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I
NWASIKE, Dominic Azikiwe, 1943- \
MEXICO-CITY TOWN GOVERNMENT 1590-1650: i
r STUDY IN ALDERMANIC BACKGROUND AND PERFORMANCE !

The University of Wisconsin, Ph.D., 1972

History, general

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UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS
 MEXICO CITY TOWN GOVERNMENT 1590-1650:

A STUDY IN AIDERMANIC BACKGROUND AND PERFORMANCE

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of

the University of Wisconsin in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy.

by

Dominic^Nwasike

Degree to be awarded
January 19—

June 19—

August 19—
To Professors: Phelan

Smith

Lovejoy

This thesis having been approved in respect

to form and meohanioal execution is referred to

you for judgment upon its substan merit

Dean

Approved as satisfying in substance the

doctoral thesis requirement of the University of

Wisconsin.
ji
w /TtBii or Professor

I L

May 23 _ 72
Date of Examination, 19
 MEXICO-CITY TOWN GOVERNMENT 1590-1650:
STUDY IN ALDERMANIC BACKGROUND AND PERFORMANCE

by

DOMINIC AZIKIWE NWASIKE

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OP PHILOSOPHY
(History)

at the
UNIVERSITY OP WISCONSIN

1972
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My gratitude goes to the Rockefeller Foundation

whose five year grant made this study possible.
My thanks to the staff of the following archives
for all their help in locating documents during my
research visit: Archivo de la Nacion, Archivo de La
Antiguo Ayuntamiento and Archivo de Notorias in Mexico
City; and Archivo de Indias in Seville.
A special gratitude to the Colegio de Mexico for
letting me use their facilities during my visit to
Mexico. My thanks also to Enrique Floriscano and Luis
Gonzalez for their help while I was in Mexico,
My appreciation to my advisor John L. Phelan
whose guidance, assistance and criticisms were most
helpful.
A special thanks to Linda Feuer whose moral
support I found indispensable.

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND . 13
II. THE FAMILY BACKGROUND OF ALDERMEN ...... 48
III. THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 75
IV. MUNICIPAL ROLL-CALL ANALYSIS:
ISSUES AND OPINIONS ... 99
V. THE COUNCIL AND SOCIAL GROUPS:
THE URBAN WORKER 123
VI. THE NON-WHITE MAJORITY AND THEIR
EMPLOYERS . , 149
VII, ALDERMEN AS REGULATORS: GRAIN
STORAGE AND PRICE FIXING 172
CONCLUSION 195
BIBLIOGRAPHY 200
GLOSSARY 207
APPENDIX . 210

iii
 Introduction

A monographic study of municipal government,

especially in Mexico, has been long overdue. Published
studies to date have been too general and too institution­
alized. The ideological framework behind such an assertion is
simply that in the final analysis people are more important
then the institutions they create or utilize. It is my
ardent hope that a study aimed at looking at the people
behind Mexico City municipal government in sociol-economic
and familial terms will aid to a better understanding of
this very important arm of Spanish Colonialism.
Studies in modern municipal government administra­
tion are important not just for the role being played today
by urban centers in the social and economic life of any
country, but more importantly, for the political importance
of such urban centers. Such importance is underlined by
the astuteness with which politicians court city bosses.
But if the study of modern metropolises is important for
the politics as well as the role played by urban centers in
a nation's overall development, the study of colonial
municipal governments takes on an added significance.
All through Latin America, such municipal govern­
ments represented the principal source of power and patronage
for restless Creoles. In a sense they acted as safety
 2

valves for the discriminating practice in office holding in

Iberian colonial policy. In a very loose sense municipal
councils began and ended colonialism. They acted as first
seats of local and royal authority as soon as conquest was
consumated. From Cuba to Mexico City the case was the
same—municipal councils got established before the plan of
the city was thought of. The council not only apportioned
lands, but laws for the utilization of such lands.
After the colony had been created, it was the
council that acted as "protectors" of American-born
Spaniards in opposition^to "Spanish" interests. During
the independence period the councils became first
centers of resistance to the "marriage of inconvenience"
that had lasted for nearly three centuries. Town govern­
ments transcended the sense of Spanish Colonialism itself
as their position was not just the antithesis but curiously
enough an extension of the Spanish patrimonial state at
least in an institutional sense.
In essence, this will be a study in people, in
their backgrounds, their economic interests, their family
and political backgrounds and their ideological outlook.
More importantly, an attempt will be made to show if such
background was more important than the idea of the council
as an institution in reaching agreements within the council.
Thus, an effort will be made in the early chapters
to establish the socio-economic and ideological qualities
 3

of each member. Such an approach will be through showing

the type of economic activities outside of the council in
which each person is involved. The assumption here is that
if the majority of members are land holders, such economic
interests may be reflected in the performance of their
duties. Furthermore, such an approach will help to show
what types of groups occupied council posts.
Besides, it will not be sufficient to show that
council members came from the upper cadres of society. It
will be interesting to show from what group economically and
socially. Thus, for example, an attempt will be made to
show if members made their wealth from land, mining,
commerce or inheritance. The point about inheritance is
particularly interesting from another point of view. Argu­
ments about the closedness of the council often cite nepotism
as one of the reasons. What was uppermost in the minds of
aldermen while considering specific legislations? Did
their stand on given issues depend on their personal
interests, family backgrounds, social backgrounds or on
their economic backgrounds? Furthermore, did they vote on
specific issues because of the nature of the issues or was
places of origin of aldermen more important?
More importantly, were aldermen interested in
projecting their own personal views arising out of their
socio-economic background or were they more interested in
projecting a collective view of the members as representing
 4

an institution—the municipal council? The assumption is

that if the latter was found to be true, it will then be
rewarding to analyze the council's legislations for the
various socio-economic groups in the society.
Such an approach will include an analysis of the
legislations for gremios (representing urban poor), analysis
of council price fixing policies (aimed at the whole society),
council relation to Blacks and Indians (representing the
non-white majority).
The thesis is therefore in three parts. Part One
deals with the background of the aldermen, while Part Two
is an. analysis of their stand on various roll-calls. It is
anticipated that the index of agreement on issues will be
high among the aldermen. If this is the case, the idea of
the municipal council as an institution was more important
than the backgrounds of the members. The third section of
the thesis will therefore deal with the various legislations
passed by the council as an institution for the ordering of
the whole society.
Some of the variables that will be used in the
determination of the background of the aldermen will include
the regional origin of aldermen—were they born in Spain or
in America? How did they obtain their aldermanic seats?
Was it through purchase or inheritance. Finally, how many
were young and how many were old?
 5

.The assumption in the second section of this work

is that it will be possible to find a correlation or lack
of it between background and performance. The problem
anticipated in such an approach will be that of using modern
economic and societal norms to equate 17th Century America.
Such a problem, I feel, will be overcome by analyzing
council legislations within an overall framework of the
ideology behind Spanish administrative bureaucracy. It will
not be sufficient to look at council laws without asking
questions why it is that way. The idea of the disparity
between theory and practice, between the law and its
observance in the Spanish system is very pertinent. It
would not be wise to look at the strictness of these legis­
lations and their frequency without asking why. Neither
will it be sufficient to explain them away as councilors
being uninterested in economic development. Any explanation,
I think, must include relationship of the Cabildo viz-a-viz
the Spanish bureaucracy.
In this chapter, therefore, I will trace the history
of the various regulations for urban guilds, show how
frequently they occurred, as well as analyze representative
legislations. Although local government was not directly
concerned with regulations for haciendas, estancias and
ganados, they still had an element of control in such
activities through the mesta and through the buying of meat
for the city.
 6

