6] “Corrupts or Fouls”
The expression “corrupts or fouls” as used in this section must be taken in its literal and not its artificial sense. It
could not be said that a mahar (a low caste man) by drawing water from a public well, rendered the water less
fit for drinking purposes and thus “corrupts or fouls” it within the meaning of the above section. The quality of
the water is not affected by the fact that certain persons, owing to caste prejudices, may refrain from using the
well.268 The defiling or causing to be defiled the water, etc, referred to in section 61(m) of the Bombay Act (4 of
1890), and voluntarily corrupting or fouling water, etc, referred to in this section, both mean some act which
defiles or fouls the water.
[s 277.6.1] Some Offending Acts
Where a woman of the lower caste takes water from a public cistern of water, she cannot be convicted of
defiling or fouling the water either under the Bombay District Police Act or under the Indian Penal Code.269 The
mere bathing in a tank, not set apart by any lawful order for bathing purposes, without anything further, is not an
offence under this section.270 But bathing as it is ordinarily practised, fouls drinking water.271
Spitting into a public well fouls the water of the well though the degree to which the act of the accused rendered
the water less fit for drinking might be small.272
Where the accused fished with basket nets in a tank used for drinking purposes, thereby causing a light
disturbance of the mud and so making the water rather less fit for drinking, it was held that the accused had
committed an offence under this section.273
Cultivating paddy in the bed of a tank used by the public for drinking purposes is a nuisance and is punishable
under this section and section 291.274
Mere angling in a tank is not an offence under this section, without proof that the accused used bait of a foul
kind.275
The accused loaded toilet waste in a lorry and dumped the latrine waste into the thodu underneath the bridge
and polluted the water. Held, the prosecution of the accused for offence under section 277, IPC was
maintainable, and same was not quashed on petition under section 482, CrPC.276
[s 277.7] “Water of any Public Spring or Reservoir”
For an offence under this section, the corrupting or fouling must be of the water of a spring or reservoir, and
that spring or reservoir must be public.
Both a spring and a reservoir are sources from which water may be taken. In the case of a spring, the water
springs or shoots up from the ground spontaneously. A well may be taken to be a spring as its water comes out
from the ground spontaneously. A reservoir is where water is stored. A tank would come under this heading.
The section requires that the spring or reservoir, the water of which is fouled, should be a public spring or
Page 5 of 8
reservoir. Relying on an observation in Reg v Wellard,277 it has been held in a Nagpur case,278 that a place is a
public place if people are allowed access to it, though there may be no legal right to it. A well is thus a public
well, if people are allowed to use its water. But in the case of Ramkewal Singh v State,279 a learned Judge of
the Patna High Court discussed the case of Reg v Wellard,280 and quoting the various views of the judges in
that case, held that that case cannot be taken as an authority for the proposition that, as a general rule, a place
is a public place if people are allowed access to it, though they may have no legal right to it. His Lordship,
therefore, held that where the well the water of which was fouled was claimed by the complainant herself to be
her private well, this section had no application, even though some of the neighbours were allowed to draw
water from it.
[s 277.7.1] Public River, Nullah, Private Well etc. not Covered under the Section
The water in question must be that of a public spring or reservoir. A public river is not a public spring,281 nor is a
stream of water running along the bed of river,282 nor is the water of a rivulet, even though standing in pools and
used as drinking water.283 The water of a nullah does not constitute a public spring. The fouling of the water of a
nullah, is, therefore, no offence under this section.284 Notes under section 290 may also be referred to.
Section 277, IPC does not apply to a case of pollution of a well which the complainant claims to be her private
well, particularly in the absence of any evidence to show that the public were using its water by right. The mere
fact that the neighbours were using its water does not make it a public well, as they may be doing so by
licence.285 Where a dog-killer buried the carcass of a dog in the bed of a public river near town, it was held that
conviction under this section could not be sustained, although there was evidence that the people of the vicinity
bathed in, and drank water from the river and also used, for domestic purposes, water taken from there.286
[s 277.8] “So as to Render it Less Fit for the Purpose for which it is Ordinarily used”
This qualification renders it necessary to prove the purpose for which the water is ordinarily used, and then it
has to be proved that the fouling has rendered the water less fit for that purpose.
It is not necessary that the spring or reservoir should be reserved for the purpose. It is enough if its water is
ordinarily used for that purpose.287 It is not even necessary to prove the degree of fouling. All that is necessary
is that the fouling rendered the water less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used. Thus, spitting into a
public well fouls its water so as to render it less fit for drinking, though the degree to which it has rendered the
water less fit may be very small.288
[s 277.9] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable. A summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable
but not compoundable. The offence is triable by any magistrate.
[s 277.10] Sanction Required under Local Acts, Whether Necessary for Offences under this Section
Where, a private complaint was filed alleging offences under sections 277, 278 and 290, IPC against the
accused, the accused raised the question of want of jurisdiction even before issue of the process, after
interpreting sections 49, 60, 47, 24 and 43 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and
sections 43, 52, 40, 22 and 37 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and sections 190, 197
of the CrPC, 1973 and section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that:
The resultant effect of the provision in the Water Act, and Air Act is that irrespective of the question whether or not an
Page 6 of 8
Act, complained of also constitutes an offence under the Indian Penal Code, the prosecution has to be in compliance
with the provision of these special Acts and it is not open to a magistrate to take cognizance under section 190 of the
Code without the written sanction of the State Boards the express legislative mandate cannot be permitted to be
whittled down by labelling the Act complained of as an offence not under the special Acts but under the Indian Penal
Code.
Then any prosecution for an act which is an offence under the special Act, by any agency other that the competent
Board on the ground that it is also an offence under the Indian Penal Code can also be characterised as colourable
because the offences under the special Acts are graver ones and labelling the Acts as an IPC offence will be just to
evade the requirement of previous sanction under the special Acts.289
[s 277.11] Charge
In case the framing of a charge is deemed expedient or necessary. The following form may be adopted:
That you, on or about the………day of…….……at…………, voluntarily corrupted, (or fouled), the water of the public
spring (or reservoir), to wit…………… so as to render it less fit for the purpose for which it is ordinarily used, and
thereby committed the offence punishable under s 277 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
[s 277.12] Proof
(i) the accused corrupted or fouled the water;
(ii) the water was of any public spring or reservoir;
(iii) he did so voluntarily;
(iv) the act of corrupting or fouling rendered the water less fit for the purpose for which it was ordinarily
used.
Page 7 of 8
262 Prasad v State of Kerala, 2012 (1) Ker LT 861 : 2012 (1) KLJ 658 (Ker).
263 Re Mathian, 1 Weir 229.
264 Empress v Halodhur, ILR 2 Cal 383.
265 Reg v Vetti Chokkan, 4 Mad 229; Re Anthony, 1 Weir 230.
266 Madras HC Proceedings, 13 December 1878 : (SC) 1 Weir 72, p 96.
268 Empress v Pandia Mahar, (1900) 13 CPLR 92, relying on Muttumira v Queen-Empress, ILR 7 Mad 590; Queen-
Empress v Byramji Edalji, 12 ILR Bom 437.
269 Re Bhagi, (1900) 2 Bom LR 1078 .

270 1 Weir 228.
271 Re Mathian, 1 Weir 229.
272 Ramkaranlal v Emperor, AIR 1916 Ngp 15 (1) : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 650 ; Empress v Pandia Mahar, 13 CPLR 92; Re
Punni Besoyi, 1 Weir 231.
273 Re Punni Besoyi, 1 Weir 231.
274 Re Ramatripati, 1 Weir 229.
275 Re Srinivsa Naik, 1 Weir 231.
277 Reg v Wellard, (1885) 14 QBD 63 , 51 LT 64 : 33 WR 136 : 15 Cox CC 559.
278 Ramkaran Lal v Emperor, AIR 1916 Ngp 15 (1) : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 650 .
279 Ramkewal Singh v State, AIR 1954 Pat 309 , p 310.

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280 Reg v Wellard, (1885) 14 QBD 63 , 51 LT 64 : 33 WR 136 : 15 Cox CC 559.
281 R v Halodhur, ILR 2 Cal 383 : 1 Weir 230.

282 R v Patha, BR 2 July 1869; R v Vetti Chokkan, ILR 4 Mad 229 : 1 Weir 230; R v Nama Rama, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 6 : 6 Bom
LR 52.
283 R v Hari Bapu, BR 29 September 1885.
284 Queen-Empress v Nilappa Dayappa, Ratanlal Un Cr Cas 963.
285 Ramekwal Singh v State, AIR 1954 Pat 309 .
286 Re Anthony, 1 Weir 230.
287 Re Muthan, 1 Weir 229.
288 Ramkaran Lal v Emperor, AIR 1916 Ngp 15 (1); See also Prasad v State of Kerala, 2012 (1) Ker LT 861 : 2012 (1) KLJ
658 (Ker).
289 Babulal v Shri Aditya Birla, (1986) 1 Crimes 249 [LNIND 1985 MP 111] (MP); Prasad v State of Kerala, 2012 (1) Ker
LT 861 : 2012 (1) KLJ 658 (Ker).
End of Document
[s 278] Making atmosphere noxious to health.—

public remedies.4
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Whoever voluntarily vitiates the atmosphere in any place so as to make it noxious to the health of persons in
general dwelling or carrying on business in the neighbourhood or passing along a public way, shall be punished
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with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees.
[s 278.1] Scope
This section is directed against public, and not a private nuisance. It is clearly provided in it that the atmosphere
must be so vitiated as to make it noxious to the health of the persons in general dwelling or carrying on
business in the neighbourhood, or passing along a public way.290
Where the accused threw a human skull into the house of the complainant and the skull was in a highly
offensive condition, but there was no finding to show that the effect of it was to make the atmosphere noxious to
the other persons dwelling in the locality, it was held that, although the conduct of the accused was most
reprehensible and offensive, he was not guilty under this section.291
The act of performing the offences of nature in a public street is not an offence under this section.292
[s 278.2] “Voluntarily Vitiates the Atmosphere”
A public nuisance may be caused by smoke, stench, or effluvia, if, either singly or in combination, the accused
creates serious public injury to health. An indictment for a nuisance, by steeping stinking skins in water, laying it
to be committed near the highway, and also near several dwelling houses, has been held sufficient; for if a man
causes a nuisance near the highway by which the air thereabout is corrupted, it must, in its nature, be a
nuisance to those who are in the highway.293
[s 278.3] “Noxious to the Health”
The word “noxious” does not merely mean hurtful and offensive to the smell, but includes also the complex idea
of insalubrity and offensiveness.294 If a trade is alleged to be noxious by producing unwholesome smells, it may
be proved that the smells are frequently perceived, and are not only offensive to the senses but have an
injurious effect on those who smell them.295 It has been held that if an open compound is used as an open
latrine without any shed, obnoxious smell is bound to emanate from it and it would amount to an offence under
this section. It has also been held that the fact that the neighbouring houses were constructed after the
nuisance had been commenced in immaterial.296 Synopsis in section 272, IPC may be referred to.
[s 278.4] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable. Summons may ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate.
The cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken within six months.
[s 278.5] Sanction Required under Local Acts, Whether Necessary for Offences under this Section
Synopsis note 10 of section 277 may be referred to.
[s 278.6] Charge
For a charge under this section, if deemed necessary, the following form may be adopted:
I (name and office of magistrate etc), hereby charge you (name of accused) as follows:
Page 4 of 5
That you on or about the………day of………, at………by………(state the act) voluntarily vitiated the atmosphere
of…………… (name the place) so as to make it noxious to the health of persons in general, dwelling or carrying on
business in the neighbourhood or passing along a public way, and thereby committed the offence punishable under
[s 278.7] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it must be proved that:
(i) the accused voluntarily vitiated the atmosphere in a particular place; and
(ii) such vitiation made it noxious to the health of persons in general dwelling, or carrying on business, in
the neighbourhood, or passing along a public way.
290 Rahim Mian v Emperor, AIR 1929 Pat 113 , p 114 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 556 .
291 Ibid.
292 Queen-Empress v Mahadshet, Ratanlal Un Cr Cas 200.
293 R v White, (1757) 1 Burr 333.

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294 R v White, (1757) 1 Burr; cf Bishop Aukland LB v Bishop Auckland Iron, etc Co, (1882) 10 QBD 138 .
296 Suwa Lal v State, AIR 1953 Ajmer 4 .
End of Document
[s 279] Rash driving or riding on a public way.—

public remedies.4
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Whoever drives any vehicle, or rides, on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger
human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of
Page 3 of 44
Sections 279, 280 and 284–289, IPC all deal with public nuisances affecting public safety.297 In all of these
sections the offences are due to criminal rashness or negligence. In all of them mere negligence or rashness is
made punishable, apart from any injury actually done.298 It is plain that the essence of the offence consists in
the possibility of injury, and not in its actual occurrence, as all the clauses contain the words “likely to cause
hurt or injury”, or words of a similar nature. The occurrence of actual injury meets with punishment under
sections 337 and 338, IPC, though, strangely enough, the actual inflicting of hurt is liable to less punishment
under section 337, IPC than the commission of the same act would be, if no hurt has resulted. Nor is it
necessary that there should be any intention to injure, or reason to anticipate the particular injury that ensued, if
it was in fact caused by the accused’s negligence.299 It is sufficient if the carelessness is such as does cause, or
is likely to cause, injury. Mere rashness or negligence (except in the case of negligence under section 281, IPC
and of rashness and negligence under section 283, IPC) under the various circumstances given is rendered
punishable by sections 279–289, IPC, quite irrespective of any injurious consequences, the essence of the
offence being the possibility or likelihood of injury. If hurt is caused by reason of one of these offences, the
offence falls under section 337, IPC. If grievous hurt is the result of one of these offences, the offence falls
under section 338, IPC. If death is the result, the offence is punishable under section 304A, IPC.300
The section takes into account, the potential danger or possibility of danger to life or injury to persons on
account of the rash or negligent driving or riding by an accused.301
In England, by section 35 of the Offences Against the Person Act, 1861:302
Whosoever, having the charge of any carriage or vehicle, shall, by wanton or furious driving or racing, or other wilful
misconduct, or by wilful neglect, do or cause to be done any bodily harm to any person whatsoever, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term
not exceeding two years.
The section extends to bicycles and to all carriages whether drawn by animals or propelled by steam, petrol,
electricity or other mechanical means.
The Road Traffic Act, 1930,303 section 11,304 states:
(1) If any person drives a motor vehicle on a road recklessly, or at a speed or in a manner which is
dangerous to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the nature,
condition, and use of the road, and the amount of traffic which is actually at the time, or which might
reasonably be expected to be, on the road, he shall be liable:
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(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds or to imprisonment for a term
not exceeding in the case of a second or subsequent conviction six months, or to both, such fine
and imprisonment;
(b) on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine, or to
both such imprisonment and fine.305
Section 222(a) of the Tanganyika Penal Code also is similar to this section.
In India, a similar provision with respect to rash or negligent driving of a motor vehicle is contained in section
184 of the Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988) sections 304A, 336, 337 and 338 of this Code are also analogous to
this section, but they are not confined to rash or negligent driving or riding, but extend to all rash or negligent
acts.
This section deals with rash or negligent driving or riding on a public way. To constitute an offence under this
section:
(i) there must be rash or negligent driving or riding;
(ii) it must be on a public way; and
(iii) the driving or riding must be in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely
to cause hurt or injury to any person other than the driver.306
In order to constitute an offence punishable under section 279, IPC it must be established that:
(a) the accused was driving the vehicle on public way,
(b) such driving was done in a rash and negligent manner to endanger human life or likely to cause hurt or injury
to any other person.
For the purpose of s 279, rashness and negligence must be described as criminal rashness or criminal negligence. It
must be more than mere carelessness or error of judgment.307
Section 279, IPC requires two essentials: viz, (a) driving or riding of a vehicle on any public way; and (b) such
driving must be so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any person.
Both the said ingredients must exist to attract the offence. To invite the wrath of law under section 279, IPC, the
act complained of need not be a rash and negligent one. For attracting the offence under section 279, IPC, the
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rashness or negligence attributable to the accused must be criminal rashness or negligence. It is true that the
section does not require an element of mens rea for getting involved therein. What is essentially required is the
utter callousness or recklessness or an indifferent/unmindful attitude towards the consequences.308
[s 279.3.1] Probability, Possibility and Likelihood
For an offence under this section, the effect of the manner, in which the act is performed, must be either: (a)
that human life was, as a fact, endangered thereby; or (b) that hurt or injury was likely to be caused thereby.
Therefore, it must be shown that some person was either in a position of danger to his life or there was a
likelihood of persons being hurt or injured. Likelihood is something stronger than a possibility, and may or may
not amount to a probability, which is merely a strong degree of likelihood.309
[s 279.4] Essence of the Offences
Mere rashness or negligence (except in the case of negligence under section 281, and of rashness and
negligence under section 283) under the various circumstances given is rendered punishable by sections 279
to 289, quite irrespective of any injurious consequences, the essence of the offence being the possibility or
likelihood of injury.
[s 279.4.1] Actual Accident or an Injury not Necessary
In order to constitute an offence under this section there need not be any accident or injury or death to
individuals. Driving a vehicle on any public way in the manner specified in the section alone is sufficient. The
provision is intended to protect the interest of society by avoiding danger to pedestrians and vehicular traffic
mainly. Even without waiting for such danger happening, the offender could be brought to justice.310
[s 279.4.2] An Aggravated Degree of Rash and Negligent Driving is Contemplated
To be guilty of an offence under section 279 the accused must drive a vehicle in such a rash or negligent
manner as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Both ingredients
must be satisfied. The accused must drive the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner, and the driving in a rash
or negligent manner must be such as to endanger human life or be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other
person. A certain aggravated degree of rash or negligent driving is contemplated here.311
[s 279.5] Difference between Section 279 of IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
Culpable driving of a motor vehicle giving rise to penalties on the criminal side and damages on the civil side
may be classified as negligent driving, rash driving and guilty errors of judgment. Of these three classes, the
first two constitute the component elements of reckless or dangerous driving punishable under section 184 of
the Motor Vehicles Act.
Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act (59 of 1988) runs as follows:
184. Driving dangerously. —Whoever drives a motor vehicle at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the
public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the nature, condition and use of the place where
the vehicle is driven and the amount of traffic which actually is at the time or which might reasonably be expected to be
in the place, shall be punishable for the first offence with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, and for any second or subsequent offence if committed within
three years of the commission of a previous similar offence, with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.
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Comparing the above with this section, the two sections might appear to cover the same offence. But there are
differences between the two. Thus:
(i) Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act refers only to driving, while this section refers to not only driving,
but also riding;
(ii) Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act refers to the driving only of a motor vehicle, while this section
refers to the driving of any vehicle and is not confined to a motor vehicle.
(iii) Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act refers to dangerous driving in any place, while this section refers
to driving on any public way.
(iv) Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act refers to driving “at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous
to the public, having regard to all the circumstances of the case”. But this section refers to driving “in a
manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any
other person.”
The offence under the two sections may, however, overlap each other.312 An accused, tried and acquitted for an
offence under section 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (since repealed and replaced by section 184 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988) cannot be tried for an offence under this section.313
[s 279.6] Section 279 of IPC and Section 177 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
Section 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would apply not only to offenders under the Motor Vehicles Act,
but also for breach of any rule, regulation or notification made thereunder the punishment for which is not
provided for, under those provisions. On the other hand, this section is a self-contained section like any other
section of the Code, prescribing the extent of punishment. This being independent by itself, there is no meaning
in connecting it or reading it with section 177 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It would be wrong to charge a person
under both the sections for the same act.314
[s 279.7] Sections 279, 337 and 336—Distinction
The offences under sections 279 and 337 are offences of a different nature and the conduct referred to therein
is penalised with different objects.315
This section penalises rash driving or riding on a public way. A person who drives any vehicle or rides on any
public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to
any other person, is liable to be punished under this section. This offence falls within chapter XIV of the Code
which is a chapter dealing with offences affecting public health, safety, convenience, decency and morals. An
offence under section 279 is essentially an offence against public safety. By section 337, causing hurt by an act
endangering life or personal safety of others is penalised. By that section, whoever causes hurt to any person
by doing an act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others is liable to be
punished in the manner provided thereby. This section occurs in chapter XVI, which deals with offences
affecting the human body. Under this section the maximum sentence which may be imposed is rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees, or with both. Under section 337, the maximum sentence is rigorous imprisonment for a term which may
extend to six months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. The offence
punishable under section 337 is the offence of hurt committed in certain defined circumstances. By section 336,
an act endangering life or personal safety of others which is done rashly or negligently is an aggravated form of
the offence defined by section 336.316
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[s 279.8] Sections 279 and 338—Distinction
Under section 338, IPC, whoever causes grievous hurt to any person by doing an act so rashly or negligently
as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others, is liable to be punished in the manner provided
thereby. This section is covered by chapter XVI, which deals with offences affecting the human body.
None of the parts of the offence defined in section 338, IPC, is sufficient to constitute an offence under section
279 of the said Code because under section 279, the ingredient of driving any vehicle or riding in a public way
is essential, which is not necessary under section 338. The offence under section 338 of the IPC need not be
committed by driving a vehicle or riding on a public way.317
Sections 279 and 338 are co-related with section 304A, IPC; and section 279, IPC applies to the driving of any
vehicle or riding on any public way in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to
cause hurt or injury to any person where no hurt has actually been caused. Section 338, IPC applies to a case
where grievous hurt has been caused to any person by an act being done so rashly or negligently as to
endanger human life or the personal safety of others. It is more general than this section and embraces not only
the act of driving or riding but all acts which endanger human life or personal safety.
[s 279.9] Sections 279 and 304A—Distinction
Commentary under the same heading in section 304A, vol III may be referred to.
To establish an offence under either section 279 or section 304A, rashness and negligence has to be
established, but the only distinction is that in section 279 the rash and negligent act relates to the manner of
driving or riding on a public way, while an offence under section 304A extends to any rash and negligent act
falling short of culpable homicide.318 A rash and negligent act is the gist of both the offences. However, offences
punishable under sections 279 and 304A, IPC, being distinct, the accused can be convicted for both the
offences.319
[s 279.10] Overlapping of Offences under Sections 279, 337 and 338 does not make these Offences of Same
Character
Undoubtedly section 279, IPC penalises rash or negligent driving but on that account an offence under either
section 337 or section 338, IPC, cannot be said to be of the same nature or character. Offences under section
279, and section 337 or section 338, IPC are offences of different nature and the conduct referred to therein is
penalised with different objects. There is no doubt that the above three sections overlap, but that does not
make those offences of the same character. Offence under section 279, IPC is not compoundable, while
sections 337 and 338 are compoundable with the permission of the court. Thus, the offence under sections 279
and 337 or section 338 of the Indian Penal Code, being distinct, an accused can be convicted both under
sections 279 and 337 or section 338, IPC.
A person can be convicted of an offence under section 279 as well of an offence under section 337, IPC at the
same time.320
[s 279.11] “Drives any Vehicle or Rides”
This section covers not only rash or negligent driving, but also such riding. If a man rides so fast that he would
be unable to stop the horse if a foot-passenger got in the way, he would be liable, provided that the foot-
passenger acts in a reasonable manner.321
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So far as driving is concerned, it may be of any vehicle, including a tram-car,322 or a bullock-cart,323 or even a
bicycle, for a man to ride pillion on an ordinary bicycle in a crowded street is a negligent act which is likely to
cause injury to the other persons and vehicles there.324
[s 279.12] “On any Public Way”
What the section penalises is not rash driving anywhere, but only rash driving on any public way.325 The
expression “public way” is not defined in the IPC. Sub-s (34) of section 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
defines a public place thus:
(34) “Public place” means a road, street, way or other place, whether a thoroughfare or not, to which the public have a
right of access, and includes any place or stand at which passengers are picked up or set down by a stage carriage.
The words “are granted access or over which they have a right to pass” which occurred in the definition in the
Motor Vehicles Act of 1914 have been substituted by the words “have a right of access” and so no question of
grant arises now. The way may be a road or street, and all that is necessary to make it “public” is that the public
should have a right of access to it.
Under section 121(1) of the English Road Traffic Act, 1930:326
(1) “Road” means any highway and any other road to which the public have access, and includes bridges
over which a road passes.
• …
The “public way” in this and some of the following sections may be a “highway”, which is defined as “a way
leading from the marked town, or inhabited place to another inhabited place, and which is common to all”.327 In
Pran Nath Kundu v Emperor,328 which was a case under section 283, it was observed:
Where the privilege to use a road is enjoyed only by one particular section of the community or by inhabitants of two or
three villages and not by others, the road is not a public road.329 Where there is the intention to allow not the public
generally but merely visitors to or traders with the people of the village, or way allowed to be used by villagers to go to
a church or a market or the common fields of a village, such ways are not regarded as public ways but private ways,
and they generally have their origin in custom.330 Such a customary way can be converted into an ordinary highway
after use by the general public sufficient to raise the presumption of dedication.331 But the evidence in support of the
public claim must be cogent.332
[s 279.13] “Rash or Negligent”

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For the purposes of this section the manner in which the driving, riding or navigation is performed must be rash
or negligent.333 A certain aggravated degree of rash or negligent driving is contemplated here.334
In the case of negligence, “the party does not do an act which he was bound to do, because he adverts not to
do it”. In the case of rashness “the party does an act and breaks a positive duty. He thinks of the probable
mischief, but, in consequence of a mis-supposition begotten by insufficient advertence, he assumes that the
mischief will not ensure in the given instance or case. The radical idea denoted is always this. The party runs a
risk of which he is conscious”.335 Even in ordinary parlance negligence connotes want of proper care and
rashness conveys the idea of recklessness or the doing of an act without due consideration.336
Negligence’ was defined in the well-known case of Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co,337 thus:
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which
ordinarily regulated the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do.
The Law Revision Committee in 1939, adopted the definition, “Negligence may be said to consist in a failure to
exercise due care in a case in which a duty to take care exists”. The general concept of reasonable foresight is
the criterion of negligence and is fluid in its application; it has to be fitted to the facts of the particular case.338
“Negligence is not established by proving that the loss might possibly and with extraordinary foresight and
prudence have been avoided.”339
[s 279.13.1] Negligence—Failure to take Precaution may Amount to Negligence
A rash act is primarily an over-hasty act and is thus opposed to a deliberate act. It may also include a deliberate
act done without due deliberation and caution.340 Negligence is a breach of duty caused by the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by the consideration, which ordinarily regulates the conduct of
human affairs, would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.341 The
negligence connotes want of proper care.342 If the possibility of danger emerging is reasonably apparent, then
to take no precautions is negligence; but if the possibility of danger emerging is only a mere possibility which
would never occur to the mind of a reasonable man, then there is no negligence in not having taken
extraordinary precautions.343 For the definition of “negligence” in civil cases refer to Ramesh Kumar Nayak v
UOI.344
[s 279.14] “Culpable Rashness or Negligence”
Negligence is an omission to do something, which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations, which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do. Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the dangerous consequences
will follow but in the circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution that was incumbent
on him. Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper
care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which,
having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the
accused person to have adopted.345 It is the duty of every motorist while driving on a public road to keep a
lookout for other motorists coming from the front to avoid collision with the oncoming vehicle. Where a driver
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has not exercised this much care and caution incumbent upon him and if his conduct occasions an accident, he
is guilty of culpable negligence as imputability of criminality arises from the neglect of civic duty of
circumspection and running the risk or doing such an act with recklessness and indifference to the
consequences. A person driving a motor vehicle is also under a duty to be in a position to control it on seeing
the peril in front which could normally be expected on the road.346 Rashness consists in hazarding a dangerous
or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in
running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences.347 Culpable
rashness is acting with the consciousness that the dangerous consequences may follow, but with the hope that
they will not follow, and often with the belief that the actor had taken sufficient precautions to prevent the
happening of such consequences.348 Driving at an excessive speed on a public road would be prima facie
evidence of rash driving in determining whether the person is rash and negligent. The standard of reasonable
care is that which is reasonable to be demanded in the circumstances, if still mishap occurs, the person cannot
be held guilty of rashness.349 But if a vehicle with defective brakes, is driven at a speed of 15 or 20 kms in a
crowded bazaar, it is nothing but driving the vehicle rashly at high speed.350
Where the appellant driver of police jeep under the influence of alcohol was driving jeep at high speed, caused
death of five persons, injured seven, and went 93 feet ahead of the incident, could only be stopped by the
Police Officer who was travelling in vehicle. It was held a case of culpable negligence and the driver was
convicted under sections 304A, 337, 338 and 279, IPC.351
Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that the mischievous and illegal consequences may follow,
but with the hope that they will not, often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precaution to prevent
their happening. Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect
will follow, in the circumstances which show that the accused has not exercised the caution incumbent upon
him and if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of the civic
duty of circumspection.352
Where the accused appellant driver of a jeep was driving negligently and rashly, dashed against a girl going on
the road, caused injuries to her, the accused was convicted under section 279.353
[s 279.14.1] Mere Error of Judgment or Carelessness not Sufficient
Under this section, the rashness or negligence shown must be what may fairly be described as criminal
rashness or criminal negligence. Before an accused can be convicted of an offence under this section, there
must be something more than a mere error of judgement or mere carelessness.354 For the purpose of section
279 rashness and negligence may be described as criminal rashness or criminal negligence. It must be more
than mere carelessness or error of judgment. Negligence connotes an idea of reckless doing of an act without
consideration of any consequences.355
[s 279.14.2] Reckless
In order to render a person liable for criminal negligence there must be something more than mere negligence;
for law distinguishes between negligence which originates a civil liability and one the consequence of which is a
criminal prosecution. But negligence does not mean, even for criminal negligence, absolute carelessness or
indifference, but want of such a degree of care as is required in particular circumstances. Simple lack of care as
will constitute civil liability is not enough. A very high degree of negligence is required to be proved before the
felony is established and this may aptly be described by the epithet “reckless”.356
[s 279.14.3] Driver Running away from the Spot
Where the accused driver of a jeep was driving jeep rashly and negligently, after hitting the deceased boy
standing on the side of the road, ran away, held it indicated that he was guilty otherwise, there was no
necessity for him to run away from the place of occurrence. He took false defence in his statement under
section 313, CrPC when it was pointed to him that he ran away from the place of accident. Accused was
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convicted under sections 279 and 304A, IPC.357
[s 279.14.4] No Universal Rule of Negligence
“Negligence” is the breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
these considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which
a prudent and reasonable man would not do.358
No universal rule as to what amount of carelessness is necessary in order to render negligence culpable can be
laid down, and the question must be determined on the facts of the particular case.359
The culpability in culpable negligence arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection;360 such
circumspection as a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs would use.361 No universal rule as to what amount of carelessness is necessary in order to
render negligence culpable can be laid down, and the question must be determined on the facts of the
particular case.362 Negligence cannot be inferred from the mere fact of a person having been run over.363
Where the trial court and the appellate court convicted the driver of a bus with the finding that he was guilty of
rashness and negligence both in driving the bus under sections 279 and 337, IPC, but in revision the Bombay
High Court found that there was only negligence on his part and maintained the conviction.364 Therefore, either
of the two is sufficient to bring home the guilt to the accused.
[s 279.15] Distinction between “Negligence” and “Rashness”
Rashness consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may
cause injury and running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the
consequences. And criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable
and proper care and precaution to guard against injuring others which having regard to all the circumstances
out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted.365
Distinction between rashness and negligence is that negligence connotes want of proper care, while rashness
conveys of idea of reckless doing of an act without consideration of any consequences. A rash act is primarily
an over hasty act and is thus opposed to a deliberate act, but it also includes an act which, though it may be
said to be deliberate, is yet done without due deliberation and caution. Austin366 has drawn distinction between
negligence and rashness which, though closely allied “are broadly distinguished by differences.” In cases of
negligence, the party performs not an act to which he is obliged. He breaks a positive duty. Negligence is
basically a breach of a duty because of omission to do something which a reasonable man guided by these
considerations which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs to mould, or doing something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. “Negligence” is not an affirmative word. It is a negative word. It is absence
of such care, skill and diligence as it was the duty of the person to bring to the performance of the work which
he is said not to have performed. There is a distinction between a rash act and a negligent act. Criminal
negligence is the great and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable or proper care and
precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which having
regard to all circumstances out of which charge has arisen was the imperative duty of the accused person to
have adopted. Negligence is an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon these
considerations which ordinarily regulate conduct of human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent
and reasonable man would not do. A culpable rashness is acting with consciousness that mischievous effect
will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised caution incumbent upon him and if
he had he would have had consciousness. Imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumstances.
As between rashness and negligence, the former is a graver offence.367
There is a clear distinction between negligence and rashness and that distinction is contemplated even by this
section. In the case of negligence, the party does not do an act which he was bound to do, because he adverts
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not to do it. In the case of rashness, the party does an act and breaks a positive duty. He thinks of the probable
mischief. But in consequences of a mis-supposition begotten by insufficient advertence, he assumes that the
mischief will not ensue in the given instance or case. The radical idea denoted is always this. The party runs a
risk of which he is conscious. Even in ordinary parlance, negligence connotes want of proper care and
rashness conveys the idea of recklessness or the doing of an act without due consideration.368
[s 279.15.1] No Presumption of Negligence in Certain Cases
Negligence, however, cannot be inferred from the mere fact of a person having been run over,369 or from the
mere fact that the passengers were dragged into the bus in a hurry before the two buses collided,370 or from a
mere fact that an accident has taken place and some persons have been injured,371 or from the mere fact that
the vehicle was at a fast speed.372 Failure of the driver to sound the horn has also been held to be negligent
driving.373
[s 279.16] Consciousness about Consequences in Rashness and Negligence in Practice
Culpable rashness is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow, but
with the hope that they will not, and often with the belief that the accused has taken sufficient precautions to
prevent their happenings.374 The imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness (luxuria). Culpable
negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in
circumstances which show that the accused has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him, and that if he
had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of the civil duty of
circumspection. It is manifest that personal injury consciously and intentionally caused cannot fall within either
of these categories which are wholly inapplicable to the case of an act or a series of acts, themselves intended,
which are the direct producers of death.375
Rashness consists in doing something which ought not to have been done by a person who “adverts to the
consequences of his act, but by reason of some assumption which he examines insufficiently (he) concludes
that those consequences will not follow the act in the instance before him”. “The party runs a risk of which he is
conscious; but he thinks that the mischief will probably be averted in the given instance”.376 Negligence consists
in not doing something which ought to have been done, by a person who does not think about that which he
ought to have done.377 A rash act is primarily an over-hasty act and is thus opposed to a deliberate act.378 The
rashness conveys an idea of recklessness in doing of an act without consideration of any consequences.379
Rashness implies doing an act and thereby breaking a negative duty, and negligence implies not doing an act,
and thereby breaking a positive duty. The one is doing something which ought not to have been done; the other
is not doing something which ought to have been done. Such is the precise meaning of these terms in the
language of jurisprudence, but, the word “rashness” as used in the Code includes “heedlessness” and thus
signifies an insufficient advertence or complete inadvertence to the consequence of his conduct on the part of
the agent. Thus, a man on horseback who furiously gallops down a crowded street commits a rash act, whether
he thinks that people will get out of his way, or gives no thought at all to the probable consequences of what he
is doing. So the driving of a vehicle at a high speed without caring for the persons going on the road, amounts
to culpable rashness.380 Absence of any person inside the vehicle is not, by itself, a circumstance to absolve the
accused from liability.381
Again, “negligence” in practice is more often combined with a positive act, ie, it does not exist in reference to
the very act, but with regard to the neglect of certain necessary precautions in doing the act. Thus, in the
language of these sections, it is the “manner” of doing the act which is rash or negligent. To take the above
example, riding down the crowded street is the act in question. Galloping under these circumstances is a
manner of riding which is rash, whilst omitting to give warning to the foot-passengers is a negligent manner of
riding. The culpability (in culpable negligence) “arises from the neglect of the civil duty of circumspection”.382
Such circumspection as “a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the
conduct of human affairs” would use.383
[s 279.17] Determination of Rashness and Negligence
In determining whether a person is negligent or rash, the standard of reasonable care is that which is
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reasonably to be demanded in the circumstances. The relevant circumstances to take into account may be the
importance of the end to be served by acting in this way or the other. If all the vehicles running on the roads in
this country were restricted to a speed of 5 or 10 miles per hour, there would be fewer accidents. But our
national life would be intolerably slowed down. Therefore, the purpose to be served, if sufficiently important,
justifies the assumption of abnormal risk. But that does not mean that the driver of a vehicle who uses the
highway should take abnormal risk and drive in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to
be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person.
The driver must be able to pull up within limits of vision, but each case must depend upon its own
circumstances.384 The condition of the road and the nature of traffic are also circumstances to be considered in
order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the accident was the result of rash and negligent driving of the
vehicle by the driver.385 When the road is free and the road condition is perfect, the accused is justified in
driving his vehicle (mini bus) at normal speed. But even when the road is blocked by the truck and the road
condition is bad as fresh earth was spread on the roadside, if the accused-driver still drives his vehicle at
normal speed without slowing it down, it is evident that such driving is a rash and negligent act on his part.386
Speed is not a criterion even to infer the rash or negligent act of driving, but it is corroborative factor.387Accused
driver of a roadways bus was driving bus at a high speed which dashed against a tempo coming from opposite
direction and caused injuries to three persons occupants of the tempo. Accused driver was convicted under
[s 279.17.1] Boy Crossing the Road
The accused driver was driving the bus; the bus took deviation at the spot of the accident and hit the house.
The injured passenger PW did not depose that the accused was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The
defence version was that a boy was crossing the road and to avoid accident, the accused driver looked to the
other side of the road and hit the house. The defence version being probable was believed, the accused
appellant was acquitted of the charge under sections 279, 337, 338 and 427, IPC.389
[s 279.17.2] Principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur —If Applicable
Commentary under same heading in section 304A, vol III may be referred to.
It is true that in motor accident cases the principle that the facts speak for themselves is applicable.390 The
principle of res ipsa loquitur will apply to the facts of the case where the incident speaks for itself. Where, the
vehicle was driven on the highway by the accused on the wrong391 side and the accident resulted in death of
two persons, it was held that it is a fit case where the principle of res ipsa loquitur is applied. Normally, this
principle is applicable only in the realm of tortious liability. An accident as mentioned above will speak for itself
for the rash and negligent act on the part of the accused.392 The courts can invoke the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur which is found applicable by the apex court as long back in the case of Syed Akbar v State of
Karnataka.393 But where some prosecution witnesses have corroborated the explanation given by the accused
that he was compelled to take the vehicle to the right side leaving the road, in order to avoid a head-on collision
with the lorry, it was clear that even assuming that the principle of res ipsa loquitur can be pressed into service
in a case like this, there was sufficient explanation offered by the accused to explain why he had to take the
vehicle to the wrong side. That being so, ignoring this aspect, the principle of res ipsa loquitur could not be
applied stating that the facts spoke for themselves inasmuch as such facts were capable of being explained by
the accused.394 In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of “rashness” or “negligence”
could be drawn by invoking the maxim “res ipsa loquitur”.395
The principle of res ipsa loquitur has limited application in the domain of criminal law.396Where accused driver
has reasonable explanation for the accident viz, in order to avoid head on collusion he had to take vehicle to
the wrong side resulting in accident, the accused cannot be convicted under section 279, IPC by applying the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.397
[s 279.17.3] Mere Non-Observance of Rules not Necessarily Constitutes Wilful Rashness or Negligence
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Mere non-observance of the requirements of the rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act or driving a vehicle,
which is not in its ideal condition, would not necessarily amount to wilful rashness or negligence required to
constitute an offence under the Motor Vehicles Act or driving a vehicle, which is not in its ideal condition, would
not necessarily amount to wilful rashness or negligence required to constitute an offence under the aforesaid
sections.398
[s 279.17.4] Accidents on Highway
The situation that prevails on the open highway is slightly different to one that the court would take into account
had the incident taken place within the city limits. One needs to take into account the factors that on the
highway, vehicles would legitimately be moving at a relatively high speed. The more important aspect is that on
the highway the vehicles have a right of way and if a person desires to cross the highway, the rules of the road
require that the person would have to wait until the traffic has passed and only then embark on crossing the
highway. It is a very familiar error committed by pedestrians even on the national highway that they saunter on
to the road regardless of the movement of the traffic and if a person does a suicidal act of this type, then it
would be impermissible for a court in a situation of this type to hold the driver of the vehicle responsible for the
consequences of the act.399 High or low speed is a relative term depending upon other factors.400 Where the
vehicle being driven on a national highway, caused an accident in front of a school, it is expected for a driver to
be cautious and slow down the vehicle.401
[s 279.17.5] Slow and Fast Speed—Depends upon Individual Notions
The fact that a vehicle is driven at high speed or the fact that a vehicle is not driven at high speed cannot, by
itself, without judging the situation in which the driver has been placed, be a factor to determine rashness or
negligence. High speed may not in each case be sufficient to hold that the driver is rash or negligent. If,
however, a person is driving along a street in a town or in a crowded locality where persons are on the move,
he has a duty not to drive carelessly and at an unusually rapid pace.402 Mere proof of high speed is not
sufficient to prove rashness and negligence to drive home the accusation under sections 279 and 304A,
IPC.403Merely because the truck was being driven at a “high-speed” does not bespeak of either “negligence” or
“rashness” by itself. When none of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even
approximately, as to what they meant by “high-speed”. “High-speed” is a relative term, it is for the prosecution
to bring on record material to establish as to what is meant by “high-speed” in the facts and circumstances of
the case.404 It is always dangerous to rely upon such evidence of the passengers because what is slow speed
and fast speed depends upon the idea or notions about the speed and which varies from person to person.
Unless a passenger is conversant with driving, it is difficult to rely upon the evidence of such a passenger to
determine whether the bus was driven at fast speed or otherwise. The accident had taken place on a zig-zag
road and it is unlikely that the driver could have driven the bus at such place at a high speed. If the bus was not
driven at a high speed, then the mere fact that the accident has taken place would not lead to the conclusion
that the accused was driving rashly and negligently.405 Where the bus driver drove the bus at a very high speed,
lost control over the vehicle and came to the eastern side of the road causing an accident with a jeep resulting
in death of all passengers travelling in the jeep, besides finding no mechanical defect in the offending vehicle,
the conviction of the accused driver under sections 279 & 304A, IPC, was maintained.406 Where the accused
while driving the truck with high speed climbed onto a footpath and hit the deceased from behind causing his
death, testimony of five witnesses was found truthful, conviction of the accused under sections 279, 304A, IPC,
was upheld.407
The expression “high speed” is an unambiguous/unclear expression. There must be prosecution evidence that
the accused was driving the vehicle in rash and negligent manner.408
Where the accused driver of the bus even though was driving the vehicle at a slow speed, but hit a scooterist
from behind causing death, was held guilty under sections 279 and 304A, IPC.409
[s 279.17.6] Speed alone not the Test of Rashness and Negligence—Real Test Indicted
The relationship between speed, rashness or negligence depends upon the place, time, condition of the road,
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nature of the traffic and such other like circumstances. A motor vehicle is meant to be driven in speed. It is not
always the one who drives his vehicle at a slow speed who is a safe driver. So, the speed with which a vehicle
is driven is not always the deciding factor for coming to a finding whether accused was driving rashly or
negligently.410 Speed is not the sole contention for determining the negligent driving of the vehicle unless and
until it is proved by the cogent evidence that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently.411 It is not the
speed alone that makes the driving rash or negligent. An automobile is meant to be driven in speed. Depending
upon the place, speed by itself may not be rashness or negligence sometimes. But even without speed, driving
can be rash or negligent as to endanger human life or health. The real test for negligent driving is whether the
accident could have been avoided by the accused if he had exercised due care and diligence which ordinarily
cautious persons using the road in similar circumstances would have done.412
It may not be always possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was
driving rashly and negligently. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and
negligently, it would amount to “rash and negligent driving” within the meaning of section 279, IPC.413
Speed is not a criteria even to infer the rash or negligent act of driving, but it is corroborative factor.414Accused
driver of a roadways bus, driving bus at a high speed which dashed against a tempo coming from opposite
direction, caused injuries to three persons occupants of the tempo, accused driver was convicted under
To bring home a charge under section 279, IPC prosecution has to prove not only the fact that the accused was
driving the vehicle on a public way, but has also to prove that such driving was so rash or negligent as to
endanger human life or likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. Criminal negligence or criminal
rashness is an important element.
The speed is not the sole contention for determining the negligent driving of the vehicle, unless and until it is
proved by cogent evidence that the vehicle was being driven rashly or negligently.416 Mere fact that the accused
was driving the vehicle at high speed may not attract the provision of this section and prosecution has to prove
something more.417
[s 279.17.7] Situation and Location are also Material
High speed is a relative term. A vehicle which is driven in a congested road even at a speed of 30 km may
constitute high speed, but driving a vehicle at a speed higher than 30 kms in an open road may not be
considered driving at high speed. It would depend upon the nature and situation of the road, concentration of
pedestrians and vehicular traffic on it and many such other relevant factors.418
The road on which the truck was plying was only 11 feet wide and, therefore, a very narrow road. Even if the
truck was going at a speed of 10–12 miles per hour, it cannot be said as a rule that it was not rash driving. It
depends upon the situation or the location where the vehicle was being driven.419 High or low speed is a relative
term depending upon other factors. If a vehicle with defective brakes is driven at a speed of 15–20 kms in a
crowded bazaar, it is nothing but driving the vehicle rashly at high speed.420 The lengthy skid marks found on
the spot indicate that the bus while on descend and having negotiated the curve was being driven at a very high
speed.421 The fact that the accident took place on the right side of the road on a blind turn and brake-marks of
6.5 meters were found on the right side of the road, by itself proves that the accused was rash and negligent in
driving the vehicle.422 Where, the evidence of a witness whose jeep was also involved in the accident clearly
discloses that the truck was being driven by the accused at a very high speed, the truck had no lights, it was
being driven without the driver sounding the horn, the visibility was very poor at that time due to heavy fog and
the witness was driving the jeep on the left side of the road very cautiously at a speed less than 15–20 miles
per hour and he had put on both the head lights and he was also sounding the horn at intervals, so as to give
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warning to the vehicles approaching from the opposite sides. The finding of the courts below that the accident
happened due to rash and negligent driving of the accused was perfectly justified.423
But where the evidence of the motor vehicle inspector, who visited the spot of accident, showed that after the
accident the motor-cycle moved to a distance of 17.6 meters, it is a strong factor to draw the inference that the
driving of the motor-cycle was rash and negligent. There can be no escape from the conclusion that the
accused-respondent is guilty of offences under section 279, IPC.424
[s 279.17.8] Dragging Marks/Skid Marks on Road—Absence of
Absence of dragging marks/skid marks on the road are not always or invariably necessary to prove
rashness/negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle.425
[s 279.17.9] Other Factors
Where the truck was not being driven at a fast speed in a rash and negligent manner but it was the deceased
himself who fully contributed to the cause of the accident and came in front of the truck all of a sudden when it
was only at a distance of 6–7 feet. In these circumstances it was held, it cannot be said that the petitioner
caused the accident due to his rash and negligent driving and the conviction of the petitioner cannot be
sustained.426
Similarly, where the pedestrian crossed the road without attempting to take care to see the approaching vehicle
with the consequences that he was knocked down by that vehicle, it was held that the finding as to rashness or
negligence on the part of the driver was wrong and no offence under section 279, IPC was made out.427
While the truck was going on the main thoroughfare from south to north, the ill-fated young girl was crossing the
road from east to west and she had already covered 35 ft. of the road. There was sufficient time and margin for
the driver to see that the young child was crossing the road and he could have applied brakes instead of
knocking down the girl only 17 ft. away from the kerb. Appellant accused was convicted of charge under
sections 279 and 304A, IPC.428
Accused car driver was prosecuted on allegations that the accused was driving the car in rash and negligent
manner and caused grievous injuries to a child 7 years old. Evidence proved that the child was playing on the
road, while playing the child was running on the road to reach the house, due to this act, he came in contact
with the car and the driver of the car had applied its brakes to save him and there were skid marks up to 30
feet. The site plan prepared by IO corroborated the defence version as there were skid marks on the spot.
Accused was acquitted of the charges under sections 279, 337 and 338, IPC.429
[s 279.17.10] Accidents on Account of Mechanical defect in the Vehicle
Commentary under the same heading in section 304A, vol III may be referred to.
Evidence of witnesses established that the accused appellant driving a jeep loaded with passengers, dashed
with roadside trees, collapsed by the side of the road, and as a result 12/13 passengers on board sustained
injuries, one injured died later in the hospital. Vehicle was seized from the spot in damaged condition. The
motor vehicle inspector reported that the vehicle was having no mechanical defect at the time of the accident.
Accused appellant had suffered injuries in the accident. The appellant driver was convicted under sections 279,
338 and 304A, IPC.430
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Where the accident took place not due to rash and negligent driving of the car by the accused-petitioner but
due to some mechanical defect, which developed when the car was being driven on the road immediately
before the accident had taken place, and the brake-oil leaked out, it cannot be said that the accused petitioner
was negligent in not checking up the brake-oil, rather it appears that it was due to sheer ill-luck that the brake-
oil leaked out due to some mechanical defect which the car had developed all of a sudden, it was held that the
accident during which the cyclist sustained his injuries was due to negligence on his own part and not due to
rash and negligent driving of the car by the accused-petitioner.431
[s 279.17.11] Mechanical Defect in Vehicle
Where the evidence established that the accident by a Road Transport Corporation bus occurred due to
mechanical defect in the bus, the accused driver of the bus was acquitted of the charges under sections 279
and 304A, IPC.432
The evidence led by the prosecution as well as by the defence clearly shows that the accident had taken place
because of a mechanical defect mainly that the steering of the bus had got locked at the time when it met with
the accident with the motorcyclist. No doubt, as could be inferred from the sketch, the bus had gone to the right,
beyond the road along with the said motorcyclist. However, on this count alone one certainly cannot come to
the conclusion that the accused/driver of the said bus was driving it rashly and negligently, more so because
the motorcyclist was coming from his opposite direction. Therefore, the accused was entitled to acquittal.433
When steering wheel being not in order and hence, not workable, is a part of prosecution story itself shows that
it was not necessary for the accused to state these facts in so many words even in his examination under
section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It can safely be inferred that incident was merely an accident
and there is nothing to infer that the accused was driving the vehicle either rashly or negligently.434
[s 279.17.12] Poor Maintenance of Vehicle
The accused appellant by rash and negligent driving of scooter had caused serious injuries to a four years old
boy. The appellant had taken plea that the accident had occurred as tyre of the scooter had bursted. Poor
maintenance of the vehicle is itself a negligent act as it speaks of “absence of care” so far as the vehicle is
concerned. Accused appellant was convicted under sections 279 and 304A.435
[s 279.17.13] Boy Crossing the Road
The accused driver was driving the bus, the bus took deviation at the spot of the accident and hit the house.
The injured passenger PW did not depose that the accused was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The
defence version was that a boy was crossing the road and to avoid accident, the accused driver took to the
other side of the road and hit the house. The defence version being probable was believed, the accused
appellant was acquitted of the charge under sections 279, 337, 338 and 427, IPC.436
[s 279.17.14] Benefit of Doubt when to be Given
The onus is on the prosecution to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the vehicle was being driven in a
rash or negligent manner. What is rash or negligent driving would depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down. Where the court is not able to get a clear picture as to how
the accident happened, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.437
[s 279.18] Duties of the Driver and user of the Road [s 279.18.1] To Prevent Injury
As shown above, the offence consists in rash or negligent driving or riding. It is the duty of everyone who drives
a vehicle on a public highway to drive it with such care and caution as to prevent, as far as is in his or her
power, any injury to any person.438 There is a duty on the driver of a motor car to observe ordinary care or skill
towards persons using the highway, whom he could reasonably foresee as likely to be affected.439
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[s 279.18.2] Special Care in Case of Mechanical Defect
Where a vehicle with defective brakes had to be driven in the crowded bazaar the driver was required to
exercise reasonable care by driving the bus at snail’s speed to enable him to bring it to a halt whenever
required without applying the brakes.440
[s 279.18.3] Foot Passenger’s Right to use Carriageway
A foot passenger, though he may be infirm from disease, has a right to walk on the carriageway, although there
be a footpath, and he is entitled to the exercise of reasonable care on the part of the persons driving carriages
along the carriageway.441 It is obviously the duty of a driver to see that he does not approach so near a car in
front of him that he cannot avoid a collision if that car slackens speed or stops.442
[s 279.18.4] Overloading of Vehicle
Overloading of 60-65 people in the truck like fodder contributes to the negligence of the accused driver. In the
present case the truck had turned turtle, causing injuries to several persons of death of the three persons on
the spot and six persons in the hospital. The appellant accused driver was convicted under sections 279, 304A
and 338, IPC.443
[s 279.18.5] Blowing Horn when Necessary
Mere speed is not the criterion to Judge the rashness or negligence. Even high speed on a highway, which is
not surrounded by abadi, cannot be said to be a rash act. But driving the bus in a locality without giving any
horn is a breach of a duty imposed upon a driver.444 Failure of a driver to sound the horn also amounts to
negligent driving.445
[s 279.18.6] Condition of Road and Nature of Traffic to be kept in view
A person who is driving a motor vehicle should always keep it in a state of control sufficient to enable him to
avoid dashing against any other vehicle or running over any pedestrian who may be on the road. It is the duty
of every one who drives a vehicle on a public highway to drive it with care and caution and to avoid as far as
possible any injury to any person. The condition of the road and the nature of the traffic are also circumstances
to be considered in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the accident was the result of rash and
negligent driving of the vehicle by the driver.446
Bigger the vehicle, bigger is the responsibility. In the instant case the offending bus was a big passenger
vehicle and while driving such a big vehicle along the public road and that too in an area where there are
educational institutions, the accused driver should have been very careful. The very act of the accused in
driving the bus and dashing from behind the cyclist, would speak volumes about the rashness and negligence
in driving the vehicle.447
[s 279.18.7] Certain Precaution to be Observed—Own Safety also Material
On a clear road with no traffic in front or behind except at a distance, a driver is entitled to take any part of the
road he likes. He must, however, keep a sharp lookout in front and behind and when he sees a vehicle
approaching, he must go to the left or near side of the highway to permit the passage of the other vehicle.448
No rider or driver can tell when a pedestrian may happen to arrive on a road; consequently, he cannot drive or
ride rashly or negligently even at a time when the road happens to be temporarily unoccupied by any
pedestrian or by any vehicle. And this is so not only because any person or any vehicle may happen to arrive
on the road at any time, but also because the driver or the rider is to look to his own safety as well, and cannot
at all indulge in a riding or driving which may endanger his own life.449
[s 279.18.8] Vehicle Parked on Wrong side of Road

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The accused was alleged to have caused injuries to the driver and the passengers of the auto rickshaw,
evidence showed that the auto rickshaw at the time of the incident was parked on the wrong side of the road,
there was no evidence that the accused at the time of the accident was driving the jeep at speed beyond
prescribed limit for the area where the accident occurred, accused was acquitted of the charge under section
279, IPC.450
[s 279.18.9] Care when using Wrong side of Road
A person driving a carriage is bound to keep on the ordinary side of the road; but if he does not do so, it is his
duty to use more care and diligence, and keep a better lookout, that he may avoid collision, that would not be a
requisite if he were to keep to his proper side of the road.451 Where it was established that the accident took
place on the right side of the road taking the direction of the vehicle (truck) into consideration and the accident
took place where the driver could not see beyond the said turn, the truck crashed into the scooter coming from
the opposite direction on its own side, the fact that the accident took place on the right side of the road on a
blind turn and brake-marks of 6.5 metres were found on the right side of the road, by itself proves that accused
was rash and negligent in driving the said truck.452 Where the accused driving mini bus rashly and negligently
dashed against the bus, causing injuries to the passengers of both the buses, the mini bus driven by the
accused was on the wrong side of the road, the passengers of the mini bus deposed that the accused driver
was driving the bus at a high speed, accused respondent was convicted under sections 279 and 337, IPC.453
Where accused driver of a bus driving collided with a truck coming from opposite direction, caused injuries to
the complainant and other persons, photographs showed that the bus was coming on wrong side, he was
Where the photographs of the spot showed that the offending truck was on the wrong side of the road, i.e. on
extreme right side of road on the curve, whereas the victim Maruti car was at its left side, the appellant accused
was convicted under section 279, IPC.455
Even if there is no oral evidence of rash and negligent driving of the bus by the accused, but the fact that the
accused was driving the bus on the wrong side of the road at a high speed proves rash and negligent driving by
the accused. Accused appellant was convicted under sections 279 and 304A, IPC.456
[s 279.18.10] Constant Anticipation by Driver is subject to Normal Conditions
As already stated, the rashness and negligence in driving cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the
crossing pedestrian was knocked down by the bus. In the hustle and bustle of present day life, the most
essential element of carefulness and diligence in the activity such as driving is constant anticipation, but its
postulate is a normal condition. Where the victim had crossed over to the western side on seeing the bus
coming and still decided to cross back to the eastern side immediately unmindful of the approach of the bus, it
was observed that the driver could not be blamed for not anticipating her last trip towards the east and as he
was pardoned for not anticipating such a suicidal return journey on the part of the deceased, the case of
rashness and negligence on his part was ruled out.457
[s 279.18.11] Non-observance of the Rule of the Road
It is the duty of every user of the road to make reasonable use of it for the purposes of passing along it and to
allow others to do so also. One way of doing it is to conform to the ordinary usages of the road. When the
accused was coming along the wrong side and at a terrific speed, it is impossible to hold that he was not driving
the car in a rash or negligent manner as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any
other person.458
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Motorists are not the only persons who owe a duty of care; others also have a responsibility and must conform
to the ordinary usages of the road. There is a duty on every user of the road to make a reasonable use of it for
the purposes of passing along it, and to allow others to do so also.
A person driving a motor car has a right to expect that the persons negligently loitering on the road would make
way for him, especially when he sees that they are aware of his approach. Even when they signal him to stop,
he is not bound to do so, whatever the rules of courtesy may be. He has the right to assume that they would get
out of the way when they see him ignore their signals. It is the experience of motorists along the Indian roads,
and elsewhere also, that they are often signaled to stop by persons who are begging a ride. Obviously, they
need not pull up for this. As a rule, it is not until they are right upon them that it is possible to determine whether
the signals are really of distress or not, and then of course with a courteous driver the car is usually brought to a
standstill a short distance away. But even then one does not expect a man to stand obstinately in the way while
he is in the process of pulling up. A car cannot be stopped in a few feet, especially when it is a heavy one like a
motor lorry.459 The rule of the road is not an invariable or inflexible rule, and a deviation from it may, upon
occasion, be not only justifiable but actually necessary.460 It is the duty of any person driving another vehicle on
the same road as that on which a tram-car is running, not to bring his vehicle on the tram lines in front of the
car, so as to obstruct its ordinary progress. It follows then that a driver of a tram-car, while he must not drive
negligently or rashly, is entitled to expect that other traffic along the road will keep clear off, or remove itself
from, the tramway line so far as is reasonably possible. This does not mean of course that a driver of a tram-car
is entitled to travel with excessive speed, that he is entitled, for instance, to ignore a blind man who is trying to
cross the road or when he sees another vehicle is on the line and cannot get clear in time, that he is entitled to
hold on his way regardless of all other considerations. His position is privileged to this extent that he has
acquired the right by law to the use of the line and he is entitled to expect that if other vehicles are in the way
that they will give passage to him.
In a case where a tram-car collided with a camel cart, it appeared that the tram-car was being driven by the
applicant at a fast, but not at an excessive speed, upon the tram lime, and there was nothing upon the tram line
directly in front of the tram-car, but on the other line parallel to it, the camel cart was proceeding in the same
direction. It also appeared that if the camel had not suddenly swerved to the left side instead of to the right side
there would have been no collision. In the circumstances, it was held that it would not be said that the driver of
the tram-car was rash or negligent within the meaning of this section merely because he did not anticipate that
the camel would suddenly swerve to the left side instead of to the right side. He was entitled to expect that the
camel cart would continue on its way or that, if it made any effort to move, the effort would be directed towards
moving away from the line upon which his car was proceeding and not moving across it.461
[s 279.18.12] Accident at Green Signal
Where the accused driving a bus at a fast speed struck against the deceased at green signal, held it was
sufficient proof that the accused was driving the bus rashly and negligently.462
[s 279.18.13] Driving on Right Side on Kacha or Zigzag Road
Where the road was admittedly zig-zag near the place of accident, the accused driver ought to have slowed
down the bus so as to be able to stop it at a moment’s notice, and should not have driven the bus on the right
side of the road. When a heavy loaded bus is driven across a zig-zag road or up a hill prudence requires that
he should reduce the speed considerably so as to be able to stop the vehicle at a moment’s notice.463 The very
act of driving of the vehicle on the right side of the kuccha road itself is a dangerous act.464
[s 279.19] Precaution in “Trial Run”
A “trial run” is after all a “test run” to satisfy the repairers that the repair work has been completed to their
satisfaction. Putting a vehicle to trial run, therefore, is not certifying to its road-worthiness. The board should be
hung on the vehicle to that effect to warn all concerned that such a vehicle on the road is not absolutely
roadworthy but was being tested for the purpose, and the possibility of its failing could not be ruled out.465
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[s 279.20] Dashing against a Stationary Vehicle
The act of the accused in dashing against a stationary lorry may amount to rash and negligent driving. With the
head lights on, the driver of the offending vehicle should have been able to see the stationary lorry and with
diligent driving could have avoided the accident.466
[s 279.21] Passenger Jumping Out of Bus in Motion
The deceased, on his own, opened the gate and alighted from the bus, while it was still in motion. On being
asked by the conductor and the passengers the accused immediately stopped the bus. On these facts if the
deceased had no patience and without waiting for the bus to come to complete halt, alighted, no negligence
can be attributed to the driver of the bus. Thus, even if the prosecution case goes un-rebutted there are no
chances of the accused being guilty for offence under section 279 or 304A, IPC.467 Where the accused
appellant driver of the truck was negotiating steep height and the truck due to some mechanical defect or
otherwise started rolling back, one of the four labourers out of panic jumped from the truck and died, the act of
jumping from the truck was the rash and negligent act of the deceased, for which the accused could not be
[s 279.22] Passenger going on Roof of Bus
Section 279 deals with rash driving or riding on a pubic way. For bringing in application of either sections 279 or
304A it must be established that there was an element of rashness or negligence. Appellant accused was a
driver in Himachal Pradesh Transport Corporation. On the day of the incident while he was driving the vehicle,
the bus had stopped at a bus stop. One passenger after alighting from the bus went to its roof top for the
purpose of unloading his luggage. The accused without waiting for a signal from the conductor and without
verifying if all the passengers who were to board, had boarded and who were to alight had alighted, all of a
sudden started the bus as a result of which the said passenger fell down and sustained injuries. He was carried
to the hospital where he succumbed to the injuries. Even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, there
was no evidence led to show that any negligence was involved. The conviction of the accused appellant under
sections 279 and 304A, IPC was set aside.469
[s 279.23] Driving on the Wrong Side of Road—Whether Offence
The mere non-observance of the requirements of the rules, framed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, or
driving a vehicle, which is not in an ideal condition, would not necessarily amount to wilful rashness or
negligence, required to constitute an offence under sections 279 and 304A, IPC.470 It is true that the usage of
the road is not the sole criterion for determining negligence and there may be instances where even though the
vehicle was found on the wrong side of the road, the driver had taken appropriate precautions and exercised
due care and diligence.471
It cannot be said that a person driving his motor car even slowly on the wrong side of the road at a blind corner
between two roads of considerable traffic is not driving the car rashly or negligently.472 But it is not always
necessarily rash and negligent to drive on the wrong side of the road. Much would depend upon other
conditions.473
Where the accused was driving on the wrong side of the road, but he took all possible precautions by driving
his car slowly and by putting his hand up to give his signal to the complainant when he saw the complainant’s
car coming on from the opposite direction at an excessive speed, but in spite of all this an unfortunate accident
occurred, which would not have occurred if the complainant had not been driving his car at an excessive speed,
it was held that the guilt of the accused under this section was not proved.474 But where the accused while
driving the truck hit the scooter from behind while overtaking the scooterist from the left side, and hit the
scooterist from the right side of the truck and could not stop immediately after colliding with the scooter, it is
obvious that the accused did not exercise reasonable and proper care which was imperative duty to have
exercised. He was obviously unmindful of the safety of the scooterist and was driving the truck at an
uncontrollable speed, as a result he could not control his vehicle after hitting the scooter. He had not even
blown the horn before overtaking the scooter from the left side. These circumstances clearly proved that the
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accused was guilty of rashness and criminal negligence and that was the direct cause of this fatal accidental
death.475
There was prosecution evidence that the accused respondent was driving motorcycle at a high speed on the
wrong side of the road after it had become dark and without lights. In mechanical examination the motorcycle
was found in order. Held, the act of the accused was such a wanton that it must be presumed that he had the
knowledge that his act would cause injury to any person on the road. He was convicted under sections 279 and
338, IPC.476
[s 279.24] Racing Competition
Where two buses were racing and competing with each other, the drivers of both the buses were held guilty
under this section because racing or competition involves rash driving on both sides.477 Permitting or taking part
in a race or trial of speed of any kind between motor vehicles in any public place without the written consent of
the state Government is an offence even under section 189 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
[s 279.25] Overtaking another Vehicle
Where the accused driving a vehicle overtakes another vehicle at fast speed having total disregard to the
passengers who might have been crossing the road after alighting form the vehicle, he is guilty of rash and
negligent driving. Accused appellant was convicted under section 304A.478
Accused appellant, driver of a van, attempted to overtake the car, had hit the scooter and caused the death of
the rider and injuries to the pillion rider of the scooter. The name of the accused was not mentioned in the FIR.
He was arrested after one month of the accident. Identifying witness had only a glimpse of the driver of the
vehicle. There was no interaction between identifying witness and the driver of the vehicle at the spot for a
sufficient longer period. In these circumstances, the identification of the accused for the first time, after six
years, in the court, in the absence of any test identification parade, during the course of investigation was held
not to be sufficient to connect him with the present case. Accused was acquitted of the charges under sections
279 and 304A, IPC.479
[s 279.26] “Driving Cart without Reins”
Simply driving a cart, the bullocks of which have no nose-string, does not constitute the offence under this
section.480
Upon a trial for manslaughter it appeared that the accused was standing up in a spring cart; the reins were not
in his hands, but lying on the horse’s back; while the horse was trotting down a hill with the cart, the deceased,
a child of about three years old, ran across the road before the horse, and the wheel of the cart knocked it down
and killed it. It did not appear that the accused saw the child before the accident. Erle J, told the jury that if the
accused had had the reins, and by using them, could have saved the child, he was guilty of manslaughter; but if
they thought he could not have saved the child by pulling the reins or otherwise by their assistance, they must
acquit him.481
On an indictment for manslaughter, the evidence was that the accused, being employed to drive a cart, sat
inside instead of attending at the horse’s head, and while he was sitting there, the cart ran over a child who was
gathering up flowers on the road. Bayley B, held that the accused, by being in the cart, instead of at the horse’s
head, or by its side, was guilty of negligence, and death having been caused thereby, he was guilty of
manslaughter.482
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Where a person allowed his cart to proceed unattended along a road and ran over a boy who was sleeping on
the road, it was held he could be not convicted under this section but either under section 337 or section 338,
IPC.483
[s 279.27] “Rash Riding”
If a person rides a horse so fast that he would be unable to stop it if a foot-passenger got in the way, he would
be liable under this section provided that the foot-passenger acted in a reasonable manner.484
[s 279.28] “Riding Pillion on Bicycle”
For a man to ride a pillion on an ordinary bicycle in a crowded street is a negligent act which is likely to cause
injury to the other persons and vehicles there.485
[s 279.29] “Contributory Negligence”—Doctrine not Applicable in Criminal Law
In case of an accident on account of rash and negligent driving under this section, contributory negligence
cannot be put up as a defence.486 It is well established that the doctrine of contributory negligence, so well
known in the law of tort, has, as such, fortunately no place in criminal law. The question is purely one of
causation and the facts of each case should be examined in the light of the principles suggested above. It may,
in some cases, appear that it was the sufferer’s own conduct which can alone be regarded as the cause of his
misfortune. But where this is not so, the victim’s carelessness or folly does not per se limit the liability of one
who has, in fact, caused him harm.487 In cases of road accidents the court has to keep in mind the likelihood of
an error of judgment on the part of the person who is driving a motor vehicle as well as a pedestrian who
attempts to cross the road little realising the great difference in his speed and that of the approaching motor
vehicle.488 The doctrine of contributory negligence has no application in criminal law.489
[s 279.29.1] Contributory Negligence—No Defence in such Cases
Whether a vehicle is being driven fast or not depends upon the notion of a person. The petitioner was carrying
his sister on the pillion seat and in the normal course he would not be driving the motor cycle recklessly for his
and for the safety of his sister. The plea of contributory negligence is no defence on a case of this nature but
then while deciding the criminality one has to bear in mind the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and
the eyewitnesses” testimony cannot be accepted mechanically unless it fits in with the facts and circumstances
of the case leading to the conclusion that the act of the accused was really a vicarious act of recklessness
which alone resulted in the accident.490
[s 279.29.2] Contributory Negligence—Ground for Lesser Punishment
Where the accused overtook three buses at a time by driving his bus in a rash and negligent manner and not
only collided with the bus coming from the opposite side but also lost control of his vehicle and clashed against
a tree causing simple and grievous injuries to the passengers and his conviction under sections 279, 337, 338,
IPC and section 184, Motor Vehicle Act (59 of 1988) was found proper. But, since the driver coming from the
opposite side was also guilty of contributory negligence, the accused was not found entitled to leniencies and
was sentenced to pay fine quantified at Rs 1000 on each of the heads of charge aggregating to Rs 4000 and no
default in sentence was prescribed.491
Due to rash and negligent driving of cart, the deceased child came under the wheel of the cart, was crushed.
Three carts were involved in the accident. As the case was of contributory negligence, sentence was reduced
to the period already undergone.492
[s 279.30] “So as to Endanger Human Life or to be Likely to Cause Hurt or Injury”
To be guilty of an offence under this section the accused must drive the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner
and driving must be such as to endanger human life or be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. A
certain aggravated degree of rash or negligent driving is contemplated here.493 For an offence under this
section the effect of the manner in which the act is performed must be either: (a) that human life was, as a fact
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endangered thereby, or (b) that hurt or injury was likely to be caused thereby. Therefore, it must be shown that
some person was either in a position of danger to his life, or that there was a likelihood of persons being hurt or
injured. Likelihood is something stronger that a possibility, and may or may not amount to a probability, which is
merely a stronger degree of likelihood.494 A magistrate may, therefore, take into consideration the probability of
persons using the road being placed in danger, and the fact that no one happened to be on the road at the time
is no defence.495 For a conviction under this section, it is, however, not necessary that the rash or negligent act
should result in injury to life or limb. Bare negligence involving the risk of injury is punishable under the
section.496
[s 279.31] Rash or Negligent Driving or Riding not Permissible even when Roads are Unoccupied
The more the public way is crowded, the greater is the diligence and care expected from a driver or rider.
Again, no rider or driver can tell when a pedestrian may happen to arrive on a road, consequently, he cannot
drive or ride rashly or negligently even at a time when the road happens to be temporarily unoccupied by any
pedestrian or by any vehicle. And this is not only because any person or any vehicle may happen to arrive on
the road at any time, but also because the driver or the rider is to look to his own safety as well and cannot at
all indulge in a riding or driving which may endanger his own life.497
[s 279.32] “Hurt”
[s 279.33] “Injury”
The word “injury” in the section, would denote any harm whatever illegally caused, to any person, in body,
mind, reputation or property (refer to section 44 ante). Therefore, negligent or rash driving, which may cause
harm to the property of a person, is covered in this section.498
[s 279.34] “To any other Person”
The words “any other person” are very wide, and are not distinctly limited to persons on a road as distinct from
the occupants of the particular vehicle which is being rashly or negligently driven. They are wide enough to
include the occupants of the vehicle itself, and it may be reasonably held, especially at the present time, that
the occupants of a motor bus have as much right to be protected against rash or negligent driving on the part of
the driver of the bus as have other people on the road.499
[s 279.35] “Abetment”—Meaning
To establish the abetment of an offence under this section, it is not sufficient to show that the accused had
instigated the driver to drive fast; it must be shown at least that he instigated him to drive at a pace which was
in itself, in all the circumstances, so rashly fast as to endanger human life. In fact, looking at the common sense
view, it seems unlikely that any passenger in a car would explicitly tell any person to drive in a manner which is
dangerous. The fact that the owner or an occupant did not insist on the driver driving at a moderate pace, does
not show that he instigated his driving at a reckless pace.500
[s 279.35.1] Supervisor of Learner Driver when Liable
The appellant had been acting (under the appropriate statutory regulation) as supervisor of a learner-driver of a
motorcar. The driver pulled out on a pronounced bend of the road in order to overtake and pass a horse and
cart, being unable to see a motor-lorry which was approaching in the opposite direction on its proper side of the
road. He stalled his engine when well over the center of the road so that a collision occurred. The appellant
sitting in the passenger’s seat on the left of the driver saw the horse and cart, the white line in the center of the
road, and the driver’s manoeuvre in pulling out to pass, but he took no steps to prevent this, and so far as the
evidence showed, remained passive. The driver was convicted of driving the motor vehicle without due care
and attention, and the appellant was convicted of aiding and abetting the driver.
Page 25 of 44
In dismissing his appeal, the divisional court held that the appellant was under a legal duty imposed by the
regulations to take such action as could be reasonably expected to be done by a person supervising the acts of
another to prevent that other from acting unskillfully or carelessly in a manner likely to cause danger to others;
and to this extent to participate in the driving.501
[s 279.35.2] Owner or Occupant when also Liable
If, however, the circumstances justify an inference that a common purpose to drive the car in a dangerously
rash or negligent manner existed between the owner or occupant and the driver, the former also would be
liable.502
[s 279.35.3] 36. Liability of Owner of Vehicle—When Exists
The rashness or negligence must be personal. Thus, the actual driver, and not the owner of the carriage, is
liable under this section.503 But this rule does not apply in cases where a master employs a servant to do
anything which is prima facie dangerous to the public.504
[s 279.37] Liability under this Section and Special Laws
It cannot be laid down as a general rule of law that where there is a special law making a particular act an
offence and providing penalties for such an offence, the general law must be held to be inapplicable. It is
possible that the same act may be an offence under two different Acts and both may be applicable
simultaneously, and the offender may be prosecuted and convicted under either Act. It may, however, be
conceded that where the offence falls strictly within the provision of a section of a special Act, rather than fall
back upon a more general law which prescribes a heavier penalty, in such a case it may be assumed that the
Legislature in prescribing the smaller penalty has considered recourse to the special law as the proper
course.505 Where a special kind of rash or negligent act is penalised under a special law, recourse should not
be had to this section.506
The offence under this section is cognizable, but a summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a
bailable offence but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate and even summarily.
The cognizance of an offence under this section can be taken within one year.507 Trial should be speedy. In
case of enormous delay it is liable to be quashed.508 Delay of nine and a half years for a trial of rash and
negligence driving was held to be too long a time to be condoned.509
[s 279.38.1] Court’s Discretion to Exempt Personal Appearance of Accused
Under section 317, CrPC, the Judge or magistrate can, at any stage of inquiry or trial, dispense with the
personal attendance of the accused before the court if he satisfies that his presence is not necessary in the
interest of justice. The discretion to exempt personal attendance of the accused should be exercised judicially
with care and caution depending upon circumstances of each case or each occasion. Accordingly, when a
question of identification of an offender arises in a case under sections 279 and 304A, IPC, the Judge or
magistrate should see that on the date of examination of eye-witnesses, the accused appears in court so that
they can get a chance to identify him.510
[s 279.39] Notice under Section 251, CrPC
The following form of the notice under section 251, CrPC, 1973 may be adopted:
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I (name of the office of the magistrate etc) hereby give notice to you (name of accused) as follows:
That you on or about the………… day of ………… at…………, drove a vehicle (name the vehicle), or rode on a public
way (name the way) in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt (or injury)
to any other person and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 279 of the Indian Penal Code, and
And I hereby direct that you be tried for the said offence.
Q. Have you heard and understood the notice?
Ans. Yes
Q. Do you plead guilty or have any defence to make?
Ans. Name of the office of the Magistrate
[s 279.40] Joinder of Charges and Persons at one Trial
Rash or negligent driving by the driver of one vehicle is independent of rash or negligent driving by the driver of
another vehicle. When, therefore, two vehicles collide due to the rash or negligent driving of the drivers of the
two vehicles, the two acts of the two drivers cannot be said to constitute the same transaction within the
meaning of section 223, CrPC, and the trial of the two drivers together at one trial for the offence under section
279 is illegal.511 It has been held that where two motor vehicles coming from opposite directions collide due to
rash and negligent driving by the drivers of the two vehicles, and the collision results in the death of one
passenger and grievous hurt to another passenger, a joint trial of the two drivers for the Motor Vehicles Act, is
illegal, as they cannot be said to have been committed in the course of the same transaction.512 But a contrary
view has been taken by the Rajasthan High Court.513
[s 279.41] Proof
(i) the accused was driving a vehicle or was riding;
(ii) the driving or riding was on a public way;
(iii) he was driving or riding rashly or negligently; and

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(iv) such manner of driving or riding endangered human life, or was likely to cause hurt or injury to any
other person.514
Burden lies on the prosecution to establish that the accused driver was driving the vehicle at high speed. The
prosecution must also establish the place of occurrence.515 Where the accused has pleaded guilty, he cannot
be allowed to urge later on that he was not made aware of the consequences.516
Prosecution case was that the accused was driving a truck at a very fast speed, dashed against the deceased
from behind, causing his death. There was evidence of one witness who was also not cross-examined, there
was no other evidence showing the speed of the truck at the time of the accident. Accused was acquitted of the
charges under sections 279 and 304A, IPC.517
The petitioner accused was found guilty of driving auto rickshaw rashly and negligently. The petitioner had
dashed the said vehicle against the deceased and as a result, the deceased sustained grievous injury and was
admitted to the hospital. During treatment the deceased died after 38 days of the accident. The injury sustained
by the deceased in the accident caused by the accused, was the direct and proximate cause, which led to the
death of the deceased. The accused was convicted for offences under sections 279 and 304A.518
Eye-witnesses deposed that the accident was due to rash and negligent driving of the truck, the truck dashed
against the scooter causing the death of two brothers. The conviction of the accused under sections 279 and
304A, IPC was held proper.519
Once the accident stands proved and the circumstances which appear on the record conclude the rash or
negligent driving by the offending vehicle, immediately the onus shifts upon such driver to prove due care and
caution.520
The respondent accused was prosecuted under sections 279 and 337, IPC on allegations that he was driving
the motorcycle at high speed, hit the victim from wrong side, causing injuries on his legs, chest, head etc. There
were material omissions and contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witness. Respondent was
acquitted of the charges under sections 279 and 337, IPC.521
Where the accused driver of the bus in the process of overtaking the bullock cart dashed against the
motorcycle coming from the opposite side, the pillion rider of the motorcycle injured in the accident was the best
witness about the incident. The accused driver of the bus dragged the motorcycle for about 20 feet and stopped
the vehicle on the footpath on the western side of the road. Held, the accused driver of the bus was guilty of
rash and negligent driving of the bus. He was convicted under sections 279, 338 and 304A, IPC.522
Where the accused has been already acquitted under section 187, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for want of
evidence, accused cannot be convicted for offences under sections 279 and 304A, IPC.523
[s 279.41.1] Where Pedestrian Crossing the Road is Negligent
Where a person suddenly crossed the road without taking note of the approaching vehicle, there was every
possibility of his crashing against the vehicle without the driver becoming aware of it. The driver of the vehicle in
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such circumstances cannot save accidents and so cannot be held to be negligent in such cases.524 Where the
boy who met with the accident was only aged five years, although he was accompanied by his father, yet he
was going ahead of him independently and when the truck came close, he, all of a sudden started crossing the
road, in these circumstances it cannot be said that accused driver caused the accident due to his rash and
negligent driving.525
If an accident occurs on a public road in a village and is witnessed by one or more witnesses, the eye
witnesses are more likely to be the residents of the locality or the persons visiting that locality on business or
some other purpose. Merely because the persons are residents of the village or the locality where the accident
occurred, they cannot be called as interested witnesses.526
Where a pedestrian crosses the road and does not take care to see whether any vehicle or truck is coming
along the road, so that he dashes against the bus or truck, the driver may not be held guilty of negligence.527
Where the old pedestrian crossed the road without attempting to take care to see the approaching bus with the
consequence that he was knocked down by that bus, no case of criminal negligence could be inferred against
the driver.528
[s 279.41.2] Non-examination of the Driver of Victim Vehicle
Where it is proved by the evidence on the record that the accused was driving bus rashly and negligently and
dashed against the tempo causing the death of two persons and injuries to several persons, accused would not
be acquitted on the mere ground that the driver of the tempo was not examined in the case.529
[s 279.41.3] Non-Examination of Investigating Officer
Where the very date of alleged occurrence became doubtful and the case of prosecution in this regard is
contradicted by the evidence of the doctors, the injured has stated that his statement was not recorded and only
his thumb impression was taken, the non-examination of investigating officer in these circumstances would
certainly prejudice the accused and so the accused was acquitted for the offences under sections 279 and 338,
IPC.530
[s 279.41.4] Identification of Driver-Test Identification Parade
Prosecution witnesses identified the accused driver driving the vehicle at the time of accident, in the court. He
was also named in FIR. Test identification parade was found not necessary. Conviction of accused under
section 279, IPC was held proper.531
[s 279.41.5] Identification of the Accused
Accused driving van in abnormal speed on a public way had caused the death of a lady. Owner of the offending
vehicle deposed that the accused appellant was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Eye-witnesses
identified the accused in the dock. Mere fact that the witnesses could not give out the name of the accused in
the witness box was held not fatal to the prosecution case.532
Prosecution’s case was that the accused driving goods truck in rash and negligent manner dashed against Tata
Sumo which was coming from the opposite direction. All the PWs were sitting in the rear seats of the Tata
Sumo as such they had no opportunity to see the driver of the offending vehicle. The witnesses did not depose
before the court that they saw the face of the driver of the offending vehicle. The identity/identification of the
accused was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The accused were acquitted of the charge under sections
279, 337 and 304A, IPC.533
About 10-15 persons had gathered on the spot at the time of the accident, two of them were examined by the
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prosecution. One witness deposed that he came to know from the mob assembled on the spot that the accused
was driving the offending vehicle, another witness deposed that on the next day of the accident he came to
know that the accused was driving the vehicle. The identity of the accused driver was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. He was given benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charge under sections 279 and 304A,
IPC.534
In prosecution of the accused for rash and negligent driving under sections 279, 337, 338, IPC, witness
supporting the prosecution case, who was minor at the time of the incident testified before the court that the
driver was not on the wheels at the time of the accident. Another hostile witness deposed that he could not see
the driver of the offending vehicle. Accused was not convicted for offences under sections 279, 337 and 338,
IPC.535
Prosecution’s case was that the accused was driving the jeep rashly and negligently, which collided with the
auto rickshaw, causing serious injuries to auto rickshaw passengers and death of one of them. The testimony of
the witnesses varied about the direction from which offending jeep came. Witnesses disclosed the name of the
accused driver for the first time in the court. The evidence of the eye-witnesses that they identified the accused
in the light of another lorry was found not reliable. Investigating Officer of the case was not examined and the
place of occurrence was not proved. The accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt and was acquitted.536
Accused driver of a canter was prosecuted on allegations that while driving rashly and negligent he dashed
against the two girls, causing death of one and injuries to another. If the accused is not known to the witness
previously and he is identified in the court for the first time then it becomes a question of fact whether reliance is
to be placed upon that evidence or not. In the instant case there was evidence of PW1 that the accused
alighted from the canter and came to them and disclosed his name, parentage and address and it was only
thereafter that he had escaped from the spot leaving behind the canter. Thus, the complainant interacted with
the accused and had sufficient opportunity to note his distinctive features which made the basis of identification
of the accused by him in the court. There was nothing on the record to disbelieve that part of the testimony of
the complainant. The accident had occurred in the day at 10.15 AM. The identification of the accused was
found reliable. He was convicted under sections 279 and 304, IPC.537
[s 279.41.6] Two Versions—Discretion of Court in such Cases
The principle is that when two versions emerge from the prosecution evidence, the one which is favourable to
the accused, should be adopted and its benefits should be given to the accused.538 Where in the given case the
circumstances clearly showed rashness and negligence on the part of the driver and from the perusal of the site
plan, it was evident that it is a straight road and the driver knew that there is a level crossing and when one side
of the gate was locked by the gateman, he ought to have slowed down the bus and should have driven at a
speed so that it could have completely stopped much before the level crossing, the ingredients of the offences
under sections 279, 336 and 337, IPC and under section 129 of Indian Railways Act were held fully proved
against the accused beyond all reasonable doubt and his acquittal recorded by the magistrate was set aside.539
[s 279.41.7] Rashness and Negligence when not Averred in Complaint—Matter of Inference
Merely because there is no averment in the complaint that the crash by the respondent was a rash and
negligent act of his driving, it does not follow that the ingredients of the offence alleged were not proved. It is a
matter of inference. The impugned order of discharge was accordingly quashed and set aside and the
magistrate was directed to dispose of the case in accordance with law.540
[s 279.41.8] Circumstantial Evidence
In cases where negligence is the primary cause, it may not always be that direct evidence to prove it exists. In
such cases, the circumstantial evidence may be adduced to prove negligence.541
[s 279.42] Conviction both under Sections 279 and 337 or Section 338—Legality of
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None of the parts of the offence defined in section 338, IPC, is sufficient to constitute an offence under section
279, IPC, because under section 279, the ingredient of driving any vehicle or riding on a public way is essential,
which is not necessary under section 338. The offence under section 338, IPC, need not be committed by
driving a vehicle or riding on a public way and therefore section 71, IPC, cannot be applied to sections 338 and
279, IPC.542
A Full Bench of the Madhya Bharat High Court held that an offence under this section is distinct from an offence
either under section 337 or section 338, and therefore, a person convicted of an offence either under section
337 or section 338 can also be convicted for an offence under this section. If, however, the two offences are
committed in the same transaction, section 71 of this Code will govern the assessment of punishment.543 The
Rajasthan High Court has also held that the offence under sections 279, 337 or section 338, IPC being distinct
an accused can be convicted both under sections 279 and 337 or section 338, IPC.544 The imposition of
separate sentences, however, cannot be justified where the acts constituting two different offences form part of
the same transaction against the same accused.545 Separate sentences under sections 279 and 338, IPC,
obviously cannot be passed because an act of rash and negligent driving would automatically merge under the
act covered under section 338, IPC.546
[s 279.43] Conviction under Section 190, Motor Vehicles Act—No Bar to Conviction under Penal Code
A conviction under section 190 of the Motor Vehicles Act is no bar to a conviction of the accused under this
section or sections 304A and 338 of the Indian Penal Code.547
[s 279.44] Acquittal under Section 337 or Section 338—No Bar to Prosecution under Section 279
If by rash or negligent driving the accused has caused injury to some person, offences punishable under
sections 279 and 337 will be committed, and acquittal of the offence under section 337 or section 338, IPC, as
a result of compounding will still leave the charge under this section outstanding and prosecuting under this
section is not barred by the acquittal.548
The offence punishable under section 279, IPC is a grave offence, the sentence prescribed is higher, the
accused can be punished under section 279, IPC only, and not under both sections 279 and 337, IPC.549
[s 279.45] Whether Conviction/Sentence both under Section 279 and Section 304A is Permissible
If a person is guilty of an offence under section 279, IPC, and death is also caused as a result of the negligent
act, he will be guilty of the offence under section 304A, IPC,550 because an offence under this section is a minor
offence which is included in section 304A, IPC. An accused, convicted under section 304A, IPC, therefore,
cannot be convicted under this section as the latter is a minor offence.551 A somewhat contrary view has been
expressed in MH Mohammadali v State of Gujarat552 and Kantilal Shivabhai Thakur v State of Gujarat,553
wherein it has been held that offences under section 279, IPC and section 304A, IPC, are distinct offences and
an accused can be convicted for offences under the said two sections though the punishment given for the
minor offence such as under section 279, IPC, cannot be passed in view of the provision of section 71, IPC.
The Delhi High Court has also taken a similar view and it was held that there was no need to impose any
separate sentence for minor sentence under section 279 because the offence under sections 304A and 338,
IPC, are similar offence in aggravated forms. Thus, the sentence imposed under section 279 was set aside.554
The same view is taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court holding that some of the facts found as ingredients
of the offences under section 304A, IPC covered the ingredients of the offence under section 279, IPC and
hence, the sentence of fine imposed by the lower court under section 279, IPC, was therefore set aside.555 A
definite finding must be recorded by the court as to whether the version of the witnesses, regarding the high
speed and negligent driving at the time of the accident, was acceptable to him or not. In the absence of a
definite finding as to whether the driving was negligent or not, no conviction under this section or section 304A
can be recorded.556
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Sentence, it is said is the most public face of the criminal justice system. A sentence imposed by the courts
should have a deterrent effect more so when accident cases are on the rise. Courts are required to ensure that
whenever an accused is found guilty, he does not escape the clutches of law very lightly. Sentencing discretion
has to be exercised considering the facts of each case.557 It is well known that there is no formula for
determining sentence in each individual case. The lower appellate court might have decided to impose a little
lesser or bigger sentence than the one imposed by it. There is no method of knowing as to what sentence
would be appropriate in a given case. Sentence is a matter of discretion with the court and sentence is to be
awarded on a conspectus of the entirety of facts and circumstances of each individual case.558
There cannot be a blanket sentence for all the offences and it is obligatory for the trial court to say specifically
what is the sentence imposed and for which of the offence, failing which the only course left of the High Court is
to set aside the very conviction and remit the case to the trial court for disposal according to law.559
If the accused are found guilty of rash and negligent driving courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do
not escape the clutches of law very lightly. The sentence imposed by the courts should have a deterrent effect
on potential wrongdoers and it should be commensurate with the seriousness of the offence. Of course, the
courts are given discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide and varying range of facts that
might be relevant for fixing the quantum of sentence. But the discretion shall be exercised with due regard to
the larger interest of the society and it is needless, that passing of sentence on the offender is probably the
most public face of the criminal justice system.560
Where the evidence on record clearly revealed that the petitioner was driving the bus rashly and negligently, it
was held that to avoid speeding menace and the alarming rate of increase in accidents to see that public roads
do not become death traps and/or to see that heavy vehicles are not used as lethal weapons, some deterrent
punishment is required to be provided for such type of cases. In any set of circumstances it would be totally
misplaced sympathy if the accused is released on probation. This may lead to lawlessness. Further, the
sentence also should not be a flea-bite sentence. It should not be forgotten that it was a defence of the
petitioner that he was not the driver of the vehicle and that as the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable
doubt that he was the driver of the vehicle, he seeks sympathy from the court and prays that he may be
released on probation. It would not be just and proper to release the petitioner on probation or to reduce the
sentence.561
Appellant accused while driving tanker in rash and negligent manner caused the death of the scooterist. There
was no allegation that the appellant at the time of accident, was under the influence of liquor or any other
substance impairing his driving skills. The sentence awarded to him was reduced to the period already
undergone. In addition he was directed to pay Rs 1 lac as compensation to the mother of the deceased.562
[s 279.46.1] Lenient View, when Called for—Release on Probation, if Permissible
Where a truck was being driven by the appellant and another truck tried to overtake his truck with the result that
when he found that bullock cart was in front of him he tried to apply his brakes but there was insufficient time to
apply them before he hit the bullock cart. The pipe got burst and on account of this, the brakes failed.
Thereafter the truck was not under his control. The accident occurred because the truck behind him overtook
him at a place which was a bridge and at a time when there was a bullock cart already in front of his truck. The
driver of the truck behind the appellant was also rash and negligent in overtaking the truck at such a place and
time. It was held that the petitioner could not be absolved of his guilt on this ground because if he had been
driving carefully he could avoid the accident. His rash and negligent driving has been proved but considering
the circumstance that his brakes suddenly failed and that another truck also came and he lost control, the
accused can be given benefit of probation563 or the punishment awarded in such cases can be lenient.564
Where there was some breakage in the hydraulic system of the brakes of the vehicle it would be proper to deal
with the accused under section 360, CrPC or under the Probation of Offenders Act.565 Age of the accused, his
Page 32 of 44
antecedents, the manner in which the accident took place, the conduct of the accused in removing the injured
to the hospital immediately after the accident, his family liability etc, are other considerations on which the
benefit of release on probation may be extended to the accused.566
A person found guilty and convicted for offence under section 279 and section 304A, IPC cannot be released
on probation.567
Where death of two persons was caused by rash and negligent driving of the accused the case was not found
fit for the exercise of power under section 4 of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 or section 360, CrPC though
the accused was the only earning member of his family.568 Where the accused driving the matador suddenly
overtook a lorry and went to the extreme right and hit the deceased standing at that spot resulting in his death
the request for benefit of Probation of Offenders Act to the accused was declined.569
Where due to rash and negligent driving of the truck by the accused a person died, the accused was a first
offender and belonged to a poor family and had a number of persons dependent on him. There was no
complaint of the conduct during the trial, the parties had also settled their dispute, the accused had already
undergone part of the sentence the Punjab and Haryana High Court, on these facts directed that the accused
be released on probation for a period of three years under section 360, CrPC read with section 4 of the
Probation of Offenders Act on his furnishing a personal bond of the sum of Rs 10,000 with one surety of the like
sum.570 Where the accused who was convicted under sections 279, 338, IPC, has suffered the agony of trial for
six years, he had also undergone a period of 10 days in custody and was not a previous convict, the accused
was found entitled to the benefit of section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act.571 But where the accused
caused the death of five persons by rash and negligent driving his case was not fit for grant of probation under
section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. However, since the degree of the rashness and negligence was not
that culpable and great the sentence imposed upon the accused was reduced to nine months RI and sentence
of fine was confirmed.572
[s 279.46.2] Implications of Day’s Imprisonment
The punishment of one day’s simple imprisonment is a sentence that is well known. Its purpose is to exercise
clemency towards an accused, and so it is ordinarily passed where imprisonment is the only punishment
allowed by law, and the court sees, in the circumstances of the case, grounds for passing the lightest possible
sentence. In practice the person on whom it is passed is not placed in prison, but is to all intents and purposes
as free as though the sentence had not been passed.573
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297 State v Kamalakar Prabhakar Juvekar, AIR 1960 Bom 269 [LNIND 1959 BOM 104] : (1960) Cr LJ 814 .
298 Mohan Lal v State, (1991) JCC 128 (Del); Mukeem v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1997) JIC 122(All).
299 Smith v London and South-Western Rly Co, LR 6 CP 14.
300 State v Kamalakar Prabhakar Juvekar, AIR 1960 Bom 269 [LNIND 1959 BOM 104] : (1960) Cr LJ 814 ; Nanalal
Harishanker v State of Gujarat, AIR 1969 Guj 62 [LNIND 1967 GUJ 45] : (1969) Cr LJ 389 ; Vishwanath Vishnu
Dabholkar v King, AIR 1948 PC 183 : (1948) 49 Cr LJ 665 ; Anadasingh Niggi v State, AIR 1969 Ori 49 [LNIND 1968
ORI 79] , p 51 : (1969) Cr LJ 428 ; Mohan Lal v State, (1991) JCC 128 (Del).
301 Vasudevari v State, (1975) Ker LT 750 : (1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 659 : (1975) ACJ 523 .
302 24 and 25 Vict, c 100.
303 20 and 21 Geo, 5 c 43.
304 As amended by the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1934 (23 and 24 Geo 5, c 53), section 4 of the Road Traffic Act, 1956 (4
and 5 Eliz 2, c 67), 8th Sch 12(1). Now sections 1–44 repealed by Road Traffic Act, 1960(c. 16), Sch 18 Pt I.
306 Emperor v Abdul Latif, AIR 1944 Lah 163 : (1944) 45 Cr LJ 699 ; Raghunath Behera v State, (1968) 34 Cut LT 500, p
504 : (1968) Cr LJ 851 ; Ajit Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1975) Cr LJ 77 : (1975) ACJ 339 ; Badri Prasad
Tiwari v State, (1994) Cr LJ 389 (Ori); Bada Kanta Phukan v State of Assam, (1992) Cr LJ 1197 (Gau); Padmacharan
Naik v State, (1982) Cr LJ (NOC) 192 (Ori); Braham Dass v State of HP, 2009 Cr LJ 4297 : AIR 2009 SC 3181 [LNIND
2009 SC 1130] : (2009) 7 SCC 353 [LNIND 2009 SC 1130] .
307 Prafulla Kumar Rout v State of Orissa, (1995) Cr LJ 1277 (Ori); Rajesh R v State of Kerala, 2014 Cr LJ 4580 (Ker) :
2014 (3) Ker LT 890 : 2014 (4) KLJ 119 .
308 Rajesh R v State of Kerala, 2014 Cr LJ 4580 , p 4582 (Ker) : 2015 (1) Ren CR (Criminal) 255.
309 PM Raju v State of Karnataka, (1977) Cr LJ 1545 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 211; Ajit Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh,
(1975) Cr LJ 77 .
310 Mohan Pai v State of Kerala, (1987) 1 Ker LT 625 : (1987) Ker LJ 513 : (1988) 1 Crimes 852 [LNIND 1987 KER 98] , p
853 (Ker); Mohan Lal v State of Delhi, (1991) JCC 128 , p 131.
311 Ajit Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1975) Cr LJ 77 .
312 King v Maung Thoung Shwe, AIR 1938 Rang 161 : (1938) 39 Cr LJ 642 , a case under section 5 of the Motor Vehicles
Act of 1914, which corresponds to section 116 of the Act of 1939 and section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
313 Waeezul Khan v State of Bihar, AIR 1967 Pat 368 : (1967) Cr LJ 1564 .
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314 Re Govilan, AIR 1958 Mad 286 [LNIND 1958 MAD 169] : (1958) Cr LJ 775 ; Cheriyan v Sirkar Prosecutor, AIR 1950 Tr
& Coch 14; R v Finney, (1874) 12 Cox CC 625; Jumman v Emperor, AIR 1944 Ngp 285 ; Emperor v Abdul Auayyum,
AIR 1941 Lah 113 ; Robson v Emperor, AIR 1934 Rang 194 ; Andrew v Director of Public Prosecutions, (1937) 2 All ER
552 ; Re Ganesan, AIR 1950 Mad 71 [LNIND 1949 MAD 48] : (1949) 2 Mad LJ 255; Re Appayya, AIR 1957 AP 100
[LNIND 1956 AP 106] : (1956) Andh WR 784; Gulam Saeed Gulam Amir v State, AIR 1954 MB 41 ; Chammanla v
State, AIR 1953 Hyd 123 ; Re JC May, AIR 1960 Mad 50 , pp 51–52 : (1960) Cr LJ 239 .
315 Nandlal Haishanker v State of Gujarat, AIR 1969 Guj 62 [LNIND 1967 GUJ 45] .
316 State v Kamalakar Prabhakar Juvekar, AIR 1960 Bom 269 [LNIND 1959 BOM 104] , p 270 : (1960) Cr LJ 814 : (1960)
ILR Bom 75 : 61 Bom LR 1674.
317 Babulal Chotalal v State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 Guj 240 [LNIND 1966 GUJ 65] .
318 Badri Prasad Tiwari v State, (1994) Cr LJ 389 (Cr); Prafulla Kumar Rai v State of Orissa, (1995) Cr LJ 1277 (Ori).
319 Kantilal Shrivabhai Thakkar v State of Gujarat, (1990) Cr LJ 2500 (Guj).
320 Nandlal Harishanker v State, AIR 1969 Guj 62 [LNIND 1967 GUJ 45] .
321 Re Balunki, 1 CPLR (Cr) 112.
322 Abdul Ghani Nasurullah v Emperor, AIR 1938 Rang 86 .
323 Reg v Ganpatee, Ratanlal Un Cr Cas 19.
324 King v Basdeo, AIR 1940 Rang 176 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 693 .
325 Raghunath Behera v State, (1968) 34 Cut LT 500, 504 : (1968) Cr LJ 851.
326 20 and 21 Geo, 5 Cr 43.
327 KK Wadhwani v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1958 Raj 138 [LNIND 1957 RAJ 203] , p 139 : (1957) 7 ILR Raj 353.
328 Pran Nath Kundu v Emperor, AIR 1930 Cal 286 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 859 , pp 860-61 : ILR 57 Cal 326 : 33 Cal WN 915.
329 Sham Soonder Bhattacharjee v Monee Ram Dass, 25 WR 233; Fatehyab Khan v Mahommed Yusuf, (A9) 434 All WN
(1887) 82.
330 Brocklebank v Thompson, (1903) 2 Ch 344 : 72 LJ Ch 626 : 89 LT 209 : 19 TLR 285.
331 Farquhar v Newbury Rural Council, (1903) 1 Ch 12 : 78 LJ Ch 170 : 100 LT 17 : 73 JP 1 : 7 LGR 364 : 25 TLR 39.
332 Bemondsey Vestry v Brown, (1866) 1 Ex 204 .
333 PM Raju v State of Karnataka, (1977) Cr LJ 1545 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 211; Ajit Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh,
(1975) Cr LJ 77 .
Page 35 of 44
334 Ajit Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1975) Cr LJ 77 .
335 Austin’s Jurisprudence, Vol 1, 1911, p 127.
336 Emperor v Abdul Latif, AIR 1944 Lah 163 , p 164 : (1944) 45 Cr LJ 699 ; State of Bihar v Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat
56 : 54 Cr LJ 518; Re JC May, AIR 1960 Mad 50 : (1960) Cr LJ 234 .
337 Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks Co, (1858) 11 Ex 781 : 25 LJ Ex 212 : 4 WR 294 : 86 Dig 6; Ravi Kapur v State of
Rajasthan, AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC 284 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 (118) AIC 167
(SC).
338 Per Lord Wright in Bourhill v Young, (1943) AC 92 , p 107.
339 Rothschild v Royal Mail Steam Packet Co, (1851) 18 LT (OS) 334; Hart v Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co, (1869)
21 LT 261 .
340 Nga Myat Thin, (1893–1900) LBR 426.

341 Padmacharan Naik v State, (1982) Cr LJ (NOC) 192 (Cr); State of Himachal Pradesh v Amar Nath, (2002) Cr LJ 495
(HP).
342 Badri Prasad Tiwari v State, (1994) Cr LJ 389 (Ori).
343 Per Lord Dunedin in Fardon v Harcourt Rivington, (1932) 146 LT 391 cited Re JC May, AIR 1960 Mad 50 , pp 52–53 :
(1960) Cr LJ 234 ; Emperor v HC Bayne, (1906) 3 Cr LJ 494 .
344 Ramesh Kumar Nayak v UOI, (1995) 2 TAC 312 , pp 316–17 (Ori).
345 SN Hussain v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 685 ; Re JC May, (1960) Mad 50 : (1960) Cr LJ 239 ; PM Raju v
State of Karnataka, (1977) Cr LJ 1545 , p 1546 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 211; Re JC May, AIR 1960 Mad 50 , p 53 : (1960)
Cr LJ 234 ; State of Rajasthan v Niranjan Singh, (1971) WLN (1) 235; Tiramareddi Satyanarayan v State, (1970) 36 Cut
LT 301, p 304; PM Raju v State of Karnataka, (1977) Cr LJ 1545 , p 1547 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 211; Zahoor
Mohammed v State, (1972) All Cr R 401; State of Himachal Pradesh v Amar Nath, (2002) Cr LT 495 (HP).
346 Jai Bhagwan v State, 76 (1998) DLT 934 (Del) : (1999) 1 CCR 112 .
347 Supra; P Yareian v State of Mysore, (1972) Cr LJ 404 (Mys).
348 State of Rajasthan v Niranjan Singh, (1971) 1 WLN 235 , p 239; Tiramareddi Satyanarayan v State, (1970) 36 Cut LT
301, p 304; PM Raju v State of Karnataka, (1977) Cr LJ 1545 , p 1547 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 211; State of Bihar v
Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat 56 .
349 State of Himachal Pradesh v Amar Nath, (2002) Cr LJ 495 (HP).
350 Devraj v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1991) 3 Crimes 383 [LNIND 1991 HP 28] (HP).
351 Shaikh Maheboob v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 4729 (Bom).
352 Surendra Mahapatra v State, (1984) 2 Crimes 581 (Ori); State v Ramakant Yaswant, AIR 1968 Goa 77 : (1968) Cr LJ
933 ; Raghunath Bihere v State, (1968) Cut LT 500, p 504 : (1968) Cr LJ 851 ; State of Kerala v Arunachalam Reddiar,
Page 36 of 44
(1961) Mad LJ (Cr) 328 (Ker); Zahoor Mohd v State, (1972) All Cr R 401; Shiva Ram v State, AIR 1965 All 196 [LNIND
1963 ALL 187] : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 524 .
353 Md. Hiran Mia v State of Tripura, 2010 Cr LJ 189 (Gauh) : (2010) 3 GLR 468 .
354 Penu alias Pannu Sethi v State, (1983) 1 Crimes 876 (Ori).
355 Badri Prasad Tiwari v State, (1994) Cr LJ 389 , p 390.
356 R v Bateman, (1925–90) 16 Cox CC 710 : (1874) 12 Cox CC 625; Hilton’s case (1838) 2 Lewin 214; Rex v Dalloway,
(1846–48) 2 Cox CC 273 : (1960) Cr LJ 239 ; Badri Prasad Tewari v State, (1994) Cr LJ 389 , p 390.
357 Thukan Sharing v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2009 Cr LJ 4093 , p 4095 (HP).
358 Padmacharan Naik v State, (1982) Cr LJ (NOC) 192 (Ori); State of Rajasthan v Niranjan Singh, (1971) WLN (Pt I) 235.
359 SHCLE, Vol 3, p 2 and notes to sections 32 and 33.
360 Re Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, 7 Mad HCR 119; Emperor v Katabdi Mundul, ILR 4 Cal 764; R v Ganapati Saluke, BR
12 August 1869.
361 Stirling; Blyth v Birmingham Waterworks, 11 Ex 784; Smith v LSW Rly Co, LR 5 CP 102.
362 SHCLE, Vol 3, p 2.
363 Re Pillasan, Weir 1, 232; Kamdarali Serang v R, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 362 .
364 Annasahed Bandhu Patil v State of Maharashtra, (1991) Cr LJ 814 (Bom).
365 Balachandra v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 1319 [LNIND 1968 SC 106] .
366 Austin’s Jurisprudence, 4th Edn, p 444.
367 Badri Prasad Tiwari v State, (1994) Cr LJ 389 ; Prafulla Kumar Rout v State of Orissa, (1995) Cr LJ 1277 (Ori).
368 Re JC May, AIR 1960 Mad 50 : (1960) Cr LJ 234 .
369 Re Pillagan, 1 Weir 232; Bijuli Swain v State of Orissa, (1980) 50 Cut 358, p 362 (Ori) : (1981) Cr LJ 583 ; Kamdar Ali
Sarang v R, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 362 .
370 Kunju Pillai Parameswaran Pillai v State, (1967) ACC LJ 377 (Ker).
371 State of Bihar v Sarful Haque, (1973) BLJR 304 ; Ajit Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1975) Cr LJ 77 : (1975) ACJ
339 (HP).
372 State of Maharashtra v Bramhadatta Ramdas Sharma, (1978) Cr LJ 106 , p 109 (Mah); Jogeshwar Koeri v State of
Bihar, (1978) BLJR 24 (Summary of Cases).
373 State of Rajasthan v Niranjan Singh, (1971) 1 WLN 235 .
374 Ibid; Tiramareddi Satyanarayan v State, (1970) 36 Cut LT 301, p 304; PM Raju v State of Karnataka, (1977) Cr LJ 1545
, p 1547 : (1977) Mad LJ (Cr) 211; State of Bihar v Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat 56 .
375 Re Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, 1 Weir 324 : 7 Mad HC Rep 119; State of Bihar v Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat 56 .
376 Austin’s Jurisprudence, Lect 20, p 441.
377 Ibid; Annasahab Bandu Patil v State of Maharashtra, (1991) Cr LJ 814 (Bom).
378 Padmacharan Naik v State, (1992) Cr LJ (NOC) 192 (Ori).

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379 Badri Prasad Tiwari v State, (1994) Cr LJ 389 (Ori).
380 State of Rajasthan v Niranjan Singh, (1971) 1 WLN 235 , 240; ASRT Corp v Mahamaya, AIR 1977 Gau 55 , p 58 :
(1977) ACC CJ 454; State of Kerala v Ramaswami Iyer, (1961) Ker LT 769 .
381 Vasudevan v State, (1975) Ker LT 750 : (1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 659.
382 Re Nidamarti Nagabhushanam, 7 Mad HCR 119; R v Katabdi Mandul, ILR 4 Cal 764; R v Ganapati Saluke, BR 12
August 1869; Pyarejan v Mysore, (1972) Cr LJ 404 , p 405 : (1971) Mad LJ (Cr) 225.
383 Starling, Ibid; Blyth v Birmingham Water Works, 2 Ex 784; Smith v LSW Rly Co, LR 5 CP 102.
384 Pyarejan v State of Mysore, (1971) 1 Mys LJ 314 : (1971) Mad LJ (Cr) 225; Chitoolal Ram Swaroop Rathore v State of
Madhya Pradesh, (1992) MPLJ 793 [LNIND 1990 MP 177] ; Bhagwat Rai v State of Bihar, (1972) BLJR 353 , pp 354–
55.
385 Mohanlal v State, (1991) JCC 128 , p 131; Shakila Khader v V Naushar Gama, (1975) Cr LJ 1105 (SC) relied on.
386 Bhaskar Patre v State of Orissa, (1989) Cr LJ 516 (Ori).
387 State of HP v Baljit Singh, 2012 Cr LJ 237 , p 239 (P&H).
388 State of HP v Baljit Singh, 2012 Cr LJ 237 , p 239 (P&H); State of Karnataka v Vajirappa, 2018 Cr LJ 806 .
389 Durgappa v State of Karnataka, 2009 Cr LJ 226 , p 228 (Kant) : ILR 2008 Karnataka 3759 [LNIND 2008 KANT 254] :
2008 (5) Kar LJ 668 [LNIND 2008 KANT 254] : 2008 (4) KCCR 2177 [LNIND 2008 KANT 254] ; State of Himachal
Pradesh v Jawaharlal Jindal, 2011 Cr LJ 3827 (HP).
390 Swayambu v State, (2001) Cr LJ 1577 (Mad).
391 State v Mohammed Yusuf, (2001) Cr LJ (Kant).
392 Francis Xavier Rodrigues v State, (1997) Cr LJ 1374 (Bom).
393 Syed Akbar v State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 [LNIND 1979 SC 297] : (1979) Cr LJ 1374 ; In Ishwar Sadeppa v
State of Karnataka, (2004) Cr LJ 4912 .
394 BC Ramachandra v State of Karnataka, (2007) Cr LJ 475 (Kant).
395 Abdul Subhan v State, (2007) Cr LJ 1089 (Del); State of Karnataka v Satish, (1998) SCC (Cr) 1508.
396 BC Ramchandra v State of Karnataka, 2007 Cr LJ 475 , p 478 (Kant); Jacob Mathew v State of Punjab, AIR 2005 SC
3180 [LNIND 2005 SC 587] : 2005 AIR SCW 3685 : 2005 Cr LJ 3710 : (2005) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2005 SC 587] ; Syad
Akbar v State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 [LNIND 1979 SC 297] : 1979 Cr LJ 1374 : (1980) 1 SCC 30 [LNIND
1979 SC 297] : (1980) 1 SCR 95 [LNIND 1979 SC 297] .
397 BC Ramchandra v State of Karnataka, 2007 Cr LJ 475 , p 478 (Kant).
398 Penu alias Pannu Sethi v State, (1983) 1 Crimes 876 (Ori).
399 State v Mahommed Yusuf, (2001) Cr LJ 5 (Kant).
400 Devraj v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1991) 3 Crimes 383 [LNIND 1991 HP 28] (HP).
401 Prafulla Kumar Rout v State of Orissa, (1995) Cr LJ 1277 (Ori).
Page 38 of 44
402 Padmacharan Naik v State, (1982) Cr LJ (NOC) 192 (Ori); Madhu Sudan Debnath v State of Tripura, 2012 (116) AIC
699 (Gauh).
403 Madhu Sudhan Debnath v State of Tripura, 2012 (116) AIC 699 (Gauh).
404 State of Karnataka v Satish, (1998) SCC (Cr) 1508; Abdul Subhan v State, (2007) Cr LJ 1089 .
405 Madhukar Venkatesh Kulkarni v State of Maharashtra, (1983) 1 Bom CR 307 [LNIND 1982 BOM 30] , p 309.
406 Suyambu v State, (2001) Cr LJ 1577 (Mad).
407 Mann Prakash v State of Haryana, (1996) Cr LJ 663 (P&H).
408 Abdul Subhan v State, 2007 Cr LJ 1089 (Del) : 133 (2006) DLT 562 : (2006) ILR 2 Del 882.
409 Mehnga Singh v State, 2012 Cr LJ 4930 (Del).
410 Bhaskar Patra v State of Orissa, (1989) Cr LJ 516 (Ori); State of Maharastra v Suresh Vital Mule, 2017 (3) crimes, p
107 (Bom).
411 State of Rajasthan v Nauratan Mal, (2002) Cr LJ 348 (Raj); State of HP v Parmodh Singh, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 277 (HP);
State of HP v Amar Nath, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 654 (HP); Kushal Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC)
839 (HP) (Accused Acquitted).
412 State of Kerala v Gopalan Nair, (1988 (2) Ker LJ 662 , 664; Harprasad Jena v State, (1967) 33 Cut LT 882, 885;
Vasudevan v State, 1975 Ker LT 750 : (1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 659.
413 Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 4403 , p 4408 : AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 AIR
SCW 4659 : 2012 (7) Scale 354 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC 284 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] .
416 State of Rajasthan v Nauratan Mal, (2002) Cr LJ 348 (Raj).
417 Beda Kant Phukan v State of Assam, (1992) Cr LJ 1197 (Gau) : (1991) 2 Gau LR 52 , p 54.
418 Prafulla Kumar Rout v State of Orissa, 1995 Cr LJ 1277 (Ori).
419 Bhagwat Rai v State of Bihar, 1972 BLJR 353 –55.
420 Devraj v State of Himachal Pradesh, 1991 (3) Crimes 383 [LNIND 1991 HP 28] (HP).
421 Karam Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, (2001) III CCR 22 (HP).
422 State v Suhas Satardekar, (1999) III CCR 642 (Bom).
423 Amar Singh v State of Bihar, 1971 UJ 518 (SC).
424 State of Orissa v Abhiram Sethi, (1985) 60 Cut LT 212, p 213.
425 Mehnga Singh v State, 2012 Cr LJ 4930 , p 4933 (Del).
426 Vijender Singh v State of Haryana, (1994) 2 Crimes 294 [LNIND 1993 PNH 199] , p 295 : (1994) 1 Rec Cr R 20 :
(1994) 2 Chand Cr Cas 502 (P&H).
427 Raju PM v State of Karnataka, (1977) 1 Kant LJ 260 , p 263.
428 Bansilal Babuji Vanjara v State of Gujarat, 2007 Cr LJ 2879 , p 2880 (Guj).
429 State of Himachal Pradesh v Jawaharlal Jindal, 2011 Cr LJ 3827 , p 3829 (HP).
430 Hardhan Gope v State of Tripura, 2012 Cr LJ 3232 (Gauh).
431 Puran Chand v State of Punjab, (1978) Chand LR 136, p 140 : (1978) Cr LT 5.
432 State of Himachal Padesh v Manohar Singh, 2011 Cr LJ 3402 (HP).
433 Gajanan Majik v State, (2006) Cr LJ 1146 (Bom).
434 Mahadev v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2006) Cr LJ 4246 (MP).
435 Binoda Bihari Sharma v State of Orissa, 2011 Cr LJ 1989 , p 1991 (Ori) : 2010 (II) ILR-CUT 1167.
436 Durgappa v State of Karnataka, 2009 Cr LJ 226 , p 228 (Kant) : ILR 2008 Karnataka 3759 [LNIND 2008 KANT 254] ;
State of Himachal Pradesh v Jawaharlal Jindal, 2011 Cr LJ 3827 (HP).
437 Trinath Panigrahi v State, (1975) 41 Cut LT 245 : (1975) 1 Cut WR 84; Bijuli Swain v State of Orissa, (1980) 50 Cut LT
358, 362 (Ori); Sant Lal v State of Rajasthan, (1976) Raj Cr Cas 46; State v Ramakant Yashwant, AIR 1968 Goa 77 :
Page 39 of 44
(1968) Cr LJ 933 ; Chotelal Ramswaroop Rathore v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1992) MPLJ 793 [LNIND 1990 MP 177]
, p 796; Niranjan Singh v State (Delhi Admn), (1997) 1 Crimes 181 [LNIND 1996 DEL 740] , p 184 (Del).
439 Re JC May, AIR 1960 Mad 50 , p 53 : (1960) Cr LJ 234 .
440 Gurdas Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1992) Cr LJ 3538 , p 3540.
441 Russell on Crime, 11th Edn, p 478; citing R v Walker, (1824) 1 CP 320 .
442 Babu Santu Jadhav v Emperor, AIR 1921 Bom 456 , p 457 : (1921) 22 Cr LJ 324 .
443 Zora Singh v State of Punjab, 2008 Cr LJ 1572 (Pat).
444 Lal Singh v State of Haryana, (1993) 3 R Cr R (P&H) 231, p 233 : (1994) 1 Chand Cr Cas 41.
445 State of Rajasthan v Niranjan Singh, (1971) 1 WLN 235 .
446 Mohanlal v State, (1991) JCC 128 , p 131; Shakila Khadar v Naushar Gama, (1975) Cr LJ 1105 (SC).
447 KK Mani v State, 2009 Cr LJ 4595 , p 4601 (Mad).
448 Raghavan Pillai v State, AIR 1954 Tr & Coch 25, p 26; Swadling v Cooper, (1930) WN 204 : 46 TLR 597 : 143 LT 732;
Deota Misir v Emperor, AIR 1931 All 708 : (1931) 32 Cr LJ 1061 ; Charan Singh v Emperor, AIR 1925 All 798 : (1925)
26 Cr LJ 1254 .
449 Emperor v Abdul Latif, AIR 1944 Lah 163 , p 164 : (1944) 45 Cr LJ 699 .
450 Manna Ghosh v State of Tripura, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 866 (Gauh).
451 Russell on Crime, 11th Edn, p 478; citing Pluckwell v Wilson, (1832) 1 C&P 320.
452 State v Suhas Satardekar, (1999) III CCR 642 (Bom).
453 State of Mohandas S Gawade, 2007 Cr LJ 850 (Bom).
454 State of Himachal Pradesh v Varinder Kumar, 2008 Cr LJ 4175 , p 4178 (HP) : 2008 (2) ShimLC 13.
455 State of Himachal Pradesh v Amrik Singh, 2007 Cr LJ 4177 (HP).
456 Mohan Singh v State of Haryana, 2011 Cr LJ (NOC) 553 (P&H).
457 Bhausaheb Sakharam Mhasruk v State of Maharashtra, (1983) 2 Bom CR 729 [LNIND 1983 BOM 74] (Bom) : (1984) 1
CLC 11 (Bom).
458 Sivarama Pillai Ayyappan Pillai v State, AIR 1952 Tr & Coch 173 (DB).
459 Emperor v Homnarain Sukhailal Cachhi, AIR 1934 Ngp 65 , p 66 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 696 .
460 Wayde v Lady Car, (1883) 2 D&R 255; Re Jehangir D Davai, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 167 , p 168.
461 Abdul Ghani v Emperor, AIR 1938 Sind 86 , p 87 : (1938) 39 Cr LJ 555 .
462 Harpal Singh v UT Chandigarh, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 1177 (P&H).
463 Phagu Moharana v State, AIR 1961 Ori 71 [LNIND 1959 ORI 42] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 541 .
464 State of Karnataka v M F Kodliwad, (2004) Cr LJ 3712 (Kant).
465 V Sujatha v State of Kerala, (1995) 2 Chand Cr Cas 18, p 23–24 (SC).
466 State v Mohammadsab Urf Baba, (2006) Cr LJ 3410 (Kant).
467 Bagtawar Singh v State of Rajasthan, (2005) Cr LJ 2636 (Raj).
468 Parimal Hawalder v State, 2013 (122) AIC 736 (Cal) : 2013 (3) Crimes 684 .
469 Braham Dass v State of HP, 2009 Cr LJ 4297 , p 4298 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 3181 [LNIND 2009 SC 1130] : (2009) 7
SCC 353 [LNIND 2009 SC 1130] .
470 Penu v State, (1980) 49 Cut LT 337, p 340 : (1980) Cr LJ (NOC) 132 (Ori) : (1981) CLC 231 .
Page 40 of 44
471 Phagu Moharana v State, AIR 1961 Ori 71 [LNIND 1959 ORI 42] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 541 .
472 Yar Mahommed v Emperor, (1925) 26 Cr LJ 253 .
473 Ram Sewak v Emperor, AIR 1933 Oudh 391 , p 392.
474 FG Robson v Emperor, AIR 1934 Rang 194 : (1935) 36 Cr LJ 178 .
475 Mohkam Singh v State of National Capital Territory of Delhi, 1 (1999) CCR 692 (Del).
476 State of HP v Niti Raj, 2009 Cr LJ 1922 , p 1926 (HP) : 2010 (2) Crimes 553 .
477 Parameswaram Pillai v State of Kerala, (1967) Ker LT 11 (SN).
478 State of Goa v Devendra Kashinath Chopedekar, 2010 Cr LJ 1011 , p 1019 (Bom); Bikram Pradhan v State of Sikkim,
2014 (141) AIC 825 (Sikk).
479 Hartej Singh v Union Territory, Administration, Chandigarh, 2009 Cr LJ 3353 , p 3356 (P&H).
480 Reg v Ganpatee, Ratanlal Un Cas 19.
481 R v Dalloway, (1847) 3 Cox 273.
482 R v Knight, (1828) 1 Lew 168.
483 Govt of Bombay v Malkaji, Ratanlal Un Cas 198.
484 Re Balunki, 1 CPLR (Cr) 112.
485 King v Bas Deo, AIR 1940 Rang 176 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 693 .
486 Padmacharan Naik v State, (1982) Cr LJ (NOC) 192 (Ori).
487 Russell on Crime, 11th Edn, p 33; citing R v Dallway, (1847) 3 Cox 273; R v Walker, (1824) 1 C&P 320; R v Swindal
and Osborne, (1846) 2 CK 230.
488 Zahoor Mahommed v State, (1972) All Cr R 401; State of Maharashtra v Ravji Khandu Landhe, (1993) 1 Crimes 293
(Bom).
489 Fagu Moharana v State, AIR 1961 Ori 71 [LNIND 1959 ORI 42] , p 72 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 541 ; R v Jones, (1870) 11 Cox
CC 393.
Page 41 of 44
490 Rajesh Srivastava v State, (1991) JCC 547 (Del).

491 State of Karnataka v Peter Prank, (2000) Cr LJ 3516 (Kant).
492 Vijai Rai v State of Bihar, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 176 (Pat).
493 Ajit Singh v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1975) Cr LJ 77 (HP).
494 Notes to section 39.
495 R v Harmusji Nowroji Lord, 19 ILR Bom 715.
496 Sivarama Pillai Ayyappan Pillai v State, AIR 1953 TC 173 , p 174.
497 Emperor v Abdul Latif, AIR 1944 Lah 163 , p 164; Queen-Empress v Hormusji Nowroji Lord, 19 ILR Bom 715.
498 Vasudevan v State, (1975) Ker LT 750 : (1975) Mad LJ (Cr) 659 : (1975) ACJ 523 ; Kamal Kusha v S Kirpal Singh,
(1987) Kash LJ 211 ; Abdul Kadar Ebrahim Sura v Kashinath Moreshwar Chandani, AIR 1968 Bom 267 [LNIND 1967
BOM 17] ; Municipal Committee, Seoni v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1962 MP 40 [LNIND 1961 MP 35] : (1961)
MPLJ 667 : (1961) Jab LJ 771 ; Devaram v State of Rajasthan, (1980) CLR 679 , 681; Surendra Singh v Lal Sheoraj,
AIR 1975 MP 85 [LNIND 1973 MP 76] , p 88 : (1975) MPLJ 57 : (1975) Jab LJ 140 .
499 Ejaz Ahmad v Emperor, AIR 1936 Oudh 148 , p 150; doubting the view in Mahommed Jamal v Emperor, AIR 1930
Sind 64 : (1929) 30 Cr LJ 1077 .
500 Maung Tun Khin v King, AIR 1938 Rang 97 , p 98 : (1938) 39 Cr LJ 535 .
501 Rubre v Faulkner, (1940) 1 KB 571 .

502 R v Baldessare, (1930) 144 LT 185 : 22 Cr App R 70.
503 Mayne’s Criminal Law in India, 14th Edn, p 247; Larrymore v Pernendoo, 14 WR (Cr) 32; R v Bennett, 28 LJMC 27.
504 R v Dixon, 3 M&S 11–14; R v Lister, D&B, 209; AG v Siddon, 1 Cr & Jer 202; Sanglli Nand v R, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 495 .
505 Jiwa Ram v Emperor, AIR 1932 All 69 : (1932) 33 Cr LJ 309 ; Joti Prasad Gupta v Emperor, AIR 1932 All 18 : (1932)
33 Cr LJ 236 ; Emperor v Ganesh Vaman Joshi, AIR 1931 Bom 140 : (1931) 32 Cr LJ 471 , distinguishing Mohan Lal
Saxena v Emperor, AIR 1930 Oudh 497 : (1931) 32 Cr LJ 104 .
506 R v Bayne, (1906) 3 Cr LJ 494 : 8 Bom LR 414.
507 Altab Khan v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1987) 23 ACC 103 , p 104.
508 Sriniwas Pal v Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh, AIR 1988 SC 1729 [LNIND 1988 SC 327] : (1988) 2 Crimes 950 ,
p 954 (SC) : (1988) Cr LJ 183 .
509 Ibid.
Page 42 of 44
510 State v Yudhisthra Nanda, (2001) III CCR 184 (Ori).

511 Re Venkayala Pati Gopala Rao, AIR 1956 AP 21 : (1956) Cr LJ 27 ; Umar Bin v State, AIR 1954 Sau 15 : (1954) Cr LJ
143 ; Edward Tom v State, AIR 1954 Tr & Coch 4 : (1954) Cr LJ 25 ; State v Mangla Ram, AIR 1962 Raj 155 : (1962) 1
Cr LJ 763 .
512 Umar Bin v State, AIR 1954 Sau 15 : (1954) Cr LJ 143 ; Edward Tom v State, AIR 1954 Tr & Coch 4 : (1954) Cr LJ 25
; Gayan Singh Prabhat Singh v State, AIR 1963 Guj 275 [LNIND 1962 GUJ 95] : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 519 (1); Re Venkayala
Pati Gopala Rao, AIR 1956 AP 21 ; State v Ramakant, AIR 1968 Goa 77 : (1968) Cr LJ 933 .
513 State v Mangloo Ram, AIR 1962 Raj 155 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 763 .
514 Shiv Singh v State, (1983) 24 DLT 158 [LNIND 1983 DEL 165] , p 161; State v Ramkant Yeshwant, AIR 1968 Goa 77
: (1968) Cr LJ 933 ; Raghunath Behera v State, (1968) 34 Cut LT 500, p 504 : (1968) Cr LJ 851 ; State of Kerala v
Arunahalam Reddiar, (1961) Mad LJ (Cr) 328 (Ker); Prabadas v PK Datta, (1986) Cr LJ 398 (Guj) : (1985) Guj LJ 78.
515 Sidique v State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLJ 470 : ILR (2013) (3) Ker 540 (Ker); Hemant Kumar v State of Himachal
Pradesh, 2017 Cr LJ 894 (HP) Accused acquitted); Kalimuddin v State of HP, 2017 Cr LJ 1173 (HP).
516 Thomas v State of Kerala, 2013 (1) KLJ 344 (Ker) : 2013 Cr LJ 825 .
517 Bal Kishan v State, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 1175 (Del).
518 Aleem Pasha v State of Karnataka, 2013 Cr LJ 174 (Kant) : 2012 (6) KarLJ 463 [LNIND 2012 KANT 223] .
519 Satnam Singh v State of HP, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 55 (HP).
521 State of Rajasthan v Mohan Ram, 2009 Cr J (NOC) 43 (Raj).
522 State of Karnataka v Kumayian, 2010 Cr LJ 3376 (Kant) : 2010 (3) KCCR 2402 [LNIND 2010 KANT 262] .
523 Basappa v State of Karnataka, (2014) 5 SCC 154 [LNIND 2014 SC 106] : (2014) 136 AIC 253 (SC) : 2014 (3) Scale 87
[LNIND 2014 SC 106] .
524 Mahadeo Hari Lokre v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 221 [LNIND 1971 SC 593] : (1972) Cr LJ 49 ; Om Prakash
v State of Rajasthan, (1990) 2 WLN 599 ; Bhagirath Singh v State of Rajasthan, (1999) Cr LJ 4237 (Raj); See also
Durgappa v State of Karnataka, 2009 Cr LJ 226 (Kant) : ILR 2008 Karnataka 3759 [LNIND 2008 KANT 254] .
525 Vijender Singh v State of Haryana, (1994) 2 Crimes 294 [LNIND 1993 PNH 199] (P&H).
526 Digamber Baburao Ingavale v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 2418 , p 2419 (Bom) (Accused bus driver driving
rashly and negligently, colliding against an autorickshaw, convicted under sections 279 and 337, IPC).
527 Mohanta Lal v State of West Bengal, (1968) ACJ 124 (SC).
528 PM Raju v State of Karnataka, (1977) Cr LJ 1545 (Kant).
529 State of Karnataka v Akram Pasha, 2008 Cr LJ 155 (Kant).
530 Ashok Kumar v State of Haryana, (2001) 3 Ren CR (Cr) 17 (P&H).
Page 43 of 44
531 Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 4403 (SC) : AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 AIR SCW
4659 : 2012 (7) Scale 354 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC 284 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] .
532 Md Abdul Kayum v State of Tripura, 2014 Cr LJ 4792 , p 4794 (Tripura).
533 State v S Manoharan, 2014 Cr LJ 3307 , p 3310 (Kant) (DB) : 2014 (3) AKR 55; see also Fazoof Pasha v State of
Karnataka, 2012 (117) AIC 870 (Benefit of doubt given to accused).
534 S Sakir v State of Tamil Nadu, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 165 (Mad).
535 Sunil Kumar v State of HP, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 278 (HP).
536 Palliyalil Sidique v State of Kerala, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 62 (Ker).
537 Kewal Singh v State of Punjab, 2011 Cr LJ 3004 , p 3008 (P&H) : 2011 (4) Ren CR (Criminal) 636.
538 State of Himachal Pradesh v Sudarsan Singh, (1992) 2 Crimes 870 , p 872 (HP).
539 State of Rajasthan v Singara Singh, (1983) CLR 278 , p 279 (Raj).
540 Mulchand Motilal Raka v State of Maharashtra, (1995) 1 Crimes 177 , p 179 (Bom).
541 Ravi Kapur v State of Rajasthan, 2012 Cr LJ 4403 , p 4411 : AIR 2012 SC 2986 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : 2012 AIR
SCW 4659 : 2012 (7) Scale 354 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] : (2012) 9 SCC 284 [LNIND 2012 SC 474] .
542 Babulal Chotalal v State of Gujarat, AIR 1969 Guj 240 .
543 State v Gulam Meer, AIR 1956 MB 141 , p 144 (FB); overruling the decision in State v Jagdish, (1952) MBLR (Cr) 302
: (1952) MBLJ HCR 459; but see Collett v Emperor, (1929) Mad WN 395; Emperor v Aghan, AIR 1927 Oudh 441 ;
Govt of Bombay v Malkaji, Ratanlal Un Cr Cas 198; contra Queen-Empress v Bali, Ratanlal Un Cr Cas 396, decision in
which no reasons were given; State of Bihar v Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat 56 : 54 Cr LJ 518; Raghava Pillai v State,
AIR 1954 Tr & Coch 25 : (1954) Cr LJ 7 .
544 State of Rajasthan v Niranjan Singh, (1971) WLN (Pt 1) 235.
545 Ragho Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1939 Pat 388 : (1939) 40 Cr LJ 759 ; dissented in N Harishanker v State of Gujarat,
(1969) Cr LJ 759 ; Champa Pasin v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 326 : (1928) 29 Cr LJ 325 ; BD Vittal Shetty v State of
Karnataka, (1979) Cr LJ (NOC) (Kant).
546 Roop Chand v State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 1 CCR 538 (Chh); Nanalal Harishanker v State of Gujarat, AIR 1969 Guj
62 [LNIND 1967 GUJ 45] .
547 State of Bihar v Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat 56 .
548 State v Karmalakar Prabhakar Gavekar, AIR 1960 Bom 269 [LNIND 1959 BOM 104] .
549 Md. Hiran Mia v State of Tripura, 2010 Cr LJ 189 , p 191 (Gauh) : (2010) 3 GLR 468 .
550 Esco Mathew v State of Kerala, (1967) Ker LJ 227 .
551 Shiva Ram v State, (1965) All 196 : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 524 ; Ranjit Singh v State of Haryana, (1988) Chand Cr Cases 516
(P&H).
552 MH Mohammadali v State of Gujarat, (1971) Gujarat 72 : 171 Cr LJ 469 relying upon State v Gulam Meer, (1956) MP
141 : (1956) Cr LJ 624 (FB).
553 Kantilal Shivabhai Thakur v State of Gujarat, (1990) Cr LJ 2500 (Guj).

Page 44 of 44
554 Abdul Hameed v State, (1990) 41 DLT 306 [LNIND 1990 DEL 108] , p 307; Hamid Khan v State, (1996) 1 Crimes 465
(Del).
555 Nanhe Khan v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1907) Cr LJ 1403 (MP).
556 Ram Shankar Rai v State of Bihar, (1975) Cr LJ 1402 , p 1404 : (1974) BLJR 913 (Pat).
557 State v Mohandas S Gawade, (2007) Cr LJ 850 (Bom).
558 Rampal v State of Haryana, (1989) 16 Cr LT 193, p 195.
559 State of Karnataka by Pandavapura Police v CK Devraj, (1993) 1 Crimes 590 , p 596 (Kant).
560 State of Karnataka v Sharanappa Basna Gouda Aregoudar, (2002) 2 CCR 33 (SC).
561 Fateh Mohmod Aloyasbhai Samanti v State of Gujarat, (1988) CLR (Guj) 375, pp 376, 378, relying on Ravjibhai
Maganbhai v State of Gujarat, (1984) Guj LH 306; State of Karnataka v Krishna, AIR 1987 SC 861 [LNIND 1987 SC
701] ; Amarlal v State of Rajasthan, (1988) Cr LJ 1 .
562 Manish Jalan v State of Karnataka, 2008 Cr LJ 3941 , p 3944 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 3074 [LNIND 2008 SC 1396] :
563 Prabhu Dayal v State of Rajasthan, (1993) 3 Crimes (Raj) 369, p 370; Kuldip Singh v State of Haryana, (1996) 1 Serv
LJ 449; Mann Prakash v State of Haryana, (1996) Cr LJ 663 , p 665; Sunderlal alias Shankarlal v State of Punjab,
(1993) 1 Crimes 98 ; Gurmeet Singh v State of Punjab, (1992) 3 Crimes 475 , p 476; Bishamber Dass v State (Union
Territory of Chandigarh), (1987) 1 91 PLR 664 , p 665.
564 Durga Singh v State, (1991) RCC 127, p 128; Sher Khan v State of Rajasthan, (1982) CLR 48 (Raj).
565 Adam Khan Adam Ali v State of Rajasthan, (1985) Raj Cr Cases 276, p 277.
566 Nirmal Singh v Union Territory of Chandigarh, (1991) 1 CC Cases 65 (HC); Bishamber Dass v State (Union Territory of
Chandigarh), (1987) 1 91 PLR 664 , p 665.
567 State of HP v Girdhari Lal, 2007 Cr LJ 4347 (HP).
568 Pal alias Nand Lal v State (Delhi Admn), (1983) 23 DLT 484 [LNIND 1983 DEL 112] (Del).
569 State v SB Marigouda, (1999) Cr LJ 2171 .
570 Mann Prakash v State of Haryana, (1996) Cr LJ 663 (P&H).
571 Mahabir Singh v State, (2001) 1 Ren CR (Cri) 808 (Del).
572 Swarna Singh v State of Punjab, (1998) 1 Ren CR (Cri) 682 (P&H).
573 Per Jenkins CJ, in Emperor v HC Bayne, 3 Cr LJ 494, p 498.
End of Document
[s 280] Rash navigation of vessel.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 6




Whoever navigates any vessel in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to
cause hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
Page 3 of 6
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
[s 280.1] Scope
This section, which deals with rash or negligent navigation, is analogous to the preceding section. It only
extends its provisions to waterways. That section applies to public ways on land whereas this section applies to
all waterways, whether public or private, and whether a sea, river, lake or canal. The section is, however,
confined to inland navigation, and not to navigation on high seas.
Rash and negligent navigation on the high seas is not within the scope of this section. The Indian Merchant
Shipping Act,574 the Pilgrim Ships Act,575 and the Native Passenger Ships Act,576 provide for the safety of
passengers on the high seas.
[s 280.2] “Vessel”
This word denotes anything made of the conveyance by water of human beings or of property.577
[s 280.3] “Rash or Negligent Navigation”
The manner in which the navigation is performed must be rash or negligent. The fact that a steam launch ran
into a cargo boat at anchor is in itself prima facie evidence of negligent navigation.578
To support a conviction under this section there must be proof of rashness or negligence which endangers
human life or is likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person. The immediate cause of the accident should
be rashness or negligence on the part of the navigator. In considering the question of degree, the question of
contributory negligence has also to be taken into account, not as a defence to the indictment, but for the
purpose of determining causation and fixing a measure of the liability of the accused.579 To make the captain of
a steam vessel guilty of manslaughter, in causing a person to be drowned, by running down a boat, the
prosecutor must show some act done by the captain; and mere omission on his part, in not doing the whole of
his duty, is not sufficient. But, if there be sufficient light, and the captain is either at the helm, or in a situation to
be giving the command, and does that which causes the injury, he is guilty of manslaughter.580 It is a primary
duty of steam vessels to keep out of the way of vessels lying at anchor. Where the water at the place of the
collision is admittedly apt to be disturbed and uncertain owing to eddies, it is all the more incumbent on the
Serang to give a wide berth to cargo boats at anchor, and the fact that he can into the stern of one of them
would be, in itself, prima facie evidence of negligent navigation.581
[s 280.4] “In a Manner…So as to Endanger Human Life or to be Likely to Cause Hurt or Injury”
In a prosecution under this section, it is not enough to prove that the accused navigated the vessel in an
extremely slovenly manner. It is necessary to prove that he navigated it in such a manner as to endanger
human life or in a manner which was likely to cause hurt or injury to other persons.582 Where a ferryboat was
upset because it was sent without sufficient ballast and the ferry contractor was charged of having abetted the
navigation of a vessel in a manner so rash as to endanger human life and was convicted under this section and
section 109, it was held that, in the absence of evidence to show that the contractor intentionally omitted to
provide the ferryboat with what he knew to be necessary for safe navigation, the conviction for abetment could
not be supported.583 As pointed out above, the immediate cause of the accident should be rashness or
negligence on the part of the navigator. But where a boat, carrying passengers more than its carrying capacity,
capsized, it was held that the accused were guilty under this section and section 304A of this Code.”584
[s 280.5] Quashing of FIR
Where except the master of the vessel, the responsibility of the crew for navigation of the vessel that they
courted the disaster by design is not spelled out from the allegations in the FIR under sections 280 and 336 of
the Indian Penal Code 1860 and section 14 of Foreigners Act, 1946, and the documents produced in the case
and the circumstances also do not prima facie indicate that the accused persons entered the territorial waters,
willfully and even if so, they are entitled for innocent passage, being the members of the crew of a fishing
Page 4 of 6
vessel as per the existing laws and the International Conventions, a conclusion which is unexceptionable.
Except the accused, the master of the vessel, the other accused persons were not responsible for rash and
negligent navigation. Evidently, the rest of the crew members who belong to different nationalities, were
working in the fishing vessel to earn their livelihood. In the circumstances and for the reasons mentioned above,
the case registered against the rest of the crew members except the master of the vessel was quashed.585
[s 280.6] “Endanger Human Life”
[s 280.7] “Hurt”
[s 280.8] “Injury”
[s 280.9] Procedure
bailable offence but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate and can also be tried summarily.
The cognizance of this offence can be taken within one year.
[s 280.9.1] Non-compoundable
Offences punishable under sections 279 and 304 A, IPC are not mentioned in the two tables of section 320,
CrPC, the offences are not compoundable.586
The following form of notice under section 251, CrPC 1973 may be adopted:
I (name and office of magistrate etc) hereby give notice to you (name of accused) as follows:
That you, on or about the………day of…………20……….…at……… navigated a vessel (name the vessel) in a manner
so rash (or negligent) as to endanger human life [or to be likely to cause hurt (or injury) to any other person], and
Ans. Yes
Page 5 of 6
[s 280.11] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it will be necessary to prove that:
(i) the accused navigated a vessel;
(ii) he did so, in a rash or negligent manner; and
(iii) the manner of navigation was such as to endanger human life, or such as to be likely to cause hurt or
injury to any other person.
574 Act 7 of 1880.
575 Act 14 of 1895.
576 Act 10 of 1887 (now Act 21 of 1923).

Page 6 of 6
578 Lal Meah v R, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 582 .
579 Kamadar Ali Serang v Emperor, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 362 ; State of Kerala v Krishnan Thampi, (1965) Ker LT (short notes)
6.
580 Rex v Gean, (1835) 7 C&P 156.
581 Lal Meah v Emperor, (1911) 12 Cr LJ 582 , p 583.
582 Rahimtullah Ibrahim v Emperor, AIR 1925 Sind 284 , p 285 : 26 Cr LJ 1026.
583 Reg v Sakaram Govind, Ratanlal Un Cas 35, p 36.
584 State of Kerala v Krishna Thampi, (1965) Ker LT 6 (short notes); notes under section 279.
585 Hisa A Sheng v Administrator, Union Territory of Lakshadweep, (2007) Cr LJ 821 (Ker).
586 Manish Jalan v State of Karnataka, 2008 Cr LJ 3941 , p 3942 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 3074 [LNIND 2008 SC 1396] :
End of Document
[s 281] Exhibition of false light, mark or buoy.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 4




Whoever exhibits any false light, mark or buoy, intending or knowing it to be likely that such exhibition will
mislead any navigator, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
Page 3 of 4
seven years, or with fine, or with both.
[s 281.1] Scope
This section deals with exhibition of false signals to a vessel. It punishes exhibiting a false light, mark or buoy
(ie an anchored floating seamark for showing navigable course) with the intention and knowledge that such an
action would mislead a navigator. Mens rea is an essential ingredient of the offence under this section. Where
the act is not intentional but due to negligence, it will not be within the purview of this section.
The provision of this section are analogous to the provisions of section 47 of the English Malicious Damage Act,
1861587 as amended by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, section 1 which reads:
Whosoever shall, unlawfully mark, alter, or remove any light or signal, or unlawfully exhibit any false light or signal, with
intent to bring any ship, vessel, or boat into danger, or shall unlawfully and maliciously do anything tending to the
immediate loss or destruction any ship, vessel, or boat, and for which no punishment is hereinbefore provided, shall be
guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for life…
[s 281.3] Voluntary Exhibition of False Lights, etc.
A person who intends a certain effect of his actions, or knows that such an effect is likely, causes that effect
“voluntarily” under section 39, negligence is excluded by the terms in the section, only conduct accompanied by
consciousness in regard to its likely consequence being punishable therein. A negligent act of the kind would
fall under section 283, post.
[s 281.4] Procedure
The offence under this section is cognizable and a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. The
offence is bailable but not compoundable. It is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
There is no time limit for taking cognizance of this offence.
[s 281.5] Charge
That you, on or about the………day of………at………did exhibit a false light (or mark or buoy) knowing (or intending) it
to be likely that the exhibition of the said false light (or mark or buoy) would mislead the officer in charge of the
navigation of any vessel; and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 281 of the Indian Penal Code,
Page 4 of 4
[s 281.6] Proof
(i) the accused exhibited a false light, mark or buoy; and
(ii) he did so with the intention or knowledge of misleading any navigator.
587 24 and 25 Vict c 97. Section 1 of the Malicious Damage Act, 1861, now repealed by the Criminal Damage Act, 1971.
End of Document
[s 282] Conveying person by water for hire in unsafe or overloaded
vessel.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 6
[s 282] Conveying person by water for hire in unsafe or overloaded vessel.—




Whoever knowingly or negligently conveys, or causes to be conveyed for hire, any person by water in any
vessel, when that vessel is in such a state or so loaded as to endanger the life of that person, shall be punished
Page 3 of 6
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
[s 282.1] Scope
This section which is confined to common carrier by water, deals with conveying persons by water, for hire in
unsafe or overloaded vessels. The offence consists in conveying a passenger for hire in vessel which is so
unseaworthy, either from its own condition or from the way in which it is loaded, as to endanger his life. The
offence is not confined only to overloading, but includes carrying a passenger in an unsafe vessel. But a person
is liable under this section only if he conveys a passenger in an unsafe vessel “knowingly or negligently”. If an
overloaded launch does not capsize on account of the negligence of the owners but because of the stampede
that followed the sudden rush of persons, waiting at the jetty, which resulted in a displacement of the balance of
the launch and breaking away of the ropes, the owner and master of the launch cannot be held guilty under this
section.588
This word is wide enough to include a boatman, a lessee of a ferry,589 or the owner of a vessel.590
[s 282.3] “Knowingly or Negligently”
Apparently the word “knowingly” takes the same meaning as “rashly”, ie, the party runs a risk of which he is
conscious, but he thinks that the mischief will probably be averted in the given instance.591 If, on the other hand,
he “negligently” conveys ie, conveys in a negligent manner, and gives no thought to the possible consequences
of his conduct, or thinks about them insufficiently then the offence will come within the mischief of this section.
Criminal negligence is gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care to
guard against injury either to the public in general or to the individual in particular which, having regard to the
circumstances, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted.
[s 282.4] Mere Unseaworthiness of Vessel not Sufficient
To constitute an offence under this section, it is not sufficient that the vessel was not in a seaworthy state, it
must have been known by the accused to be in such a state, or he must have occupied such a position that his
ignorance of it amounts to negligence. The owner of a ship would be bound to take all proper precautions to
ascertain whether or not his ship was seaworthy. The manager of a booking-office, at which passengers are
supplied with tickets for any vessel they wish to select, would be under no such obligation. It is also to be
remembered that seaworthiness is a relative term, and merely means fitness to perform the service which the
vessel is about to undertake. A ship may be fit to undertake a small coasting voyage, with an ordinary cargo,
when it may not be fit to go to a distant country in the typhoon season, or to carry a load of machinery.592
[s 282.5] Owner of Boat when Liable for Overloading by Boatman—Liability of the Lessee of a Ferry
Where the owner of a boat who knowingly or negligently permits overloading of his boat so as to endanger the
safety of the passengers travelling therein, he is guilty under this section. He cannot shift his liability to the
tindal (boatman) who was in actual charge of the boat at the time of overloading. Even when there is no proof
that he actually knew about the overloading, his negligence will make him liable if he did not take due care and
attention.593 Criminal negligence is gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper
care to guard against injury either to the public in general or to the individual in particular, which having regard
to the circumstances it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted. The lessee of a ferry
ought to know that overloading, particularly in the middle of the monsoon, would be dangerous and it is his duty
to take proper precautions to ensure that his majhis (boatman) do not overload boats. He should not only give
definite instructions to them not to overload the boats but also see that the majhis carry out the instruction. It
would be culpable negligence on his part if he leaves the whole matter in the hands of boatman and thus leave
the passengers to their fate.594
[s 282.6] “To Endanger”
It must be proved that the life of the person was, as a fact, endangered by the state of the vessel.
[s 282.7] “Conveyed for Hire”

Page 4 of 6
The person whose life is endangered must be a person “conveyed for hire” ie, a passenger.595 Endangering the
lives of officers and crews of a ship by sending it to sea in an unseaworthy condition is punishable under
section 336, IPC, and not under this section.
[s 282.8] Procedure
An offence under this section is cognizable but a summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable. It is triable by any magistrate.
The cognizance of this offence can be taken within a year.
The following form of the notice under section 251, CrPC 1973 may be adopted:
I (name and office of the magistrate etc) hereby notice to you (name of accused) as follows:
That you on or about the………day of………at………knowingly or negligently conveyed, (or caused to be conveyed)
for hire……… (name the person) by water in the vessel (name the vessel) when that vessel was in such a state (or so
loaded) as to endanger the life of the said……… (name the person), and thereby committed the offence punishable
under section 282 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
Ans. Yes
[s 282.10] Proof

Page 5 of 6
(i) the accused conveyed a person for hire, or caused the same to be done;
(ii) the conveyance was by water in a vessel;
(iii) such vessel was at that time in such a state, or so loaded, as to be dangerous to the life of that
passenger; and
(iv) when he conveyed such person in the vessel, the accused knew of the state of such vessel, or he
acted negligently.
588 VR Bhate v State of Maharashtra, (1970) SC 1362 , pp 1364, 1365 : (1970) Cr LJ 1261 .
589 Tofail Ahmad Mia v Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal 490 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 1373 .
590 Re KSM MahommedAbdul Kadar Marakayar, AIR 1950 Mad 300 [LNIND 1949 MAD 177] : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 729 .
591 Austin’s Jurisprudence, Chapter 20, 441, notes to section 280.
592 Kopitoff v Silson, 1 QBD 377.
593 Re KSM MahommedAbdul Kadar Marakayar, AIR 1950 Mad 300 [LNIND 1949 MAD 177] , p 301 : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 729
.
594 Tofail Ahmad Mea v Emperor, AIR 1934 Cal 490 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 1373 .
595 R v Khoda Jagta, 1 Bom HCR 13.

