Pdvsa: Risk Engineering Manual

PDVSA
RISK ENGINEERING MANUAL

VOLUME 2
PDVSA N° TITULO
IR–G–01 SAFETY CRITERIA FOR THE DESIGN OF OFFSHORE

INSTALLATIONS
1 FEB.01 GENERAL REVISION 43 L. T. J.B. H.G.
0 MAY.93 APPROVED 33 J. R. L. H. C. C.
REV. FECHA DESCRIPCION PAG. REV. APROB. APROB.
APROB. Héctor Goodfellow FECHA FEB.01 APROB. Jesús Dávila FECHA FEB.01
E PDVSA, 1983 SPECIALISTS

RISK ENGINEERING MANUAL PDVSA IR–G–01
PDVSA
REVISION FECHA
SAFETY CRITERIA FOR THE DESIGN OF
OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS 1 FEB.01
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Menú Principal Indice manual Indice norma
Index
1 SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 APPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3.1 PDVSA Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3.2 International Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4 DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5 CLASSIFICATION OF PLATFORMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6 BASIC DESIGN CONCEPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.1 General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
6.2 Geographical Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.3 Inherent Safety Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.4 Equipment Layout Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
6.5 Considerations About Signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.6 Fire and Explosion Protection Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1 Equipment Location and Layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2 Automatic Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.3 Fire Protection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7.4 Safety Instrumented Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
7.5 Vents, Flare and Depressuring Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7.6 Classification of Hazardous Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7.7 Drainage System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.8 Survival System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.9 Control Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
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1 SCOPE
This document contains the basic criteria applicable to the design of installations
located offshore. Existing standards were adapted and modified for the
development of this document, and new considerations based on past experience
of the petroleum industry were also included.
This document is based in the application of the most recent techniques and
design practices for offshore installations, as well as national and international
petroleum industry experience. The requirements established by laws,
regulations, decrees, or official standards in force, shall prevail over the criteria
set forth here, except when this document indicates a more stringent criteria. The
application of the criteria defined in this document is recommended for the design
of new offshore installations, and for changes and modifications to the existing
installations, as well as for those existing installations with a level of risk
incompatible with the corporate policies and objectives established by PDVSA.
2 APPLICATIONS
The present criteria have general application to fixed offshore installations that
process, handle or store flammable, combustible, and/or toxic substances.
Onshore installations are excluded from this standard.
3 REFERENCES
3.1 PDVSA Standards
HE–251–PRT Sistemas de Drenaje
IR–C–03 Revestimiento Contra Incendio
IR–E–01 Clasificación de Areas
IR–I–01 Sistema de Detección y Alarma de Incendio
IR–I–02 Sistemas de Detección de gases Inflamables / Tóxicos
IR–M–03 Sistema de Agua Contra Incendio
IR–M–04 Sistema de Espuma Contra Incendio
IR–M–05 Sistemas Especiales de Extinción y Alarma de Incendio
IR–P–01 Sistemas de Parada de Emergencia, Bloqueo, Despresurización
y Venteo de Equipos y Plantas
IR–S–01 Filosofía de Diseño Seguro
IR–S–02 Criterios para el Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos
K–331 Instrument Power Supplies
K–336 Safety Instrumented Systems
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3.2 International Standards

3.2.1 API – American Petroleum Institute
API–RP–2G “Production Facilities on Offshore Structures”
API–RP–14C “Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation and
Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production
Platforms”
API–RP–14E “Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Offshore
Production Platforms Piping Systems”
API–RP–14F “Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical
Systems for Offshore Production Platforms”
API–RP–14G “Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on
Open Type Offshore Production Platforms”
API–RP–14J “Recommended Practice for Design and Hazard Analysis for
Offshore Production Facilities”
API–RP–520 “Recommended Practice for the Design and Installation of
Pressure Relieving Systems in Refineries” Part I and II
API–RP–521 “Guide for Pressure and Depressuring Systems”
3.2.2 NORSOK – Norsk Sokkels Konkuranseposisjon (The Competitive Standing
of the Norwegian Offshore Sector)
S–DP–001 “Technical Safety”
3.2.3 ISO – International Standard Organization
ISO–13702 “Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries – Offshore Platform
Systems – Functional Requirements and Guidelines for the
Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions – Draft”.
4 DEFINITIONS
ABANDONMENT: Process of emergency escape from the installation when one
or all of the evacuation means have failed. The onboard personnel shall have
available several access routes to get to the water, including jumping.
EVACUATION: Planned method to abandon the installation without direct entry
to the sea but to transport means that will take the personnel onshore or to a
nearby but safe installation.
PRIMARY MEANS OF ESCAPE: Fixed vertical ladders and ladders with hand
railing of metallic construction.
SECONDARY MEANS OF ESCAPE: Fixed vertical ladders and ladders with
hand railing of metallic construction or flexible portable ladders, ropes or other
satisfactory means.
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PROTECTIVE WALL: A barrier designed to support or deflect flying objects or

in free fall, prevent the flow of liquid from one area to another or limit the effect of
fires or explosions.
ATTENDED PLATFORM: Platform in which people normally stay more than
twelve hours a day.
OPEN–TYPE PLATFORM: A platform with sufficient natural ventilation to
minimize vapor accumulation.
RESCUE: Process for rescuing the injured persons or the survivors from an
accident to be transported to a safe destination.
FLARE SYSTEM: A system for discharging and incinerating gases through a
control valve and a liquid separator drum from a pressurized system to the
atmosphere during normal or abnormal operations. This discharge may be
continuous or intermittent.
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN SYSTEM: System which when activated shall
initiate the shutdown of all platform production activities and equipment, including
the closure of the emergency isolation valves. The system may be activated from
manual stations and/or automatically by fire and gas detection sensors.
SAFETY SYSTEM: An arrangement of safety equipment and emergency support
systems specially designed to carry out the platform shutdown. The system
consists of a predetermined number of shutdowns of individual processes, which
may be activated by manual control or automatically.
EMERGENCY VENTING SYSTEM: System for discharging gas through manual
or automatic activation due to the actuation of a safety valve from a pressurized
system towards the atmosphere, with the purpose of liberating abnormally high
pressures.
EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN VALVE: A valve normally open, which closes when
operated automatically or remotely, to isolate processes in emergency situations.
SUB–SEA SHUTDOWN VALVE: An automatic, normally open sub–sea valve,
installed in risers as close as possible to the platform’s first level and without
interfering with the insulation in the splash zone. The object of this valve is to
isolate flow from the risers towards the platform in case of emergency.
5 CLASSIFICATION OF PLATFORMS
CLASS 1: Platform for control and administrative uses and where there are
no facilities for handling and storage of hydrocarbon products.
The existence of a diesel tank for daily use, if its capacity does not
exceed 3780 liters (1000 gallons), should be allowed in this class
of platform.
CLASS 2: Platforms with facilities for handling, processing and storage of
hydrocarbon products, such as platforms that process or store
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gas and/or petroleum, pumping facilities, loading terminal,

metering facilities, compression stations, including respective
control buildings and workshops where necessary.
CLASS 3: Platforms that contain auxiliary equipment for the generation and
distribution of energy, water injection, fire water supply, etc.
CLASS 4: Open platforms without machinery, such as platforms with
wellheads, water injection manifold, venting supports, modules
for admission and discharge, and junction platforms.
6 BASIC DESIGN CONCEPTIONS

6.1 General Considerations
6.1.1 The contents of this document establish a base for the design of the safety system
in offshore installations. Additionally, it offers guidance for the analysis of systems
or new components that differ significantly from those covered in this document.
6.1.2 The purpose of the safety system in an offshore installation, as it is conceived in
this document, is that of protecting personnel, environment, and the installation,
from the threats to safety caused by failures in the production process. To
accomplish this, once the safety system is installed and operating, procedures
should be established to ensure its integrity and operability.
6.1.3 The release of hydrocarbons is an important factor virtually in all the events
threatening safety. Thus, the main objective of the safety system should be to
prevent the release of hydrocarbons from the process and minimize the adverse
effects of such releases. The general objectives of the safety systems are listed
as follows:
S To prevent undesirable events that could lead to a hydrocarbon release.
S To block the affected process or part there of, in order to stop the flow of
hydrocarbons to the release point.
S To contain and recover the liquid hydrocarbons and disperse in a safe manner
the gases released from the process.
S To prevent the ignition of hydrocarbons released to the atmosphere.
S To block the process in case of fire.
S To prevent a domino–effect in the installation.
6.1.4 The offshore installation and its equipment shall be designed for safe operation
and according to sound engineering practices, as established in the PDVSA
document IR–S–01 “Filosofía de Diseño Seguro”.
6.1.5 The use of Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) for the study of installations and their
processes shall determine the minimum safety requirements for the installation
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and its components. Refer to PDVSA IR–S–02 document “Criterios para el

Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos”.
6.1.6 The design features and measures that reduce the probability of a hazardous
event shall be given priority over the design or measures that reduce the
consequences of the event.
6.2 Geographical Considerations

6.2.1 The structures installed in remote locations require considerably more planning
than those located near fabrication facilities and supply points. In this respect, the
offshore production systems should be arranged to allow the utilization of
pre–fabricated equipment and systems.
6.2.2 The distance between the platform and the terminal onshore should be a
determining consideration when planning piping, pumping systems, gas
compressors, storage requirements, and facilities for wastewater. The separation
distance between platforms should be determined based on a quantitative risk
analysis (QRA). This distance shall be conditioned by the installation of greater
risk and shall be equivalent to the distance that offers a risk level within the
“minimum risk” criteria according to the risk tolerance criteria contained in the
PDVSA IR–S–02 document “Criterios para el Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos”.
In either case, the minimum distance between platforms must allow carrying out
construction tasks, maintenance, and fire fighting.
6.3 Inherent Safety Considerations