It is hoped such comparison will throw into greater

relief council economic ideology. Did their action equate
17th Century economic beliefs? Were they primarily
interested in the betterment of the society viz-a-viz
Spain? Or were they only interested in maintaining the
status quo? By extension, were their actions guided by
self-interest? A corollary will be to see how involved the
council was in the gremios. In short, was there any
evidence of patron-client relationship (involving councilors)
in the craft guilds? If so, how did this affect their
performance?
H. J. Hobsbawn in Primitive Rebels argues that in
all "primitive societies" (he defines primitive as societies
in the steps before industrialization), there was an
unwritten contract between the rulers and the ruled whereby
the ruled maintained their patience and obedience as long as
the rulers provide a plentiful supply of staples at reasonable
prices. As long as the bargain were kept the crowd in the
cities was not apt to riot. But with scarcity either from
famine or natural causes, the unwritten law ceases to
function and the city poor therefore has the right to riot
for better conditions.
Such a thesis will be the starting point for an
analysis of muncipal government price-fixing and price-
regulation policies in the 17th Century. The numerous
legislations, Alhondigas and Positos, fixing prices,
 7

prohibiting resales, et cetera, will be explored. The

important position occupied by the granary and the priced-
regulating Posito will be dealt with. The effort will be
to see how effective these mechanisms were. An attempt
will also be made to see how applicable the Hobsbawnian
theory (which he found to be true for Europe) is to
Mexican conditions.
While councillors may have legislated in an off­
handed manner for gremios, they could not afford to do so
in the matter of supplying the city with food staples. The
two 17th Century Mexico City riots become particularly
important. They both occurred at points of grain scarcity
and rising prices. While councillors therefore may have
had particular interests in gremios or haciendas, they could
not afford to be the same with their price^fixing policies.
The theory here is that the resultant effects of any given
rioting cannot be predicted. Councillors may not only loose
their property but even their lives. It would seem, there­
fore, that any legislations for food would be honestly
thought out if only to maintain the unwritten contract.
At this point, a word is in order about periodiza-
tion. The problem with any study on 17th Century Mexico
City history is one of the gaps in the documentation,
especially between 1650-1692. This gap resulted from the
1692 city rioting which destroyed part of the municipal
council archives. It is, therefore, difficult to make a
 8

continuity study of the whole 17th Century. In the original

Actas de Cabildo of Mexico City, for example, there are no
records for the years 1639-35 and 1650-92.
Of necessity, therefore, any 17th Century study
seeking continuity has to stop by 1650 or between 1690--1700.
Outside of the practical considerations however, there are
many historical reasons for the choice in periodization.
The period before 1598 was one of institution building.
Among other things, it saw the establishment and the growth
of Mexico City and the organization of its municipal council.
As the papers of the minutes of the early council shows,
the period before 600 was an extremely fluid one.
The council not only had to forge the plan of the
city, it had to grant lands, argue for the extension of
the Encomienda in perpetuity, establish various organs of
municipal government administration, (some of them admittedly
from Spain but still untried in the new world). More
importantly, neither the king nor council knew exactly
what rights each possessed. The result was the constant
tug-of-war between both arms of the administration. By the
beginning of the 17th Century, things had tended to coalesce,
with the council losing some of its powers and gaining in
other areas.
One could therefore say that while the 16th Century
marked the period of city building, the 17th Century was
time for its flourishing. In a sense, council powers were
 9

no longer to be seriously threatened at least until the time

of the Bourbons and their intendants. More importantly, the
trend in sales of public offices was already in full swing
and most members of the council at the beginning of the
period of this study had either bought or renounced their
posts. In short, the periodization in a very loose sense
makes this a study about the consequences of the sale of
municipal council offices. This does not lessen the impor­
tance of the fact that by the beginning of the 17th Century,
Mexico City council had staked out an informal claim to
act as spokesman for Mexico City and New Spain, The study
of the council from this point of view and in time takes
on an added significance. Invariably, it will be rewarding
to see which of the multitudinous interests suffer.
From a purely economic point of view the early 17th
Century is also important. It saw the decline of encomiendas
and the beginnings of large landed estates in the forms of
haciendas and estancias. These changes have been lucidly
discussed in Chevalier's classic study La Grande Domaine au
Mexique. From our point of view however, this changing
situation must have meant added encroachments on municipal
lands and with it, new council measures to deal with them.
Needless to say, even the councillors themselves must have
also had a stake in such economic changes. This two-fold
action therefore makes study of municipal council membership
socio-economic and political background all the more
 10

interesting. In the mirage of such conflicting and mutually

reinforcing interests, what eventually thrives—selfishness
or civic pride?
Woodrow Borah's New Spain's Century of Depression
and Lynch1s Spain Under the Hapsburgs, have clashing
interpretations about the seventeenth century. While
Borah saw New Spain in the throes of human and economic
decline, Lynch saw it as a period of inward looking and
beginnings of internal development and commerce. At issue
here is whether Spain's economic decline and Mexico's
decline in human resources drastically affected that
Viceroyalty's economy. While Borah tends to think that the
configuration of both forces did indeed lead to bad economic
times, Lynch feels otherwise. He sees it as a blessing in
disguise as such phenomena meant Mexico had to rely on her own
resources. Invariably, this led to the beginnings of a
self-supporting, self-sufficient economy.
Whether such bad times hurt Mexico or not, its
1 importance for this study cannot be overstressed. For one,
the fluidity of such a situation must have meant a greater
task on council responsibilities and new measures to deal
with them. It must have also meant fewer labor hands for
municipal projects. If a councillor in charge of Indian
labor for city construction was tempted to channel some of
it to his hacienda, it was only because of the scarcity.
Besides, the two Mexico City riots of the century clearly
 11

underline the economic problems of the period. The crowd

on two separate occasions did riot, apparently in response
to scarcity and rising prices. No attempt is being made to
pass judgment, but the fact still remains that economic
scarcity must have influenced council activities like it
never did before or after. The steps they took to meet it
is therefore interesting.
Finally, the lack of data prevented this thesis
dealing with certain questions: since aldermen were
predominantly land owners, what effect did this have on
their legislations affecting hacienda owners? Furthermore
such information would have been helpful in a comparison
of municipal council legislation for hacienda owners (where
aldermen had vested interests) and urban guilds.
More importantly, I wanted to determine the number
of aldermen who made their wealth in trade or textile
industry. The idea was that if their number was large
enough, they may bring a different perspective into the
city council. This line of inquiry proved fruitless due to
the lack of information on the economic background of the
aldermen.
Furthermore, the lack of data made it impossible
for me to determine the settlement pattern and age distribu­
tion of Mexico City residents. This lack made it difficult
to determine the cut-off age in dividing aldermen into
young and old.
 12

The choice of forty resulted in placing a majority

of the aldermen in the category of the young. It is
possible that such a cut-off affected the analysis. The
choice was influenced by the number of aldermen above forty
that had already served the king in various royal positions
before becoming aldermen.
 CHAPTER X
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Town governments in Spain, especially those of

Andalucia province affected the formation and evolution
of town councils in Hispanic America. The thirteenth and
fourteenth century municipal experience in this area was
to be later transferred to the New World as a majority of
new world settlers came from here. There is no concensus
as to the origins of the Spanish municipum.1 It will
therefore be instructive to begin by considering the Roman
municipio.
Like the medieval Spanish town, the Roman Civitas
included an urban nucleus and a rural hinterland. There
was a variation in rights and privileges between the rural
and urban sectors with the municipes (those born in the
city) occupying the most important position. Although they
originally possessed the right of electing the magistrates,
they seem to have lost it by 2 A.D. to a body called the
curia comprising about one hundred men. The decuriones, as
they were called, were individuals either experienced in
town administration or drawn from the propertied class.
This body also acted as court of appeal from the decisions
of the magistracy.