Page 6 of 6
End of Document
[s 283] Danger or obstruction in public way or line of navigation.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 10




Whoever, by doing any act, or by omitting to take order with any property in his possession or under his charge,
causes danger, obstruction or injury to any person in any public way or public line of navigation, shall be
Page 3 of 10
punished with fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.
[s 283.1] Scope
This section penalises causing danger or obstruction to any person in a public way or public line or navigation.
This section refers to parties who do acts so as to cause danger, obstruction, or injury to any person in any
public way.596 It applies not only to persons who do some positive act, but also to those who omit to take order
with any property in his possession or under his charge, and is based on the maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum
non laedas (so use your own as not to cause injury to another). The section is enacted to protect persons in the
exercise of their public right. A public nuisance may undoubtedly be caused without any deliberate intention of
causing it, and this section and indeed section 290, do not refer to the intention of the accused person. The
obstruction may be caused by negligence, and in nine cases out of ten it is so caused.597 The section cannot,
however, be extended to a case where a party prohibits strangers from passing through its field even though
they may have been allowed access on earlier occasions.598
The section has the following two ingredients:
(i) A person must do an act or omit to take order with any property in his possession or under his charge.
(ii) Such act or omission must cause danger, obstruction, or injury to any person in any public way or in
the public line of navigation.
It is the author of the act, which caused the obstruction, etc, who is liable under this section, and not the person
who may use the obstruction. Thus, where a hut encroached upon a public way and caused obstruction, it is
the person who constructed the hut, who is liable and not the person who takes it on rent and opens a shop.599
[s 283.3.1] Owner and Contractor
Where the accused employed a contractor to supply materials for the repair of a temple, and the contractor
placed some girders on a public way and thereby caused an obstruction, but there was nothing to show that the
accused directed or sanctioned the contractor to place the girders on the road, it was held that the accused
could not be convicted under this section.600
[s 283.3.2] Occupier and the Owner
With regard to an omission to take order with any property, the person liable under this section is the person
who is in possession or charge of the property. Prima facie this person is the actual occupant, whether he is the
owner or tenant, and it makes no difference in the latter case that, as between himself and his landlord, the
latter is liable to make repairs.
As the danger is the matter that concerns the public, the public are to look to the occupier and not to the estate,
which is not material in such cases to the public.’601
[s 283.3.3] Liability in a Case of Nuisance
According to the civil law, and a fortiori according to criminal law, a landlord is not liable merely because
premises in the occupation of a tenant are in such a state as to amount to a nuisance.602 Nor does he become
liable for a nuisance created by a tenant merely because, when the tenancy came to an end, he renewed it, the
property with the nuisance on it never having got back again into his hands.603 If, however, he has himself
created the nuisance, he is of course, the person liable,604 and if the nuisance is one of a continuing character,
Page 4 of 10
he does not free himself from liability by letting the premises to a tenant.605 The occupation of servants or
agents will be the occupation of their employers, though of course they would be personally liable for any
nuisance created by themselves.606
[s 283.4] Meaning of Act
“Act” is here contrasted with “omitting” and thus bears its strict sense of something positive (refer to section 32,
IPC). The word “act” used in this section cannot be read in such a wide sense that mere standing on the road
without anything more is such an act as punishable under this section. If that were so, then anybody out of a
crowd witnessing a fair or procession standing on the road might be hauled up under this section.607
[s 283.5] “By Doing any act”
What is punishable under this section is not any act, but only an act which causes danger, obstruction or injury
to anyone. “Anyone” does not mean “everyone”. The liability results from the consequences to the individual
harmed and not from any impropriety in the act itself. If there is a legal right to do the act, of course it is not
punishable, unless it is improperly performed. Thus, an act done under statutory authority is not punishable
even if it causes injury to somebody.608 It would, of course, be otherwise, if the statutory authority was
negligently or improperly carried out.609 Similarly, there are some acts which are so necessary to the ordinary
enjoyment of property, that they are lawful, even though they cause a temporary obstruction to the highway,
such as the stoppage of carts to unload goods into a warehouse, or the erection of a hoarding to protect the
public while buildings are being repaired.610 The occasional inconvenience arising from crowds of persons or a
carriage blocking up the road when private entertainment is being given is not punishable if reasonable
precautions are taken to mitigate the evil but it is a nuisance that the streets should be blocked up night after
night by crowds waiting to enter a theatre, and it would be punishable even though only a single person
complained that access to his house was obstructed.611
[s 283.6] “Or by Omitting to take Order”
The word “omitting” seems to be used in the popular sense of the word “omission”,612 ie, intentional or
unintentional non-doing, and therefore, includes a mere neglect to take order. The offence by omission is an
omission “to take order”, ie, to dispose of the property in such a way as to prevent the danger, obstruction or
injury, but the omission must be the cause of the injury, and not some unavoidable event, such as a flood.
The danger or injury must be such as would naturally flow from the act. Therefore, where the defendant, being
in possession of land abutting on a public footway, excavated an area in the course of building a house
immediately adjoining the footway, and left it unprotected, and a person walking in the night fell in, the
defendant was held to be liable though in point of law, the party who fell in was off the road, and was in law a
trespasser.613 But the contrary was held where a man made a well in the middle of his field, through which there
was a right of way, and a person straying off the path at night, fell into it. Martin B, after citing the last case with
approval said:
But when the excavation is made at some distance from the way, and the person falling into it would be a trespasser
upon the defendant’s land before he reached it, the case seems to be different. We do not see where the liability is to
stop. A man going off a road in a dark night, and losing his way, may wander to any extent. We think the proper and
true test of legal liability is, whether the excavation be substantially adjoining the way.614
[s 283.7] “Any property”
The property may be movable or immovable. Notes under section 22 may be referred to.
Page 5 of 10
[s 283.9] “In his Possession or under his Charge”
This expression means “in his possession or custody”,615 and the essence of both is effective control. Hence,
neither is the owner of a wrecked and abandoned ship is liable for the danger, obstruction or injury caused by
it,616 nor is the late owner of a bull which has been set at large according to the religious practice of the
Hindus.617
But every shopkeeper in a public street, although he has a right to exhibit his wares in any way he likes in his
shop, must exercise his right so as not to cause annoyance or nuisance to the public, as by attracting large
crowds in the public street.618
[s 283.10] “With any Property in his Possession or under his Charge”
The words “with any property in his possession or under his charge” are not to be read with the word “act”.
They are to be read only with the phrase “by omitting to take order”. As observed by Sharma J in Badrinarain v
State:619
So far as the Acts of the Indian Legislature and the Constitution of India are concerned, it has been held that in India,
the punctuations in the statutes should not be ignored. We cannot, therefore, ignore the comma after the words ‘by
doing any act’ and giving it significance, we hold that the words ‘or by omitting to take order with any property in his
possession or under his charge’ are disjunctive and not conjunctive to ‘by doing any act’. If the words ‘with any property
in his possession or under his charge’, were intended by the Legislature to qualify the word ‘act’ also, it would not have
been necessary to add the words ‘or by omitting to take order’ as under s 32 of the Indian Penal Code, the words
which refer to acts done also extend to illegal omission. The words ‘by doing any act with any property in his
possession or under his charge’ would therefore have included illegal omission to take order with any property in his
possession or under his charge.
As it was the intention of the Legislature to restrict the omission only to any property in the possession or under
the charge of the accused, the expression “or by omitting to take order with any property in his possession or
under his charge” had to be added.
[s 283.11] “Causes”
The danger, obstruction, or injury must be caused, ie, the mere act or omission is not per se punishable, as in
the case of rashness or negligence (except in the case of negligence, which is excluded in section 281, in
sections 279–282 and sections 284–289, IPC).
Where there was no evidence of any kind to the effect that the accused by driving their carts on the road
caused danger, obstruction or injury to any person on the road, their conviction under section 283, IPC, cannot
be sustained.620
[s 283.12] Obstruction
Every obstruction must endanger and inconvenience, but the converse is not true. Every inconvenience need
not necessarily arise out of obstruction. Where the accused placed logs at a space of seven feet in width on a
Page 6 of 10
road, which was 24 feet in width, but there was no finding or evidence that the stacking, caused injury, danger
or annoyance, it was held that there was no obstruction within the meaning of this section and the accused
could not be convicted under this section or under section 200, IPC.621
Where the accused driver was alleged to have negligently parked a tractor trolley duly loaded with fertilizers in
the middle of the road without there being any signal of its being stationary and as such three persons who
were proceeding on a motorcycle collided with the stationary trolley and sustained severe injuries. Initially a
challan was filed against the accused only for offence under section 283, IPC, and subsequently a
supplementary challan was filed under section 304A, IPC, and the court of the additional chief judicial
magistrate took cognizance of both the offences. The petition filed by the accused under section 482, CrPC for
quashing criminal proceeding against him before the additional chief judicial magistrate was dismissed by the
Rajasthan High Court as there was ample material on record of the learned trial court to take cognizance of the
offence under sections 283 and 304A, IPC against the accused petitioners.622 Section 283 does not refer to the
intention of the accused. The obstruction may be caused by negligence and in nine cases out of ten it is so
caused.623 Where the sub-inspector was exercising his public right to ride along the side of the road and it was
admitted that the side of the road was occupied by the charpoy of the accused, and the circumstance were
such that the sub-inspector was undoubtedly obstructed, the conviction of the accused under section 283, IPC,
was found proper.624 Notes and section 280 may be referred to.
[s 283.13] Injury to any Person
The injury to any person means any harm illegally caused to his body or to his property.625 The harm in these
cases can clearly be only physical.
[s 283.14] “To any Person”
Obstruction to the public does not bring an act under this section, but under section 290. For an offence under
this section there must be obstruction to some particular person or class of persons in a public way, etc.626
An appropriation of part of a street by building over it does not constitute an offence under this section, in the
absence of evidence that danger, obstruction, or injury was caused thereby. It would fall under sections 278
and 290.627
[s 283.15] “In any Public Way”
A public way is a place over which members of the public have the right to pass, either individually or in a
number collectively. But a highway cannot be so used as to exclude other persons, equally entitled, from the
use of it.628
[s 283.15.1] Private and Customary Way
As pointed out in Pran Nath Kundu v Emperor,629 where the privilege to use a road is enjoyed only by one
particular section of the community or by inhabitants of two or three villages and not by others the road is not a
public road.630 Where there is the intention to allow, not the public generally but merely visitors to or traders with
the people of the village, or ways allowed to be used by villagers to go to a church or marked to the common
fields of a village, such ways are not regarded as public ways but private ways and they generally have their
origin in custom.631 Such a customary way can be converted into an ordinary highway after use by the general
public sufficient to raise the presumption of dedication.632 But the evidence in support of the public claim must
be cogent.633
Where a municipality had constructed a barrel drain in the highway, and then allowed it to fall out of repair, so
that it became a hole into which a man and horse fell, Sir Barnes Peacock J, said:
Page 7 of 10
Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the applicants by reason of the construction of the drain, and their neglect
to repair it, whereby the dangerous hole was formed, which was left open and unfenced, caused a nuisance on the
highway, for which they were liable to an indictment. This being so, their Lordships are of opinion that the corporation
are also liable to an action at the suit of any person who sustained a direct and particular damage from their breach of
duty.634
Where the accused obstructed by building a stone wall across a cart track which he claimed to be in his private
patta land, and he claimed a right to close it by putting a wall, it was held that he could be convicted under this
section, but could be proceeded under section 133, CrPC.635
bailable offence but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate and summarily.
The cognizance of this offence can be taken within six months only.
I (name and office of the magistrate etc) hereby notice to you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you on or about the………day of………at………did………(name the act) (or omitted to take order) with…(name
the property) in your possession (or under your charge), and thereby caused danger, obstruction or injury to (name the
person) in the public way (name the way) [or in the public line of navigation (name the life of navigation)] and thereby
committed an offence under section 283 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
Ans. Yes

Page 8 of 10
[s 283.18] Proof
(i) the accused did some act or omitted to take order with a property in his possession or charge; and
(ii) the said act or omission caused danger, obstruction or injury to some person in any public way or
public line of navigation.
For a conviction under this section, there must be proof of obstruction to the road so as to cause danger or
injury to any person passing the road without which there can be no conviction.636
596 Queen v Bholanath Banerjee, 7 WR 31, p 32.
597 Ram Krishna v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 746 (i) : (1935) 36 Cr LJ 893 : (1935) All LJ 1057.
598 Nand Ram v Sub-Divisional Judge, 70 PLR 225 (Del) : (1969) Cr LJ 77 , p 79 (Del).
599 Narain Adhikari v Emperor, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 244 : 8 Cal WN 369.
600 Lalta Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1921 All 192 (1) : (1921) 22 Cr LJ 331 (1).
Page 9 of 10
601 R v Watts, 1 Salk 357; per Littledale J 5 B&Cr, 560 affirmed in 6 M&WP 510.
602 Russel v Shenton, 3 QB 449; Nelson v Liverpool Brewery Co, 2 CPD 311.
603 Bowen v Anderson, (1894) 1 QB 164 .
604 Draper v Sherring, 30 LJMC 225.
605 R v Pedly, 1 A&E 822; Thomson v Gibson, 7 M&W 456; Todd v Flight, 9 CBNS 377 : 30 LJCP 21.
606 Rich v Basterfield, 4 CB 783 : 16 LJCP 273 : 5 B&CP 560; Mayne’s Criminal Law, p 623.
607 Badrinarain v State, AIR 1957 Raj 64 [LNIND 1956 RAJ 178] , p 65 : (1957) Cr LJ 391 .
608 Huams v Webster, LR 4 QB 138; Moore v Lambeth Waterworks, 17 QBD 462.
609 Williams v Great Western Rly Co, LR 9 Ex 157; as to injury resulting from a rotten fence refer to Horrold v Watney,
(1898) 2 QB 320 .
610 Herring v Metropolitan Board of Works, 34 LJMC 224 : SC 19 CBNC 510.
611 Barber v Pentey, (1893) 2 Ch 447 , where the whole law as to nuisance to highways is discussed.
612 Refer to notes to sections 32, 33.
613 Bames v Ward, 9 CB 392; Hadley v Taylor, LR 1 CP 53; Brown v E&M Rly Co, 22 QBD 391.
614 Hardcastle v South Yorkshire Rly Co, 28 LJ Ex 139 SC : 4 H&N 67; Houndell v Smith, 29 LJCP 203 SC : 7 CBNS 731;
Binks v South Yorkshire Rly Co, 32 LJ QB 26 : SC 3 B&Cr 214; Reg v Anthony Udayan, 6 Mad 280.
615 Refer to notes under section 27.
616 Brown v Mallet, 5 CB 599.
617 R v Shambu Dial, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 501 : 5 PR Cr (1904) : 5 PLR 308.
618 R v Noor Mahommed Soleman, ILR 36 Bom 368 : 12 Cr LJ 258.
619 Badrinarain v State, AIR 1957 Raj 64 [LNIND 1956 RAJ 178] , p 65 : (1957) Cr LJ 391 .
620 Emperor v Ghulam Raza, AIR 1925 Lah 153 : (1925) Cr LJ 707 .
621 Moochia Naik v State, AIR 1967 Ori 36 [LNIND 1965 ORI 90] , p 37 : (1967) Cr LJ 393 .
622 Jai Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2001) Cr LJ 3915 (Raj).
623 Ram Krishna v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 746 (1) : (1935) 36 Cr LJ 893 : (1935) All LJ 1057.
Page 10 of 10
624 Ibid.
625 R v Natha Lalla, 6 Bom HCC 67; Refer section 44.
626 R v Khadar Moidin, ILR 4 Mad 235; Re Umesh Chandra Kar, 14 ILR Cal 656.
627 R v Virappa Chetti, 20 ILR Mad 433.
628 Re Mruthyuzar Khan Sab, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 321 .
629 Pran Nath Kundu v Emperor, AIR 1930 Cal 285 , p 288 : 31 Cr LJ 859; Fatehyab Khan v Mahommed Yusuf, (1887) 9
All 434 : (1887) All WN 82.
630 Sham v Monee, 25 WR 233; Fatehyab Khan v Mahommed Yusuf, (1887) 9 All 434 : (1887) All WN 82.
631 Brocklebank v Thompson, (1903) 2 Ch 344 : 72 LJ Ch 626 : 19 TLR 285 : 89 LT 209.
632 Farquhar v Newbury Rural District, (1909) 1 Ch 12 : 78 LJ Ch 170 : 25 TLR 39 : 7 LGR 364 : 73 JP 1 : 100 LT 17.
633 Vestry or Bermondsey v Brown, (1865) 1 Ef 204.
634 Burough of Bathurst v Macpherson, 4 AC 256; explained in Picton Municipality v Geldert, (1893) AC 525 , p 531;
Municipal Council of Sydney v Bourke, (1895) AC 433 followed in Corp of Calcutta v Anderson, 10 ILR Cal 445.
635 Re Muthu Goundan, AIR 1940 Mad 216 [LNIND 1939 MAD 411] : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 391 .
636 Emperor v Ghulam Raza, AIR 1925 Lah 153 , 155 : (1924) 25 Cr LJ 707 .
End of Document
[s 284] Negligent conduct with respect to poisonous substance.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 6




Whoever does, with any poisonous substance, any act in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human
life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person,
Page 3 of 6
or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any poisonous substance in his possession as is
sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life from such poisonous substance,
[s 284.1] Scope
This section deals with negligent conduct with respect to poisonous substance. To sustain a conviction under
this section, it is sufficient that a person in possession of a poisonous substance should have negligently
omitted to take such order with it as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life from the
poisonous substance. The gist of the offence is culpable negligence, and the fact that a person has the custody
of any dangerous substance suffices by itself to impose upon him the duty of being careful. It is not necessary
to constitute an offence under this section, that the negligent omission punishable under the section should be
followed by any disastrous consequences.637
[s 284.2] Meaning of Act
The word “act” in sections 284–287, IPC is contrasted with the word “omission” and thus, having regard to the
context, it signifies a thing or things done, ie, positive, as contrasted with negative conduct.638
[s 284.3] “Rash or Negligent”
Notes under section 279 referred to.
[s 284.5] “Hurt”
If hurt is actually caused by the rash or negligent act, the case falls within the ambit of section 337,639 and not
under this section.
[s 284.6] “Injury”
[s 284.7] “Knowingly or Negligently Omits”
Both these mental states relate to non-doing and negative conduct, ie, something is not done by the agent,
knowingly or negligently.
[s 284.8] “To take such Order”
Where the accused, who was a police sergeant, took over a desk containing poisonous powders and also some
other powders, which might easily be mistaken one for the other, without taking any precaution whatever to
guard against misuse of the poison, and the only order he took with the poison subsequently was to hand over
the key of the receptacle, in which the powders were kept, to a subordinate official, who by mistake issued
some of the poisonous powders to a person suffering from fever who took one of the powders and died, it was
Page 4 of 6
held, that on the above facts, a conviction under this section was sustainable, but not under section 304A.640
The offence under this section is cognizable but a summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a
bailable offence but not compoundable. It is triable by any magistrate and may also be tried summarily.
Offences punishable under sections 279 and 304, IPC are not compoundable.641
The limitation for taking cognizance of this offence is one year.
That you on or about the………day of………did (name the act) with……… (name the poisonous substance) in a
manner so rash (or negligent) as to endanger human life, [or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to (name the person)],
[or knowingly (or negligently) omitted to take such order with………(name the poisonous substances) in your
possession as is sufficient to guard against probable danger to human life from such poisonous substance], and
thereby committed an offence punishable under section 284 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
Ans. Yes

Page 5 of 6
[s 284.12] Proof
The following points require proof for a conviction under this section:
(i) Where the first para of the section is applicable:
(a) that the substance in question was poisonous;
(b) that it was capable of endangering human life or of causing hurt or injury to any person;
(c) that the accused did some act with it; and
(d) that the act was rash or negligent, so as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or
injury to any person.
(ii) Where the second para of the section is applicable:
(a) that the accused was in possession of a poisonous substance;
(b) that there was probable danger to human life from it; and
(c) that the accused knowingly or negligently omitted to take such order with it as to guard against
such danger.

Page 6 of 6
637 Re Hosein Beg, (1882) PR 16 .
638 Refer to section 32, IPC.
639 R v Abbus Sattar, 28 ILR All 464.
640 Re Hosein Beg, (1882) PR 16 .
641 Manish Jalan v State of Karnataka, AIR 2008 SC 3074 [LNIND 2008 SC 1396] : 2008 Cr LJ 3941 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
456 [LNIND 2008 SC 1396] .
End of Document
[s 285] Negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 7




Whoever does, with fire or any combustible matter, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life,
or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person,
Page 3 of 7
or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any fire or any combustible matter in his possession as
is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life from such fire or combustible matter,
[s 285.1] Scope
This section deals with negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter. It extends the provisions of
the preceding section, to fire or any combustible matter. For an offence under this section it is not necessary to
show any danger to human life; it is sufficient to prove likelihood of hurt or injury to any person.642 Where the
management had not taken safety measures, as such the occurrence took place, prosecution of the accused
under section 92 of the Factories Act was proper, was not permissible under the general law.643
[s 285.2] Part I of Section 285 Distinguished from Section 435, IPC
The actus reus for an offence under the first part of section 285, IPC would be established in every case where
the actus reus for an offence under section 435, IPC is made out. But the mens rea for the two offences is
different. The mens rea for an offence under section 435, IPC is doing of a wrongful act with the requisite
intention or knowledge of the likelihood to cause wrongful loss or damage to any person by the wrongful act.
The mens rea for an offence under the first part of section 285, IPC is, however, rashness or negligence in
doing the wrongful act.644
[s 285.3] “Combustible Matter”
Matter is said to be combustible if it is inflammable or capable of catching fire. The expression “combustible
matter” includes bidis,645 fireworks,646 and gunpowder or combustible fluids like naphtha.647 Erecting gunpowder
mills or keeping gunpowder magazines near a town is a public nuisance at common law. In R v Lister,648 it was
held to be an indictable offence to deposit and keep large quantities of naphtha in such local circumstances as
to create real danger to life and property, and further that although in the opinion of scientific men the
manufacture and keeping of the material was carried on so carefully as to produce no danger, yet there was no
doubt that its liability to danger ab extra might make it a public nuisance.
[s 285.4] “Rashly or Negligently”
Where the accused had a quarrel with his wife, got angry, broke the crockery and then went out and set fire to
the eaves of his house, thereby causing risk of injury to the house owners in the neighbourhood but doing no
actual mischief, it was held that this section was not applicable as his act was wilful and not rash and
negligent.649
The owner of a house, in which a fire breaks out, cannot be convicted under this section, without proving actual
carelessness or an illegal omission in the owner, from which rashness or negligence can be inferred. There
may be conduct either by act or omission from which rashness or negligence may be inferred, which would
require the accused to rebut it by evidence; but such an inference cannot be made merely because a fire
breaks out and destroys property or occasions risk to life or property. Evidence of actual carelessness or of an
illegal omission to take order with fire must generally be shown, before the party, by or through whom a fire is
aid to be occasioned, can be convicted.650 The mere fact that a man’s house is burnt owing to causes which
cannot be discovered, furnishes no ground for the assumption that he has been guilty of negligence under this
section. The negligence must be clearly proved.651 The mere letting off of a fire balloon cannot, therefore, in the
absence of proof of rashness or negligence, be a ground of conviction.652 The act of accused in setting fire to
the tobacco stock inside the house after pouring petrol and further act of throwing petrol on the deceased when
he tried to pacify, cannot be held either as rash or negligent act so as to attract the offence under section 285 of
IPC.653So also the accused could not be prosecuted for a rash and negligent act, which is the basic requirement
of offences alleged, merely because he was incharge of a section.654
Page 4 of 7
[s 285.6] “Hurt”
[s 285.7] “Injury”
The term “injury” as used in this section, includes any harm illegally caused to the property of any other person,
and is not confined to injury to the person only. While a marriage procession was going on, the accused, who
was one of the members of the procession, used fireworks on the road, which burnt two bundles of straw with
which a mandap (a temporary structure) belonging to the complainant was thatched, thereby causing him an
injury. It was held that the accused was guilty under this section.655 Where the accused was found smoking bidi
close to half-pressed cotton bales lying close to the press house in the compound of a company, he was rightly
convicted of negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter causing thereby likelihood of injury to
property.656
[s 285.9] “Take such Order”
Notes under section 283 and 284 may be referred to.
Same as in the case of an offence under section 284.
That you on or about the………Day of………at………did……… (name the act) with fire (or the combustible matter) so
rashly (or negligently) as to endanger human life (or to be likely to cause hurt) (or injury) to (name the other person) [or
knowingly (or negligently)] omitted to take such order with fire (or the combustible matter) in your possession as was
sufficient to guard against any probably danger to human life from such fire(or the combustible matter), and thereby
committed an offence punishable under section 285 of the Indian Penal Code, within my cognizance.
Page 5 of 7
Ans. Yes
[s 285.13] Proof
In order to support a conviction under this section, the following matters must be proved:
(i) rash or negligent dealing with fire;

(ii) the rashness or negligence must be such as:
(a) endangers human life; or
(b) is likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person; or
(iii) there must be found intentional or negligent omission in dealing with fire to guard against probably
danger to human life.657
In order to sustain a conviction under the above section, there must be evidence of rashness or of negligence
of the accused.658 It ought to be proved that on the part of the accused there was criminal negligence, as taking
no proper precautions after discovering the fire.659
In view of the provisions of section 221(2), CrPC 1973, an accused can be convicted under the first part of this
section even if he has been charged only under section 435, IPC.660
[s 285.15] Sentence
Page 6 of 7
Where, due to the negligent act of the accused, fire breaks out in a factory, resulting in the death of seven
persons, maximum punishment of six months” rigorous imprisonment to the accused cannot be said to be
severe.661
642 Queen-Empress v Krishna, Ratanlal Un Cas 134.
643 Rabindra Agarwal v State of Jharkhand, (2010) 126 FLR 580 (Jhar).
644 Komaraswami v State, (1966) 1 Mad LJ 385, p 386 : (1966) Mad LW (Cr) 176.
646 Re Natha Lalla, 5 BHCR 67.
647 R v Lister, 26 LJMC 196.
648 R v Lister, (1857) D&B 20 LJMG 196.
649 Queen-Empress v Hari, Ratanlal Un Cas 126.
650 Re Mi On, (1872–92) LBR 134.
651 Re Nga Sein, (1872–92) LBR 569.
652 Re Nga Bo Gale, (1899) LB 628.

Page 7 of 7
653 Madhusudan v State of Karnataka, 2011 Cr LJ 215 , p 220 (Kar) (DB) : 2010 (4) KCCR 2841 .
654 Mehrajuddin v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1990) CLR (MP) 245.
655 Re Natha Lalla, 5 BHCR 67 (Cr).
657 Re Nga Cho, (1872–92) LBR 411.
658 Re Nga Ya Po, (1872–92) LBR 337.
659 Re Ngaka, (1902–03) 1 UBR, Penal Code 7.
660 Komaraswami v State, AIR 1966 Mad (Cr) 176 : (1966) 1 Mad LJ 385.
661 Kurban Hussain Mohamedalli Rangawalla v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 Bom 1616 , p 1618 : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 550 .
End of Document
[s 286] Negligent conduct with respect to explosive substance.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 8




Whoever does, with any explosive substance, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life, or to
be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person,
Page 3 of 8
or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any explosive substance in his possession as is
sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life from that substance,
[s 286.1] Scope
This section provides for the punishment of a person who does any act with an explosive substance so rashly
or negligently as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any person, or who knowingly
or negligently omits to take such order with any explosive substance in his possession as is sufficient to guard
against probable danger to human life from that substance.662
The preceding section dealt with “negligent conduct with respect to fire or combustible matter” and this section
deals with negligent conduct with respect to explosive substance. Otherwise in other respects, the provisions of
both the sections are identical.
Whilst this section deals with rash or negligent conduct in respect of an “explosive substance” (quite
irrespective of any consequence of such conduct), mischief caused by an explosive substance is punishable
under sections 435, 436 or 438, IPC, as the case may be, and the manufacture, possession, use, sale,
transport and importation into India of such substances, is regulated by the Explosives Act, 1884 (Act 4 of
1884), which is a penal Act, and the intentional causing, by an explosive substance, of “an explosion of a nature
likely to endanger life or to cause serious injury to property, whether any injury to person or property has been
actually caused or not”, or an attempt or abatement of such is punishable under the Explosive Substances Act
(Act 6 of 1908).
The provisions of this section are analogous to the English rule of common law, under which erecting
gunpowder mills, or keeping gunpowder magazines near a town is a public nuisance at common law.663
[s 286.3] Offence may be Committed in Two Ways
The rash or negligent conduct in regard to an explosive substance which is punishable under this section may
take either of the two forms:
(i) an act done with such substance, which either endangers human life, or is likely to cause hurt or injury
to any other person;
(ii) an omission (intentional or otherwise) to guard against a probably danger to human life, arising from
such substance in the possession of the accused.
[s 286.4] Extent of Liability under First Part of the Section
Like the last two sections, this section also has two parts. The first part deals with dangerous acts and the
second with illegal omissions. The first part of the section is not confined to cases where the explosive
substance is in possession of the accused at the time of the injury. It applies also to a case where the injury
takes place after it left his possession and while it is being conveyed to its destination where it was sent by the
accused without packing it properly.664
[s 286.5] “Explosive Substance”

Page 4 of 8
This term is not defined in this Code, but according to section 4(d) of the Indian Explosives Act, 1884, as
substituted by the Indian Explosive (Amendment) Act, 1978 (32 of 1978), “explosive” means gunpowder,
nitroglycerine, nitroglycol, gun-cotton, di-nitro-toluene, tri-nitro-toluene, picric acid, di-nitro-phenol, tri-nitro-
resorcinol (styphnic acid), cyclo-trimethylene-tri-nitramine, penta-erythritol-tetranitrate, tetryl, nitro-guanidine,
lead azide, lead styphynate, fulminate of mercury or any other metal, diazo-di-nitro-phenol, coloured fires or any
other substance whether a single chemical compound or a mixture of substances, whether solid or liquid or
gaseous used or manufactured with a view to produce a practical effect by explosion or pyrotechnic effect; and
includes fog-signals, fireworks, fuses, rockets, percussion-caps, detonators, cartridges, ammunition of all
descriptions and every adaptation or preparation of an explosive as defined in this clause.665
According to section 2(a) of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, “explosive substance” shall be deemed to
include any material for making any explosive substance; also any apparatus, machine, implement or material
used, or intended to be used, or adapted for causing, or aiding in causing, any explosion in or with any
explosive substance; also any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement. The term “explosive
substance” as used in section 4(b) of the said Act includes any part of any apparatus, machine, or implement
intended to be used or adapted for causing or aiding in causing any explosive in or with any explosive
substance; also any part of any such apparatus, machine or implement.666
[s 286.5.1] A Part of Vessel may be Explosive Substance
The definition is of wide generality, and in the case of Rex v Charles,667 it was ruled that any part of a vessel
which, when filled with an explosive substance, or adapted for causing an explosion, is itself an explosive
substance within the statute. The articles found with the accused in that case were a lead bolt, a fuse, a brass
bolt, a screw, a brass casting, and evidence was given to show that these were various parts of a vessel, which
when filled with chlorate of potash or other explosive substance, formed a bomb of a highly dangerous
character.668
[s 286.6] Revolver or Gun, if an Explosive Substance
It has been held by the Madras High Court in Kasia Pillai’s case that a loaded revolver is not an “explosive
substance”,669 but the fireworks are.670
A contrary view has also been expressed and it has been held that a revolver, loaded or unloaded, is clearly an
“explosive substance” within the definition cited above in the undermentioned cases.671 The view of the Madras
High Court in Kasia Pillai also did not find favour with the Bombay High Court.672 However, firing a loaded gun
may come under section 286, IPC.673
In a Madras case,674 it was held that causing of hurt by negligence in the use of a gun would fall within the
purview of section 337, and this section is not intended to apply to such a case. But whether the offence falls
under this section or section 337, to sustain a conviction, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove
affirmatively that the accused had been guilty of culpable rashness or negligence. Where the accused was out
shooting with some friends and a pellet from his gun lodged in the thigh of the complainant, who was at work in
the corner of his field, there was no evidence of the rashness or negligence on the part of the accused, but the
magistrate inferred negligence from the fact that the accused fired the gun and the complainant was injured
thereby, coupled with the fact that in the month of July people are out working in their fields, it was held that
there being nothing on the record to show at what distance the accused was from the complainant, when he
fired or even that the complainant was in the direct line of fire, and it was quite possible that the complainant
was injured by a stray pellet accidentally deflected from its course, rashness or negligence was not proved, and
the conviction was quashed.675
It is difficult to see how it is possible to contend, if the accused did fire the gun, and he fired the gun in that
Page 5 of 8
particular spot, it could be anything but a rash and negligent act.676 Notes under section 279 may also be
referred to.
[s 286.8] “So as to Endanger Human Life”
Under the first part of the action which deals with dangerous acts the substance need not necessarily be in the
possession of the accused at the time of the injury (if any), eg, to dispatch fireworks, carelessly packed in a
country cart, would be an offence under the section.677
Under the second part of the section, the explosive substance must be in the possession of the accused at the
time of his omission to safeguard it.
[s 286.9] Bomb Explosion in Bus
There was explosion of a bomb kept inside a passenger bus which caused the death of one passenger and
injuries to several passengers. The prosecution witnesses identified the accused appellant. There was enough
material to connect the accused appellant with the heinous crime of planting a live bomb in a passenger bus
and getting down from the same before the bomb exploded, thereby causing death of one person and grievous
injuries on several other passengers. The accused appellant was convicted for offences under sections 285,
337, 338, 427 and 302, IPC and section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act.678
[s 286.10] “Hurt”
[s 286.11] “Injury”
Injury means any harm illegally caused to the body or to the property of another. Notes under section 44 may
be referred to.
The word “knowingly” is evidently used here advisedly and the word “intentionally” advisedly avoided. Whatever
distinction there may be between “knowingly or negligently” and “rashly or negligently” it must be assumed that
the former is purposely used in this part of the section while “rashly” is used in the first clause, consciousness is
involved in both, while intention is not. If a person omits to take precautions in respect of explosives in his
possession sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life, being conscious of the probability of
danger resulting from such omission, he “knowingly” does that which under this section renders him liable to
punishment. If a person omits to take such precautions without such consciousness, he is liable, by reason of
his negligence, if he has not exercised the caution incumbent on him, and which, if he had exercised it, would
have created in him the consciousness that his omission was likely to cause danger.679
A, having returned from watching his crops, placed a loaded gun with its hammer down on the cap, on a cot
outside his house, and went away for a short time. B, a neighbour’s child, played with the gun, which went off
and killed B. A was held not guilty under this section, he having taken order sufficient to guard against any
probable danger.680
Page 6 of 8
[s 286.15] “To Guard against any Probable Danger to Human Life”
Unless it is established that danger to human life was a probable consequence of the omission, the offence
under this section is not established.681
The same as in the case of an offence under section 284.
Where the crackers were burst and they damaged the eyes of victim in the year 1995, the challan was filed in
the year 2006, prosecution was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed by section 468(2)(c), CrPC, the
criminal proceedings were quashed.682
That you on or about the……day of………, at………, acted with………(name the explosive substance) so rashly (or
negligently) as to endanger human life, (or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to) (name of the person) [or knowingly (or
negligently) omitted to take such order with (name the explosive substance) in your possession as was sufficient to
guard against any probable danger to human life from………(name the explosive substance)], and thereby committed
Ans. Yes
[s 286.18] Proof
Page 7 of 8
To establish an offence under this section, prove the points, as mentioned in the last section, substituting
“explosive substance” for “fire or combustible substance”.
A conviction under this section can be based solely on the basis of a dying declaration if the court believes the
same to have been truthfully recorded by a reliable person.683
662 Emperor v Abdus Sattar, 28 ILR All 264.
663 Russel on Crime, p 1617.
664 Re Anantanarayana Patter, 1 Weir 236.
665 Section 4(d), Indian Explosives Act, 1884, as subs. by the Indian Explosive (Amendment) Act, 1978 (32 of 1978).
666 Section 2, Explosive Substances Act, 1908.
667 Rex v Charles, (1992) 17 Cox CC 494.

668 Amritala Hazra v Emperor, AIR 1916 Cal 188 , p 203 : 16 All LJ 497.
669 Re Kasiya Pillai, 1 Weir 235.
670 Re Anantanarrayana Patter, 1 Weir 236.
671 Queen-Empress v Gorla Chenchugadu, 8 ILR Mad 42 : 1 Weir 233; Emperor v Abdus Sattar, 28 ILR All 464 : (1906) 3
Cr LJ 363 .
Page 8 of 8
672 Krishnaji Vitthal v Emperor, AIR 1949 Bom 29 .
673 Ibid.
674 Re Kasiya Pillai, 1 Weir 235.
675 Emperor v Abdus Sattar, 28 ILR All 464 : (1906) 3 Cr LJ 363 .
676 Ibid.
677 Re Anantanarayana Patter, 1 Weir 236.
678 D Dandasi Reddy v State of Orissa, 2009 Cr LJ 4400 , p 4404 (Ori) (DB) : CLT (2009) Supp Crl 1246.
679 Queen-Empress v Golla Chenchugadu, 8 ILR Mad 421.
682 T Amudha Sidhanathan v Union Territory, Chandigarh, 2008 Cr LJ 942 (P&H) : 2008 (1) Ren CR (Criminal) 628.
683 Asruf Ali v State of Orissa, (1989) 67 CLT 464 , 468, p 469 following Dalip Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1173
, relying on Ramawati Devi v State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164 [LNIND 1983 SC 618] ; Balak Ram v State of Uttar
Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 2165 [LNIND 1974 SC 236] ; Munnu Raja v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 2199
[LNIND 1975 SC 456] .
End of Document
[s 287] Negligent conduct with respect to machinery.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 7




Whoever does, with any machinery, any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or to be likely to
cause hurt or injury to any other person,
Page 3 of 7
or knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any machinery in his possession or under his care as
is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life from such machinery,
[s 287.1] Scope
The preceding section dealt with negligent conduct with respect to explosive substances while this section
deals with negligent conduct with respect to machinery. In other respects both the sections are alike.
In Benu Krishna Mandal v State of Bihar,684 when the cooling tower was being lifted on the roof of the main
building by a pulley, chains, ballis and ropes etc, the rope suddenly broke away and one labourer fell down and
sustained injuries and later succumbed to the injuries. The factory inspector on inquiry was satisfied that the
pulleys, chains etc, used for the purpose were sufficient and capable of lifting weight many times more than the
registered weight of the tower and there was nothing specific to show that the accused had any hand in the
alleged incident, the proceedings, against the accused persons for offences under sections 287, 288, 337,
120B, IPC, were quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers under section 482, CrPC.
Where the impugned act is covered by the provisions of the Factories Act, prosecution would not be launched
[s 287.2] Sections 287 and 304A—Distinction
Where negligent conduct with respect to machinery results in the death of a human being, the question arises
whether the offence falls under section 304A, IPC or under this section. Section 304A, applies only to such acts
of the accused as are rash or negligent and are directly the cause of the death of another person. Where the
victim has no right to go near the machinery and it is never contemplated by the accused that any injury would
be caused to him, nor is it his intention to cause any injury, the offence would fall under this section and not
under section 304A.686
An employer who employs a competent engineer and does not fetter his discretion by instructions, is not
criminally responsible for accidents.687
[s 287.4] “Act”
[s 287.7] “Hurt”
[s 287.8] “Injury”
Page 4 of 7
In relation to machinery the order usually taken is to fence it.688 A person may be guilty of an offence under this
section although the person injured might not, by reason of his contributory negligence, be able to recover
damages. It is to the interest of the State that machinery should be safe for negligent as well as careful
people.689 The hand of the victim was crushed while he was repairing conveyor belt. No negligence or overt act
was attributed to the petitioner. It was also not the case that the petitioner had not taken care/steps against the
probable danger. No case under section 287 or section 304A, IPC against the petitioner was made out.690
Section 27 and the notes thereunder may be referred to.
[s 287.12] “Or under his Care”
In section 283 the expression used is “under his charge”. The engineers691 and mechanics,692 employed in a
mill may be said to have the machinery under their care.
[s 287.12.1] Sleeping Partner not Liable
Where two partners took a lease of a mill, but one of them took no active part in the management of the mill
which was left to the other partner, it was held that he could not be held liable under this section, for an accident
due to the negligent conduct of the other partner with respect to the machinery in the mill.693
[s 287.13] To Guard against any Probable Danger
What the section punishes is omission to take such order with the machinery as is sufficient to guard against
any probable danger. The section does not say any possible danger; the owner is not required to provide
perfect security against every possibility of danger. However remote, he ought to take reasonable precautions
and so much care as insufficient to guard against such danger as can be expected within the bounds of
probability.694 Where the accused had deployed the deceased an unskilled labourer for cleaning machine, the
labourer received burn injuries due to electric splash while working and died, the accused was convicted under
section 287 IPC.695
The offence under this section is not cognizable. A summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is
bailable but not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate and can also be tried summarily.
The limitation prescribed for taking cognizance of this offence is one year.
Page 5 of 7
That you on or about the………day of………at………acted with………(name of the machinery) so rashly (or
negligently) as to danger human life, (or to be likely to cause hurt) (or injury) (name the person) (or knowingly or
negligently) omitted to take such order with (name the machinery) in your possession as was sufficient to guard against
any probable danger to human life from the said machinery; and thereby committed an offence punishable under
section 287 of the Indian Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Ans. Yes
[s 287.16] Proof
In the case of an offence, under the first part of the section, the prosecution has to prove that:
(i) the accused committed some act with a machinery;
(ii) he did it rashly or negligently; and
(iii) his rashness or negligence was such as to endanger human life or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to
any other person.
In the case of an offence under the second part of the section, the prosecution must prove that:
(i) the accused was in possession of some machinery, or the same was under his care;
Page 6 of 7
(ii) he omitted to take such order with it as was sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human
life therefore; and
(iii) the accused so omitted to do so knowingly or negligently.
684 Benu Krishna Mandal v State of Bihar, (2001) III CCR 447(Pat).
685 Binod Kumar Mittal v State of Jharkhand, 2013 (4) Crimes 134 (Jhar).
686 Mohri Ram v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 453 , p 454 : 31 Cr LJ 533; Jiwan Lal v Devi Luhar, (1970) 19 Jab LJ 161 .
687 R v Kanhaya Lal, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 279 : 8 PR (Cr) 1906.
688 Indemaur v Dames, LR 2 CP 311; Britton v GW Cotton Co, LR 7 Ex 130.
689 Balenkinsop v Ogden, (1893) LR 1 QB 783.
690 Raj Kumar Bansal v State of Jharkhand, 2012 Cr LJ (NOC) 554 (Jhar).
691 R v Kanhaya Lal, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 279 .
692 Mohd Ram v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 453 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 553 .
693 Mohd Ram v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 453 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 553 .
694 Mulraj Dhir v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 507 –08 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 1232 .
Page 7 of 7
695 Jhala Dobhuvanseshwar Sharms v State of Jharkhand, 2018 Cr LJ 5859 .
End of Document
[s 288] Negligent conduct with respect to pulling down or repairing
buildings.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 5
[s 288] Negligent conduct with respect to pulling down or repairing buildings.—



[s 288] Negligent conduct with respect to pulling down or repairing

buildings.—
Page 3 of 5
Whoever, in pulling down or repairing any building, knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with that
building as is sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life from the fall of that building, or of
any part thereof, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six
months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
[s 287.1] Scope
This section deals with negligent conduct with respect to pulling down or repairing a building. It contemplates
only an omission and not a positive act, to safeguard against probable danger to human life. If the building is
situated on public way and the omission to take order with it causes danger to any person, section 283, IPC,
and not this section, will apply.
What the section requires is that the accused must knowingly or negligently omit to take such orders with the
building as is sufficient to guard against a probable danger to human life “from the fall of that building or of any
part thereof”. Hence, the injury, complained of must be the consequence of the fall of the building or any part
thereof. A worker, throwing a brick negligently, may be responsible for his rash or negligent act, but a contractor
who has engaged a worker in a work of construction, cannot be held guilty of omitting to take such order as is
sufficient to guard against a probable danger to human life from the fall of a building or any part thereof if the
injury is caused not because the building, or any part thereof, fell, but because the worker threw a brick
carelessly or negligently.696
[s 287.2] “In Pulling Down or Repairing”
The collapse of a house not undergoing such operations, as mentioned in this section cannot come under this
section.697
A close reading of the section 288, IPC would show that the starting point of the offence is the pulling down of a
building or part thereof or repairing the same. It is while pulling down or repairing is in process that offence
contemplated by the section can take place. The offence lies in the one who pulls down or the repairer who,
knowingly or negligently omitted to do certain things. What the section requires the one who pulls down or the
repairer to do is “to take such order with that building”. These words imply no more than the taking of such
steps with reference to the building. The purpose of taking the said steps is, to guard against any probable
danger to human life. The need to guard against the probable danger of human life is from the fall of the
building or any part thereof. The offence can be committed only while the building is being pulled down or
repaired. Once the pulling down or repairing is completed, the offence cannot be committed regardless of the
deficiencies in the carrying out of repairs.698
[s 287.2.1] For Scaffolding put by Contractor/Labourers Owner of Building is not Liable
Section 288, IPC concerns itself with a situation where a person, in pulling down or repairing any building,
knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with that building as is sufficient to guard against any probable
danger to human life from the fall of that building, or any part thereof. The scaffolding put up by the contractor
and/or the labourers themselves cannot fall within the sweep of this section when the owner of the building had
assigned the job of plastering to the contractor and/or the labourers and there was nothing else left for him to
do. Therefore, it cannot be construed that he knowingly or negligently omitted to take such order as is required
under section 288, IPC. Accordingly, the ingredients of section 288 are not made out against such owner.699
Notes to section 286 may be referred to.
[s 287.4] “Such Order with that Building as is Sufficient”
The degree of precaution required by this section varies with the actual necessity of the situation of the case. If
a dilapidated building is situated in a populous place more care will be needed than where the building under
Page 4 of 5
the same circumstances stands in a desired place.
[s 287.5] Procedure
The same as in the case of an offence under section 287.
I (name and office of the magistrate etc), hereby notice to you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you on or about the………day of………, at………, by pulling down (or repairing) (name the building) knowingly (or
negligently) omitted to take such order with (name the building) as was sufficient to guard against any probable danger
to human life for the fall of (name the building) (or of any part thereof), and thereby committed an offence punishable
Ans. Yes
[s 287.7] Proof
(i) the accused was pulling down or repairing a building;
(ii) in doing so he omitted to take such order therewith as to guard against any probable danger from the
fall of the building or any part thereof; and
(iii) the accused omitted to do so knowingly or negligently.

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696 Manohar Shrinlwas Montri v Avtar Singh Ganga Singh, (1970) 72 Bom LR 629 : (1970) Mah LJ 890 .
697 Jeuchand v Thakar Bawa, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 488 : 14 KLR 19.
698 Vijayak Laxman Vartak v Laxmidas Ganatra, (1991) Mah LJ 1201 , p 1203.
699 Abdul Kalam v State (Govt of National Capital Territory of Delhi), (2006) Cr LJ 3071 (Del).
End of Document
[s 289] Negligent conduct with respect to animal.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 7




Whoever knowingly or negligently omits to take such order with any animal in his possession as is sufficient to
guard against any probable danger to human life, or any probable danger of grievous hurt from such animal,
Page 3 of 7
[s 289.1] Scope
The section deals with improper or careless management of animals. The section refers to animals in
possession and of probable danger to human life or of causing grievous hurt.700 It applies to all animals whether
wild and ferocious or domestic.
Like the previous one, this section also deals with criminal omissions and not with positive acts.
[s 289.2] Essential Ingredient
The essential ingredient of the offence under this section is that there should be probable danger to human life
or limb from the negligence of the accused in not managing his animal.701
[s 289.3] Section 289 and Section 323
If in a case falling under this section simple hurt is caused by the animal, the conviction of the accused should
be under this section and not under section 323.702
It is not only a servant, who is actually in charge of an animal, but the master also may be held liable under this
section. When an old woman was gored to death by a buffalo, not only the herdsman who was in charge of the
animal, but also the master was held liable under this section as the buffalo was known to be a dangerous
animal which had attacked several persons, and no special precautions were taken regarding it.703
The offence under this section consists principally in a “knowing or negligent omission” and not merely in an
omission, which is no offence under the Indian Penal Code.704 The principal point to be considered under this
section will be the knowledge that the accused had of the dangerous propensities of the animal. Where the very
nature of the animal gives him warning, his knowledge will be assumed; as, for instance, if a person were to
make a pet of a tiger, or a bear. Otherwise, express knowledge will have to be shown, in order to involve the
necessity of unusual caution. Where injury is done by a horse, a pony, a bull, or a dog, and it is not shown that
the animal was peculiarly vicious, or that his vice was known to his master, no indictment could be maintained,
unless he had neglected the ordinary precautions employed by everyone who uses such animals. But if the
animal had shown a savage disposition to the knowledge of the owner, it would not be necessary to show that
he had actually injured anyone. In considering the knowledge of the master, it is material to inquire what
knowledge as to the dangerous propensities of the animal was possessed by his servants. Their knowledge will
not necessarily be imputed to him, but it will be a question for determination whether the persons who received
actual notice of such facts stood in such a relation to the accused that it was their duty to communicate the
notice to him, and whether in fact they did communicate it.
[s 289.5.1] Negligence to be Inferred under the Rule of Civil Law in Certain Cases
Where the animal is known to be mischievous, or is of the class of undomesticated animals, which from their
very nature are dangerous, though capable of being brought under a certain degree of subjection, the rule of
civil law seems to be to infer negligence absolutely, from the mere fact that an injury has followed. Where the
injury arose from a savage, the conclusion to be drawn from an examination of all the authorities appears to be
this, that a person keeping a mischievous animal, with knowledge of its propensities, is bound to keep it secure
at his peril; and that if it does mischief, negligence is presumed, without express averment. The negligence is in
“keeping such an animal after notice”.705 This case was followed, and the general principle approved, where the
injury was caused by an elephant which was being exhibited by the defendants.706
[s 289.5.2] Presumption of Negligence in certain Cases

Page 4 of 7
In the case of a ferocious animal it is quite clear that to allow it liberty is in itself likely to cause danger to human
beings. But in the case of a dog, it must be shown that it is likely to bite human beings. There is no presumption
in the case of an ordinary domestic dog that it is likely to bite human beings. There are many dogs that are
likely and there are some dogs that are actually trained to do so. But it must be proved against the owner of the
dog that this particular dog had a tendency or character of biting human beings.707
[s 289.5.3] Case Laws on the Point Discussed
Before the owner or keeper of an animal can be convicted under this section, for negligence with respect to his
animal, it must be made out that the animal was known to be ferocious, and that it was negligently kept. It is,
however, not necessary to show that the animal had actually bitten or injured another person before it bit or
injured the complainant; it would be enough to show that, to the knowledge of the owner, it had evidenced a
savage disposition, eg by attempting to bite.708 It must be shown that the accused knew that the animal was of
a savage disposition as against human beings. A person cannot be convicted under this section merely
because his buffalo attacked and injured the complainant’s buffalo.709 The mere fact that a rope tied to a bullock
when violently strained, broke, affords no proof of negligence.710 Where the accused’s bullock escaped from the
herd, and straying into a hospital chewed some clothes, it was held that the omission of the accused to search
for it in the hospital, which was close to his house and where he ought naturally to have suspected it would go,
was not such negligence as to bring him within the provisions of this section.711 The tethering of a horse in a
narrow street where people cannot pass without going near the animal’s hind legs is a negligent omission to
take order with the animal sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this section.712
[s 289.6] “Omits to take such Order”
In order to convict a person of an offence under this section, it must be established in the affirmative that the
accused knowingly or negligently omitted to take such order with the animal in question as was sufficient to
guard against probable danger to human life or probable danger of grievous hurt from such animal. It should,
therefore, be established in the affirmative that there was a probability that the animal would cause grievous
hurt or danger to human life.713 The degree of care or order, omission to take which is punishable under this
section, differs in the case of different animals. There are some animals naturally so fierce that all persons
acquainted with their habits are aware that danger to human life or risk of grievous hurt is the probable
consequence of allowing them to be at large. There are other animals or which at least when domesticated,
there is no probability of such danger or risk in allowing them to be at large even without a herdsman. As to
animals of the latter class, there should be some evidence that the animal, of which the person in possession is
charged with a conscious or negligent omission to take due order for its custody, is of an abnormally vicious
disposition.
[s 289.7] “Any Animal”
This section does not refer to savage animals alone but to any animal.714 For definition of “animal” section 47
may be referred to.
[s 289.8] “In his Possession”
Section 27, IPC and the notes thereunder deal with the meaning and law of “possession”. The only person
liable under this section is the person who was in possession of the animal in question. The possession may be
actual or constructive. An animal is not less in the actual possession of a servant because it is for some
purposes in the constructive possession of his master.715 Where a bull was set at large by the accused in
accordance with a general practice of the Hindus and the accused had given up possession of the animal, the
bull is no more in possession of the accused within the meaning of this section.716 Where a bull let loose by the
accused’s father was ordered to be shot on its becoming vicious, it was held that merely because the accused
claimed the bull, he could not be convicted under this section, as it could not be said that the animal was in his
possession.717
[s 289.9] “Probable Danger to Human Life or any Probable Danger of Grievous Hurt from such Animal”
To sustain a charge under this section there should be evidence not only of negligence but of such negligence
as would probably lead to danger to human life or of grievous hurt.718 It must be established in the affirmative
that the accused knowingly or negligently omitted to take such order with the animal in question as was
Page 5 of 7
sufficient to guard against probable danger to human life or probable danger of grievous hurt from such
animal.719 The likelihood of the consequence must be determined by a deduction from facts, antecedent to the
actual event and a man cannot be held criminally liable for a consequence of which so far as appears by the
evidence, nothing had occurred to show the probability. Where a pony kicked a child on the road and the owner
of the pony was convicted under this section, it was held that even assuming the negligence in keeping of the
pony, there was no evidence in the case to show that such unsecure keeping would probably lead to danger to
human life or of grievous hurt. If the pony had been proved to be vicious and the accused to be cognizant of the
fact, there would have been evidence of the commission of the offence defined in the section.720 But where the
owner of the pony negligently omitted to fasten the animal securely, and it galloped through a crowded bazaar,
it was held that the accused was liable under this section as the pony was galloping about loose. The bazaar
was crowded with people and it is quite possible that a pony running away through a crowded bazaar, albeit a
perfectly good-tempered beast on all ordinary occasions, would create a most probable danger to the lives or
limbs of the men, women and children walking on the road.721
Where a bullock escaped by pure accident and it was not proved that the disposition of the bullock rendered
any precautions necessary, it was held that the mere fact that the rope tied to the bullock, when violently
strained, broke, would afford no proof of negligence, nor was there anything to show that the probable
consequence of the negligence, even if it was assumed that there was negligence, would be danger to human
life or danger of grievous hurt.722 If a person allows his bull to be at large in spite of its vicious character, the
presumption is that he did so with knowledge that there was probable danger to human life or limb.723 The mere
presence of stray cattle on a road at night cannot be said to involve probable danger to human life or grievous
hurt within the meaning of this section.724
It is the same as in the case of an offence under section 284.
That you on or about the………day of……………at…………… knowingly (or negligently) omitted to take such order
with a (name the animal) in your possession as was sufficient to guard against any probable danger to human life (or
any probable danger of grievous hurt) from such (name the animal) and thereby committed an offence punishable
under section 289 of the Indian Penal Code within the cognizance of this court.
Ans. Yes
Page 6 of 7
[s 289.12] Proof
(i) the accused was in possession of an animal; and
(ii) he knowingly or negligently omitted to take such order with it as was necessary to guard against any
probable danger to human life or of grievous hurt.
If the animal is not by nature, fierce or vicious, the onus of proving negligence is on the prosecution.725
700 Queen-Empress v Lingappa, Ratanlal Un Cr Cas 606.
701 Shivbharan Ayodhya Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1916 Bom 196 (2) : (1916) 17 Cr LJ 383 .
702 Magistrate Shave Zin v Ma Po Nawe, AIR 1923 Rang 147 : (1924) 25 Cr LJ 565 .
703 Shamlay v Emperor, (1907) 6 Cr LJ 100 , p 101.

Page 7 of 7
704 5 WR Cr (Letter) 8.
705 May v Burdett, 9 QBD 112.

706 Mayne Criminal Law, pp 626–27.
707 Lachmi Narain v Emperor, AIR 1918 All 369 (1) : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 1 .
708 Re Thankura Aung, 1885 LBR 353.
709 Queen-Empress v Sandu, Ratanlal Un Cas 197.
710 Subbaraya Padayachi, 1 Weir 237; Cox v Bandidge, 13 CBNS 430.
711 Queen-Empress v Lingappa, Ratanlal Un Cas 606.
712 Mahommad Sadiq v King-Emperor, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 1059 .
713 Ibid.
714 Re Chand Manal, 19 WR (Cr) 1.
715 Queen-Empress v Natha Reva, Ratanlal Un Cas 163.
716 King-Emperor v Shambu Dial, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 501 ; Queen-Empress v Bandu, 8 ILR All 51.
717 Re Fatta, (1889) PR 32 .
718 Re Subbaraya Padayachi, 1Weir 237 : 3 Mad HCR App 33.
719 Mahommed Sadiq v King-Emperor, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 1059 .
720 Re Subbaraya Padaychi, 1Weir 237.
721 Re Chand Manal, 19 WR (Cr) 1.
722 Re Subbaraya Padayachi, 1 Weir 237.
723 Shivabarann Ayodhya Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1916 Bom 196 (2), p 197 : (1916) 17 Cr LJ 38 .
725 Re Brojonarain Pubraj, 2 WR 51.
End of Document
[s 290] Punishment for public nuisance in cases not otherwise provided
for.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 10
[s 290] Punishment for public nuisance in cases not otherwise provided for.—



[s 290] Punishment for public nuisance in cases not otherwise provided

for.—
Page 3 of 10
Whoever commits a public nuisance in any case not otherwise punishable by this Code, shall be punished with
fine which may extend to two hundred rupees.
[s 290.1] Scope
This section only provides for punishment of the offence defined in section 268, IPC. The commission of a
public nuisance as defined by section 268, and not made punishable by any other section in this chapter, is
punishable hereunder. The section would not come into operation if the commission of a public nuisance falls
within the scope of any particular section of this Code.726 An action under this section does not lie for a private
nuisance.727
A prosecution cannot be instituted against the chairman of a municipality under this section for keeping a
rubbish depot in the neighbourhood of houses, but it should be against the municipal corporation.728
In some cases, undoubtedly, the agents themselves may be personally responsible for the crime. It is, however,
a question of fact in each particular case whether the criminal act of the agent is the act of the corporation. In
such a case, it depends upon the nature of charge and other relevant facts and circumstances.729
[s 290.3] Public Nuisance
Section 268, IPC may be referred to.
[s 290.4] “Not otherwise Punishable by this Code”
Section 290, IPC, deals with punishment for public nuisance in cases not otherwise provided for. It deals with
public nuisance causing under the four corners of the definition in section 268 of IPC but not punishable under
any other section. These specific sections are sections 269–289 and sections 291–294, IPC.730
[s 290.5] Intention not Necessary
A public nuisance may undoubtedly be caused without any deliberate intention of causing it and section 283
and indeed section 290 do not refer to the intention of the accused person. The obstruction may be caused by
negligence and in nine cases out of ten it is so caused.731
[s 290.6] Examples of Nuisance Dealt with and Illustrating Cases Falling under this Section
Fouling the water of a river, as contrasted with that of a public spring or reservoir under section 277;732 causing
an offensive (though not necessarily noxious) smell in a high road from rotten bones or vegetable matter kept
on private premises;733 throwing dust and rubbish in the neighbourhood of houses, ie, a municipal rubbish
heap,734 though not if kept on the person’s own premises, unless otherwise offensive to passer-by in a public
place;735 gambling in, and taking dangerous animals, such as fighting rams, about a market place;736 gambling
in the public streets,737 but not in private houses;738 encroaching upon or obstructing any part of the public
highway, though it does not fall within section 283;739 letting cattle loose at night so that they stray on the public
roads, although this may not fall within section 283;740 using vulgar language in public,741 are all instances of
nuisance punishable under this section.
The mere act of enclosing village and Government land is neither an offence under this section,742 nor mere
gambling.743 Similarly, mere interruption at a public meeting,744 or quarrelling in a public street in a village,745 or
stacking of logs on a space of seven feet on a 24 feet wide road in the absence of evidence of finding that the
stacking caused injury, danger or annoyance,746 non-payment of taxes,747 would not constitute an offence under
this section.748
Page 4 of 10
Filing up the well from which the public at large were drawing water would clearly result in common injury to the
public or to the people of the village who dwell or occupy the property in the vicinity of the well. The action of
the petitioner complained of would clearly amount to an injury to the public in that it has deprived the inhabitants
of the facility of drawing water from the well.749
In a case of public nuisance under this section, it must be proved that injury, danger or annoyance was caused
either in regard to the enjoyment of property or the exercise of a public right on the part of a portion of the
community or of any particular class of people. The fact that there is a special law to meet a particular offence,
such as, cattle trespass, does not prevent the punishment of the offenders under this Code of an offence which
could be rightly punished under it.750
Where on account of accumulation of dirty water causing health hazards, a complaint was filed against officers
and employees of UPSIDC Ltd, main persons responsible for the flow of coloured and dirty water were owners
of the saree printing units and not the accused officers and employees of UPSIDC Ltd Allegations in the
complaint did not show any specific act done by the accused persons to make them liable under sections 268,
278, 290, IPC. It was held that an administrative lapse on the part of the accused persons cannot amount to a
criminal offence. Further, the accused persons were not impleaded by name and were impleaded by posts
held, it was not clear when the industrial area was established and who was responsible for the construction of
roads and drainage system at the relevant time. During the intervening long period the concerned officers must
have been transferred, it was held that the complaint suffered from technical defect and no criminal offence was
made out against the accused persons, and hence, proceedings against accused persons under sections 268,
278 and 290, IPC, were quashed.751
[s 290.7] When a Trade becomes Nuisance
The question whether a particular trade or business is or is not a nuisance can be determined only after taking
into consideration a number of circumstances such as the place where it is located or carried on, the number of
the people whose rights are prejudicially affected thereby and the extent of the injury, discomfort and
annoyance caused to human beings.752 Noise alone may constitute a nuisance.753 A noisy trade can be dealt
with as a public nuisance; but most of the decisions as to nuisance by noise or vibration are in actions for
nuisance caused to individuals suffering particularly therefrom or under byelaws made by local authorities. It
was held a public nuisance to make great noises in the night with a speaking trumpet, to the disturbance of the
neighbourhood.754
[s 290.7.1] Nuisance includes Danger or Annoyance
Where a factory creates distressing noises and vibrations which render the occupation of the property in the
neighbourhood unsafe and uncomfortable, the existence of the factory is a nuisance, for the expressions
“nuisance” includes every act or illegal omission which causes danger or annoyance to the public or to the
people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity. Although a person is at liberty to carry on any
trade or business on property belonging to him, he has no right to do so if such trade or business deprives
another of the reasonable and comfortable use of his property. Even a lawful trade would become a nuisance if
it interferes with the comfort and enjoyment of the neighbours, and gives offence to their senses or obstructs
the reasonable use of property.
[s 290.7.2] A Lawful Trade may become Nuisance Afterwards
A particular trade or business may be lawful to start with but may become a nuisance, as by reason of changed
circumstances such as the growth of population.
[s 290.7.3] No Prescriptive Right to Maintain Nuisance
The mere fact that a factory was allowed to operate for several years without any objection having been raised
by the neighbours would not render its owner immune from punishment if it is found that its existence
constitutes a nuisance to the people of the neighbourhood. It has been held repeatedly that no prescriptive right
Page 5 of 10
can be acquired to maintain, and no length of time can legalise a public nuisance.755
[s 290.7.4] Determination of Nuisance
The question whether a particular trade or business is or is not a nuisance can be determined only after taking
into consideration a number of circumstances such as the place where it is located or carried on, the number of
people whose rights are prejudicially affected thereby, and the extent of the injury, discomfort and annoyance
caused to normal human beings.
[s 290.8] Principal and Agent—Owner’s Liability for Nuisance Caused by Occupier of Premises
The general rule is that a principal is not criminally answerable for the acts of his agent. Speaking generally the
person liable, where the user of premises gives rise to a nuisance, is the occupier for the time being whoever
he may be.756
Where the accused, the manager of a school, had a building put up at a cost of Rs 35,000 employing masons
therefor and the masons constructed the same with excess of sand in the mortar, the building collapsed killing
several inmates, on these facts, the Madras High Court held that it was not the case of the prosecution that the
accused himself constructed the building, it was not disputed that he sought the assistance of the masons and
the masons constructed the building, if the masons had not done the work properly and if they had been
negligent in mixing the lime mortar in proper proportions, the accused could not be made liable for the
negligence of those persons who actually constructed the building who were supposed to be skilled. The
accused was a layman, he, therefore, could not be held liable for the negligence of the persons who actually
constructed the building, which is the causa causans for the collapse of the building. The acquittal of the
accused by the sessions court in appeal for offences under sections 304A, 337, 338 and 290, IPC, was found
proper.757
[s 290.9] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable. A summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a
bailable offence but not compoundable and is triable by any judicial magistrate and also summarily.
The limitation prescribed for taking cognizance of this offence is six months.
[s 290.10] Sanction—Whether Necessary
Sanction under section 197, CrPC, is necessary for prosecuting public servants for omitting to perform certain
functions which they are expected to perform as such public servants.758
Even against others, where the right of filing a private complaint for an offence under this section is clearly there
but by the special Acts. The right has been subjected to the restriction on the lines of section 197, CrPC and
previous written sanction of the state board etc, has been made a condition precedent to the cognizance of the
offences being taken by courts; the prosecution will not be without such previous sanction in writing. This
safeguard has a rational basis. Without it industrialists could be vexed day in and day out by being dragged to
criminal courts for a variety of reasons even unconnected with the indication of law.759
Page 6 of 10
That you on or about the………day of…at……committed………which is a public nuisance and thereby committed an
offence punishable under section 290 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of this Court.
Ans. Yes
[s 290.12] Alteration of Charge
Section 216 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with alteration of a charge, but it requires that the
alteration shall be read and explained to the accused. The accused must know what he is charged with and to
what offence he has to answer. Section 221(2) of the CrPC, must be read with section 216 of that Code. A
court cannot convict an accused person of an offence of which he has not been told anything. When the
accused has no opportunity to meet the charge and he did not even know of it till his conviction, it is not only an
irregularity but an illegality which cannot be cured.760
[s 290.13] Proof
To establish any offence under this section, the prosecution must prove that:
(i) the accused did an act or was guilty of an illegal omission;
(ii) such act or omission caused injury, danger, or annoyance;
(iii) such injury, danger, or annoyance was common to the public or the people in general who dwell or
occupy in the vicinity;
or
Page 7 of 10
(i) the accused did an act or was guilty of an illegal omission;
(ii) the act or omission in question was likely to cause injury, obstruction, danger, or annoyance, to
persons who may have occasion to use any public right.761
Utterance of certain words by the accused to his brother during cross-examination before the Land Tribunal but
there was no quarrel between them, such utterance even if true, does not constitute the offence of public
nuisance as defined under section 268, IPC, and made punishable under section 270, IPC.762
The essential elements, constituting offences under sections 290 and 323, IPC, are different. Hence, where an
accused has been charged under section 290, IPC, he cannot be convicted under section 323, IPC.763 The
ingredients of an offence under section 160, IPC, are also totally different from the ingredients of an offence
under section 290, IPC and it is doubtful whether a person charged under section 160, IPC, could ever be
Playing of the radio loud at a particular time did not constitute public nuisance. It was also too trivial for being
pursued in a court of law. The conviction under section 290, IPC was, therefore, set aside.765
[s 290.15] Sentence
Imprisonment in default of payment of a fine under this section must be simple only766 but the Madras High
Court has held that it is not restricted to simple imprisonment.767
726 R v Madho Ram, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 492 : 26 All WN 317; Re Kasayi Ahmed, 1 Weir 238; Santhosh v State of Kerala,
(1985) Cr LJ 756 (Ker).
Page 8 of 10
727 Berhampur Municipality through the Executive Officer v Orugunti Kondaya, (1977) Cut LR (Cr) 267, p 271.
728 Re Chairman of the Municipal Council, Ellore, 1 Weir 243.
729 Kurnool Municipality v Civic Association, (1973) Cr LJ 1227 ; Bhuban Ram v Bibhuti Bhushan Biswas, AIR 1919 Cal
539 , p 540 : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 915 .
730 Santhosh v State of Kerala, (1985) Cr LJ 756 (Ker).
731 Ram Krishan v Emperor, AIR 1935 All 746 .
732 R v Nama Rama, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 6 : 6 Bom LR 52.
733 Guj Berckesfeldt v R, 34 ILR Cal 73 : 1 Weir 243 : (1906) 5 Cr LJ 45 .
734 Re Vasudeva Chetti, 1 Weir 240.
735 Re Kuppa Pillai, 1 Weir 241.
736 Re Bethan Chette, 1 Weir 242; Re Rajah Sahib, 1 Weir 243.
737 Re Mala Obigadu, 1 Weir 239.
738 Re Managil Kuruvan, 1 Weir 240; Queen-Empress v Thandavarayadu, 1 Weir 241.
739 R v Madho Ram, (1906) 4 Cr LJ 492 : 26 All WN 317.
741 Saramma Zacharia v State, AIR 1953 Tr & Coch 43, p 44 : (1953) Cr LJ 288 .
742 Re Anthony Udayan, 1 Weir 245; Re Nevor Parivatappa, 1 Weir 245, p 246.
743 Re Mangil Kamran, 1 Weir 241.
744 KGS Nair v State of Kerala, (1961) Ker LT 110 : (1962) Mad LJ (Cr) 185.
745 Re Govinda, AIR 1959 Mad 513 [LNIND 1959 MAD 19] : (1959) Cr LJ 1440 .
746 Moochla Naik v State, AIR 1967 Ori 36 [LNIND 1965 ORI 90] , 37 : (1967) Cr LJ 393 .
Page 9 of 10
748 Jatindra Nath v Manindra Nath, AIR 1950 Cal 330 , p 331 : (1950) 51 Cr LJ 1241 .
749 Bhagwant v Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Hata, (1986) All LJ 1388.
750 Onooram v Lamessor, (1868) 9 WR (Cr) 70.
751 UPSIDC Ltd v Krishna Murari, (1999) III CCR 105(All).
752 Kirori Mal Bishamber Dayal v State, AIR 1958 Raj 11 : (1958) Cr LJ 91 .
753 Crown v Lambert, (1867) LR 3 Eg 409.
755 Kirori Mal Bishambar Dayal v State, AIR 1958 Punj 11 : (1958) Cr LJ 91 .
756 Bhuban Ram v Bibhute Bhushan Biswas, AIR 1919 Cal 539 , p 540 : (1918) 19 Cr LJ 915 .
757 Public Prosecutor v Pitchaiah Moopanar alias Pitchaiah Pillai, AIR 1970 Mad 198 [LNIND 1968 MAD 161] : (1970) Cr
LT 705 (Mad).
758 Captain Shankarrao Mohite v Burjoi D Engineer, AIR 1962 Bom 198 [LNIND 1961 BOM 64] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 320 .
759 Babulal v Shree Aditya Birla, (1986) 1 Crimes 249 [LNIND 1985 MP 111] , 254 (MP).
760 Raghunath Kandu v Emperor, AIR 1926 All 227 , 228 : (1926) 27 Cr LJ 152 .
761 Onooram v Lamessor, (1868) 9 WR (Cr) 70.
762 S Venkataramaih v State, (1989) Cr LJ 789 (Kant).
763 Re Gangasingam, (1969) LW (Cr) 201 : (1970) 1 Mad LJ 242; Re Govinda, AIR 1959 Mad 513 [LNIND 1959 MAD 19] ,
p 514 : (1959) Cr LJ 1440 .
764 Re Govinda, AIR 1959 Mad 513 [LNIND 1959 MAD 19] , p 514 : (1959) Cr LJ 1440 : (1959) Mad LJ (Cr) 346.
765 Ivour Heyden v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1984) Cr LJ (NOC) 16 (AP).
766 R v Santubin Lakhappa, 5 Bom HCRCC 45; Re Mala Obigadu, 1 Weir 259.
Page 10 of 10
767 Queen v Yellamandu, ILR 5 Mad 157.
End of Document
[s 291] Continuance of nuisance after injunction to discontinue.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 5




Whoever repeats or continues a public nuisance, having been enjoined by any public servant who has lawful
authority to issue such injunction not to repeat or continue such nuisance, shall be punished with simple
Page 3 of 5
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
[s 291.1] Scope
This section punishes repetition or continuance of a nuisance after an injunction to discontinue. Section 143 of
the CrPC provides for the issue of such injunctions.
[s 291.2] Enjoined
To support a conviction under this section, there must be proof of an injunction issued to the accused
individually, against repeating or continuing the same particular public nuisance. It must be shown that the
person convicted had, on some previous occasion, committed the particular nuisance, had been enjoined not to
repeat or continue it, and had repeated or continued it.
The authority under which a magistrate can order or enjoin a person against repeating or continuing a public
nuisance is provided in section 143 of the CrPC. It is the infringement of this order that is punishable under this
section. What is contemplated is an order addressed to a particular person.
A magistrate’s powers to deal with public nuisances are contained in chapter X of the CrPC 1973. Part C of this
chapter is properly applicable only to temporary orders in urgent cases. It is only in such cases that an order
may be made ex parte, and an exception is allowed to the general rule that it shall be directed to a particular
individual in such emergent cases an order may, under section 144 of that Code, be directed to the public
generally when frequenting or visiting a particular place to abstain from a certain act; but this provision does not
apply to a proclamation directed not to the public generally frequenting or visiting a particular place, but to a
portion of the community.768
For the interpretation of the term “public servant” this section has to be read with section 143, CrPC which runs
as follows:
S. 143. Magistrate may prohibit repetition or continuance of public nuisance.— A District Magistrate or Sub-
divisional Magistrate, or any other Executive Magistrate empowered by the State Government or the District Magistrate
in this behalf, may order any person not to repeat or continue a public nuisance, as defined in the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860), or any special or local law.
[s 291.4] Injunction
A personal injunction may be given by a district magistrate, or sub-divisional magistrate, or any other executive
magistrate specially empowered by the State Government, or the district magistrate in this behalf, not to repeat
or continue a public nuisance.769 Under O XXXIX, Rule 2 of the CPC, a civil court can also issue an injunction in
pending cases.
[s 291.5] Procedure
bailable offence but not compoundable and is triable by any magistrate. It can be tried summarily.
Page 4 of 5
The limitation for taking cognizance of this offence is one year.
That you on or about the………day of………at………repeated (or continued), ……… (name the public nuisance),
having been enjoined by……… (name the public servant) who had lawful authority to issue such injunction not to
repeat (or continue) ……… (name the nuisance), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 291 of
Ans. Yes
[s 291.7] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, the prosecution must prove that:
(i) the accused committed a particular public nuisance;
(ii) he was personally enjoined not to repeat or continue it; (a general proclamation to that effect is not
sufficient.)770
(iii) he was so enjoined by a public servant having lawful authority to do so; and
(iv) after having been so enjoined he repeated or continued the offence.

Page 5 of 5
In order to sustain a conviction under this section, it is necessary that the order of the magistrate forbidding the
continuance of the nuisance or evidence of notice of such a character as to make plain the precise terms of the
order and the notice, be recorded in the case. Strict proof of all the circumstances constituting an offence,
especially when the offence is one, which is not malum in se, is required on the basis of a conviction.771
Where the magistrate tried 14 persons together and convicted Nos. 1, 4, 7, 9 and 13 under section 291, IPC,
and the remainder under section 290, IPC it was held that in trying 14 persons accused of distinct offences at
the same time, the magistrate committed an irregularity calculated to the prejudiced by the several charges
having been disposed of in one trial. The conviction was quashed.772
768 Queen-Empress v Jokhu, ILR 8 All 99; Re Mahesh Chand, 20 WR 55.
769 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, section 143.
770 R v Gunga Sonha, BR 24 June 1886.
771 Queen-Empress v Gunya, Ratanlal Un Cr Cas 295.
772 Pulisanki Reddy v Queen, (1882) ILR 5 Mad 20, p 21 (DB).
End of Document
[s 292] Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc. —

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 35



773 [s 292] Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc. —

Page 3 of 35
774[(1) For the purposes of sub-section (2), a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting,
representation, figure or any other object, shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious or appeals
to the prurient interest or if its effect, or (where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any
one of its items, is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely,
having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in
it].
775[(2)]Whoever—
(a) sells, lets to hire, distributes, publicly exhibits or in any manner puts into circulation, or for purposes of
sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or circulation, makes, produces or has in his possession any
obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, representation or figure or any other obscene
object whatsoever, or
(b) imports, exports or conveys any obscene object for any of the purposes aforesaid, or knowing or
having reason to believe that such object will be sold, let to hire, distributed or publicly exhibited or in
any manner put into circulation, or
(c) takes part in or receives profits from any business in the course of which he knows or has reason to
believe that any such obscene objects are, for any of the purposes aforesaid, made, produced,
purchased, kept, imported, exported, conveyed, publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation,
or
(d) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is engaged or is ready to
engage in any act which is an offence under this section, or that any such obscene object can be
procured from or through any person, or
(e) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this section,
shall be punished 776[on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
two years, and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a second or
subsequent conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years, and
also with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees].
777[Exception.—This section does not extend to—
(a) any book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure—
(i) the publication of which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that
such book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure is in the interest of
science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern, or
(ii) which is kept or used bona fide for religious purposes;
(b) any representation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or in—
(i) any ancient monument within the meaning of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites
and Remains Act, 1958 (24 of 1958), or
(ii) any temple, or on any car used for the conveyance of idols, or kept or used for any religious
purpose.]]
Page 4 of 35
Orissa .—(1) In its application to the whole State of Orissa, in Section 292, for the words, “which may extend to
three months”, substitute the words “which may extend to two years” and insert the following proviso before the
Exception, namely:—
“Provided that for a second or any subsequent offence under this section, he shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than six months and not more than two
years and with fine”.778
(2) Section 292A. Same as that of Tamil Nadu.779
Tamil Nadu .—(1) In section 292, for the words “shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to three months or with fine or with both”, substitute the following, namely:—
“shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine
or with both:
Provided that for a second or any subsequent offence under this section, he shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than six months and not more than two
years and with fine.”780
(2) In its application to the State of Tamil Nadu, after section 292, insert the following section, namely:—
“S. 292A. Printing, etc. , of grossly indecent or scurrilous matter or matter intended for blackmail.—Whoever,—
(a) prints or causes to be printed in any newspaper, periodical or circular, or exhibits or causes to be exhibited, to
public view or distributes or causes to be distributed, or in any manner puts into circulation any picture or any
printed or written document which is grossly indecent, or in scurrilous or intended for blackmail; or
(b) sells or lets for hire, or for purposes of sale or hire makes, produces or has in his possession, any picture or
any printed or written document which is grossly indecent or is scurrilous or intended for blackmail; or
(c) conveys any picture or any printed or written document which is grossly indecent or is scurrilous or intended
for blackmail knowing or having reason to believe that such picture or document will be printed, sold, let for
hire distributed or publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation; or
(d) takes part in, or receives profits, from, any business in the course of which he knows or has reason to believe
that any such newspaper, periodical, circular, picture or other printed or written document is printed,
exhibited, distributed, circulated, sold; let for hire, made, produced, kept, conveyed or purchased; or
(e) advertises or makes known by any means whatsoever that any person is engaged or is ready to engage in
any act which is an offence under this section, or that any such newspaper, periodical, circular, picture or
Page 5 of 35
other printed or written document which is grossly indecent or is scurrilous or intended for blackmail, can be
procured from or through any person; or
(f) offers or attempts to do any act which is an offence under this section, 781[shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both]:
Provided that for a second or any subsequent offence under this section, he shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which shall not be less than six months 782[and not more than two years].
Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section, the word “scurrilous” shall be deemed to include any matter which is
likely to be injurious to morality or is calculated to injure any person:
Provided that it is not scurrilous to express in good faith anything whatever respecting the conduct of—
(i) a public servant in the discharge of his public functions or respecting his character so far as his character
appears in that conduct and no further; or
(ii) any person touching any public question, and respecting his character, so far as his character appears in that
conduct and no further.
Explanation II.—In deciding whether any person has committed an offence under this section, the court shall have
regard, inter alia, to the following considerations—
(a) the general character of the person charged, and where relevant, the nature of his business;
(b) the general character and dominant effect of the matter alleged to be grossly indecent or scurrilous or
intended for blackmail;
(c) any evidence offered or called by or on behalf of the accused person as to his intention in committing any of
the acts specified in this section.”783
—Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1960, section 3 (w.e.f. 9-11-1960).
[s 292.2] Scope
To attract the offence under section 292, IPC, there must be public circulation, sale or distribution of the alleged
obscene writing.784 Sections 292–294 deal with obscene publications, obscene objects and obscene acts which
affect public decency and morals. This section makes it an offence to publish or put into circulation any
obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing, painting, representation or figure or any other obscene object.
The section has two sub-sections. sub-section (1) defines “obscene matter” which itself consists of two parts,
the first part is in regard to a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any
other object, which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest, and the other part is related to its effect
which (or where it comprises two or more distinct items, the effect of any one of its items), if taken as a whole is
such as tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to
read, see or hear the matter, contained or embodied in it. Where the material produced satisfies the first part of
Page 6 of 35
what is described in section 292(1), the second part of it would not apply.785Sub-section (2) has five clauses
and an act covered by any one of them constitutes the offence under it but all the clauses are related to
publication or circulation of “obscene matter”.
The publication or circulation may be either by sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or in any other manner.
An advertisement is a manner of publication. But where an advertisement only says that the book advertised
contains 84 postures of men and women, but it does not itself give any posture, offensive to the senses, and
the words used do not suggest any indecent, obscene or immoral ideas, the advertisement will not come under
this section.786
The exception to the section expressly exempts books, etc, kept or used bona fide for religious purposes or are
justified as being for the public good in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or other objects of
general concern. Engravings, painting, sculptures etc, on or in ancient monuments, temples etc, have also
been specifically exempted.
No such exemption was earlier made in respect of works of art, science or literature. This defect has now been
removed by inserting sub-clause (i) in clause (a) of the Exception by Amendment Act (36 of 1969).
This section, as it originally stood in 1861, made it an offence to sell, distribute, import or print for sale or hire, or
wilfully to exhibit any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, etc. A representation in a temple or on a car used for
conveying of an idol was, however, exempted from the operation of the section.787
The section, as it stood before the amendment of 1969, was introduced into the Code by the Obscene
Publications Act (8 of 1925) with a view to give effect to Article I of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Circulation of Traffic in Obscene Publications, signed at Geneva on behalf of the
Government of India in 1923.788 The scope of the section was widened and the exception was also slightly
enlarged by inserting the words “any book, pamphlet, writing, drawing or painting kept or used bona fide for
religious purposes or”. The exception then applied to any such matter connected with religion. But with regard
to the exception the select committee said:
We have considered at length the desirability of extending the scope of the exception to new section 292 of the Indian
Penal Code, so as to cover religious, artistic and scientific writings, etc, but we have come to the conclusion that it
would be difficult to do so without including writings, etc., which are not bona fide of the nature stated. Further, there is
a substantial body of case-law, which makes it clear that bona fide religious, artistic and scientific writings, etc, are not
obscene within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code.
It is thus, clear that the scope of the exception has not been widened so as to make it applicable to objects of
art and literature,789 but it is also clear that the select committee left the exception to be supplemented by the
“substantial body of case-law” which made it clear “that bona fide religious, artistic and scientific writings, etc,
Page 7 of 35
are not obscene within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code”.
There was again a drastic amendment in the section by Act 36 of 1969. Thereby the old section 292 was
renumbered as sub-section (2) and the present sub-section (1) explaining the import and meaning of the word
“obscene” was introduced. The sentence (of imprisonment of either description, for a term which may extend to
three months, or with fine or with both) earlier provided for this section was also enhanced by Act 36 of 1969 to
make the repetition of the offence deterrent as will appear from the existing sub-section (2). The exception
clause was also amended by Act 36 of 1969 by introducing certain new provisions. The old clause ran as
follows:
Exception.—This section does not extend to any book, pamphlet, writing, drawing or painting kept or used bona fide for
religious purposes or any representation sculptured, engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or in any temple,
or on any car used for the conveyance of idols, or kept or used for any religious purpose.
[s 292.4] Analogous Law—Law of England
In England, the common law offence of obscenity was established three hundred years ago, when Sir Charles
Sedley exposed his person to the public gaze on the balcony of a tavern. Obscenity in books, however, was
punishable only before the spiritual courts because it was so held down to 1708 in which year Queen v Read,790
was decided. In 1727, in the case against one Curl it was ruled for the first time that it was a common law
offence.791 In 1857, Lord Campbell enacted the first legislative measure against obscene books, etc, and his
successor in the office of Chief Justice interpreted this statute792 in Hicklin’s case.793 The section of the English
Act is long (they were so in those days), but it used the word “obscene” and provided for search, seizure and
destruction of obscene books, etc, and made their sale, possession for sale, distribution, etc, a misdemeanour.
The section may thus be regarded as substantially in pari materia with the section as it stood before the 1969
amendment in this Code, in spite of some differences in language.794
In 1959, the Obscene Publications Act795 was passed. Section 1 of this statute prescribed the test for obscenity
and by section 4 a defence that the publication of the article was justified as being for the public good on the
ground that it is in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or of other objects of general concern was
made available to the offender. With reference to this a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had
observed, “We must, however, be guided by the law as laid down in this country without reference to a recent
statute law in England”.796
Every person is liable to a fine who, in any thoroughfare or public place in the metropolitan police district or the
City of London or in any street elsewhere in England and Wales, offers for sale or distribution, or exhibits to
public view, any profane book, paper, print, drawing, painting or representation, or sings any profane or
obscene song or ballad, or uses any profane or obscene language, to the annoyance of the inhabitants or
passengers.797
[s 292.4.1] Test of Obscenity
An Article is deemed to be obscene for the purpose of the Obscene Publications Act, 1959 and Obscene
Publications Act, 1964 if its effect or (where the Article comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any
one of its items is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.
Page 8 of 35
In proceedings against a person for publishing an obscene article, the question whether the article is obscene
must be determined without regard to any publication by another person unless it could reasonably have been
expected that the publication by that other person would follow from publication by the person charged. In
proceedings against a person for having an obscene article for publication for gain, the question whether the
article is obscene must be determined by reference to such publication for gain of the article as in the
circumstances it may reasonably be inferred he had in contemplation and to any further publication that could
reasonably be expected to follow from it, but not to any other publication.
The issue of obscenity is one for the jury and expert evidence on the issue is not ordinarily admissible although
in exceptional cases a jury may require the assistance of such evidence.
Section 1(1) of the Obscene Publications Act, 1964 is quite plain to understand. The question to be answered,
bearing in mind all the circumstances of the case, is whether there are people who could be depraved and
corrupted on the basis of the likely distribution of the material in question.798
Where obscene video cassettes were distributed to a limited circle of viewers but where there was no further
control over them, where the official channels of certification of videos were not used, and where no artistic
merit was claimed for the works, the applicant's conviction for publishing obscene works was proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued.799
Publication of obscene material established even though material only sent to one person.800
[s 292.5] Laws of Canada
In a case, Mr Gill's wilful conduct in masturbating in the driver's seat of his car while stopped at a traffic light on
a busy Surrey street, and while he was deliberately making eye contact with D.M.K., was an indecent act in the
presence of D.M.K. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the proven facts was that Mr Gill would be
seen by D.M.K. and he knew it. The exhibitionist nature of this conduct was a clear evidence of the intention of
Mr Gill.
A “public place” is defined in section 150 as “any place to which the public have access as of right or by
invitation, express or implied”. “Access” means “the right or opportunity to reach or use or visit” and not the
ability of those who are neither entitled nor invited to enter a place to see or hear from the outside, through
uncovered windows or open doors, what is transpiring within.801
[s 292.6] Object
The object of this section, which was enacted in pursuance of the international convention regarding
suppression of the circulation and traffic in obscene publication is to prevent circulation or, and traffic in,
obscene publications. There is bound to be an erosion of moral standards if one is constantly exposed to
literary and visual materials which over-emphasise sexuality and brutality. All civilised societies need legal ban
on obscenity for protecting and preserving the moral values on which there is consensus.802 The basic object of
section 292 is to prevent any circulation or sale of any obscene literature and the purposes behind the Act is to
preserve such moral values of which there is universal consensus.803
[s 292.7] Constitutional Validity of the Section
No doubt Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution guarantees complete freedom of speech and expression, but
clause (2) of the article also makes an exception in favour of existing laws which impose restriction on the
Page 9 of 35
exercise of the right in the interest of public decency or morality. This section does not go beyond decency
which falls directly within the words, “public decency or morality” in the second clause of the article. The section
manifestly embodies such a restriction as is contemplated by the second clause of the article because the law
against obscenity, of course correctly understood and applied, seeks no more than to promote public decency
and morality. The section cannot, therefore, be said to be invalid in view of the second clause of Article 19 of
the Constitution.804 The validity of this section was thus examined by the Supreme Court before its amendment
by Act 36 of 1969. There appears nothing objectionable in the said amendment so as to infringe the provisions
of Article 19 as considered by the apex court.
Let us also not forget that freedom of expression also requires adequate “breathing space”.805
[s 292.8] Section 292, IPC and Rights under Article 21 of the Constitution
Where the petitioner bought the book “The Women and Men in My Life”, by Khushwant Singh and felt aghast
and shocked at the cheap, vulgar and obscene writings about dead persons and filed writ petitions under Article
21 of the Constitution of India for direction to the commissioner of police for registration of a case under
sections 272, 509 read with section 24 of IPC. However, Jaspal Singh J, of the Delhi High Court after referring
to the alleged vulgar and obscene language used in the box regarding some men and women observed as
follows:
Khushwant Singh has dared to state. His book does not read like Anne Bradsheet’s poem ‘To My Dear Children’ or like
the life story of Elizabeth Ashbridge, a Quaker woman missionary. His are life stories of new styles of life challenging
traditional social norms and values. What he has stated has to be tested by the current standards of ordinary decent
people. I say so because the book being in English and with a high price tag is likely to be read only by well educated
persons in high income bracket like the petitioner herself. Some of them may find some stray words or passages
shocking or disgusting but not obscene. Even the petitioner only felt aghast and shocked. This does not prove
obscenity. Let us also not forget that freedom of expression requires adequate ‘breathings space’. I do not think
Khushwant Singh has crossed the permissible limits. The question of violation of right to privacy, dignity, fair treatment
or reputation as enshrined under article 21 of the Constitution thus also does not arise. In any case right of privacy
under article 21 is enforceable only qua the State.806
[s 292.9] Whether the Provisions of Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951 Repeal the Provisions of this
Section
The Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951 (56 of 1951), does not provide for punishment for printing and
publishing obscene matter, but provides only against the repetition of such publications. It is preventive in
nature regarding objectionable matters and not penal. On the other hand, under this section once a person is
found to have been concerned with the publication of obscene matter, the court must convict and punish him.
Moreover, a person found guilty under this section is considered as an offender and is guilty of having
committed an offence. The provisions of this section are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1951 Act
and therefore, it cannot be said that this section is repealed by implication by the subsequent Act.807 There is
nothing in the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951 to indicate that this section is either abrogated or
superseded. A prosecution of the accused for an offence under this section, therefore, does not in any way
amount to evading the provisions of the Press (Objectionable Matter) Act, 1951.808
[s 292.10] Abetment
In order to constitute abetment, the abetter must be shown to have “intentionally” sided to the commission of
the crime and that mere proof that the crime charged could not have been committed without the interposition
of the alleged abetter is not enough compliance with the requirements of section 107, IPC.809 Where it was not
the case of the prosecution that the accused has intentionally exhibited or arranged exhibition of a blue film,
and on the other hand, the allegation was that the accused was a spectator of the blue film and therefore, an
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abetter of the offences under sections 292, 293 and 294, IPC, this interposition as a mere spectator to the
exhibition of a blue film without any further complicity, cannot be taken to be amounting to abetment of the main
offence.810
[s 292.11] “Obscene”—Ingredients of
Sub-section (1), which defines the word “obscene” was inserted, in this section by the Indian Penal Code
(Amendment) Act, 1969. Before it, this Code did not contain any definition of this word. The said sub-section (1)
now lays down that for the purposes of sub-section (2) of this section, a book, pamphlet, paper, writing,
drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object shall be deemed to be obscene if:
(i) it is lascivious of,
(ii) it appeals to the prurient interest, or
(iii) its effect, or (where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any of its items, if taken as a
whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons, who are likely having regard to all relevant
circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.
[s 292.12] Obscene—Meaning of
The word “obscenity” as the dictionaries tell us, denotes the quality of being obscene which means “offensive,
to modesty or decency, lewd, filthy, repulsive”,811 “loathsome, indecent and lewd. But it does not mean that
every indecent or repulsive or filthy article will come under the definition of obscenity though all obscene articles
will be either indecent or repulsive”.812 The language of a writing may have a tendency of shock or disgust but
revulsion is not corruption. Tendency to corrupt is a much stronger concept than a tendency to shock or
disgust. One may find some stray words or passages shocking or disgusting but not obscene. So merely feeling
aghast or shocked does not prove obscenity.813 “Obscenity” means something opposed to public decency and
morality.814
The obscenity does not lie in the letters of the words. The writing for the purpose of branding it as “obscene”
must have tendency to deprive and corrupt person who are likely to read the same. The letters written by the
petitioner accused did not tend to deprive the reader like the chief matron to get influenced and get her
corrupted as regards moral, his conviction, therefore, under section 292, IPC was set aside.815
It may be taken as meaning offensive to chastity or modesty; expressing or presenting to the mind or view
something that delicacy, purity and decency forbid to be expressed; impure as obscene language, obscene
pictures, anything expressing or suggesting unchaste and lustful ideas, impure, indecent, lewd.816 Obscenity is
treating sex in a manner appealing to the carnal side of human nature, or having that tendency. Such treating of
sex is offensive to modesty and decency, but the extent of such appeal in a particular book, etc, are matters for
consideration in each individual case.817 Anything distinctly calculated to incite a reader to indulge in acts of
indecency or immorality is obscene, for example a book containing a description of defective sexual enjoyment
with advice for heightening and prolonging such enjoyment in the case of normal persons.818
The concept of “obscenity” would differ from country to country, state to state and even from region to region
depending on the standards of morals and contemporary society. The words treated as obscene in Malabar
area may not be obscene in other parts of Kerala; similarly the words used in other parts of Kerala may not be
obscene in Malabar area.819
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Whether the words uttered were obscene, whether those words are/were likely to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences is a question of fact to be decided based on the evidence
that may have to be adduced by reference to the meaning attributed to those words in that particular
region/locality. The tone and tenor of those words and the meaning of those words, whether hearers are likely
to suffer mental shock on hearing such words, whether those words are actually intended and used in that
locality as obscene are questions of fact to be decided based on the evidence that may have to be adduced.820
Hicklin’s test postulated that a publication has to be judged for obscenity based on isolated passage of work
considered out of context and judged by their apparent influence on most susceptible readers, such as children
or weak-minded adults. Held, Hicklin’s test is not the correct test to be applied to determine “what is obscenity”.
Section 292 of the IPC, of course, uses the expression “lascivious and prurient interests” or its effect. The
courts should apply the “community” standard test rather than “Hicklin’s test” to determine what is
“obscenity”.821
The contemporary community standards test is still in vogue with certain addition. The court has to take an
overall view of the matter, that there has to be an objective assessment and the Judge must in the first place
put himself in the position of the author and, thereafter, in the position of reader of every class and must
eliminate the subjective element or personal preference; a novel cannot be called obscene usually because of
slang and unconventional words in it; the court has to see that the writing is of such that it cannot bring home to
the adolescences any suggestion which is depraving or lascivious and that the concept of obscenity usually
differs from country to country depending on the standards of morality of contemporary society in different
countries.822
[s 292.13] Obscenity to be Judged in the Light of its Influence
Obscenity may be adjudged in the light of the influence, which the impugned matter may have, not only on the
minds of the persons, already depraved or abnormal, but also on the minds of persons, who may be completely
unintroduced to sex and may be innocent. The human mind has an inherent attraction for sex. If any material
incites extreme immoral perversities in respect of sexual indulgence, then it incites the impulses to depravity
and degeneration and would be obscene.823
[s 292.14] Sub-section (1)—“To Deprave and Corrupt”
Sub-section (1) of this section has used the words “deprave” and “corrupt” as synonymous. “To deprave and
corrupt” does not merely mean to lead astray morality.824 “Deprave” and “corrupt” refer to the effect of a
pornographic publication on the mind, including the emotions; it is not necessary that the physical (ie “overt”)
sexual activity should result.825 “Depravity” and “corruption” is not, however, confined to sexual depravity and
corruption.826
The word “obscene” means what is offensive to modesty or decency and which gives rise to emotions,
nudeness, filthiness, and repulsiveness. The real test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into
whose hands the object of the sort may fall.827
The accused was running a shop and found in possession for sale/hire/distribution, an obscene blue film video
cassette depicting a man and a woman in a completely nude posture indulging in carnal intercourse appealing
to the prurient interests of the viewers and arousing corrupt and lascivious feelings of persons who chanced to
view the video cassette. Appellant accused was convicted for offence under section 292, IPC.828
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Even the certificate issued by the Censor Board does not give immunity to a celluloid film from obscenity.829
[s 292.15] Duty of Judge or Court in Deciding Question of Obscenity of any Book, Story or Article
In deciding the question of obscenity of any book, story or article the court whose responsibility it is to adjudge
the question may, if the court considers it necessary, rely to an extent on evidence and views of leading literary
personage, if available, for its own appreciation and assessment and for satisfaction of its own conscience. The
decision of the court must necessarily be on an objective assessment of the book or story or article as a whole
and with particular reference to the passages complained of in the book, story or article. The court must take an
overall view of the matter complained of as obscene in the setting of the whole work, but the matter charged as
obscene must also be considered by itself and separately to find out whether it is so gross and its obscenity so
pronounced that it is likely to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to influence of this sort and into
whose hands the book is likely to fall. Though the court must consider the question objectively with an open
mind, yet in the matter of objective assessment the subjective attitude of the Judge hearing the matter is likely
to influence even though unconsciously, his mind and his decision on the question. A Judge with a puritan and
prudish outlook may on the basis of an objective assessment of any book or story or article, consider the same
to be obscene. It is possible that another Judge with a different kind of outlook may not consider the same book
to be obscene on his objective assessment of the very same book. The concept of obscenity is moulded to a
very great extent by the social outlook of the people who are generally expected to read the book. It is beyond
dispute that the concept of obscenity usually differs from country to country depending on the standards of
morality of contemporary society in different countries. In judging the question of obscenity, the Judge in the
first place should try to place himself in the position of the author and from the view point of the author the
Judge conveys if the work has any literary and artistic value. The Judge should thereafter place himself in the
position of a reader of every age group in whose hands the book is likely to fall and should try to appreciate
what kind of possible influence the book is likely to have in the minds of the readers. A Judge should thereafter
apply his judicial mind dispassionately to decide whether the book in question can be said to be obscene within
the meaning of section 292, IPC, by an objective assessment of the book as a whole and also of the passages
complained of as obscene separately. In appropriate cases, the court, for eliminating any subjective element or
personal preference which may remain hidden in the sub-conscious mind and may unconsciously affect a
proper objective assessment may draw upon the evidence on record and also consider the views expressed by
reputed or recognised authors of literature on such questions if there be any for his own consideration and,
satisfaction to enable the court to discharge the duty of making a proper assessment.830
It appears useful to quote here certain guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Samresh Bose v Amal
Mitra,831 in this respect as follows:
In deciding the question of obscenity of any book, story or article the court whose responsibility it is to adjudge the
question may, if the court considers it necessary, rely to an extent on evidence and view of literary personage, if
available for its own appreciation and assessment and for satisfaction of its own conscience. The decision of the court
must necessarily be on an objective assessment of the book, story or article as a whole and with particular reference to
the passage complained of in the book, story or article. The court must take an overall view of the matter complained of
as obscene in the setting of the whole work, but the matter charged as obscene must also be considered by itself and
separately to find out whether it is so gross and its obscenity so pronounced that it is likely to deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to influence of this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall.
…The concept of obscenity is moulded to a very great extent by the social outlook of the people who are generally
expected to read the book. It is beyond dispute that the concept of obscenity usually differs from country to country
depending on the standards of morality of contemporary society in different countries. In our opinion, in judging the
question of obscenity, the Judge in the first place should try to place himself in the position of the author and from the
view point of the author the Judge should try to understand what is that the author seeks to convey and what the
author conveys has any literary and artistic value. The Judge should thereafter place himself in the position of a reader
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of every age group in whose hands the book is likely to fall and should try to appreciate what kind of possible influence
the book is likely to have in the minds of the readers. A Judge, should thereafter apply his judicial mind dispassionately
to decide whether the book can be said to be obscene within the meaning of s 292, IPC by an objective assessment of
the book as a whole and also of the passages complained of as obscene separately. In appropriate cases, the court,
for eliminating any subjective element or personal preference which may remain hidden in the sub-conscious mind and
may unconsciously affect a proper objective assessment, may draw upon the evidence on record and also consider the
views expressed by reputed and recognised authors of literature on such questions if there be any for his own
consideration and satisfaction to enable the court to discharge the duty of making a proper assessment.
The petitioner accused had authored a book “Breathless in Bombay”. Certain words used in the book to
describe the character of a person in story were not held to be obscene. Prosecution of the petitioner was
quashed on petition filed under section 482, CrPC.832
[s 292.16] Obscenity Distinguished from Pornography
There is some difference between obscenity and pornography in the sense that the latter denotes writings,
pictures, etc, intended to arouse sexual desire while the former may include writings etc, not intended to do so
but which have that tendency. Both, of course, offend against public decency and morals, but pornography is
obscenity in a more aggravated form.833 It has now received the appellation of hardcore pornography by which
term is meant libidinous writings of high erotic effect unredeemed by anything literary or artistic and intended to
arouse sexual feeling.834 Pornographic pictures and writings are always obscene within the meaning of section
292.835
[s 292.17] Obscenity Distinguished from Vulgarity
In Sameresh Bose v Amal Mitra,836 the question for determination before the Supreme Court was whether a
novel written by the appellants was obscene. After carefully examining the contents of the novel, opinion of
literary personage about it and other evidence produced in the case, the Supreme Court was of the view that,
“reference to kissing, description of the body and the figures of the female characters in the book and
suggestions of acts of sex by themselves may not have the effect of depraving, debasing and encouraging the
readers of any age to lasciviousness and the novel on these counts, may not be considered to be obscene”.
Distinguishing obscenity from vulgarity the apex court observed as follows:
A vulgar writing is not necessarily obscene. Vulgarity arouses a feeling of disgust and repulsion and also boredom but
does not have the effect of depraving, debasing and corrupting the morals of any reader of the novel, whereas
obscenity has the tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.
This distinction may be further clear from the following observations made by the apex court in the same case:
…the novel is not obscene merely because slang and unconventional words have been used in the book in which
there have been emphasis on sex and description of female bodies and there are the narrations of feeling thoughts
and actions in vulgar language. Some portions of the book may appear to be vulgar and readers of cultured and
refined taste may feel shocked and disgusted. Equally in some portions, the words used and descriptions given may
not appear to be in proper taste. In some places there may have been an exhibition of bad taste leaving it to the
readers of experience and maturity to draw the necessary inference but certainly not sufficient to bring home to the
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adolescent any suggestions which is depraving or lascivious. If a reference to sex by itself in any novel is considered to
be obscene and not fit to be read by adolescents, adolescents will not be in a position to read any novel and ‘will have
to read books which are purely religious’.
Thus, every vulgar matter is not obscene as these words do not have similar connotations and each term has
its separate characteristics to affect the minds of the readers as laid down above.
[s 292.18] Filthy Abuses, Whether Obscene
Filthy abuses are not, per se, obscene within the meaning of this section. Whether certain filthy abuses are
obscene or not, regard must be had to the class of society to which the parties belong.837 Every abusive or
humiliating word would not by itself be obscene. The words uttered by the accused were abusive and
humiliating but were not obscene; his conviction under section 294(b), IPC was set aside.838However, where
the accused had abused the complainant in caste name and in open field, order framing charge under section
294, IPC was held proper.839
Word “scandal” does not have the tendency of depraving or corrupting those minds which are open to prurient
of lascivious influences.840
[s 292.19] Nude Pictures—Whether Obscene
Nudity in itself cannot under all circumstances be classified as obscene.841 A picture of a woman in the nude is
not per se obscene842 unless there is something in it which would shock or offend the taste of any ordinary or
decent-minded person. Unless nude pictures are an incentive to sensuality and excite impure thoughts in the
minds of ordinary persons of normal temperament who may happen to look at them, they cannot be regarded
as obscene within the meaning of this section.843
[s 292.19.1] Nude Pictures—Considerations for Decision
For the purpose of deciding whether a nude picture is obscene or not, one has to consider to a great extent, the
surrounding circumstances, the pose, the posture, the suggestive element in the picture, etc., the person in
whose hands it is likely to fall etc. So no hard and fast rule can be laid down for the determination of the
matter.844
In the present day society in India, a book, picture, or a publication which deals with such matters cannot per se
be said to be obscene. Great emphasis is being laid on family planning and in that connection it has become
absolutely necessary to import education about sex to the masses. It is a matter of common knowledge that
there is even a thinking to introduce sex education as one of the subjects to be taught to the younger
generation.845
When nude pictures are included in a book which deals with intimate side of sex life, without any reference to
the subject-matter, but as a cheap medium for obtaining, greater circulation of the book, the only inference, that
can be drawn, is that they have been included therein with an idea to arouse sexual desire in the readers. Such
nude pictures are pornographic and as such obscene.846
“Obscenity” should be gauged with respect to contemporary community standards that reflect the sensibilities
as well as the tolerance levels of an average reasonable person. In the present case, the appellant merely
referred to the increasing incidence of pre-marital sex and called for its societal acceptance. At no point of time
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appellant described the sexual act or said anything that could arouse sexual desires in the mind of a
reasonable and prudent reader. Furthermore, the statement has been made in the context of a survey which
has touched on numerous aspects relating to the sexual habits of people in big cities. Even though this survey
was not part of a literary or artistic work, it was published in a news magazine thereby serving the purpose of
communicating certain ideas and opinions on the above mentioned subject. In the long run, such
communication prompts a dialogue within society wherein people can chose to either defend or question the
existing social mores. It is difficult to appreciate the claim that the statements published as part of the survey
were in the nature of obscene communications.847
The same view was taken by the Allahabad High Court and it was held that the mere showing of the nude
female form in itself, is not necessarily obscene unless the manner, in which the nude pictures appear (in the
film) is such that it is likely to arouse unhealthy lustful thoughts in the mind of viewers.848
There was evidence that the accused showed pornographic films on handycam containing nude photographs of
the prosecutrix. The handycam and the cassettes were recovered from the house of the accused appellant.
When the prosecutrix demanded the cassette from the accused, he refused to return and threatened with dire
consequences. Accused appellant was convicted for offences under sections 292 and 506, IPC.849
[s 292.19.2] Obscenity of a Picture
For the purpose of testing whether a picture is obscene or not, one has hardly to depend upon any oral
testimony. What has to be considered is to a great extent the surrounding circumstances such as the pose, the
posture, the suggestive element in the picture and last of all the person or persons in whose hand it is likely to
fall.850 Under section 292 (1), IPC, a picture or article shall be deemed to be obscene if: (i) it is lascivious; (ii) it
appeals to the prurient interest; and (iii) it tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or
hear the matter, alleged to be obscene. Once the matter is found to be obscene, the question may arise as to
whether the impugned matter falls within any of the exceptions contained in the section. A picture of a
nude/semi-nude woman, as such, cannot per se be called obscene unless it has the tendency to arouse feeling
or revealing an overt sexual desire. The picture should be suggestive of deprave mind and designed to excite
sexual passion in persons who are likely to see it, which will depend on the particular posture and the
background in which the nude/semi-nude woman is depicted. Only those sex-related materials which have a
tendency of “exciting lustful thoughts” can be held to be obscene, but the obscenity has to be judged from the
point of view of an average person, by applying contemporary community standards.851
A picture alleged to be obscene has to be viewed in the background in which it was shown, and the message it
has to convey to the public and the world at large.852
Where the smudged and indecipherable publication of the face of a woman either by itself or read with the
name of the film “Together with love” printed alongside did not tend to invade or deprave and corrupt public
morals through over-sex and the film itself was not stated as being offensive, the offence under section 292,
IPC, was held not made out.853
[s 292.20] Exhibition of Blue Films
The appellant were found showing blue film in video hall to young men where about 15 viewers were present.
They were convicted under section 292, IPC read with section 34, IPC and section 7, Cinematograph Act. Held,
exhibiting blue film does not deserve leniency in sentencing. Sentence of one month simple imprisonment and
fine imposed was not interfered. Probation was refused.854
[s 292.21] Obscene Film—Certificate by Board of Film Censors—Effect
The grant of a certificate by the Board of Film Censors does not bar the court from examining the question of
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obscenity, it raises rebuttable presumption that the picture does not offensively invade or deprave public morals
through over-sex.855
[s 292.22] Obscene Film—Protection under Section 79, IPC when Available
The court has also to keep in view not only the exceptions provided by this section but also the general
exceptions provided by this Code in sections 76–95, IPC. Section 79, IPC makes an offence a non-offence
when the offending act is actually justified by law or is bona fide believed by mistake of fact to be so justified. If
the Board of Censors, acting within their jurisdiction and on an application made and pursued in good faith,
sanctions the public exhibition, the producer and connected agencies do enter the statutory harbour and are
protected, because section 79 exonerates them at least in view of their bona fide belief that the certificate is
justificatory. The prosecution is unsustainable because section 79 is exculpatory when read with section 5A of
the Cinematograph Act and the certificate issued thereunder.856
[s 292.23] Accused Privately seeing Obscene Film—No Offence
The accused were not in possession of the obscene films for the purpose of sale, distribution, circulation etc as
mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 292 of IPC. Therefore, the act of the accused privately
viewing obscene film did not constitute an offence under section 292, IPC.857
[s 292.24] A Vulgar Picture not Necessarily Obscene
A vulgar picture is not necessarily obscene unless there is something in it which would shock or offend the taste
of any ordinary or decent minded person.858
[s 292.25] Indecent Exposure—Whether Falls under this Section
Any unlawful indecent exposure of the human body in a public place, and in the view of several persons (or
either sex) the offence is in substance only a form of public nuisance by indecent exhibition. Exposing to public
view the naked body of a newly born infant has been held indictable.859 But most of the decisions relate to the
exposure of the private parts of an individual in a public place.860 Bathing so near a public footway frequented
by females that public exposure must occur, is a nuisance, and it is no defence that there has been a usage to
bathe at that place.861
Matrimonial dispute was pending between the complainant wife and the accused husband. The accused
husband hanged painting of women on wall of the bedroom in nude/semi-nude. Prima facie case for offence
under section 292, IPC was made out, order issuing process against the accused husband was not quashed.862
[s 292.26] Test of Obscenity
The test of obscenity is whether it excites or not the average person enjoying a normal state of mind to have
recourse to depravity as a matter of degenerate pleasure. Public depiction of sexual perversities crosses the
norm of morality and containing an incentive to similar performance, such depiction in certain circumstance may
surely be obscene.863
In R v Hicklin,864 the test of obscenity was laid down by Cockburn CJ, in these words:
…I think the test of obscenity is this: Whether the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose
minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of the sort may fall…It is quite certain
that it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thought of a
most impure and libidinous character.
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The test has been approved by Lord Goddard in R v Reiter,865 and it has been uniformly applied in India,866
even before the insertion of sub-section (1).
In R v Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd,867 Stable J in directing the jury, cited Cockburn CJ’s test of obscenity in
R v Hicklin868and stated:
Because this test was laid down in 1868, that does not mean that you have to consider whether this book is an
obscene book by the standards of nearly a century ago. Your task is to decide whether you think that the tendency of
the book is to deprave those whose minds today are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands the book
may fall in this year, or last year, when it was published in the country.
Remember that the charge is a charge that the tendency of the book is to corrupt and deprave. The charge is not that
the tendency of the book is either to shock or disgust.
It is undoubtedly, true that a case is not to be judged by the Victorian standards but by the moral standards of today,
since moral values and standards vary from age to age. The tests to be applied for determining whether a particular
object is obscene or not would depend on various circumstances. The idea as to what is to be deemed to be obscene
has varied from age to age, from region to region, dependent upon particular social conditions. There cannot be an
immutable standard of moral values.869
The idea as to what is to be deemed to be obscene not only varies from age to age and from region to region
but even from person to person dependent upon particular social conditions. The court must take into account
the change brought about in the society.870 Still the test laid down in Hicklin’s case should not be discarded. It
makes the court, the Judge of obscenity in relation to an impugned book etc, and lays emphasis on the
potentiality of the impugned object to deprave and corrupt by immoral influences. It will always remain a
question to decide in each case and it does not compel an adverse decision in all cases.871
Hicklin’s test postulated that a publication has to be judged for obscenity based on isolated passage of work
considered out of context and judged by their apparent influence on most susceptible readers, such as children
or weak-minded adults. Held, Hicklin’s test is not the correct test to be applied to determine “what is obscenity”.
Section 292 of the IPC, of course, uses the expression “lascivious and prurient interests” or its effect. The
courts should apply the “community” standard test rather than “Hicklin’s test” to determine what is
“obscenity”.872
[s 292.26.1] Effect on Average Person not on one of Depraved Mentality
Further, it appears that the courts have, more often, restricted the use of the term “obscenity” to sexual
immorality only. Such matters as would tend to stir in persons, into whose hands such matter is ordinarily
expected to reach. Sex impulse which leads to sexually impure and lustful thoughts, are declared as obscene,
attracting the jurisdiction of the court to ban out such publications. The true test is not to find out what depraves
the morals in any way whatsoever, but what leads to deprave only in one way viz, by exciting sexual desire and
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lascivious thoughts.
The effect produced on an ordinary member of the society or a particular class of readers for which a particular
publication may be meant has to be ascertained. It is neither a man of wide culture or rare character, nor a
person of a depraved mentality, who should be thought of as being the reader of such literature. The standard
of readers is neither one of exceptional sensibility nor one without any sensibility whatsoever.873 In considering
whether a publication is obscene, the class of persons who are likely to read such a publication must be taken
into consideration. In applying the test, one has also to consider the effect which the book would produce on an
ordinary average person,874 and not on a person with depraved mentality. In considering the question, the
persons to whom, and the time and the circumstances under which, the obscene thing is put forth must be
taken into account.875
[s 292.26.2] Obscene Poem
The respondent composed and published an obscene poem “Gandhi Mala Bhetla” on Mahatma Gandhi which
would cause damage to the image and reputation of the father of the nation, which is nurtured by every citizen
of India. Proceedings were not quashed on petition under section 482, CrPC.876
[s 292.26.3] Whether one Obscene Passage is Sufficient to Render the Whole Work Obscene
One obscene passage is sufficient to render the work obscene.877 There lurks a danger in the doctrine of the
book as a whole. The application of this doctrine would mean that if in a book some portion, say, a few pages
are clearly obscene and the rest innocuous, the book can pass muster, the good overshadowing the bad. The
fact will, however, remain that the large portion of the book being innocuous, the obscene portion thereof would
have the effect to deprave the mind of the reader. The result would be that the obscenity could then parade
under the protective cloak of a quantity of innocuous pages.878 The words “if taken as a whole” in section
292(1), are however, of significance and show a departure from the earlier approach.879
Again the test is whether the object or article is such as would rouse prurient thoughts in an average person
and whether it is obscene by contemporary standards of decency and morality. What may not rouse prurient
thoughts in an enlightened person or scholar or a moralist, may arouse, or provoke such thoughts in an
average person into whose hands the object may fall. Determination must be with reference to the kind of
person, likely to come by it. Test is not whether it will corrupt the morals of an archbishop, but whether it will
tend to corrupt the thoughts of a person understood as the average person.880
[s 292.26.4] Comparison of One Book with another not necessary
A publication cannot be said to be obscene merely because it deals frankly with sex matters, provided, of
course, that the language used is not such as to excite sensual feelings or give rise to thoughts of lust.881 A
book which is intended to give advice to married people on how to regulate the sexual side of their lives, that is
to say, with a view to promoting their health and mutual happiness, and which is written in a fairly plain
language in order to be understood, cannot be said to be obscene, merely because such a book might fall into
wrong hands.882 When there is nothing in the books to offend an ordinary decent person, it is impossible to say
that they are obscene. It is not necessary to compare one book with another to find the extent of permissible
action.883 It is useful to bear in mind the words of Lord Goddard CJ, in R v Reiter:
The character of other books is a collateral issue, the exploration of which would be endless and futile. If the books
produced by the prosecution are indecent or obscene, their quality in that respect cannot be made any better by
examining other books…
The court must, therefore, apply itself to consider each work at a time. An overall view of the obscene matter in the
setting of the whole work would, of course, be necessary, but the obscene matter must be considered by itself and
separately to find out whether it is so gross and its obscenity so decided that it is likely to deprave and corrupt those
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whose minds are open to influences of this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall. In this connection the
interests of our contemporary society and particularly the influence of the book etc…on it, must not be overlooked.884
[s 292.26.5] Elements which make a Book Obscene
A book shall be deemed obscene if: (a) it is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest, or (b) if its effect or
where it comprises of two or more distinct items, the effect of any one of its items is taken as a whole such as to
tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read the
matter contained in it. The words “if taken as a whole” are of significance and show a departure from the earlier
approach.885
The magazine published by the petitioner contained nude photographs of women. In the impugned pictures of
the magazine there was hardly anything aesthetic or artistic about them. Rather the pictures were taken and
published with the sole purpose of attracting readers who have a prurient mind. Held, there was prima facie
case to frame charge under section 292, IPC against the petitioner.886
[s 292.26.6] Offending Matter to be judged by the Court
The question, whether a book contains obscene matter or not, does not altogether depend on oral evidence
because the offending matter of the book, which is the subject of charge, must be judged by the court in the
light of section 292, IPC and the provisions of the Constitution. The publication in question should not be judged
on a different standard than the strictly legal one because there is a good deal of gulf between legalism and
literature on the question of decency.887 If it may be necessary or is at all required the court may rely to a
certain extent, on the evidence and views of leading literature on that aspect particularly when the book is in a
language with which the court is not conversant.888
[s 292.26.7] Certain Aspects to be Kept in View
The books as a whole and so also the passages under attack have to be judged keeping in view not only the
present day literary trends and standards but the present day popular permissiveness as well. At places some
words or passages may appear to be shocking or disgusting but not obscene. This does not prove obscenity.
Freedom of expression requires adequate “breathing space”.889
Whether a picture is obscene or not, one has to consider to a great extent the surrounding circumstances, the
suggestive element in the picture and the person or persons in whose hands it is likely to fall. It is the duty of
the court to find out whether there is any obscenity or any thing in the book which will undermine or take away
or influence the public in general, and the reader in particular.890
[s 292.26.8] Indecent Matter when Justified
Publication of indecent matter may be justified if it is genuinely in the interest, or for the purposes of art, science
or any other form of learning. The justification must, however, depend on the facts of each particular case, on
the form of the matter, the circumstances of its publication and the nature of the accused’s business. In other
words, if the necessary or natural effect of a publication is prejudicial to the public morality or decency, the
motive of the accused in publishing the obscene matter is immaterial.
Where the accused, a company owned by the Government of India, engaged mainly in manufacturing and
marketing of various types of condoms published the advertisement in question to promote the sale of one of
their products “Moods” for which the complainant Kerala Women’s Commission and another responsible body
sought explanation of the accused. On coming to know of the fact that advertisement published drew objection
from certain members of the society, the accused immediately withdrew the advertisement and expressed their
regret, still the complaint was filed against the accused but much thereafter, alleging an offence punishable
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under section 292, IPC. It was held that even if the complaint was maintainable, the interest of the complainant
who is alleged to be a social worker should give way to the larger interest of the society in not prosecuting the
accused persons when the two very important public bodies have accepted the regrets expressed by the
accused persons who immediately withdrew the advertisement and also in view of the explanation offered by
the accused persons regarding publication of the advertisement, the proceeding against the accused persons
was quashed by Kerala High Court by exercising powers under section 482, CrPC.891
[s 292.27] Necessity of Publication or Circulation
Publication or putting into circulation, or attempting to do so is an essential element in the offence under this
section. There are several ways of putting obscene matter into circulation. The section mentions some of them,
such as sale, letting to hire, distribution, public exhibition, advertising etc. But this list is not exhaustive. For the
purposes of the section, the indecent matter may be put into circulation in any manner.
[s 292.27.1] Mode of Publication
It is immaterial whether the publication is in writing or in print or by sign, picture or effigy. The principles laid
down in the cases upon this subject seem to cover oral communications, made before a large assembly, and
having a clear tendency to produce immorality, as in the case of the performance of an obscene play.
Publication is an essential element in the offence.892 Showing an obscene print in private to another at his
request who seeks to see and buy it for the purpose of prosecution has been held a publication.893 It seems to
be no defence in law to prove that the obscene libel is in a foreign language,894 although the language may, in
fact, limit the mischief of the publication.
Obscene books were seized from the shop of the accused, which the accused had kept in exposed state. The
court considered the contents of the book and found that the necessary ingredients of the offence were made
out. Appellant accused was convicted under section 292, IPC.895
[s 292.27.2] Advertisement is Publication
An advertisement is a manner of publication. But where an advertisement only says that the book advertised
contains 84 postures of men and women, but it does not itself give any posture offensive to the senses and the
words used do not suggest any indecent, obscene or immoral ideas, the advertisement will not come under this
section.896 In Punjab a special Act [The Punjab Suppression of Indecent Advertisement Act (Punjab Act 7 of
1941)] has been passed for the purpose of suppressing indecent advertisement.
Where it appeared that the accused kept in Epsom Downs, a booth for the purpose of showing an indecent
exhibition and they invited all persons who came within the reach of their solicitations to come in and see it, and
that those who paid, went in and did see what was grossly indecent, it was held that the facts were sufficient to
prove the common law offence of indecent exhibition.897
[s 292.28] Mens Rea
It is beyond question that unless a statute, either clearly or by necessary implication, rules out mens rea as a
constituent part of the crime, no one should be found guilty of an offence under the criminal law unless he has
got a guilty mind.898 Offences which can be held to be committed without a guilty mind are usually of
comparatively minor character. The offence under this section is not of a minor character. So mens rea is a
necessary ingredient of an offence under this section.899 “Possession” in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of this
section connotes conscious possession and in that sense it cannot be argued that mens rea or guilty mind has
been dispensed with.900
[s 292.29] Guilty Knowledge
Sub-section (2) of this section (unlike some others which open with the words “whoever knowingly or
negligently etc”) does not make the knowledge of obscenity an ingredient of the offence. The prosecution need
not prove something which the law does not burden it with. If knowledge were made a part of the guilty act
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(actus reus) and required the prosecution to prove it, it would place an almost impenetrable defence in the
hands of offenders. Something much less than actual knowledge must therefore suffice. Absence of definite
knowledge may be taken in mitigation, but it does not take the case out of the section. As regards the selling or
keeping for sale of an object which is found to be obscene the ordinary guilty intention (mens rea) will be
required before the offence can be said to be complete. The offender must have actually sold or kept for sale,
the offending article. The circumstance of the case will then determine the criminal intent and it will be a matter
of a proper inference from them. In criminal prosecution mens rea must necessarily be proved by circumstantial
evidence alone unless the accused confesses.Sub-section (2) makes sale and possession for sale one of the
elements of the offence. Where a sale has taken place, and the accused is a bookseller, the necessary
inference is readily drawn. Difficulties may, however, arise in cases close to the border. To escape liability the
accused can prove his lack of knowledge unless the circumstances are such that he must be held guilty for the
acts of another. The court will presume that he is guilty if the book is sold on his behalf and is later found to be
obscene, unless he can establish that the sale was without his knowledge or consent.901
[s 292.30] Innocent Intention no Defence
If a publication is in fact obscene, it is no defence that the intention of the party charged was innocent,902 or that
there are other passages in the book which contain moral precepts of an unexceptionable character.903 If the
probable effect of a publication is to prejudice public morals and decency, and is intended for those who have
ardent sex appeal in them and it is for the delectation of the married and the unmarried for the gratification of
their normal and abnormal sex appetites and it described varieties of sexual intercourse in a manner which, to
say the least, is obscene, it must be taken that the book was written, printed and published and brought into
circulation for prurient tastes. If the probable effect of the publication is to prejudice public morals and decency,
the accused must be taken to have intended the natural consequences of his acts.904
[s 292.31] Motive
The motive that the publisher had in publishing a book does not prevent it from being obscene if the
descriptions are in themselves obscene. The motive may be taken into account as regards the question of
sentence; but whether or not it is obscene depends on the material itself and not upon the reasons for the
publication. Where a man publishes a work manifestly obscene, he must be taken to have intended the
inevitable consequences.905
[s 292.32] Master and Servant—Vicarious Liability—Extent of
The mere fact of a person being the proprietor and publisher of a newspaper is not sufficient to render him
liable for a matter inserted by his servant. It must be shown that the matter was inserted by his orders, or with
his knowledge,906 which knowledge may be assumed if the thing is done in the ordinary course of trade
management.907
[s 292.33] Sub-section (2)(a)—“Makes, Produces”
The section covers not only the publication or circulation of an objectionable object, but also making, producing
and having in possession such an object for the purpose of publication or circulation, and also an attempt to do
so. The expression “makes” and “produces” occurring in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of this section do not
exclude printing from its ambit. They are wide enough in their ambit908 to embrace it. Possession of obscene
matter is punishable only if such possession is for the purpose of publication or circulation. Possession by a
person for his own use is not punishable under this section. But private circulation of obscene literature is not
exempted under section 292, IPC. A person who puts obscene literature in private circulation is equally guilty
[s 292.34] Sub-section (2)(a)—“Or other Objects or General Concern”
The words “or other objects of general concern” also occurring in sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of the exception to
this section fall within the same field or dimension as “science, literature, art or learning” and do not fall in a
totally different area of effect or sexual behaviour.910
[s 292.35] Sub-section (2)(a)—Sale etc of Obscene Object
In order to constitute an offence under section 292(2)(a), IPC, it must be a case where the obscene object was
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sold, let on hire, distributed or publicly exhibited or put into circulation. Production or possession of the object
for any of these purposes will also constitute an offence.911 Where the allegations were that the first accused
was seen exhibiting a blue film and accused Nos. 2 and 3 were viewing it from the drawing room of the first
accused’s residence, there was no allegation that the blue film was sold, let on hire or distributed or publicity
exhibited, there was no allegation that the film was produced by any of the accused persons for purposes of
distribution or circulation, the facts of the case were held not to constitute an offence under sub-section (2)(a) of
section 292, IPC, the charge framed against the accused persons was therefore quashed.912
In the present day society in India, a book, picture or a publication which deals with such matters cannot per se
be said to be obscene. Great emphasis is being laid on family planning and in that connection it has become
absolutely necessary to import education about sex to the masses. It is a matter of common knowledge that
there is even a thinking to introduce sex education as one of the subjects to be taught to the younger
generation.913
[s 292.36] Exceptions
The original exception to the section expressly exempted books, pamphlets, writings, drawing and paintings
from the operation of the section if they were kept or used bona fide for religious purposes. It also exempted
sculptures, engravings and paintings represented on or in any temple or on any car used for any religious
purpose.
In England, section 4 of the Obscene Publications Act of 1959914 makes an exception in the case of
publications in the interest of science, literature, art or learning or of objects of general concern. This section did
not make such exception earlier. But the courts had generally held that publication of indecent matters may be
justified if it is genuinely in the interests or for the purposes of arts, science or any other form of learning. The
books on medical science with intimate illustrations and photographs, though in a sense immodest, have not
been considered to be obscene, but the same illustrations and photographs collected in a book form without the
medical text would certainly be considered to be obscene.915 This defect has now been removed by substituting
a new exception in place of the old one by section 2 of Act 36 of 1969. Sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of the
present exception now clearly states that this section will not extend to the publication of such book, pamphlet
etc, which is proved to be justified as being for the public good on the ground that the same is in the interest of
science, literature, art or learning or other objects of general concern. Sub-clause (i) of clause (b) of the present
exception has further widened the scope of the exception clause by exempting the representation sculptured,
engraved, painted or otherwise represented on or any ancient monument within the meaning of the Ancient
Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act (24 of 1958). Such provision was necessary with a view
to protect some ancient monuments of historical and artistic importance having some vulgar or objectionable
engravings etc.
[s 292.36.1] Social Purpose
The book—“Indian Call Girls” has obviously been written by the petitioner, who is a sociologist with an object of
general good inasmuch as she had carried out research in the lives of call-girls and the men helping in the lives
of the call-girls in order to serve the social purpose of eradicating or minimising the evil of call-girls pervading
the society. The mere fact that some sort of vulgar language has been used in some portions of book in
describing sexual intercourse would not make it obscene. So this book falls under the exception to section 292,
IPC.916
[s 292.37] “Justified as Being for the Public Good”
This expression occurs in clause (a)(i) of the exception to this section. It is open to an accused to plead that the
book, pamphlet, writing, drawing, painting, representation or figure, alleged to be obscene, is justified as being
for the public good in the interest of science, literature, art or learning, etc. Where the court is considering the
question of obscenity and of public good as a defence, the court has, first of all, to determine the question of
obscenity and the evidence on the question of public good is not relevant to the question of obscenity; once
evidence has been given that satisfies the court that the articles are obscene, then and then only the court can
Page 23 of 35
proceed to consider the evidence on the other aspect, namely, public good.917
If the propagation of an idea, opinion or information be for public interest or profit, it would not be considered to
be obscene though such propagation, in a different context, may be considered to be so. It is in this view of the
matter that intimate illustrations in photographs, though in a sense immodest, are not considered obscene if
included in books of medical science.918 The justification must, however, depend on the facts of each particular
case, on the form of the matter, the circumstances of its publication and the nature of the accused’s business.
In other words, if the necessary or natural effect of a publication is prejudicial to the public morality or decency,
the motive of the accused in publishing the obscene matter is immaterial.919
A German magazine by name “STERN” having worldwide circulation published an article with a picture of Boris
Becker, a world renowned tennis player, posing nude with his dark-skinned fiancée by name Barbara Feltus, a
film actress, which was photographed by none other than her father. The articles stated that in an interview,
both Boris Becker and Barbara Feltus spoke freely about their engagement, their lives and future plans and the
message they wanted to convey to the people at large, for posing to such a photograph. Article pictures Boris
Becker as a strident protester of the pernicious practice of “apartheid”. Further, it was stated that the purpose of
the photograph was also to signify that love champions over hatred. “Sports World”, a widely circulated
magazine published in India reproduced the article and the photograph as cover story in its Issue-15 dated 5
May 1993 with the caption “Posing nude dropping out of tournaments, battling racism in Germany. Boris Becker
explains his recent approach to life” — Boris Becker Unmasked. Anandbazar Patrika, a newspaper having wide
circulation in Kolkata, also published in the second page of the newspaper the above mentioned photograph as
well as the article on 6 May 1993, as appeared in the Sports World. Held, the article and the photograph convey
message to eradicate the evil of racism and apartheid in the society. Boris Becker is protestor against racism in
Germany. The photograph and the article are intended to promote love and marriage between white skinned
man and black skinned woman. The provisions of section 292, IPC were held not attracted in the case.920
The onus is on the accused to make out his defence on the probabilities.921
[s 292.38] Information Technology Act (21 of 2000)
Where an accused is discharged under section 67 of the Information Technology Act, he cannot be
proceeded/prosecuted under section 292, IPC.922
An offence under this section is cognizable and a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable
but not compoundable and is triable by a magistrate. Cognizance of the first offence under this section can be
taken within three years of the commission of the offence. There is no limitation for taking cognizance of the
subsequent offences.
I (name the office of the magistrate etc) hereby notice to you…(name of the accused) as follows:
That on or about the………day of………at……… you sold (or let to hire, or distributed, or publicly exhibited, or put into
circulation) or, for that purpose made, produced or had in your possession an obscene book, pamphlet, paper,
Page 24 of 35
drawing, painting, representation or figure, or other object, namely…(name the book, etc) or imported, exported or
conveyed an obscene object for such purpose, or knowing or having reason to believe that it will be sold, etc, or took
part in or received profits from a business in the course of which you knew or had reason to believe that such object
was, for the purposes aforesaid, made, produced, purchased, kept, imported, exported, publicly exhibited or put into
circulation, or, advertised or made known to the public that………(name the person) was engaged or was ready to do
any act which is an offence under section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, or that any such obscene object would be
procured from such person,] (or offered or attempted to do any such act which is an offence under section 292 of the
Indian Penal Code), and thereby committed the offence punishable under section 292 of the Indian Penal Code and
Ans. Yes
[s 292.41] Contents of the Charge
When a charge is brought against an accused under section 292 or section 294, IPC, it should always specify
the words or representations alleged to be obscene, and the magistrate should state in his judgment what he
finds to have been exhibited or uttered.923 A somewhat different view was expressed by the Kerala High Court
and it was held that when a person is prosecuted under section 292, no doubt it is better to indicate, in the
charge, in what respect exactly the book is obscene. But if the accused is not prejudiced in his defence and the
prosecution maintains that the whole book is obscene mere failure to mention particular passages is not a
sufficient reason to interfere in revision.924
However, in view of the provisions of section 211(2) of the CrPC if the law which creates the offence gives it
any specific name, the offence may be described by that name only. If the charge under section 292(1), IPC
mentions only “obscene (photos) books in English, Tamil and Telugu language”, the charge is not illegal
because section 292, IPC uses a specific name to the offence and that name is obscene. The charge need not
narrate the words “such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant
circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it” mentioned in the section.925
In the instant case, the accused were not found selling or doing anything to bring the case in clause (a) of sub-
section (2) of section 292, IPC. For the second part of clause (a) the prosecution has to show that the obscene
material was made produced or kept in possession for the purpose of the sale, hire, distribution, public
exhibition or circulation, in other words, the possession of obscene object is punishable under section 292, IPC
if the possession is for the purpose of sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or circulation, if the obscene
object is kept in the house and is not for sale, hire, public exhibition or circulation, the accused cannot be
Page 25 of 35
charged under section 292, IPC.926
[s 292.42] Proof
(i) the book etc, is of an obscene nature;

(ii) the accused:
(a) sold, let to hire, distributed, publicly exhibited or in any manner put into circulation, or for purpose
of sale, hire, distribution, public exhibition or circulation made, produced or had in his possession,
any obscene book, pamphlet, paper, drawing painting, representation or figure or any other
obscene object whatsoever; or
(b) imported, exported or conveyed any obscene object for any of the purposes aforesaid, or knowing
or having reason to believe that such object would be sold, let to hire, distributed or publicly
exhibited or, in any manner put it into circulation; or
(c) took part in, or received profits from, any business in the course of which he knew, or had reason
to believe, that any such obscene objects were, for any of the purposes aforesaid, made,
produced, purchased, kept, imported, exported, conveyed, publicly exhibited or in any manner put
into circulation; or
(d) advertised or made known by any means whatsoever, that any person was engaged or was ready
to engage in any act which was an offence under this section, or that any such obscene object
could be procured from or through any person; or
(e) offered or attempted to do any act which was an offence under this section.
It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the person, who sells, or keeps for sale, any obscene
object, knows that it is obscene before he can be adjudged guilty.927
The requirement of passing an order of forfeiture of a book, presupposes that the book contains any matter the
publication of which is punishable under sections 124A or 153A or 153B or 292 or 293 or 295A of the IPC, for
the State Government to declare that every copy of such book be forfeited to the Government. The power can
only be exercised and notification can only be issued if the Government forms an opinion that the publication
contains matter which is in an offence under any of the sections of the IPC as aforestated.928
[s 292.42.1] Proof of Mere Indecency not Sufficient
It is true that in order to sustain a conviction under section 292, IPC the prosecution has to prove that the book
is obscene and that it is not sufficient to prove that it is indecent, the gravamen of the charge is that the
tendency of the book is to corrupt and deprave and not merely to shock or to disgust.929
[s 292.43] Certain Defences not Open to the Accused

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It is not open to an accused to contend that the book is not in circulation,930 or that one subject of that book was
to hold up, to the reader, contemporary life in the west,931 though he can contend that the book, or pamphlet,
etc in question, falls within the purview of the exception contemplated in this section. An accused cannot also
put to defence that his other publications were also obscene, but he had never been prosecuted earlier.932 If a
publication is, in fact, obscene, it is no defence that the intention of the accused was innocent,933 or that there
are other passages in the book which contain moral precepts of an unexceptionable character.934
[s 292.44] Sentence
The offences of corrupting the internal fabric of the mind, like the one under section 292, IPC, have got to be
treated on the same footing as in the cases of food adulterators, and deserve no leniency.935 Where the
accused sold a packet of playing cards portraying on the reverse, luridly obscene naked pictures of a man and
woman in pornographic sexual postures, a sentence of six months, rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 500
was not held to be severe.936 Where, however, the accused, who had not been prosecuted earlier for similar
publications, was put to great loss by the destruction of the obscene books and the book gave useful
instructions in sexual matters, a sentence of fine of Rs 250 for the offence under this section was held
sufficient.937 Where the accused guilty of an offence under this section was aged 31 years and it was hoped
that he would refrain from such activities in future, he was sentenced to a fine of Rs 300 and rigorous
imprisonment of two months.938 Where the accused, found guilty under this section, was a petty bookseller and
his entire stock of obscene books was seized and he gave an undertaking that he would not repeat such an
offence in future, a fine of Rs 50 was held sufficient.939 But the discretion, which the court had in passing a
sentence, has been taken away by the amendment, introduced by the Central Act, 36 of 1969, in this section.
Therefore, it is now obligatory on a court to pass a sentence of imprisonment while convicting a person under
section 292(2) of this Code. Hence, a mere sentence of fine is, now illegal.940 While considering the quantum of
sentence, the fact that the accused has pleaded guilty to the charge, must be taken notice of by the court.941
Where the accused, a young refugee and first offender, expressed desire to rehabilitate himself, sentence of
three months was held sufficient.942
[s 292.45] Probation
Where an accused is found guilty under section 292, IPC for showing blue films to young men, has undertaken
it as a commercial activity, he is not entitled to be released on probation under section 4 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958.943
[s 292.46] Destruction of Obscene Matter
On conviction under section the court may order the destruction of all the copies of the thing in respect of which
the conviction was had, and which are in the custody of the court or remain in the possession or power of the
person convicted.944 The provision is an enabling one and is not mandatory.
Page 27 of 35
773 Subs. by Act 8 of 1925, section 2 for the original section.

775 Section 292 was renumbered as sub-section (2) thereof by Act 36 of 1969, section 2 (w.e.f. 7-9-1969).
776 Subs. by Act 36 of 1969, section 2, by certain words (w.e.f. 7-9-1969).
777 Subs. by Act 36 of 1969, section 2, for Exception, (w.e.f. 7-9-1969).
778 Vide Orissa Act 13 of 1962, section 2 (w.e.f. 16-5-1962).
779 Vide Orissa Act 13 of 1962, section 3 (w.e.f. 16-5-1962).
780 Vide Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1960, section 2 (w.e.f. 9-11-1960).
781 Subs. by Tamil Nadu Act No 30 of 1984.
782 Ins. by Tamil Nadu Act No 30 of 1984, section 2 (w.e.f. 28-6-1984).

783 Vide Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1960, section 3 (w.e.f. 9-11-1960).
784 MM Haries v State of Kerala, (2005) Cr LJ 3314 (Ker).
785 State of Karnataka v Basheer, (1979) Cr LJ 1183 (Kant) (DB).
786 Jagat Narain Lall v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 649 , p 651 : (1928) 29 Cr LJ 773 .
787 Ranjit D Udeshi v State, AIR 1962 Bom 268 [LNIND 1962 BOM 8] , p 269.
788 Sukanta Haldar v State, AIR 1952 Cal 214 [LNIND 1951 CAL 175] , p 215 : 53 Cr LJ 575.
789 Ranjit D Udeshi v State, AIR 1962 Bom 268 [LNIND 1962 BOM 8] .
790 Queen v Read, (1708) 11 Mod Rep 142 Case No 205(QB).
791 R v Curl, (1727) 2 Stra 788 (KB).
792 20 and 21 Vict, c 83.

Page 28 of 35
793 Hicklin’s case (1868) 3 QB 360 .
794 Ranjit D Udeshi v State, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 .
795 Statutes 7 and 8 Eliz 2, c 66.
796 Ranjit D Udeshi v State, AIR 1962 Bom 268 [LNIND 1962 BOM 8] , p 271.
797 Halsbury's Laws of England.
798 R v Levy, (2004) EWCA Crimes 1141.

799 R v Perrin, (2002) All ER (D) 359 (Mar).
800 R v GS, (2012) Times, 16 February.
801 R v Clark, (2005) SCJ No. 4 (Vide Halsbury’s Laws of Canada).
802 Narayanan v State of Kerala, (1970) Ker LT 605 , p 607 : (1970) Mad LJ (Cr) 775.
803 Damodar Sarma v State of Assam, 2007 Cr LJ 1526 , p 1527 (Gauh).
804 Ranjit D Udeshi v State, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 , pp 12, 13.
805 Neelam Mahajan Singh v Commissioner of Police, (1996) Cr LJ 2725 (Del).
806 Neelam Mahajan Singh v Commissioner of Police, (1996) Cr LJ 2725 (Del).

807 State v Dina Nath, AIR 1956 Punj 85 , p 87 : (1956) Cr LJ 415 .
808 Re D Pandurangan, AIR 1953 Mad 418 [LNIND 1952 MAD 267] : (1953) Cr LJ 763 .
809 Shri Ram v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 175 [LNIND 1974 SC 349] : (1975) Cr LJ 240 (SC).
810 B Rosaiah (Dr) v State of Andhra Pradesh, (1991) Cr LJ 189 (AP).
811 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] ; Public Prosecutor v AD Sabapathy,
AIR 1958 Mad 210 [LNIND 1957 MAD 241] ; Re D Pandurangan, 1953 Cr LJ 763 .
812 Public Prosecutor v AD Sabapathy, AIR 1958 Mad 210 [LNIND 1957 MAD 241] ; Re D Pandurangan, (1953) Cr LJ 763
(Mad).
813 Neelam Mahajan Singh v Commissioner of Police, (1996) Cr LJ 2725 , p 2732 (Del).
814 Javeer Prasad v State of UP, 2011 (128) FLR 1105 (All).
Page 29 of 35
815 Sopan v State of Maharashtra, 2008 (2) Mah LJ (Cri) 491 (Bom).
816 State of Thakur Prasad, AIR 1959 All 49 [LNIND 1958 ALL 94] , 52 : (1959) Cr LJ 9 .
817 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 , p 16 : (1965) 1
SCR 65 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] ; CK Kakodar v State of Maharashtra, (1970) 2 SCR 80 [LNIND 1969 SC 293] ;
Sameresh Bose v Amal Mitra, (1985) 2 Crimes 782 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] (SC) : (1986) Cr LJ 24 .
818 State v Thakur Prasad, AIR 1959 All 49 [LNIND 1958 ALL 94] , p 52.
819 Dhanisha Karthika v Rakhi N Raj, 2012 Cr LJ 3225 , p 3231 (Ker) (DB) : 2012 (2) Ker LT 55 .
820 Dhanisha Karthika v Rakhi. N Raj, 2012 Cr LJ 3225 , p 3232 (Ker) (DB) : 2012 (2) Ker LT 55 : 2012 (114) AIC 595
[LNIND 2012 KER 189] .
821 Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, 2014 Cr LJ 1560 : AIR 2014 SC 1495 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : 2014 (2) Scale 16
[LNIND 2014 SC 84] : (2014) 4 SCC 257 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : 2014 (1) Supreme 535 .
822 Devidas Ramchhandra Tulujapurkar v State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cr LJ 3492 (SC) : (2015) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2015 SC
338] : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 801 [LNIND 2015 SC 338] : AIR 2015 SC 612 : (2015) 152 AIC 208 (SC).
823 Durlab Singh v State, (1971) 73 Punj LR (D) 113 .
824 Kutter (Publishing Printing & Promotions) Ltd v Director of Prosecutions, (1972) 2 All ER 898 , 904 : (1913) AC 435 .
825 Director of Public Prosecutions v Whyte, (1972) AC 849 : (1972) 3 All ER 12 (HL); Abdul Rasheed v State of Kerala,
2008 Cr LJ 3480 (Ker) : 2008 (3) Ker LT 150 .
826 John Calder (Publications) Ltd v Powall, (1965) 1 QB 509 : (1965) 1 All ER 159 ; Director of Public Prosecutions v A
and BC Chewing Gum Ltd, (1968) 1 QB 159 : (1967) 2 All ER 504 ; R v Calder and Boyars Ltd, (1968) 3 All ER 644 :
(1969) 1 QB 151 ; Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 11, 4th Edn Butterworths, London, 1976, p 581, para 1017.
827 Abdul Rasheed v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 3480 , p 3483 (Ker) : 2008 (68) AIC 617 (Ker) : 2008 (3) Ker LT 150 :
2008 (2) KLJ 367 ; Murzban F Shroff v Gopala Krishna, 2011 (108) AIC 542 (Mad).
828 Abdul Rasheed v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 3480 (Ker) : 2008 (68) AIC 617 (Ker) : 2008 (3) Ker LT 150 : 2008 (2) KLJ
367 .
829 Abdul Rasheed v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 3480 (Ker) : 2008 (3) Ker LT 150 .
830 Sameresh Bose v Amal Mitra, 1986 Cr LJ 24 (SC) : (1985) 2 Crimes 762 (SC).
831 Samresh Bose v Amal Mitra, (1985) 2 Crimes 782 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] , p 795 (SC).
Page 30 of 35
832 Murzban F Shroff M v TC Gopalakrishnan, 2011 (108) AIC 542 (Mad).
833 PK Somnath v State of Kerala, (1990) Cr LJ 542 (Ker).
834 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 831 [LNIND 1964 SC 195] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 , p 12.
835 State of Uttar Pradesh v Kunjilal, AIR 1970 All 614 : (1970) Cr LJ 1638 , p 1642.
836 Sameresh Bose v Amal Mitra, (1985) 2 Crimes 782 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] , pp 798–99.
837 Ganpat v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1966) MPLJ 29 (Notes).
838 Latheef v State of Kerala, 2015 (1) Crimes 281 (Ker).
839 Santosh Singh v State of MP, 2014 (1) Crimes 456 (MP); Himmat Singh v State of MP, 2010, p 89 AIC 683 (MP).
840 Sangeetha Lakshmana v State of Kerala, 2008 (2) Ker LT 745 : 2008 (65) AIC 330 (Ker).
841 Durlabh Singh v State, (1971) DLT 152 .
842 Gandhi Smaraka Samiti v Kanuri Jagdish Prasad, (1994) 1 Andh LT (Cr) 84 ; Aveek Sarkar v State of WB, AIR 2014
SC 1495 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : 2014 Cr LJ 1560 : (2014) 4 SCC 257 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : (2014) 137 AIC 211 (SC).
843 Sreeram Saksena v Emperor, AIR 1940 Cal 290 , p 291 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 617 ; Re M Krishnaswami, (1974) LW (Cr)
48; Durlabh Singh v State, (1971) DLT 152 : (1971) 73 Punj LR (D) 113 .
844 Re M Krishnaswami, 1974 LW (Cr) 48; Gandhi Smaraka Samiti v Kanuri Jagdish Prasad, (1994) 1 Andh LT (Cr) 84 .
845 OP Lamba v Tarun Mehta, (1988) Cr LJ 610 (P&H).
846 State of Uttar Pradesh v Kunji Lal, AIR 1970 All 614 : (1970) Cr LJ 1638 .
847 S Khushboo v Kanniammal, 2010 Cr LJ 2828 , p 2835 (SC) : AIR 2010 SC 3196 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : 2010 (4)
Scale 462 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] : (2010) 5 SCC 600 [LNIND 2010 SC 411] .
848 Farzana Bi v Board of Film Censors, (1983) 2 CLC 417 (All) : (1983) All WC 424 : (1983) All LJ 1133.
849 Vijay Sood v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2009 Cr LJ 1530 (HP).
851 Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, 2014 Cr LJ 1560 , pp 1566, 1567 : AIR 2014 SC 1495 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] :
852 Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, 2014 Cr LJ 1560 , pp 1566, 1567 : AIR 2014 SC 1495 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] :
853 Ibid.
854 Gita Ram v State of HP, 2013 (1) Crimes 247 (SC) : AIR 2013 SC 641 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 18666] : (2013) 2 SCC
694 [LNIND 2013 SC 82] .
Page 31 of 35
855 Ibid.
856 Rajkapoor v Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] : (1980) 2 SCC 175 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] : (1980) UJ
180 (SC) : (1980) CLR (SC) 96 : (1980) Cr AR 53(SC) : (1980) SCC (Cr) 383 : (1980) Cr LJ 436 (SC) : (1980) All Cr C
8 (SC) : (1980) LW (Cr) 109 (SC).
857 Deepankar Chowdari v State of Karnataka, 2008 Cr LJ 3408 , p 3410 (Kant) : 2008 (4) KCCR 2720 [LNIND 2008 KANT
189] . (Proceedings were quashed).
858 Sadanand v Delhi Admn, (1986) 2 Crimes 424 (Del); Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, 2014 Cr LJ 1560 , AIR 2014
SC 1495 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : 2014 (2) Scale 16 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : (2014) 4 SCC 257 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] .
859 R v Clerk, (1883) 15 Cox 171.
860 R v Sedley, (1863) 1 Sid 168 : 1 Keb 620 : 17 St Tr 155n.
861 R v Reed, (1871) 12 Cox 1.
862 Chintan Upadhyay v Hema Upadhyay, 2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 481 (Bom) : 2014 (2) Crimes 499 .
863 Durlab Singh v State, (1971) DLT 152 .
864 R v Hicklin, (1808) 3 QBD 360 , p 371 quoted with approval in Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965
SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 .
865 R v Reiter, (1954) 2 QB 16 .
866 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharahstra, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] ; CK Kakodar v State of Maharashtra,
(1970) 2 SCR 80 [LNIND 1969 SC 293] ; Sameresh Bose v Amal Mitra, (1985) 2 Crimes 782 [LNIND 1985 SC 296]
(SC); R v Parashram, 20 ILR Bom 193; R v Hari Singh, 28 ILR All 100, p 102; Re Kheroda Puranik, (1913) 14 Cr LJ
248 ; Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 Bom 268 [LNIND 1962 BOM 8] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 741 ; CT Prim
v State, AIR 1961 Cal 177 [LNIND 1959 CAL 81] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 371 ; State v Dina Nath, AIR 1956 Punj 85 : (1956)
Cr LJ 415 ; M Ramamurthy v State of Mysore, AIR 1954 Mys 229 : (1954) Cr LJ 1622 ; Sukanta Haldar v State, AIR
1952 Cal 314 : 53 Cr LJ 575; Emperor v Harnam Das, AIR 1947 Lah 383 : (1947) 48 Cr LJ 910 ; R v Martin Secker
and Warburg Ltd, (1954) 1 All ER 683 ; R v Reiter, (1954) 1 All ER 741 ; State of Maharashtra v Christine Kelley,
(1978) UCR 277 (280) (Bom); Dhanisha Karthika v Rakhi, 2012 Cr LJ 3225 , p 3232 (Ker) (DB) : 2012 (2) KarLJ 265 .
867 R v Martin Secker and Warburg Ltd, (1954) 2 All ER 683 .
868 R v Hicklin, (1868) 3 QB 360 : 37 LJMC 89.
869 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, (1962) Bom 268 : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 741 ; Sukanta Haldar v State, AIR 1952 Cal
214 [LNIND 1951 CAL 175] , p 215 : 53 Cr LJ 757.
870 State v Dina Nath, AIR 1956 Punj 85 , p 88 : (1959) 1 ILR Cal 678 ; Chandrakant v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC
1390 [LNIND 1969 SC 293] : (1970) Cr LJ 1273 .
Page 32 of 35
871 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 , p 15;
Chandrakant v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC 1390 [LNIND 1969 SC 293] : (1970) Cr LJ 1273 .
872 Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, 2014 Cr LJ 1560 : AIR 2014 SC 1495 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : 2014 (2) Scale 16
[LNIND 2014 SC 84] : (2014) 4 SCC257.
873 Sukanta Halder v State, AIR 1952 Cal 214 [LNIND 1951 CAL 175] , p 215 : 53 Cr LJ 575; CT Prim v State, AIR 1961
Cal 177 [LNIND 1959 CAL 81] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 371 ; Sreeram Saksena v Emperor, AIR 1940 Cal 290 : (1940) 41 Cr
LJ 617 ; Steele v Brannan, 7 CP 261; State v Thakur Prasad, AIR 1959 All 49 [LNIND 1958 ALL 94] : (1959) Cr LJ 9 .
874 Krishna Chandreshwar v State of Orissa, (1987) 64 Cut LT 632, p 637.
875 R v Thomson, (1900) 64 UP 456; State v Thakur Prasad, AIR 1959 All 49 [LNIND 1958 ALL 94] : (1959) Cr LJ 9 .
876 Devidas Ramchandra Tuljapurkar v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 1967 , p 1971 (Bom) : 2010 (112) BOMLR 535 ;
Devidas Ramchhandra Tulujapurkar v State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cr LJ 3492 (SC) : (2015) 6 SCC 1 [LNIND 2015 SC
338] : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 801 [LNIND 2015 SC 338] : AIR 2015 SC 612 : (2015) 152 AIC 208 (SC).
877 CT Prim v State, AIR 1961 Cal 177 [LNIND 1959 CAL 81] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 371 ; Ranjit D Udeshi v State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1962 Bom 268 [LNIND 1962 BOM 8] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 741 .
878 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 Bom 268 [LNIND 1962 BOM 8] : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 741 .
879 Neelam Mahajan Singh v Commissioner of Police, (1996) JCC 337 , p 346 (Del).
880 Antony v State of Kerala, (1988) 2 Crimes 173 (Ker).
881 Re M Krishnaswami, (1974) LW (Cr) 48; Durlabh Singh v State, (1971) 73 Punj LR (D) 113 .
882 Girdharlal Popatlal Shah v State, AIR 1956 Bom 32 [LNIND 1954 BOM 52] : (1956) Cr LJ 206 .
883 Sreeram Saksena v Emperor, AIR 1940 Cal 290 , p 291 : (1940) 41 Cr LJ 617 ; State v Thakur Prasad, AIR 1959 All
49 [LNIND 1958 ALL 94] : (1959) Cr LJ 9 .
884 R v Reiter, (1954) 2 QB 16.
885 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 , 15; Durlabh
Singh v State, (1971) 73 Punj LR (D) 113 .
886 Vinay Mohan Sharma v Delhi Administration, 2008 Cr LJ 1672 (Del) : (2007) ILR 10 Del 1.
887 Neelam Mahajan Singh v Commissioner of Police, (1996) JCC 337 , 346 (Del).
888 Dau Dayal v State, (1955) NUC (All) 3567; Samresh Bose v Amal Mitra, (1985) 2 Crimes 782 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] , p
799 (SC).
889 Samresh Bose v Amal Mitra, (1985) 2 Crimes 782 [LNIND 1985 SC 296] , p 799 (SC); Ranjit D Udeshi v State of
Maharashtra, (1965) 1 SCR 65 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] ; CK Kakodar v State of Maharashtra, (1970) 2 SCR 80 [LNIND
1969 SC 293] .
890 Gandhi Smaraka Samithi v Kanuri Jagdish Prasad, (1994) 1 Andh LT (Cr) 84 , p 89.
891 CMD Hindustan Latex Ltd v State of Kerala, (1999) IV CCR 558 (Ker).
892 Russel on Crime, 11th Edn, p 1633.
893 R v Altred Cartle, (1845) 1 Cox 229.
894 R v Hirsch, (1899) 34 LJ News 132.
895 Damodar Sarma v State of Assam, 2007 Cr LJ 1526 , p 1530 (Gauh) : (2007) 1 GLR 655 .
896 Jagat Narain Lall v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 649 , p 651 : (1928) 29 Cr LJ 773 .
897 R v Saundus, (1875) 1 QBD 15 .
898 OP Lamba v Tarun Mehta, ( 1988 Cr LJ 610 (P&H).
899 CT Prim v State, AIR 1961 Cal 177 [LNIND 1959 CAL 81] , p 178 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 371 ; Srinivas Mare v Emperor, AIR
1947 PC 135 .
Page 33 of 35
900 Ibid; R v Hicklin, 3 QBD 369.
901 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 , p 13.
902 R v Hari Singh, 28 ILR All 100; R v Gathercole, 2 Lewin GC 237; R v Dixon, 3 M&S 11.
903 R v Vishnu Krishna Puranik, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 248 .
904 State v Thakur Prasad, AIR 1959 All 49 [LNIND 1958 ALL 94] , p 52.
905 Kailash Chandra v Emperor, AIR 1932 Cal 651 , p 652 : (1932) 33 Cr LJ 771 .
906 R v Mahommad, (1890) All WN 175; Mumtaz Ali v R, (1905) 2 Cr LJ 717 : 35 PR (Cr) 1905; R v Uma Shankar, 18 PR
1889, Cr; R v Marney, LR (1907) 1 KB 388 : 76 LJKB 210.
907 R v Key, 52 Sol Jo (1907) : 748 CCA; Jagat Narain Lall v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 649 : (1928) 29 Cr LJ 773 .
908 Ravi v Sub-Inspector of Police, (1989) 1 Crimes 259 [LNIND 1988 KER 531] , p 261 (Ker).
909 Dau Dayal v State, (1955) NWC 3567 (All).
910 Director of Public Prosecutions v Jordon, (1978) 3 All ER 775 , p 780 (HL).
911 Ramesh Krishnan v State of Kerala, (2000) III CCR 95(Ker).
912 Ibid.
914 Statutes 7 & 8 Fliz 2, Chapter 68.
915 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 , 12, pp 14, 16.
916 Promilla Kapur (Dr) v Yashpal Bhasin, (1989) Cr LJ 1241 (Del).

917 Olympia Press Ltd v Holis, (1974) 1 All ER 108 , p 111; R v Colder and Boyars Ltd, (1968) 3 All ER 644 : (1969) 1 QB
151 (CA); Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 11, 4th Edn, p 582, para 1018.
918 State v Kunji Lal, AIR 1970 All 614 : (1970) Cr LJ 1638 , p 1642.
919 State v Thakur Prasad, AIR 1959 All 49 [LNIND 1958 ALL 94] , pp 52, 53 : (1959) Cr LJ 9 .
Page 34 of 35
920 Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, 2014 Cr LJ 1560 , p 1568 : AIR 2014 SC 1495 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : 2014 (2)
Scale 16 [LNIND 2014 SC 84] : (2014) 4 SCC 25 .
921 R v Calder and Boyars Ltd, (1968) 3 All ER 644 : (1969) 1 QB 151 (CA); Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 11, 4th Edn,
p 582.
922 Sharat Babu Digumarti v Govt of National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2017 Cr LJ 977 (SC) : (2017) 2 SCC 18 [LNIND
2016 SC 616] : 2017 (1) SCC (Cri) 628 : AIR 2017 SC 150 [LNIND 2016 SC 616] : (2017) 170 AIC 156 (SC).
923 Re Mi Min Si, (1872–92) LBR, 262; Queen v Upendranath Doss, ILR 1 Cal 356.
924 Dwarkadas v State of Kerala, (1961) Ker LJ 771 : (1961) Ker LT 701 .
925 State of Karnataka v Basheer, (1979) Cr LJ 1183 (Kant) (DB).
926 Jagdish Chawla v State of Rajasthan, (1999) Cr LJ 256 (Raj).
927 Ranjit D Udeshi v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881 [LNIND 1964 SC 205] , p 886 : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 8 .
928 Sangharaj Damodar Rupawate v Nitin Gadre, 2007 Cr LJ 3860 , p 3863 (Bom) (FB).
929 E Adikesavalu v State of Madras, (1963) Mad WN 629 (Mad).