Inherently safer design eliminate or mitigate the hazard by using materials and
process conditions that are less hazardous. The most important principles of
inherent safety principles are summarized below 1:
6.3.1 Intensification
S Using small quantities of hazardous substances or eliminating them if possible
S Minimizing the need for all intermediate hazardous material storage
S Minimizing quantities of storage by assuring timely and reliable delivery
S Ensuring that pipe is routed as direct as possible to avoid unnecessary lengths
of pipe, but also minimizing potential for external impact, exposure to corrosive
environments, etc.
6.3.2 Substitution.
S Replacing a material with a less hazardous substance
6.3.3 Attenuation.
S Using less hazardous conditions or a less hazardous form of a material.
1. Kletz, T.A., An Engineer’s View of Human Error, published by the Institution of Chemical Engineers, Rugby, U
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S Selecting a process with a lower risk potential

6.3.4 Limitation of Effects.
S Design facilities that minimize the impact of a release of a hazardous material
or energy
S Storing toxic and flammable materials as far as possible from the living quarters
o reduce hazard to personnel.
S Calculating and respecting buffer zones between hazardous materials and
living quarters
S Minimizing ignition sources
6.3.5 Simplification.
S Designing facilities that make operating errors less likely.
S Reducing number of leak sources (flanges, valves, instrument connections,
etc.).
S Limiting the amount of equipment.
6.3.6 Tolerance.
S Making equipment robust and that are forgiving of errors that are made,
processes that go to bad quality, not to an uncontrolled reaction or condition.
S Designing with sufficient material corrosion properties and toughness factors.
6.4 Equipment Layout Considerations

6.4.1 The layout and planning of the production equipment in offshore structures
require the consideration of many factors to ensure safety and efficient
maintenance and operation. Some of the most important factors to be considered
are as follows:
a. The space is an important factor in the safe operation. By incrementing the
equipment density in the structure, the operation and maintenance problems are
increased. Hence, protection measures necessary to guarantee the safety of the
installation shall be considered.
b. Sufficient space shall be available around machines, tanks, vessels, and pipe
headers to allow easy access for operation and maintenance.
c. The installation may be equipped with overhead crane and lifting points for the
safe handling of equipment and materials.
d. The work areas must have good lightning and ventilation and adequate provisions
for communication between the personnel.
6.4.2 The space limitations inherent to an offshore installation are recognized, however,
the production facilities shall be distributed to obtain a safe and
contamination–free operation.
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6.4.3 Living quarters, control room and critical safety equipment shall be located in
non–hazardous areas (see 7.6 Classificatios of Hazardous Areas).
6.4.4 Risers shall be located and designed so that the consequences of accidental
releases can be minimal. External riser inlet areas shall be protected from fires
and explosions in the platform.
6.4.5 Flares or cold vents shall be located and designed so that the release of gas (flare
can be extinguished) or radiation levels does not increase the risk.
6.4.6 The piping in all areas shall be planned to minimize directional changes,
corrosion, erosion, and at the same time shall provide easy access and egress
from all functional parts on each equipment.
6.5 Considerations About Signals

6.5.1 One of the most recent policies about the signals generated by the different
systems that comprise the unit is their segregation, in terms of priority or relation
with the safety of the personnel, environment, equipment, and process. Because
of this, it is common practice in the design of the offshore installation the utilization
of dedicated conduits for transmission of the following signals: (1) control systems
(watch over the process variables), (2) protection systems (alarms, switches, etc.)
and (3) safeguarding systems (plant shutdown, process shutdown, equipment
shutdown, etc.). Additionally, some companies have the construction practice of
using different trajectories or routes for each of the conduits of the systems
mentioned before, thus minimizing the possibility that external effects (fire,
mechanical impact, etc.) may simultaneously make the complete system
unusable.
6.5.2 Based on the aforementioned issues, each new design of an offshore installation
should consider the utilization of dedicated conduits through different routes for
the signals generated by the different systems.
6.6 Fire and Explosion Protection Considerations

6.6.1 The decision on the type and degree of fire and explosion protection for an
offshore installation should be risk–based. A fire and explosion evaluation or risk
analysis shall be performed early on in the design stage to determine the
measures required to manage these hazardous events (See PDVSA document
IR–S–02 “Criterios para el Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos”). The fire and
explosion evaluation shall take the following issues into account:
a. Release and ignition probabilities
b. Release rate and release conditions
c. Type of fire (pool fire, jet fire, explosion)
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d. Degree of ventilation, congestion and confinement expected

e. Protection systems that will exist, such as emergency depressuring and
emergency shutdown.
6.6.2 Fire and gas detection systems, passive and active fire protection systems, and
explosion prevention systems shall be provided in accordance with the
requirements of the fire and explosion evaluation.
7 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA

7.1 Equipment Location and Layout
7.1.1 Offshore installations are characterized for having several limitations. Among
these limitations, the availability of space plays an important role in the design of
the installation. This situation forces in some occasions to locate process
equipment at a reasonably safe distance, where generally the prevailing criteria
is that of maintenance access and process design conditions.
7.1.2 To obtain an efficient and safe distribution in an offshore installation is important
to arrange the layout of the equipment based on the platform classification
(Section 5). Table 1 shows different arrangements for equipment placement in the
different areas and/or platforms in offshore installations.
In some cases and for different reasons (depth, inversion, etc.), it is not possible
to follow this classification strictly. Then the location and separation of equipment
and processes shall be decided by a risk analysis previous to the design of the
installation, as indicated in the PDVSA document IR–S–02 “Criterios para el
Análisis Cuantitativo de Riesgos”.
7.1.3 Following are some general considerations that must be taken into account when
designing an offshore installation:
a. It is recommended that, whenever possible, the production equipment be
arranged in groups or areas according to those established in Table 1. These
equipment groups shall be separated or protected from the rest of the facilities.
b. An adequate spacing between equipment groups is and important factor in the
development of a safe operation. However, some factors, such as the platform
design, water depth, size and extent of the hydrocarbon deposits, operation
methods, required investments, government regulations, etc. will influence the
size and number of required structures.
c. Equipment items of relatively high integrity but containing large volumes of
hydrocarbon liquids at low pressure (separator vessels) shall be separated from
equipment with high pressure (e.g., gas compression) which are the most likely
sources of jet fires.
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d. Process equipment containing large volumes of high pressure hydrocarbons shall

be located above main load bearing structures to minimize the thermal or
overpressure load on these structures during a fire/explosion scenario.
e. The different production equipment may be located in a simple structure. The
equipment production areas are not required to be adjacent to each other. In
addition to the space considerations and the separate platforms for equipment
distribution, the following must be considered: special barriers, compartments,
safety, detection and fire extinguishing equipment, forced ventilation and other
recommendations given in this document. In locations with more than one area
of production equipment, the objectives and equipment areas combinations given
in Table 1 shall be considered. The safety systems shall be designed to stop,
under abnormal conditions, the flow of fuel to a specific equipment area. The
equipment should be located such that the flow direction be as straight as
possible, minimizing directional changes. Within each equipment group, the size
and configuration shall determine the separation distance between each piece of
equipment.
f. In the determination of space for production facilities in an offshore structure the
following factors shall be considered:
1. Space for operations and operating personnel
2. Space for maintenance tasks
3. Space to provide a safety margin against potential mechanical impact
4. Space for providing isolation from ignition sources
5. Space for fire fighting
6. Space to limit the exposure to potential fires of important equipment and
auxiliary services
g. The equipment must be distributed such that properly defined walkways exist in
all areas of the platform. Two opposite exit routes from each area must be
provided where possible. Closed areas where ignition sources exist must have
at least two exits towards non–hazardous areas.
h. Piping and equipment shall be protected from external impacts such as dropped
objects, or any other impact potential identified.
i. The utility area should serve as a buffer zone between hazardous process areas
and the living quarters or emergency service areas, and the routing of
hydrocarbon piping to or through this area shall be minimized.
j. The equipment located in areas of class 4 platform (open) must be distributed
such that it allows for natural ventilation caused by the direction of the prevailing
winds. Sufficient space should be left open around the open flame equipment to
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ensure that they have adequate ventilation. Also, the equipment must be
distributed to take advantage of the prevailing winds minimizing the possibility that
hydrocarbon releases be transported towards ignition sources. Special care
should be taken when protective barriers are used, which shall be located such
that an optimum ventilation is guaranteed. Special considerations must be taken
for the ventilation of wellheads areas which should be as open as possible with
at least two open sides. The inside of the living quarters should have adequate
extraction systems to prevent accumulation of smoke and odors. For some typical
cases, criteria is presented to provide guidance in the design of similar
installations. These cases are shown in the following subsections.
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TABLA 1. GUIDELINES FOR GROUPING PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

WELLHEADS PROCESS STORAGE PROCESS EQUIPMENT PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATIVE
AREAS AREA AREAS AREA SERVICES AREA
WITHOUT WITH
FLAME OR FLAME OR
HEAT HEAT
Objective: Objective: Objective: Objective: Objective: Objective: Objective:
To minimize To minimize To minimize To minimize To minimize Safety and Minimize the
ignition and ignition ignition fuel sources fuel sources personnel effect of
fuel sources sources sources comfort. accidents
Main equipment to be located in common areas
S Wellheads S Separators S Petroleum S Boilers, S Compressors S Living quarters S Control room
tanks furnaces and
S Header S Product heaters S Process S Fire fighting S Electrical
collection pumps equipment generators
S Choke manifold equipment/
vessels S Electrical S Disposal of waste S Fire water pumps
(pressurized generators waters
and/or
atmospheric) S Air
compressors
S Gas distribution
stations S Cranes
S Pig traps
S Vessels for
water treatment
S Small petroleum
tanks (<<<100
barrels)
Auxiliary Equipment that may be located in common areas
S Lifting S Choke manifold S Pig traps S Product S Pig trap S Lifting equipment S Emergency
equipment collection generators
S Header S Gas equipment/ S Navigation S Navigation aids
S Fire fighting distribution vessels aids S Navigation aids
equipment S Lifting stations S Emergency
equipment S Fire fighting S Fire fighting generators S Living quarters
S Navigation aids S Water equipment
S Fire fighting treatment
equipment
S Fire water pumps
equipment vessels S Lifting
S Navigation aids S Lifting
equipment
equipment
S Air compressors
S Fire fighting
equipment
S Process
pumps
S Navigation
aids
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7.1.4 Embarcation Zones
In the design of embarcation zones for the transportation of personnel and