13
 14

The decline in municipal wealth and incentive under

the Antonines led the emperors, beginning with Trajan, to
appoint special officers (curators) to oversee civic finances.
This change resulted from the mismanagement of funds by
local officials. Gradually the new officials overshadowed
town officials. Perhaps the death-nail came with an imperial
decree which held decuriones liable for the collection of
taxes owed the government. Such an order made municipal
2
office holding undesirable and unpopular.
With the passage of time however, there appeared
a local assembly, the conventus vicinorum. Its members were
primarily rural based as it was made up of land-owners. It
gave rise to the concejo. This assembly assumed greater
powers with the decline of the Germanic regime. Its
officers (.Jurados or fieles) later came to be chosen to
carry out duties once the responsibility of the administra­
tive council. The assembly also began to make important
3
decisions on matters affecting the town.
Under Muslim rule (from eighth century) cities
survived and in fact increased in wealth and size. But
while the Muslims produced an urban existence of a high
order, their influence and effect on medieval Castilian
municipal organization were insignificant. Perhaps, what
can be said is that some of the terminology of the municipal
hierarchy of medieval Spain and of the American colonies
like alcalde and alferez were of Muslim origin.
 15

The Christian reconquest was of greater importance

in the evolution of the Castilian town. The tenth to
thirteenth century may be called the era of the flowering of
municipal government. The rate of development and change
differed from one region to another due to local and
geographical differences.^
To push back the Muslims, rulers of the various
Spanish kingdoms encouraged individuals to found settlements
and towns along the frontier with offers and promises of
concessions. Pirenne feels their motivation was primarily
economic rather than military. 5 But there were also urban
clusters evolving from the greater stability and security
of life near monastries, castles of nobility, and at
g
strategic sites for the conduct of trade. To encourage
settling of these areas, Spanish kings granted extensive
rights to soldiers and all those who helped in the
reconquest. The church, monastic organizations and nobility
were the chief beneficiaries.7
Rights and privileges granted to communities along
the frontier, and elsewhere were embodied in a charter known
as a carta de poblacion or fuero. In essence, the carta
recognized the jurisdictional authority of the town, with
its rights, privileges and responsibilities. The fuero in
general, embraced the sum of conciliar legislation (by
laws and judicial decrees) enacted over a period of time.
g
By the fifteenth century, it became known as' brdenanzas.
 16

This charter included citizens residing within the rural as

well as the urban districts.9 Municipal liberties however
varied from place to place.
A series of royal legislation starting with the Rex
romana visigothoruitt (A.D. 506) and the Fuero Juzgo (A.D. 694)
and ending with the Siete Partidas (J 265} regularized these
g r a n t s . F r o m another point of view, the charter was a
contract between ruler and ruled in which each was expected
to perform its obligations.
A thirteenth century vecino had a more privileged
position, than his sixteenth century counterpart in Spain
and America, The term vecino signified all heads of
families and landowners. To obtain this status, one had
to establish residence in the city, have his name inscribed
in the official roll of citizenry and be willing to fulfill
the obligations recorded in the f u e r o . T o r e t a i n h i s s t a t u s ,
a vecino was required to provide a substitute to perform
his civic duties if he were absent from the town for a
considerable period of time. Indefinite or prolonged period
of absence resulted in forfeiture of citizenship.12 A
large section of the population were classified as moradores
or lodgers. They did not maintain a separate household
neither did they own land.
Due to municipal inefficiency and increased popula^
tion, the consejo by the beginning of the thirteenth century
was superseded by a small group of office holders. In the
 17

final development of this trend, the council formed a

closed corporation known by a variety of names—the cabildo,
justicia, regimiento, and ayuntamiento.13 The number of those
comprising the ayuntamiento in the thirteenth century
differed according to the size and prestige of the city or
town. Its chief functionaries were ordinarily the alcaldes
ordinarios. The reqidores (aldermen) acted as a kind of
legislature. Few, if any, of these officials received
salaries.
Social and racial differentiation also played a role
in the determination of municipal affairs. As a rule, the
dominant element was the rising middle sectors drawn from
property owners, merchants, professionals, and well-to-do
artisans. But there were towns where representation was
equally divided between nobles and commoners.
Economically, the principal source of revenue was
derived from property acquired during the conquest to which
title was recognized in the charter. Municipal land was
inalienable and comprised two types—municipal and communal.
The first called propios or bienes conceiiles, consisted of
agricultural lands. They were administered by the city
officials. The land was worked in common by rotation, or
rented. The proceeds went toward the support of the local
government. The communal lands (bienes comunales) consisted
of woodland, pastures and a separate well-defined area
'located just outside the city gates known as ejido.15
 18

Private property also existed alongisde municipal owned

lands in the form of town lots (solares), and cultivated
stripes in the surrounding area (heredades).
Another source of income was taxes, the collection
of which was leased to individuals or associations. They
included excises on certain commodities like meat, bread,
and wines, duties on the circulation of goods, fees for the
use of weight measures, etc.16 Revenue was supplemented by
fines for violation of city ordinances.
Part of royal recognition of the importance of towns
was their right to representation in the cortes. Such
representation was due, however, more to royal pecuniary
needs than to seek council advice. The delegates were
selected by various means.17 By the beginning of the four­
teenth century however, the representatives of the Third
Estates in Castile possessed considerable power, at least
more than that enjoyed by their English counterpart in the
same era.18
Due to the need for defense against the Muslims and
royal impotence, towns banded together in the twelfth century
in leagues known as hermandades. They were directed mainly
against nobles and on occasions against any king who
threatened municipal liberties. Royal weakness, arising out
of the unremitting struggle with the nobles, helped town
governments retain a generous degree of political and
administrative freedom to the mid-fourteenth century.
 19