930 Sukanta Haldar v State, (1959) 1 ILR Cal 678 .
931 CT Prim v State, AIR 1961 Cal 177 [LNIND 1959 CAL 81] , p 180 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 371 .
932 Dau Dayal v State, (1955) NUC (All) 3567.
933 R v Hari Singh, 28 ILR All 100.
934 R v Vishnu Krishna Puranik, (1913) 14 Cr LJ 248 .
935 Uttam Singh v State, AIR 1974 SC 1230 [LNIND 1974 SC 113] , pp 1231–32 : (1974) Cr LJ 923 : (1974) SCWR 688 :
(1974) 4 SCC 590 [LNIND 1974 SC 113] ; Gopal Saha v State, (1975) 41 Cut LT 171 : (1974) Cut LR (Cr) 421.
936 Uttam Singh v State, AIR 1974 SC 1230 [LNIND 1974 SC 113] , pp 1231–32 : (1974) Cr LJ 923 (probation under
section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 not granted) : 1974 SCR (3) 722 .
937 Dau Dayal v State, (1955) NUC (All) 3567.
938 Chandrasekher Pradhan v State, (1976) Cut LT 121(Cr).

Page 35 of 35
939 Dwarakadas v State of Kerala, (1961) Ker LT 701 : (1961) Ker LJ 771 .
940 State of Karnataka v Basheer, (1979) Cr LJ 1183 , p 1185 : (1980) Mad LJ (Cr) 259 (Kant) (DB).
941 Ibid.
942 Gopal Saha v State, (1975) 41 Cut LT 171.
943 Gita Ram v State of HP, AIR 2013 SC 641 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 18666] : (2013) 2 SCC 694 [LNIND 2013 SC 82] :
(2013) 124 AIC 154 .
944 Section 455(1), CrPC 1973.
End of Document
[s 293] Sale, etc., of obscene objects to young person.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 5



945[s 293] Sale, etc., of obscene objects to young person.—

Whoever sells, lets to hire, distributes, exhibits or circulates to any person under the age of twenty years any
such obscene object as is referred to in the last preceding section, or offers or attempts so to do, shall be
Page 3 of 5
punished 946[on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
years, and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, and, in the event of a second or subsequent
conviction, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and also with
fine which may extend to five thousand rupees].
Tamil Nadu—In section 293—
(a) For the words “any such obscene object as is referred to in the last preceding section”, the words,
figures and letters “any such obscene object as is referred to in s 292 or any such newspaper,
periodical, circular, picture or other printed or written document as is referred to in s 292A”, shall be
substituted;
(b) for the words “which may extend to six months” the words “which may extend to three years” shall be
substituted;
(c) in the marginal note, after the words “obscene objects” the words “and grossly indecent or scurrilous
matter or matter intended for blackmail”, shall be inserted.947
Orissa—Same as in Tamil Nadu.948
[s 293.2] Scope
This section punishes a person who sells, lets to hire, distributes, exhibits or circulates obscene objects as
referred to in the preceding section to young persons. It enhances the punishment where the obscene objects
are sold, etc, to persons under the age of 20 years.
In the final draft of the International Conference which drafted, the convention in accordance with which this
section was substituted for the original, it was stated that the conference generally was of opinion that the
offence of offering, delivering, selling or distributing obscene objects must be held to have been aggravated
when committed in respect of minors. The Council (of the League) considered that it would be preferable to
leave each state free to fix the age under which a person should be considered to be a minor for the purposes
of this provision.949
This section was substituted for the original by section 2 of the Obscene Publication Act (8 of 1925). The
section was again amended in 1969 by Act 36 of 1969 with a view to provide a more stringent punishment.
Before the 1969 amendment the offence was punishable only with imprisonment of either description for a term
which could extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
This section is analogous to section 2 of the English Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act,
1955.
[s 293.5] Abetment
Synopsis note 8 of section 292 may be referred to.
[s 293.6] Procedure
Page 4 of 5
This offence is cognizable and a warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable but not
compoundable and is triable by any magistrate.
The limitation for taking cognizance of this offence is three years. This bar of limitation will, however, not apply
to subsequent offences committed by the accused after his conviction in a case under this section.
[s 293.7] Charge
I (name and office of the magistrate etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you on or about the………day of………19………, at………, sold (or let to hire, or distributed or exhibited or
circulated) to………(name the person) under the age of twenty years………(name the obscene object) (or offered or
attempted to do so), and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 293 of the Indian Penal Code and
950[And that you, the said………(name the accused) stand further charged that you had been earlier convicted on
the………day of………by………(name the court) of an offence under this section, which conviction is still in force and
effect, and that you are thereby liable to enhanced punishment in the event of your conviction in this case.]
And I hereby direct that you be tried by this court for the said offence.
[s 293.8] Proof
(i) a book or object of obscene nature, as is referred to in section 292, IPC, was sold, etc.;
(ii) the person, to whom it was sold, etc., or offered or attempted to do so, was under the age of 20 years.
[s 293.9] Assessment of Evidence—Relevancy of Certificate of Board of Censors
In a trial for the offence under sections 292 and 293, IPC, a certificate granted under section 5A of the
Cinematograph Act, 1952, by the Board of Censors, does not provide an irrebuttable defence to the accused,
who have been granted such as certificate, but it is certainly a relevant fact of some weight to be taken into
consideration by the criminal court in deciding whether the offence charged is established. Regard must be
had, by the court, to the fact that the certificate represents the judgment of a body of persons, particularly
selected under the statute for the specific purpose of adjusting the suitability of films for public exhibition, and
the judgment extends to a consideration of the principal ingredients which go to constitute the offences under
sections 292 and 293 of the Indian Penal Code. At the same time, the court must remind itself that the function
Page 5 of 5
of deciding whether the ingredients are established is primarily and essentially its own function and it cannot
abdicate that function in favour of another, no matter how august and qualified be the statutory authority.951
[s 293.10] Destruction of Obscene Matter
On a conviction under this section or under section 292, IPC, the court may under section 455(1) of the CrPC
1973 order the destruction of all the copies of the thing in respect of which the conviction was had, and which
are in the custody of the court or remain in possession or power of the person convicted.
945 Subs. by Act 8 of 1925, section 2 for the original section.
946 Subs. by Act 36 of 1969, section 2, for certain words (w.e.f. 7-9-1969).
947 Vide TN Act 25 of 1960, section 4 (w.e.f. 9-11-1960).
948 ]rissa Act 13 of 1962, section 4 (w.e.f. 16-5-1962).
949 Statement of Objects of Reasons, Gazette of India, 1924, Pt 5, p 126.
950 Sections 211(7), 236 and 248(3) of the CrPC 1973.

951 Raj Kapoor v State (Delhi Admn), AIR 1980 SC 258 [LNIND 1979 SC 428] : (1980) Cr LJ 202 .
End of Document
[s 294] Obscene acts and songs.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 16



952[s 294] Obscene acts and songs.—

Whoever, to the annoyance of others,
Page 3 of 16
(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or

(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
months, or with fine, or with both.]
[s 294.1] Object
The section is intended to prevent an obscene act being performed in public, to the annoyance of the public at
large.953
It must be read subject, inter alia, to the general exception in sections 87 and 88 of this Code.954 A customer,
who goes to a hotel, where a cabaret show is run, impliedly gives his consent to take the risk of the mental
harm, if any, of being annoyed by the obscene sound and dances which the cabaret performer may give. The
maxim volenti non fit injuria must apply to annoyance, if any.955 “Writing letter” to the woman police officer at her
residential address using vulgar and obscene language does not come under the mischief of section 292 or
section 294.956
To make out an offence under section 294(b) of IPC, the alleged obscene act must have been committed by
the accused in or near a public place.957 Offence under section 294(b) cannot be made out uttering words in a
private garden which is not a public place.958
This section was substituted for the original section 294 by section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (3 of
1895). The original section ran thus:
Whoever sings, recites or utters in or near any public place any obscene song, ballad, or words to the annoyance of
others, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with
fine, or with both.
The old section was replaced to meet a case of indecency which was common in the Madras Presidency and
was pointed out in an unreported case of the High Court.
[s 294.3] Essential Ingredients of the Offence under this Section
The essential ingredients of the section are:
(i) an act must have been done in a public place, or a song, ballad or words must have been sung, recited
or uttered in, or near any such place;
(ii) the act, song, ballad or words must be obscene; and

Page 4 of 16
(iii) the same must cause annoyance to others.
The main ingredient for the offence under section 294(b), IPC is uttering words in a public place to the
annoyance of others.959
[s 294.4] Abetment
[s 294.5] “Annoyance to others”
An act per se indecent and obscene would not warrant prosecution under section 294 of the IPC in absence of
express evidence of annoyance to any other persons.960
To prove the offence under section 294, IPC mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient, but there must
be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance to others.961 Annoyance to others is essential to
constitute an offence under this section. Where there is no evidence recorded that the language used caused
annoyance to anybody, a conviction under this section cannot be sustained.962 From the wording of the section
it is plain that annoyance by the obscene act of the accused should be caused to others. The word “others”
includes singular member as well.963 The section does not limit the scope of the word “others” to mean the
person who is the intended victim of the obscene act. It is enough if the obscene act is committed in public and
causes annoyance to anybody, be he the contemplated victim of the offender or not.964 There can be a large
number of acts which, by their very nature, are so offensive to morality and repugnant to a sense of propriety
and decency that, if done in public, they would cause annoyance to any every respectable member of the
society regardless that the doer of the act has or has not any particular individual or individuals in his mind
whom he wants to injuriously affect when doing the act. The doing of such an act would cause annoyance to
the public at large and the offender cannot escape liability on the plea that there was no particular victim
intended by him. Similarly, there is another class of cases in which the offender, by his act, intends to injuriously
affect his victim only, but nonetheless, since the act is done in public and it is obscene, it is bound to cause
annoyance to others also who happen to see and hear it besides the victim intended.965 Kissing by two young
people without any intention of annoying anyone has, however, not been held to be an obscene act.966
Where a couple was taking photograph of each other sitting together and using their mobile phones outside the
court premises, held no annoyance was caused to the public, as such no offence under section 294, IPC was
committed and therefore FIR was quashed.967
[s 294.5.1] Annoyance—How to be Determined
In determining whether a particular utterance caused annoyance to others, regard should be had to the
circumstances of the case and to the class of society to which the parties belong.968
[s 294.6] “Obscene Act”
No precise or arithmetical definition of the word “obscene” to cover all possible cases could be given earlier. It
had to be judged on the facts of each case, whether in the context of its surroundings the questioned act was
obscene or not. The position has considerably been changed now. Sub-section (1) of section 292 inserted by
the Amendment Act 36 of 1969 now specifically defines the word “obscene” and the said definition can be used
for the purposes of this section as well.
The word “obscenity” used in section 294, IPC does not have different meaning than what is explained in
Page 5 of 16
Test of obscenity laid down in Hicklin’s case970 followed in PT Chacko v Nainan Chacko971 and George v State
of Kerala,972while interpreting “obscenity” used ins 294(b) of IPC, having been followed for nearly four decades
has to be accepted and followed as the correct law laid down on the point.973
[s 294.6.1] Test of Obscenity
Commentary under the same heading in section 292, ante may be referred to. For test of obscenity, see also
Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v State of Maharashtra.974
The test of obscenity is the substantial tendency to corrupt by rousing lustful desires.975 In a case, the accused
addressed two respectable young girls not known to him, openly in the hearing of others, in a public place,
inviting them to accompany him on his rickshaw in amorous words suggestive of illicit sex relations with them.
The words addressed by the applicant were clearly offensive to the chastity and modesty of the girls, something
which delicacy, purity and decency forbade to be expressed. The girls, as also others who were present, must
have suffered a moral shock to hear such sensuous words addressed to them by an utter stranger. They were
suggestive of unchaste and lustful ideas and were impure, indecent and lewd. It was held that by addressing
such words to the girls the accused committed an obscene act within the meaning of this section.976
[s 294.6.2] Cabaret Dances and Obscenity
It is hard to hold the contention that cabaret dances are harmful to public order and morals and are likely to
deprave and corrupt the minds of the viewers, especially those who are young and besides being obscene,
cause annoyance to the other customers of the restaurant. A customer above the age of 18, who goes to a
hotel, where a cabaret show is run, looks forward to be entertained by obscenity and cannot complain of
annoyance to which, if any, he shall be deemed to have given his consent. Even assuming that such a hotel
where any person can buy tickets or seats is considered to be a public place, it cannot be held that the
obscenity and annoyance which are punishable under section 294, IPC are caused without the consent express
or implied of such person. An offence under section 294, IPC can be said to have been committed to the
annoyance of the public, if the public or a section thereof object.977 The cabaret dances where indecent and
obscene act per se is involved would not attract provision of section 294 in absence of express evidence of
annoyance by any of the persons who attended such show.978
The performance of a cabaret dance devoid of nudity and obscenity judged with Indian standards, is
permissible, and is not, in any way, liable to be banned or prevented.979
[s 294.6.3] Nude Female Form—Whether Obscene
Mere showing of nude female form in itself, is not necessarily obscene, unless the manner in which the nude
picture appeared in the film is such that it is likely to arouse unhealthy lustful thoughts in the mind of viewers.980
[s 294.6.4] Obscenity and Moral Turpitude
In Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana,981 the question before the Supreme Court was whether a conviction under
this section involves moral turpitude. The apex court defined “moral turpitude” as follows:
Moral turpitude, is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is
inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity.
Page 6 of 16
It was held that conviction under section 294, IPC, per se does not establish moral turpitude. The courts should
be sensitive to the changing perspectives and concepts of morality to appreciate the effect of section 294, IPC
on today’s society and its standards, and its changing views of obscenity.
[s 294.7] “Public Place”
To constitute an offence under this section, it is necessary that the acts, enumerated in the section, must have
been done in, or near, any “public place”.982 “A public place is a place where the public go, no matter whether
they have a right to go or not. The right is not the question”.983 Where annoyance to the public was not caused
by the act of the accused persons, namely a couple taking photograph of each other and, sitting together and
using their mobile phones outside the court premises, held no offence under section 294, IPC was made out,
FIR was quashed.984
In considering whether a particular locality is a public place or not, the courts look at it in respect to the manner
in which it was used at the time of the alleged offence. Thus, if a village storehouse in which medicines are
sold, is locked up at night, it then ceases to be a public place, though it was such during the day. And the
general principle seems to be, that the place must be one to which people are at the time privileged to resort
without an invitation. On the other hand, any place may be made public by a temporary assemblage; and the
exclusion of a few persons is not alone sufficient to prevent its being such.985
A necessary ingredient of the offence under section 294 of the IPC is that it must occur in a “public place”. A
public place must be held to be a place which is open to the members of the public though in some cases
access to it by members of the public may be on fulfilling certain conditions. But the right of access to such
place must not be limited to any determinate section of public and the person in charge of the place should
have no right or discretion to deny access to any member of the public as long as such member is ready to
fulfill the conditions attached for access. Where the incident was alleged to have occurred in the room of the
petitioner, Managing Director, when the complainant had gone after prior appointment, the petitioner had
threatened and abused the complainant, the Managing Director’s room is not a public place, offence under
section 294, IPC was not committed, cognizance taken against the petitioner was quashed on petition under
A railway carriage is a public place.987 So also is an omnibus, train, or public urinal.988
Exposure of a man’s person in a public place is indictable.989
In the instant case the incident had taken place inside the house of the accused appellant which is not a public
place. The words and sentences alleged to be obscene were not mentioned in the FIR. FIR was quashed on
petition filed under section 482, CrPC.990
[s 294.7.1] Public Place—Hotel with Restriction of Entry by Ticket Like Cinema Hall
An enclosed area in a posh hotel where cabaret dance is performed cannot be said to be a private place merely
Page 7 of 16
by reason that entry is restricted to persons purchasing the highly priced tickets and costly food and drinks are
served. A posh hotel is as much a public place as a cinema house. Entry to a hotel just like a cinema house
cannot be and is not being restricted to anybody. A hotel must definitely be placed accessible to all except
perhaps subject to reasonable restrictions allowed by law. It continues to be a public place. If any portion of the
hotel is earmarked for persons who opt to pay a particular amount, it does not cease to be a public place for
that reason, because without discrimination anybody will have access on such payment. Therefore, there is no
point in contending that a portion of a hotel where the only restrictions for entry on some payments is not a
public place. Otherwise the result will be that any public place could be made a private place by enclosing the
same and restricting entry to persons who can afford payment of huge amounts. If “public place” is determined
on the amount of money, one may have to shell out for securing admission the position will be pitiable and it will
only tend to judicial recognition of corruption. If what is prohibited in a cinema house where people are admitted
for charges within their reach is not taboo for the rich who could afford to witness such shows for higher tickets
with additional amounts for drinks and food, the position is really ridiculous. The position will be that those who
could afford enormous amounts could conduct or witness obscene acts with impunity. That is not the legal
intent. If that principle is accepted the criterion for deciding a public place will be the amount that is expended
for getting entry. If so a cinema house also will cease to be a public place if the ticket charges are enormously
increased and it is provided that consumption of costly food and drinks on payment is also a must. That is not
what the law intended as the criterion for deciding whether a place is public or not. If that is the criterion every
public place could be converted into a private place by restricting entry to rich persons who alone could afford
the luxury. The result will be that any obscenity which is prohibited to the poor will not be a prohibited obscenity
for the rich. That will lead to a very unhappy position. So also previous advertisement of what is going to be
performed cannot have the effect of converting a public place into a private place or obscenity into something
which is not obscene.991 Thus, (i) cabaret dances where indecent and obscene act per se is involved, would not
attract the provision of section 294 of the IPC without fulfilment of its essential ingredients i.e. evidence
pertaining to “annoyance to others” and (ii) the hotels like the one where cabaret dances are performed and
entry is restricted by purchase of the tickets, would still be the public places within the meaning of section 294
of the IPC.992
Where the allegation was that the accused owner of the bar and restaurant was organizing obscene dances in
guise of orchestra in bar and restaurant it was held that section 294, IPC was not attracted in the case.993
[s 294.8] Occurrences not taking Place in Public Place
Where the accused went to the complainant’s house and abused him, it was held that the act was not done in,
or near, any public place and, therefore, it did not constitute an offence under this section.994 Similarly, where
the accused was abusing the complainant, his next door neighbour standing on his own chabutra, the chabutra
was held not to be a public place so as to constitute an offence under section 294(b), IPC.995 Where the
occurrence did not take place in a public place but it took place in the garden belonging to one person, who
stated to have purchased the said property from another person without the knowledge of the accused person,
who are the wife and son of the person who has sold the said property, under these circumstances the
proceeding for the offence under section 294(b), IPC, is not maintainable.996 The offence under the section
cannot be made out for uttering words in a private garden which was not a public place.997
Where the place in question was out of sight of the public footpath but was a place to which persons were in the
habit of going without any strict legal right to do so and without being in any way hindered, and the prisoner
exposed his person to several little girls, it was held that he was rightly convicted, and a suggestion was thrown
out that the offence might be indictable if committed before diverse subjects of the realm even if the place be
not public.998
The prosecution case was that the accused by uttering obscene words and words relating to caste
dispossessed the complainant from land. Evidence however showed that the accused was in possession of the
disputed land. The case set up by the complainant was false. Accused was acquitted of the charge under
Page 8 of 16
[s 294.9] Sealing and Seizing Theatre and Articles
Insofar as arrest of the persons, who are alleged to have committed the offence under section 294 of IPC,
which is a cognizable offence, and seizing five reels of the offending film is concerned, there cannot be any
objection for they directly relate to commission of the offence. Sealing and seizing the theatre is, however, not
authorised in law. But when on allegation that the licensee of the theatre is screening obscene or pornographic
films, B-form licence is cancelled or suspended thereby the theatre cannot be used for screening any films.
However, at the stage of investigation in relation to a criminal case, the police do not have any powers to seize
the cinema theatre or projector.1000
[s 294.10] Clause (b)—“Obscene Songs”—Ballad and Words
It must be proved that the act or words in question were obscene.1001 They are to be stated in the FIR or
complaint. The mere allegation of the use of obscene words without mentioning the words uttered cannot
attract charges under section 294, clause (b).1002
In order to constitute an offence under section 294(b), the accused must sing, recite or utter any obscene song,
ballad or words, in or near any public place.1003
A conviction under this section for singing obscene songs in a public place was set aside in the absence of
proof that the particular songs sung were obscene, though they belonged to a class of songs many of which
were obscene.1004
[s 294.11] Vulgar Abuses—Whether Obscene
No literal significance can, however, be attached to vulgar abuses,1005 abuse cannot be equated with utterance
of obscene words, there must be proof of annoyance to others in the public place.1006 So mere vulgar abuses
do not constitute an offence under section 294, IPC, though of course in certain circumstances intentional insult
with intent to provoke breach of peace may enable court to frame a charge under section 504, IPC. Mere
platitudinous utterances signifying the enraged state of a person’s mind would not be sufficient to attract the
application of the provision of section 294, IPC. The test is whether the tendency of the matter charged on
obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences.1007 Where the
accused called a mistress, serving in a school, “Randi”, “Chhinar” and “Vaishya” in the public place, it was held
that the words were obscene and annoying within the meaning of this section.1008
Where the petitioners were alleged to have uttered words to two girls in public places, “oh, good looking, how
are you, from where have you come and how is your life, let us laugh and play”. These words allegedly created
bad influence on the public. But it was held that none of the saying attributed to petitioners could in any way be
construed as amounting to an offence under section 294, IPC.1009
[s 294.12] Obscene Words
So if the words uttered by the accused are not such as would tend to arouse sexually impure thoughts or
deprave or corrupt the mind of complainant, who is himself a doctor they do not answer the test of
obscenity.1010 But where the accused, in a public lane, repeatedly uttered words “Haae jani maar daal idhar bhi
darshan karti ja” when girls and ladies were passing, it was held that the words were obscene and annoying.1011
[s 294.13] Dramatic Performance Act (19 of 1876), Section 9
A conviction under section 9 of the Dramatic Performance Act (19 of 1876), is no bar to conviction under this
section.
Page 9 of 16
An offence under this section is cognizable. A warrant shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is bailable but
not compoundable. It can be tried by any judicial magistrate and can be tried summarily. But where the charge
under this section is against a Government servant, which if established, would entail the dismissal of the
government, the accused should not be tried summarily.1012
I (name and the office of the magistrate etc) hereby notice to you (name of the accused) as follows:
That you on or about………day of………, at………, to the annoyance of (name the persons) did the obscene
act………(name the obscene act) in………(name the public place) (or sung or recited or uttered)………(name the
song, ballad or words) which was an obscene song, (ballad or words), in [or near………(name the public place)], and
thereby committed an offence punishable under section 294 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
Ans. Yes
[s 294.16] Proof
(i) the accused:

Page 10 of 16
(a) either did some act in any public place; or
(b) sang, recited, or uttered any song, ballad or words, in or near any public place,
(ii) the said act, song, ballad or words were obscene; and
(iii) it caused annoyance to others.1013
Where the obscene words used by the accused were not set out in the evidence, it was held, that the omission
was not a sufficient ground for setting aside the conviction.1014
A vague or general statement in the FIR that the accused showered obscene words is not enough to constitute
an offence under section 294(b). It is necessary to state the words uttered by the accused. The prosecution
would not be justified in bringing in the evidence for the first time the words are allegedly spoken to by the
accused, when the same is not recorded in the First Information Statement in a case instituted upon police
report.1015 Where the words alleged to be obscene were not reproduced in FIR, charge for offence under
section 294(b), IPC framed against the accused was quashed.1016
Mere unparliamentary words used by the accused would not amount to offence punishable under section 294
when the words are not obscene.1017
To prove the offence under section 294, IPC, mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient, but there
must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance to others.1018
[s 294.16.1] Film Reel found containing Blue Film Attached to the Regular Film
Where the materials collected during the course of investigation prima facie point out that the obscene scene is
totally unconnected with the English Film “Girl” and the obscene scene had been connected to the film “Girl”
and shown as part of the film, just prior to intermission, in such a state of affairs, it cannot at all be stated that
the offending act of exhibition of the blue film containing the obscene scene, which is totally unconnected with
the censored film, is actually justified by law or is bona fide believed by mistake of fact to be justified, therefore,
accused who were prosecuted of the offence under sections 294, 279, IPC, read with section 7(1)(b) of
Cinematograph Act, 1952 cannot get benefit of section 79, IPC, to get the proceedings quashed.1019
[s 294.16.2] Annoyance is to be Inferred from Proved Facts and Circumstances
Annoyance is generally associated with the mental condition and for that reason it is difficult to prove it as a fact
by positive evidence. In almost all the cases, it is to be inferred from the proved facts. In the given case, the
words attributed to the accused are clearly abusive and obscene especially when directed against a doctor and
a public servant. The fact that the doctor and some other members of the public were impelled to complain
about it is a sufficient indication of the fact that they were all annoyed by the use of such words in a public
place. These circumstances are sufficient to establish the ingredient relative to annoyance contained in section
294, IPC.1020 Though, unless annoyance is caused, an act will not be punishable under section 294, IPC yet it is
not necessary that the witness should specifically say that annoyance was caused, it can be inferred from the
facts and circumstances in which the incident occurred.1021 In the absence of any evidence that an annoyance
was caused to any member of the public, it was held that the charge was not proved.1022
[s 294.16.3] Photographs best Evidence

Page 11 of 16
Where the charge related to dancing by a professional dancer in an obscene manner, it is not safe to act upon
the oral evidence of the prosecution witness who has been set up by the police. The best thing in such cases
should be to take a photograph at the time of dancing to find out whether such dancing is nude and
obscene.1023 Similarly, where neither the informant nor the girl, who had been teased by the accused, was
examined and the court recorded conviction on the hearsay evidence of a witness who had reached the spot
after the occurrence was over, it was held that the conviction of the accused was not maintainable.1024
The old trend was in favour of a lenient punishment under this section. In a case of 1923 the Rangoon High
Court had held that a sentence of three months” rigorous imprisonment under this section for using obscene
language in a public place is unduly severe.1025 In yet another old case, it was observed that in ordinary cases
under this section where the bad language is not specially pointed at an individual and arises from a mere
outbreak of temper, a small fine is sufficient to meet the requirements of justice.1026 A woman, who abused her
husband in language and under circumstances amounting to an offence under this section, was ordered to pay
a fine of Rs 20, and, in default of payment, to undergo one month’s simple imprisonment. The fine was paid. It
was held that the sentence was unduly severe and that it must be reduced to Rs 2 and that the balance ought
to be refunded.1027 This view was probably taken as it was the husband, who was abused by his own wife and
was the result of some domestic quarrel otherwise even a fine of Rs 20 should be regarded as too lenient a
punishment. Apart from this, the decision is of the period 1872–92, when even a rupee had some value. In any
case, it should be no authority at the end of the present century.
In a later, Allahabad case,1028 Misra J, observed:
Teasing by road-side Romeos is fast on the increase in cities. Unfortunately, no offence is so easy to commit, yet so
difficult to be booked. The victims of the offence are mostly modest and shy girls or young women of respectable
families. While on the road or passing in the by-lanes, prowling desperadoes cut filthy jokes with them and pass
indecent, sensuous and sarcastic remarks against them. The poor victims dare not protest in order to avoid creating
scene and attracting a crowd at the spot. Publicity of such incidents sometimes leads to injurious effect against the
victims themselves inasmuch as it subsequently provides material for groundless scandal and unjustified gossip
against their character from interested quarters. The victims therefore, are compelled as of necessity to silently suffer
the disgrace and instinctively leave the spot as quickly as they can without disclosing their identity. The offenders being
riffraffs and desperate character, prudence dictates that even respectable passersby, who happen to hear and see the
ugly incident must to their mental anguish, pretend not to have heard or noticed it and to pass off the place quickly in
their own safety. The result is that the offenders indulge in the crime freely and with impunity without any fear of
consequence to themselves. The offence hardly ever is brought to the notice of the authorities. In my opinion, such an
offence, when proved, must be looked upon with utmost severity and should be punished deterrently. The maximum
sentence of imprisonment provided under this section is three months’ rigorous imprisonment only, plus fine also in the
discretion of the court. In fact, I think it is time that, considering its large incidence, the legislature thought fit to amend
the law and provide severe punishment for this offence.
[s 294.17.1] Eve-Teasing Deserves Deterrent Punishment
The Patna High Court has also taken a similar view and it has been held that as the teasing of school girls has
become very common, an offence, under this section when proved, must be looked upon with utmost severity
and should be punished deterrently. It should not be dealt with lightly.1029
[s 294.18] Security for Keeping the Peace
Although an offence under this section, does not necessarily amount to a breach of the peace, if it in fact did so,
or was intended or known to be likely to cause a breach of the peace the offender may be bound over to keep
Page 12 of 16
the peace at the time of conviction.1030
952 Subs. by Act 3, of 1895, section 3 for the original section.
953 Zafar Ahmed Khan v State, AIR 1963 All 105 [LNIND 1962 ALL 125] , p 107 : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 273 .
954 State of Maharashtra v Joyce Zee alias Temico, (1975) Bom LR 218 : (1976) ILR Bom 1299 .
955 State of Maharashtra v Joyce Zee alias Temico, (1975) Bom LR 218 : (1976) ILR Bom 1299 ; Sadhna v State (Delhi
Admn), (1981) 83 Punj LR (Del) 70 , p 71; Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v State of Maharashtra, (1970) Cr LJ
1273 .
956 MM Haries v State of Kerala, (2005) Cr LJ 3314 (Ker).
957 Ibid.
958 Saraswathi v State, 2002 Cr LJ 1420 (Mad).
959 Preethimon v State of Kerala, 2008 Cr LJ 1233 , p 1234 (Ker) : 2008 (2) Ker LT 666 .
960 Narendra H Khurana v The Commissioner of Police, (2004) Cr LJ 3393 (Bom) (DB).
961 K Jayaramanuju v Jankaraj, (1997) Cr LJ 1623 (Mad).
962 Nyo Ke, (1872–92) LBR 332; Ma Kye W, (1872–92) LBR 537; Ganpat v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1966) MPLJ
(Notes) 29; Khitish Kumar Purohit v State of Orissa, (1991) 72 Cut LT 79.
Page 13 of 16
963 Section 9, IPC.
964 Zafar Ahmed Khan v State, AIR 1963 All 105 [LNIND 1962 ALL 125] , p 107 : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 273 .
965 Ibid.
966 Atul Jain v State of Haryana, (1989) Serv LJ 28 (P&H).
967 A&B v State, through National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 669 (Del).
968 Ganpat v State of Himachal Pradesh, (1966) MPLJ (Notes) 29.

969 Dhanisha Karthika v Rakshi N Raj, 2012 Cr LJ 3225 , p 3231 (Ker) (DB) : 2012 (2) KarLJ 265 .
970 Hicklin’s case (1868) 3 QB 360 .
971 PT Chacko v Nainan Chacko, (1967) Ker LT 799 .
972 George v State of Kerala, (1968) Ker LT 219 .
973 Dhanisha Karthika v Rakhi N Raj, 2012 Cr LJ 3225 , p 3232 (Ker) (DB) : 2012 (2) KarLJ 265 .
974 Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2015 SC 2612 [LNIND 2015 SC 338] : (2015) 6 SCC
1 [LNIND 2015 SC 338] .
975 PT Chacko v Nainan Chacko, (1967) Ker LT 799 : (1967) Mad LJ (Cr) 815.
976 Zafar Ahmed Khan v State, AIR 1963 All 105 [LNIND 1962 ALL 125] , p 107.
977 Sadhana v State (Delhi Admn), (1981) Chand Cr Cas 17 (Del) : 81 Punj LR (DS) 70; State of Maharashtra v Joycee
Zee alias Temico, (1975) Bom LR 218 .
979 KP Mahommed v State of Kerala, (1984) Cr LJ 745 (Ker) : (1984) Ker LT 276 : (1984) 2 ILR Ker 66.
980 Farzance Bi v Board of Film Censors, (1983) All WC 424 : (1983) 2 CLC 417 (All) : (1983) All LJ 1133 relied on
Rajkapoor v Laxman, (1980) 2 SCC 175 [LNIND 1979 SC 492] .
981 Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, (1996) SCC (Cr) 583, p 587.
982 State v Gangaram, (1960) Nag LJ (Notes) 111 ; Shivwati Devi Saket v Muliya, (1991) CLR (MP) 333, pp 334 (Notes).
983 R v Wellard, LR 14 QBD 63, p 66, per Grove JL.
984 A&B v State Thr National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 669 (Del).
985 Mayne’s Criminal Law, 11th Edn, p 145, citing 1 Bishop, section 315.
986 Ashok Kumar Mishra v State of Orissa, 2013 Cr LJ 1431 , p 1432 (Ori) : 2013 (I) Ori LR 287 .
Page 14 of 16
987 Lanrish v Archer, (1882) 10 QBD 44 .
988 Arch 792; R v Thallman, 33 LJMC 58; R v Harris, LR ICC 282.
989 R v Sidney, (1663) 1 Sid 168 : 3 Keb 620; R v Holmes, (1852) Derrs 207.
990 Aniruddha Ganesh Pathak v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 1069 (Bom).
992 Ibid; Seema Dass (Smt) v State of AP, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 753 (AP).
993 Seema Dass (Smt) v State of AP, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 753 (AP).
994 State v Gangaram, 1960 Nag LJ 111 (Notes).
995 Rakesh Kumar Madotia v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1996) 3 CCR 180 (MP).
996 Saraswathi v State, (2002) Cr LJ 1420 (Mad).
997 Saraswathi v State, (2002) Cr LJ 1420 (Mad).
998 R v Wellard, (1884) QBD 63 ; cf R v Madercine, (1899) 20 New S Wales Rep Law 36, where a conviction was upheld
for indecent exposure on the verandah, of a private house in the presence of several children.
999 Ansar Ali v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 471 (MP).
1000 P Kullaiah Swamy v Sub-Inspector of Police, Jammalamadugu, (2003) Cr LJ 2488 (AP).
1001 R v Ganubin Krishna, 4 Bom HCCC 25; R v Upendronath Doss, ILR 1 Cal 356.
1002 V Dhasiah v State, (1994) 2 Crimes 67 : (1994) 1 LW (Cr) 285 (Mad); Santhilal v Parmeshwaran, (1988) Ker
LT (SW) 74 ; Savarimuthu Nadar v State, (1994) Mad LJ (Cr) 154.
1004 Ganu K Gunrav, 4 BHC 25.
1005 Hargovind v Balkrishna Prasad, (1988) CLR 384 (MP).
1006 State of Madhya Pradesh v Arvind Kumar, (1967) Jab LJ 10 (SN).
1007 Om Prakash s/o Janta Prasad Dumar v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) MPLJ 657 .
Page 15 of 16
1008 Chhotelal v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1966) MPLJ (Notes) 144.
1009 Sanjeev Sehgal v State of Punjab, (1987) Chand Cr Cas 218(P&H).
1010 Chacko George v State of Kerala, (1968) Ker LT 219 , p 222 : (1968) Mad LJ (Cr) 269.
1011 State of Uttar Pradesh v Kailash, (1967) All Cr R 416 : (1967) All WR 648 (HC).
1012 Lalta Prasad v State, (1968) All Cr R 18.
1013 Bidyandhar Giri v State of Orissa, (1992) 73 Cut LT 520.
1014 Narasamma, 1 Weir 251; Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana, (1996) SCC (Cr) 583, p 586.
1017 Venkatachalam v State, (2010) 2 MadLJ (Cri) 12 (Mad).
1018 K Jayaramanuju v Jankaraj, (1997) Cr LJ 1623 (Mad).
1019 Mahommad Raffi v State, (1992) 3 Crimes 157 (Mad).

1020 Patel HM Malle Gowda v State of Mysore, (1973) 1 Mys LJ 42 : (1973) Mad LJ (Cr) 114 : (1973) Cr LJ 1047 ,
p 1048.
1021 Babulal v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1980) MPWN 236.
1022 Khitish Kumar Purohit v State of Orissa, (1991) 72 Cut LT 79.
1023 Re Cucla alias Coral Banker, (1974) LW (Cr) 196.
1024 Kashmira Singh v State, AIR 1965 J&K 37 : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 554 .
1025 Parliam v King-Emperor, AIR 1923 Rang 253 .
1026 Re Ma Kye W, (1872–92) LBR 537.
1027 (1872–92) LBR 309.
1028 Zafar Ahmad Khan v State, AIR 1963 All 105 [LNIND 1962 ALL 125] , p 107 : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 273 .
1029 Sadan Prasad v State of Bihar, (1970) Cr LJ 1323 : (1969) Pat LR 257.
1030 Section 106, CrPC 1973; R v Mi Kun Ya, (1904) 1 Cr LJ 555 ; UBR 1904, 1 Qr PC 4; Fab Lal Gir v Fogmohun
Gir, ILR 26 Cal 576; Sheo Bhajan v SA Mosawi, 27 ILR Cal 983.
Page 16 of 16
End of Document
[s 294A] Keeping lottery office.—

public remedies.4
Page 2 of 16



1031[s 294A] Keeping lottery office.—

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Whoever keeps any office or place for the purpose of drawing any lottery 1032[not being 1033[a State lottery] or a
lottery authorised by the 1034[State] Government], shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
And whoever publishes any proposal to pay any sum, or to deliver any goods, or to do or forbear from doing
anything for the benefit of any person, on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the drawing of any
ticket, lot, number or figure in any such lottery, shall be punished with fine which may extend to one thousand
rupees.]
[s 294A.1] Scope
This section makes it an offence to keep a place for drawing a lottery, and to publish a lottery. A lottery by itself
is not, in India, unlawful in the sense that it is prohibited by law. It is only in relation to this section that a lottery
becomes unlawful:1035
Every lottery is either authorised or not authorised by government. The section does not touch authorised
lotteries, but intends to save people from the effects of those not authorised, firstly, by prohibiting the keeping of
offices or places for drawing them, and secondly, by prohibiting the publication of any advertisements relating to
them.1036
[s 294A.2] Analogous Law
In Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar,1037 Venkataramana Rao J, summed up the development of the law regarding
lotteries as follows:
It is necessary to advert briefly to the development of the law, both in England in India, regarding lotteries and the
underlying principle on which they have been rendered illegal, or, in certain circumstance made punishable.
[s 294A.2.1] Law in England
In England lotteries were perfectly valid at common law, but between the years 1698 and 1846 a series of
statutes were enacted in order to suppress lotteries. The original purpose of these acts was twofold; to
authorise only state lotteries which in fact thrived from 1709–1803, and also to prevent any opposition to those
state lotteries either at home or from abroad. Later statutes were also intended to prevent innocent persons
from being ruined. It is necessary to refer to these various statutes except two of them insofar as they have a
bearing on the Indian Statute Law. Two of the said statutes are the Gambling Act of 18021038 and the Lotteries
Act of 1823.1039 The relevant provisions of the said two Acts are as follows:
The Gambling Act
An act to suppress certain games and lotteries and authorised by law.1040
Whereas evil-disposed persons do frequently resort to public houses and other places, to set up certain mischievous
games or lotteries called little goes, and to induce servants, children, and unwary persons to play at the said games,
and thereby most fraudulently obtain great sums of money from servants, children, and unwary persons to the great
impoverishment and utter ruin of many families…
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For remedy whereof, be it enacted, that all such games or lotteries called little goes, shall, from the after the passing of
this Act, be deemed, and are hereby declared common and public nuisances and against law. From and after 1 day of
July 1802, no person or persons whatsoever shall publicly or privately keep any office or place to exercise, keep open,
show or expose to be played, drawn, or thrown at or in, either by dice, lotteries, cards, balls, or by numbers or figures,
or by any other way, contrivance, or device whatsoever, any game or lottery called a little go or any other lottery
whatsoever not authorised by Parliament, or shall knowingly suffer to be exercised, kept open, shown, or exposed to
be played, drawn or thrown at or in, either by dice, lots, cards, balls or by number or figures, or by any other way,
contrivance, or device whatsoever, any such game or lottery in his or her house, room, or place upon pain of forfeiting
for every such offence the sum of five hundred pounds, to be recovered in the court of exchequer at the suit of His
Majesty’s Attorney-General, and to be put to the use of His Majesty, his heirs and successors.
Lotteries Act, 1823 QQ 2548
The Lotteries Act, 1823, provided that if any person or persons were to sell tickets or chances in any lottery not
authorised by an Act of Parliament or publish any scheme or proposal for the sale of any ticket or chance in
such a lottery, for every such offence he had to forfeit and pay a sum of fifty pounds.
It will be seen from the preamble of 42 Geo 3, the underlying public policy which declared the lotteries common
public nuisance was that they promote gambling and speculations so that great sums are obtained fraudulently
from servants, children and unwary persons, to the great impoverishment and utter ruin of many families.
[s 294A.2.2] Act 5 of 1844
In India, Act 5 of 1844 was enacted on these lines. The relevant provisions are as follows:
Whereas great mischief has been found to result from the existence of lotteries:
(1) it is hereby enacted, that, in the territories subject to the government of the East India Company, all lotteries
not authorised by government shall, from and after 31st day of March 1844, be deemed, and are hereby
declared, common and public nuisances and against law;
(2) and it is hereby enacted, that from and after the day aforesaid, no person shall, in the said territories, publicly
or privately, keep any office or place for the purpose of drawing any lottery not authorised by the government,
or shall have any such lottery drawn, or shall knowingly suffer any such lottery to be drawn, in his or her
house; and any person so offending shall for every such offence, upon conviction, before a justice of the
peace, or magistrate, be punished by fine not exceeding Rs 5,000.
The interpretation of “lottery” in Act 5 of 1844, was accepted by the Legislature and with the knowledge of that
interpretation, the Penal Code was amended by section 10 of Act 27 of 1870, by enacting this section, which it
may be observed is more restricted in scope than that of Act 5 of 1844.
Though the Private Lotteries Act, 1844 was repealed, the same spirit permitting its various provisions has
reincarnated in the shape of section 294A, IPC.1041

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This section was inserted by section 10 of the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act (27 of 1870).
The words “a lottery organized by the Central Government or the Government of a Pt A State or a Pt B State”
were substituted for the words “a state lottery” and the word “state” was substituted for the word “Provincial” by
the adaptation of Laws Order 1950. The words “a state lottery” were substituted for the words “a lottery
organized by the Central Government or the Government of a Pt A or a Pt B State” by Pt B State (Laws) Act,
1951 (3 of 1951).
[s 294A.4] Section repealed in Certain States
The provision of section 294A, IPC have been repealed in Andhra Pradesh by section 27 of Andhra Pradesh
Act (26 of 1968) (with effect from 1 February 1969), in Maharashtra by section 33 of the Bombay Act (82 of
1958) (with effect from 1 May 1959) in Gujarat by section 33 of the Bombay Act (82 of 1958) read with section
87 of the Bombay Act (11 of 1960) and in Mysore, except Bellary district, by section 33 of Mysore Act (27 of
1951).
[s 294A.5] Object
Neither under the English Acts on the subject, nor under this Code, is it made an offence to buy a ticket in a
lottery. There can be no doubt that these enactments are aimed at the class of persons who promote lotteries
and that they are intended to protect the class of persons who are tempted to take tickets in lotteries.1042 This
was the view of the policy of the Lottery Acts taken by Striling J, in Barclay v Pearson.1043 The fact that the
lotteries have a pernicious tendency is evident from the fact that private lotteries were prohibited as far back as
in the 19th century by means of the Private Lotteries Act, 1844, though the said Act was repealed, the same
spirit permitting its various provisions has reincarnated in the shape of section 294A, IPC.1044 Under section
294A, if any person sums a private lottery, he is liable to imprisonment or fine or both. It appears that when the
Government itself sums a lottery or permits a lottery to sum, the lottery is not legitimised but it only exempts that
lottery from the operation of section 294A, IPC.1045
[s 294A.6] Two Parts of the Section
The section is in two parts. The first part makes it an offence to keep any office or place for the purpose of
drawing any lottery not authorised by government. The second part makes it an offence to publish any sum on
an event or contingency relative to the drawing of any ticket in such lottery.1046 What has been rendered
indictable under the first part, is the running of public lotteries and the precise offence envisaged by the section
is that of keeping any place for the purpose of drawing any unauthorised lottery.1047 The officer or place, the
keeping of which is punishable under this part of the section, must be intended to be the scene of actual
drawing of the lottery, the keeping of an office for the transaction of preliminary business and correspondence,
and not intended or used for the purpose of drawing, is no offence under the first part of the section.1048
The offence under the second part of the section consists in the publication of proposals and does not depend
on whether the proposals were to be actually carried out or not. The intention of the Legislature appears to
have been that the public should not be informed of such proposals.1049 If the proposals are such as come
within the mischief of the second clause of this section, the offence is completed by publishing them and it does
not matter whether the scheme is to actually conduct the lottery or to merely defraud the public.1050
[s 294A.7] Essential Ingredients of this Offence
The first part of the section which deals with keeping a lottery office has two essential ingredients, namely:
(i) there must be keeping of an office or place for drawing lottery; and
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(ii) the lottery must not be a state lottery or a lottery authorised by the state government.
The ingredients of the offence under the second part of the section, which deals with the publication of any
proposal regarding a lottery, are:
(i) there must be a lottery,
(ii) there must be a drawing of any ticket, lot, number or figure in such lottery, and
(iii) there must be a publication of a proposal to pay any money, or to deliver any goods, or to do or forbear
doing anything for the benefit of any person on any event or contingency relative or applicable to such
drawing.1051
[s 294A.8] “Lottery” [s 294A.8.1] Meaning
There is no formal definition of “lottery” in the Penal Code or in any other statute. Its common meaning, as
disclosed by the dictionary is, “a scheme for the distribution of prizes by lot or chance”. It is in this sense that
the word is used in this section.1052 What constitutes a lottery is that some gain is to come to the subscriber
dependent upon pure chance, any element of skill being absent.1053 Lucky draw schemes are covered under
the provisions of section 294A, IPC.1054
[s 294A.8.2] A Game of Chance
The term “lottery” denotes a game of chance. Ordinarily, it is a sort of device to induce the party to buy
worthless things against their better judgment and with no return. The only person, who always wins, is the
lottery-keeper. Where the purpose of the scheme is only to attract deposits, and distribution of prizes from
periodical lots is only an inducement; and where no subscriber stands to lose, as even the interest money is
paid to the persons who do not get any prize, it is difficult to describe the transaction as a lottery to attract
section 294A, Pt I, IPC.1055
[s 294A.8.3] Chance to Win is the Essence of Lottery
In the Oxford New English Dictionary, a lottery is defined as “an arrangement for the distribution of prizes by
chance among persons purchasing tickets”.1056 Tickets of course are only the tokens of the chance purchased,
and it is the purchase of this chance which is the essence of a lottery. A lottery involves the collective
contribution of the prize money by the competitors, though some of them may have paid nothing.1057 The
purchase of a chance of winning a prize makes the thing a lottery,1058 but an absolutely free and gratuitous
distribution of chances, none of which had been paid for by the competitors, would not be so.1059 Where the
result does not depend entirely on chance, the transaction is not a lottery.1060
[s 294A.8.4] Lottery Distinguished from a Game or Sports
A lottery is a distribution of prizes by lot or chance.1061 The distribution must be determined by mere chance and
not by judgment or skill,1062 and this distinguishes a lottery from a game or sports. But where the result does not
depend entirely on chance the transaction is not a lottery.1063
[s 294A.8.5] Actual Distribution of Prize not Essential
The question of lottery or no lottery is not to be determined by the quality of the promoters’ motive, and it is not
an element of a lottery that some of the competitors must stand to lose.1064 The principle underlying a lottery is
that there should be a distribution of prizes determined solely by chance; but if the results of the lottery are such
that no prize at all is distributed and the organizer of the lottery pockets the whole of the stakes adventured, the
transaction does not cease to be lottery. The actual distribution of a prize the essential factor in the case in that
there should be a scheme for distribution of a prize or prizes to be determined solely by chance, and if chance
Page 7 of 16
so decrees that no prize is to be distributed to the adventures and the stakes are to be appropriated by the
organizer of the lottery, the scheme is nonetheless a lottery.1065
[s 294A.8.6] Substantial Object of the Whole Scheme is to be seen
It has been held that the substantial object of the whole scheme will be looked at in order to ascertain whether it
is a lottery. Where the scheme has for its object the carrying on of a legitimate business, the fact that it provides
for the distribution of its profits in certain events by lot will not vitiate the scheme.1066 But where one of the
conditions of the scheme, floated by the accused, showed that the company would hold a draw every month
and would give ten prizes of a total sum of Rs 1500 as detailed in the conditions, it was held that the scheme
came within the ambit of the term “lottery”.1067
[s 294A.8.7] Circuitous Payment of Prize does not Change the Nature of Scheme
In Shanmugha Mudali v Kuman Swami Mudali,1068 it was held that a scheme would not be a lottery if the prize
money came out of the interest earned from the subscribers’ contributions. But dissenting from this view it has
been held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that if the subscribers have purchased a chance of winning
a prize, it can make no difference whether the prizes are paid circuitously from the interest earned on the
subscribers’ contributions or are paid directly from those contributions.1069
[s 294A.8.8] Whether kuri is lottery?
It has been held that a transaction is not necessarily a lottery simply because a matter of whatever kind is
agreed to be decided by lot, and a kuri where the fund is distributed by lot is not lottery.1070 Referring to the first
of these cases the Punjab Chief Court remarked in Madan Gopal v R:1071
The proceedings were entirely private and extremely limited in extent, and we are by no means prepared to admit that
if in similar circumstances subscribers had been invited by public advertisement, and in thousands instead of units, so
that the profit resulting from a lucky draw would have been substantial, the result of the case would have been same.
In a subsequent Full Bench case, however, it has been definitely held that a kuri is a lottery.1072
[s 294A.8.9] Prize Scheme under which Free Coupons Issued to Customers on Sale of Goods
As no amount is collected from the consumers to whom coupons are supplied, the conduct of the scheme
cannot amount to conduct of a prize chit scheme prohibited by the Prize Chits and Money Circulation (Banning)
Act, 1978. From the scheme, it is seen that the proposal is to draw lots with all the participating merchants and
it is not based on the coupons taken by them so that it is not possible to say that the merchants have made a
contribution or subscription for taking part in the lots to be drawn so the scheme does not offend the provisions
of the said Act.1073
In order to constitute a lottery within the meaning of the Lotteries Regulation Act, 1998, the scheme must be for
distribution of prizes by lot or chance to those persons who participate in the chances of a prize by purchasing
tickets. Since no tickets are sold or purchased, the scheme does not constitute a “lottery”. Thus, neither the
provision in the Lotteries Regulation Act, 1998 nor the provision in section 294A, IPC is attracted.1074
[s 294A.9] “Whoever” [s 294A.9.1] Includes User of a Place though Neither the Owner nor Occupier
This section makes it an offence for any person to keep an office or place for the purpose of drawing a lottery
there. It would include the case of a person who, without being the owner or occupier, is permitted to keep the
place for the particular object.1075
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[s 294A.9.2] Members of the Committee of a Club
The members of the committee of a club, who have control of the premises of the club, keep the premises for
the purposes of this section and they cannot be allowed to shift their responsibility on to the general body of
members or to the club which is an abstract entity.1076
[s 294A.9.3] Persons having Common Object
Where the common object is the keeping of a place for the purposes of drawing a lottery not authorised by
government, all who engage in such an object, are each individually guilty and they can be prosecuted
successfully in whole or in part, jointly or severally.1077
[s 294A.10] “Keeps any Office or Place”
This section makes it an offence to keep a place for drawing a lottery or to publish a lottery. “Keeping” implies
not occasional user, but something habitual or regular. A certain degree of habitualness or continuity of
operation is intended as also a fixed or ascertained locality for the drawing.1078 The notion of keeping also
implies some dominion over the place kept. There would not be keeping of a place unless there is an
occupation, so effective as to enable the persons drawing the lottery to be regularly found in that place at stated
times. But an exclusive dedication of the place for the purpose of drawing the lottery is not necessary. The
essential thing is the habitual or regular use of a place for the purpose of drawing lots, such user being
sufficiently effective as to enable anyone interested in the lottery to know where the promoters can be found at
the time of the draw. It is not necessary that the members of the public should be excluded from the place or
that the place should not be used for any purpose other than drawing of the lottery.1079
[s 294A.11] Meaning of “Drawing”
The word “drawing” is used in the section in its physical sense and when the section was enacted in 1870, it
seems probable that the only form of lottery envisaged by the Legislature was a lottery run on the usual lines in
which the winning numbers are actually drawn out of an urn, box or other receptacle and the actual drawing of
logs was an essential ingredient.1080
Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “drawing” as “the act of pulling, attracting, extracting, taking lots, a card
or cards, from the pack, etc”. Its meaning relative to a lottery is clearly, therefore, that the lots should be drawn
by some mechanical or human agency involving their chance extraction. Where there is no physical or
mechanical “drawing” to determine the lucky lots which depends on a sort of arithmetical progression based on
an original number to be determined merely by the chance of a bond-holder there is no drawing as
contemplated in the section.1081
[s 294A.11.1] Drawing does not mean Conducting
The word “drawing” must be given its natural meaning. It does not mean conducting.1082 Where the accused
was running a lottery which was a gigantic swindle, in that the only substantial prize fell necessarily to the agent
who sold the largest number of tickets, the ticket bearing the highest number among those sold by the agent
was a number upon which all the other lucky numbers received a small prize of one rupee. It was held that
although it was true that the accused was conducting a lottery and had cheated the public on a large scale, he
was not guilty under either part of this section, because he had not been keeping an office or place for the
purpose of drawing a lottery, and had not been publishing any proposal to pay any sum on any contingency
relative to the drawing of any ticket, lots, number or figure in any such lottery.1083
[s 294A.12] “For the Purpose of Drawing any Lottery”
The first clause of the section speaks of keeping an office for “purpose of drawing any lottery”. The conditions
for the application of that part of the section are complied with, when it is shown that the accused did keep an
office where they carried on the necessary preliminary work for running a lottery and received the lottery
moneys, and which they held out to the public as the place where the lottery would finally be drawn.1084 The
office or place, the keeping of which is punishable under this section, must be intended to be the scene of the
actual drawing of the lottery. The keeping of an office for the transaction of preliminary business and
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correspondence and not intended or used for the purpose of drawing is not an offence under the first part of the
section.1085
[s 294A.13] Difference between Lottery and Wagering Contract
In Thacker v Hardy,1086 Cotton LJ, said:
The essence of gaming and wagering is that one party is to win and the other to lose upon a future event which at the
time of the contract is of an uncertain nature, that is to say, if the event turns out one way A will lose; but if it turns out
the other way he will win.
In Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co,1087 Hawkins J, defined a “wager” thus:
A wagering contract is one by which two persons professing to hold opposite views touching the issue of a future
uncertain event mutually agree that, dependent upon the determination of that event, one shall win from the other, and
that other shall pay or hand over to him, a sum of money or other stake; neither of the contracting parties having any
other interest in that contract than the sum or stake he will so win or lose, there being no other real consideration for
the making of such contract by either of the parties…if either of the parties may win but cannot lose, or may lose but
cannot win, it is not a wagering contract.
[s 294A.13.1] Even if none Loses, the Scheme may be Lottery
A lottery and a wagering contract are two distinct things. A scheme may amount to a lottery though none of the
competitions is a loser.1088
[s 294A.14] “Not being a Lottery Authorised by the State Government”
The section applies to unauthorised lotteries whether conducted in or out of India.1089 The fact that the business
of an association of persons is registered as a company does not make it authorised by government.1090 It
would not be within the collector’s authority to sanction a lottery, he being a revenue officer; and the mere fact
of taking income from the club on the profits of the lotteries would not authorise them.1091 The withholding of a
prosecution does not amount to authorisation.1092
The words in the section “not authorised by government” are equivalent to meaning unless it (the lottery) has
been authorised by Government or except in the case where it (the lottery) has been authorised by
government. It is a reasonable view to take that they are in the nature of an exception, and as they appear in
the section defining the offence, it is reasonable to hold that section 105 of the Evidence Act, applies and that
the burden of proof lies on the accused person, to show that the lottery was authorised by the government.1093
[s 294A.14.1] Lottery Authorised by the State Government
The language of section 294A, IPC is very clear. It excludes only a State lottery and a lottery authorised by the
State Government. In the latter portion, the words “state government” should necessarily mean the State within
which the lottery is conducted. In this case it is the State Government of Tamil Nadu. Unless the lottery is
authorised by the State of Tamil Nadu, it will not be exempted under section 294A, IPC. Section 294A, IPC,
Page 10 of 16
does not prescribe the procedure by which the State Government should authorise to run a lottery. Hence, it is
open to the State Government to pass executive orders for regulating the conduct of lotteries or to prevent the
conducting of lotteries within the State.1094
[s 294A.14.2] Discretion Vested in the Government
Section 294A of the Indian Penal Code 1860, contemplates authorisation being given by the State Government
to any person to draw a lottery. It does not specifically give any guidelines to indicate in what manner the
discretion vested in the Government is to be exercised. But this does not mean that the discretion to be
exercised is an unguided discretion. The provision itself, read in the light of the other provisions in the chapter,
would certainly provide necessary guidelines and limitations. The authorisation granted by the State
Government for punishment with imprisonment, or with fine, or with both indicates the seriousness with which
the Legislature looked at the particular act which is rendered punishable. Evidently, the offence involved is an
offence which falls under the general category of offences which have been brought under chapter XIV, namely
offences affecting public health, safety, convenience, decency and morals. One or more of these aspects would
certainly be relevant in deciding whether in a given case, authorisation is to be granted or rejected. Drawing a
lottery may affect public health, public safety or public convenience etc. A businessman may try to dupe the
public by drawing a lottery. Another may try to flood the market with cheap goods and stifle healthy competition.
A scheme may be loaded heavily against the public. A manufacturer may try to popularise substandard goods
by attracting the customers in the guise of a lucky draw prize scheme. Certainly, this will be injurious to public
health, public safety and public convenience, as the case may be depending on the nature of the manufacturing
product, and terms and conditions of the scheme, state of the market and a host of other considerations.
[s 294A.14.3] Too many Prize Schemes—When not Conducive to Public Interest
Allowing too many prize schemes to be conducted at the same time in the same locality or area may also not
be conducive to public interest as it may lead to unhealthy competition. Co-operative sector or small scale
industry and the like may require to be assisted by such promotion schemes. At times, even a large scale
manufactures may genuinely desire to run a lottery to help sales promotion. Individual requirements in the light
of public interest must guide the Government in authorising or declining to authorise, a scheme. In the case of
multiplicity of applications, the Government has certainly the power of regulation which includes the power of
making a choice between applicants unless it be that all the applications, can be granted. Granting of
preference in any reasonable manner short of conferring monopoly to a co-operative society would be
permissible and will not amount to discrimination. If two manufacturers have not been allowed to conduct a
scheme during an identical period, it cannot be said to be an attempt to create monopoly. It is only an attempt
to regulate the conduct of schemes, keeping in mind the interest of manufacturers as well as public interest. If
the State Government is of the opinion that it will not be conducive in public interest to allow two manufacturers
to conduct the same scheme during the identical period, the decision cannot be said to be either discriminatory
or creative of monopoly. This is a case where the state Government is bound to select one or two or more of
the applicants who seek authorisation of the state government, and the State Government will have to choose
one or the other on relevant grounds.1095
[s 294A.14.4] Lottery Business whether Protected by Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21 of the Constitution
It also needs to be noticed that the rights protected by Article 19(1) are not absolute. The limitations are stated
in clauses 2–6 of Article 19. The rights guaranteed in Articles 19(1)(a)–(g) are to be read along with the
qualifications contained in clauses 2–6 of Article 19. The right to practice any profession or carry on any
occupation, trade or business does not extend to practising a profession or carrying on an occupation, trade or
business which is inherently vicious and pernicious. It does not entitle a citizen to carry on trade or business
activities which are immoral and criminal. They are res extra commercium i.e. they are outside commerce. May
be the interest of a citizen lies in carrying on trade or business which is pernicious but demands of public
interest have to be give primacy and they over ride individual interest.
Since the business of the sale of lottery tickets is of a pernicious nature no person has a legal or a fundamental
right in it. There is good authority for the proposition that trade or business which is noxious or pernicious in
nature, is not covered under Articles 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution.1096
[s 294A.15] Meaning of Publisher

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The word “publisher” includes both the person who sends a proposal as well as the proprietor of a newspaper
who prints the proposal as an advertisement. The proprietor of a Bombay newspaper who published an
advertisement in his paper relating to a Melbourne lottery was accordingly held punishable under this
section.1097 Where the publication is that a particular lottery ticket can be had at a particular place, it does not
appear to be sufficient to constitute a publication of a proposal to pay any sum on any event or contingency
relative or applicable to the drawing of any ticket in any lottery not authorised by the Government as provided in
the second paragraph of this section. If there had been an advertisement about the lottery itself, the position
might have been different. It is difficult to say that the publication of a reference to the tickets about an
unauthorised lottery is prohibited by this section.1098
[s 294A.15.1] Publication of Proposal
The publication, contemplated by this section, is not some public advertisement in the sense of a written
publication in newspapers or handbills. As far as publication in the second part of section 294A, IPC is
concerned, it envisages making a thing available to the public. Where a pamphlet is given only to persons who
are depositing money in the bank, there is no advertisement of the same at all.1099 If a number of persons go
about canvassing for subscribers on the basis of scheme, settled beforehand by the promoter, it amounts to a
publication of the proposal.1100 Once it is established that the accused appellant was responsible for sending a
circular to the printing company to be printed, and that it was printed, there is an end to his appeal, for it is
inconceivable that none of the printers read the circular.1101 Under the Press and Registration of Books Act (25
of 1867), a publication in a newspaper makes the proprietor liable. Section 7 of the said Act makes the printer
or publisher responsible for everything appearing in the newspaper.1102 The provisions of that section lay down
that a declaration made by a person that he is the printer of a newspaper shall be sufficient evidence (unless
the contrary is proved) as against that person that he was the printer of every portion of every issue of the
newspaper named in the declaration. The effect of this section is to throw upon the declared printer the onus of
proving that in fact he was not the printer of any issues of the newspaper which may form the subject matter of
legal proceedings.1103 A mere causal and gratuitous delivery of a lottery ticket is not necessarily a publication
within the meaning of this section.1104 But where the ticket books were delivered with a view to the tickets
therein being sold, this cannot be considered to be, in any sense, a mere casual or gratuitous delivery, and
amounts to a publication.1105
[s 294A.15.2] Publication of Proposal—Non-Payment of Prize is of no Consequence
Where the accused was charged for publishing a circular of a proposal for a lottery for the sale of tickets for
prizes on horses winning at the Derby races on starters and for other special prizes in these terms, and saying
that the sweep would close on a certain date, that the draw under the supervision of the patrons stated in the
tickets would take place a few days later (date specified) and that the prize winners would be notified by
telegrams, it was held that the accused was guilty of the charge as he had published a proposal to pay a sum
for the benefit of a person on an event, or contingency relative or applicable to the drawing of the ticket in a
lottery and it did not matter that the payment proposed to be made was not made by the person advertising.1106
[s 294A.16] “Goods”
The word “goods” includes movable and immovable property.1107
The offence under this section is non- cognizable. A summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a
bailable offence but not compoundable. It can be tried by any judicial magistrate and summarily.
The limitation for taking cognizance of an offence under Pt I of this section is one year and for Pt II is six
months.
[s 294A.18] Notice under Section 251, CrPC
Page 12 of 16
That you on or about the………day of………at……… kept an office (or place) for the purpose of drawing a lottery not
being a State Lottery or a lottery authorised by the State Government.
or
published a proposal to pay a sum (or to deliver goods) (or to do) (or forbear doing anything) for the benefit of any
person on an event or contingency relative or applicable to the drawing of ticket, lot, number or figure in a lottery not
being a state lottery or a lottery authorised by the state government,] and thereby committed an offence punishable
under section 294A of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
Ans. Yes
[s 294A.19] Proof
For establishing an offence under the first part of this section, the prosecution will have to prove that:
(i) the accused kept an offence or place for the purpose of drawing a lottery; and
(ii) such lottery was not a State lottery or a lottery authorised by the State Government.
Page 13 of 16
And to establish an offence under the second part of the section, it will be necessary to prove that:
(i) the accused published a proposal; and
(ii) the said proposal was to pay a sum, or to deliver any goods, or to do or forbear doing something for
the benefit of any person, on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the drawing of any
ticket, lot, number or figure in any such lottery.1108
1032 Subs. by the AO 1937, for “not authorised by government”.
1033 Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, section 3 and schedule, for “a lottery organised by the Central Government or the
Government of a Pt A State or a Pt B State”.
1034 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “Provincial”.
1035 Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] (FB) : 59 ILR Mad 562 : 70 Mad LJ
36.
1036 Queen-Empress v Vellancherji Kavasji Shapurji, 10 ILR Bom 97, 101; Kamal Agency v State of Maharashtra,
AIR 1971 Bom 332 [LNIND 1970 BOM 63] , p 340 : 72 Bom LR 928.-
1037 Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] , p 239 (FB).
Page 14 of 16
1038 42 Geo III, c 119.

1039 4 Geo IV, c 60.
1040 42 Geo III, c 119.
1041 ABSLVM v Commissioner of Police, (1999) 3 CCR 476 (Del) (DB).

1043 Barclay v Pearson, (1893) 2 Ch D 154 : 62 LJ Ch 636 : 42 WR 74 : 68 LT 709.
1044 ABSLVM v Commissioner of Police, (1999) 3 CCR 476 (Del) (DB).
1045 Ibid.
1047 Emperor v Mukandi Lal, AIR 1917 Lah 93 , p 95 : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 65 .
1048 Madan Gopal v Emperor, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 382 : 14 PWR (Cr) 1910.
1049 Queen-Empress v Mancherji Kavasji Shapurji, 10 ILR Bom 97; Public Prosecutor v M Jwala Subrahmanyam,
AIR 1957 AP 987 , p 990 : (1957) Cr LJ 1389 .
1050 Public Prosecutor v M Jwala Subrahmanyam, AIR 1957 AP 987 , p 990 : (1957) Cr LJ 1389 .
1051 Vazirally v Emperor, AIR 1928 Bom 550 , p 551 : 30 Bom LR 1426; State v VN Narayanasami Mudaliar,
(1983) Mad LW (Cr) 105 [LNIND 1981 MAD 463] : (1984) Mad LJ (Cr) 40.
1052 Emperor v Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1934 Lah 840 , p 841; Tayler v Smettan, (1883) 11 QBD 207 ; Suresh Kumar
Bali v State, (1978) All Cr C 307 : (1978) All LJ 976.
1053 Universal Mutual Aid & Poor Houses Association Ltd, Madras v AD Thoppa Naidu, AIR 1933 Mad 16 [LNIND
1932 MAD 63] , p 20 : (1932) 33 Cr LJ 792 .
1054 Tata Oil Mills Co Ltd v State of Kerala, (1982) Ker LT 324 .
1055 State v VM Narayanasami Mudaliar, (1983) Mad LW (Cr) 105 [LNIND 1981 MAD 463] : (1984) Mad LJ (Cr)
40.
1056 Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] , p 227.
1057 Wills v Young, (1907) 1 KB 448 ; Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] ,
p 227.
1058 Bartlett v Parker, (1912) 2 KB 497 .
1059 Wills v Young, (1907) 1 KB 448 .
1060 Hall v Cox, LR (1899) 1 QB 198 .
1061 Barclay v Pearson, (1893) LR 2 Ch 154.
1062 Re Dormisony Mundaly, 1 Weir 251.
1063 Hall v Cox, LR (1899) 1 QB 198 .
Page 15 of 16
1065 Barkett v Parker, (1912) 2 KB 497 ; Emperor v Mukandi Lal, AIR 1917 Lah 93 , p 94 : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 768 .
1066 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 15, 4th Edn, Butterworths, London, 1976, section 229, per Venkataramana
Rao J, in Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] , pp 240–41.
1067 Suresh Kumar Bahri v State, (1978) All Cr C 307 : (1978) All LJ 976.
1068 Shanmugha Mudali v Kuman Swami Mudali, AIR 1925 Mad 870 [LNIND 1925 MAD 13] : ILR 48 Mad 661.
1070 Kamakshi Achari v Appava Pillai, 1 Mad HCR 448 : 1 Weir 251; followed in Vasudevan v Mammed, ILR 26
Mad 212.
1071 Madan Gopal v R, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 382 , p 384 : 17 PR (Cr) 1910.
1072 Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] (FB).
1073 T Hamza Haji v State of Kerala, (1999) 3 CCR 646 (Ker).
1074 Ibid.
1075 Per Cormish J, in Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] , p 228 (FB).
1076 R v AJ Cooke, (1914) 15 Cr LJ 243 .
1077 Emperor v AJ Cooke, 23 IC 195 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 243 .
1078 Martin v Benjamin, (1907) 1 KB 64 ; Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331]
, p 226 (FB).
1079 Per Wadsworth J, in Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] , p 237 (FB).
1080 Emperor v Mukandi Lal, AIR 1917 Lah 93 , p 96 : (1917) 18 Cr LJ 768 ; Vazirally v Emperor, AIR 1928 Bom
550 ; OD Hardar v Emperor, AIR 1934 Sind 149 ; Public Prosecutor v KB Kalkura, AIR 1942 Mad 404 [LNIND 1941
MAD 314] : (1942) 43 Cr LJ 751 .
1081 Emperor v Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1934 Lah 840 , p 841.
1082 Public Prosecutor v KB Kalkura, AIR 1942 Mad 404 [LNIND 1941 MAD 314] : (1942) 43 Cr LJ 751 .
1083 Ibid.
1084 AS Ramaswami Mudaliar v Crown, AIR 1923 Mad 187 (1) : (1922) 23 Cr LJ 688 .
1085 Madan Gopal v Emperor, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 382 : 14 PWR (Cr) 1910 : 17 PR (Cr) 1910.
1086 Thacker v Hardy, (1878) 4 QBD 685 : 39 LT 595 : 27 WR 158 : 48 LJQB 289.
1087 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co, (1892) 2 QBD 484 : 56 JP 662 : 61 LJQB 696.
1089 R v Mancherji, 10 ILR Bom 97.
1090 Ramanejam Chetti, 1 Weir 252.

Page 16 of 16
1091 Emperor v AJ Cooke, AIR 1914 LB 23 , p 26 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 243 .
1092 Public Prosecutor v Soosal Pillai, AIR 1938 Mad 315 [LNIND 1937 MAD 320] , p 316.
1093 Emperor v AJ Cooke, AIR 1914 LB 23 , p 27 : (1914) 15 Cr LJ 243 .
1094 Rama Nava Nirman Samithi v State of Tamil Nadu, (1990) Cr LT 2620 (Mad).
1095 Tata Oil Mills Co Ltd v State of Kerala, (1982) Ker LT 324 .
1096 ABSLVM v Commissioner of Police, (1999) 3 CCR 476 (Del)(DB).
1097 Queen-Empress v Mancherji Kavasji Shapurji, 10 ILR Bom 97.
1098 King-Emperor v Rachappa Murigappa Shabedi, AIR 1925 Bom 26 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 222 .
1099 State v VM Narayanasami Mudaliar, (1983) LW (Cr) 105 : (1984) Mad LJ (Cr) 40.
1100 Per Varadachari J, in Sesha Ayyar v Krishna Ayyar, AIR 1936 Mad 225 [LNIND 1935 MAD 331] , p 233 (FB).
1101 Dew v Director of Public Prosecutions, (1920) 89 LJKB 1166 ; Lilomal Manumal v Emperor, AIR 1941 Sind 91
, p 92 : (1941) 42 Cr LJ 613 .
1102 Emperor v Phanendra Nath Mitter, ILR 35 Cal 945.
1103 Emperor v Phanendra Nath Mitter, ILR 35 Cal 945; Emperor v Mahommad Siraj, AIR 1928 All 400 , p 401.
1104 FA D’Sauza v Emperor, AIR 1926 Sind 213 , p 215.
1105 Emperor v Diwan Chand Joely, AIR 1930 Lah 81 , p 82 : (1930) 31 Cr LJ 692 .
1106 Chimanlal Pranjivandas Gheewalla v Emperor, AIR 1925 Bom 243 , p 244 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 780 .
1107 Re CM Pedda Malla Reddi, AIR 1927 Mad 66 [LNIND 1926 MAD 324] : (1927) 28 Cr LJ 4 .
1108 State v VN Narayanasami Mudaliar, (1983) LW (Cr) 105 : (1984) Mad LJ (Cr) 40.
End of Document
[s 295] Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion
of any class.—
> R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code > Chapter XV Of Offences Relating to Religion
Chapter XV Of Offences Relating to Religion

15.1 Introduction
With regard to this chapter of the IPC, the framers of the Code stated:
The principle on which this chapter has been framed is a principle on which it would be desirable that all governments
should act, but from which the British Government in India cannot depart without risking the dissolution of society; it is this,
that every man should be suffered to profess his own religion, and that no man should be suffered to insult the religion of
another.1
15.2 Constitution Provides Equality in the Matter of Practice of Religion 15.2.1 Offence under this Chapter not to be
Committed though Permitted by any Religion
India is a secular state, that is, a state which has no religion of its own. Articles 25–28 of the Indian Constitution
guarantee to all persons the right to freedom of religion. Under Article 25(1), “All persons are equally entitled to
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion” subject to public order,
morality and health. But “however free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the criminal laws of
the country passed with reference to actions regarded by general consent as properly the subject of punitive
legislation”.2 Clause (2) of Article 25 of the Constitution, therefore, provides that “nothing in this article shall affect
the operation of any existing law” and saves the operation of the provisions of this chapter which deal with the
offences relating to religion. The result is that acts amounting to offences under this chapter cannot be committed
by a person even though they may be sanctioned by the tenets of his own religion, eg., injuring or defiling a place of
worship, with intent to insult the religion of any class, disturbing a religious assembly, trespassing on burial places,
etc., uttering words or making representations with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings of another person or
class.
The Legislature in enacting chapter XV of Indian Penal Code, apparently had it in view to punish, in a country
populated by persons of widely different religious, deliberate acts of offence perpetrated by persons of one religious
persuasion for the insult or annoyance of persons of another persuasion. I do not apprehend that it was not
intended to make criminally punishable under the general law breaches of ritualistic observance committed by
person of any one creed against the canons of their own faith. It could never have been intended to make acts
harmless in themselves and only regarded with disfavour because opposed to an ecclesiastical law punishable
under the Indian Penal Code.3
15.2.2 Religious Tolerance is the Objective
The legislature, in framing chapter XV, has made a great advance in the direction of religious toleration which
civilised methods of thought enjoin, and if difficulties arise in connection with such matters, they are due not to any
defect of the law, but to the inconsiderate and reckless behaviour of the various sections of a population which do
not fully appreciate the blessings of religious toleration and individual liberty which the British rule, by framing laws,
Page 2 of 12
[s 295] Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.—
has accorded to the people of this country.4
[s 295] Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion
of any class.—
Whoever destroys, damages, or defiles any place of worship, or any object held sacred by any class of persons
with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of any class of persons or with the knowledge that any class of
persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, shall be
punished, with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with
both.
[s 295.1] Scope
This section makes punishable acts of destruction, damage or defilement by whomsoever committed and quite
irrespective of the person of the offender, provided that such acts are done with the intention of insulting the
religion of any class of persons, or with the knowledge that such destruction, damage or defilement will be
considered by any class as an insult to their religion. The mens rea is, therefore, of the essence of the offence,
and, in addition, the act must itself be one of destruction, damage or defilement; otherwise it is not criminally
punishable.5 A doctrinal disagreement will not constitute an act of outraging or insulting any religion or religious
beliefs.6
This section follows the English law under which “affrays in a church or churchyard have always been
esteemed very heinous offences, as being very great indignities to the Divine Majesty, to whose worship and
service such places are immediately dedicated; and upon this consideration all irrelevant behaviour in these
places has been passed for the criminal by the makers of our laws. Several statutes have been passed for the
purpose of preventing disturbances in places of worship belonging to the established church, and also in those
belonging to congregation of Protestant Dissenters and Roman Catholics.”7
[s 295.2.1] Law of England
“Religious hatred” is hatred against a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of
religious belief; however, nothing in the statutory provisions governing the offences of incitement to religious
hatred is to be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of
antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or practices of their adherents, or
of any other belief system or the beliefs or practices of its adherents, or proselytizing or urging adherents of a
different religion or belief system to cease practicing their religion or belief system.8
When considering the seriousness of such offences in the context of terrorism, it was material to have regard to
the period of time covered by the offending, the sophistication, skill and industry devoted to it and the likelihood
that the offending would lead others to commit acts of terrorism, or might even have done so.9
[s 295.2.2] Law of Canada
It is an offence punishable on summary conviction to willfully:
• disturb or interrupt an assemblage of persons met for religious worship or for a moral, social or
benevolent purpose, or
• do anything that disturbs the order or solemnity of such a meeting.

Page 3 of 12
Two people are “an assemblage of persons”; a “meeting” occurs when people meet for religious worship; and
the period prior to the formal ceremony is included in the “order or solemnity of the meeting”. Where the
accused deliberately obstructed or partially obstructed parishioners, or caused parishioners to avoid their
regular entrance to their place of worship, this was sufficient to constitute the offence. The offence of disturbing
or interrupting an assemblage does not violate the Charter.10
[s 295.3] Object
The object with which the Legislature framed this section was, as indicated by the section itself, to prevent
wanton insult to the religious notions of a class of persons.11 The section has been intended to respect the
religious susceptibilities of persons of different religious persuasions or creeds. Courts have to be very
circumspect in such matters and pay due regard to the feelings and religious emotions of different classes of
persons with different beliefs, irrespective of the consideration whether or not they share those beliefs, or
whether they are rational or otherwise, in the opinion of the court.12
In Note J being the note on the chapter of offences relating to religion and caste, the Law Commissioners
stated of section 275 of the Code (which corresponds with section 295 of the present Code):
We have prescribed a punishment of great severity (the proposed punishment is rigorous imprisonment for a term
which might extend to seven years) for the intentional destroying or defiling of places of worship, or of objects held
sacred by any class of persons. No offence in the whole Code is so likely to lead to tumult, to sanguinary outrage, and
even to armed insurrection. The slaughter of a cow in a scared place at Benares in 1809 caused violent tumult,
attended with considerable loss of life. The pollution of a mosque at Bangalore was attended with consequences still
more lamentable and alarming. We have therefore empowered the courts in cases of this description to pass very
severe sentence on the offender.
The ingredients of the offence under this section are:
(1) a person must first destroy, damage or defile any place of worship or any object held sacred by any
class of persons;
(2) he must thereby have the intention of insulting the religion of any class of persons, or he must have the
knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an
insult to their religion.
If any one of these ingredients is not present, the offence is not made out.13
It makes no difference that the guilty party is a worshipper in the temple which he has defiled.14
[s 295.6] “Destroys, Damages or Defiles” [s 295.6.1] Defiles—Meaning of

Page 4 of 12
The word “defiles” as used in this section, cannot be restricted to acts which would render the place of worship
or object held sacred, unclean or dirty as piece of stone or metal. The words used in the section are “whoever
defiles a place of worship or an object held sacred” by a certain class of persons. The object with which the
Legislature framed this section, as indicated by the section itself, was to prevent wanton insult to the religious
notions of that class of persons. The word “defile” ought to be taken in the sense in which such class of
worshippers usually understands it when it is applied to a place or an object of worship. In this sense it would
include any act done in relation to the Lingam which would render it impure to the accused’s knowledge
according to the recognised usage of the institution as an object of worship. “If the accused knew that the
temple in the case before us is one of those temples, and if he did the act imputed to him to ridicule openly the
established rule in regard to the unity of the Lingam as an object of worship, it may then be reasonably inferred
that he did the act wantonly and with the intention of insulting the religious notions of the general body of
worshippers”.
[s 295.6.2] Words “Destroys” and “Damages” Explained
The words “destroys” and “damages” which precede the word “defiles” in this section indicate classes of acts
which are designed to cause a particular result and not to limit the word “defile” to making an object held sacred
dirty as a material object.15 Therefore, “to defile” means, in this connection, not only to make a place unclean,
foul, or dirty, but to render it ceremonially or ritually impure. For a conviction under this section, such pollution
must be proved. The mere entry of a person of non-polluting caste into a temple is not defilement within the
[s 295.6.3] Bull not a Sacred Object
In Romesh Chunder Sannyal v Hira Mondal,17 it was held that the killing of a bull was not “destroying” within the
meaning of this section, because it was held that the bull was not an “object” within the meaning of the section,
and not because killing is not destruction.
[s 295.7] Place of Worship
In the absence of proof that the place in question was a place of worship, a conviction under the section would
be bad, eg., an enclosure to the tomb of a Mahommadan fakir not used as a place of worship.18
A mosque is a place of worship and so also a Hindu temple. A mosque becomes consecrated on the
declaration of the waqf that he has constituted it into a Musjid, or on the performance of prayers therein.19 But
the subject matter of a dedication under the Mahommadan law must be the lawful property of the waqf or the
waqf will not be valid.
Where an attempt was made to bring into existence a public mosque in a plot in the possession of an
agricultural tenant without the permission of the landlord, it was held that the use of a hut situated in that plot as
a public mosque without the landlord’s permission could not make it a place of worship as contemplated by this
section.20
A lessee by his unilateral act cannot prejudice the lessor’s proprietary right in a leasehold property. Where a
piece of garden land together with a shed thereon is let out on lease, but the lessor has not dedicated the shed
or the side to the Hindu public of the locality to be used as a temple or a place of worship, the lessor who has
no proprietary right over the property cannot make any such dedication. The mere fact that the lessees used
the building as a place of worship and permitted such use by other Hindus of the locality could not in any way
prejudice the proprietary right of the lessor over the property. The privilege enjoyed by the lessees and others in
making use of this shed as a prayer hall could continue only as long as the lease arrangements continued.
Such a user of the shed cannot make it a place of worship within the meaning of this section.21
Page 5 of 12
In this case the idol was allegedly taken out of the temple and immersed in the nearby pond. Held, section 295
of the Indian Penal Code may prima facie apply.22
[s 295.8] “Any Object held Sacred”
In A Veerabhadran Chettiar v EV Ramaswami Naicker,23 a learned Judge referring to the decisions reported in
the undermentioned cases24 held that:
In the above case they were dealing with a dedicated bull. It is clear from the observations in the above two cases that
the word ‘object’ has to be interpreted ejusdem generis with a place of worship. Interpreted like that, it would mean that
the section would apply only to cases where an idol in a temple is sought to be destroyed, damaged, or defiled. The
words “any object held sacred by any class of persons” even otherwise will apply only to idols in a temple or when they
are carried out in processions on festival occasions.
[s 295.8.1] Object—Whether includes Cow or Bull
The word “object” means a material body or substance perceived or cognizable by the senses. It is a general
word not limited to inanimate object, but is wide enough to include an animate object like a cow or a bull.25 But
a Full Bench of Allahabad High Court,26 as well as a Full Bench of the Punjab Chief Court27 have held that the
word “object” in this section does not include animate objects like a cow or a bull.
[s 295.8.2] An Object may be Sacred without Worship
However, on appeal their Lordships of the Supreme Court overruled the earlier decision in Veerabhadran
Chettiar’s case, and observed:
The learned Judge in the court below has given much too restricted a meaning to the words “any object held sacred by
any class of persons” by holding that only idols in temples or idols carried in processions on festival occasions are
meant to be included within those words. There are no such express words of limitation in section 295 of the Indian
Penal Code, and in our opinion the learned Judge has clearly misdirected himself in importing those words of limitation.
Idols are only illustrative of those words. A sacred book, like the Bible, or the Koran, or the Granth Saheb, is clearly
within the ambit of those general words. If the courts below were right in their interpretation of the crucial words in
section 295, the burning or otherwise destroying or defiling such sacred books, will not come within the purview of the
penal statute. In our opinion, placing such a restricted interpretation on the words of such general import, is against all
established canons of construction. Any object however trivial or destitute of real value in itself, if regarded as sacred
by any class of persons would come within the meaning of the penal section. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the
object, in order to be held sacred, should have been actually worshipped. An object may be held sacred by a class of
persons without being worshipped by them. It is clear, therefore, that the court below were rather cynical in so lightly
brushing aside the religious susceptibilities of that class of persons to which the complainant claims to belong.28
[s 295.8.3] Object of Respect and Sacred Object—Not the same thing
There is a distinction, not arbitrary, between objects which are objects of respect and even veneration and
objects which are held sacred; as an example of the former, a place of sepulchre (not actually consecrated, as
in the case of ground specially consecrated for that purpose according to the rites of Christian Churches), as
distinguished from a place for worship to the deity or where an idol or altar is kept; and such distinction appears
to have been kept in view by the legislature, for while section 295, IPC deals with the latter class of objects and
places,29 section 297, IPC deals more especially with trespasses on places of sepulchre and places set apart
Page 6 of 12
for the performance of funeral rites and as depositories for the remains of the dead.30
Dilating further on the same point, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed in Veerabhadran Chettiar:31
The section has been intended to respect the religious susceptibilities of persons of different religious persuasions or
creeds; courts have got to be very circumspect in such matters, and to pay due regard to the feelings and religious
emotions of different classes of persons with different beliefs, irrespective of the consideration whether or not they
share those beliefs, or whether they are rational or otherwise, in the opinion of the court.
[s 295.9] Any Class of Persons
It cannot be held that sections 295–298, IPC are only applicable to between those who follow different religions
and not as between different sects or classes of Hindus, who are lean towards sectarian beliefs. The
expression “any class of persons” includes any religious sect, however small in number.32 Even two persons
can form a class,33 but the complainant and his family cannot form a class of persons within the meaning of this
section.34
The clause “class of person” used in section 295 cannot be constructed to be persons of different community. It
may be clamped on the same community and sect.35
[s 295.10] “With the Intention of thereby Insulting the Religion”
The authors of the Code, while framing this section, noted:36
The question whether insults offered to a religion ought to be visited with punishment does not appear to us at all to
depend on the question whether that religion be true or false. The religion may be false, but the pain which such insults
give to the professor of that religion is real. It is often, as the most superficial observation may convince us, as real a
pain and as acute a pain as is caused by almost any offence against the person, against property or against character.
Nor is there any compensating good whatsoever to be set off against the pain. Discussion, indeed, tends to elicit truth;
but insults have no such tendency, they can be employed just as easily against the purest faith as against the most
monstrous superstition. It is easier to argue against falsehood than against truth; but it is as easy to pull down or defile
the temples of truth as those of falsehood; it is as easy to molest with ribaldry and clamour men assembled for
purposes of pious and rational worship, as men engaged in the most absurd ceremonies. Such insults, when directed
against erroneous opinions, seldom have any other effect than to fix those opinions deeper and to give a character of
peculiar ferocity to theological dissension; instead of eliciting truth, they only inflame fanaticism.
These considerations apply with peculiar force to India. There is perhaps no country in which the government has so
much to apprehend from religious excitement among the people. The Christians are numerically a very small minority
of the population, and in possession of all the highest posts in the government in the tribunals and in the army. Under
their rule are placed millions of Mahommadans, of differing sects, but all strongly attached to the fundamental articles
of the Mahommadan creed, and tens of millions of Hindus, strongly attached to doctrine and rites which Christians and
Mahommadans join in reprobating. Such a state of things is pregnant with dangers which can only be averted by a firm
adherence to the true principles of toleration. On those principles the British Government has hitherto acted with
eminent judgment, and with no less eminent success; and on those principles we propose to frame this part of the
Page 7 of 12
Penal Code.
[s 295.10.1] Mere Doctrinal Disagreement will not Amount to Insulting the Religious Feelings
Where on publication of a book by the accused, a Christian group filed a complaint alleging the outraging of
religious feelings and infringement of copy of translations of songs and mutilations of sacred writings in books
published by the accused, there was no evidence showing that disagreement expressed by the accused with
the doctrine of the complainant was with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging religious feelings of the
complainant group, it was held that mere doctrinal disagreement will not constitute an act of outraging or
insulting any religion or religious belief.37
[s 295.11] “Mens Rea”
Mens rea is of the essence of the offence under this section.38 The mere defilement of a place of worship is no
offence under it. In order to sustain a conviction, there must be an intention of thereby insulting the religion of a
class of persons, or the knowledge that a class of persons is likely to consider the defilement as an insult to
their religion.39
[s 295.11.1] Some Illustrative Cases
Where a person, as a result of a quarrel with a relation, throws a basket containing cooked food (fowl, fish, rice,
etc.), into a well without any intention to wound the religious susceptibilities of anyone, he cannot be convicted
of an offence under this section.40
The defendants were charged under this section, in that they (Hindus) removed some old building materials
belonging to a mosque, and thereby insulted the religious feelings of Mahommadans. They were acquitted on
the finding that the mosque was, or at any rate its roof was, in a rotten condition, and that no one had any
particular claim to it. Dismissing a revision petition against it, it was held that there was no reason to believe
that one of the defendants, in acting as he did, had any intention of insulting the religion of the Mahommadan
residents of the village, or that he did so even with the knowledge that any class of persons was likely to
consider the removal of the materials as an insult to their religion.41
Where a Hindu had sexual intercourse with a woman at night, within an enclosure surrounding a tomb of a
Mahommadan fakir, venerated by some of his co-religionists, it was held that the accused had no intention to
insult the religious feelings of the Mahommadan, and he could not be convicted under this section inasmuch as
there was no evidence to show that the tomb in question was used as a place of worship, or that any particular
object held sacred was defiled.42
Where the accused, a goldsmith by caste, performed abishekam, i.e.., poured coconut-water over a Lingam (an
idol) it was held by Muthuswami Iyer J:
The word ‘defiled’ in section 295 must not be restricted to acts which would render the Lingam unclean or dirty as a
piece of stone or metal. It is to be taken in the sense in which such class of worshippers usually understood it when it is
applied to a place or an object of worship. In this sense, it would include any act done in relation to the Lingam, which
would render it impure to the accused’s knowledge, according to the recognised usage of the institution as an object of
worship. If the act leads to this result, it is of no consequence whether it makes the Lingam materially or ritually impure.
In many temples it is not usual for worshippers generally to touch the idol or pour coconut-water upon it, except
through persons, who are specially appointed to do so and enjoined to observe special rules of cleanliness. If the
accused knew that the temple, in the present case, was one of those temples, and if he did the act imputed to him to
Page 8 of 12
ridicule openly the established rule in regard to the purity of the Lingam as an object or worship, it might then be
reasonably inferred that he did the act wantonly, and with the intention of insulting the religious notions of the general
body of worshippers.43
Where the lessee of a shed, without any authority, uses it as a prayer hall and the lessor, getting delivery of the
property in execution of a decree, pulls down the shed, he cannot be said to have intended or known that such
an act will be an insult to the religion of others who had no manner of right over the property or the shed.44
Where according to the customary religious practices prevalent in a temple certain puja pendas had the
exclusive right to offer the daily bhog to the deity but on a certain occasion, they having refused to offer the
bhog, the superintendent of the temple got it offered by others, it was held that in the absence of evidence to
show that the superintendent intended to ridicule the established practices of the temple or to wantonly insult
the feelings of the worshippers of the temple, he could not be held liable under this section.45
Where the accused, a Mahommadan, threw a burning cigarette on a Viman, an object held sacred by the
Hindus, while it was being taken out in a procession, but the cigarette did not fall on the Viman and only struck
it on the side and fell down, it was held that it could not be said that the act of the accused was unintentional or
that the accused did not have the knowledge contemplated by this section, and that he was guilty of an attempt
to commit the offence under this section.46
In DP Titus v LW Lyall,47 it was observed that unless it is alleged that the pastor of the church has done
anything with the intention of insulting the religion of any class of persons, the mere running of a nursery school
and a dispensary in a portion of the church premises, by him, would not amount to an offence under section
295, IPC.
When an elephant accompanying the Moharram procession got enraged and went berserk, the magistrate
passed an order under section 133, CrPC authorising the accused to liquidate the elephant to protect the
property and life of people. The situation’s exigency had left no alternative but to direct the elephant’s
liquidation. The prosecution of the accused under this section was held unjustified.48
[s 295.12] “Religion”
The word “religion” has not been defined in this Code or in the Constitution, and it is a term which is hardly
susceptible of any rigid definition. In an American case,49 it has been held “that the term “religion” has reference
to one’s views of his relation to his Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being and
Character and of obedience to His will. It is often confounded with “cultus” of form or worship of a particular
sect, but is distinguishable from the latter”.
However, this definition of “religion” has not been accepted by the Supreme Court of India. With reference to
the word “religion” in Article 25 of the Indian Constitution, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed:
Religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and it is not necessarily theistic. There are well-
Page 9 of 12
known religions in India like Buddhism and Jainism which do not believe in God or in any intelligent first cause. A
religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that
religion as conductive to their spiritual well-being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else but a
doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a Code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe
rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these
forms and observance might extend even to matters of food and dress. What constitutes the essential part of a religion
is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. If the tenets of any religious sect of
the Hindus prescribe that offerings of food should be given to the idol at particular hours of the day, that periodical
ceremonies should be performed in a certain way at certain periods of the year or that there should be daily recital of
sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all these would be regarded as parts of religion and the mere fact that they
involve expenditure of money or employment of priests and servants or the use of marketable commodities would not
make them secular activities partaking of a commercial or economic character; all of them are religious practices and
should be regarded as matters of religion.
… Freedom of religion in our Constitution is not confined to religious beliefs only; it extends to religious practices as
well, subject to the restrictions which the Constitution itself has laid down under article 26(b). Therefore, a religious
denomination or organisation enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are
essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold and no outside authority has any jurisdiction to interfere with
their decision in such matters.50
The offence under this section is cognizable. A summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is non-
bailable and not compoundable. It can be tried by any magistrate.
[s 295.14] Notice under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, Section 251
In a prosecution under this section, the following form of the notice under section 251, CrPC, may be adopted:
I (name of office of the magistrate etc) hereby notice to you (name of the accused) as follows:
That on or about the…………………… day of………………… at……………… You destroyed (or damaged or defiled)
…………. (a place of worship) [(or…………. an object held sacred by a class of persons namely (mention the class)]
with the intention of thereby insulting the religion of that class of persons (or with the knowledge that any class of
persons were likely to consider the said destruction, (damage or defilement) as an insult to their religion, and you
thereby committed an offence, punishable under section 295 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.

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Ans. Yes
Q. Do you plead guilty or have any defence to make ?
[s 295.15] Proof
To establish an offence under this section, it will have to be proved that the accused:
(1)
(a) destroyed, damaged or defiled any place of worship; or
(b) destroyed, damaged or defiled any object held sacred by any class of persons; and
(2)
(a) he did so with the intention of insulting the religion of any class of persons; or
(b) had done so with the knowledge that any class of persons was likely to consider such destruction,
damage or defilement as an insult to their religion.
[s 295.16] Sentence
The Indian Law Commissioners were of opinion that an offence under this section deserves a very severe
punishment and proposed rigorous imprisonment for a term which might extend to seven years. The section,
however, prescribes only imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with
fine or both.
1 Note JP 136.
2 Devies v Beason, (1890) 133 US 333.

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3 Re Sibakoti Swami, 1 Weir 253, p 255.
4 Queen-Empress v Imam Ali, 10 ILR All 150, p 158.
5 Re Sivakoti Swami, 1 Weir 253, p 255.
6 Zac Poonen v Hidden Treasure Literature Incorporated in Canada, (2002) Cr LJ 481 (Kant).
7 Russell on Crime, Vol II, 11th Edn, p 1766.
8 Vide Hulsbury’s Laws of England.

9 R v Saleem, R v Muhid, R v Javed, (2007) All ER (D) 462 (Oct).
10 Vide, Halsbury’s Laws of Canada.
11 Re Sivakoti Swami, 1 Weir 253, p 255; Gopinath Puja Panda Samanta v Ramchandra Deb, AIR 1958 Ori 220 [LNIND
1958 ORI 37] , p 223 : (1958) Cr LJ 1207 .
12 S Veerabhadran Chettiar v EV Ramaswami Naicker, AIR 1958 SC 1032 [LNIND 1958 SC 95] , p 1035 : (1958) Cr LJ
1565 ; State of Mysore v Henry Rodrigues, (1962) Mys LJ 271 : (1962) 2 Cr LJ 594 .
13 A Verrabhandran Chettiar v EV Ramaswami Naicker, AIR 1955 Mad 550 [LNIND 1954 MAD 220] , p 551 : 56 Cr LJ
1268; Southern Eastern Railway v State of Jharkhand, 2012 (113) AIC 512 (Jhar); Biplab Das v State, 2017 Cr LJ 644
(Cal).
14 Re Bheema Goundan, 1 Weir 256.
15 Per Muthuswami Aiyar J, Re Sivakoti Swami, 1 Weir 253; Re Bheemagounda, 1 Weir 256; Gopinath Puja Panda
Samanta v Ram Chandra Deb, AIR 1958 Ori 220 [LNIND 1958 ORI 37] : (1958) Cr LJ 1207 .
16 Kutti Chami Moothan v Rama Pattar, 47 IC 812 : 19 Cr LJ 960.
17 Romesh Chunder Sannyal v Hira Mondal, 17 ILR Cal 852.
18 Re Ratna Mudali, 1 Weir 253.
19 Adam Sheikh v Isha Sheikh, 1 Cal WN 76.
20 Bechan Jha v Emperor, AIR 1941 Pat 492 : 42 Cr LJ 579.
21 Joseph v State of Kerala, AIR 1961 Ker 28 [LNIND 1960 KER 149] , p 31 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 82 .
22 Biplab Das v State, 2017 Cr LJ 644 (Cal).
23 A Veerabhadran Chettiar v EV Ramaswami Naicker, AIR 1955 Mad 550 [LNIND 1954 MAD 220] , p 551 : 56 Cr LJ
1268 (overruled).
24 Queen-Empress v Imam Ali, 10 ILR All 150 and Romesh Chunder Sanyal v Hira Mondal, 17 ILR Cal 852.
Page 12 of 12
25 Hakim v Empress, (1884) PR 27 .

26 Romesh Chunder Sanyal v Hira Mondal, 17 ILR Cal 852.
27 Ali Mohammad v Emperor, 7 Cr LJ 314.
28 S Veerabhandran Chettiar v EV Ramaswami Naicker, AIR 1958 SC 1032 [LNIND 1958 SC 95], p 1035 : (1958) Cr LJ
1565.
29 Per Brandt J Re Ratna Mudali, 10 ILR Mad 126 : 1 Weir 256.

30 Ibid.
31 Veerabhadran Chettiar, AIR 1958 SC 1032 [LNIND 1958 SC 95] , p 1035 : (1958) Cr LJ 1565 .
32 Re Sivakoti Swami, 1 Weir 253.
33 Banarsidas Chamaria v State, 98 Cal 139.
34 Amir Hasan v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 414 , p 415 : 41 Cr LJ 810.
36 Note JP, p 136.
37 Zac Pooven v Hidden Treasure Literature Incorporated in Canada, (2002) Cr LJ 481 (Kant).
38 Re Sivakoti Swami, 1 Weir 253, pp 255–56.
39 Re Zingoo, 7 CPLR 45.
40 Queen-Empress v Waman Lakshman, Ratanlal Un Cr C 979.

41 Jan Mahommad v Narain Das, 1883 AWN 39.
42 Re Ratna Mudali, ILR 10 Mad 126.
43 Re Sivakoti Swami, 1 Weir 253.
44 Joseph v State of Kerala, AIR 1961 Ker 28 [LNIND 1960 KER 149] , p 32 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 82 .
45 Gopinath Puja Panda Samanta v Ramchandra Deb, AIR 1958 Ori 220 [LNIND 1958 ORI 37] : (1958) Cr LJ 1207 .
46 Saidullah Khan v State of Bhopal, AIR 1955 Bhopal 23 , p 24.
47 DP Titus v LW Lyall, (1981) Cr LJ 68 , p 69 (All).
48 Aziz Ahmad (Dr) v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1993) 2 Crimes 22 (All) : (1993) JIC 178 (DB).
49 Davis v Beason, (1883) 133 US 333, p 342.
50 Commr Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282 [LNIND 1954 SC
69] , pp 290–91 : (1954) 1 Mad LJ 596 : (1954) Mad WN 363 : 67 LW 1220.
End of Document
[s 295A] Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious
feelings of any class, by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.—

15.1 Introduction
another.1
class.
Page 2 of 17
[s 295A] Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class, by insulting its
religion or religious beliefs.—
51[s 295A] Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious

feelings of any class, by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.—
Whoever, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of 52[citizens in
India], 53[by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise], insults or
attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to 54[three years], or with fine, or with both.]
[s 295A.1] State Amendments
Andhra Pradesh.—In Andhra Pradesh the offence is cognizable vide A.P. G.O. Ms. No. 732, dated 5-12-1991.
[s 295A.2] Scope
This section makes it an offence to speak or write any words with a deliberate and malicious intention of
outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of India or insulting or attempting to insult the religious
beliefs of that class.55 It does not penalise any and every act of insult to, or attempt to insult, the religion or the
religious beliefs of a class of citizens, but only those acts of insult to or those varieties of attempt to insult, the
religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens which are perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. Insult to religion offered unwittingly or carelessly or
without any deliberate or malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of that class do not come within
the section. It only punishes the aggravated form of such insult when it is perpetrated with the deliberate and
malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class. The calculated tendency of this aggravated
form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order, and the section is valid only in so far as it is in the interests of
public order. Having regard to the ingredients of the offence created by this section, there cannot be any
possibility of the section being employed for purposes not sanctioned by arts 19(2), 25 and 26 of the
Constitution. In other words, the section can be applied only when it is necessary “in the interest of public
order”.56 In order to bring the case within the scope of this section it is not so much the matter of discourse as
the manner of it. In other words, the words used should be such as are bound to be regarded by any
reasonable man as grossly offensive and provocative, and maliciously and deliberately intended to outrage the
feelings of any class of citizens of India.57
The section was inserted as stated above by section 2 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (25 of 1927). The
words “citizen of India” were substituted for the words “His Majesty’s subjects” by the Adaptation of Laws Order,
1950.
The section was further amended by section 3 of the Indian Penal Code (Amendment) Act (41 of 1961)58 by
which:
(a) for the words “by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation”, the words “by words,
either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise”, and
(b) for the words “two years”, the words “three years”, were substituted.
Page 3 of 17
[s 295A.4] History of the Law
This section was inserted in the Code by section 2 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act (25 of 1927). The
immediate cause for this was an agitation following a decision of a Judge of the Lahore Court in Raj Paul v
Emperor,59 holding that section 153A of this Code was intended to prevent persons from making attacks on a
particular community as it exists at the present time and was not meant to stop polemics against deceased
religious leaders, however scurrilous and in bad taste such attacks might be. In a subsequent case a Division
Bench of the same court held that a scurrilous, vituperative and foul attack on a religion or its founder would
come within the purview of section 153A.60 The Allahabad High Court also held that a certain book entitled
“Vichitra Jiwan” depicting the life of the Prophet Mohammad promoted feelings of enmity between Hindus and
Mahommadans and came within the purview of section 153A, IPC. Thus, before the insertion of this section,
such malicious writings could, if at all, be dealt with only under section 153A as attempts to promote feelings of
enmity or hatred between different classes of citizens. They could not be dealt with as offences against religion
under this chapter. This section was enacted to make malicious acts insulting the religion, or outraging the
religious feelings, of any class of citizens, punishable as offences relating to religion, whether or not they
amount to attempts to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between classes.
[s 295A.5] Statement of Object
In the statement of objects and reasons, it was stated:61
The prevalence of malicious writings intended to insult the religion, or outrage the religious feelings of various classes
of His Majesty’s subjects had made it necessary to examine the existing provisions of the law with a view to seeing
whether they require to be strengthened. Chapter 15 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with offences relating to
religion, provides no penalty in respect of writings of the kind described above, such writings can usually be dealt with
under section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, as it is seldom that they do not represent an attempt to promote feelings
of enmity or hatred between different classes. It must be recognized, however, that this is only an indirect way of
dealing with acts which may properly be made punishable themselves, apart from the question whether they have the
further effect of promoting feelings of enmity or hatred between classes. Accordingly it is proposed to insert a new
section in chapter 15 of the Indian Penal Code, with the object of making it a specific offence intentionally to insult or
attempt to insult the religion, or outrage or attempt to outrage the religious feelings, of any class of His Majesty’s
subjects.
[s 295A.5.1] Provisions of Article 26 are not Affected
The section also does not prohibit or make punishable anything which is mere profession, practice or
propagation of a religion or any of the things specified in Article 26 of the Constitution of India. What is made
punishable is “deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens of
India”. If there is any such deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of
citizens of India, then whether that intention is expressed by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by
visible representation or otherwise it is made punishable under this section. But “deliberate and malicious
intention of outraging the religious feelings” of others is not the same thing as professing, practising or
propagating one’s own religion. One may, with complete liberty, profess, practise or propagate his religion
without any obstacle or hindrance and nothing what he may do, can possibly be treated or considered as an
intention to outrage the religious feelings of any class of people, much less would it amount to a “deliberate and
malicious” intention to do so. There would be deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious
feelings of others only if a person does something which has a tinge of intention to outrage the feelings of
others and even that intention is not merely deliberate, but also malicious.62
[s 295A.6] Validity of this Section
This section cannot be said to be ultra vires and void on the ground of its interfering with the fundamental right
to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The section is
Page 4 of 17
enacted in the interests of public order, and only penalises the aggravated form of insult to religion when it is
perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of a class of citizens.
The calculated tendency of this aggravated form of insult is clearly to disrupt the public order, and the section
which penalises such activities is well within the protection of clause (2) of Article 19 of the Constitution, as
being a law imposing a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Having regard to the ingredients of the offence, there cannot
be any possibility of the section being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution.
Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution guarantee the right to freedom of religion, but the right to freedom of
religion so assured is expressly made subject to public order, morality and health. These two articles, in terms,
contemplated that restrictions may be imposed on the rights guaranteed by them in the interest of public
order.63 If it does impose any restriction, it is within the four corners of the expression “subject to public order,
morality and health”.64 Passing of an order banning or forfeiture of Koran would go against the preamble of the
Constitution and would violate provisions of Article 25 thereof. The preamble proclaims India to be a secular
state. It states that each and every religion is to be treated equally. No preference is to be given to any
particular religion. Liberty of thought, expression, belief, and worship are assured. The Koran, which is the basic
textbook of Mahommadans, occupies a unique position to the believers of that faith. Bible is to the Christians
and Gita, Ramayan and Mahabharata are to the Hindus. If such an order is passed, it would take away the
secularity of India and deprive a section of people of their right of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship.
It would also amount to infringement of Article 25 which provides that all persons shall be equally entitled to
freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate any religion. Banning or forfeiture
of Koran would infringe that right. Such action would amount to the abolition of the Muslim religion itself. The
Muslim religion cannot exist without Koran. The proposed action would take away the freedom of conscience of
the people of that religion and their right to profess, practise and propagate the said religion. Such action is
unthinkable. The court cannot sit in judgment on holy books like the Koran, Bible, Gita and Granth Sahib.65
Free thinking does not involve freedom to make scurrilous attacks on the religion and religious beliefs of other
sects with impunity. It is not free thinking to abuse and insult other religions. Further, the method and the
manner of discourse on a particular topic also matter very much. All the citizens of India are guaranteed
freedom of religion and freedom of conscience by our Constitution and each one has a right to pursue his own
way of attaining salvation, unhampered and without interference from others. It is the duty of the state to create
such a climate as would enable every one of its citizens to exercise freedom of religion and conscience. Section
99A of the Old CrPC, 1898 (now section 95 of the CrPC 1973) and section 295A of the IPC are only legislative
recognition of the power of the state to take action for the purpose of affording such protection to all its
citizens.66 Freedom of speech is one of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution. But the limits of the
freedom end where the religion and religious beliefs are insulted or outraged. Section 295A is obviously a
reasonable restriction which is in public interest.67
[s 295A.7] Retrospective Effect of the Section
This section has no retrospective effect, but if a new edition of a book, which was published before the
enactment of the section, is published after its enactment, the author of the book can be convicted under this
section if his connection with the publisher is proved.68
[s 295A.8] Essential Ingredients of the Offence under this Section
To constitute an offence under this section, the following ingredients must exist:
(1) the accused must insult or make an attempt to insult, the religion or religious beliefs of any class of
citizens of India;
Page 5 of 17
(2) the said insult etc., must be with the deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings
of the said class of citizens; and
(3) the said insult, etc., must be by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representations or otherwise.69
[s 295A.8.1] Relative Scope of sections 153A and 295A
Notes under section 153A may be referred to.
[s 295A.8.2] Relative Scope of sections 295A and 298
Commentary under the same heading in section 298, post, may be referred to.
This section first became law in 1927. Up to that time acts constituting the offence under it fell within section
298, which still forms part of the IPC. The Select Committee, in its report stated that the essence of the offence
is “that the insult to religion or the outrage to religious feelings must be the sole, or primary, or at least the
deliberate and conscious intention. We have accordingly decided to adopt the phraseology of section 298 which
requires deliberate intention in order to constitute the offence with which it deals”.
While section 298, IPC uses the word “wounding”, section 295A uses the word “outraging”. Outraging is a much
stronger word than wounding. In Murray’s Dictionary, “outrage” is explained as to wrong grossly, treat with
gross violence or indignity.70 The two sections still stand together in the IPC, but the offence under this section
is more serious. “Outraging” in this section is a stronger word than “wounding”, and the intention to outrage
must be malicious as well as deliberate, and must be directed to a class of persons, and not merely to an
individual. But under section 298 they must not only be directed to an individual, but must also be uttered in the
hearing of that individual, but intention need not be malicious. It is enough if it is deliberate. Under this section,
the prosecution must prove something more than under section 298; they must show insult for the sake of
insulting and with an intention which springs from malice and malice alone. To a charge under this section,
therefore, it would be a defence to say, “I had no malicious intention towards a class, but I did intend to wound
or shock the feelings of an individual so that attention might, however rudely, be called to the reform which I
had in view”.71
[s 295A.9] “With Deliberate and Malicious Intention”
One of the basic requirements of section 295A, IPC, is a deliberate and malicious act. Malice in one sense is
negation of bona fides.72 To come within the ambit of section 295A, the intent must be both malicious and
deliberate. It is well settled that the offending publication is to be viewed as a whole and the intent of the author
has to be gathered from a broader perspective and not merely from a few solitary lines or quotations.73 The
main ingredient of the offence under this section is insult to the religion or religious beliefs of any class of
citizens. But the section further requires that the act of insulting must be with “deliberate and malicious
intention” of outraging the religious feelings of that class of citizens. Now an act may be deliberate without being
malicious, or malicious without being deliberate. What the section requires is not an intention which is either
deliberate only or malicious only but an intention which is both deliberate and malicious.74
There should be a deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of citizens
of India or of wounding the religious feelings of any person.75 Complaint allegation was that as per the belief of
Muslim community, holy “Quaran” was neither written nor created by anybody but it came into
existence/revealed by Allah (God) himself, therefore, disclosing the holy “Quran” as “Racha Gaya” in the
answer given by Sir Amitabh Bachchan in the TV Programme “Kaun Banega Krorepati” was contrary to the
belief of the Muslim community and, therefore, the religious feelings of Muslim community were hurt and as this
statement was deliberately made, the accused was liable to be prosecuted for the offences punishable under
sections 295A and 298, IPC. Held, allegation made in the complaint that the statement was deliberately made
Page 6 of 17
was without any supporting material to show that there was a deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the
feeling of any class of citizens of India or of any person, it would not be sufficient to draw the proceedings under
sections 295A/298, IPC. No such intention was shown or was apparent in the reply given in the programme.
The accused was not summoned.76
The section requires that there should be deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of
any class of citizens. The mere fact that the learned author used such words as “Kulta”, or “Duracharini”, with
reference to Sita not as his comment, but as the accusations of the conspirators and the rumour-mongers, this
cannot, by itself, establish his intention as contemplated by section 295A, IPC, though there may be other
synonyms for such words or that they may be expressible in milder terms.77
Section 295A of the IPC does not penalize every act of insult but penalizes only deliberate acts of insult, so that
even if by any expression insult is in fact caused, that expression is not an offence if the insult offered is
unwilling or unintended.78 It was alleged that pursuant to a criminal conspiracy hatched with the 2nd and 3rd
accused, the 1st accused made certain disclosures as part of deciphering the Devaprasnam that a woman had
entered into the sanctum sanctorum (Garbha griha) of the temple and touched the idol of Lord Ayyappa. He
made such a false statement knowing fully well that no female above the age of 10 and below 50 years can
ever enter into even the peripheries of the temple. He made a further declaration while Devaprasnam continued
on 17 June 2006 that the woman who had committed such sacrilege is an artist and an accomplished dancer.
The three accused, by their false declarations and acts done, caused hurt and also insulted the religious belief,
tenents and faith of the followers of Hindu religion and the devotees of Lord Ayyappa, punishable under
sections 295A and 120B of the IPC. The police report did not show that the accused had made such
declarations with deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of a class of persons, that
too, to insult the religion and religious feelings, to invite the penal consequences under section 295A of the
IPC.79
The question arose in this case was whether the book “Dwikhandita” written by Taslima Narseen of Bangladesh
could be proscribed in India. As the book was written in the context of author’s country of origin, it does not
deliberately and maliciously intend to outrage the religious feelings of any community of India, and since the
theme of the book was the hapless condition of women in that country, it was held, that it does not come within
the ambit of section 295A of the IPC and, therefore, the order of forfeiture under section 95, CrPC 1973 was
unwarranted, and was accordingly set aside.80
[s 295A.9.1] Intention unless Conceived suddenly, may be Inferred to be Deliberate
In the first instance, the intention to outrage the religious feelings must be deliberate, ie, not conceived all of a
sudden in the course of a discussion, but premeditated. A mere knowledge that the religious feelings of others
may be outraged would not suffice, nor a mere intention to outrage such feelings, unless the intention is
deliberate. Where the intention to outrage the feelings is not conceived suddenly in the course of a discussion,
but, premeditated, deliberate intention may be inferred.81 It must also be shown that the intention to outrage the
religious feelings was also malicious.
The fact that the statement is contrary to material available on record and has been made without inquiry or
investigation, would be sufficient to hold that it was deliberately and maliciously made to outrage the religious
feeling of followers of Pranami Dharma. Nothing else is required to establish the guilt of the respondent.82
[s 295A.9.2] Malice—Meaning of
One of the basic requirements of section 295A is deliberate and malicious act. Malice in one sense is negation
of bona fides.83 The word “malicious” used in this section presents some difficulty. According to Stroud’s
Judicial Dictionary, malice in common acceptation means ill-will against a person. But in its legal sense, it
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means wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse. In Peary Lal v Emperor,84 it was held that, if
a person willfully does an act injurious to another without lawful excuse, he does it maliciously. Malice in its
legal import does not mean spite or ill-will, but the willful doing of an illegal act.85 The court of criminal appeal
has observed in a later case:86
In any statutory definition of a crime, ‘malice’ must be taken not in the old vague sense of ‘wickedness’ in general, but
as requiring either: (i) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done, or (ii) recklessness as
to whether such harm should occur or not (ie, the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done,
and yet has gone on to take the risk of it). It is neither limited to, nor does it indeed require, any ill-will towards the
person injured.
[s 295A.9.3] Object behind inserting the term “Malice”
Further, we were impressed by an argument to the effect that an insult to a religion or to the religious beliefs of the
followers of a religion might be inflicted in good faith by a writer with the object of facilitating some measure of social
reform by administering such a shock to the followers of the religion as would ensure notice being taken of any
criticism so made. We have, therefore amplified the words ‘with deliberate intention’ by inserting reference to malice,
and we think that the section which we have now evolved will be both comprehensive and at the same time of not too
wide an application.87
What is punishable under this section is not so much the matter of the discourse, written or spoken, as the
manner of it. One must, therefore, look with great care at the words used. If the words used caused persons to
feel insulted but were only such as might possibly wound and in fact did so, then there would be no offence
under the section; if the words used were bound to be regarded by any reasonable man as grossly offensive
and provocative, and were maliciously intended to be regarded as such then an offence would have been
committed.88
[s 295A.9.4] Malice is not Capable of Direct or Tangible Proof
Malice, no doubt, is one of the important ingredients of the offence under the section and it is certainly for the
prosecution to establish that element by proper evidence. But it has to be realised that malice is a state of the
mind and often is not capable of direct and tangible proof. In almost all cases where it is required to be proved,
it has to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances, having due regard to the setting, background and
connected facts in relation to the writings in question. Malice in one sense is a negation of bona fides. If a
person knowing that his words, either uttered or written, are likely to offend or injure the religious faiths of
others, indulges in them, it would be difficult to hold that his act was done bona fide and without malice.89
[s 295A.9.5] Malice and Intention are to be Inferred
Malice being an important ingredient of the offence under this section, it is for the prosecution to establish it by
proper evidence. But it being a state of mind and often not capable of direct and tangible proof, it has to be
inferred from the circumstances, having due regard to the setting, background and connected facts in relation to
editing and publishing articles of the nature in question.90 If the language used transgresses the limits of
decency and is designed to vex, annoy and outrage the religious feelings of others, the malicious intention of
the writer can be inferred from the language employed by him.91
[s 295A.9.6] Malice when to be Presumed
It, therefore, appears that, in this section the word “malicious” has not been used in the popular sense. In order
to establish malice as contemplated by this section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the
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accused bore ill-will or enmity against specific persons. If the injurious act was done voluntarily without a lawful
excuse, malice may be presumed.92 Provocation received from supporters of the opposite view cannot be
treated as a lawful excuse for writing offensive books.93
[s 295A.10] “Outraging Religious Feelings”
In section 298, the expression used is “wounding religious feelings”, while in this section “outraging religious
feelings” is used. The word “outrage” is somewhat stronger than the word “wound”.94 The Select Committee in
their report stated:95
We think that to penalise even an intentional outrage or attempted outrage upon the religious feelings of any class
would be casting the net too wide for the cases with particular reference to which the Bill has been introduced. At the
same time, we realise that the reference to the outraging of religious feelings was inserted to provide for the case of an
insult to the founder of a religion or a person held sacred by the followers of a particular religion where such an outrage
does not amount to an insult of the religion. It has in one instance been held that an insult to the founder of a religion is
not necessarily an insult to the religion although it may outrage the religious feelings of the followers of that religion.
We have therefore provided that the new section shall only apply in cases where a religion is insulted with the
deliberate intention of outraging the religious feelings of its followers.
[s 295A.10.1] Even a True Statement may outrage Religious Feelings
This section requires that the offending writing must be with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the
religious feelings of a class of citizens of India. Therefore, the enquiry under this section has to be confined to
the question whether there was malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of a class of citizens of
India. Even a true statement may outrage religious feelings.96 In the case of books alleged to fall within the
scope of this section, the truth of the language can neither be pleaded nor proved. The inquiry has to be
confined to the question whether there was malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of a class of
citizens of India. Even a true statement may outrage religious feelings.97
The applicant wrote a book “Islam—A concept of Political World Invasion by Muslims”. The book contained
attack on the personal life of Mohammad Paigambar, which would hurt Muslim sentiments. The ban on the
circulation of the book imposed by the Maharashtra Government under section 95, CrPC was held proper.98
[s 295A.10.2] Book of a Writer—When does not Outrage Religious Feelings
The book was an autobiographical work, detailing the events occurring in the life of the author and the status of
the women in Bangladesh in the socio-religious and political situation by reason of adoption of state religion in
Bangladesh. It was held that it, in no way, divulged the requisite mens rea to outrage religious feelings to insult
the religion or religious belief of that class of citizens in India. The theme of the book and its context was
essentially secular and not in the nature of an insult to religion or religious feelings of that class of the citizens in
India. The contents of the offending passages are the opinion of the author based on historical data and the
same cannot constitute an “insult” or “attempt to insult” upon the religion or religious belief of Muslims in India.99
Having regard to the established principles of law governing the field, the book read as a whole: (1) does not
reflect that the book was concerned with the Indian scenario and by no stretch of imagination could any
passage be construed to have even been intended to mean and apply to the citizens of that class in India; (2)
does not reflect any intention of outraging the religious feelings to insult the religion or religious belief of that
class of citizens in India; (3) the intention that could be gathered from the context and the theme of the book, by
no stretch of imagination can be called deliberate and malicious for achieving any object of religious hatred; (4)
Page 9 of 17
it appears to be vibrant with the thoughts and philosophy of life conceived by the author having regard to the
context and situation and the plight of women in the society in Bangladesh; (5) it appears to be directed against
the malaise and ills of the society sought to be supported and sanctioned in the name of religion in general; (6)
particularly, in the context of adoption of State religion in Bangladesh by the then ruler purporting to support
such sanction through State machinery at the cost of democracy and secularism, the salient features of the
Constitution of Bangladesh; (7) in the context of the socio-religio-politico situation in Bangladesh, the author
had intended to administer a shock in order to revolutionise the feelings and sensitize the attitude of the people
of Bangladesh towards women clamouring for equality; (8) read in the perspective of the whole book, one
would be left with the impression of the author’s philosophy of equality between men and women, between
women and women, between men and men and above all the humanity with a perfectly secular outlook which
the State has to follow and the law is to be enacted applicable to the humanity irrespective of the caste, creed
and religion affording equality to all, a principle enshrined and vibrant as the soul of the Constitution of India.100
[s 295A.10.3] Book has to be Read as a Whole
In order to see whether a particular passage in the book is offensive, the book has to be read as a whole and
cannot be read in piecemeal. The offending passage cannot be read out of context of the central theme of the
book.101
[s 295A.10.4] Feelings of a Class and not of the Individuals should have been Outraged
The idea of making a separate offence under section 295A is to punish those who attempt to insult the religion
or religious belief of any class of citizens in India. It does not probably relate to any act done with the intention
of outraging the religious feelings of any individual. Section 295A has application where the whole of particular
class of citizens is affected and it is for this reason that a complaint by the state Government or an officer
empowered in this behalf by the state Government has been made a pre-requisite for the initiation of such
proceedings.102
[s 295A.10.5] Historical Part of any Narrative
Historical perspective and a discussion based thereon without the requisite mens rea does not and cannot fall
within the ambit of section 295A of the IPC. Distortion of history may lead to an inference of necessary mens
rea but such inference cannot be drawn due to existence of ample historical support.103
Where the origin of a community is sought to be traced, so long as there is adherence to the historical part of
the narrative, however unpalatable it may be to the members of that community, there may be no offence. But,
on the other hand, where the author uses language which shows malice and is bound to annoy the members of
the community so as to degrade them in the eyes of the other classes, he would be promoting feelings of
enmity and hatred.104
[s 295A.10.6] Mere Doctrinal Disagreement will not Amount to Outraging the Religious Feelings
Where on publication of a book by the accused, a Christian group filed a complaint alleging the outraging of
religious feeling and infringement of copy of translations of songs and mutilations of sacred writings in books
published by the accused, there was no evidence showing that disagreement expressed by the accused with
the doctrine of the complainant was with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of
the complainant group, it was held that mere doctrinal disagreement will not constitute an act of outraging or
insulting any religion or religious belief.105
Where a person, who in public said that the Ramayana is a fiction and that no Rama was ever born and then
kicked the book of Ramayana thereby tearing its cover and pages, it was held that the act of the accused was
to outrage the feelings of Hindus and Sikhs who hold the Ramayana in reverence, and, therefore, the accused
was liable under this section.106
[s 295A.10.7] Photographs of Gods and Goddesses of Hindus on Fire Crackers, Newspapers, etc.
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It is a fact that photographs of Hindu Gods and Goddesses are pasted on fire crackers. This practice has been
going on for many years and up till now nobody has raised any objection regarding this practice. This has
happened only because nobody has thought it objectionable, nobody’s feelings have been hurt on seeing the
fire crackers bursting and the photographs being destroyed because the photographs on the fire crackers have
not been viewed as photographs of Gods and Goddesses but just as some prints to attract the attention of
customers. There was no intention that anybody’s feelings should be hurt by selling such fire crackers or by
bursting such fire crackers. However, in Bhau v State of Maharashtra,107 a new dimension has been given to
the matter. The court observed in this case:
Nobody from Hindu community up-till-now has thought over on this issue in this way. It is just whim of the petitioners
and for that they have come before the court. This is nothing but wasting time, money and energy.
Photographs of Gods and Goddesses, and for that matter, other respectable National Leaders, are being printed
everyday in different newspapers and everybody knows that the life of the newspaper is hardly for 24 hours and
thereafter it becomes waste paper and those photographs on the newspapers go to the dustbin in majority of the cases
without anybody considering that there are photographs of Gods and Goddesses of Hindu religion or photographs of
National Leaders because the matter is never looked at from that point of view.
Whenever invitation cards of marriages or other ceremonies being performed by Hindu persons, photographs of Gods
and Goddesses are printed on these invitation cards and once the purpose of the cards is finished, those cards also go
to the dustbins, with them the photographs printed on them. Here also nobody’s feelings are hurt by saying that the
photographs of Gods and Goddesses are being thrown in dustbins along with other rubbish matters.
[s 295A.10.8] Criticism of Hindu Religion for Untouchability, etc.
The criticism of Hindu religion for its inculcation of the doctrine of untouchability and for the sanction which it
has given to reprehensible treatment meted out to the lower castes has of recent years been considered
perfectly legitimate.108
[s 295A.11] “Class”
[s 295A.12] “Written”
Notes under section 124A may be referred.
[s 295A.13] “Visible Representation”
[s 295A.14] Attempts
[s 295A.15] “Religious Beliefs”
The Select Committee, in its report stated:109
‘To make it clear that an attack on a founder is not omitted from the scope of the section, we have specifically made
Page 11 of 17
punishable an insult to the religious beliefs of the followers or any religion’.
[s 295A.15.1] Whether Provocation may be Justified to Outrage Religious Beliefs
So an attack on a founder and the religious beliefs of his followers is not excluded from the scope of this
section. Where the accused, finding that certain pamphlets had been issued in support of the opposite view,
wrote six books by way of reply, it was held that it might be that the applicant wrote the six books by way of a
reply to the pamphlets issued from the opposite camp, but, if on examining the language used by the applicant
in the six books, it is found that the writing is likely to outrage religious beliefs or feelings of a certain class of
citizens, he would be liable under this section.110
Appellant accused was carrying beef and the blood was falling on the road. The informant and others objected
to it as it might cause hurt to the sentiments of Hindu. In the scuffle ensued in which the informants and others
received injuries which were not grievous in nature. The FIR and the statement of the witnesses did not show
that the accused did the act with the intention to create religious rift and communal disharmony between the
two groups. Appellant accused was acquitted of the charge under section 295A, IPC.111
The offence under this section is cognizable. A warrant shall issue in the first instance. It is neither bailable nor
compoundable and is triable by a magistrate of the first class.
[s 295A.17] Sanction for Prosecution
No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under this section except with the previous sanction
of the Central Government or of the state government.112
The Central Government or the state Government (as the case may be) may, before according its sanction,
order a preliminary investigation by a police officer not below the rank of inspector, in which case such police
officer shall have the power, referred to in section 155(3), CrPC.
The obtaining of a sanction is a sine qua non and no magistrate can take cognizance of the complaint under
section 295A, IPC unless the order, granting sanction, is produced.
Unless sanction is obtained prosecution for offence under section 295A, IPC is not maintainable.113
An order of cognizance of offence punishable under sections 153A and 295A, IPC without being supported by
the order of sanction of the state Government is liable to be quashed.114 On a complaint filed under sections
153A, 295A and for other offences before the magistrate, the magistrate cannot take cognizance of offences
under sections 295A and 153A without there being any sanction under section 196(1), CrPC.115
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If the complainant feels that the applicants, with malicious and deliberate intention of outraging the religious
feelings of Hindus, have published the article, proper course would be to move the Government for their
prosecution under section 295A, IPC.116
Where no sanction is given in accordance with section 196(1), CrPC to prosecute the accused for the offence
under section 295A, IPC, the apex court quashed the proceedings.117
Complaint filed for offence under section 295A, IPC without obtaining the sanction of the Government was
quashed.118
[s 295A.18] Charge
In a prosecution under this section the following form of the charge may be adopted:
I (name and office of the magistrate etc) hereby charge you (name of the accused) as follows:
That on or about the …day of…at…you (*) insulted (or attempted to insult) the religion (or the religious beliefs) of…by
the following words spoken (or written) [or by signs or by visible representations (or otherwise) to wit….] with the
deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of the said class of citizens of India, and you
thereby committed an offence, punishable under section 295A of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance.
[s 295A.19] Proof
(a) the accused insulted or attempted to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of a class of citizens of
India by words either spoken or written or by visible representations, or otherwise; and
(b) he did so with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of that class of
citizens.
Under this section the prosecution must show that the accused insulted for the sake of insulting and with an
intention which sprung from malice and malice alone.119
[s 295A.20] Defence
Page 13 of 17
To a charge under this section it would be a defence to say: “I had no malicious intention towards a class, but I
did intend to wound or shock the feelings of an individual so that attention might, however rudely, be called to
the reform which I had in view”.120 But it is no defence for anyone to plead that he was writing a book in reply to
the one written by one professing another religion who had attacked his own religion.121
[s 295A.20.1] Truthfulness of a Statement is no Defence
The truth of language can neither be pleaded nor proved. Even a true statement may outrage religious feelings.
It was held that the intention of the writer of a book must be judged primarily by the language of book itself,
though it is permissible to receive and consider external evidence either to prove or to rebut the meaning
ascribed to it. If the language is of a nature calculated to produce or to promote feelings of enmity or hatred, the
writer must be presumed to intend that which his act was likely to produce.122 A statement, which would
otherwise fall within the mischief of this section, cannot be taken out of it merely because it happens to be the
true statement.123
[s 295A.21] Forfeiture
Section 95(1) of the CrPC authorises the State Government to forfeit a newspaper, book or document, the
publication of which is an offence under this section. A person aggrieved by an order of forfeiture passed by the
State Government may apply to the High Court under section 96, CrPC to set aside such order.
Where there was nothing objectionable in the book that might be said to insult Hinduism or to promote
disharmony and hatred between different castes so as to be punishable under section 153A or under section
295A, IPC, the impugned order of its forfeiture was held wholly unjustified and unsustainable.124 The statement
of the ground of the opinion by the State Government is mandatory and a total absence thereof would vitiate
the declaration of forfeiture.125 The satisfaction of the High Court alone that the offending material does not
contain any matter which is punishable under one or other of the relevant sections specified in section 95(1)(b),
CrPC, is the conclusive factor in either upholding or quashing the declaration of forfeiture.126
1 Note JP 136.
52 Subs. by the AO 1950, for “His Majesty’s subject”.
53 Subs. by Act 41 of 1961, section 3, for certain words (w.e.f. 27-9-1961).

Page 14 of 17
54 Subs. by Act 41 of 1961, section 3, for “two years” (w.e.f. 27-9-1961).
55 Re P Ramaswamy, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 146 .
56 Ramji Lal Modi v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 620 [LNIND 1957 SC 36] , p 623 : (1957) Cr LJ 1006 ; Public
Prosecutor v Ramaswami, AIR 1964 Mad 258 [LNIND 1963 MAD 236] : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 672 .
57 Shiv Ram Dass v Punjab State, AIR 1955 Punj 28 , p 30 : (1955) Cr LJ 337 ; King v Nga Shwe Hpi, AIR 1939 Rang 99
: 40 Cr LJ 640.
58 Gazette of India, dated 10-8-1961, Pt 2, section 2, p 681.
59 Raj Paul v Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 590 : 28 Cr LJ 721.
60 Devi Saran Sharma v Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 504 : 28 Cr LJ 594.
61 Gazette of India, dated 20-8-1927, Pt 5, p 213.
62 Sant Das Maheshwari v Baburam, AIR 1969 All 436 [LNIND 1968 ALL 15] : (1969) Cr LJ 1097 .
63 Ramji Lal Modi v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 620 [LNIND 1957 SC 36] : (1957) Cr LJ 1001 .
64 Sant Das Maheshwari v Baburam, AIR 1969 All 436 [LNIND 1968 ALL 15] : (1969) Cr LJ 1097 .
65 Chandanmal Chopra v State of West Bengal, (1986) Cr LJ 182 (Cal).
66 Veerabrahmam v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 AP 572 [LNIND 1959 AP 70] , p 578 : (1959) Cr LJ 1280 .
67 Re Ramaswamy, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 146 , p 147.
68 Shib Shram v Emperor, AIR 1941 Oudh 310 , p 315 : 42 Cr LJ 429.
69 Re Ramaswamy, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 146 ; Sant Das Maheshwari v Babu Ram, AIR 1969 All 436 [LNIND 1968 ALL 15] :
(1969) Cr LJ 1097 ; Jayamala v State of Kerala, 2013 Cr LJ 622 (Ker) : 2012 (3) KHC 291 : 2012 (3) KLJ 454 ; Biplab
Das v State, 2017 Cr LJ 644 (Cal).
70 The Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v Govt of National Capital Territory of Delhi, (2001) Cr LJ Del 3689
(FB).
71 King v Nga Shwe Hpi, AIR 1939 Rang 199 : 40 Cr LJ 640; Baba Khalil Ahmad v State, AIR 1960 All 715 [LNIND 1960
ALL 96] , p 718 : (1960) Cr LJ 1528 .
72 Ibid.
73 Nand Kishore Singh v State of Bihar, (1985) Cr LJ 797 (Pat) (SB).

Page 15 of 17
74 King v Nga Shwe Hpi, AIR 1939 Rang 199 : 40 Cr LJ 640; Public Prosecutor v Ramaswami, AIR 1964 Mad 258
[LNIND 1963 MAD 236] : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 672 ; Sant Das Maheshwari v Baburam, AIR 1969 All 436 [LNIND 1968 ALL
15] : (1969) Cr LJ 1097 .
75 Mudassir Ullah Khan v State of UP, 2013 Cr LJ 3741 , p 3742 (All).
76 Mudassir Ullah Khan v State of UP, 2013 Cr LJ 3741 , p 3742 (All) : 2013 (5) All LJ 37.
77 Ramlalpuri v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1971 MP 152 [LNIND 1970 MP 17] , p 158.
78 Jayamala v State of Kerala, 2013 Cr LJ 622 , p 625 (Ker).
79 Jayamala v State of Kerala, 2013 Cr LJ 622 , p 627 (Ker) : 2012 (3) Ker LT 461 : ICK 2012 (3) Ker 690 .
80 Sujato Bhadra v State of West Bengal, 2006 Cr LJ 368 , p 402 (Cal) (SB) : (2005) 4 Cal HN 601.
81 Narayan Dev v State, AIR 1952 Ori 149 [LNIND 1951 ORI 39] and notes under section 298.
82 State of Madhya Pradesh v Swami Rishi Kumar, (1993) Cr LJ 23 (MP).
83 The Trustees of Safdar Hashmi Memorial Trust v Govt of National Capital Territory of Delhi, (2001) Cr LJ Del 3689
(FB).
84 Peary Lal v Emperor, AIR 1917 All 317 (1) : 15 All LJ 106, Knox J referred to R v Pembleton, (1874) 43 LJMC 91.
85 Gott v Measures, (1948) 1 KB 234 , p 239 : (1947) 2 All ER 609 , p 610, per Lord Goddard CJ.
86 R v Cunningham, (1957) 2 QB 396 .
88 King v Nga Shwe Hpi, AIR 1939 Rang 199 , p 200. Refer to synopsis under section 219, ante.
89 Re P Ramaswamy, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 147 ; see also, dissenting judgment of Bheema Sankaram J in N Veerabrahman v
State, AIR 1959 AP 572 [LNIND 1959 AP 70] , p 583 : (1959) Cr LJ 1280 .
90 Re P Ramaswami, (1962) Cr LJ 146 : (1962) Mad LJ (Cr) 465; dissenting judgment of Bheema Shankaram J in N
Veerabrahman v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 AP 572 [LNIND 1959 AP 70] : (1959) Cr LJ 1280 .
91 State of Mysore v Henry Rodrigues, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 564 : 40 Mys LJ 271.
92 Baba Khalil Ahmed v State, AIR 1960 All 715 [LNIND 1960 ALL 96] , p 719 : (1960) Cr LJ 1528 .
93 Ibid.
94 Baba Khalil Ahmad v State, AIR 1960 All 715 [LNIND 1960 ALL 96] , p 718 : (1960) Cr LJ 1628 ; King v Nga Shwe Hpi,
AIR 1939 Rang 199 : 40 Cr LJ 640.
96 Baba Khalil Ahmed v State, AIR 1960 All 715 [LNIND 1960 ALL 96] , p 718 : (1960) Cr LJ 1528 ; Kali Charan Sharma v
Emperor, AIR 1927 All 649 : 27 Cr LJ 968.
97 Baba Khalil Ahmad v State, AIR 1960 All 715 [LNIND 1960 ALL 96] , p 718 : (1960) Cr LJ 1528 .
98 R V Bhasin v State of Maharashtra, 2012 Cr LJ 1375 : 2010 (112) Bom LR 154 : 2012 (2) Ker LT (SN) 69 (Bom) (FB).
Page 16 of 17
99 Sujato Bhadra v State of West Bengal, (2006) Cr LJ 368 (Cal) (FB).

101 Sujato Bhadra v State of West Bengal, 2006 Cr LJ 368 , p 381 (Cal) (SB) : (2005) 4 Cal HN 601.
102 State v Nand Singh, (1979) CLR (P&H) 6, pp 8–9.
104 Harnam Das v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 All 538 [LNIND 1957 ALL 126] , p 541 : (1957) Cr LJ 912 (SB).
105 Zac Poonen v Hidden Treasure Literature Incorporated in Canada, (2002) Cr LJ 481 (Kant).
106 Chand Singh v State, (1967) 69 PLR 126 , p 128 : (1967) Cur LJ 72 .
107 Bhau v State of Maharashtra, (1999) Cr LJ (Bom) 1230 (DB).
108 Lalai Singh Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1971) Cr LJ 1773 (All) (FB).
109 Gazette of India, dated 17-9-1927, Pt 5, pp 251–52.
110 Baba Khalil Ahmad v State, AIR 1960 All 715 [LNIND 1960 ALL 96] , p 718 : (1960) Cr LJ 1528 .
111 Pesh Imam Qureshi v State of Jharkhand, 2008 Cr LJ (NOC) 297 : 2008 (1) Jhar R 56 (Jhar).
112 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, sections 196(1) and (3); Biplab Das v State, 2017 Cr LJ 644 (Cal).
114 Swami Laxmanananda Saraswat v State of Orissa, (1988) 2 Crimes 960 [LNIND 1988 ORI 162] (Ori).
115 Srivishwanath v Sriyogendranath Tripathi, (1986) 2 Crimes 413 [LNIND 1986 ALL 21] (All).
116 Laxminarayan Singh v Shreeram Sharma, (1983) 1 Crimes 615 , p 621 (MP).
117 Manoj Rai v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) Cr LT 470 (SC).
118 Rameshbhai M Gagadia v State of Gujarat, 2010 Cr LJ (NOC) 508 (Guj).
119 King v Nga Shwa Hpi, AIR 1939 Rang 199 , p 200 : 40 Cr LJ 640.
120 Ibid.
121 Shiv Ram Dass Udasin v Punjab State, AIR 1955 Punj 28 , p 29 : (1955) Cr LJ 337 .
122 Baba Khalil Ahmad v State, AIR 1960 All 715 [LNIND 1960 ALL 96] : (1960) Cr LJ 1528 .
123 State of Mysore v Henry Rodrigues, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 564 , 567 : 40 Mys LJ 271; Kali Charan Sharma v Emperor, AIR
1927 All 649 : 28 Cr LJ 968.
124 Lalai Singh Yadav v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1971) Cr LJ 1773 (All) (FB).
125 Nand Kishore Singh v State of Bihar, (1995) Cr LJ 797 (Pat) (SB).
Page 17 of 17
126 Ibid.
End of Document
[s 296] Disturbing religious assembly.—

15.1 Introduction
another.1
class.
Page 2 of 8

Whoever voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious
worship, or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
[s 296.1] Scope
This section deals with disturbance of a religious assembly, which may or may not be in a place of worship.
The penal law of India extends a special protection against voluntary disturbance to all assemblies lawfully
engaged in religious worship or ceremonies.127
This section in the Code may fairly by supposed to have been framed upon the kindred English law to be found
in 52 Geo III, chapter 155, section 12, also 23 and 24 Victoria, chapter 39.128
[s 296.3] Object
The object of the section is to secure freedom from molestation when people meet for the performance of acts
which ordinarily take place in some quiet spot vested for the time, in the assembly exclusively.
To constitute an offence under this section:129
(1) there must be an assembly;
(2) the assembly must be lawfully engaged in religious worship or religious ceremonies; and
(3) the accused must have voluntarily caused disturbance to such an assembly.
[s 296.5] “Voluntarily”
A person is said to cause an effect voluntarily when he causes it by means whereby he intended to cause it, or
by means which at the time of employing those means, he knew, or had reason to believe to be likely to cause
it.130
[s 296.6] Intention to Cause Disturbance is the Essence—Not an Active Intention but mere Knowledge is
Sufficient
The essence of the offence under this section is the intention express or implied,131 to cause disturbance to a
religious assembly, and it is immaterial whether this intention is due to religious animosity, or any other cause,
intention to cause a certain result is not an element necessary to constitute a voluntary causing of that result
but knowledge of or belief in, the likelihood of the result following, though not intended, may supply the place of
intention. If, therefore, the accused knew, or had reason to believe that their act in removing an image was
likely to cause disturbance to any religious worship, then, though they might not have intended to cause such
disturbance, yet the causing of the disturbance, would be voluntary within the meaning of the Code.132 It is not,
therefore, necessary for the purpose of this section, that the accused should have had an active intention to
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disturb religious worship. It is sufficient, if knowing they are likely to disturb it by their music, they take the risk
and do actually cause disturbance.133
Refer to notes under section 39.
[s 296.7] “Causes Disturbance”
If disturbance is not proved as a fact there can be no conviction under the section, but to constitute a
“disturbance”, it is not necessary that there should be an actual stay or interruption of the service. It cannot be
said that a congregation assembled for public worship cannot be disturbed unless there is an actual stay or
interruption of the service. Where the worshippers are reciting one Mantram, it amounts to a disturbance to
recite another, in their presence and hearing, so as to distract their minds from the act in which they are
engaged.134 But where one sect of a religion could not hear what the other sect recited, it was held that no
disturbance was caused within the meaning of this section.135
[s 296.7.1] Substantial and not Merely Fanciful Disturbance Matters
Spreading false rumours, although they might have had the most serious consequences, cannot be described
as “causing a disturbance”.136 The playing of music near a mosque would not by itself, without anything further,
amount to an offence within the meaning of this section. Any deliberate intention to disturb the worship may not
be necessary; but surely it must be found as a fact before the section could apply, that there was a substantial
and not merely fanciful disturbance of the worship.137
[s 296.7.2] Persons Engaged in Religious Worship can cause disturbance to Different Community
There is nothing in section 296, IPC, to justify the interpretation that the persons who were themselves engaged
in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, cannot be convicted of causing disturbance to
another community.138
[s 296.7.3] DSP can Regulate extent of Music in Streets on Future Occasions
Where the order was issued that no procession with music would be allowed to pass within 40 kms from the
mosque, it is clearly a regulation that falls within the ambit of section 30 of Police Act, 1861. Sub-section 4 of
section 30 of the said Act clearly gives the District Superintendent of Police a right to regulate the extent to
which music may be used in the streets on future occasions, and it is not necessary for him to pass a separate
order on every occasion.139
[s 296.7.4] Consequences of Pronouncing Amin Loudly
A mosque to be a mosque must be a building dedicated to God, and not a building dedicated to God with a
reservation that it could be used only by a particular person holding particular views of the ritual. No sect or
creed or portion of the community can restrain others claiming the right. There is no authority in the
Mahommadan ecclesiastical law to limit the tone of the voice in which the word amin is to be pronounced. So
long as persons are Mahommadans, they are entitled to enter a mosque and perform the worship and say the
word amin without anything to restrain their tone or note of the octave. But if the pronouncing of the word amin
results in the disturbance of the peace, it will have to be dealt with under the criminal law. But where the word
amin is pronounced aloud in the honest exercise of the conscience that it should be so pronounced, there can
be neither any offence under the criminal law, nor any wrong in the civil law (per Mahmood J). If a
Mahommedan goes to a mosque not with the object of honestly performing his own religious duties, but with
the deliberate purpose and intention of disturbing the quiet devotion of others engaged in prayers, and acts in
such a way that the necessary consequences is that the congregation is disturbed, he has brought himself
within the meaning of this section (per Stuart J). A Mahommedan would bring himself within the grasp of
criminal law, who, not in the bona fide performance of his devotions, but mala fide for the purpose of disturbing
others engaged in their devotions, makes any demonstrations, oral or otherwise, in a mosque, and disturbance
is the result.140 Where, however, there was no voluntary disturbance to any assembly, engaged in namaz or
prayer, but the word amin was loudly uttered by the accused at the close of the prayer, it was held that no
offence under this section was made out.141
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[s 296.7.5] Interference with Devotion Amounts to Disturbance
Where a mosque is a public mosque open to the use of all Mahommadans without distinction of sect, a
Mahommadan who, in the bona fide exercise of his religious duties in such mosque, pronounces the word amin
in a loud tone of voice, according to the tenets of his sect, does nothing which is contrary to the Mahommadan
ecclesiastical law or which is either an offence or civil wrong, though he may by such conduct cause annoyance
to his fellow-worshippers in the mosque. But any person, Mahommadan or otherwise, who goes into a mosque
not bona fide for religious purpose, but mala fide to create a disturbance there and interfere with the devotion of
the ordinary frequenters of the mosque, will render himself criminally liable.142
[s 296.8] “Assembly”
For the purpose of this section, even three persons gathered together for the purpose of worship are sufficient
to constitute an assembly.143 A religious procession is but an assembly in motion.144
[s 296.9] “Lawfully Engaged in the Performance of Religious Worship”
To come within the protection afforded by the section, the assembly of persons must be essentially a religious
assembly, and it must be lawfully engaged as such. An assembly, therefore, which is not really a religious
assembly, though carrying on its proceeding in such guise, would not be protected by the section, eg., an
assembly whose real common object is one of those set out in section 141, and is therefore, an unlawful
assembly. “Whatever” is prohibited by law to be done directly, cannot legally be effected by an indirect and
circuitous contrivance.145
[s 296.9.1] Worship to be Real and not a Cloak
The worship referred to in this section must be a real worship and not a cloak for doing something else, and the
assembly must be lawfully engaged in such worship. If the ceremony is commenced by an act which is not
lawful, it cannot be said that the persons engaged in them are lawfully engaged, from the mere circumstances
of their falling into a posture of worship, though such worship may be real. As to whether a worship is real or
not, much must depend upon the circumstances under which it is performed.146
[s 296.10] Assembly Prohibited by Law is not Lawfully Engaged
A religious assembly which is prohibited by law is not lawfully engaged in the performance of worship or
ceremonies eg., such an assembly on private property under conditions which constitute it a trespass or one
which has been lawfully commanded to disperse under section 151,147 or which has been prohibited by order of
a magistrate under section 144 of the CrPC.148
[s 296.10.1] No Assembly can be Lawfully Engaged on a Highway
Where certain boys were beating drums on a public road to summon people for a procession during Moharram,
and the accused seized the drums which he returned to them the next day, it was held that the accused’s acts
did not constitute an offence as no assembly can be lawfully engaged within the meaning of this section on a
highway.149
[s 296.10.2] Inherent Right to use Public Road for Religious Procession
The use of the public highways for religious processions is, despite dicta to the contrary,150 a well-established
right. Such use is but incidental to the right of the general public, all members of which have equal rights in
them.151 There is a right in every community to take out a religious procession, with its appropriate
observances, along a highway. This is an inherent right and does not depend on the proof of any custom or a
long, established practice. Even if such a procession be an innovation, it would be in the exercise of legal
rights. The right is independent of any long standing tradition and is not lost by mere abstention or non-exercise
of it for a number of years.
An enquiry as to the existence or non-existence of an old custom is, therefore, unnecessary and irrelevant.152
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[s 296.10.3] No Exclusive Right to any Religious Sect
However, no religious sect can lay claim to an exclusive right to the use of a public way, or portion of it for
religious processions or worship.153
[s 296.10.4] Condition of uses of Public Highways
A public highway is primarily for purposes of traffic, and every individual is entitled to use it in a reasonable way.
But he cannot claim it exclusively for purposes of worship. Persons of every sect are entitled to take out
religious processions through public streets provided they do not interfere with the ordinary use of such streets
by the other members of the public.154 The taking out of a procession accompanied with music, whether as a
part of religious worship or not, is within the civil rights of the community, but not an exclusive use of the
highway for worship, and worshippers in a mosque or temple which abuts on a highway have no right to compel
processionists to stop their music completely while passing a mosque or temple on the ground that there was
continuous worship inside it.
[s 296.10.5] Religious Ceremony Starts when Procession Starts
Where the mahars of a certain locality took out their yearly samaptt processions and were proceeding by the
customary route in front of a mosque when they were stopped by the accused and prevented from going by that
route and threatened with attack if they did so, and they accordingly diverted their procession and went by a
route behind the mosque, it was held that a religious ceremony was in progress from the time when the
procession started and the accused were convicted accordingly.155
[s 296.10.6] Exclusive use of Public way may Render the Religious Rites Unlawful
The right being thus limited, it follows that if any religious sect uses a public way in such a manner as to
obstruct its use by other members of the public, it is not “lawfully engaged” in the performance of religious rites
and to cause disturbance of such an assembly in vindication of the right of passage would be no offence under
this section.
[s 296.10.7] This Section not Attracted in a Case of Procession through Private Land
A tazia procession was taken out by some Mahommadans on the tenth day of Moharram through a private
grove, although they had no right to take tazias through the grove. The Hindus objected to the tazias being
taken through the grove and directed the tazias to be taken back. A riot took place and they were convicted
under sections 147, 323 and 296, IPC. In revision however, it was held that no offence under this section was
committed.156
Where certain lodhas, who, with the sanction of the public authorities, had been carrying flags to a temple in
procession through a public street, were attacked by persons who objected to the procession, it was held that
such attack constituted a disturbance of the performance of a religious ceremony punishable under this
section.157
[s 296.10.8] Presumption in Case of Continued Use
Continued use by the public of a way raises a presumption that it belongs to the public, and was dedicated by
the owner for public use.158
bailable offence but not compoundable. It is triable by any magistrate and can also be tried summarily.

Page 6 of 8
[s 296.11.1] Notice under section 251, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
The following form of the notice under section 251, CrPC, may be adopted in a prosecution under this section:
I (name and office of the magistrate etc) hereby notice to you (name of the accused), as follows:
That on or about the….day of….at…you (*) voluntarily caused disturbance by (specify the act) to an assembly, to
wit….which was lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship (or religious ceremonies) and you thereby
committed an offence under section 298 of the India Penal Code, and within my cognizance.
Ans. Yes
[s 296.12] Proof
(a) the accused voluntarily caused disturbance to an assembly; and
(b) such assembly was then lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious
ceremonies.
Where several persons are charged, the case of each accused should be considered and proved individually.159
1 Note JP 136.
127 Vijiaraghava Chariar v Emperor, 26 ILR Mad 554 : 1 Weir 260 (FB).
Page 7 of 8
128 Emperor v Masit, 34 ILR All 78.
129 Jaipal Gir v Dharmapala, 23 ILR Cal 60.
130 Public Prosecutor v Sunku Seethiah, 34 ILR Mad 92.
131 R v Sunku Seethaiah, 34 ILR Mad 92.
132 Jaipal Gir v Dharmapala, ILR 23 Cal 60.
133 Public Prosecutor v Sunku Seethiah, 34 ILR Mad 92.
134 Re Krishnatatachari, 1 Weir 259.
135 Vijiraghava Chariar v Emperor, 26 ILR Mad 554 : 1 Weir 260 (FB).
136 Mohammad Hussain v Emperor, AIR 1919 All 188 (2) : 20 Cr LJ 421.
137 Kolimi Mahabub Sahiv v Sri Sidheswaraswami Temple at Devalampeta, AIR 1945 Mad 496 [LNIND 1945 MAD 128] , p
497.
138 Laxmikant Balwantrao Deshmukh v Emperor, AIR 1943 Ngp 199 .
139 Ibid.
140 Per Edge CJ in Ataullah v Azimullah, ILR 12 All 494 (FB); Queen v Empress v Ramzan, 7 ILR All 461.
141 Imam Firasat Hussain v State, 1972 All Cr R 168; Jangu v Ahmadullah, ILR 13 All 419 (FB).
142 Jangu v Ahmad Ullah, ILR 13 All 419 (FB).
143 Emperor v Aftab Mohd Khan, AIR 1940 All 291 : 41 Cr LJ 647.
144 Vijairaghava Chariar v Emperor, 26 ILR Mad 554.
145 Booth v Bank of England, 7 Cal and F 509 : 6 Bing NC 416.
146 Jaipal Gir v H Dharmapala, ILR 23 Cal 60.