equipment in offshore installations, the prevailing meteorological and
oceanographic conditions must be considered. The winds, tides and
predominant currents may condition the location of the facilities for the personnel
transport, and thus the orientation and layout of the entire installation.
The piers and boats, ships, vessels, embarcation areas must be located in the
side of the structure that is against the wind. Cranes may be located on the
embarcation area for safe loading and unloading of equipment. Areas for the
storage of piping and voluminous materials should be located within the area
covered by the loading arm.
7.1.5 Living Quarters
The living quarters shall be protected against external fires, explosions and noise.
The ventilation systems shall be designed to maintain fresh and breathable air
and prevent ingress of flammable/toxic vapors due to an external event and vent
smoke in case of a fire within the living quarters. The escape routes shall be
rapidly accessible from the living quarters through one of the primary means of
escape. The escape routes shall be designed to minimize the heat exposure
potential and the fire sources. Living quarters are ignition sources and they shall
be isolated from fuel sources by a reasonable distance. The windows and other
openings shall be eliminated from the sides facing the adjacent production
platform.
The living quarters shall be located in non–hazardous areas, as far as possible

from the operations (drilling, production, and auxiliary systems) and its design
shall provide safety to the personnel. Walkways shall be built in the exterior sides
of the living quarters and opposite to the operational area to provide safe means
of egress and a comfortable and relaxing atmosphere during the spare time.
Auxiliary services, such as electricity generation equipment, waste water

treatment, and air conditioning may be located in the same platform as the living
quarters. The designer should ensure that all precautions are taken to control
noise and unpleasant smells so the utility of the living quarters is not adversely
affected.
The living quarters shall be designed and protected to ensure that the functions
for which they are designed (including safe haven) can be maintained during a
release or fire situation. They shall be equipped with reliable smoke detection and
alarm systems.
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7.1.6 Drilling and Wellhead Area

The location of the wellhead in a structure is dictated by several factors. The
wellheads shall be located such that they can be easily accessible for the drilling
barges, repair equipment, and where it can be provided with adequate structure
support. The wellheads shall be separated or protected from ignition sources,
fuel, machinery and other objects that can fall or slide. The area shall be separated
from processing areas in order to minimize the consequences from a blow out.
Access from two different directions shall be provided for fire fighting of a burning
blow out, or alternatively, the area shall be provided with a fire fighting system that
provides a substitute to external fire fighting. The critical activities that take place
in the wellhead area during emergencies make the need for escape routes from
this area of paramount importance.
The highest pressure found in an offshore platform is normally associated with the
production manifold. This area shall be located at a maximum distance from
required safe areas (living quarters, control room, and location of safety critical
equipment) The flow from the wellheads may be very difficult to contain or control,
therefore, the protection of the wellhead and BOP (Blow Out Preventer)
equipment such as control panels and hydraulic systems and their related signal
paths must be the first priority after personnel protection.
Further considerations regarding the location of the wellhead area:
S Avoid storage of combustible fluids.
S Facilitate access and emergency work in the wellhead area in the event of a
blow–out.
S Minimize hydrocarbon piping not connected to the well.
S Locate the wellheads as high as practical and above the main frame in order
to minimize exposure of the main frame from a wellhead fire and to facilitate
control of a blowout on the platform.
7.1.7 Riser Area
Risers may release large amounts of hydrocarbons upon a failure. Thus, they
shall be located behind main support structures or be provided with protection
structures able to resist an external impact due to ships or drifting objects.
The following protection measures shall be considered:
S Passive fire protection if there is more than one gas riser or if there is one riser
and several oil risers (this will prevent escalation).
S If pig launchers and receivers are provided, they shall be located in open,
naturally ventilated areas near the edges of the platform, with hatches directed
away from equipment and structures.
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S ESD valves shall be located in open naturally ventilated areas as close to the
sea as practical. Electric cables, pneumatic tubings and hydraulic systems
associates with this ESD valves shall be protected from explosions and fire
(fire–proofed) for a period of time sufficient to perform the shut down sequence.
7.1.8 Process Areas Without Flame or Heat Generating Equipment
The process equipment located in this area can have potential fuel sources and
should be separated or protected from the ignition sources. Process equipment
without flame or heat should not be located above or below equipment with flame
or heat without special protection.
The process vessels without flame/heat may be located closer to the wellheads
than any other equipment since the areas for both are potential fuel sources and
shall not contain ignition sources. The normal flow pattern is frequently from the
wellheads towards the process vessels without flame/heat, thus both areas shall
be located as close as possible in order to simplify the piping interconnections.
7.1.9 Hydrocarbon Storage Tanks Area
The hydrocarbon storage tanks may be potential hazards due to the liquid fuel that
they contain and the associated venting of gases. The storage tanks should be
distant or protected from the wellheads and potential ignition sources such as
vessels with flame/heat, machinery and living quarters. The petroleum storage
tanks should be located in the vicinity of the process equipment without
flame/heat, as both types of equipment represent potential fuel sources without
being potential ignition sources.
Precautions must be taken to prevent spills of liquids that may flow inside other
production equipment areas.
7.1.10 Process Areas With Flame or Heat Generating Equipment
The equipment located in process areas which generate flame/heat should be
considered as potential ignition sources, since some fuel sources will necessarily
be present. The process vessels which generate flame/heat should be distant or
protected from the wellheads, from vessels that do not generate flame/heat and
from petroleum storage tanks. If the vessels that generated flame/heat are
located in the same structure with other equipment and process vessels, the
potential ignition hazard should be minimized taking into account the precautions
addressed elsewhere in this document.
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7.1.11 Flare Boom, Flare Towers and Vents

Flare booms and flare towers shall be located and sized taking into consideration
all relevant flaring rates and wind situations to ensure that the heat radiation level
will be within acceptable limits (see API 521) at all important locations on the
platforms, with regard to operators, structures such as cranes and towers,
electrical and mechanical equipment, and piping. In general, vents and flare
systems shall be located so that the prevailing winds carry the heat or flammable
gases away from the platform.
The flare flame or hot gases shall not represent a thermal radiation hazard to
crane operators, crane structures and drill tower structures. The design of cold
vents shall take into account the consequences if the release was to ignite, and
ignition shall not represent an unacceptable risk to the operators, structures,
equipment or piping. A visible signal shall be provided for helicopter pilots to warn
of the vent discharge location.
A flare/vent study indicating the potential hazard effects on all exposed areas shall
be provided in all cases.
7.1.12 Machinery Area

The machinery that includes potential ignition and fuel sources should be distant
or protected from the wellheads, process equipment without flame/heat,
petroleum storage tanks and living quarters.
The machinery and process equipment with flame/heat are similar in type and
hazard level and may be located in areas close to each other.
7.1.13 Emergency Service Area

Areas containing equipment required during emergency conditions are defined
as emergency service areas. This equipment includes, but is not limited to,
firewater systems, emergency alarm systems, emergency generators and power
distribution systems, main control and communications equipment, emergency
ventilation equipment and equipment needed during evacuation.
The only hydrocarbon piping allowed into or through this area are the fuel supply
lines required for powering emergency equipment.
7.1.14 Layout for Simultaneous Operations

If simultaneous drilling, work over and/or production operations are planned
during the platform active life, layout arrangements to provide adequate space
for these operations need to be considered at the early planning and design
stages.
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The arrangement of production, compression and support equipment

(generators, cranes, quarters, heliport, etc.) will likely be impacted by
simultaneous operation. Workover and drilling rigs, wireline and snubbing units,
and construction equipment require considerable space. In addition, it may be
required to plan and design the space for support items such as drilling crew living
quarters, welding machines, air compressors, generators and mixing pits.
Operational procedures shall ensure an acceptable safety level of the installation
during simultaneous operation. A risk analysis should be considered for
determining which operations can occur simultaneously without posing an
unacceptable risk to personnel or the platform.
7.2 Automatic Detection

In general, the application of automatic detection systems in an offshore
installation is based on a risk analysis which makes use of the following criteria:
S Intrinsic risk level of the installation (nature of the fuel, inventory, equipment
type).
S Criticality or importance of the installation/equipment.
S Asset value and replacement time.
S Availability of personnel to act in emergencies, response time.
In general, the design of detection systems (gas and/or fire) in offshore
installations shall be based in the principles and concepts established in the
PDVSA standard IR–I–02 “Sistemas de Detección de Gases
Inflamables/Tóxicos” and IR–I–01 PDVSA “Sistemas de Detección y Alarma de
Incendio”. Modifications or additions required for the application of such
standards in offshore installations are established in the following section.
Fire and gas detection system provide continuos automatic monitoring to alert
personnel of the presence of a hazardous gas release or fire situation and allow
for automatic or manual initiation of early control actions.
For the installation of fire and gas detection systems, the platform shall be divided
into fire areas to be covered with adequate number of detectors. The following
list indicates features to be considered or required in the design of fire and gas
detection systems:
S All fire and gas detection system display and information facilities shall be
centralized and located in a continuously manned area such as the main
control room.
S The alarm presentation in the main control room shall identify the affected area
and provide indication of the level or quantity of gas.
S If toxic gas detection is required for protection of the personnel, it should be
integrated with the fire and gas detection system.
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S Faults of the detection system shall result in a failure alarm at a control room.
7.2.1 Gas Detection and Alarm Initiation
The number, location and type of gas detectors shall be determined using the
guidelines set forth in this section, and also by taking into account the following
factors:
S Potential leaks within area.
S Borders between non–hazardous and hazardous areas.
S Gas density relative to air (light or heavy gas).
S Detection principles and voting logic.
S Ventilation air flow patterns.
S Prevailing wind directions and wind speeds.
S Size of the area.
S Criticality of the area.
a. Applications
Typical guidelines for location of gas detectors in the platform are given in Table
2. In addition, and based on the platform classification established in Section 5 of
this document and depending on whether or not personnel is present permanently
in the installation, the use of gas detection systems by platform type is
recommended as follows:
1. Manned Platforms
Platform Class 1: They shall be installed in the fresh air intakes of the
pressurization and conditioning system associated with the different
environments of this platform. At least two gas detectors are recommended
per fresh air intake.
Platform Class 2: It is necessary the installation of gas detection systems
in these areas due to the possibility of accumulation of gases or flammable
vapors as this classification includes the process areas of the platform.
Platform Class 3: Gas detectors shall be installed if these platforms have
electrical distribution systems (MCC, transformers, rectifiers, etc.) or diesel
motors for the fire fighting system.
Platform Class 4: The use of gas detectors in this platform is not
recommended because the open spaces and low capacity vessels make
gas or vapor accumulation improbable.
2. Unmanned Platforms
The installation of gas detectors in platforms Class 1, 2 and 3 is
recommended and the alarms that this system generates shall be
transmitted to the supervisory center for the installation.
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b. Operational Philosophy
The interaction of the control module with systems such as (1) emergency
shutdown system, and (2) fire extinguishing system, shall depend on the
occupancy regime (routine, frequent, scheduled) in the installation. The following
criteria are recommended:
1. Manned Platforms
It is recommended that the interaction philosophy include the following
actions:
– Activation of the alarms in the control module
– Automatic activation of the emergency shutdown system for combustion
equipment (furnaces, gas generators, boilers, etc.) and fire extinguishing
system.
– Automatic activation of the emergency shutdown system for the entire
installation, fire extinguishing system, and alarms.
The designer shall select the most practical option for the installation, in
terms of the results of the risk analysis and the basic objectives of the
detection systems, which are listed below in order of importance:
– Personnel safety.
– Physical integrity and continuity of operations at the installation.
– Minimize the probability of contact between ignition sources and flammable
mixtures.
Additionally, it is recommended to establish a set point for the interaction of
the detection system with the systems mentioned above at a value of 20%
and 40% of the lower flammability limit of the substance under consideration
for alarm and for shutdown of equipment, respectively. (Refer to IR–I–01).
2. Unmanned Platforms
The gas detection system should activate the emergency shutdown system
and the fire extinguishing system in this type of platform. Additionally, a
mechanism shall be established in the system for sending or transmitting the
alarm signal (identification of the situation) to the control center.
c. Cabling and Routing
The cabling of the gas detection systems and alarms, for the electrical supply as
well as for signal transmission, should be made by means of cable conduits or
trays of the protection systems.
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7.2.2 Fire Detection and Alarm Initiation