By the first half of the fourteenth century signs of

decay set in. The decline was hastened by royal policy.
Influenced by the revival of Roman legal theories and
temporarily supreme over feudal resistance, Alfonso XI
(1325-1350) persuaded the Cortes of Alcala (1348) to
appoint corregidores (royal agents). These officials could
be dispatched at the invitation of the citizenry to towns
needing advice and aid. With time, corregidores were sent
to towns without local request. They illegally assumed
authority, to the king's advantage. Alfonso went further.
He also initiated the system of royal regidores when in 1343
he sent certain of his retaineers to the council of Segovia,
who were expected to function alongside regularly elected
aldermen.19 Their efforts led to the alteration or with­
drawal of local ordinances pertaining to municipal autonomy.
Ferdinand and Isabel went further. The councils
were further weakened by their aim to promote centraliza­
tion. Annual election of magistrates was abolished and
thereafter were to be selected by lot for life. An
ordinance of 1480 passed by the Cortes of Toledo authorized
the king to abolish hereditary offices and to prevent the
transfer of positions to relatives and friends. Leasing
of the office of alderman was forbidden and violations were
punishable by forfeiture. 20 They also used two other
agents—pesquisidores (having right of inquiry into
functioning of muncipal law), and veedores (with duty of
overseeing conduct of officials).21
The last municipal attempt at regaining lost
liberties was represented in the comuneros movement early
in the reign of Emperor Charles V.22 Although the immediate
cause of the revolt was the monarch's levy of taxes
expecially the alcabala (sales tax), there were other
deep-seated reasons—among them, desire to regain lost
rights and privileges.23 After the revolt, the crown had
no difficulty imposing its will. More importantly, the
conflict had other results especially for America. As
Preston Moore sums it up,
it disclosed a partial flux in the relationship
of the political institutions of the kingdom . . .
a constitutional vagueness and incertitude that
may account in some measure for the absence
of a clearly defined policy for the local
entities evolving across the Atlantic. The
gravity of the uprising counseled a cautious
attitude in the extension of the principle of
absolutism.24
The first concrete experimentation with problems of
colonial rule was in the Canaries, In 1494, Isabella granted
a fuero to Las Palmas, the principal city of the islands.
All of the important towns under royal administration had
cabildos or senates presided over by officials with varying
25
titles. These bodies possessed wide legislative powers.
Towns on the mainland were part and parcel of the
process of conquest and colonization. Paced with Indian
menace and always in the minority, Spaniards found it
convenient to establish themselves in cities and towns. These
became the foci of socio-political organization—areas from
which new conquests proceeded.
By a series of royal cedulas. Christopher Columbus
was empowered to set up town governments in areas he
discovered. He was also to appoint the officials. But
Columbus was not a successful administrator. The general
discontent among the settlers culminated in their request in
1507 asking the king to grant them fueros of the Spanish
municipalities.2 6
In this embryonic stage of municipal development the
local governments exercised many rights and privileges.
Their authority was at first not materially affected by
the substitution of royal for proprietary rule. The towns
acted as checks on the first conquistadores and their
descendants.27 At the same time, there was also a lot of
diversity and lack of uniformity in municipal organization.
The election of officers and their duties varied from one
place to the other. Lucas Alaman suggests that there was
an element of incertitude in the alcalde1s function at
28
this period.
The end of proprietary rule of the Columbus family
came with a royal edict in 1519 in which the crown annexed
Expanola. A second cedula a year later extended royal
annexation to the remainder of the Indies already discovered
or yet to be discovered.29 The code issued at Toro in.1505
was thenceforth to apply to all cases, situations, and
 22

conditions unforseen or neglected by royal decree.30

The first Mexico City municipal government was
inaugurated on March 7, 1524.31 The meeting was at Cortes'
house. He evidently appointed its members. They included
Francisco de las Casas as Alcalde mayor, Bachiller Ortega
as alcalde ordinario, Bernardino Vasquez de Tapia, Gonzalo
Ocampo, Rodrigo de Paz, Juan de Hinojosa and Alonzo Jaramillo
as regidores; Francisco Qrduna as clerk of the house and
Fernando Lopez as mayordomo.32
Following the precedent set in Coyoacan, the council
started to grant lands to the citizens, their sizes varying
according to the social status of the recipient. Rules
were set up making it mandatory to erect a building on one's
site or lose the land. This doesn't seem to have worked
very well for on July 29th, 1524, the council relaxed its
rules and gave vecinos with lots an extension of 3 months
in which to plan and organize how they were going to put up
a house, two months in which to begin construction or lose
ownership of such lots.33 The council was equally ready to
enforce the last clause, for on February 28, 1525, the land
given to Licenciado Suasu, the council's lawyer, was taken
away from him and redistributed. Two months later, however,
he received another lot.
Part of the organizational problems that beset the
council at this early stage involved the resale of land by
vecinos. The reason given for the sale of land was because
 23

its owner was leaving the city for some other area of New
Spain like Vera Cruz or Panuco. There is no record of the
council's refusal to grant such a request.34 Indeed the
council was in a particularly difficult position because
it did encourage persons to join in the attempts at
discovery and settlement of other parts of New Spain. But
such an encouragement meant a depopulation of the city and
complication of the attempts at an orderly distribution of
town plots.
A corollary to the organizational problems was the
town's concern for a well planned city. To this end the city
enacted the Ordenanza de los portales on April 15, 1524. It
regulated the types of materials to be used in building
houses especially those near the plaza, their sizes and
style. Another law (April 19, 1524) made each house owner
responsible for the cleaning of the street area around his
lot.
A 1525 royal ordinance defined the city's duties.
Although aimed at Villas de la Natividad de Neustra Senora
and Trujillo on the Hondurian coast, the same rules applied
to all of New Spain. The ordinance designated the town
council as base of all the economic administration of the
settlement. The natives were to be well treated, civilized
and christianized. Merchants were to be well treated and
their taxes paid and officials were not to take advantage of
their positions to mistreat vecinos. The ordinance went
 24

further to make attendance at council meetings mandatory and

imposed a fine for non-attendance. Finally, the council was
to plan the city and allot sufficient space for plazas,
markets, etc. The city plan was supposed to follow the
example of Spanish cities.35
Another organizational problem to which the council
early addressed itself was that of jurisdiction. Concerned
with administrative efficiency, the members appealed to
the King through Gonzalo Mexia for a delineation of city
and town boundaries. In an August 3, 1527 Cedula, the king
granted that each town was to extend two leagues beyond
their limits, with the right to divide said land among the
inhabitants for their grazing. Another request by the
council in Mexico City for an extension of its boundaries
was granted in a cedula of October 3, 1539. The city limits
set by this cedula were maintained all through the colonial
period. It also served as a yard stick for cities to be
founded later. In essence it extended Mexico City govern­
ment's jurisdiction to fifteen leagues beyond the urban
nucleus. The cedula also granted the council rights to
certain city propios, perpetuity of the office of Fiel
executor, permission to begin building a university and
more important, the right to distribute any vacant Indian
lands to Spaniards in order to avoid depopulation of New
Spain. Any Indians affected were to be relocated.36
 25

Twenty years later, the king reversed the idea

contained in that cedula. In essence, the council no longer
had any right to grant land outside of the traza to
Spaniards.37 The city appealed this decision with no luck.
Previous grants given by the city to Spaniards outside of
the traza were revoked.38
Part of the organizational efforts of the city
government included getting the king to grant them a
preferential status as being the head of all New Spain.
This was granted in a cedula dated July 24, 1548, in which the
king recognized the city for its good deeds and thenceforth
to be known as "mui noble, ynsigne, y mui leal." This name
was meant to go with the coat of arms already granted the
city on July 4, 1525.39 By March 9, 1531, the city comm­
issioned Juan Artillero to paint the city's escudero for a
fee of 51 pesos.
After Cortes, Gonzalo de Salazar succeeded as
president of the council. His power was, however, revoked
on January 29, 1526, and Francisco de las Casas took his
place. By April 14, 1529, days for meetings were set at
Monday, Wednesday, and Fridays with all aldermen expected
to assist or be fined.40 Although town government had been
tried elsewhere in America and the peninsula, and councillors
had something to draw upon, the problems of delineating
council rights vis-a-vis Spain proved onerous. The fluidity
of the situation called for experimentation and even haggling
over powers.
 26