147 R v Tucker, 7 ILR Bom 42.
148 Refer to section 188.
149 Emperor v Dhalu Ram, 10 Cr LJ 445; Vijiaraghava Chariar v Emperor, 26 ILR Mad 554.
150 Refer to the judgments of Bhashyam Aiyangar and Subramaniya Aiyar JJ in Vijiaraghava Chariar v Emperor, 26 ILR
Mad 554; R v Dhalu Ram, 10 Cr LJ 445 : 119 PLR 1909; R v Masit, 34 ILR All 78, 12 Cr LJ 573.
151 Sadagopa Chariar v Krishnamoorthy Rao, 30 ILR Mad 185, p 190 (PC); Mannada Mudali v Naliaya Gounden, 32 ILR
Mad 527, p 529; Sengodan v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 534.
Page 8 of 8
152 Mahommad Jalil Khan v Ram Nath Katua, AIR 1931 All 341 , p 344; Manzur Hussain v Mahommad Zaman, AIR 1925
PC 36 ; Mahommad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1949 Ngp 132 : 50 Cr LJ 329; Chanda Sajan Patil v Nyahalchand
Panamchand, AIR 1950 Bom 192 [LNIND 1948 BOM 136] .
153 Kandasami Mudali v Subraya Mudali, 32 ILR Mad 478, p 483.
154 Mahommad Jalil Khan v Ram Nath Katua, AIR 1931 All 341 , p 344.
155 Mahommad Khan v Emperor, AIR 1949 Ngp 132 : 50 Cr LJ 329.
156 Bulgar Singh v Emperor, AIR 1933 Oudh 196 , p 197 : 34 Cr LJ 778.
157 Emperor v Masit, 34 ILR All 78 : 12 Cr LJ 573.
158 Mannada Mudall v Nallaya Gounden, 32 ILR Mad 527.
159 1961 BLJR 347 .
End of Document
[s 297] Trespassing on burial places, etc.—

15.1 Introduction
another.1
class.
Page 2 of 9

Whoever, with the intention of wounding the feelings of any person, or of insulting the religion of any person, or
with the knowledge that the feelings of any person are likely to be wounded, or that the religion of any person is
likely to be insulted thereby,
commits any trespass in any place of worship or on any place of sepulture, or any place set apart for the
performance of funeral rites or as a depository for the remains of the dead, or offers any indignity to any human
corpse, or causes disturbance to any persons assembled for the performance of funeral ceremonies,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine,
or with both.
[s 297.1] Scope
This section punishes persons who injure the feelings of living persons by insults offered to the dead. It extends
the principle laid down in section 295 to places which are treated as sacred. This section is comprehensively
worded, and the offence at which it strikes is intimately bound with the commission of a trespass or, subject to
that of deliberately offering an indignity to a corpse or causing disturbance to a body of persons assembled for
the performance of funeral ceremonies.160
The criminal intention or knowledge in this offence is to wound the feelings, or insult the religion of any person,
and the conduct in pursuance of such intention or knowledge is either: (i) a trespass on one or other of four
places of religious rites; or (ii) the offering of an indignity to any human corpse; or (iii) the causing of a
disturbance to a funeral ceremony. This section does not refer to “religious feelings”, though the kind of feelings
which comes within the section, is clearly limited, in its nature, by the second paragraph to the section by
reference to a place of worship, to a place of sepulchre, to feelings of a spiritual nature than a material kind and
to feelings associated with such sacred places. It does not punish acts which are merely of earthly vanity or
pride.161
This section, as originally drafted, applied only to “a place of sepulchre” but its scope has been extended on the
recommendation of the Law Commissioners, who said:162
It seems to us that the word ‘sepulchre’, the proper meaning of which is burial or interment, is not sufficiently
comprehensive to express what is intended in this place; for it is clear that what is contemplated is any place in which
are performed the last rites of the dead, of whatsoever nature they may be, or in which the remains of the dead are
deposited. Instead of ‘a place of sepulchre’ we would propose any place set apart for the performance of funeral rites,
or a depository for the remains of the dead.
[s 297.1.1] Gist of the Offence
The provisions of this section are applicable where there is a trespass in a place of religious worship with the
knowledge that the feelings of persons would be wounded thereby.163 The gist of the offence is the committing
of trespass on a place of sepulchre with the intention or with the knowledge specified in the section, and if these
essentials are not established, no offence under the section is made out.164
[s 297.2] With the Intention or with the Knowledge— Mens Rea

Page 3 of 9
In a particular situation an act may not cause disgrace or may not humiliate, but in other situations that very act
may cause disgrace or humiliation. So the intention of the person concerned as well as surrounding
circumstances, are important factors.165
Intention or knowledge of either of the things specified is essential to the offence.166 Mere reason to believe167
which is so often classed with intention or knowledge in the IPC, is insufficient.
[s 297.2.1] Ploughing Ground—Consequences
This section does not make an act committed in defiance of it an offence only when that act is committed with
the intention of wounding the feelings of any person; it is equally an offence if committed with the knowledge
that the feelings of any person are likely to be wounded or the religion of any person is likely to be insulted
thereby. Persons who enter a burial ground and plough up land used as a graveyard are guilty of the offence
under this section, although they enter the ground with the knowledge of the owner, and apparently, with his
consent.168
[s 297.2.2] Doing an Act Secretly with Knowledge of Consequences
A, a Hindu, had sexual connection with a woman at 9 O’clock at night in an enclosure surrounding a tomb of a
Mahommadan fakir, which was not used as a place of worship. It was held that A committed an offence under
section 297, IPC, as he committed a trespass on a place of sepulchre and knew that his act, if detected, was
likely to wound the feelings of Mahommadans, and that his belief that the act would probably not be detected
would not make any difference though it might well be taken into consideration in awarding punishment.169
Using a Mahommadan tomb as a place of privacy for adulterous intercourse is an offence under this section, as
it is trespassing on a place of sepulchre with the knowledge that the religious feelings of certain Mahommadans
were likely to be insulted thereby.170
Where, owing to a bona fide dispute as to use of a burial place, arising out of a question between the parties as
to the complainants’ delay or neglect in making a certain payment, a delay occurred in digging a grave, but
nothing else, the corpse not having been brought to the ground, when the dispute commenced, it was held that
this section was not applicable to the case.171
[s 297.2.3] Mere Delay without an Intention to Offer Indignity
Where the accused, forming part of a committee, whose duty it was to collect subscriptions to defray the cost of
a wall around a cemetery, but having no right to compel payment of burial fees, demanded a fee from the
complainant’s party before admitting the corpse into the cemetery, and after some discussion, during which the
corpse was placed on the ground, the corpse was admitted without payment, it was held, that there was no
intention to offer any “indignity” within the meaning of this section.172
[s 297.3] “Commits any Trespass”
The word “trespass” in this section has not the same meaning as criminal trespass in section 441, IPC, but
implies any violent or injurious act committed in the place with the intention and knowledge specified in this
section.173 The word “trespass” as used in this section has not any peculiar meaning.174 Every invasion of
private property ie, of possession or of a right to possession, be it ever so minute, is a trespass.175
[s 297.3.1] Entry with Permission—Intention of Entry Material
However, leave or licence of the possessor to the entry, of course, prevents such entry being a trespass. In one
case where A went on to certain land used as a burial ground, with the consent and wish of B, the owner of the
land, and ploughed it up (thereby disturbing the graves) for the purpose of turning it into an agricultural land, it
Page 4 of 9
was held that A was guilty of an offence under this section.176 But this decision cannot be supported. Apart from
the fact that there was obviously no trespass (which is essential to the offence) A’s intention in entering on the
ground was clearly to cultivate it and nothing else. He intended no “offence relating to religion”, the subject
matter of this chapter. He may have had reason to believe that his operations would be likely to wound the
feelings of the community who used the ground as a place of sepulchre but that would not bring his conduct
within the section. The offence may be mischief under sections 425 and 426.177
[s 297.3.2] Trespass and Criminal Trespass
This section speaks of “any trespass” and not of criminal trespass. Therefore, whether the trespass is of a civil
or a criminal nature, the offence becomes complete, for the completion of the offence it is not necessary to
record a finding that the trespass committed was necessarily a criminal trespass.178
[s 297.3.3] Owner of Land not Exempt
The ownership of the land does not exempt its owner from the rigours of this section. In Abdul Kadar v Abdul
Kasim,179 it was observed:
Although the petitioners have been found by the Civil Court to be the owners of the land in question and although they
have been given khas possession thereof by the Civil Court, that does not entitle them to disturb any graves that may
be found existing in that land or to damage any structure that may have been raised over such graves, if by such act or
acts the feelings of any person interested in the graves are likely to be wounded. The fact that the petitioners are the
sole owners of the land in question does not render their action in damaging the structures that had been erected over
the graves of the complainant’s father and aunt, any the less a trespass within the meaning of section 297 of the Code,
even though the petitioners have been placed in khas possession of the land by the Civil Court.
Where the accused removed bricks from the graves of the ancestors of the complainant, it was held that the
bricks had been disturbed and that the intention was to wound the feelings of the complainant and the accused
committed trespass within the meaning of this section.180
[s 297.3.4] Consequences of Hurling Abuses in a Mosque
In a Nagpur case, the evidence established that the accused had gone to a mosque for mid-day prayer as
usual; when the service was over, he was asked by some others why he had, on former occasions, abused the
Moulvi and the congregation. On his attempting a denial, witnesses were sent for, and an altercation followed;
the petitioner then began to abuse all and sundry, employing obscene epithets and uttering threats. It was held
that in order to convict the accused, the court would have to come to the conclusion that he, with the intention
of wounding the feelings of the Moulvi and the congregation, remained unlawfully within the mosque with intent
thereby to insult or annoy the said Moulvi and congregation, and that on the facts of the case a conviction under
this section could not be sustained.181
[s 297.3.5] Co-sharer’s Liability under this Section
Acts done by a co-owner of property in the exercise of his rights of property cannot amount to a trespass. A, B,
C and D were co-owners of a ground in which they were accustomed to bury their dead. A and B opened a
saw-pit close to the grave of D’s relations, but without disturbing their graves. It was held that A and B
committed no offence under this section.182 But a joint owner, who in the course of demarking his share in the
land dug up certain graves and exposed the bones of the person buried there, in spite of the remonstrance of
their relations, was convicted under this section.183
[s 297.4] Place of Worship
For a conviction under this section, there should be a trespass on a place of religious worship with the
Page 5 of 9
knowledge that the feelings of persons would be wounded thereby.184 Where a Mahar, a low caste man,
entered into a temple, he was found guilty of an offence under this section.185 Under the changed social
conditions and the fundamental rights and right of equality guaranteed, by the Constitution, this decision may
not hold good now. Persons found inside a mosque having sexual connection were held guilty under this
section.186 Four accused persons entered the house of the complainant and one of them demolished the wall
which he was constructing and took the pindi of the Naika Cossain which was worshipped by the complainant
and his family from the niche and threw it into a drain running by the side of the lane. It was held that the
accused were guilty under this section.187
[s 297.5] “Place of Sepulchre”
Sepulchre means burial or interment.188 A few isolated and secret cases of burial in the course of many years
on a piece of land do not constitute the place one of sepulchre within the meaning of this section.189 But it is not
necessary that the burial ground should be in use. If it has been a burial ground and if there are visible graves
in it, it becomes a depository for the remains of the dead.190 For an offence under this section it is essential that
the place must have been set apart as a depository of the remains of the dead.191
The act of a person who destroys or disturbs a place of sepulchre with the intention of wounding the feelings of
any person or with the knowledge that the feelings of any person are to be wounded, is wrongful and amounts
to a trespass within the meaning of the said section, no matter whether the land in which the place of sepulchre
is included does or does not belong to the persons who are guilty of the act complained of.192
[s 297.6] “Any Place Set Apart for the Performance of Funeral Rites”
Persons interfering in the performance of funeral ceremonies become trespassers at the funeral pyre and when
they interfere with the obsequies, they are guilty under this section.193 But the stopping of a tazia during a
Moharram procession does not amount to an offence as, it is not a funeral ceremony within the meaning of this
section.194
[s 297.7] “Offers any Indignity to any Human Corpse”
What is indignity to a corpse is not defined anywhere. Indignity is generally synonymous to humiliation or
disgrace. A conduct to be criminal in the sense of section 297, IPC, should be spiteful to become humiliating or
disgraceful. In a particular situation, an act may not cause disgrace or may not humiliate, but in other situations
that very act may cause disgrace or humiliation. So, the intention of the person concerned as well as
surrounding circumstances, are important factors.195
Where certain persons deliberately put obstacles in the way of the complainant in burying his son because he
had not joined the khilafat movement, it was held that the accused were not guilty, as it would not be said that
by their act they offered any indignity to the corpse. In the course of his judgment, Stuart J observed:
I do not propose to expatiate upon the mentality of persons who, to support their view as to what they conceive
desirable in politics, use their influence to prevent a man from burying his little child. But as the law stands, they have
not committed any criminal offence in this particular case. The act was an act of boycotting and was not a criminal act
either under the Penal Code or any other laws.
Where a dangerous criminal was shot dead in a police encounter and after the post-mortem, the police took his
body to his father, who refused to accept it for cremation, and a large crowd gathered in the meantime to see
the dead body, and in order to maintain law and order and assure the public at large about the death of the
Page 6 of 9
dangerous criminal, his body was roped and tried to the tower for a few minutes, it was held that no insult or
indignity was shown by the police/accused person to the dead body. Since the intention of police officers to
show indignity to the body was not proved, so offence under sections 297/34, IPC was not made out against
them.196
[s 297.8] “Causes Disturbance to any Person Assembled for the Performance of Funeral Ceremonies”
The word “disturbance” in this section has not been defined, but it implies some active interference in, or
hindrance to, the performance of the funeral ceremonies.
The grand-daughter-in-law of the complainant died, and the complainant and his relations took the body out to
the cremation ground and were preparing to cremate it; the accused came there and told them not to cremate
the body, and on being asked why, said that they would state the reason to the police. It was held that the mere
utterance of the words “do not cremate the body”, unaccompanied by any attempt to prevent the cremation, or
by any manifestation on the part of the accused of their intention to interfere if the complainant and his relations
should persist in having the body cremated, cannot be regarded as a disturbance to the persons assembled for
the performance of the funeral ceremonies, within the meaning of this section.197
[s 297.9] Procedure
It is the same as in the case of an offence under section 296, IPC.
In a prosecution for an offence under this section, the following form of the notice under section 251, CrPC,
may be adopted:
I (name and office of the magistrate etc) hereby notice to you (name of the accused), as follows :
That on or about the….day of…….at…….you (*) committed trespass in…… a place of worship [(or a place of
sepulchre) (or a place set apart for the performance of funeral rites) (or a place which is used as a depository for the
remains of the dead)], offered an indignity by….(specify the act) to the corpse of……[(or caused disturbance to
persons, to wit……assembled for the performance of funeral ceremonies with the intention of wounding the feelings of
(name the persons whose feelings are wounded) or insulted the religion of…) (or with the knowledge that the feelings
of…….are likely to be wounded) (or that the religion of….is likely to be insulted)] and you thereby committed an offence
Ans. Yes
[s 297.10] Proof

Page 7 of 9
(1) the accused had the intention to:
(a) wound the feelings of any person; or

(b) to insult the religion of any person; or, had the knowledge:
(i) that the feelings of any person are likely to be thereby wounded; or
(ii) that the religion of any person is likely to be thereby insulted;
(2) the accused
(a) committed trespass; or
(b) offered any indignity to a human corpse; or
(c) disturbed persons assembled for funeral ceremonies;
(3) the place trespassed upon was either:
(a) a place of worship; or
(b) a place of burial or cremation; or
(c) a place set apart for the performance of funeral rites, or
(d) a place set apart as a depository for the remains of the dead.
Where the charges framed against an accused was under clause (1) of section 297, IPC, but the evidence
established charge under clause (2) of section 297, IPC, against him, it was held that the accused could not be
convicted under clause (1) of section 297, IPC.198
1 Note JP 136.
Page 8 of 9
160 Mustaffa Rahim v Motilal Chunilal, 10 Cr LJ 160, p 165.
161 Sanoo Manji v Emperor, AIR 1941 Sind 33 , p 34 : 42 Cr LJ 454.
163 Queen-Empress v Bhagya, Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cas 148.

164 Umar Din v Emperor, AIR 1915 Lah 409 : 16 Cr LJ 683.
165 Sudarshan Kumar v Gangacharan Dubey, (2000) Cr LJ 1618 (MP).
166 Re Hajee Mohammed Ghouse, 1 Weir 287; Jhulan Sain v R, 40 ILR Cal 548, p 154 Cr LJ 117.
167 Refer to the Indian Penal Code 1860, section 28.
168 Queen-Empress v Subhan, 18 ILR All 395.

169 Re Ratna Mudali, 10 ILR Mad 126 : 1 Weir 256.
170 Re Gaja, 5 CPLR Cr 32.
171 Re Barhan Shah, (1887) PR 26 .
172 Re Hajee Mahommad Ghouse Sahab, 1 Weir 287.
173 Jhulan Sain v R, 40 ILR Cal 548, 14 Cr LJ 117; Sanoo Manaji v Emperor, AIR 1941 Sind 33 : 42 Cr LJ 454; Mustan v
Emperor, AIR 1924 Rang 105 : 25 Cr LJ 253; Queen-Empress v Subhan, 18 ILR All 395; Ram Prasad v Emperor, 33
ILR All 773; Maqsud Hussain v Emperor, AIR 1924 All 9 : 24 Cr LJ 711; Umer Din v Crown, AIR 1915 Lah 409 : 16 Cr
LJ 683; Mullukohand Sheikh v King, AIR 1949 Cal 104 : 50 Cr LJ 135; Abdul Kadar v Abdul Kasim, AIR 1932 Cal 459
: 33 Cr LJ 517.
174 Per, Le Rossignol J in Umar Din v Emperor, AIR 1915 Lah 409 , p 414 : 16 Cr LJ 883.
175 Entick v Carrington, 19 St Tri 1066, Pollock’s Law of Torts, 4th Edn, p 307.
176 R v Subhan, 18 ILR All 395.

177 Re Rumla Nagayan, 1 Weir 496.
178 Ram Prasad v State, AIR 1952 All 878 [LNIND 1952 ALL 136] , p 879 : (1952) Cr LJ 1551 .
179 Abdul Kadar v Abdul Kasim, AIR 1932 Cal 459 , p 460 : 33 Cr LJ 517.
180 Mulluckchand Sheikh v King, AIR 1949 Cal 104 : 50 Cr LJ 135.
181 Mustan v King-Emperor, AIR 1924 Rang 106 , p 107 : 25 Cr LJ 553.
Page 9 of 9
182 Re Kheja Mahommad, 3 ILR Mad 179 : 1 Weir 286.

183 R v Ram Prasad, 33 ILR All 773 : 13 Cr LJ 532.
184 Queen-Empress v Bhogya, Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cas 148.
185 Ibid.
186 Maqsud Hussain v Emperor, AIR 1924 All 9 : 24 Cr LJ 711.
187 Amir Hassan v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pat 4141 : 41 Cr LJ 810.
188 Refer to section 261 of the Second Report of the Law Commission.
189 Mustaffa Rahim v Motilal Chunilal, 10 Cr LJ 160.
190 Jhulan Sain v R, 40 ILR Cal 548 : 14 Cr LJ 117.
191 Katwaru v State, (1976) Cr LJ 943 : (1976) All Cr C 26.
192 Umar Din v Emperor, AIR 1915 Lah 409 , p 412 : 16 Cr LJ 683.
193 Subramania Ayyar v Venkata Ayyar, 6 ILR Mad 254.
194 Ghasita v Kalka, 5 AWN 49.
197 Amanat v Emperor, AIR 1922 All 184 (2) : 25 Cr LJ 72.
198 Gopal Chandra Choudhary v State, (1971) Cr LJ 1008 (Cal).
End of Document
[s 298] Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious
feelings.—

15.1 Introduction
another.1
class.
Page 2 of 9
[s 298] Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings.—
[s 298] Uttering words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound religious

feelings.—
Whoever, with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of any person, utters any word or
makes any sound in the hearing of that person or makes any gesture in the sight of that person or places, any
object in the sight of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
Andhra Pradesh.—In Andhra Pradesh the offence is cognizable vide A.P. G.O. Ms. No. 732, dated 5-12-1991.
[s 298.2] Scope
This section punishes the doing of certain acts with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of
any person. It is much wider in scope than section 295 and includes any action which is known to wound the
religious feelings of others.199
The offence relates to oral words, uttered, in the presence of a person, with the intention of wounding his
religious feelings. This section can, therefore, have no application where the grievance relates to a written
article, published in a weekly.200
In England, at Common Law, it is an indictable misdemeanour “to speak or otherwise publish any matter
blaspheming god, eg, by denying his existence or providence to contumeliously reproaching Jesus Christ, or
vilifying or bringing into disbelief or contempt or ridicule, Christianity in general, or any doctrine of the Christian
religion or the Bible”.201 There have also been some statutes on the subject.202 But the opinions of the judges
have of late changed with respect to the essential elements of the offence, and the gist of the offence is not
now considered to be in holding an opinion contrary to the general tenets of Christianity, or the particular
doctrines of the Church of England, which may be heretical, but in the mode of expressing it. Now it is not
blasphemy with due gravity and propriety to contend that the Christian religion, or any part of its doctrine, or the
whole or any part of the Holy scriptures, is untrue.203 With regard to this section the Indian Law Commissioners
observed:204
In England, an attempt to convert any one from the religion of the country by the most gentle and dispassionate
address, is by law an offence; to attempt the same thing by contemptuous or vituperative language is an offence which
would be severely punished in practice. But the reason is that conversion is not recognised as a legitimate object. The
law assumes the truth of Christianity. But it is manifest that the law and the legislature of this country cannot assume
the truth of any religion. And, as free discussion, or, in other words, attempts to conversion, is the best criterion of the
truth of anything, the truth or falsehood of which is not already assumed by law to be beyond controversy, it seems to
follow that a bona fide attempt to convert ought not in this country to be treated as a crime, even though the intention to
convert be an intention to do so by wounding the religious feelings of the persons addressed. We apprehend it is
almost impossible to convert a sincere or ardent votary of any faith without wounding his religious feelings in the early
stages of the process.
Page 3 of 9
[s 298.4] Object
With reference to the object of this section, the authors of the Code said:
In framing this clause we had two objects in view: we wish to allow all fair latitude to religious discussion, and at the
same time to prevent the professors of any religion from offering, under the pretext of such discussion, intentional
insults to what is held sacred by others. We do not conceive that any person can be justified in wounding with
deliberate intention, the religious feelings of his neighbours by words, gesture or exhibitions. A warm expression
dropped in the heat of controversy or an argument urged by a person not for the purpose of insulting and annoying the
professors of a different creed, but in good faith for the purpose of vindicating his own, will not fall under the definition
contained in this clause.
[s 298.4.1] Gist of the Offence
The gist of the offence is the intention to wound the religious feelings of another, which may be by uttering a
word or making a sound in his hearing, or making a gesture or placing any object, in his sight.
[s 298.5] Relative Scope of Sections 295 and 298, Indian Penal Code, 1860
See also synopsis 8 under section 295A. This section is one of the five sections (295–98) in chapter XV dealing
with offences relating to religion. It will be useful to compare the provisions in the other sections as regards the
criminal intention or knowledge requisite for the commission of the offence. Section 295, IPC deals with
destruction, damage or defilement of a place of worship either with the intention of insulting the religion of any
class of persons or with knowledge that such insult is likely to result. Section 295A, IPC which was inserted by
the Amending Act of 1927, speaks of “deliberate and malicious intention” of outraging the religious feelings of
any class of person. Section 296, IPC refers to voluntary disturbance of any religious assembly and the
expression “voluntarily” as defined in section 39 would include either intention or knowledge. Similarly, section
297, IPC refers both to the intention and knowledge. It will thus be seen that while sections 295, 296 and 297
require either guilty intention or guilty knowledge as specified in those sections, sections 295A and 298, IPC
require “deliberate intention”. Section 295A goes further and requires even proof of malice before a conviction
can be sustained under that section. As to what the Legislature meant by the words “deliberate intention”
occurring in this section, an indication may be found in the report of the Select Committee, on whose
recommendation section 295A was inserted in the IPC. It is stated there that the essence of the offence is:
That the insult to religion or the outrage to religious feelings must be the sole, or primary, or at least the deliberate and
conscious intention. We have accordingly decided to adopt the phraseology of section 298 which requires deliberate
intention in order to constitute the offence with which it deals.205
[s 298.6] “With the Deliberate Intention”
Section 298, IPC makes it an offence if anyone with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings
of any person, utters any word or makes any sound in the hearing of that person.206 The essence of the offence
consists in the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of other persons. A mere knowledge of the
likelihood that the religious feelings of other persons may be wounded would not suffice, nor a mere intention to
wound such feelings, unless that intention was deliberate.207
Mere allegation in the complaint that the statement was deliberately made without any supporting material to
Page 4 of 9
show that there was a deliberate and malicious intention to outrage the religious feelings of any class of citizens
of India or of any person would not be sufficient to draw the proceedings under sections 295A/298 IPC. The
malicious intention should either be shown to exist or should be apparent from the nature of the act alleged to
constitute an offence.208
The intention to wound the religious feelings of another must, in order to convict a person under this section, be
a deliberate one.209 Referring to certain objections to this action, the Law Commissioners said:210
We understand these instances to be mentioned as indicative of the strictness with which the definition is to be
construed, so as not to make a person criminally liable for words, etc, wounding the religious feelings of another,
unless a deliberate intention so to wound his feelings be unequivocally manifested, as it would be by mere railing and
abuse, and by offensive attacks upon his religion, under the pretext of discussion, without any argument which an
impartial arbiter could possibly believe to have been addressed to him in good faith merely for the purpose of
convincing him of the truth. It is here to be observed, that it is not the impression of the offended party that it is to be
admitted to decide whether the words uttered deserve to be considered as insulting, and whether they were uttered
with the deliberate intention of insulting; these are points to be determined upon cool and calm consideration of the
circumstances by the judge. The intention to wound must be deliberate, that is, not conceived on the sudden in the
course of discussion, but premeditated. It must appear, not only that the party, being engaged in a discussion with
another on the subject of the religion professed by that other, in the course of the argument, consciously used words
likely to wound his religious feelings, but that he entered into the discussion with the deliberate purpose of so offending
him. In other places in the Code, a party is held guilty if he causes a certain effect, the causing of which is an offence,
intending to cause that effect, or knowing that his act was likely to cause it. Here, there is a marked difference;
although the party uttering offensive words might be conscious at the moment of uttering them that they were likely to
wound the feelings of his audience, yet if it were apparent that he uttered them on the spur of the occasion, in good
faith, simply to further his argument—that he did not take advantage of the occasion to utter them in pursuance of
deliberate purpose to offend—he would not, we think, be liable to conviction under section 298. If, however, a party
were to force himself upon the attention of another addressing to him, an involuntary hearer, an insulting invective
against his religion, he would, we conceive, fall under the definition, for the reasonable inference from his conduct
would be, that he had a deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of his hearer.
With reference to the offence of blasphemy which is analogous to this offence, Russell observes that:
The wilful intention to insult and mislead others, by means of licentious and contumelious abuse offered to sacred
subjects or by wilful sophistry calculated to mislead the ignorant and unwary, is the criterion and test of guilt. A
malicious and mischievous intention, or what is equivalent to such an intention in law as well as morals—a state of
apathy and indifference to the interests of society—is the broad boundary between right and wrong.211
Section 298 IPC is a penal provision which requires strict interpretation. Complaint was filed with allegations
that the accused Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works is depicting picture of Lord Ganesh on its Bidi product as a
result of which the religious susceptibility of Hindus were being hurt. It was also alleged that the accused was
utilizing the name of the said pious deity for his commercial benefit. It was further alleged that after smoking of
Bidi the residue is thrown on the roads and on the other filthy places and the said residues are trampled under
Page 5 of 9
the shoes, which hurt the religious sentiments of Hindus and brings disrepute to the deity. Held, the allegations
made in the complaint were general allegations, the act is not using the trade mark with deliberate intention to
hurt the religious feeling and sentiments of Hindus. The accused was not summoned.212
[s 298.6.1] Intention has to be Inferred
The deliberate intention has undoubtedly to be inferred from the words spoken, the place where they were
spoken and the persons to whom they were addressed and other surrounding circumstances.213 In R v
Boulter,214 on an indictment for blasphemous speeches, Phillimore J, directed the jury as follows:
A man is free to speak and teach what he pleases as to religious matter, though not as to morals. He is free to teach
what he likes as to religious matters even if it is unbelief. But when we come to consider whether he has exceeded the
limits, we must not neglect to consider the place where he speaks, and the persons to whom he speaks. A man is not
free in a public place where passersby who might not willingly go to listen to him knowing that what he was going to
say might accidentally hear his words, or where young people might be present. A man is not free in such places to
use coarse ridicule on subjects which are sacred to most people in the country. He is free to use arguments.
[s 298.6.2] Insult in the Course of Argument—Inference Regarding Intention
It is true that the offence of blasphemous libel in English law is not the same as the offence described in this
section but wilful intention which is the essential ingredient of the former offence is almost synonymous with
deliberate intention required for the offence under this section and in considering whether certain words were
said with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of persons, the observations of Phillimore J,
quoted above, are very helpful.215 When a man, in the course of an argument, uses insulting words to another,
it is impossible to suppose that he does so without the intention of insulting him. It is not to be believed that he
uses them in good faith simply for the purpose of convincing or persuading the person with whom he is arguing.
In such a case the intention is to be inferred from the character of the words. Again, when words, not positively
insulting in themselves, are used in a manner clearly evidencing a deliberate intention to insult the religious
feelings of another, the case will fall within the clause. But it will not be an offence when any person arguing
with another on the subject of his religion says, what is likely to wound his religious feelings in good faith, simply
for the purpose of convincing the person with whom he is arguing, of what he believes to be the truth.216
[s 298.6.3] Premeditated Intention
Where the intention to wound was not conceived suddenly in the course of discussion but premeditated,
deliberate intention may be inferred. Similarly, if the offending words were spoken without good faith by a
person who entered into a discussion with the primary purpose of insulting religious feelings of his listeners,
deliberate intention may be inferred.217
[s 298.6.4] Requirement in Case of more Intentions than One
In doing a particular act, a person may have more intentions than one and to hold him guilty of the intention
required for a particular offence, it must be further shown that the intention specified in that offence was the real
or dominant intention.218
[s 298.6.5] Intention and Motive
Motive is not to be confused with intention. If a man knows that a certain consequence will follow from his act, it
must be presumed in law that he intended that consequence to take place, although he may have had some
quite different ulterior motive for performing the act. Killing of a cow in the presence of Hindus would lead to a
wounding of their religious feelings, and the accused must be supposed to have intended the necessary
consequences of his acts and is guilty under this section.219
Page 6 of 9
In a case the accused were charged under section 295, IPC, in that they, Hindus, removed some old building
materials belonging to a mosque, and thereby insulted the religious feelings of Mahommedans. They were
acquitted on the finding that the mosque was, or at any rate its roof was, in a rotten condition, and that no one
had any particular claim to it. The complainant having applied to the High Court for revision, it was held that
there was no reason to believe that one of the defendants in acting as he did, had any intention of insulting the
religion of the Mahommedan residents of the village, or that he did so even with the knowledge that any class of
persons was likely to consider the removal of the materials as an insult to their religion.220
To throw a shoe on the ground adjacent to food prepared for a feast by caste Hindus, for the purpose of
depriving them of expected meal, has been held not to constitute an offence within the section, or section
504.221
Killing a goat and exposing its flesh for sale in the presence of Mahommedans does not amount to an offence
under this section, as the Mahommedans do not revere goats.222
Where the accused called out to a gathering of members of a certain caste at a dinner, that they would be
eating cow’s flesh if they did not admit a certain woman to the caste, and in consequence the guests left their
food untouched, it was held that no offence under this section had been committed.223
Where a woman, having given birth to an illegitimate child, went to the house of the person whom she alleged
to be its father and threw upon him the clothes which she had been wearing at the time of her confinement, it
was held that this was no offence under this section as it treats offences relating to religion and not those
relating to caste.224
[s 298.7] Religious Feelings
The IPC does not define religious feeling but it is evident that religious feeling can mean nothing more or less
than that associated with a person’s religious ideas.225
[s 298.7.1] Religion
In Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar,226 their Lordships of the
Supreme Court have held that religion is a matter of faith with individuals or communities and that a religion
undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that
religion as conducive to their spiritual well being, but it would not be correct to say that religion is nothing else
but a doctrine or belief. It has been further pointed out in that decision that a religion may not only lay down a
Code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and
modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might
extend even to matters of food and dress.
[s 298.7.2] Cow Slaughter—Considerations arising therefrom
In view of the observations in Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar,
the idea of slaughter of cows which is repugnant to the Hindus universally cannot be held to be a mere
superstition. Such repugnance is nothing but a part of the religious idea of all who profess the Hindus religion.
In Mahommad Hanif Quareshi v State of Bihar,227 the Supreme Court has held that sacrifice of a cow even on
the Bakr-id day is not an obligatory overt act of a Mussalman to exhibit his religious belief and idea. Even if it be
conceded that the accused persons as Muslims were under a religious compulsion to sacrifice a cow on the
occasion of Bakr-id Day, it must be noted that their rights to do such acts are subject to some important
limitations under Article 25(1) of the Constitution. If follows that Mahommedans can pursue their religious
practices so as not to wound the feelings of others which might cause a breach of public order, ie, the public
Page 7 of 9
tranquility.
[s 298.7.2.1] Cow Slaughter in Privacy
Where a cow is slaughtered by Muslims in a place which cannot be said to be a public place at a time when it
might be anticipated that there would be no one to overlook, and without uttering any insulting gestures, it
would not be possible to say that the Muslims slaughtered the cow with the deliberate intention of wounding the
religious feelings of the Hindus.228 But if a Mahommedan slaughters a cow or a bull in broad day-light in an
open place in full view of the Hindus, he must be deemed to have done the act with a deliberate intention to
wound the religious feelings of the Hindus and would be liable under this section.229
[s 298.8] Procedure
The offence under this section is non-cognizable. A summons shall ordinarily issue in the first instance. It is a
bailable and compoundable offence. It can be tried by any magistrate or summarily.
In a prosecution of an offence under this section, the following form of the notice under section 251, CrPC may
be adopted:
That on or about the…………… day of…………… at…………… you uttered the words…………… (mention them) in
the hearing of…………… (name the person) [(or made a sound, to wit…………… in the hearing of……………) (or
made a gesture in the sight of……………) (or placed an object, to wit…………… in the sight of……………)] with the
deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of the said person and thereby committed an offence under
Ans. Yes
[s 298.9] Proof
(1) the accused uttered some words or made some sound in the hearing of the complainant or made a
gesture or placed any object in the sight of the complainant; and
(2) he did so with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of the complainant.
Page 8 of 9
To hold a person guilty of an offence under section 298, IPC, the prosecution must establish affirmatively that
the act was done with the deliberate intention of wounding the religious feelings of some person. It is true that
intention has to be gathered from the conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances. Bt a mere
knowledge of the likelihood that the feelings of other persons might be hurt, would not suffice to bring their act
within the mischief of section 298, IPC.230
1 Note JP 136.
199 Mir Chittan v Emperor, AIR 1937 All 13 , p 14 : 38 Cr LJ 202; Chakra Behera v Bata Krushna Mohapatra, AIR 1963 Ori
23 [LNIND 1962 ORI 17] : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 712 .
200 Shalibhadra Shah v Swami Krishna Bharati, (1981) Cr LJ 113 (Guj) : (1980) Guj LT 116 (Guj) (DB).
202 Ibid, pp 1758–59.
203 R v Ramsay and Foote, (1883) 48 LT 733 ; R v Bontta, (1909) JP 12 ; Bowman v Secular Society Ltd, (1917) AC 436
(HL).
205 Narayan Das v State, AIR 1952 Ori 147 , p 151 : 53 Cr LJ 772.
206 Shailbhadra Shah v Swami Krishna Bharti, (1981) Cr LJ 113 : (1980) Guj LT 116; Mangalore Ganesh Bedi Works v
Gokalesh Pathak, 2008 Cr LJ 4673 (All) : 2010 (1) Crimes 476 : (2008) ILR 2 All 581.
207 Narayan Das v State, AIR 1952 Ori 147 , p 151 : 53 Cr LJ 772.
208 Mudassir Ullah Khan v State of UP, 2013 Cr LJ 3741 , p 3742 (All) : 2013 (2) ACR 2020 : 2013 (3) ADJ 108 [LNIND
2013 ALL 45] : 2013 (5) All LJ 73.
209 Habibulla, 1899 PR 4 .

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210 Second Report 1847, section 252.

212 Managlore Ganesh Beedi Works v Gokalesh Pathak, 2008 Cr LJ 4673 , p 4675 (All).
213 Narayan Das v State, AIR 1952 Ori 149 [LNIND 1951 ORI 39] ; Gulab v State, (1955) Cr LJ 168 .
214 R v Boulter, (1908) 72 JP 188 .
215 Narayan Das v State, AIR 1952 Ori 149 [LNIND 1951 ORI 39] , p 151 : 53 Cr LJ 772.
217 Narayan Das v State, AIR 1952 Ori 149 [LNIND 1951 ORI 39] .
218 Sinaswamy Selvanayagam v King, (1951) AC 83 .
219 Mir Chittan v Emperor, AIR 1937 All 13 , p 14 : 28 Cr LJ 193.
220 Queen-Empress v Rahman, 13 AWN 144.
221 R v Moti Lal, 24 ILR All 155.
222 Kirpa Singh v R, 12 Cr LJ 601.
223 Queen-Empress v Dagadi, Ratanlal Unrep Cr Cas 592.
224 Tukaram v Zeli, 6 CPLR 7.
225 Kitab Ali Munshi v Shanti Ranjan Deb, AIR 1965 Tripura 22 : (1967) 2 Cr LJ 134 .
226 Commr, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282 [LNIND 1954 SC
69] .
227 Mahommad Hanif Quareshi v State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 [LNIND 1958 SC 58] .
228 Shiekh Amjad v Emperor, AIR 1942 Pat 471 : 21 ILR 21 Pat 315 : 44 Cr LJ 30.
229 Mir Chittan v Emperor, AIR 1937 All 13 : 38 Cr LJ 202; Kitab Ali Munshi v Shanti Ranjan Deb, AIR 1965 Tripura 22 :
(1965) 2 Cr LJ 134 ; Mahommad Hanif Quareshi v State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 [LNIND 1958 SC 58] : (1958) SCJ
975 .
230 Chakra Behra v Balakrushna Mohapatra, AIR 1963 Ori 23 [LNIND 1962 ORI 17] , p 24.
End of Document
[s 299] Culpable homicide.—
> R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code > Chapter XVI Of Offences Affecting the Human Body
Chapter XVI Of Offences Affecting the Human Body

Having so far dealt with offences against the State and the public generally, the Code now proceeds to deal with
offences against the person, property, status and reputation of individuals.
This chapter deals with “offences affecting the human body”. These offences are grouped as follows:
(a) offences affecting life (sections 299-311);

(b) causing miscarriage, injuries to unborn children, exposure of infants and concealment of births (sections
312-318);
(c) hurt (sections 319-338);
(d) wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement (sections 339-348);
(e) criminal force and assault (sections 349-358);
(f) kidnapping, abduction, slavery and forced labour (sections 359-374);
(g) rape (sections 375, 376, 376A-376E); and
(h) unnatural offences (section 377).
16.1 “Life” as under Section 45
The first group of offences, affecting the human body, consists of offences affecting life. The word “life” denotes the
life of a human being unless the contrary appears from the context. In this part of the Code, there is nothing to the
contrary and, therefore, “life” simply means the life of a human being.
16.2 “Human being”
A new-born child becomes a human being for the purpose of criminal law when “any part of that child has been
brought forth though the child may not have breathed or been completely born” (section 299, Explanation 3, IPC).
The test of separate existence, which is essential to a human being, in the theory of law (whatever it may be in
medical science) is the answer to the question “whether the child is carrying on its being without the help of the
mother’s circulation?” If yes, then it has a separate existence even though it may not be fully born; if no, it has no
such separate legal existence.1 The causing of the death of a child in a mother’s womb is, therefore, not homicide
(Explanation 3), but an offence under sections 312, 313, 315 or 316, IPC.
16.3 “Homicide”
The killing of a human being by a human being is termed homicide.2 It may be lawful or unlawful homicide. Under
section 299, IPC, homicide becomes culpable when a human being terminates the life of another in a blameworthy
manner. Culpability depends on the knowledge, motive and the manner of the act of the accused. The offence is
punishable under either section 302, or section 304 which consists of two parts.3
16.3.1 Lawful Homicide

Page 2 of 52
Homicide is not unlawful if it falls within any of the general exceptions in Chapter IV. Lawful homicides may be
classified as:
(a) justifiable homicide, and
(b) excusable homicide.
(a) Justifiable Homicide
Justifiable is of several kinds as it may be occasioned by the performance of acts, required by law or done by the
permission of law. Thus, it may be homicide by:
(i) a person who is bound, or by a mistake of fact, in good faith, believes himself bound, by law (section 76,
IPC);
(ii) a Judge acting judicially in the exercise of any power which he possesses, or in good faith, he believes to
possess, under law (section 77, IPC);
(iii) a person acting in good faith and in pursuance of a judgment or order of a court (section 78, IPC);
(iv) a person who is justified, or by a mistake of fact, in good faith, believes himself to be justified, by law
(section 79, IPC);
(v) a person acting without any criminal intention to cause harm and in good faith to avert other harm to
person or property (section 81, IPC); or
(vi) a person exercising his right of private defence (section 103, IPC).
(b) Excusable Homicide
Homicide is excusable in the following cases:
(i) where death is caused by accident or misfortune, and without any criminal intention or knowledge in the
doing of a lawful act, in a lawful manner, by lawful means, and with proper care and caution (section 80,
IPC);
(ii) where death is caused by a child, or a person or unsound mind, or an intoxicated person, in the
circumstances mentioned in sections 82, 83, 84 and 85, IPC; or
(iii) where death is caused unintentionally by an act done in good faith, for the benefit of the person killed,
when:
(a) he if a minor or lunatic, his guardian has expressly or impliedly consented to such an act (sections 87-
88, IPC), or
(b) where it is impossible for the person killed to signify his consent, or where he is incapable for giving
consent, and has no guardian from whom it is possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be
done with benefit (section 92, IPC).
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16.3.2 Unlawful Homicide 16.3.2.1 Species of Unlawful Homicide
There are four species of unlawful homicide:
(i) Culpable homicide—Defined and explained in sections 229 and 301. Attempt to commit such offence
(section 308). Punishment (section 304).
(ii) Murder—Defined and explained in section 300. Punishment (section 302). Aggravated murder (section
303). Attempt to murder (section 307). A special variety of murder (thugee) (sections 310 and 311), dacoity
with murder (section 396).
(iii) Suicide—Abetment thereof and punishment (sections 305-306)
• Attempt to commit suicide and the punishment (section 309).
(iv) Dowry death punishable under section 304B.
(v) Homicide by a rash or negligent act—Punishment (section 304A).
Unlawful homicide is not to be compared with “culpable homicide” which expression is used, in this Code, in a
technical sense as denoting the offence defined in section 299. The offence under section 304A is an unlawful
homicide, but it does not amount to “culpable homicide” (section 304A).
OF OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE

Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death,
commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Illustrations
(a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge that
death is likely to be thereby caused. Z, believing the ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed.
A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it. A, intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely to
cause Z’s death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offence;
but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.
(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B, who is behind a bush; A not knowing that
he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as
he did not intent to kill B, or to cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.
Explanation 1.—A person, who causes bodily injury to another, who is labouring under a disorder, disease or
bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
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Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person, who causes such bodily injury, shall be
deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment, the death
might have been prevented.
Explanation 3.—The causing of the death of a child in the mother’s womb is not homicide. But it may amount to
culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the
child may not have breathed or been completely born.
[s 299.1] Scope
This section defines culpable homicide broadly,4 ie, culpable homicide simpliciter, and not culpable homicide
not amounting to murder;5 it lays down that acts, which fall within the definition given, constitute the offence of
culpable homicide. At this stage, the law is not concerned whether the acts described amount, or do not
amount, to murder. All that is said is that they amount to culpable homicide, which is a wider offence than that
of murder, as all acts of culpable homicide do not amount to murder though, of course, all acts of murder are
acts of culpable homicide6 because culpable homicide is the genus, while murder is a species of culpable
homicide. What is left out of culpable homicide, after the special characteristics of murder have been taken
away from it, is culpable homicide not amounting to murder.7 “Culpable homicide” is the genus and “murder” is
its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides” but all “culpable homicides” are not “murders”.8
In the scheme of the IPC “culpable homicide” is genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder” is “culpable
homicide” but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, “culpable homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder is
culpable homicide not amounting to murder”.9
The offence of culpable homicide defined by this section, involves the doing of an act (a) with the intention of
causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (c) with the
knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. If death is caused in any of these three circumstances, the
offence of culpable homicide is said to be committed. The existence of the three circumstances (a), (b) and (c)
distinguishes homicide, which is culpable, from homicides which are lesser offences or which are excusable
altogether. The killing comes within the second part of section 299, which relates to intention of causing bodily
injury likely to cause death, it comes under section 304, Pt I, and if there is no intention but only knowledge, that
is to say, if there is no intention to cause death or a bodily injury likely to cause death, but only knowledge that
the death is likely to be caused, the offence is under section 304, Pt II.10
“Culpable homicide” may or may not amount to “murder”, in terms of section 300 of IPC. When a “culpable
homicide is murder”, the punitive consequences shall follow in terms of section 302 of IPC while in other cases,
that is, where an offence is “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”, punishment would be dealt with under
section 304 of the IPC.11
Intent and knowledge in the ingredients of the section postulate the existence of a positive mental attitude and
this mental condition is the special mens rea necessary for the offence. The guilty intention in the first two
conditions contemplates the intended death of the person harmed or the intentional causing of an injury likely to
cause his death. The knowledge in the third condition contemplates knowledge of the likelihood of the death of
the person.12
[s 299.2] Law of Australia
Homicide is “unlawful” or “culpable” unless it is authorised, justified or excused at law. Examples of lawful
homicide include accidental killings, killings in legitimate self-defence or defence of others, and, in certain
circumstances, killings done during the exercise of a lawful power of arrest, the prevention of the commission of
a crime, or in the defence of property. In Queensland, lawful homicide may also include the provision of
palliative care. Suicide is no longer a crime in Australian jurisdictions, and therefore neither is attempted
suicide. However, assisting another person’s suicide may result in criminal liability for homicide. Homicide
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offences may also include crimes such as dangerous or culpable driving causing death.13
In R v Boreman case, the deceased, John Reid, occupied a flat above the flat occupied by the appellants
Boreman and Michael Byrne in Plumstead. On the evening of 4 April 1996 there was a fight between Boreman
and the deceased which resulted in both sustaining some injury. The appellants Michael Byrne and Malcolm
Byrne (no relation) were both in the house later that night. At approximately 4 am the three appellants were in
the deceased’s flat when an ugly incident took place during which the deceased received substantial injuries
from being kicked and hit by pieces of wood. At 5 am the Fire Brigade were alerted and arrived to find the
deceased at his flat badly burnt.
The prosecution case was that the appellants had intended to kill or seriously injure the deceased before the
fire and that the injuries he then received were an operative and substantial cause of death. They also sought
to show that the appellants had set the fire deliberately in any event. The defence case, in general terms, was
that the injuries sustained before the fire were not life threatening and the fire itself, which the defence
submitted was the sole cause of death, was accidental. Michael and Malcolm Byrne argued that if there was a
joint enterprise in the deceased's flat, they withdrew before the serious injuries were inflicted and lacked any
intent to cause serious harm.
Held, the attack was a joint enterprise, that each was a party to the common purpose to inflict grievous bodily
harm, that grievous bodily harm was in fact inflicted in furtherance of the joint enterprise and that these injuries
were a substantial and operating cause of death, even though the immediate and precipitating cause of death
was the inhalation. Moreover they must have considered and rejected the defences of self-defence and
provocation. Conviction on the charge of murder was held proper.14
[s 299.3] Three Forms of Culpable Homicide
For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the IPC practically
recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, “culpable homicide of the first
degree”. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in section 300 as “murder”. The second
may be termed as “culpable homicide of the second degree”. This is punishable under the first part of section
304. Then, there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the
punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable
homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of section 304.15
The IPC recognizes two kinds of homicide: (1) Culpable homicide, dealt with between sections 299 and 304,
IPC; and (2) Not culpable homicide, dealt with by section 304A, IPC.
When an act or omission of an accused caused the death of any person, he or she is either guilty of culpable
homicide or guilty of not culpable homicide. It is for the court to determine on the evidence whether, if it is
culpable homicide, it amounts to murder as explained in section 300 of the IPC (along with all its clauses) or not
as explained in section 304 IPC. If culpable homicide cannot be proved, then it would fall in the category of
“not-culpable homicide”.
When there is a death of a human being, it may either be culpable homicide (amounting to murder or not
amounting to murder) or not culpable homicide, but it is a homicide nevertheless.16
[s 299.4] Crucial Question
Commentary under the same heading in section 300, post, may be referrred to.
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[s 299.5] Essentials of Culpable Homicide
Culpable homicide consists of three elements: (a) death of a human being; (b) which is caused by the physical
conduct of a person; and (c) the mental attitude of that person towards the consequences of such conduct. In
other words, where one is charged with the offence of culpable homicide, three facts have to be established.
First of all, it must be proved that the person, alleged to be victim of the offence, is dead; secondly, that he died
by the means alleged on the part of the prosecution; and thirdly, that the accused intentionally took that part in
causing his death which is attributed to him by the prosecution.17 So, the mental element in culpable homicide,
ie, the mental attitude of the agent towards the consequences of his conduct, is one of intention or knowledge.
Motive is immaterial, so far as the offence of culpable homicide is concerned, and therefore, it need not be
established.18 The intention refers to either the death itself or a bodily injury which is likely to cause death, ie, an
injury dangerous to life, whilst the knowledge refers to the death itself. There are, thus, three species of mens
rea in culpable homicide: (a) an intention to cause death; (b) an intention to cause a dangerous injury; and (c)
knowledge that death is likely to happen. Illustrations (a) and (b) to section 299, IPC, give examples of culpable
homicide accompanied by the first or third species and illustration (c) shows that unless one or other of the
three species is present, there can be no culpable homicide.19 The first class of culpable homicide is causing
death by doing an act with the intention of causing death; such an offence is also prima facie murder within the
express words of section 300. The second class of culpable homicide is causing death with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; this section, in defining this class of culpable homicide,
does not dealt with knowledge at all, and knowledge and intention must not be confused. The third class of
culpable homicide is causing death by an act with knowledge (on the part of the offender) that he is likely, by
such act, to cause death.20
[s 299.6] Section 299, Section 300 and Section 304A
Commentary under the same heading in section 300 post, may be referred to.
[s 299.7] “Murder” Distinguished from “Culpable Homicide”
[s 299.8] Clause “Secondly” of Section 300 Distinguished from the Second Clause of Section 299
[s 299.9] Clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 Distinguished from the Second Clause of Section 299
[s 299.10] Clause (c) of Section 299 and Fourth Clause of Section 300
All accused may not be liable for culpable homicide. If it cannot be proved that it was the accused who caused
the death of the deceased person, there can be no conviction.21 Thus, even when it is clear that one of the two
persons must have caused the death, but it is not clear as to which of them did so, both must be acquitted.22
The expression “whoever causes death”, read along with section 9, IPC, means one, where death is caused by
one person, and more where death is caused by more than one person.
Where death is caused by the act of one person, but with the assistance of others, he alone is guilty of culpable
homicide under section 299, IPC, but the others would be punishable, as if they had caused the death, under
the provisions of sections 34-38.23 Where three persons attack another with lathis, not upon a sudden quarrel,
but in concert and after previous consultation, they must be deemed to be acting with a common intention and
each one’s act must be presumed to have been done in furtherance of the common intention.24 However, for
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this to be the case, the death must have been caused “in furtherance of the common intention of all”.25
If death is caused by one person but it was not the common intention of all the persons to cause death, the
others are not liable therefore, ie, where the common intention is to give a beating, and no more, and one of the
parties kills the victim.26 In a case, four accused persons joined in beating another. Only the two older accused
struck him on the head and those blows caused his death. The two younger men struck him on the body, but
not with exceptional violence. There was no original design to kill the man. It was held that the two younger
accused, who did not themselves strike fatal blows, did not realise that they were joining in a murder, or how
grave the injuries inflicted by their older comrades were, and they were not, therefore, liable for murder.27
Some other instances are given below:
(a) Where the two accused persons assaulted the deceased not with motive to murder but to commit the
robbery successfully, an offence under section 394, IPC, was made out against them, the first accused
having caused death of the deceased was also liable for offence under section 304, Pt II, IPC.28
(b) Where the accused were chasing the son of the deceased with intention to kill, the deceased interfered
and got killed instead, since the accused had no intention to kill the deceased, the accused who
inflicted the fatal injury on head of the deceased was convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC instead of
section 304, Pt I, the other accused who inflicted sword injury which was simple injury was committed
under section 324, IPC.29 Where the accused persons had right of private defence but exceeded it,
accused attacked the prosecution witness with bhala and thrust the bhala in his abdomen causing
grievious injuries and the co-accused gave fatal blow with a deadly weapon and caused death, the
former accused was held liable under section 326 read with section 322, IPC while the co-accused was
held guilty under section 304, Pt I, IPC.30
(c) Where the two accused persons attacked the deceased with a hunting sickle and dagger, the evidence
showed that the co-accused first attacked and after he stopped beating the deceased the accused
stabbed him. The injuries caused by the accused were fatal and led to the death of the deceased,
conviction of the accused for murder under section 302 was found proper, however, considering the
nature of attack, weapon used and injuries caused, the conviction of co-accused was altered to one
under section 304, Pt I, IPC.31
(d) Where the accused caught hold of the deceased while the co-accused inflicted a knife blow on him, the
accused was convicted under section 326 read with section 34 while conviction of co-accused was
altered from section 302, IPC to section 304, Pt I, IPC.32
(e) Where the accused persons went to the house of the complainant armed with lathis to belabour them,
the main accused not a member of the assembly picked up a heavy stone weighing about 15 kgs and
dropped it from the roof of his house on the head of the deceased who arrived there, he alone was
found guilty of an offence under section 304, Pt II, IPC and the other accused persons were not held
guilty of offence under section 304, Pt II, IPC read with section 149, IPC, however, there was no
sufficient evidence with regard to the formation of assembly and causing injury to the complainant and
the others, so, the conviction of the other accused persons under sections 323/149, IPC, was found
proper.33
(f) Where accused no. 1 hurled the bomb at the deceased and killed him, the conviction of accused no. 1
under section 302 of IPC and sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 was found
proper. Similarly, accused no. 2 who hurled a bomb on a prosecution witness but his wife came in the
middle to save her husband, the bomb hit the wife and she succumbed to her injuries, conviction of
accused no. 2 under section 304, Pt II of IPC and sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act
was found proper. Accused no. 3 hurled a country-made bomb towards the victim but missed him by
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chance, the act of accused no. 3 was an attempt to kill and so accused no. 3 was held liable to be
convicted under section 307 of IPC and sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act.34
Where co-accused caused simple injury with an axe and the main accused caused stab-injury, on a vital part of
the body of the deceased, the co-accused was convicted under section 324, IPC and the main accused under
section 304, Pt II, IPC, as each accused was found to have acted individually and not in concert.35 Where the
accused persons assaulted the deceased causing his death, the prosecution could not establish common
intention of accused persons, accused no. 1 who had used an iron pipe and had a given blow which proved to
be a simple injury and accused no. 3 who had given stick blows and inflicted injuries were convicted under
section 324, IPC, accused no. 2 who pelted stones and caused voluntary hurt was convicted under section 323,
IPC, and accused no. 4 who inflicted pipe-blow which landed on head of the deceased was convicted under
section 304, Pt II, IPC.36
Cases frequently arise where the death could not have occurred but for an act on the part of the accused, but in
which he had been excused on the ground that some other person intervened and appeared to have been the
more immediate and direct cause of the death and that the death was not the consequence of what the
accused did, but was the consequence of what the intervener did. But if one person is engaged in murderously
beating another to death and a stranger, without sharing the common intention, rushes in and adds some more
blows so that the victim’s death is more speedily brought about, then it is a case where both would be guilty of
murder and the first man cannot be allowed a defence that it was the second assailant’s stroke that finally
ended the victim’s life.37 The mere fact of presence at a murder, committed by another, is, therefore,
insufficient,38 but if coupled with some conduct, which renders aid, it is enough.39 The aid rendered must be to
the killing. Thus, assistance in the disposal of the dead body, or by not giving information of the murder, is not
enough though such conduct constitutes offences under sections 201 and 202 irrespectively.40
[s 299.12] “Causes Death”
Death must be the result or consequences of the physical conduct, or, inversely, the conduct in question must
be the cause of death. As observed by Mayne:41
… any act is said to cause death within the meaning of s 299 when the death results either from the act itself or from
some consequences, necessarily or naturally flowing from that act, and reasonably contemplated as its result.
Where, without the intervention of any considerable change of circumstances, the death is connected with the
act of violence by a chain of causes and effects, the death must be regarded as proximate, and not too remote,
a consequence of the act of violence.42 In order that a person should be guilty of culpable homicide, it is
indispensable that the death of the deceased should be connected with the act of violence or other primary
cause; not merely by a chain of causes and effect, but by such direct influence as is calculated to produce the
effect without the intervention of any considerable change of circumstances.43
[s 299.13] Explanation 1: Accelerating Death or Killing Person Labouring under Disease
A person, causing bodily injury to another, who is labouring under a disorder, disease, or bodily infirmity, and
thereby accelerating the death of that other, is deemed to have “caused his death”.44 This is what Explanation 1
to this section states. As explained by Morgan and Macpherson:45
An offence, affecting the life of a person, who must soon die either from a mortal disease or in course of nature from
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old age and decay, is not a less offence than one which affects the life of a person in strong health. The offender
causes death, in one case, by accelerating that event by a few months, or days, or hours; in the other case, possibly,
he hastens the event by many years. The real difference between the two cases is not in point of law, but in respect of
the degree of proof, requisite to show the cause of death. From where the death of a person, who receives some bodily
injury, while labouring under a disease, is the subject of enquiry, the court, in estimating the evidence, must consider
whether it is sufficiently proved which of the two causes, the disease or the bodily injury to the deceased person, is the
cause of his death on the day when his death occurs.
It is not necessary (if it were possible) that the evidence should enable the court to apportion the two causes
and the degree in which each of them contributes to the result. But the court must be satisfied: (1) that the
death, at the time when it occurs, is not caused solely by the disease; and (2) that it is caused by the bodily
injury to this extent that it is accelerated by such injury. Suppose A is ill of small-pox and Z gives him pills in
such doses that the disease is aggravated and death is accelerated. Z has caused death, notwithstanding that
it may be proved that A must have eventually died of the small-pox.
Likewise, if A is very ill with fever and B, intending his death, administers large doses of opium, thereby
accelerating A’s death, B kills A.46
The explanation assumes that the bodily injury was inflicted with the intention of causing death or the
knowledge that it would be likely to cause death. It was only intended to repeat the English rule that an injury,
which accelerates the death of a dying man, is deemed to be the cause of it and where death has been caused,
it is no defence that the deceased was suffering from a complaint which would have caused his death in any
event. Section 300(2), IPC, makes it clear that the offender is not responsible for death in such a case, unless
he knows that the condition of the deceased was such that his act was likely to cause death.47 Thus, where the
injury, inflicted by the accused, was not such as is likely to cause death, but death ensued because the heart of
the deceased was weak and dilated, and the accused had no intention to cause death and did not know that
the deceased was suffering from heart disease, it was held that the offence did not amount to culpable
homicide under this section.48 But when the right lung of the deceased was TB affected, the combined effect of
alcohol consumed by him and the injuries inflicted by the accused shortened the period of death and resulted in
quicker death. The conviction of the accused under section 304, Pt II, IPC was found proper.49
[s 299.14] “Death”
The word “death”, in this section, means the death of a human being (section 46, IPC). But a person can be
said to cause death of a human being only if that human being was alive before his death was caused. In other
words, death can be caused only of a living human being. This is made clear by Explanation 3 to this section.
This explanation declares that the causing of the death of a child in the mother’s womb is not homicide, but it
may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child if any part of that child has been brought
forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born.50 The child may have breathed while in
the mother’s womb, but it does not itself prove that such breathing necessarily took place after it had wholly or
partially emerged from its mother’s womb.51
[s 299.15] Death Must be Caused
Proof of the death of a person, alleged to have been murdered, is the first essential to a conviction of murder.
This is established by the finding of the body. Sir Mathew Hale once observed:
I will never convict any person of murder unless there is any trace of the body or unless the body is found.52
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The first part of section 304, IPC applies where there is guilty intention, whereas the second part applies where
there is guilty knowledge. But before an accused is held guilty and punished under the first part or second part
of section 304, IPC, a death must have been caused by him under any of the circumstances mentioned in the
five exceptions to section 300, IPC, which include death caused while deprived of power of self-control under
grave and sudden provocation, while exercising in good faith the right of private defence of person or property,
and in a sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation. When death itself had not been caused there
is no occasion for convicting the accused under section 304 of the IPC.53
[s 299.16] Death Caused May be of any Human Being
The section does not say that the intention must be to cause the death of a specific human being. It is sufficient
if the death of any human being is in contemplation or known to be likely. Consequently, there may be: (a)
complete indifference as to who, in particular, is killed; or (b) the death of a specific individual may be in
contemplation, but it is another who is actually killed.54
[s 299.17] Death May Not be of any Particular Person
That, there may be complete indifference as to who, in particular, is to be killed, is clear from illustration (a) to
the section. If a person buries a bomb in a frequented path, where it is almost certain that it will be tread on and
explode and cause the death of any one treading on it, and if it does, infact explode and cause death, that
person is guilty of murder unless he can explain his action in such a way as to negative the inference as to his
intention which the nature and circumstances of the act suggest. It is not at all necessary that he should intend
to cause the death of any particular person.55
[s 299.18] Death of Person Not Intended to be Killed
The section does not require that the offender should intend to kill (or know himself to be likely to kill) any
particular person. It is enough if he “causes the death” of any one by doing an act with the intention of “causing
death” to anyone, whether the person intended to be killed or anyone else. The language is perfectly general
and all that it requires, is that there should be an intention to cause death, or a knowledge that death is likely to
be the result, and there is nothing which would require that the homicidal intention or knowledge must be with
reference to the life of the person whose death is actually caused. The law affords protection equally to the lives
of all persons, and once the criminal intention, ie, an intention to destroy human life, is found, there is no reason
why it should make any difference, whether the act, done with such intention, causes the death of the person
aimed at or of someone else. Section 301 also supported this construction as it assumes that the accused, in
such cases, would be guilty of culpable homicide.56
Where the accused hurled a bomb on the prosecution witness, the wife of the witness came in the middle to
save her husband as a result of which the bomb hit the wife and she succumbed to her injuries, conviction of
the accused under section 304, Pt II, was found proper.57
[s 299.19] Death Due to Supervening Causes
Certain kinds of injuries are not immediately followed by serious consequences; an injured person may die after
a long or short period and his death may be as much a consequence of the injury as if it had taken place on the
spot. Similarly, an aggressor is as responsible as if the deceased has been directly killed by his violence,
provided the fatal result can be traced to the probable consequence of the injury. No doubt, when death is so
caused by remote or indirect causes, it might be difficult to establish the mens rea, which is necessary for the
offence of murder, the more remote the cause, the less possible it would be to show that the accused intended
or realised the result. However, where the intention to cause death is clearly made out, it does not matter that
death was caused directly, but by a chain of consequences, each following upon the other in the processes of
nature, and not being an unexpected complication causing a new mischief. Thus, where the accused stabbed
his wife in the back and injured her spinal cord, and the injury resulted in paralysis of the lower limbs and the
bladder, followed by cystitis and bed sore, and the woman died after several months, it was held that death was
caused by the injury, inflicted by the accused, and he was guilty of murder.58 In Re Dorasamy Servai,59 it was
held that when an injury to the head sets up septic pneumonia, which results in death, the person, who inflicts
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the blow on the head, cannot be absolved from the consequences of his crime by saying that his victim died of
pneumonia, and not of the blow on the head, and that, by calling the consequences of an injury a disease, one
cannot alter the nature of the consequential results of the injury. The court, after referring to a number of
English and Indian cases, observed that the test is whether the cause of death is to be directly associated with
the act. It further remarked that it would be a strange position if a man, who inflicts a wound, causing almost
immediate death, should be held guilty of murder while a man, who inflicts a similar wound, from which
pneumonia supervenes, should not.60 In two Lahore cases,61 it was held that if a person receives grievous
injuries and dies from pneumonia, which supervenes as a result of them, the perpetrators of the attack on him
are guilty of murder. In a Sind case, where the accused attacked a person with murderous weapons and
inflicted dangerous wounds and, although the wounds had somewhat healed up, blood poisoning intervened
and the person died of brain fever, it was held that the wounds were the cause of death within the meaning of
this section.62
[s 299.20] Proximate Cause of Death—Death Due to Complication or Development
An act is said to cause death when death results from the act itself or from some consequences necessarily or
naturally flowing from the act, and reasonably contemplated as its result. Where, without the intervention of any
considerable change of circumstances, death is connected with the act of violence of a chain of causes and
effects, death must be regarded as the proximate, and not a remote, consequences of the act. The cause must
not only be the cause sine qua non, but it must also be a cause reasonably proximate; but the doctrine of
criminal causation has reasonable limits. An injury may lead to death. Death may be instantaneous; it may be
delayed. The injury may lead to shock, excessive bleeding, coma, syncopation, etc, and cause death. In such a
case, injury and death have a clearly perceptible and direct nexus and there will be no difficulty in finding that
death is the direct result of injury. The decision may not be so easy in a case where death is caused not directly
by the injury itself but due to a complication or development or in a case where death is not instantaneous but is
delayed. Where death is delayed or due to a later complication or development, court has to consider the
nature of the injury, complication or development and attendant circumstances. If the complication or
development is the natural or probable or necessary consequence of the injury and if it is reasonably
contemplated as its result, the injury can be said to have caused death. If, on the other hand, the chain of
consequences is broken or if there is an unexpected complication, causing new mischief, the relation of cause
and effect is not established, or the causal connection is too remote, and the injury cannot be said to have
caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused
by a complication, naturally flowing from the injury, and not the injury itself, since causal connection is
proximate.63
[s 299.21] “By doing an act”
For the application of section 299, IPC, death must be the result or consequence of an act, done by the
accused, or, inversely the act of the accused must be the cause of the death. The act, or physical action, is the
means of causing death.
An act, which is the cause of the death, must not be confused with a prior act which is merely one of
preparation. Thus, if A, B, and C go armed to certain land, on which cultivators are at work, in order to enforce
their supposed rights, and a quarrel ensures in which A kills one of the cultivators with a blow of a dao intending
to kill him, they are guilty of murder. But the cause of death is the blow, and not the previous action of A, B and
C in arming themselves and going to the land. In Reaz-ud-din Shaikh v Emperor,64 going armed to the land was
held to be an act done with the knowledge that death was likely and, therefore, within the ambit of sections 299
and 300. But the act likely to cause death must, by the terms of section 299, be “such act”, ie, the act which
caused the death. The blow of the dao was the cause of death, and not the arming and assembling on the land.
[s 299.22] “An act” includes a Series of Acts
The word “act”, as used in sections 299 and 300, read with section 33 of the IPC, denotes not only a single act,
but also a series of acts taken as a single act. When a number of persons participate in the commission of a
criminal act, the responsibility may be individual, that is to say, each person may be guilty of a different offence,
or all of them may be liable for the total result produced. This would, however, depend on the intention and
knowledge of the participants. The subject is then covered by sections 34, 35 and 38 of the IPC. Thus, if two
persons beat a third person and one intends to cause his death and the other to cause only grievous injury and
there is no common intention, their offences will be different. But this would not be the case if the offence is
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committed with a common intention.65
Under section 33, IPC, the word “act” denotes a series of acts as well as a single act. But, for an act to amount
to culpable homicide, it must have caused the death of a living human being and it must have been done with
the intention or knowledge specified in this section. In a series of acts, the first act may not have caused death
and the subsequent act, which caused the death, may have been done only to cause disappearance of the
body of the victim, believed to be already dead, or to show that he committed suicide. In such cases, the law
may be stated thus:
where the first act is done without any intention to kill, or knowledge that it is likely to cause death, and the second act,
which causes the death, is done in the belief that the victim is already dead, the accused is not guilty of culpable
homicide or murder, but of hurt or grievous hurt.66
But if the first act is done with the intention of killing, or with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, and
the second act, which causes the death, is so closely connected, in time and purpose, with the first that the two
acts form parts of the same transaction, the accused is guilty of culpable homicide whether, when doing the
second act, he believed that the victim was already dead or was completely indifferent as to whether the victim
was alive or dead.67
[s 299.23] Accused Hitting and Making Victim Unconscious, Believing him Dead doing act Leading to Death of
Victim—Effect and Instances
In Empress v Khandu Valad Bhawani,68 the accused struck the deceased three blows on the head with a stick.
The deceased fell down senseless on the ground. The accused, believing that he was dead, set fire to the hut,
in which he was lying, with a view to remove all evidence of the crime. The medical evidence showed that the
blows, struck by the accused, were not likely to cause death, and did not cause death, and that death was
really caused by injuries from burning when the accused set fire to the hut. The majority of the judges (Parsons
J, dissenting) held that as the accused undoubtedly believed that he had killed his victim, “there would be a
difficulty in regarding what occurred from first to last as one continuous act, done with the intention of killing the
deceased, and that the accused should be held to have committed only the attempt to murder, punishable
under section 307. In Emperor v Dalu Sardar,69 it was held that the accused was not guilty of murder on a
finding that he had first assaulted the deceased, without any intention of causing death, and subsequently,
believing her dead, had suspended her body by the neck by a piece of string tied to the roof of the house. It
was found that, in fact, death was not caused by the previous assault, but by the hanging. A conviction was
inflicted under section 325, IPC. But in an earlier case, where one person struck the deceased a blow, which
knocked him down, and then he and the other accused, without inquiring as to whether he was dead, in haste,
hung him up to a tree so as to make it appear that he committed suicide, all the accused were convicted of hurt.
But the High Court quashed the proceedings and directed the accused to be re-tried on charges of murder,
culpable homicide not amounting to murder and hurt.70 In Re Shreenarayan,71 the accused struck the deceased
a single blow on the head and she fell down bleeding from the nose and became senseless. The accused
thought that she was dead and burnt the body. It was held that the accused were not guilty under section 302,
but were liable to be convicted under section 304, Pt 2, for acting with gross negligence and thereby causing
death. In Re Thavamoni,72 the accused assaulted a woman, with the intention of causing her death, and
believing her to be dead, though, in fact, she was not, threw her body into a well where she was found dead.
The High Court, following the decision in Re Kaliappa Goundan,73 held the accused guilty of murder since the
intention of the accused was, from the beginning to cause the death of the deceased. In Nehal Mahto v
Emperor,74 in which the facts were strikingly similar to those in the case of Kaliappa Goundan v Emperor,75 the
Patna High Court, agreeing with that decision, held that the accused were guilty of murder, and the same view
was taken in Lingaraj Das v Emperor,76 and it was held that if the intention is to kill, the offence is one of murder
even if the killing takes place by a series of acts in two stages.77 In Emperor v Gujjan Singh,78 the accused
struck the deceased two or three times on the head and, when the latter fell down unconscious, threw him face
down into a pool, containing a few inches of water, removed the contents of his pockets and covered the body
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with the branches of a tree. Later on, the accused carried the body of the deceased in a dhoti and threw it into a
canal. On these facts, it was held, by a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court:
The action being continuous and it being impossible to resolve the two incidents into two wholly separate actions,
inspired by different motives and committed for different reasons, we are of opinion that the accused must be treated
as having done one act with the intention of causing death and as having succeeding in carrying out his object.
[s 299.24] “With the Intention of Causing Death”
The word “intention” means the mental attitude of the man who decides to bring about a certain result. Every
act is followed by consequences. The consequence, necessary to constitute the offence of culpable homicide,
is death. By “intention” is meant the expectation of the consequence in question79 and intention does not,
therefore, necessarily involve premeditation or thinking out the killing before hand.80 An accused may “intend”
certain injuries albeit he may not know or intend the serious consequences of those injuries. But the injuries in
order to be “intentional” should not be such which the appellant in the heat of passion and without any previous
enmity happened to just cause, but should at least be such, for causing which the appellant infact strove.
“Intention” is purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end. It is the mental attitude of a man who has
resolved to bring about a certain result, if he can possibly do so. It is shaping of one’s conduct to achieve a
particular end at which he aims.81 A man expects the natural consequences of his acts and, in law, is presumed
to intend them.82 If, therefore, a person, in performing some act, either: (a) expects death to be the
consequence thereof; or (b) expects a dangerous injury (ie, a bodily injury likely to cause death) to be the
consequence thereof; or (c) knows that death is a likely consequence thereof,83 and, in each case, death
ensues, his intention in the first two cases, and his knowledge in the third case, renders the homicide culpable.
A guilty intention or knowledge is, thus, essential to this offence, and if this does not exist, the killing cannot
amount to culpable homicide.84 The law does not regard every case of homicide as prima facie murder; it
throws on the prosecution the burden of proving an intent or knowledge.85 Where, therefore, there is nothing
more than a fatal result to indicate an intention to cause death, etc, and no weapon has been used, it is unsafe
to convict a person of murder.86 In certain classes of injuries, resulting in death, eg, injuries of which death is
not a natural or ordinary consequence, there must be, in order to support conviction for murder, a specific
finding of the intention to cause death.87 However, under the IPC, no constructive, but actual intention is
required.88
[s 299.24.1] Intention or Knowledge
In order to read either intention or knowledge, the courts have to examine the circumstances as there cannot be
any direct evidence as to the state of mind of the accused.89
[s 299.24.2] Assault from Blunt Side of Axe
Accused belonging to scheduled tribes and inhabitant of tribal area committed the murder of his wife. There
were frequent quarrels between the accused and the victim. On the date of incident the accused under
provocation assaulted his wife from the blunt side of the axe. Since he did not assault from the sharp cutting
side of the axe, he could not be imputed with intention to cause the death of the deceased. His conviction under
section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, IPC, a sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment
already undergone by him was found sufficient.90
[s 299.25] Motive not Required to be Proved
Motive for doing a criminal act is generally a difficult area of prosecution. One cannot normally see into the mind
of another. Motive is the emotion which impels a man to do a particular act. Such impelling cause need not
necessarily be proportionally grave to do grave crimes. Many a murders have been committed without any
known or prominent motive. It is quite possible that the aforesaid impelling factor would remain undiscoverable.
Lord Chief Justice Champbell struck a note of caution in Reg v Palmer91 thus:
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But if there be any motive which can be assigned, I am bound to tell you that the adequacy of that motive is of little
importance. We know, from experience of criminal courts that atrocious crimes of this sort have been committed from
very slight motives; not merely from malice and revenge, but to gain a small pecuniary advantage, and to drive off for a
time pressing difficulties.
In some cases, it may not be difficult to establish motive but in other cases, inferences from circumstances may
help in discerning the mental propensity of the person concerned. There may also be cases in which it is not
possible to disinter the mental transaction of the accused which would have impelled him to act. No proof can
be expected in all cases as to how the mind of the accused worked in a particular situation. Sometimes, it may
appear that the motive established is a weak one. That by itself, is insufficient to lead to any inference adverse
to the prosecution.92 Motive for the crime rarely affects the worth of evidence of the eyewitnesses.93 When facts
are clear, it is not necessary to prove motive. The motive, which induces a man to do any particular act, is
known to him, and to him alone, or possibly to the deceased and it is impossible to establish it. At the most, the
prosecution can only suggest as to what may have been the motive for any particular act.94 Failure of the
prosecution to establish the motive for the crime does not mean that the entire prosecution case has to be
thrown overboard. It only casts a duty on the court to scrutinise the other evidence, particularly the evidence of
eyewitnesses.95 The fact, that the prosecution has failed to lead such evidence, has this effect only that the
other evidence, bearing on the guilt of the accused, has to be very closely examined.96
Motive, the absence of which cannot absolve the accused from the commission of crime,97 nor does it call for
any leniency in sentence,98 is relevant and important on the question of intention;99 it does not, however,
acquire much significance where the offence can be proved by other evidence,100 or when the case is based on
ocular testimony of witnesses.101 The fact, that the apparent motive was too flimsy, is, therefore, no reply to the
unshaken testimony of credible and natural eyewitnesses102 because the question of motive becomes more or
less academic where the direct testimony, regarding assault, it worthy of credence.103 Sometimes, it may
appear that the motive established is a weak one. That by itself is insufficient to lead to any inference adverse
to the prosecution.104 It must, however, be remembered that if motive, as a circumstance is put forward, it must,
like any other circumstance, be fully established.105 If motive is proved by the prosecution, the court has to
consider it and see whether it is adequate.106
Inequitable distribution of property undoubtedly provides an adequate motive for murder,107 but no inference of
motive can be drawn merely from the existence of claims put up by kins to family property.108 Where the
accused killed the entire family of his uncle, the motive alleged by the prosecution was elimination of
successors of half share of property. The plea of the defence that the motive alleged was not plausible as
person to whom deceased had bequeathed property by Will was not killed. This was rejected because no
material was brought forth to show that the accused knew of the Will.109
[s 299.26] Motive—Sound Proposition and Unsound Suggestion
Though it is a sound proposition that every criminal act is done with a motive, it is unsound to suggest that no
such criminal act can be presumed unless motive is proved. After all, motive is a psychological phenomenon.
Mere fact that prosecution failed to translate the mental disposition of the accused into evidence does not mean
that no such mental condition existed in the mind of the assailant. In Atley v State of Uttar Pradesh110 it was
held:
…that is true, and where there is clear proof of motive for the crime, that lends additional support to the finding of the
court that the accused was guilty but absence of clear proof of motive does not necessarily lead to the contrary
conclusion.
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[s 299.27] Motive not Essential Ingredient of Offence
It must be remembered that motive is not an essential ingredient of an offence111 and the question of motive
need not be considered when the evidence is clear that the particular accused was the assailant112 and,
therefore, there is no burden of proof on the prosecution to establish the existence of any motive.113 It is true
that motive is not an essential ingredient of the offence of murder and when there is direct evidence about the
commission of the offence, motive loses its significance and recedes in the background.114
[s 299.28] In the Face of Direct Evidence Motive Loses Significance
Simply because it is not possible to find out the exact motive, the direct evidence cannot be disbelieved if it is
reliable.115 When there is direct evidence of a reliable character, no question of motive can arise.116 It is now
well settled that in cases in which there is direct testimony, motive loses much of its importance and the court
has to decide the case on the basis of the evidence of direct witnesses.117 Once it is established by other
evidence that the offence was committed, the absence of motive becomes entirely immaterial and cannot be
used as a mitigating circumstance in connection with the measure of sentence to be imposed.118
[s 299.29] Existence of Motive is Important in Cases of Circumstantial Evidence
Existence of motive, even if not an essential component in proof of the offence,119 assumes importance only
where direct and credible evidence is not available and the case rests upon circumstantial evidence.120 Where
the prosecution evidence disclosed that there was a long-standing dispute over property between the accused
and the deceased, the accused had strong motive to kill the deceased.121 Where only circumstantial evidence is
available at the outset, one normally starts looking for the motive of crime122 as it is relevant in making the
prosecution story probable123 and helps in determining the conduct of the accused at the time of committing the
offence.124 Undoubtedly, in cases of circumstantial evidence, motive bears important significance. It is
sometimes difficult to unlock the motive from the mind of the accused. People do not act wholly without motive.
The failure to discover the motive of an offence does not signify its non-existence. The failure to prove motive is
not fatal as a matter of law. Proof of motive is never indispensable for conviction. When facts are clear, it is
immaterial that no motive has been proved, therefore, absence of proof of motive does not break the link in the
chain of circumstance connecting the accused with the crime nor militates against the prosecution case.125
[s 299.30] When Motive to Implicate Accused and Motive to Kill by Accused are Equally Balanced
Discovery of motive for the crime is not imperative in every case.126 When the motive to implicate accused on
prosecution side as well as the motive to kill on the part of the accused are equally balanced, the court should
look to the surrounding circumstances.127
[s 299.31] Knowledge of Motive Different from Suspicion of Motive
If motive is known and established, it is a strong piece of evidence against an accused. However, knowledge of
motive is different from suspicion of motive. When there has been a dispute between an accused and the
deceased, the implication of the accused on the basis of suspicion of there being a motive for the crime cannot
be ruled out.128
[s 299.32] Motive alone is Insufficient to Fasten Guilt
There can be no conviction on mere vague evidence of motive.129 In the absence of any reliable evidence,
motive alone is insufficient to fasten guilt.130 It is wholly insufficient, even if coupled with other circumstances,
when the evidence of eyewitnesses is wholly unacceptable,131 or when evidence on other important, issues is
unreliable.132
[s 299.33] Motive Distinguished from Intention
Motive should be distinguished from intention. Intention refers to consequences produced by the act or
omission of the offender, while motive refers to inducement for producing such consequences.133
[s 299.34] “With the Intention of Causing such Bodily Injury as is Likely to Cause Death”
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Both the first and second clauses of this section require intention. But the intention, required by the two clauses,
is not the same. The intention, required by the first clause, is to cause death, whereas the intention required by
the second clause, is only to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Where the intention is to
cause death, the offence is murder unless the case falls under one of the exceptions, mentioned in section
300.134 If an exception does apply, the first part of section 304 will regulate the punishment.135 Where the
intention is to cause only bodily injury, it may or may not amount to murder. If the offence is culpable homicide
not amounting to murder, the punishment is still regulated by the first part of section 304, being covered by the
words “if the act, by which the death is caused, is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death”.136 When the accused were armed with lathis, the injuries caused by hard, blunt object
were found only on the hands and feet of the deceased, the accused could not be convicted for murder, so their
conviction was altered to one under sections 325 and 326.137 The bodily injury, intended to be caused, must be
such “as is likely to cause death”. To justify a conviction of culpable homicide of any sort against an offender,
who has committed an intentional act, causing bodily injury to another, and which act was intended for some
particular individual, there must, at least be a finding that the offender intended, by his act, to cause bodily
injury likely to cause death.138 Where the appellant on the spur of moment, all of a sudden inflicted one
“Hansua” blow causing death, it canot be held that the appellant committed the offence of murder within the
meaning of section 300, IPC rather it can be construed that the appellant committed the offence with the
intention of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, within the meaning of section 299, IPC.
Conviction of the appellant under section 302, IPC was modified to one under section 304, Pt II, IPC.139
Accused police officers being annoyed with the stabbing of their constable, in police custody gave beating to
the deceased causing death. Held, the accused appellant did not intend to cause death, but the act was done
with the knowledge that it was likely to cause the death of the deceased. The case falls within the Pt III of
section 299 and will be punishable under the Pt II of section 304, accordingly the accused appellant was
convicted under section 304, Pt II.140
The difference between an intention to cause death and an intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death is a difference of degrees only. The latter is a degree lower in the scale of criminality than the
former.141 In either case, the act of the accused must have caused death. The nature of weapon used, the
manner in which blows are dealt, the parts of the body on which they are dealt and the manner in which the
weapons are used are important to gather intention of the accused.
The accused after consuming alcohol had gone to the house of the deceased. There was exchange of hot
words, the accused caught-hold of the deceased by neck and dashed against the mud wall. Asphyxia and
cardiac arrest were the cause of death. There was no preparation or pre-meditation on the part of the accused.
The accused had no intention but he could be imputed with knowledge that his act was likely to cause the death
of the deceased. The accused was convicted under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC.142
Where the accused gave only one injury by iron rod on the head of the deceased, it was not clear from the
medical evidence as to whether deceased died on account of head injuries. The death of deceased could well
be on account of septicaemia, the doctor however did not clarify whether septicemia was the direct result of the
injuries, the accused surely cannot be pinned down for an offence under section 302, IPC, though he can be
held guilty under section 304, Pt II as septicemia could have been developed because of operation also.143
Where the accused caused a knife injury on the buttock of the deceased, the accused cannot be imputed with
the intention of causing death as the buttock is not a vital part of the body, more so when two injuries caused by
the accused on the person of the deceased were also not on a vital part of the body and were not of grievous
nature and were opined to be caused by a blunt object, the conviction of the accused was altered from section
302 to that under section 304, Pt II, IPC.144 Where death of the deceased was caused by a single blow by kassi
(spade), medical evidence showed that kassi blow caused damage to skull of the deceased, it can, therefore,
be said that accused caused the death by doing an act with the knowledge that he was thereby likely to cause
death, his act, therefore, would amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and would fall under
section 304, Pt I, IPC.145 Appellant accused inflicted single gun shot injury on the left side of chest resulting in
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death. The act was done with the knowledge that by such act the accused was likely to cause the death of the
deceased, the case fell under IIIrd Pt of section 299, as culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The
conviction of the appellant accused under section 302, IPC was converted into one under section 304, Pt II, a
sentence of five years rigorous imprisonment was imposed.146 Where the manner in which a stab injury on the
chest of deceased was given by the accused showed that the accused had not only the intention but also the
knowledge that injury given was likely to cause death, the conviction of the accused was altered from one under
section 302 to one under section 307, Pt I, IPC.147 Accused appellant assaulted the deceased with iron rod
causing death. The accused did not intend to cause death but he can be attributed with knowledge that his act
was likely to cause death of the victim. The conviction of the accused appellant under section 302, IPC was
altered to one under section 304, Pt II and accused was sentenced to 10 years rigorous imprisonment.148
Over the cable connection, a sudden quarrel took place between the appellant accused and the son of the
deceased. On account of heat of passion, the appellant went home; took out his father’s revolver and started
firing indiscriminately, and one of the bullets hit the deceased on her chin. The appellant had the knowledge
that the use of revolver was likely to cause death and, as such, the present case would fall within the third
clause of section 299, IPC. The offence committed by the appellant was only “culpable homicide not amounting
to murder”. The accused appellant was convicted under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC.149
[s 299.35] “Likely”—Interpretation
The word “likely” means probably. It is distinguished from possibly. When the chances of a thing happening are
even with, or greater than, its not happening, we say that the thing will probably happen. When the chances of
its happening are very high, we say that it will most probably happen. An injury sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death merely means that death will be the most probable result of the injury, having regard to
ordinary course of nature.
The expression does not mean that death must result in the case in which such an injury is caused. Therefore,
the expression “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” is a species of the genus likely. In sections 299 and
304, the word “likely” is used in a comprehensive sense as including both the higher and the lower degrees of
likelihood. In section 300, the word “likely” is used in the sense of a higher degree of likelihood. In section 300,
the word “likely” is used in the sense of a lower degree of likelihood only. In common parlance, however, the
word “likely” is used only as denoting a lower degree of likelihood. It is in this sense that the word is used in
deciding cases to distinguish between an offence falling under section 302 from that falling under section
304.150 An effect is “likely” to take place when there is a likelihood distinguishable from mere possibility. A thing
is possible when it may happen; likely when chances are in favour of its happening, and probable when the
chances are strongly in its favour. Thus, probability is the stronger degree of likelyhood. A thing may, therefore,
be likely without being probable though a thing probable must be likely.151 “The offence is culpable homicide if
the bodily injury, intended to be inflicted, is likely to cause death; it is murder if such injury is sufficient, in the
ordinary course of nature, to cause death.” The distinction is fine, but appreciable. It is a question of degree of
probability.152
[s 299.36] Explanation 2
This explanation provides that where death is caused by injury, the person, who causes it, would be deemed to
have caused the death although, by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment, the death might have
been prevented.153
In view of the Explanation 2 of section 299, IPC, no accused can raise the contention that he did not cause the
death as it might have been prevented by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment. If an accused
causes an injury on a vital portion of the body and as a result of it the victim dies, it is no defence to a charge of
murder for the accused to say that rendering of proper and expert medical assistance would have prevented
the death and so he cannot be held liable for murder.154 The principle, underlying the explanation, seems to be
that a man is responsible for the natural consequences of his conduct and the fact, that those natural
consequences might have been negatived by artificial means, does not affect the question of liability. Thus, if A
deliberately inflicts an injury on B, which is likely to result in his death by lockjaw, and if B refuses to allow a
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surgeon to perform an operation to prevent this and dies, A is guilty of killing B.155 Similarly, where an injury is
intentionally inflicted, the defence, that no proper medical treatment was given to the victim, does not exonerate
the person, who caused the injury, from the guilt of murder if he intended that the injury should be sufficient, in
the ordinary course of nature, to cause death or knew that it was likely to cause death of that person. It does
not exonerate him from the guilt of culpable homicide if death ensues as a natural or likely consequence. Such
a person is deemed to have caused the death and his degree of criminal responsibility must depend, on the
knowledge or intention to be gathered from the proved facts.156
The appellant accused had beat the deceased on his head twice, the deceased died in the hospital where he
was treated by various doctors. The plea of the accused that the deceased could have survived if proper
treatment had been given to her was rejected in view of the provisions of Explanation 2 to section 299 which
provides that where the death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be
deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death
might have been prevented.157
[s 299.37] “Intention” does not Imply Knowledge of Likelihood of Causing Death
Intention is locked up in the heart of the assailant and the inference is to be drawn from acts and attending
circumstances.158 All that the second clause of this section requires, is an intention to cause such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death. Here intention neither implies existence of previous design, nor assumes any
forethought. Nor is it necessary that the accused should have knowledge that the injury, which he intends to
cause, will be sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.159 The plain words of the second
clause of section 299, IPC, require no proof of knowledge that the bodily injury intended was likely to cause
death. The question is one of fact and may be sub-divided into two parts: (a) Was bodily injury intended? (b)
Was such bodily injury likely to cause death? If the answers to both these questions are in the affirmative, then
the offender is guilty of culpable homicide. However, when one asks whether a bodily injury is likely to cause
death, that means as a natural and probably consequence of the injury, and not as a special and abnormal
consequence of some disability, on the part of the victim, which was unknown to the offender. Thus, a blow,
with the fist upon the thyroid cartilage is not ordinarily likely to cause death; if fatal result ensues from it by
reason of some abnormal condition of the cartilage, unknown to the offender, his offence does not amount to
culpable homicide because the intention to be ascribed to him is no more than the natural and probable
consequence of his act. Similarly, in the absence of such knowledge, if a person causes death by doing an act
with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, his offence comes under section 299,
IPC and it is only if the intention was to cause bodily injury, which injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of
nature, to cause death, that the offence would come under section 300, clause (3).160
[s 299.38] Knowledge
Knowledge, as used in this section, is a word which imports a certainty and not merely a probability,161 though
intention also includes foresight of certainty.162 Knowledge, as contrasted with intention, would more properly
signify a state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which the human mind might itself remain supine or
inactive.163
[s 299.39] “Knows”, “Thinks” and Likely Consequences
“Knows” is a stronger word than “thinks”. In many cases, which unhappily arise, a person does not pause to
think, much less does he know, what degree of harm he will effect by striking a blow or blows which may
ultimately prove fatal. Some of these cases rightly result in convictions for murder because of the savagery of
the attack, or because a lethal weapon was used on a vital part of the body, as a result of which death was the
natural and probable consequence, and the injuries, intended to be inflicted, were sufficient, in the ordinary
course of nature, to cause death. However, there are other cases which end fatally and in which death was not
the natural and probable consequence because the injuries were not very severe, but were merely a likely
consequence. These causes are expressly governed by the second part of section 299; they do not amount to
murder, but are nonetheless culpable homicide.164
[s 299.40] “Intention” Distinguished from “Knowledge”
The framers of the IPC designedly used the words “intention” and “knowledge” and it is accepted that the
knowledge of the consequences which may result in doing an act is not the same thing as the intention that
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such consequences should ensue. Firstly, when an act is done by a person, it is presumed that he must have
been aware that certain specified harmful consequences would or could follow. However, that knowledge is
bare awareness and not the same thing as intention that such, consequences should ensue. As compared to
“knowledge”, “intention” requires something more than the mere foresight of the consequences, namely the
purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a particular end.
Kenny in Outlines of Criminal Law165 has observed:
Intention: To intend is to have in mind a fixed purpose to reach a desired objective, the noun ‘intention’ in the present
connection is used to denote the state of mind of a man who not only foresees but also desires the possible
consequences of his conduct. Thus if one man throws another from a high tower or cuts off his head it would seem
plain that he both foresees the victim’s death and also desires it: the desire and the foresight will also be the same if a
person knowingly leaves a helpless invalid of infant without nourishment or other necessary support until death
supervenes. It will be noted that there cannot be intention unless there is also foresight, since a man must decide to his
own satisfaction, and accordingly must foresee, that to which his express purpose is directed.
Again, a man cannot intend to do a thing unless he desires to do it. It may well be a thing that he dislikes doing, but he
dislikes still more the consequences of his not doing it. That is to say he desires the lesser of two evils, and therefore
has made up his mind to bring about that one.
Russell on Crime166 has observed:
In the present analysis of the mental element in crime the word ‘intention’ is used to denote the mental attitude of a
man who has resolved to bring about a certain result if he can possibly do so. He shapes his line of conduct so as to
achieve a particular end at which he aims.
It can thus be seen that the “knowledge” as contrasted with “intention” signifies a state of mental realisation with
the bare state of conscious awareness of certain facts in which human mind remains supine or inactive. On the
other hand, “intention” is a conscious state in which mental faculties are aroused into activity and summoned
into action for the purpose of achieving a conceived end. It means shaping of one’s conduct so as to bring
about a certain event. Therefore, in the case of “intention” mental faculties are projected in a set direction.
Intention need not necessarily involve premeditation. Whether there is such an intention is a question of fact.167
Knowledge, as contrasted with intention, would more properly signify a state of conscious awareness of certain
facts in which the human mind might itself remain supine or inactive. On the other hand, intention connotes a
conscious state in which mental faculties are roused into activity and summoned into action for the deliberate
purpose of being directed towards a particular and specified end which the human mind conceives and
perceives before itself. Mental facilities, which might be dispersed in the case of knowledge, are, in the case of
intention, concentrated and converged on a particular point and projected in a set direction.168
[s 299.41] Intention and Knowledge may Sometime Mean Same Thing

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Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is awareness of the
consequences of the act. In many cases, intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same
thing, more or less, and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge
and intention is, no doubt, thin, but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things.169 Intention
requires something more than a mere foresight of the consequences, a purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a
particular end, whereas knowledge implies awareness that certain consequences would or could not follow.170
[s 299.42] Intention, Knowledge and three Clauses of Section 299
“Intent” and “knowledge” in the ingredients of section 299, IPC postulate the existence of positive mental
attitude and this mental condition as the special mens rea condition of section 299 contemplates the intended
death of the person harmed or the intentional causing of an injury likely to cause death. The knowledge in the
third condition contemplates knowledge of the likelihood of the death of a person.171
[s 299.43] Foresight of Consequences
Foresight of consequences is the common factor in both intention and knowledge as used in the two clauses of
this section. Where consequences are substantially certain or inevitable, the doer may be credited with
knowledge of the foresight of those consequences and the act may be called intentional; but where
consequences are not so certain, criminality may be attached to those acts only where the accused could be
credited with the knowledge of foresight of such consequences only which are likely, ie, which he could
reasonably have foreseen, though he may not have desired them. The third clause is, thus, only a species of
the second clause where the degree of probability of the result being death is only foreseen as likely by the
accused. The latter requires a particular intent, while the former is satisfied with knowledge only.172
[s 299.44] “With the Knowledge that he is Likely, by such Act, to Cause Death”
Section 299, IPC enacts that the doing of an act, which causes death, is culpable homicide if it is done either: (i)
with one of the two intentions, that is to say, with the intention of causing either: (a) death, or (b) such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death; or (ii) with the knowledge that death is likely to be caused by such act.
Headings (i) and (ii) are, it will be noticed, alternative, one to the other, so that it follows that culpable homicide
may be committed without any intention on the part of the accused if he has the knowledge indicated in the said
heading (ii). Section 304 lays down as to what shall be the punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to
murder; if the act is merely done with the knowledge that death is likely to be caused thereby and without either
of the intentions, mentioned in the above heading (i), that is to say, if the case falls under the above heading (ii),
a lesser punishment is provided under the latter part of section 304.173 The word “likely” implies both higher and
lower degrees of probability. Whether the offence is culpable homicide or murder depends upon the degree of
risk to human life. If the risk is of a lower degree and death is merely a likely result, it is culpable homicide; if the
risk is higher and death is the most probable result, it is murder.174
The third clause of the section, relating to knowledge, is intended to apply to cases in which there is no
intention to cause death or bodily injury, eg, furious driving at a mark near a public road.175 A person, causing
death, even without homicidal intention, is liable if he acted with the knowledge that he is likely to cause
death.176 Even though the accused might not have the intention to cause death, his act is done with the
knowledge that it is likely to cause death, he has, therefore, committed an offence punishable under section
304, Pt II and is required to be punished for the same.177 The accused picking up a heavy stone weighing about
15 kgs and dropping it from the roof of his house on the head of the deceased could be said to have knowledge
that he vide his act was likely to cause death of the deceased and so is liable under section 304 Pt II, IPC.178
Where it was found that death had been caused by a single blow with a lathi and the other injuries, found on the
body of the deceased, did not indicate a determination to beat the deceased to death, it was held that it was not
possible to hold that death was caused by doing an act with the intention of causing death or with the intention
of causing such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, but it might be held that death was caused by the
doing of an act with the knowledge that by such act the person, who did it, was likely to cause death.179 Where
the accused stuffed a cloth into deceased’s mouth in order to silence him, and not with any idea of killing him, it
was held that the most, that can be said, is that the accused must be presumed to have known that they were
likely, in so doing, to cause his death.180
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Where the accused had no intention to cause the death but knowledge could be imputed to him that his act was
likely to cause the death of the deceased, viz the accused dashes the head of the deceased against the wall,
the accused would be convicted under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC.181
On proof of commission of the offence of gang-rape found to have been committed in a violent manner, the
accused are assumed to be having knowledge that by their action it was likely that the deceased would have
died.182 Where looking into anti-mortem injuries suffered by the deceased and the fact that as the deceased
appeared to have died as a result of the right artery being punctured at the ilium, the accused could not be
fastened with the intention of puncturing right artery at the ilium as per the first three clauses of section 300, or
the knowledge as contemplated by the fourth clause of section 300, he could only be saddled with the
knowledge of causing death of the deceased, as contemplated by section 299, IPC.183
Where the medical evidence showed that there was only one injury on the head that proved to be fatal, the
other injuries were found to be simple, the weapons used also were not deadly, it was held that under these
circumstances, it was reasonable to hold that the accused persons only had knowledge that the injuries inflicted
by them were likely to cause death, the conviction of accused persons from section 304, Pt I was altered to
[s 299.45] Presumption Regarding Intention or Knowledge
The requisite intention or knowledge, in order to render killing culpable homicide, must be clearly proved by the
prosecution,185 which can usually be done by proof of the circumstances which prove the act or omission in
question,186 because there is an accepted doctrine that a man of mature understanding is presumed to intend
the natural and probable consequences of his acts.187 This doctrine itself is based upon the presumption that a
person of mature understanding knows the natural and probable consequences of his acts. Therefore, if a
person does an act, knowing what its natural and probable consequences will be, then he is presumed to have
intended, by that act, to give rise to those consequences.188 The degree of guilt depends upon intention, and
the intention to be inferred, must be gathered from the facts proved. Sometimes, an act is committed which
would not, in an ordinary case, inflict injury sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, but
which, the offender knows, is likely to cause death. Proof of such knowledge throws light upon his intention.189
[s 299.46] Presumption Regarding Intention
The intention is to be judged by his acts in relation to the surrounding circumstances.190 The presumption of
intention must, therefore, depend upon the facts of each particular case,191 eg, when the accused inflicts an
injury with a blunt weapon, he would be liable for an offence no more serious than one under section 325,192
but, in drawing the presumption, the court must have regard to the common course of events.193 In deciding the
question of intention, therefore, the nature of the weapon used, the part of the body on which the blow is given,
the force of the blow and its number are some of the factors which assume importance. Death from a blow or
blows on the head with a heavy sharp-edged weapon is probably, as rule, associated by the villagers with
breaking of the skull, but the ignorance of the actual cause, which will bring about the victim’s death as a result
of the blow or blows, cannot affect the question of the striker’s intention. The fact, that the accused went on
striking shows unmistakably that he intended to cause bodily injury and that the bodily injury, intended to be
caused, was sufficient to end fatally.194 Where there was nothing more than a fatal result to indicate an intention
to cause death, etc., and where no weapons had been used, it was held unsafe to convict the accused of
murder.195
[s 299.47] Presumption Regarding Knowledge
The fact that knowledge of wrongful act is accompanied by indifference, whether death or serious injury is
caused, or even by a wish that it may not be caused, makes no difference.196 In a case of snake-bite, two
snake-charmers were giving a performance before a crowd and put a snake on a boy’s head. The boy tried to
pushaway the snake and was bitten on the hand with the result that he died. It was held that the snake-
charmers did not think that the snake would bite the boy, but nevertheless their act was done with the
knowledge that it was likely to cause death, thought not with the knowledge that it was so imminently
dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death. The accused were, therefore, convicted of culpable
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homicide not amounting to murder.197 Where the accused armed with a bow and arrow chased his deceased
wife and while running shot an arrow at a distance of 80 feet causing injury to her resulting in her death. It is not
possible to say that he inflicted injury with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
however, the accused who is familiar with the weapon must necessary have known that by shooting an arrow
from a bow at such a distance there is every likelihood of the arrow piercing a vital part of the body and
likelihood of causing death, it was held that accused’s act attracted the last clause of section 299, punishable
under Pt II of section 304, IPC.198 Where altercation and fight took place between the accused and deceased
and during the same the accused took out a knife from his trousers and inflicted a blow with it on the chest of
the deceased, the death of the deceased was not instantaneous, the knife used resembled only a pen-knife, no
second injury with a knife was caused, it was held that accused had not intended to kill the deceased and the
offence will fall within the ambit of Pt I of section 304 and not under section 300, IPC.199
[s 299.48] Death Caused by a Person under Voluntary Intoxication
Voluntary intoxication, while it affords no ground of exemption from liability for causing, whilst under its
influence, the death of another (section 85), may render the offence culpable homicide, and not murder.200
[s 299.49] Death as an Accidental Consequence
To cause death by an act, which is not likely to cause death, does not amount to culpable homicide, ie, death
as an accidental consequence of a man’s conduct does not render that conduct culpable homicide.201
Illustrations
(i) A is working with a hatchet, the head of which flies off and kills B on the spot. A is not liable.
(ii) A, an officer of a ship, whilst superintending its unloading by coolies, strikes at B, a cooly, with a light stick. To
avoid the blow, B springs to one side, slips, falls overboard, and is drowned. A, though guilty of an assault, is
not guilty of culpable homicide.
Section 299 and illustration (c), IPC, do away with the distinction between accidental death caused by an
unlawful act. Under the IPC, a person, who, whilst doing a lawful act, kills another accidentally, is exempted
under section 80, and if the act is an unlawful one, still he has not committed culpable homicide because
intention or knowledge, in reference to the death, is, by force of section 299, essential to this offence.202
[s 299.50] Numerous Injuries
Although, in a given case, the number of injuries on the person of the deceased may not be the determinative
factor, the same, however, is relevant.203 The number of injuries is always not determinative of the offence. It
would depend on the weapon used, place where the injuries were inflicted and the nature of the injuries.204
Where the injuries inflicted were numerous, but no bones were broken and none of the injuries individually
amounted to more than a simple hurt and they were mostly on the legs and arms, it was held that no intention
to cause death could be inferred and the assailants could only be deemed to have known that, by the beating,
which they gave, they were likely to cause the victim’s death.205 Where seven accused inflicted 24 injuries on
the deceased, about 20 of which being inflicted after the deceased had fallen down and was unconscious, it
was observed that it showed that they certainly beat him with the intention of causing such bodily injuries as
were likely to cause his or with the knowledge that, by such acts, they were likely to cause his death. In these
circumstances, all the accused were held guilty of an offence of culpable homicide punishable under section
304, IPC.206 However, when three persons set to work to beat a fourth with sticks, the blows being directed at
the head of that fourth, they must be fixed with the knowledge that they were likely to cause death.207
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Where the number of injuries found on the dead persons were many and the accused persons were not
justified in causing so many injuries so to have exceeded the right of private defence, their conviction under
section 304, Pt I, was found proper.208 Where the accused party entered the house of the complainant party
and assaulted them with lathis resulting into death of the deceased, the number and nature of injuries received
by each party pointed out that accused were aggressors.209
[s 299.51] Single Blow Causing Death
In Zahid Khan v Emperor, a Division Bench of the Oudh Chief Court observed:
Where death has been caused by a single blow with a lathi and the other injuries, found on the body of the deceased,
do not indicate a determination to beat the deceased to death, such as is indicated in many cases, it is not possible to
hold that death was caused by doing an act with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, but it may be held that death was caused by the doing of an act with the
knowledge that, by such act, the person, who did it, was likely to cause death.210
A similar view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Sardarkhan Zahidkhan v Emperor,211 in which Beaman J
observed:
Where death is caused by a single blow, it is always much more difficult to be absolutely certain what degree of bodily
injury the offender intended.
Referring to this observation in Virsa Singh v State of Punjab,212 the Supreme Court observed:
With due respect to the learned Judge, he has linked up the intent required with the seriousness of the injury, and that,
as we have shown, is not what the section requires. The two matters are quite separate and distinct though the
evidence about them may sometimes overlap. The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious
injury or a trivial one, but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did
not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires
is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible
inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is
neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict
an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question, and once the
existence of the injury is proved, the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances
warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the intention is there or not is one of fact, and not one of law. Whether the
wound is serious or otherwise, and if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and distinct question and has nothing to
do with the question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the injury in question.
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In cases of single injury, the facts and circumstances of each case has to be taken into consideration before
arriving at the conclusion whether the accused should be appropriately convicted under section 302, IPC or
under section 304, Pt II, IPC. It cannot be laid down as a general principle that in no case of single blow or
injury, accused cannot be convicted under section 302, IPC.213
Where accused caught hold of deceased while co-accused inflicted a knife-blow on him, accused was
convicted under section 326 read with section 34 while the conviction of co-accused was altered from section
302 to section 304, Pt I, IPC.214 Accused appellant gave a single lathi blow on the head of the accused,
deceased was hospitalized and died after six days. Other co-accused had not given any blow, as such were
acquitted by the courts below. There was no intention or pre-meditation in the mind of the accused appellant to
inflict such injuries to the deceased as were likely to cause his death in the ordinary course of nature. Accused
appellant was convicted under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC.215
Accused appellant gave knife blow on the vital part of the body of the deceased which proved fatal, he had
concealed the knife. He was convicted under section 302, IPC.216
It cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever a single blow is given application of
section 302, IPC is ruled out. It would depend upon several factors. In the present case the accused appellant
A1 had stabbed the deceased with a dagger on his left chest causing death on the spot. Looking to the facts
and circumstances of the case, the appellant A1 was convicted under section 304, Pt I and not under section
302, IPC.217
Where the accused gave one single katari blow in a sudden quarrel on the head of the deceased218 and where
the accused stabbed the deceased with a knife on the spur of the moment219 the conviction of the accused was
altered from one under section 302, IPC, to one under section 304, Pt II, IPC. Where the accused, after an
altercation, hit the deceased on the leg, above the ankle, with his dah with such force that he cut through the
bones and the arteries and in consequence the man died four days later in hospital, the Rangoon High Court
altered his conviction under section 302 to one under section 304, Pt I, observing:
The intention, so far as I can see, of the appellant was to cut the deceased on the leg and the cut inflicted was quite
low down near the ankle. A man, who directs a blow in this direction as a general result, would be a man who does not
intend to cause injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death because most cuts on the leg are not
injuries sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. The blow was delivered with great force, perhaps
we could say, and even residents in the jungle must be held to know that a violent blow of this nature with a formidable
weapon is likely to cause death wherever the blow may fall, but I do not think that any intention, higher than this, can
be imputed against the appellant.220
Where the accused inflicted only one pipe blow on the head of the deceased, the deceased was operated and
died 10 days later due to septicemia and other complications that set in, the accused cannot be said to have
intended to cause death for that particular injury, the conviction of accused therefore was altered from section
302 to section 304, Pt II, IPC. When the injury caused by the musal on head of the deceased221 revealed there
was no previous enmity but trivial incidents caused hot exchange of words, section 304, Pt II and not section
302 is attracted.222 Where the evidence on record disclosed that it was blunt side of the axe which was used for
dealing blow on the deceased and there was only one blow on the head of the deceased which proved to be
fatal, the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder was made out. The conviction of the accused
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under section 302 was altered to one under section 304, Pt I.223
It cannot be said as a rule of universal application that whenever one blow is given section 302, IPC is ruled
out. It would depend upon the facts of each case. The weapon used, size of the weapon, place where the
assault took place, background facts leading to the assault, part of the body where the blow was given are
some of the factors to be considered. In the present case only one blow with a small stick was inflicted and the
place where the assault took place was dimly lit. Held case was covered by section 304, Pt I, and not section
302, IPC. Ten years rigorous imprisonment was imposed.224
Where a single blow by the accused caused death of the deceased after several days, the accused is liable
under section 304, Pt II.225 Where the accused inflicted only one injury on the abdomen of the deceased, the
doctor opined that the complications may set in, in some cases and further opined that the complications may
be after the injured is admitted in the hospital, in these circumstances it is difficult to hold that the accused
intended to cause that particular injury, so clause (3) of section 300, is not attracted and the accused was
convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC.226 Where the death was caused by single blow with kassi (spade), there
was no previous enmity between the accused and the deceased. The medical evidence showed that the kassi
blow caused damage to the skull, it was held that the accused caused the death by doing an act with the
knowledge that he was thereby likely to cause the death, his act therefore, would amount culpable homicide
and not murder and would fall under section 304, Pt I, the conviction was altered from section 302 to section
304, Pt I, IPC.227 Where a quarrel took place between the accused and the victim and the accused incensed by
the situation, gave a blow with a stick, which fell on a vulnerable part of the victim’s body resulting in his death
the conviction of the accused was altered from section 302 to section 304, Pt II, IPC.228 Where, accused shot
only arrow at the deceased in the night hitting him in the stomach, the deceased died five days after the
occurrence, the accused was held guilty under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302.229
Where the manner in which a stab injury on the chest of deceased was given by the accused showed that the
accused had not only the intention but also the knowledge that injury given was likely to cause death, the
conviction of the accused was altered from that under section 302 to one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.230
Accused inflicted knife blow on the chest, vital part of body causing death of the deceased. He was convicted
under section 302, IPC and not under section 325, IPC.231
Where death of the deceased was caused by a single blow by kassi (spade), medical evidence showed that the
kassi blow caused damage to skull of the deceased, it can, therefore, be said that the accused caused the
death by doing an act with the knowledge that he was thereby likely to cause death, his act, therefore, would
amount to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and would fall under section 304, Pt I, IPC.232
However, no legal proposition can be laid down that wherever one blow by means of a lethal weapon or by a
stabbing instrument is dealt on the person of the deceased, the case would not come within the purview of any
of the clauses of section 300 defining murder and that the case would come invariably within the purview of
section 304, Pt I or Pt II, IPC. Each case would depend upon facts and circumstances.233 Accused assaulted
with darat, an agricultural implement, on the back side of head of deceased, causing cut of skull, and death.
Single injury was caused, but injury caused was imminently dangerous. Accused was convicted on the charge
of murder.234
The appellants accused persons who had assembled outside the house of the deceased were taking drinks
and causing nuisance. On objection raised by the landlords, appellant accused had inflicted single injury on
head of the deceased who had intervened with blunt-side of the axe, also assaulted another person on head.
Held, it was not a case of single injury, the appellant accused had participated in the entire incident. Accused
Page 26 of 52
[s 299.52] Single Blow Causing Death in a Sudden Quarrel
When the incident took place at the spur of the moment without any intention, the accused had given only one
blow in a sudden quarrel with the deceased, the order of the High Court acquitting him under section 302 and
convicting him only under section 304, Pt I was held proper.236 Where there was a sudden quarrel and the
accused inflicted single lathi injury on the deceased, the occurrence happened unexpectedly in a spur of
moment and in heat of passion of sudden quarrel and there was no pre-meditation, the conviction of the
accused under section 302 was set aside and accused was convicted for the offence under section 304, Pt II,
IPC.237
[s 299.53] Single Blow Causing Death in Right of Private Defence
Where the dispute arose between the accused persons on one side and the deceased on the other over
partition of the house in which they were living, the evidence showing that the deceased was angry enough,
armed with gandala and opened attack on two out of the three accused persons, there was every possibility for
the accused to have apprehended sufficient danger to himself justifying his taking recourse to protecting
himself, single blow inflicted in abdomen of the deceased by the accused snatching weapon from assailant was
not excessive use of force in his right to self-defence. So, the conviction of the accused under section 304, Pt I
was set aside.238
[s 299.54] Single Sickle Blow on Back of Deceased
On the date of the incident, all of a sudden altercation ensued between the appellant and deceased on the
issue of payment of Rs.150/- as interest amount. There was no previous enmity between the appellant and the
deceased. A single blow of sickle was inflicted by the appellant on the back of the deceased. In the opinion of
doctor, injury Nos. 1 to 9 were in the nature of “Ulcers” and indirect outcome of injury No. 10. The deceased
died two years after the incident. The doctor opined that the deceased had not died due to direct result of injury
No. 10 sustained by him. The conviction of the appellant under section 324, IPC was affirmed. In view of the
mental agony and financial sufferings, the sentence of three years imposed by the High Court was reduced to
the period already undergone.239
[s 299.55] Single Gun Shot Injury on Waist
Appellant accused caused a single shot injury to the deceased on waist. The accused was convicted under
section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC.240
[s 299.56] Single Lathi Blow Causing Death
A blow on the head with a lathi is certainly likely to cause death and the person, who inflicts a lathi blow on the
head of another person, must be presumed to have the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death. But it does not necessarily follow that a lathi blow on the head is always sufficient, in the ordinary
course of nature, to cause death.241 Similarly, it cannot be accepted that whenever death is on account of a
single blow, offence is one under section 304, and not section 302.242 It would depend upon weapon used, size
of it in some cases, force with which blow was given, part of body it was given and several such relevant
factors.243 The nature of offence where there is a single injury could not be decided merely on the basis of a
single injury and thus in a mechanical fashion. The nature of the offence would certainly depend upon the other
attendant circumstances which would help the court to find definitely about the intention on the part of the
accused. Such attendant circumstances could be very many, they being: (i) whether the act was pre-meditated;
(ii) the nature of weapon used; (iii) the nature of assault on the accused. In the instant case the accused
plunged the screw driver. When the screw driver was plunged into the vital part of the body of the deceased, it
cut his liver and spleen, injury was 12 cm deep. This was a case where the act was done with intention of
causing bodily injury and the body injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, covered by “Thirdly” of section 300 of IPC. The conviction of the accused under section 302 and
not under section 304, Pt II, IPC was held proper.244
[s 299.57] Single Blow by Bamboo
Where the appellant accused inflicted single blow with broken bamboo stick on the deceased caused death on
the place of occurrence, he was convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC and sentenced to five years rigorous
imprisonment.245
Page 27 of 52
[s 299.58] Single Blow by Yoke
The accused and the deceased were on inimical terms. The accused gave single blow of yoke to the deceased
in night, caused single injury which proved fatal. The accused appellant was convicted under section 304, Pt
I.246
[s 299.59] To Beat a Person after he has Fallen Down
To beat a person after he has fallen down does not necessarily prove the intention of causing his death. Certain
factors will have to be considered, for instance, the number of blows, the nature of those blows, and the parts of
the body on which those blows have been inflicted.247 Where the assailants took undue advantage of the fact
that the victim was not armed and gave several blows on his head with lathis and the beating continued even
after the victim had fallen down, it was held that the accused were guilty of murder, and not of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.248 Where, even after the deceased fell down after receiving injuries, he was
not spared but the accused, further assaulted him, such conduct of the accused is consistent with an intention
to kill the deceased.249 In such cases, the possibility of the accused causing injuries in exercise of private
defence is ruled out.250
[s 299.60] Strangulation
When a man kneels on the body of another and presses his throat with great violence, he knows that he is
likely to cause death and if death results from strangulation, the knowledge merges into intention and he is
guilty of murder under section 300, firstly, unless he can obtain the benefit of any of the exceptions to section
300. However, where death was not due to strangulation, but no internal bleeding due to rupture of an enlarged
spleen, it was held that the knowledge stopped short of intention and the offence committed was culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.251 Where, in a sudden unpremeditated attack, the accused seized hold of
the deceased and strangled him to death, it was held that it could not be said that the injury, intended to be
inflicted, was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, but the act of the accused was done
with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death, and that he was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder.252
Under Explanation (3) to section 299, IPC, it is necessary to prove not only that the child breathed and was,
therefore, a living child, but also that it breathed after it had, wholly or partially emerged from its mother’s womb.
In the absence of definite proof of the child being alive and having breathed after it was born, the mother cannot
be convicted of culpable homicide.253 Immediately on delivery of a child, the mother suffers from a mental
depression, verging on temporary insanity, and she may not be in a position to observe the condition of the
child minutely at birth. So, unless it is otherwise proved beyond reasonable doubt that the child was born alive,
it is unsafe to convict the accused (mother) of murder. The standard of proof should be commensurate with the
gravity of the crime. In India, infanticide is included in murder.254
[s 299.61] Dangerous Injuries
A person plunging a dangerous weapon, like a knife, into a vital part of the body, will be deemed to intend to
cause such injury as, he knew, was likely to cause death.255 A person, who voluntarily inflicts injury such as to
endanger one’s life, must always, except in the most extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, be taken to
know that he is likely to cause death. If the victim is actually killed, the conviction, in such cases, should
ordinarily be of the offence of culpable homicide.256
What is the injury intended to be inflicted by the accused can be ascertained, unless the accused admits that he
intended to inflict a particular injury, only by the nature of the weapon or weapons used, by the seriousness of
the injury caused, and by the parts of the body on which the wounds are inflicted. Whether such injuries are
likely to cause death or are sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, would depend again on
the different degrees of probability. If death is the most probable result, it would be murder.257 When a grown-up
person, in full possession of his senses, stabs another person on the stomach in the region of the umbilicus,
inflicting a wound three inches long and causing the intestines to protrude through it, and that injury is found by
medical officers to be a very serious injury with very little chance of survival, and when death also has occurred
as a result of that injury, it would amount almost to judicial misconduct to hold that there was no intent on to
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cause such bodily injury as the assailant knew to be likely to cause the death of the victim of that he had no
knowledge that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability, cause death or such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death.258
[s 299.62] Burn Injuries
By no stretch of imagination one can reasonably argue that an act of pouring kerosene on the body of a person
and setting him on fire thus resulting into injuries to the person would amount to an offence of simple injuries
punishable under section 323, IPC.259 Such an act of the accused even if done under the influence of liquor or
in the state of complete drunkenness would rule out the possibility of the said accused while committing the
offence being totally unoblivious of the fact that the act by itself was so imminently dangerous that it might, in all
probability cause death of the deceased or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.260
Where the accused poured kerosene and set the victim ablaze by lighting a match stick, after having set the
victim on fire, the accused poured water on her and also covered her with a chadar to put out the fire. The
victim died 19–20 days after the incident. In these circumstances the accused may not have had the intention to
commit murder but he certainly had the knowledge that by pouring kerosene oil on the victim and setting her
ablaze could result in her death, so the accused was found liable under section 304, Pt II, IPC, and sentence
and conviction under section 302, IPC was set aside.261
[s 299.63] Fracture of Bones
One who inflicts injuries, which cause fracture of the skull, must be held guilty of the offence of murder because
he must have intended the natural consequences of the act. A fracture of the skull, in the ordinary course of
nature, would result in death. A person is also presumed to know that a fracture of the skull is likely to result in
death.262 When, however, the surrounding circumstances of a case do not warrant the suggestion of an
intention to kill or to cause a fatal injury, the accused must, at least, be deemed to know that a blow on the head
with a weapon like kulhari (axe) is likely to cause death.263 Presumably, everybody knows that the abdomen is
the most delicate and vulnerable part of the human body, and if a man, with that knowledge, kicks the abdomen
with such violence as to cause fracture of two ribs and rupture of the spleen, which is normal, he should be
presumed to have done so with the knowledge that he, by so kicking, is likely to cause death.264
[s 299.64] Use of Firearms
Where it appeared that the accused fired a gunshot in a free fight suddenly under grave provocation where
there was a free fight between the parties for quite sometime, the accused was held guilty under section 304, Pt
II instead of section 302, IPC.265 Where the death of the deceased wife was caused by a pistol-shot fired by her
husband accused, the possibility of husband using firearm in a fit of rage owing to quarrel with the deceased
could not be ruled out, the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt I and was acquitted of the charge
[s 299.65] Use of Knife/Katari
It must be assumed that a person, who goes armed with a stabbing weapon to assault another person, against
whom he has a previous grudge, and actually strikes that person at a vital part of his body and causes his
death, intends to cause such bodily injury, as is imminently dangerous to life, and must be held guilty of
murder.267 An injury, caused, by stabbing, with a knife, which is a lethal weapon, in the abdominal region with
the result that the intestines emerge, is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, and whoever
intentionally causes such an injury is guilty of murder.268
Where the accused gave one single katari blow in a sudden quarrel on the head of the deceased269 and where
the accused stabbed the deceased with knife in a spur of the moment270 the conviction of the accused was
altered from one under section 302, IPC to one under section 304, Pt II, IPC.
[s 299.66] Squeezing Testicles
In a case, the prisoner, by gripping and squeezing the testicles of the deceased, caused them to be much
Page 29 of 52
bruised and reduced them to a pulpy condition, thereby causing an injury to them which resulted in his death. It
was held that death was a probable consequence of the prisoner’s act and that she was guilty under section
304, IPC, of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.271 Where the accused seized the deceased by his
testicles and squeezed them with considerable force and for a long time and the deceased, who was in a very
unsound bodily condition, died from the shock of the pain, and the medical evidence showed that the injury,
inflicted by the accused, would not, in normal conditions, have endangered the life of the deceased, it was held
that the accused was guilty of causing only simple hurt.272
[s 299.67] Use of Deadly or Dangerous Weapons
There is no such thing as a regular or ear-marked weapon for committing murder.273 The implements used in
carpentry are not readily such deadly weapons so as to cause, per se, any serious or a grievous hurt or injury
to the victim.274 Where a number of persons go armed with deadly weapons to attack a person or a party, it may
be assumed, as a matter of common sense, that their common intention is at least to cause grievous hurt. If, in
the course of the commission of that offence, death is caused, the persons, so attacking, will be guilty of an
offence under section 302, IPC.275 Thus, where a number of persons attacked another with sharp-edged
weapons like kripans, with object of causing him serious injuries, it was held that they must have known that
one or other of those injuries might cause death and, therefore, they were liable for murder under section 302,
by virtue of section 149.276
Tyre lever has been held to be a dangerous weapon in State of Madhya Pradesh v Manzoor Hason,277 and it
was observed that the question, whether to convict the accused under section 302 or under section 326, must
be answered with regard to the nature of the weapon used.
[s 299.68] Use of Heavy Weapons
In Karam v Empress,278 the prisoner, who had caused the death of his wife by striking her on the head with a
wooden kharwanji in the course of a sudden quarrel, was held not to be guilty of murder, but only of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. It was observed that a single blow on the head with a kharwanji is not likely
to cause the death of the person struck, nor can it be said that a person, who strikes another on the head with
such a weapon, intends to cause death or such bodily injury as is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to
cause death. If, in such a case, death does occur as a result of the injury caused, the offence committed is not
murder because none of the clauses to section 300, IPC, is applicable. If, however, a man, even in the course
of a sudden quarrel, gives a terrific blow on the head of another with a weapon, like a heavy hammer or a
heavy hatchet, and the result is that head bones are smashed to pieces, it must, on the principle that a man
intends the natural consequences of his act, be held that he intended to cause such bodily injury as he knew
was likely to cause death or that the injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient, in the ordinary course of
nature, to cause death. The offence, thus committed is, therefore, murder both under clauses secondly and
thirdly to section 300, IPC, unless some exception to that section reduces it from murder to culpable homicide
not amounting to murder.279
[s 299.69] Use of an Axe
Even the most illiterate and ignorant person would realise that a savage blow with an axe in the region of the
abdomen and spine is bound to cause death, or injury, which would result in death, and the person, who strikes
such blows, must have either intended to cause death or cause such bodily injury as would, in the ordinary
course of nature, result in death and, is therefore, guilty of murder.280
However, where the quarrel took place on the spur of the moment over a very trifling matter, there was no
previous motive to cause murderous attack, the accused lost control over his temper and assaulted deceased
with an axe, it could not be said that the accused had an intention to cause bodily injury and was likely to cause
death or to cause death, the conviction of the accused was altered from section 302 to section 304, Pt I, IPC.281
Where the evidence on record disclosed that it was blunt side of the axe which was used for dealing blow on
the deceased and there was only one blow on the head of the deceased which proved to be fatal, the offence of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder was made out. The conviction of the accused under section 302
was altered to one under section 304, Pt I.282
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[s 299.70] Use of Gandasa
The stomach is as vital a part of the human anatomy as the head, and to strike three or four blows with a heavy
chopper or gandasa on the stomach of any human being, thereby injuring the intestines and the peritoneum
and disembowelling that person, is an act which clearly shows that the assailant necessarily had the intention of
causing such bodily injury as he knew was likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused.
There is no question of the amount of force used in striking the blow on the abdomen. The very fact, that such
blows are inflicted on the abdomen with a heavy sharp cutting weapon like a gandasa or chopper, is sufficient
to make manifest the intention of the assailant that he intended to cause such bodily injury as he knew was
likely to cause the death of the victim.283
[s 299.71] Use of Dagger
Appellant accused inflicted dagger blows on face, neck and hand of the deceased causing death. FIR was
prompt, oral evidence and medical evidence, fully corroborated the prosecution case. Plea of the defence that
there were several other persons of the name of the accused appellant as such the identity of the accused was
not established was not supported by the evidence of other witnesses. Appellant accused was convicted under
[s 299.72] Use of Kulhari
Any sane person must be presumed to know that a blow on the head with a weapon, like a kulhari is likely to
cause death.285
[s 299.73] Use of Spear
Prima facie, a man, who drives a spear into the stomach of another and causes that man’s death, commits
murder.286 Injuries inflicted with a spear, are sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, or, at
any rate, likely to cause death.287
[s 299.74] Use of Scissors
The medical officer had found three incised wounds on the body of the deceased, which could be caused with a
pair of scissors. There was evidence of the eye-witness that the accused appellant caused injuries by scissors
on the deceased. Accused was convicted under sections 302, 307/34, IPC.288
Where the accused had given only one blow with a pair of scissors on the chest of the deceased causing death,
it could be inferred that the accused had knowledge that an injury caused by such a weapon on the vital part of
the body of the deceased would cause death. Conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was altered to
one under section 304, Pt II and ten years’ rigorous imprisonment was imposed.289
[s 299.75] Use of Stone
Eye-witnesses (PWs) deposed that the accused hit the deceased on the left side of the head with the stone and
he rolled down. There was no material before the High Court to come to a conclusion that the death occurred
due to fall. The High Court came to a peculiar finding that it might be possible that before the stone had hit the
head of the deceased, he had slipped and had rolled down. Conviction under section 302, IPC recorded by trial
court was restored.290
[s 299.76] Use of Bow and Arrows
Where the accused shot only one arrow of the deceased in the night hitting him in the stomach, the deceased
died five days after the occurrence, the accused was held guilty under section 304, Pt II and not under section
302.291 Where accused shot an arrow at a distance of 80 feet from the deceased wife who was being chased by
the accused and both were running, it was held that accused’s act attracted the last clause of section 299,
punishable under section 304, Pt II of IPC.292
In a case of free fight the accused/appellant along with companions armed with bow and arrows encircled the
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deceased, the arrow shot by the accused hit the deceased on the chest who fell down, the accused took up a
piece of stone and struck it on the head of the deceased as a result of which brain injury was caused. The High
Court holding that there was a free fight convicted the accused for their individual acts and convicted
accused/appellant under section 304, Pt II, IPC. The conviction was maintained by the apex court under section
304, Pt II, in an appeal filed by accused/appellant against the judgment of the High Court.293 Where the fact
situation showed that arrows were being shot from a distance, not with any accuracy and one of such arrows hit
the deceased, as established by the evidence of eye-witnesses the accused had shot that arrow and there was
no sudden quarrel, the conviction of the accused was altered from section 302 to section 304, Pt I.294
[s 299.77] Use of Cycle Chain
Where only one injury was caused by a cycle chain on the head of the deceased which was serious and other
injuries were only bruises and abrasions though there was bitter enmity between two groups, only cycle chain
and gloves were used, the conviction under sections 302/34, was altered to one under section 304, Pt II/section
34, IPC.295
[s 299.78] Use of Lathis/Sticks/Wooden Logs
A lathi cannot necessarily be considered an imminently dangerous weapon.296 It (bamboo stick) is a lethal
weapon. A person, who uses a lathi in assaulting another, must know that he is very likely to cause death.297
Where the accused gave the deceased a terrific blow with a lathi on the head in consequence of which the skull
got fractured like a coconut shell, and the unfortunate man died, it was held that ordinarily the only inference,
that can be made, is that the person, who gave such a blow on the head, either intended to cause death or else
intended to cause such bodily injury as would be sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.298
Where the accused gave two blows on the chest of the deceased with the stick resulting into his death having
regard to the nature of the weapon used and on the parts of the body on which blows were dealt the conviction
was altered from section 302 to section 304, Pt II, IPC.299 Appellant accused had nurtured grievance against the
deceased, gave two or three stick blows on the head of the deceased. The deceased fell down, was admitted in
the hospital where he was treated by several doctors and died after about forty days. Appellant accused was
convicted under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC.300
Appellant had suspicion about the chastity of his wife, inflicted injuries by sticks causing death. It was not
discernible that the injuries were inflicted with an intention to cause death of the victim or to cause such bodily
injury that it was likely to cause the death of the victim. However, it was clear that the acts were done by the
accused with the knowledge that it was likely to cause death. Conviction of the appellant under section 302,
IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt II, IPC.301
The accused appellant picked up one gobbaly tree wood piece lying on the spot and hit on the head of the
deceased, the post-mortem report stated that blow itself might have caused the death of the deceased, the
accused appellant was convicted under section 302, IPC.302
Where the deceased having illicit relationship with the mother of the accused, he was also forcing the sister of
the accused to have a relationship with him, the deceased picking up quarrel with the accused on the date of
incident and attempting to cause injury to him, unable to bear the agony and ill-treatment meted out to his
mother and sister and losing temper due to sudden provocation, the accused was beating the deceased to
death with a stick, the accused acted on account of sustained provocation and was found liable to be convicted
under section 304, Pt I.303 Where the altercation took place between two parties, the accused gave a single lathi
blow on the head of the deceased, an old man of 70 years who died 7 days after the incident, the doctor
examining the deceased had admitted that at the old age of deceased a fracture could be caused even by slight
force used in inflicting a blow, on these facts intention to cause death or such bodily injury which was likely to
cause death cannot be inferred, it cannot also be said that the accused knew that the blow he was giving could
be so imminently dangerous that it must in all probabilities cause death, knowledge that the act was likely to
cause death can only be inferred, therefore, the conviction of the accused under section 302 was altered to one
under section 304, Pt II, IPC.304 Where the appellant husband in a sudden quarrel after exchange of hot words
picked up a wooden log in fit of anger and hit a single blow, on the head of the deceased wife causing death,
Page 32 of 52
the appellant accused was convicted under section 304, Pt I, and not under section 302, IPC.305
The injury attributed to the accused appellant on the person of the deceased was a very small abrasion. The
injury caused was a very small dimension and it was doubtful whether the injury could be caused with a lathi
which the accused was said to be carrying, another accused placed in similar situation had been acquitted by
the trial court, the accused was acquitted of the charge under sections 302/34, IPC.306
Appellant accused R was alleged to be armed with lathi. PWs did not state that the accused R had caused any
lathi injury, no overt act was attributed to him. The appellant accused R was held entitled to benefit of doubt,
was acquitted.307
[s 299.79] Kicks and Blows
In a case, the accused kicked his wife on the side with such tremendous force that it caused practically her
instant death. There was nothing to show that she was suffering from any disease. It was held that a man, who
so kicks a prostrate woman on the side, must be credited with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause
her death.308 Where the accused went to the house of the deceased, caught hold of the deceased, hit him on
cheek and neck, on sight that neighbours have come the accused stated that he would not leave the deceased
alive and kicked him on the private parts, the deceased died due to neurogenic shock resulting from the injury
to the private parts, the injury opined by the doctor to be sufficient to cause immediate death, the statement of
the accused followed by the kick shows that he had knowledge that it was likely to cause death. On these facts,
it was held that the conviction of the accused could only be for murder. The trial court convicted him under
section 304, Pt II. The High Court in appeal should not have interfered with the conviction and altered it to
section 323, IPC. Hence, the Supreme Court altered the conviction of the accused from section 323 to section
304.309 Where the statement in FIR by the interested eye-witnesses that the deceased was beaten by kicks and
fists by the co-accused, however, in the statement on oath in the court, it was stated that the co-accused had
caught hold of victim when the accused inflicted knife blows and also inflicted injuries by lathi, the contradictory
statements of the witnesses cannot be relied on. So, the co-accused was found entitled to be acquitted.310
Where the accused assaulted the deceased by means of fists and legs by throwing him on ground and injuries
received on head caused his death, conviction of the accused under section 304 is was found proper.311
[s 299.80] Throttling
The accused caused death of his mother by throttling, the incident happened on mother trying to advice his son
(accused) that he should not treat his wife cruelly. The conviction of the accused was altered from section 302
to conviction under section 304, Pt I.312
[s 299.81] Woman Jumping into well with her Child
Where a girl of 17 years of age being tired of her husband’s ill-treatment attempted to commit suicide by
jumping in a well with child on her neck and she jumped with the child and the child died of the jump though
survived, the conviction under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 334A, IPC. The court was
further pleased reduce the sentence to six months simple imprisonment to run concurrently with the instance
In a case of Emperor v Dhirajia314 where a young woman with her baby in her arms had jumped or fallen down
in a well, it was observed that in order to possess and to form an intention, there must be a capacity for reason.
And when by some extraneous force the capacity for reason has been listed, the capacity to form an intention
must have been unseated too. But knowledge stands upon a different footing. Some degree of knowledge must
be attributed to every sane person. Obviously the degree of knowledge which any particular person can be
assumed to possess must vary. The act done with knowledge of consequences is not prima facie a murder, it
becomes murder only in the absence of excuse. Ill-treated wife leaving home without knowledge of her
husband where husband following her, wife getting into panic and throwing herself with body in her arms into an
Page 33 of 52
open well, the evidence was held to be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It was further observed that
the offence did not amount to an attempt to commit suicide. Where an act of the accused in jumping into the
well with her children was clearly one made by her knowing that it must in all probability cause the death of her
children. She had no excuse for incurring the risk of causing the death of her children. The face that there were
quarrels between her and her sister-in-law and that her life had become unbearable on account of this family
discord could not be regarded as a valid justification.315
Where the accused appellant, wife of a rickshaw-puller who used to ill-treat her, jumped into the well with her
two sonsI. It was observed that under clause 4 of section 300, culpable homicide is murder if the person
committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability, cause death, or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commit such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In the circumstances the constant ill-treatment to which
the accused appellant was subjected at the hands of her husband could not furnish such an excuse.316
Where there was no evidence as to how exactly the accused who was suffering from chronic and incurable
illness fell into the well at midnight along with her child aged one and a half years, and the child was also
suffering from rickets prior to his death. It was observed that it may be possible to hold that the accused
attempted to commit suicide by jumping along with her child. However, in absence of any evidence clearly
indicating as to exactly how they fell into the well, it would be wrong to play on the termination and hold the
accused guilty under section 309 or section 302 and exclude the operation of section 84, IPC.317 Where the
accused attempted to end her life by jumping into a well alongwith her female child in her lap, the life of the
female child was lost in the incident, the mental condition of accused at the time of the incident was not normal
as she was suffering from illness of tuberculosis coupled with severe stomach pain, the accused was in full
senses when she was brought out of the well and had narrated to the witnesses the reason justifying her act,
the case was not found fit to be covered for the purposes of plea of insanity available under section 84, IPC, the
act was done by the accused with the knowledge of consequences so offence of culpable homicide not
amounting to murder was made out, hence, conviction of the accused under section 302 was altered to one
under section 304, Pt II, IPC.318
1 R v Pritchard, (1901) 17 TLR 310.
2 Stephen’s Digest, Article 239; Chenda v State of Chhattisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 172 : (2013) 12 SCC 110 [LNIND 2013 SC
773]: 2013 (10) Scale 637 [LNIND 2013 SC 773] (It is derived from Latin, means the act of killing a human being).
3 Chenda v State of Chhattisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 172, p 173 (SC) : 2013 AIR SCW 6260 : (2013) 12 SCC 110 [LNIND 2013
SC 773].
4 Per Mosely J, in his referring order in King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 263 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124.
5 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 205 : 54 Cr LJ 565; Sukhdeo v State, 1968 Cr LJ 438 : AIR 1968 All 151 [LNIND
1967 ALL 24] .
6 Per Mosely J, in his referring order in King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 263 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124.
7 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 205 : 54 Cr LJ 565; Sukhdeo v State, 1968 Cr LJ 438 : AIR 1968 All 151 [LNIND
1967 ALL 24] .
Page 34 of 52
8 Rampal Singh v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 3765 (SC) : 2012 AIR SCW 4211 : 2012 (6) Scale 574 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] :
2012 (5) All LJ 248 : (2012) 8 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] ; Veeram v State of UP, 2011 (11) SCC 367 [LNIND
2011 SC 414] : AIR 2011 SC 1655 [LNIND 2011 SC 414] : 2011 Cr LJ 2688 .
9 Budhi Lal v State of Uttarakhand, 2009 Cr LJ 360 , pp 362, 363 (SC) : 2008 AIR SCW 6968 : AIR 2009 SC 87 [LNIND
2008 SC 1928] : JT 2008 (10) SC 572 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] : 2008 (12) Scale 848 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] : (2008)
14 SCC 647 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] .
10 Gita Rani Ghosh v State of West Bengal, 2012 Cr LJ 794 : p 800 (Cal) (DB).
11 Rampal Singh v State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 3765 , p 3769 (SC) : 2012 AIR SCW 4211 : 2012 (6) Scale 574 [LNIND 2012
SC 425] : 2012 (5) All LJ 248 : (2012) 8 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] .
12 Ando v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 150; Shri Ram v State, 1973 WLN 401 : 1973 Cr
LJ 1443 ; Nga Chi Tia v King, AIR 1939 Rang 225 : 40 Cr LJ 725.
13 Halsbury’s Laws of Australia.
14 R v Boreman, (2000) 1 All ER 307 .
15 Sellappan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 Cr LJ 1442 (SC) : 2007 (2) Scale 373 [LNIND 2007 SC 91] : (2007) 15 SCC 327
[LNIND 2007 SC 91] ; Sunder Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3281 (SC) : 2007 (6) Scale 649 [LNIND 2007 SC
599] : (2007) 10 SCC 371 [LNIND 2007 SC 599] : (2007) 7 SCR 76 [LNIND 2007 SC 599] ; Shakti Dan v State of
Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3426 (SC) : 2007 (6) Scale 151 [LNIND 2007 SC 543] : (2007) 15 SCC 68 [LNIND 2007 SC 543]
: (2007) 5 SCR 673 [LNIND 2007 SC 543] ; Budhi Lal v State of Uttarkhand, 2009 Cr LJ 360 : 2008 AIR SCW 6968 :
AIR 2009 SC 87 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] : JT 2008 (10) SC 572 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] : 2008 (12) Scale 848 [LNIND
2008 SC 1928] : (2008) 14 SCC 647 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] ; Jagriti Devi v State of HP, AIR 2009 SC 2869 [LNIND
2009 SC 1376] : (2009) 14 SCC 771 [LNIND 2009 SC 1376] : AIR 2009 SC 2869 [LNIND 2009 SC 1376] : (2009) 10
SCR 167 [LNIND 2009 SC 1376] : 2009 (8) JT 648 : 2009 (9) Scale 48 [LNIND 2009 SC 1376] : 2009 (3) Crimes 289
[LNIND 2009 SC 1376] (SC); Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] : 2008 (5) JT
407 : 2008 (6) Scale 433 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] .
16 Richhpal Singh Meena v Ghasi, (2014) 8 SCC 918 [LNIND 2014 SC 691] : AIR 2014 SC 3595 [LNIND 2014 SC 691] :
2014 Cr LJ 4339 .
17 Emperor v Ananda Bhau, 3 Cr LJ 85 : 7 Bom LR 985.
18 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 325 : 1959 Cr LJ 993 ; Emperor v
Manubha, 1 Cr LJ 1027; Emperor v Bai Pani, 1 Cr LJ 193; See also Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC
753 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] : 2008 (5) JT 407 : 2008 (6) Scale 433 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] ; Raj Kumar v State of
Maharashtra, (2009) 15 SCC 292 [LNIND 2009 SC 1504] : (2009) 11 SCR 49 [LNIND 2009 SC 1504] : 2009 (9) JT 413
: 2009 (9) Scale 495 [LNIND 2009 SC 1504] ; Harendra Nath Borah v State of Assam, (2007) 15 SCC 249 [LNIND
2007 SC 84] : (2007) 1 SCR 1211 [LNIND 2007 SC 84] : 2007 (2) JT 404 : 2007 (2) Scale 319 [LNIND 2007 SC 84] .
19 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 325 : 1959 Cr LJ 993 .
20 King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 271 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124.
Page 35 of 52
21 Ahmad v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 275.
22 Muzammal v Emperor, 10 Cr LJ 321; Torap Ali v Empress, ILR 22 Cal 638; Langar v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 718; Dhani
Ram v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 104; Fateh Sher v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 593.
23 State v Hira Duhey, AIR 1952 Pat 135 .
24 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 : 54 Cr LJ 565; Bashir v State, AIR 1953 All 668 [LNIND 1953 ALL 77] : 54 Cr LJ
1505.
25 Emperor v Mahmadkhan, 5 Cr LJ 168 : 9 Bom LR 153; Subbappa Channappa v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 235; Emperor v
Mahabir, 14 Cr LJ 241; R v Kanhai, ILR 35 All 329.
26 Emperor v Duma Baidya, ILR 19 Mad 483 : 1 Weir 298; Nga Tun Baw v Emperor, 7 Cr LJ 205; Emperor v Bhola Singh,
ILR 29 Mad 282 : 12 Cr LJ 124.
27 Gul Shah v Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah 552 : 16 Cr LJ 93.
28 Rajjo alias Gingin v State, 1999 Cr LJ 2996 (All) (DB).
29 Asu v State of Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 207 (Raj).
30 State of Haryana v Sher Singh, (2002) JT 7 SC 98.
31 Ramanna v State of Andhra Pradesh, 1998 Cr LJ 2716 (AP) (DB).
32 Tirthi Lal v State of Punjab, 1999 Cr LJ 2356 (P&H) (DB).
33 Santosh v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2000 Cr LJ 1140 (MP).
34 Padigapati Sanjeevaraidu alias Kethanna v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 Cr LJ 3396 (AP) (DB).
35 State of Karnataka v Akbarsab Ameensab Umachagi, 2000 Cr LJ 5036 (Kant) (DB).
36 Anil Amrutrao Jalte v State of Gujarat, (1999) 2 CCR 411 (Guj) (DB).
37 Nakafodi v State, AIR 1958 Ori 113 [LNIND 1957 ORI 24] , p 116 : 1958 Cr LJ 785 ; Golla Chenchuramayya v Emperor,
AIR 1946 Mad 83 : 47 Cr LJ 514; Ganga Singh v State, 1980 Cr LJ 235 , p 239 (All) (DB).
38 Wansarapu Baladu, 1 Weir 296; Chiman Lal v Gulam Mohluddin, 12 Cr LJ 189.
39 Golla Sanyasi, 1 Weir 296; Emperor v Shivsingji, 1 Cr LJ 891 : 14 Ker LR 209; Emperor v Kala Nanji, 1 Cr LJ 920 : 14
Ker LR 184; Wadhawa Singh v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 742; Emperor v Ram Newaz, 14 Cr LJ 615.
Page 36 of 52
40 Kammari Kamappa, 1 Weir 297, p 298; Muzammal v Emperor, 10 Cr LJ 321.
41 Mayne, Criminal Law of India, 4th Edn.
42 Davasia Yohannan v State, AIR 1958 Ker 207 [LNIND 1958 KER 20] , p 210 : 1958 Cr LJ 1021 .
43 Nga Ba Min v Emperor, AIR 1935 Rang 418 , p 419; Public Prosecutor v Mushunooru Suryanarayanamoorty, 13 Cr LJ
145 : 22 Mad LJ 333.
44 Empress of India v Fox, ILR 2 All 522, p 526.
45 Penal Code, p 257.
46 Emperor v Anando Bhau, 3 Cr LJ 85, p 87 : 7 Bom LR 985.
47 Emperor v Ismail, AIR 1918 Sind 60 : 19 Cr LJ 319.
48 Ibid; Bharat Singh v Emperor, AIR 1932 Oudh 279 : 34 Cr LJ 99; Empress v Fox, ILR 2 All 522; Empress v O’Brien,
ILR 2 All 766; Empress v Randhir Singh, ILR 3 All 597; Queen v Punchanan Tantes, 5 WR (Cr) 97; Queen v Bysagoo
Noshyo, 8 WR (Cr) 29.
49 Munshi Singh Gautam v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2005 Cr LJ 320 (SC).
50 Law laid down in this explanation, is wider than the English law under which complete emergence from the mother’s
womb is necessary to constitute a human being.
51 Budho v Emperor, AIR 1916 Lah 184 : 17 Cr LJ 20; Boya Latchmakka, AIR 1940 Mad 294 [LNIND 1939 MAD 387] :
41 Cr LJ 597.
52 Quoted in Emperor v Ananda Bhau, 3 Cr LJ 85, 86 : 7 Bom LR 985; R v Kersey, (1908) 21 CoxCC 690.
53 Harendra Nath Mandal v State of Bihar, (1993) 1 CCR 117 (SC).
54 Public Prosecutor v Mushunooru Suryanarayanamoorty, 13 Cr LJ 145.
55 Per Benson J, Re Chukkapalli Ramayya, 11 Cr LJ 222, p 225.
56 Public Prosecutor v Mushunooru Suryanrayanamoorty, 13 Cr LJ 145, p 154; Ganga Singh v State, 1980 Cr LJ 235 , p
238 (All) (DB); Ballan v State, AIR 1955 All 626 [LNIND 1955 ALL 71] : 56 Cr LJ 1448 : 13 WR (Cr) (Letters) 2; Ba U v
57 Padigiapati Sanjeevaraidu alias Kethanna v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2000 Cr LJ 3396 (AP) (DB).
Page 37 of 52
58 Davasia Yohanna v State, AIR 1958 Ker 207 [LNIND 1958 KER 20] , p 210 : 1958 Cr LJ 1021 .
59 Dorasamy Servai, AIR 1944 Mad 157 : 45 Cr LJ 513 : (1943) 2 Mad LJ 660 : 1943 Mad WN 797.
60 Hari Chunni Lal v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 MPLJ 321 : 1977 CLR 326 (MP).
61 Nur Muhammad v Emperor, 31 Cr LJ 198; Fazla v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 851 : 29 Cr LJ 678.
62 Nuro v Emperor, 15 Cr LJ 376; Lal Singh v Emperor, AIR 1938 Lah 31 : 39 Cr LJ 265; Salebhat v Emperor, AIR 1949
Ngp 19 : 49 Cr LJ 647(2); Nga Paw v Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 526 .
63 State of Kerala v Narayanankutty, 1980 Ker LT 908 , pp 911-12 (DB); Edupuganti Kesava Rao v State of Andhra
Pradesh, (1980) 1 Andh LT 49 (DB).
64 Reaz-ud-din Shaikh v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 295.
65 Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 151.
66 Re Palani Goundan, AIR 1920 Mad 862 : 20 Cr LJ 404 (FB); Re Chinnathambi, AIR 1953 Mad 239 : 54 Cr LJ 449;
Empress v Khandu Valad Shawani, ILR 15 Bom 194 (FB), (distinguished in Kaliappa Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1933
Mad 798 : 34 Cr LJ 1109; Re Shreenarayan, ILR 27 Pat 67; Emperor v Dalu Sardar, AIR 1915 Cal 221 : 15 Cr LJ 709;
Re Gour Gobindo Thakoor, (1866) 6 WR 55 (Cr).
67 Re Thavamani, AIR 1943 Mad 571 [LNIND 1943 MAD 90] : (1943) 2 Mad LJ 13; Kaliappa Goundan v Emperor, AIR
1933 Mad 798 : 34 Cr LJ 1109; Nehal Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1939 Pat 625 : ILR 18 Pat 485; Lingaraj Das v Emperor,
AIR 1945 Pat 470 : ILR 24 Pat 131; Emperor v Khubi, AIR 1923 All 545 : 25 Cr LJ 703; Emperor v Gujjan Singh, AIR
1931 Lah 27 : 32 Cr LJ 483. See commentary under section 33, ante.
68 Empress v Khandu Valad Bhawani, ILR 15 Bom 194 (FB).
69 Emperor v Dalu Sardar, AIR 1915 Cal 221 : 15 Cr LJ 709.
70 Re Gour Gobindo Thakoor, (1866) 6 WR 55 (Cr).
71 Shreenarayan, Re, ILR 27 Pat 67.
72 Re: Thavamani, AIR 1943 Mad 571 [LNIND 1943 MAD 90] : (1943) 2 Mad LJ 13 : 1943-56-LW340.
73 Re Kaliappa Goundan, AIR 1933 Mad 798 : 34 Cr LJ 1109 (distinguished Re Chinnathambi, AIR 1953 Mad 239 : 54
Cr LJ 449).
74 Nehal Mahto v Emperor, AIR 1939 Pat 625 : ILR 18 Pat 485.
75 Kaliappa Goundan v Emperor, AIR 1933 Mad 798 : 34 Cr LJ 1109.

Page 38 of 52
76 Lingaraj Das v Emperor, AIR 1945 Pat 470 : ILR 24 Pat 131.
77 Emperor v Khubi, AIR 1923 All 545 : 25 Cr LJ 703.
78 Emperor v Gujjan Singh, AIR 1931 Lah 27 : 32 Cr LJ 483.
79 Austin’s Jurisprudence, Vol I, p 79.
80 R v Fairbrother, “The Times”, 12 December 1908 (CCA); Ganesh Shrawan v State, 1970 Mah LJ 75 .
81 Patiram v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1992) 2 Crimes 621 [LNIND 1991 MP 203] (MP) (DB) : (1992) 1 CCR 329 (MP)
(DB).
82 R v Lakshman, ILR 26 Bom 558; Sellamuthu v Pallamuthu, 12 Cr LJ 30, p 31; Syed Batcha Sahib v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ
115 : 1 Weir 300.
83 Gujjar v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 591.
84 Empress v Fox, ILR 2 All 522, pp 526-27; Empress v Randhir Singh, ILR 3 All 597-98.
85 1 Weir 288.
86 Re, Daude Gangadu, 1 Weir 299.
87 Muvvala Kondaiyya, 1 Weir 300.
88 Queen v Gureeboolla, 5 WR 42.
89 Sanjeev v State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 387 [LNIND 2015 SC 104] .