a. Applications
Based on the main function executed in the platform being evaluated, the
selection and installation of fire detectors (smoke, heat or flame) is recommended
as per Table 2.
b. Operational Philosophy
The fire detection systems shall activate the fire prevention and extinguishing
systems according to following PDVSA standards:
S IR–M–03 “Sistema de Agua contra Incendio”
S IR–M–04 “Sistema de Espuma contra Incendio”
S IR–M–05 “Sistemas Especiales de Extinción de Incendios”
For each specific installation, the automatic activation of the emergency shutdown
system, blocking, depressuring and venting of equipment and plants shall be
evaluated in terms of the following aspects:
S Intrinsic risk level of the installation (nature of the fuel, inventory, equipment
type).
S Criticality or operational importance of the installation/equipment.
S Value of the asset and replacement time.
S Availability of personnel for acting in emergencies and response time.
The designer shall evaluate the most viable option for the relation between the
detection system and the emergency shutdown system, taking into consideration
the criteria established in sections 7.2.1.b.1 (Manned Platforms) and 7.2.1.b.2
(Unmanned Platforms).
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TABLA 2. TYPICAL APPLICATIONS OF FIRE AND GAS DETECTORS
PLATFORM MAIN FUNCTION TYPE OF DETECTOR (RECOMMENDED)

GAS HEAT SMOKE FLAME
Process Plant X (Note 11) X (Note 1) X (Note 2)
Electrical Generation Plants X (Note 3) X (Note 2)
Main Pump Stations X (Note 1) X (Note 4)
Manifolds and Wellhead Area X (Note 1) X (Note 2)
Flow Stations, Metering and Control Stations X (Note 1) X (Note 4)
Atmospheric Storage Tanks (Flammable X (Note 1) X (Note 4)
Liquids)
Control Rooms X (Note 12) X (Note 5)
Electrical Power Distribution Centers X (Note 5)
(Electrical Substations)
Motor Control Center X (Note 12) X (Note 5)
Switchgear Room X (Note 12) X (Note 5)
Laboratories X (Note 6) X (Note 7)
Warehouses and Storerooms, Depending on
Type of Materials
S Wood And Paper X X
S Plastic X
S Food X
S Metals X
S Flammable Gases and Liquids X (Note 11) X X
Workshops X (Note 12) X
Administrative Buildings And Offices X (Note 12) X (Note 8) X (Note 9)
Dining Areas and Living Quarters X (Note 12) X (Note10) X (Note 10)
Fire Pump Room with Diesel Engine X
Battery Room (Lead Acid) X (Note 13) X
NOTES FOR TABLE 2
1. Beam heat detector (pneumatic fusible tubing type or similar), over specific high risk equipment
such as exchangers batteries and pumps, valve manifolds, seals on floating roof storage tanks,
pressurized storage tanks, support structures for loading arms.
2. Ultraviolet detectors located in critical equipment such as gas turbines, compressors and open air
pumps, if recommended by the risk analysis.
3. In enclosed areas containing electrical equipment: switch room, machine rooms, raceways or
cable conduits.
4. Ultraviolet detectors covering the general area of the installation. Applicable in high risk
installations normally unmanned or partially manned and after execution of a risk analysis.
5. Ionic detectors covering the entire area, including false floors, ceilings and cable raceways. The
installation of detectors shall be considered inside enclosures for electrical/electronic equipment.
The influence of air currents shall be analyzed for the location and spacing of detectors.
6. Point heat detectors using the rate of temperature increase.
7. In areas where they will not be affected for air currents and smoke produced in the hoods.
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8. Up to 500 m2 per plant and/or more than three levels high.

9. More than 500 m2 per plant and/or more than three levels high.
10. In areas where hot meals are prepared only heat detectors of fixed temperature shall be installed.
11. Area gas detection
12. At air intakes
13. Hydrogen detector at extractor
7.3 Fire Protection Systems

7.3.1 General Considerations
There are many types of platforms and combinations of equipment installations,
reason for which the establishment of a single criteria for fire protection which
covers all the combinations is impossible. However, specific criteria can be
established for each functional area depending on the hazards and on whether
or not the area is open or enclosed. Active and passive fire protection shall be
provided such that a fire is prevented from spreading to other areas within a
determined time period and to protect load carrying structures against critical heat
loads.
7.3.2 Passive Fire Protection
Passive fire protection measures do not require any device to sense and/or
actively respond to a process variable and have very reliable mechanical design.
Examples of passive design solutions include:
S Physical separation of equipment.
S Fire walls.
S Spray–on insulating materials.
S Insulating blankets of fireproof materials.
Passive fire protection shall be provided for enclosures or essential systems
which contain equipment whose failure in a fire situation is unacceptable. The
selection of the fire protection measures shall take into account the duration of
protection required, the type of fire and the maximum allowable temperature for
the structure or equipment to be protected. The selection of the materials for
passive fire protection should consider also the environment to which it will be
exposed, maintenance and smoke generation in fire situations.
Passive protection in the form of fire proofing is commonly used in critical
structural steel and critical supports, living quarters, mustering areas and any
critical equipment (See section 7.3.7 Protection of Metallic Structures). Passive
protection must be considered to protect critical components such as separators,
risers and topside ESD valves.
The physical separation of ignition sources from fuel sources and the separation
of escape ways from potential fire radiation are important safety considerations.
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The installation of a barrier wall or a fire wall must be considered when the
designer judges there is not adequate spacing. However, barrier walls or fire walls
may prevent adequate ventilation in the area or hamper escape, and shall only
be used when it is impossible to provide adequate separation. Fire walls that may
reduce the consequence of fires and explosions, may indeed increase the
chances of an explosion due to increased confinement leading to accumulation
of gas. Typical uses of fire or barrier walls is to separate living quarters from
external fires, or to protect any section of the escape routes for a specified time,
or to separate process areas from storage tanks or wellheads from process areas.
The outer walls of the living quarters or fire walls shall be design to support the
heat flux determined by fire load calculation.
Passive fire protection shall not be the only means of fire protection because it is
normally effective only for a limited period of time, after which the protected area
is vulnerable to fire damage. The best fire protection for a platform is achieved
by a combination of passive and active fire mitigation systems.
7.3.3 Active Fire Protection
Active fire protection solutions require devices to monitor a process variable and
function to mitigate a hazard. Active fire protection is recommended on all
platforms with process equipment.
Examples of active fire mitigation systems are:
S water
S water with foaming additives
S chemical extinguishing
S combination of water, foam and chemical fire mitigation systems
S inert gas extinguishing agents for enclosed spaces.
Some fires may be controlled and extinguished effectively by isolating the fuel
source and thus preventing the fire propagation. The fuel sources may be isolated
by closure of an automatic or manual valve, by check valves, or with relief and/or
depressuring systems.
The active fire control systems in offshore platforms may use water, chemicals or
a combination of both. Many considerations influence the design of fire prevention
and control systems so the desired protection level is provided. These include the
size and complexity of the platform, the nature of the operation, the quantity and
experience of the operators to use the fire fighting equipment, the protected area,
the availability of additional fire fighting equipment not located in the platform, and
the consequences that could result from a major fire. However, an adequate
design of a fire control and extinguishing system will not comply with the overall
fire control objective if the personnel is not adequately trained and/or the fire
fighting equipment is not maintained in operable conditions.
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7.3.4 Fire Water System