It seems Cortes' appointment of four regidores in

Coyoacan was insufficient and so the council appealed to
the king that the number of aldermanic seats be reaised to
twelve. On October 23, 1523, the king granted their request.
In the same cedula the crown also stipulated that lesser
towns were to have six aldermen. But the city's victory
was short-lived, for on June 18, 1524, Pedro del Castillo
and Hernando Campos presented royal "provisiones" appoint­
ing them royal clerks. A year later Diego Ocano received
a royal appointment as Public Clerk. At the same period,
Alonso Perez presented to the council royal merced appointing
him alderman.41
On the face of it these appointments may not have
meant much but they signaled the beginning of royal attempts
to have some element of direct control on the council. The
king followed up these appointments with a few more. In
Mexico City itself, alcaldes ordinarios and aldermen were
still appointed by the gobernador as late as 1527. In this
year another element of royal control came into play. The
crown ordered that any subsequent appointment must be
approved by royal officials. The same cedula however, gave
the council the concession to elect mayordomos, diputados,
42
procuradores and other minor officials.
In the same year, the king approved the election
of aldermen and alcaldes ordinarios. This posed a two-fold
problem. The king before this data had appointed some
 27

people to regimientos. Secondly and more imporant is that

prior to 1527, some aldermen had renounced their offices.
Such a renunciation meant that its owners purchased such
posts. Perhaps the only possible explanation was that given
in the cedula, granting the councillors permission to
elect aldermen. A paragraph in the cedula stated that
"these twelve regidores are outside of those appointed by
his majesty."43
Before the end of 1527 some vecinos appealed to the
king to step in and remedy the abuses being committed by
aldermen in the election of alcaldes ordinarios. A 1527
cedula imposed a fine of 10,000 maravedis for any one
violating procedures laid down by the crown. In its final
form, the law prohibited any aldermen to vote for their
blood relations.44
In an attempt at remedying the situation the council
by the 1530's ruled that alcaldes were no longer to have
votes in the town council and more important, they must be
chosen not from the vecinos but from among the aldermen.45
This change tended to lessen whatever element of democratic
representation the cabildo had. Even the post of procurador
mayor was henceforth to be occupied by an alderman. Before
this ruling the practice had been for councillors to elect
town officials from a list of about thirty citizens. This
oligarchical trend would be intensified when regimentos
became saleable. Before this date however, the council in
 28

1554 and 1559 recorded the first renunciation of office of

alderman from father to son. In a second case, Alonzo
Merida, an alderman, wanted to renounce his post to his son
George de Merida. There was a precedent in 1554 when
Gonzalo Salazar renounced his aldermanic seat to his son
Joan Velasquez Salazar. The complication, however, was
that George was a minor of eleven years. The? .king granted
the renunciation.46 Even more important, Luis de Velasco,
son of the viceroy of the same name was made alderman in
1565 by the king not for his merits but for the good services
of his father.
Perhaps one of the more interesting chapters in this
period of town government in Mexico was the council's
struggle with royal officials on the spot to safeguard their
rights and pre-eminence. The struggle was almost as old as
the council itself, for by 1529 councillors were complaining
to the king that Cortes had used his position to usurp city
lands and that such an action should be stopped. Part of
the argument included water rights which had been granted
the estate of the marquis to the detriment of the city.
But attempts at asserting municipal independence occurred
even earlier. In 1524, the council refused to accept as
public clerk, Hernan Perez, whom Cortes had appointed. They
appealed the appointment to the king on grounds that such
an appointment violated municipal fueros and privileges.
 29

Another important fight centered on whether judges

of the Audiencia might attend council sessions. Aldermen
argued that the presence of the judges not only violated
their rights but also such presence would tend to hinder
discussion and voting in council. They appealed to the
king who agreed with them temporarily. The victory was
short-lived, for six years later Oydor Loaiza entered the
city council with a royal cedula to the effect that an oydor
was to assist in council deliberations. This cedula was
to be a forerunner of two others later in the century
making it mandatory for a judge to be present when alcaldes
are being elected and another appointing a corregidor to
preside over council meetings.
In fact by January 1, 1555, it became mandatory for
a judge to be present in council chambers when alcaldes
ordinarios were chosen. Such an oydor was to have "voz y
voto" in any such elections.47 Before this time, the king
in April 17, 1538, granted voice and vote to royal
treasurer, contador, factor, and veedor.48 A similar case
was that of the office of fiel executor. After two petitions
of 1520 and 1531 the king agreed temporarily to let the
council make the appointments.49
Perhaps this last request points to the fact that
members of the town government were intent on keeping others
out of the council. This was particularly true of the two
petitions brought against the council in 1560 by Francisco
 30

Montealegre-Contador of the royal treasury. As contador

he had the right to sit in council but the members opposed
his admission.
One is tempted to conclude that councillors were
either selfish or power hungry. In fact there is abundant
evidence to reach such a conclusion. As early as 1528 when
usurpation of muncipal authority was not a real danger,
citizens had complained to the king that council meetings
were too secretive and being held in strange places and
times so that the citizens would not know what went on.
Some of the council's actions lent some plausibility to
these charges. A year earlier the council, for example, had
written to the king asking that non-councillors should be
barred from entering council buildings, and in another
letter they asked the king to limit the number of aldermen
to twelve. In addition they requested and won approval
from the crown in 1548 to pass their own ordinances for
city administration.
It may be pointed out in their defense, however,
that they had precedents in the peninsula as guidelines.
Besides, the fluidity of the situation warranted such
bargaining. More important, the council saw itself as
spokesman for all of New Spain—an area of recent conquest
where people had used their personal fortunes for conquest
and discovery. In fact, their fears of domination by royal
authorities seemed to materialize as the century wore on.
 31

For by November 26, 1573, the king appointed Licenciado

Obregon corregidor to preside over council meetings and to
act in conjunction with alcaldes as court of first instance.
But what was the council's relation to the citizens?
How did councillors view themselves in regard to all
groups within the society? The first half century of
municipal administration in Mexico could be regarded as
the high point of its existence. The newness of the office,
the new geographical setting, the determination and alert­
ness of the officials, the fluidity of the situation, and
the king's willingness all made for a concerted effort at
experimentation and development. The council was in the
flattering position of viewing itself as spokesman for all
of New Spain. Internally, the council tended to identify
with all groups within the society. In political,
economic, and human terms, the council strove to wrest
concessions from the authorities in Spain. These forces,
working together, combined to produce a half century of
letters to the king and council of the Indies seeking a wide
variety of rights and privileges. Indicative of the extent
of the council's lobbying activities, the number of letters
written between 1524 and 1580 were more than those written •
for any other century of its history.
More to the point, petitions and the concern of
councillors tended to permeate all levels and groups in the
struggling society. Indeed, the fairness of the council at
this period provides a good departure in the study of
 32

benevolenacy of preplural societies. A study of the letters

and petitions sent by the city council to Spain and royal
replies tell us much about the position of the various
ethnic groups and their relation to the council.
The letters of the council to Spain cover many
issues, but they can be roughly divided into seven headings:
(a) Rewards to conquistadores and land
distribution.
(b) Protection and expansion of stock farming
and by extension, preferential treatment
to its owners.
(c) Rules of mining and the position of miners.
(d) Preferential treatment to merchants and
traders.
(e) Deferment of taxes.
(f) The position of the religious orders and
monasteries.
(g) Opportunity for travel.
It s fould be pointed out that the above areas of
interest will be dealt with as it affected the white sector
of society. The other ethnic groups will be considered
later.
Coming from the ranks of conquistadores themselves,
councillors from the very beginning wanted those who had
spent energy, money, and time to be duly rewarded.
Following the first royal appointment of Alonzo Perez in
 33