90 Sukra Munda v State of Odisha, 2014 Cr LJ 275 (277) (Ori) (DB).
91 Reg v Palmer, 1856 CCC 308 .
92 Nathuni Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 1808 .
93 State of Kerala v Velayndan Pillai, 1967 Ker LT 17 (SN); State of Orissa v Lachhmi Mushli, (1978) 46 Cut LT 122, p 127
(DB); Bhikari v Emperor, AIR 1934 Oudh 405 , p 411.
94 Per Curning J, in Hazrat Gul Khan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Cal 430 , p 432 : 29 Cr LJ 546; Ashok Dubey v State of
Madhya Pradesh, 1980 CLR 58 , p 72 (MP) (DB) : 1980 Cr LJ (NOC) 111 (MP); Om Prakash v State, 1980 Cr LJ
(NOC) 67 (Del) (DB); State of Haryana v Sher Singh, 1981 CLR 230 , p 233 (SC); Rajinder Kumar v State of Punjab,
AIR 1966 SC 1323 , p 1324; State v Durgacharan, AIR 1963 Ori 33 [LNIND 1962 ORI 43] , p 37.
95 Nachhittar Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 118 [LNIND 1974 SC 289] , p 121 : 1975 Cr LJ 66 .
Page 39 of 52
96 Atley v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 807 , p 810; Hari Bag v State, AIR 1958 Cal 118 [LNIND 1957 CAL 142] :
1958 Cr LJ 362 ; Satya Vir v State, AIR 1958 All 746 [LNIND 1957 ALL 219] ; Prem Narain v State, AIR 1957 All 177
[LNIND 1956 ALL 172] .
97 State of Rajasthan v Badri, 1974 WLN 736 : 1974 Raj LW 477 .
98 Dilip Kumar v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 CLR 624 (SC).
99 Per Mukerji J, in Hazarat Gut Khan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Cal 430 : 29 Cr LJ 546.
100 Datar Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1193 [LNIND 1973 SC 409] : 1974 Cr LJ 908 .
101 Haji Lal Din v State, 1977 Cr LJ 538 , p 541 : 1976 J&K LR 549; Surendran v State, 1977 Cr LJ 1197 : 1977 Mad LJ
(Cr) 101.
102 Faquira v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 915 [LNIND 1993 SC 52] , p 916 : 1976 Cr LJ 677 ; Jagdish v State of
Madhya Pradesh, 1981 CLR 220 , p 221 (SC).
103 Molu v State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 2499 , p 2505 : 1976 Cr LJ 1895 ; Podda Narayana v State of Andhra Pradesh,
AIR 1975 SC 1252 [LNIND 1975 SC 147] : 1975 Cr LJ 1062 .
104 Nathuni Yadav v State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 1809 .
105 Lal Singh v State, 1980 Cr LJ (NOC) 51 (Raj) : 1979 WLN 30 .
106 State of Haryana v Sher Singh, 1981 CLR 230 , p 233 (SC).
107 Dalbir Kaur v State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 472 [LNIND 1976 SC 279] , p 484 : 1977 Cr LJ 273 .
108 Bakshish Singh v State, AIR 1971 SC 2016 , p 2017 : 1971 Cr LJ 1452 .
109 Darshan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 747 [LNIND 1988 SC 70] .
110 Atley v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1955 SC 807 : (1956) 26 AWR 483 : 1955 Cr LJ 1653 .
111 State of Mysore v Nanja, AIR 1958 Mys 48 , p 53; Surajpal Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1972 Cr LJ 1668 , p
1676; Kodur Thimma Reddi, AIR 1957 AP 758 [LNIND 1957 AP 25] , 762.
112 Narayan Nathu Naik v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1971 SC 1656 [LNIND 1970 SC 158] , p 1657 : 1971 Mad LJ (Cr) 43;
Dore v State of Karnataka, (1980) 24 Mad LJ (Cr) 281, p 283 (Kant) (DB); Laxman Singh v Jai Prakash, (1984) 2
Crimes 918 [LNIND 1984 DEL 325] .
Page 40 of 52
113 State v Durga Charan Bank, AIR 1963 Ori 33 [LNIND 1962 ORI 43] , p 37; Kishan v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1980 Raj
LW 510 , p 513 (DB).
114 Gordhan v State of Rajasthan, 1987 Cr LJ 541 , p 547 (Raj) (DB); Dasan v State of Kerala, 1987 Cr LJ 180 , p 184
(Ker) (DB); Suhash v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1987 Cr LJ 991 , p 995 : AIR 1987 SC 1222 [LNIND 1987 SC 389] .
115 Ghansa Singh v State, AIR 1958 Raj 226 [LNIND 1957 RAJ 120] : 1958 Cr LJ 1232 ; State of Uttar Pradesh v Hari
Prasad, AIR 1974 SC 1740 [LNIND 1973 SC 384] -41 : 1974 Cr LJ 1274 ; Bhulakirama Koiri v State, 1970 Cr LJ 403
(Cal).
116 Re Desingh Nadar, 1960 Mad 532, p 535; Gurcharan Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 , p 463; Mato Din v
Emperor, AIR 1937 Oudh 236 : 38 Cr LJ 424; Manbodh v State, AIR 1955 Ngp 97 ; Ranjan v State, 1973 Cr LJ 1378 ,
p 1383; Public Prosecutor v Rajulapati Basavayya, 1937 Mad WN 993; Ramachandrayya v Emperor, 1936 Mad WN
(Cr) 111; Sankoppa Shetty, 1940 Mad WN 963 : AIR 1941 Mad 326 [LNIND 1940 MAD 204] ; Vaithinatha Filial v
Emperor, 1913 Mad WN 806 (PC); Walli Mohammad v King, 1949 Mad WN (Cr) 88 : AIR 1949 PC 103 ; State of
Andhra Pradesh v Bogum Chandraiah, AIR 1986 SC 1899 ; Vinod Kumar v State of Haryana, 1997 Cr LJ 2893 (P&H)
(DB).
117 Tunda v State, 1990 Cr LJ 868 (All) (DB).
118 Vadivelu Thevar v State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 [LNIND 1957 SC 41] ; Jan Mohammad v State, AIR 1963 All 501
[LNIND 1962 ALL 115] , p 504 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 281 ; Devi Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1981 CLR (MP High Court
Notes) 107; Surendra Narain alias Munna Pande v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1998 SC 192 [LNIND 1997 SC 1689] :
1998 Cr LJ 359 (SC); but see Re Sankappa Shetty, AIR 1941 Mad 326 [LNIND 1940 MAD 204] , p 332 : 42 Cr LJ 338.
119 Arundhati Kentuni v State, 34 Cut LT 60, p 68; Bhulakiram Koiri v State, 1970 Cr LJ 403 (Cal).
120 Bhagoji v Hyderabad Govt, AIR 1954 Hyd 196 .
121 Sukhdev Singh v State of Punjab, (1987) JT 1 SC 628.
122 Udai Pal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1972 UJ 38 (SC) : AIR 1972 SC 54 [LNIND 1971 SC 452] , p 57.
123 Mukhtiar Singh v State of Punjab, 1975 Cr LJ 132 : 1974 Punj LJ (Cr) 338; Keshav Dev v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR
1973 SC 482 : 1972 Cr LJ 1196 .
124 State Prosecutor v VN Achutha Kurup, 1967 Ker LT 18 (SN); Re Narsiah, 1959 AP 313 , p 315.
125 Mulakh Raj etc v Satish Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1175 [LNIND 1992 SC 322] .
126 Yeshwant v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 337 [LNIND 1972 SC 247] , p 343 : 1972 Cr LJ 1254 .
127 State of Punjab v Pritam Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2005 , p 2006 : 1977 Cr LJ 1575 .
128 Het Ram v State, 1974 Cr LJ 871 , p 873 : 1974 All Cr R 74.
Page 41 of 52
129 State of Rajasthan v Manga, 1973 Cr LJ 1075 : 1973 Raj LW 58 .
130 State of Rajasthan v Balbir Singh, 1980 Cr LJ (NOC) 112 (Raj); State v Shankar Sakharam Jadhav, AIR 1957 Bom 226
; Re Zahirabi, AIR 1966 Mys 199 ; Rannun v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 88 : 27 Cr LJ 709; Onkar v State of Madhya
Pradesh, 1974 Cr LJ 1200 , p 1204.
131 Narsinbhai v Chhatra Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1753 : 1977 Cr LJ 1144 .
132 Shrilal Jadho v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1976 Cr LJ 1325 , p 1330.
133 State Prosecutor v VN Achutha Kurup, 1967 Ker LT 18 (SN); Russell on Crimes, 11th Edn p 18 and following pages;
Re Kuttayan, AIR 1960 Mad 9 [LNIND 1959 MAD 219] : 1960 Cr LJ 85 .
134 Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342.
135 Shwe Ein v Emperor, 3 Cr LJ 355, pp 357-58.
136 Ibid.
137 Rathan Singh and Ran Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 2147 .
138 Rathan Singh and Ran Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1988 SC 2147 , p 358.
139 Radha Kanta Sheet v State of West Bengal, 2015 Cr LJ 2006 , p 2007 (Cal) (DB).
140 RP Tyagi v State Govt of National Capital Territory of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 609 , p 611 (SC) : 2010 AIR SCW 169 : 2009
(14) Scale 616 [LNIND 2009 SC 1986] : (2009) 17 SCC 445 [LNIND 2009 SC 1986] .
141 Nga Min Po, (1897-1901) 1 UBR 288; Nga Shwe Baw, (1897-1901) UBR 285.
142 Umesh Suresh Vale v State of Maharashtra, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 50 (Bom) (DB).
143 Sumer Chand v State of Haryana, (1998) 2 Crimes 228 (P&H); Balbir Singh alias Bhira v State of Haryana, 1996 Cr LJ
2663 (P&H) (DB).
144 Sabir Ahmed v State, 1988 Cr LJ 772 (Del (DB).
145 Vedpal v State of Haryana, 1995 Cr LJ 3556 (P&H) (DB).
146 Bunnilal Chaudhary v State of Bihar, 2006 Cr LJ 3297 , p 3301 : AIR 2006 SC 2531 [LNIND 2006 SC 473] : 2006 (6)
147 Suresh v State, (1988) 35 DLT 411 [LNIND 1988 DEL 156] (Del) (DB).
Page 42 of 52
148 Surajit Sarkar v State of West Bengal, AIR 2013 SC 807 [LNINDORD 2012 SC 361] : (2013) 2 SCC 146 [LNIND 2012
SC 1313] : 2013 Cr LJ 1137 , p 1147 (SC).
149 Vineet Kumar Chauhan v State of UP, 2008 Cr LJ 1367 , p 1371 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 780 [LNIND 2007 SC 1509] :
2008 AIR SCW 1 : 2008 (1) All LJ 735 : (2007) 14 Scale 386 [LNIND 2007 SC 1509] : 2007 (8) Supreme 502 : (2007)
14 SCC 660 [LNIND 2007 SC 1509] .
150 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 205 : 54 Cr LJ 565.
151 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] : 1959 Cr LJ 993 ; per Melvill J, in
Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342, p 345; Shwe Ein v Emperor, 3 Cr LJ 355; Dadi Ahdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955 AP 24
[LNIND 1954 AP 40] : 56 Cr LJ 329.
152 Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342, 345.
153 Narayanan Satheesan v State of Kerala, AIR 1977 SC 2308 [LNIND 1977 SC 278] , p 2313 : 1977 Cr LJ 1946 ;
Satrughana Lahar v State, 1998 Cr LJ 1508 (Ori); Sellappan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 Cr LJ 1442 : 2007 (2) Scale
373 [LNIND 2007 SC 91] : (2007) 15 SCC 327 [LNIND 2007 SC 91] .
154 Pappachan alias Joseph v State of Kerala, 1994 Cr LJ 1765 (Ker); Johny v State of Kerala, 2015 Cr LJ 1753 (Ker)
(DB).
155 See also R v Holland, 2 Moo & R 351; Re Krishnaswami Naicker, AIR 1965 Mad 261 , p 263 : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 42 .
156 Kins v Abor Ahmed, AIR 1937 Rang 396 , p 397 (FB) : 38 Cr LJ 1097 (explaining Emperor v Nga San Pal, AIR 1936
Rang 442 : 37 Cr LJ 1119; Bichhu v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1958 All 791 [LNIND 1958 ALL 17] : 1958 Cr LJ 1367
; Kela Ayyappan v State, AIR 1959 Ker 230 [LNIND 1958 KER 21] : 1959 Cr LJ 981 ; Re Krishnaswami Naicker, AIR
1965 Mad 261 , p 263 : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 42 ; Salebhai Kadarali v Emperor, AIR 1949 Ngp 19 : 49 Cr LJ 647.
157 Sellappan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 Cr LJ 1442 , p 1447 (SC) : 2007 (2) Scale 373 [LNIND 2007 SC 91] : (2007) 15
SCC 327 [LNIND 2007 SC 91] .
158 State of Haryana v Pale, 1996 Cr LJ 1872 (SC).
159 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 : 54 Cr LJ 565; Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19]
.
160 Gahbar Pande v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 169 , pp 171-72 : 29 Cr LJ 17; Chanda v State, 1980 Chand LR 18 (Del) 112,
p 117; Anbu Mani v State of Tamil Nadu, 1980 LW (Cr) 19 (SC).
161 Gahbar Pande v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 169 : 29 Cr LJ 17.
162 Rama v State, AIR 1969 Goa 116 [LNIND 1972 SC 301] : 1969 Cr LJ 1393 .
163 Faqira v State, AIR 1955 All 321 [LNIND 1954 ALL 153] , p 325 : 56 Cr LJ 884.
Page 43 of 52
164 King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 273 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124; Kudumulla Mahanana Reddi, AIR 1960 AP 141
[LNIND 1959 AP 181] : 1960 Cr LJ 303 .
165 Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn p 31.
167 Jai Prakash v State (Delhi Admn), (1991) 2 SCC 32 .
168 Faqira v State, AIR 1955 All 321 [LNIND 1954 ALL 153] , p 325 : 56 Cr LJ 884.
169 Basudev v State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488 [LNIND 1956 SC 34] , p 490 : 1956 Cr LJ 919 (2); Krushna Singh v State,
1971 Cr LJ 1497 , p 1500 : 37 Cut LT 321.
170 Ram Kumar v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1970 Raj 60 [LNIND 1969 RAJ 152] , p 63 : 1970 Cr LJ 486 ; Russell on Crimes,
12th Edn, Vol I, p 40.
171 Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] ; Jayaraj v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 3976 SC 1519 .
172 Ramprasad v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 363 , pp 367-68.
173 Nga Chit Tin v King, AIR 1939 Rang 225 : 40 Cr LJ 725; Laxman Kalu Nikalje v State of Maharashtra, 1968 Cr LJ 1647
: AIR 1968 SC 1390 [LNIND 1968 SC 537] .
175 Ibid.
176 Ghudo v Emperor, AIR 1945 Ngp 143 : 47 Cr LJ 196; Laxman Kalu Nikalje v State of Maharashtra, 1968 Cr LJ 1647 :
AIR 1968 SC 1390 [LNIND 1968 SC 537] ; Mana Gendalal v Emperor, AIR 1930 Bom 483 ; Bai Jiba v Emperor, AIR
1917 Bom 259 , p 260, per Beaman J.
177 SD Sons v State of Gujarat, AIR 1991 SC 917 [LNIND 1990 SC 807] .
178 Santosh and etc v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2000 Cr LJ 1140 (MP).
179 Zahid Khan v Emperor, AIR 1939 Oudh 49 : 40 Cr LJ 187; Inder Singh Bagga Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1955 SC
439 , p 444 : 56 Cr LJ 1014; Ajmer Singh v State, AIR 1955 Punj 13 : 1955 Cr LJ 305 .
180 Re Sengoda Goundan, AIR 1916 Mad 651 [LNIND 1915 MAD 210] : 16 Cr LJ 614.
Page 44 of 52
181 Umesh Suresh Vale v State of Maharashtra, 2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 50 (Bom) (DB); Raman v State of Kerala, 2015 Cr LJ
2989 (Ker) (DB) (Appellant inflicted injuries on his wife causing death).
182 State of Orissa v Dibakar Naik, (2002) 2 CCR 205 (SC).
183 Shankar Kondiba Gore v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 93 (Bom) (DB).
184 Madhusudan Satpathi v State of Orissa, AIR 1994 SC 474 .
185 Sheikh Choollye, 4 WR (Cr) 35 : 1 Weir 288; R v Steam, (1947) 1 All ER 813 , p 816; Virsa Singh v State of Punjab,
AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] : 1958 Cr LJ 818 .
186 Re Pooshoo, 4 WR (Cr) 33; Re Muvvala Kondaiya, 1 Weir 300.
187 King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 276 (FB) per Mya Bu J : 42 Cr LJ 124; Swami v State, AIR 1954 Pepsu 10 ,
p 14 : 54 Cr LJ 1878; Re Pooshoo, 4 WR (Cr) 33; Muvvala Kondaiya, 1 Weir 300.
188 King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 276 (FB), per Mya Bu J, 42 Cr LJ 124.
189 Kudumula Mahanandi Reddi, AIR 1960 AP 141 [LNIND 1959 AP 181] , p 143 : 1960 Cr LJ 303 ; King v Aung Nyun, AIR
1940 Rang 259 , p 272 (FB) : 42 (Cr) LJ 124.
190 Sawami v State, AIR 1954 Pepsu 10 , p 14 : 54 Cr LJ 1878; Ramprasad v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1963) 1 Cr LJ
363 : 1962 Jab LJ 629 .
191 Gahbar Pande v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 169 .
192 Bira v State, (1973) 75 Punj LR 107 : 1973 CLR 53 .
194 Ghasi Ram v State, AIR 1952 Bhopal 25 , p 29 : 53 Cr LJ 1366; Dadi Abdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955 AP 24 [LNIND 1954 AP
40] : 56 Cr LJ 329; Hardev Singh v State of Punjab, (1971) 73 Punj LR 280 ; R v Ketaabdi Mundul, ILR 4 Cal 764, p
766.
195 Re Daude Gangadu, 1 Weir 299.
196 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 325.
197 Empress v Ganesh Doobey, ILR 5 Cal 351 : 4 CLR 580; Nga Ba Tu v Emperor, AIR 1921 LB 26 : 23 Cr LJ 59; Queen
v Poonal Fattemah, 12 WR (Cr) 7; Empress v Nga Aung Ban, (1897-1901) 1 UBR 307; Nga Po Kyow v Emperor,
(1902-03) 1 UBR 1; Pika Bewa v Emperor, ILR 39 Cal 855 : 16 Cal WN 1055; Emperor v Ramava Channappa, 17 Bom
LR 217; Empress v Kangla, (1898) 18 AWN 163; Ngwa Shwe Kin v Emperor, (1915) 8 LBR 166 : 30 IC 133.
Page 45 of 52
198 Kabiraj Tudu v State of Assam, 1994 Cr LJ 437 (Guj) (DB).
199 Panduranj Ramchandra Agro v State of Maharashtra, 1995 Cr LJ 762 (Bom) (DB).
200 Section 86 and commentary thereunder; Re Thiyagarayan, 1 Weir 301; Nga San v Emperor, 1 Cr LJ 473.
201 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] : 1958 Cr LJ 818 .
202 Empress v Punchanun Tantee, 5 WR (Cr) 97; Empress v Fox, ILR 2 All 522; Empress v Ganesh Doobey, ILR 5 Cal
351; Empress v Randhir Singh, ILR 3 All 597.
203 Sheikh Rafi v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 2746 (SC).
204 Adu Ram v Mukna, 2004 Cr LJ 4674 (SC).
205 Beli v Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 621 : 27 Cr LJ 29; Inder Singh v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 157 : 30 Cr LJ 141; Nur
Mohammad Roshen Ein v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 883 : 35 Cr LJ 65; but see Allah Ditto v Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah
260 : 25 Cr LJ 547; Samand Singh v Emperor, 20 Cr LJ 157 (where the injuries were severe and included several
fractures of bones).
206 Emperor v Sat Narain, AIR 1935 Oudh 381 , p 383 : 36 Cr LJ 573; Emperor v Rataj, AIR 1932 Oudh 186 : 33 Cr LJ
561.
207 Harnama v Emperor, 22 Cr LJ 276, p 278; Sukha v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1956 SC 513 [LNIND 1956 SC 30] , p 519 :
1956 Cr LJ 923 .
208 State of Karnataka v Shivappa Gurusiddappa, 1998 Cr LJ 1253 (SC).
209 Vijay Bahadur Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1998 Cr LJ 2358 (All) (DB).
210 Zahid Khan v Emperor, AIR 1939 Oudh 49 : 40 Cr LJ 187.

211 Sardarkhan Zahidkhan v Emperor, AIR 1916 Bom 191 , 192 : 17 Cr LJ 530.
212 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] , 468 : 1958 Cr LJ 818 ; Ramprasad v State of
Madhya Pradesh, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 363 : 1962 Jab LJ 629 ; Gudar Dusadh v State of Bihar, AIR 1972 SC 952 [LNIND
1972 SC 110] , p 955 : 1972 Cr LJ 587 .
213 Gurmukh Singh v State of Haryana, 2010 Cr LJ 450 (SC) : 2009 (11) Scale 688 [LNIND 2009 SC 1725] : (2009) 15
SCC 635 [LNIND 2009 SC 1725] .
214 Tirthi Lal v State of Punjab, 1999 Cr LJ 2356 (P&H) (DB).
215 Gurmukh Singh v State of Haryana, 2010 Cr LJ 450 , p 454 (SC) : 2009 (11) Scale 688 [LNIND 2009 SC 1725] : (2009)
15 SCC 635 [LNIND 2009 SC 1725] ; Abani K Debnath v State of Tripura, AIR 2006 SC 518 : 2006 Cr LJ 314 : (2005)
13 SCC 422 : 2005 (9) Scale 531 (Accused gave single dah blow on spur of moment which proved fatal); Pappu v
Page 46 of 52
State of MP, 2006 AIR SCW 3623 : (2006) 7 SCC 391 [LNIND 2006 SC 487] : AIR 2006 SC 2659 [LNIND 2006 SC
487] : 2006 (Supp-3) SCR 394 : 2006 (7) Scale 24 [LNIND 2006 SC 487] : 2006 Cr LJ 3640 ; Jagrup Singh v State of
Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 616 [LNIND 1981 SC 280] : AIR 1981 SC 1552 [LNIND 1981 SC 280] (Single blow from blunt
side of Gandhala, accused convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC); Gurmail Singh v State of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 185
: AIR 1982 SC 1466 (Single blow of spear on the chest of the deceased causing death); Kulwant Rai v State of Punjab,
AIR 1982 SC 126 (On a short quarrel, accused give single dagger blow which proved fatal); Jagtar Singh v State of
Punjab, (1983) 2 SCC 342 : AIR 1983 SC 463 [LNIND 1996 SC 826] (Single fatal knife blow on chest of the
deceased); Hem Raj v State (Delhi Administration), (1990) Supp SCC 291 : AIR 1990 SC 2252 (Single fatal stab injury
on chest of the accused).
216 Settu v State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 Cr LJ 3889 : AIR 2006 SC 2986 [LNIND 2006 SC 639] : 2006 (8) Scale 382 [LNIND
2006 SC 639] : (2006) 10 SCC 549 [LNIND 2006 SC 639] ; Pulcherla Nagaraju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ
3899 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 3010 [LNIND 2006 SC 621] : 2006 (8) Scale 133 [LNIND 2006 SC 621] : (2006) 11 SCC 444
[LNIND 2006 SC 621] (Single forceful blow by barisa (a long dagger) on vital part of the body of the deceased,
conviction under section 302, IPC, upheld.
217 Katta Surendra v State of UP, 2008 Cr LJ 3196 , p 3198 (SC) : (2008) 9 Scale 359 : 2008 AIR SCW 4271 : (2008) 11
SCC 360 [LNIND 2008 SC 1294] ; Raj Pal v State of Haryana, (2006) 9 SCC 678 [LNIND 2006 SC 282] ; Jai Dev v
State of Punjab, 1963 (3) SCR 489 [LNIND 1962 SC 249] : AIR 1963 SC 612 [LNIND 1962 SC 249] ; Shaikh Majid v
State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1062 , p 1065 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 1091 [LNIND 2008 SC 3023] : 2008 (1) Scale 561
[LNIND 2008 SC 3023] : (2008) 11 SCC 131 [LNIND 2008 SC 3023] .
218 Andhari Naik v State of Orissa, 1999 Cr LJ 1346 (Ori) (DB).
219 Tamil Mani v State, 1997 Cr LJ 144 (Mad) (DB).
220 Abor Ahmed v King, AIR 1938 Rang 17 : 39 Cr LJ 244, dissenting from Kra Chan U v Emperor, AIR 1923 Rang 247
: 25 Cr LJ 207; Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 207 : 54 Cr LJ 565; Mohammad v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 254 (2);
Gupta v Rex, AIR 1949 All 109 [LNIND 1948 ALL 23] : 50 Cr LJ 127.
221 Ram Kumar Pal v State of West Bengal, 1999 Cr LJ 3868 (Cal) (DB).
222 Baij Nath v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1994 Cr LJ 398 (All) (DB).
223 Baghia Urang v State of Assam, 2004 Cr LJ 2249 (Gau) (DB).
224 Thangaiya v State of Tamil Nadu, 2005 Cr LJ 684 , p 689 : 2005 (1) Crimes 319 (SC) : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284 [LNIND
2004 SC 1221] : 2004 (10) JT 421 : AIR 2005 SC 1142 [LNIND 2004 SC 1221] : 2004 (10) Scale 319 [LNIND 2004 SC
1221] : (2005) 9 SCC 650 [LNIND 2004 SC 1221] .
225 Abani K Debnath v State of Tripura, 2006 Cr LJ 314(SC) ; Ram Gopal v State of Rajasthan, 2006 Cr LJ 362 (Raj) (DB).
226 Ramaswamy v State of Tamil Nadu, 1993 Cr LJ 3253 (SC).
228 Om Prakash v State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 642 : 1981 Cr LJ 30 .
229 Karhna Tudu v State of Assam, 1994 Cr LJ 432 (Gau) (DB).

Page 47 of 52
230 Suresh v State, (1988) 35 DLT 411 [LNIND 1988 DEL 156] (Del) (DB).
231 Balraje v State of Maharashtra, 2010 Cr LJ 3443 : 2010 AIR SCW 3707 : (2010) 6 SCC 673 [LNIND 2010 SC 487] :
2010 (5) Scale 576 [LNIND 2010 SC 487] .
233 Pradip Choudhary v State, 1985 Cr LJ 1770 (Ori) (DB); Kana Majhi v State, 1985 Cr LJ 1876 (Ori) (DB); Sandhya
Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 , p 2113 : 2006 SCC (Cri) 394 : 2006 (3) Scale 665 [LNIND 2006 SC
230] : (2006) 4 SCC 653 [LNIND 2006 SC 230] .
234 Som Raj v State of HP, 2013 Cr LJ 2237 (SC) : AIR 2013 SC 1649 [LNIND 2013 SC 152] : 2013 (2) Scale 774 [LNIND
2013 SC 152] : (2013) 14 SCC 246 [LNIND 2013 SC 152] .
235 Ambaram v State of MP, 2007 Cr LJ 2743 , p 2746 (SC) : 2007 (6) Scale 632 : 2007 AIR SCW 2745 : 2007 (4)
Supreme 252 : (2007) 12 SCC 105 [LNIND 2007 SC 546] .
236 State of Punjab v Gurcharan Singh, 1998 Cr LJ 4560 (SC).
237 Bhika v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 193 (Raj) (DB).
238 Dharam Pal v State, 2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 383 (Del) (DB).
239 Ramdas v State of MP, 2009 Cr LJ 1136 , p 1137 (SC) : 2009 AIR SCW 604 : 2009 (1) 364 : (2009) 4 SCC 57 [LNIND
2009 SC 55] .
240 Daya Nand v State of Haryana, 2008 Cr LJ 2975 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 1823 [LNIND 2008 SC 827] : 2008 (6) Scale 62
[LNIND 2008 SC 827] : 2008 AIR SCW 2515 : (2008) 15 SCC 717 [LNIND 2008 SC 827] .
241 Per Kulwant Sahay J, in Gahbar Pande v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 169 , p 171 : 29 Cr LJ 17; Public Prosecutor v
Madathi, AIR 1942 Mad 415 [LNIND 1941 MAD 305] : 43 Cr LJ 671.
242 Pulicherla Nagaraju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3899 (SC).
243 Pappu v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC).
244 Bavisetting Kameshwra Rao v State of AP, 2008 Cr LJ 2987 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 1854 [LNIND 2008 SC 742] : 2008
(4) Scale 452 [LNIND 2008 SC 742] : (2008) 15 SCC 725 [LNIND 2008 SC 742] .
245 Sri Haren Pator v State of Assam, 2013 (2) Crimes 298 (Gauh).
246 Ramchandra Dhondiba Kaware v State of Maharashtra, 2009 Cr LJ 1739 , p 1740 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 1835 [LNIND
2009 SC 177] : 2009 (2) Scale 20 [LNIND 2009 SC 177] : (2009) 11 SCC 179 [LNIND 2009 SC 177] .
Page 48 of 52
247 Sunder Singh v Emperor, AIR 1939 Oudh 207 , p 209 : 40 Cr LJ 722; Muhammad Roshen Din v Emperor, AIR 1933
Lah 883 : 35 Cr LJ 65; Ram Lal v Emperor, 46 Cr LJ 728.
248 Bashir v State, AIR 1953 All 668 [LNIND 1953 ALL 77] : 54 Cr LJ 1505.
249 Labhu Ram v State of Punjab, 1996 Cr LJ 399 (SC).
250 Harabailu Kariappa v State of Karnataka, 1996 Cr LJ 321 (Kant) (DB).
251 Munnilal v Emperor, AIR 1943 All 344 , p 345.
252 Nanak v Emperor, AIR 1931 Lah 189 , p 191 : 32 Cr LJ 1205.
253 Lunano Lotha v State of Nagaland, 1981 Cr LJ 522 , p 526 (Gau) (DB).
254 Lunano Lotha v State of Nagaland, 1981 Cr LJ 522 , p 527 (Gau) (DB).
255 Mohammed v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 254 : 33 Cr LJ 375.
256 Mana Gendal v Emperor, AIR 1930 Bom 483 : 32 Cr LJ 289.
257 Re Dadi Abdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955 AP 24 [LNIND 1954 AP 40] : 56 Cr LJ 329.
258 Kelu Ayyappan v State, AIR 1959 Ker 230 [LNIND 1958 KER 21] , p 233 : 1959 Cr LJ 981 .
259 Caetano Fernandes v State, (1992) 1 CCR 860 (Bom) (DB).
260 Ibid.
261 Prakash v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1944) 1 CCR 445 (MP)(DB); Pallapolu Narasimha Rao v State of Andhra
Pradesh, 1997 Cr LJ 4448 (AP) (DB); Hari Shankar v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 2902 (SC); Sham Madhavrao
Rupvate v State of Maharashtra, 2000 Cr LJ 2389 (Bom) (DB); Mohan Das v State of Rajasthan, (2002) 1 CCR 495
(Raj) (DB).
262 Bashir v State, AIR 1953 All 668 [LNIND 1953 ALL 77] , p 670 : 54 Cr LJ 1505; Emperor v Hanuman, ILR 35 All 560;
Sheo Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1942 Oudh 193 : 43 Cr LJ 243; Re Dadi Abdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955 AP 24 [LNIND 1954
AP 40] : 56 Cr LJ 329.
263 Sawami v State, AIR 1954 Pepsu 10 : 54 Cr LJ 1878; Bahaduri v Emperor, AIR 1927 Lah 63 : 28 Cr LJ 45.
264 H Mansel Pleydell v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 313 , p 317 : 27 Cr LJ 977.
Page 49 of 52
265 Kanwarlal v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2002) 7 AD 356 (SC); Y, 1999 Cr LJ 3903 (P&H) (DB).
266 Shanu Pratap Tewari v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2002 Cr LJ 1243 (All) (DB).
267 Jog Raj v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 534 , p 539 : 32 Cr LJ 290; Kadarbhai v State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 Guj LT 341 (DB).
268 Salebhai Kadarali v Emperor, AIR 1949 Ngp 19 : 49 Cr LJ 647 (2); but see Parmeshari Das v Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah
332 : 35 Cr LJ 1319.
269 Andhari Naik v State of Orissa, 1999 Cr LJ 1346 (Ori) (DB).
270 Tamil Mani v State, 1997 Cr LJ 144 (Mad) (DB).
271 Empress v Kaliyani, ILR 19 Mad 356 : 1 Weir 313, per majority.
272 Bai Jiba v Emperor, AIR 1917 Bom 259 : 18 Cr LJ 1010; Empress v Kaliyand, ILR 19 Mad 356 : 1 Weir 313, per
minority.
273 State of Uttar Pradesh v Indrajeet alias Sukhatha, 2000 Cr LJ 4663 (SC).
274 Ibid.
275 Raghubir v Rex, AIR 1951 All 365 [LNIND 1950 ALL 204] , p 366; Re Mohideen Pichai Rowther, AIR 1940 Mad 43
[LNIND 1938 MAD 259] , p 45 : 41 Cr LJ 337.
276 Ghansa Singh v State, AIR 1951 Raj 226 , p 234 : 1958 Cr LJ 1232 , relying on Chikkarange Gowda v State of
Mysore, AIR 1956 SC 731 : 1956 Cr LJ 1365 ; KC Mathew v State of Travancore and Cochin, AIR 1956 SC 241
[LNIND 1955 SC 111] : 1956 Cr LJ 444 .
277 State of Madhya Pradesh v Manzoor Hason, (1970) 19 Jab LJ 91 (SN).
278 Karam v Empress, 5 PR (Cr) 1893.
279 Ghulam v Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 149 : 51 Cr LJ 962, dissenting from Rahmat v Emperor, 30 PR (Cr) 1902 : 6 PLR
1903.
280 Emperor v Girdhari Teli, AIR 1940 Pat 605 , 41 Cr LJ 587; Panna v State, AIR 1950 Ajmer 75 , p 76; Ghasi Ram v
State, AIR 1952 Bhopal 25 : 1952 Cr LJ 1366 ; Balai Bauri v Emperor, AIR 1934 Pat 603 , 36 Cr LJ 184 (2).
281 Rati Ram v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1997 Cr LJ 1525 (All) (DB); Harchand v State of Rajasthan, 1997 Cr LJ 345 (Raj)
(DB).
282 Baghia Urang v State of Assam, 2004 Cr LJ 2249 (Gau) (DB).

Page 50 of 52
283 Bhikhari v Emperor, AIR 1934 Oudh 405 , p 408 : 35 Cr LJ 1113; Nazar Singh v State, AIR 1951 Pepsu 60 ; Emperor v
Samat Kala, AIR 1934 Bom 156 : 35 Cr LJ 829.
284 Munney v State of UP, 2006 Cr LJ 4064 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 2902 [LNIND 2006 SC 582] : 2006 (7) Scale 510 [LNIND
2006 SC 582] : 2006 (5) All LJ 690 (SC) : (2006) 12 SCC 697 [LNIND 2006 SC 582] .
285 Sawami v State, AIR 1954 Pepsu 10 , p 14 : 1953 Cr LJ 1878 ; Bhola Bind v Emperor, AIR 1944 Pat 92 , p 95 : 45 Cr
LJ 409.
286 Ramhira Missir v Emperor, AIR 1943 Pat 397 , p 402.
287 Ghurey v Rex, AIR 1949 All 342 : 50 Cr LJ 535; Bhola Bind v Emperor, AIR 1944 Pat 92 : 45 Cr LJ 409.
288 Rajinder v State (National Capital Territory of Delhi), 2011 AIR SCW 6051 : 2012 Cr LJ 435 (SC) : 2011 (9) Scale 118
289 Mavila Thamban Nambiar v State of Kerala, AIR 1979 SC 687 [LNIND 1978 SC 380] : 1997 SCC (Cri) 726 [LNIND
1997 SC 24] .
290 State of HP v Ram Krishan, 2009 Cr LJ 1138 , p 1139 (SC) : 2009 AIR SCW 616 : 2009 (1) Scale 324 [LNIND 2009 SC
43] : (2009) 11 SCC 327 [LNIND 2009 SC 43] .
291 Kachna v State of Rajasthan, 1986 Cr LJ 306 (Raj) (DB).
292 Kabiraj Tudu v State of Assam, 1994 Cr LJ 432 (Gau) (DB).
293 Kotwal v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1993) 2 CCR 488 (SC).
294 Laxman v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 4626 (SC).
295 Panchaiah v State of Karnataka, AIR 1994 SC 963 .
296 Lachhiya v State, 1980 All LJ 887, p 889 : 1980 CLR 488 (UP) (All).
297 Emperor v Gulub, AIR 1918 All 420 : 19 Cr LJ 953; Lachhiya v State, 1980 All LJ 887 : 1980 CLR 488 (UP).
298 Sadhu Kumbhar v King, AIR 1951 Ori 354 [LNIND 1949 ORI 8] , p 355 : 52 Cr LJ 1136; Dadi Abdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955
AP 24 [LNIND 1954 AP 40] , p 26 : 56 Cr LJ 329; Hariram Mahatha v Emperor, AIR 1942 Pat 96 : 43 Cr LJ 41;
Kandasami Salagar, AIR 1942 Mad 213 : 43 Cr LJ 516; Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 207.
299 Karam Singh v State of Punjab, 1993 Cr LJ 367 (SC).

Page 51 of 52
300 Sellappan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 Cr LJ 1442 , p 1447 : (2007) 2 Scale 373 [LNIND 2007 SC 91] : (2007) 15 SCC
327 [LNIND 2007 SC 91] .
301 Raman v State of Kerala, 2015 Cr LJ 2989 (Ker) (DB).
302 Lokesh Shivakumar v State of Karnatka, AIR 2012 SC 926 : 2012 (3) SCC 196 [LNIND 2012 SC 114] : 2012 (2) Scale
420 [LNIND 2012 SC 114] : 2012 Cr LJ 1625 , p 1629 (SC).
303 Sivakumar v State, 2003 Cr LJ 3690 (Mad) (DB).
304 Ahmad Ali v State of Rajasthan, 1996 Cr LJ 3315 (Raj); Gopi v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1997 Cr LJ 260 (All) (DB).
305 Attar Singh v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 11 SCC 719 [LNIND 2012 SC 844] : 2012 (12) Scale 678 [LNIND 2012 SC
844] ; see also Babu v State of TN, (2013) 8 SCC 60 [LNIND 2013 SC 582] : 2013 Cr LJ 3649 : 2013 (8) Scale 48
[LNIND 2013 SC 582] .
306 Gurmail Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 Cr LJ 665 , p 667 : 2011 (6) Scale 322 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 397] : (2011) 15
SCC 412 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 397] : (2011) 5 SCR 550 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 397] .
307 Narain v State, 2005 Cr LJ 2001 (All) (DB) : 2005 All LJ 979 : 2005 (2) Crimes 2 .
308 Re Marimuthu, AIR 1924 Mad 41 , p 42 : 24 Cr LJ 721.
309 State of Karnataka v Mohamed Nazeer, 2003 Cr LJ 1240 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 999 [LNIND 2003 SC 92] .
310 Babu Khan v State of Rajasthan, 2003 Cr LJ 2654 (Raj) (DB).
311 Boka Marandi v State of Jharkhand, 2007 Cr LJ (NOC) 150 (Jhar) : (2007) 1 AIR Jhar. R 389.
312 Shakti Dan v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3426 (SC).
313 Supadi Lukadu v Emperor, AIR 1925 Bom 310 : (1925) 26 Cr LJ 1016 (Bom).
314 Emperor v Dhirajia, AIR 1940 All 486 : (1941) 42 Cr LJ 146 (All).
315 Gyarsibai v State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1953 MB 61 : (1953) Cr LJ 588 .
316 Thagani Bai v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1972) Jab LJ 604 , [as quoted in Baijanti Bai v State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2000) Cr LJ 3253) ].
317 Phulahai v State of Maharashtra, (1976) Cr LJ 1519 (Bom) (DB).
318 Baijayanti Bai v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2000) Cr LJ 3253 (MP) (DB).
Page 52 of 52
End of Document
[s 300] Murder.—


312-318);
16.3 “Homicide”
Page 2 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
classified as:
IPC);
(section 79, IPC);
IPC);
when:
88, IPC), or
Page 3 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
[s 300] Murder.—
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused
is done with the intention of causing death, or—
• Secondly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be
likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or—
• Thirdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or—
• Fourthly.—If the person committing the act knows that it so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without
any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Page 4 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
Illustrations
(a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him
with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder,
although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of
a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives
him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health,
here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to
cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary
course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have
intended to cause Z’s death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of
murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual.
Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender,
whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person
who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:—
• First.—That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for
killing or doing harm to any person.
• Secondly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public
servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
• Thirdly.—That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private
defence.
• Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from
amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Illustrations
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child.
This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was
not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending
nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not
committed murder, but merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z.
This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the
exercise of his powers.
Page 5 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s
deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z.
This is murder.
(e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent
him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence and kills Z. This is
murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private
defence.
(f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage
of B’s rage, and to cause him kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife.
Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private
defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person
against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing
more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Illustration
Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to causea grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z
persists in the assault. A, believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being
horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide.
Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant, or aiding a public servant
acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers, given to him by law, and causes death by
doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as
such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight, in the
heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a
cruel or unusual manner.
Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault.
Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age
of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent.
Illustration
A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen years of age, to commit suicide. Here, on
account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore, abetted murder.
[s 300.1] Scope
The nature of culpable homicide having been explained in section 299, IPC, this section sets out the
circumstances when culpable homicide turns into “murder” which is only an aggravated form of culpable
homicide.319Section 300, IPC, is not attracted in the absence of any intention, on the part of the accused, to
cause death of the deceased, particularly when he (ie accused) first gives lathi blows on non-vital parts of body
of the deceased.320 Therefore, unless the cause is brought within any of the five exceptions to this section,
culpable homicide will be murder; but despite the fact that none of the exceptions has been pleaded, the
prosecution is bound to bring the cause under any of the four clauses of this section.321 The prosecution has to
prove in every case of culpable homicide to attract the provisions of section 300, IPC, that, the act by which the
death was caused was done (i) with the intention of causing death, or (ii) with the intention of causing such
bodily injury which the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is
caused, or (iii) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be
inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or (iv) with the knowledge that the act is so
imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death
and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death.322
Page 6 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
The section, defines as to what must be proved to establish a prima facie murder unless any of the mitigating
circumstances, set out in the five exceptions, applies. If any of them applies, the prima facie presumption, that
the offence is murder, is removed and the offence becomes “culpable homicide not amounting to murder”.323 It
must, however, be noted that the exceptions, carved out under this section for mitigating the crime, would be
inapplicable to a murder, committed in the course of the offence of dacoity, because the word “murder”, as used
in section 396, is not the same thing as “murder” defined in this section.324
[s 300.2] English Law
To establish a case of murder the prosecution must prove: (1) that the unlawful death of the victim was caused
by an act or omission of the defendant; and (2) that the defendant did that act or omitted to act with “malice
aforethought”, express or implied. The burden of proof remains, throughout, on the prosecution and, apart from
the special defences of insanity and diminished responsibility and the anomalous case of suicide pacts, it is at
no time incumbent upon the defendant to establish any other defence, or partial defence, to the charge. The
mental element of murder, traditionally called “malice aforethought”, may take the form of “an intention
unlawfully to kill (express malice)” or “an intention unlawfully to cause grievous bodily harm (implied malice)”.
Therefore, “intent” is the essential element in both forms of “malice aforethought”.
Further, it has been held by the Supreme Court of UK that: “Both parties in gunfight guilty of murder of
bystander killed by stray bullet; guilt was result of either combination of common law principles relating to aiding
and abetting and doctrine of transferred malice operated, or conclusion that both parties were principals to joint
enterprise to engage in unlawful violence with intent to cause death or serious injury.”325 It has also been held
that, “The public interest in the administration of justice is best served if in any trial on indictment the trial Judge
leaves to the jury, subject to any appropriate caution or warning but irrespective of the wishes of trial counsel,
any obvious alternative offence which there was evidence to support: thus on a charge of murder it is in the
interests of justice that a Judge direct a jury as to manslaughter, as an alternative to murder.”326
[s 300.3] Canadian Law
Under the Canadian law, “Murder” is one of the three forms of culpable homicide: murder, manslaughter or
infanticide. Further, it is an indictable offence to commit first degree murder or second degree murder.
[s 300.3.1] Actus Reus
A person commits homicide when, directly or indirectly, by any means, he or she causes the death of a human
being. There are two kinds of homicide: “culpable” and “non-culpable” homicide. “Non-culpable” homicide is not
an offence. Culpable homicide means to cause another person”s death by:
• an unlawful act,
• criminal negligence,
• causing, by threats or fear of violence or by deception, the deceased to do anything that causes death,
or
• wilfully frightening a child or sick person so as to cause death.
The test for “death” is not “brain death” but organ death i.e. to see whether or not the deceased”s vital organs,
including the heart, continue to operate. Where a person, by an act or omission, does anything that results in
the death of another person, he is deemed to cause the death, notwithstanding that death from such cause
might have been prevented by resorting to proper means. Where a person causes a bodily injury to another
person, which itself is of a dangerous nature and from which death results, he is deemed to have caused the
death, notwithstanding whether the immediate cause of death is proper or improper treatment that is applied in
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[s 300] Murder.—
good faith. Where a person causes a bodily injury to another person resulting in death, he is deemed to have
caused the death notwithstanding that the effect of the bodily injury is only to accelerate the death from a
disease or disorder arising from some other cause.
These situations are fact-specific, and the trial Judge is obliged to give the jury a clear and specific instruction
with respect to intervening events. Where an intervening faulty CPR procedure appeared on the evidence to be
the cause of death, it was critical that the jury understood their obligation to consider whether or not any
independent, intervening and therefore, exculpatory factors occurred after the accused's acts, thereby severing
the link in the chain that tied them to the death. The decision of treating physicians to pursue a conservative,
non-interventionist treatment of the 77 year old man who had been shot, in view of his age and health, could
not exculpate the accused, when the man died three weeks later. Organs such as kidneys may be removed for
transplantation purposes before a mortally injured person is pronounced dead.
[s 300.3.2] Causation
The applicable standard for causation in relation to all homicide cases (with one exception for first-degree
murder) is a “significant contributing cause”. This is constitutionally valid. No person commits culpable homicide
where he causes the death of a human being by any influence on the mind alone or by any disorder or disease
resulting from influence on the mind alone. However, causing the death of a child or sick person by wilfully
frightening him or her may constitute culpable homicide. No conviction lay where the deceased died from acute
heart failure caused by stress resulting from the accused’s break-in and subsequent struggle.
[s 300.3.3] Mens Rea
Culpable homicide is murder in the following circumstances:
• Intent to kill.
• The accused causes death with one of the specified intentions required for murder ie, the accused
means to cause the deceased's death.
• Intent to cause bodily harm, likely to cause death, and is reckless as to whether death ensues or not.
• In the absence of the intent to kill, murder requires the death of a human being by bodily harm of a
sufficient gravity such that it is likely to cause death. Since death has in fact resulted, this requirement
will generally, however illogically, operate except in cases where the bodily harm actually inflicted only
caused death because of some unusual or unexpected chain of circumstances. Then the argument will
remain plausible that the bodily harm intended by the accused was not in fact likely to cause death.
The required accompanying mental elements are threefold: the intention to cause that bodily harm
which is likely to cause death, the knowledge that the intended bodily harm is likely to cause death and
recklessness as to whether death ensues or not. In the first element, the accused must foresee a
likelihood of death flowing from the bodily harm she or he is intentionally causing the victim, therefore
foresight of a mere danger of death is not sufficient. The element “likely” in the mens rea of murder in
section 229(a)(ii) means “a substantial degree of probability”. Recklessness requires advertence to the
prohibited consequence and the conscious running of that risk. It is now clear that recklessness
requires advertence to the probability (likelihood) of the prohibited consequence and not merely the
possibility thereof.
• Unintended deceased.
• The accused would otherwise be guilty of murder in respect of an intended target, but happens to kill
the wrong person. This is “the doctrine of transferred intent” where the mental element is simply
“transferred” from the intended target to the actual deceased. Even in a case of transferred intent, the
accused at the time of the act that kills the deceased must have the specific requisite intent in relation
to the intended target. The “transferred intent doctrine” has no application where the accused intends
to commit suicide but inadvertently kills another.
• No intent to kill, but death likely.
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[s 300] Murder.—
• The accused is engaged in an unlawful object and foresight of death becomes sufficient mens rea. The
objective liability phrase “ought to know” in the Code as written is constitutionally invalid under section
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and should be read out of the section. Thus,
murder is made out upon simple foresight of the likelihood of death where the accused acts for “an
unlawful object”. In other words, the mental elements “intent to cause bodily harm” and “recklessness
as to whether death ensues or not” are replaced by “unlawful purpose”. The fact that the accused acts
for an unlawful purpose is viewed as sufficiently equivalent in regard to culpability to justify discarding
the other mental requirements since the accused is still required to have a foresight of likelihood of
death. Thus, the section as read down is constitutional. There are three components under section
229(c): an unlawful object (“for an unlawful object”); a dangerous act (“does anything that he knows is
likely to cause death and thereby causes death to a human being”); and knowledge or foresight of;
likelihood of death (“that he knows is likely to cause death”). A gang member who is prepared to
engage in a shootout on a public street with an opposing gang can be liable for murder when an
innocent bystander is shot to death.
• Murder in commission of specified offences.
• This applies where the accused is engaged in one of the specified offences and the intentional use of
bodily harm in aid thereof or in aid of his escape causes death. The specified offences are: committing
or attempting to commit high treason or treason, or sabotage, piratical acts, hijacking an aircraft,
escape or rescue from prison or lawful custody, assaulting a peace officer, sexual assault, sexual
assault with a weapon, threats to a third party or causing bodily harm, aggravated sexual assault,
kidnapping and forcible confinement, hostage taking, robbery, breaking and entering, and arson. As
the offence is written in the Code, the accused may be convicted whether or not he or she means to
cause death to any human being and whether or not he knows that death is likely to be caused to any
human being, if the accused either meant to cause bodily harm, administer a stupefying or
overpowering thing or wilfully stops the breath of a human being, for the purpose of facilitating either
the commission of the offence or his flight after committing or attempting to commit the offence, and
the death ensues from the bodily harm, the accused for the purposes of flight, and the death ensues
therefrom. This offence is unconstitutional, as the minimum constitutionally acceptable mens rea for
murder is at least foresight of death and the provisions of this section fail to comply with that
consideration.
While there must be concurrence of the mens rea and actus reus, the two elements need not be completely co-
extensive. If death results after a series of wrongful acts that are part of a single transaction, so long as the
requisite mental state coincides at some point with the wrongful acts, it will be sufficient to constitute the
offence.
If A assaults B, leaving him unconscious on the floor of a building in which the assault occurred and before B
regains consciousness he is killed when the building collapses in a sudden earthquake, A cannot be held
criminally responsible for the homicide. The law would attribute B's death to another intervening cause and not
to A’s assault even though B would not have been in the building but for the force of A’s blow that rendered him
unconscious. The assault was the reason that B was there but the blow was not the cause of the man's
death.327
The transfer of intent applies equally to the elements of planned and deliberate action. If the accused intends to
kill one person or himself or intends to cause serious bodily harm to one person or to himself knowing that he is
likely to cause death, and he deliberately formulates a plan to carry out that act, but in so doing accidentally or
mistakenly kills someone else, then he is still guilty of first degree murder regarding that killing.328
[s 300.4] Essentials of Murder
Except in cases covered by the five exceptions mentioned in section 300 of the IPC, culpable homicide is
murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or if the act falls
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[s 300] Murder.—
within any of the 3 clauses of section 300, namely, secondly, thirdly and fourthly.329 In order that culpable
homicide may amount to a murder, as enunciated in this section, the following two things are essential:
(1) The killing must be accompanied by the intention or knowledge, specified in this section. Culpable
homicide is not prime facie murder. It lies on the prosecution to prove the requisite intention or
knowledge.330 If the prosecution fails to do this, but the intention or knowledge, requisite under section
299, is established, then the accused is guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.331
• Further, “intent” and “knowledge” postulate the existence of positive mental attitude and this mental
condition is the special mens rea which is necessary for the offence.332
(2) The killing must not fall within one or other of the five exceptions, specified in this section. If it does, the
accused is again guilty only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.333
[s 300.5] Crucial Question
The crucial question is as to which was the appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme of the IPC,
“culpable homicide” is “genus” and “murder” its “specie”. All “murder” is “culpable homicide”, but not vice-versa.
Speaking generally, “culpable homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder” is culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.334
[s 300.6] Court’s Approach in Four Stages
The proper way, in which a court should approach the facts and apply the law in cases where one person has,
by doing an act, caused the death of another person, may be expressed in stages as follows:
[s 300.6.1] First Stage
It should first be established, to the satisfaction of the court, that the accused person has done an act by doing
which he has caused the death of another person, ie, there must be a relation between the act, done by the
accused, and the death of the victim of the offence.
[s 300.6.2] Second Stage
The court must next consider whether that act on the part of the accused amounts to culpable homicide, ie,
whether the act of the accused comes within the purview of section 299, IPC.
[s 300.6.3] Third Stage
If it is established that the act, which caused the death, was done, whether with one of the two intentions, or
with the knowledge necessary to cause that act to amount to culpable homicide, then, and then only, section
300, IPC comes into operation and, therefore, the next thing to do is to ascertain whether such act was done
either (1) with one of the three intentions, that is to say, with the intention of causing either (i) death, or (ii) such
bodily injury as the offender knew to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm was caused,
or (iii) such bodily injury as was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death; or (2) (i) with the
knowledge that the act was so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause either (a) death or (b)
such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, and (ii) without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing
either (a) death or (b) such bodily injury as was likely to cause death.
[s 300.6.4] Fourth Stage
If it has been proved that the act either (a) was done by the accused with the intention of causing death, or (b) it
fulfilled one of the other requirements of section 299, IPC and also fulfilled one of the requirements of section
300, IPC, then, it must further be considered whether, on the facts of the particular case, the culpable homicide
is brought down from the higher plane of murder, to the lower plane of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, by reason of the act having been done, either (a) in an excessive, but bona fide, exercise of the right of
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[s 300] Murder.—
private defence, or (b) whilst the accused was deprived of the power of self-control, by grave and sudden
provocation, or (c) in sudden fight in the heat of passion, or (d) in such circumstances as are mentioned in
either exception 3 or exception 4 in section 300. If culpable homicide is not amounting to murder, the only
matter to be considered at the fourth stage is whether the accused has established (if such is his case) the right
of private defence as a complete defence under section 96.335
[s 300.7] “Murder” Distinguished from “Culpable Homicide”
The distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder is often lost sight of, resulting
in undue liberality in favour of undeserving culprits like police officers.336 Two offences involve the killing of a
person, viz, the offence of “culpable homicide” and the more heinous offence of “murder”. What distinguishes
these two offences is the presence of a special mens rea, which consists of four mental attitudes, in the
presence of any of which the lesser offence becomes the greater. These four mental attitudes are stated in
section 300 and they distinguish murder from culpable homicide. Unless the offence can be said to involve, at
least, one such mental attitude, it cannot be murder.337 The distinction between the offences of culpable
homicide and murder is the presence of special mens rea which consists of four mental attitudes in the
presence of any of which the lesser offence becomes greater. These attitudes are stated in section 300, IPC,
as distinguishing murder from culpable homicide not amounting to murder.338 In considering whether the
offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the manner of causing injuries to the victim by
accused persons as deposed by the prosecution witness, nature of injuries caused to the victim, part of the
body where accused person/persons caused injuries to the victim, the weapon/weapons used in the
commission of crime and conduct of the offender/offenders are to be taken into account.339
An injury “likely to cause death”, within the meaning of section 299(2) may, or may not, fall within the
descriptions, mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of section 300, which both clauses together do not equal
culpable homicide in section 299(2).340 The offence will amount to murder if the conditions, laid down in any
one, or more, of the four clauses of section 300, are satisfied. If the offence comes under section 299, or under
one, or other, of the exceptions to section 300, it will be culpable homicide not amounting to murder.341 If an act
is done with the knowledge that the doer is likely by such act to cause death, the offence is culpable homicide
unless the act done is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death and is committed without any excuse, in which case the offence is murder. If the act
is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, the offence is culpable
homicide unless the offender knows that the act done is likely to cause the death of the person to whom the
harm is caused or if the bodily injury is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.342 The
degree of knowledge is a question of fact.343 Putting it shortly, culpable homicide, as defined under section 299,
does not amount to murder (a) where, though the evidence is sufficient to constitute murder, one or more of the
exceptions to section 300 apply, or (b) where the degree of mens rea, specified under section 299, is present,
but not the special degrees referred to by section 300.344 To render culpable homicide murder, the case must
come within the provisions of clause (1), or (2), or (3), or (4), of section 300.345
[s 300.8] Culpable Homicide is Genus and Murder its Specie—Three Degrees of Culpable Homicide
In the scheme of the IPC, “culpable homicide” is genus and “murder” its specie. All “murder” is culpable
homicide, but not vice-versa. Speaking generally, “culpable homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder”
is culpable homicide not amounting to murder. For purposes of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of
this offence, IPC practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide.346 The first is what may be called
“culpable homicide of the first degree”. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is defined in section
300 as “murder”. The second may be termed as “culpable homicide of the second degree”. This is punishable
under the first part of section 304. And then, there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is the lowest
type of culpable homicide and the punishment, provided for it, is also the lowest among punishments provided
for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of section 304.347
[s 300.9] Tabular Comparison of Culpable Homicide and Murder
The terms of sections 299 and 300 are almost identical as readily appears from the following tabular
comparison:348
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[s 300] Murder.—
Section 299 Section 300
A person commits culpable homicide if the act, by which the Subject to certain exceptions, culpable the act by which
death is caused, is done— homicide is murder if the death is caused, is done—
Intention
(a) with the intention of causing death; or death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or
(b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the
cause death; or offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to
whom the harm is caused; or
(3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and
the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient, in the
ordinary course of nature, to cause death; or
Knowledge
(c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous
that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury
as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for
incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is
mentioned above.
On a glance of the above table, it will be noticed that not only the actus reus, but also the mental elements of
intention or knowledge, required by the two sections, are the same and the only distinction between the
offences lies in the degree of risk to human life which the offender intends or knows. If death is a likely result, it
is culpable homicide; if it is the most probable result, it is murder.349
[s 300.10] Court to Focus on Keywords used in Sections 299 and 300
The academic distinction between “murder” and “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” has always
vexed the courts. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms
used by the Legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest
way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the
keywords used in the various clauses of sections 299 and 300.350
[s 300.11] Section 299, Section 300 and Section 304A
Commentary under the same heading in section 299, ante and commentary under section 304A, post, may be
referred to.
The cases in which death of the victim is caused by the accused with the intention or knowledge to kill are
either covered under culpable homicide as defined under section 299, IPC, and made punishable under section
304, IPC, or murder as defined in section 300, IPC and made punishable under section 302, IPC. The
essentials of section 299, IPC, are given in synopsis note 5 of section 299, IPC, and that of section 300, IPC,
are given in synopsis note 4 of that section and their distinctions in the last synopsis. There is another category
of cases in which the death of the victim is caused by the accused on account of his rash or negligent act.
There cases are covered under section 304A, IPC.
The provisions of section 304A, IPC apply to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no
knowledge that the act done in all probabilities will cause death. Therefore, this provision is directed at offences
outside the range of sections 299 and 300, IPC and obviously contemplates those cases into which neither
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[s 300] Murder.—
intention, nor knowledge enters. The words “not amounting to culpable homicide” in the section are very
significant and it must therefore be understood that intentionally or knowingly inflicted injury or violence directly
and wilfully caused is excluded. The section applies only to such acts which are rash or negligent and are
directly the cause of death of another person. In other words, a rash act is primarily an over hasty act as
opposed to a deliberate act, but done without due care and caution. Then the question of whether the conduct
of the accused amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends on the amount of care and
circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider fit to be sufficient and this depends on the
circumstances in each case.351
In Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh v State of Pepsu,352 a mahant went to the house of the accused who was having
a drink party and the accused was respectful to him and was very anxious to show all hospitality to him. The
accused wanted the mahant to take meals and spend the night with him. However, on seeing that the mahant
was going away, the accused fired his gun without aiming at the mahant just to prevent him from leaving his
place by terrifying him to some extent, but unfortunately the shot hit the mahant and he died. The Apex Court
held that on the materials placed, it was not proved that the accused had an intention of firing at the mahant,
but it was a wholly rash and negligent act on the part of the accused and accordingly convicted him under
section 304A, IPC.
In Meera Puri v State of Nagaland,353 the accused fired a rifle with the knowledge that the children and others
were near about, and the same resulted in the death of a child. The court noted that the accused did not aim at
the child or fire at the party. Gowsami CJ, as he then was, who spoke for the Bench, held as under:
By her act in firing the rifle in the way she did with the full knowledge of the children and others near about, she has
done a rash and negligent act, which, although does not amount to culpable homicide, brings her within the mischief of
s 304-A, Penal Code. We consider her rash and negligent act in firing in that way as culpable rashness and negligence
and act merely an error of judgment or defect of (sic) intelligence.
In Nga San Win,354 the accused, a sub-inspector of police while pursuing a party of gamblers fired four shots in
the air, but one of the persons got injured and died. Noting that the sub-inspector fired from a short distance
from the crowd, the court observed that if he had only taken sufficient care and caution, he would not have fired
the four shots, while running, even into the air from such a short distance and that he acted with over-hastiness
and held him to be guilty under section 304A, IPC. In Emperor v Morgan,355 two accused persons belonging to
the light infantry were practising target shooting at a place by the side of a public road, due to which a man was
fatally wounded. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court found them guilty under section 304A, IPC
holding that they fired the rifles without having taken any precaution or the use of the slightest circumspection
with regard to the safety of others. In Balwant Singh v State of Punjab,356 the accused, a police constable, with
a view to maintain law and order killed two bystanders with his service rifle. The accused did not aim at the two
deceased persons who were away. It was night time and it could not definitely be said that the accused would
have seen them. In fact the prosecution witness and his brother who started assaulting the head-constable and
the accused were not hit by the shots fired by the accused. That itself showed that the accused fired his rifle
without any aim and only to scare away the people; including the prosecution witness and his brother and he
did so as directed by the head-constable who was in command of the police party. However, even in such a
situation he had to act in a prudent manner but when he acted in such haste, rashly, and without
circumspection and due care and caution with regard to the safety of other innocent people then the only
inference is that his rash act amounted to culpable rashness attracting the provisions of section 304A, IPC. The
conviction of the accused was, therefore, altered from section 302, IPC to section 304A, IPC, by the open court.
[s 300.12] “Except in the Cases Hereinafter Excepted”

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[s 300] Murder.—
Except in cases covered by the five exceptions mentioned in section 300 of the IPC, culpable homicide is
murder if the act by which the death caused is done with the intention of causing death, or if the act falls within
any of the three clauses of section 300, namely, secondly, thirdly and fourthly. An offence cannot amount to
murder unless it falls within the definition of “culpable homicide” because section 300 merely points out the
cases in which culpable homicide is murder. But an offence may amount to culpable homicide without
amounting to murder. Thus, culpable homicide may not amount to murder (a) where, though the evidence is
sufficient to constitute murder, one, or more, of the five exceptions to section 300 apply, or (b) where the
degree of mens rea, specified under section 299, IPC, is present, but not the special degrees referred to by
section 300. So, the question, as to whether a particular case is within one of the said exceptions, does not
arise for consideration unless the prosecution has established a case of murder. If the prosecution has proved
that culpable homicide (under section 299, IPC) has been committed by the accused, but has failed to prove
that such culpable homicide amounts to murder (under section 300), it is improper, and indeed useless, to
consider whether any of the mitigating factors are present.
[s 300.13] Clause Firstly—“With the Intention of Causing Death”
By virtue of this clause, which corresponds with, and is equivalent to, the first clause of section 299, an offence
is murder if there is an intention to kill. The intention to kill a person has to be gathered from certain factors
such as, the nature of the weapon used and the vital part on which the injury was inflicted, and the force with
which the weapon was used and other attendant circumstances. Once the intention to kill is proved, the offence
is murder unless one of the exceptions applies, in which case the offence is reduced to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder.357 If the court comes to the conclusion that the accused had common intention to kill the
deceased and this conclusion is further fortified by the medical evidence, the accused are guilty of murder
under sections 302/34, IPC.358 Further, it has been held that the intention of the accused to cause death can be
ascertained from the resultant injuries.359 Where injuries are inflicted with the intention of killing a person and
death ensues as a result of the injuries, it is a clear case of murder falling under this clause.360 Where the
accused was held responsible not only for the fatal injury but other injuries too which were amongst 16 injuries
found on the deceased, the magnitude of the damage apparent on the dead body besides the incised wound
inflicted on deceased by accused with the aid of a dagger clearly indicated his intention to cause murder of the
deceased.361 Where the accused abused the deceased by holding his collar and brandishing the knife, however
the deceased overpowered the accused and sat on his chest, the co-accused at the call of the accused
delivered a knife-blow on victim’s thigh by which the accused got released from the victim’s grip and without
any provocation dealt a very severe knife-blow on the stomach of the deceased causing severe injuries to the
vital parts of the body resulting in his death, it cannot be held that the accused had no intention to cause the
murderous assault on the deceased.362 Where a knife injury was caused directly and deep into the stomach of
the deceased, a vital part which led to his death in a short time, it cannot be said that there was no intention to
cause that very injury which had led ultimately to the death of the deceased. Therefore, the accused were
convicted under section 302, IPC.363 Where, the accused A2 and A3 caught hold of the deceased and the
accused A1 swiftly took out knife from his waist and stabbed the deceased causing death, it was held that, the
acts on the part of A2 and A3 stood on a different footing than the act committed by A1. However, the common
intention to attack the deceased was there in the minds of A2 and A3 along with A1 and it was proved that the 3
accused persons came together and they wanted to attack the deceased. Further, A2 and A3 were having
knowledge that their acts along with the acts of A1 were likely to cause the death of the deceased, but at the
same time, an intention to commit murder could not be attributed to A2 and A3 as apart from catching hold of
the deceased and stopping him, A2 and A3 had not attacked the deceased.364 Where the assailants accused
gave two lathi blows to the deceased S, which had caused facture of the ribs and pierced his lungs and the
injuries caused were neither unintentional nor accidental, the doctor had opined that the injuries caused were
sufficient to cause death in the normal course; it was held that the guilt of the accused fell under section 300,
clause thirdly, punishable under section 302, IPC.365
Where there was a dispute between the accused and the deceased over the removal of the boundary stone,
the accused assaulted the deceased with axe over his head and back of the neck of the deceased resulting in
fracture and ultimate death, it was held that the guilt of the accused fell under section 302 and not section 304,
IPC.366
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[s 300] Murder.—
Where the accused assaulted the deceased in such a manner that the deceased suffered grievous injuries
which were sufficient to cause death, but the injuries were not inflicted by the accused to kill the deceased, the
use of the words Maro Maro by the accused did not indicate that they intended to cause the death of the
deceased. The conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt II,
IPC.367
The single-injury theory cannot be made applicable to a case where a deadly weapon like firearm is used. Even
a single injury caused by a firearm would only lead to an inference that the death was caused intentionally.368
Firing two shots successively at a person clearly shows a murderous intent.369 Where the accused set fire to the
single room hut, in which the deceased was sleeping, after locking the door of the room from outside and also
prevented the villagers from going to the rescue of the helpless inmate of the room, it was held that the
intention of the accused to kill the deceased was clear and they were liable for murder.370 When the assault was
given by a sword on the head of a victim with such a force that grievous cut and bleeding injuries occurred on
the head of the deceased such that his brain matter was exposed, there can be no manner of doubt that the
intention of the accused was to cause the death of the deceased.371 In a case, the intention to cause the death
was inferred from the nature of the injuries caused.372 Where as many as 34 injuries by an axe had been
caused, it was held that intention to cause death may be inferred from the nature and number of injuries.373
Where a person causes an injury on a vital part, the intention to kill can be attributed to him.374 Sometimes the
nature of the weapon used, sometimes the part of the body on which the injury is caused, and sometimes both
are relevant.375 Where the accused had inflicted injury by axe on the head of the deceased and the medical
officer who conducted autopsy examination deposed that such injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, the case fell under section 302 and not under section 304, Pt II, IPC.376 Where an
assault with a lathi is made on the head, the intention may not be to kill; if, however, the injury is inflicted on the
chest with a long knife, the intention to kill is clear.377 Illustration (a) to section 300, and (a), (c), (d), (e), and (f)
to exception 1, section 300, IPC, illustrate cases falling under the first clause of this section.
Repeated axe blow on vital parts of the victim depicts intention to cause death.378
As stated earlier, this clause contemplates the intention to cause death. Intention, which is a question of fact,
when proved, is an almost necessary inference from the established facts. As a basic rule, one may say that
when the doer of an act knows that his act will result in death, he should be deemed to have intended to cause
death. Every man is, in law, deemed to know and to intend the natural and probable consequences of his act.
This clause would, therefore, apply only when the culprit or culprits either knew, or must have known, that death
would be the result of his or their act.379 Where the deceased after consuming liquor entered the house of the
accused, and did not leave the house despite the request of the accused, the appellant inflicted a blow with a
spade on the head of the deceased; the deceased died after five days, it was held that the accused had no
intention to cause the death of the deceased, and he was convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC.380
There was evidence that the accused was unhappy with the quality of the food prepared by the deceased cook,
and the accused assaulted him with kicks and fists causing his death. The deceased had sustained multiple
contusions; however, the nature of injuries of the deceased did not suggest that the accused intended to cause
death of the deceased. Therefore, the conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was altered to one
under section 304, Pt II, IPC.381
[s 300.13.1] Intention
Where the accused had no intention to cause the death of the deceased but knowledge could be imputed to
him as his act was one that was likely to cause death viz. the accused dashed the head of the deceased
against the wall, the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC.382
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Where the accused being armed with axe and kati could have assaulted on the vital parts of the body of the
deceased if they had any intention to cause death; the very fact that the accused were alleged to have
assaulted on arm and wrist and corresponding injuries were also found in course of post-mortem examination, it
was held proper to convict the accused for commission of offence under section 304, Pt II read with section 34,
IPC since they had no intention to cause death but had knowledge that such injuries may cause death.383
Where the act of the accused appeared to have been committed out of deep frustration as the accused was a
vagabond, it was held that there was no mens rea on the part of the accused to commit the murder of the
deceased The conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt I,
IPC.384
In a case where the accused armed with knives laid down the deceased on the ground and caused injuries on
the vital parts of the body of the deceased, it was held that the intention of all the accused to commit the murder
of the deceased was discernible and the accused were convicted under section 302. The plea of the accused
that the offence fell under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC was rejected.385
[s 300.14] Clause Secondly
An intention to kill is not required in every case. Knowledge on the part of the accused, that the natural or
probable consequences of the act would be death,386 or that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must,
in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury which was likely to cause death,387 would suffice. In common
parlance, the word “likely” is used only to denote a lower degree of “likelihood”, meaning thereby to distinguish
an offence, falling under section 302, IPC, from that falling under section 304, IPC.388 An act of setting any
person aflame after pouring kerosene is definitely likely to cause death of that person and this fact is obviously
known to the accused persons when they caught hold of the deceased, poured kerosene over her and set her
ablaze. Both clauses secondly and fourthly of section 300 clearly apply to these facts.389 Where both the
accused had caused one blow each with a gandasa on the head, a vital part of the body, of the deceased and
the extent of damage as disclosed by the doctor that the death was caused by shock and haemorrhage due to
injury to the brain which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the conviction of the
accused person under sections 302/34, IPC, was upheld.390 Where the accused by use of bare hand suffocated
the deceased in stagnant water leading to death, the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt I and not
under section 302, IPC.391 Where there was family dispute with regard to property, the accused appellant gave
one blow with iron rod on the head of the deceased causing death, the accused had no intention to kill and his
conviction under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt II.392 Where on a sudden quarrel on
the spur of the moment, the accused inflicted cuts by kathi on the neck which caused the death of his younger
brother, he was convicted under section 304, Pt II, and his conviction under section 302, IPC was set aside.393
Where the accused was quarrelling with prosecution witness and the deceased was trying to pacify, the
accused being unhappy with the deceased’s intervention assaulted the deceased with a pestle with such force
that the head of the deceased was broken into pieces, the injury caused not only showed the intention of the
accused to cause death but also knowledge that the injury was likely to cause death, thus, the accused was
The second clause of section 300, IPC mentions one special circumstance which converts culpable homicide
into murder. Putting aside the exceptions in the section, which reduce the offence of murder to culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, culpable homicide is again considered murder if the offender does the act
with the intention of causing such bodily injury which he knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to
whom harm is caused.395 This knowledge must be in relation to the “peculiar physical condition” of the
deceased and the accused, having full knowledge that the injury, intended to be caused, would most likely
result in his death on account of his “peculiar physical condition”, causes the injury to him and death ensues.396
Pushing a person into the sea, with a bleeding head injury may not have been with the intention to kill, but it
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would certainly show the “intention of causing a bodily injury as was likely to cause death”, within the meaning
of section 300 and section 304, Pt I of the IPC.397 Where the accused/victim who was brought to the police
station on a false charge of dacoity, was mercilessly beaten by the constables with the intention to cause such
bodily injury as the constables knew would cause his death, the injuries would fall under clause “secondly” of
section 300.398 If the element of knowledge is wanting, the offence would not be murder, but only culpable
homicide not amounting to murder or even a lesser offence. Illustration (b), appended to this clause, very
clearly brings out the point.399 When clause (3) of this section speaks of an injury sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, it contemplates an injury caused to a normal grown-up human being and does
not take account of the special physical condition of the person harmed accelerating his death. When an injury,
which would not be sufficient to cause the death of an ordinary grown-up human being, is sufficient to cause the
death of a person in a sub-normal state of health, eg by reason of age, disease, or weakness of previous
injuries, it is spoken of as an injury likely to cause the death of the person, to whom the harm is caused, bearing
in mind that person’s special physical condition. This is what is provided for in clause (2) of the section.400
Where, neither it has been shown that any constitutional or other peculiarity existed in the case of the
deceased, which would have made it likely that injuries, which ordinarily would not cause death, would be fatal
in his case, nor the fact that his assailants were aware of it, clause (2) would be inapplicable.401
Where the deceased aged 90 years was dragged from his cot, beaten by wall clock on head by the accused,
causing death, it was held that the accused was attributed by the consequences of his act and the accused was
While the respondent accused and one more person were riding on motorcycle, respondent accused fired with
pistol causing death of the deceased. The respondent-accused knew that his act of shooting the deceased
person is likely to cause death of that person to whom harm is caused. It cannot be believed that respondent-
accused did not know about the likelihood of causing death, though, he may not know as to whom he is causing
bodily harm. The ingredients of section 300, IPC were proved in the case. Judgment of the High Court
converting the sentence from section 302 to section 304, Pt I, IPC, was set aside, that of the trial court
convicting the respondent accused under section 302, IPC was restored.403
[s 300.15] Clause “Secondly” of Section 300 Distinguished from the Second Clause of Section 299
Commentary under the same heading in section 299, ante, may be referred to.
The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the
offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal
harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of
nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the “intention
to cause death” is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury
coupled with the offender’s knowledge of the likelihood of such injury. Clause (b) of section 299 does not
postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of section
300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is
suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of
that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may
be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to
cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be
murder, even if the injury which caused the death was intentionally given.404
Clause (2) of section 300 differs from the second clause of section 299 in the sense that stress is laid on the
knowledge of the offender that he is likely to cause death by the act done. It has, therefore, ordinarily been
applied to those cases where the offender has specific knowledge of the facts or circumstances which makes
the act done particularly dangerous to the life of the person to whom that harm is done. Thus, if A knows that B
is suffering from an enlarged spleen and, with that fact in his mind, proceeds to give B a violent blow in the
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region of the spleen and B dies, the offence would fall under clause (2) of section 300, and not under the
second clause of section 299, because of the special knowledge of A. This is not the only class of cases which
is covered by clause (2) aforesaid, but it is the commonest type of cases falling under it.405 If, on the other hand,
a person does an act knowing what its natural and probable consequences will be, then he is presumed to have
intended, by that act, to give rise to such consequences. The intention, spoken of in the second clause of
section 299, is such intention. But the knowledge, mentioned in the second clause of section 300, is not
knowledge of the nature and probable consequences to an ordinary human being, but the knowledge of the
nature and probable consequences to the particular person to whom the harm is caused. In proving this
knowledge, it may be, and in most cases it is, necessary to have recourse to the natural presumption that a
man is presumed to know the natural and probable consequences of his acts and, in such cases, the practical
question, that arises, is whether, on account of a certain peculiarity, known to the accused, as a fact, in the
person to whom the harm is caused, the presumption as to knowledge can property be drawn, having regard to
the common course of natural events. If the answer be in the affirmative, the offence is murder; if the answer be
in the negative, or there is any reasonable doubt that the presumption can be drawn, the offence may be
culpable homicide if the injury intended was likely to cause the death of an ordinary human being without being
especially likely to cause the death of the person, to whom the harm is caused, or it may not amount to culpable
homicide if the accused cannot be presumed to have intended to cause an injury likely to cause death. In the
last mentioned class of cases, the offence may be one of the lesser offences, affecting the human body,
determined according to whether the accused intended to cause hurt or grievous hurt or knew his act to be
likely to cause hurt or grievous hurt.406 Thus, the distinction between knowledge of the natural and probable
consequences of an act to an ordinary human being and the knowledge of the natural and probable
consequences to the particular person, to whom the harm is caused, distinguishes clause (2) of section 299
from clause (2) of section 300.407 Again, when an injury, which would not be sufficient to cause the death of an
ordinary grown-up human being, is sufficient to cause the death of a person in a sub-normal state of health, eg,
by reason of age, disease or weakness or previous injuries, it is spoken of as an injury “likely to cause the
death of the person, to whom the harm is caused”, bearing in mind the person’s special physical condition. This
is provided for in clause (2) of section 300. Clause (2) of section 299, on the other hand, refers to the causing of
an injury likely to cause death without any reference to the special physical condition of the person to whom the
harm is caused.408
[s 300.16] Clause Thirdly
For cases to fall within this clause, it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death if death ensues
from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.409 It must
be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, which in the ordinary course of
nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz, the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be
inflicted.410 The sufficiency of an intentional injury to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is the gist of
the clause, irrespective of an intention to cause death.411 The emphasis is on the sufficiency of the injury, in the
ordinary course of nature, to cause death. The sufficiency is the high probability of death in the ordinary course
of nature.412 Thus, for cases that fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the culprits should have the
knowledge of death so long as the intended injuries are sufficient to cause death. Whether an injury is sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature is a question of fact and it does not cease to be sufficient merely because the
person, who inflicts the injury, does not know that it is sufficient. The correct principle seems to be that a case
falls within clause (3) when the degree of probability of death is very great and certainly so where death is the
inevitable result of the intended injuries, whether the culprits intended death or even did not know that death
would result.413
Nature of injuries, if sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature, and intention to cause death,
warrants conviction under section 302 IPC. Two injuries found on the body of the deceased were incised
wounds. The doctor opined that injuries were sufficient to cause death. Held, offence fell under clause “thirdly”
of section 300. Accused respondents were convicted under section 302, IPC.414
If the probability of death is very high, then the requirements of clause “thirdly” of section 300, IPC are satisfied
and the fact that a particular individual may, by the fact of his having secured especially skilled treatment or
being in possession of a particularly strong constitution, have survived an injury, which would otherwise prove
fatal to majority of persons, subjected to it, is not enough to prove that such an injury is not sufficient, in the
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ordinary course of nature, to cause death.415 The chopping off of the leg would necessarily involve the cutting of
all bone structures, blood vessels and nerves. A case of this kind would fall under clause “thirdly” of the
section.416 If the injury, that the offender intends to cause, and does cause, is sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature, the offence is murder, irrespective of whether the offender intended to cause death
and whether the offender had a subjective knowledge of the consequences.417 The intention of the offender in
relation to sufficiency, or otherwise, of the injury is not a matter for consideration at all,418 and the notation, that
the injuries should normally be on, what the layman considers to be, vital parts of the body in order to constitute
murder in law is not correct.419 This part of the inquiry is purely objective and inferential, and has nothing to do
with the intention of the offender.420 Similarly, what is necessary to establish is that the bodily injury, intended to
be inflicted, is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.421
The Supreme Court, in Virsa Singh v State of Punjab,422 observed that, for the application of this clause, it must
first be established that an injury is caused; next, it must be established objectively what the nature of that injury
in the ordinary “course of nature” is. If the injury is found, in the opinion of the court, to be sufficient to cause
death, one test is satisfied. Then, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that very injury, and not
some other injury, and that it was not accidental or unintentional. If this is also held against the offender, the
offence of murder is established.423 The question, in such a case, which falls for determination, is whether the
causing of the fatal injury was accidental or unintentional or whether some other kind of injury was intended to
be inflicted by the assailant.424 There should be explicit medical opinion on the question whether the injuries
caused were sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. Where the two injuries caused by a stone were in
the ordinary course of nature not sufficient to cause death, acquittal of accused proper.425 If the injury, in the
opinion of the doctor, is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death of the deceased,426 and it is
not unintentional or accidental,427 or it cannot be said that it was caused negligently,428 the case would fall
under this clause. But, if the injury caused is not sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, it is
out of the purview of this clause.429 So, the fact, that the deceased met his death after one month of the date of
occurrence, would exclude the application of the ingredients of this clause, particularly when the medical
opinion with regard to the cause of death is hesitating.430 Where the accused had inflicted as many as 26
injuries, the obvious intention of the accused was to cause the death of the deceased; merely because most of
the injuries were on the extremities (non-vital parts), it was no ground to alter the conviction of the accused
under section 302, IPC into one under section 304, Pt II, IPC, when the doctor had opined that the injuries were
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.431 Where the accused had poured acid on the
deceased while the latter was sleeping which caused 60% burn injuries and septicemia causing death, it was
held that since the cause of death was burn injuries and not septicemia, the accused was convicted under
section 302, IPC and not section 304, Pt I, IPC.432
The incised injuries caused to the deceased were intentional and were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature even if it could not be said that his death was intended. This was sufficient to bring the case
within clause “thirdly” of section 300.433
Whether the injury inflicted was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a matter of
inference or deduction from the proved facts about the nature of the injury, and has nothing to do with the
question of intention.434 It has to be decided by the court as a question of fact.435 In some cases, where death
resulted from a single lathi blow on vital part of the body, eg, the head, it was held that the case fell under
section 304 because the injury, intended to be caused, was such as was “likely to cause death”.436 However, in
none of these cases, clause (3) of this section was discussed.
The two accused armed with weapons entered the house of the deceased to commit robbery, when
overpowered by the deceased, the accused inflicted knife blow in the abdomen of the deceased causing death.
It was held that the case was not covered by clause “Thirdly” of section 300, IPC; the accused who had come to
commit robbery had the intention to cause the death of the deceased, and therefore, the offence of the accused
fell under section 302, IPC and not under section 304, Pt I, IPC.437
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The accused was alleged to have caused injuries by knife on the deceased. However, the medical evidence in
the case disclosed that the injuries found on the deceased were simple injuries and none of them was
described as grievous. There was no evidence to prove that the injuries inflicted on the deceased were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This injury was not attributed to the respondent
accused, and there was nothing to establish that the injury which ultimately resulted in the death of the
deceased was intended by any one. Both the High Court and Supreme Court held that the offence under
section 302, IPC was not made out and that the offence made out was one punishable under section 304, Pt II,
IPC.438
Where accused persons caused three stab injuries on chest, stomach and intestine, sufficient to cause death in
ordinary course, the case falls under section 300, clause “thirdly” and the accused persons would be liable to
be convicted under section 302.439
[s 300.17] Two Parts of Clause “Thirdly”
This clause has two parts. The first part is a subjective one which indicates that the injury must be an intentional
one, and not an accidental one and the second part is objective in the sense that, looking at the injury intended
to be caused, the court must be satisfied that it was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause
death.440 These two parts are disjunctive and separate. In using the objective test, the court can take note of the
fact that the accused used no weapon in attacking the deceased.441 Where there is an intention to cause bodily
injury and death has ensued, the question will ordinarily be whether the injury, which the accused intended to
inflict, was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death or was merely likely to cause death and
that will depend mainly on the weapon used, the force with which it was used, the number of blows struck, and
the part of the body injured.442 Where the accused gave cuts with an axe in the middle of the thigh with such
severity as to sever the lower part from the upper thigh, it was held that he was guilty under this clause.443
[s 300.18] Test Laid Down in Virsa Singh’s Case Ingrained in our Legal Systems
In Virsa Singh v State of Punjab,444 Vivian Bose, J, speaking for the court, explained the meaning and scope of
clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following acts before it can bring a case under
section 300, clause “thirdly”. First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly the
nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that
there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or
that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the inquiry
proceeded further. Fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up the three
elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the inquiry is
purely objective and inferential, and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
The ingredients of clause “thirdly” of section 300, IPC were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse
language as follows:
To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under s 300, “thirdly”.
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;

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Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not
accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and
has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words:
The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to
inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify
such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the
injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he
knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the
intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness but
whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause
it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.
These observations of Vivian Bose, J are locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh’s case445 for the
applicability of clause “thirdly” is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law.
Under clause “thirdly” of section 300, IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are
satisfied, ie, (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the
intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily
injury, which in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz, that the injury found to be
present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh’s case, even if the intention of the accused was limited to
the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to
the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to section 300 clearly
brings out this point.446
[s 300.19] So Many Injuries Caused in Quick Succession Attract Clause “Thirdly”
Nineteen injuries caused in quick succession cannot be said to have been caused as a result of grave and
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sudden provocation. The very fact that so many injuries were caused in quick succession and particularly
where the deceased being unarmed and in a helpless situation, is sufficient to indicate that section 300, clause
“Thirdly” is attracted to the case.447
[s 300.20] Nature and Extent of Intention Required in Clause “Thirdly”
In order to bring a case within the third clause of this section, it is not only necessary that the injury be
sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, but also that the accused intended to cause that
injury.448 What clause “thirdly” of section 300 requires is (a) that the act, by which death is caused, is done with
the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and (b) that the bodily injury, intended to be inflicted, is
sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury, actually
found to be present, is proved, the rest of the inquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a
matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The
intention in relation to sufficiency, or otherwise, of the injury is not a matter for consideration at all.449 Proof of
injury on any particular part of body may be determinative of the intention of causing death. If it has not been
proved that it was the intention of the accused to inflict the particular injury on the particular place, it is not
possible to apply clause (3) of section 300.450 Where the accused gave cuts with an axe in the middle of the
thigh with such severity as to sever the lower part from the upper thigh, he was held guilty under clause (3) of
For cases to fall within clause (3) of section 300, IPC, it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause
death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature.452
[s 300.21] Inference Regarding Intention to Cause Injury
Whether the offender intended to inflict the injury in question is one of fact, and not of law. Although the court
“attributes” a particular intention or a desire to the individual concerned having regard to the act, committed by
him, and the circumstances, surrounding the commission of the act,453 so that, on proof of existence of injuries
in question, the intention to cause injuries would be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances
warrant an opposite conclusion,454 yet the test of intention is always subjective to the accused,455 and can be
inferred from the act, conduct or other relevant circumstances in each case,456 or it may become clear from the
fact that the injury was inflicted “on a very vital part of the body with a deadly weapon”457 though there can be
circumstances to show that the intention of the offender was not to inflict a bodily injury sufficient, in the
ordinary course of nature, to cause death and it was only accidentally, in the circumstances, which the offender
could not himself foresee, that a fatal injury was caused and death took place.458 Where the accused thrust a
spear into the abdomen of the deceased with such force that it penetrated the bowels and three coils of the
intestines came out of the wound and digested food oozed out from cuts in three places, as a result of which
the deceased died, it was held that, in the absence of evidence, or reasonable explanation, that the accused
did not intend to stab in the stomach with a degree of force sufficient to penetrate that far into the body, or to
indicate that his act was a regrettable accident, and that he intended otherwise, it would be perverse to
conclude that he did not intend to inflict the injury that he did.459
Where the accused hit the deceased with a rice pounder, which is a deadly weapon, with such force as to
cause an extensive fracture and death, it was held that it could not be said that he did not intend to cause the
injury which led to her death. Even if it be considered that he had no intention to kill, there can be no doubt that
he intended to inflict the injury, which he actually inflicted, and he must have known that such an injury is
sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.460 A person, who causes such serious injuries as are
expected, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, must, in the absence of anything to show that it was
caused accidentally or negligently, be held to have inflicted them intentionally.461 In BN Srikantiah v State of
Mysore,462 the Supreme Court observed:
There were 24 injuries on the person of the deceased, out of which 21 were incised, and they were either on his head
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or the neck or the shoulders or on the forearms. All these, except perhaps the last, are vital parts of the body and
anybody, who causes injuries with weapons of the kind, that the appellants used, must be fixed with the intention of
causing such bodily injury or injuries as would fall within clause (3) of section 300, IPC.463
Where the accused, armed with a long knife, went to the deceased and, taking him unaware, gave him a blow
in the neck, with that knife, causing a deep injury, which was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to
cause his death, it was held that a deep stab wound, caused, with a long knife, in the neck of the victim, taking
the defenceless victim, by surprise, could lead to only one conclusion that the accused had the intention to kill
the deceased and was, therefore, guilty of murder.464 Where the accused inflicted knife injuries on two minor
children and inflicted injuries causing death of his wife, the injuries being sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death, he was convicted under section 302, IPC, though he had no intention to commit the
murder of his two children.465
[s 300.22] “The Bodily Injury Intended to be Inflicted”
The expression “the bodily injury intended to be inflicted” is descriptive of the earlier part of the clause, namely,
the infliction of bodily injury with the intention to inflict it, that is to say, if the circumstances justify an inference
that a man’s intention was only to inflict a blow on the lower part of the leg, or some lesser blow, and it can be
shown that the blow landed in the region of the heart by accident, then, though an injury to the heart is shown to
be present, the intention to inflict an injury in that region, or of that nature, is not proved.466 So, the expression
“and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted” does not import the idea that the intention, required by the first
part of the clause, should be to inflict an injury sufficient to cause death as was interpreted in Faqira v State.467
[s 300.23] “Ordinary Course of Nature”
The emphasis, in clause “thirdly” of this section, is on the sufficiency of the injury in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. “Ordinary course of nature” means “in the usual course if left alone”.468 The expression
“ordinary course of nature” means normal course or due course. At the best it may envisage a high probability
of death. On the converse the word always means inevitably or invariably.469
Where the injury caused by knife by the accused was clearly intended by him and it was not an accidental or
unintentional injury, the medical evidence established that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. It was held that, the offence committed by the appellant is clearly covered by clause
“Thirdly” of section 300, IPC.470
[s 300.24] “Sufficient, in the Ordinary Course of Nature, to Cause Death”
The expression “sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death” only means in normal or due
course or at the best may envisage a high probability of death, but certainly does not mean that the injury
should invariably or inevitably lead to death. The distinction between the expression high probability of death
and death invariably or inevitably taking place though fine is substantial and if overlooked may result in gross
miscarriage of justice.471 It is an error to suppose that the words “sufficient in the ordinary course” can be
applied only when death is an almost certain result. If a person knowingly causes injuries which are more likely
to cause death than not in the ordinary course, his offence falls under clause (2), or clause (3), of section
300.472 So, an injury “sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death” merely means that death will
be the most probable result of the injury having regard to ordinary course of nature, and not that death must be
the necessary consequence.473 One single blow, with spear, in the abdomen,474 or one blow on head,475 is not a
circumstance which will mitigate the offence in view of the medical opinion that the injury was, in the ordinary
course of nature, sufficient to cause death.476 A stab wound in the abdomen, viscera deep, has been held to be
sufficient, in the ordinary cause of nature, to cause death.477 An injury, inflicted by the assailant, may be said to
be sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death if the bodily injury is proved to be fatal in the
ordinary course.478 Where an injury was inflicted with great force on the most vital part of the body, viz, chest,
on account of which the left lung was pierced through and through and both the ventricles were punctured, it
was held that the injury was sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.479 But stuffing the mouth
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with a handkerchief cannot be said to be sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.480 Where,
in a sudden unpremeditated attack, the accused caught hold the deceased and strangled him to death with his
turban, it was held that it could not be said that the injury, which the accused intended to inflict, was sufficient,
in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.481 Where the accused was carrying only a torch and was given
a dagger by the co-accused during the quarrel, only one overt act was attributed to the accused and injury
inflicted by him on the neck of the deceased when there was a scuffle between accused and the deceased, the
injury caused by the accused was likely to cause death cumulatively with other injuries, but was not sufficient in
the ordinary cause of nature to cause death so clause 3 of section 300, IPC, was not attracted.482 Where the
accused had given severe beatings by sticks, the injuries and fractures received by the deceased were
dangerously sufficient to cause death; omission of the doctor to give opinion that the injuries were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death was held to be of no consequence.483
Where the evidence showed that prior to the incident there was fight between the parties and the accused had
extended death threat and the accused by his motor vehicle hit and dragged the deceased causing his death, it
was held that the accused had the intention to cause bodily injury sufficient for conviction under section 300,
IPC and not under section 304, Pt I, IPC.484
Where the deceased died due to septicemia after 35 days of the incident, but as the deceased had sustained
seven gun shot injuries which in the ordinary course of nature were sufficient to cause death, it was held that
the case fell within the ambit of section 302, IPC.485
[s 300.25] Proof of Sufficiency of the Injury to Cause Death in Clause “Thirdly”
Once the intention to cause the bodily injury, found to be present, is proved, the rest of the inquiry is purely
objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient, in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death.486 This question being one of fact in each case,487 presumably, a
medical witness, is in the best position to give evidence on the point.488 The sufficiency of the injury may be
established by the nature and quality of the act, taken with the consequence, which was intimately related to
the act.489 The prosecution may elicit, from the medical officer, who held that autopsy, the evidence to the effect
whetherthe injury, found on the body of the deceased, was merely likely to cause death or sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.490 However, even if the doctor has not said that any one of the
injuries was not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course, the court can infer that from the nature of the
injuries found on the body of the deceased.491 No doubt it would have been of advantage to the court if public
prosecutor had put the question to the doctor if the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to
cause death. But mere omission to put that question is not enough for the court to reach a wrong conclusion
that the injury noticed by the autopsy surgeon was not responsible for causing death of the deceased. Though
not an expert as the autopsy surgeon, the sessions Judge himself being an experienced judicial officer can look
at the injuries himself and deduced whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. When no sensible man with some idea regarding the fracture of homicidal cases would come to a
different conclusion from the 45 injuries on the dead body which included fracture of 5 ribs (2 to 6) on the left
side toward sternal end, fracture of some of the fingers and extravasation of blood on the right side of occipital
region and above on the citus of rib-fractures etc, except that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death.492 In a case, it was observed that nineteen injuries caused in quick succession cannot
be said to have been caused as a result of grave and sudden provocation. The very fact that so many injuries
were caused in quick succession and particularly where the deceased being unarmed and in a helpless
situation, it was sufficient to indicate that section 300, clause “Thirdly” was attracted.493
Where the victim is either helpless or rendered helpless and the offender does some act which leads to death in
the ordinary course and death takes place from the act of the offender and nothing else, it is hardly necessary
to prove more than the acts themselves and the causal connection between the acts and the end result.494 A
blow on the head with a lathi is certainly likely to cause death and the person, who inflicts a lathi blow on the
head of another person, must be presumed to have the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death. But it does not necessarily follow that a lathi blow on the head is always sufficient, in the ordinary
course of nature, to cause death.495 When, in view of the medical evidence, it is not certain that the deceased
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died a homicidal death, the conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC, cannot be sustained.496
With a view to bring home the charge under section 302, IPC, it is essential for the doctor to state that the
injury/injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the absence of such opinion,
the courts do not generally make a guess about the nature of the injury, especially when there is evidence to
show that the injured could have been saved. To clothe an accused with the liability under section 302, IPC, the
prosecution has to establish the requisite intention or the requisite knowledge.497
[s 300.26] Numerous Injuries and Clause “Thirdly”
Commentary under the heading “Numerous Injuries” in section 299, ante, may be referred to.
Although, in a given case, the number of injuries on the person of the deceased may not be the determinative
factor, the same, however, is relevant.498
If, from the nature and number of injuries, caused on various parts of the body of the deceased, and the
weapon used, it would be reasonable to hold that the accused really intended to cause injuries which were
sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death,499 then it is not necessary that each injury,500 or even
any one injury, should, by itself, be sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. Even if none of
the injuries, by itself, is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, but if they cumulatively,501 or
even two of them,502 are sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, the offence would be
murder under clause “thirdly” of this section. Where, even though there was no punctured or incised wound on
a vital part of the body, death was caused very soon after the incident on account of shock and haemorrhage
produced by the multiple injuries caused with a spear, it was held that the injuries were sufficient, in the
ordinary course of nature, to cause death.503 The point, whether the injuries were cumulatively sufficient, or
individually sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, would, however, bring about a
substantial difference in cases where the assailants are themselves numerous. When no specific injury can be
attributed distinctly to any of the accused, the correct rule, as propounded by the Supreme Court in Sorban
Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh,504 is to convict the several accused under section 302, read with section 34,
IPC, and not to convict any one of them under section 302simpliciter.505
[s 300.27] Injuries on Vital or Non-vital Parts of Body of the Deceased and Clause “Thirdly”
Ordinarily, an injury on a vital part of the body is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.506 A
stab in a vital part of the body, resulting in the victim’s death, is an injury sufficient, in the ordinary course of
nature, to cause death.507 Where a man inflicts a wound on a vital spot and death ensues, it is no defence to
say that the accused did not intend the injury to be fatal.508 There are a plethora of cases on an injury in the
ordinary course of nature.509 Where the stomach and the omentum had hemiated together and the omentum
protruded through the hole, which the injury had made, the pleura and the diaphragm were both cut and the
injury had extended right up to the abdominal cavity, the injury was held sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature.510 Where a concerted attack is direct against the head of a victim, which is smashed, the
attack is made with the knowledge that the injury inflicted is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause
death and the offence is murder.511 But all blows on the head do not necessarily cause death or inflict injuries
sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.512 A remark by Melville J, in Reg v Govinda:513
Practically, I think, it will generally resolve itself into a consideration of the nature of the weapon used. A blow from the
fist or a stick on a vital part may be likely to cause death; a wound from a sword in a vital part is sufficient, in the
ordinary course of nature, to cause death.
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To this, it may be added that the decision may depend on the size and weight of the stick, where a stick is
used, and in the way in which it is used.514
An injury on the neck, cutting through the spinal cord, is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause
death.515 Where, in the course of an altercation between the two, the accused stabbed the deceased on the left
forearm with a knife, it was held that as the forearm was not a vital part, the accused was guilty only of causing
grievous hurt.516 The case is, however, quite different when a weapon, like a sword, is used in order to chop off,
or to hack at, a limb. The person, who uses a sword or aruval, chopping off an arm or a leg, and, by so doing,
severs the arteries of the arm or leg, must know that he is inflicting an injury which, in the ordinary course of
nature, is sufficient to cause death. The offence, in such a case, is clearly one of murder.517 So, even if the
intended injury is on a non-vital part of the body and the victim dies as a result of it, it would be murder if the
injury inflicted is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. An injury to a vital part of the body
is not necessarily an ingredient to determine whether the case falls under section 300. If the bodily injury
intended to be, and also actually inflicted, is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, the
offence falls under section 300.518 Where merciless blows, with a fairly heavy stick, were struck so that two ribs
were fractured, the pleura was injured and the right lung was lacerated, and the almost inevitable result of the
injury was death, it was held that though an ordinary man might survive such a beating, death would be the
most probable, and not merely the likely, result and it must, therefore, be held that the accused intended to
inflict injuries sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.519 The fact, that to a reasonable man
the case, resulting in the assault, may appear to be quite petty, is not decisive as to the offence committed
when there is evidence that blows, more than one, were inflicted on the skull, which is a vital part of the body of
a person, causing multiple depressed comminuted fractures. As the assault was preceded by a hot discussion,
the blows must have been inflicted in anger as great force is bound to be used to cause the above fractures.
Such a case would fall under clause “thirdly” of section 300, IPC so that the offence would be one punishable
Where the ordinary course of nature is neither interrupted, nor interfered, with, by any intervening act of another
and whatever happens is the result of the acts of the assailants alone, they would be sufficient, in the ordinary
course of nature, to cause death.521
[s 300.28] Death due to septicemia
In the instant case, the death occurred 62 days after the occurrence due to septicemia and it was indirectly due
to the injuries sustained by the deceased. Having regard to the fact that deceased survived for 62 days and that
his condition was stable when he was discharged from the hospital, cannot draw an inference that the intended
injury caused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death so as to attract clause (3) of section
300, IPC. Conviction of the appellants under section 302/34, IPC was modified to one under section 304, Pt I,
IPC.522
[s 300.29] Clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 Distinguished from the Second Clause of Section 299
In clause “thirdly” of section 300, instead of the words “likely to cause death”, occurring in the corresponding
second clause of section 299, the words “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” have been used.
Obviously, the distinction is between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death. This distinction is fine and real, but, if overlooked, may result in
miscarriage of justice. The difference between the second clause of section 299 and clause “thirdly” of section
300 is one of degree of probability of death, resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is
the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium, or
lowest, degree. The word “likely” in the second clause of section 299 conveys the sense of “probable” as
distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death”, in clause “thirdly” of section 300, mean that death will be the most probable result of the injury
having regard to the ordinary course of nature.523 If the act done, in all reasonable probability, results in death,
the offence is murder, whereas if it is only likely to cause death, the offence is within the second clause of
section 299.524 Though a large number of blows, inflicted by a light stick, might indicate an intention to cause
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bodily injuries sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death, yet there should be clear medical
evidence to support such an inference; and, in the absence of such evidence, the benefit of doubt, as to
whether the case falls under clause “thirdly” of section 300, should be given to the accused and he should be
convicted only of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304, Pt I, read with section 299(2)
of the IPC.525
[s 300.30] Clause Fourthly—Scope and Applicability of
The fourth clause of this section contemplates the doing of an imminently dangerous act, in general, and not
the doing of any bodily harm to any particular individual. In case of intentionally causing bodily injury to a
particular person, the question, whether such an act is murder, has to be decided with reference to the first
three clauses of the section. The fourth clause is designed to provide for rare class of cases like putting lives of
many persons in jeopardy, by the act done, as envisaged in illustration (d) of the section and the like.526 When a
man deliberately strikes or shoots another, the case can never fall under this clause.527 This clause comes into
play only if no other clause of this section applies. In cases, where the intention of the assailants, as inferred
from the result of their act, can, at least, be that of causing such bodily injuries as the assailants would have
known to be likely to cause the death of their victim, the invocation of this clause would be altogether
erroneous.528 The emphasis in the preceding part of the fourth clause is on the imminently dangerous nature of
the act itself. Further, the clause is usually applied to cases where the act of the offender is not directed against
any particular person. There may even be no intention to cause harm or injury to any particular individual. The
act proceeds not from any malicious intention towards any particular individual, but is the result of a general
disregard for human life and safety. There may, however, be rare cases in which the target of attack, even
under this clause, may be a single individual. The act of a person, practising feats of archery by aiming his
arrow at the cap of a human being walking at some distance away or at a mother leaving a new born baby in
the open, or the act of pouring kerosene oil over the body of victim and setting fire to it,529 may provide an
instance of it.530 Therefore, furious driving and firing at a mark near a public road would be cases of this
description.531 The Supreme Court, in State of Madhya Pradesh v Ram Prasad,532 observed that clause
“fourthly”, though usually invoked in those cases where there is no intention to cause the death of any particular
person (as the illustration shows), may on its terms, be used in those cases also where there is extreme
callousness towards the result and the risk taken is such that it may be stated that the person knows that the
act is likely to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. In Pradeep Kumar Pathak v State,533
the court observed that the clause “fourthly” of section 300, IPC, envisages knowledge, and not intention. An
assailant, causing deep injury in the chest with a deadly weapon like knife, spear, gun, etc., must know that he
is doing an imminently dangerous act which, in all probability, would cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death. As it is common knowledge that the vital organs are found in the chest, therefore, if the
deceased dies within half-an-hour of the causing of a deep injury in his chest by the accused with a deadly
weapon like a knife, the accused is liable under the said clause even if the doctor, who conducts the post-
mortem examination, is not examined in evidence.
[s 300.31] Essential Requirements of the Fourth Clause
Following are the essential requirements of fourth clause of section 300:
(i) the person, committing the offence, knows that the dangerous character of the act is so imminent that it
must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;534 and
(ii) he should have committed the act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death.535
For applicability of this clause following are the necessary requirements:

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[s 300] Murder.—
(1) the act must be imminently dangerous;
(2) the act must be of extra-ordinary recklessness;
(3) the danger to human life must be imminent; and
(4) the imminence should be such that it will in all probability cause death or cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death.536
Where the deceased had refused to take wine with the accused and the later first fired in the air and thereafter
fired indiscriminately, the offence was committed under section 304, Pt I and not under section 302, IPC.537
[s 300.32] Clause (c) of Section 299 and Fourth Clause of Section 300
Clause (c) of section 299 and clause (4) of section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act
causing death. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of section 300 would be applicable where the
knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from
a particular person or persons, being caused from his imminently dangerous act approximates to a practical
certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act
having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury
as aforesaid.538
[s 300.33] “Imminently” and “Imminently Dangerous”
The word “imminently” implies a risk which is both threatening and near. The question of whether an act is
imminently dangerous depends upon nature of the act and its evident risk to human life. The danger threatened
must be to human life. It must be an act in which death of human is certain or almost so, and it would be
surprising if the result was otherwise. Moreover, the danger must not only be of certain or almost certain death,
but of a death which is near and may be counted by number of hours or days.539 The man, who strikes another
with a knife in the throat, must know that the blow is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability,
cause death and the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death.540 When the accused had used a dangerous weapon like a rifle, (being a police constable he must have
known that it was a dangerous weapon) and having regard to the fact that he had fired as many as five shots,
at the deceased, one of which was fired after the victim was hit by a bullet and collapsed on the ground, in any
view of the matter the case would fall under clause “fourthly” of section 300, IPC.541 The act of the accused in
abandoning the two-year old child is imminently so dangerous that it would have in all probability caused death
or such bodily injury as is likely to cause his death attracting clause, fourthly, of section 300, IPC.542
After attending to nature’s call, the deceased returned to the house a little late. The accused questioned her as
to why she was coming late and he also suspected her fidelity. There was no provocation for the accused to
pour kerosene and set her on fire. Act of pouring kerosene, though in a spur of moment, the same was followed
by lighting match stick and throwing it on the deceased and thereby setting her ablaze. Both the acts are
intimately connected with each other and resulted in causing the death of the deceased. Even assuming that
the accused had no intention to cause the death of the deceased, act of the accused falls under clause (iv) of
section 300, IPC that is the act of causing injury so imminently dangerous where it will in all probability cause
death. Any person of average intelligence would have the knowledge that pouring of kerosene and setting her
on fire by throwing a lighted matchstick is so imminently dangerous that in all probability such an act would
cause injuries causing death. Accused was held guilty of murder.543
[s 300.34] “If the Person, Committing the Act, Knows that it is so Imminently Dangerous that it must, in all
Probability, Cause Death or such Bodily Injury as is Likely to Cause Death”
The earlier part of this fourth clause of section 300 refers to cases where the act of the accused is itself so
imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
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death. The degree of the probability or likelihood of the act, resulting in fatal harm is of the highest level.544 The
knowledge must relate to the time when the act was done, and not to any time anterior to it.545 An act of setting
any person aflame after pouring kerosene is definitely likely to cause the death of that person and this fact is
obviously known to the accused persons when they caught hold of the deceased, poured kerosene over her
and set her ablaze.546 One accused sprinkled petrol in a bus and another accused lit the matchstick thereafter.
These facts are sufficient to bring the case under section 302, IPC, because these very acts were such that
accused would be deemed to know that pouring of petrol in the bus and lighting fire are so imminently
dangerous that in all probabilities it would cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death of the
passengers.547
Where the accused persons had thrown bricks on the vital parts of the body of the deceased who was a 78
year old man, thereby causing his death, in such event, knowledge to commit murder can definitely be
attributed to the accused as the deceased died instantaneously after receiving the brick injuries. The conviction
of the accused under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt II.548
Where a person chokes the throat of a 10 years old child by paper, the act depicts his intention to kill or at least
knowledge that it will kill the child. Accused was convicted on charge of murder.549 Where deceased snatched a
40 days old child from the lap of his blind mother and threw on the ground causing death, intention to cause
death was clear.550
The knowledge, that this clause requires, is not merely that the act in question is “imminently dangerous”, but
also that “it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death”. A danger is imminent when it is immediately threatened or is impending. Bodily injury,
which is likely to cause death, may be “sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death”, but the
words “imminently dangerous” and “in all probability”, in this clause, show that death must be an almost certain
consequence of the act—so certain that only a miracle can prevent it.551 At one time, it was considered that the
wielding of a lathi was an imminently dangerous act and if a severe injury is caused resulting in death, the case
should fall within the purview of clause “fourthly” of this section.552 However, this view has not been followed in
other cases.
In Perana v Emperor,553 it was observed that the use of lathi is certainly dangerous, but is not so dangerous
that anybody would, in the ordinary course, think that death is a probable cause of the use of the lathi. Lathis
are frequently used and result in nothing more than injuries which are simple hurt or, at the most, grievous hurt.
In another case, it was observed that it cannot be said of every lathi blow that it is so imminently dangerous that
it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Even brutal assaults with
lathis, resulting in death, do not fall under clause “fourthly” of section 300 and do not ordinarily amount to
murder, unless the accused intends to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient, in the ordinary
course of nature, to cause death.554
[s 300.35] Proof of Intention or Knowledge
It is the duty of the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt subject to his (accused’s) defence of insanity and
subject also to any statutory exception.555 If, however, the prosecution has failed to prove the requisite intention
or knowledge, the court can rely on the proved circumstances in judging the offence even if the accused might
have failed to raise the plea in his defence.556
In the context of intention, the question is not whether the accused intended to kill or to inflict injuries of any
particular degree of seriousness, but the question rather is whether he intended to inflict the injuries in question,
and once the existence of such injuries is established, the intention to cause the same will be presumed unless
an opposite conclusion is warranted by the proved circumstances.557 The following cases, for illustrations’ sake,
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[s 300] Murder.—
may explain the above proposition:
(i) The accused had intended only to incapacitate the deceased by hitting at his leg which act was not as
imminently dangerous as would, in all probability, cause death; the stroke however hit the vital part of
the body and resulted in the victim’s death. It was held that the accused had no intention to cause
death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.558
(ii) The accused had set fire to the clothes of his wife. It was held that accused must have known that he
was running the risk of causing death of the victim because no special knowledge is required to know
that one might cause death by such act.559
The circumstance, that there may be difficulty in establishing the requisite knowledge or intention, by no means,
discharges the prosecution from the burden of so doing.560 Thus, when the court is called upon to arrive at a
finding as to the real intention of the accused in committing a particular offence, it is expected to consider every
available circumstance and it should accept only that conclusion which can be arrived at, beyond reasonable
doubt.561Section 100 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, does not absolve the prosecution from proving all the
essential ingredients of an offence, nor does it cast upon an accused the burden of proving that no offence has
been committed.562 Therefore, in order to establish the guilt, specific intention to cause death or bodily injury
should be proved by the prosecution.563
[s 300.36] “And Commits such act without any Excuse for Incurring the Risk of Causing Death or such Injury as
Aforesaid”
Merely causing death, by doing an act with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death, is not murder. In order that an act, done with such knowledge, should constitute
murder, it is necessary that it should be committed without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing the
death or bodily injury. An act, done with the knowledge of its consequences, is not prima facie murder; it
becomes murder only if it can be positively affirmed that there was no excuse. The requirements of the section
are not satisfied by the act of homicide being one of extreme recklessness. It must, in addition, be wholly
inexcusable. When a risk is incurred, even a risk of the gravest possible character which must normally result in
death, the taking of that risk is not murder unless it was inexcusable to take it.564 It is culpable homicide
because the act, causing death, is done with the knowledge that the actor is thereby likely to cause death; it is
not murder because it does not satisfy both parts of the definition of murder in clause “fourthly” of section 300.
Being culpable homicide and not murder, the act is necessarily culpable homicide not amounting to murder.565
The words “without any excuse for incurring the risk” mean without any excuse which a criminal court,
administering the criminal law, as embodied in IPC, can reasonably regard as an excuse. The term “excuse”,
also occurs in the explanation to section 81, IPC. It is used there as synonymous with the expression “to justify”
which seems to indicate that the grammatical meaning of exculpating or absolving is intended to be retained. In
this sense, the words would mean in the absence of any exculpatory circumstances other than any of those
circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to this section.566 In view of the above, an imminently
dangerous act is not murder if it is done to prevent a greater evil. If the evil can be avoided without doing the
act, then there can be no valid justification for doing the act which is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.567 In Emperor v Dhirajia,568 a village
woman left her home with her six months’ old baby in her arms on account of her husband’s ill-treatment. After
she had gone some distance from home, she turned around and saw her husband pursuing her. She became
panicky and jumped into a well nearby with the baby in her arms. The baby died, but the woman survived. On
these facts, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court assumed that the woman had knowledge of the
consequences of her act, but thought that she had an excuse and that excuse was panic or fright, it held her
guilty, not of murder, but of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Similarly, in Supadi v Emperor,569 a girl
of 17 years of age, who too was ill-treated by her husband, jumped with her baby into a well when she found
that her husband prevented her from returning to her parents. In this case, she was carrying the baby on her
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back but the judges came to the conclusion that she was not aware at all that she had a baby with her and,
therefore, the girl was convicted under section 304A, and not under clause “fourthly” of section 300. But in Re
Karuppal,570 a woman had been very harshly treated by her husband and was living a life of utmost misery and,
therefore, jumped into a well with her two children with the result that the children died. It was held that, as
there was no evidence of insanity which would take away the criminality of the act, the woman was guilty of
murder; but in view of the extenuating circumstances, even a sentence of transportation for life was considered
excessive and a sentence of three years’ imprisonment was recommended. From the above decisions, it
appears that it is a matter of fact, and not of law, whether a particular act of homicide, committed with the
knowledge, described in clause “fourthly” of this section, is committed without any excuse. As the fourth clause
is framed, it need never be determined as a matter of law what circumstances, other than, or falling short of, the
five exceptions, constitute an excuse, it being, in each case, a question of fact whether, from the
circumstances, which are proved, the just inference is that the act was done without any excuse.571
[s 300.37] If one of the Four Conditions of Section 300 is Satisfied, the Offence is Murder
It is to be noticed that clauses (1)-(4) of section 300, IPC define culpable homicide amounting to murder. An
offence will amount to murder if any one of the four clauses enumerated under section 300, IPC is satisfied. All
the four conditions precedent, enumerated under section 300, IPC are not necessary to co-exist for an offence
of murder. It would be sufficient for the prosecution to establish any one of the conditions enumerated under
section 300, IPC, against an offender or offenders, as the case maybe, for punishing him or them for an offence
of murder.572 To render culpable homicide to murder, the case must come within the provisions of clauses (1),
or (2), or (3), or (4), of section 300.573 In a case where the prosecution case is supported by direct eyewitness
evidence, the rules applicable to a case where death is caused by administering poison and where the fate of
the case rests entirely on circumstantial evidence are not applicable when the prosecution has otherwise
proved its case against the accused. Its failure to prove the source from which the accused procured the poison
would not by itself be of any consequence.574
[s 300.38] Exceptions—Scope of
After setting out the four mental conditions, the section lays down five exceptions which reduce the offence of
murder again to “culpable homicide” which may be said to be culpable homicide not amounting to murder,575
which mitigates the offence of murder. When a case does not fall under any of the exceptions of this section,
the accused can rightly be convicted under section 302, IPC, as when he deliberately caused a fatal injury on
the most vital part of body of the deceased.576 If, however, any one of them is attracted, the prima facie
presumption, that the offence is murder, is removed and the offence becomes “culpable homicide not
amounting to murder”.577 An offence may also amount to culpable homicide, but not murder, even though none
of the exceptions in section 300 is applicable to the case.578 It must be noted that unless the act done
constitutes, at least prima facie, a murder by reason of the intention, with which it is found to be done, the court
need not consider the exceptions.579
The exceptions, specified in this section, are special exceptions which must be distinguished from the general
exceptions specified in Chapter 4 of IPC. The general exceptions rebut the prima facie liability of the offender
and he is completely exonerated from blame. But the special exceptions, specified in this section, do not
completely exonerate him, but only mitigate the offence, committed by him, and reduce his liability.580 The five
exceptions, specified in the section, may briefly be stated to arise out of:
(i) provocation;
(ii) right of private defence of person or property;
(iii) exercise of legal powers;
(iv) absence of pre-meditation and heat of passion;

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(v) consent.
[s 300.39] Operation of Exceptions
As pointed out by Plowden J, in a case, namely, Re Barkatulla,581 the operation of the five exceptions to section
300 is practically somewhat different in respect to an act, which falls within one of the first three clauses of
section 300, and in respect to an act which falls within the fourth clause. The exceptions operate in this way.
The existence of all the circumstances, described in an exception, excuse an act, which would otherwise be
murder within one of the first three clauses, to the extent that the act constitutes only culpable homicide not
amounting to murder, and not murder. Here the act is prima facie murder unless and until an exception is
established. There is no inconsistency involved in finding that an act falls within one of these clauses and also
falls within an exception, for all the circumstances of any exception may co-exist with the murderous intention.
When, however, an act falls within the fourth clause of section 300 as regards the knowledge, with which it is
done, and the circumstances, constituting an exception, exist, there is this difference, ie, it cannot consistently
be affirmed (at the end of a trial and upon all the evidence) as an act, causing death, done with the knowledge
described, in one breath that it was done without any excuse for running the risk of causing death and in the
next breath that it was done under circumstances which the law declares to be an excuse for the act of causing
death to the extent of preventing the culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It has been decided, that it is
a matter of fact, and not, of law, whether a particular act of homicide, committed with the knowledge described
in clause (4) of section 300 is committed without any excuse. As the fourth clause is expressed, like the three
preceding clauses, to be subject to the five exceptions, which are legal excuses for murder (as contra-
distinguished from culpable homicide), it is evident that the words “without any excuse” in clause (4) do not
mean merely in the absence of the circumstances described in the exceptions. A court, as a Judge of fact, is
left at liberty to affirm, upon proof of circumstances other than, or falling short of, an exception, not that these
circumstances form an excuse for murder, but that, in view of them, the court is unable to affirm that the
particular act of homicide was committed without any excuse and is, therefore, unable to pronounce the act to
be culpable homicide amounting to murder as defined in clause (4) of section 300.
Where one of the two accused raises a plea that his case falls under one of the exceptions, the case of the
other may also be entitled to the benefit of such defence although the other denies his presence altogether.582
Where the death caused by the accused was not premeditated and the injuries were not sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to have caused his death, furthermore the accused had no common intention to
cause death of deceased, as only accused no. 1 had caused a vital injury on the head of the deceased, it was
held that, the case was covered by exceptions 1 and 4 of section 300, IPC. Therefore, the accused no. 1 was
convicted under sections 304, Pt I/149 of the IPC.583
[s 300.40] Burden of Proving Exceptions
The law of homicide is contained in sections 299 and 300 of the IPC. If a case falls under section 300 it is
murder, unless one of the exceptions to the section is attracted. The other defences to a charge of murder are
contained in chapter IV of the IPC which prima facie rebuts the liability of the offender and he is completely
exonerated from blame. In any case, unless one of the various sections of the IPC applies, the onus under
section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not discharged.584 If an accused pleads an exception, then,
because of section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances,
bringing the case within any of the exceptions, lies upon him and the court is enjoined to presume the absence
of such circumstances. Consequently, the accused must establish, from the evidence, the existence of such
circumstances. The court is precluded to presume them in the absence of their proof; it is precluded from
speculating and giving the accused any benefit of doubt on the basis of such speculation.585 Of course, the
accused has merely to satisfy the standard of a prudent man. If the material placed before the court, such as
oral and documentary evidence, presumptions, admissions or even prosecution evidence, satisfies the test of a
prudent man, the accused will be deemed to have discharged his burden. It may merely raise a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as regards one, or other, of the necessary ingredients of the offence itself. It may,
for instance, raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court whether the accused had the requisite intention,
laid down in section 299 of the IPC. If the court has such a reasonable doubt, it has to acquit the accused
because, in that event, the prosecution must be deemed to have failed to prove conclusively the guilt of the
accused.586 In the case of
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[s 300] Murder.—
ReMurugian,587 the bare word of the accused was accepted. However, it cannot be accepted as a principle that,
in every case, the bare word of an accused person is sufficient to discharge the burden of proof of an
exception. There must be some corroboration, direct or indirect, of the statement of the accused person.588
[s 300.41] Benefit of Exceptions to Accused though not Claimed or Claimed Belatedly
If, upon the evidence, it appears that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any one of the exceptions, neither
the ignorance of the accused, nor the falsity of his defence, nor any mistake or omission of the lower courts or
advocates, should deprive him of the benefit of it.589 The fact, that the accused has not specifically pleaded the
right of self-defence or any other exception, should not influence the court in concluding that the plea of self-
defence was not available to the accused to any degree.590 The fact, that the accused has disclosed the
circumstances, constituting grave and sudden provocation for the first time only in his statement before the
sessions court, is not, by itself, sufficient to dismiss the same out of consideration as being an afterthought
counsel for the accused is entitled to rely upon any circumstance which, if accepted, would convert the offence
into a lesser one even if such circumstance had not been placed before the court at an earlier stage. The
question is whether such circumstances did exist, though it was not disclosed at an earlier stage.591
[s 300.42] Exception 1—Scope of
The defence of provocation rests upon the fact that provocation was grave and sudden by reason of which the
accused was deprived of his power of self-control.592 One of the conditions for the operation of this exception is
that the accused must have used force in consequence of grave and sudden provocation. One slap cannot
constitute grave provocation even though it may be held to be sudden.593 Nineteen injuries caused in quick
succession cannot be said to have been caused as a result of grave and sudden provocation.594 It is true that if
the modesty of a girl is being outraged or any person tries to molest one’s sister then that may give a right to a
brother to thrash the person who has done so, but it does not give any sufficient cause to kill that person.595
Mere objectionable or filthy abuses cannot be said to have deprived one of one’s power of self-control596 though
a very foul abuse, hurled by the deceased, may be grave and sudden enough to entitle an accused to the
benefit of exception 1.597 It is no defence if the fatal blow is traced not to the influence of passion, arising from
the provocation, but after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time for premeditation and calculation.598
Where the accused went home, came armed with a spear and brought his brothers, who were armed with
lathis, it was held that this interval was enough to cool him down.599 Similarly, where the accused went to his
house, which was about a furlong away from the scene of occurrence, and fetched a gun to shoot the victim, it
was held that there was sufficient time for him to cool down.600 But running a distance of 45 yards by the
accused was held not to furnish him sufficient time to cool down his indignant passion.601
It is the temporary loss, and not the permanent or utter absence of reason of self-control, which is contemplated
by this exception and, what is more, such loss of self-control must be shown to have been caused by a grave
and sudden provocative act or conduct of the victim.602 An accused, who found his wife, lying with her
paramour, almost naked, killed them by an axe, was held entitled to this exception.603 But the rule, that when
wife, mother or married sister, living under care of husband, son or brother, is apprehended having sexual
intercourse with a stranger, the killing of that stranger would attract the benefit of grave and sudden
provocation, was held not to extend to cases of first cousin, second cousin or others.604
Where the wife of the accused threw a vegetable cutter at him causing an injury on his right little finger, it was
held that it constituted a grave and sudden provocation, which deprived him of his power of self-control within
the meaning of exception 1, keeping in view, the fact that the wife was also refusing conjugal relations to her
husband (ie, the accused) while she was carrying them with her sister’s husband. Viewed in this background,
the conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC, was altered into one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.605
In a case, the niece of the accused had eloped with her school teacher and the accused suspected the hand of
the deceased. On the date of the incident the accused was working in his field and the deceased came there
and after a long verbal duel, the accused picked up a sickle lying on the ground and delivered a blow on the
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neck of the deceased. There was no pre-meditation or pre-plan of the accused to cause the death of the
deceased. As the accused acted under grave and sudden provocation, and he did not repeat the blow, he was
convicted under section 304, Pt II and not section 302, IPC.606
[s 300.43] Law Relating to Exception 1
The law, laid down in the undernoted case,607 relating to exception 1 of section 300, may be stated as under:
(i) the test of grave and sudden provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of
society, to which the accused belongs, and placed in the situation, in which the accused was placed,
would be so provoked as to lose his self-control;608
(ii) words and gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an
accused so as to bring his act within exception 1 to section 300;
(iii) the mental background created by the previous act of the victim, may be taken into consideration in
ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing the
offence;609 and
(iv) the fatal blow should be clearly traced to the influence of passion, arising from that provocation, and
not after the passion had cooled down by lapse of time, or otherwise giving room and scope for
premeditation and calculation.
[s 300.44] Conditions Necessary for the Application of Exception 1
Under exception 1, culpable homicide is not murder if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) there must be provocation to the accused;
(ii) the provocation must be grave;
(iii) the provocation must also be sudden;
(iv) the provocation must have deprived the accused of his power of self-control;
(v) the offence must have been committed during loss of self-control; and
(vi) the person killed must have been the person giving provocation, or another by mistake or accident.610
In applying the test, it is of particular importance:
(a) to consider whether sufficient interval had elapsed, since the provocation, to allow a reasonable man to
cool; and
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(b) to take, into account, the instrument, with which the homicide was effected, because a retort in the heat
of passion, induced by provocation by a simple blow, is a very different thing from one by making use
of a deadly weapon like a concealed dagger.611
[s 300.45] Provocation
Provocation is an external stimulus which can be objectively measured. However, loss of self-control is a
subjective phenomenon. To look into the mind of the accused is seldom possible. The state of mind can be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances.612
The provocation must be such as will upset not merely a hasty, hot-tempered and hypersensitive person, but
also a person of ordinary sense and calmness. The law does not take into consideration abnormal creatures
reacting abnormally in given situations. It contemplates the acting of normal beings in a given situation and the
protection, which is offered by the exception, is the protection for normal beings reacting normally in a given set
of circumstances.613 It all depends on how a particular situation acts on the mind of the person keeping in view
his social status and mental background to which a man of his nature could be prone to.614
[s 300.46] Test of “Grave and Sudden Provocation”
The test of “grave and sudden” provocation is whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of
society, to which the accused belonged, and placed in the situation, in which the accused was placed, would be
so provoked as to lose his self-control. What a reasonable man will do in certain circumstance depends upon
the customs, manners, way of life, traditional values, etc., that is to say, the cultural, social and emotional
background of the society to which an accused belongs.615 So, a reasonable man is a normal man of the same
class or community as that to which the accused belongs.616 In Mahmood v State,617 Dhavan J, suggested that
whenever the courts refer to a “reasonable” person, they really mean a normal person. The proper criterion is
the likely reaction of a normal person against a similar provocation. Whenever an accused pleads grave
provocation in defence, he means that the provocation, under which he killed his victim, was too strong for him
to resist, and the simple question before the court is, would a normal person have been able to control himself,
if similarly provoked, and did the accused, in killing the deceased, react like any normal person? Thus, the test
is not the conduct of the reasonable man, but the impulses and frailties of a normal man and his likely reaction
to a similar provocation. In Mahmood v State,618 the court pointed out that the question of fact, under the
explanation, attached to exception 1, is not whether the accused lost self-control, but whether the provocation
was grave enough to prevent the offence from being murder even if the accused did lose self-control. In
deciding this question, ordinarily, the general nature of the provocation, rather than its effect on a particular
individual, has to be considered. The court has to consider the general nature of the provocation and to decide
whether it is provocative enough to make a normal person, in similar circumstances, react so violently as to
release his homicidal impulses.
The word “grave” indicates that provocation be of such a nature so as to give cause for alarm to the accused
and “sudden” means an action which must be quick and unexpected so as to provoke the accused. The
question whether the provocation was grave and sudden is a question of fact and not one of law. Each case is
to be considered according to its own facts.619
What kind of provocation and in what manner was it made are all matters of evidence, which were completely
absent on record. In the circumstances, the plea of grave provocation was rejected.620
[s 300.47] There must be Provocation to the Accused
The first condition to invoke the operation of exception 1 to section 300 is that there must be provocation to the
accused. When fatal injuries have been caused without provocation the offence is punishable under section
302, and not under section 304, Pt I of the IPC.621 Where the provocation came from the side of the accused,
the accused was not entitled to the benefit of exception 1.622
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The accused did not adduce evidence to show that the complainant or his brothers abused or used provocative
words/language; exception 1 to section 300 was not attracted in the case. Conviction under section 302, IPC
was held proper.623
[s 300.48] Provocation Caused by Act
There may be circumstances which may merely predispose a man to a violent act, but these are not enough to
bring the offender within the purview of exception 1. The provocation must be an act, or series of acts, which,
by their very nature, would induce sudden and temporary loss of self-control in a reasonable man to such an
extent that it can be said that he is no longer the master of his mind.624
Where there was admittedly a quarrel between the parties, following an assault on the accused’s father, and
both sides were injured and the prosecution failed to explain the injuries on accused person, it was held that the
defence of grave and sudden provocation might be true.625 If a person beats another with a shoe, that would be
considered to be the height of shame, particularly in the midst of a number of villagers. An attempt to beat a
man with a shoe would, therefore, give sufficient provocation to the man intended to be beaten.626 But, it is
impossible to say that a man was deprived of the power of self-control merely by being slapped two or three
times on the back. Being slapped cannot be a sufficient provocation.627 When there is material showing that the
deceased prior to incident attempted to outrage the modesty of the niece of the accused provoking the
accused, inflicting knife blows on the vital part of the body of the deceased causing death, the case falls under
exception 1 to section 300, IPC.628
Where the deceased husband was perverted in sexual habits and used to satisfy his lust in an unnatural way
and the accused wife killed him, the circumstances showed that she killed her husband under grave and
sudden provocation, the case was found covered by exception 1 of section 300, IPC.629 In Akhtar v State,630 the
accused had been under the stress of previous provocations. He, however, controlled himself and acted quite
reasonably and properly until the very last act of provocation by the use of foul and filthy language, hurled, at
the accused’s father and the accused himself, by the accused’s own brother, who also aggressively advanced
towards the accused and grappled with him. It was held that there was sufficient provocation within the
meaning of this exception. Where a poor man catches a thief in the act of stealing rice and, on the impulse of
the moment, rushes at the thief and belabours him with a stick in a fatal way, it is a clear case of grave and
sudden provocation.631 A threat of a wife to leave her husband forever without any prior reason is indeed
provocation and if she goes further and removes the thali (an ornament which, in Southern India, a Hindu
woman is made to wear on her marriage and which she is supposed not to part with until the death of the
husband) from her neck, which is attributable to the separation of the marital tie with the husband, and throws it,
on his face, there is sufficient provocation for the husband to make him lose his self-control and give him the
benefit of this exception.632
Where the accused seeing his wife in compromising position with the deceased lost self control, assaulted the
deceased causing death, held case was covered by exception 1 to section 300, accused was convicted under
section 304, Pt I of IPC.633
Where a wife not only refuses to give pan to her husband, when he asks for it, but also throws dirty water on his
face, it would be an act which would cause the husband to lose control of himself and would be grave and
sudden provocation.634 Where the accused on seeing the deceased committing the act of sodomy on the son of
the accused, lost his power of self-control and it was undoubtedly a grave and sudden provocation for him
which led him to commit the murderous assault on the deceased.635 Where the accused were carrying on their
agricultural operation, the deceased came to the field and tried to demarcate the boundary line and caused
provocation, on such grave and sudden provocation caused by prosecution party, accused attacked the
deceased. The evidence also disclosed that the accused on being suddenly and gravely provoked by the
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deceased was deprived of her self-control, exception 1 to section 300, IPC attracted to the facts of the case.636
Where the accused persons being provoked by the murder of their brother by the son of the deceased, within
15 minutes of the first incident set on fire the house of the deceased causing death of the deceased, his wife
and children, it was observed that a time gap of 15 minutes was not sufficient for the members of the family of
the accused persons to gain their self control, when they saw the dead body of their brother. It was held that,
the accused persons committed murder in question under grave and sudden provocation and their case was
fully covered by exception 1 to section 300, IPC and the accused were convicted under sections 304, Pt I, and
147, IPC.637
[s 300.49] Provocation Caused by Words and Gestures
A notable difference between the English and the Indian law on the subject is that, while there is practically a
rule of law in England that mere words and gestures cannot, except in circumstances of most extreme and
exceptional character, be sufficient to constitute a grave and sudden provocation, there is no such firmly
entrenched rule of any sort in this country about the use of words.638 Everything depends on the peculiarities of
facts and circumstances and the context in which certain words may have been used.639 Where it was difficult
to reach any definite conclusion, on the test of preponderance of probabilities, as to in what circumstances the
fight between the deceased and accused originated, there was no previous enmity between the accused and
the deceased, nor had the accused come to the scene of occurrence with any predetermined mind or pre-
planning and it was in evidence that the incident occurred on the spur of the moment during the course of
altercation which ensued between the deceased and the accused, the evidence also did not make it clear, as to
what exact altercation did occur between them, its nature and precise words spoken have not been brought on
record, the weapon of offence, the spade was not used from its sharp-edged side, but was used only from its
blunt end during the entire incident, all these factors, if taken together, would lead to a reasonable inference
that the accused may have been deprived of his self-control on account of grave and sudden provocation given
by the deceased.640 In Ullu Mahapatra v King,641 it was observed that harsh words never break bones and the
law expects a reasonable person to endure abuse without resorting to fatal violence. But in KM Nanavati v
State of Maharashtra642 the Supreme Court held that words and gestures may also, under certain
circumstances, cause grave and sudden provocation to an accused so as to bring his case within the first
exception to section 300 of the IPC. Where the deceased was a member of a high caste, and the accused
belonging to low caste, was subjected to repeated insults by the deceased, the accused requested the
deceased, a headmaster in a school for a job which was available in the school, the deceased asked the
accused to make available his wife to him for immoral purpose, on these facts it was held that accused lost his
self-control and due to grave and sudden provocation, inflicted injuries on the deceased, successively within
seconds with knife.643 In Ghulam Mustafa Gahno v Emperor,644 it was held that showing booja, gesture of
contempt, by a wife to her husband cannot be said to cause such grave and sudden provocation as to deprive
him of his power of self-control.
Information received from a reliable person and believed to be credible as to the existence of a provoking act,
which is being done in the immediate neighbourhood and the existence of which is instantaneously verified,
can, within the meaning of this exception, be said to be provocation given by the person, committing that act,
just as much as if the person provoked had seen it in the first place with his own eyes.645 However, the mere
fact, that deceased described himself as chacha of accused, without mentioning any blood relation between the
two, cannot be taken to be such grave and sudden provocation as to attract this exception.646 Similarly, the act
of a child of five years in coming out of her house to spit on the accused and show her legs would not constitute
a provocation to sustain the plea of grave and sudden provocation.647
There was a verbal argument and heated exchange of words amongst the accused and complainant and his
family members over a trivial issue of parking of autorickshaw. The accused no. 3 being driven by grave and
sudden provocation gave knife blows to the deceased causing his death. Since there was no pre-meditation
and intention to kill the deceased, the case of the accused appellant fell under section 300, exception 1, and his
conviction under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.648
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Where in a Panchayat convened by the parties for settling some matter, the accused being provoked by certain
remarks passed by the deceased, suddenly inflicted a single blow by a knife on the chest of the deceased
causing death, the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt I and not under section 302, IPC.649
[s 300.50] Provocation Caused by use of Abusive Language
The use of abusive language “of the foulest kind”, addressed to a man, already engaged, would be provocation
sufficient to deprive him of self-control.650 However, a mere vulgar abuse is not such a grave and sudden
provocation as is contemplated by this exception.651 In this last cited case, the deceased, a sardar, was a foul
mouthed old man and was in the habit of abusing and bullying his servants and dependants. He abused the
accused, a servant, in the morning and further struck him on the forehead causing it to bleed. These insults
were offered in the presence of several persons who were the associates and fellow-workmen of the accused.
The accused remonstrated and the deceased went away. But he returned at about noon and once again
abused the accused in the manner which apparently was habitual with him. This repeated insult infuriated the
accused who picked up a hatchet, which happened to be lying nearby, and without any premeditation, made a
murderous attack on the deceased. It was held that there was grave provocation. In Amarjit Singh v State652 the
deceased, an unemployed addict father, demanded money from accused, his son, making his demand
imperative even if money had to be raised by prostituting his (accused’s) mother. The son assaulted the
deceased with a knife. It was held that the language as used was sufficient to entitle the accused to the benefit
of this exception. Where, in the course of a quarrel between them, the deceased hurled filthy abuses at the
accused and even insinuated that he once committed unnatural offence with a pigeon, it was held that there
was grave and sufficient provocation within the meaning of this exception.653
[s 300.51] Provocation must be Grave
It is not all provocation that will reduce the crime of murder into mere culpable homicide. Provocation, to have
that result, must be such that it temporarily deprives the person provoked of the power of self-control as a result
of which he commits the unlawful act which causes death.654 For the application of the section, the provocation
pleaded must be grave. “Grave” means that it must be serious enough to influence the mind of the person
provoked. An accused person, in order to invoke the benefit of the first exception, must distinctly show not only
that the act was done under the influence of some feeling, which took away, from the person doing, it, all
control over his actions, but also that, that feeling had an adequate cause.655 Each little provocation cannot be
called grave simply because the consequences ensuing from that provocation at the hands of the accused had
been grave. The provocation must be such as will upset not merely a hastily, hot-tempered and hypersensitive
person, but even a person of ordinary sense and calmness.656 If provocation does not result in immediate
retaliation and motive to take revenge emerges, the accused cannot claim benefit of exception 1 to section 300,
IPC.657 A bare statement by the accused, that he regarded the provocation as grave, will not be accepted by the
court. The court has to apply an objective test for deciding whether the provocation was grave. An ordinary
exchange of abuses is a matter of common occurrence. A reasonable man does not lose self-control merely on
account of an ordinary exchange of abuses. An ordinary exchange of abuses is not, therefore, treated as the
basis for a grave provocation.658 Where the accused killed his wife not only because he was angry with her as
she had gone away to her father’s house to inquire about his health without the accused’s permission, but also
because he was annoyed that she refused to depart with him at once, it was held that it could not be said to
amount to provocation, far less grave and sudden provocation.659 Similarly, the mere sight of an enemy,
travelling in another lorry, cannot be said to be a grave and sudden provocation.660 Passions of a person in a
drunken condition are probably easily aroused when he sees his aunt being beaten by her husband, but that is
not the kind of provocation, contemplated by this exception; if he kills his uncle his offence is murder, and not
culpable homicide, though sentence may be reduced.661 The mere refusal of a wife to have conjugal connection
with her husband cannot be said to cause grave provocation to him.662 But a person, who finds his wife and her
paramour in flagrante delicto, undoubtedly receives the highest provocation and the indulgence, which the law
shows in such cases, is condescension to the frailty of human nature.663Ram Kumar v State of Haryana,664 was
a case wherein the accused and the deceased were real brothers, the former exhorting the latter to discontinue
illicit connection with the widow of their brother. The deceased protested in hot words whereupon the accused
picked up knife, lying on a hand-cart, and caused a thrust on the back of neck resulting in death of the
deceased. It was held that the case fell under the first exception because the accused acted, while deprived of
power of self-control, under grave and sudden provocation. Where a concubine, for whom the accused
grievously injured his wife and sacrificed his caste, left him for another connection, it was held that it was a
grave provocation to the accused.665 Where the wife of the accused, a Hindu, hurled one of the most intolerable
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imprecations upon him that “he would be eating cow’s flesh if he cooked and ate in the house”, it was held that
the provocation was grave.666 Where deceased caught hold of hand of wife of accused and asked her to come
with him, somehow she got herself released and ran away to her house and informed the accused about the
incident, accused went to deceased and gave an axe blow which proved fatal behaviour of the deceased in
normal course was bound to cause great provocation to the accused a tribal because of which the offence was
committed.667
A person claiming the benefit of provocation has to show that the provocation was so grave and sudden that he
was deprived of power of self-control and that he caused the death of a person while he was still in that state of
mind.668
Where the deceased was unarmed and was only trying to wake up the accused so as to do patrolling duty, the
action of deceased to slap and push the accused, could not be characterized as grave and sudden, so as to
provoke the accused to fire at the deceased killing him on the spot. In such a case, the plea of grave and
sudden provocation was rejected and the conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was not converted
into one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.669
Where the accused who was humiliated by his superior, after six hours while still on the guard duty shot the
deceased dead, it was held that the provocation was not sudden and grave and he was not entitled to
protection of exception 1 and was convicted under section 302, IPC.670
[s 300.52] “Sudden” Involves two Elements
The word “sudden” involves two elements. First, the provocation must be unexpected. If an accused plans, in
advance, to receive a provocation in order to justify the subsequent homicide, the provocation cannot be said to
be sudden. Secondly, the interval between the provocation and the homicide should be brief. If the man, giving
the provocation, is killed within a minute after the provocation, it is a case of sudden provocation. If the man is
killed after six hours of the provocation, it is not a case of sudden provocation.671
[s 300.53] Provocation must also be Sudden
The provocation must be grave as well as sudden to entitle the accused to the indulgence of the exception 1.672
Grave provocations, suffered by the accused over a long series of years, are insufficient, in the absence of
evidence of recent and sudden provocation, to reduce the offence of killing to culpable homicide.673 If the
provocation is not immediate and grave, but is the culmination of a long period of swaggering and insult, which
finally makes an accused lose his temper, the benefit of exception 1 cannot be given to him.674 A provocation,
however grave, which is not sudden, but is a chronic one, will not satisfy the requirements of this exception.675
In a case of intentional killing, the fact, that the intention was sudden and the impulse momentary and even
uncontrollable, is no mitigation unless it can be shown that the act was the result of grave and sudden
provocation.676 Where the true reason for assault was that, a month or so before the incident, the deceased had
attempted to outrage, the modesty of the accused’s wife, it was held that the interval between the incident and
the assault was too long to afford to him the benefit of exception 1.677 If a husband, finding his wife actually
committing adultery, kills her or her lover at once, that, of course, would be grave and sudden provocation; but
where the injured husband has time for deliberation, this exception will not apply. The reason for excusing a
person, who acts under grave and sudden provocation, is that he has lost his reason. If, however, the accused
shows that he has deliberated in any way, or there has been a lapse of time, which would enable him to cool
down, he cannot be said to be acting under sudden provocation. Therefore, this exception would not apply
though the sentence may be reduced.678 In KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra,679 the Supreme Court has
pointed out that the mental background, created by the previous act of the victim, may be taken into
consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused grave and sudden provocation for committing
the offence, but that is, in itself, insufficient to invoke the provisions of exception 1. The accused, hearing that
his sister was having illicit connection with the deceased, picked up an axe, went to the sister’s home, broke
open the door and, finding the deceased with his sister, killed both of them with the axe. It was held that
provocation, though grave, was not sudden.680 In another case, in which the accused, seeing his sister and her
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paramour having illicit connection, killed both of them, the Allahabad High Court gave him the benefit of this
exception and observed:
Of course, there is a difference between the provocation, which a man receives when he finds another man committing
adultery with his wife, and the provocation, which he receives when he finds his sister dishonouring his family by
having illicit intercourse with a man; still, the latter provocation, cannot, in commonsense and in one’s experience of the
world, be looked upon as a light one.681
But in a Madras case, it has been held that when a wife or mother or married sister, living under the projection
of the husband or son or brother, is caught in the act of having sexual intercourse with a stranger, the killing of
that stranger by the husband, son or brother, before there is time to get over the sudden anger, would be only
an offence under section 304, IPC. However, a person, who is not the guardian or custodian of a woman, would
have no similar right to kill her and claim to be convicted only under section 304, IPC.682
But, for the provocation to be sudden, it is not necessary that it should have immediately preceded the killing in
point of time. There have been cases in which the accused had the provocation of adultery, being committed by
the deceased with his wife, and the killing was after an interval of time during which the accused had to wait for
the deceased to come out of the room or the deceased was taken to some distance.683 In Boya Munigadu v
Queen,684 in the evening, preceding the commission of the murder, the accused saw the deceased having
connection with his (accused’s) wife and was intensely moved by what he saw, but he did not interfere then.
The next morning, he saw his wife eating with the deceased and giving him food while she left her husband
without it. Enraged at this, the accused immediately killed the deceased. Giving the accused the benefit of this
exception, it was observed that, that amounted to provocation, grave enough and sudden enough to deprive
him of his self-control, and reduced the offence from murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In a
Madras case, it was first reported to the accused that his wife gave betel-nut to another man, it being a sign of
intimacy between the two. Then, on the day of occurrence, he saw his wife and that man weeding in a field side
by side and their bodies frequently coming in contact. This greatly exasperated the accused. He subsequently
upbraided his wife first, but she told him that she could do just as she liked and that there were thousands of
men as good as he. Upon this, he killed her in a passion. It was held that the provocation, thus received by the
accused, was sufficiently grave and sudden to bring the killing of his wife under this exception.685
Where the deceased had abused the accused and called him “gandu”, thereafter the accused on the next day
stabbed the deceased with knife, it was held that the accused had time to deliberate, and had planned to kill the
deceased, and therefore, he was not entitled to benefit of exception 1 to section 300, IPC.686
In a case, the wife of the accused left the house and started living with another person and she did not return to
the house of the accused on the message sent to her. It was observed that the accused had reasonable time to
go to the carpenter’s shop for picking up a Baditha and dealt the deceased with the Baditha; further it was held
that this was not a grave and sudden provocation for the accused to give such fatal injuries to his wife.
Therefore, the case was not covered under the clause of grave and sudden provocation.687
In the instant case, the wife of the accused had eloped with the deceased one week before the incident and she
returned on 12 April 2000, and the incident took place in the evening of 14 April 2000. It was held that the case
was not covered by exception 1 to section 300, IPC, the provocation even if was grave, was not sudden.688
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Where on account of an old enmity, the accused persons went to theatre, called out the deceased watching
movie, quarreled with him, threatened and stabbed him causing death, it was held that exception 1 to section
300 was not attracted in the case.689 Also, in the case of Imtiaz v State of UP,690 based on the facts and
circumstances of the case, the plea of grave and sudden provocation was rejected. Where the accused
husband asked his wife to withdraw the maintenance proceedings and after she refused, the accused inflicted
polpat blow on her head resulting in death, it was held that the case was not covered by exceptions 1 and 3 to
section 300. Where the wife refuses to withdraw the maintenance proceedings, the mere denial of the wife
would not amount to grave and sudden provocation within the meaning of exception 1 to section 300, IPC.
Further the alleged provocation was sought by the accused himself.691
[s 300.54] Lapse of Time Converts Provocation into Resentment
Provocation must be distinguished from resentment.692 Lapse of time changes the former into the latter, which
is founded on revenge, and not upon the absence of self-control caused by passion. A, believing that he had
been the victim of witchcraft at the hands of his brother during the past three or four months, suddenly attacked
and killed him. This was held to be murder.693 A man’s feeling, that the deceased was misbehaving with his
wife, must cause a provocation to him to retaliate; but when such feeling of provocation is a long standing one,
gaining intensity from day to day until finally the person, harbouring such feeling, yields to the provocation by
attacking his enemy, it cannot be said that he is acting under grave and sudden provocation. On the other
hand, the provocative feeling which he was entertaining for some time can only be termed the motive for the act
committed by him.694
[s 300.55] Whether the Provocation, in a Given Case, was Grave and Sudden is a Question of Fact
The explanation, at the end of exception 1, is very important because it enjoins that the question, whether the
provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from being murder, should be treated as a
question of fact, and not as a question of law. It follows, therefore, that each case must be considered
according to its own facts and the court must decide, on the particular circumstances of that case, whether the
provocation was grave and sudden enough to permit an indulgent view of the crime committed by the
accused.695 The court must consider the reaction of a normal man, whose impulses are conditioned by the
same environment as that of the accused, and not of a normal man in the abstract. What is grave and sudden
provocation to a Baluchi may not be grave and sudden provocation to an Englishman or vice versa.696
Precisely, for this reason, the Legislature has made the gravity of a provocation a question of fact and left it to
the court to decide each case according to its own peculiar circumstances.697 There can be no direct evidence
as to what was the psychological effect of the provocation upon the mind of a person in certain circumstances.
The state of mind of a person has to be gathered from proved facts.698 Similarly, if it is proved that the accused
did receive grave and sudden provocation, it will generally be assumed that the homicide was committed while
the accused was deprived of the power of self-control.699
In the case of Re Murugian700 the Madras High Court observed:
We should view it as a psychological problem, and not one where reasoning, as to the legality or otherwise, of the
rights of parties is to be considered before the emotion of the man is roused to action. Each case has to be considered
in the circumstances that prevail at the given situation, and there can be no generalization on such issues.
[s 300.56] Grave and Sudden Provocation in Instances
Following are instances of grave and sudden provocation to accused:

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(a) Deceased catching hold of wife of accused and asking her to go with him.701
(b) Rape of wife of the accused.702
(c) Deceased boasting that he is paramour of wife of the accused and openly expressing his intention to
take her to live with him.703
(d) Accused carrying agricultural operation and deceased came to the field and tried to demarcate
boundary lines to the field.704
(e) Insult to low caste accused by high caste deceased.705
(f) Deceased wife insisted on going to native town alone where she had extra-marital affair and such
insistence leading to quarrel between her and accused.706
(g) Explanatory part of dying declaration of deceased clearly indicated that on the day of incident, the
deceased did something so objectionable while cutting jokes with sister of the accused that blood
quickly rushed to accused’s head and the accused picked up loaded revolver of deceased and fired
repeated shots at the deceased. Accused was deprived of power of self control by such grave and
sudden provocation occasioned by obscene and objectionable behavior of deceased with his blood
sister.707
(h) The deceased who used to collect waste papers from the roadside, collected the waste papers and
cardboard boxes and threw them inside the shop of the accused. On seeing this, the accused got
angry and shouted at deceased and pulled his hair. The deceased thereupon pushed the accused and
the accused took a knife from the top of a table in the shop and stabbed the deceased in the chest.
The deceased fell down due to this injury and died. It was held that the accused was deprived of the
power of self control by grave and sudden provocation which led him to commit the offence. It is
evident that the accused had no motive or intention to cause the death of the deceased since the
accused was not carrying the knife from before, and only picked it up during the scuffle with the
deceased. The incident resulted in a sudden fight and in the heat of passion, without the accused
having taken undue advantage or having acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Hence, the accused was
entitled to the benefit of exceptions 1 and 4 to section 300 and the case was under section 304, Pt II,
IPC.708
(i) Where there was evidence that the deceased came drunk and started abusing and beating his father,
on the call of the father, the accused (brother of the accused) came armed with a small axe and
inflicted injuries on his head causing death, the act of the accused was out of grave and sudden
provocation and was covered by exception to section 300, IPC and the accused was convicted under
section 304, Pt I, IPC.709
[s 300.57] Insolent Answer of Wife, Whether Grave and Sudden Provocation
Where the accused asked his wife to cook his food and, on her declining to do so saying that she would rather
die in a sweeper’s house than cook meals for him, dealt several blows on her, with an axe, with a fatal result, it
was held that the answer, given by the wife, could not be treated as sufficient provocation within the meaning of
this exception.710 Similarly, where the accused suspected his wife to be in criminal intimacy with one N and, one
day, on seeing her going towards the house of N, asked her not to go there and, on her giving a defiant answer,
brutally attacked her and brought about her death, it was held that the defiant tone of the answer could, to some
extent, amount to provocation, but it was not sufficiently grave, nor was it surprisingly sudden.711
In Inayat v Emperor,712 the accused’s younger sister, the deceased, who had left her husband and was living
under the care of accused, was suspected to be of an immoral character. On the night of murder, at about 3
am, she had gone to meet a stranger in the cattle shed at the back of the house for a clandestine purpose.
When the accused asked the deceased why she did not give up her evil ways, she refused to listen to him and
gave an insolent reply. Thereupon, the accused gave her a blow with a hatchet which caused her death. It was
held that the provocation, received by the accused was, in the circumstances, almost as grave and sudden as it
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would have been if he had seen the deceased in the act of sexual intercourse with a stranger and it was further
aggravated by insolvent reply given by the deceased and that the case properly fell within the purview of
section 304, Pt I.
[s 300.58] Confession of Adultery by Wife—Whether Grave and Sudden Provocation
In England, when the wife suddenly confesses to her husband that she has committed adultery with someone,
it is treated as equivalent to a discovery of the act itself.713 Same is the situation in India.714 In Nga Saw Maung
v Emperor,715 the accused found his wife pregnant and, suspecting that there was something wrong before and
that he was not the father of the child, inquired of her if she had been cohabiting with a particular person. She
said “yes” in a taunting manner. The accused immediately stabbed her to death. It was held that it was hardly
possible to imagine graver provocation being received and that the accused was guilty of culpable homicide,
and not of murder. In an Allahabad case, the accused’s wife was grossly immoral and he upbraided her with
her misconduct. Instead of being repentant, she said that she would again do such acts upon his head.
Thereupon, he became enraged and struck her with a stick. She struggled with him and caught hold of his
fingers and bit them. He then lost control of himself and took out a knife and stabbed her to death. It was held
that there was sufficient provocation to come within this exception.716 Where accused found his wife in a
compromising position with another man so assaulted her with a stick in the heat of passion and she died after
receiving injuries, accused was found guilty under section 304, Pt I, and not under section 302, IPC.717
In Imbichi Koya v Emperor,718 it was held that the principle, that if a wife suddenly confesses to her husband
that she had committed adultery, it may be treated as equivalent to the discovery of the act itself and if the
husband forthwith kills her, the offence is only one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and cannot be
extended to a case of murder, by the husband, of the paramour with whom his wife had confessed to have
committed adultery. If the wife tells her husband that she has committed adultery with a man that would not be
grave and sudden provocation for the murder of the paramour. ReMuthappa Goundan,719 another Division
Bench of the Madras High Court agreed with this view. It, however, makes no difference, whether the deceased
is the wife or mistress of the deceased.720 But where the altercation between accused and wife began the
previous night when he had refused to have intercourse with her, his wife compared the manner of intercourse
of her paramour with her and she even told him that if he was not willing to come she would get her paramour
and under the very nose of her husband (accused) would indulge in such intercourse, the altercation between
accused and his wife over the affair took place the whole night even when, he came back following afternoon
again the deceased wife quarreled with him and he lost control, he took a chisel (an instrument used in
carpentry) and killed his wife, accused was held entitled to benefit of exception 1 of section 300, IPC.721 Where
the evidence clearly showed that the accused was piqued due to his recently acquired knowledge that the
deceased had betrayed him and he wanted to finish the deceased for that reason, he had clear intention to kill
the deceased and there was no evidence of the deceased lady providing him any provocation what to talk of
sudden and grave provocation to the accused for commission of the offence, it was true that prosecution
witness (PW1) was not aware of the language in which the accused and the deceased must have been
conversing but that did not mean that there must have been some grave and sudden provocation at the hands
of the lady which resulted in assault on her body by the appellant in view of the fact that the accused himself
had uttered the crucial words in Hindi which could be understood by the two prosecution witnesses (PW1 and
PW2) that he wanted to teach a lesson of life to the lady as she had betrayed him in love, on these facts the
accused was found not entitled to the benefit of exception 1 to section 300, IPC and his conviction under
section 302, IPC, by the sessions court was upheld.722
[s 300.59] Provocation must have Deprived the Accused of his Power of Self-control
Under exception 1, the provocation must not only be grave and sudden but it must also have, by its gravity and
suddenness, deprived the accused of the power of self-control.723 In other words, it ought to be distinctly shown
not only that the act was done under the influence of some feeling, which took away, from the person, doing it,
all control of his action, but also that feeling had an adequate cause.724 The adequate cause should be strong
enough to make a normal man lose his self-control.725 It is an essential condition for the operation of exception
1 that the offender, by reason of the provocation, shall have been deprived of the power of self-control.726 So,
provocation is an excuse only when the accused is thereby deprived of the power of self-control and unless it is
found that the provocation had destroyed the power of self-control, the proof of provocation is no defence.727
Where the accused were carrying on their agricultural operation, the deceased came to the field and tried to
demarcate a boundary line and caused provocation, on such grave and sudden provocation caused by
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prosecution party, the accused attacked the deceased, the evidence also discharged that the accused on being
suddenly and gravely provoked by the deceased, was deprived of her self-control, and hence exception 1 to
section 300, IPC, was attracted to the facts of the case.728
Where the deceased was a member of high caste and accused belonged to a low caste and the former
subjected the latter to repeated insults, and the accused requested the deceased, a headmaster in school for a
job which was available in school, the deceased asked the accused to make available his wife to him for
immoral purpose, it was held that the accused lost his self-control and due to grave and sudden provocation,
inflicted injuries on the deceased, successively within seconds with a knife.729 In a case, it was held that the
action of a wife, assaulting her husband with a sword and chasing him particularly when he has actually
received some injuries, must be taken to be sufficient to provoke the husband to the extent of losing self-control
when he snatches the sword from wife and inflicts on her fatal injury.730 However, in another case, the
deceased, the unarmed elder brother of the drunken accused, advised the accused to stop drinking and each
abused the other. The accused then brought a naked kirpan and gave a blow with it across the throat of the
deceased causing fatal injuries. It was observed that it could not be said from the evidence that there was any
provocation which could be regarded as grave or that, in the situation, in which the two brothers were placed at
the relevant time; the accused must have been deprived of the power of self-control.731 In one case, it was
remarked that mere unfounded suspicion, that the wife of the accused was carrying on an intrigue with
someone is not enough to allow the accused to take the life of his wife.732 There are, however, cases where
suspicion of infidelity coupled with conduct of the wife, has been held to be sufficient to bring the case within
this exception.733
An offence resulting from grave and sudden provocation would normally mean that a person placed in such
circumstances could lose self-control but only temporarily and that too, in proximity to the time of provocation.
The provocation could be an act or series of acts done by the deceased to the accused resulting in inflicting of
injury.734
[s 300.60] Offence must have been Committed during Loss of Self-control
Another essential condition for the application of exception 1 is that the accused should have killed the
deceased during the continuance of loss of the power of self-control of which he was deprived by the grave and
sudden provocation. The fatal blow should be traced to the influence of the passion, arising from that
provocation, and not when the passion has cooled down by lapse of time or has otherwise given room and
scope for premeditation and calculation.735 Thus, the exception applies only if death is caused during the time
when the offender is deprived of the power of self-control as a result of grave and sudden provocation. If the
degree and duration of the loss of the power of self-control are not commensurate with the degree of gravity of
provocation, the benefit of this exception cannot be availed of by the offender.736 It has to be shown that the act,
causing death, was committed after loss of self-control, but before self-possession had an opportunity to return.
This can often be presumed from the existence of a grave provocation and the sudden and drastic character of
the violent and hasty act, immediately following the provocation; but facts and circumstances may sometimes
exist which destroy the presumption and show that self-possession was not actually lost.737 A husband, finding
a man in his room at night, who has come there for the purpose of intriguing with his wife, would receive the
gravest provocation; and if he kills the seducer then and there, his offence would not amount to murder. But
when a man has time to cool down, ie, if he, after seizing the intruder, under the circumstances stated above,
takes him away to another room and, after being joined by another man there and so being in a position to
render all resistance hopeless, deliberately first knocks his enemy down and then suffocates him with a
bamboo-pole, placed and pressed upon his neck, the pole having been fetched from outside, he can hardly
plead the extenuating circumstances provided for in this exception.738 If, therefore, the accused shows that he
has deliberated in any way, or there has been a lapse of time, which would enable him to cool down, then he
cannot be said to be acting under sudden provocation.739 However, the rule, contained in exception 1, does not
contemplate that, in order to entitle the accused to earn the mitigation provided for, the act must immediately
follow the provocation. In Abalu Das v Emperor,740 the court thought that the provocation was of a nature that
would continue to influence the feelings of the accused for a considerable period after the culprit was found in
the company of his wife. Where, therefore, the accused saw his wife and her lover, actually committing
adultery, or, at least, together in a room, and he first grappled with the lover and killed him and then turned to
his wife and killed her, it was held that it would not be a justification to say that any considerable period
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intervened between the two murders.741 The question to be determined in such a case is how long the
provocation continued to weigh on the mind of the accused. There must be some material on the record to
enable the court to determine that question. Where there is nothing which leads the court to suppose that the
accused acted on anything but grave provocation, the fatal stroke must be referred to the immediate impulse of
such provocation.742
Nineteen injuries caused in quick succession cannot be said to have been caused as a result of grave and
sudden provocation. Appellant accused was convicted under section 302, IPC.743
It is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule as to when a person can be said to have had time to cool down
and thus to be deprived of the benefit of this exception. Much depends on the individual characteristics of the
accused and that element cannot be ignored in the determination of this matter. In a Lahore case, the accused
saw the deceased, who had contacted a liaison with his daughter-in-law, entering his house. He informed his
son, who was at a short distance, of what he saw. Then they both came to the house and, seeing the daughter-
in-law and the deceased together in a compromising position, killed the deceased. It was held that even if the
father had seen the deceased, entering his house in his absence, when he was at a short distance from his
house, he must have been provoked to such a degree as to lose his sense then and there, and if he further
informed his son, of what he had seen, and came to his house, accompanied by his son, he had no time to cool
down, so to say, and thus return to his normal condition. The whole thing formed a series of one transaction
and the provocation continued until such time when the deed was done.744 But there should be some
circumstance to indicate that the act of the accused was done in the same transaction in which he received the
grave and sudden provocation.745 In Bansi v State,746 the benefit of exception 1 was not given to the accused
because, by the time the attack was launched, an appreciable amount of time had passed, thereby disentitling
him to plead that he had been deprived of the power of self-control.
[s 300.61] Person Killed must be the Person Giving Provocation to Another by Mistake or Accident
Another condition for the application of this exception is that the offender must have caused the death of the
person who gave the provocation or that of any other person by mistake or accident.747 The fact, that the
provocation did not proceed directly from the victim, renders exception 1 to section 300 inapplicable to a
particular case. If some other factors, emanating from other sources, intervene, which lead to the provocation,
and the fatal blow cannot be traced directly to the influence of passion, arising from the conduct of the victim,
the accused is deprived of the benefit of exception 1.748 Where, without any sudden and grave provocation from
the deceased, who was an innocent intervener between the accused and his (accused’s) father in a quarrel, the
accused caused fatal injuries to the deceased with a knife, it was held that the act of the accused was a cruel
act and his conviction under section 302, IPC, was proper.749
[s 300.62] Provisos
The first exception to this section is subject to three provisos which are really exceptions to the exception.
[s 300.63] First Proviso
The first proviso to exception 1 of this section says that the provocation will not be deemed to be grave and
sudden when that provocation is sought, or voluntarily caused, by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing
harm to any person.750 When the accused himself was responsible for inviting provocation, the subsequent act
of deceased by opening fire from their respective weapons upon the deceased and another and in this factual
situation, the accused was responsible in inviting provocation from the complainant party who returned fire, the
subsequent fact of accused person of firing upon them cannot be brought within the four corners of exception
1.751 The effect of the proviso is that provocation does not reduce murder to culpable homicide under the first
exception if the provocation is sought, or courted, by the offender, or if it is voluntarily caused by him, as an
excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. A person cannot “pick a quarrel” with another in order to fight
and then plead the fight as being a provocation. Nor can a man “go out of his way” in order to be provoked.
Seeking provocation is best illustrated in adultery cases. In Queen v Lachan,752 the accused was convicted of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder in respect of his cousin’s widow who lived with him. The evidence
showed that the accused was seen to follow the deceased for a considerable distance with a gandasa under
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circumstances which indicated that he wanted to detect whether she was going to keep an assignation. He
found her in the act of connection with her paramour and killed her. The court held that the conviction should be
altered to one of murder as the accused went deliberately in search of the provocation, sought to be made the
mitigation of his offence, and under circumstances disclosed, it could not be said that he was deprived of self-
control by grave and sudden provocation. Where the accused, who knew that his sister had gone to meet the
deceased, with whom she had illicit connection, deliberately went to the spot with the intention of killing the
culprit if he found him with his sister and killed him on finding him with her, it was held that he sought the
provocation by deliberately going to the scene of the meeting.753 Similarly, where the accused themselves
started the trouble and offered earlier provocation by calling the opponents by beat of drum and calling them for
a fight, it was held that the fact that the challenge by the deceased was couched in strong indecent language,
cannot be considered to be grave and sudden provocation, as is contemplated by the first exception, especially
when it is read along with the first proviso to the said exception.754 Where the husband attacked his unarmed
wife with pestle without any threat or danger to his life, the deceased wife caught hold of private parts of the
husband in order to save herself but could not save herself and the result was that husband accused ultimately
killed her by hitting her on her head, here the husband cannot be said to have acted in exercise of right of
private defence.755
[s 300.64] Second Proviso
This proviso is illustrated by illusts (c) and (d). It is not limited to what is done by public servants only; it also
includes acts done by any person in obedience to law. Grave provocation, given by anything done under cover
of obedience to the law, or under cover of its authority, or by a public servant, or in defence in excess of what is
strictly warranted by the law, in point of violence, or as regards the means used, or the manner of using them
and the like, would be admissible in extenuation of homicide under this proviso.
[s 300.65] Third Proviso
The right of private defence is available against an offence and, therefore, where an act is done in exercise of
the right of private defence, such act cannot give rise to any right of private defence in favour of the aggressor
in return. This would seem to be so even if the person exercising the right of private defence, has the better of
his aggressor, provided, of course, he does not exceed his right because the moment he exceeds it, he
commits an offence. There is also no right of private defence in cases where there is time to have recourse to
the protection of public authorities. The right of private defence is essentially a defensive right, circumscribed by
the statute, available only when the circumstances clearly justify it. It would not be allowed to be pleaded, or
availed of as a pretext for a vindictive aggressive or retributive purpose. According to section 97, IPC, this right
vests even in strangers for the defence of the body or property of other persons against offences mentioned
therein. The courts have, therefore, to be careful in seeing that no one, on the mere pretext of the exercise of
the right of private defence, takes sides in a quarrel between two or more persons and inflicts injuries on the
one or the other. In case, where two parties are having a free fight without disclosing as to who is the initial
aggressor, it may be dangerous as a rule, to clothe, either of them or his sympathiser, with a right of private
defence. If, however, one of them is shown to be committing an offence affecting the human body, then that
would, of course, seem to give rise to such a right.756
[s 300.66] Exception 2—Scope of
The IPC recognises the right of private defence of a person and property against certain offences (section 97,
IPC) and declares that nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of such right of private defence
(section 96, IPC). The right of private defence, however, is made subject to certain restrictions. In the first
instance, the right, in no case, extends to the inflicting of more harm than it is necessary to inflict for the
purpose of defence (section 99, IPC). If, therefore, a person, exercising the right of private defence, causes
death where it is not necessary to do so for the purpose of such defence, he exceeds the power so given to him
by law within the meaning of this exception.757 Then again, the right extends to the causing of death only in
defence against certain offences enumerated in sections 100 and 103, IPC.758
Against other offences, the right of private defence extends only to causing any harm other than death,
(sections 101 and 104, IPC). Even if death is caused in the exercise of the right of private defence of body or
property against the offence, mentioned in sections 100 and 103, subject of course, to the restrictions as
mentioned in section 99 it is no offence at all (section 96), nor even culpable homicide not amounting to murder,
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and no question arises as to the application of exception 2 to section 300.759 The accused need not affirmatively
establish that he had a right of private defence and he exercised the same in that manner. This general
exception which deals with the right of private defence lays an emphasis on the reasonable apprehension in the
mind of accused while exercising the right of private defence. Where an injury is found on the accused, and if
the accused comes forward with a specific plea of private defence, the same has to be considered in the facts
and the surrounding circumstances obtained in the case. Every kind of explanation put forward particularly at
the belated stage by the prosecution will not be sufficient and cannot be held to be an appropriate explanation
to reject the version put forward by the accused, particularly when it does not appear to be false but, on the
other hand, appears to be plausible.760
The question of the operation of this exception arises only if the alleged offender exceeds the right of private
defence761 subject to the limitations, that (a) the accused caused the death of a person without premeditation;
and (b) he caused the death of the victim, without any intention of doing more harm than what was necessary
for the purpose of defence even if the harm caused was more than what was necessary for the purpose of
defence.762 In order to attract the benefit of this exception, it is necessary to show that the act of the accused
was without any intention of doing more harm than what was necessary for the purpose of private defence
where the deceased was made disabled and defenseless and the number of attacks on him were definitely with
the intention of doing more harm than what was necessary for ousting him from taking forcible possession of
the disputed land, it was held that this exception was not attracted.763 Thus, what this exception means is
explained below:
If a person, who possesses the right of private defence, infact, does no more than what is necessary for him to
do, he commits no offence; but if he exceeds the right, it is still a lesser offence than murder if his intention was
to do no more harm than what he believed necessary in the exercise of his right. The exception deals, in the
concluding words, not with fact, but with intention, and refers to circumstances, in which a person does not take
advantage of the right of private defence to kill with a vengeful motive, but exceeds that right by inflicting fatal
injuries where their infliction was, in fact, unnecessary and where there was reckless criminality, though the
right of private defence was the only impulse operating in the mind.764
This exception is a necessary corollary of section 99 IPC.765
In a case, the accused after inflicting injuries on R, ran towards P, who was standing 10 steps away from the
place of incident, who after seeing the incident relating to the death of R started running away and he was
chased by the accused persons who then inflicted lathi blows on P, thereby causing his death. It was held that
in such situation the accused had no right to invoke right of self defence by chasing P and causing fatal injuries
to him. The reasonable apprehension disappeared when P was running away to escape from the scene,
therefore, the conviction of the accused under sections 302/34 was held proper.766
[s 300.67] Requirements of Exception 2
The benefit of this exception can be invoked where an accused person has exercised the right of private
defence of person or property in good faith and, then, had exceeded that power, which the law had given to
him, and has caused the death of his antagonist without premeditation and without any intention of doing more
harm than what was necessary for the purpose of such defence.767 In considering the question whether the
accused exceeded the right of private defence, the court has to consider the part played by the accused
persons, gravity of the offence committed and nature of attack made by them.768 Normally, if there is non-
explanation of the injuries on the person of accused, it may at the most give scope to argue that the accused
had the right of private defence.769 If the person has exercised his right (a) in good faith, (b) without
premeditation of death, and (c) without any intention of doing more harm than what was necessary, then his
offence will be culpable homicide not amounting to murder.770 But the said three conditions must occur;
otherwise the offence will be murder. It will have to be borne in mind that if, after commission of an assault of
simple or grievous nature, there is, in any case, no further apprehension of assault, occasion for the exercise of
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right of private defence of body should not arise. At the same time, the possibility of infliction of further assault,
likely to cause grievous bodily injury, cannot, as a rule, be ruled out on the mere ground that the injury or the
injuries, already inflicted, are simple. The law, in this respect, honours the human instinct of self-preservation. In
considering whether one is entitled to exercise the right of private defence of his body, one has to place himself
in the position of the accused in the midst of circumstances, in which he stood, and to form his opinion,
whether, for him in those circumstances, it was not fairly wise to apprehend such an injury to the body as would
entitle him to exercise the right that he claims to have done. Where an accused, charged with murder, asserts
that he killed in self-defence, his state of mind at the time of the killing becomes material and important in
determining his justification or his belief in an impending attack by the deceased.771 However, an accused
cannot escape the liability for his assault merely by asserting that he exercised the right of private defence.
There should be some evidence, direct or indirect, indicating either positively or showing at least the reasonable
possibility of right of private defence having been exercised by the accused. A bald assertion of the exercise of
right of private defence, without anything more, cannot deflect the scale against the prosecution if the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, satisfactorily establishes that the accused had deliberately and wilfully caused
injuries without any excuse772 though it is not for the accused to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he acted
in self-defence; he has only to raise a probability in his favour of the same being true.773
Where the injuries of the accused were self-inflicted, and the accused refused to undergo radiological
examination of the injuries and failed to tell the doctor as to how and why he got the injuries, the plea of the
accused that he attacked the deceased to save the life of his father was rejected.774 Once it is established that
there was the existence of the right of private defence, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that such
right had been exceeded.775
The accused armed with a kulhari in his hand went to the house of the deceased and hacked both the
deceased to death one after another. The accused had not received any injury and the very fact that the
accused committed the murder of two persons one after the other ruled out the plea of private defence. Further,
a woman by virtue of its feminine nature and with a feeble body, ordinarily would not pose a threat or danger to
the life of a well bodied man with a lathi. Therefore, the plea of private defence was rejected; and accused was
convicted under section 302, IPC776.
Where it was found that the death of two persons occurred due to the firing resorted to by the accused as part
of his self-defence, the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC777.
Complainant party was not aggressor, on the other hand, the accused persons were aggressor. Occurrence
took place in the house of the complainant. The accused fired shots at the deceased member of complainant
party from a close range. Plea of self defence was not tenable. Accused were not entitled to benefit of
exception 2 to section 300, IPC.778
[s 300.68] There must be a Right of Private Defence
The first requirement of exception 2 is that the accused must have had a right of private defence of body or of
property and he must have exercised it.779 It is not attracted when no right of private defence accrued to the
accused who inflicts fatal injuries to the deceased.780 If there is no initial right of private defence, then there can
hardly be any question exceeding that right.781 Normally if there is non-explanation by the prosecution about the
injuries on the accused persons, it may at the most give scope to argue that the accused had the right of private
defence or in general that the prosecution evidence should be rejected as they have not come out with the
whole truth, particularly regarding the genesis of the occurrence.782 Where the accused persons received
injuries during the same occurrence in which the complainants were injured and when they had taken the plea
that they acted in self-defence, which cannot be lightly ignored particularly in the absence of any explanation of
their injuries by the prosecution.783 In such an event a doubt arises whether the accused acted in exercise of his
right of self-defence and that benefit has to go to him and submission on behalf of the accused that he might
have acted in exercise of his right of self-defence has some force.784 The determination of the question whether
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there exists the alleged right of private defence is always a question of fact.785
The accused need not affirmatively, establish that he had a right of private defence and he exercised the same
in that manner. Where an injury is found on the person of the accused and if the accused comes forward with a
specific plea of the right of private defence, the same has to be considered in the facts and surrounding
circumstances obtained in the case.786 For example, the action of the entrant in the khandar of the accused
being merely of easing himself, because, for want of time, he could not go outside the village, could not be
sufficient to make out a case of criminal trespass and, in such a case, the accused, causing death of the
entrant, cannot be held to have exceeded his right of private defence of property.787 The right of private defence
does not arise upon the use of mere words, threatening future injury, and the killing of the person, who uses
such threats, would be murder.788 A person, who began a quarrel by acting, in an improper manner, towards the
wife of the deceased and declined to leave the place peacefully, when asked by them to do so, being himself
responsible for the subsequent consequences, cannot plead the right of private defence.789 The right
commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger arises and ceases when such apprehension
ceases or on completion of the offence.790
In a Lahore case, the deceased was a man of desperate character who had recently come out of jail after
undergoing a long sentence of imprisonment which had been awarded to him for causing somebody’s death.
The accused found him molesting his maternal uncle’s wife and reprimanded him. The deceased abused him
and threatened to give him a blow with a club which he was carrying. The accused snatched the club from him
and gave him a blow with it. The deceased persisted in abusing him and so he gave him another blow which
killed him by rupturing his spleen which was enlarged. The accused had no knowledge of it. It was held that the
first blow, given by the accused, was in the exercise of the right of private defence, but since he gave the
second blow, not because he apprehended any more danger from the victim, but because he went on abusing
him, his act in giving the second blow was not protected by the right of private defence.791
In a case the evidence showed that heated arguments took place between the accused and the deceased for
more than an hour and the deceased under the influence of liquor, had trespassed into the house of the
accused with an intention of molesting the accused, who in fact was his real sister-in-law. The accused persons
attacked the deceased; however, it was held that the accused might have retaliated to ward off the blows given
by the deceased in exercise of their right of private defence; therefore the accused persons were acquitted of
the charge under section 302, IPC.792
Where the accused fired with gun on the deceased causing his death, whereas the deceased was not armed
and nor had he made any attempt on the life of the accused, it was held that the plea of the right of private
defence by the accused was not sustainable and the accused was convicted under section 302, IPC.793
There was overwhelming evidence produced by the prosecution, affirming that the crowd which had gathered at
the place of occurrence, was un-armed. There was also evidence on the record of the case to authenticate, that
all the villagers were only persuading the accused-appellant–Bhis co-accused–K, not to insist on carrying out
their threat, to murder M–PW15. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses also demonstrated that there was
substantial distance between the villagers and the place at which the accused were standing. The crowd
comprised of men, women and children, by itself is sufficient to infer that the neighbours and co-villagers were
not aiming at causing any harm or injury to the accused-appellant or the co-accused. One of the deceased M
was a woman and one of the injured S was a child of 5 years. On taking into consideration the entirety of the
facts and circumstances of the case, held the plea of self defence was not available to the accused persons,
their conviction for offence under section 302 IPC was upheld.794
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Where the deceased had gone to the house of the accused and inflicted injuries by Kapa on the accused and
his wife, the accused no. 3 in order to defend himself and his wife inflicted a single injury on the chest of the
deceased with a cobbler’s instrument, the plea of the accused that they acted in exercise of right of private
defence was accepted and the accused were acquitted of the charge under section 302, IPC.795
[s 300.69] The Right must have been Exercised in “Good Faith”
The right of private defence is a right of defence,796 being purely preventive, and not punitive or retributive.797
Culpable homicide cannot be held to be murder when the accused exercised in good faith his right of private
defence.798 The requirement of exception 2, therefore, is that the accused must have been exercising the right
of private defence in good faith. Where two accused, armed with a lorh and a deadly axe, proceeded upon a
house-breaking expedition and, in order to escape, the man with the axe used that axe, aiming his blow at the
face and head of a pursuer, armed only with a lathi or a lorh, it was held that it cannot be said that he was bona
fide exercising the right of private defence.799 Where there is no evidence that the accused exercised in good
faith, the right of private defence of person. Exception 2 will not apply.800 When even after the deceased fell
down after receiving injuries he was not spared, but the accused further assaulted him, such conduct of the
accused is consistent with an intention to kill the deceased.801 In such cases, possibility of accused causing
injuries in exercise of private defence is ruled out.802
[s 300.70] Accused must have Exceeded the Right of Private Defence
In considering the question whether the accused exceeded the right of private defence, court has to consider
the part played by the accused person, gravity of the offence committed and nature of attack made by them.803
Exception 2 applies only if the accused has, in exercising the right of private defence, exceeded the powers,
given to him by law, and causes death.804 The accused would be said to have exceeded the power, given to
him by law, if he causes more harm than what is necessary for the purpose of his defence,805 such as the act in
spearing to death the unarmed deceased as soon as he (ie, the deceased) advances to seize the trespassing
cattle of the accused.806 Where the deceased father, aged 74 years, had chastised his daughter, the accused
son, aged 32, on being enraged, inflicted a large number of injuries by blows/fists, knife and a wooden piece
causing death; it was held that the accused son exceeded his right of private defence and the case was not
covered by exception 2 to section 300 and the conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was held
proper.807 Where occurrence of the event took place in the field of the deceased on his objection to removal of
crops by accused persons, and the deceased’s act of biting finger of the hand of the accused caused
provocation to his accused sons, the medical evidence proved that the death was caused by back portion of the
axe so the two accused armed with axe were convicted under section 304, Pt I, IPC for exceeding right of
private defence of body of their father/accused; the other accused persons were acquitted.808
Where the accused have no right of private defence on the facts of the case, the question of exceeding the right
of private defence does not arise.809
Where the complainant party attacked the accused party with sticks causing injuries to them, in retaliation of
attack by complainant the accused party exceeded the right of private defence so the charge of murder fails,
thus, the accused were held liable to be convicted under section 304, Pt I, IPC.810
Where the deceased came to the house of the accused in a drunken condition with a danda in his hands and
started abusing the accused and his family members (other co-accused persons) and also assaulted the family
members of the accused, the accused in retaliation, inflicted multiple tangier blows to the head of the deceased,
it was held that the right of private defence accrued to the accused as he reasonably apprehended the death
and grievous injuries to him and members of his family. However, the accused exceeded the right by inflicting
more injuries to the deceased, therefore, the case fell within the ambit of exception 2 to section 300 and the
accused was liable to be convicted under section 304, Pt I, IPC.811
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Where stones from the side of the house of the deceased had fallen on to the house of the accused, the
accused had every right to protect his properties, but he exceeded the right by inflicting repeated blows leading
to the death of the deceased. It was held that the case was covered by exception 2 to section 300, and the
accused was convicted under section 304, Pt I, IPC.812 Where in a sudden quarrel the accused persons
exceeded their right of private defence in causing death of two persons, they were held entitled to benefit of
exception 2 of section 300, IPC.813 Where, even after the deceased (who intruded into the accused’s plot with a
tractor) had fallen down, the accused continued to injure him in a vindictive and revengeful spirit, it was held
that they exceeded their right of private defence and were, therefore, liable to conviction under Pt I of section
304 instead of under section 302.814 But where in a case of triple murder the accused fired at victims from a
close range and one in the back while he was running away, the victims were not armed, the accused was not
under any danger or threat from the victims, the accused was held not entitled to any right of private defence
and deserved conviction under section 300, and not under section 304, Pt I, IPC.815
Where the deceased husband suspecting the fidelity of his wife, the accused, had threatened his wife that he
will kill her with a vegetable cutter, and only thereafter the accused wife cut him with an axe, it was held that the
act of the accused amounted to exercise of private defence, but she exceeded the right, hence the guilt of the
accused fell under exception 2 to section 300, and was convicted under section 304, Pt I, IPC.816
The defence of the accused was that he had gone to the deceased’s house for repairing his TV, and the
deceased had just come home and he expressed a desire to have unnatural sex with the accused, which the
accused refused and thereupon the deceased removed all his clothes and for the purpose of gratifying his
unnatural lust, he attacked the accused. The accused apprehended that the deceased would force him to have
unnatural sex with him and on being certain that he would be a victim of unnatural lust, he picked up a weapon
and to protect himself from unnatural sex and assault he attacked the deceased with a weapon. As a result, the
deceased fell down and it was held that the “defence version” was probable as the accused caused death in
exercise of right of private defence, but exceeded this right and was held guilty under section 304, Pt II.817
In a case, there was reliable prosecution evidence that R had dealt a blow on the head of the deceased by the
sabba, due to which the deceased fell. Once the deceased fell to the ground, the apprehension of any threat of
death or injury being caused by the deceased to the accused R, ended. The fact that the accused had brutally
beheaded the deceased and assaulted him repeatedly on the thoracic cavity of the deceased with such force
that during each assault the penetration of the sabba in the thoracic cavity was full, it can be safely inferred that
the accused R had exceeded the right of private defence. Therefore, the offence committed by the accused R
fell under exception 2 to section 300 of the IPC and did not travel beyond section 304, Pt I of the IPC.818
[s 300.71] Accused not Exceeding Right of Private Defence is Entitled to Acquittal
Section 100, IPC, may be referred to. Where there was no prior enmity between the two groups and the whole
incident developed suddenly, the accused persons received a fair number of injuries, some of them were on
vital parts, the prosecution had no plausible explanation for these injuries, the plea of the accused that they
inflicted injuries on deceased in self-defence was quite probable, the accused inflicted only one injury on the
head of the deceased, in such a situation it cannot be said that the act of the accused was not in conformity
with the limitation laid down section 100, IPC and all the accused persons were found entitled to benefit of
doubt.819
[s 300.72] “Without Premeditation and without any Intention of doing more harm than is Necessary for the
Purpose of such defence”
For the application of exception 2, it is further necessary that the accused must have caused the death without
premeditation and without any intention of doing more harm than what was necessary for the purpose of private
defence. Where an accused, exceeding his right of private defence, intentionally,820 or deliberately,821 causes
more harm than what is necessary or indiscriminately assaults the deceased after he becomes disabled,822 he
is not entitled to the benefit of the exception. In a case, the deceased, none of whom was in possession of any
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dangerous weapon, were harvesting the crops on a plot of land peacefully under the protection of police. The
accused, who claimed the crop in the field, went to the field armed with guns, with the common intention of
killing the deceased, and shot them dead at point blank range. It was held that, under the circumstances, it
could not be said that the accused had shot at the deceased without premeditation and without the intention of
doing more harm than what was necessary for the purpose of private defence.823 It is an accepted proposition
of law that a person cannot avail himself of the plea of self-defence in a case of homicide when he was himself
the aggressor and had wilfully brought, on himself, without legal excuse, the necessity for the killing. It would be
strange indeed if a person, who provides an attack, brings on a combat and then slays his assailant, were to
take shelter behind the plea of self-defence in justification of the blow which he struck during the encounter.824
If, however, the deceased becomes aggressive and attacks the accused first, it would be a case where the
accused must be said to have acted without premeditation. Where all, but one, of the injuries, inflicted by the
accused on the deceased, are such as are not likely to cause death, it cannot be said that the accused
intended to cause more harm than what was necessary.825 But where A and B, who are unarmed, assault C
with their hands and C stabs B with a large knife through the lungs and stomach and B dies, C is guilty of
murder, and not of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.826 Exception 2 or any other exception in section
300, IPC would not apply when the deceased is unarmed, and the assault cannot be said to be sudden and
unpremeditated.827 If the accused causes injuries to the unarmed deceased before he receives stick blows by
the deceased’s son, it cannot be said that the deceased was the aggressor and that the accused caused those
injuries to the deceased to ward off any imminent apprehension of death or grievous hurt to himself.828 The
accused has to establish, with a balance of probability, circumstances which would bring his case within any
exception.829
Where the accused had not gone to the spot with any weapon, but there was a lengthy quarrel and scuffle
between the deceased and the deceased and his son hit the accused with sticks on his head and the blows
landed on his elbows when he raised his hands to protect his head, and that at that stage, the accused picked
up one of the thorny sticks lying at the spot and hit the deceased, to protect himself and not with the intention of
killing him, the plea of private defence was accepted and the accused was acquitted of the charge under
[s 300.73] Exception 2 of Section 300 and Section 34
Commentary under section 34, ante, vol I, may be referred to.
Where two persons are charged with murder and one of them brings his case within exception 2 and is
convicted of culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Pt I of section 304, the other cannot be
convicted under Pt II of section 304, read with section 34, as section 34 requires common intention, while Pt II
of section 304 deals only with knowledge, and not common intention.831
[s 300.74] Exception 3—Scope and Applicability of
This exception provides that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a
public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers, given to him by law, and
causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, thinks to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of
his duty as a public servant without ill-will towards the person whose death he has caused.832 For the
application of this exception, the following facts must be established, namely:
(i) the person, accused of murder, must be a public servant (section 21, IPC) or one who is aiding such
servant when the latter is acting for the advancement of public justice;
(ii) he must, in good faith as under section 52, IPC, believe that the act, which results in death, was “lawful
and necessary” for the due discharge of his duty; and
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(iii) he must act without ill-will towards the person who is killed.
Where the accused, a police constable and so a public servant, with a view to re-arrest a suspected thief, who
has escaped from the running train, pursued him and, on his failure to catch him, fired at him, but, in that
process, hit a fireman, it was held that the accused, being a public servant, whose object was the advancement
of public justice, though he undoubtedly exceeded the powers given to him by law, caused the death of the
fireman by doing an act which, he in good faith, believed to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his
duty, and that he was entitled to the benefit of this exception.833 A police officer, who causes death by firing on
an unlawful assembly for the purpose of dispersing it, is protected only if he believes in good faith, that it is
necessary for the public security to disperse the assembly by firing on it.834
Exception 3, thus, pre-supposes that a public servant who causes death, must do so in good faith and in due
discharge of his duty as a public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused.
The accused had fired without provocation at a car killing two innocent persons and injuring one; in this case,
the court observed that the accused had not acted in good faith. Further, the obligation to prove an exception is
on the preponderance of probabilities but it nevertheless lies on the defence and even on this touchstone, the
defence did not succeed. Therefore, it was held that the accused police party was not entitled to the benefit of
exception 3.835
This exception has no application to acts done by a public servant outside his duty.836
To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely:
(a) it was a sudden fight;
(b) there was no premeditation,
(c) the act was done in a heat of passion; and
(d) assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is
not relevant, nor is it relevant, who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of
wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the
occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of
anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy,
and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception,
provided he has not acted cruelly.837
• Accused police personal caused death of the deceased in police custody, he was convicted under
section 304, Part 11 IPC, sentence of 10 yrs RI was held proper. (State v Sanvlo Naik, 2018 CrLJ 972
.)
Further, in order to bring a case under exception 4 to section 300, IPC, the evidence must show that the
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accused acted without any premeditation and in a heat of passion and without having taken undue advantage
and that he had not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Every one of these circumstances is required to be
proved to attract this exception to section 300, IPC and it is not sufficient to prove only some of them.838
This exception is meant to apply to cases where, in whatever way, the quarrel may have originated; the
subsequent conduct of both the parties puts them on an equal footing.839 Where a mutual conflict develops and
there is no reliable and acceptable evidence as to how it started and as to who was the aggressor, the situation
does not permit of the plea of private defence on either side. It would be a case of sudden fight and has to be
dealt with under this exception.840
The exception is just for the benefit of the person who cannot invoke the right of private defence. An occasion
to consider the applicability of this exception will arise where the accused, who had no right of private defence
of person, has caused the death of another in circumstances which, according to him, would bring his case
within the exception. This means that this exception may be of help to an accused who was the first to strike or
to create an apprehension of danger in the mind of the other and as such could not rely on any right of private
defence of person or, in the circumstances, was not entitled to any right of private defence. It is to mitigate the
gravity of his offence that he may take advantage of this exception by pleading that he had caused the death of
the other without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without his
taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner. The fact, that the accused committed the
assault first, will not, in such circumstances, deprive him of the benefit of the exception. In other words, his act,
being responsible for the first assault in the fight and thus, for the entire incident, will not aggravate the offence
against him because of the want of premeditation, the suddenness of the incident, heated passion and his not
taking unfair advantage do not put him at par with one who deliberately commits the murder of another with the
intention or knowledge as contemplated in section 300.841 So, the aid of this exception can be invoked if, and
only if, death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight, (c) in the heat of passion upon a sudden
quarrel, and (d) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. To
bring a case within this exception, all the ingredients, mentioned in it, must be found.842 So long as the fight is
unpremeditated and sudden, the accused, irrespective of his conduct before the fight, earns the mitigation,
provided for in this exception, subject to the condition that he did not, in the course of the fight, take undue
advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner.843
If, from the evidence and attendant circumstances, it is reasonable to hold that the accused intentionally caused
a bodily injury, to the deceased and this injury was found sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause
death, but the said injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a
sudden quarrel and without the accused having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner,
the case is covered by exception 4 to section 300 and the culpable homicide is not murder. The offence,
therefore, is punishable under the first part ofs 304.844
Where, at a marriage function, there was exchange of hot words as to who had invited the deceased, which led
to a sudden quarrel without premeditation and the accused inflicted one lathi blow on the deceased who was
otherwise not armed, the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC.845
[s 300.76] Test of Applicability of Exception 4
The proper test for the applicability of this exception is whether the accused shows, since the onus is on him,
under section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that he acted solely out of the provocation generated by
the heat of a sudden quarrel followed by a sudden fight.846 In fact, exception 4 deals with cases in which
notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in
whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect
of guilt upon equal footing.847 Where one person picks up a knife and stabs another in the stomach merely
following an exchange of heated words, the ordinary inference is that the attacker has acted out of some other
motive as well as the provocation that may have been generated by the verbal altercation.848 Where accused
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on being slapped by the deceased ran to his house situated at a considerable distance and brought several
deadly weapons, inflicted various injuries on deceased two of which were fatal, the accused can be said to
have acted in a “cruel” and “unusual” manner and so was not entitled to benefit of exception 4 ofs 300, IPC.849
Where there was evidence that the accused persons armed with deadly weapons like swords, balam, lathis,
pharsa came to the house of the deceased to teach a lesson for getting the accused persons convicted, and
after coming to the house of deceased, the accused opened the attack with the sword, with which he hit the
deceased on the head and ultimately deceased succumbed to his injuries, it was held that exception 4 to
section 300 was not attracted in the case.850
[s 300.77] Ingredients of Exception 4
The ingredients of the said exception 4 are (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no pre-meditation; (iii)
the act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted
in a cruel manner. In the event the said ingredients are present, the cause of quarrel would not be material as
to who offered the provocation or started assault. Indisputably, however, the occurrence must be sudden and
not pre-meditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger.851
The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation, (b) in a sudden fight; (c)
without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight
must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within exception 4, all the ingredients mentioned in it
must be found.852
[s 300.78] “Without Premeditation”
As stated earlier, exception 4 comes into play only if death is caused without premeditation. To constitute a pre-
meditated killing, it is necessary that the accused should have reflected with a view to determine whether he
could kill and that he should have determined to kill as a result of that reflection, that is to say, killing should be
a predetermined killing upon consideration, and not sudden under the momentary excitement and impulse of
passion upon provocation given at the time, or so recently before, as not to allow time for reflection.853 Pre-
meditation is the guiding factor to draw a line in between murder and culpable homicide. Therefore, if the court
will get benefit of acquittal or lesser punishment whichever is applicable in the facts and circumstances of the
case and that is the basic principle of criminal law.854 Premeditation may be established by direct or positive
evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Evidence of premeditation can be furnished by former grudges or
previous threats and expressions of ill-feelings by acts of preparation to kill, such as procuring a deadly weapon
or selecting a dangerous weapon in preference to one less dangerous, and by the manner in which the killing
was committed. For example, repeated shots, blows or other acts of violence are sufficient evidence of
premeditation. Premeditation is not proved from the mere fact of killing by the use of a deadly weapon; it must
be shown by the manner of the killing and the circumstances, under which it was done, or from other facts in
evidence.855 But whether the killing was premeditated is not the first test to be applied while considering
whether the exception of “a sudden fight in the heat of passion” is applicable to any given set of facts. The first
test is whether the act of the accused, which caused the deceased’s death, was done without premeditation.
The distinction is not to be ignored.856
The exception clearly indicates that culpable homicide in a fight is murder unless the fight is unpremeditated
and is such as is, therein described, sudden in the heat of passion and on a sudden quarrel. A fight is not per
se a palliating circumstance; only an unpremeditated fight can be such. Where persons engage in a fight under
circumstances which warrant the inference that culpable homicide is premeditated, they are responsible for the
consequences to their full extent.857 If, after exchange of blows on equal terms, one of the parties, without any
such intention at the commencement of the affray, snatches a deadly weapon and kills the other party with it,
such a killing will be only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. But if a party, under colour of fighting,
upon equal terms, uses, from the beginning of the contest, a deadly weapon without the knowledge of the other
party and kills the other party with such weapon, or if, at the beginning of the contest, he prepares a deadly
weapon so as to have the power of using it at some part of the contest and uses it accordingly in the course of
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the combat, and kills the other party with the weapon, the killing, in both these cases, will be murder.858 If the
fight is deliberate and contemplated, it cannot be said that there was a sudden and unpremeditated fight.859 But
when the incident takes place in two parts and the latter part of the incident follows upon the earlier as its
sequel and there is no time for reason to interpose and passions to cool down, the fatal injury must be thought
to have been caused without premeditation.860
In a case, the evidence showed that as soon as the accused entered the house, there appeared to be some
quarrel with his wife and in that fight first, he threw a water pot and thereafter a kerosene lamp, and since the
deceased wife was wearing a nylon sari, she caught fire and sustained 70% burn injuries and died. The
accused had also received burn injuries to the extent of 18%. It was held that there was a sudden fight and
there was no pre-meditation and therefore, the case squarely fell under exception 4, section 300, IPC.861
[s 300.79] Fight
Though the term “fight” has not been defined in IPC, yet everyone knows as to what a “fight” is.862 It takes two
or more to start a fight; it implies mutual assault;863 it implies a combat or contest, in which both parties
participate, irrespective of how they fare in it.864 One-sided attack cannot constitute a fight.865 An incident will be
a fight if the parties are pitched and arrayed against each other and an act of violence of one party is met and
countered by similar act of the other.866 In order to constitute a fight, it is necessary that blows should have
been exchanged,867 but it is not necessary that weapons should be used,868 though there has to be an offer of
violence on both sides.869 Fight must be with the person who is killed.870 Exception 4 would not be attracted
where there was no exchange of blows between the deceased, who was unarmed, and the accused and the
assault on the deceased by the accused was deliberate and pressed with determination when the deceased
was fleeing for his life.871 If blows are exchanged, the fact, that the person assaulted hits back in self-defence,
would not make any difference. It may be added that if, in the course of a sudden quarrel, one of the parties
gives a blow to his adversary and that blow results in death, he cannot take advantage of exception 4,
notwithstanding the fact that, after he has given the blow, he is belaboured by the deceased, before he dies, or
by his companions, for the simple reason that, at the time, when he gave the fatal blow, there was no fight.872 It
is always more than a mere verbal quarrel.873 If there is no quarrel between the accused and the deceased, it is
unnecessary to look further and inquire whether any of the other facts which are essential for the purpose of
bringing a case within exception 4 have been established.874 Moreover, for attraction of this exception, which is
listed as exception “Fourthly” in section 302, IPC, there has to be not only a sudden quarrel, but also a fight,
which means use of criminal force by both the sides.875 Verbal abuses are not a fight.876
In a case, the accused was not armed with any deadly weapon and the accused and the deceased were
grappling and fighting and in that sequence, when the deceased jumped down in another field, the accused
threw a stone which hit the deceased on his head leading to death. It was held that section 304, Pt II, IPC was
attracted in the case.877
[s 300.80] Sudden Fight/Quarrel
There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place for which both parties
are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his
own conduct, it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation
and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter.878 It is not possible to emaciate
any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a
quarrel is sudden must necessarily depend upon the proven facts of each case.879 A “fight” connotes something
more than a verbal duel.880
Where the accused armed with spears had arrived on the spot, the act of the accused in assaulting the
deceased was premeditated and not sudden, thus, it washeld that exception 4 to section 300, IPC was not
attracted in the case and conviction under section 302, IPC was held proper.881
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The word “sudden” only means that the fight should not have been prearranged.882 If two persons gather
together at a place and some dispute suddenly arises, as a result of which the parties attack each other or one
person attacks another, that would be a case of sudden fight. But if some persons deliberately go to another
with the intention of attacking him, that can never be a case of free fight or sudden fight. That would be a case
where the latter would be entitled to the right of private defence in order to ward off the attack on him by the
former.883 A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then
clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation nor in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it
were so, the exception more appropriately applicable would be exception 1.884 If two parties clash in a sudden
fight in which nobody is killed, it is the duty of the court to determine which party was the aggressor and if this
cannot be determined on the evidence produced in the case, the accused party must be given the benefit of
doubt with regard to having acted in the right of self-defence.885
When there was a wordy quarrel between the two sides leading to the use of weapons by both the parties
against each other, it is not a case where the accused had deliberately attacked the deceased and the injured
witness with an intention to kill them. On the other hand, it is a case which would fall under exception 4 to
section 304, IPC.886 When admittedly there could not have been any premeditation, the accused (banana seller)
and the deceased, (customer of the accused) quarreled after the deceased had refused to pay five paisa, the
picking of knife by accused which had been kept by him for peeling bananas and giving of the blow by him can
be said to be in the spur of the moment.887 In a restaurant when the deceased and his friends were having food,
the accused while passing by, made an abrasive comment on the complainant party at which the deceased
laughed. The accused stabbed the deceased with a broken bottle causing death. It was held that the incident
was out of sudden quarrel and the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC.888 In a case, initially the
accused did not have any weapon with him, however, during the course of the incident, he went inside and
came back with a knife with the help of which he stabbed the deceased. It was held that the case cannot be
said to be one under section 302, IPC but it is a case falling under section 304, Pt II, IPC.889 Where, something
happened at the spur of the moment, which led the accused to strike the deceased with the blunt side of
gandhala in the heat of the moment, without pre-meditation and in a sudden fight; the case was covered by
exception 4 to section 300.890 Where in a sudden quarrel regarding going to village to the accused’s ailing
father, the husband stabbed his wife with knife, poured kerosene oil and set her on fire, it was held that the
case was covered by exception 4 to section 300, IPC.891
Where in a sudden quarrel between the accused and the deceased, blows are exchanged, but they are
separated by people, and thereafter, the accused runs to his house, fetches a deadly weapon and gives a blow
on a vital part of the body of the deceased, who is standing unguardedly, the first part of the affair may be said
to be a sudden fight, but the subsequent part of the affair, after the disengagement of the two parties, cannot be
said to be a sudden fight without premeditation.892 When the accused suddenly came out of the house and
stabbed deceased first on the back and when the deceased who was repairing the puncture actually in his
bicycle turned, the accused stabbed him again in the chest, it could not be said that the fight was on when the
injuries were caused because at that time the deceased was actually repairing the puncture in his bicycle, so
exception 4 to section 300, IPC, would not apply.893
Where the accused, in a sudden fight over beating of a dog, hit the deceased with an iron rod carried by him,
however he did not repeat the blow which showed that the intention to kill was absent, the case fell under
exception 4 to section 300, IPC. Therefore, the conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was converted
into one under section 304, Pt II, IPC.894
In the instant case, there was a fight at the spur of the moment between the two male groups on the issue of
taking possession of cattle shed with no intention to kill any one. The accused set fire to the cattle shed, the
deceased was inside the cattle shed, who caught fire and died. No overt act was attributed to any one and the
conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was altered into one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.895
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In the instant case, the accused and his father, armed with a knife, had followed the deceased who had gone to
the pond for the purpose of digging the earth and ultimately murdered him. There was no evidence that there
was sudden fight or that the accused attacked the deceased in heat of passion. It was held that the act was not
covered by exception 4 to section 300, IPC.896
Where on a sudden quarrel at the spur of the moment, the accused inflicted cuts by kathi on the neck and
caused the death of his younger brother, he was convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC and his conviction
under section 302, IPC was set aside.897
A fight cannot be said to be sudden if it was in the contemplation of the accused party from the very start and
they must have been expecting it all along.898 Thus, the fact that assault took place after about two hours after
the exchange of hot words between accused and deceased and deceased was hit for quite number of times on
head, a vital part, takes case out of the purview exception 4 of section 300, IPC.899 Where the accused no. 1 did
not strike the deceased at the first instance, but he struck him after an interval of time; since he left the place of
occurrence, went home and then came back armed with a Farsa, it was held that exception 4 to section 300,
IPC was not attracted in the case. The conviction of the accused no. 1 recorded by the Sessions Judge under
section 302, IPC was proper.900
In a case where the accused persons, who were drunk, suddenly quarreled with the deceased for not voting in
election in favour of the winning party and assaulted the deceased, it was held that the case fell under
exception 4 of section 300, IPC and the conviction of the accused appellant under section 304, Pt I, instead of
In a case, the son of the deceased threw a stone on a cat which, while jumping, landed on the terrace of the
first accused, where some grain was lying for drying. The boy was scolded and beaten by the accused and the
mother of the boy, on hearing this altercation, called her husband, the deceased. There was scuffle between
the accused and the deceased, the accused struck the head of the deceased with tekani (piece of wood) used
for supporting the bullock carts. The deceased fell down, and he died nearly four hours after the incident. The
available evidence showed that there was no premeditation on the part of the accused and that it was a sudden
fight. There was only one hit and there was nothing to show that there was any cruelty involved by inflicting any
other injury or by any other conduct on the part of the accused so as to hold the accused as intending to cause
the death of the deceased. The case was fully covered by exception 4 to section 300, IPC, and fell under
The accused was going to his house and carrying a bundle of cotton/grass, and on his way the cotton bundle
hit the roof of the complainant’s house. On sudden quarrel and exchange of hot words, the accused went to
their nearby house, brought weapons viz axe, knife and gupti and caused injuries to the deceased which
proved fatal. It was held that the case fell under exception 4 of section 300 and the accused were convicted
under section 304, Pt I, IPC.903
In another case, at the time of the incident the deceased was cutting karuvela trees and he had a spade and
aruval in his hand, the accused came there and questioned him as to how he could cut the trees, and following
the same, there was a verbal duel; immediately, the accused snatched the aruval and cut him on the neck and
shoulder indiscriminately, causing instantaneous death. It was held that the occurrence took place in course of
sudden quarrel, thus, exception 4 to section 300, IPC applied and conviction was under section 304, Pt I,
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IPC.904
Where the facts of the case showed that there was no premeditation, the fight resulted on drinking of water
from the hand pipe after an exchange of abuses, there appeared no intention on the part of the accused to
cause the death of the deceased, nor were the injuries caused with the intention of causing such bodily injuries
as the accused knew were likely to cause death. The case was covered by exception 4 to section 300, IPC, and
the offence committed by the accused was culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The accused were
convicted of the offence under section 304, Pt II of the IPC and not under section 302 of the IPC.905
Where a dispute arose between the parties because of conflicting claims as to ownership of land, after an
exchange of hot words, in course of sudden quarrel, the accused assaulted the deceased. It was held that the
case was covered by exception 4 of section 300; and accused was convicted under section 304 Pt I, IPC.906
Where in a sudden quarrel/fight, the accused had given two blows by a wooden log on the head of the
deceased resulting in his death, it was held that the accused was entitled to the benefit of exception 4 to section
300, IPC, and he was convicted under section 304, Pt I and not under section 302, IPC.907
In a sudden fight between two religious groups over the issue of prayer, a single blow from a small knife was
given to the deceased. It was held that the accused could not be convicted on the charge of murder and his
conviction under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.908
When the accused assaulted their landlord when the latter asked for payment of rent and the nephew
(deceased) of the landlord intervened, the accused section delivered a knife blow to the deceased; it was a
case of sudden fight. It was held that exception 4 to section 300 was fully attracted in the case and the
conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC recorded by the trial court was converted into one under
In a case, after an exchange of hot words between the accused and the deceased over the damage of the
crops of the complainant by the accused, the accused fired one shot causing death of the deceased; it was held
that the accused had no intention to cause the death of the deceased and exception 4 to section 300, IPC was
attracted.910
Where evidence showed that the accused on a sudden quarrel with regards to peels of eggs, inflicted injuries
on the deceased by knife, blows, kicks and fists, it was held that the case fell under exception 4 to section 300,
IPC, and the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt I, instead of section 302.911
A father, in a drunken state, abused his step son and mother, and also beat the latter and thereafter, in a
sudden quarrel, the accused son hacked his father thereby causing death; it was held that the accused was
entitled to the benefit of exception 4 to section 300, IPC, and his conviction under section 302, IPC was
converted to one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.912
Where the accused in a sudden altercation with his wife and mother-in-law assaulted his mother-in-law causing
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three injuries which proved fatal, the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt I and not under section 302,
IPC.913
On sudden quarrel between the accused and the deceased over a trivial issue, the accused picked up the
Dhangu and gave two Dhangu blows on the head of the deceased which proved fatal; the accused was
convicted under section 304, Pt II and not under section 302, IPC.914
[s 300.81] “Heat of Passion”
“Heat of passion” requires that there must be no time for the passion to cool down. In such a case, the court is
not concerned with the origin of the fight, and the guilt or innocence of the accused is not dependent upon the
result of an inquiry as to his conduct. The temper may rise with each exchange of blows and it is not unlikely
that the less blameworthy individual may conduct himself in a more blameworthy manner. So long as the fight is
unpremeditated and sudden, the accused, irrespective of his conduct before the fight, earns mitigation,
provided for in the exception, subject to the condition that he has not taken, in the course of the fight, undue
advantage or has not acted in a cruel or unusual manner.915 Heat of passion requires that there must be no
time for the passions to cool down.916 There was dispute between the parties qua possession of land, the
accused, in heat of passion, inflicted barchi blow on the head of the deceased which caused death; it was held
that the case was covered by exception 4 to section 300, IPC.917
Where the two accused brought weapons from their houses, and inflicted blows on the deceased causing his
death, it was held that the two accused had sufficient time to cool down and the crime was not committed in a
heat of passion; exception 4 was not attracted in the case.918
In another case where the accused had no pre-meditation to assault the deceased, rather the accused in the
heat of passion inflicted such bodily injury, which was likely to cause death; his conviction under section 302,
IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.919 Where the accused tried to commit rape on the
deceased, which when resisted by the deceased, the accused poured kerosene oil and set her on fire and later,
when she cried the accused also poured water on her to save her life, as the act of the accused was not
premeditated, the accused only wanted to frighten the deceased, the conviction of the accused under section
302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt II, IPC.920
In a sudden fight going on, the deceased, out of curiosity, came to enquire about the fighting going on, the
accused dragged him and his brother and inflicted solitary Hasua blow on the neck causing instantaneous
death. It was held that the act done was in the heat of passion; upon sudden quarrel and that the accused had
neither taken undue advantage, nor acted in cruel manner. The case was covered by section 300, exception 4,
and fell under section 304, Pt I and not section 302, IPC.921
It was established on record that the accused and the deceased were taking liquor and an altercation had taken
place amongst the three. After the altercation, the accused N had slapped the deceased resulting into some
grappling. It was at this moment that accused B had picked up an iron rod which was lying nearby and in the
heat of passion, had given the fatal blow on the head of the deceased. Only one injury was given which clearly
shows that accused B had not taken any undue advantage nor had he acted in a cruel manner. It was held that
the case fell under exception 4 to section 300, IPC.922
Where there was neither any preparation, nor any premeditation after altercation, and in the heat of passion,
the accused inflicted knife blow in the abdomen of the deceased, which hit in latter’s kidney and proved fatal,
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the accused was convicted under section 304, Pt II instead of section 302, IPC.923
[s 300.82] Further Requirement of Exception 4
Though there may be absence of premeditation and it may be a case of sudden fight, that is not sufficient to
bring the offence committed by the accused within the purview of exception 4. The further requirement of
exception 4 that the offender should not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner,
should be satisfied.924
[s 300.83] Taking Undue Advantage
For the application of exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no
premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or
unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.925
Where the offender takes undue advantage or has acted in a cruel or unusual manner, the benefit of exception
4 cannot be given to him. If the weapon used or the manner of attack by the assailant is out of all proportion,
that circumstance must be taken into consideration to decide, whether undue advantage has been taken.926
The expression “undue advantage”, as used in this exception, means “unfair advantage” and cannot be limited
to a case where the victim is made physically incapable to defend himself. An assailant cannot but be said to
have taken undue advantage when the victim is taken completely unaware, and struck when he does not even
suspect of being struck,927 or when the deceased has no weapon while the assailant has picked up a kripan
and stabs the deceased in his most vital part.928 Similarly, an assailant cannot but be said to have taken undue
advantage of his victim if he is armed with an axe while the deceased is not.929 When a man stabs an unarmed
person, who makes no threatening gestures and merely asks the accused’s opponent to stop fighting, it cannot
be said that the accused has not taken undue advantage of the victim.930 If two men are fighting and one of
them is unarmed, while the other uses a deadly weapon, the one, who uses a weapon, must be held to have
taken an undue advantage.931 Where, however, a deceased is armed with a knife, formidably of nine inches in
length, which he freely and unhesitatingly uses and carries it when he runs away for shelter, it cannot be said
that, in chasing the deceased and inflicting the fatal injury on him, when he is armed with such a knife, the
accused has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel or unusual manner.932 In the instant case, the facts
showed that there was no premeditation in the incident, no sudden quarrel and it was a unilateral act on the
part of the accused that he lost his temper as he suspected the deceased of having misappropriated the fare
that he had been collecting. The accused had taken undue advantage of his position inasmuchas he had run to
the scooter, opened the boot, taken out a knife and caused one injury on the person of the deceased who was
a young, unarmed boy. It was held that the case was not covered by exception 4 and his conviction under
Where despite protest/objection made by the accused persons, the complainant party tried to pass their bullock
cart through the fields of the accused persons, a free fight ensued in which accused persons inflicted two
injuries by palsi and dau (agriculture instruments), causing death; the accused persons had not taken undue
advantage nor acted in cruel manner and it was held the case fell under exception 4 to section 300, IPC.934
In a case blows on vital parts of unarmed persons were given with brutality and the abdomens of two deceased
persons were ripped open and internal organs came out. In view of the aforesaid factual position, exception 4 to
section 300, IPC was held inapplicable in the case.935
The accused fired shot from his gun at the deceased, while the deceased was unarmed and there was also no
provocation from him. However, the accused had intention to kill the deceased, and had taken undue
advantage of his position. Therefore, exception 4 did not apply in the case, and his conviction under section
302, IPC was held proper.936
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[s 300] Murder.—
[s 300.84] Acting in a Cruel or Unusual Manner
As has been stated elsewhere, to bring a case within exception 4 all the ingredients, mentioned in it, must be
found.937 And even then, the exception will apply only if it is established by the accused that he did not take
undue advantage and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner.938 Conversely, if the accused acts in a cruel
manner, the case does not fall under this exception and the offence would be one of murder.939 Intention to
cause more harm, if capable of being inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case, would mean that
the act was done in a cruel and unusual manner.940
If the weapon or manner of attack by the assailant is out of all proportion to the offence given, that circumstance
must be taken into consideration for deciding whether undue advantage has been taken. In such a case, the
assailant must also be said to have acted in an unusual manner.941 Wife’s refusal to have sex with accused
husband led to a quarrel and the accused husband inflicted as many as 14 injuries on the neck of deceased
and strangulated her with enormous force causing death. He had taken undue advantage of the fact that he
was a male and was much stronger physically and the murder had also been committed in a revolting and cruel
manner. It was held that exception 4 to section 300, IPC was not attracted in the case and conviction of the
accused under section 302, IPC was upheld.942 The absence or presence of injuries on the body of accused
may quite often serve as a pointer whether the accused had acted in any cruel or unusual manner. An injury on
person of accused may afford ground to assume that the members of the party of the deceased had also been
armed with dangerous weapons, since otherwise the injuries, found on the body of the accused, cannot be
explained.943 Merely because three injuries were caused to the deceased during the scuffle, it could not be said
that accused had acted in a cruel and unusual manner.944 When two contending parties, each armed with
sharp-edged weapons, clashed and, in the course of a free fight, some injuries were inflicted on one party or
the other, it was held that it cannot be said that either of them acted in a cruel or unusual manner. It would have
been otherwise if the deceased and his party were unarmed, or armed with weapons which were not lethal or
dangerous, and the accused’s party had used sharp weapons. In that case the accused could be deemed to
have acted in a cruel or unusual manner.945 In the instant case, blows on vital parts of unarmed persons were
given with brutality such that the abdomens of two deceased persons were ripped open and internal organs
come out. In view of the aforesaid factual position, exception 4 to section 300, IPC was held inapplicable in the
case.946
The very fact that the accused appellants used the fire arms in the course of a frivolous quarrel triggered off by
the sarcastic remarks of the deceased, demonstrated beyond doubt that the accused acted in a cruel manner.
Exception 4 to section 300 was not attracted in the case and conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC
was held proper.947
In the instant case altercation had taken place at the restaurant of the accused no. 1 over the supply of biryani;
after a sufficient time seven accused persons armed with weapons came and assaulted the deceased and
PWs, caused the death of the deceased and injuries to PWs. Held, accused no. 1 had arrived at the scene of
occurrence with nine armed men out of which three were equipped with knives and the rest were equipped with
sticks. Sufficient amount of time had elapsed between the initial altercation at the restaurant of accused no. 1
and the subsequent arrival of the accused persons at the spot of the crime. Moreover, accused no. 1 had
inflicted knife injury of such a nature, upon the unarmed deceased, that was sufficient in the ordinary course of
nature to cause death. Held, the accused no. 1 was not entitled to benefit of the exception clause 4.948
Likewise, where the accused gave a beating to the buffaloes of the deceased with eucalyptus stick, as the
buffaloes were tethering in his enclosure and when the deceased quarreled with him not to do so, he gave two
injuries with the same stick causing death of the deceased, it was a sudden quarrel without premeditation; the
accused was held not to have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.949 Where the
accused without any pre-meditation inflicted a single knife blow causing death, the conviction of the accused
under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, Pt I, IPC.950
Page 62 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
The accused inflicted a single blow with pen knife which caused the death of the deceased. It was held that
intention to cause death could not be imputed to the accused. However, the accused knew that his act was
likely to cause the death of the deceased; therefore, the case was covered by exception 4 to section 300,
IPC.951
See also the undermentioned cases where on the facts of the case, exception 4 to section 300 was held
inapplicable in the case.952
See also the following cases where on the facts of the case, the case was held covered by exception 4 to
section 300, IPC. 953
[s 300.85] Distinction between Exception 1 and Exception 4
Exception 4 to section 300 covers acts done in a sudden fight. It deals with a case of provocation not covered
by the first exception, the exception is founded upon the same principle of absence of premeditation the
distinction is that while in exception 1, there is total deprivation of self-control, in exception 4 there is only that
heat of passion which clouds a person’s sober reason and leads to acts which would not have been otherwise
committed. A sudden fight implies mutual provocation and postulates bilateral transaction in which both victim
and assailant assault each other.954 There is provocation in exception 4 as in exception 1, but the injury done is
not the direct consequence of that provocation.955 A sudden fight implies mutual provocation and blows on each
side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases can the
whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the exception more appropriately applicable would be
exception 1.956 In fact exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck,
or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet
the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing.957
The infliction of harm without the consent of the sufferer falls under the general exception, contained in sections
87 to 93 of IPC. But under those sections, death cannot be consented to, either expressly or by implication.
Refer to sections 87, 88, 89 and 92. Under section 87, even a person above the age of eighteen years is
precluded from giving a valid consent to an act, intended to cause, or which is known to the doer to be likely to
cause death or grievous hurt. Such a consent will not, therefore, prevent the act from being a crime, but this
exception provides that, in such a case, the person, who kills the consenting party, shall be guilty of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder, and not of murder. Where a man of full age (ie above 18 years) submits
himself to emasculation, performed neither by a skilful hand, nor in the least dangerous way and dies from the
injury, the persons concerned in the act are guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder by virtue of this
exception.958
It may be noted that exception 5 to section 300, IPC, must receive a very strict and not a liberal interpretation
and in applying the said exception the act alleged to be consented to or authorised by the victim must be
considered by very close scrutiny.959 Thus, where the sessions court and the High Court had correctly
appreciated evidence adduced in a case and had come to the finding that the husband had planned to murder
the wife and in execution of the said plan had murdered the wife and thereafter tried to commit suicide, the
conviction of the husband under sections 302 and 309, IPC, was upheld by the Apex Court.960
This exception applies to cases where a man consents to submit to the doing of some particular act, either
knowing that it will certainly cause death, or that death will be likely to be the result; but it does not refer to the
running of a risk of death from something, which a man intends to avert, if he can possibly do so, even by
causing the death of the person from whom the danger is to be anticipated.961 In a Lahore case, the accused
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[s 300] Murder.—
killed his step-father, who was an infirm old man, with his consent in order to involve some of their enemies in
trouble by charging them with murder. It was held that the case was covered by this exception.962 The exception
cannot be applied unless the person killed had the full knowledge of the facts and was determined to suffer or
to take the risk of death and unless this determination existed at the moment of his death. The question of
whether there was such consent is a question of fact, to be decided on the circumstances of each case.963 In
the Full Bench case of Empress v Nayamuddin,964 Pigot J, delivering the majority judgment, observed:
…the exception should be considered in applying it first, with reference to the act, consented to or authorised, and next
with reference to the person or persons authorised. And, I think that, as to each of these, some degree of particularity
at least should appear upon the facts proved before the exception can be said to apply…the consent may be inferred
from circumstances and does not absolutely need to be established by actual proof of express consent.
A man, who, by concert with his adversary, goes out armed with a deadly weapon to fight that adversary, who
is also armed with a deadly weapon, must be taken to be aware that he runs the risk of losing his life and, as he
voluntarily puts himself in that position, he must be taken to consent to incur the risk.965 In such a case, the
circumstances do show a distant act of the mind of each combatant with respect to the other and in concert with
him of willingness to encounter and suffer such known and anticipated acts of violence from that other as he
cannot defend himself from. But to include such a case within this exception is rather to strain the terms of it. At
any rate, there is a distinction between such a case and one in which the members of two riotous assemblies,
who agree to fight together and some of whom, on each side, are, to the knowledge of all the members, armed
with deadly weapons. From a mere agreement to fight, such a consent, as is contemplated by this exception,
cannot be imputed, to each member of the two mobs, to suffer death or take the risk of death at the hands of
any one of the armed members of the other mob, by means of whichever of such deadly weapons, used in
whatever way that person may please and be able, to inflict.966 The same reasoning would apply to cases of
duelling.967
[s 300.87] “Consent”
Consent, under IPC, is not valid if it is obtained by either misrepresentation or concealment as it implies not
only a knowledge of the risk, but a judgment in regard to it, a deliberate free act of the mind. In other words,
before exception 5 can be applied, it must be found that the person killed, with full knowledge of the facts,
determined to suffer death, or take the risk of death and this determination continued, and existed till the
moment of his death.968 An accused who wants to bring his case within the domain of exception 5 of section
300, IPC must not only show that the deceased took the risk voluntarily, he must further prove that the
deceased had the requisite knowledge that he would die while doing so.969 An accused, pleading consent as a
defence, must show that the person consenting did know what risk he was undertaking. A patient can hardly be
said to accept a risk of which he is not aware. A doctor, pleading consent to an operation, that might prove fatal,
must show that the patient did accept the risk and that consequently, he was aware of it.970 A husband, being in
sore distress, desired to commit suicide. His wife asked him to first kill her and then kill himself and he
accordingly killed her, but was caught before he killed himself. It was held that the consent of the wife was a
consent within the meaning of exception 5 to section 300, IPC.971
To attract exception 5 to section 300, IPC, there must have been free and voluntary consent of the deceased.
Where both accused and the deceased fell in love and then entered in the pact to commit suicide, the accused
inflicted injuries on the deceased causing death and also inflicted injuries on himself but survived, it was held
that exception 5 was attracted in the case.972
In Queen v Anunto Rurnagat,973 the accused and his wife, being overwhelmed with grief for the loss of their
child, determined to kill themselves. His wife made repeated requests to him that he should kill her and after a
Page 64 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
time, he did so by striking her three blows with an axe. It was held that the case did come within exception 5
and that the accused was guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. In a case, a man tried to
persuade his concubine to leave on the ground that a scandal was being created by his association with her.
But she refused, took the knife out of his waist, put it into his hand and asked him to kill her. He, accordingly,
cut her neck with the knife. It was held that the accused was entitled to the benefit of this exception.974 In a
similar case the accused tried to persuade the deceased to leave him and go away, but she said that she would
never leave him and suggested that both of them might commit suicide. The next morning, he killed her. The
accused was given the benefit of this exception.975 In Masum Ali v Emperor,976 the accused strangled his
beloved, aged 16 years, to death upon their decision to die together in despair of future separation and with the
feeling that they could not live apart. It was held that this was essentially the case where the spirit, if not the
letter, of exception 5 could be applied. Because, the girl was below 18 years of age, not capable of giving her
valid consent, the accused was convicted of murder though sentenced to transportation for life. Had the
murdered girl been of 18 years or above, the offence would have been culpable homicide not amounting to
murder. However, where in Queen v Poonai Fattehmal977 the accused, a snake-charmer, persuaded the
deceased to allow themselves to be bitten by a poisonous snake, inducing them to believe that he had power to
protect them from harm, it was held that the consent having been founded on a misconception of fact and the
accused knowing that the consent was given in consequence of such misconception, the accused was not
protected by this exception.
SC 773].
319 Ande v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 150; Hayati Usta v State, AIR 1967 Goa 11 , p 16
(FB).
320 Udit v State,1980 All LJ 534, p 536 (DB).
321 Kishore Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 2267 [LNIND 1977 SC 288] : 1977 Cr LJ 1937 .
322 State of AP v Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] : 1977 Cr LJ 1 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 659 [LNIND 1976 SC
331] .
323 King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 271 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124; Mahomed Hasan v Emperor, AIR 1934 Sind 145 , p
148 : 36 Cr LJ 22; Thakur Mahto v State of Bihar, 1972 BLJR 265 : 1972 Cr LJ 835 .
324 Ram Singh v State,1971 All LJ 833 : 1971 RD 545.
325 R v Gnango, (2011) UKSC 59 : (2012) 1 AC 827 : (2012) 2 All ER 129 .
326 R v Coutts, (2006) UKHL 39 : (2006) 4 All ER 353 : (2006) 1 WLR 2154 .
Page 65 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
327 Rv Reid,(2003) NSJ No 360.

328 R v Fontaine,(2002) MJ No 363 (Also see Halsbury’s Laws of Canada).
329 State of Uttar Pradesh v Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 [LNIND 1985 SC 16] : 1986 Cr LJ 836 .
330 Rakhia v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 214; Charku Sattiah v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1960 AP 153 [LNIND 1959 AP 102] :
1960 Cr LJ 309 .
331 Re Midde Venkappa, 1 Weir 299.
332 Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] ; followed in Jayaraj v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR
1976 SC 1519 , p 1524 : 1976 Cr LJ 1186 .
333 Emperor v Mahmadkhan Sultankhan, 5 Cr LJ 168, 9 Bom LR 153.
334 Sellappan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2007 Cr LJ 1442 (SC); Shakti Dan v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3426 (SC);
Sunder Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3281 (SC) (FB); Budhi Lal v State of Uttarkhand, 2009 Cr LJ 360 : 2008
AIR SCW 6968 : AIR 2009 SC 87 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] : 2008 (57) BLJR 223 : JT 2008 (10) SC 572 [LNIND 2008
SC 1928] : 2008 (12) Scale 848 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] : (2008) 14 SCC 647 [LNIND 2008 SC 1928] ; Rampal Singh v
State of UP, 2012 Cr LJ 3765 : 2012 AIR SCW 4211 : 2012 (6) Scale 574 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] : (2012) 8 SCC 289
[LNIND 2012 SC 425] .
335 Nga Chit Tu v King,AIR 1939 Rang 225 , pp 227-229 : 40 Cr LJ 725.

336 State of Uttar Pradesh v Ram Sugar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 [LNIND 1985 SC 16] : 1986 Cr LJ 436 (SC).
337 Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] , p 1877; Shankar Majhi v State,(1971) 1
CWR 770 : 1971 Cut LT 565; Amjot Ali Munshi v State of Assam, (1988) 1 Crimes 65 , p 66 (Gau).
338 Subhash Shamrao Pachunde v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 546 (SC).
339 Saleem v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 1419 (Raj) (DB).
340 Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342; King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124; 54 Cr LJ 565; Inder Singh
v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 157 : 30 Cr LJ 141; Babulal v Emperor, AIR 1946 Ngp 120 : 47 Cr LJ 441; Khiman v
Emperor,1936 All LJ 73; Mahomed Hasan v Emperor, AIR 1934 Sind 145 : 36 Cr LJ 22; contrary view in Empress of
India v Idu Beg, ILR 3 All 776(1), p 778; Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD
115] , p 326 : 1959 Cr LJ 993 , seems to be wrong.
341 Re Dadi Abdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955 AP 24 [LNIND 1954 AP 40] , p 25 : 56 Cr LJ 329.
342 Per Dalip Singh J, in Inder Singh v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 157 , p 158 : 30 Cr LJ 141; Empress v Gora Chand Gope, 5
WR (Cr) 45 (FB); Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 206 : 1953 Cr LJ 565 .
343 Ugrasen Mukhi v State,(1966) 32 Cut LT 589, p 594; State of Uttar Pradesh v Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 426 :
1986 Cr LJ 836 (SC).
Page 66 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
344 Mohomed Hasan v Emperor, AIR 1934 Sind 145 , p 149 : 36 Cr LJ 22; Queen v Sheik Bazu, 8 WR (Cr) 47, p 51.
345 Queen v Sheik Bazu, 8 WR (Cr) 47, p 51.
346 Sampuran Singh v State of Haryana, 1980 Cr LJ 951 , p 955 (Punj) (DB).
347 State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] , p 50 : 1977 Cr LJ 1 ; Reg v
Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342, p 344; Mahabir Harso v State of Orissa, 1996 Cr LJ 158 (Ori) (DB); Narasingh Challan v
State, 1997 Cr LJ 2204 (Ori) (DB); Dharni alias Dhaneswar Naik v State, 1999 Cr LJ 2712 (Ori) (DB); Ruli Ram v State
of Haryana, (2002) 7 AD 492 (SC); Abdul Waheed Khan alias Waheed v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2002) JT 6 SC 274;
Bishek Mohananda v State, 1998 Cr LJ 1489 (Ori) (DB); Ramakrishnan Nair alias Raju v State of Kerala, 2000 Cr LJ
416 (Ker) (DB).
348 Shakti Dan v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3426 (SC); Sunder Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3281 (SC) (FB);
Rajinder v State of Haryana, 2006 Cr LJ 2926 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 2257 [LNIND 2006 SC 442] ; Gita Rani Ghosh v
State of West Bengal, 2012 Cr LJ 794 , p 799 (Cal) (DB).
349 Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342; Re Dadi Abdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955 AP 24 [LNIND 1954 AP 40] : 1955 Cr LJ 239 ;
Sajjan Singh v State, (1965) 67 Punj LR 1204 .
350 Rajinder v State of Haryana, 2006 Cr LJ 2926 (SC); Shakti Dan v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3426 (SC); Sunder
Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2007 Cr LJ 3281 (SC) (FB).
351 Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, (1994) JT 2 SC 30.
352 Sadhu Singh Harnam Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1954 SC 727 .
353 Meera Puri v State of Nagaland, 1971 Cr LJ 539 .
354 Nga San Win, AIR 1933 Rang 326 .
355 Emperor v Morgan, (1909) 9 Cr LJ 393 .
356 Balwant Singh v State of Punjab, (1994) JT 2 SC 30.
357 Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] ; Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC
148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 150; Inder Singh v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 157 , p 158 : 30 Cr LJ 141; State of Rajasthan
v Arjun Singh, (2011) 9 SCC 115 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : AIR 2011 SC 3380 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : (2011) 10 SCR
823 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : 2011(9) Scale 661 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : 2011 Cr LJ 494 ; John Pandian v State, (2011) 3
SCC (Cri) 550 [LNIND 2010 SC 1179] : (2010) 14 SCC 129 [LNIND 2010 SC 1179] : 2011 (1) Crimes 1 (SC).
358 Jagdish v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 CLR 212 , p 215 (MP) (DB); State of Maharashtra v Kalu Shivram Jagtap,
AIR 1980 SC (UJ) 632, p 633; Brij Mohan v State, 1984 Cr LJ 34 .
359 John Pandian v State, (2010) 14 SCC 129 [LNIND 2010 SC 1179] : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 550 [LNIND 2010 SC 1179] :
2011 (1) Crimes 1 (SC).
Page 67 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
360 Badri v State, AIR 1953 All 189 [LNIND 1952 ALL 196] , p 191 : 54 Cr LJ 450.
361 Devaramani Bheemanna v State of Karnataka, 1995 Cr LJ 1534 (SC).
362 Nashik v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1993 SC 1485 ; Moses Arulanantham v State of TN, (2010) 17 SCC 702 (Internal
injuries caused with knife showed that accused had intention to cause death).
363 Gurmail Singh v State of Punjab, 2012 Cr LJ 665 : 2011 (6) Scale 322 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 397] : (2011) 15 SCC 412
[LNINDORD 2011 SC 397] ; See alsoArun Nivalaji More v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006 SC 2886 [LNIND 2006 SC
591] : 2006 AIR SCW 3999 : (2007) 2 SCC 613 .
364 Ajithkumar v State of Kerala, 2014 Cr LJ 2313 , pp 2320, 2321 (Ker) (DB) (Bhaba Nanda Barma v State of Assam, AIR
1977 SC 2252 [LNIND 1977 SC 291] : 1977 Cr LJ 1930 : (1977) 4 SCC 396 [LNIND 1977 SC 358] & Afrahim Sheikh v
State of West Bengal, AIR 1964 SC 1263 [LNIND 1964 SC 1] : 1964 Cr LJ 350 : (1964) 6 SCR 172 [LNIND 1964 SC 1]
, relied on).
365 Richhpal Singh Meena v Ghasi, (2014) 8 SCC 918 [LNIND 2014 SC 691] : AIR 2014 SC 3595 [LNIND 2014 SC 691] :
2014 Cr LJ 4339 .
366 Pundappa Yankappa Pujari v State of Karnataka, 2014 Cr LJ 3781 , p 3788 : AIR 2014 SC 2733 [LNIND 2014 SC 592]
: (2014) 12 SCC 372 [LNIND 2014 SC 592] .
367 Litta Singhv State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 3321 (SC) : 2013 AIR SCW 3583 : AIR 2013 SC 2554 [LNIND 2013 SC
443] : 2013 (6) Scale 399 [LNIND 2013 SC 443] .
368 AN Chandra v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1990) JT 3 SC 832.
369 Ahmad Yar Khan v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 171; Rajendra Prasad Singh v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat 147 : 34 Cr LJ 1071.
370 Rawalpenta Venkalu v State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 171 : 1956 Cr LJ 338 .
371 Mahabir Harro v State of Orissa, 1996 Cr LJ 158 (Ori) (DB).
372 Brij Bhukhan v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 474 : 1957 Cr LJ 591 ; Oswal Danji Tejsi v State, AIR 1961 Guj 16
[LNIND 1960 GUJ 47] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 251 ; Kutali Ali v Emperor, 42 PWR 1911 (Cr); Per Cuming J, in Hazrat Gul
Khan v Emperor, AIR 1928 Cal 430 , p 432 : 29 Cr LJ 546; Bhola Bind v Emperor, AIR 1944 Pat 92 , p 95 : 45 Cr LJ
409; Re Kandasami Solagar, AIR 1942 Mad 213 : 43 Cr LJ 516; Inder Singh Bagga Singh v State of Pepsu, AIR 1955
SC 439 : 56 Cr LJ 1014; Rahman Samail v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 245 , p 253 : 40 Cr LJ 712.
373 Laxman v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 1803 : 1974 Cr LJ 1271 .
374 Chahat Khan v State of Haryana, 1973 Cr LJ 36 , p 38 : AIR 1972 SC 2574 ; Bhaskar Pandit Kadrim v State of
Maharashtra, 1984 Cr LJ 493 (Mah); State of Haryana v Pala, 1996 Cr LJ 1872 (SC).
375 Ram Jatan v State,1979 All Cr R 105.

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[s 300] Murder.—
376 Namdeo v State of Maharashtra, 2007 Cr LJ 1819 , p 1827 (SC) : 2007 (4) Scale 337 [LNIND 2007 SC 316] .
377 Ranjit Singh v State, (1965) 67 PLR 1175 .
378 State of Madhya Pradeshh v Anil, 2017 Cr LJ 17 (MP) (DB).
379 Rahman Samail v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 245 , p 251 : 40 Cr LJ 712.
380 Laxmichand v State of Maharashtra, (2011) 2 SCC 128 [LNIND 2011 SC 26] : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 621 .
381 Swarn Kaur v Gurmukh Singh, 2013 Cr LJ 3991 , p 3999 (SC) : AIR 2013 SC 3356 [LNIND 2013 SC 593] : 2013 (8)
382 Umesh Suresh Vale v State of Maharashtra,2014 Cr LJ (NOC) 50 (Bom) (DB).

383 Kanhu Gouda v State of Orissa,2008 Cr LJ 2716 , p 2718 (Ori) (DB).
384 Makhmalsinh v State of Gujarat,2014 Cr LJ 519 , p 522 (Guj) (DB).
385 Satvir v State of Uttar Pradesh,2009 Cr LJ 1586 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 2163 [LNIND 2009 SC 450] : 2009 (3) Scale 439
[LNIND 2009 SC 450] .
386 Santosh v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 Cr LJ 602 , p 603 : AIR 1975 SC 654 [LNIND 1975 SC 50] .
387 Kelu Ayyappan v State, AIR 1959 Ker 230 [LNIND 1958 KER 21] , p 233 : 1959 Cr LJ 981 .
388 Sukhdeo v State, 1968 Cr LJ 438 : AIR 1968 All 151 [LNIND 1967 ALL 24] .
389 Ramesh v State (Delhi Admn), 1996 Cr LJ 309 (Del) (DB).
390 Balbir Singh v State of Punjab, (1994) 3 Crimes 900 (SC); Ashok Kumar Magabhai Vankar v State of Gujarat, (2011) 10
SCC 604 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 342] : 2012 Cr LJ 685 : 2012 (1) SCC(Cr) 397 (Assault by pestle with force, head of the
deceased was broken).
391 Kumraval v State, (2009) 17 SCC 524 [LNINDORD 2009 SC 491] .
392 Dhan Singh v State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 277 [LNIND 2010 SC 635] .
393 Felix Abrose D’Souza v State of Karnataka, (2009) 16 SCC 361 : 2002 (8) JT 249 : 2003 (1) Supreme 679 : 2010 (3)
SCC (Cr) 294 : 2003 (2) Crimes 78 (SC).
394 Ashok Kumar Magabhai Vankar v State of Gujarat, (2011) 10 SCC 604 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 342] : 2012 Cr LJ 685 :
2012 (1) SCC (Cr) 397.
395 Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 150; Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342.
Page 69 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
396 State of Orissa v Goti Lachhumu Dora,(1979) 47 Cut LT 312; Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , 54 Cr LJ 565; Anda v
State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 150; Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342.
397 Abdul Nawaz v State of West Bengal, 2012 Cr LJ 2901 , p 2906 (SC) : AIR 2012 SC 1951 [LNIND 2012 SC 307] :
398 State of Uttar Pradesh v Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416 [LNIND 1985 SC 16] .
399 Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 150; Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342.
400 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 : 54 Cr LJ 565; Ram Asre v Emperor, AIR 1923 Oudh 97 : 24 Cr LJ 513.
401 Waryam Sher Mohammad v Emperor, AIR 1938 Lah 834 ; Inder Singh v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 157 : 30 Cr LJ 141;
Rahman Samail v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 245 , p 252 : 40 Cr LJ 712; Emperor v Ratan, AIR 1932 Oudh 186 : 33 Cr
LJ 561.
402 Kunjomohan v State of Kerala, (2012) 13 SCC 750 [LNIND 2012 SC 742] : 2012 (11) JT 381 : 2012 (11) Scale 212
[LNIND 2012 SC 742] .
403 State of Rajasthan v Ram Kailash, 2016 Cr LJ 1205 (SC) : AIR 2016 SC 634 [LNIND 2016 SC 41] : (2016) 4 SCC 590
[LNIND 2016 SC 41] : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 331 : (2016) 160 AIC 180 (SC).
404 Abdul Waheed Khanalias Waheed v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2002) JT 6 SC 274; Ruli Ram and anor v State of
Haryana, (2002) 7 AD 492 (SC).
405 Inder Singh v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 157 , p 158 : 30 Cr LJ 141; Ishwar Behera v State,1975 Cut LT 904.
406 Emperor v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , pp 272-75 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124.
407 Empress v Pooshoo, 4 WR (Cr) 33; Queen v Sheik Choollye, 4 WR (Cr) 35.
408 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 : 54 Cr LJ 565; Ram Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 1970 Cr LJ 486 : AIR 1970 Raj 60
[LNIND 1969 RAJ 152] .
409 Rajwant v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] : 1966 Cr LJ 1509 ; Kishan v State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1974 SC 244 [LNIND 1973 SC 345] : 1974 Cr LJ 324 .
410 Settu v State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 Cr LJ 3889 , p 3893 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 2986 [LNIND 2006 SC 639] : 2006 (8)
Scale 382 [LNIND 2006 SC 639] : (2006) 10 SCC 549 [LNIND 2006 SC 639] : (2006) Supp (6) SCR 185 .
411 Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 151.
412 Dhansai Sahu v State, AIR 1960 Ori 105 : 35 Cut LT 18.
Page 70 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
413 Rahman Samail v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 245 , p 253 : 40 Cr LJ 712, dissenting fromKing v Abor Ahmad, AIR 1937
Rang 396 : 38 Cr LJ 1097; Re Thangavelu, 1972 Cr LJ 390 , p 394 : 1971 Mad LJ 663 (Cr); Virsa Singh v State of
Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] ; Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC
125] ; Harjinder Singh v Delhi Admn, AIR 1968 SC 867 [LNIND 1967 SC 324] : 1968 Cr LJ 1023 ; Suresh Chandra v
State, 1972 Cr LJ 1416 , p 1420; g, AIR 1976 SC 1519 , p 1524 : 1976 Cr LJ 1186 ; Laxman Kalu Nikalje v State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 1390 [LNIND 1968 SC 537] ; Parmar Bhikhabhai v State of Gujarat, 11 Bom LR 82; Kirtan v
State of Madhya Pradesh, 1984 Cr LJ 1069 (MP); Rameshraya v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2001 Cr LJ 1252 (SC).
414 State of Madhya Pradesh v GolooRaikwar, 2016 (2) Supreme 358 : AIR 2016 SC 1182 [LNIND 2016 SC 103] : 2016
Cr LJ 1905 : 2016 (3) Scale 88 [LNIND 2016 SC 103] : (2016) 12 SCC 139 [LNIND 2016 SC 103] : (2016) 162 AIC 236
.
415 Re Singaram Padayachi, AIR 1944 Mad 223 [LNIND 1943 MAD 239] , p 225 : 45 Cr LJ 729; Amar Singh v State, 71
PLR 358, p 366.
416 Public Prosecutor v Ayyanar,(1969) 2 Mad LJ 453, pp 455-56.
417 Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] , p 1878; Dhansai Sahu v State, AIR 1969
Ori 105 [LNIND 1968 ORI 7] ; Dore v State of Karnataka,(1980) 24 Mad LJ 281, p 286 (Kant) (DB); State of Rajasthan v
Mangilal, AIR 1980 Raj LW 159 , pp 161-62 (DB); Rahman Samail v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 245 , p 253 : 40 Cr LJ
712; Kadarbhai v State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 Guj LT 341 (DB); Nand Singh v State, (1968) 70 PLR 58 (SN); King v
Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 264 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124, per Mosely J, in the order of reference.
418 Public Prosecutor v Ahdul Rahim, 1968 Cr LJ 1030 : AIR 1968 AP 231 [LNIND 1966 AP 174] .
419 Re Thangaraj,1972 LW (Cr) 170.
420 Re Varadu Gounder,1970 LW (Cr) 282.
421 Gulab Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1974 WLN 168 : 1974 Raj LW 130 ; Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148
[LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 151; Mohan Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1973 WLN 749 : 1973 Raj LW 657 .
422 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] ; Settu v State of TN, 2006 Cr LJ 3889 : AIR
2006 SC 2986 [LNIND 2006 SC 639] : (2006) 10 SCC 549 [LNIND 2006 SC 639] : (2006) Supp(6) SCR 185.
423 Jagroop Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1552 [LNIND 1981 SC 280] ; State of Madhya Pradesh v Mangu
Kishan, 1966 Jab LJ 1047 : AIR 1967 MP 167 [LNIND 1966 MP 89] (wherein a single injury with back metal side of an
axe upon the head of the victim had resulted in his death); State of Rajasthan v Mangilal, 1980 Raj LW 159 , pp 161-
162.
424 Hardev Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 179 [LNIND 1974 SC 400] , p 181 : 1975 Cr LJ 243 .
425 State of Rajasthan v Shera Ram, AIR 2012 SC 1 [LNIND 2011 SC 1192] : (2012) 1 SCC 602 [LNIND 2011 SC 1192] .
426 Morecha v State of Rajasthan, 1978 Cr LJ 1710 , p 1713 (SC); Vijay v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 CLR 175 , p 179
(MP) (Notes) (DB).
Page 71 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
427 Mahadeo Ganpat Badawans v State of Maharashtra, 1977 SCC 1756 : 1977 Cr LJ 1148 ; Aditya Mohaptra v State of
Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 2110 , p 2111 : 1980 Cr LJ 1475 , p 1476; Ambika Yadav v State of Bihar, 1972 BLJR 107 ; State
of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarapu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] , p 51 : 1977 Cr LJ 1 ; Kishan v
State of Rajasthan, AIR 1980 Raj LW 510 , p 517 (DB).
428 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 207 : 54 Cr LJ 565; Jagan v State, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 641 .
429 State v Raja Panda, (1971) 37 CLT 667 ; Fakira v State of Maharashtra, (1997) 2 Crimes 517 (Bom) (DB).
430 Kishore Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 2267 [LNIND 1977 SC 288] : 1977 Cr LJ 1937 ; Sudershan
Kumar v State of Delhi, 1975 Cr LJ 16 , p 18 : AIR 1974 SC 2328 [LNIND 1974 SC 333] ; Dhansai Sahu v State, AIR
1969 Ori 105 [LNIND 1968 ORI 7] ; State of Rajasthan v Arjun Singh, (2011) 9 SCC 115 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : AIR
2011 SC 3380 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : 2011 Cr LJ 4943 .
431 Sher Singh v State of Haryana, (2010) 14 SCC 24 [LNIND 2010 SC 1239] : (2011) 98 AIC 218 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 373
[LNIND 2010 SC 1239] .
432 Veerala Satyanarayana v State of AP, (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 274 : (2009) 16 SCC 316 .
433 State of Madhya Pradesh v Goloo Raikwar, 2016 Cr LJ 1905 (SC) : AIR 2016 SC 1182 [LNIND 2016 SC 103] : 2016
(3) Scale 88 [LNIND 2016 SC 103] : (2016) 12 SCC 139 [LNIND 2016 SC 103] : (2016) 160 AIC 236 (SC).
434 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] , pp 466-67 : 1958 Cr LJ 818 ; Domisetti
Subhanna v State of Andhra Pradesh,(1975) 2 Andh WR 155.
435 Domisetti Subhanna v State of Audhra Pradesh,(1975) 2 Andh WR 155.
436 Khimar v Emperor,1936 All LJ 73; Perana v Emperor,1936 All LJ 333.
437 State of AP v M Sobhan Babu, 2011 Cr LJ 2175 : 2011 AIR SCW 1914 : (2010) 3 Scale 451 : (2010) 15 SCC 69
[LNIND 2010 SC 1219] .
438 State of Rajasthan v Jora Ram, 2005 Cr LJ 2578 , p 2579 : AIR 2005 SC 2440 [LNIND 2005 SC 399] : (2005) 10 SCC
591 [LNIND 2005 SC 399] : 2005 (2) Crimes 157 .
439 Saddik @ Lalo Gulam Hussein Shaikh v State of Gujarat, 2016 (7) Supreme 202 : AIR 2016 SC 5101 [LNIND 2016 SC
401] .
440 Nanku v State, AIR 1972 All Cr R 293 : 1972 All Cr C 263; Ram v State, 1973 Cr LJ 1443 , p 1447 : 1973 WLN 401 ;
Re Thangavelu,(1971) 2 Mad LJ 403 : 1971 Mad LJ (Cr) 663.
441 Re Podi,(1967) 2 Mad LJ 74, p 78.
442 Babulal v Emperor, AIR 1946 Ngp 120 , p 121 : 47 Cr LJ 441; Mohammad Wahid v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980
CLR 105 (Notes) (MP) (DB).
Page 72 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
443 Sultan v State of Rajasthan, 1966 Raj LW 517 ; Nana Gangaram Dhore v State, 1970 Cr LJ 621 (Bom); State of
Madhya Pradesh v Badri Prasad, 1980 CLR 94 , p 98 (Notes) (MP) (DB).
444 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] .
445 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] : 1958 Cr LJ 818 .
446 Settu v State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 Cr LJ 3889 (SC).
447 Sheikh Rafi v State of AP, 2007 Cr LJ 2746 (SC).
448 State of Madhya Pradesh v Shanker Gangaram, AIR 1956 Ngp 208 : 1956 Cr LJ 908 ; Virsa Singh v State of Punjab,
AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] : 1958 Cr LJ 818 , followed inState of Mysore v Hanamant Nagappa, AIR
1965 Mys 150 : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 737 ; Thannoo v State, AIR 1959 All 131 [LNIND 1958 ALL 118] : 1959 Cr LJ 158 ; Re
Krishnaswami Naicker, AIR 1965 Mad 261 : (1965) 2 Cr LJ 42 ; Jagan v State, (1962) 2 Cr LJ 641 ; Basappa
Bhimappa Doddamani v State, AIR 1961 Mys 21 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 120 .
449 Public Prosecutor v Abdul Rahim, 1968 Cr LJ 1030 : AIR 1968 AP 231 [LNIND 1966 AP 174] .
450 Harjinder Singh v Delhi Admn, 1968 Cr LJ 1023 : AIR 1968 SC 867 [LNIND 1967 SC 324] .
451 Sultan v State of Rajasthan, 1966 Raj LW 517 ; Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] ,
p 467 : 1958 Cr LJ 818 ; R v Steane, (1947) 1 All ER 813 , p 816; Badri v State, AIR 1953 All 189 [LNIND 1952 ALL
196] : 54 Cr LJ 450.
452 Balkar Singh v State of Uttarakhand, 2009 Cr LJ 2980 , p 2983 (SC) : 2009 AIR SCW 3499 : 2009 (4) Scale 507
[LNIND 2009 SC 690] : (2009) 15 SCC 366 [LNIND 2009 SC 690] : (2009) 5 SCR 242 [LNIND 2009 SC 690] ; Rajwant
v State of Kerala, 1966 Cr LJ 1509 : AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] .
453 Barku Krishna v State of Gujarat, AIR 1972 Guj LR 457.
454 State of Orissa v Raidhar Gouda,1973 Cut LT 1225; Hardev v State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 179 [LNIND 1974 SC 400]
, p 181 : 1975 Cr LJ 243 .
455 Laxman v State of Rajasthan, 1975 WLN 243 .
456 Mukha Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1975 WLN 555 .
457 Sajan v State of Rajasthan, 1975 WLN 536 .
458 Khachera Mal v State of Uttar Pradesh,1973 All Cr C 391.
459 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] , p 468 : 1958 Cr LJ 818 ; Gani Mohammad v
State of Rajasthan, 1970 Raj LW 5 .
Page 73 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
460 Re Muniandi Servai, AIR 1944 Mad 251 [LNIND 1943 MAD 211] , p 253, 45 Cr LJ 733; State of Madhya Pradesh v
Gangabai, 1971 MPLJ 829 ; Joginder Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1876 , p 1879; Elem Molla v Emperor, 11
Cr LJ 417, ILR 37 Cal 315.
461 Badri v State, AIR 1953 All 189 [LNIND 1952 ALL 196] , p 191 : 54 Cr LJ 450; Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 207 :
54 Cr LJ 565.
462 BN Srikantiah v State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 672 [LNIND 1958 SC 49] : 1958 Cr LJ 1251 .
463 Daljit Singh v Emperor,AIR 1937 Ngp 274 , p 280 : 39 Cr LJ 92; Sohan Majhi v State,AIR 1970 Pat 303 , p 304 : 1970
Cr LJ 1245 ; Nga Khwet v King,AIR 1941 Rang 319 , p 321 : 43 Cr LJ 266.
464 State of Madhya Pradesh v Matroomal, 1980 Cr LJ 310 , pp 312-313 (MP) (DB).
465 State of Maharashtra v Sushil Vishnu Ombasa, 2015 Cr LJ 1894 (Bom) (DB).
466 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] , pp 466-467 : 1958 Cr LJ 818 ; Harjinder Singh v
Delhi Admn, 1968 Cr LJ 1023 : AIR 1968 SC 867 [LNIND 1967 SC 324] .
467 Faqira v State, AIR 1955 All 321 [LNIND 1954 ALL 153] , p 325.
468 State of Orissa v Ghana Padhan,(1979) 47 Cut LT 575.
469 Vishnu Daga Pagar v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 2430 (Bom) (DB).
470 Arun Nivalaji More v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 4057 , p 4064 : AIR 2006 SC 2886 [LNIND 2006 SC 591] :
(2006) 7 Scale 532 [LNIND 2006 SC 591] : (2006) 12 SCC 613 [LNIND 2006 SC 591] .
471 Vishnu Daga Pagar v State of Maharashtra, 1997 Cr LJ 2430 (Bom) (DB).
472 Arjun Singh v Emperor, AIR 1942 Lah 255 , p 256 : 43 Cr LJ 812; Babu Lal v Emperor, AIR 1946 Ngp 120 , p 127 : 47
Cr LJ 441; Ram Murti v State of Haryana, (1977) 79 PLR 12 .
473 Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 : 54 Cr LJ 565.
474 Dharam Pal v State of Uttar Pradesh,1970 SCC (Cr) 132 : (1970) 1 SCC 429 ; Abdul Main v State of Rajasthan, 1984
CLR 310 (Raj).
475 Re Govindarasu, 1970 LW 199 (Cr).
476 Dharam Pal v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1970 SCC 132 (Cr) : (1970) 1 SCC 429 ; Domisetti Subbanna v State of Andhra
Pradesh,(1975) 2 Andh WR 155; Ghulam v Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 149 , p 150 : 51 Cr LJ 962; Bharu v State of Madhya
Pradesh, 1974 Jab LJ 240 ; Mongolia v State of Rajasthan, 1975 WLN 688 ; Sitori v State of Rajasthan, 1975 WLN 483
; Bheema v State of Rajasthan, 1984 CLR 86 (Raj).
Page 74 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
477 Salebhai Kadarali v Emperor, AIR 1949 Ngp 1949 Cr LJ 647 (2); Delmohammad v Emperor, AIR 1942 Pat 420 : 43 Cr
LJ 883.
478 Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] , p 1878.
479 Rajinder Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1978 SC 1420 , p 1421 : (1978) 3 SCC 422 [LNIND 1978 SC 176] ; Public
Prosecutor v Ayyar,(1969) 2 Mad LJ 453, pp 455-456; Maridasan v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1980 SC 573 , p 574;
Gaffar v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1980 CLR 600 , p 605 (All) (DB), (wherein it was held that an accused, who inflicts a
stab injury in the chest (a vital part of the body) of the deceased, as a result of which he dies only half an hour after and
which injury is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death of the victim, is guilty of murder); Kaliya v
State of Rajasthan, 1984 CLR 321 (Raj).
480 Narain Rao v State, AIR 1952 MB 25 .
481 Nanak v Emperor, AIR 1931 Lah 189 : 32 Cr LJ 1205.
482 Abdul Mazid v State of Assam, AIR 1994 SC 1487 .
483 Ram Kumar v State of MP, 2014 Cr LJ 3694 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 607 [LNIND 2014 SC 620] : (2014) 140 AIC 61 (SC) :
2014 (4) Crimes 90 (SC).
484 Khachar Dipu v State of Gujarat, 2013 Cr LJ 3177 : 2013 AIR SCW 3223 (SC) : 2013 (5) Scale 37 : (2013) 4 SCC 322
[LNIND 2013 SC 278] .
485 State of Rajasthan v Arjun Singh, 2011 Cr LJ 4943 , p 4949 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 3380 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : 2011 (9)
Scale 661 [LNIND 2011 SC 855] : 2011 AIR SCW 5295.
486 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] , p 467 : 1958 Cr LJ 818 ; Rajwant Singh v State
of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] ; Bhaktawar v State of Haryana,1980 SCC (Cr) 150, p 152 : (1979)
4 SCC 698 [LNIND 1978 SC 289] ; Ramasharya v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2001 Cr LJ 1452 (SC).
487 Narayanan Nair Raghwan Nair v State of Travancore and Cochin, AIR 1956 SC 99 [LNIND 1955 KER 138] : 1956 Cr
LJ 278 .
488 Rahman Samail v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 245 , p 252 : 40 Cr LJ 712; Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 : 54 Cr LJ 565.
490 Re Thangaswami, AIR 1963 Mad 476 [LNIND 1959 MAD 143] .
491 Ibid; Brij Bhukhan v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 474 , p 477 : 1957 Cr LJ 591 ; Rajwant Singh v State of
Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] , p 1878.
492 State of West Bengal v Mir Muhammad Omar, 2000 Cr LJ 4047 (SC).
Page 75 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
493 Sheikh Rafi v State of AP, 2007 Cr LJ 2746 : 2007 AIR SCW 2749 : 2007 (3) Supreme 675 : 2007 (6) Scale 74 [LNIND
2007 SC 522] .
494 Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] , pp 1878-79.
495 Gahbar Pande v Emperor, AIR 1928 Pat 169 , p 171 : 29 Cr LJ 17; Behari v State, AIR 1953 All 203 , 54 Cr LJ 565;
Perana v Emperor,1936 All LJ 333; Queen v Khedun Misser, 7 WR (Cr) 54, p 55; Emperor v Hashim, 14 Cr LJ 459;
Saidino v Emperor, 16 Cr LJ 710; Nga Na Ban v Emperor, 5 Cr LJ 306.
496 Balu Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1981 CLR 10 , p 11 (MP High Court Notes) (DB).
497 State v Akbar Dar, 1980 Srinagar LJ 661, p 670 (J&K) (DB).
498 Sheikh Rafi v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 2746 (SC).
499 Rajendera v State, 1968 Cr LJ 811 (All), followingAnda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] ;
Kirtem v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1984 Cr LJ 1069 .
500 Re China Naicker,1937 Mad WN 1129.
501 Brij Bhukan v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 474 , p 477 : 1957 Cr LJ 591 ; Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966
SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 152; Jhaduram v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 CLR 99 , p 100 (Notes) (MP) (DB);
Rewaram v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1978 Cr LJ 858 ; Lal Singh v Emperor, AIR 1938 Lah 31 : 39 Cr LJ 265; Lati v
Emperor, AIR 1937 Ngp 335 ; Thakur Das v State, AIR 1967 All 495 [LNIND 1966 ALL 108] : 1967 Cr LJ 1455 .
502 Mochi Ram Mahton v State, 1972 BLJR 596 .
503 Ghurey v Rex, AIR 1949 All 342 : 50 Cr LJ 535.
504 Sorban Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1970 UJ 328 (SC).
505 Re Oswal Danji Tesji v State, AIR 1961 Guj 16 [LNIND 1960 GUJ 47] : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 251 .
506 Re Dadi Abdul Gafoor, AIR 1955 AP 24 [LNIND 1954 AP 40] : 56 Cr LJ 329; State of Madhya Pradesh v Badriprasad,
1980 CLR 94 , p 98 (Notes) (MP) (DB); Noor Mohammed v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 CLR 102 , p 104 (Notes)
(MP) (DB).
507 Re Mahanti Sreeramulu, AIR 1940 Mad 293 [LNIND 1939 MAD 391] : 41 Cr LJ 491; Aditya Mohapatra v State of
Orissa, AIR 1980 SC 2110 , p 2111 : 1980 Cr LJ 1475 , p 1476; State of Karnataka v Vedanayagam, AIR 1995 SCC
(Cr) 231; Sannappa Rayappa Jadge v State of Karnataka, AIR 1994 SC (Cr) 1167; Babubhai Ranchodbhai Patel v
State of Gujarat, AIR 1994 SC (Cr) 265 : 1994 Cr LJ 2099 ; Vide Vasanta v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1983 SC 361
[LNIND 1983 SC 43] : 1983 Cr LJ 693 (SC); Appadurai v State, 1997 Cr LJ 2349 (Mad) (DB); Bahan Ramji Chaudhary
v State of Maharashtra, 1999 Cr LJ 4338 (Bom) (DB).
508 Nga Khwet v King, AIR 1941 Rang 319 , p 321; Thannoo v State, AIR 1959 All 131 [LNIND 1958 ALL 118] : 1959 Cr
LJ 158 ; Sadhu Kumbhar v King, AIR 1951 Ori 354 [LNIND 1949 ORI 8] , p 355 : 52 Cr LJ 1136; Nga Ba U v Emperor,
AIR 1937 Rang 429 , p 430; Nga Ohn Pe v Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 477 , p 478; Bikrama v State, AIR 1958 All 348
Page 76 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
[LNIND 1957 ALL 179] : 1958 Cr LJ 588 ; Ghulam v Crown, AIR 1950 Lah 149 : 51 Cr LJ 962; Nazar Singh v State,
AIR 1951 Pepsu 66 .
509 Bicchu v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1958 All 791 [LNIND 1958 ALL 17] : 1958 Cr LJ 1367 ; Ramprasad v State of
Madhya Pradesh, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 363 , p 368; Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342; Basappa Bhimappa Doddamani v State,
AIR 1961 Mys 21 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 120 ; Dilmohammad v Emperor, AIR 1942 Pat 420 : 43 Cr LJ 883.
510 Narayanan Nair Raghavan Nair v State of Travancore & Cochin, AIR 1956 SC 99 [LNIND 1955 KER 138] : 1956 Cr LJ
278 .
511 Emperor v Ram Newaz, 14 Cr LJ 615 : ILR 35 All 506; Sipahi Singh v Emperor, AIR 1923 All 88 (2) : 24 Cr LJ 106; Lati
v Emperor, AIR 1937 Ngp 335 .
512 Willaim Slaney v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116 [LNIND 1955 SC 90] , p 133 : 1956 Cr LJ 291 .
514 Nga Na Ban v Emperor, 5 Cr LJ 306.
515 Nga Po Swa v Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 113 : 37 Cr LJ 435; Re Krishnaswami Naicker, AIR 1965 Mad 261 , p 263 :
(1965) 2 Cr LJ 42 .
516 Re Kottegodan Alaxi, AIR 1939 Mad 269 : 40 Cr LJ 308 (1).
517 Public Prosecutor v Ramaswami Nadar, AIR 1940 Mad 745 [LNIND 1940 MAD 61] , p 746; Public Prosecutor v
Ayyanar,(1969) 2 Mad LJ 453, pp 455-456; Amar Singh v State, 71 Punj LR 358, p 366; Re Singaram Padayachi, AIR
1944 Mad 223 [LNIND 1943 MAD 239] , p 225 : 45 Cr LJ 729.
518 Virsa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465 [LNIND 1958 SC 19] ; Public Prosecutor v Ayyanar,(1969) 2 Mad LJ
453, pp 455-456.
519 Babulal v Emperor, AIR 1946 Ngp 120 , p 121 : 47 Cr LJ 441; Bhikham v State, AIR 1980 All LJ 927 (DB); Anda v State
of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] .
520 Gathi v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 CLR 346 , p 348 (MP) (DB).
522 Sanjay v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2016 Cr LJ 1117 (SC) : AIR 2016 SC 282 [LNINDU 2016 SC 8] : (2016) 3 SCC 62
[LNINDU 2016 SC 8] : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 712 : (2016) 2 All LJ 125 : (2016) 158 AIC 204 (SC).
523 State of Andhra Pradesh v Rayavarupu Punnayya, AIR 1977 SC 45 [LNIND 1976 SC 331] , pp 50-51 : 1977 Cr LJ 1 ;
Abdul Waheed Khan alias Waheed v State of Andhra Pradesh, (2002) JT 6 SC 274; Ruli Ram v State of
Haryana,(2002) 7 AD (AS) 492.
Page 77 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
524 Inder Singh v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 157 , p 158; Re Dadi Abdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955 AP 24 [LNIND 1954 AP 40] , p 26;
King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 (FB); Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342, p 345.
525 Darhoon Khuda Bux v Emperor, AIR 1914 Sind 35 : 16 Cr LJ 472.
526 Dharam Raut u State of Bihar, AIR 1964 Pat 334 , p 337; Nga Na Ban v Emperor, 5 Cr LJ 306; Rahman Ismail v
Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 245 , p 253; Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] , p 151;
Rajwant Singh v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874 [LNIND 1966 SC 125] , p 1879; Nawab v Emperor, AIR 1914 Lah
98 , p 100 : 15 Cr LJ 610; Re Dadi Abdul Gaffoor, AIR 1955 AP 24 [LNIND 1954 AP 40] : 1955 Cr LJ 329 ; Thangani
Bai v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1972 MPLJ 607 : 1972 Jab LJ 604 .
527 Nga Na Ban v Emperor, 5 Cr LJ 306; Manindra Lal Das v Emperor, AIR 1937 Cal 432 ; Ram Asre v Emperor, AIR 1923
Oudh 97 , p 100.
528 Hasta Ismail v Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 593 : 38 Cr LJ 1073.
529 State of Madhya Pradesh v Ram Prasad, (1968) 17 Jab LJ 774 , p 779 (SC) : AIR 1968 SC 881 [LNIND 1967 SC 358] .
530 Faqira v State, AIR 1955 All 321 [LNIND 1954 ALL 153] , p 327 : 1955 Cr LJ 884 ; Bhagat Singh v Emperor, AIR 1930
Lah 266 , p 268.
531 Reg v Govinda, ILR 1 Bom 342, p 345.
532 State of Madhya Pradesh v Ram Prasad, AIR 1968 SC 881 [LNIND 1967 SC 358] : (1968) 2 SCJ 355 .
533 Pradeep Kumar Pathak v State, AIR 1980 All LJ 834.
534 Ugrasen Mukhi v State,(1966) 32 Cut LT 589, p 593.
535 Abdul Karim v Empress,(1872) 92 LBR 650.
536 Dilipbhai Madhubhai Patel v State of Gujrat, 2003 CR LJ 565 .
537 Balkar Singh v State of Uttarakhand, 2009 Cr LJ 2980 , p 2984 (SC) : 2009 AIR SCW 3499 : 2009 (4) Scale 507
[LNIND 2009 SC 690] : (2009) 15 SCC3 66 : (2009) 5 SCR 242 [LNIND 2009 SC 690] .
538 Settuv State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 Cr LJ 3889 (SC).
539 Dilipbhai Madhubhai Patel v State of Gujrat, 2003 Cr LJ 565 (Guj).
540 Judagi Mullah v Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat 168 , p 171, 31 Cr LJ 243.
541 Sehej Ram v State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 614 [LNIND 1983 SC 90] .
Page 78 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
542 Pawan Kumar v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1999 Cr LJ 329 (MP) (DB).
543 Santhosh Shankar Pawar v State of Maharashtra, 2015 Cr LJ 4880 (SC) : AIR 2015 SC 3789 [LNIND 2015 SC 275] :
(2015) 7 SCC 641 [LNIND 2015 SC 275] : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 276 : 2015 (5) Scale 424 [LNIND 2015 SC 275] .
544 Faqira v State, AIR 1955 All 321 [LNIND 1954 ALL 153] , p 327 : 1955 Cr LJ 884 .
545 Sewa Ram v State, (1976) 78 PLR 99 ; Prabhunath v State, AIR 1957 All 667 [LNIND 1957 ALL 119] , p 670 : 1957 Cr
LJ 1056 .
546 Ramesh v State (Delhi Admn),1996 Cr LT 309 (Del) (DB); State of Rajasthan v Santosh Savita, (2013) 12 SCC 663
[LNINDORD 2013 SC 10304] : 2013 Cr LJ 4611 : AIR 2013 SC 3731 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 10304] : I (2014) CCR 17
(SC) : 2013 (3) JCC 2123 : 2013 (10) Scale 182 [LNINDORD 2013 SC 10304] (Accused convicted under section 304,
Pt II, IPC).
547 Third Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur v Gantele Vijayavardhan Rao, 1996 Cr LJ 703 (AP) (DB).
548 Naimuddin v State of West Bengal, 2010 Cr LJ 392 , p 395 (SC) : 2009 AIR SCW 7062 : 2009 (13) Scale 605 [LNIND
2009 SC 1963] : AIR 2010 SC 505 [LNIND 2009 SC 1963] : JT 2009 (14) SC 419 [LNIND 2009 SC 1963] : (2010) 1
SCC 123 [LNIND 2009 SC 1963] .
549 Nasir Uddin Laskar v State of Assam, 2017 Cr LJ 465 (Gauh) (DB).
550 Hiralal Guwala v State of Assam, 2017 Cr LJ 639 (Gauh) (DB).
551 Nanbu v State, AIR 1956 MB 207 , p 208 : 1956 Cr LJ 1078 ; Pran Krishna Chakravarty v Emperor, AIR 1935 Cal 580 ,
p 590.
552 Kanhal v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 609 : 11 All LJ 752; Emperor v Subhappa Chunnappa, 15 Bom LR 303; Emperor v Ram
Newaz, 14 Cr LJ 615 : 11 All LJ 804; Hanuman v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 685 : 11 All LJ 926 (dissenting fromDhian Singh
v Emperor, 9 All LJ 180); Garib v Emperor, AIR 1919 All 445 : 20 Cr LJ 767; Emperor v Umrao, AIR 1923 All 355 (2) :
24 Cr LJ 753; Parshadi v Emperor, AIR 1929 All 160 : 30 Cr LJ 559.
553 Perana v Emperor,1936 All LJ 333.
554 Emperor v Hashim, 14 Cr LJ 459; Saidino v Emperor, 16 Cr LJ 710; Naganaban v Emperor, 5 Cr LJ 306; Behari v
Emperor, AIR 1953 All 203 , p 207; Queen v Khedun Misser, 7 WR (Cr) 54(2), p 55.
555 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions, (1935) AC 462 , p 481; Charker Sattiah v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1960 AP 153 [LNIND 1959 AP 102] , p 155 : 1960 Cr LJ 309 .
556 Ram Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 1969 Raj LW 610 : AIR 1970 Raj 60 [LNIND 1969 RAJ 152] .
557 Gopal Chandra Ghosh v State, (1976) 42 CLT 21 .

Page 79 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
558 State v Dhanidhar Mohanty, (1976) 42 CLT 29 : AIR 1976 Ori 79 [LNIND 1975 ORI 48] .
559 Bandu v State of Maharashtra, 1978 Mah LJ 324 ; Bandarupalli Venkateshwarlu v State of Andhra Pradesh, 1975 Cr
LJ 21 , p 23 : AIR 1974 SC 2363 .
560 Re Sultana, 35 PR (Cr) 1884.
561 State of Gujarat v Mohanlal Kuberds,1975 Guj LR 260.
562 Stephen Seneviratne v King, AIR 1936 PC 289 [LNIND 1936 PC 51] : 37 Cr LJ 963; Attygalle v King, 37 Cr LJ 628 :
AIR 1936 PC 169 .
563 Ram Kumar v State of Rajasthan, 1969 Raj LW 610 : AIR 1970 Raj 60 [LNIND 1969 RAJ 152] .
564 Emperor v Dhirajia, AIR 1940 All 486 , p 489 :42 Cr LJ 146; Per Plowden J, Re Barkatulla, 1887 PR 32 ; Gyarsibai v
State, AIR 1953 MB 61 , p 62 : 54 Cr LJ 588.
565 Per Plowden J, Re Barkatulla, 1887 PR 32 ; Gyasibai v State, AIR 1953 MB 61 , p 62 : 54 Cr LJ 588.
566 Re Suba, 1888 PR 40 .
567 Syarsibai v State, AIR 1953 MB 61 , p 62 : 54 Cr LJ 588.
568 Emperor v Dhirajia, AIR 1940 All 486 : 42 Cr LJ 146.
569 Supadi v Emperor, AIR 1925 Bom 310 : 26 Cr LJ 1016 (2).
570 Re Karuppal, AIR 1940 Mad 50 : 42 Cr LJ 270.
571 Per Plowden J, Re Barkatulla, 1887 32 PR 65 , p 66.
572 Salim v State of Rajasthan, 1999 Cr LJ 1419 (Raj) (DB).
573 Queen v Sheik Bazu, 8 WR (Cr) 47, p 51.
574 Devaki v State of Kerala, 2000 Cr LJ 477 .
575 Anda v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996 SC 148 [LNIND 1965 SC 75] .
576 Pappu v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1978 SC 1455 : 1978 SCC 571 (Cr).
Page 80 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
577 King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , p 271 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124; Thakur Mahton v State of Bihar, 1972 BLJR 265 :
1972 Cr LJ 835 .
578 Raja Ram v Emperor, AIR 1935 Oudh 239 ; King v Aung Nyun, AIR 1940 Rang 259 , pp 271-73 (FB) : 42 Cr LJ 124;
Mahomed Hasan v Emperor, AIR 1934 Sind 145 , p 149 : 36 Cr LJ 22.
579 Shyama Charan Sri Ram Saran v State, AIR 1969 All 61 [LNIND 1968 ALL 24] .
580 Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180] : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 617 .
581 Re Barkatulla, 32 PR 1887 (Cr).
582 Mukha Singh v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1975 Raj LW 510 : 1976 Cr LJ 457 , p 460.
583 Veeran v State of MP, 2011 Cr LJ 2688 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 1655 [LNIND 2011 SC 414] : 2 0011 (4) Scale 618 :
(2011) 11 SCC 367 [LNIND 2011 SC 414] : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 195 [LNIND 2011 SC 414] : (2011) 5 SCR 300 [LNIND
2011 SC 414] .
584 Arur Singh Fateh Singh v State, AIR 1957 Punj 81 , p 83 : 1957 Cr LJ 532 .
585 Abdul Mojid v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1963 MP 364 [LNIND 1963 MP 56] , p 367 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 631 ; State of
Maharashtra v Krishnamwti Laxmipati Naidu, 1981 Cr LJ 9 , p 16 (SC) : AIR 1981 SC 617 ; Ram Kumar v State of
Rajasthan, 1970 Cr LJ 486 : AIR 1970 Raj 60 [LNIND 1969 RAJ 152] .
586 Dayabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 [LNIND 1964 SC 88] , pp 1566-67 : (1964) 2 Cr
LJ 472 ; KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 605 , p 617 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 521 ; Mohd Ramzani v State of
Delhi, 1980 UJ 541 (SC).
587 Re Murugian, AIR 1957 Mad 541 [LNIND 1957 MAD 52] : 1957 Cr LJ 970 .
588 Jairam Chandrabhan v State of Bombay, AIR 1959 Bom 463 [LNIND 1958 BOM 89] , p 464 : 1959 Cr LJ 1299 .
589 Motiram Chandiram v Emperor, AIR 1941 Sind 117 : 42 Cr LJ 786.
590 Re Thommen Thomas v State of Kerala, AIR 1957 Ker 53 [LNIND 1956 KER 152] : 1957 Cr LJ 635 .
591 Re Mwugian, AIR 1957 Mad 541 [LNIND 1957 MAD 52] , p 544 : 1957 Cr LJ 970 .
592 Neeraj v State, AIR 1978 All LJ 1293; Mancini v DPP, AIR 1942 Cal 1 , p 9; Kannakunnummal Ahmed Koya v State of
Kerala, AIR 1967 Ker 92 [LNIND 1966 KER 115] , p 95.
593 Lachmi Kirsani v State,1974 Cut LR 348 (Cr).

Page 81 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
594 Sheikh Rafi v State of AP, 2007 Cr LJ 2746 (SC); Sukhlal Sarkar v UOI, 2012 Cr LJ 3032 : (2012) 5 SCC 703 [LNIND
2012 SC 364] .
595 Amarjeet Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1996 Cr LJ 185 (Raj) (DB).
596 State of Orissa v Burdara Majhi,(1978) 46 Cut LT 328.
597 Amarjit Singh Sohan Singh v State, 1970 Cr LJ 835 : AIR 1970 Punj 279 .
598 Guru Prasad v State,1978 All Cr R 440.
599 Dwarika Yadav v State, 1976 Cr LJ 239 , p 242.
600 Gyanendra Kumar v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 502 [LNIND 1971 SC 601] , p 505 : 1972 Cr LJ 308 .
601 Re Govinda,1974 LW (Cr) 157.
602 Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180] : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 617 .
603 Shyama Charan Sri Ram Saran v State, AIR 1969 All 61 [LNIND 1968 ALL 24] ; Mukhi v State, 35 Cut LT 94, p 97 :
1969 Cr LJ 1172 ; Ralia v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 208; Emperor v Jate Uraon, AIR 1940 Pat 541 ; Mohammad Yar v
604 Fakirappa Yellappa Tukkapanawar,1971 Mad LJ 394 (Cr). For a case of sister, seeState of Mysore v Ramaji Ramappa
Malagi, (1972) 2 Mys LJ 6 .
605 Ibid.
606 Chinnathaman v State Rep by Inspector of Police, 2008 Cr LJ 1372 , p 1375 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 784 [LNIND 2007 SC
1485] : 2008 AIR SCW 7 : 2007 (14) Scale 357 [LNIND 2007 SC 1485] : 2007 (8) Supreme 417 .
607 KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 521 , p 546; Re
Ganesan, 1974 Cr LJ 381 , p 384 : 1973 Mad LW 42 (Cr); Atma Ram v State, 1967 Cr LJ 1697 : AIR 1967 Punj 508 .
608 Shyama Charan Sri Ram Saran v State, AIR 1969 All 61 [LNIND 1968 ALL 24] ; Madhavan v State of Kerala, AIR
1966 Ker 258 [LNIND 1966 KER 1] , p 259.
609 Re Ganesan, 1973 LW 42 (Cr); Gurubasavaiah v State of Karnataka, 1979 Cr LJ 603 .
610 KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] , p 626 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 521 ; Swamy
Prasad v State, 1980 CLR 361 , p 365 (UP); Mahmood v State, AIR 1961 All 538 : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 591 ; Sukhlal Sarkar
v UOI, 2012 Cr LJ 3032 : (2012) 5 SCC 703 [LNIND 2012 SC 364] : 2012 AIR SCW 3398 : 2012 (4) Scale 599 [LNIND
2012 SC 364] ; BD Khunte v UOI, 2015 Cr LJ 243 , p 247 (SC) : 2014 (12) Scale 481 [LNIND 2014 SC 912] : (2015) 1
SCC 286 [LNIND 2014 SC 912] .
Page 82 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
611 State v Mohanasundaram, 1973 LW 181 (Cr); State v Laikhan Pradhan, AIR 1956 Ori 108 [LNIND 1955 ORI 16] , p
110 : 1956 Cr LJ 638 .
612 Re Vadivel Padayachi, 1972 Cr LJ 1641 , p 1642 : 1972 Mad LW 34 (Cr).
613 Shyama Charan Sri Ram Saran v State, AIR 1969 All 61 [LNIND 1968 ALL 24] ; Madhavan v State of Kerala, AIR 1966
Ker 258 [LNIND 1966 KER 1] , p 259; Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180] : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 617 ;
Arun Raj v UOI, (2010) 6 SCC 457 [LNIND 2010 SC 506] , p 463 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 155 : 2010 (5) Scale 608 [LNIND
2010 SC 506] .
614 State of Karnataka v R Varadaraju, 1995 Cr LJ 1429 (Kant) (DB).
615 KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] , pp 629-630 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 521 ;
Sankappa Rai v State of Kerala, 1968 Ker LJ 643 ; Madhavan v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 Ker 258 [LNIND 1966 KER
1] .
616 Ghulam Mustafa Ghno v Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 182 -183 : 40 Cr LJ 778; Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND
1963 ALL 180] , p 269; Krishnan Nair v State of Kerala, 1965 Ker LT 150 , pp 158-159.
617 Mahmood v State, AIR 1961 All 538 , pp 541-542.
618 Mahmood v State, AIR 1961 All 538 : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 591 ; Ghulam Mustafa Gahno v Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 182 : 40
Cr LJ 778; Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180] , pp 268-269 : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 617 .
619 Sukhlal Sarkar v UOI, 2012 Cr LJ 3032 : 2012 AIR SCW 3398 : (2012) 5 SCC 703 [LNIND 2012 SC 364] : 2012 (4)
Scale 599 [LNIND 2012 SC 364] .
620 Mumtaz @ Muntyaz v State of UP (Now Uttrakhand), 2016 (4) Supreme 711 : AIR 2016 SC 3151 [LNIND 2016 SC
271] : (2016) 6 Scale 130 : (2016) 11 Scale 786 : (2016) 164 AIC 121 (SC).
621 Mannam Balaswamy v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1980 SC 448 , p 449.
622 Guru Dev Singh v State of MP, 2011 Cr LJ 3101 , p 3106 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 2088 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 286] : 2011
(6) Scale 20 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 286] : (2011) 5 SCC 721 [LNIND 2011 SC 512] .
623 Imtiaz v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 1663 , p 1666 (SC) : 2007 (3) Scale 204 [LNIND 2007 SC 172] : (2007) 15
SCC 299 [LNIND 2007 SC 172] .
624 Ulla Mahapatra v King, AIR 1950 Ori 261 [LNIND 1950 ORI 4] , p 264.
625 Petei Beja v State of Orissa, 31 Cut LT 67, p 70.
626 Re Kannan, AIR 1953 Mad 579 , p 580 : 54 Cr LJ 1109; Ghulam Mohammad v Rex, AIR 1950 All 91 [LNIND 1949 ALL
77] : 51 Cr LJ 385.
Page 83 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
627 Nga Chit Tin v King, AIR 1939 Rang 225 , p 226 : 40 Cr LJ 725; Shiv Ram Sahu v State of MP, 2017 Cr LJ 941 (MP)
(DB).
628 Tarachand v State of Maharashtra, 2000 Cr LJ 2667 (Bom) (DB).
629 Girja Devi alias Gita Devi v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2000 Cr LJ 1528 (HP) (DB).
630 Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180] , p 270 : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 617 .
631 Queen v Gokool Bowree, 5 WR 33, p 40 (Cr).
632 Madhavan v State of Kerala, AIR 1966 Ker 258 [LNIND 1966 KER 1] .
633 Ranjit Das v State of Assam, 2017 Cr LJ 696 (Gauh) (DB).
634 Krishna Chandra Pati v Emperor, AIR 1929 Pat 201 .
635 Hansa Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1977 SC 1801 .
636 Madni v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 1713 .
637 State of UP v Shyam Veer, 2005 Cr LJ 2606 , p 2607 : AIR 2005 SC 4108 [LNIND 2005 SC 400] : (2005) 10 SCC 611
[LNIND 2005 SC 400] .
638 Krishnan Udayan v State of Kerala, AIR 1971 Ker LT 604 : 1971 Ker LR 550; Dini v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 485 ;
Sukhai v Emperor, AIR 1925 All 676 .
640 Makhan Lal v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2000 Cr LJ 3896 (All) (DB).
641 Ullu Mahapatra v King, AIR 1950 Ori 261 [LNIND 1950 ORI 4] , p 263; Urlikia Medina v State, AIR 1964 Ori 149 ; Madi
Adma v State, 35 Cut LT 336.
642 KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] , p 630 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 521 ; Madi Adma
v State, 35 Cut LT 336.
643 Devku Bhikha v State of Gujarat, AIR 1995 SC 2171 .
644 Ghulam Mustafa Gahno v Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 182 , p 184 : 40 Cr LJ 778.
645 Chanan Khan v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 123 , p 126 : 44 Cr LJ 595.
Page 84 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
646 Santokh Singh v State, (1970) 72 PLR 262 .
647 Re Chinnapaiyan,(1969) 1 Mad LJ 511, p 513.
648 Dudabhai Dalabhai Gohil v State of Gujarat, 2014 Cr LJ 125 , p 130 (Guj) (DB).
649 State of AP v Thummala Anjanayulu, (2010) 14 SCC 621 [LNIND 2010 SC 1144] : AIR 2011 SC 564 [LNIND 2010 SC
1144] : (2011) 98 AIC 190 (SC).
650 Empress v Khogayi, ILR 2 Mad 122-23.
651 Abdullah v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 369 , p 370 : 33 Cr LJ 338; Partaba v Crown, AIR 1923 Lah 408 ; Lala v State, AIR
1953 Bilaspur 27 .
652 Amarjit Singh v State, AIR 1970 Punj 279 : 1970 Cr LJ 835 .
653 Abdul Majid v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1963 MP 364 [LNIND 1963 MP 56] : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 631 ; Akhtar v State,
AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180] : (1964) 1 Cr LJ 617 ; Chet Ram v UOI, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 120 ; Pancham v
Emperor, AIR 1947 Oudh 148 : 48 Cr LJ 229; Nga Paw Yin v Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 40 , p 41 : 37 Cr LJ 410; Atma
Ram v State, AIR 1967 Punj 508 : 69 Punj LR 794, p 799; Rahman v Emperor, AIR 1930 Lah 344 ; Maung Ni v
Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 49 ; Hira Singh v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 126 : 34 Cr LJ 1159 (1); Abdul Khanan Watamir v
654 Mohan v State, 1997 Cr LJ 22 (Mad) (DB); Dudabhai Dudabhai Gohil v State of Gujarat, 2014 Cr LJ 125 (Guj) (DB).
655 Queen v Hari Giree, 10 WR 26 (Cr); Hafizullah v State, AIR 1957 All 377 [LNIND 1957 ALL 27] ; Queen v Ganesh
Luskur, 9 WR 72 (Cr).
656 Dhanno Khan v State, AIR 1957 All 317 [LNIND 1956 ALL 217] , p 319 : 1957 Cr LJ 498 .
657 BD Khunte v UOI, 2014 (8) Supreme 87 (SC) : (2015) 1 SCC 286 [LNIND 2014 SC 912] : 2014 (12) Scale 481 [LNIND
2014 SC 912] : 2014 (9) SLT 462 : 2015 Cr LJ 243 : 2014 (4) Crimes 286 (SC).
658 Mahmood v State, AIR 1961 All 538 , p 542 : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 591 .
659 Rahman v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 14 : 32 Cr LJ 1118.
660 Emperor v Prem Singh, AIR 1942 Lah 301 : 34 Cr LJ 117.
661 Nga Po Nyun v Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 325 .
662 Re Nattekallappa, 1 Weir 308.

Page 85 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
663 Mansingh Parma Teli, AIR 1959 MP 267 : 1959 Cr LJ 850 ; Kadir Baksh v Emperor, AIR 1920 Lah 501 ; Muhammad
Zaman v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 165 ; Jagar Beg Jai v Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 692 ; Hussain v Emperor, AIR 1939
Lah 471 : 41 Cr LJ 15; Hemsingh v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 CLR 209 , pp 211-212 (MP); Mongol Ganda v
Emperor, AIR 1925 Ngp 37 ; Queen v Maithya Gazee, 6 WR 42 (Cr); Queen v Gour Chunder Poli, 1 WR 17 (Cr);
Queen v Bhekye, 1 WR 46 (Cr); Emperor v Mehdi Ali, AIR 1941 All 310 ; Raj Kishore v State, AIR 1953 All 464 [LNIND
1953 ALL 22] ; Noukar Mouledina v Emperor, AIR 1937 Sind 212 : 38 Cr LJ 968; Empress v Asha Gopal, Ratanlal Cr
C 932.
664 Ram Kumar v State of Haryana, (1978) 80 PLR 408 .
665 Re Ghuntappa, 1 Weir 306.
666 Pancham v Emperor, AIR 1947 Oudh 148 : 48 Cr LJ 229.
667 Bonda Devesus v State of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 SCC 115 .
Scale 599 [LNIND 2012 SC 364] .
Scale 599 [LNIND 2012 SC 364] .
670 BD Khunte v UOI, 2015 Cr LJ 243 , p 247 (SC) : 2014 (12) Scale 481 [LNIND 2014 SC 912] : (2015) 1 SCC 286
[LNIND 2014 SC 912] .
671 Mahmood v State, AIR 1961 All 538 : (1961) Cr LJ 591 , Oak J.
672 Mahmood v State, AIR 1961 All 538 , p 540 : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 591 ; Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL
180] ; Re Andi Thevan, AIR 1941 Mad 251 ; Queen v Subrain, 13 WR 33 (Cr); Dhanno Khan v State, AIR 1957 All 317
[LNIND 1956 ALL 217] .
673 Moni Prodhano, 1 Weir 306.
674 Nga Sae Myini v Emperor, AIR 1937 Rang 4 , p 6.
675 Jumma Fateh Mohammad v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 438 : 34 Cr LJ 94.
676 Daljit Singh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Ngp 274 , p 280.
677 Dattu Genu Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1974 SC 387 [LNIND 1973 SC 357] , p 388 : 1974 Cr LJ 446 .
678 Jagar Beg Jat v Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 692 ; Imam Bakhsh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 562 : 38 Cr LJ 637; Gangaram
Raghunath v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1965) 14 Jab LJ 280 , p 283 : AIR 1965 MP 122 [LNIND 1963 MP 98] ; Jugraj
Budhan v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1966 Jab LJ 115 (SN); Maiga v State, (1972) 1 Mys LJ 306 : 1972 Mad LJ 191
(Cr); Lal Khan v Emperor, AIR 1948 Lah 43 ; Re Ghuntappa, 1 Weir 306.
Page 86 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
679 KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] , p 626 : (1962) (1) Cr LJ 521 ; Abdul
Majid v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1963 MP 364 [LNIND 1963 MP 56] , p 366.
680 Imam Baksh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 562 : 38 Cr LJ 637; Mehra Mistak v Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah 103 : 35 Cr LJ
1378; Empress v Mohan, ILR 8 All 622; Empress v Lochan, ILR 8 All 635; see alsoNamala Subba Rao v State of
Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 47 (SC).
681 Empress v Chunni, ILR 18 All 497; Dini v Emperor,AIR 1926 Lah 485 -486.
682 Re Jamaluddin,1955 NUC 1834.
683 Abalu Das v Emperor, ILR 28 Cal 571 : 5 Cal WN 708; Raham Shah v Emperor, AIR 1925 Lah 114 : 26 Cr LJ 534.
684 Boya Munigadu v Queen, ILR 3 Mad 33.
685 Re Venkatesan, 1 Weir 307; Ranjit Das v State of Assam, 2017 Cr LJ 696 (Gauh) (DB).
686 Arun Raj v UOI, (2010) 6 SCC 457 [LNIND 2010 SC 506] , p 463 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 155 .
687 Namala Subba Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 47 , p 49 (SC) : AIR 2007 SC 9 [LNIND 2006 SC 826] :
688 Ansari Krishna Murthy v State of AP, (2009) 17 SCC 462 [LNIND 2009 SC 1640] : 2009 (13) Scale 26 : 2011 (1) SCC
(Cr) 901.
689 Mohd Asif v State of Uttranchal, (2009) 11 SCC 497 [LNIND 2009 SC 558] : 2009 Cr LJ 2789 : (2009) 4 SCR 12
[LNIND 2009 SC 558] : 2009 (3) Scale 695 [LNIND 2009 SC 558] : 2009 (3) SLT 77 .
690 Imtiaz v State of UP, (2007) 15 SCC 269 .
691 Raj Kumar v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 15 SCC 292 [LNIND 2009 SC 1504] : (2009) 11 SCR 49 [LNIND 2009 SC
1504] : 2009 (9) JT 413 : 2009 (9) Scale 495 [LNIND 2009 SC 1504] .
692 Re Natte Kallappa, 1 Weir 308.
693 Re Gandava Nayako, 1 Weir 305; Re Mom Prodhana, 1 Weir 306; Emperor v Rahim Khan, 15 Cr LJ 501; Gangaram
Raghunath v State, (1965) 14 Jab LJ 280 , p 283 : 1965 MP 122 .
694 Chindan Nair v State of Kerala, AIR 1957 Ker 166 [LNIND 1957 KER 75] , p 169 : 1957 Cr LJ 1261 ; Jumma Fateh
Mohammad v Emperor, AIR 1932 Lah 438 ; Abdul Majid v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1963 MP 364 [LNIND 1963
MP 56] , p 366 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 631 .
695 Mansa Ram v State, 1975 Cr LJ 1772 , p 1775; Swami Prosad v State,1980 (UP) CLR 361, p 365.
696 Ghulam Mustfa Gahno v Emperor, AIR 1939 Sind 182 -83 : 40 Cr LJ 778; Mansa Ram v State, 1975 Cr LJ 1772 ;
Akhtar v State, AIR 1964 All 262 [LNIND 1963 ALL 180] , p 268.
Page 87 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
697 Abdul Majid v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1963 MP 364 [LNIND 1963 MP 56] , p 366 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 631 .
698 Panchan v Emperor, AIR 1947 Oudh 148 , p 149; Des Raj v Emperor, 29 Cr LJ 454.
699 Mahmood v State, AIR 1961 All 538 -539 : (1961) 2 Cr LJ 591 ; Mohan Singh v State,(1980) 49 Cut LT 275, p 284.
700 Re Murugian, AIR 1957 Mad 541 [LNIND 1957 MAD 52] , p 546 : 1957 Cr LJ 970 .
701 Bonda Deves v State of Andhra Pradesh, 1996 SCC 115 .
702 Jagjit Singh v State of Punjab, (1978) 80 Punj LR 331 .
703 Nga May Maung v Emperor, AIR 1936 Rang 472 .
704 Madani v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 1713 .
706 Ashok Soma Misal v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 1528 (Bom) (DB).
707 Pushpendra Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2005 Cr LJ 2022 (All) (DB).
708 Muthu v State, 2008 Cr LJ 442 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 1303] : 2007 AIR SCW 6982; See alsoD Sailu
v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2008 Cr LJ 686 (SC); Gali Venkataiah v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2008 Cr LJ 690 (SC) :
2007 AIR SCW 7282.
709 Budhi Singh v State of HP, 2013 Cr LJ 962 (SC) : 2012 (12) Scale 393 .
710 Re Dhula v State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1956 MB 94 : 1956 Cr LJ 241 .
711 Re Mathappa Goundan, AIR 1954 Mad 538 , p 540 : 55 Cr LJ 733.
712 Inayat v Emperor, AIR 1933 Lah 869 : 35 Cr LJ 74; Gouranga Dora v State,(1971) 37 Cut LT 170; Re Thandavan,
1973 Cr LJ 1041 , p 1043 : 1972 Mad LW 244 (Cr); Queen v Kasseemoddeen, 4 WR 38 (Cr); Jafar v Emperor, 1 Cr LJ
705 : 6 Punj LR 492; Mohammad Yar v Emperor, AIR 1924 Lah 62 ; Imam Bakhsh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 562 .
713 King v Palmer, (1913) 2 KB 29 .
714 Re Murugian, AIR 1957 Mad 541 [LNIND 1957 MAD 52] , p 546 : 1957 Cr LJ 970 ; Re Chervirala Narayan, AIR 1958
AP 235 [LNIND 1957 AP 37] : 1958 Cr LJ 476 ; Jairam Chandrabhan v State of Bombay, AIR 1959 Bom 463 [LNIND
1958 BOM 89] , p 465.
Page 88 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
715 Nga Saw Maung v Emperor, AIR 1937 Rang 466 : 39 Cr LJ 137.
716 Sukhal v Emperor, AIR 1925 All 676 ; Re Ghuntappa, 1 Weir 306; Re Venkatesan, 1 Weir 307; Re Nallekallappa, 1
Weir 308.
717 Ramchandra Pangi v State, 1984 Cr LJ (NOC) 12 (Ori) (DB).
718 Imbichi Koya v Emperor, AIR 1934 Mad 176 : 35 Cr LJ 694.
719 Re Muthappa Goundan, AIR 1954 Mad 538 : 55 Cr LJ 733; Paieshwari Prasad v Emperor, AIR 1928 Oudh 241 .
720 Kota Potharaja, AIR 1932 Mad 25 [LNIND 1931 MAD 260] : 33 Cr LJ 273; Emperor v Dinabandhu Ooria, AIR 1930 Cal
199 , p 203 : 31 Cr LJ 737; Re Ghuntappa, 1 Weir 306; Murgi Munda v Emperor, AIR 1939 Pat 443 ; Sheo Ram v
Emperor, AIR 1937 Oudh 457 ; Mir Zaman v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pesh 101 .
721 State of Karnataka v R Varadaraju, 1995 Cr LJ 1429 (Kant) (DB).
722 JP Lall v State, (1995) 57 DLT 394 [LNIND 1995 DEL 62] (Del) (DB).
723 Public Prosecutor v Kundarapu Danam,1961 Mad LJ 580 (Cr) : 1961 Andh WR 182.
724 Hafizullah v State, AIR 1957 All 377 [LNIND 1957 ALL 27] , p 380.
725 Abdul Majid v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1963 MP 364 [LNIND 1963 MP 56] , p 366 : (1963) 2 Cr LJ 631 ;
Murugaiya Nadan v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 235.
726 KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 521 .
727 R v Devji Govindji, ILR 20 Bom 215.
728 Madni v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1994 SC 1713 .
730 Chand Singh v State of Rajasthan, 1971 Cr LJ 1501 , pp 1506-1507.
731 Sadhu Singh v State, 1969 Cr LJ 1183 (Punj).
732 State v Gurbachan Singh, AIR 1953 Pepsu 32 , p 33 : 54 Cr LJ 445; Re Pakirappa Yellappa Tukkappanawar, 1971 Cr
LJ 1511 : 1971 Mad LJ 394 (Cr).
Page 89 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
733 Abdul Khanan Watamir v Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 436 ; Muhammad v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 861 : 30 Cr LJ 1044;
Ralia v Emperor, 14 Cr LJ 208; Boya Munigadu v Queen, ILR 3 Mad 33; Latu Mukhi v State, 1969 Cr LJ 1172 : 35 Cut
LT 94; Babu Lal v State, AIR 1960 All 223 [LNIND 1959 ALL 117] , p 226 : 1960 Cr LJ 437 .
734 Budhi Singh v State of HP, 2013 Cr LJ 962 , p 968 (SC) : 2012 (12) Scale 393 .
735 KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 521 ; Hafizullah v State,
AIR 1957 All 377 [LNIND 1957 ALL 27] , p 380 : 1957 Cr LJ 617 ; State v Laikhan Pradhan, AIR 1956 Ori 108 [LNIND
1955 ORI 16] ; Queen v Yasin Sheikh, 12 WR 68 (Cr).
736 Guriya Bucha v State of Gujarat, AIR 1962 Guj 39 [LNIND 1961 GUJ 134] , p 43 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 324 .
738 Queen v Bechoo Saout, 19 WR 35, p 36 (Cr); Jairam Chandrabhan v State of Bombay, AIR 1959 Bom 463 [LNIND
1958 BOM 89] : 1959 Cr LJ 1299 ; Adil Mohamed v R, 9 Cr LJ 32 : 8 Cal LJ 561; Nannhu Gobrya v State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1960 MP 132 [LNIND 1959 MP 148] , p 134 : 1960 Cr LJ 605 ; Re Ramaswamy Konar, 1954 Cr LJ 1545 .
739 Jagar Beg Jat v Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 692 : 38 Cr LJ 1057.
740 Abalu Das v Emperor, ILR 28 Cal 571.
741 Kadir Baksh v Emperor, AIR 1920 Lah 501 , p 504; Raham Shah v Crown, AIR 1925 Lah 114 .
742 Queen v Nakul Nushyo, 7 WR 27 (Cr).
743 Sheikh Rafi v State of AP, 2007 Cr LJ 2746 (SC) : 2007 AIR SCW 2749 : 2007 (3) Supreme 675 : 2007 (6) Scale 74
744 Chanan Khan v Emperor, AIR 1943 Lah 123 , p 125 : 44 Cr LJ 595.
745 State v Jane Bahadur,1960 All LJ 721 : 1960 All WR 556; Bahadur v Emperor, AIR 1935 Pesh 78 ; Jan Muhammad v
Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 861 ; Empress v Khogayi, ILR 2 Mad 122.
746 Bansi v State, AIR 1956 All 668 [LNIND 1956 ALL 61] : 1956 Cr LJ 1272 .
747 KM Nanavati v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC 605 [LNIND 1961 SC 362] , p 626, illusts (a) and (b).
748 Yusuf v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1973 Cr LJ 1220 , p 1225 : 1973 All LJ 111; Nga Po Aung Gyaw v Emperor, AIR 1936
Rang 115 .
749 Mannam Balaswamy v State of Andhra Pradesh, 1980 CLR 75 , p 76 (SC) : 1980 SCC 313 (Cr).
Page 90 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
750 Mahamdu v Emperor, AIR 1945 Sind 42 , p 46 : 46 Cr LJ 614; Raj Kumar v State of Maharashtra, (2009) 15 SCC 292
[LNIND 2009 SC 1504] : (2009) 11 SCR 49 [LNIND 2009 SC 1504] : 2009 (9) Scale 495 [LNIND 2009 SC 1504] .
751 Sartaj Mahammad v State, 2001 Cr LJ 2823 (All) (DB).
752 Queen v Lachan, ILR 8 All 635 : ILR 6 All 822; Chainu v,Emperor, AIR 1926 Oudh 272 : 27 Cr LJ 65.
753 Mehra Mistak v Emperor, AIR 1934 Lah 103 : 151 IC 751; Imam Baksh v Emperor, AIR 1937 Lah 562 : ILR 1937 Lah
206 ; Gosain v Emperor, AIR 1920 All 199 : 18 All LJ 851; Mahamdu v Emperor, AIR 1945 Sind 42 : 46 Cr LJ 614.
754 Re Mala Narayana, AIR 1962 AP 166 : (1962) 1 Cr LJ 394 .
755 Pattani v State, 1993 Cr LJ 1709 (Mad) (DB).
756 Munne Khan v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1971 SC 1491 [LNIND 1970 SC 338] , p 1494 : 1971 BLJR 1080 [LNIND
1970 SC 338] ; Kalu v State, AIR 1965 Raj 74 : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 478 .
757 State v Satish Sangma, AIR 1954 Assam 56 .
758 Ibid.
759 State v Satish Sangma, AIR 1954 Assam 56 ; Padmeshwar Phukan v State, 1971 Cr LJ 1595 , p 1596.
760 Scoria alias Thankan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 2342 .
761 State v Satish Sangma, AIR 1954 Assam 56 ; Padmeshwar Phukan v State, 1971 Cr LJ 1595 , p 1596.
762 Dholia Ravji v State, (1961) 1 Cr LJ 813 , pp 814-815.
763 Jharia Naik v State, 35 Cut LT 322, p 326.
764 Po Mye v King, AIR 1940 Rang 129 , p 132 : 41 Cr LJ 634; Ram Lal v Empress, AIR 1928 Oudh 15 : 28 Cr LJ 1029.
765 Akal Sahu v Emperor, AIR 1948 Pat 62 : 48 Cr LJ 565.
766 Gopal v State of Rajasthan, 2013 Cr LJ 1297 (SC) : 2013 AIR SCW 889 : (2013) 2 SCC 188 [LNIND 2013 SC 37] :
2013 (1) Scale 445 [LNIND 2013 SC 37] ; Krishna Kant Chaturvedi v State of UP, 2013 Cr LJ 1491 (All) (DB).
767 Balbir Singh Balwant Singh v State, AIR 1959 Punj 332 , p 338 : 1959 Cr LJ 901 ; Ram Dahin Singh v State of Bihar,
(1970) 19 Jab LJ 76 (SC) (SN).
768 State of Karnataka v Jinappa Payappa Kudachi, 1993 Cr LJ 3915 (SC).

Page 91 of 104
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769 Ibid.
770 Siryan v Emperor, 17 Cr LJ 270.
771 Kheiri Bewa v State, AIR 1952 Ori 37 [LNIND 1951 ORI 2] , p 39.
772 Damisetti Subbanna v State of Andhra Pradesh, 1976 Cr LJ 1242 , p 1245.
773 Manik Malakar v State of Assam, 1976 Cr LJ 1921 , p 1923.
774 Gurjit Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 1955 (SC) : 2015 (3) Scale 337 [LNIND 2015 SC 144] : (2015) 4 SCC 380
[LNIND 2015 SC 144] .
775 Mazidar Rahman v State of Assam, 1977 Cr LJ 1293 , p 1297 (Gau).
776 State of UP v Chatur Singh, 2006 Cr LJ 545 , p 546 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 745 : 2005 (9) Scale 444 : 2006 (1) All LJ 649.
777 Rajinder Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 1330 (SC) : III (2015) CCR 91 (SC) : 2015 (1) Scale 95 [LNINDORD
2014 SC 19863] .
778 Raj Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 2803 (SC) : (2015) 6 SCC 268 [LNIND 2015 SC 283] : 2015 (5) Scale 492
[LNIND 2015 SC 283] : 2015 AIR SCW 2941.
779 Balbir Singh Balwar Singh v State, AIR 1959 Punj 332 , p 338 : 1959 Cr LJ 901 ; Roopsingh v State of Rajasthan, 1980
Cr LJ 138 (Raj) (NOC); Victor alias Kaloo v State, 1966 Jab LJ 587 .
780 Mohammed Mytheen Shahul Hameed v State of Kerala, AIR 1980 SC 108 , p 111.
781 Munney Khan v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1971) 1 SCR 943 [LNIND 1970 SC 338] : AIR 1971 SC 1491 [LNIND 1970
SC 338] , p 1494; Jhaduram v State of Madhya Pradesh, 1980 Cr LJ 99 (Notes) (MP) (DB).
783 Dev Raj v State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 523 .
784 Kanwarjeet Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1992 SC 2199 .
785 Gundicha Bhoi v State, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 700 , p 702.
786 Scoria alias Thankan v State of Kerala, AIR 1995 SC 3242 .

Page 92 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
787 Ghanshyam v State,1978 A Cr R 415.
788 Empress v Gabardhan Bhuyan, 4 Beng LR (App) 101.
789 King v Nga Pu Gyi, AIR 1938 Rang 441 : 40 Cr LJ 59.
790 Queen v Bulakee Jalahed, 10 WR 9 (Cr).
791 Emperor v Lal Bakhsh, AIR 1945 Lah 43 : 46 Cr LJ 736; Khetri Bewa v State, AIR 1952 Ori 37 [LNIND 1951 ORI 2] ;
Lalman Shivnath v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1971) 1 Cr LJ 176 , p 180; Ram Ration v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR
1977 SC 619 [LNIND 1976 SC 454] , p 622 : (1971) 1 SCC 188 .
792 State of Himachal Pradesh v Bhikham Ram, 2011 Cr LJ 910 , p 915 (HP) : 2010 (3) Shim LC 329.
793 Narinder Kumar v State of Jammu & Kashmir, 2010 Cr LJ 3905 , p 3910 (SC) : AIR 2010 SC 3015 [LNIND 2010 SC
629] : 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 3337 (SC) : JT 2010 (7) SC 454 [LNIND 2010 SC 629] : (2010) 9 SCC 259 [LNIND 2010 SC
629] .
794 Brij Lal v State of Rajasthan, 2016 Cr LJ 4832 (SC) : AIR 2016 SC 3875 [LNIND 2016 SC 331] : 2016(8) Scale 83 :
(2016) 13 SCC 347 [LNIND 2016 SC 331] ; (2016) 166 AIC 199 .
795 Babu Ram v State of Punjab, 2008 Cr LJ 1651 , p 1654 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 260 : (2008) 3 SCC 709 [LNIND 2008 SC
361] : 2008 (2) Scale 499 .
796 State of Uttar Pradesh v Ram Swarup, AIR 1974 SC 1570 [LNIND 1974 SC 472] , p 1574 : 1974 Cr LJ 1035 .
797 Ram Dahin Singh v State of Bihar, 1970 SCC 376 (Cr) : 1970 UJ 592 (SC).
798 Rajesh Kumar v State, (1988) 35 DLT 262 [LNIND 1988 DEL 120] (Del) (DB).
799 Fakiro v Emperor, AIR 1947 Sind 107 : 48 Cr LJ 823; Victor alias Kaloo v State, 1966 Jab LJ 587 ; Motiram Chandiram
v Emperor, AIR 1941 Sind 117 : 42 Cr LJ 789.
800 Sada Ram v State, 71 PLR 428, p 435; State of Assam v Inush Ali, 1982 Cr LJ 1044 (Gau) (DB).
801 Labhu Ram v State of Punjab, 1996 Cr LJ 399 (SC).
802 Harabailu Kariappa v State of Karnataka, 1996 Cr LJ 321 (Kant) (DB).
804 Siryan v Emperor, 17 Cr LJ 270; Yogendra Moraji v State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 660 , p 674; State of Madhya
Pradesh v Sultan, 1980 CLR 66 (MP) (Notes) (DB).
Page 93 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
805 Sada Ram v State, 71 Punj LR 428, p 435; Maniram Dewar v State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 Cr LJ 4232 (Chh) (DB) : 2009
(3) CGLJ 117 .
806 Re Venkataswami Naicker,(1966) 1 Mad LJ 95; Mirza Hidayatullah Baig v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1525 ;
Ghanshyam Dass v State, AIR 1979 SC 44 , p 49; Purnia v State of Orissa, AIR 1979 SC 1454 ; Rafiq v State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 1179 , p 1181 : 1979 Cr LJ 706 ; Mohinder Pal Jolly v State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 577
[LNIND 1978 SC 389] ; Munney Khan v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 2 SCC 491 (Cr) : 1970 Mah LJ 883 [LNIND
1970 SC 338] ; Nakafodi v State, 1958 Cr LJ 834 : 1958 Cr LJ 785 ; Public Prosecutor v Semalai Pannadi, AIR 1960
Mad 240 [LNIND 1959 MAD 76] : 1960 Cr LJ 834 ; Farid v Emperor, 12 Cr LJ 81; Dohariya v State, AIR 1956 MB 23 :
1956 Cr LJ 70 .
807 Mohanan Pillai v State of Kerala, (2009) 16 SCC 287 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 264 .
808 Hanumantappa Krishnappa Mantor v State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 399 .
809 Raj Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 2803 (SC) : (2015) 6 SCC 268 [LNIND 2015 SC 283] : 2015 (5) Scale 492
[LNIND 2015 SC 283] : 2015 AIR SCW 2941.
810 State of Punjab v Jagjit Singh, AIR 1994 SC 1598 ; Pathubha Govindji Rathod v State of Gujarat, AIR 2015 SC 1118
[LNIND 2015 SC 45] : 2015 Cr LJ 1413 (SC) : 2015 (1) Scale 250 [LNIND 2015 SC 20] : (2015) 3 SCC 724 [LNIND
2015 SC 20] (In group fighting accused sustained deep knife blow on back, resorted firing by revolver causing death.
Right of private defence exceeded, accused convicted under section 304, Pt I).
811 Maniram Dewar v State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 Cr LJ 4232 , p 4235 (Chh) (DB) : 2009 (3) CGLJ 117 .
812 Puran Singh v State of Uttaranchal, 2009 Cr LJ (NOC) 850 (Utr) (DB).
813 Dev Raj v State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1994 SC 523 .
814 Tara Chand v State of Haryana, AIR 1971 SC 1891 , p 1897 : 1971 Cr LJ 1411 .
815 State of Punjab v Karnail Singh, AIR 1995 SC 1970 ;See alsoRanbir Singh v State of Haryana, 2009 Cr LJ 3051 : 2009
AIR SCW 3683 : 2009 (7) Scale 310 [LNIND 2009 SC 1053] : (2009) 16 SCC 193 [LNIND 2009 SC 1053] .
816 Jayalakshmi v State of Tamil Nadu, 2009 Cr LJ 2502 , p 2508 (Mad).
817 Samir Nijam Landge v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 3429 , p 3433 (Bom) (DB) : 2006 (2) Bom CR (Cri) 42 .
818 Rati Ram Khadiya v State of Chhattisgarh, 2009 Cr LJ 2563 , p 2567 (Chh) (DB).
819 Ram Phal v State of Haryana, AIR 1993 SC 1979 .
820 Lachmi Koeri v State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat 62 : 1960 Cr LJ 274 .
Page 94 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
821 Noor Muhammed Abdul Samad v State, AIR 1959 Ker 46 [LNIND 1958 KER 173] : 1959 Cr LJ 187 .
822 State of Orissa v Sabu Dalbehera, 31 Cut LT 265, pp 268-269.
823 Gurdutta Mal v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 SC 257 [LNIND 1964 SC 30] : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 242 ; State of Mysore v
Hansamaant Nagappa Gavada, AIR 1965 Mys 150 : (1965) 1 Cr LJ 737 .
824 Kirpal Singh v State, AIR 1951 Punj 137 , p 140 : 52 Cr LJ 1517.
825 Dholia Ravji v State, (1961) 1 Cr LJ 813 ; Shankar v State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC 1532 ; Thommen Thomas
v State of Kerala, AIR 1957 Ker 53 [LNIND 1956 KER 152] : 1957 Cr LJ 635 .
826 Emperor v Bhimji Jeram, 1 Cr LJ 491, 14 Ker LR 24; Garugu Ramayya, 12 Cr LJ 18 : 8 Mad LT 462; Thekkumthatathil
Kelukutti v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 782.
827 State of Maharashtra v Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu, 1981 Cr LJ 9 , pp 16-17 (SC) : AIR 1981 SC 617 .
828 Ibid.
829 Ibid.
830 Krishnan v State of Tamil Nadu, 2006 Cr LJ 3907 , p 3914 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 3037 [LNIND 2006 SC 612] : 2006 (8)
831 Asmat Sheik v Emperor, AIR 1940 Cal 147 .
832 Dakhi Singh v State, AIR 1955 All 379 [LNIND 1955 ALL 14] , p 382 : 56 Cr LJ 905.
833 Ibid.
834 Empress v Subha Naik, ILR 21 Mad 249 : 1 Weir 310.
835 Satyavir Singh Rathi v State through CBI, 2011 Cr LJ 2908 , p 2922 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 1748 [LNIND 2011 SC 475] :
836 R v Ahdul Hakim, ILR 3 All 253.
837 Surinder Kumar v Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1989 SC 1094 [LNIND 1989 SC 140] ; Ravindra Shalik Naik v
State of Maharashtra, 2009 Cr LJ 1549 : AIR 2009 SC 1709 [LNIND 2009 SC 2425] : 2009 (2) Scale 354 [LNIND 2009
SC 2425] ; Babulal Sahu v State of Chhattisgarh, 2011 Cr LJ 3131 : AIR 2011 SC 2530 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 399] ;
Vijendra Kumar v State of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 3851 : 2010 AIR SCW 4414 : 2010 (5) Scale 707 [LNIND 2010 SC 413] ;
State of MP v Shiv Shankar, (2014) 10 SCC 366 [LNINDU 2014 SC 86] : 2014 (10) Scale 608 [LNINDU 2014 SC 86] :
2014 (7) Supreme 1 : 2014 (8) SLT 569 : 2015 Cr LJ 155 : 2014 (4) Crimes 114 (SC); Dilip Kumar Mondal v State of
West Bengal, 2015 Cr LJ 1321 (SC) : 2015 (1) Scale 441 [LNIND 2015 SC 25] : (2015) 3 SCC 433 [LNIND 2015 SC
Page 95 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
25] ; Sanjeev v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 1669 (SC) : 2015 (2) Scale 591 [LNIND 2015 SC 104] : (2015) 4 SCC 387
[LNIND 2015 SC 104] .
838 State of Rajasthan v Islam, 2011 Cr LJ 3110 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 2317 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] : 2011 AIR SCW
3553 : (2011) 6 SCC 343 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] : 2011 (6) Scale 389 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] .
839 Karam Singh v Emperor, AIR 1926 Lah 219 : 27 Cr LJ 459.
840 Jumman v State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 469 , p 474.
841 Abdul Razaq v State, AIR 1960 All 567 [LNIND 1960 ALL 30] , p 568 : 1960 Cr LJ 1179 ; Queen v Zalim Rai, 1 WR 33,
p 34 (Cr); Nga Chit Tin v King, AIR 1939 Rang 225 , p 230 : 40 Cr LJ 725.
842 Bati Kunjami v State, 1996 Cr LJ 1431 (Ori) (DB); Ramesh Narayan alias Andi v State, 1999 Cr LJ 3056 (Cal) (DB);
Rajendra Singh v State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ 2199 (SC); Ramchandran v State of Kerala, 2000 Cr LJ 973 (Ker) (DB);
Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 874 (SC); Suchand Bouri v State of WB, (2009) 17 SCC 63 [LNIND
2009 SC 797] : 2009 Cr LJ 2840 : AIR 2009 SC 2319 [LNIND 2009 SC 797] .
843 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 327 : 1959 Cr LJ 993 .
844 State of Bihar v Mohammad Khursheed, 1968 Cr LJ 574 ; Phukan v State,1980 All LJ 588, p 590 (DB); Jangri Pathak v
State, (1965) 1 Cr LJ 373 (All).
845 Pappu v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC) : AIR 2006 SC 2659 [LNIND 2006 SC 487] : (2006) 7 SCC
846 Bati Kunjami v State, 1996 Cr LJ 1431 (Ori) (DB).
847 Sandhya Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 (SC); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ
3204 (SC); Pappu v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007
Cr LJ 3204 (SC); Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 874 (SC).
848 Sunnu Muduli v Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 168 , p 171 : 48 Cr LJ 838.
850 Hawa Singh v State of Haryana, 2009 Cr LJ 1146 , p 1148 (SC) : 2009 AIR SCW 665 : 2009 (1) Scale 581 [LNIND
2009 SC 87] : (2009) 3 SCC 411 [LNIND 2009 SC 77] .
851 Subhash Shamrao Pachunde v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 546 (SC); Shaukat v State of Uttaranchal, 2010 Cr LJ
4310 , p 4317 : (2010) 5 SCC 68 [LNIND 2010 SC 387] ; Vijendra Kumar v State of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 3851 : 2010 AIR
SCW 4414 : 2010 (5) Scale 707 [LNIND 2010 SC 413] : (2010) 12 SCC 381 [LNIND 2010 SC 413] ; Bhola v State of
HP, 2009 Cr LJ 1885 : AIR 2009 SC 1338 [LNIND 2009 SC 386] : 2009 AIR SCW 1942 : (2009) 11 SCC 460 [LNIND
2009 SC 386] .
852 Sandhya Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 (SC).