The fire water systems are installed frequently in offshore installations to provide
a source of water for the cooling of equipment, to maintain the integrity of the
installation and to control and extinguish fires.
The design of the systems must be based on sound engineering practices and in
the PDVSA Standard IR–M–03 “Sistema de Agua Contra Incendio”.
The pumping capacity of the fire fighting system should be sufficient to execute
all functions required by the fire control design. In cases where personnel is
available to operate the fire fighting equipment, the discharge capacity of the
system should be sufficient for their operation without exposing the personnel to
extreme danger.
The basic components of the fire water system are the pump and motor,
distribution piping, hoses and nozzles. The fixed sprinkler systems and the
monitors are useful to protect areas which cannot be reached with the hoses or
for closed areas which may be dangerous to the personnel. The water from
sprinkler or spray nozzles systems shall cover all surfaces for the protected
equipment or piping.
In general, the design of fire water systems for offshore installations shall follow
the Standard PDVSA IR–M–03 “Sistemas de Agua Contra Incendio”, taking into
account the aspects mentioned in the following sections.
a. Water Quality
The quality of the water may be the same as in its natural source. However, in the
design and selection of the materials, the problems associated with the use of the
water and its characteristics must be considered. Water treatment may be
necessary to prevent marine growth impairing the fire water system. The most
common problems such as corrosion and abrasion may be attenuated with the
use of adequate materials in the pumping equipment, insulation in piping and
appropriate filtering systems. Special attention shall be placed to the obstruction
of the nozzles and/or sprinklers due to the water impurities. To avoid pluggage due
to scale and impurities, nozzles shall be located away from the bottom of the
header.
b. Main Piping Network
Differing from onshore installation where minimum diameters are established, the
sizing of the fire main offshore shall be the result of the corresponding hydraulic
calculation, considering as the design flow rate that is required in the section with
the highest demand in the installation. The total flow rate of the fire water system
should include the consumption of the fixed sprinklers systems plus that required
for the combined used of fixed monitors and hoses.
The piping network of the fire water system in platforms shall have sufficient
mechanisms for interconnection with the fire fighting systems of any platform if
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necessary. The fire water piping network shall have fixed monitors installed in the
interconnection bridges between platforms, as well as around the platforms
containing flammable substances, and allow the isolation from adjacent
platforms.
The distribution network shall be kept pressurized and shall consist of a network
with a main loop and corresponding branches towards the different installations.
In cases where this is not possible, a single pipe may be installed as long as the
supply of water by independent sides is guaranteed.
Special attention must be place in the location of the fire water main and the supply
of water to a module to ensure that accidents or fires cannot damage it. For
example, the fire main should not be located in the same pipe rack as hydrocarbon
piping.
c. Pumping System.
The capacity, type, pressure requirements, components and start and stop
system for the fire water pumping systems in offshore installations shall be sized,
conceived and designed according to PDVSA standard IR–M–03 “Sistema de
Agua Contra Incendio”.
In any case, the pumping system shall be installed preferable in a platform Class
1 or 3. In those cases where this is not possible, the installation of systems that
will guarantee the integrity of the pumps in case of fire shall be required, such as
fire walls to protect the pumps, water curtains, etc.
Redundant and independent pump systems shall be provided for large integrated
installations to provide full protection if a unit is unavailable due to maintenance
or break down. Each system is to have 100% capacity for the largest fire water
demand. Each pump system should have two pump units of 50% capacity each.
The shutdown of the fire water pump shall be local only.
d. Application Rate
The space limitations for the placement of equipment in offshore installation force
a decrease in the spacing between equipment, which results in more complex and
congested installations. This complexity and congestion of equipment facilitates
the propagation of fires between equipment. This consequence may be
minimized with the installation of pulverized water systems with discharge
densities in the range of 0,2 to 0,5 gpm x ft2.
Consequently, the determination of the discharge density for a specific installation
must be based on an evaluation of the complexity and degree of congestion of the
facility.
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7.3.5 Fire Fighting Foam System

In those installations where a risk analysis justifies the equipment and/or
installation protection using foam, the design requirements established in the
PDVSA standard IR–M–02 “Sistema de Espuma Contra Incendio” shall be
applied. Foaming agents are especially useful on liquid hydrocarbon pool fires.
7.3.6 Special Systems for Fire Extinguishing
The equipment and installations that must be protected with special agents such
as dry chemical powder and/or carbon dioxide, are described in the PDVSA
Standard IR–M–05 “Sistemas Especiales de Extinción de Incendios”. The design
of these systems must be based in the aforementioned standard.
Dry chemical systems are suitable for indoors or outdoors fire and can generally
be applied on most platform equipment. A major advantage of chemical systems
is that they do not rely on an external energy source to operate.
Gaseous extinguishing system such as carbon dioxide or Halon replacement
gases are suitable for electrical equipment and shall be considered for enclosed
locations such as switch gear rooms, motor control rooms and control rooms.
7.3.7 Protection of Metallic Structures
Fire proofing insulation shall be provided in offshore installations to steel
structures supporting equipment and piping, according to the PDVSA Standard
IR–C–03 “Revestimiento Contra Incendio”.
When the use of the insulation material is not practical for existing instalation, fixed
systems of pulverized water may be utilized as an alternative according to what
is specified in the PDVSA Standard IR–M–03 “Sistema de Agua Contra Incendio”.
7.3.8 Explosion Protection and Mitigation
The consequences and likelihood of an explosion may be minimized by following
design principles states. Elsewhere in this document such as maximizing
ventilation, minimizing ignition sources and minimizing congestion of equipment
and pipework. In addition, other specific design features can be incorporated into
the design to reduce explosion risks:
S Horizontal vessels orientated so the longest dimension is in the direction of the
main vent flow.
S Openings maximized, particularly in floors and ceilings if possible.
S Use of grated floors and ceilings.
S Use of release mitigation by means of water sprays and dilution.
S Design for collapse towards the less critical directions.
S Flame path minimized for most probable releases of flammable materials.
S Critical equipment/barriers and structures as strong as practicable and not
limited by the result of overpressure calculations, as the accuracy of these
models is not fully known.
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Blast relief and ventilation panels may be considered for controlling small
overpressure levels as they can provide adequate venting to allow unburnt gas
and combustion products out of a confinement before dangerously high
pressures develop. These measures are not effective for major overpressure
levels.
Blast barriers or walls may be considered to minimize the consequences of an
explosion, but generally, the avoidance of congestion and confinement in the
layout is the preferred option.
7.4 Safety Instrumented Systems

The purpose of the safety instrumented system (SIS) is to ensure safety of
platform personnel and equipment. The SIS shall bring to a safe condition
individual items of equipment, operating units, or all wells, equipments and others
process systems. See PDVSA Standard K–336.
The SIS shall be independent of and in addition to systems and equipment used
for normal operation, control and monitoring, and shall protect in case of
malfunction or maloperation of these systems and equipment.
The SIS shall cover three main levels of shutdown:
S Process shutdown (PSD)
S Emergency shutdown (ESD)
S Abandon platform shutdown (APS)
7.4.1 Process Shutdown (PSD)
The PSD should provide protection to prevent or minimize the effect of a process
equipment failure. The components of the process in a production platform
consist of the complete process from the wellhead up to the most remote
discharge point, thus, all process equipment and their functions must be identified
in order to evaluate and/or quantify the risks associated with potential process
accidents. The results (i.e.: process risks or safety integrity level: SIL 0, 1, 2 or
3) should be used to rank and prioritize safety functions needed in order to reduce
the process risk to an acceptable level.
7.4.2 Emergency Shutdown (ESD)
The ESD level is designed to initiate manually or automatically the shutdown of
all wells, equipment and other process systems. This system may include a
number of independent shutdown systems that may be activated separately. The
activation of the emergency shutdown system shall result in a halt of the platform
production activities, including the closure of the piping emergency valves.
The emergency shutdown system shall be designed to allow the continued
operation of the fire systems and the electricity generating stations when they are
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activated in an emergency, as well as depressuring and flare systems. All

emergency systems shall be kept operable after a ESD, such as fire and gas
detection, fire fighting, radio/external communication, UPS, emergency lighting,
public address system, evacuation systems. Personnel lifts and hydraulic work
platforms shall remain operable to allow escape of personnel from such
equipment in a shutdown. The design of the ESD system shall be based in the
PDVSA Standard K–336.
The emergency shutdown system provides a means for the personnel to manually
initiate the platform shutdown upon observation of an abnormal condition. Fusible
elements in the fire water piping may be integrated with the emergency shutdown
system.
The emergency shutdown systems may be activated by the following:
S Manually via ESD stations or from the control room.
S By a process shutdown system depending of the process risk level.
S or automatically by means of a gas or fire detection system.
If drilling and well servicing activities take place in the platform, special
consideration must be given to the ESD actions. It is usual to have manual
initiation of ESD action affecting drilling or well service operations, and automatic
ESD of drilling and workover operations only initiated by confirmed fire or gas in
rooms critical to these operations.
An adequately designed emergency shutdown shall detect the abnormal
condition, either operational or equipment related, and shall react isolating all
necessary components or the complete platform. Other actions such as alarm,
activation of fire extinguishing systems, and depressuring may be initiated by the
emergency shutdown systems. In any case, all actions shall depend of the
criticality level of the abnormal condition.
An effective emergency shutdown system shall include emergency boundary
isolation of the platform by providing ESD valves in incoming pipeline risers and
wellheads and in gas lift lines. In addition, subsea isolation may be necessary to
supplement risers isolation valves in order to limit the leak durations associated
with riser failure. Isolation ESD valves may also be considered in export pipelines
In some cases, it may be appropriate to have more than one level of emergency
shutdown. The highest degree ESD would leave only the emergency systems
active. The lower degree ESD would involve shutting down the process; close
riser/flow line valves and wellhead valves and switch over turbine generators from
fuel gas to diesel.
The principal objective of the emergency shutdown system is the reduction of the
consequences from accidents or hazards, in the following order:
S Personnel protection.
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S Minimization of the environmental impact.