1525 as alderman they appealed to the king that aldermanic

seats should be reserved exclusively for conquistadores and
their families. The exclusive rights to aldermanic seats
for conquistadores is not dissimilar to the rewards in
fueors granted to various cities in Spain as incentives to
the Christian reconquest. However, such a precedent in a
new setting would have meant, as it came to mean, that
counciliar administration would be the prerogative of a
few with birth right as criteria for office holding.
From an economic point of view, the council also
championed the cause of conquistadores and their families.
In a letter to the king, they argued that only those
residing in New Spain should be given encomiendas. Absentee
owners, they felt, often appointed administrators who
mistreated the Indians. They made it plain that only
residents and specifically conquerors and their sons should
be given encomiendas. The king granted their request in a
June 25, 1530, cedula.
The council presented the same argument in 1531 to
oppose the way the repartimiento by royal officials had been
carried out. They opposed the fact that royal officials
had distributed Indians to their friends without regard for
the conquistadores.51 One needs to go through all the
letters written by the city to Spain at this period to
realize the magnitude of their concern for conquerors.
Practically every petition, memorial, or instruction to the
 34

procurador general to the Spanish court is full of pleas for

conquerors. Even as late as 1594 and 1595, they were still
pleading the cause of conquerors and their descendants. A
typical example was that of 1595 in which councillors stated
that there were many descendants of conquerors with no means
of sustenance since encomiendas were often left vacant
following the death of the original owners. To remedy
this situation, councillors wanted encomiendas to be granted
in perpetuity.^2
Part of their concern for conquistadores also
extended to other whites in society in regards to dist­
ributing land for agricultural and grazing purposes. The
concern was two-fold. On the one hand, their concern was
purely jurisdictional'—to be able to control a 15 league
radius around the city and to have the authority to
apportion out land within the area. On the other hand, they
were genuinely concerned with being able to distribute land
to citizens rather than allowing royal bureaucrats whom
the council accused of favoritism. Both of these issues
were interrelated for an extension of city boundary meant
more land for the vecinos. Besides an argument often
advanced by the council was that division of land among
vecinos would lead to permanency and the growth in the white
population.53 Furthermore, they were interested in lands
beyond the immediate city limits as in Coyuacan, Cuernavaca,
Ayacapistla, and Thenaica. It may be pointed out that
 35

most of these requests were not for Mexico City alone but
for other towns as well. Implicit in the request for more
land was the question of grazing land for stocks. Only
on two occasions did the council cite this as reason for
54
their request. But on both occasions, they made it clear
that such areas outside of city limits were to be common
property where every citizen could graze his~animals or cut
wood for house building.
Perhaps nothing demonstrated more clearly the
council's concern for this last point than the regulations
for the use of communal lands and ejidos for grazing. By
1529 the council established a mesta with judges who were
supposed to oversee that ordinances concerning grazing and
other matters were obeyed.55 The council further articulated
its concern when on February 22, 1532, they ordered that no
one was to have an estancia, nor build a house within the
e-jidos. Anyone having such houses must tear them down
within ten days. Evidently, these regulations were not
obeyed, for the council had to reissue these ordinances twice
in 1537 but in slightly different terms. One stipulated
the registration of all grazing animals with the council
within 10 days or a fine of 100 pesos. The other reinforced
the idea of the ejido as common property.
One may at this point ask why the council was very
much interested in the preservation of the idea of communal
property rights? The obvious explanation that comes to mind
 36

will be that of the freeness of communal lands implicit in

the historical origins of such lands on the peninsula. But
it does not explain all. It is contended that the attempt
at safeguarding the commons'—which shows a sense of fair­
ness—was part of the overall ideological framework of the
people who made up the council at this time. Besides, the
timing is crucial. Mexico City was experiencing a period
of uncertainty, and everything possible had to be done to
encourage people to stay. Most important, social status
(by the very fact of the fluidity of the situation) had not
yet been drawn either on economic or patrimonial basis.
It was not to be before the 1530's that the first Hidalgo
would enter the town council. For the time being, therefore,
social differentiation was to be based on whether one was
a conquistador, his descendant or not. The approach would
change as the century came to a close, with new economic
ventures which tended to shift interests, the sale of public
offices which guaranteed its monopoly to a rich land-owning
few, and the emergence of a pluralistic society which tended
to complicate shifting interests.
For the time being, however, the council could
afford to be tough on cattle owners as it did on May 21,
1540. At this date they legislated that owners of grazing
flocks which had done,any damages to municipal lands and
property were to repair them at their expense. They were
given fifty days in which to comply, at the end of which they
 37
were expected to pay 3 pesos a day and 6 pesos for every
night it was not repaired. If the damage was done by cows,
the penalty was increased to an extra 2 reales per head of
cow per day and 4 reales more at night.56 It seems, however,
these laws were never strictly enforced or obeyed, for on
numerous occasions (October 14, 1541, and March 28, 1561, for
example) the council had to listen to complaints about
damage being done to grazing lands by estancia owners. But
the council on occasion also sided with estancia owners
especially when royal officials were involved. In 1544, they
had to appeal to the king to stop the viceroy from removing
estancias and other lands granted to citizens by the council
and giving them to his friends and relatives. Some of
those lands had belonged to vecinos for the past twenty
years.57
The cabildo also showed an early interest in other
economic groups like miners, traders, merchants, and urban
guilds. They were primarily interested in the liberaliza­
tion of mining in order that every citizen could have the
right to mine when and where he pleased. To increase
incentives, they sought to keep down costs and royal taxes.
Indeed, most of the letters written by the council to Spain
from the 1520's onwards on this matter, dealt with tax
reduction and in some cases, total tax exemption for miners.58
Primarily, they expressed opposition to the viceroy
granting mining rights on the grounds that he tended to
 38

grant such favours to his friends. Another argument was that

high taxes might also lead to a depopulation of New Spain
due in part to the lack of incentives such measures may
generate. Implicit in the first argument is the juris­
dictional one of the demarcation of authority between royal
officials and town representatives. This struggle at times
went beyond mere politics to honorifics, such as who came
first in a procession or who had the front seat in a public
or church ceremony. The second argument, however, seems
to reveal a real concern for a successful settlement, a
concern which invariably tended to find vecinos siding with
councillors against royal officials. Besides, such argu­
ments tended to foreshadow a cleavage that was to develop
later between Creoles and peninsulares. A council letter
written in 1546 to the effect that the high prices and
scarcity of iron and iron materials destined for the mines
was due to the fact that Spanish merchants were deliberately
59
not shipping more iron further strengthens this contention.
Local traders and merchants were not as lucky. Most
of the city ordinances regulating trade were quite onerous
to say the least. They reflected the mercantilist economic
approach of the period. Not only did city ordinances dis­
courage cooperatives, mergers, and expansion but even
regulated type of wares as well as prices. There seems to
be an element of contradiction in the council's posture as
regards traders. But the reason is not hard to find.
 39

Coming from a Spanish background, where nobility was

respected and where land associated activities were most
respected, trading tended to be frowned upon. It will not
be surprising, therefore, if people engaged in such
ventures were looked down upon or even suspected.
The same was true, even at this early stage, for
town guilds (gremios). Ordinances regulating every
economic group showed an amazing concern for minute details,
These laws not only defined qualifications and procedures
for becoming a maestro and member of a guild, but they
also regulated the way each craft member was to produce his
ware and the materials he was to employ. As was the case
with the merchants, the ordinances also discouraged
60
mergers, cooperatives and expansion.
The cleavage already alluded to between Spaniards
born in America and those born in Spain was even more
noticeable in the fight for religious equality. Such a
struggle often had mixed motives. For one, the council was
genuinely concerned about the inequality and discrimination
against Creoles in religious orders. While arguing that
the number of priests sent from Spain were too many, they
urged that monastries and a University be built to provide
61
means of education and training for citizens. On the
other hand, such requests while advancing the common good
tended to reflect an element of self-interest. In a 1546
letter to the king for example, the councillors argued
 40

that their daughters were not being married off because

of lack of dowry. They wanted the king to authorize the
building of two convents, where their unmarried daughters
could dedicate themselves to the service of God. The
problem will be more complicated later when the law of
mayorazgo prohibiting the division of an estate at its
owner's death, comes into being. Many sons of noble
families would be hard put finding a means of sustenance
and would thus turn to the religious orders for career
outlets.
Part of the fight with royal officials involved the
freedom of travel for all citizens to any part of New
Spain or Hispanola. In council letters of 1527, 1530 and
1538, they appealed to the king on this matter. In the
letter of 1530 they argued that the practice of the clerk
of the Andiencia issuing travel permits to people wishing
to go to other areas of New Spain was diminishing the
effectiveness of the council and giving too much power to
the clerk,^
It is clear by now that the municipal council was
concerned with all economic groups within the white cadre
of society. The nature of the interest depended on three
variables: whether it involved a jurisdictional struggle
with royal officials, if it would discourage people to
settle and if the councillors' personal interest was
involved. In the final analysis, the geographical setting,
 41