Page 96 of 104
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853 Kripal Singh v State, AIR 1951 Punj 137 , p 140; Public Prosecutor v Bonder Siddaiah,(1978) 2 Andh WR 461 : 1978
Mad LJ 698 (Cr).
854 Ramesh Narayan alias Andi v State, 1999 Cr LJ 3056 (Cal) (DB).
855 Kripal Singh v State, AIR 1951 Punj 137 , p 140.
856 Nga Chit Tin v King, AIR 1939 Rang 225 , p 233.
857 Empress v Rohimuddin, ILR 5 Cal 31, p 34; Re Kither Khan, 11 Cr LJ 191; Nga Thawe v Emperor, 13 Cr LJ 272.
858 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 327; Nga Ba Shin v Emperor, AIR
1933 Rang 142 .
859 Lal Singh v Crown, 48 Cr LJ 786.
860 Amrithalinga Nadan v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1976 SC 1133 , p 1138 : 1976 Cr LJ 848 ; Queen v Rajoo Ghose, 7
WR 70 (Cr).
861 Sayaji Hanmat Bankar v State of Maharashtra, 2011 Cr LJ 4338 , p 4339 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 3172 [LNIND 2011 SC
653] : 2011 AIR SCW 4502 : (2011) 7 Scale 710 [LNIND 2011 SC 653] .
862 Atma Singh Kahan Singh v State, AIR 1955 Punj 191 -92 : 56 Cr LJ 1283; Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR
1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 327 : 1959 Cr LJ 993 .
863 Nafe Singh v State of Haryana, 1973 Cr LJ 965 , p 967 : 74 Punj LR 990; Bhagwan Munjali Pawade v State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 133 [LNIND 1978 SC 151] , p 134; Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323
[LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 327 : 1959 Cr LJ 993 ; Thannoo v State, AIR 1959 All 131 [LNIND 1958 ALL 118] , p 132 :
1959 Cr LJ 158 ; Narayanan Nair Raghwan Nair v State of Travancore, AIR 1956 SC 99 [LNIND 1955 KER 138] ;
Sikander alias Mohd Sofia v State (Delhi Admn), 1999 Cr LJ 2098 (SC); Ramchandran v State of Kerala, 2000 Cr LJ
973 (Ker) (DB); Sandhya Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 (SC); Pappu v State of Madhya Pradesh,
2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC); Dilip Kumar Mondal v State of West Bengal, 2015 Cr LJ 1321 (SC) : 2015 (1) Scale 441 [LNIND
2015 SC 25] : (2015) 3 SCC 433 [LNIND 2015 SC 25] .
864 Thonnoo v State, AIR 1959 All 131 [LNIND 1958 ALL 118] -132 : 1959 Cr LJ 158 ; Bati Kunjami v State, 1996 Cr LJ
1431 (Ori) (DB).
865 Nafe Singh v State of Haryana, 1973 Cr LJ 965 , p 967 : 74 PLR 990; Atma Singh Kahan Singh v State, AIR 1955 Punj
191 , p 192 : 56 Cr LJ 1283.
866 Nafe Singh v State of Haryana, 1973 Cr LJ 965 , p 967 : 74 PLR 990.
867 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 327; Bhagwan Munjali Pawade v
State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 133 [LNIND 1978 SC 151] -134; Balani Kani v State of Kerala, 1980 Ker LJ 740 , p
743; Hansraj Singh v Emperor, AIR 1946 Lah 41 , p 43 : 47 Cr LJ 234.
Page 97 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
868 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 327; Atma Singh Kahan Singh v
State, AIR 1955 Punj 191 , p 192; Bati Kunjami v State, 1996 Cr LJ 1451 (Ori) (DB).
869 Pakhar Singh v Emperor, AIR 1948 Lah 75 , p 76 : 49 Cr LJ 110.
870 Balani Kani v State of Kerala, 1980 Ker LT 740 , p 743.
871 Mohammad Mytheen Shahul Hameed v State of Kerala, AIR 1980 SC 108 , p 111; State of MP v Shivshankar, (2014)
10 SCC 366 [LNINDU 2014 SC 86] : 2014 (10) Scale 608 : 2014 (7) Supreme 1 : 2014 (8) SLT 569 : 2015 Cr LJ 155 :
2014 (4) Crimes 114 (SC).
872 Emperor v Babu Ram, AIR 1931 All 8 : 32 Cr LJ 1269; Rawail Chand v State of Uttar Pradesh,1967 All WR 394 (SC).
873 Meredith J, in Sunnu Muduli v Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 168 , p 172 : 48 Cr LJ 838.
874 Nga Chit Tin v King, AIR 1939 Rang 325 , p 328 : 40 Cr LJ 725.
875 Ram Lal v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 939 (HP) (DB).
876 State of Orissa v Khaga, (2013) 14 SCC 649 [LNIND 2013 SC 715] .
877 Baraf Singh v State of Uttaranchal, 2005 Cr LJ 3212 , p 3215 (Utr) (DB) : 2005 (3) UC 1539 .
878 Situ Kandi v State, 1999 Cr LJ 1642 (Ori) (DB); Pappu v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC); Sandhya
Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 (SC); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 3204
(SC); Muthu v State, 2008 Cr LJ 442 : AIR 2008 SC 1 [LNIND 2007 SC 1303] : (2009) 17 SCC 433 [LNIND 2007 SC
1303] ; Gali Venkataiah v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2008 Cr LJ 690 (SC) AIR 2008 SC 462 [LNIND 2007 SC 1317] :
2007 (13) Scale 37 [LNIND 2007 SC 1317] : (2007) 14 SCC 475 [LNIND 2007 SC 1317] ; Dilip Kumar Mondal v State
of West Bengal, 2015 Cr LJ 1321 (SC) : 2015 (1) Scale 441 [LNIND 2015 SC 25] : (2015) 3 SCC 433 [LNIND 2015 SC
25] .
880 Kesar Singh v State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753 [LNIND 2008 SC 1001] .
881 Imtiaz v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 1663 , p 1666 (SC) : 2007 (3) Scale 204 [LNIND 2007 SC 172] : (2007) 15
SCC 299 [LNIND 2007 SC 172] .
882 Hansraj Singh v Emperor, AIR 1946 Lah 41 , p 43.
883 State v Kolis Hira Bhaga, AIR 1961 Guj 8 [LNIND 1960 GUJ 29] , p 11 : (1961) 1 Cr LJ 54 (2).
884 Sita Kandi v State, 1999 Cr LJ 1642 (Ori) (DB); Sandhya Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 (SC); Pappu
v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC).
Page 98 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
885 Gian Singh v State of Punjab, (1972) 74 PLR 974 ; Dilip Kumar Mondal v State of West Bengal, 2015 Cr LJ 1321 (SC))
: 2015 (1) Scale 441 [LNIND 2015 SC 25] : (2015) 3 SCC 433 [LNIND 2015 SC 25] .
886 State of Uttar Pradesh v Jodha Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1822 ; Rajinder Singh v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 1330 (SC)
(Conviction of the appellant under section 302, IPC modified to one under section 304, Pt II, IPC).
887 Brij Pal v State, (1988) 36 DLT 335 [LNIND 1988 DEL 281] (Del); Chenda v State of Chhattisgarh, (2013) 12 SCC 110
[LNIND 2013 SC 773] : 2014 Cr LJ 172 : 2013 (4) Crimes 59 (SC) (Held, case covered by exception 4).
888 Subramani v SHO Odiyansalai, ( 2011 Cr LJ 2897 ).
889 Satish Narayan Sawant v State of Goa, 2009 Cr LJ 4655 , p 4666 (SC) : 2009 AIR SCW 6077 : 2009 (12) Scale 494
[LNINDORD 2009 SC 579] .
890 Jagrup Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 1981 SC 1552 [LNIND 1981 SC 280] ; Sangharaj Bhogappa Kamble v State of
Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 651 [LNIND 2010 SC 1051] : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 370 (Deceased intervener—Accused
inflicted one injury by knife in chest of the deceased—Conviction under section 304, Pt I and not under section 302,
IPC—Five years” RI imposed); Bhagyadhan Pal v State of Orissa, 2015 Cr LJ 1531 (Ori) (DB) (Conviction of accused
under section 302, IPC altered to one under section 304, Pt I, IPC).
891 K Ravi Kumar v State of Karnataka, 2015 Cr LJ 553 (SC) : (2015) 2 SCC 638 [LNIND 2014 SC 976] .
892 Lal Singh v Crown, 48 Cr LJ 786, p 788; Sarjug Prasad v State, AIR 1959 Pat 66 , p 69; State of Madhya Pradesh v
Mangu Kisan, AIR 1967 MP 167 [LNIND 1966 MP 89] : 1966 Jab LT 1047, p 1051.
893 Ashok Babu Mali v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 944 .
894 Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2013 SC 2454 [LNIND 2013 SC 502] : (2013) 6 SCC 770 [LNIND
2013 SC 502] : 2013 Cr LJ 3044 : 2013 AIR SCW 3153.
895 Balu Onkar Pund v State of Maharashtra, AIR 2015 SC 949 [LNIND 2015 SC 70] , p 953 : (2015) 3 SCC 409 [LNIND
2015 SC 70] : 2015 (2) JT 36 : 2015 (2) Scale 147 [LNIND 2015 SC 70] : 2015 (2) SLT 116 : 2015 (1) Crimes 181 (SC).
896 Shaukat v State of Uttaranchal, 2010 Cr LJ 4310 : 2010 AIR SCW 5017 : (2010) 5 SCC 68 [LNIND 2010 SC 387] :
(2010) 4 Scale 299 [LNIND 2010 SC 387] .
897 Felix Ambrose D’Souza v State of Karnatkaa, (2009) 16 SCC 361 : 2010 (3) SCC (Cr) 294 : 2003 (2) Crimes 78 (SC).
898 Gaman v Crown, 48 Cr LJ 590, p 597.
899 Jai Pal Singh v State, 1996 Cr LJ 4097 (Del).
900 State of Rajasthan v Islam, 2011 Cr LJ 3110 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 2317 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] : 2011 AIR SCW
3553 : (2011) 6 SCC 343 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] : 2011 (6) Scale 389 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 309] .
Page 99 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
901 Bhola v State of HP, 2009 Cr LJ 1885 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 1338 [LNIND 2009 SC 386] : 2009 AIR SCW 1942.
902 Chenda v State of Chhattisgarh, 2014 Cr LJ 172 , p 173 (SC) : 2013 AIR SCW 6260 : (2013) 12 SCC 110 [LNIND 2013
SC 773] .
903 Ravindra Shalik Naik v State of Maharashtra, 2009 Cr LJ 1549 , p 1550 (SC) : AIR 2009 SC 1709 [LNIND 2009 SC
2425] : 2009 (2) Scale 354 [LNIND 2009 SC 2425] .
904 Kulesh Mondal v State of West Bengal, 2008 Cr LJ 325 (SC) : AIR 2007 SC 3228 [LNIND 2007 SC 1043] : 2007 AIR
SCW 5880; Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1023 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 927
[LNIND 2008 SC 18] : 2008 (1) Scale 118 [LNIND 2008 SC 18] ; A Maharaj v State of Tamil Nadu, 2009 Cr LJ 315 (SC)
: AIR 2009 SC 480 [LNIND 2008 SC 2235] : CLT (2009) Sup. Crl 307 : JT 2008 (12) SC 111 [LNIND 2008 SC 2235] :
905 Dharam Pal v State of UP, 2008 Cr LJ 1016 , p 1023 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 920 [LNIND 2008 SC 6] : 2008 (1) Scale 9
[LNIND 2008 SC 6] : 2008 (1) All LJ 721.
906 Iqbal Singh v State of Punjab, 2008 Cr LJ 4679 , p 4682 (SC) : 2008 AIR SCW 6368 : 2008 (11) Scale 599 [LNIND
2008 SC 1671] : (2008) 11 SCC 698 [LNIND 2008 SC 1671] .
907 Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1023 , p 1025 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 927
[LNIND 2008 SC 18] : 2008 (1) Scale 118 [LNIND 2008 SC 18] : 2008 AIR SCW 370.
908 Shaikh Majid v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1062 , p 1065 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 1091 [LNIND 2008 SC 3023] :
2008 (1) Scale 561 [LNIND 2008 SC 3023] .
909 Sandhya Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 (SC) : 2006 SCC (Cri) 394 : 2006 (3) Scale 665 [LNIND
2006 SC 230] : (2006) 4 SCC653.
910 Surendra Singh v State of Uttaranchal, 2006 Cr LJ 2461 : AIR 2006 SC 1920 [LNIND 2006 SC 323] : 2006 (4) Scale
647 [LNIND 2006 SC 323] : (2006) 9 SCC 531 [LNIND 2006 SC 323] .
911 Rakesh v State of MP, 2008 Cr LJ 1646 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 1229 [LNIND 2008 SC 298] : 2008 AIR SCW 1229 : 2008
(2) Scale 375 [LNIND 2008 SC 298] .
912 Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 3204 (SC) : AIR 2007 SC 1904 [LNIND 2007 SC 761] : 2007 (8)
Scale 95 [LNIND 2007 SC 761] : 2007 (4) Supreme 581 ; A Maharaja v State of Maharashtra, 2009 Cr LJ 315 (SC) :
AIR 2009 SC 480 [LNIND 2008 SC 2235] : CLT (2009) Supp Crl 307 : JT 2008 (12) SC 111 [LNIND 2008 SC 2235] :
913 Gurdev Raj v State of Punjab, 2008 Cr LJ 382 , p 386 (SC) : 2007 (7) Supreme 417 : 2011 (11) Scale 729 .
914 Ravi Kumar v State of Punjab, 2005 Cr LJ 1742 : (2005) 9 SCC 315 [LNIND 2005 SC 230] : 2005 (2) Supreme 402 .
915 Public Prosecutor v Somasundaram, AIR 1959 Mad 323 [LNIND 1958 MAD 115] , p 327; Sita Kandi v State, 1999 Cr
LJ 1642 (Ori) (DB); Ram Chandran v State of Kerala, 2000 Cr LJ 973 (Ker) (DB).
Page 100 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
916 Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 874 (SC) : AIR 2007 SC 363 [LNIND 2006 SC 1043] .
917 Nanka Ram v State of Rajasthan, (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 82 : (2014) 136 AIC 59 (SC) : 2014 Cr LJ 1843 .
918 State of Orissa v Khaga, (2013) 14 SCC 649 [LNIND 2013 SC 715] : 2013 (10) Scale 413 [LNIND 2013 SC 715] : 2013
(6) Supreme 209 : 2013 (7) SLT 616 : 2013 (4) Crimes 67 (SC).
919 Gobinda Soren v State of Odisha, 2014 Cr LJ 197 , pp 199, 200 (Ori) (DB) (Sania Dora v State of Odisha, (1984) 1 Ori
LR 665 (Ori) and Mandangi Samburu v State of Odisha, 1985 (1) OCR 271 (Ori) followed; Sukra Munda v State of
Odisha, 2014 Cr LJ 275 (Ori) (DB).
920 Sanjeev Girraj Kirar v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2014 Cr LJ 512 (MP) (DB).
921 Kulesh Mondal v State of West Bengal, 2008 Cr LJ 325 (SC) : AIR 2007 SC 3228 [LNIND 2007 SC 1043] : 2007 AIR
SCW 5880; Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1023 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 927
[LNIND 2008 SC 18] : 2008 (1) Scale 118 [LNIND 2008 SC 18] ; A Maharaj v State of Tamil Nadu, 2009 Cr LJ 315
(SC).
922 Nirmal Singh v State, 2011 Cr LJ 2258 , p 2267 (Del).
923 Mohammad Iqbal v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2012 Cr LJ 337 , p 342 (Chh) (DB).
924 Suresh Chandra v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2005 Cr LJ 3449 (SC).
925 Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 874 (SC); Kulesh Mondal v State of West Bengal, 2008 Cr LJ 325
(SC) : AIR 2007 SC 3228 [LNIND 2007 SC 1043] : 2007 (10) Scale 637 [LNIND 2007 SC 1043] : (2007) 8 SCC 578
[LNIND 2007 SC 1043] ; Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1023 (SC) : AIR
2008 SC 927 [LNIND 2008 SC 18] : 2008 (1) Scale 118 [LNIND 2008 SC 18] : (2008) 14 SCC 491 [LNIND 2008 SC
18] .
926 Ibid; Kulesh Mondal v State of West Bengal, 2008 Cr LJ 325 (SC) : AIR 2007 SC 3228 [LNIND 2007 SC 1043] : 2007
AIR SCW 5880; Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan Nayar v State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ 1023 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC
927 Mayadhar Paramanik v State,(1971) 1 Cut WR 779 : 1971 Cut LT 582; Sandhya Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006
Cr LJ 2111(SC) ; Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 3204 (SC); Pappu v State of Madhya Pradesh,
2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC); Bangaru Venkata Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2008 Cr LJ 4353 (SC); Rakesh v State of
MP, 2008 Cr LJ 1646 (SC) : AIR 2008 SC 1229 [LNIND 2008 SC 298] : 2008 AIR SCW 1229 : 2008 (2) Scale 375
[LNIND 2008 SC 298] ; Thankachan v State of Kerala, AIR 2008 SC 406 [LNIND 2007 SC 1325] : 2007 AIR SCW
7153 : 2007 (11) SCR 1128 ; Suresh Kumar v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2008 Cr LJ 2247 : AIR 2008 SC 1973
[LNIND 2008 SC 766] : 2008 (4) Scale 173 .
928 Bahal Singh v State, 1971 Cr LJ 532 , p 535 (All); Babu v State, (2013) 4 SCC 448 [LNIND 2013 SC 267] : AIR 2013
SC 1769 [LNIND 2013 SC 267] : 2013 Cr LJ 2176 .
929 State of Madhya Pradesh v Mangu Kisan, 1966 Jab LJ 1047 , pp 1051-1052 : AIR 1967 MP 167 [LNIND 1966 MP 89] ;
Re Thippanna,1971 Mad LJ 200 (Cr).
Page 101 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
930 Narayanan Nair Raghavan Nair v State of Travancore and Cochin, AIR 1956 SC 99 [LNIND 1955 KER 138] , p 101;
Thannoo v State, AIR 1959 All 131 [LNIND 1958 ALL 118] ; Ali Mohammad v Emperor, AIR 1936 Sind 31 ; Mir Zaman
v Emperor, AIR 1937 Pesh 101 .
931 Po Kin v Emperor, 1 Cr LJ 1128, p 1130; Basappa Bhimappa Doddamani v State, AIR 1961 Mys 21 ; Syed Ahmed v
King, AIR 1938 Rang 15 , p 16; Umar Khushal v Emperor, AIR 1940 Pesh 1 , p 2; Re Thippanna, 1971 Cr LJ 1640 , p
1649 : 1971 Mad LJ 200 (Cr).
932 Amrithalinga Nadar v State of Tamil Nadu, 1975 CLR 632 (SC) : 1975 UJ 883 (SC); Nga Ba Shin v Emperor, AIR 1933
Rang 142 , p 144; Kaplesh Kumar v State of Gujarat, (2009) 16 SCC 343 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 286 (Accused inflicted
knife injury on left side of chest of the deceased causing death, the deceased was going to class-room. Accused was
convicted under section 302, IPC); See alsoVijendra Kumar v State of Delhi, (2010) 12 SCC 381 [LNIND 2010 SC 413]
: 2010 (5) Scale 707 [LNIND 2010 SC 413] : 2010 (4) SLT 385 : 2010 Cr LJ 3851 ; Shaukat v State of Uttranchal,
(2010) 5 SCC 68 [LNIND 2010 SC 387] : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1238 [LNIND 2010 SC 387] : 2010 (4) Scale 299 [LNIND
2010 SC 387] : 2010 (4) SLT 15 : 2010 Cr LJ 4310 .
933 Vijender Kumar v State of Delhi, 2010 Cr LJ 3851 (SC) : 2010 AIR SCW 4414 : 2010 (5) Scale 707 [LNIND 2010 SC
413] .
934 Dilip Kumar Mondal v State of West Bengal, 2015 Cr LJ 1321 (SC) : 2015 (1) Scale 441 [LNIND 2015 SC 25] : (2015) 3
SCC 433 [LNIND 2015 SC 25] . See alsoAhmed Shah v State of Rajasthan, 2015 Cr LJ 1398 (SC) : 2015 (1) Scale
222 [LNIND 2015 SC 21] : (2015) 3 SCC 93 [LNIND 2015 SC 21] and Sanjeev v State of Haryana, 2015 Cr LJ 1669
(SC) : 2015 (2) Scale 591 [LNIND 2015 SC 104] : (2015) 4 SCC 387 [LNIND 2015 SC 104] .
935 Bangaru Venkata Rao v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2008 Cr LJ 4353 , p 4355 (SC).
936 Anil v State of Haryana, 2007 Cr LJ 4294 , p 4298 (SC) : 2007 (7) Scale 56 [LNIND 2007 SC 629] : 2007 (5) Supreme
15 .
937 Kripal Singh v State, AIR 1951 Punj 137 , p 140; Thannoo v State, AIR 1959 All 131 [LNIND 1958 ALL 118] .
938 Re Rahiman Khan Sahib, AIR 1938 Mad 403 [LNIND 1937 MAD 369] , p 405; Basappa Bhimappa Doddamani v State,
AIR 1961 Mys 21 , p 24; Lohana Govind Jamnadas v State of Gujarat,1980 Guj LT (SN) 161; Lal Singh v Crown, 48 Cr
LJ 786; Jagat Narain v Emperor, AIR 1945 Oudh 31 ; Shyam Lal v State, 1971 Cr LJ 978 , p 982 : 1971 All LJ 439;
Suresh Chandra v State of UP, 2005 Cr LJ 3449 : AIR 2005 SC 3120 [LNIND 2005 SC 543] : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1364 .
939 Ratan Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1973 Cr LJ 1101 , p 1103 : 1973 All LJ 303; Abdul Aziz v Emperor, AIR 1933 Pat
508 : (1934) 35 Cr LJ 725 ; Basic v State, AIR 1953 All 668 [LNIND 1953 ALL 77] : 1953 Cr LJ 1505 .
940 Dhani v State of Rajasthan, 1973 Cr LJ 1336 , p 1340 : 1973 Raj LW 274 .
941 Sarjug Prasad v State, AIR 1959 Pat 66 , p 69.
942 Babulal Sahu v State of of Chhattisgarh, 2011 Cr LJ 3131 , p 3132 (SC) : AIR 2011 SC 2530 [LNINDORD 2011 SC
399] : 2011 AIR SCW 3617 : 2011 (6) Scale 206 [LNINDORD 2011 SC 399] .
943 Mohomed Ghouse v State, (1965) 2 Cr LJ 288 (Mys) (DB), followingDharman v State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 324 :
1957 Cr LJ 420 ; Jumman v State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 469 : 1957 Cr LJ 586 .
Page 102 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
944 Surinder Kumar v Union Territory, Chandigarh, AIR 1989 SC 1094 [LNIND 1989 SC 140] .
945 Dharman v State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 324 , p 326; Babu v State, (2013) 4 SCC 448 [LNIND 2013 SC 267] : AIR
2013 SC 1769 [LNIND 2013 SC 267] ; Raj Paul Singh v State, (2012) 10 SCC 144 [LNIND 2012 SC 647] : (2012) 8
SCR 1203 [LNIND 2012 SC 647] : 2012 (10) Scale 137 [LNIND 2012 SC 647] (Deceased unarmed, Accused gave
knife blow—exception 4 not attracted); Dilip Kumar Mondal v State of West Bengal, 2015 Cr LJ 1321 (SC) : 2015 (1)
946 Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 874 , p 877 (SC) : AIR 2007 SC 363 [LNIND 2006 SC 1043] :
947 Suresh Chandra v State of UP, 2005 Cr LJ 3449 , p 3451 : AIR 2005 SC 3120 [LNIND 2005 SC 543] : 2005 SCC (Cr)
1364.
948 Saddik v State of Gujarat, 2017 Cr LJ 149 (SC) : AIR 2016 SC 5101 [LNIND 2016 SC 401] : (2016) 10 SC 663 : 2016
(9) Scale 492 .
949 Jagir Singh v State of Haryana, 1996 Cr LJ 2693 (P&H) (DB).
950 Sharad v State of Maharashtra, (2010) 15 SCC 560 [LNIND 2009 SC 1922] : 2009 (14) Scale 179 [LNIND 2009 SC
1922] : 2009 (9) SLT 720 ; Mukesh v State of MP, (2010) 15 SCC 585 : 2002 (6) JT 310 ; Rampal Singh v State of UP,
(2012) 8 SCC 289 [LNIND 2012 SC 425] : 2012 Cr LJ 3765 (Case of single shot); Buddhu Singh v State of Bihar,
(2011) 14 SCC 471 [LNIND 2011 SC 466] : (2011) 5 SCR 962 : 2011 (6) JT 617 (Single axe blow); Bhimanna v State of
Karnataka, (2012) 9 SCC 650 [LNIND 2012 SC 529] : AIR 2012 SC 3026 [LNIND 2012 SC 529] : (2012) 7 SCR 909 :
2012 (8) JT 298 : 2012 (8) Scale 457 [LNIND 2012 SC 529] ; Johny v State of Kerala, (2011) 14 SCC 158 : 2012 (3)
SCC(Cr) 1284; see alsoRanjitham v Basavaraj, (2012) 1 SCC 414 [LNIND 2011 SC 1185] : AIR 2012 SC 1856
[LNIND 2011 SC 1185] : 2011 (13) JT 480 : 2011 (13) Scale 221 [LNIND 2011 SC 1185] : 2011 (8) Supreme 260 :
2012 Cr LJ 2135 .
951 Ranjitham v Basavaraj, 2012 Cr LJ 2135 (SC) : AIR 2012 SC 1856 [LNIND 2011 SC 1185] : (2012) 1 SCC 414 [LNIND
2011 SC 1185] : 2012 AIR SCW 2205 : 2011 (3) Scale 221 .
952 Mohd Asif v State of Uttranchal, 2009 Cr LJ 2789 : (2009) 11 SCC 497 [LNIND 2009 SC 558] ; Sukhda v State of
Punjab, (2007) 15 SCC 364 [LNIND 2007 SC 815] : 2007 (9) JT 257 : 2007 (8) Scale 649 [LNIND 2007 SC 815] ;
Maniben v State of Gujarat, (2009) 8 SCC 796 [LNIND 2009 SC 1643] : AIR 2010 SC 1261 [LNIND 2009 SC 1643] :
(2009) 12 SCR 753 [LNIND 2009 SC 1643] : 2009 (3) Crimes 298 [LNIND 2009 SC 1643] (SC).
953 Ramesh Krishna Madhusudan, AIR 2008 SC 927 [LNIND 2008 SC 18] : 2008 Cr LJ 1023 : (2008) 14 SCC 491 [LNIND
2008 SC 18] ; Arumugam v State, AIR 2009 SC 331 [LNIND 2008 SC 1994] : (2008) 15 SCC 590 [LNIND 2008 SC
1994] ; Raghubir Singh v State of Haryana, AIR 2009 SC 1223 [LNIND 2008 SC 2228] : (2008) 16 SCC 33 [LNIND
2008 SC 2228] .
954 Bati Kunjami v State, 1996 Cr LJ 1431 (Ori) (DB); Situ Kandi v State, 1999 Cr LJ 1642 (Ori) (DB); Sandhya Jadhav v
State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 (SC); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 3204 (SC); Pappu
v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 3204 (SC);
Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 874 (SC); See alsoGolla Yelugu Govindu v State of AP, AIR 2008
SC 1842 [LNIND 2008 SC 751] : 2008 Cr LJ 2607 : (2008) 16 SCC 769 [LNIND 2008 SC 751] ; Trimbak v State of
Maharashtra, (2008) 17 SCC 213 [LNIND 2008 SC 571] : 2008 (3) Scale 405 [LNIND 2008 SC 571] ; Hawa Singh v
State of Haryana, (2009) 3 SCC 411 [LNIND 2009 SC 77] : 2009 Cr LJ 1146 .
Page 103 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
955 Sita Kandi v State, 1999 Cr LJ 1642 (Ori) (DB); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 3204 (SC);
Pappu v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ 3204
(SC); Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 874 (SC).
956 Sita Kandi v State, 1999 Cr LJ 1642 (Ori) (DB).
957 Sandhya Jadhav v State of Maharashtra, 2006 Cr LJ 2111 (SC); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007 Cr LJ
3204 (SC); Pappu v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2006 Cr LJ 3640 (SC); Byvarapu Raju v State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007
Cr LJ 3204 (SC); Naveen Chandra v State of Uttaranchal, 2007 Cr LJ 874 (SC).
958 Queen v Baboolan Hijrah, 5 WR 7 (Cr).
959 Vijay alias Gyanchand Jain v State of Madhya Pradesh, (1994) JT 5 SC 528.
960 Ibid.
961 Empress v Rohimuddin, ILR 5 Cal 31, p 34.
962 Ujagar Singh v Emperor, AIR 1918 Lah 145 , p 146 : 19 Cr LJ 125.
963 Empress v Nayamuddin, ILR 18 Cal 484 (FB); Po Set v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 345.
964 Empress v Nayamuddin, ILR 18 Cal 484, p 490.
965 Shamshere Khan v Empress, ILR 6 Cal 154, p 158.
966 Empress v Nayamuddin, ILR 18 Cal 484 (FB), dissenting from Shamshere Khan v Empress, ILR 6 Cal 154.
967 Po Set v Emperor, 11 Cr LJ 345.
968 O’Kinealy J, in Empress v Nayamuddin, ILR 18 Cal 484, p 492 (FB).
969 Po Set v Emperor, (1910) 11 Cr LJ 345 ; Rajinder Kumar Sharma v State, 1996 Cr LJ 2510 (Del) (DB).
970 Sukaroo Kabiraj v Empress, ILR 14 Cal 566, p 568.
971 Dasrath Paswan v State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 190 ; Queen v Anunto Rurnagat, 6 WR 57 (Cr).
972 Narendra v State of Rajasthan, 2014 (10) SCC 248 [LNINDU 2014 SC 77] : 2014 Cr LJ 4396 : 2014 (10) JT 96 : 2014
(10) Scale 62 [LNINDU 2014 SC 77] .
973 Queen v Anunto Rurnagat, 6 WR 57 (Cr).

Page 104 of 104
[s 300] Murder.—
974 Kanaga Kasvan v Emperor, AIR 1931 Mad 436 ; Re Nainmuthu Kannappan, AIR 1940 Mad 138 ; Re Ambalathi
Assainar, AIR 1956 Mad 97 , wherein a contrary view was taken.
975 Re Nainamuthu Kannappan, AIR 1940 Mad 138 ; Kanaga Kosvan v Emperor, AIR 1931 Mad 436 ; Re Ambalathi
Assainar, AIR 1956 Mad 97 , but see wherein a contrary view was taken.
976 Masum Ali v Emperor, AIR 1929 Lah 50 .
977 Queen v Poonai Fattehmal, 12 WR 7 (Cr).
End of Document
[s 301] Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person
whose death was intended.—


312-318);
16.3 “Homicide”
Page 2 of 7
[s 301] Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person whose death was intended.—
classified as:
IPC);
(section 79, IPC);
IPC);
when:
88, IPC), or
Page 3 of 7
[s 301] Culpable homicide by causing death of person other than person

whose death was intended.—
If a person, by doing anything which he intends or knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable
homicide by causing the death of any person, whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to
cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the description of which it would have been if he
had caused the death of the person, whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.
[s 301.1] Scope
Section 301, IPC does not enact any rule not deducible from sections 299 and 300, IPC; it merely declares, in
plain language, an important rule deducible from the said sections just as an explanation to a section does. The
rule cannot well be stated as an explanation to either section 299 or section 300 as it relates to both. It was,
therefore, found most convenient to state the rule by means of a fresh section. The rule makes it clear that
culpable homicide may be committed by causing the death of a person whom the offender neither intended, nor
knew himself to be likely to kill, a rule which, though it does not lie on the surface of section 299 yet, is
deducible from the generality of the words “causes death” and from the illustration to the section; and the rule
Page 4 of 7
then goes on to state that the quality of the homicide, that is, whether it amounts to murder or not, will depend
on the intention or knowledge which the offender had in regard to the person intended or known to be likely, to
be killed or injured, and not with reference to his intention or knowledge with regard to the person actually killed,
a rule deducible from the language of sections 299 and 300 though not, perhaps, lying on their very surface.978
[s 301.2] Object
The law affords protection equally to the lives of all persons, and once the criminal intention, ie, an intention to
destroy human life, is found, it does not make any difference whether the act, done with such intention, causes
the death of the person aimed at, or of someone else. Illustration (a) to section 299, IPC makes it quite clear
that the Legislature deliberately employed general and unqualified language in order to cover cases where the
person, whose death is caused by the act of the accused, was not the person intended to be killed by him, but
some other person. This section, ie, section 301, IPC, also supports this construction as it assumes that the
accused, in such cases, would be guilty of culpable homicide. The object of this section is to lay down that the
nature of culpable homicide of which the accused in these cases would be guilty, namely whether murder or
not, would be the same as he would have been guilty of if the person, whose death was intended to be brought
about, had been killed.979
[s 301.3] Applicability
The section applies to cases where the accused causes the death of another whose death he neither intends,
nor knows himself likely, to cause.980 In other words, the section applies where the death of the person, whose
death is intended, or known to be likely to occur, by the person doing the act does not, as a fact, occur, but the
death of someone else occurs as a result of the act done by him. It does not apply where the death—both of
the persons whose death was in contemplation and of another person or persons—has occurred.981 The
accused’s intention or knowledge of the effect of his act in relation to the unintended or accidental victim is
presumed not to exist at all in a case to which section 301 can apply982 because this section clearly makes
culpable homicide murder notwithstanding the fact that there was no intention actually to commit the murder of
the particular person killed.983
[s 301.4] Section 301 and Section 304A
Where the accused persons were alleged to have fired freely towards the fleeing complainant party, the first
shot injured one person and the second shot resulted in the death of the 10-year old son of the complainant,
the gun was not fired in the air just to frighten the complainant and his companion, the firing was resorted to in a
locality where there were a number of shops, these circumstances attract section 300 read with section 301,
IPC, and not section 304-A, as the death of a person other than whose death intended was caused.984
[s 301.5] Doctrine of Transfer of Malice
The provision is founded on a doctrine called a transfer of malice by Halo and Foster. Others describe it as a
transmigration of motive. Coke calls it coupling the event with the intention and the end with the cause. If the
killing takes place in the course of doing an act which a person intends or knows to be likely to cause death, it
ought to be treated as if the real intention of the killer had been actually carried out.985 Where, though initially,
the malice was focused on prosecution witness, the fact that all the accused chased and assaulted the
deceased is a case of transfer of malice.986
The section embodies a well-established principle of criminal jurisprudence based on the doctrine of transferred
malice. It is settled law that where a blow, aimed at one person, falls upon another and kills him, the offence
committed by the assailant is the same as it would have been if the blow had struck the intended victim.987 It is
clear that even though the accused intended to cause the death of prosecution witness and the stab, which was
aimed at prosecution witness, fell on the chest of the deceased, which resulted in the death of the deceased, as
per the principle of “transfer of malice”, it must be presumed that the accused had the intention to cause the
death of the deceased alone. Hence, the act committed by the accused to commit the murder of prosecution
witness, which, unfortunately, caused the death of the deceased would attract the offence under section 301,
read with section 302, IPC, and consequently, the conviction imposed on the accused by the trial court, for the
offence under section 301 read with section 302, IPC.988
Page 5 of 7
[s 301.5.1] Conviction under section 326 Based on Doctrine of Transfer of Malice
Where the stab was aimed at the mother, but it hit the child in her arms causing his death, it was held that the
accused was liable neither for the offence of murder nor for that of culpable homicide, even by operation of
section 301, there being no material to show that the identical stab, if it had fallen on the mother, against whom
it was aimed, would have caused her death. The offence made out was held to be one under section 326, since
the conviction of the accused could be sustained on the basis of the doctrine of transfer of malice embodied in
section 301.989
[s 301.6] Applicability of Section 34 to Cases under Section 301
In Wazir Singh v State of Punjab,990 an interesting point as to the applicability of section 34 to cases falling
under section 301, IPC, was raised, but it was left undecided. There, the accused and one X, who were both
armed with rifles and had the common intention of killing B, fired their rifles at him. It so happened that at the
time of firing, there was also one S with B. Both of them began to run and B succeeded in hiding himself behind
a tree, but S was fatally injured by the shots. It could not be found as to whose shots caused the fatal injuries.
The question arose whether the common intention to kill B could, by virtue of section 301, be transferred so as
to operate on the matter of murder of S, there being, at no time, any common intention entertained between the
accused and X to commit the murder of S. The point was left undecided as the appeal was limited to the
question of sentence and the decision of the said point, one way or the other, was not to affect the sentence
passed. In Ganga Singh v State,991 the court observed the expression “in furtherance of the common intention
of all”, in section 34, IPC, need not necessarily relate to the person actually killed. It is sufficient for the
application of section 34, IPC, that the “common intention of several persons”, contemplated therein, is to
commit culpable homicide, irrespective of any specified person. In such a case, each member shall be liable for
the act resulting in murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, as the case may be. In Shankarlal
Kacharabhai v State,992 the Supreme Court pointed out that, under section 301, IPC, if A intends to kill B but
kills C whose death he neither intends nor knows himself to be likely to cause, the intention to kill C is, by law,
attributed to him. If A aims his shots at B, but it misses B, either because B moves out of the range of the shot
or because the shot misses the mark, and hits some other person C, whether within sight or out of sight, A will
be deemed, under section 301, to have hit C with the intention to kill him. What is to be noticed is that to invoke
section 301, A shall not have any intention to cause the death, or the knowledge that he is likely to cause the
death of C. If this condition is not complied with and the accused shoots at a particular person with the intention
of killing him, though under a misapprehension of his identity, all the ingredients of sections 299 and 300, IPC
are complied with. The aid of section 301, IPC is not called for.
[s 301.7] Applicability of Section 149 to Cases under Section 301
Though section 149, IPC, may not in a given case apply to a case covered by section 301, it would depend
upon the factual background involved. No hard and fast rule of universal application can be invoked.993
Where the accused aimed a blow with a sharp dao at B, but instead of killing B, it struck a child in his arms and
killed it, it was held that the offence was of murder punishable under section 301.994 Similarly, where a blow was
aimed at a woman, but, she having ducked, it struck another woman and killed her, it was held that the
assailant was guilty of murder by virtue of this section.995 If an accused intends to kill a particular person but he
kills another, he is guilty of an offence under section 301.996 The accused, with the intention of killing A gave
him poisoned sweet halwa to eat. A ate a little and threw away the rest. It was picked up by B who ate it and
died. It was held that the accused was guilty of murder.997 So also, where the accused mixed poison in halwa
with the intention of killing her husband, but another man also partook of the halwa and died, it was held that
the accused was guilty of murder.998 Where the intention of the accused was to cause the death of a particular
person but his act of taking a lorry at a high speed with the intention of hitting against that “particular person”
and killing him really resulted in causing the death of deceased and the fact that the deceased sustained the
fatal injuries not as a result of the direct hitting of the lorry but due to the fall of pillar and its debris on the body
of the deceased would not also change the position. Since the accused’s intention in taking the lorry was to kill
“another person” and the overt act committed by the accused in furtherance of his intention was so imminently
dangerous that it must in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death, and
hence, the offence committed by the accused would squarely fall under section 301 and would amount to
murder and the accused would be liable to be convicted for an offence punishable under section 302.999 Where
the accused persons fired freely at the fleeing complainant party, the first shot injured one person and the
Page 6 of 7
second shot resulted in the death of a 10 year old boy of the complainant, which was not intended by the
accused, the offence committed by accused was murder under section 300 read with 301, IPC and not under
section 304A, IPC.1000
Where the deceased received a single blow, by knife in the abdomen by the accused while intervening to save
her brother from being attacked by the accused, the accused can be clothed with knowledge and not intention
that the injury was likely to cause death and so the offence would fall under section 304, Pt II, IPC and not
SC 773].
978 Ganga Singh v State, (1980) Cr LJ 235 , p 239 (All) (DB); Public Prosecutor v Mushunooru Suryanarayanamoorty, 13
Cr LJ 145, p 147 (Mad); Jeani v Emperor, 15 All LJ 13 : 17 Cr LJ 505; Ballon v State, AIR 1955 All 626 [LNIND 1955
ALL 71] : (1955) Cr LJ 1448 (All).
979 Re Public Prosecutor v Mushunooru Suryanarayanamoorty, 13 Cr LJ 145.
980 Re Girada Narayana, AIR 1963 AP 146 [LNIND 1962 AP 108] , p 148 : (1963) 1 Cr LJ 415 .
981 Re Public Prosecutor v Mushunooru Suryanarayanamoorty, 13 Cr LJ 145.
982 Koran Singh v State, (1965) All LJ 52 : (1965) AWR 132 .
983 Ballon v State, AIR 1955 All 626 [LNIND 1955 ALL 71] .
984 Abdul Ise Suleman v State of Gujarat, AIR 1994 SC 1910 [LNIND 1994 SC 209] .
985 State of Maharashtra v Kashirao, (2003) Cr LJ 4464 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 3901 [LNIND 2003 SC 716] .
986 Ibid.
987 Suba v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 344 , p 346, 29 Cr LJ 280; Shankarlu Kacharabhai v State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC
1260 [LNIND 1964 SC 230] , p 1263; Public Prosecutor v Mushunoorn Suryanarayanamoorty, 13 Cr LJ 145;
Viswanatha Pillai v State of Kerala, (1994) Cr LJ 1037 (Ker) (DB); Jagpal Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 982 :
(1991) Cr LJ 597 (SC).
Page 7 of 7
988 Nagaraj v State, (2006) Cr LJ 3724 (Mad) (DB).
989 Kurien v State of Kerala, (1975) Ker LT 748 .

990 Wazir Singh v State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 754 .
991 Ganga Singh v State, (1980) Cr LJ 235 , p 239 (All) (DB).
992 Shankarlal Kacharabhai v State, AIR 1965 SC 1260 [LNIND 1964 SC 230] , p 1263 : (1965) 1 SCWR 750 .
993 State of Maharashtra v Kashirao, (2003) Cr LJ 4464 (SC) : AIR 2003 SC 3901 [LNIND 2003 SC 716] .
994 Queen v Phomonee Ahun, 8 WR 78 (Cr); Gyanendra Kumar v State, AIR 1972 SC 502 [LNIND 1971 SC 601] : (1972)
Cr LJ 308 ; Dan Behari v State of UP, (2003) Cr LJ 4959 (SC).
995 Suba v Emperor, AIR 1928 Lah 344 ; Ballon v State, AIR 1955 All 626 [LNIND 1955 ALL 71] : (1955) Cr LJ 1448 (All);
Re Subramaniam, (1980) Mad LJ 633, p 637.
996 Hari Shankar v State of Mysore, (1980) SCC 107 , p 108.
997 Public Prosecutor v Mashanooru Suryanarayanamoorty, 13 Cr LJ 145.
998 Jeoni v Emperor, 15 All LJ 13 : 17 Cr LJ 505; Boreddi Kondamma, AIR 1945 Mad 293 .
999 Padmonabhan Ganga v State of Kerala, (1988) Cr LJ 591 (Ker) (DB).
1000 Abdul ha Suleman v State of Gujarat, AIR 1994 SC 1910 [LNIND 1994 SC 209] : (1995) Cr LJ 464 (SC).
1001 Ramesh Vithalrao Thakre v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 1453 : (1995) Cr LJ 2907 (SC).
End of Document
[s 302] Punishment for murder.—


312-318);
16.3 “Homicide”
Page 2 of 309
classified as:
IPC);
(section 79, IPC);
IPC);
when:
88, IPC), or
Page 3 of 309

Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or 1002[imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to
fine.
[s 302.1] Introduction
Unlike civil cases where documentary evidence matters far more than ocular evidence, the reverse is the
position in a criminal trial of the offences under the IPC except for a few offences like sections 467/471, etc.
Murder is the most heinous offence in the IPC, which makes it the most important too. Beside ocular evidence,
medical evidence, dying declaration, confessions, identification of an accused are important pieces of evidence
in a criminal case. A murder case cannot be properly understood without dealing with these important aspects.
Keeping in view the importance of murder cases, a fair idea of the legal position as clarified by High Courts and
the Supreme Court regarding different types of witnesses, different aspects of dying declaration, confessions,
circumstantial evidence are dealt with separately under different heads in this part.
Page 4 of 309
The idea is not to encroach upon the territory of commentaries on the Evidence Act or the CrPC, but to avoid
wastage of time and diversion of attention of the reader in switching from this book to another in search of the
latest basic law on these aspects. However, where in depth analysis is required, reference should be made to
commentaries on CrPC or the Evidence Act with regard to relevant provisions enshrined therein.
[s 302.2] Scope
Under the old CrPC, ample discretion was given to courts to pass death sentence. An alternative sentence of
life term could be awarded in exceptional circumstances, that too, after advancing special reasons for making
this departure from the general rule. The current CrPC entirely reversed the rule. A sentence for imprisonment
for life is now the rule and capital sentence is an exception. It has also been made obligatory on the courts to
record special reasons if ultimately death sentence is to be awarded. A Constitutional Bench of the Supreme
Court in the case of Bachan Singh v State of Punjab,1003 while upholding the constitutional validity of death
sentence voiced that as a legal principle death sentence is still awardable but only in rarest of rare cases when
the alternative option of lesser sentence is unquestionably foreclosed.1004 While it is the duty of the court to see
that no innocent person is punished, it is equally important to see where it is clear evidence of commission of
crime by a person such person should not be given the benefit of some distortion or exaggeration, made for the
prosecution by the witnesses.1005 The plea by the accused that he remained in jail for more than seven years is
not a good ground to reduce the sentence.1006 Every incidence of murder involves brutality, which is one of the
factors for imposing the extreme penalty on the accused while considering the case for imposition of sentence
on the accused, but it cannot be a sole ground for imposing extreme penalty. Other factors have also to be
taken into consideration, ie, aggravating and mitigating circumstances along with the brutality, ie, the act of the
accused. The Legislature has incorporated the provision of death penalty in order to impose appropriate
punishment for a criminal act to respond to the need of society for justice against criminals. Punishment is
always imposed not only to punish the criminal but also to ensure that criminal is punished in a befitting
manner, commensurate with the crime committed by him. Of course, at the time of consideration for
punishment the court is required to consider the act as well as right of victim of crime and the society at large.
Manifestly, inadequate punishment having regard to the nature of crime of offence would not subserve the
cause of justice to the society. The court has to examine as to whether the murder has been committed for a
motive, which evinces total depravity, for eg, murder by hired assassins for money or reward or cold-blooded
murder for gains of a person vis-à-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position or in a position of trust or
when the court reaches to conclusion looking to the facts of the case that the accused is a menace to the
society looking to his past criminal track record and nefarious activities.1007
In absence of any intention to cause death or the knowledge that the act would result in death, accused cannot
be convicted under section 302, IPC.1008
This section makes no distinction between men. It will apply even to a case where a police officer, in the zeal of
his duty to trace out an offence, commits torture on the suspect and thereby causes his death.1009 Even the
choice between the two penalties, provided in the section, does not depend upon any classification of murders
on the basis of youth, sex, etc. The IPC has not created any special categories, or classes of persons, who can
claim exemption from death sentence as a matter of right. Neither youth, nor sex, nor any other peculiarity is
mentioned in the section entitling any person to claim exemption from capital punishment after his conviction for
murder. It merely says “Whoever commits murder shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment for life and shall
also be liable to fine.”1010 In Gangu Singh v State, it was stated that the murder trial of the accused less than 16
years on date of occurrence should not be tried by a sessions judge, but, shall be dealt with in accordance with
provisions of Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1952.1011
This section applies whether the murder is committed by one or by more than one person (see section 9, IPC).
[s 302.4] “Commits Murder”
If it cannot be proved that it was the accused who caused the death of the deceased person, there can be no
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conviction.1012 Thus, even if it is clear that one of the two persons must have caused the death, but not as to
which of them did so, both will be acquitted.1013 When assault is made by many accused but without common
intention the doctor’s opinion that the death was due to head injury and the accused who alone is the author of
the head injury is guilty of murder and the other accused persons who assaulted the dead body cannot be
made liable for the offence of murder.1014 However, if one person is engaged in murderously beating another to
death and a stranger, without sharing the common intention, rushes in and adds some more blows so that the
victim’s death is more speedily brought about, then it is a case where both would be guilty of murder and the
first man cannot be allowed a defense that it was the second assailant’s stroke that finally ended the victim’s
life.1015
For the commission of the offence of murder, it is not necessary that the accused should have the intention to
cause death. If it is proved that the accused had the intention to inflict the injuries actually suffered by the
victim, and such injuries are found to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the
ingredients of clause “thirdly” of section 300 are fulfilled and the accused must be held guilty of “murder”
punishable under section 302.1016
If the whole combination of facts, necessary to prove murder, is not proved, the accused may be punished for
any complete minor offence, disclosed by the facts, which have been proved.1017 Where an accused person is
convicted in the alternative, either of murder, or, eg, of an offence under section 201, IPC (causing
disappearance of evidence), he must be punished with a punishment applicable to the minor offence, eg,
imprisonment for seven years.1018
In order to convict the accused for an offence under section 302, IPC, the first and foremost aspect to be
proved by the prosecution is the homicidal death. Where the evidence proves that the death was accidental
death and not homicidal death, the accused cannot be convicted under section 302, IPC.1019
[s 302.5] Relevant Factors to Ascertain Murder
Merely because there were some minor injuries, it cannot be said that section 302, IPC, is not attracted.
Though the number of injuries does not determine the question whether section 302, IPC, is to be attracted, yet
the nature of injuries, the weapon used, and the places where injuries exist are relevant factors.1020 In
considering whether the offence is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the manner of
causing injuries to the victim by the accused person as deposed by the prosecution witnesses, nature of injuries
caused to the victim, part of the body where accused person(s) caused injuries to the victim, the weapon(s)
used in the commission of crime and conduct of the offender(s) charged with the offence of murder, are to be
taken into account.1021
[s 302.6] Motive
Commentary under section 299, ante, may be referred to.
Motive is a relevant factor in all criminal cases whether based on the testimony of an eyewitness or
circumstantial evidence.1022 Motive is not an ingredient for an offence under section 302, IPC.1023 When the
participation of the accused is established by the evidence of an eyewitness, absence of motive pales into
insignificance and cannot be a ground to justify his acquittal.1024 Where the testimony of the wife that the
accused fired shot from gun at the deceased was corroborated by medical evidence and contents of the FIR, in
the presence of direct evidence, uncertainty of motive was held of no consequence and conviction of the
accused under section 302, IPC was affirmed.1025
Page 6 of 309
Motive loses its significance in case the direct evidence of witnesses is trustworthy.1026
As there was land dispute between the complainant party and the accused persons, held, the accused had
strong motive to commit the offence against the complainant party.1027
Oral evidence clinchingly established that there was land dispute between the parties. Absence of documentary
evidence was held no ground to discard motive which was established by oral evidence.1028
The deceased Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the temple intended to transfer the accused persons’
functionaries of the temple for mis-appropriation of funds. By the transfer the accused would have lost control of
the affairs of the temple. Held, this was sufficient motive for the accused persons for the commission of the
murder of the deceased.1029
Motive, if proved, would supply a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence; but absence thereof cannot be a
ground to reject the prosecution case. Conviction on the charge of murder was upheld.1030
In a case where the accused himself had taken the deceased to the hospital which showed that he had no
motive or intention to commit a crime, much less to give a gun shot, which would inevitably result in the death of
deceased, the accused was acquitted of the charge of murder under section 302, IPC.1031
Prosecution case was that the accused committed the murder of his wife and daughter by gun shot injury as he
wanted to remarry a girl. The said motive was mentioned neither in FIR nor in Police statement. Evidence and
conduct of eye-witness not informing anybody in the village was unnatural, hence witness disbelieved. Second
FIR anti timed. Acquittal on the charge of murder recorded by High Court was not interfered.1032
In a case the accused committed the murder of three teenaged children of the complainant while they were
returning from school, the accused had the motive as his wife had eloped with the brother of the complainant
and had threatened the complainant. Therefore, the conviction of the accused under sections 302 and 364, IPC
was held proper.1033
[s 302.6.1] Motive—Election Rivalry
There was sufficient motive with the accused persons to commit the murder of the deceased since the
deceased had defeated accused H in the Pradhan elections, thus putting an end to his position as Pradhan for
the last 28-30 years. The long nursed feeling of hatred and the simmering enmity between the family of the
deceased and the accused persons most likely manifested itself in the outburst of anger resulting in the murder
of the deceased. Moreover it is a settled legal proposition that even if the absence of motive, as alleged, is
accepted that is of no consequence and pales into insignificance when direct evidence establishes the crime.
Therefore, in case there is direct trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to commission of an offence, motive
loses its significance.1034
[s 302.6.2] Conviction of main Accused under section 302 and of another under section 341
Commentary under section 341, ante, may be referred to.

Page 7 of 309
(I) CONSTRUCTIVE LIABILITY
[s 302.7] Applicability of Section 34 to Section 302
Commentary under section 34, ante, vol 1 may be referred to.
It is only the person, who actually commits murder, who is directly made liable under this section, others may
be held liable for murder vicariously under sections 34-38 or under section 149, IPC.1035 A mention of the
section in the judgment is not the requirement of law to convict a person. If the ingredients of the offence are
present, conviction can be made. It is not material to bring the case under section 34, IPC, as to who in fact,
inflicted the fatal blow.1036 Accused persons charged with offences under section 302 read with section 149,
IPC, can be convicted under section 302 read with section 34, IPC.1037 Even in the absence of a charge under
section 34 IPC, the conviction and sentence under section 302, IPC, can be maintained adding section 34
thereto.1038 When two, out of the three accused, have been convicted of a charge under sections 302/34, the
third can be convicted under section 302, only when his “individual, and not the conjoint, liability” has been
established.1039 But where the other two accused, who have been tried along with the appellant on a charge
under sections 302/34, have been acquitted, there being no evidence that any other unknown person took part
in the murder, the appellant, too, cannot be convicted under sections 302/34 even though the appellant’s
confession, implicating conjointly himself and the two others, is taken as true and voluntary.1040 There was
evidence that the four accused armed with weapons reached the place of occurrence, two of the accused
dragged the deceased, and on the exhortation of one, he fired a shot at the deceased causing death. It was
held that it could be said that not only the two accused were present at the scene of the offence but they
actively participated in the commission of the offence by doing acts in furtherance of the common intention of
killing the deceased, and so their conviction under section 302 was held proper.1041
Out of seven accused persons put on trial, five accused persons were acquitted by the trial Court. Two accused
H and M armed with lathi and sharp edged weapon had come together on the spot, gave abuses, had inflicted
injuries with sharp edged weapon and lathi, and had left together from the spot. Held, common intention was
proved, thus, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the two accused appellants not with the aid of section
149, IPC, but with the aid of section 34.1042
In a case of human sacrifice, it was held that just by mere presence of the accused it cannot be said to attribute
a common intention and as such, the accused cannot be convicted with the aid of section 34, IPC. Therefore,
the accused were acquitted of the charge under section 302 read with section 34, IPC.1043
The evidence of public witnesses about the role of exhortation attributed to appellant N was full of
contradictions, however there was no evidence of pre-consent or prior meeting of minds between the two
appellants N and B, therefore, appellant N was held entitled to benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charge
The co-accused S, who was a pillion rider, along with main accused R had gone to commit the murder of the
deceased. But the eye-witnesses did not depose that the co-accused S was armed with any weapon or had any
role in the murder, therefore the co-accused S was acquitted of the charge under sections 302/34, IPC.1045
Where the testimony of the public witnesses about the presence/involvement of the two accused in the
commission of the murder was contradictory, and there was no material to show that the accused had
Page 8 of 309
committed the alleged offence in the furtherance of their common intention, the accused were acquitted of the
charge under section 302, IPC.1046
There was a land dispute between the two brothers and the accused assaulted the victim with chura and his
minor son, the co-accused caught hold of the victim, however the evidence was lacking to show that there was
any prior meeting of minds between the accused and his minor son co-accused, the conviction of the co-
accused under section 300 read with section 34, IPC was held to be not proper and was set aside.1047
The complainant and his father (deceased) were returning home from the police station at night and the
accused persons came in the way armed with lathi, sword and iron rod, and assaulted the deceased, giving
continuous beating and caused serious injuries resulting in death. It was held by the court that the injuries
sustained by the deceased were caused by the accused persons in pursuance of their common intention to
cause the death of the deceased and the accused were convicted under sections 302 and 34, IPC.1048
In a case it was alleged that the father and son had gone to the house of the deceased, and father caught hold
of the deceased and the son attacked the deceased with Gupti, however father was not named in FIR, hence
he was acquitted of charge under sections 302 and 34, IPC.1049
Where three persons separately armed with weapons storm into the house of the victim in the dead of the night,
just because only one of them uses the weapon and gives a fatal blow, it would not absolve the others. The
others may not be required to use their weapons, but that by itself does not change the role of such other
accused to that of a mere bystander. It was held that the two accused were assigned the role of exhortation and
all the three accused were convicted under section 302, IPC read with section 34, IPC.1050
[s 302.7.1] Applicability of section 34 to Murder Case when all but one Accused Acquitted
In the case of Krishna Govind Patil v State of Maharashtra,1051 a four-judge Bench of the Supreme Court was
considering a case in which there were a total four accused persons and all of them were acquitted by the trial
court of the charge under section 302 read with section 34, IPC. The High Court upheld acquittal of the three
accused persons, but convicted the fourth accused under section 302 read with section 34, IPC. When the
matter was brought to the Supreme Court, the conviction was set aside as apart from these four accused
persons, there was no other fifth accused and in view of the acquittal of three accused persons, the conviction
of the accused before the Supreme Court under section 302 read with section 34, IPC, could not be maintained
as there was none else with whom he could have shared the common intention to cause death of the
deceased. While acquitting, the Supreme Court observed that neither it was the prosecution case that there
was any fifth accused person nor was there any evidence to that effect, meaning thereby that if there could
have been any other accused person, known or unknown, other than the four persons tried, the conviction of
the accused before the Supreme Court could have been upheld as it could have been said that he shared the
common intention with the fifth unknown accused person to commit the offence. To illustrate the point, if in a
case an FIR is lodged against four persons, known as well as unknown, and tried, out of whom three acquitted,
one person can be convicted under section 302, IPC simpliciter, in case it is found that injury inflicted by him
was fatal one, but he cannot be convicted under section 302 with the aid of section 34, IPC as in view of
acquittal of the other accused persons, he cannot be said to have shared the common intention with anybody.
On the other hand, if there are three persons, two named and one unknown, whose identity could not be
ascertained even during the course of investigation, and upon being put on trial, out of the two named one gets
acquitted, the other can be convicted under section 302 with the aid of section 34, IPC, as it can be said that
the convicted accused shared the common intention with the unknown person if there is evidence to that
effect.1052
The evidence of the eye-witnesses that the co-accused were holding the deceased by hand, exhorted the
Page 9 of 309
accused to bring gun and to shoot at the deceased was found reliable, thus, the co-accused were convicted
under section 302 read with section 34, IPC.1053
Where the public witness deposed that the accused S had gone to work after switching off the line from the
transformer and after completing the work, he returned and switched on the electricity line; it was clear that the
transformer was at a distance from the electric pole where the deceased got electrocuted and since the
accused rushed there to ensure that the line is switched off, it was considered not safe to convict the accused
under section 302 read with section 34, IPC, and as such he was acquitted.1054
[s 302.8] Applicability of Section 149 to Section 302
Section 149 of the IPC makes the members of an unlawful assembly vicariously liable where it is proved that
the offence is committed in pursuance of the common object of the unlawful assembly, where the members of
the unlawful assembly knew that such offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of the object of the
unlawful assembly. Once it is established that the unlawful assembly had common object, it is not necessary
that all persons forming the unlawful assembly must be shown to have committed some overt act for the
purposes of incurring the vicarious liability for the offence committed by a member of such unlawful assembly.
Under this section the liability of the other members of the unlawful assembly for the offence committed during
the continuance of the occurrence, rests upon the fact whether the other members knew beforehand that the
offence actually committed was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. Common object
has to be distinguished from the common intention. There is no question of common intention in section 149 of
the IPC. Where no injury is inflicted pursuant to the common object to kill the deceased, but caused only when
provoked by one of the witnesses, the members of the unlawful assembly cannot be held guilty for the
commission of the offence of murder.1055 Where death has been caused in prosecution of the common object of
an unlawful assembly, it is not necessary to record a definite and specific finding as to which particular accused
out of the members of the unlawful assembly caused the fatal injury. Once an unlawful assembly has come into
existence, each member of the assembly becomes vicariously liable for the criminal act of any other member of
the assembly committed in prosecution of the common object of the assembly.1056
The presence of the accused KN on the spot was deposed to by the eye-witness who was niece of the
accused, therefore, his conviction under section 302, IPC on the charge of murder was upheld.1057
Where the prosecution evidence showed that out of eight accused persons, four accused were not present on
the spot, no overt act could also be attributed to them, and they were acquitted of the charge under section 302
read with section 149, IPC.1058
All the seven accused assailants armed with lethal weapons viz. country made pistols, lathi, bhala came
together to the house of the complainant and participated in the assault in which one person was killed and one
injured. The charges against the accused that they in concert with other accused persons to achieve a common
object entered the house of the complainant stood proved and they all were convicted under sections 149 and
302, IPC.1059
There was no enmity between the deceased and the accused and he had not caused any injury to the
deceased and no overt act was attributed to the accused so far as the deceased was concerned. Therefore, the
mere fact that the accused was armed with a lathi, by itself would not prove that he shared common object with
which the main accused was inspired. The prosecution had not adduced evidence to establish the nexus
between the common object and the offence committed. Hence it was held that, the accused could not be
convicted with the help of section 149, IPC.1060
Page 10 of 309
Where the eye-witness in his statement mentioned the name of one accused and did not attribute any overt act
to other accused persons, it was held that other accused did not share common object with the named
accused, and the conviction of the co-accused under sections 302 and 149, IPC was set aside.1061
Where the two accused were not named in FIR and they were not identified, none of the public witnesses had
taken their names as the persons who committed any overt act, or the persons who chased the deceased, it
was not established that they were members of unlawful assembly, and therefore, it was held that they could
not be convicted under sections 302 and 149, IPC and they were acquitted of the charge.1062
The evidence of the eye-witnesses established that all the eight accused persons were armed with weapons,
and they surrounded the deceased and prevented others from going near the deceased to rescue him. They
had arrived together in the same jeep and left by the jeep after the incident and the jeep was kept in starting
position. The accused were convicted under sections 302 and 149, IPC.1063 Where the son of the accused,
though present on the spot, did not take part in assault and no evidence was adduced that he shared a
common object of an unlawful assembly, he was given the benefit of doubt, and his conviction under sections
302 and149, IPC was set aside.1064
(II) PROCEDURE
[s 302.9] Procedure
The offence of murder is a cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable offence, and is exclusively triable
by a court of session. Except as otherwise provided by the CrPC, or by any other law for the time being in force,
no court of session shall take cognizance of any offence unless the case has been committed to by a
magistrate under the said Code.1065 Section 209 of the new CrPC dispenses with the inquiry, preliminary to
commitment, in cases triable exclusively by a court of session, irrespective of whether such a case is instituted
on a criminal complaint or on a police report.1066
When an offence under section 302, IPC, is alleged against a public servant and the cognizance of offence is
not taken owing to the absence of sanction to prosecute him, there is no scope to take cognizance of the
offence of murder punishable under section 302, IPC.1067
The apex court has impressed upon the trial courts of the need to indicate the rank of the accused besides
using the name while recording evidence in cases involving multiplicity of accused. It also opined that it would
be profitable for the High Courts to issue circulars to trial courts to implement this practical suggestion to avoid
possible miscarriage of justice resulting solely on account of defective and truncated recording of evidence in
criminal cases.1068
[s 302.10] Judicial Restraint while Dealing with Judgments of Lower Courts
Commentary under section 366, post, may be referred to.
Time and again the apex court has emphasised the need to exercise judicial restraint, particularly while dealing
with judgments and orders of the lowers courts. The High Court should avoid unsavory remarks against a
judicial personage of the lower hierarchy,1069 when the situation does not warrant such castigation.1070
[s 302.11] Judicial Restraint while Making Remarks against Police/ Investigating Officers
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Castigation of investigation unfortunately seems to be a regular practice when the trial courts acquit accused in
criminal cases. It is almost impossible to come across a single case wherein the investigation was conducted
completely flawlessly or was absolutely foolproof. The function of criminal courts should not be wasted in
picking out the lapses in investigation and by expressing unsavory criticism against investigating officers.1071
The Courts should bear in mind the time constraints of the police officers in the present system, the ill-equipped
machinery they have to cope with, and the traditional apathy of respectable persons to come forward for giving
evidence in criminal cases which are realities the police force have to confront with while conducting
investigation. In almost every case, an Investigating Officer (IO) is impugned with castigating remarks. The
courts should not overlook the fact that usually such an officer is not heard in respect of such remarks made
against him. The court need make such depreciatory remarks only when it is absolutely necessary in a
particular case, and that too by keeping in mind the broad realities indicated above.1072 Thus when the Division
Bench of the High Court did not make any reference to any particular omission or lacuna in the investigation but
used unkind remarks against the investigating officer saying “Investigation of the case was perfunctory and
suffered from serious lacuna and irregularity”, it did not find favour with the Supreme Court.1073
[s 302.12] Precedent—Broad Resemblance to another Case is not Decisive
Unless and until the facts and circumstances in a cited case are in pari materia in all respects with the facts and
circumstances of the case at hand, it will not be proper to treat an earlier case as a precedent to arrive at a
definite conclusion. This is clear from some judgments of the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court has
taken a different view from the earlier cases, though basic facts look similar in the latter case.1074 How a person
reacts in a given case may be the determinative factor so far as that case is concerned. That cannot be applied
as a rule of universal application to all cases irrespective of the fact situation in that particular case. There can
be no empirical formula as to how one reacts in a given situation and its effect and impact. It would be almost
like trying to put a square peg on a round hole. To imprint the fact situation of one decided case upon another
or observations made in the peculiar facts of a given case to any or every other case notwithstanding
dissimilarity in effect and the distinctive features is legally impermissible. Each case, more particularly a criminal
case, depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough to warrant
like treatment because a significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid
the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of
another. To decide therefore on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is
not at all decisive.1075
[s 302.13] Accused Pleading he was a Child—Duty of the Court
When a plea is raised on behalf of an accused that he was a “child” within the meaning of the definition of the
expression under the Act, it becomes obligatory for the court, in case it entertains any doubt about the age as
claimed by the accused, to hold an inquiry itself for determination of the question of age of the accused or
cause an inquiry to be held and seek a report regarding the same, if necessary, by asking the parties to lead
evidence in that regard. Keeping in view the beneficial nature of the socially oriented legislation, it is an
obligation of the court where such a plea is raised to examine that plea with care and it cannot fold its hands
and without returning a positive finding regarding that plea, deny the benefit of the provisions to an accused.
The court must hold an inquiry and return a finding regarding the age, one way or the other.1076 The High
Courts and subordinate courts were to deal with such cases with more sensitivity, as otherwise the object of the
Acts1077 would be frustrated and the effort of the Legislature to reform the delinquent child and reclaim him as a
useful member of the society would be frustrated.1078 The Supreme Court also emphasised that High Courts
may issue administrative directions to the subordinate courts that whenever such a plea is raised before them
and they entertain any reasonable doubt about the correctness of the plea, they must as a rule, conduct an
inquiry by giving opportunity to the parties to establish their respective claims and return a finding regarding the
age of the concerned accused and then deal with the case in the manner provided by law.1079
[s 302.13.1] Relevant Date for Determining Age of Accused
The relevant date for determining age of the accused is date when the accused was brought for first time before
the court. The accused below 16 years when brought before the court would be termed as “Child” under section
2(f) of the Rajasthan Children Act of 1970.1080
[s 302.13.2] Can the Plea that Accused was a Child be Entertained for the First Time at the Appellate Stage?
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The view of a Full Bench of the Patna High Court1081 was that though the normal rule is that a plea unless it
goes to the very root of the jurisdiction should not be allowed to be taken at the appellate stage especially when
it requires investigation into a question of fact but a plea that accused in question was a “child” within the
meaning of the Act can be entertained at the appellate stage also and should not be overlooked on technical
grounds. After noticing the provisions of the Bihar Children Act, 1982 and the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986, a Full
Bench of the Patna High Court opined, taking into consideration the aim and intention of the two Acts, that the
application of the provisions of the Acts should not be denied to an offender where, by the time the trial
commenced or concluded the accused had ceased to be a juvenile, although when the offence was committed
he was a juvenile within the meaning of the Act. The court then laid down the procedure which should be
followed when a plea is raised to the effect that the accused on the date of the offence was a child and held that
inquiry into that aspect should be conducted and on the basis of the evidence led at the inquiry, the court
should record a finding whether or not on the date of commission of the offence, the accused was a “child”
within the meaning of the Act.1082 A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court also took the view that the plea
by the accused that he was a child at time of commission of the offence can be allowed to be raised for the first
time in appeal.1083 But the Apex Court took a somewhat contrary view in another case.1084 Wherein, neither
before the committal court nor before the trial court any plea was raised on behalf of the accused that he was a
child and so should not have been committed by the magistrate and therefore tried by the sessions court and
that he ought to have been dealt with only by the court of Juveniles, the Apex Court did not approve that the
High Court merely on the basis of the entry made in section 313, CrPC, a statement mentioning the age of the
accused as 17 years, has concluded that the accused was a “child” within the definition of the Act on the date of
the occurrence.1085 Later in another case where the plea that the accused on the date of the incident was hardly
13 years old was not taken before the trial court and High Court so the Apex Court where this plea was raised
for the first time upheld the conviction of the accused but set aside the sentences awarded.1086 When the
accused has not taken the plea before the sessions court that he was a child at the time of the incident, such
plea cannot be taken before High Court in appeal for the first time to get benefit of the Children’s Act.1087 When
such plea of applicability of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 is neither taken before
the trial court nor before the High Court nor before the Supreme Court, it being a mixed question of law and fact
which cannot be taken for the first time in criminal appeal before the Supreme Court as this is not a pure
question of law.1088
[s 302.13.3] A Child Tried by Sessions Court cannot be Sentenced
When a person accused is a child at the time of commission of offence under the Children’s Act applicable and
he is tried by the Sessions Court with or without an adult accused and is held guilty of the offence charged, he
cannot be sentenced for the offence committed even though he becomes an adult at the time of his conviction
and cannot be sent to an approved school under the respective Children’s Acts for being retained there, as he
had already attained majority. The sentence if awarded by the trial court is liable to be quashed on the sole
ground that the accused was a child on the date of commission of the occurrence though his conviction can be
maintained.1089 But when accused is found to be above 16 years of age at the time of incident, he is not entitled
to the benefit of the UP Children’s Act, 1952.1090
I (name and office of Sessions Judge, etc) hereby charge you (name of accused person) as follows:
That you, on or about the…day of…, at…have committed murder by causing the death of…and thereby committed an
offence, punishable under s 302 of the Indian Penal Code, and within the cognizance of this court.
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[s 302.14.1] Particulars of Charge
Under section 211 of the CrPC,1091 every charge shall state the offence with which the accused is charged. If
the law, which creates the offence, gives it any specific name, the offence may be described, in the charge, by
that name only. The fact, that the charge is made, is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition,
required by law to constitute the offence charged, is fulfilled in the particular case. It is only when the law, which
creates the offence, does not give it any specific name that so much of the definition of the offence must be
stated as to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged. A charge, which expressly
mentions the specific name, given to it by law, would be a sufficient charge under sub-section (2) of section
221, CrPC 1898, corresponding to section 211 of the CrPC, even if the ingredients of the offence are not given.
But if the specific name of the offence is not mentioned, the ingredients cannot be implied.1092 Thus, A is
charged with the murder of B. This is equivalent to a statement that A’s act falls within the definition of murder
given in sections 299 and 300, IPC, that it did not fall within any of the general exceptions of the said Code or
within any of the five exceptions to section 300 or that, if it did fall within exception 1, one or other of the three
provisos to that exception applied to it.1093 A charge under section 302/34, IPC showing that either the appellant
“or” some other person” committed the murder, has been held to be defective because it does not show, nor
does it mention, how the appellant acted in concert with anyone else.1094 It should be remembered that nothing,
which is not essential to the offence, should be included in the charge, except such details of time and place as
are sufficient to give, to the accused, notice of the matter with which he is charged.
[s 302.14.2] Separate Charges for Distinct Offences
Under section 218 of the CrPC, for every distinct offence of which any person is accused, there shall be a
separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately except in the cases mentioned in sections
219, 220, 221 and 223. Where, therefore, the accused killed a man and subsequently his wife, it was held that
the two murders were distinct offences and the inclusion of both in one charge offended against the first part of
section 233, CrPC 1898, corresponding to section 218 (1), CrPC 1973.1095
[s 302.14.3] Alternative Charge
The joinder of a charge of murder (section 502, IPC) and of causing disappearance of the evidence of the
murder (section 201, IPC) in the alternative is legal.1096 It was held, by the Privy Council, in Begu v Emperor1097
that in a charge of murder under section 302, a conviction under section 201, without a further charge being
made, is not illegal. Where a person is acquitted of the charge of murder and other cognate charges, with which
he is charged, his conviction under section 201, without any further charge, is perfectly legal.1098 Where
alternative charges under sections 302 and 201 are framed, the Sessions Court should take the evidence into
consideration and record its findings on both the charges. It should not record a finding of acquittal on the
charge of section 201, without going into the question and taking the evidence into consideration, on the mere
ground that the accused is convicted of the offence under section 202. The dangers of such a course are
pointed out in Adi Bhumiani v State.1099
[s 302.14.4] Alteration of Charge
Under the CrPC, 1898, the magistrate, while committing a case to the court of session, was required to frame a
charge. Under the CrPC, 1973, he simply commits the case to the court of sessions and the latter proceeds to
frame a charge as if it were the court of original jurisdiction. Under section 228, CrPC,1100 on the material placed
before it, if there are grounds for presuming that the accused committed the offence, it has to frame a charge or
the charges. Section 216(1), CrPC,1101 empowers the court to alter, or to add to any charge at any time before
the judgment is pronounced. It invests the court with a comprehensive power to remedy the defect in the
framing or non-framing, of a charge, whether discovered at the initial stage of the trial or at any subsequent
stage prior to judgment.1102 The law, however, warrants that the alteration of the charge and the trial on the
altered charge must not occasion a failure of justice.
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Where the circumstance are almost identical, the absence of a charge, under section 302, against only the
accused, when others are acquitted, is not fatal and the defect is only a mere irregularity which is curable and
no prejudice can be said to have been caused to the accused convict.1103
Accused charged with Section 302 can be convicted under Section 314
Commentary under the section 314, ante, may be referred to.
[s 302.14.5] Defect, Irregularity, Omission or Error in Charge
According to section 464, CrPC, no finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be
deemed invalid, merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or
irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges unless, in the opinion of the court, a failure of
justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Thus, if in framing charges against the accused, there was some
technical defect or error, no benefit arises to the accused unless due to that defect/error in framing the charge,
any substantial injustice has been caused to the accused or accused has been prejudiced in getting justice.1104
When all particulars required to be given in the charge under section 212, CrPC, were mentioned in the charge
and if, in a technical manner, the charges were not framed in the prescribed form as enjoined by the CrPC, then
on the technical footing there is no justification for holding the charge to be defective.1105 Mere omission in
charge of words “along with three others” is not fatal when particularly no failure of justice is occasioned.1106
(III) ADMISSION, CONFESSION AND PLEA OF GUILT
[s 302.15] Introduction
Criminal law gives several opportunities to the accused to admit during investigation and trial the facts relating
to the crime alleged to be committed by him. Such statements of the accused if proved are confessions and
conviction can be based on the statements. But where, besides such statements of the accused, some
evidence is required to be proved to establish the case of the prosecution then such statements are an
admission and not confession. An accused who wants to confess his guilt during the investigation of his case
can do so before a magistrate under section 164, CrPC, or give an extra-judicial confession before any member
of the public. Besides admission and confession the accused may take a plea of guilt when after ascertaining a
prima facie case against him, the court frames charge of the offence alleged against him and reads it over and
explains it to him. The charge if admitted is known as plea of guilt and obviates the need for the trial. After the
evidence, the prosecution is concluded and all the incriminating circumstances appearing against the accused
are put to the accused under section 313(1)(b), CrPC, 1973. The court may also in the inquiry or trial, at any
stage without previously warning the accused put such questions to him as the court considers necessary
under section 313(1)(a), CrPC, 1973. In answer to the question or examination by the court under section
313(1)(a) and (b), CrPC, 1973, the accused may admit to the incriminating circumstances against him but since
the examination of the accused under section 313(1)(b), CrPC, 1973, is always after the conclusion of the
prosecution evidence which commences subsequent to pleading not guilty to the charge, by the accused, it is
most unlikely that the accused would admit the prosecution case as a whole during his such examination.
However, he may admit some of the circumstances appearing against him in evidence which may fall short of
confession. The admission and confession may be judicial or extra-judicial.
From the above, it is obvious that there is essentially a difference between admission, confession and plea of
guilt. Admission is defined and dealt with in sections 17-23 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and is not in itself
sufficient for the conviction of the accused. However, confession and plea of guilt which are in themselves
sufficient for the purpose of conviction of the accused owing to their being more important, are being further
dealt with separately.
[s 302.15.1] Plea of Guilt should be in the Words used by Accused
Unlike section 252 CrPC, though section 229 CrPC does not cast any obligation on the sessions Judge to
record the plea of the accused as nearly as possible in the words used by the accused, yet prudence demands
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that the court records the plea in the words used by the accused so that the court confirming conviction and
sentence may know what exactly the plea of the accused was.1107
[s 302.16] Relevancy and Admissibility of Confession
A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession
appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge
against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient, in the opinion of the court, to
give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he
would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against
him.1108 No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of the police officer, unless it be made in
the immediate presence of a magistrate shall be proved against such person,1109 except the part of such
statement of the accused which leads to the discovery of the fact.1110 Otherwise no confession made to a police
officer shall be used against a person accused of any offence.1111 The position of a village administrative officer
is not different from the police.1112 But a senior reserve police officer appointed under the State Reserve Police
Force Act though a police officer under the Bombay Police Act, but since he is not empowered with the power
of investigation envisaged in chapter 12 of CrPC is not a police officer within the meaning of section 25 of the
Evidence Act, so a confession before him by the accused is valid.1113
[s 302.17] What is a Confession
“Confession” which is known as a species of “admission” is to be found contained in sections 24-30 of the
Evidence Act, 1872.
“Confession” has not been defined in the Evidence Act. Justice Stephen, in his Digest of the Law of Evidence,
defined it thus: “A confession is an admission made at any time by a person charged with crime, stating or
suggesting the inference that he committed the crime”.
This definition was adopted by various High Courts in India.1114 Justice Straight, however, in Queens Empress v
Jagrup,1115 did not adopt this definition and held that only those statements which are the direct
acknowledgements of guilt could be regarded as “confessions” and not mere inculpatory admission which may
fall short of an admission of guilt. A similar view was taken in Emperor v Santya Bandit.1116 The judicial opinion
was thus not unanimous as to the exact meaning of “confession”. The Privy Council, however, by its
authoritative pronouncement in Pakala Narayana Swami v The King-Emperor,1117 clarified the position and laid
down that a confession must either admit in terms of the offence, or at any rate substantially all the facts which
constitute the offence.
This was followed by this court in many cases, including Palvinder Kaur v State of Punjab,1118 Om Prakash v
State of Uttar Pradesh,1119 State of Uttar Pradesh v Deoman Upadhyaya.1120
In view of these decisions, it is certain that a “confession” must either be an express acknowledgement of guilt
of the offence charged, certain and complete in itself or it must admit substantially all the facts which constitute
the offence.1121 Compelling the accused to be searched does not amount to confession.1122
[s 302.18] Confessions before a Magistrate
During the course of an investigation or at any time afterwards before the commencement of the inquiry of trial,
the confession may be recorded by any metropolitan magistrate or judicial magistrate under section 164, CrPC.
However, a police officer on whom any power of a magistrate has been conferred under any law for the time
being in force, is not entitled to record confessional statements.1123 The magistrate shall, before recording any
such confession, explain to the person making it that he is not bound to make a confession and that, if he does
so, it may be used as evidence against him; and the magistrate shall not record any such confession unless,
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upon questioning the person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily.1124 If at any
time before the confession is recorded, the person appearing before the magistrate states that he is not willing
to make the confession, and the magistrate shall not authorise the detention of such person in police
custody.1125 The magistrate is also required to make a prescribed memorandum at the foot of the record of
confessional statement verifying that he has explained to the accused that he was not bound to make a
confession and if he does so, then his confessional statement may be used against him and that the confession
was made voluntarily by the accused.1126 Certificate/memorandum at foot of confession as one required under
section 164(4) is mandatory and non-compliance with requirements of section 164(4) makes confession
inadmissible.1127 The act of recording confession under section 164, CrPC being a very solemn act, the
magistrate recording the confession must take care that the requirements of section 164(2), CrPC, are fully
complied with.1128 The magistrate recording a confession should question the person making it to find out if the
confession is being made voluntarily.1129 The questioning of the accused before recording confession as to
whether it was voluntary as a matter of substance and not of mere form. A magistrate should ascertain at the
beginning of the statement and not at the end whether the confession made is voluntarily.1130 If the questions to
Judge the voluntary nature of a confessional statement are not put to the accused before recording the
confession, the confessional statements so recorded cannot be relied upon despite the fact that the magistrate
has given a certificate as required under section 164(4), CrPC.1131
[s 302.18.1] Confession before Magistrate does not offend Article 21
The rendering of legal assistance, according to the principle of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, on the very
first day of production of the accused before the magistrate is meant for giving and for offering an opportunity to
the accused as to the course he will take in the case as his defence. Section 164, CrPC, contains a warning to
the accused to be given by the magistrate, before making any confessional statement offering time to him for
his reflection and to insure that before making such statement whether he was under coercion or duress by the
police and or there was any police person within his sight. These are the protective measures. The accused
has to be warned by the magistrate that even if he refuses to give any confessional statement he will not be
sent to police custody and it will not be taken against him. The special provision under section 164, CrPC, is
made by the Legislature in its wisdom and the same does not come within the purview of Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and as such there is no militancy of Article 21 and section 164, CrPC.1132
[s 302.19] Confession of Co-accused
Section 30, Evidence Act, states that when more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence,
and a confession made by one of such person is proved, the court may take into consideration such confession
as against such other persons as well as against the person who makes such confession.
Section 30 of the Evidence Act appears to be based on the view that an accused who admits his own guilt
affords same sort of credibility in support of the truth of his confession against offers as well as himself.1133 The
statement of the co-accused must amount to confession and if it is short of that, it cannot be admissible in
evidence against the other accused.1134 It is essential that the accused making the confessional statement and
the co-accused be tried jointly. Where a joint trial started but could not continue for long as the son of the
accused absconded and the case of the accused was separated, section 30 of the Evidence Act would not be
attracted and the statement of the other accused would not be usable against the absconding accused.1135 But,
where such accused absconded at the absolute end of the joint trial resulting in separating his trial, his
confession can be taken into consideration against the other accused to lend assurance to the conclusion of
guilt reached on the basis of other evidence.1136 In case, the accused making the confession dies before
pronouncement of judgment in a joint trial, his confession under section 30 of the Evidence Act read with
section 32(3) of the same act is relevant.1137 The confession of a co-accused against himself and against other
accused in a joint trial is relevant only if they are being tried for the same or identical offence. If the accused
persons in the same trial are being tried for different offences, then the confession of the accused is not
relevant under section 30 of the Evidence Act. Such a confession can only be taken into consideration by the
court but is not in itself a substantive piece of evidence.1138
A confession made by an accused is not relevant against the co-accused under section 10 of the Evidence
Page 17 of 309
Act.1139
[s 302.19.1] Evidentiary Value of Confession of Co-Accused
The confession of a co-accused is a very weak type of evidence.1140 It does not even come within the definition
of “evidence” contained in section 3 of the Evidence Act.1141 The confession of a co-accused stands on an even
lower footing than that of the evidence of an accomplice. It can only be considered against his co-accused. The
Evidence Act itself gives it a position inferior to the evidence of an approver.1142 The conviction cannot be based
solely on a confession made by a co-accused in the absence of corroboration from independent evidence.1143
Although without corroborative evidence a confession made by an accused cannot be used to convict his co-
accused but the accused making a confession can be convicted solely upon his own confession despite the fact
that he retracted his confession, provided that the court believes it to be true.1144 The extrajudicial confession
has to be proved like any other fact. The value of evidence as to the confession depends upon the veracity of
the others to whom it is made and the circumstances in which it came to be made and the actual words used by
the accused.1145
[s 302.20] Retracted Confession of Accused
After the confession is retracted by the accused, it is not free from suspicion and so cannot be acted upon
without corroboration of credible independent evidence.1146 What amount of corroboration1147 is necessary and
what is sufficient corroboration has to be decided in each case on its own facts and circumstances.1148 But the
rule that a retracted confession cannot be acted upon unless corroborated, is more of prudence than of law.1149
The rule of prudence does not require that each and every circumstance mentioned in the confession with
regard to the participation of the person in the crime must be separately and independently corroborated.1150 If
the court believes that the retracted confession is voluntary and true, a conviction based upon even
uncorroborated retracted confession is not illegal.1151 Where the confession was retracted after lapse of several
months and after the closure of prosecution evidence during examination of accused under section 313, CrPC
and not at the earliest opportunity, it can be concluded that the confession was voluntary as it militates to some
extent against the contention of the accused that the confession was recorded under pressure of the police.1152
But when accused made confessional statement stating that he hit the deceased on head and other parts of the
body and this version of the accused was inconsistent with the medical evidence and subsequently, the
accused retracted the confession, it was not found safe to rely upon such retracted extra-judicial confession.1153
The legal position with regard to retracted confession can be summed up in the observations made by the
Supreme Court in Shankar v State of Tamil Nadu,1154 given below.
Judicial confessions are those which are made before a magistrate or in court in due course of legal
proceedings and when such a confession is retracted, the courts have held that apart from the statement being
voluntary, it should be true and should receive sufficient corroboration in material particulars by independent
evidence. The rule of prudence namely requiring corroboration does not mean that each and every
circumstance mentioned in the confession with regard to the participation of the accused in the crime must be
separately and independently corroborated. It is sufficient if there is general corroboration of the important
incidents, just like in the case of an approver’s evidence and it is not necessary that the corroborative evidence
itself should be sufficient for conviction. It may not be necessary to refer to remaining aspects governing the
use of retracted confession for the purposes of this case. Suffice it to say that it is also laid down that it is not
illegal to base a conviction or an uncorroborated confession of an accused person but as a rule of prudence
which has sanctified itself to the rule of law, the courts do look for corroboration before acting upon and
accepting the retracted confession and what amount of corroboration would be necessary in a case would be a
question of fact to be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. In State of Tamil Nadu v Kutty
alias Laxmi Narsimhan,1155 it was said:
It is not the law that once a confession was retracted the court should presume that the confession is tainted. As a
matter of practical knowledge we can say that non-retracted confession is a rarity in criminal cases. To retract from
confession is the right of the confessor and all the accused against whom confessions were produced by the
prosecution have invariably adopted that right. It would be injudicious to jettison a judicial confession on the mere
premise that its maker has retracted from it. The court has a duty to evaluate the evidence concerning the confession
Page 18 of 309
by looking at all aspects. The twin test of a confession is to ascertain whether it was voluntary and true. Once those
tests are found to be positive the next endeavour is to see whether there is any other reason which stands in the way
of acting on it. Even for that, retraction of the confession is not the ground to throw the confession overboard.
[s 302.21] Retracted Confession of Co-accused
Retracted confession does not come within the definition of evidence contained in section 3 of the Evidence
Act. But, when there is sufficient evidence against co-accused then the confession described under section 30
of the Evidence Act may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence to support
the conviction.1156 A retracted confession is a weak link against the maker and more so against a co-
accused.1157 A retracted confession of a co-accused cannot be made the foundation of a conviction though it
can be considered against the other accused to be used only in support of other evidence.1158 Although a
confession made by an accused cannot be used to convict the co-accused in the same trial in the absence of
corroborative evidence, but the accused making it can be convicted solely upon his own confession despite it
being retracted provided the court believes it to be true.1159
[s 302.21.1] Credibility of Retracted Confession
The weight to be attached to a retracted confession must depend upon whether the court thinks that it was
induced by the consideration that the confession was untrue, or by realisation on that it had failed to secure the
benefits of the hope which inspired it.1160 The amount of credibility to be attached to a retracted confession
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. As a matter of prudence and practice, a court
would not ordinarily act upon it to convict a co-accused without the strongest and fullest corroboration on
material particulars. Corroboration in full sense implies corroboration not only as to the factum of the offence
but also as to the connection of the co-accused with that offence.1161
[s 302.22] Extra-Judicial Confession
A confession made before a magistrate or in court is a judicial confession. The confessions made before
anyone except magistrate or court are extra-judicial confessions. Sarkar on Evidence1162 states: “An extra-
judicial confession may properly be made to any person or collection or body of persons. It is not even
necessary that the statement should have been addressed to any definite individual…”. Further, an extra
judicial confession is a weak form of evidence.1163 Extra judicial confession made by the accused before the
Village Administrative Officer is not admissible and thus, cannot be relied upon.1164
Extra judicial confession alleged to be made by the accused before member of Gram Panchayat was not found
reliable; accused was acquitted of the charge of murder.1165
Extra-judicial confessions are not usually considered with favour but that does not mean that such a confession
coming from a person who has no reason to state falsely and circumstances tend to support his statement,
should not be disbelieved. An extra-judicial confession made to one who is not a person of authority and which
is free from any suspicion as to its voluntary character and has also a ring of truth in it is admissible in evidence
against the accused and deserves to be acted upon.1166
When the contents of extra-judicial confession are disclosed long before to the witnesses but the extra-judicial
confession was subsequently recorded inside the police station, the mere fact that the confessions read to the
witnesses were later put in black and white in the police station is no reason to cover it with the cloak of
inadmissibility.1167 But extra judicial confession made in the presence of the police is not admissible.1168 Though
it is admissible if made before a village administrative officer1169 or to a constable or an official of the Rajasthan
armed constabulary not vested with power of investigation, before but not in the course of investigation, as
section 162, CrPC, would not be attracted.1170
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Extra judicial confession made to the witnesses found not reliable as the accused had no occasion to make
extra judicial confession to the witnesses.1171 The three accused respondents were acquitted of the charge
under section 302, IPC.
Where the accused was alleged to have made confession to one of his relatives who lodged a complaint with
police after a delay of three days, though being a social worker she was with police for two days in connection
with some other case, the extra-judicial confession was held surrounded by suspicious circumstances.1172 In
charge for rape and murder, extra judicial confession made by the accused to Sarpanch was found not reliable,
as the Sarpanch had disclosed the extra-judicial confession to police after 16 days; the conviction of the
accused under sections 302 and 376, IPC was set aside.1173
In a murder case, the extra judicial confession made by the accused to Police Patil was believed and the
accused were convicted under section 302 read with section 34, IPC.1174 In a case, the extra judicial confession
was made by the accused to a convenient witness to the police as the witness admitted that he had stood bail
in a large number of excise cases and that he was running a toddy shop. There was no other evidence to
connect the accused with the commission of the offence charged. It was case of no evidence. The accused
appellant was acquitted of the charge under section 302, IPC.1175
[s 302.22.1] Extra-Judicial Confession may be Strong Evidence
Extra-judicial confession can be relied upon and it is not always essential that there should be corroboration, if
found:
(i) voluntary;
(ii) reliable;
(iii) without any allegation of inimical terms;
(iv) trustworthy;
(v) unbiased;
(vi) in a natural incidental way;
(vii) showing the accused only as a perpetrator;
(viii) nothing which may militate against him;
(ix) clear and unambiguous inspiring confidence of the court; and
(x) appearing and natural.
In such factual scenario, no research of corroboration is warranted.1176
The evidence in the form of extra-judicial confession if undergoes successful scrutiny of the aforesaid aspects,
can be relied on for the purpose of holding the accused guilty even without other independent corroboration or
circumstantial evidence. Corroboration to the extra-judicial confession in all cases is sine qua non is neither just
nor reasonable proposition. If extra-judicial confession is found to be unbiased, untainted coming from the
evidence of trustworthy and reliable witness who have stood the test of cross-examination against whom there
is no remote suggestion or allegation of inimical terms can be based for holding the accused guilty.1177
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In fact, extra-judicial confession is like any other evidence if proved under section 3 of the Evidence Act. If it is
successfully proved by the prosecution that version stated by the witnesses was truthful and voluntary version
of the accused referable to incriminating circumstances and his complicity, the same would form basis for
conviction. It is not the quantity but quality which matters in evaluating the evidence of prosecution even in case
of extra-judicial confession either under section 24 or 30 of the Evidence Act.1178
There is neither any rule of law nor of prudence that evidence furnished by extra-judicial confession cannot be
relied upon unless corroborated by some other credible evidence. The courts have considered the evidence of
extra-judicial confession a weak piece of evidence. If the evidence about extra-judicial confession comes from
the mouth of witness/witnesses who appear to be unbiased not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in
respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive for attributing an
untruthful statement to the accused, the words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous and
unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the witness
which may militate against it, then after subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous tests on the
touchstone of credibility, if it passes the test, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis
of a conviction. It has further been observed that in such a situation to go in search of corroboration itself tends
to cast a shadow of doubt over the evidence. If the evidence of extra-judicial confession is reliable, trustworthy
and beyond reproach, the same can be relied upon a conviction can be founded thereon.1179
It is required that the evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be corroborated and where
such confession was proved by an independent witness who was a responsible officer and who bore no animus
against the accused, there was hardly any justification to disbelieve the same.1180
The prosecution did not produce and prove the alleged confessional statement made by the accused and
reduced into writing by PW9 and witnessed by PW10. The oral testimony of these witnesses to the effect that
such confessional statements were recorded was held of no consequence. The alleged confessional
statements were discarded.1181
[s 302.22.2] Confession to an Inimical Person most unlikely
Making confession to an inimical person is most unlikely.1182
[s 302.23] Plea of Guilty in Capital Cases
A plea of guilty under section 229 of the CrPC,1183 is not a confession. It is a statement which, if accepted by
the court, amounts to a waiver of trial on the part of the accused in which case alone it might be utilised in
evidence.1184 It is an admission of all the facts, on which the charge is found, as well as an admission of guilt in
respect of them. A plea of guilty in a criminal court can only be made in response to a charge and an informal
admission as to guilt does not amount to a formal plea of guilty and such admission has not, in fact or in law,
the same binding effect as a plea of guilty.1185 It is also not an admission, by an accused, of the guilt under a
particular section of the IPC. He does not plead to a section of a criminal statute; he pleads guilty, or not guilty,
to the facts alleged to disclose an offence under that section.1186 Similarly, where the facts, mentioned in the
police reports, do not, by themselves, constitute an offence, the mere admission of the accused, that the facts
mentioned are correct, is not tantamount to a guilty plea.1187 It must be remembered that the plea of guilty does
not avail when the offence in question has not been committed in the eyes of law.1188
Almost all the High Courts of the country have taken the view that the court should not act upon the plea of
guilty in a serious offense but should proceed to take the evidence as if the plea had been one of not guilty and
should decide the case upon the what evidence including the accused’s plea.1189
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It is a settled practice not to accept the plea of guilty in a murder case unless the court is satisfied that the
accused knew exactly what was implied by his plea of guilty and its effect.1190 Where, on a trial for murder, the
accused was put to some questions, in answer to which he said that he hit the deceased, and the sessions
judge, treating the statement as a plea of guilty, convicted the accused of murder, it was held: (a) that it was not
in accordance with the usual practice to accept a plea of guilty in a case where the natural consequence would
be a sentence of death; and (b) that a man may plead that he hit someone, who thereby died, without
necessarily admitting that he committed murder because murder, under the IPC, requires a certain intention or
a certain knowledge.1191 But though it is not the usual practice to accept plea of guilty on a capital charge, it
cannot be said that it can never be accepted. There, is no reason why, if proper safeguards are taken, such a
plea should not be accepted. Such safeguards must include the accused’s representation by counsel, who
must be in a position to answer the questions of the court, with respect to the fact as to whether the accused
knows what he is doing and the consequences of his plea and also a medical report or medical evidence upon
him.1192 Where, in a capital case, there is any doubt as to whether the accused fully understands the meaning
and effect of a plea of guilty, it is advisable for the court to take evidence, and not to convict solely on the plea
of the accused.1193 Under section 229, CrPC,1194 the court is not bound to convict the accused on his plea of
guilty. The court has a discretion to accept, or not to accept, the plea.1195 If an accused pleads guilty, the court
ought to satisfy itself that he confesses the full offence charged in the indictment.1196 So, before an accused can
be convicted on a plea of guilty, it must be established that he has admitted all the facts, on which his charge is
founded, as well as guilt in respect of them. Unless the accused distinctly admits each and every fact necessary
to constitute the offence, and unless the Judge himself finds, on the admissions made, that the offence charged
is legally established, he should record evidence and come to a decision thereon.1197
Where an accused has pleaded guilty to a charge of murder, conviction of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder is illegal.1198
(IV) ARTICLES RECOVERED AS CASE PROPERTY
[s 302.24] Discovery of the Deceased’s Articles from the Possession of the Accused or at his Instance
Where an accused is found in possession of the ornaments, worn by the deceased at the time of the murder,
the question arises as to the inference to be drawn from this circumstance. In this respect, some theories in
favour of the accused need be considered and eliminated before drawing an inference of murder against the
accused. The first is that it may be that someone merely committed the murder and went away leaving the
ornaments. The second is that someone murdered the deceased and stole the property and then entrusted it to
the accused. And the third is that the murderer, who robbed the deceased of the ornaments, was himself
robbed by someone. After eliminating the possible theories suggested above, the court is entitled, if it appears
reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, to infer that the accused committed the murder, or took part in
its commission, from the fact that he is found in possession of property proved to have been in possession of
the murdered person at the time of murder, or is able to point out the place where such property is concealed
and admits having concealed it there and fails to give any reasonable explanation of his possession.1199
In what circumstances, the presumption under section 114, illustration (a), of the Evidence Act, may be drawn
depends upon the circumstances, under which the discovery of the fruits of crime is made from a particular
accused, the time-gap or the interval and the nature of the property involved, especially in quantity and
character, in the context of early or delayed dispensability.1200 So, although the recovery of the articles
belonging to the deceased from the possession of the accused raises a suspicion about his complicity in the
murder, yet in the absence of any other evidence, it would be unsafe to draw an inference of guilt on a charge
of murder and base a conviction thereon. What may be held in such a case is that the accused is guilty of an
offence under section 411,1201 or under section 380.1202 Where, therefore, the only evidence against an accused
person is the recovery of stolen property, then even though the circumstances may indicate that the theft and
the murder must have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw the inference that the person, in
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possession of the stolen property was the murderer.
The discovery evidence, by itself, is subsidiary and cannot sustain a conviction but where there is plenty of
evidence to sustain the prosecution case, the discovery evidence could be treated as a valuable piece of
corroborative evidence.1203
Suspicion cannot take the place of proof.1204 In Bhikha Gober v Emperor,1205 it was held that the mere fact, that
an accused produced, shortly after the murder, ornaments which were on the murdered person, is not enough
to justify the inference that the accused must have committed the murder. There must be some further material
to connect the accused with the murder in order to hold him guilty of that offence.
The recovery of articles, which are ordinary articles found in many houses and which have no identifying marks,
is held to be hardly of any probative value.1206
[s 302.25] In Robbery-cum-Murder Cases Recent and Unexplained Possession of Stolen Property Raises
Presumption of Murder as well
When robbery and murder are part of the same transaction and the accused from whom the recovery of stolen
properties was made, consequent upon their disclosure statements and they did not offer any explanation
regarding their possession of the stolen properties, drawing a presumption under section 114 of Evidence Act, it
can solely be held that the accused persons were at least guilty of the offence of robbery punishable under
section 392, IPC, on the assumption that they were not armed with any deadly weapon.1207 The recent and
unexplained possession of stolen properties will be taken to be presumptive evidence of the charge of murder
as well.1208 The presumption permitted to be drawn under illustration 114(a) of the Evidence Act has to be read
along with “important time factor”. If the ornaments in possession of the deceased are found in possession of a
person soon after the murder, a presumption of killing may be permitted. The close proximity of the recovery
with the murder as “important time factor” should not be lost sight of.1209
But in a case of robbery and murder, when the recovery of all the three articles of the victim are found in
possession of the accused on the very next day leading to the presumption that the accused committed robbery
but death of the victim was found to be caused by drowning, no internal or external injury was found on the
person of the deceased though some superficial marks of injuries could not be noticed due to decomposition of
the dead body, it was difficult to link the death of the deceased by drowning with the offence of robbery. Thus,
the accused persons were found entitled to acquittal under section 302, IPC, but were liable for conviction
under section 392, IPC.1210 While drawing presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act in robbery-cum-
murder cases on the basis of recent possession of belongings, of the victim with the accused, the court must
adopt a cautious approach and have assurances from all angles that the accused not merely committed theft or
robbery but also killed the victim.1211 Thus, where the accused persons removed earrings causing injuries to the
deceased and there was every possibility that one of the accused, picked up the stone at that moment and
decided to hit the deceased in order to silence or immobilise the victim, if the idea was to murder him and take
away the ornaments, there was really no need to forcibly snatch the earrings before putting an end to the
victim. When there was no pre-meditated plan to kill the deceased, then two possibilities arose, one common
intention of accused persons sprang up and they decided to kill the victim instantaneously for whatever reason,
two, one of the accused suddenly got the idea of killing the deceased and in furtherance thereof picking up the
stone lying at the spot and hitting the deceased, when there is a reasonable scope for two possibilities and the
court is not in a position to know the actual details of the occurrence, it is not safe to extend the presumption
under section 114 so as to find the accused persons guilty of the offence of murder with the aid of section 34,
IPC.1212
[s 302.26] Recovered Articles not immediately Sealed—Effect
Where the recovered articles were not immediately sealed no value can be attached to the said recovery.1213
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When the investigating officer did not affix lac seals after effecting recoveries from the accused persons, no
evidentiary value can be attached to the said recovery.1214
[s 302.27] Discovery of Fact under Section 27, Indian Evidence Act, 18721215
The essence of section 27, Evidence Act, is that it was enacted as a proviso to the two preceding sections
(sections 25 and 26) which imposed a complete ban on the admissibility of any confession made by an accused
either to the police or to any one while the accused is in police custody. The object of making a provision in
section 27 was to permit a certain portion of the statement made by an accused to a police officer admissible in
evidence whether or not such statement is or is not a confessional. Nonetheless, the ban against admissibility
would stand lifted if the statement distinctly related to a discovery of fact. A fact can be discovered by the police
(investigating officer) pursuant to information elicited from the accused if such disclosure was followed by one
or more of a variety of causes. Recovery of an object is only one such cause. Recovery, or even production of
object by itself need not necessarily result in discovery of a fact.1216 That is why Sir John Beaumont said in
Pulikuri Kottaya1217 that “it is fallacious to treat the fact discovered in the section as equivalent to the object
produced”. The following sentence of the learned law lord in the said decision, though terse, is eloquent in
conveying the message highlighting the pith of the ratio.
Information supplied by the person in custody that ‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house’, does not
lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a
knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the
commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant.
The legal proposition adumbrated in Pulikuri Kottaya has been considered and tested by the court, time and
again, and on all such occasions, the court has only reiterated the said principle with approval.1218 The ratio
therein (Kottaya’s) has become locus classicus and even the lapse of half-a-century after its pronouncement
has not eroded its forensic worth.1219 No doubt in a given case an object could also be a fact, but discovery of a
fact cannot be equated with recovery of the object though the latter may help in the final shape of what exactly
was the fact discovered pursuant to the information elicited from the accused.1220 Thus, during interrogation by
the police when the accused made a statement “I have kept firearm concealed behind the old house in a heap
of wood”, the fact discovered by police officer before whom statement is made is certainly not the gun, the fact
discovered is that the accused had concealed the gun behind the old house under a heap of wood.1221
[s 302.27.1] Accused pointing out Place of Concealment of Dead Body or Incriminating Material—Three
Possibilities
There are three possibilities when an accused points out the place where a dead body or an incriminating
material was concealed without stating that it was concealed by himself. One is that he himself concealed it.
Second is that he saw somebody else concealing it. And the third is that he would have been told by another
person that it was concealed there. But if the accused declines to tell the criminal court that his knowledge
about the concealment was on account of one of the last two possibilities, the criminal court can presume that it
was concealed by the accused himself. This is because the accused is the only person who can offer the
explanation as to how else he came to know of such concealment and if he chooses to refrain from telling the
court as to how else he came to know of it, the presumption is a well-justified course to be adopted by the court.
Such an interpretation is not inconsistent with the principle embodied in section 27 of the Evidence Act.1222
[s 302.28] Blood-stained Articles
The fact that there was human blood on the accused’s clothes when he was arrested, may be taken into
consideration in determining his guilt in a murder case,1223 but it cannot be regarded as a conclusive piece of
evidence.1224 Of course, it is a piece of evidence which goes to support other evidence,1225 but it is impossible
to say that mere discovery of a blood-stained article is enough to justify a conviction for murder.1226 The
recovery of a blood-stained axe at the instance of the accused is one of the incriminating circumstances against
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the accused.1227 The plea that as the knife was found from a nearby water pit after about 24 hours, no blood
would have remained on it cannot be accepted as the evidence showed that the knife was closed before it was
thrown in that water pit.1228 Recovery of a piece of cloth and two shirt buttons found near the body of the
deceased on the basis of disclosure statement made by accused 14 days after the incident was not attached
importance in case under section 302, IPC. The accused was given benefit of doubt and acquitted.1229 The
recovery of the dead body along with a blood-stained khurpi from the field of the accused may render his
conduct rather suspicious, but suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of legal proof,1230 and more so
when falsehood has been mixed by witnesses in such a manner that it is difficult to separate it from truth1231
though it is another matter when the evidence of identifying witnesses shows that they had sufficient
opportunity to mark the features of the accused and their identifications are also corroborated by the recovery
of a blood-stained knife and a blood-stained bush shirt at the pointing out of the accused and there is not a
shadow of doubt that the accused had committed the dastardly attack on the deceased.1232
Where a person could not explain as to how his wife was killed or who killed her and not only denied the
ownership of clothes but also betrayed ignorance about the stains on his clothes, his conduct was held to be
inconsistent with his innocence.1233 In Kashinath Krishna Jadhav v State of Maharashtra,1234 where the clothes
of the accused when arrested soon after the occurrence, were found to be stained with blood and the accused
was also, soon after the occurrence, seen sitting with a blood-stained knife in his hand in front of the room, in
which the dead body of the deceased was lying, conviction of the accused, in the absence of any acceptable
explanation, was held proper. Mere presence of blood stains on the shirt of the accused without evidence of
blood group is not of any consequence.1235 Where the accused produced a blood-stained sword and said that
he had killed the deceased with it, but the prosecution failed to prove that the blood on the sword was human
blood, it was presumed that the blood was not human blood and consequently the sword could not be said to
have any connection with the crime.1236 It was held, in another case, that, from the mere finding of blood in
accused’s house, it could not be concluded that the accused either himself committed, or was responsible for
the commission of, murder.1237 The fact that no blood was found on the spot is immaterial.1238 There was clear
and consistent evidence of the eye-witnesses that the occurrence took place inside the house of the deceased,
hence, evidence was not discarded merely because no blood stains were found at the place of occurrence.1239
In serologist test blood was detected on the seized wooden butts weapon of offence. The report of serologist
would not be rejected merely because the blood was insufficient for serologist test.1240
The discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot be wholly relied upon and conviction in such a serious
matter like charge of murder cannot be based upon the discovery. In the instant case, recovery of articles viz.
blood stained clothes of the deceased and blood stained kuduval offence weapon, was made from open space
ten days after the incident. The prosecution did not establish that the house where murder was committed
belonged to the accused. The alleged discovery was absolutely farcical. There was also no motive for the
murder. The accused was given benefit of doubt and conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC was set
aside.1241
(V) MEDICAL EVIDENCE
Offence weapons were recovered at the instance of the appellants, serologist report showed presence of blood
group A on the weapons and the clothes of the accused persons. All were convicted for offences under
sections 364A, 302 and 201, IPC.1242
The place of occurrence was proved beyond doubt in the light of evidence of PWs. The investigating officer had
recovered blood stained roll of the clay and plain clay from the place of incident and also had recovered
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cartridges from the place of the incident. Even as per the forensic report human blood was found on the roll of
clay. The aforesaid circumstance would clearly establish that the place of incident was the baithka of the
informant and not the village pakvainar as alleged by the defence.1243
Mere non recovery of pistol weapon of offence was held not fatal to the prosecution case.1244
[s 302.29] Medical Evidence—Importance
Medical evidence plays an important role in a murder case. In a criminal case, medical evidence is a very safe
yardstick for measuring the veracity of ocular accounts. It corroborates the same, unless it suffers from some
inherent improbabilities or intrinsic infirmities, it would ordinarily be accepted by the court. On the converse, if it
is belied by the medical evidence in the absence of some in-built guarantees which demonstrate the
truthfulness of the prosecution case, like spot arrest of accused persons, the court normally would be loath to
accept it. Such an approach is founded on the trite law that whereas witnesses may lie, circumstances do
not.1245 In cases of ghastly murders where the accused has taken the plea of insanity the medical experts,
particularly the professors, should not venture to come and give evidence in a light hearted manner with
unconvincing opinions.1246 The value of a medical witness is not merely a check upon the testimony of
eyewitnesses; it is also independent testimony because it may establish certain facts, quite apart from the other
oral evidence. If a person is shot at close range, the marks of tattooing, found by the medical witness, would
show that the range was small, quite apart from any other opinion. Similarly, fractures of bones and depth and
size of the wounds would show the nature of the weapon used. It is, therefore, wrong to say that it is only
opinion evidence; it is often direct evidence of the facts found upon the victim’s person.1247 In firearm injuries,
usually the entrance wound is smaller and the exit wound is bigger. Where the exit wound was not only smaller
in dimension than the entry wound but was also smaller in dimension than the size of the cartridge, taken out of
the revolver, allegedly used for causing injuries, it was held that the injuries were not gunshot injuries. In such
cases, it cannot be expected from medical evidence to give any categorical opinion about the character of
injuries merely on the basis of their margins or edges.1248 Where the medical officer has not given depth of all
the injuries on the person of the deceased, and except injury no. 5 in the post-mortem certificate, none of the
injuries seemed to have been deep cut injuries, the inference arose that other injuries, ie, injuries nos. 1-4 and
6-11 were not serious in nature.1249
Where the doctor conducting post-mortem categorically stated in his certificate that the exact cause of death
cannot be ascribed and preserved his opinion pending result of chemical analysis and in his subsequent report
was not able to give definite opinion as to injuries found on the dead body could be ante-mortem or post-
mortem, it could not be concluded that death of the deceased can only be homicidal.1250 The mere fact, that the
eyewitness had seen the victim being struck with a knife, cannot be held to be inconsistent with the medical
evidence showing strangulation as the cause of death when the medical report shows that there were a number
of incised wounds in addition to marks of strangulation.1251 It is the duty of the prosecution, and no less of the
court, to see that the weapon of offence, if available, is shown to the medical witness and his opinion invited as
to whether all, or any of the injuries on the victim could be caused with that weapon. Failure to do so may,
sometimes, cause miscarriage of justice.1252
[s 302.29.1] Time of Incident
When the doctor (PW7) in his examination-in-chief had categorically stated that the incident could have
occurred at 8.00 am which corroborated the case of the informant, there was no reason for the court to
disbelieve this fact to hold that the incident occurred between 2.00 and 4.00 am merely based on a vague
statement made by the Doctor in the cross-examination.1253
[s 302.29.2] Time of Death
Medical science has not achieved such perfection so as to enable a medical practitioner to categorically state in
regard to the exact time of death.1254
[s 302.30] Doctor’s statement only Opinion

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A doctor usually confronted with such questions regarding different possibilities or probabilities of causing those
injuries or post-mortem features which he noticed in the medical report may express his views one way or the
other depending upon the manner the question was asked. But the answers given by the witness to such
questions need not become the last word on such possibilities. After all, he gives only his opinion regarding
such questions. But to discard the testimony of an eyewitness simply on the strength of such opinion expressed
by the medical witness is not conducive to the administration of criminal justice.1255
[s 302.31] Corpus Delicti
It is a well-settled principle in law that in a trial for murder, it is neither an absolute necessity nor an essential
ingredient to establish corpus delicti. The fact of the death of the deceased must be established like any other
fact. The corpse in some cases may not be possible to be traced or recovered. There are a number of
possibilities where a dead body could be disposed of without a trace, therefore, if the recovery of the dead body
is to be held to be mandatory to convict an accused, in many a case the accused would manage to see that the
dead body is destroyed which would afford the accused complete immunity from being held guilty or from being
punished. What is therefore required in law to base a conviction for an offence of murder is that there should be
reliable and plausible evidence that the offence of murder like any other factum of death was committed and it
must be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, albeit the dead body may not be traced.1256 In law, a
conviction for an offence does not necessarily depend upon the corpse being found. There may be reliable
evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the commission of the murder though the corpse is not traceable.1257
Where the prosecution is successful in providing cogent and satisfactory proof of the victim having met a
homicidal death, absence of corpus delicti will not, by itself, be fatal to a charge of murder.1258 Post-mortem
examination on the dead body is not absolutely necessary to prove murder. Even in the absence of the dead
body, murder may otherwise be proved by credible evidence.1259 The failure on the part of the prosecution to
recover the dead body will not indicate that there was no murder if the other evidence is convincing enough to
establish the crime of murder.1260 In a murder case, it is the murder which is the thing to be regarded, and not
the finding of the body. Once the court is satisfied that the murder has been committed and the accused person
has committed it, the question of sentence must be determined upon the gravity of the offence irrespective of
the circumstances whether the body has, or has not, been discovered.1261 Where the body of the deceased is
not found and the factum of death is established by nothing but a retracted confession, the accused should be
given the lesser sentence.1262
The question, whether a man is dead or not, is always a question of fact to be decided on the facts of each
case.1263 In the absence of evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the death of the person, who is said to have
been killed by the accused, there is no onus upon the accused to account for the disappearance, or non-
production, of the person alleged to be dead. Again, the prosecution must further prove that the accused are
the persons who committed the murder charged.1264 Therefore, it is impossible for a court, in a matter of life and
death, to leave a gap in the prosecution evidence and to arrive, by a process of speculation, at a conclusion
which cannot be justified by evidence.1265
When it is established that the accused persons after killing the deceased took away the body of the deceased
it is for the accused persons to explain, what they did with the dead body of the deceased as section 106 of the
Evidence Act1266 would apply as prosecution has succeeded in proving the death of the deceased by the
accused person.1267
Would a person play hoax with the police stating that he had murdered another and had caused disappearance
of evidence, when the person allegedly murdered was, in fact, alive? Would accepting these allegations of
masochism as true not be credulous? Are not the allegations made against the petitioners of their having given
false information to the police that they had committed murder and had caused disappearance of the evidence,
so absurd and improbable, on the basis of which no prudent man could ever reach a just conclusion that there
was sufficient ground for proceeding against them? The answers thereto can only be in the affirmative. It defies
reason that two persons would confess to having murdered their sister/niece, when in fact, she was very much
alive. Given alteration in the charge-sheet by the police was only to cover up their earlier lapse in having
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charged the petitioners of murder and destruction of evidence under sections 302 and 211, IPC. The accused
persons are however required to be paid suitable costs, for the harrowing experience they have undergone and
the uncalled for misery they had to suffer for no fault of theirs.1268 The corpus delicti or the fact of homicidal
death can be proved by telling and inculpating circumstances which definitely lead to the conclusion that within
all human probability, the victim has been murdered by the accused concerned.1269
[s 302.31.1] Identity of the Corpse
In one case, overwhelming evidence showed that the dead body on which autopsy was conducted was that of
the victim, the sister and nephew of the deceased were sure of the identity of the deceased, the fact that the
deceased aged 29 years was shown by novice medical practitioner to be aged 40 years without conducting any
medical tests in this regard or the observation of the same doctor that the penis of the dead body had
undergone religious circumcision contrary to the report of the senior doctor, a specialist in forensic medicine
who conducted the post-mortem but did not find any evidence of such circumcision on the dead boy, are not
enough to create doubt as to the identity of the victim.1270 The identification of dead body on the basis of clothes
and ornaments cannot be altogether rejected on the ground that the garments such as a saree and blouse are
common items which any women would be wearing and there was nothing very special on the basis of which it
could be said that the clothes could form a reliable basis. Often there is familiarity particularly within the family
with regard to some of the garments which a person wears. When the parents of the deceased on seeing the
clothes identified them as belonging to their daughter, there is strong possibility that they are right, but the same
could not be said with regard to jewellery worn by the deceased which is a common item in the absence of
special distinguishing features.1271 Where the daughter of the deceased identified her mother’s body after its
recovery from the river on the basis of tattoo marks, and the post-mortem report regarding post-mortem held on
the next day of recovery of body showed that there were no tattoo marks or the body, since the report did not
suggest that the body when recovered was in a badly decomposed state, identification made by daughter could
not be disbelieved.1272
[s 302.31.2] Corpse found Floating in Water
Medical jurists have warned that in the case of a dead body found floating in water, the medical men, from a
mere observance of the external condition of the body, should not jump to the conclusion that the death was
from drowning. Only internal examination of the body can reveal symptoms which may indicate with certainty as
to whether death was from drowning or from unlawful violence before the body was immersed in water. The fact
that the stomach was not filled with water and bloated and no froth was coming out of the mouth of deceased,
are important symptoms which go a long way to exclude the possibility of death being as a result of suicide by
drowning.1273
[s 302.31.3] Burning Case—Smell of Kerosene from Deceased even after Three Days—Effect
The doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination, found smell of kerosene emanating from the body of
the deceased. If, as put forth by the accused, accidental fire that erupted from the stove, had set the deceased
on fire, it is not possible that the body would smell of kerosene even after three days. The incident took place
on 27 October 1996, whereas the death occurred on 30 October 1996, and the post-mortem was conducted
then. If it was an accidental fire, it is highly impossible that the body would smell of kerosene. The learned
counsel for the accused made a feeble attempt to explain it saying that in his attempt to extinguish the fire, the
accused might have rolled the deceased on the ground as the result that the kerosene which had fallen on the
ground due to toppling of the kerosene can could have percolated the deceased’s body. This theory is also not
possible since if kerosene had fallen on the ground, that would have caught fire and it is not likely that the
appellant, in his attempt to extinguish fire on the body of the deceased would roll her on such fire. Besides, in
his written statement submitted under section 313 of the CrPC, nowhere did the appellant mention any such
attempt. The smell of kerosene emanating from the body of the deceased is a clear indication that the fire was
set only after kerosene was poured on her body.1274
[s 302.31.4] Burning Case—Doctor’s Report Suggesting Suicide
Doctor’s opinion that colour or burns was suggestive of suicidal death was a stray observation and could not
help accused since it was not the defence of accused that deceased committed suicide.1275 Prosecution case
was that the accused husband on account of non-fulfilment of dowry demand poured kerosene oil on the
deceased and set her on fire. The dying declaration of the deceased was not free from doubt. The record of the
case maintained in the hospital noted that when the doctor examined the deceased she was conscious. The
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doctor noted that the deceased had stated to have sustained burns around 9 pm at her residence. She was
given some treatment and referred to the resident medical officer. Here again the doctor noted that the
deceased alleged to have sustained burns accidentally at her residence. The acquittal of the accused for
offences under sections 302, IPC and 498A, IPC was held proper.1276
[s 302.31.5] Three types of Contradictions between Medical and Oral Evidence and their Inferences
The conflict between oral testimony and medical evidence can be of varied dimensions and shapes. There may
be cases where there is total absence of injuries which are normally caused by a particular weapon. There is
another category where though the injuries found on the victim are of the type which are possible by the
weapon of assault, but the size and dimension of the injuries do not exactly tally with the size and dimension of
the weapon. The third category can be where the injuries found on the victim are such which are normally
caused by the weapon of assault but they are not found on that portion of the body where they are deposed to
have been caused by the eye-witness. The same kind of inference cannot be drawn in the three categories of
apparent conflict in oral and medical evidence enumerated above. In the first category it may legitimately be
inferred that the oral evidence regarding assault having been made from a particular weapon is not truthful.
However, in the second and third category, no such inference can straightaway be drawn. The manner and
method of assault, the position of the victim, the resistance offered by him, the opportunity available to the
witnesses to see the occurrence like their distance, presence of light and many other similar factors will have to
be taken into consideration in judging the reliability of ocular testimony.1277
[s 302.32] Contradiction between Medical Evidence and Oral Evidence-—Accused may be Entitled to Acquittal
Whenever there is a conflict between medical evidence and ocular testimony, normally ocular testimony should
be preferred unless it belies fundamental facts.1278 If, in the light of the medical evidence, it is difficult to accept
the prosecution case as alleged, and the defence version is not false altogether, it is unsafe to maintain the
conviction.1279 The evidentiary value of medical evidence is only corroborative and not conclusive and, hence,
in case of a conflict between oral evidence and medical evidence, the former is to be preferred unless the
medical evidence completely rules out the oral evidence. In the instant case no conflict between medical and
oral evidence was found.1280 Evidentiary value of medical evidence is only corroborative and not conclusive. In
case of conflict, ocular evidence is preferred.1281 Primacy has to be given to the ocular evidence particularly in
the case of minor discrepancies.1282 It is trite law that oral evidence has to get primacy and medical evidence is
basically opinionative. It is only when the medical evidence specifically rules out the injury as claimed to have
been inflicted as per the oral testimony, then only in a given case, the court has to draw adverse inference.1283 It
is very important for the prosecution that the medical evidence with regard to type of weapon used by the
accused and the nature of injuries sustained by the victim is corroborated with the statement of the
eyewitnesses in this regard. The contradictory ocular and medical evidence may be fatal to the prosecution
case, leading to acquittal of the accused.1284 Following are the instances of types of contradictions between the
ocular and medical evidence which were one of the major factors in the acquittal of the accused.
(i) An eyewitness stated that the accused assaulted the deceased with a pronged weapon (jalia) but the
medical witness categorically opened that injuries 1, 2 and 9 on the body of the deceased could have
been caused by gandasi.1285
(ii) The prosecution case is that the accused inflicted the injury only once and that too from behind by way
of a single blow with jalia but the medical evidence clearly indicates that three incised wounds were
inflicted upon the deceased, one on the nape of neck, another on the left side of mandible and third on
the left side of the elbow joint.1286
(iii) The ocular evidence is that the deceased was attacked not by kassi but by spade but the doctor who
held the autopsy clearly stated that the injuries could be caused only by a kassi (pickaxe).1287
(iv) In the opinion of the doctor, the person who caused injuries to the deceased was at a higher level than
the deceased, which was wholly inconsistent with the testimony of eyewitnesses.1288
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(v) The prosecution case was that accused gave lathi blow over forehead of the deceased but the doctor
did not find any head injury on the body of the deceased during post-mortem examination, further the
doctor did not find any undigested food material in the abdominal cavity of the deceased making
statement of eyewitnesses regarding time of death, contradictory.1289
(vi) According to prosecution witnesses the deceased was allegedly beaten by all the accused with lathi,
medical evidence supported the possibility that the fatal head injury could be caused when the head of
the accused could have struck a stone on account of fall on the ground.1290
(vii) Eyewitnesses stated that the accused persons grappled with the deceased who fell down but the
doctor who conducted post-mortem on body of the deceased did not find any mark or ligature around
the neck or any mark of injury on the body and opined clearly that cause of death was asphyxia due to
drowning,1291 where the eyewitnesses state that the only injury on the person of the deceased was the
result of three separate blows but medical evidence showed that it was extremely improbable that the
injury was caused even by two simultaneous blows.1292
(viii) Medical evidence showed injuries to be caused by knife whereas eyewitnesses stated that the main
accused had a pharsa battle axe in his hand and the other accused did not cause any injuries.1293
(ix) The medical evidence shows that death of victim was due to the effect of endrin poisoning but
prosecution evidence did not show that victim was forced to take endrin by the accused.1294
(x) Eyewitnesses stated that the deceased and injured were assaulted with sharp cutting weapons but
evidence of doctor who conducted post-mortem examination showed that the deceased had no injury
which could not have been caused by a sharp-cutting weapon and he had sustained only one injury
which could have been caused, according to the doctor, by a blunt weapon only.1295
(xi) The eyewitness stated that the deceased was given 10/15 tamba blows and also was strangulated, but
the medical expert did not find any injury on the neck or on other parts of the body except two injuries
on the head and also did not find any evidence of strangulation and there were other infirmities also in
prosecution case.1296
(xii) The medical evidence clearly indicates that three incised wounds were inflicted on the body of the
deceased but evidence of eyewitness, shows that the accused had inflicted injury only once by a single
blow.1297
(xiii) The doctor who held the post-mortem examination states in his evidence that during autopsy partly
digested food material was found in the stomach of the deceased but the evidence of the eyewitnesses
state that the deceased took his food along with them, just before he was killed.1298
(xiv) From the evidence of doctor it appears that except one injury all the injuries were caused by sharp
cutting weapon, but from the evidence of eyewitness, even a whisper could not be found that the
accused had any sharp cutting weapon capable of inflicting incised wounds or that they had any
weapon except a dagger/knife which normally can cause puncture wounds.1299
(xv) The medical evidence depicts three injuries on the person of deceased while according to ocular
evidence only one blow was struck on the person of the deceased.1300
(xvi) The only eyewitness states infliction of many injuries by accused but doctor states that the deceased
sustained only one anti-mortem injury.1301
(xvii) According to the medical evidence, the victim died within moments of receiving the injuries whereas
according to the ocular version of the prosecution witnesses, there was gap of about nine hours
between the receipt of injuries and death.1302
(xviii) The evidence of eyewitnesses was that the accused assaulted the deceased on face, thighs and
stomach but post-mortem report belied the said evidence.1303
(xix) The specific evidence of eyewitnesses is that the accused gave a single hit on the head of the
deceased but the medical evidence showed that there were several injuries but no injury on the back of
the head though the injuries were on the left side occipital region, right-parietal region and right
temporal region.1304
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(xx) The eyewitnesses deposed that two shots were fired by the accused and both had caused injury to the
deceased but the evidence of the doctor was that the injuries were possibly caused by only one shot.
All the eyewitnesses stated that the accused had fired two shots from his revolver from a distance of
six to nine feet, but medical evidence showed that there was blackening around the wounds. Further,
the eyewitness stated that the injured witness suffered injuries of pharsas and lathi at the hands of the
accused, but medical evidence disclosed that he had not received a single injury which could have
been caused by a pharsa.1305
(xxi) The doctor did not find any head injury on the body of the deceased during post-mortem examination,
while the eyewitness account shows that a lathi blow was given on the head of the deceased and it
was not a mild blow and the Investigating Officer also observed the said injury on the forehead of the
deceased.1306
(xxii) The prosecution case was that the accused armed with sharp weapons like a gandhasa and ghop
attacked the deceased. The post-mortem report showed that the assault was made with the blunt side
of the weapon, there was no mention in the FIR about the use of the sharp edged weapons from their
blunt side, the eyewitness account that accused had used blunt side of weapon showed that they
made statements to fit in with post-mortem report.1307
(xxiii) The eyewitnesses stated that accused persons gave barchha and lathi blows but the medical
evidence showed that all the injuries on the person of the deceased were caused by sharp edged
weapons.1308
(xxiv) The evidence of extra-judicial confession that deceased was poisoned was belied by medical
evidence stating that death occurred due to multiple injuries.1309
(xxv) The eyewitness alleged that the accused fired a revolver shot at the deceased in a scuffle, but
medical evidence showed stab wounds on the person of the deceased apart from firearm injury.1310
(xxvi) The consistent prosecution version that victim was assaulted with lathis and knife was belied by
absence of any lathi injury in the post-mortem examination of the victim, which runs contrary to the
(xxvii) Medical evidence showing presence of two shots from the gun and was contrary to ocular
testimony and the manner of assault as stated by witnesses was rendered doubtful by the conflicting
medical evidence.1312
(xxviii) The deceased suffered kassi injury by the sharp side, the witness stated in categorical terms that
kassi had penetrated four angul (approximately three inches) in the head. At the same time witness
said that the accused had inflicted kassi blow from the reverse side making contradictory statement.
The doctor who conducted autopsy of the deceased found that the injury on the head of the deceased
did not correspond to the measurement of the reverse side of kassi shown to him.1313
(xxix) The evidence of eyewitness mentioned in an omnibus way that the accused were armed with lathis
but no overtact was attributed to them, the medical evidence ruled out any lathis having been used and
doctor found only incised injuries on the dead bodies and on the injured prosecution witnesses.1314
(xxx) The number of injuries and nature of injuries on the person of the deceased were totally and
completely impossible to reconcile with the oral evidence and medical evidence.1315
(xxxi) The ocular evidence showed that deceased was thrashed by four persons on a cot by lathi blows
for one hour but there was no blood of the victim on the cot or on the floor.1316
(xxxii) Eyewitnesses stated that they had seen the accused persons grappling with the deceased and
when there was a noise, the accused persons fled away from the spot and as a result of grappling, the
deceased fell down but no injury was found on the body of the deceased and the evidence of the
doctor who conducted the post-mortem on the body of the deceased showed that there was no mark of
ligature seen around the neck and there was no mark of injury on the body and cause of death was
asphyxia due to drowning which was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.1317
(xxxiii) Evidence of eyewitnesses showed that the deceased was first assaulted with lathis and when he
had fallen down, he was shot at, but the face of the deceased was virtually turned into pulp, though
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there was no evidence that indiscriminate lathi blows were given on his face nor did the doctor say that
the face was turned almost to a pulp by lathi blows. There was also no possibility of single gunshot
injury causing such damage to face and so ocular evidence was neither reliable nor compatible with
medical evidence.1318
(xxxiv) The eyewitness stated that the accused stuck the deceased with a hansia blow while the doctor
explained that injury caused on chest of the deceased was a punctured wound and a hansia which is
curved or half-rounded with a sharp edge on only one side could not cause such an injury.1319
(xxxv) According to prosecution witnesses, accused come down by staircase to the ground floor, fell
down, got up and after going 5-6 steps fell down, but according to the evidence of the doctor, due to
the injuries caused to the accused he might have suffered paralysis and he could not have moved 5-6
steps after falling down.1320
(xxxvi) All three eyewitnesses in a parrot-like manner stated that when accused fired at the deceased he
was removed by five-six paces (12-15 ft) from him but the doctor has been very specific in the opinion
that the shot must have been fired from a distance of less than four feet. The doctor further opined that
the shot must have been fired from right side of the deceased as direction of that shot was inward and
from right to left, however, according to one of the eyewitnesses the accused was in front of the
deceased and not on his right or last side.1321
(xxxvii) The ocular evidence was that deceased was assaulted with bhusa. But the doctor’s statement was
that death was due to the injury on the head which might have been caused by a sharp cutting
weapon.1322
(xxxviii) The eyewitnesses stated that the accused fired the shot with his hand bent downwards. But the
doctor opined that the hand which fired the shot must have been at a slightly lower level than the part
of the body hit by the shot, which means that the barrel of the gun must have been pointing
upwards.1323
(xxxix) The three eyewitnesses stated that the accused rasped the neck of the deceased by using
gandasa while two co-accused caught hold of the deceased but medical evidence regarding nature of
injuries on neck of deceased did not suggest that the neck of the deceased having been rasped, ie,
using a weapon like gandasa or like a saw. On the contrary, the medical evidence showed that
probably that heavy blow or blows, one or two, were dealt with by sharp cutting heavy weapon, may be
a gandasa, resulting into instantaneous death of the deceased. The medical evidence also showed
that the deceased also sustained an injury on the hand by the same or similar weapon but no
explanation was given by eyewitnesses as to how the deceased sustained injury on hand.1324
(xl) The consistent stand of the prosecution witness has been that the bullet hit the deceased on the chest,
but the medical evidence clearly points out that the deceased was hit on the back and the exit wound is
on the chest.1325
(xli) The prosecution case was that two positive injuries were sustained by the deceased by firearms of the
accused but medical evidence showed that only one gun injury shot was found on the person of the
victim.1326
(xlii) The testimony of the two eyewitnesses showed that the accused inflicted two injuries by the axe and
10 to 12 injuries by the “jayee”, while as per doctor and his post-mortem report the deceased received
five incised injuries and seven injuries by a blunt weapon on her person.1327
(xliii) The prosecution witness stated that deceased received pellet injuries on his chest and jaw,
investigating officer also stated in injury statement that deceased received pellet injuries on tongue,
chest, chin etc., but the bullet was recovered from the chest cavity of the deceased by the doctor and
there was no explanation by the prosecution about it.1328
(xliv) According to medical evidence, there were no lathi injuries, whereas the ocular version was that
deceased was assaulted with lathis after his fall on the ground due to firearm injury.1329
(xlv) The post-mortem report of the two deceased showed that besides firearm injury the deceased also
sustained non-superficial, injuries by blunt object while ocular evidence did not disclose that any of the
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accused was armed with any blunt object or that the firearm was also used by any of the accused from
the blunt side.1330
(xlvi) The post-mortem report of the deceased persons showed no firearm injury while the prosecution
witnesses stated before the police that the accused caused gunshot injuries on the person of the
deceased and subsequently tried to improve their statements after knowing about post-mortem report,
the panchnamas prepared immediately after the occurrence also showed gunshot injuries on the
person of the deceased.1331
(xlvii) Incised and penetrating wounds were found on the body of the deceased. Where no lathi or pistol
injury was found on the body of the deceased in medical examination, the presence of accused armed
with pistol or lathi was ruled out. Accused persons alleged to be armed with pistol and lathi were
acquitted of the charge of murder.1332
(xlviii) Eye-witnesses, relatives of the deceased, deposed that accused persons caused fire-arm injuries
to the deceased but in post-mortem examination no fire arm injury on the person of the deceased was
found. The accused were given benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charge of murder.1333
(xlix) It was the prosecution case disclosed in the FIR, and the eye-witnesses also deposed before the
court that the accused inflicted pharsi (axe) blow and a stick blow on the head of the deceased. But in
post-mortem examination no incised wound was found on the head of the deceased. Only one
lacerated wound was found on the head of the deceased in post-mortem examination. Appellant
accused was given benefit of doubt and acquitted of charge under section 302, IPC.1334
(l) It was the consistent testimony of both eyewitnesses that accused at the time of incident had a pharsa
while his unknown companions had spears and they all caused injuries to the deceased with their
respective weapons, but a perusal of the post-mortem report showed that the bone deep injury was a
lacerated wound and the doctor admitted in his cross-examination that this injury was the result of a
lathi blow.1335
(li) As per medical evidence, two injuries caused by a sharp-edged weapon were found on the body of the
deceased and the eyewitness account was that three accused assaulted the deceased with a sharp-
edged weapon. The seized weapons were also not shown to the doctor for soliciting his opinion as to
whether injuries on the body of deceased could be caused by those weapons.1336
(lii) The testimony of the two eyewitnesses did not show that the deceased was also attacked on the chest
and the hand and so was contradictory with the medical evidence. Further, the ocular evidence was
also contradictory with medical evidence regarding time of incident.1337
(liii) The two eyewitnesses stated that all the eight accused were armed with gandasas and they caused a
series of injuries on the deceased but their statements were belied by medical evidence which showed
that injury no 1 was caused by a sharp weapon, injuries no 2, 3, 4 and 5 were caused by firearms and
injuries no 6 and 7 by a blunt weapon.1338
(liv) Eyewitness stated that one accused fired a shot on the deceased, while the other gave a
gandasa/chopper blow, but as per medical report, no injury of sharp-edged weapon was found on the
body of the deceased.1339
(lv) As per evidence of witness the accused fired at the deceased from behind, but the medical evidence
showed that the entry wound was found on the stomach of the deceased.1340
(lvi) Where the eye-witnesses deposed that the deceased was shot on his back by the accused, but in the
post-mortem report, a singular bullet wound which had entry from the front of the chest and had exit
point at the back of the deceased was found, there was major contradiction between ocular and
medical evidence, hence, the accused appellant was acquitted of the charge of murder.1341
(lvii) The eyewitness stated that one of the accused, fired two rounds on the back of the deceased but no
gunshot injury was found in the post-mortem report of the doctor.1342
(lviii) No injury caused by sickle alleged to be used by one of the accused persons was found in the post-
mortem examination. Acquittal of the accused persons on charge of murder was held proper.1343
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The evidence of the two eye-witnesses about the assault made by the accused persons was not corroborated
by medical evidence, and evidence about the assault was so intermingled that it was not possible to separate
the grain from the chaff, thus, the accused were acquitted of the charge under section 302, IPC.1344
Where the eye-witnesses stated that the accused with sharp edged weapons had assaulted on the forehead of
the deceased, but the doctor deposed that the deceased had not sustained injury on his forehead, held it was a
clear case of contradiction between the medical and ocular evidence coupled with severe contradictions in the
oral evidence, clear latches in investigation, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. Accused appellants
were acquitted of the offences under sections 302 and 324 read with section 34, IPC.1345
Prosecution case was that the accused fired with pistol and rifle at the deceased from behind and caused
death. No rifle injury was found on the body of the deceased though PWs deposed that the accused fired with
rifle at the deceased. Accused was acquitted of the offence under section 302, IPC.1346
It would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of medical witnesses to exclude the
eye-witnesses” account which are to be tested independently and not treated as the “variable” keeping the
medical evidence as the “constant”. Where the eye-witnesses” account is found credible and trustworthy, a
medical opinion pointing to the alternative possibilities cannot be accepted as conclusive.1347
The eyewitness account did not obtain any support from the medical evidence regarding the nature of injuries
rather it ran counter to medical evidence and though for ascertainment of weapon used, the body of the
deceased was referred for X-ray examination by the doctor conducting post-mortem, however, the X-ray report
was not shown to the doctor till the date of examination or even produced before the Court.1348
The eye-witness stated that the accused, on being exhorted by the co-accused, had picked up a big stone and
thrown it at head of the deceased resulting in his death. However, the injuries suffered by the deceased and
medical evidence neither indicated any depressed injury nor showed any bleeding from nose and ears of the
deceased.1349
When the eye-witnesses stated that deceased was assaulted by a hasua, a semi-circular weapon and the
medical witness deposed that toddy tapper, ie, a hasua is curved in shape, but none of the injuries appearing
on the dead body of the deceased was semi-circular or a curved injury and as such there was a question mark
regarding the injuries appearing on the dead body of the deceased having been caused by a hasua.1350
The medical witness had deposed that the injuries of the deceased were caused by heavy sharp cutting
weapon, might have been inflicted by a pharsa, but the eye-witness stated that main accused gave single
pharsa (axe) blow on neck of the deceased and other accused assaulted deceased with pharsa and lathi,
however, injuries caused by hard and blunt substance were not found on body of the deceased.1351
Evidence of the prosecution witnesses was that the deceased was killed immediately after he had his evening
meals, however, medical evidence showed that stomach and small intestine of the deceased was empty,
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falsifying prosecution case as regards time of death.1352
According to medical evidence, injury no 1 was caused by a shot fired from a distance of within three feet and
injury no 3 from a distance of 3” to 12” and PW 2 stated that the shots were fired at his deceased father from a
distance of some 5-6 paces (one pace is equivalent to two and a half feet) while PW 3 stated that the shots
were fired at the deceased from a distance of some ten paces.1353
Evidence of the witness was that the accused assaulted the deceased with blunt side of bankri on left ear of the
deceased but as per medical evidence there was no injury on left ear which could be attributed to blunt
weapon.1354
There was discrepancy between the oral evidence and the medical evidence inasmuch as the injury on the
deceased indicated that the bullets were discharged from very close range from his body, while the prosecution
evidence in this regard showed that the assailants were standing at a considerable distance away from the
deceased.1355
Absence of burn injuries on the person of injured not supporting evidence of the witnesses regarding alleged
infliction of assault by means of hot iron rod.1356
Where the FIR and the eye-witnesses alleged that the deceased was given a pharsa (axe) blow and a stick
blow on his head but no incised wound on the head was found in the post-mortem report, the post-mortem
report also showed only one injury on the head of the deceased.1357
The testimony of the witnesses was that they heard firing of 2–3 gun shots was contrary to evidence of doctor
who held post-mortem examination over body of the deceased and found only one bullet injury.1358
The testimony of eye-witnesses was that the accused persons assaulted the deceased with ballam, bichhua
and axe, was totally inconsistent with medical evidence showing that all injuries found on the body of the
deceased were caused only by hard and blunt object.1359
Both the eye-witnesses stated that from the chaunh (pointed end of the plough) injury was caused to the
deceased, but the doctor in very specific words had said that injury no 5, by which the deceased had died,
could not have been caused by a chaunh.1360
The post-mortem report showed only one incised injury on the head of the deceased whereas the witness,
specifically stated that the accused dealt two axe blows on the head of the deceased.1361
The accused appellant ULC had carried a knife, but no injury from the same knife was found on the person of
the deceased. The participation of the accused appellant ULC was doubtful, thus, his conviction under sections
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302/34, IPC recorded by the courts below was set aside.1362
PW 2 while describing the incident deposed that A1 appellant had inflicted injury on the neck of the deceased
by patta knife and, thereafter caused cut on the right side of his head and further inflicted cut on the neck and
that he had also inflicted injuries on the back. It was submitted by the learned counsel that no injury was found
on the back of the deceased and, therefore, the medical evidence did not corroborate the statement of PW. In
the instant case, the duration of the occurrence was short. The injuries on the deceased were inflicted in quick
succession and it was too much to expect from a witness in such circumstances to narrate the exact injuries
caused on the person of the deceased. The generalized statement as regards the injuries would be more
credible than the particularized statement of location of injuries on the body when the injuries were caused in
quick succession and in a short time. Moreover, there was every possibility of the first injury being caused from
the back side of the deceased. The medical evidence corroborated the statement of the eye-witness PW. There
was no conflict between medical and ocular evidence.1363
[s 302.32.1] Injuries not Caused by Appellant by lathi—Acquitted
None of the injuries found on the person of the deceased could be attributed to lathi wielded by the appellant.
Appellant was given benefit of doubt and acquitted.1364
[s 302.32.2] Reliable Evidence of an Eyewitness does not become Untrustworthy due to Inconsistency with
Medical Evidence
It is well-settled that positive evidence in a case is that of eyewitnesses who had seen and narrated the entire
occurrence. The evidence of a medical man or an expert is merely an opinion which lends corroboration to the
direct evidence in a case where there is a glaring inconsistency between direct evidence and medical evidence
in respect of entire prosecution story, that is undoubtedly a manifest defect in the prosecution case.1365 Where
the eyewitness travelling along with the deceased deposed that the deceased received injury in his back but
medical evidence showed that the deceased received a gunshot in his chest and thoracic region, it was held
that witness having seen exit wound on back of deceased, bleeding, though he had been hit in back so his
evidence could not be rejected.1366 It is not always the inconsistency in the evidence of eyewitnesses and
medical evidence in a murder case which makes eyewitnesses unreliable, the evidence of eyewitnesses is to
be fully and correctly evaluated and cannot be discredited on the basis of somewhat unsatisfactory testimony of
the doctor which on proper judicial appraisal does not contradict the version of prosecution witnesses as to the
manner in which offence was committed.1367 Merely because an illiterate witnesses stated that deceased took
his meal immediately before the occurrence cannot by itself be a circumstance to discredit their evidence on
basis of medical evidence regarding presence of semi-digested food in stomach of the deceased giving
contradictory version regarding time of the incident.1368 If direct evidence is satisfactory and reliable, the same
cannot be rejected on hypothetical medical evidence.1369 When post-mortem report showed that there were a
number of incised wounds on the person of the deceased in addition to marks of strangulation and the death
was due to strangulation, evidence of eyewitness that she saw the accused striking the deceased with a knife
cannot be contradictory to post-mortem report as the witness also stated that she woke up from sleep on
hearing a gurgling sound which evidently came from her husband when he was being strangulated.1370 Where
eyewitnesses stated that the deceased was hit on his back by a shot fired by the accused but the doctor who
had performed the post-mortem examination deposed that the entry wound was on the chest and exit wound on
the back, the inconsistency could not help accused he being compounder in the same Government hospital, the
doctor who had performed the post-mortem examination had evidently tried to help him, evidence of
eyewitnesses therefore could be rejected.1371
Medical opinion in a case is not the last word on the subject, shall be tested by the court. Son of the deceased
deposed before the court that the accused appellant had caused head injury to his deceased father by using
country made pistol. High Court was held justified in recording the conviction of the appellant on murder charge
after setting aside acquittal recorded by trial court.1372
[s 302.32.3] Should Eye-witness Account be preferred to Medical Evidence in Cases of Contradiction between
them?
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Where ocular evidence is cogent, reliable and credible, medical evidence to the contrary cannot corrode the
evidentiary value of former.1373 In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v Dharkole alias Govind Singh,1374 it
was held by the Supreme Court that where the medical evidence was at variance with the ocular evidence, the
testimony of the eye-witness should be decided independently and if found trustworthy, the same could not be
discarded merely because it is at variance with medical opinion. While there can be no difference of opinion
with the principle explained in the aforesaid decision, the application thereof will depend on whether the story
as made out by the prosecution is trustworthy and can be related to the injuries suffered by the victim in the
manner as sought to be projected. If the ocular testimony is such that it is not possible to relate the injuries with
the circumstances in which they were said to have been inflicted, the court has the discretion not to accept the
ocular evidence. The principle enunciated in Dharkole’s case (supra) may be applied in an appropriate case,
but each case has to be determined having regard to its own set of facts.1375
[s 302.32.4] Slight Variation between Medical and Ocular Evidence
It is trite law that minor variations between medical evidence and ocular evidence do not take away the primacy
of the latter. Unless medical evidence in its term goes so far as to completely rule out all possibilities
whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner stated by the eye-witnesses the testimony of eye-witness
cannot be thrown out1376 In State of Uttar Pradesh v Krishna Gopal and another,1377 this position has been
illuminatingly and exhaustively reiterated.1378
[s 302.32.5] Inconsistency between Opinion of two Medical Witnesses
Where the opinion of a medical witness is contradicted by another medical witness, both of whom are equally
competent to form an opinion, the opinion of that expert should be accepted which supports the direct evidence
in the case.1379 The contradictions in the nature of injuries on the person of the deceased depicted in the post-
mortem report and in the injury report prepared by the doctor who examined the deceased when he was
injured, coupled with other infirmities in the prosecution case entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt.1380
Similarly, the contradiction in the evidence of the two doctors regarding nature of injuries found on the accused
and also that they could not be caused by knife as alleged by accused disentitles the accused to the right of
private defence.1381 When the doctor who actually examined the accused and had noted the injuries himself
stated that one of the injuries cannot be a self-inflicted injury, another doctor gave his opinion only on the basis
of injury report and the X-ray report, without even looking at the X-ray plate, the court relied upon the opinion of
the former.1382 Where medical evidence showed that the victim died of jaundice and liver failure but post-
mortem report listed cause of death as shock and hemorrhage due to anti-mortem injuries, in a custodial death
case, the Supreme Court directed that the cause of the victim’s death should be investigated by the CBI.1383
The opinion of the doctor, who was new to the profession and had just completed his internship after his
graduation, that the penis of dead body had undergone religious circumcision is not material when the doctor,
who conducted post-mortem examination and was a specialist in forensic medicine and a senior person, did not
find any evidence of such circumcision on the dead body.1384 Whatever be the reason, no court could afford to
ignore the report of the doctor who so conducted the autopsy with meticulous precision about all the features
noticed, merely on the strength of what another doctor had scribbled in the medico legal case at the initial
stage.1385
Where, on the question that the victim was murdered, there is conflicting medical evidence, circumstantial
evidence satisfactorily establishing that death was homicidal, the medical evidence supporting homicide ought
to be accepted.1386 Where three doctors who conducted a joint post-mortem examination without seeing the
report of the chemical examiner who conducted the autopsy exhausted their opinion that the deceased had
died of asphyxia due to suffocation caused by smothering and/or internal airway obstruction, the doctor
examined by defence after going through chemical examiner’s report opined that poison was responsible for
death rather than smothering, the court could not ignore the large number of external injuries particularly there
on the legs of the victim and in association with the finding of joint post-mortem report of internal organs
cumulatively lead to one conclusion in favour of the theory of forcible smothering leading to discarding of
evidence of the doctor examined by the defence.
[s 302.32.6] Contradiction between Ocular and Medical Evidence regarding Fatal Injury—Medical Evidence to
be preferred
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Where the medical officer who had performed the post-mortem examination gave clear, irrefutable reasons
founded on physical facts noted by him at the autopsy in support of his firm opinion that the only external injury
found on the body of the deceased could not be the result of two simultaneous blows, and, in the ordinary
course of human events and experience also it was extremely improbable, that the three blows simultaneously
given by three different persons from different directions with sharp-edged weapons would land with such
precision and exactitude so as to cause a single wound of such clean cut margins and such dimensions and
other characteristics as those of the external wound round by the medical officer, the version of the
eyewitnesses that the injury of deceased was the result of three separate blows was inherently improbable and
intrinsically incredible and so could not be accepted in preference to evidence of the medical expert.1387 In the
chapter on “Deaths from Asphyxia” in Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence,1388 the learned author has pointed out that
in cases of death due to hanging, in addition to the cord-mark, there would be dribbling of saliva from the mouth
at an angle. A study of this book shows that in case of strangulation, death could be slow.1389 But where in case
of murder there was medical evidence on record that blood was oozing from nose and mouth and that there
was a pool of blood underneath the body of the deceased, the death would be due to asphyxia by strangulation.
In other words, asphyxia was not due to hanging though dead body was ultimately recovered from a tree.
Therefore, the defence version that death of the victim was due to strangulation in the absence of cord-mark
around the neck of the deceased could not be believed in preference to medical evidence.1390
[s 302.32.7] Post-mortem—Non-recovery of Pellets
Where death of the deceased was caused by air-gun, and proved by medical opinion, non-recovery of pellets
from the body of the deceased in post-mortem examination, despite best efforts, was held not fatal to the
[s 302.32.8] Presence of Soot Particles in the Larynx of Deceased—Homicidal Burning
The presence of kerosene on the scalp hair of the deceased and presence of dust particles in the larynx of the
deceased clearly evince that kerosene oil was poured on the skull of the deceased which could not have
happened by accident. It was a case of homicidal burning.1392
[s 302.33] Medical Testimony as to the Nature of the Injury
The testimony and report of medical witness as to nature of the injury on the person of victim is not final. Where
the doctor had stated that the injuries were sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death, the court after
analysing the injuries can come to the conclusion that the injuries, cumulatively were not sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death.1393 “It is well known that doctor can never be certain on the point of
the time so far as duration of injuries are concerned”.1394 In the face of hesitant medical opinion about the
causes of death given by three doctors and the further fact that the deceased died after a month of occurrence,
the court may come to the conclusion that clause (3) of section 300, IPC, has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt, leading to conversion of conviction under section 302 to one under section 304, IPC.1395 If
numerous injuries are found on the body of the deceased and the doctor’s medical evidence does not say that
any one of the injuries was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, even if none of the injuries
by themselves was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, cumulatively they were certainly
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause his death, which in fact took place soon after the assault.1396
The inquiry in regard to the question whether the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, is purely objective and inferential and the matter has to be decided by the court as a question of fact,
even where the medical witness does not say anything about the sufficiency or otherwise of an injury to cause
death in ordinary course of nature or where a medical witness makes a positive assertion one way or the other,
the court cannot be relieved of its duty in deciding for itself the nature of injury. A medical witness who conducts
a post-mortem is one of the witnesses in a case and assessing evidence of witnesses including the evidence of
a medical witness, is the duty of the Court.1397
If the doctor expresses his opinion that the injury is sufficient to cause death but does not use the words of the
code in the ordinary course of nature. By no stretch of imagination can it be construed that when the doctor
stated that the injury is “sufficient to cause death”, he meant that injury is “sufficient” to cause death under
peculiar or extraordinary circumstances and insufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.1398 No
doubt it would have been of advantage to the court if the public prosecutor had put the question to the doctor if
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the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. But mere omission to put that
question is not enough for the court to reach a wrong conclusion that the injury noticed by autopsy surgeon was
not responsible for causing death of the deceased. Though not an expert as an autopsy surgeon, the sessions
Judge himself would have been an experienced judicial officer. Looking at the injuries he himself could have
deduced whether the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No sensible man
with some idea regarding the features of homicidal cases would come to a different conclusion from the 45
injuries on the dead body which included fracture of five ribs (2-6) on the left side towards sternal end, fracture
of some of the fingers and extravasation of blood on the right side of occipital region and also on the citus of rib-
fractures etc., except that these injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.1399
Medical evidence can be used to repel the testimony of eyewitnesses only if it is so conclusive as to rule out
even the possibility of the eyewitness’s version being true. A doctor usually confronted with such questions
regarding different possibilities or probabilities of causing those injuries or post-mortem features which he
noticed in the medical report may express his views one way or the other depending upon the manner the
question was asked. But the answers given by the witness to such questions need not become the last word on
such possibilities. After all, he gives only his opinion regarding such questions. But to discard the testimony of
an eyewitness simply on the strength of such opinion expressed by the medical witness is not conducive to the
administration of criminal justice.1400
[s 302.34] Duration of Injuries in Post-mortem Report and Medical Certificate
In the instant case, in the medical certificate, the age of the injuries was mentioned as 24 hours, which meant
that the injuries could have been caused within 24 hours of examination of the injured. In the post-mortem
report, the determination of precise duration of the injuries can be possible due to the internal examination of
the injuries, whereas no such advantage is available to the doctor when he examines the injuries in the nature
of contusions. Therefore, normally the approximate duration is indicated in such certificates.1401
There was conflict between death certificate and post-mortem report about cause of death. In the death
certificate, cause of death given was cardiac arrest while in the post-mortem report cause of death shown was
smothering. Benefit of doubt was extended; appellant was acquitted of murder charge.1402
[s 302.35] Failure of Prosecution to show Weapon of Offence to Medical Witness
It is the duty of the prosecution, and no less of the court, to see that the alleged weapon of the offence, if
available, is shown to the medical witness and his opinion invited as to whether all or any of the injuries on the
victim could be caused with that weapon. Failure to do so may, sometimes, cause aberration in the course of
justice.1403 Where the weapons of offence were not shown to the doctor and it was impossible to say with
certainty whether the injury was caused by the ballam or the bhala that were seized and therefore, whether it
was one or the other of the accused persons who was responsible for it, even if one believed that on the day of
occurrence one of them carried a ballam and the other a bhala, the conviction under section 302, IPC,
simpliciter cannot therefore be sustained.1404 But when the accused persons in furtherance of their common
intention stabbed the victims, the failure of the prosecution to seek the opinion of the doctor with regard to
particular weapons used in stabbing the two victims could not result into rejecting the prosecution case.1405
Where the seized weapons were not shown to the doctor for soliciting his opinion as to whether injuries on the
body of deceased could because by those weapons, the number of injuries found on the person of deceased
was two, while prosecution case was that, three accused assaulted deceased with sharp-edged weapon, the
conviction of the accused person under sections 302/34, IPC, was set aside.1406
[s 302.36] Post-mortem Report
It is not always necessary to have a complete post-mortem in every case. Section 174 of the CrPC confers
discretion to the police officer not to send the body for post-mortem examination if there is no doubt as to the
cause of the death. If the cause of death is absolutely certain and beyond the shadow of doubt or controversy, it
is unnecessary to have the post-mortem done by the medical officer.1407 The post-mortem report is not
substantive evidence but it is the doctor’s statement in court which has the credibility of substantive evidence,
which in normal circumstance ought to be used only for refreshing the memory of the doctor witness or to
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contradict what he might say from the witness box.1408 When both post-mortem report and inquest report are
not substantive evidence, the discrepancy occurring therein cannot be fatal to the prosecution case.1409 Where
the post-mortem was conducted jointly by two doctor but the doctor who did the major work was examined and
the other doctor was not examined the omission to examine the latter conducting post-mortem was of no
relevance.1410 Failure of the doctor conducting post-mortem to state that the cause of death was firearm injuries
is not of much importance if ocular version is cogent.1411 Where the doctor who conducted the post-mortem
examination was not examined but another qualified and experienced doctor who could identify his signature
and handwriting was examined who deposed about the nature of injuries and consequence thereof, the post-
mortem report was treated as proved and it was also observed by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High
Court that section 294, CrPC would have no application to the facts of the case nor was it obligatory on the part
of the prosecution to have tendered the post-mortem report after having obtained the consent of the defense
under section 294, CrPC.1412 Where the doctor conducting post-mortem in his certificate categorically stated
that exact cause of death cannot be ascertained and preserved his opinion pending result of chemical analysis,
in his subsequent report he was not able to give a definite opinion as to injuries found on the dead body which
could be ante-mortem or post-mortem, it could not be concluded that death of the deceased could be
homicidal.1413 Whatever be the reason, no court can afford to ignore the report of a doctor who has conducted
an autopsy with meticulous precision about all the features noticed, merely on the strength of what another
doctor has scribbled in the medico legal case at the initial stage.1414
[s 302.36.1] The Two Aspects of Expert Evidence
Expert evidence has two aspects, the data evidence and the opinion evidence while it is undoubtedly true that
data evidence cannot be rejected if it is inconsistent with oral evidence, yet so far as opinion evidence is
concerned, it is only an inference drawn from the data and that evidence would not have precedence over the
direct eyewitness testimony unless of course the inconsistency between the two is so great as to obviously
falsify the oral evidence.1415 There is distinction between the objective finding of the doctor and his opinion
based on such objective finding. Where the doctor finds a lacerated wound on the dead body and opines that
the same had been caused by a hard blunt substance, it is open to the court to take a different view on the
basis of reliable ocular evidence and hold that the wound in question was caused by a firearm and not a hard,
blunt substance. But it is not possible to read lacerated wound as incised wound. In other words, so far
“opinion” is concerned, it may be possible in an appropriate case to take a different view, but it is not possible to
say that the objective finding is not correct, unless it is challenged on the basis of some reliable evidence.1416
[s 302.37] Importance of Rigor Mortis in ascertaining Time of Death
The time within which rigor mortis develops all over the body has no factual basis. It depends on various factors
such as constitution of the deceased, season of the year, the temperature in the region and the conditions
under which the body has been preserved.1417
In estimating the time of death from the presence or absence of rigor mortis, is of slight use. In the warm
climate of India, rigor mortis may commence in an hour or two after death, even these assumptions are only
guidelines and are not a sure test to fix the time of death.1418 It is true that normally rigor mortis commences
after one to two hours after the death and the entire body gets stiffened within five to six hours but the definite
time since death cannot be estimated with the aid of the time of commencement of rigor morits. The speed of
onset of rigor mortis depends on many factors and this speed is delayed indefinitely in cold conditions.1419 The
murder allegedly took place on a boat. The dead body was thrown in the water. It remained under water for
more than five days. Rigor mortis was absent and the body was fully decomposed. The soft tissues of some of
the parts of the body had been eaten away by fish. Medical science has not achieved such perfection so as to
enable a medical practitioner to categorically state in regard to the exact time of death. In a case of this nature,
it was difficult to pinpoint the exact time of death.1420 When, it is quite apparent, that in the absence, of various
factors which had not been noted by any doctor considering which the probable time for the outset of rigor
mortis and estimation of probable time of death with references to the state of rigor mortis and coolness of the
body can be fairly estimated, any opinion as to the time of death therefore cannot be held to be wholly
reliable.1421 Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence1422 states:
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Rigor mortis first appears in the involuntary muscles, and then in the voluntary… In the voluntary muscles rigor mortis
follows a definite course. It first occurs in the muscles of the eyelids, next in the muscles of the back of the neck and
lower jaw, then in those of the front of the neck face, chest and upper extremities, and lastly extends downwards to the
muscles of the abdomen and lower extremities. Last to be affected are the small muscles of the fingers and toes. It
passes off in the same sequence.1423 Taylor, in his book,1424 under the caption ‘The order in which rigor appears’
states:
As a rule, cadaveric rigidity first appears in the muscles of the face, neck and trunk; it then takes place in the muscles
of the upper extremities, and lastly in the legs… In regard to its disappearance the muscles of the lower extremities will
often be found rigid, while those of the trunk and upper extremities are again in a state of relaxation. It appears later
and lasts longer in the lower extremities than in other parts of the body.1425
In Jhala and Raju’s Medical Jurisprudence1426 it has been stated:
Rigor mortis is due to rigidity of the muscles. It appears both in the voluntary as well as involuntary muscles, its
appearance and disappearance in various muscles follows a pattern. It is apparent first in the region of head, face,
neck, eyelids and lower jaw. It last shows its appearance in the lower extremities. Hence, if rigor mortis is present in
the lower extremities, it can safely be opined that it is present all over… After the rigor mortis has set in the whole body
(as confirmed from its presence in lower extremities), no specific opinion is possible till the time it starts disappearing
i.e., after about 18 hours.1427
It would thus appear that all the authorities on the subject are unanimous in their opinion that rigor mortis sets in
and reaches the “extremities” at the end and that it follows the same pattern both in the matter of appearance
and disappearance. The presence of rigor mortis by itself, cannot be decisive of the time of death, but it is
difficult to believe that rigor mortis would be found only in the extremities of the body within seven hours of the
death. It is true that on the basis of presence of rigor mortis, no opinion can be given with mathematical
precision regarding the time of death. At the same time, in view of the undisputed position regarding the
“course” of appearance and disappearance of rigor, its presence only in the extremities does provide a sound
basis to find out the probability or otherwise of the prosecution case regarding time of death. The process of
appearance and disappearance of rigor mortis may take relatively shorter and longer time but it cannot be that
within seven hours time it would disappear from the other portions of the body like head, face, neck, and
abdomen and remain only in the extremities.1428 In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,1429 in the
heading “Putrefaction of Decomposition and Autolysis” it is stated:
Putrefaction follows the disappearance of the rigor mortis but this is not always the case; since, in Northern India
especially during the hot months from April to October it commences before rigor mortis has completely passed off
from the lower extremities.1430
[s 302.37.1] Time of Death