S Protection of the plant and equipment, and maintenance of safe operations
compatible with the production requirements.
When planning and designing an emergency shutdown system, first is necessary
to determine which events could threat the human life, the environment, or the
assets. It must be possible to test the ESD logic without compromising the
platform safety or reducing the production rate. The inspection procedures that
require functional field tests or removal of components should be planned very
carefully. The location of the emergency shutdown system components must be
such that allows easy access for their testing and inspection. The preparation and
training of the personnel performing the inspections is of paramount importance
and should be conducted on a formal basis.
7.4.3 Abandon Platform Shutdown (APS)
The APS is manually operated to ensure that upon total evacuation the platform
is depressurized and electrically dead. Fire pumps, if running shall be allowed to
run empty the diesel day tank and emergency support systems with built–in power
supply (helideck perimeter lights, emergency lights) shall be left operational.
7.4.4 Emergency Shutdown Stations and APS Stations
The stations for the activation of the emergency shutdown system for a complete
shutdown of platform shall be located in:
a. Helideck
b. Exit stairs in all levels
c. Embarcation areas
d. In the center or each bridge or corridor connecting two platforms
e. Meeting point in case of emergency; muster areas such as life boat stations
and helidecks
f. Near the exit from the living quarters
g. Exit from areas with hydrocarbon piping and equipment such as wellheads,
drilling and process.
h. Along major escape routes.
i. At control points such as the control rooms, driller’s cabin, emergency
operation center, radio room.
j. Other locations as required to provide accessible stations in all areas of the
platforms.
The manual APS stations shall be distributed in strategic locations such as the:
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a. Meeting point in case of emergency (lifeboat stations, helideck, bridge

connections)
b. Main control room.
The emergency shutdown and APS stations shall be located such that they are
protected against accidental activation. The emergency shutdown system
stations and the APS stations shall be identified and the position for the activation
lever shall also be clearly identified. The manual emergency shutdown system
shall be of quick opening type without restriction that prevent swift activation. Due
to the importance of the emergency shutdown system for the platforms safety, the
associated valves materials shall have high corrosion resistance.
7.4.5 Emergency Power
The emergency power shall be supplied from a diesel engine driven emergency
generator dedicated exclusively to supply emergency power. The emergency
power shall be able to support all emergency systems for a minimum of 18 hours.
The location of the emergency generator has to be carefully chosen to prevent its
demise after a fire or explosion, at least until safe evacuation has been performed.
The design of the emergency generator should provide for automatic start and
connect on loss of main power supply, local manual start, start and monitoring
from the control room, and for black start (i.e. start without any available power).
The diesel to the emergency generator should preferably be supplied by gravity
flow, and if this is not possible, the diesel transfer pump shall be supplied from the
emergency switchboard. The automatic start of the emergency generator shall
be inhibited or the generator stopped in the event of confirmed gas detection
within the emergency generator enclosure, emergency switchgear room or at the
engine air intake.
A list of the typical safety (and operational) equipment to be provided with
emergency power is:
S Fire and gas detection systems
S Fire fighting
S ESD systems
S Telecommunications equipment
S Public address and intercom systems
S Blow down and flare
S Emergency and escape lighting
S Personnel lifts and hydraulic work platforms
S Evacuation
S Status display of critical systems in central control room
S Identification lights and navigation aids
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S Process control and data acquisition system

S PSD system
S Ventilation and cooling for all equipment within this list
In addition to emergency power, an UPS shall be supplied for essential safety
equipment, according to PDVSA standard K–331.
It is important to segregate critical emergency power cables from main power
cables to prevent that a fire associated with the main power cables will disable the
emergency power. If this segregation is not feasible, the emergency power cables
shall be fire–resistant. Critical emergency power cables shall be routed or
protected to avoid being affected by fires or explosions in hazardous areas.
Examples of critical emergency power cables are the cables between emergency
generators, emergency switchboard, UPS battery chargers/inverters, and
sub–distribution boards.
In some platforms, it may be necessary to maintain control of drilling activities
during loss of main power. The emergency power system shall allow for essential
drilling emergency equipment, such as BOP closing unit, instrument air
compression and diesel transfer pump, to remain available.
7.5 Vents, Flare and Depressuring Systems

The venting and flaring systems associated to the process equipment shall be
designed and located considering the fuel quantities to be burned or vented, the
prevailing wind direction, location of other equipment including supports, living
quarters, air intakes, approximation zone for helicopters and boats, ignition
sources, downwind platforms, drilling derricks and other elevated structures and
other factors that can affect the safe operation of the flare or the venting of process
fluids or gases.
These systems shall be located such that the venting of flammable vapors and/or
the radiation originating from a possible ignition of such vapors do not constitute
a hazard for the personnel and/or installation. In any case, the flare and vent
systems shall be designed based on the maximum discharges and PDVSA
Standard IR–P–01.
7.5.1 Vent Systems
The vent system is a gas disposal system designed to collect normal and
abnormal releases of process gases and direct them to a safe atmospheric
location. The vent system is a manual or automatic system which utilizes pressure
relief valves designed to discharge gas from a pressurized vessel or piping
system to the atmosphere. Its purpose is to relieve the excess pressure of the
vessels that are operating above their specified design pressure. The venting
system may include the vent valve or a rupture disc, the collection piping, a
gas–liquid separator and the vent stack.
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Vents shall be designed and located to prevent accidental liquid carryover from
falling on hot surfaces or vulnerable areas.
The atmospheric vent final outlet pipe shall discharge outside the perimeter of the
platform to prevent accumulation of gases. The prevailing wind direction shall
move the vented gas away from the platform.
Atmospheric venting is usually used when excessive backpressure in the flare
system does not allow for routing to flare.
Venting systems for atmospheric and pressurized gas disposal shall be separated
as atmospheric tanks are susceptible to damage from very low backpressures.
Gas disposal systems shall not contain any low points where liquids could
accumulate and block the relief passages. In addition, the auto–refrigeration
effect of high pressure gas venting needs to be considered to assess the
possibility of hydrate formation in the system.
7.5.2 Flare Systems
The flare system is a system for discharging and incinerating during normal or
abnormal conditions the gas coming from a pressurized system through a control
valve. This discharge may be continuous or intermittent. The flare system shall
include the control valve, the collection piping, the gas–liquid separator and the
gas venting. Normally, the gases discharged inside the flare system are at a low
pressure and low flow rate.
The backpressures required are not defined in all codes and operation guides,
however, the flare system shall be designed ensuring that the vessels and/or
tanks will not be overpressurized and with capacity for the maximum volume that
may be vented.
Flare systems shall be designed to prevent liquid carryover. The location of the
flare shall minimize the possibility that accidental liquid carryover will fall on the
platform or on boats or barges.
Flare radiation calculations for critical flaring conditions shall be provided early on
in the design to estimate the radiation load on all areas of the platform. This
calculations shall also account for varying wind conditions and flaring rates. A gas
dispersion calculation shall also be performed for the case when the flame is
extinguished to ensure design provides for safe dispersion of gases.
The radiation levels in open areas of the platform where personnel may be present
or where structures and equipment are exposed must comply with PDVSA
permissible limits or international codes such as API RP 521. The following
guidelines shall apply:
S Heat loads on steel or aluminum structures shall not give temperatures that
results in loss of structural integrity.
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S Heat loads on wires in drill tower and cranes shall be limited depending on type
of lubrication and inspection /replacement frequency.
S Flare radiation shall not cause in hazardous areas temperatures above 200 _C
or above the ignition temperature of the actual gas, whichever is the lowest.
S Heat loads on rated electrical equipment and instrumentation shall not give
temperatures exceeding 40 _C.
S In helidecks, the maximum radiation allowed to perform the necessary
helicopter operations is 1.9 kW/m2.
Local radiation shields may be provided as a last resource to protect personnel,
equipment and structures when radiation levels are deemed excessive, but
always taking into consideration that extra confinement and congestion may
increase the chances of an explosion in case of a gas release.
7.5.3 Depressuring Systems
Depressuring or blowdown systems minimize or eliminate the quantity of

pressurized gaseous sources present in the process during an emergency
situation by rapidly discharging the pressurized gas (manually or automatically)
within a venting system or to a flare. Automatic systems are preferred if a delay
in initiating the blowdown presents a significant risk to personnel or platform. In
these cases, a blowdown cancel feature may be acceptable for cases when
operator decides that depressuring is unnecessary.
An automatic depressuring system shall be provided for pressurized vessels and

piping segments during an emergency shutdown, if they can contain more than
one ton of produced hydrocarbons. For gas systems, the maximum containment
shall be less than one ton (NORSOK).
Depressuring systems are required in addition to pressure relief facilities because

of the loss of material strength during a fire. Depressuring reduces pressure
induced stresses in a vessel that has been weakened due to exposure to extreme
heat.
Depressuring systems reduce the release rate from failures in liquid filled parts
of the system by decreasing the system pressure and also reduce the duration
of jet fires.
Depressuring systems may also be required for systems unable to contain the
hazardous substances by passive means alone. The loss of active containment
mechanisms will require depressurization to prevent escape of the substances
such as in the case of loss of the seal oil in a centrifugal compressor.
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A risk analysis taking into account the location of the equipment, the risk of it being
exposed to fire, the consequence of the rupture and any active or passive fire
protection available, should be performed in order to justify not providing a
depressuring system when required based on maximum containment during shut
down. Also, the benefits of depressuring systems need to be weighted against
the discharge of large volumes of gas in a short period of time during an
emergency condition, which may result in unacceptable high levels of radiation
or flammable or toxic gas. A sequence blowdown may be considered to limit peak
flowrates in vent or flare system. In this case, a failure of the timer should be
considered in the design of the depressuring system to ensure its adequacy.
7.6 Classification of Hazardous Areas