the fluidity of a new settlement situation and tradition

carried over from the mother country tended to be
conditioning factors.
But what was the role of the council vis-a-vis
other ethnic groups in the society? What did the newness
of the situation mean for the Indian? There seems to have
been an element of ambivalence in the council's approach to
the Indians. Genuine philanthropy was mixed with fear and
in certain cases downright condescension. It seems there
was a constant fear that the Indians had not acquiesced
to their conquest and would rise up and slaughter the white
minority. While their immediate solution was to advocate
fortification of cities, their long-range solution was an
intensive program of hispanization to reconcile the Indians
to Spanish rule. They even suggested in 1548 that a school
be opened up for mestizos whose Spanish fathers had been
killed in various wars of conquest. All through this
period, they complained to the king about all sorts of
disadvantages under which the Indians lived. They opposed
sending inexperienced bureaucrats as inspectors to Indian
villages. During the 1580's when the number of Indians
had been greatly reduced due to disease, they advocated
lessening the burden of tributes and work in mines. But
at the same time, they saw the Indians as children who must
63
be discouraged from drinking.
 42

In retrospect, one cannot help but conclude that town

government at this period was quite lively and innovative.
The councillors showed a keen interest and awareness in all
levels of city life. Assuming the role of spokesman and
protector of all groups, cities and towns of New Spain,
they made endless appeals to the crown in order to influence
royal policy on behalf of their constituents.
With tradition on their side, they fought to retain
whatever authority they could vis-a-vis crown officials.
While not always successful, they had at least set the tone
for town government in New Spain. Indeed this period in
the council's history tended to be the most enriching in
terms of the new situation which they faced, the fact that
to a great extent offices were still elective and based
on merit and finally the fact that municipal institutions
were still in the process of formation. Hence the council
had some room in which to maneuver.
The vitality of the institution is clearly reflected
during the sixteenth century in the amount and in the type
of activities in which it was involved. It is not an
accident that at this period, some aldermen received fines
for failure to be present at meetings, while others were
suspended for periods of time. Basic changes occurred by
the end of the sixteenth century with the advent of the
sale of offices.
 43

Roger B. Merriman feels this point has been hotly

debated. See The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old
World and the New (4 vols. New York, 1918-1934); T~, 184.
Scholars who feel the origins are traceable to Rome include
Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City: A study of the
Religion, Laws and Institutions of Greece and Rome (Boston
and New York, 1889); Francois Guizot, The History of
Civilization from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the French
Revolution (3 vols. London, 1887); Ernesto Mayer, Historia
de las Instituciones Sociales de Espana y Portugal durante
los Siqlos V al XVI (t tomos, Madrid, 1926). Those who
argued that municipal experience was original to Spain
include: Henri Pirenne, Medieval Cities; Their Origin and
the Revival of Trade, translated by Frank Halsey (Princeton,
N.J., 1964); Eduardo de Hinojosa y Naveros, Estudios sobre
la historia del Derecho Espanol (Madrid, 1903); Claudio
Sanchez Albornoz, Ruine y Extincion del Municipio Romano en
Espana e Instituciones que le Reemplazan (Buenos Aires,
1943); Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta, Historia de Espana
y su Influencia en la Historia Universal (2nd ed., 11 tomos;
Barcelona'—Buenos Aires, 1920-1950).
2
Michael I. Rostovtzeff, A History of the Ancient
World (2 vols., Oxford, 1933), 11^ 259, 260; James S. Reid,
The Municipalities of the Roman Empire (Cambridge, 1913),
pp. 438-448; Ballesteros, Historia de Espana, I, 646-650;
Cambridge Ancient History (12 vols., Cambridge and New
York, 1924-1939), X, 205-217.
3Ballesteros, Historia de Espana, I, 910-912.

4Robert S< Chamberlain, "Castilian backgrounds of

the Repartimiento^-Encomienda," Contributions to American
Anthropology and History, no. 25, Washington, 1939, p. 34.
5Medieval Cities: The Origin and the Revival of
Trade, p. 59.
g
Claudio Sanchez-Albornoz, Una Ciudad Hispano-
Cristiana hace un Milenio Estampas de la Vida en Leon
(Buenos Aires, n.d.), 21-25.
7Chamberlain, "Castilian Backgrounds . . .
pp. 33-34.
 44
g
Ballesteros, Historia de Espana, II, p. 755.
g
Ramon Carande, "Sevilla, Fortaleza y Mercado,"
Anuario de Historia del Derecho Indiano, tomo II, (Madrid,
1925), p. 246.

^°See John T. Vance, The Background of Hispanic-

American Law: Legal Sources and Juridical Literature of
Spain (New York, 1943), pp. 42-53, 97.

"^Carande, "Sevilla, Fortaleza y Mercado," p. 306.

12
Antonio Sacristan y Martinez, Municipalides de
Castilla y Leon Estudio Historico—Critlco (Madrid, 1877),
pp. 234-242.
13The term "cabildo" signified the body at the head
of local government; ",j.usticia" a judicial institution,
"regimiento," those designated to rule the city; and
"ayuntamiento" a union of the chief officials engaged in
directing civic policies.
14Altamira y Crevea, Historia de Espana y de la
Civilizacion Espanol (4 vols.; Barcelona, 1900-1011), I,
__ ^2Q,

"^Eyler N. Simpson, The Ejido, Mexico's way out

(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1937), p. 11.
16
Carande, "Sevilla, Fortaleza y Mercado," pp. 376-
387.
17R B. Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire in
t
the Old World and the New, 4 vols.; (New York, 1918-1934),
I, p. 222.
18
Charles M. Mcllwain, "The Medieval Estates" in
The Cambridge Medieval History, VII, 701, 702.
19Merriman, Spanish Empire in the Old World and the
New, I, p. 146.
20
Merriman, Spanish Empire in the Old World and the
New, I, p. 146.
 45

21
See Merriman, Spanish Empire in the Old World and
the New, II, pp. 147-152 for the detailed instruction given
by the king to Corregidores in 1500 on how to carry out
their duty.
22
Henry L. Seaver, The Great Revolt in Castile, a
Study of the Comuneros Movement of 1520-1521 (Boston and
New York, 1928); Altamira, Historia de Espana, III, p. 9;
Merriman, Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New;
Manuel Danvila y Collado, El Poder Civil en Espana (Madrid,
1885), p. 231.
23See for example: Coleccion de Documentos ineditos
para la historia de Espana (112 vols; Madrid, 1842-1895),
I, pp. 272-283.
24
Irene Wright, The Early History of Cuba, 1492-1586
(N.Y., 1916) 111-112; J. P. Moore, The Cabildo in Peru under
the Hapsburgs (Duke University Press, 1954), p. 31.
25Jose Peraza de Ayala, "Los Antiquos Cabildos de
los Islas Canaries" Anuario de Historia del Derecho Espanol,
t. IV (Madrid, 19271 p^ 239.
26
Antonio de Herrera, Historia General de los Hechos
de los Castellanos en las islas y Tierra Firme del Mar
Oceano (10 vols., Asuncion, 1944), II, pp. 95-97,
27Jose Maria ots. Capdequi, "Los Ongmes de la
Colonizacion Espanola en America," Boletin del Instituto
de Investiqaciones Historicas, XVIII (1935), p.
28
Historia de Mejico (5 vols.; Mexico City, 1849-
1852), I, p. 30.
29Recopilacion de las leyes de los remos de las
Indias (4 vols.; 5th ed.; Madrid, 1841), Libro III, titulo
I, ley I.
30Juan de Solozano y Pereyra, Politica Indiana (2
vols.; Madrid, 1776) II, p. 403.
31There was one from 1522 whose meetings were held in
Coyoacan while the ancient city was being rebuilt. The
minutes of this early council have been lost. The only
known records begin in 1524 with the first meeting of the
council in Mexico City.
 46

32
Archivo de la Antigno Ayuntamiento de la ciudad de
Mexico, hereafter cited as AAA, Compendio vol. I, p. 163.
33AAA Seccion de Barrio Lorenzot, No. 434,
Compendio 2.