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Medical science has not achieved such perfection so as to enable a medical practitioner to categorically state in
regard to the exact time of death. In the instant case, the murder took place on a boat, and the dead body was
thrown in the water. Dead body remained under water for more than five days. Rigor mortis was absent and the
body was fully decomposed. The soft tissues of some of the parts of the body had been eaten away by fish. It
was not possible for the doctor to pinpoint the exact time of death.1431
[s 302.38] Contents of Stomach cannot give exact Time of Death
The stomachic contents cannot determine with precision the time of death inasmuch as the power of
digestibility may remain in abeyance for a long time in states of profound shock and coma and it must also be
remembered that the process of digestion in normal healthy person may continue for a time after death. Be it
noted, all the imponderables pointed out by Dr Modi in his book on Medical Jurisprudence which makes the
digestive testimony inconclusive, and, therefore insufficient, to contradict positive evidence, if any, about the
time of death. To impute exactitude to a medical statement, oblivious to the variables noticed by experts and
changes in the dietary and eating habits is to be unfair to the Science. We are not prepared to run the judicial
risk of taking the whole verdict on such nebulous medical observations made by the Doctor.1432
As the occurrence was a daylight occurrence, the inconsistency as to the fact that the stomach of the deceased
was found empty, whereas, the wife of the deceased deposed that the deceased had taken breakfast before
incident took place, was held not fatal to the prosecution case.1433
[s 302.38.1] When Contents of Stomach Assume Importance
It may be possible to contend that contents of the stomach may not always be an indicator of the time of death.
But in a case where stomach is empty and the prosecution evidence is that the murder had taken place shortly
after the deceased has his last meal, to say that the contents of the stomach have no material bearing on the
determination of the time, is not acceptable. When the time of death being a material factor to verify the
presence of the eye-witnesses it was obligatory for the prosecution to have clarified the discrepancy between
the medical evidence and the oral evidence. If the prosecution has failed to do so, a serious doubt as to the
time of incident and the presence of the eye-witnesses at the time of incident and their narration of the incident
also becomes doubtful.1434 Where the PW I stated that he and the deceased had gone to take tea after dinner
when the incident took place, but no food was found in the post-mortem, and even small intestines were found
empty, the evidence of eye-witnesses was not believed, and appellant accused was acquitted of the charge of
murder.1435
[s 302.38.2] Semi-digested Food in Stomach of the Deceased
As per oral evidence of PW12 sister in law of the deceased, the deceased had taken food at about 10 pm, while
the occurrence was alleged to have taken place at 8.30 pm and in the post-mortem examination, semi-digested
food was found. The accused contended that there was a conflict between oral and medical evidence. Held, as
per doctor’s evidence, the death occurred within 24 hours of the post-mortem, and the variation between the
medical evidence and the testimony of the eye-witnesses was not such which would lead to a conclusion that
the prosecution case was not correct.1436
As intestines of the deceased contained semi digested food, the prosecution case that occurrence took place at
8 am was believed.1437
[s 302.38.3] Undigested Food in the Stomach of the Deceased—Time of Death can be Ascertained
The Supreme Court in a quite number of cases determined time of death of deceased relying on nature of the
contents of the stomach or intestine.
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In Ram Narain Singh v State of Punjab,1438 in para 9 of this decision the Supreme Court held:
Medical evidence of Dr Walia shows that undigested food was found in the stomach of the deceased and according to
him the deceased must have taken his food only five minutes before his death or at the most within half an hour of his
death. Doctor’s evidence therefore clearly shows that he must have taken his food at 8 pm which is also the usual time
when the villagers take their food. Relying on this circumstance the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the
incident must have taken place at about 8 pm, and it belied version of the two eyewitnesses that the occurrence took
place in their house at about 6.30 pm. From the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it appears clear that if in the
stomach of dead man undigested food material is found, it must be presumed that he died at the most within about half
an hour since he took his food last. Therefore, the contents of stomach/intestine of a dead man must contain
undigested food material if he dies within half an hour after he took food.1439
Likewise the Supreme Court in Raghunandan v State of Uttar Pradesh,1440 determined the time of
death/occurrence on the basis of nature of the contents of the stomach/intestine.
In Charan Singh v State of Punjab,1441 it was held by the Supreme Court in para 18 as follows:
The first information report about the present occurrence was lodged promptly and this is apparent from the fact that a
copy of the first information report was received by the Judicial Magistrate concerned at Ludhiana at 8.12 pm the same
evening. We are not impressed by the suggestion that the occurrence took place not at 5 pm but much earlier.
According to the post mortem examination reports, the stomach of each one of the two deceased persons was empty
at the time of the post mortem examination. Normally a vegetable diet containing mostly farinaceous food as usually
taken by an Indian does not leave the stomach completely within six to seven hours after its ingestion (see page 151 of
Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, Sixteenth Edition). If the occurrence had taken place at 2 or 3 pm as
suggested on behalf of the accused persons the mid day meals usually taken by the villagers at about 11 am would still
be in their stomachs and the same would have been empty at the time of the post mortem examination. The fact that
the stomach of each of the deceased persons was empty lends assurance to the prosecution version that the
occurrence took place at about 5 pm.
From the above discussion it is evident that stage of digestion of the food material or the nature of the contents
of the stomach or intestine can be the basis to estimate time of death or the time of occurrence depending upon
the circumstances of the case.1442 Where the prosecution case was that the deceased was murdered at about
7.30 am on 13 March 1990 and FIR and lodged at 10 am on the same day but defence has thrown a
suggestion that the deceased died in the previous evening, suggestion was denied by prosecution witness, the
doctor’s evidence showed that age of injury was 38-40 hours from the time of post-mortem examination which
takes the time of death to previous evening, besides the doctor also found undigested rice in the stomach, the
normal practice in the month of March in the area was to take rice in the evening, so evidence of record
established that deceased took food in the evening and immediately thereafter he died, accused was held
entitled to the benefit of doubt.1443 Where the prosecution had fixed up the time of murder as 11 pm on surmise,
perhaps, the actual time of murder would have been later in the night or the last earlier, by any stretch of
imagination on the fact of the case, absence of any food materials in the stomach cannot be counted as a
circumstance in favour of the accused.1444
[s 302.38.4] The Time Period for Emptying the Stomach—Factors affecting it

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In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence & Toxicology,1445 the learned author has opined: “The rate of emptying of
stomach varies in healthy persons. It varies in man from 2.5, 6 hours…”.1446
In Medico-legal Postmortems in India,1447 the learned author Dr CK Parikh has opined:
The length of time required to empty the stomach after a meal is very variable, and depends not only on the type of
meal ingested but also on stomach tone and pyloric function and on the psychological state of the individual. Fear
slows but anger hastens gastric emptying. The power of digestion may remain suspended for a long time in conditions
of shock and coma. Food has been sent in the stomach remaining undigested in persons who received severe head
injuries soon after their meal and died within 12-24 hours.
In general, milk leaves the stomach rapidly but the large vegetable and fatty meals consumed in India do not
usually leave the stomach under four hours. Chapattis digest to a pulp fairly quickly, within about two hours, but
do not leave the stomach quickly when other foods are present with them. Most kinds of dals retain their form
for about two to three hours and rice grains retain their form up to three to four hours. If meat has been eaten
along with the vegetable foods, it is seldom distinguishable as such after three hours, and after four hours, both
green vegetables and roots are also indistinguishable. In general, if at autopsy one finds that the stomach is full
it would suggest that the victim died within two hours of taking the last meal if food was distinguishable and four
hours if the food was indistinguishable. The volume and condition of stomach contents can thus provide
important data.1448
In HMV Cox’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,1449 the learned author opined:
In a sudden and unexpected death, if a full stomach containing undigested food is found, it is reasonable, if other
evidence is not incompatible to deduce that death occurred within two to four hours of the eating of the last meal. It is
dangerous to make any more accurate interpretation than this.1450
The opinion of Dr CK Parikh contained in the book Medico-legal Postmortems in India, is that not only ingestion
of the meal will depend upon the type of meal consumed but it will also depend upon stomach tone and pyloric
functions and on the psychological state of the individual. According to the author large vegetable and fatty
meals do not leave the stomach under four hours but chapattis digest to pulp fairly quickly within about two
hours. In case chapattis are taken along with other items of food, it will take a longer time to leave the stomach.
Dals retain their form for 2-3 hours and rice retains its form for 3-4 hours. So therefore, the ingestion will
depend upon the type and quality of food consumed by a person and upon his digestive power. This power
varies from person to person. It would depend upon the kind and quantity of food consumed. Period of
digestion is different for different types of foods.1451
The time taken normally for digesting of food would depend upon the quality and quantity of food as well,
besides others. It is required to be factually proved as to the quantum of food that was taken, atmospheric
conditions and such other relevant factors to throw doubt about the correctness of time of occurrence as stated
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by the witnesses. Only when the ocular evidence is wholly inconsistent with the medical evidence the court has
to consider the effect thereof. The Supreme Court in Pattipati Venkaiah v State of Andhra Pradesh,1452
observed that medical science is not yet so perfect as to determine the exact time of death nor can the same be
determined in a computerised or mathematical fashion so as to be accurate to the last second. The state of the
contents of the stomach found at the time of medical examination is not a safe guide for determining the time of
occurrence because that would be a matter of speculation, in the absence of reliable evidence on the question
as to when exactly the deceased had his last meal and what that meal consisted of. In Nihal Singh v State of
Punjab,1453 it was indicated that the time required for digestion may depend upon the nature of the food. The
time also varies according to the digestive capacity. The process of digestion is not uniform and varies from
individual to individual and the health of a person at a particular time and so many other varying factors.1454
[s 302.38.5] Empty Stomach of the Deceased and Time of Death
The time of death cannot be viewed with any mathematical accuracy.1455 The stomach contents cannot
determine with precision the time of death and there are imponderables which make the digestive testimony
inconclusive and therefore, insufficient to contradict positive evidence, if any, about the time of death. To impute
exactitude to a medical statement oblivious to variables noticed by experts and changes in dietary habits is to
be unfair to science.1456 In the absence of any convincing evidence that the doctor holding post-mortem
examination had deliberately given a wrong report, his evidence is not liable to be discarded. Where there is
positive direct evidence about the time of occurrence, it would be wrong to make conjecture about such time on
the basis of the presence of faecal matter in the intestines and come to the conclusion that the deceased would
normally have evacuated it early in the morning.1457 Even the presence of faecal matter in the intestines would
not be conclusive. In the present case, the fact that the stomach of the deceased was empty, lends assurance
to the prosecution version that the occurrence took place at around 4.45 pm, because it has come in evidence
that he had taken his meal at noon time on that day.1458 The contents of the stomach found at the time of post-
mortem are not a safe guide to determine the time of the incident. It was also observed that it was not proper
and fair to a medical witness to discard his evidence by referring to passages of experts on medical
jurisprudence without bringing the reference to the notice of the witnesses.1459 Where the stomach of the
deceased was found empty as revealed by post-mortem report, it was held that inference that incident took
place early in the morning would be a pure speculation.1460 The stomach being empty or the large intestine not
having any faecal matter would not falsify the positive evidence on the question of time of death. Therefore, the
evidence of eyewitnesses as regards the time of occurrence of the incident and of the doctor as regards the
time of death cannot be discarded merely on a theoretical consideration of the process of digestion of food.1461
Where as per the prosecution’s case the incident took place at 12 noon and the post-mortem reports of both the
deceased boys showed that the stomach of both the deceased was empty and faecal matter was present in the
intestines and on the strength of that medical evidence the plea of the defence was that it was unnatural that
the boys had not taken their breakfast or food by the time, ie, 12 noon, the unfortunate incident had occurred so
eyewitness account given by the witnesses was in conflict with medical evidence, was rejected by the
Allahabad High Court on the ground that because it was not the case of the prosecution that the deceased had
left the house after taking food or breakfast. Unless there is evidence to that effect, it can safely be said that the
incident had not taken place at 12 noon as alleged by the prosecution or the oral evidence is not in line with
medical evidence.1462 The presence of faecal matter in the large intestine of the deceased is not suggestive of
the fact that the incident took place late in the night or in the early hours of the next day, more so, when there
was convincing evidence of the son of the deceased that his father was shot dead when he had gone to ease
himself in the night.1463
[s 302.38.6] Contradiction between Statement of Witness and Post-Mortem Report as to Content of Stomach
The contradiction in post-mortem report relating to empty stomach of deceased and statement of his wife that
he had taken breakfast before going to the fields would not be fatal.1464
[s 302.39] Non-mentioning of Name of Accused in Medico-legal Report—When Fatal
When from the medico-legal report that the doctor sent to the police after examining the deceased, apart from
the name of deceased, his father’s name, his address, his occupation and an account as to how the injuries
were caused, the place where he was found, these particulars obviously were furnished by the deceased
himself before his death or eyewitness, who accompanied him. In that context it was expected if really the
accused was the assailant that his name would be disclosed by all or any of them while furnishing the cause of
the injuries. It can, therefore, be legitimately inferred that at the earliest available opportunity the same of the
accused was not disclosed. This fact coupled with the fact that no special report in the respect of registration of
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the case on the day FIR was recorded and the evidence on record unmistakable shows that it was forwarded to
the magistrate only after the case was converted to section 302, IPC, consequent upon the death of the
deceased. This glaring circumstance prompts the inference that the FIR did not see that light of the day till the
death of the deceased, in the light of these facts the conviction and sentence of the accused under section 302,
IPC, and other offences were set aside.1465
[s 302.39.1] Non-mentioning of the Statement made to the Doctor in the Memo forwarded to the Police
The memo which is sent by doctor to the police is in a prescribed form found in a book obviously kept by the
hospital. One of the forms is filled up and sent by the doctor to the sub-inspector of the police. It is not
necessary at all to mention all the statements made to the doctor by the persons who brought the patient to him
in that memo. It is not part of the duty of the doctor.1466 Thus, omission of doctor to mention the statements
made to him by the persons who accompanied the injured in the memo sent to the police had no effect on the
prosecution case.
[s 302.40] Strangulation and Hanging Cases
In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology in the chapter on “Deaths from Asphyxia”, the deaths due to
asphyxia by strangulation are explained. The learned author points out that death due to hanging, in addition to
the cord-mark there would be dribbling of saliva from the angle of mouth. The learned author also says that in
cases of strangulation, pure blood issues from the mouth, nose and ears specially when great violence had
been used and the tongue is also protruding.1467 A study of Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence shows that in a case
of strangulation death could be slow.1468 The strangulation is established due to the availability of contusion of
sternomestoid of muscle on both sides, which is common in strangulation and will not occur in hanging.1469
Where in a case of murder the suggestion by defence was that the death of the victim was by hanging as dead
body was recovered from a tree but the medical evidence on record showed that blood was oozing from the
nose and the mouth and that there was a pool of blood under the body of deceased, the death could be due to
asphyxia by strangulation. In other words, asphyxia was not due to hanging though the dead body was
ultimately recovered from a tree.1470
In the act of strangulation by the hands much greater degree of violence is commonly employed than is
necessary to cause death, fingernail impressions are common and if much force is used locally in producing
construction, the larynx, wind pipe, the muscles, even vessels in the front sides of the neck may be found to be
bruised or lacerated. The hyoid is sometimes fractured.
Evidence of violent compression or constriction of the neck during life is obtained from the presence of
ecchymosis and swelling and lividity of haemorrage above the level of the constriction and swelling and lividity
of face.
In Llyods Medical Jurisprudence of India, the author has noticed that: “If both hands are employed as is very
often the case, several marks will be seen on each side of the throat”.
It will appear from the aforesaid text books on medical jurisprudence that in strangulation with hands (throttling),
the face is cyanosed, livid and swollen, the eyes are open and suffused, the pupils dilated, the tongue swollen,
dark coloured and protruded, bleeding occurs from the mouth, nostrils and ears, ecchymosis may result and
fingernail marks may be found. If both the hands are used several marks may be seen on each side of throat.
Hyoid bone may be fractured. Hyoid bone is not fractured by any means other than strangulation.
The opinion contained in Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology is always regarded as of high
authoritative value.1471 Both in Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology and in Taylor’s Principle and
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Practice of Medical Jurisprudence, it has been clearly indicated that suicide by self strangulation is very rare.
For committing suicide by self-strangulation the person committing suicide must take aid of contrivance so as to
ensure application of sufficient force until death by strangulation. Without such contrivance sufficient force
cannot be applied because initially with the pulling the ends of the string must get loosened.1472 Therefore, on
account of absence of contrivance which rules out any possibility of suicide by the deceased by self-
strangulation, the defence plea of self-strangulation was discarded and in the face of circumstantial evidence
being absolutely clinching in establishing the complicity of the accused in committing the murder of the
deceased, the apex court reversed the order of acquittal of the accused passed by the High Court.1473
On the night of occurrence, the deceased wife was with the accused husband. The accused did not furnish any
explanation as to how the deceased died. In post-mortem examination, external and internal injuries and,
hematoma were found on the neck of the deceased wife. The medical officer opined that the death of the
deceased was due to strangulation. Conviction of the accused on charge under sections 302/34, 201, IPC was
held proper.1474
Fracture of the hyoid bone suggests only strangulation.1475
The accused had strangulated his deceased wife and threw her dead body into a well. The accused took the
plea that the deceased fell into the well accidentally. After the body of the deceased was taken out from the
well, no water came out of her mouth when her dead body was pressed. The defence theory of accidental fall
was ruled out. The accused was convicted under sections 302/201, IPC.1476
In the instant case of alleged strangulation, the second post-mortem reiterated that cause of death was
“asphyxia as a result of strangulation”. According to the medical opinion, a hard blunt substance appeared to
have been used to cause strangulation leading to death on account of asphyxia. However, no such hard or
blunt substance was found or seized from the room. Doctors had not found any physical signs of internal
injuries viz. any extravasations of blood in the tissue or any laceration in the underlying muscles. Considering
post-mortem reports and the evidence of PWs, the court held that reasonable doubts arose as to the cause of
death due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation.1477
Death was caused due to constriction force applied to neck resulting in asphyxia and shock resulting in death.
Theory of suicide was rejected. Held, it was a case of murder by strangulation.1478
Where burn injuries found on the body of the deceased were post-mortem injuries, held, cause of death of the
deceased was strangulation.1479
See also the undermentioned case.1480
[s 302.40.1] Presence or Absence of Ligature Marks on Neck of Deceased—Effect
If there was no ligature mark on and around the neck of the deceased it is a very signifiant feature ruling out the
possibility of suicide by strangulation with the help of rope, etc. Abraded contusions in front of the neck and on
right side of the neck with ecchymosis present under the contusions speak of throttling because the abraded
contusions would be caused when the neck is pressed by the hand and pressure is exerted upon the throat.
The doctor clearly stated that the contusions on the neck and the fracture of both the cornua of hyoid bone was
the result of forceful pressing of the neck.1481 Where post-mortem report showed that there was ligature mark
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on the neck of the deceased wife which was ante-mortem, the opinion of the doctor was clear and definite that
such ligature mark of 5 cm width in horizontal position could not be caused by hanging but would have been
caused by strangulation, the medical evidence, therefore, completely pacified the case of the accused husband
that on his return from the field to his house he had found his wife hanging, and thus she had committed
suicide.1482 In case of ligature mark caused by suicidal hanging, normally, the mark could be situated above the
thyroid cartilage. If it was across the thyroid cartilage, the possibility of ligature mark is homicidal cannot be
ruled out. The possibility of death due to suicide also cannot be brushed aside. In case of homicidal death there
would be further injuries inside the neck muscles. In case of homicidal strangulation in addition to ligature mark
or finger mark there is probability of struggle mark of violence on the other part of the body. Although in the
case of suicide saliva must have dribbled, but due to partial suspension of the body asphyxia process might be
slow and gradual as a result dribbling of saliva might be absent.1483
Where it has come in evidence that the chadar was about one and a half meter long and one meter wide, this
shows that in fact it was not a full chaddar or a bed sheet but was a piece of cloth, which is sometimes used by
ordinary people like rickshaw pullers to cover their face during winters especially in night, if the said piece of
cloth is converted into a rope by rolling it over, its diameter will very much depend upon the fact as to how
strongly and tightly it is rolled over. If a piece of cloth which is only one meter in width is tightly rolled over in the
shape of a rope, its diameter will be much less than 6/7 cm and the ligature mark on the neck of the deceased
would be of still lesser dimension. The width of the ligature mark would very much depend upon the type of the
cloth, how tightly and strongly it was rolled over and was converted into a rope and how soon it was
removed.1484
[s 302.40.2] Distinction between Ligature Marks in Cases of Hanging and Strangulation
In the case of hanging, the position of ligature mark would be different from that of the strangulation. In the case
of hanging, mark goes up towards the jaw and it also passes above the thyroid cartilage. The ligature mark
pass obliquely from the front side of the neck. In the case of hanging, the mark of knot of the rope would be
visible on front of the neck. In the case of hanging, there must be a little stretch on the neck due to the weight of
the body. In the case of hanging, there would be no horizontal ante-mortem injuries around the neck. In the
case of strangulation, it may be caused by any rope or by any cloth or it may be caused by pressing the throat
by hand, small bruises and contusion on the sides of the neck would be visible. If the strangulation may have
been caused by pressing the neck by rope or anything alike, the ligature mark would be present on the neck in
a circle all around the neck.1485
[s 302.40.3] Strangulation and Throttling
The Court should not lay uncalled for emphasis on the difference between strangulation and throttling.
Strangulation is a generic term and throttling is one of its species as observed in Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence
and Toxicology,1486 Taylor’s Principle and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence1487 and Lyods Medical
Jurisprudence for India.1488 Strangulation means a violent form of death when results in constricting the neck by
means of ligature or by any other means and strangulation on is called throttling when the constriction is
produced by the presence of the fingers or palm upon the throat.1489 The strangulation is established due to the
availability of contusion of sternomestoid of muscle on both sides, which is common in strangulation and will not
occur in hanging.1490 Where there is absolutely nothing in the evidence on record to indicate that the multiple
bruises on the body of the deceased were self-inflicted; rather, these bruises were indicative of severe beating
and the fracture of the hyoid bones with superficial bruises on the neck cements the possibility of strangulation.
In such circumstances, there can be really no escape from the conclusion that it was the accused who had
killed the said deceased by throttling her to death.1491
Accused persons committed the murder of the deceased boy aged 5 years by strangulation as proved by the
post-mortem report, thus, they were convicted under section 302, IPC.1492
The three appellants accused had strangulated the deceased, chopped off her head, cut the body into pieces
and disposed of the body. The deceased had gone to the accused to demand money, her share in the property
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sold, as her husband was inside the jail in connection with a case under the NDPS Act. The human skeleton of
the deceased and her garments were recovered at the instance of the accused appellants. Accused appellants
were convicted under sections 302 and 201, IPC.1493
The doctor who conducted post-mortem in the case deposed that the death of the deceased was on account of
asphyxia caused by throttling. This conclusion was supported by the fact that there was a fracture of the cornua
of the hyoid bone. It is well accepted in medical jurisprudence that hyoid bone can be fractured only if it is
pressed with great force or hit by hard substance with great force. Otherwise the hyoid bone is not a bone
which can be easily fractured. Moreover, the absence of carbon particles and fumes in the trachea and
bronchus led to the irresistible conclusion that the deceased must have died before she was set on fire. Some
amount of carbon particles and fumes would have certainly been found in the trachea and bronchus if she were
alive when set on fire. Accused husband was convicted for offences under sections 302, 498A and 201,
IPC.1494
[s 302.40.4] Duty of Medical Officer in Throttling Cases
According to the medical jurisprudence, in a case of throttling, the medical officer is expected to remove a piece
of skin around the neck for preservation as an exhibit in a later criminal proceedings for the purpose of
ascertaining the opinion of the expert. The failure in this regard, is a lacuna in the case.1495
[s 302.40.5] Some Hanging Cases
(a) When the medical evidence of the doctor shows that in the case of suicide by hanging there is normally
trickling of the saliva from an angle of the mouth of the deceased, when stains the clothes of the
deceased which, were not found on examination of the clothes worn by the deceased, the plea of
defence that the deceased committed suicide by hanging stood falsified.1496
(b) Where the allegations against the accused were that accused assaulted deceased wife till she became
unconscious and thereafter left the house, he came back and hanged her, the evidence on record
indicated that after assaulting the deceased as result of which she became unconscious the accused
left the house along with his daughter and came back home sometime later. The version of the
accused was that he untied the knot of the saree which she used as the ligature and brought her down.
In the absence of any evidence to prove that deceased was alive when the accused came back, his
version cannot be rejected altogether entitling him to acquittal.1497
(c) Where the accused husband was alleged to have throttled his wife to death at his father-in-law’s
house, no external injuries of fracture of hyoid bone was found in post-mortem examination of the
deceased, though in the cross-examination, the doctor stated that generally in all cases of throttling,
marks of violence and injuries cannot be found but this stray statement of the doctor in the cross-
examination was not a conclusive opinion but it was only a possibility in the absence of material to
show that the death had occurred by throttling and some other infirmities in the prosecution case,
accused was found entitled to be acquitted.1498
[s 302.41] Death by Drowning—Signs
In the autopsy examination 200 mls of watery fluid was found in the stomach of the deceased. Modi in his
celebrated work Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, has opined that the presence of a certain quantity of
water in the stomach is an important sign of death by drowning. It is not possible for water to get into the
stomach, if a body is submerged after death.1499
Mere absence of diatom in the deceased’s body would not exclude the possibility of death by drowning. The
post-mortem report also indicated presence of mud in the trachea of the children, which also pointed to the
possibility of death by drowning.1500
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Accused appellant, a girl aged 15 years, was alleged to have drowned the child (deceased) in pond. As there
was a short distance between the pond and the house of the deceased, the possibility of accidental death could
not be ruled out. Conviction of the accused appellant under section 302, IPC was set aside.1501
[s 302.42] Depth of Injury more than Length of Blade of Weapon
Normally the depth of injury may not be more than the length of the blade of the weapon of offence because the
blade of the weapon has an important role in causing the injury. But when a 14 cm deep injury was found on
the person of the deceased which was undoubtedly more than the length of the blade of the weapon but since it
was a forceful blow, the apex court did not see any improbability of such a deep injury having being caused by
the said weapon.1502
[s 302.42.1] Character of an Incised or Slash Wound
The edges of a wound made by a heavy cutting weapon, such as an axe, hatchet or shovel may not be as
smooth at those of a wound caused by a light cutting weapon, such as a knife, razor, etc., and may show signs
of contusion.1503
Keeping in view the above view of the learned author and taking into consideration the axe used and the
injuries found on the person of the two deceased persons, it can certainly be said with all experience in life that
when a weapon like an axe is used even on its blunt side, then, the very weight of the axe added with the force
exerted behind it will generate forceful momentum and accordingly, the resultant blow was found to give an
appearance of the injury of a contused lacerated wound and not that of an incised wound depending upon force
exerted. Apart from the above quoted recitals. Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence supports ocular evidence even the
common sense approach and experience of life commands that the injury caused by muddamal heavy axe with
all force and the momentum at its back was bound to cause and bring about an appearance of the contused
lacerated wound. In fact, when the axe blow lands on the head and when it first contacts the skin with the sharp
side and there is not much force, then it may cause and also leave behind the appearance of incised wound but
as against this if with the heavy weight axe and the force behind it, the blow is delivered then even if with the
first contact, it causes an incised wound but instantaneously in an inseparable moment the weight and the force
makes a further impact, it is bound to ultimately give the look of a contused lacerated wound.1504
[s 302.43] Value of Expert Opinions expressed in Medical Text Books
It cannot be said that the opinions of the authors of medical textbooks were given in regard to circumstances
exactly similar to those which arose in the case before the court nor is this a satisfactory way of dealing with or
disposing of the evidence of an expert examined in the case unless the passages which are sought to be relied
to discredit his opinion are put to him. The Supreme Court in Sunderlal v State of Madhya Pradesh,1505
disapproved of judges drawing conclusions adverse to the accused by relying upon such passages in the
absence of their being put to medical witnesses. Similar view was expressed in Bhagwan Das v State of
Rajasthan.1506 Though opinions expressed in textbooks by specialist authors may be of considerable assistance
and importance for the court in arriving at the truth, these cannot always be treated or viewed to be either
conclusive or final as to what such author says to deprive even a court of law to come to an appropriate
conclusion of its own on the peculiar facts proved in a given case. In substance, though such views may have
persuasive value cannot always be considered to be authoritatively binding, even to dispense with the actual
proof otherwise reasonably required of the guilt of the accused in a given case. Such opinions cannot be
elevated to or placed on higher pedestal than the opinion of an expert examined in court and the weight
ordinarily to which it may be entitled to or deserves to be given.1507 The purported opinion expressed by an
author, hypothetical answers given to hypothetical questions, and mere hypothetical and abstract opinions by
textbook writers, on assumed facts, cannot dilute evidentiary value of ocular evidence if it is credible and
cogent.1508
[s 302.43.1] Should the Books on Medical Jurisprudence be Relied upon by Courts with or without putting the
same to the Medical Witness?
In Piara Singh v State of Punjab,1509 the reliance on a number of books on medical jurisprudence to support the
evidence of one doctor did not find favour with the Apex Court. It was observed that unless the books were put
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to an expert the High Court should not have done so. Recitals in the books do not provide a sufficient guide to
determine the truth or falsity of the testimony of an expert.
The ratio of the decision of the apex court was analysed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in
Rataniya Bhima Bhil v State of Gujarat,1510 and it was explained that in the aforesaid the Supreme Court case
that the prosecution had examined two medical officers who had given two conflicting opinions and at the time
of writing the judgment, the court had relied upon some recitals in medical jurisprudence without giving an
opportunity to the other concerned medical officer whose evidence did not conquer with the said recitals.
Therefore, in the case before a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court where the facts were very simple viz.,
which side of axe whether sharp or blunt side was used which was simply an aspect of appreciation of evidence
and did not call for expert knowledge, so it was held that the decision of the Supreme Court in Piara Singh’s
case did not apply.
Where the doctor who conducted the post-mortem was confronted by the defence in the cross-examination by
observations made in Lyon’s Medical Jurisprudence,1511 Parikh’s Text Book on Medical Jurisprudence and also
with the book The Essentials of Forensic Medicine by Dr KS Narayana Reddy1512 and the opinion of the doctor
as to the cause of death was contrary to the opinion expressed by the learned authors in these books on
medical jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that though sufficient weightage should be given to the
evidence of the doctor who has conducted the post-mortem, as compared to the statements found in the
textbooks, but giving weightage does not ipso facto mean that each and every statement made by a medical
witness should be accepted on its face value even when it is self-contradictory. When there is a reasonable
doubt in regard to cause of death of the victim, it is not safe to rely upon the evidence of the doctor solely for
the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the victim’s death is proved by the prosecution to be homicidal.1513
The opinions in the eminent books on medical jurisprudence cannot be ignored when the doctor in a case has
given his report without reason and without support of authority.1514
[s 302.44] Fractures caused to Ribs without corresponding Internal Injuries—Not an Accident Case
Where the doctor being a prosecution witness stated in the cross-examination that the injuries on the person of
the deceased could as well have been caused even in a motor accident, the apex court observed that a closer
scrutiny of the injuries impels it to rule out the possibility of a motor accident as a cause for all the injuries eg,
fractures on the ribs 5-10 have no corresponding external injury. If these fractures were caused in a motor
accident there should necessarily have been corresponding external injuries but if the deceased was
manhandled by the assailants with bare hands and legs (either by stamping or by hitting on the chest when the
victim was lying) those fractures could have been caused without causing any corresponding internal injury.
That apart, the minor damage noticed on the scooter is incompatible with the theory of motor accident resulting
in such number of injuries.1515
[s 302.44.1] Depressed Fracture
Cox, in his Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, while dealing with head injuries, has described various types
of fractures. He has described “depressed fracture” in the following words:
Depressed Fracture: This is also known as signature fracture or fractures a la signature as their pattern at times
resembles the weapon which caused it. Heavy weapons with a small striking surface, eg axe, hammer, stone etc,
cause localized depressed fracture.1516
[s 302.45] Injury caused by Accused but Death due to Improper Medical Treatment
It will be useful to refer to the law in the UK and the USA on this point as many principles of our justice system
have been borrowed from these two countries:
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[s 302.45.1] Position of Law in the UK
In Halsbury’s Laws of England,1517 the law on the point has been stated as follows:
For the purposes of offences of homicide, a person causes the death of another where by any act or omission he
accelerates the death of that other. The act or omission need not be the sole or the substantial cause but it must be
one of the causes, and one that is more than minimal. It is, therefore, possible to have two or more independent
operative causes of death, and any person whose conduct constitutes a cause may be convicted of an offence in
respect of the death.
It is not necessary that the death should have been caused in the way intended or foreseen by the defendant. It
is enough that the death was a foreseeable or natural consequence of the defendant’s conduct, so if the
defendant threatened the victim who accidentally killed himself in trying to make his escape, the defendant is
liable for murder or manslaughter, according to his mens rea.
If a wound is inflicted and death results, the person who inflicted the wound will be held to have caused the
death although the victim may have neglected to use proper remedies, or have refused to undergo a necessary
operation.
Similarly, where a wound or hurt has necessitated medical treatment and such treatment is improper or
negligent so that death ensues, the wound will be regarded as causing the death if it continues to be an
operative cause at the time of death, but if the original wound is merely the setting in which another cause
operates, or has become merely part of the history of the case, an ensuing death cannot be said to result from
the wound and the person who inflicted it cannot be said to have caused the death.1518
[s 302.45.2] Position of Law in the USA
(a) Contribution of act to death—liability for homicide does not depend upon the fact that death is the
immediate consequence of the injury inflicted by the accused. One who inflicts an injury on another is
deemed by law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributes mediately or immediately to the death of
such other. He is legally accountable if the direct cause of death is the natural result of his criminal act.
The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility, provided
such other causes are not the proximate cause of the death. Criminal responsibility for inflicting an
injury which is the immediate cause of death is not lessened merely because of the predisposed
physical condition of the deceased without which the blow or wound would not have been fatal.
(b) Acceleration of death—Criminal responsibility for homicide is not relieved because the person killed
has previously been mortally wounded by another, if the act of the accused actually causes or
accelerates death. The law declares that one who inflicts an injury on another and thereby accelerates
his death shall be held criminally responsible thereof. It is said in this connection that if any life at all is
left in a human body, even the least spark, the extinguishment of it is as much homicide as the killing of
the most vital being. In accordance with this rule, one who inflicts injury on the deceased after the latter
is mortally wounded by another may be guilty of homicide if the effect of the former’s act hastens
death. In such case, the person who inflicts the first injury may also be convicted, according to some
authorities, if it appears that the injury or wound inflicted by him would have resulted in death without
the intervening act.
(c) Disease or physical condition resulting from or co-operating with injury—One who inflicts a blow
or wound upon another, which devolves into or initiates an affliction or disease, is criminally
responsible for the death of such person ultimately resulting from the affliction or disease. It is not
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indispensable to a conviction that the wounds be necessarily fatal and the direct cause of death. It is
sufficient that they cause death indirectly through a chain of natural effects and causes, unchanged by
human action. This rule is applied not merely where the consequential development is in the form of an
immediate infection of the wounds itself, such as erysipelas, septicemia or blood poisoning, but also
when the condition developing it is anatomically dissociated from the mere external wounds, as in the
case of miscarriage, or pneumonia, or where blows cause congestion of the brain resulting in death, or
in exposure which causes death.1519
[s 302.45.3] Position of Law in India
It may be pointed out that Explanation 2 to section 299, IPC, lays down that when death is caused by bodily
injury the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused death although by resorting to
proper remedies and skillful treatment, death might have been prevented. In Moreha v State of Rajasthan,1520 it
was held that the mere fact that if immediate expert treatment had been available and the emergency operation
had been performed there were chances of survival of the deceased can be of no avail to the accused in view
of Explanation 2 to section 299, IPC. The nature of the offence committed by an accused has to be judged with
reference to sections 299 and 300 of the IPC.1521 In Zorawal v State,1522 where the deceased had sustained
gunshot injuries but died after 12 days on account of peritonitis, it was held that the offence committed by the
accused was under section 302, IPC. In Naresh v State,1523 knife injuries were caused to the deceased on 2
March 1974. After initial treatment at Ghaziabad he was shifted to Safdarjang Hospital, Delhi where he died on
20 April 1974. The post-mortem examination showed that the death took place due to septicaemia and there
was pus in the operational injury. It was held that septicaemia caused by the abdominal operational injury
accelerated the death of the victim and injury sustained by him was the real cause of his death. In Jageshwar
Singh v State of Bihar,1524 it was held as follows:
Even if the injuries caused the death combined with the complication of tetanus, it must be held that those injuries were
the cause of death or that, in any case the circumstances in which those injuries were received would be
circumstances of transactions which resulted in his death.1525
The legal position which emerges is that if injury is caused which makes it imperative for the victim to have
medical treatment and such treatment is improper or negligent or is not up to the mark and the victim dies, the
injury will be regarded as causing the death of the victim and the fact that other causes contribute to the death
does not mitigate or reduce the liability of the accused unless the other causes are wholly independent and do
not owe their origin to anything connected with the injury or their treatment and are the sole cause of death.1526
[s 302.45.4] Victim got Discharged against Medical Advice, Dying on Re-Admission
Where the victim wife was set on fire by the husband, sustained 807 burn injuries and she got discharged from
hospital against medical advice and on her re-admission in the hospital she succumbed to her injuries, the
doctor who besides conducting post-mortem examination had also treated the deceased at first instance and
after re-admission, opined that deceased died on account of burn injuries sustained by her, the accused was
found guilty under section 302, IPC, and not under section 304, IPC.1527
[s 302.45.5] Stone
In normal circumstances, incised wounds cannot be caused by a stone unless the stone is sharp-edged or is
given the shape of a sharp-edged weapon.1528
(VI) GUN, BULLET INJURY AND EVIDENCE AND REPORT OF BALLISTIC EXPERT
[s 302.46] Importance of Report of Ballistic Expert

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In murder cases where firearms are used, the report of a ballistic expert is important, particularly to know
whether the bullet found in the body of the deceased or when it has pierced the body and was recovered from
the spot and was fired from the same firearm which was recovered from the accused or at his instance.
It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that in every case where a firearm is allegedly used by an
accused person, the prosecution must lead the evidence of a Ballistic Expert to prove the charge, irrespective
of the quality of the direct evidence available on record. Where direct evidence is of such an unimpeachable
character, and, the nature of injuries disclosed by post-mortem notes is consistent with the direct evidence, the
examination of the Ballistic Expert may not be regarded as essential. However, where direct evidence is not
available or there is some doubt as to whether the injuries could or could not have been caused by a particular
weapon, examination of an expert would be desirable to cure an apparent inconsistency, or for the purpose of
corroboration of oral evidence.1529
[s 302.46.1] Comparison Microscope—Importance in Comparing the Crime Cartridge with Test Cartridge
Usually more can be seen through a microscope than can be photographed through it. There are several
reasons for this superiority of visual perception, in the first place, the eye looking through a microscope can
scan the field and change focus at different points of the field in addition the eye can see any movement
present, and with the aid of mental “filling in” is able to perceive form and detail that may not be recorded
photographically. Moreover, as the lens system of the microscope produces a curved field, this works out nicely
for the eye since the retina is curved, but does not work so well photographically since the film plane is flat. Due
to this latter defect, not all of the field will be photographed to the same degree of sharp focus, and some
distortion may be produced in the photograph.1530 It cannot therefore be doubted that a comparison microscope
is the most important and most widely used scientific instrument in comparing the crime cartridge with the test
cartridge. Such microscopes are of various types but they have been described as follows in Mathew’s
Firearms Identification.1531
A comparison microscope consists essentially of two compound microscopes, having identical optical systems, so that
they give the same magnification, connected by an optical ‘bridge’ containing a combination of prisms such that by
viewing two separate objects (one under each miscroscope) through a single eyepiece the two objects may be
compared by bringing the images of parts of each into juxtaposition.
It has further been stated that when the desired condition is attained for purposes of comparison the bullets are
said to be “matched” and correct opinion can be given thereon.
Modi, in his book,1532 states:
Close range wounds of entry without washing should be excised with the surrounding skin and deeper tissues and
immersed in a fixative solution, eg, formaline. The microscopic examination of close range wounds of entry may show
the scorching effects of the gases and traces of carbon monoxide and metals etc.1533
[s 302.46.2] Expert not taking Microscopic Photograph or its Non-Production in Court—Effect
It is true that there has been considerable difference of opinion amongst investigators regarding the use of
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photographs in a court for the purpose of illustrating the matching of the markings, and while it may be that
microscope photographs, when taken with the due care and in the best of conditions, may enable the evidence
to be placed on the record in a visible form, it cannot be denied that a court would not be justified in rejecting
the opinion of an expert who has examined the markings under the comparison microscope simply for the
reason that he has not thought it necessary to take the photographs. It is therefore not possible to reject the
evidence of ballistic expert who has categorically stated that he had compared the land and groove markings
on the bullets under a comparison microscope, simply because he did not think it necessary to take the
photographs.1534
[s 302.46.3] Bullet Injury Entry Wound Smaller Than Exit Wound
A wound of entry is smaller in size than the wound of emergence. The wound of entry has inverted margins and
wound of re-emergence has everted margins. In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,1535 this opinion
is mentioned:
The wound of entrance in distance shot is usually smaller than the projectile due to the elasticity of the skin, and round
when the projectile strikes the body at a right angle and oval when it strikes the body obliquely. The edges of wound
are inverted…The wound of exit is often larger than the wound of entrance and its edges are irregular and
everted…The edges of both the wounds of entrance and exit may be exerted in fatty persons due to protrusion of fat in
the wounds, and in decomposed bodies from the expansive action of the gases of putrefaction…
In a book on the subject, namely, Forensic Science in Criminal Investigation and Trials1536 by Dr BR Sharma,
PhD, Director, Himachal State Forensic Science Laboratory, Shimla, it is observed regarding wounds caused
by a gun, that when velocity of a fired shot exceeds 600 meter per second and up to 1100 meter per second it
also causes wound of the nature of blast effect. Thus, the wound in the loose skin around the testicles of the
deceased could be because of such effect also. At the same page it is also mentioned that if a projectile comes
out of the body the exit wound is larger than the entrance wound. So the laceration in that area after testicles of
the size 3½´´ × 3´´ with irregular margin is explainable on this theory of blast effect of a fired shot. Even in
Gaur’s book, namely Firearms, Forensic, Ballastic, Forensic Chemistry and Criminal Jurisprudence,1537 it is
observed at that wound of exit is usually larger than the wound of entrance, unless on the way through the body
the projectile is intercepted by some bones and, there is some deformity or disintegration in the projectile, Shri
K Kumar in his book Forensic Ballistics in Criminal Justice based on his experience as Director of Ballistics
Laboratory of various states, making a scientific exposition of gunshot wounds, compares wound of entrance
and wound of exit as under:
Wound of Entrance Wound of Exit
1. Size
Appears smaller than the wound of exit Appears larger than the wound of
due to inversion. Greater the distance, entrance due to eversion. May appear
smaller the appearance. Contact shots smaller than the entrance if the entrance
are exception to this phenomena due to wound is a contact shot.
stretching of surface skin.
2. Shape
Regular, ie, circular when the bullet hits The shape is of irregular size.
at right angles and oval when it hits and
penetrates in an angular direction.
3. Nature
Punctured and lacerated. May at times appear as incised

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particularly with high velocity, tapered

and pencil point bullet.
4. Margins
Usually inverted, but in case of wound Usually everted, broaded collar,

on fatty part of the body, the entrance contusion, tattoo in, blackening, burning,
wound may appear as everted due to carbonization, etc., are absent.Usually
protrusion of fat. May be surrounded everted, abraded A collar, contusion,
with abraded collar and contused. tattooing, blackening, burning
Quantity of grease may be deposited. carbonisation, etc. are absent.
There may be blackening, scorching,
tattooing, singing of hair in case of close
range shot. Microscopical examination of
skin and subcutaneous tissues around
the wound of entrance will disclose
evidence of carbonisation, swelling and
homogenisation of dermal collagen apart
from the deposit of dark particles.
In firearm injuries, usually the entrance wound is smaller and the exit wound is bigger. Where the exit wound
was not only smaller in dimension than the entry wound but was also smaller in dimension than the size of the
cartridge, taken out of the revolver, allegedly used for causing injuries, it was held that the injuries were not
gunshot injuries. In such cases, it cannot be expected from medical evidence to give any categorical opinion
about the character of injuries merely on the basis of their margins or edges.1538 From a country made pistol it
cannot be expected that after penetrating the abdomen and intestine and back muscles of a person it would
cause multiple exit wounds when pellets were not big in size so that exit wounds would be found in large
numbers. There may not be any exit wound at all.1539 In cases of a bullet injury except where the bullet gets
fragmented after entering the body and only a portion thereof passes out of the exit wound or the bullet remains
embedded in the body and does not pass out in the normal course and is subsequently taken out or except in
case of a point blank wound, it is practically and usually not possible that the size of the wound of exit may be
smaller than the diameter of the bullet.1540
[s 302.47] Person Shot at from Close Range
If a person is shot at from close range, the marks of tatooing found by the medical witness would show that the
range was small, quite apart from any other opinion.
In case of gun the range of blackening would normally extend to three feet as beyond that shot charge begins
to disperse. In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology1541 the opinion of Dr Modi goes that the shot
charge of a gun at a distance of one to three feet makes a single aperture with irregular and lacerated edges
corresponding in size to the bore of the muzzle of the gun as the shot charge enters as one mass but is
scattered after entering the wound and causes great damage to the internal tissues. The skin surrounding the
wounds is blackened, scorched and tattooed with unburnt grains of powder. On the other hand, at a distance of
six feet the central aperture is surrounded by separate openings in an area of about two inches in diameter
made by a few pellets of the shot which spread out before reaching the mark, the skin surrounding the aperture
may not be blackened or scorched but is tattooed to some extent. At a distance of about 12 feet the charge of
shot spreads widely and enters the body as individual pellets producing separate openings in an area of five to
eight inches in diameter depending on the extent of choke but without causing blackening, scorching or
tattooing of the surrounding skin. According to Taylor,1542 no general rule can be laid down about the distance
from which a firearm was discharged. If blackening is found around the wound of entry on the dead body by the
medical man it confirms that the deceased was within six feet of the assailant.1543 No charring or burning of the
skin was found in medical examination as shot was fired from a distance of more than six feet.1544
[s 302.47.1] Fire from a Shot Gun by Close Range

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The prosecution case was that the appellant had fired shot from about 2 meters causing death of the deceased.
Several wounds of entry spread across the chest and left upper arm with blackening and burning around some
of them were found. The dispersal of pellets and the uneven blackening and burning over the bullet holes
suggested that a primitive weapon, (a “topidar” shot gun, a muzzle loading weapon, which is often a primitive
weapon and when used with gun powder and shot of uncertain quality and quantity, is likely to give uneven and
uncertain pellet patterns) could have been used. The doctor gave opinion that the shot had been fired from
about 2 metres from a shot gun, which fully corresponded with the injuries found on the dead body. Accused
Where prosecution witnesses deposed that the accused appellant fired from a close range causing death of the
deceased, but no blackening or charring was found at the wound of entry in the body of the deceased, the use
of the gun by the accused appellant was not established. Accused was acquitted of the charge under section
302, IPC.1546
[s 302.47.2] Accused Assaulted Deceased with Fire-arm—No Fire arm Injury found—Accused Acquitted
Evidence of eye-witnesses was that the accused assaulted the deceased with fire arms, knife and rod. But in
post-mortem examination, no gun shot injury was found on the person of the deceased. Empty cartridges were
also not recovered from the spot. Enmity between the parties was admitted. Eye-witnesses were related to the
deceased. Accused persons were acquitted of the charge under sections 302/34, IPC.1547
Prosecution case that the accused persons took away the deceased from his house and about 20 minutes
thereafter 3-4 shots were heard, was not supported by medical evidence as in post-mortem examination, no
gun shot injury was found on the person of the deceased, and only lacerated wounds were found. All the
accused appellants were held entitled to benefit of doubt, thus, their conviction under sections 302/34, IPC was
set aside.1548
[s 302.48] Wounds and Gunshots
The argument that the two gunshot injuries had spread, which suggested that these were fired from some
distance is negatived by presence of blackening, charring and tattooing mark. The blackening was present in
an area of 14 cm by 10 cm but the entry would was 2 cm by 2.06 cm only.1549 But where the deceased died of
gunshot injuries fired from single barrel gun, the pelletes were recovered from the dead body of the deceased
and there was possibility of pelletes from single shot being disbursed and causing more than one injury, the
injuries found on the body of the deceased being more will not belie prosecution version of single shot fired
from gun of the accused when the pelletes were fired from the distance of 40 feet or even 15-20 feet. The
possibility of blackening around injuries also could not be ruled out as due to gap of about a month from the
date of incident to the date of recovery, the possibility of the gunpowder residues being washed off by water
cannot be ruled out.1550
[s 302.49] Double Barrel Gun
In case of a double barrel gun, it is impossible to make out which pellet has been fired from which gun.1551
Where the evidence of ballistic expert showed that the injuries suffered by the deceased and the pellets
removed from his body, could be fired from the double barrel guns recovered as per the disclosure statement
made by the accused, the conviction of the accused under section 302 read with section 34, IPC, was
upheld.1552
[s 302.50] Evidentiary Value of Opinion of Ballistic Expert
The evidence of ballistic expert has corroborative value when it finds support from statement of eyewitnesses. It
helps the prosecution in proving guilt of the accused, when the case of prosecution that the accused persons
had fired their guns is amply corroborated by the report of the ballistic expert that all the cartridges of point 12
bore recovered from the house of the deceased had been fired from the guns of the accused persons, the
conviction of the accused persons under sections 302/307/34, IPC, and under section 27 Arms Act was
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upheld.1553 Where the ballistic expert showed that bullets recovered from the body of the deceased had been
fired from revolvers used by the accused, the injuries of the deceased were compatible with the manner of their
being caused as deposed to by eyewitnesses, the conviction of the accused persons under sections 302/34,
IPC, was upheld.1554 When the reliable ballistic experts opinion that gunshot injuries found on the body of the
deceased and on the person of the injured person were caused by two different weapons, ie, one by country
made pistol and other by factory made gun, while prosecution case was that both deceased and injured witness
received gunshot injury, the conviction of the accused under sections 302 and 307, IPC, was set aside.1555
Where defence of accused was that in a free fight between accused party and deceased party, the butt of the
gun of the accused was broken by an axe-blow because of which it went off killing deceased, evidence of
ballistic expert showed that axe-blow could not move forward safety lock of gun so that gun could go off, gun
injuries on deceased also indicated that the gun was not fired from close range. Plea of accidental firing of
accused persons was not accepted.1556 The court can refuse to place any reliance on the opinion of an expert
which is unsupported by any reasons.1557 When the opinion of ballistic expert is based on the notes prepared by
him and the same is prepared in the exercise of his official duty, no reliance can be placed upon such
opinion/report when the copies of the notes are not supplied to the defence.1558 In the face of definite evidence
of ballistic expert on record that point 32 deformed lead bullet, which was found from the body of deceased was
fired from an English revolver which was seized from accused, the defence plea that bullet recovered from the
body of the deceased was not compared by ballistic expert to find out that it was fired or not from the revolvers
of police officers is of no use to the accused.1559
Where ocular evidence of the injured witnesses was that the first shot as well as the second one were fired by
the accused and the report of the ballistic expert showed that two shots were fired from two different guns, the
explanation of the witness that it was dark and when the torchlight was flashed, the accused was seen pointing
his gun towards them and therefore they had believed that the previous shot was also fired by him, deserves to
be accepted when the identity of accused was not challenged.1560 When the witnesses have not stated that
shots were fired from the two guns in question, non-production of the report of the ballistic expert is of no
consequence.1561 It cannot be laid down as a general proposition that in every case where a firearm is allegedly
used by an accused person, the prosecution must lead the evidence of a Ballistic Expert to prove the charge,
irrespective of the quality of the direct evidence available on record. In the present case, the death of the
deceased was caused by bullet fired from a revolver. The medical evidence was consistent with the oral
evidence. It was clear that the bullet recovered by the doctor at the time of post-mortem of the victim had
traversed to thoracic spine through the neck from the face near the angle of the jaw, hitting the fifth thoracic
vertebra, badly damaging the underlying spinal cord, thus, the absence of Ballistic Expert’s evidence was held
not fatal to the case of the prosecution, notwithstanding the fact that the Forensic Science Laboratory, in its
report, had not expressed a definite opinion about the bullet recovered from the place of occurrence.1562
There was cogent and reliable evidence to establish the prosecution case. Seizure of the fire arms and
recovering the empties and sending them for examination by the Ballistic Expert would have only corroborated
the prosecution case but by not sending them to the Ballistic Expert in the case was not fatal in view of the
categorical testimony of PW about the whole incident.1563
Appellant accused fired with gun at the deceased causing his death. The evidence of two eye-witnesses was
found reliable, and the plea of the accused that it was accidental firing from rifle was found improbable. As
admittedly it was a case of firing from gun, the non-sending of rifle to the Ballistic Expert for opinion was
inconsequential.1564
[s 302.50.1] Inconsistency between Evidence of Ballistic Expert and that of Eyewitnesses
When evidence of qualified ballistic expert proved beyond doubt that injuries attributed to the accused were
caused by a double barrel gun and not a rifle, the contradictory statements of eyewitnesses who was neither
expert nor had used gun or rifle before, about use of gun at one time and rifle at other is not material.1565 But
when accused as per prosecution case has fired with a gun causing death of the deceased and injuring the
eyewitnesses but ballistic experts opinion that the gunshot injuries found on the body of the deceased and the
injured witness were caused by two different weapons ie, one by factory made gun and other by country made
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pistol, the conviction of accused under sections 302 and 307, IPC, was set aside.1566
When direct evidence of witness is available inconsistency related to distances from which gunshots were fired
between evidence of medical expert and eyewitness is of no significant whatsoever. So what is required is that
the eyewitness account must substantially tally with the medical evidence on record.1567 Where it is proved
beyond doubt that the evidence of the eyewitnesses is trustworthy in a case where the accused person
committed murder by gunshots, the inconsistency between the opinion of expert and the eyewitnesses relating
to the distance from which gunshots were fired carried no weight. If the eyewitnesses stand the test of their
credibility they have to be believed.1568 From the mere admission in his evidence by witness that “MO 1 is the
gun which the accused was having at the time of shooting”, it cannot be held that based on the contents of
ballistic expert (that fired cartridge could not have been fired from rifle examined by him), the whole prosecution
case must fall to the ground.1569 Where prosecution witness stated that the deceased received pellet injuries on
his chest and jaw, and the investigating officer also stated in the injury statement that deceased received pellet
injuries on tongue, chest, chin etc., but the bullet was recovered from the chest cavity of the deceased by the
doctor and there was no explanation by prosecution about it, the fact that the loaded gun seized by
investigating officer and bullet removed from chest cavity of the deceased by the doctor were not sent to
ballistic expert for examination the acquittal of accused was upheld.1570
[s 302.51] Time when Weapon/Cartridge was fired
In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,1571 while dealing with the topic as to “the time when the
weapon was fired” it has been observed that “it is never possible to ascertain with any scientific accuracy the
time when a weapon or cartridge was fired”.1572
[s 302.52] Non-recovery of Pistol or Spent Cartridge
The non-recovery of the pistol or cartridge does not detract from the case of the prosecution, where the direct
evidence is acceptable.1573
Where the participation of the accused armed with katta was proved by the reliable evidence of injured
witnesses and medical evidence, non-recovery of katta from the spot was held not fatal.1574
[s 302.53] Non-recovery of Weapon of Offence
It is an established proposition of law that mere non-recovery of weapon does not falsify the prosecution case
where there is ample unimpeachable ocular evidence.1575
[s 302.54] Mere Recovery of Offence Weapon not sufficient to Record Conviction
The recovery of offence weapon viz gun, was effected after more than two years. The prosecution did not prove
that during this intervening period of more than two years, the gun had not changed hands and the same was
consistently possessed by the accused appellant. Possibility of use of another gun of the same caliber could
not be ruled out. There was also no direct evidence to connect the accused with the commission of offence by
the accused appellant. The accused appellant was given benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charges under
sections 302, 460/34, IPC.1576
[s 302.55] Recovery of Empties from the Place of Occurrence—Weapon used is Pistol and not Recovered
If shots had been fired from a revolver then the empties would have remained inside the chamber of the
revolver and would not have fallen out on the platform. Presence of five empties on the platform clearly
indicated that the weapon used for firing shots was a pistol.1577 Identity of weapon and manner of use by the
accused has to be established by the prosecution the weapon and the empties have to be connected with the
crime otherwise the use of weapon is not established and the same is not connected with the accused.1578
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Where fire-arm used is not recovered, and as such the same is not sent to the ballistic expert, scientifically it is
not possible for the ballistic expert to give definite opinion only by examining cartridges whether the recovered
cartridges have been fired from the same firearm.1579
Where the alleged recovery of country made pistol and cartridges was found concocted, accused was given
benefit of doubt and acquitted of charge of murder under section 302, IPC.1580
In every case of gun firing, it is not required that each and every bullet should hit the target. There may be
attempts by the deceased or the victim to save himself from the raining bullets, in which case, the bullets may
not hit the target. Merely because all the bullets fired from the gun did not hit the target and were not recovered
from the scene of offence, is no ground to conclude that the incident did not take place.1581
[s 302.56] Seized Firearm not sent for Examination by Ballistic Expert—Effect
Where the guns seized from two accused persons had not been sent for forensic examination by ballistic
experts, both accused persons having licenced guns surrendered in the court after a lapse of 11 days from the
date of incident. Examination of guns by the ballistic expert after a lapse of 11 days would not have made any
material difference. It would have been different if any bullet or pellet would have been found and recovered
either from the body or from the scene of occurrence in which case the ballistic expert would have been
expected to conduct test-fires and determine whether the bullet or pellet was fired from the seized guns or any
one of them.1582 Seizure of the fire arms and recovering the empties and sending them for examination by the
ballistic expert would have only corroborated the prosecution case but by not sending them to the ballistic
expert in the particular case may not be fatal in view of the categorical testimony of prosecution witness about
the whole incident.1583
[s 302.57] False Encounter
In autopsy examination, blackening and tatooing were found around bullet injuries on the chest and back of the
deceased. This showed that shots were fired from a short distance, which was not consistent with the theory of
genuine encounter. No fire-arm was recovered from the body of the deceased. The police party had not
received any injury. Held, it was a case of false encounter.1584
[s 302.58] Death in Police Lock-up
Where the entries in police station diary showed that the appellant accused had kept the deceased in police
lock-up, and injuries including fracture of rib, which was the cause of death, were found in the medical
examination of the deceased, and the deceased was in the custody of the appellant accused and none-else,
however as the evidence did not show that the accused intended to cause the death of the deceased, his
conviction under section 302, IPC was altered to one under section 304, IPC.1585
Where the deceased, suspect in a theft and lurking house trespass case, was detained in police custody for 2/3
days, subjected to electric shock to his scrotum by accused police officials in police custody, causing death,
accused appellants police officials were convicted under section 304, Pt II, IPC.1586
(VII) POISONING CASES
[s 302.59] Routes of Administration of Poison
In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,1587 in section II dealing with toxicology, routes of
administration of poison have been given. It is stated: “Poisons may gain entry into the body by various other
routes. These can be considered as enteral routes. The poison may come in contact with the skin, mucous
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membrane of the respiratory tract, gastro-intestinal tract, eye, ear and the vagina”.1588
[s 302.60] Poisons [s 302.60.1] Mercury
In Modi’s Medical jurisprudence and Toxicology,1589 in section II dealing with toxicology, Modi has dealt with
mercury and its compounds as poisons. About mercury, it is stated at p 135 that:
(i) Persons concerned with mercury mining are also liable to get poisoned. It is easily converted into a dull grey
powder when shaken up with oil or triturated with sugar, chalk or lard. The process is known as deadening
and is used in preparing mercurial ointment and emplastrum. The metal is not acted upon by hydrochloric
acid. It is slightly dissolved by dilute cold sulphuric acid but completely dissolved by strong sulphuric and nitric
acids.
About compounds of mercury, against mercuric chloride the book states: “It is a violent poison, and is obtained
in the bazaar, often mixed with impure sub-chloride”.1590
Further:
After mercury is absorbed into the system, it is eliminated in the saliva, urine and faeces, and in the milk and
perspiration, if the quantity is large. It also passes rapidly to the foetus in uterus through the placental circulation
particularly methyl mercury compounds. Elimination commences within a few hours of the administration of a single
dose and is completed within four to five days after which the metal cannot be detected in the urine, but its excretion is
very slow, if mercury is given in repeated small doses it may be detected in the solid organs after long periods. The
diagnosis of clinical and industrial mercury poisoning can be proved by measuring the amount of mercury in the urine.
Mercury is often used as a medicine, hence the detection of small quantity in the viscera does not contra indicate death
from some other cause.
According to Modi this type of poison can cause renal failure.1591
According to Dr Bernard Knight, in Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology,1592 “a characteristic feature of

poisoning by mercury is suppression of urine at early stage of poisoning and presence of blood and albumin in
urine. This is because mercurials are specific poisons to kidneys and cause necrosis of glomeruli”. Shock and
collapse supervenes and the cause of death is mostly kidney failure. Where the accused, a scientist who had
done his PhD in bio-chemistry was alleged to have inserted mercuric chloride crystals mixed with tamarind into
vagina of his wife who developed severe burning in her genitals after insertion and was treated by the doctor for
chemical burns, the wife died 44 days after administration of the poison due to renal failure. The post-mortem
and forensic science laboratory report showed that there was no trace of mercuric chloride in her body. In view
of Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, since the deceased died 44 days after administration of
poison and so there was no possibility of mercury at the time of conducting post-mortem, and since the
accused had access to the mercuric chloride crystals in the laboratory at the place of his work and crystals
were available in open market and accused being a scientist knew the use and misuse of the chemical, the
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death of deceased was held to be caused by mercury poisoning by the accused and not by renal failure.1593
[s 302.60.2] Dhatura
In Lyon’s Medical Jurisprudence for India,1594 it is said:
In the East, dhatura is not used with homicidal or suicidal intent; it is almost invariably employed with the object of
producing stupefaction to facilitate theft.1595
In Emperor v Bhagwan Din,1596 it was observed that dhatura is not exactly a deadly poison and may often be
given for the purpose of merely stupefying a victim. But, although death does not always follow from dhatura
poisoning, yet it does follow in a considerable proportion of cases.1597 A Division Bench of the Nagpur High
Court observed that dhatura is a common poison frequently used to cause death, and the effects of dhatura,
plants of which are often to be found in villages, are well known to the villagers.1598
The question, as to what offence is constituted by the administration of dhatura depends upon the
consequences of the act of its administration and the intention or knowledge of the person administering it. In
Empress v Tulsha,1599 a woman who had administered dhatura to three members of her family, all of whom
recovered, was found guilty of an attempt to murder. Re Venkatachalam Chetty,1600 it was held that since it was
not shown that pneumonia was a likely consequence of the administration of dhatura, nor was it established
that the pneumonia was caused by the exposure or was a probable consequences of sleeping out, it could not
be said that the death was caused by the administration of dhatura and the accused was guilty of the offence
under section 238, IPC. On the other hand, in Emperor v Bhagwan Din,1601 where dhatura had been
administered to travelers, one of whom died and the trial court had convicted the accused under section 304,
the High Court had altered the conviction to one under section 325 though the judges remarked that the case
might possibly have come under section 326.1602
The best indication of the intention of the offenders can be gathered from the quantity of dhatura which he
administered. Where, therefore, in order, to facilitate robbery, the accused administered a large quantity of
dhatura to his victims in the hope that the successful culmination of his crime would be facilitated by the death
of his victims and the subsequent difficulty of tracing him with the help only of persons, little acquainted with
him, it was held that he was guilty of murder.1603 So once it is established that the accused, with a motive to get
rid of the victim administered a fatal dose of dhatura in his food, the conclusion to be drawn is that he or she
committed murder unless the explanation is such as to create some doubt in the mind of the court. Thus, if one
deliberately administers a common poison, the effects of which are well known, it is no defence to say that one
failed to grade the exact dose correctly so as to cause some injury short of death. The question, whether a
person knows what he is administering and knows what its effects will be, is, of course, a question of fact in the
particular case. If the necessary knowledge can be attributed to the accused, he would be guilty of murder.1604
[s 302.60.3] Arsenic
A person who administers a well-known poison, like arsenic, to another, must be taken to know that his act is
so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause
death, and if death ensues, he is guilty of murder notwithstanding that his intention may not have been to cause
death.1605 If, however, the person, to whom the arsenic is administered, survives, the accused would be guilty of
an offence under section 307, IPC.1606 In Emperor v Sikandar,1607 it was held that it is of the utmost importance,
in a case of arsenic poisoning, that the prosecution should prove that a lethal dose of arsenic, ie, two grains or
upwards, had been administered.1608
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Accidental case of poisoning by arsenic sometimes occurs from its admixture with drinks or articles of food.
There have been instances where white arsenic has been mistaken for baking powder, soda, sugar, salt or flour
and has caused mass accidental poisoning.1609 Thus where the testimony of eyewitnesses as regards manner
of pouring arsenic poison by the accused in the cooking-pot was not reliable, there was absence of motive on
the part of the accused of administering poison, there was possibility that the arsenic poison was mixed in dal
(pulse) accidentally at the hands of someone else, the conviction of the accused was set aside.1610
[s 302.60.4] Aconite
It is stated in books on medical jurisprudence and toxicology that a root of aconite is often used both externally
and internally by vaids and hakims in this country and that it is also sometimes added to country made liquors
to increase their intoxicating power. But there is no doubt that a variety of aconite is a deadly poison and, in the
absence of anything to show any other intention, a person, who administers aconite to another, producing fatal
results within three hours, cannot but have the intention of killing him. In any case, a person, who administers
aconite of such quality and in such quantity to another, as results in his death within three hours, must be taken
to have known that his act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, and if death ensues, he is guilty of murder, notwithstanding that his intention
may not have been to cause death.1611 Where, however, a woman administered aconite powder to her
husband, not with an intention to kill him, but with an intention to obtain some kind of domination over him, it
was held that she was guilty of an offence under section 328, IPC.1612
[s 302.60.5] Love Potions
Sometimes poisonous drugs are used as love potions with fatal results and the question arises as to which of
the offences has been committed in such cases. There have been several cases, all very much of the same
nature, in which it has been held that where the intention to cause death cannot be clearly found without any
other possible explanation of the act of the person of giving poison, a conviction for murder cannot stand and
even if the person, administering the drug, had neither the intention to cause death, nor the knowledge that she
was likely to cause death, she must be held to have administered the poison without due care and caution and
the offence would fall under section 304A, IPC.1613 In Pika Bewa v Emperor,1614 it was held that unless it is
shown clearly and without possible doubt that the intention was to cause death, where a substance is
administered as a love potion, the accused cannot be convicted of murder. The mere administering of a love
potion or drug, which, a person thinks, might be beneficial, is not, in itself, an offence, but when it is supposed
to have effect upon persons, with whom the paramour of the accused had enmity, and when she administers it
without due care and caution or any inquiry as to what it really is, her act certainly falls within section 304A,
IPC. If, however, the administration of the love potion does not cause death of the victim, but results merely in
his falling into delirium or coma, the person administering it would be guilty of the offence under section 328,
IPC.1615 A person, who supplies love potion to another for being administered as such, would be liable as an
abettor.1616
[s 302.61] Proof Needed in Poisoning Cases
In a case of poisoning, the prosecution must establish that:
(a) death took place by poisoning;
(b) the accused had poison in his possession; and
(c) the accused had an occasion to administer poison to the deceased;
(d) there is a clear motive for an accused to administer poison to the deceased.1617
If however, the accused gives the victim something to eat and the victim dies immediately on the ingestion of
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that food with symptoms of poisoning and poison, in fact, found in viscera, the requirement of proving, that the
accused was possessed of the poison, would follow the circumstance that the accused gave the victim
something to eat and it need not be separately proved.1618 In Mohan v State of Uttar Pradesh,1619 the Supreme
Court considered the proof of the fact of possession of poison unnecessary as the victim had died soon after
eating pedas given by the accused and had not taken any other food likely to contain poison.
Beyond the above four elements, which are essential to be proved in poisoning cases, the prosecution has also
to establish that the deceased died of a particular poison said to have been administered.1620 It has also been
said that it is of the utmost importance in a case of arsenic poisoning that the prosecution should prove that a
lethal dose of arsenic, that is, two grains or upwards, had been administered.1621 In Happu v Emperor,1622 it was
observed that if the prosecution wishes to establish that the deceased died of arsenic poisoning by means of
the chemical examiner and weight is to be attached to his evidence, it must be proved that at least two grains of
arsenic were administered to the deceased before death. It can be done by proving the discovery of this
quantity in the body of the deceased or by accounting for its absence in part which absence in part may be
attributed to vomiting, purging or the natural elimination of poison from the body of the deceased.1623
Where in alleged case of poisoning, no poison was detected in the viscera of the deceased, and evidence failed
to show that the death of the deceased was caused by administering poison by the accused, the acquittal of the
accused for offence under section 302, IPC was recorded.1624
Where poison is recovered from a concealed place at the instance of the accused, the court would infer that the
accused administered poison to the deceased. Accused was convicted on charge of murder.1625
Where evidence proved that there was matrimonial discord between the parties and death of the deceased was
caused by forced administration of poison and smothering, accused husband was convicted under section 302,
IPC.1626
In case of death by administering poison, four circumstances are to be examined before recording a conviction:
(i) there was a clear motive for the accused to administer poison to the deceased; (ii) the deceased died of
poison, said to have been administered; (iii) the accused had poison in his possession and (iv) he had an
opportunity to administer the poison to the deceased. The prosecution alleged that the husband administered
the poison to her whereas defence took the plea that there was a strong possibility of her having been ill-
treated, being sensitive and impressible, she might have committed suicide out of depression and frustration
arising from an emotional upsurge. A number of injuries was caused on the person of the deceased which the
medical opinion stated were inflicted by the accused, a doctor by profession in administering poison to the
deceased. There were various contusions of big size on periorbital area, intraorbital area, forehead, upper
eyelid, cheek, 8 cm x 7 cm contusion over the chin, contusion over the lower lip, 11 cm x 5 cm multiple small
abrasions over neck and upper chest, 10 cm x 4 cm contusion in infra-axillary area. Nature of the injuries
indicated that they could not have been caused by convulsions. The accused was in the company of the victim
in the same room is not disputed. Thus, it was for him to explain the injuries found on the person of deceased.
The victim became unconscious at the house itself. The accused did not take the victim to the hospital
immediately and delayed it. He being a doctor knew the consequences of organo phosphorus poisoning and in
spite of that he did not take the victim to the hospital despite requests being made by various witnesses. The
police had taken the victim to the hospital. Injuries were on the front part of the body which indicated that the
deceased was subjected to violence before she succumbed due to poisoning. Section 106 of the Evidence Act
requires a person having special knowledge of the fact to explain the same as required by section 106 of the
Evidence Act. Held, circumstances of the case clearly proved the guilt of the accused respondent. High Court
was in error in giving benefit of doubt to the respondent. Conviction of the respondent for offence under section
302, IPC was proper.1627
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Where the appellant husband was alleged to have mixed cyanide in cold drink and given the same to his wife
causing death, the oral evidence about the purchase of cyanide was not reliable, and the recovery of limca
bottle from the house of the accused did not inspire confidence as the sample to the FSL was sent 22 days
after the seizure, the conviction of the appellant was found not sustainable, and was set aside.1628
Proof needed in poisoning cases is circumstantial evidence. If circumstantial evidence, in the absence of direct
proof of the above mentioned elements,1629 is so decisive that the court can unhesitatingly hold that death was
the result of administration of poison (though not detected) and that the poison must have been administered by
the accused, then the conviction can be rested on it.1630 Even in Anant Chintaman Lagu v State of Bombay,1631
where poison could not be traced in the viscera by chemical and post-mortem examination, the majority of the
judges had concluded that the circumstantial evidence established the administration of poison by the
accused.1632 It was, however, warned, in Ramgopal v State of Maharashtra,1633 that where the evidence is
circumstantial, the fact, that the accused had motive to cause death of the deceased, though, relevant, is not
enough to dispense with the proof of certain facts. The evidence of motive, which is frequently given in
poisoning cases, is of subsidiary importance and the mere fact, that the accused had a motive to cause the
death of the deceased, is not a fact which will dispense with the proof of points that the accused had the poison
in his or her possession and that the accused had an opportunity to administer the same to the deceased.1634
On the fateful night, admittedly nobody was present in the bedroom where the accused appellant and the
deceased were sleeping as husband and wife. The victim screamed at about 2 am, which attracted the inmates
of the house to rush to the bedroom where they found the victim dead. The accused husband did not explain
how the deceased died. The conviction of the accused husband under section 302, IPC was held proper.1635
The evidence of a prosecution witness, a goldsmith, cannot be rejected on the ground that he had no license to
possess potassium cyanide and he had not disclosed the fact of giving potassium cyanide to accused to any
other person. Being a goldsmith, it was quite likely that he was able to obtain potassium cyanide even though
he did not have a license to possess it as cyanide is commonly used by goldsmiths for electroplating gold
ornaments.1636
Appellants were prosecuted for offences under sections 302, 120B and 201, IPC on allegations that the
accused persons made the deceased and his wife drink coffee in which they had mixed sleeping pills, and also
administered five injections of poison. The doctor in post-mortem report had opined that the cause of death
could not be ascertained as the body was decomposed. According to FSL report, medicine called Diazepam
“Tranquilizer” was found in the stomach, intestine, liver, heart, kidney and lungs etc. The mere recovery of
injections from a lane near the house of the accused was held not sufficient to record the conviction of the
accused appellants. Conviction of the accused appellants for offences under sections 302, 120B and 201, IPC
was held not proper and was set aside.1637
There was no evidence to show that any of the accused persons administered poison. PW3 deposed that the
poison was mixed with the halua and she found the taste to be pungent and did not have the whole of halua
served to her; but the deceased took the whole quantity which was offered to him. She did not know from where
the halua came. There was no forensic examination of the halua which is supposed to have contained the
poison by PW3 and shared by the deceased. The acquittal of the accused persons, as recorded by the High
Court under section 302, IPC, was held justified.1638
Appellant accused doctor son-in-law with intention to grab property made his father-in-law and mother-in-law
believe that they were suffering from AIDS, and on the pretext of treatment, gave poisonous injection, caused
their death and that of their three minor children. Held, case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus,
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accused was convicted under section 302, IPC.1639
Medical evidence established forced poisoning. A number of injuries was found on body of deceased. Accused
was alone in the room with deceased; he did not explain injuries of the deceased (wife). Conviction of the
accused for offence under section 302, IPC was held proper.1640
[s 302.62] Chemical Examiner’s Report
Before using the chemical examiner’s report, the court must satisfy itself that the substances examined were, in
fact, what they are said to be1641 because such a report can be of no use unless there is proof of the identity of
the articles found during investigation and sent to the chemical examiner with the articles examined by him.1642
It is always open to the court to call the chemical examiner when this course is deemed to be necessary in the
interests of justice. He does not, as a rule, give any opinion as to the cause of death; he merely reports the
result of the chemical examination of the substances sent to him. It is for the court to determine the cause of
death after a consideration of such report together with the post-mortem appearances, as deposed to by the
officer, who conducts the autopsy, and the other evidence in the case.1643 In ordinary circumstances there
would be nothing wrong in taking reports of the chemical examiner and the imperial serologist on record without
examining these persons as witnesses as permitted by the CrPC. When however there is a difference of
opinion in the reports so much so that the effect of one report is to nullify the effect of the other, the duty to
explain the difference is on the prosecution and mere production of reports does not, under the circumstances,
prove anything which can weigh against the accused.
Failure of the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to disintegration of the serum in the meanwhile
does not mean that the blood stuck on the axe would not have been human blood at all. Sometimes it happens,
either because the stain is too insufficient or due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation that a
serologist might fail to detect the origin of the blood. Will it then mean that the blood would be of some other
origin? Such guess work that blood on the other axe would have been animal blood is unrealistic and far-
fetched in the broad spectrum of this case. The effort of the criminal court should not be to prowl for imaginative
doubts. Unless the doubt is of a reasonable dimension which a judicially conscientious mind entertains with
some objectivity no benefit can be claimed by the accused.1644 In the absence of report regarding origin of
blood it cannot be said that the court could not have convicted the accused when the serologist and chemical
examiner have found that the chadar (sheet) seized in consequence of the disclosure statement made by the
accused was stained with human blood, as with the lapse of time the classification of the blood could not be
determined. No bonus or benefit can be conferred upon the accused by the Court.1645 Even if the serologist did
not enter the witness box, his report is admissible in evidence under section 293(4)(f), CrPC.1646
[s 302.63] Contradiction between Report of Chemical Examiner and Statement of Doctor
Where in a murder by burning, the doctor who examined the deceased stated that the body of the deceased
smelled of kerosene but the report of forensic science laboratory showed that traces of petroleum were
detected on partially burnt clothes of the deceased, in the face of report of the forensic science laboratory which
was based upon scientific analysis, the statement of the doctor which was only an opinion was discarded
particularly when it militated against the version of eyewitness.1647
[s 302.64] Failure of Police to send the Blood for Chemical Examination—Effect
The failure of the police to send the blood for chemical examination in a serious case of murder is to be
deprecated. In such cases, place of occurrence is often disputed. However, such an omission need not
jeopardise the success of the prosecution case where there is other reliable evidence to fix the scene of
occurrence.1648 Where in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the crucial questions were as to whether the
gloves of the accused were stained with blood, whether that blood was human matched the blood group of the
deceased, to link the accused with murder, non-production of the chemical analysts report by the prosecution
was fatal to its case because without it the court was unable to hold that either the clothes or the axe was
blood-stained.1649 Lapse on the part of investigating officer in not sending the sample of blood-stained earth to
the chemical examiner is fatal to the prosecution case when eyewitnesses account given by interested and
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inimical witnesses is not reliable.1650
(VIII) BURN CASES
The prosecution case disclosed in the complaint filed by the father of the complainant was that the appellant
husband subjected the deceased to mental and physical torture and on the date of incident poured kerosene oil
on the deceased and set her ablaze. Contrary to it, in the dying declaration recorded in the hospital, the
deceased had stated that she had sustained burn injuries due to explosion of stove. She did not name the
accused. The accused had also sustained injuries on his hand and face which showed that he tried to save the
deceased. The possibility of committing suicide could not be ruled out. Held, the prosecution case was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC recorded by the trial
court was found not sustainable, hence, it was set aside.1651
The accused husband had poured kerosene oil on the body of his deceased wife as the latter had refused to
transfer her property to the husband. At the time of the admission of the victim in the hospital the doctor
examined in the case, had recorded the statement of the deceased in the admission register in which she had
told him that the accused appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. She also stated the same
in the dying declaration made by her to the Head Constable, showing the involvement of the accused appellant.
The conviction of the accused appellant recorded by the High Court under section 304, Pt II, IPC, after setting
aside the acquittal recorded by the trial court was confirmed.1652
Prosecution case and evidence was that the appellants mother-in-law and sister-in-law ill-treated the deceased
for non-fulfilment of dowry demand, and burnt her alive. Dying declaration of the deceased implicated the
accused appellants. Doctor had given certificate that the victim at the time of making dying declaration was in fit
mental state to make dying declaration. Conviction of the appellant was held proper.1653
The accused persons caught hold of the deceased from her arms, sprinkled kerosene on her, lighted a
matchstick and set her ablaze. Dying declaration of the deceased recorded by Magistrate in the presence of the
doctor who certified mental fitness of the deceased implicated all the appellants. Dying declaration could not be
ignored merely because the victim had suffered 100% burn injuries in view of the mental fitness certified by the
doctor. Dying declaration was found voluntary and voluntary conviction of the accused persons was held
proper.1654
The incident admittedly took place inside a small room. It had two doors. The prosecution witnesses knocked
both the doors. Their call to the deceased to open the door remained unanswered and only then they took
recourse to breaking open the door. According to them, not only the appellant was with them at that point of
time, but also he took part in dousing the flames. Indisputably, he took the deceased to the hospital. In such a
situation, the dying declaration which implicated the appellant accused was eschewed from consideration. The
appellant husband was acquitted of the charge under section 302, IPC.1655
(IX) HONOUR KILLING
The deceased, a Kshatriya, was married to the accused appellant, a member of the Schedule Caste. The
accused paternal uncle of the deceased was annoyed with the marriage. The prosecution case was that the
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accused appellant had taken the deceased on the pretext that her grandmother was seriously ill and wanted to
see her. The dead body of the deceased was recovered two days later. Marriage had taken place six years
before; even a child was born to the couple. The honour killing, which was the alleged motive of murder, was
weak. Last seen evidence was found unreliable as the statement of witnesses recorded under section 161
CrPC was recorded four months after the incident. Evidence of recovery was also found not reliable.
Circumstantial evidence adduced in the case was found insufficient to record the conviction of the accused
appellant. Accused appellant was acquitted of the charge under section 302, IPC.1656
It was a case of honour killing. Apart from fixed term 25 years of life imprisonment the court also granted
compensation with default clause to the victims.1657
[s 302.64.1] Honour Killing of Daughter
Deceased daughter of the accused appellant had married with a boy of lower caste. The appellant had
threatened to kill his daughter. The deceased was found lying in pool of blood with a cut on her neck. Eye-
witness deposed before the court that she had seen the accused coming out of public toilet with blood stained
sickle. Her testimony corroborated by other circumstances, was found reliable and believed. Accused was
found guilty and convicted on the charge of murder.1658
(X) IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED AND CASE PROPERTY
[s 302.65] Night Incident
A mob of about 20 persons at about 10 pm in the night had entered the house and committed the murder of
three inmates of the house. Eye-witness from his field had seen the incident; he identified only four persons out
of mob. The injury said to be received by the eye-witness was not mentioned in the FIR, nor was he examined
by the doctor. The night of incident was a foggy night. FIR was delayed. The accused appellants were entitled
to benefit of doubt and acquitted.1659
Where the incident took place in the month of March at 5 pm, and the victims and the accused persons were
known to each other, identification of the accused persons could not be doubted, thus, conviction of the
accused persons for offence under sections 300, 307, 436, 506 and 149, IPC was held proper.1660
The identification of the assailants by PWs from a distance of 100 ft was found possible. The area was
illuminated by the electric lights all around and there was sufficient light to see them.1661
[s 302.66] Identification in Moonlight from Distance
One PW had identified the appellant from a distance of 25 ft in the moonlight and also in the light of an electric
bulb fixed in the courtyard of the room. It is quite improbable that in the night from such a long distance PW was
able to identify the accused. Accused was acquitted of the charge of murder.1662
[s 302.67] Identification of Accused—Opportunity for the Witnesses to see the Accused
Where though the incident of murder took place in broad daylight, but the eye-witnesses had little time to
see/identify the accused, test identification was held with delay of 12 months, the accused was entitled to
benefit of doubt and acquitted.1663
Apart from the fact that there was delay of 25 days in holding the TI parade, none of the concerned prosecution
witnesses had given any identification marks or disclosed special features or attributes of any of those four
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persons in general and the accused in particular. Further, no incident or crime had actually taken place in the
presence of those prosecution witnesses nor any special circumstances had occurred which would invite their
attention so as to register the features or special attributes of the concerned accused. Their chance meeting, as
alleged, was in the night and was only for some fleeting moments.1664
[s 302.68] Identity of Accused not proved—Night Occurrence—Accused Acquitted
The identity of the assailants was not established by the prosecution evidence. The incident had taken place at
night and though the oral evidence did indicate the presence of lantern in the premises but the said lantern was
neither shown in the site plan nor seized by the police. The incident was seen by a large number of persons
and that too from a distance of 20 paces. There was enmity between the parties. The medical evidence did not
support the ocular version. The Supreme Court affirmed the view expressed by the High Court that the accused
was entitled to benefit of doubt and to acquittal.1665
It was a night occurrence. At place of occurrence, there was absence of proper light. Accused was acquitted of
charge of murder.1666
There was explosion of a bomb which was kept inside a passenger bus which caused the death of one
passenger and injuries to several passengers. The prosecution witnesses identified the accused appellant.
There was enough material to connect the accused appellant with the heinous crime of planting a live bomb in
a passenger bus and getting down from the same before the bomb exploded, thereby causing death of one
person and grievous injuries to several other passengers. The accused appellant was convicted for offences
under sections 285, 337, 338, 427, 302, IPC and section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act.1667
The incident occurred in the night around 3.00 am, at a place where there was no proper light. From the
material on record it was not clear whether the source of light in the form of torches and jeep flash light was
sufficient to enable the forest officers to see the accused-appellants for the purpose of their identification in later
stage of the case. Held, the possibility of false implication could not be ruled out.1668
The very identification of the accused appellant was doubtful. The accused appellant was convicted solely on
the evidence that the murder weapon which had been recovered at his instance had been matched with the
bullet recovered from the dead body. Recovery of offence weapon was itself doubtful. The case of the acquitted
co-accused was similar. The accused appellant was also acquitted of the charges under sections 393, 398 and
302, IPC.1669
[s 302.69] Identification of Accused in Court
Identification parade conducted in the prison. Ordinarily, courts do not give much credence to the identification
made in the court for the first time; but the identification of the accused for the first time in court is permissible in
law. But the said principle has to be applied in the facts and circumstances of each case. While PW2 was
examined in the court, trial court which had the opportunity of seeing and observing demeanour of PW2 found
her version identifying C (A-5) trustworthy. The identification evidence was accepted.1670
[s 302.70] Identification Parade
The main purpose of holding test identification parade during investigation is to enable the eyewitnesses to
identify the accused who were not previously known to them. This way the investigating officer can satisfy
himself of the bona fides of the witnesses and produce further evidence to corroborate their testimony.1671 The
holding of test identification parade is all the more necessary when the eyewitnesses are unable to name the
offender but claim that they could identify him on seeing him.1672 But the State is not bound to hold test
identification parade when the accused are arrested on the spot though such an identification parade can be
held on the request from the accused.1673 When the accused persons are named in the FIR lodged within one
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hour of the incident, non-holding of identification parade does not matter.1674 Where identity of the accused is
not disputed, holding of test identification parade is not necessary.1675 Where conviction of the accused was not
based on identification parade but on the evidence of eyewitness which was found reliable as the conviction
cannot be set aside on the ground that identification was not reliable as witness had seen the accused in the
police lock-up, more so when the witness admitted before the identification parade that he was acquainted with
the accused.1676 When the accused was known to the witnesses before the occurrence, and though the witness
did not know his name but could identify him, holding of test identification parade was not essential.1677 When
the police asked the witness whether he could identify the persons who were on the scooter to which he replied
in affirmative and then the two accused persons were shown for the purpose of identification and the witness
identified them, such an identification will not assist the prosecution in any way nor could it be held to be test
identification parade.1678 The legal position is the same when the accused is shown to the witnesses before
holding test identification parade.1679
Where identity of the accused is not disputed, holding of test identification parade is not necessary.1680
PW who identified the accused in jail knew the accused, as he was also in jail along with the accused in that
very cell for about 20 days. The police had detained illegally and unauthorizedly PW along with the accused in
the same cell for about 20 days. Thus, the test identification parade was not conducted in a lawful manner, and
such test identification parade was not relied upon. Acquittal of the accused A2 to A6 on charges under
sections 302, 395, 201/34, IPC was held proper.1681
There is no invariable rule that two accused persons cannot be made part of the same TIP. Joint TIP would
thus, in no manner, affect the validity of the TIP.1682
[s 302.70.1] Delay in holding Test Identification Parade
The test identification parade must be held without any delay. In the absence of proper explanation given by the
prosecution for the delay in holding the test identification parade, the evidence of identification is not reliable.1683
The unexplained delay of four months in conducting such parade itself mars the credibility of test identification
parade.1684 Where the Test Identification Parade was not conducted properly and was delayed, benefit of doubt
was given to the accused as their identity had not been clearly established by the prosecution. Acquittal of the
accused appellants for offences under sections 302, 307, 120B, 314, IPC was sustained.1685 But when accused
is put to test identification within 24 hours of his arrest, identification cannot be rejected on the ground that it
was not possible for the witnesses to identify the accused after a lapse of three months.1686 An identification
parade held 44 hours after occurrence cannot be said to be delayed.1687 Where parade was held after about
two months and delay was properly explained, it cannot be discarded.1688
Evidence of test identification parade held with inordinate delay of 2½ months by Taluka Magistrate casualty
and not as per established norms was not relied upon.1689
[s 302.70.2] Evidentiary Value of Test Identification Parade
The test identification parade has corroborative value only. The identification of the accused by the witness in
the court is substantive evidence. But when the accused is not known to the witnesses, the safe rule is that the
testimony on oath of the witnesses regarding identity of the accused requires corroboration by way of an earlier
test identification parade during investigation,1690 without which the evidence of identification during trial in the
court is of little value.1691 When photograph of the accused was published in all local newspapers and it was
also shown to the witness before test identification parade, neither the test identification parade nor subsequent
identification of the accused in the court during trial by the witness after many years is reliable.1692 The legal
position is the same, when the accused is shown to the witnesses before holding test identification parade.1693
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Identification of the accused not known from before, for the first time by a witness in court during trial, is
considered a weak type of evidence.1694
[s 302.70.3] Failure to hold Test Identification Parade though demanded or not by Accused
The failure to hold that test identification parade even after a demand by the accused is not always fatal and it
is only one of the relevant factors to be taken into consideration along with the other evidence on record. If the
claim of the ocular witnesses that they already knew the accused is found to be true, the failure to hold a test
identification parade is inconsequential.1695 The evidence of eyewitnesses is not to be jettisoned merely due to
the failure of the investigating officer to conduct test identification parade when the witnesses already knew the
accused and name of some of the accused is given in the FIR.1696 In some cases the Supreme Court has held
that failure to hold test identification parade with respect to the witnesses who did not know the accused before
the occurrence is not necessarily fatal.1697 In other words, identification of an accused in court is the substantive
evidence of the person identifying him and earlier identification in test identification parade does not affect the
admissibility of the evidence of identification in court.1698 But it cannot be denied however that though not fatal,
absence of the corroborative evidence of prior identification in a test identification parade makes the
substantive evidence of identification in court after a long lapse of time a weak piece of evidence and no
reliance can be placed upon it unless sufficiently and satisfactorily corroborated by other evidence.1699
[s 302.70.4] Accused/Known People can be identified by their Voice etc, in the Absence of Light
Known people could be recognised by their gait, timbre of voice etc.1700 Thus, although in some instances there
was no light, but where the witnesses were known to the accused persons being their very close relations, they
could have recognised them by the timbre of their voice, gait, etc.1701
Where the accused were co-villagers, their identification by the PWs in the light inside the room was found
reliable and believed.1702
Accused immediate neighbour of ****** is easily identifiable even in absence of light by his face and voice.1703
[s 302.70.5] Identification of Accused by Witness in Scooter Headlight
The four appellants accused armed with sickles and knives attacked the deceased who was driving a scooter,
fell down and died. Incident was of the month of April at about 7 pm. Eye-witness identified the appellants in the
scooter headlight. Identification was found reliable and believed. Absence of source of light in the FIR was held
not fatal to the prosecution case. Accused appellants were convicted under section 302, IPC.1704
[s 302.70.6] Legal Position of Test Identification Parade
The legal position regarding test identification parade of accused is concluded by the Supreme Court as
follows:
(a) If an accused is well known to the prosecution witnesses, no test identification parade is called for and
it would be meaningless and a sheer waste of public time to hold the same.
(b) In cases where according to the prosecution the accused is known to the prosecution witnesses, but
the said fact is denied by him and he challenges his identity by the prosecution witnesses by filing a
petition for holding test identification parade, a court while dealing with such a prayer, should consider
without holding a mini inquiry as to whether the denial is bona fide or a mere pretence and/or made
with an ulterior motive to delay the investigation, question for grant of such a prayer would not arise.
Unjustified grant or refusal of such a prayer would not necessarily insure to the benefit of either party
nor the same would be detrimental to their interest. In case prayer is granted and test identification
parade is held in which a witness fails to identify the accused, his so-called claim that the accused was
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known to him and the evidence of identification in court should not be accepted. But in case either
prayer is not granted or granted but no test identification parade held, the same ipso facto cannot be a
ground for throwing out evidence of identification of an accused in court when evidence of the witness,
on the question of identity of the accused, is found to be credible. The main thrust should be on answer
to the question as to whether evidence of a witness in court to the identity of the accused is trustworthy
or not. In case the answer is in the affirmative, the fact that prayer for holding test identification parade
was rejected or although granted, but no such parade was held, would not in any manner affect the
evidence adduced in court in relation to identity of the accused. But if, however, such an evidence is
not free from doubt, the same may be a relevant material while appreciating the evidence of
identification adduced in court.
(c) Evidence of identification of an accused in court by a witness is substantive evidence whereas that of
identification in test identification parade is, though a primary evidence but not substantive one, and the
same can be used only to corroborate identification of accused by a witness in court.
(d) Identification parades are held during the course of investigation ordinarily at the instance of
investigating agencies and should be held with reasonable dispatch for the purpose of enabling the
witnesses to identity either the properties which are the subject matter of the alleged offence or the
accused persons involved in the offence so as to provide it with materials to assure itself if the
investigation is proceeding on the right lines and the persons whom it suspects to have committed the
offence were the real culprits.
(e) Failure to hold test identification parade does not make the evidence of identification in court
inadmissible rather the same is very much admissible in law, but ordinarily identification of an accused
by a witness for the first time in court should not form the basis of conviction, the same being from its
very nature inherently of a weak character unless it is corroborated by his previous identification in the
test identification parade or any other evidence. The previous identification in the test identification
parade is a check value to the evidence of identification in Court, of an accused by a witness and the
same is a rule of prudence and not law.
(f) In exceptional circumstances only, as discussed above, evidence of identification for the first time in
Court, without the same being corroborated by previous identification in the test identification parade or
any other evidence, can form the basis of conviction.
(g) Ordinarily, if an accused is not named in the first information report, his identification by witnesses in
court, should not be relied upon, especially when they did not disclose name of the accused before the
police, but to this general rule there may be exceptions as enumerated above.1705
[s 302.71] Fingerprints
Under section 4 of Identification of Prisoner’s Act, 1920, police is competent to take fingerprints of the accused
but to dispel any suspicion as to its bona fides or to eliminate the possibility of fabrication of evidence. It is
eminently desirable that they are taken before or under the order of the magistrate in accordance with section 5
of the said Act.1706 When specimen fingerprints of the accused were not taken before or under the order of a
magistrate and the prosecution failed to prove that the seized article with the fingerprints of the accused was
not tampered with before sending to the bureau and the seized articles were not produced and exhibited during
the trial, the conviction of the accused on the basis of the fingerprints report was found not proper.1707 When
majority of fingerprints found at the crime scenes or crime articles are partially smudged, it is for the
experienced and skilled fingerprint expert to say whether a mark is usable as fingerprint evidence. Similarly, it is
for a competent technician to examine and give opinion whether the identity of fingerprints can be established,
and if so, whether that can be done on eight or even less identical characteristics in an appropriate case.1708
Since the Supreme Court says that the fingerprint test is an exact science, the availability of fingerprints of the
accused in the house of the deceased is a clinching and vital circumstance.1709 The report of the fingerprint
expert does not fall within any of the categories contemplated under section 293(4), CrPC. Hence this report
cannot be used in evidence without examination of the fingerprint expert.1710 Failure of the prosecution to
produce the result of examination of fingerprints lifted from the scene of occurrence leads to the inference that it
is possible that the result of this examination may have been contrary to the story set-up by the prosecution.1711
But, non-examination of the fingerprint expert has no effect on the prosecution case when it has come on
record that before seizure of the weapon of offence many persons had handled it.1712 When the fingerprints
were lifted from the spot but the fingerprints of the accused were not taken and sent for comparison by an
expert, there is no possibility of any report of the expert being in existence, non-production of which may lead to
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any adverse inference against the prosecution.1713
[s 302.71.1] Presence/Absence of Fingerprints of Accused—Effect
Presence of a fingerprint at the scene of occurrence is a positive evidence. But the absence of a fingerprint is
not enough to foreclose the presence of the persons concerned at the scene. If during perpetration of the crime
the fingerprint of the culprit could possibly be remitted at the scene it is equally a possibility that such a remnant
would not be remitted at all. Hence absence of finger impressions is not guarantee of absence of the person
concerned at the scene.1714
[s 302.72] Footprints
The science of identification of footprints is not a fully developed science and, therefore, if in a given case
evidence relating to the same is found satisfactory, it may be used only to reinforce the conclusions as to the
identity of a culprit already arrived at on the basis of other evidence.1715 It is not safe to act upon the footprint
evidence when sample footprints of the accused were not taken before a magistrate.1716 In a murder case, it is
not proper for a Judge to take the opinion of a footprint expert regarding footprints found near the corpse of the
victim, as conclusive evidence against the accused. The expert’s opinion is valuable but it must be supported
by statements of fact, the accuracy or otherwise of which can be verified by the Judge.1717 The circumstance of
matching of shoeprints found at the spot with that of the accused is considered insufficient to establish the
offence.1718
[s 302.73] Handwriting Expert
Opinion of hand writing expert is only an opinion evidence; cannot be conclusive.1719
[s 302.74] Accused Making Phone Calls from Mobile of the Deceased Immediately after Murder
The use of Mobile handset bearing IEMI No. 35136304044030 on which the accused appellant made calls from
his own registered mobile phone (SIM) No. 9818480558, immediately after the occurrence of the murder of
deceased, was a legitimate basis for the identification of the accused appellant. The accused appellant was
arrested. The nexus of the accused appellant with the deceased at the time of occurrence stood fully sustained
from the aforesaid SIM/IEMI details. The conviction of the accused appellant under sections 302, 380 and 452,
IPC was upheld.1720
[s 302.75] Identification of Accused by Police Dogs—Evidentiary Value
The uncanny smelling power of canine species has been profitably tapped by investigating agencies to track
the culprits. Trained dogs can pick up scent from the scene of any object and trace out the routes through
which the culprits would have gone to reach their hideouts. Developing countries have utilised such sniffer dogs
in a large measure. In India also the utilisation of such tracker dogs is on the increase. Though such dogs may
be useful to the investigating officers, can their movements be of any help to the court in evaluating the
evidence in criminal cases?1721 Where FIR was lodged about the murder of the deceased, but accused was not
named, and the sniffer dog identified the accused and the accused was formally arrested, the identification of
the accused by sniffer evidence was relied upon.1722
A four-fold criticism is advanced against the reception of such evidence. First is, that it is not possible to test the
correctness of the canine movements through the normal method available in criminal cases, i.e. in cross-
examination. Second is that the life and liberty of human beings should not be made to depend on animal
sensibilities. Third is that the possibility of a dog misjudging the smell or mistaking the track cannot be ruled out,
or many a times such mistakes have happened. Fourth is that even today science has not given a final
pronouncement about the accuracy of canine tracking.1723
There are basically three kinds of police dogs: tracker dogs, patrol dogs and sniffer dogs. Recent trends show
that hounds belonging to certain special breeds sheltered in specialised kennels and imparted with special
training are capable of leading an investigating agency to a very useful clause in crime detection and thereby
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help detectives to make a breakthrough in investigation. English courts have already started treating such
evidence as admissible. In Canada and in Scotland such evidence has become admissible of late though in the
United States the position is not uniform in different states.
The weakness of the evidence based on tracker dogs has been much discussed. The possibility of error on the
part of the dog or its master is the first aspect. The possibility of misunderstanding between the dog and its
master is also a factor. The possibility of a misrepresentation or a wrong inference from the behaviour of the
dog cannot be ruled out. The last, but not the least, is the fact that from a scientific point of view, there is little
knowledge and much uncertainty as to the precise faculties which enable police dogs to track and identify
criminals. Police dogs engage in these actions by virtue of instincts and also by the training imparted to
them.1724
In Abdul Razak Murtaza Dafadar v State of Maharashtra,1725 a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court declined to
express any concluded opinion or to lay down any general rule with regard to tracker dog’s evidence or its admissibility
against the accused as it was not necessary to do so on the fact situation. However, their Lordships made the following
observations on the usefulness or otherwise of such evidence: ‘It was argued that the tracker dog’s evidence could be
likened to the type of evidence accepted from scientific experts describing chemical reactions, blood tests and the
actions of bacilli. The comparison does not, however, appear to be sound because the behaviour of chemicals, blood
corpuscles and bacilli contains no element of conscious volition or deliberate choice. But dogs are intelligent animals
with many thought process similar to the thought processes of human beings and wherever you have thought
processes there is always the risk of error, deception and even self-deception. For these reasons we are of the opinion
that in the present state of scientific knowledge evidence of dog tracking even if admissible, is not ordinarily of much
weight. In Surinder Pal Jain v Delhi Admn,1726 a two judge Bench expressed the opinion that the pointing out by the
dogs could as well lead to a misguided suspicion that the accused had committed the crime, so their Lordships
sidelined that item of evidence from consideration.
Criminal courts need not bother much about the evidence based on sniffer dogs due to the inherent frailties
adumbrated above although the investigating agency may employ such sniffer dogs for helping the
investigation to track down criminals.
Investigating exercise can afford to make attempts or forays with the help of canine faculties but judicial
exercise can ill afford them.1727 In the undermentioned case, the prosecution case was that the accused killed
the deceased by sharp edged weapon. The dog tracking evidence adduced by the prosecution was not relied
on for the following reasons:—
(i) It was not established that the pair of tyre chappals which was found near the dead body of deceased
either belonged to the accused or it was used by the accused.
(ii) After taking smell of the pair of chappals, the dog pointed out the blood stained shirt, pyjama and
sickle. However, no evidence was collected by the investigating officer to establish that clothes or the
sickle either belonged to the accused or they were used by the accused.
(iii) After taking smell of the shirt, pyjama and sickle, the dog pointed out the house of the accused. It came
in the evidence of PW5 (Dog Handler) that whenever the trained dog recognizes the culprit, it would
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raise its front legs and place the same on the chest of the culprit and/or start barking. However, nothing
of this sort happened in the present case though there was evidence suggesting that the accused was
present near the house.
(iv) The house pointed out by the dog was not in exclusive occupation of the accused.1728
[s 302.76] Voice Identification
Indubitably, requiring the accused to lend his voice sample for the limited purpose of identification of his voice
so as to compare the same with the tape-recorded telephonic conversation, is not requiring him to impart
knowledge in respect of relevant facts, by means of oral statements or statements in writing of his personal
knowledge of the facts to be communicated to a court or to a person holding an enquiry or investigation, thus, it
is not violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution.1729
[s 302.77] Identification by Hair
The fact that the deceased had a few strands of hair in his hand which did not match with any of the accused
except A13, who was already acquitted by the Trial Court as well as the High Court, by itself cannot exonerate
the accused only because the samples do not match.1730
[s 302.78] Identification of Stolen Property
The identification of stolen articles by owners or the persons who have the opportunity to see them very often,
cannot be discarded merely on the ground that no special identification marks were present on the said
ornaments. It is so because such person can identify the articles by feel, touch or various points of difference
distinguishing one thing from the other of the same kind, though they may not be able to formulate the reasons,
as such identification is based on untranslatable impressions of their minds.1731
The two accused appellants and one more accused (convicted), were alleged to have committed the murder of
the deceased couple. The articles viz mangalsutra, ring and chain recovered from the possession of the
accused were of common use and are easily available. No TI parade in respect of the recovered articles was
held. Material witnesses examined by the prosecution had not supported the prosecution case against the two
appellants. Their acquittal recorded by the High Court was not disturbed.1732
(XI) POLICE INVESTIGATION
[s 302.79] Duty of Investigating Officer
The Investigating Officer (IO) has to work up a theory on the clues available but if he finds that there is material
which shakes that theory, he must not be adamant to present a pre-conceived theory before the court. The IO
must keep his mind open to collect and verify the facts in a straight forward manner.1733 Non-action on the part
of IO reflects upon the nature and manner of the investigation. When the IO deliberately made no efforts to
know the genesis and origin of the occurrence, the investigation is far from fair and honest.1734 But the mere
fact that the Investigating Officer committed irregularity or illegality during the course of the investigation would
not and does not cast doubt on the prosecution case nor trustworthy and reliable evidence can be cast aside to
record acquittal on that account.1735 Failure of IO to note crime number in some documents during investigation
cannot be a ground to disbelieve his evidence.1736
The Investigating Officer, dealing with a murder case, is expected to be diligent, truthful and fair in his approach
and his performance should always be in conformity with the police manual and a default or breach of duty may
prove fatal to the prosecution’s case. In the present case the investigation was carried out with unconcerned
and uninspiring performance. There was no firm and sincere effort with the needed zeal and spirit to bring
home the guilt of the accused. The order of conviction and order of sentence passed by the High Court was set
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aside.1737
[s 302.80] Defective Investigation—Effect
It is true that in case the court, on perusal, finds that statements of eyewitnesses are truthful and are reliable
and trustworthy, then, ignoring the lapses of investigating officer in not complying with such safeguards, as are
provided in the CrPC with regard to recording of substance of FIR in daily diary, sending of the special report
promptly to the Metropolitan Magistrate and recording of brief facts containing the names of the accused and
eyewitnesses in the inquest proceedings, could be ignored.1738 In the case of a defective investigation, the court
has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence. But it would not be right in acquitting an accused person
solely on account of the defect; to do so would tantamount to playing into the hands of the IO if the investigation
is designedly defective.1739 The defective investigation would not, therefore, deter the court from convicting the
accused if the courts finds that dehors the defects the accused can still be convicted on the basis of the
evidence on record.1740 As was observed in Ram Bihari Yadav v State of Bihar and others,1741 if primacy is
given to such designed or negligent investigation, to the omission or lapses by perfunctory investigation or
omissions, the faith and confidence of the people would be shaken not only in the law enforcing agency but
also in the administration of justice. The view was again reiterated in Amar Singh v Balwinder Singh and
others.1742 As noted in this case,1743 it would have been certainly better if the firearms were sent to the forensic
test laboratory for comparison. But the report of the ballistic expert would merely be in the nature of an expert
opinion without any conclusiveness attached to it. When the direct testimony of the eye-witnesses corroborated
by the medical evidence fully establishes the prosecution version, failure or omission or negligence on the part
of the IO cannot affect credibility of the prosecution version.1744
Experience shows that for reasons unknown, the police invariably commit lapses in not complying with the
relevant provisions of law meticulously in every case. When such lapses occur in a particular case, the court is
to be on guard to examine the ocular evidence, with more care in order to determine whether such ocular
evidence is fully reliable and can be given credence despite such lapses on the part of the investigating agency.
Where, the ocular evidence is of a shaky nature and a lingering doubt comes to mind about such eyewitness,
where, eyewitness having not actually witnessed the occurrence, these lapses committed by the investigating
officer assume significance and the benefit of doubt has to be given in such a case to the accused.1745
Merely because of certain lapses in the investigation the prosecution story cannot be dispensed with especially
when there is no material contradiction in the statement of prosecution witnesses examined in the case.1746
Lapses in investigation do not invalidate the proceedings.1747
[s 302.81] Delay in Recording Statement of Witness under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731748
It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case to find if testimony of a witness is credible in spite of
delay in case diary statement under section 161, CrPC.1749 In Sunil Kumar v State of Madhya Pradesh,1750 there
was delay of one and a half months in recording the case diary statement of a witness who was the mother of
the victim and who had reached there at once. The Supreme Court found that there was ample evidence that
the mother had reached the spot, and regarding delay in the case diary statement the court observed that such
delay in every case does not lead to disbelieving such witness. If the witness’s presence is natural, the
dereliction of duty by the police in not recording the case diary statement in time will not adversely affect the
reliability of such witness.
Another case worth citing is State of Uttar Pradesh v Sikander Ali.1751 In this case, one witness who was the
father of the victim was examined by the police 24 days after the incident. The investigating officer explained
that delay was due to a law and order problem. The Supreme Court held that the statement of such witness
cannot be discarded on account of such delay. The non-explanation by the prosecution as to why the
eyewitness had not been examined shortly after the incident and for inordinate delay in examining them, is no
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ground to discard the convincing and reliable evidence adduced in the case.1752 However, whether the
investigating officer met the witness for the first time about 3-4 months after the incident and the statement of
the witness was recorded after extreme delay, for which no explanation was available on record, the statement
of the witness becomes incredible.1753
Where the statement of two witnesses under section 161 CrPC was recorded with delay by IO, the presence of
the two eye-witnesses on the spot was found doubtful, conviction of the appellants accused for offence under
sections 302/149, IPC was set aside.1754
Delay in recording statement under section 161 CrPC would cast a doubt upon prosecution case if witnesses
were available but their statements were not recorded.1755
[s 302.82] Statement made to Police before the Start of Investigation is Admissible and not Hit by Section 162,
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
It is settled position in law that the prohibition contained in section 162, CrPC, extends to
(1) all statements:
(a) the statement need not be a confession, it applies equally to all statements, confessional or
otherwise;
(b) the statement need not be reduced into writing; it applies equally to all statements whether
reduced into writing or not;
(2) by whomsoever made:
(a) the prohibition applies equally to statements made by any person, whether accused or not;
(b) the person making the statement need not be in police custody while making the statement; but:
(i) the statement must be made to a police officer; and

(ii) must be made in the course of an investigation under chapter 12, CrPC.
It will thus be seen that for being excluded from using the statement made to a police official it must be made in
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the course of investigation under chapter 12, CrPC. A constable or an official of the Rajasthan Armed
Constabulary is not invested with any powers of investigation as contemplated by chapter 12, CrPC and,
therefore, there is no question of the statement being made to any of them being excluded from use by
recourse to the provisions of section 162, CrPC. Assuming that an official of the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary
is police as contended by learned counsel relying on several rules contained in the Rajasthan Police
Subordinate Service Rules 1989, in order that it could be so excluded it must be in the course of investigation
under chapter 12 of the CrPC.1756 The statement of the deceased, ie, dying declaration recorded by the
investigating officer before the start of investigation of the case can be treated as a dying declaration and the
plea of the accused that it should be treated as an FIR cannot be accepted.1757
All statements made to the police before commencement of investigation are admissible in evidence, and
investigation does not necessarily commence immediately after the FIR is recorded.1758 When the IO had only
received the FIR at the shop of the witness and had not even visited the site before he recorded the statements
“C” to “D”, and therefore the portion “C” to “D” is the part of the FIR not hit by section 162, CrPC.1759
[s 302.83] Delay in forwarding Report to Magistrate—Effect
On receiving first information of a cognizable offence an officer incharge of a police station is required under
section 157(1), CrPC, to forthwith send a report of the same to a magistrate empowered to take cognizance of
such offence upon a police report. The report is to be submitted in the manner provided under section 158,
CrPC. But delay in dispatch of FIR to the Magistrate in itself is not sufficient to throw out the prosecution case in
its entirety.1760 It is not that as if every delay in sending the delayed special report to the District Magistrate
would necessarily lead to the inference that the FIR has not been lodged at the time stated or has been ante-
timed or ante-dated or that the investigation is not fair and forthright.1761 But when such delay is coupled with
the suspicion or other infirmities attaching to the recording of FIR, or the conduct of the investigation thereafter,
it affects adversely the case of the prosecution.1762 So, when there is inordinate delay of about three days in
lodging FIR and also delay of about four days in sending FIR to the Magistrate in a murder case coupled with
other circumstances, the accused cannot be convicted.1763
Delay in forwarding the FIR to court is not fatal in a case in which investigation has commenced promptly on its
basis.1764
There was delay of six days in forwarding FIR to the concerned Magistrate. However, no question was put to
the IO in his cross examination about the delay in dispatching the FIR to the Magistrate. Held the delay was not
fatal to the prosecution case.1765
In several cases the Supreme Court has emphasised the importance of prompt dispatch of FIR from police
station to the Judicial Magistrate and also to the superintendent of police of the district.1766 But, such a delay in
dispatch of FIR to the Magistrate cannot be so detrimental as to dislodge the case of the prosecution on this
ground alone if otherwise it is worth placing reliance.1767 Mere fact that the copy of FIR was received by the
concerned magistrate three days after the incidence does not lead to the conclusion that FIR was not lodged on
the same date or it was ante-dated.1768 But, non-proving of FIR and record to show that the copy of FIR was
dispatched to the jurisdiction magistrate in compliance with section 167, CrPC, points out a few likely holes left
unplugged by the prosecution.1769 The explanation by the prosecution that delay in sending FIR to magistrate
occurred as those two days were holidays is not acceptable, as FIR should reach the concerned Magistrate
without any undue delay.1770 If the delay is reasonably explained no adverse inference can be drawn but failure
to explain the delay would require the court to minutely examine the prosecution version for assuring itself that
no innocent person has been implicated in the crime. Investing upon the accused to seek an explanation of the
delay in sending copy of FIR to the Magistrate is not the requirement of law. It is always for the prosecution to
explain such a delay and if reasonable, plausible and sufficient explanation is tendered, no adverse inference
can be drawn against it.1771 The expression “forthwith” used in section 157(1), CrPC, obviously cannot mean
that the prosecution is required to explain every hours delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, of course, the
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same has to be sent with reasonable dispatch, which would obviously mean within a reasonable, possible time
in the circumstances prevailing.1772
Copy of the FIR mandated under section 157, CrPC was not forwarded to the concerned Magistrate. There
were material contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witness. Recovery of offence weapon was
found doubtful. Conviction of the accused appellants under sections 148 and 302, IPC recorded by courts
below was set aside.1773
The dispatch of a copy of the FIR “forthwith” ensures that there is no manipulation or interpolation in the FIR. If
the prosecution is asked to give an explanation for the delay in the dispatch of a copy of the FIR, it ought to do
so. However, if the court is convinced of the prosecution version’s truthfulness and trustworthiness of the
witnesses, the absence of an explanation may not be regarded as detrimental to the prosecution case. It would
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. Where officer-in-charge of the police station is not asked
questions about the delay in sending special report to the Magistrate, no adverse inference shall be drawn
against the prosecution.1774
[s 302.84] Shortcomings in Site Plan prepared by the Investigating Officer
The Investigating Officer, who generally himself is not an eyewitness of the occurrence, prepares the site plan.
He has no personal knowledge regarding the place from where the witness has seen the occurrence or from
where the accused has assaulted the deceased. He can make the entries in the site plan what he himself had
seen and observed and that will be the direct and substantive piece of evidence being based on his personal
knowledge; but as he has not himself seen the incident, therefore, he could have mentioned the place from
where the witnesses had seen the occurrence only after ascertaining the same from the eyewitnesses, which is
not admissible in evidence being hit by section 162, CrPC.1775
In Jagdish Narain v State of Uttar Pradesh,1776 site plan was prepared by the investigating officer who failed to
indicate in the site plan the spot wherefrom the shots were allegedly fired by the appellants. While considering
the effect of failure of the Investigating Officer to indicate the spot, the Supreme Court held:1777
While preparing a site plan an investigating police officer can certainly record what he sees and observes, for that will
be direct and substantive evidence being based on his personal knowledge; but as he was not obviously present when
the incident took place, he has to derive knowledge as to when, where and how it happened from persons who had
seen the incident. When a witness testifies about what he heard from somebody else it is ordinarily not admissible in
evidence being hearsay, but if the person from whom he heard is examined to give direct evidence within the meaning
of s 60 of the Evidence Act, the former’s evidence would be admissible to corroborate the latter in accordance with s
157, CrPC. However, such a statement made to a police officer, when he is investigating into an offence in
accordance, with Chapter 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be used to even corroborate the maker thereof
in view of the embargo in section 162(1), CrPC, appearing in that chapter and can be used only to contradict him (the
maker) in accordance with the proviso thereof, except in those cases where sub-section (2) of the section applies. That
necessarily means that if in the site plan PW 6 had even shown the place from which the shots were allegedly fired
after ascertaining the same from the eyewitnesses it could not have been admitted in evidence being hit by section
162, CrPC.
In this view of the matter, the failure on the part of the investigating officer to point out the place in the site plan
from where the eyewitnesses had seen the occurrence, is not and it cannot be read in evidence being hit by
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Omission in site plan is not a ground to disbelieve the otherwise credible testimony of eye-witnesses.1779
[s 302.84.1] Omission of Crime Number in Site Plan
Otherwise credible testimony of eye-witnesses cannot be disbelieved on the basis of the site plan.1780
Where the crime number is not mentioned in the site plan, that by itself, does not create any doubt as to the
truthfulness of the prosecution story for the reason that it is only one site plan in respect of crime in question
which has been prepared.1781
[s 302.84.2] Omission of Crime Number in Inquest Report
Mere non-mentioning of crime number in the inquest report does not create any doubt as to the preparation of
inquest report where the doctor who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased stated that he
received the dead body in sealed condition.1782
[s 302.84.3] Site Plan—Existence/Absence of Blood
It is often argued by the Counsel for the accused that in the site plan or in the observation panchnama no place
where blood was found has been shown. The Supreme Court opined that the existence of blood or absence
thereof would not, by itself, be such a fact as would completely wipe out the evidence of eye-witnesses.1783
[s 302.85] If Court can examine Case Diaries and Statement under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure
1973, in favour of Accused
The Courts can certainly look at the case diary as contemplated under section 172(2) of the CrPC, to determine
the veracity of the investigation and to aid the court in such inquiry. However, such diaries cannot be used as
evidence.1784
The provisions embodied in sub-section (3) of section 172 of the CrPC cannot be characterised as
unreasonable or arbitrary. Under sub-section (2) of section 172, CrPC, the court itself has the unfettered power
to examine the entries in the diaries. This is a very important safeguard. The Legislature has reposed complete
trust in the court which is conducting the inquiry or the trial. It has empowered the court to call for any such
relevant case diary if there is any inconsistency or contradiction arising in the context of the case diary the court
can use the entries for the purpose of contradicting the police officer as provided in sub-section (3) of section
172 of the CrPC. Ultimately, there can be no better custodian or guardian of the interest of justice than the court
trying the case. No court will deny to itself the power to make use of the entries in the diary to the advantage of
the accused by contradicting the police officer with reference to the contents of the diaries.1785
General Diary entries are summary entries relating to movement of police, or relating to the fact that some
information regarding an offence has been given at the police station.1786
The public interest requirement from the stand point of the need to ensure a fair trial for an accused is more
than sufficiently met by the power conferred on the court, which is the ultimate custodian of the interest of
justice and can always be trusted to be vigilant to ensure that the interest of accused persons standing the trial,
is fully safeguarded.1787
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This proposition of law will equally apply to the statements made to the police officer in the course of
investigation under section 161 of the CrPC under section 162(1) of the CrPC there is a bar to the statement
made by any person to a police officer to be used for any purpose and the same is provided under section 145
of the Indian Evidence Act.1788
However, the bar under section 162 shall not apply to the statements falling under section 32(1) of the
Evidence Act or for a discovery of fact as required under section 27 of the Evidence Act. If certain admissions
were made to the police officer by a witness in the course of investigation and if such admissions or
contradiction were not elicited in evidence, it is always open to the court to look at the case diary to find out
contradictions not elicited in evidence. If such contradictions are in favour of the accused, it can be looked into,
to aid the court in favour of the accused. If the court can look at a confession of the accused there does not
seem to be any inhibition for looking at the statement of the witnesses recorded under section 161, CrPC, in
favour of the accused. There is nothing wrong in this procedure, otherwise the power under section 172(2) of
CrPC, could become as empty formality.1789 But a somewhat contrary view is taken by the apex court which
was confronted with the question that if the public prosecution failed to get the contradiction explained as
permitted by the 1st limb of the proviso to section 162(1), CrPC, is it permissible for the court to invoke the
powers under section 172, CrPC, for explaining such contradiction After referring to sub-section 172, CrPC, the
Supreme Court explained as follows:
A reading of the said sub-sections makes the position clear that the discretion given to the court to use such diaries is
only for aiding the court to decide on a point. It is made abundantly clear in sub-section (2) itself that the court is
forbidden from using the entries of such diaries as evidence. What cannot be used as evidence against the accused
cannot be used in any other manner against him. If the court uses the entries in a case diary for contradicting a police
officer it should be done only in the manner provided in section 145 of the Evidence Act ie, by giving the author of the
statement an opportunity to explain the contradiction after his attention is called to that part of the statement which is
intended to be so used for contradiction. In other words, the power conferred on the court for perusal of the diary under
section 172 of the Code is not intended for explaining a contradiction which the defence has winched to the fore
through the channel permitted by law. The interdict contained in section 162 of the Code, debars the court from using
the power under section 172 of the Code for the purpose of explaining the contradiction.1790
[s 302.86] Conclusion of Investigation and Proceedings in Court thereafter
The result of investigation under chapter 12 of the CrPC is a conclusion that an investigating officer draws on
the basis of materials collected during investigation and such conclusion can only form the basis of a competent
court to take cognizance during investigation are to be translated into legal evidence, the trial court is then
required to base its conclusion solely on the evidence adduced during the trial, and it cannot rely on the
investigation or the result thereof.1791 If the result of investigation was to be made the basis of a court’s verdict
regarding guilt or innocence of an accused, there would be no need of a trial in a police case for relying on the
report submitted under section 173(2), CrPC. A court would be entitled to decide the fate of the person
arraigned, such a course is not legally permissible.1792
[s 302.87] Inquest Report
The proceedings under section 174, CrPC, have a limited scope. The object of the proceedings thereunder is
merely to ascertain whether a person has died under suspicious circumstances or an unnatural death and if so,
what is the apparent cause of death1793 and nature of injuries and the possible weapon used in causing those
injuries.1794 The question regarding the details as to how the deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or
under what circumstances he was assaulted, is foreign to the ambit of the scope of proceedings under section
174, CrPC. Neither in practice nor in law is it necessary for the police to mention these details in the inquest
report.1795 It is neither incumbent upon the police officer who prepared the inquest report to mention the names
of the assailant, nor it is necessary for the eyewitnesses,1796 who are witnesses to the said inquest to insist
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upon the mention of the names of the assailants in the inquest report nor it is possible to draw any inference
against the prosecution that the names of the assailants were not known merely because they are not
mentioned in the inquest report.1797 The non-mentioning of the names of the assailants in the inquest report or
in the requisition memo, cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution case.1798 When there was no column in
inquest-report about the names of the assailants, there was no occasion for anyone to mention the names of
assailants in it.1799
It is well established that inquest report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be looked into for
testing the veracity of the witnesses of inquest. The object of preparing such report is merely to ascertain the
apparent cause of death, namely, whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental or caused by animals or
machinery etc. and stating in what manner, or by what weapon or instrument, the injuries on the body appear to
have been inflicted. The non-recording of certain relevant entries in the inquest report eg when inquest
proceedings started and when ended, do not constitute a material deffect so grave to throw out the prosecution
story and the otherwise reliable testimonies of prosecution witnesses that have mostly remained
uncontroverted.1800
Inquest report is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can only be looked into for testing veracity of
witnesses.1801
The evidence of eyewitnesses cannot be discussed on erroneous interpretation of section 174, CrPC, to
disbelieve the prosecution story.1802 The court is not justified in treating the statement allegedly made by the
witness during inquest proceeding as substantive evidence in view of embargo of section 162, CrPC. It is
equally unjustified when it placed reliance upon the FIR informer who could not be examined during trials as the
FIR could only be used for the purpose of corroborating and contradicting the person who lodges it and under
no circumstances can it be used as substantive evidence, and the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt in
such cases.1803 The Supreme Court has consistently held that inquest report cannot be treated as substantive
evidence but may be utilised for contradicting the witness of inquest.1804 Statements contained in an inquest
report, to the extent they relate to what the Investigating Officer saw and found are admissible but any
statement made thereon on the basis of what he heard from others, would be hit by section 162, CrPC.1805 If on
reading of inquest report it is clear that the names of the assailants are not mentioned and nevertheless, the
FIR gives all the names of the assailants, then it would lead to an indication that FIR might have been
registered after the inquest report.1806 In some cases,1807 it has been held that even not giving the names of the
accused or of the eyewitnesses in the brief facts which are sent along with the inquest papers also would
sometime result in doubting the prosecution version.1808 Where the entire inquest report was in one ink while
the name of the informant in the inquest report was by a different ink, which created a suspicion that when the
inquest report was prepared, the FIR had not come into existence, and it had not been decided as to who would
be made the first informant. It was later that the name of the informant was inserted in the inquest report. This
gives rise to a great deal of doubt as to whether the FIR was lodged by the person named therein, and at that
time, because in that event the name of the informant would have been written at the time when the remaining
contents of the inquest report were written.1809
Lapse on the part of the investigating officer in conducting inquest proceedings/ report cannot render
prosecution case doubtful or unworthy of belief. Accused were conducted for offences under sections 302,
364A, IPC.1810
Conducting inquest and sending dead body for post-mortem before registering FIR is not fatal to prosecution
case in all cases.1811
[s 302.87.1] Police Diary—Right of Accused to Inspect

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The police diary is only a record of day to day investigation made by the investigating officer. Neither the
accused nor his agent is entitled to call for such case diary and also are not entitled to see them during the
course of inquiry or trial. The unfettered power conferred by the Statute under section 172(2) of CrPC on the
court to examine the entries of the police diary would not allow the accused to claim similar unfettered right to
inspect the case diary. The confidentiality is always kept in the matter of investigation and it is not desirable to
make available the police diary to the accused on his demand.1812
(XII) DYING DECLARATION OF VICTIM
[s 302.88] Dying Declaration—Scope
The statement made by the deceased before his death as to the cause of his death or as to any of the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death is known as dying declaration. Such statement is
relevant under section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act in a case in which the cause of that person’s death is
relevant. Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay.1813 A magistrate should preferably record the dying
declaration in question and answer form.1814 But when the dying person is in severe bodily pain owing to stab
injuries in abdomen and words were scarce, his natural impulse would be to tell the Magistrate without wasting
his breath on details as to who had stabbed him. The recording of such brief dying declaration is natural and
reliable.1815 The dying declaration must not necessarily be made before the Magistrate1816 but when it is not
recorded by a magistrate, it has to be scrutinised closely.1817 The dying declaration recorded by a police officer
in the light of facts and circumstances of the case may lead to conviction of the accused.1818 But recording of
dying declaration by the investigating officer during the course of investigation should not be encouraged.1819
Recording of dying declaration by an executive magistrate though not in question-answer form1820 or by the
doctor or1821in the injury report by the doctor1822 is admissible in evidence. Although it is preferable to have the
dying declaration in question-answer form, such requirement is not absolute. A dying declaration if otherwise
reliable and trustworthy need not be discarded merely on the ground that it is not recorded in question-answer
form.1823
Witness, to whom deceased made oral dying declaration before Police Inspector, did not disclose it to any
other. Inspector neither reduced the dying declaration into writing, nor conveyed this to the police station;
accused was acquitted.1824
[s 302.88.1] Eyewitness Accounts Stand on Higher Footing to Dying Declaration
The dying declarations cannot be put at the same pedestal as direct account or eye-witness account of the
incident. If the two are to be compared, the eye-witness account must stand on a higher footing.1825
[s 302.88.2] Fit Mental State of Declarant—Necessity of
Acceptability of a dying declaration is greater because the declaration is made in extremity. When the party is
on the verge of death, one rarely finds any motive to tell falsehood and it is for this reason that the requirements
of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with in case of a dying declaration. Since the accused has no
power of cross-examination, the court would insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to
inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court should ensure that the
statement was not as a result of tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is for the court to ascertain
from the evidence placed on record that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had ample opportunity to
observe and identify the culprit.1826
Where there was interpolation in the date of endorsement about the mental fitness, capability of the deceased
at the time of recording dying declaration was doubtful, accused was held entitled to benefit of doubt and
acquitted of charge of murder of his wife.1827
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Dying declaration recorded by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was endorsed by the attending doctor certifying
mental fitness of the deceased, which contained detailed description of the incident. The dying declaration was
found reliable. Accused was convicted on the murder charge.1828
Deceased was administered pathedine due to pain, but was in fit condition to make dying declaration as
certified by doctor. Dying declaration was found reliable.1829
Dying declaration of the deceased recorded by SDM; Doctor’s certificate about mental fitness of the deceased
was not obtained. Dying declaration was held suspicious. Conviction on murder charge was set aside.1830
Dying declaration recorded by the Head Constable, even without obtaining endorsement of the doctor that the
declarant was in fit mental condition to make declaration was found valid.1831
[s 302.89] Evidentiary Value of Dying Declaration
The earlier view was that it is not safe to convict an accused person on the evidence furnished by a dying
declaration without further corroboration because such a statement is not on oath and is not subject to cross-
examination and because the maker of it might be mentally and physically in a state of confusion.1832 However,
subsequently, in a landmark judgment Khushal Rao v State of Bombay,1833 the earlier view was reversed and
the following propositions of law have been made:
On a review of the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different High Courts in
India and in this Court, we have come to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Madras
High Court, aforesaid, (1) that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that dying declaration cannot form the
sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case must be determined on its own facts keeping in
view the circumstances in which the dying declaration was made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general
proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a dying
declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the light of surrounding
circumstances and with reference to the principles governing the weighing of evidence; (5) that a dying declaration
which has been recorded by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that is to say, in the form of questions and
answers, and, as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the declaration, stands on a much higher footing than
a dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony which may suffer from all the infirmities of human memory and
human character, and (6) that in order to test the reliability of a dying declaration, the court has to keep in view, the
circumstances like the opportunity of the dying man for observation, for example, whether there was sufficient light if
the crime was committed at night; whether the capacity of the man to remember the facts stated, had not been
impaired at the time he was making the statement, by circumstances beyond his control; that the statement has been
consistent throughout if he had several opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it;
and that the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of tutoring by interested
parties.
Even if the eyewitness account is taken to be inconsistent with a part of the dying declaration, once the dying
declaration is found reliable, trustworthy and consistent with circumstantial evidence on record, such dying
declaration by itself is adequate to bring home the case against the accused.1834
[s 302.89.1] Death after Few Days—Dying Declaration not Discarded

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Dying declaration which is recorded in expectation of death, need not be discarded only because death took
place after a few days. In the instant case, death of the deceased old woman took place 25 days after the
incident. Dying declaration was not discarded. Conviction under section 302, IPC was affirmed.1835
[s 302.90] Dying Declaration of Burnt Person—Conduct of Accused in Extinguishing Fire
In case the burnt wife gives dying declaration implicating her husband, the fact that the accused tried to
extinguish the fire on the person of the deceased may be on the account of two reasons, one reasons may be
that the accused is really innocent and he is trying to save the life of that person by extinguishing the fire.
Another reason may be that the accused had become immediately repentant and to control the damage that
had been caused by his act in setting fire to that person. To put it plainly, such conduct could be the conduct of
an innocent person or a repentant person. If a person after having set fire to another person, realises
immediately the magnitude of the damage caused by him to the life of that person and out of repentance
immediately tries to control that damage, it could not be the conduct of an innocent person but it could be the
conduct of a repentant person.1836 When there were strained relations between the deceased burnt wife and the
accused husband and she made a voluntary reliable dying declaration to neighbours implicating her husband in
the act of setting her on fire, the subsequent conduct of the accused in extinguishing the fire was not the
conduct of an innocent man, rather it was the conduct of a person who was trying to control the damage caused
by him, so the conviction of the accused was upheld.1837 But in State of Assam v Mafizuddin Ahmed,1838 the
Apex Court disbelieved the dying declaration on the ground of certain circumstances which also included that
the accused in that case covered the burning body of the deceased with a quilt and tried to extinguish the fire.
In State of Gujarat v Mohanbhai Ragubhai Patel,1839 the Supreme Court held that burning of the woman by
accused is doubtful because of conduct of accused in throwing mattress over the deceased and also because
of absence of motive in that case, the attempt of accused to extinguish fire on body of deceased was
considered one of the grounds to disbelieve the dying declaration. But later in Kumbhar Dhirajlal Mohanlal v
State of Gujarat,1840 the Supreme Court took a somewhat contrary view and assumed that the accused
sustained the injuries while extinguishing the fire still it would not lead to the inference that the fire was
accidental for the dying declaration itself indicated that the accused received those injuries after he had set her
on fire. The observations of the High Court that a shrewd person may adopt these tactics; first setting his wife
on fire then make an effort to extinguish the fire and thereafter remain by her side were approved. The fact that
the accused recorded injuries in the hand and other portions of the body which were also indicated by the
doctor that it was likely that the injuries on the person of the accused were caused while gripping the deceased
when she was trying to escape from the flames on her person. The conduct of the accused after the incident
that he has not been either in the hospital or even cared to see the deceased showed that he was trying to
keep himself away. The dying declaration of the deceased was also found truthful so the conviction of the
accused was upheld.1841
The accused husband made no attempt to put out the fire and save the deceased wife, the dying declaration by
the wife showed that he killed her by setting her on fire. The accused was found guilty of murdering his wife.1842
Where, in four dying declarations to different persons, the allegation was that the death of the wife was due to
setting her on fire by the husband, the plea of the husband/accused that he is innocent and attempted to save
her and got injured in the process was found without merit as the doctor opined that location and nature of
injuries found on the body of the accused were not consistent with the claim that he had tried to extinguish the
fire but on the other hand had tried to hold her to prevent her from going out of the room.1843 Similarly, in a
death by burns case, the deceased wife gave dying declaration which was trustworthy and reliable, the accused
sustained injuries not while extinguishing fire but in the process of setting the deceased on fire, the conviction of
the accused husband was found proper.1844
[s 302.91] More than One Dying Declaration
When two or more dying declarations are recorded and they corroborate with each other they on being proved
can be acted upon but when two or more dying declarations are contradictory to each other, it is not safe to act
upon them. In a bride burning case, there were few dying declarations made by the deceased revealing glaring
inconsistencies vis-à-vis naming the culprit, one of the dying declarations indicated the incident as an accident,
the conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC, based upon one of the dying declarations implicating the
accused was set aside by the Supreme Court.1845 When there is more than one dying declaration genuinely
recorded, they must be tested on the touchstone of consistency and probabilities.1846 In another bride burning
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case, the two dying declarations gave contrary versions. One dying declaration duly recorded by a doctor
showed that the victim was burnt by her mother-in-law and husband while the second dying declaration
recorded by a person attested by sarpanch indicated that the deceased committed suicide which was
introduced by the police inspector in his cross-examination and was not proved by a competent witness was
discarded and placing reliance on the first dying declaration recorded by the doctor, the conviction of the
accused under sections 302, 34, IPC, was sustained.1847 In a bride burning case, as the two dying declarations
were inconsistent, the accused mother-in-law was given the benefit of doubt and was acquitted of charge under
section 302, IPC.1848 In another case, a dying declaration was recorded by the doctor that the deceased was
set on fire by her husband, the second dying declaration was recorded by a police constable and was also
attested by a doctor. The third dying declaration was duly recorded by an executive magistrate with
endorsement by doctor that the patient was fit to give statement, observing that it was immaterial that the third
dying declaration was not recorded in question-answer form and there was no infirmity in any of the dying
declarations, the conviction of the accused under section 302, IPC, was upheld by the Apex Court.1849
The prosecution evidence was that the accused appellant hit the deceased and the eye-witness by a wooden
bat and pushed them into bushes. It could not be stated that the accused appellant intended to cause the death
of the deceased. However, knowledge could be imputed to him that his action was likely to cause the death of
the deceased. The conviction of the appellant under section 302, IPC was altered into one under section 304,
Pt II, IPC.1850
Where the first dying declaration was recorded by the doctor and another by a police officer and thereafter the
deceased succumbed to burn injuries, the evidence of witness attesting first dying declaration showed that the
deceased was in a fit condition to give a statement, both dying declarations stated that the accused himself
caused burn injuries to his accused wife and so corroborated with each other, no relatives of the deceased
were present at the time of recording of the dying declaration, no one could think of tutoring her to give false
statement so as to implicate the accused; no domestic lady having children and living with her husband will
falsely implicate her husband unless there is a strong motive which was not proved, the dying declaration was
therefore admissible.1851 First dying declaration recorded by police immediately after incident was found not
reliable as it was recorded in the presence of mother-in-law under pressure. Second dying declaration recorded
by Magistrate which showed the complicity of her husband, in-laws was found more probable. Conviction of the
accused appellants under sections 302/34, IPC was affirmed.1852 When there is no contradiction between the
two dying declarations of one deceased1853 or three dying declarations1854 of another deceased implicating the
accused, the conviction of the accused was found proper. Same is the legal position when two out of three
dying declarations are not contradictory.1855 But when all three dying declarations did not inspire confidence and
the other evidence was also not creditworthy the accused is entitled to acquittal.1856 When two dying
declarations are inconsistent, much importance need not be given to them.1857 But when two of the four dying
declarations are reliable, they can be acted upon.1858 The court cannot sideline noticeable discrepancy looming
large as between the two different dying declarations made by the same person. When the sphere of scrutiny of
dying declaration is a restricted area, the court cannot afford to sideline such a material divergence relating to
the very occasion of the crime in either context, spoken to one was wrong, or that, in the other was wrong. Both
could be reconciled with each other only with much strain as it relates to the opportunity for the culprit to commit
the offence. Adopting such a strain to the detriment of the accused in a criminal case is not a feasible
course.1859
The deceased was said to have made two dying declarations. The second dying declaration made by the
deceased introduced a new case and involved new accused persons and new witnesses. The first dying
declaration was recorded by ASI at the police station. Both the dying declarations were discarded. Conviction of
the appellant under section 302, IPC was found improper, and as such, was set aside.1860
[s 302.92] Principles Governing Dying Declaration
In Paniben v State of Gujarat,1861 the Supreme Court laid down the principles governing dying declaration which
could be summed up as under:1862
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(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without
corroboration.1863
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base the conviction on it,
without corroboration.1864
(iii) This court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not
the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had opportunity to observe and identify
the assailant and was in a fit state to make the declaration.1865
(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.1866
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with
regard to it is to be rejected.1867
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction.1868
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence it is not to be
rejected.1869
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness
of the statement itself guarantees truth.1870
(ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy itself whether deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the
dying declaration, seeks medical opinion. But where the eyewitness has said that the deceased was in
a fit and conscious state to make his dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail.1871
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration the said
declaration cannot be acted upon.1872
(xi) The deceased told the doctors attending her in the hospital that she did not know as to who set her on
fire. Accused appellants were acquitted of the charge under section 302, IPC.1873
[s 302.92.1] Long Delay between the Time of Dying Declaration and the Death of the Deceased
There is no merit in the contention that the deceased died long after making the dying declaration and
therefore, the dying declaration has no value. Such a dying declaration does not lose its value if the person
lives for a longer time than expected. However, the question has to be considered in each case on the facts
and circumstances established therein.1874
[s 302.92.2] Lengthy Dying Declaration Discarded
The dying declaration showed that the deceased was not in a position to speak and see and in such state of
mind, it was highly doubtful and unbelievable that the deceased had written a lengthy statement running into
more than 3 pages containing various details by sign and gestures. The contents of the dying declaration were
shrouded by doubts and suspicion and the entire evidence suggested that the dying declaration did not reveal
the entire truth. The appellants were held entitled to benefit of doubt and their conviction under section 302, IPC
was set aside.1875
[s 302.92.3] “Circumstances of Transaction which resulted in His Death”
The collocation of the words in section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, “circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in his death” is apparently of wider amplitude than saying “circumstance which caused his death”.
There need not necessarily be a direct nexus between “circumstances” and death. It is enough if the words
spoken by the deceased have reference to any circumstance which has connection with any of the transactions
which ended up in the death of the deceased. Such statement would also fall within the purview of section 32(1)
of the Evidence Act. In other words, it is not necessary that such circumstance should be proximate, for, even
Page 87 of 309
distant circumstance can also become admissible under the sub-section, provided it has nexus with the
transaction which resulted in the death.1876 The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically
reduced to a cut and dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a strait-jacket. Distance of
time would depend or vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical
culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement
regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire
statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context. Sometimes statements
relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of
death.1877
[s 302.92.4] Bride Burning—Dying Declaration of Deceased
Where in a bride burning case, the dying declaration made by the deceased before the Executive Magistrate
and police was found voluntary, conviction of the appellant accused under section 302, IPC was held
proper.1878
[s 302.93] Tests to know the Truthfulness of Dying Declaration
The truthfulness of a dying declaration has to be tested with reference to the circumstances and other relevant
facts of each case.1879 By and large, inter alia, the following tests can be devised in order to answer the
question whether dying declaration is true:
(i) whether the declarant had sufficient opportunity to observe and identify his assailant;
(ii) whether the capacity of the declarant to remember the facts stated, had not been impaired at the time
he was making the statement by circumstances beyond his control either due to nature of the injuries
or for any other cause;
(iii) whether the statement has been consistent throughout if the declarant had several opportunity of
making a dying declaration apart from the official record of it;
(iv) whether the statement had been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the result of the tutoring
by interested parties;
(v) whether the statement made by the declarant is intrinsically sound and in accord with probabilities;
(vi) whether any material part of the statement is proved to be false by other reliable evidence.1880
[s 302.94] Person Making Dying Declaration Surviving
Where a witness survives after making dying declaration, his statement cannot be admitted as dying
declaration but as it is a statement made shortly after the occurrence, at the earliest opportunity and is so
connected with the fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction, it is relevant and admissible as res
gestae under section 6 of the Evidence Act.1881 A magistrate is legally competent to record a dying declaration
“in the course of investigation” as provided in chapter 12 of the CrPC. The contours provided in section 164(1),
CrPC, would cover such a statement.1882 However, such a statement, so long as its maker remains alive,
cannot be used as substantive evidence. Its use is limited to corroboration or contradiction of testimony of its
maker.1883
[s 302.95] Dying Declaration is useless when Accused has right of Private Defence
Although dying declaration is a very strong piece of evidence and conviction of accused on its basis even on its
corroboration is not illegal but in the face of right of private defence of the accused this piece of evidence looses
its significance. Thus in a case before the Supreme Court, though the dying declaration held the accused to be
the sole author of the fatal injury but it was held that this by itself was not a corroborative factor to establish the
murder charge in view of the plea of private defence taken by the accused and so the accused was
Page 88 of 309
acquitted.1884
[s 302.96] Importance of Certificate showing Deceased Medically Fit to make Statement
It is an essential requirement and one on which there could be no matter of compromise that the condition of
the patient at the time when the dying declaration was made has to be assessed by the doctor concerned and
certified on the document at that very point of time. The courts can never accept a situation whereby this very
vital requirement is bypassed and the prosecution attempts to get over the infirmity by examining the doctor at a
much later point of time in order to try and cover up the lacuna. It is a well accepted position in law that where
the condition of a patient is so serious, the doctor must certify the consciousness levels. There can be no
dispute about the fact that the patient in such cases is undergoing a lot of physical pain that the mental
condition of the patient is also not very certain having regard to the nature of the injuries and the consequence

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1. [s 171A] “Candidate”, “Electoral right” defined.—

R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code

(a) Bribery (section 171B).

(b) Undue influence at election (section 171C).

(c) Personation at election (section 171D).

(d) False statement in connection with an election (section 171G).

(e) Illegal payments in connection with an election (section 171H).

13 [s 171A] “Candidate”, “Electoral right” defined.—

[s 171A.2] Legislative Changes

[s 171A.3.1] Election Embraces Whole Procedure

[s 171A.4] Definition of Candidate

[s 171A.5] Candidate—Determining Factor

[s 171A.6] Withdrawal after Nomination—Effect

[s 171A.7] “Electoral Right”—Definition of

3 State v Siddhannath Gangaram, AIR 1956 MB 241, p 243.

7 NP Ponnaswami v Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64 [LNIND 1952 SC 2], p 69.

8 Refer to section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

11 Ibid, p 155, per Walsh J.

12 Ibid, p 156, per Mears CJ.

13 Ins. by the Act 39 of 1920, section 2.

14 Subs. by Act 40 of 1975, section 9, for clause (a) (w.e.f. 6-8-1975).

16 Shankar Nanasahab Karpe v Returning Officer, AIR 1952 Bom 279 .

18 Raj Krushna Bose v Binod Kanungo, AIR 1954 SC 2002 .

19 S Khader Sheriff v Munnuswami, AIR 1955 SC 775 [LNIND 1955 SC 52] .

22 Deepak Ganpatrao Solunke v Govt of Maharashtra, (1999) Cr LJ 1224 (Bom) (DB).

23 Court on its own motion v UOI, (2001) Cr LJ 225 (P&H).

26 SK Singh v VV Giri, AIR 1970 SC 2097 [LNIND 1970 SC 367] , p 2110.

R A NELSON’S Indian Penal Code

(a) Bribery (section 171B).

(b) Undue influence at election (section 171C).

(c) Personation at election (section 171D).

(d) False statement in connection with an election (section 171G).

(e) Illegal payments in connection with an election (section 171H).

commits the offence of bribery:

This section defines bribery at an election.

[s 171B.1.1] Bribery in Election

[s 171B.1.2] Bribery as Corrupt Practice

(1) “Bribery” that is to say,—

(b) an elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election, or as a reward to—

(ii) an elector for having voted or refrained from voting;

[s 171B.1.3] Laws of England

A person is guilty of a corrupt practice if he is guilty of bribery. A person is guilty of bribery:

The term “gratification” has been explained above.

[s 171B.3] Gratification to Individual and not to the Party

[s 171B.4] Gratification not Limited to Money

[s 171B.5] Gratification—Tests to be Applied

[s 171B.6] Making of Gift is Corrupt Practice

[s 171B.7] Contribution to Charity

[s 171B.8] What is Treating?

[s 171B.9] Proof—To be Proved as any other Offence

[s 171B.10] Illustrative Cases

3 State v Siddhannath Gangaram, AIR 1956 MB 241, p 243.

7 NP Ponnaswami v Returning Officer, AIR 1952 SC 64 [LNIND 1952 SC 2], p 69.

8 Refer to section 105 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

11 Ibid, p 155, per Walsh J.

12 Ibid, p 156, per Mears CJ.

27 Ins. by the Act 39 of 1920, section 2.

32 Re Plymouth, (1859) 2 Per & Dav 238.

33 Waterford, (1870) O M&H 25.

38 Pillai v Dangali, AIR 1942 Rang 52 , pp 54, 55.

39 SB Adityan v S Kanaswami, AIR 1958 SC 857 [LNIND 1958 SC 203] .