The classification of hazardous areas for the selection and installation of electrical
equipment in offshore platforms shall be based in the principles and concepts
established in the PDVSA Standard IR–E–01 “Clasificación de Áreas”. This
classification into hazardous and non–hazardous areas is intended to minimize
the probability of ignition by electrical equipment if a release occurs. As an
inherent safety precaution, consideration shall be given to minimize the amount
of electrical equipment installed in hazardous areas.
The classification of hazardous areas shall be based on situations associated to
routine platform operations such as continuous or periodic venting, evaporation
from open handling systems, small leaks from flanges and gaskets, escape of
flammable materials during maintenance or work–over. Major releases such as
vessel or pipe failure should not be use for upgrading the classification of a specific
area. These catastrophic events, however, will form part of the risk analysis, and
depending on the analysis results more stringent requirements on the
arrangement and design of the affected equipment may be appropriate.
Due to the nature of the offshore installations, there are some issues in this
standard which are not tacitly applicable to these installations. The modifications
or additions required for the correct application of such standard to the design of
offshore installations is established below:
S In platforms handling gas or crude, continuous ignition sources, either
electrical or other types, shall not be permitted unless these are located in air
tight sealed containers or in pressurized enclosures.
S In the auxiliary platforms, the production facilities that constitute ignition
sources in open places (such as emergency diesel engines, turbine systems,
etc.) shall be located in the platform’s second level at least 8 meters above the
highest elevation of the production header and from the emergency shutdown
system located in the first level of the auxiliary platform. If these indications are
followed, such areas need not be electrically classified.
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S The living quarters shall not be electrically classified, since the air intakes for
the pressurization or ventilation system come from a non–classified location.
S The helidecks and embarcation areas shall be located in non–classified areas.
The diesel (and gas) engines shall be located in non–hazardous areas since they
may provide a source of ignition for flammable gas releases and also may create
an overspeeding hazard through ingestion of flammable gas. Diesel engines for
essential safety systems should be provided with protection such that the diesel
engine can continue to operate even if gas is present in area during an
emergency. These protections may include isolation of electrical components,
overspeed protection and/or cooling of hot surfaces.
7.7 Drainage System

The drainage system shall be designed for the collection and disposal of
contaminants from all sources. A good drainage system prevents spills from
contaminating the water, and prevents the accumulation of flammable liquids in
the bridges or embarcation areas and promotes good housekeeping practice.
The drainage system and sumps shall be considered as an integral part of the
process design. Precautions shall be taken to minimize drainage points using
vertical vessels with bottoms liquid outlets wherever possible.
For the design of drainage systems in offshore installations, the PDVSA standard
HE–251–PRT “Sistemas de Drenaje” shall apply, taking into consideration the
aspects mentioned in 7.7.1 and 7.7.2.
7.7.1 Pressurized Drains
Closed and pressurized drainage systems create possible safety risks because
of a) the piping complexity, b) they provide possible means for level losses in a
vessel and may cause hazardous pressure waves and c) they connect vessels
with different working or design pressure.
When closed and/or pressurized drains are used in pressurized vessels, these
shall have the drain piping connected to the final disposal facility and shall be
independent from the gravity systems to prevent entry of fluids from the
pressurized drains to the gravity drains.
The design pressure of the interconnecting piping and drain valves in each
component or equipment shall correspond to the highest working pressure of the
components in the system. A closed drain system shall be provided for hydrogen
sulfide (H2S) service to allow the safe disposal of such streams.
7.7.2 Gravity Drains
The embarkation areas and fluid collection drums are usually gravity drained
towards the final disposal facility. A wide variety of materials may be satisfactorily
utilized for this service. Even if steel piping is not satisfactory for use in
hydrocarbons service, it may be used for gravity drains.
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The piping bends and flow restrictions shall be minimized in a gravity system. The
piping shall be installed with a negative gradient in the order of 1/8 inches per foot.
In some cases it may be necessary to install the piping in a horizontal manner, but
never with a positive slope.
Cleaning and purge connection shall also be provided in the drainage system.
Since liquid hydrocarbons may contain hydrocarbon gases, the gravity drain
systems shall include liquid seals to prevent gas from the sump from migrating into
the drain system. Buildings or enclosures shall not be located on top of drain
openings as gas may migrate throughout the drain piping into these spaces.
Similarly, the drainage system shall be designed to prevent burning fuel from
migrating to other areas. Special attention shall be given to minimizing the
probability of burning fuel spreading to the sea level where it can adversely affect
the integrity of the platform support structure and hinder evacuation.
Hazardous and non–hazardous open drains shall be separate with no
interconnections. The design of the drainage system shall limit the maximum
horizontal spread of the spill
In many instances, the release of liquid hydrocarbons may be associated to a fire
situation. In light of this, the capacity of the drainage system should be sufficient
to handle credible spills simultaneously with deluge system or fire fighting
activities.
The drainage system on the helideck should be designed for quick removal of
aviation fuel spills from the vicinity of the aircraft and without impairing escape
routes.
7.8 Survival System

The analysis of past events in which have occurred in offshore installations (Piper
Alpha) have shown that human behavioral patterns play an important role in the
effectiveness of the evacuation system. Similarly, these analysis have
demonstrated the need for taking human behavior into consideration in the design
of evacuation systems in offshore installation.
The emergency plans must be developed to deal with any abnormal situation in
the platform. This plan must be identified and shall define in sequential order the
persons in charge of controlling the emergency, as well as the responsibilities of
the emergency responders. Additionally, the plan shall define the communication
systems to be utilized during the emergency.
Similarly an escape plan shall be developed so the platform can be abandoned
in a safe manner. This plan must address the identification of the abandonment
signal, the location of primary and secondary means of escape and of the escape
walkways.
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Copy of these plans must be located in sites visible and accessible to all
personnel.
All platforms shall be provided with sufficient means of escape so the personnel
can escape or exit in a safe manner in case of fire or other emergencies.
The means of escape shall be located and arranged to facilitate the access by all
personnel. When there is more than one primary means of escape in the
platforms, at least two of them shall be located in opposite sides, arranged and
constructed to minimize the possibility that both can be blocked in case of fire or
emergency. When only one primary means of escape, and one or more
secondary means, at least one of the secondary means shall be located at the
opposite side and distant from the primary means of escape. Similarly, they must
be arranged and constructed to minimize the possibility that both can be blocked
in case of fire or other emergency condition.
All the platforms shall be provided with sufficient walkways so all personnel can
escape from the fire area or from the emergency condition and go to the means
of escape.
The walkways shall be distributed and maintained to provide adequate clearance
and be accessible to the platform personnel, and they shall be constructed and
distributed to allow escape in two different directions.
7.8.1 Alarm Systems
An alarm system, as well as a public address and communication system shall be
provided for all manned platforms to quickly warn and direct personnel during an
emergency situation.
In every manned offshore platform, audible alarms shall be installed in all areas.
The alarm shall be capable of sounding intermittently to indicate an emergency
situation and continuously to indicate a situation that requires platform
abandonment. In areas of high noise, a visual alarm signal shall also be provided.
In embarcations areas as well as helidecks a visual alarm signal shall be provided.
The alarm signals may be activated automatically by sensors detecting heat,
flame, smoke or gas; or manually by push buttons strategically located in the
different levels of the platform.
Location, number, type and effect of alarm systems and signals shall promote
easy identification of the alarm signal in the required areas.
After an audible alarm, an announcement on the public address systems is
required. Typically, for muster, general and toxic gas alarm conditions, the
personnel shall stop all work, follow the instructions given over the public address
system and carry out their emergency response duties. Personnel without
emergency response duties shall report to the mustering area immediately unless
other wise instructed.
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A typical alarm system is suggested in Table 3. (NORSOK Standard

S–DP–00102). It shall be noted that an emergency response program shall be
in place for any platform, and it shall include training and regular drills and alarm
testing so they can be easily recognized by the personnel if a real emergency
arises. The emergency training shall familiarize personnel with the emergency
alarms, escape devices, and their specific emergency and evacuation duties
TABLA 3. TYPICAL ALARM SYSTEM IN A MANNED OFFHSHORE PLATFORM

(NORSOK STANDARD S–DP–00102)
ALARM TYPE SIGNAL INDICATES

Muster alarm Continuous audible signal. Yellow Prepare to abandon
flashing or rotating visual lamp. installation.
General alarm Intermittent audible signal (1 second on, Fire, or fire related
1 second off). Yellow flashing or situations, gas leak or
rotating visual lamp. other serious situations.
Toxic Gas Alarm Note 1 Intermittent audible signal (0.1 second Toxic gas, e.g. H2S
on, 0.1 sec. off). Yellow flashing or
rotating visual lamp.
Local alarm in rooms Local red light at entrance. Local high Gas released. Note 2.
protected by CO2 or other frequency tone in room/area and in
gases with lethal adjacent room/area providing access.
concentrations
Inert gas protected Local red light at entrance. Gas released. Note 2.
rooms/areas
Local alarm on loss of Local white flashing or rotating visual Pressurization lost in room
pressurization lamp. Announcement by public address
system.
Alert Two level audible tone on public Important announcement
address system. to follow on public address
system
NOTES:
1. At small local occurrences, local alarm may suffice.
2. Pre warning before release required in inert gas protected rooms
7.8.2 Meeting Point in Case of Emergencies
In the design of offshore installations, one or more meeting points shall be
equipped and signalized for emergency situations. These meeting points shall be
located in the safest areas of the installation such as:
a. The control room if it is separated from the process area. The meeting point shall
not be located in the same place where the control panels are located to avoid
interference with the emergency control operations.
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b. Helidecks or embarcation areas.

c. Any platform Class 1 or 3.
7.8.3 Escape Ways and Evacuation Means
To guarantee the safety during evacuation, escape, and rescue, the offshore
installations shall be designed, equipped and organized to provide safe means of
evacuation for all personnel in the installation during the widest range of
circumstances. The evacuation means shall always be available for immediate
use. The requirements for a safe evacuation, escape and rescue are presented
as follows:
a. Escape Routes
The offshore installations shall be provided with escape routes from each
regularly manned area and they shall be designed to be kept passable with no
obstructions in case of emergency and allow escape at least in two opposite
directions. Escape routes shall have an emergency lighting systems and
adequate signaling to direct all personnel located in the different areas of the
installation towards safe areas or the evacuation means.
A variety of descent means towards the water shall be available in the installation.
The type, quantity and location of these means shall be specified in the design and
shall at least include stairways and ladders and personnel gear for descending
with rope.
Ladders towards the water should be installed in all corners of the platform and
shall be designed to support the effect of waves and other adverse conditions.
The following criteria, taken directly from NORSOK Standard S–DP–00102,
applies in the design of escape routes:
S The dimension of escape routes shall be minimum 1m width (0.9m for doors)
and 2.1m in height (2.005mm for doors). Escape routes intended for use by
more than 50 persons shall be extended to 1.5m (1.2m for doors) in width and
2.2m in height. All escape routes shall allow for means of evacuating personnel
in stretchers and must be free of obstructions.
S There shall be at least two exits to escape routes from every regularly manned
area outside quarters and offices, leading in different escape directions. Also,
the escape exits from a location shall be located so that it would be unlikely that
a single event would block both paths.
S The escape route network shall lead to safe areas and facilities as follows:
– Living quarters
– Temporary mustering (if available).
– Life boats and life rafts–stations.
– Boat landings (not normally manned installations)
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– Helideck.
– Flotel or other installations linked by bridge/walk way.
S Primary escape paths shall be located along the outer edge of the platform to
reduce smoke exposure.
S Escape routes shall preferably be part of the daily used transport and
passageways. Where appropriate, main escape routes shall be provided on
the outside along the periphery of the installation.
S Doors shall normally open in the direction of the escape routes, but shall not
block the outside escape route. Opening of doors should not require electric,
hydraulic or pneumatic power. If such power is required the power supply shall
be local.
S Any dining room or recreation room in the living quarter where more than 15
persons may be assembled shall have at least two exit doors. Internal room
arrangement shall be evaluated for possible blockage of exits following an
accident as well as external blockage. For all areas where there is a risk of
congestion and panic, the doors shall be provided with panic bars.
S All living quarters shall be provided with at least one path of escape to the sea
as well as two independent paths of escape. Walkways on the exterior sides
of the living quarters opposite to the operation area enhance safe egress from
the building.
S Escape routes leading to a higher or lower level shall be provided by stairways.
The number of these stairways shall be assessed based on the platform size,
configuration of areas and equipment layout. Vertical ladders can be used in
areas where the work is of such a nature that only a few persons (max. 3) are
in the area on short time basis.
S It shall be possible to escape from a drilling area without running through a
wellhead area.
S A dead end corridor of more than 5 meters length is not acceptable. Stairways
included in escape routes shall be designed to allow for transport of injured
personnel on stretcher.
S Escape routes and emergency stations shall be illuminated. Escape routes
shall be provided with adequate emergency lighting. Emergency stations
should have minimum 15 lux, escape routes minimum 4 lux.
S Escape routes in all areas outside the living quarters shall be marked by yellow
painting on the floor.
S The escape routes within the living quarter shall be provided with low level
directional lighting, showing correct escape direction. Other enclosed and
regularly manned utility and process areas shall be considered separately.
S Escape routes shall be arranged from the drill floor to adjacent modules and
also down the substructure. Protection of these escape routes from radiation
heat shall be considered.
PDVSA
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If escape to the sea is difficult, the evacuation philosophy may include a temporary
mustering area. The designated temporary mustering area should be designed
to withstand the worst case fire or explosion scenario. All mustering areas shall
have at least two independent paths to the sea, and evacuation and survival gear
for all personnel shall be available at these locations.
b. Evacuation Means
The evacuation means which depend on the external conditions do not provide
safety under all circumstances. Therefore, offshore installations shall be provided
by other primary evacuation systems which shall be controlled from the
installation and do not depend on external intervention. They shall have sufficient
capacity to guarantee the complete evacuation of all personnel in a wide range
of possible emergencies. These evacuation systems may consist of totally
encapsulated, self propelled vessels (also called escape chutes). If for any
reason these primary systems are partially or totally unavailable, alternate
descent means to the water and means to rescue personnel from the water, within
a wide range of climatic conditions shall be provided. Appropriate survival
equipment shall be provided for all personnel onboard. The above mentioned
shall be based on a risk analysis.
Safety evaluations shall be performed to cover all aspects of personnel protection
in case of emergency. The evacuation, escape and rescue process shall be
evaluated to develop and revise the facility emergency plans.
The selection of the equipment that constitutes the evacuation systems shall be
based in a systematic analysis and shall be the equipment that is better adapted
for the installation. The systematic analysis shall cover the formal command
structure, helicopters, totally encapsulated, self–propelled vessels, life rafts and
other escape means towards the waters, available boats and other means for
rapid rescue of the escape equipment and survivors.
The helicopters shall be the preferred evacuation means from the offshore
installations as a precautionary measure in those cases in which helicopters can
be utilized during the development of the emergency. For these reason the use
of helicopters and the associated facilities shall be considered in the design of
offshore installations.
The helidecks shall be designed complying with the international standards for
civil aeronautics in offshore installations. Emphasis shall be made on the fire
fighting and extinguishing systems. Additionally, the access means to the
helicopter shall consist of safe ways for personnel so they can arrive easily to the
helideck from any point in the installation.
The quantity and location of these evacuation means shall be determined based
on a safety analysis, considering that they all be easily accessible from any area
of the platform.
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If there is an independent platform for the control room, this shall be the meeting
point in case of emergency.
The availability, type and characteristics of backup rafts for rescue in the water
shall be studied during the development of the emergency plan.
7.8.4 Survival Equipment
Each offshore installation shall be provided with the survival equipment
mentioned below. The quantity of personal survival equipment shall be sufficient
for the maximum number of personnel on the platform at one time, including
visitors:
1. Life jackets
2. Smoke masks with single filter to provide protection for at least 10 minutes,
during the escape.
3. Flashlights
4. Fire proof gloves
5. Self contained breathing apparatus
6. First aid kit
7. Equipment for transporting injured personnel
8. Fire fighting equipment
9. H2S detection equipment where required
10. Storage bins for the life jackets
The quantity and location of these equipment shall be determined based on an
analysis in each particular platform. In any case, the lifesaving vests shall be
provided to each individual for continuous use, whereas an additional quantity of
lifesaving ring shall be provided in strategically located points.
7.9 Control Room

7.9.1 Due to the space limitations and congestion in offshore installation, the location
of the control room is of vital importance since it represents the operations control
center and shall remain in operation in case of an undesirable event.
7.9.2 In the design of offshore installations, the control room shall be installed in an
independent platform and at a distance that allows its operation in case of an
undesirable event. The separation of the platform where the control room is
located with respect to the process platform shall be determined by a risk analysis
as indicated in the PDVSA Standard IR–S–02 “Criterios para el Análisis
Cuantitativo de Riesgos”.
PDVSA
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7.9.3 The design of the control room shall be based in principles and concepts
established in the PDVSA Standard IR–C–02 “Diseño de Edificios de Control”,
introducing the modifications and/or additions required by the nature of the
installation. These modifications or additions are as stated below:
a. The platform where the control room is located shall be placed upwind to prevent
that releases of flammable and/or toxic gases travel towards the control room.
b. Due to the weight limitations, the control room in offshore installations shall be of
normal construction but using non combustible building materials.
c. The design of the control room shall be such that the side adjacent to the operation
platform has the smallest possible area.
d. The use of windows in the control room shall not be allowed, and if for any reason
a window must be installed, the material strength shall be equal to that of the walls.
e. The air conditioning systems shall not allow the entry of flammable and/or toxic
gases, smoke, etc., inside the room.
f. Two emergency exits shall be provided in opposite sides and exiting to a safe
area.
g. If due to space or design conditions the control room is located in the production
platform, a positive pressure (pressurization) shall be maintained inside the
control room to prevent the entry of gases and smoke through main and
emergency doors. Special care must be taken regarding the suction location for
the pressurization equipment and air conditioning to guarantee the suction of
fresh air. If the operational and design conditions warrant it, gas detectors shall
be placed in this area.

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PDVSA

RISK ENGINEERING MANUAL

IR–G–01 SAFETY CRITERIA FOR THE DESIGN OF OFFSHORE

1 FEB.01 GENERAL REVISION 43 L. T. J.B. H.G.

REV. FECHA DESCRIPCION PAG. REV. APROB. APROB.

E PDVSA, 1983 SPECIALISTS

3.2 International Standards

PROTECTIVE WALL: A barrier designed to support or deflect flying objects or

gas and/or petroleum, pumping facilities, loading terminal,

6 BASIC DESIGN CONCEPTIONS

and its components. Refer to PDVSA IR–S–02 document “Criterios para el

6.2 Geographical Considerations

6.3 Inherent Safety Considerations

S Selecting a process with a lower risk potential

6.4 Equipment Layout Considerations

6.5 Considerations About Signals

6.6 Fire and Explosion Protection Considerations

d. Degree of ventilation, congestion and confinement expected

7 GENERAL DESIGN CRITERIA

d. Process equipment containing large volumes of high pressure hydrocarbons shall

TABLA 1. GUIDELINES FOR GROUPING PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT

7.1.4 Embarcation Zones

In the design of embarcation zones for the transportation of personnel and

7.1.5 Living Quarters

The living quarters shall be located in non–hazardous areas, as far as possible

Auxiliary services, such as electricity generation equipment, waste water

7.1.6 Drilling and Wellhead Area

7.1.11 Flare Boom, Flare Towers and Vents

7.1.12 Machinery Area

7.1.13 Emergency Service Area

7.1.14 Layout for Simultaneous Operations

The arrangement of production, compression and support equipment

7.2 Automatic Detection

7.2.2 Fire Detection and Alarm Initiation

TABLA 2. TYPICAL APPLICATIONS OF FIRE AND GAS DETECTORS

PLATFORM MAIN FUNCTION TYPE OF DETECTOR (RECOMMENDED)

8. Up to 500 m2 per plant and/or more than three levels high.

7.3 Fire Protection Systems

7.3.4 Fire Water System

The shutdown of the fire water pump shall be local only.

7.3.5 Fire Fighting Foam System

7.4 Safety Instrumented Systems

activated in an emergency, as well as depressuring and flare systems. All

S Minimization of the environmental impact.

a. Meeting point in case of emergency (lifeboat stations, helideck, bridge

S Process control and data acquisition system

7.5 Vents, Flare and Depressuring Systems

7.5.3 Depressuring Systems

Depressuring or blowdown systems minimize or eliminate the quantity of

An automatic depressuring system shall be provided for pressurized vessels and

Depressuring systems are required in addition to pressure relief facilities because

7.6 Classification of Hazardous Areas

7.7 Drainage System

7.8 Survival System

A typical alarm system is suggested in Table 3. (NORSOK Standard

TABLA 3. TYPICAL ALARM SYSTEM IN A MANNED OFFHSHORE PLATFORM

ALARM TYPE SIGNAL INDICATES

b. Helidecks or embarcation areas.

7.9 Control Room

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