Compendio, I. For example Miguel Araz petitioned

the council on April 15, 1524 to sell his lot because he
was leaving for Panuco. The request was granted. The same
was also true of Hernando Herez's petition on same day
because he was going to Vera Cruz.

3^Alaman, 156; 323 (appendix).

O£
Barrio Lorenzot Cedulario fo. 20, 62-69.
37Following the conquest separate areas were
designated for Spaniards and Indians. The taza or plan
was in the theoretical formulation for this separateness.
The granting of land outside the Spanish taza meant an
encroachment on Indian rights.

^Tieras y Ejidos, 1527-1708, (Vol. I, Expd. II,

No. 4065) AAA.

^Libro I of Actas, foja 166.

40Compendio, fo. 26.

41Cedulario, fo. 9, Compendio, 2.

^Compendio, fo. 15.

^Compendio, fo. 20.

44Actas—mmutes of January 1, 1600;

45Compendio, fo. 28, 42.

^Compendio, fo. 174.

Compendio, fo. 154.

 47

48Cedulario, fo. 54.

49
Ibid., 28, 49, Compendio, 59.

^Cedulario, 162. (Cedulario foxa 101).

51
Cedulario, fo. 30, 42 (foxa 6).
52Cedulario, fo. 240, Compendio, 398. There are
numerous examples of letters like this written by the
Council before 1580. See Compendio, 28-29, 85.
53See for example a request in 1538 in Cedulario,
fo. 55.
54One occasion was on August 10, 1530 and the other
on May 2, 1563.
55William H. Dusenberry has done an excellent study
of the mesta. See The Mexican Mesta: the administration
of ranching in colonial Mexico (Urbana, University of
Illinois).
e£
Compendio, fo. 84, 85, 95.

^Cedulario, fo. 78.

^See for example Cedulario, 17, 37, 59, 88, 92,

99. Compendio, 7.
59
Cedulario, fo. 88.
60Compendio, fo. 2, 7.

C1
Cedulario, fo. 55, 89, 105.

^Cedulario, fo. 38.

^Cedulario, fo. 56, 128, 191-193.

 CHAPTER II
THE FAMILY BACKGROUND OF ALDERMEN

This chapter will be a study of the seventy-five

aldermen that ran the city council between 1590 and the
end of the seventeenth century. It is a study in family
relationships and interrelationships.
An attempt will be made to determine the family
background and connections of each of the aldermen, what
proportion had some family relationship'—marital or
otherwise—to other members, and if aldermen had relations
in other sectors of the Spanish bureaucracy. This chapter
will look into the ratio of aldermen born in Spain
(peninsulares) to those born in the New World (Creoles).
This chapter will also explore percentage dis­
tributions in terms of at what age people joined the city
government, what proportion of aldermen held previous
political office in the overall bureaucracy, and what
proportion occupied posts in the Spanish bureaucracy during
and after their aldermanic posts.
The approach will be the simple one of finding
interrelationships between the members with age differentia­
tion remaining an almost constant factor. Two age
differentiations will be used. Aldermen below forty will
be considered as young, while those over forty will be
48
 49

regarded as old. Besides, such an arbitrariness anticipates

the margin of error in the age calculation which may. vary
anywhere from one to ten years. An effort will be made to
study each group independently of the other with a view
to later comparing both groups.
Did the city council act as a means, in economic
terms, to lateral and horizontal advancement or purely as
an honorific institution to young aldermen, and did the
older aldermen see it as the end point in a brilliant
career of civil service? Finally, did those born in Spain
use their aldermanic seats as a means of integration into
the predominantly Creole society?
Further weight will be lent to the analysis by a
utilization of two independent variables—whether one got
his post through purchase or renunciation from a relative,
and whether one was Spanish or American born. It is hoped
to identify differing trends in interrelationships, if any,
between those who inherited posts and those who purchased
them, and between those born in Spain and those born in
America.
A few problems are anticipated. There was a large
turnover in the membership. Many aldermen occupied their
posts for very short periods of time before either selling
or renouncing them. The result is the lack of continuity
in membership composition. Besides, the number of years
an individual acted as a city official is bound to influence
 50

his perspective in dealing with matters affecting the city.

No attempts have been made to utilize such a variable in
the analysis.
The other difficulty was that of the lack of
materials for all of the aldermen. Of the seventy-five
members, there is information on sixty-two. This figure
represents over 80% of the membership and is therefore not
expected to effect substantially the final outcome.
Mexico City aldermanic posts for the period under
consideration represented a diverse assortment of people
who were either Spanish or American born, members that had
either bought or inherited their posts, and members whose
viewpoints on current social issues were expected to be
diverse. A greater percentage was from noble families
whose economic base was on land and land-oriented
activities. Of all known cases, only two members had been
involved in trade before becoming aldermen.
In terms of age differentiation, about forty-six
aldermen were under forty while sixteen were over forty.
The majority of members were American born and they bought
their posts. The majority also had some relatives in
either the city government or in the Spanish administrative
system. Information is lacking on about a fourth of Spanish-
born aldermen. The majority of them bought their posts.
They seem to have been equally divided amonst the young and
the old.
 51

The two groups are represented schematically in

Table I.1
TABLE I
SELECTED ATTRIBUTES OF ALDERMEN

Relations in Means of Royal Posts

the Council & Gaining Occupied
Age Bureaucracy Office

Young 46 Council 28 Bought 46 Before 13

Old 16 Bureaucracy 35 Inherited 15 After 31
Unknown 13 Unknown 12 Unknown 14 Unknown 31

A majority of the aldermen were young—forty-six

as opposed to sixteen who were old. About the same
proportion of aldermen bought their aldermanic seats rather
than inheriting them. Thirty-five aldermen had relations
working in the Spanish bureaucracy, while another twenty-
eight had either their fathers, sons or in-laws as members
of the town council. On the whole, forty-four members
obtained royal positions either before, during or after
their term of office as aldermen.
Some initial conclusions are in order from the
above figures. Membership in Mexico City town government
was predominantly young. Since forty-four of the members
occupied royal positions either before or after their
aldermanic terms, it is possible that membership in the
Spanish bureaucratic system afforded one a greater
 52

opportunity of obtaining a seat in the town council; or

that membership in the town council offered one greater
opportunity of advancement into the Spanish bureaucracy.
The latter seems to be more app licable since
thirty-one of the aldermen applied and got positions in
the Spanish bureaucracy after their terms of office as
aldermen.2 It will be shown later that a majority of the
thirteen aldermen who had occupied royal posts before
becoming aldermen were from the ranks of old Spanish-born
councillors. Since most of these older aldermen did not
seek other royal posts after their terms of office as
aldermen, their municipal seats therefore were end points
in their bureaucratic careers.3
The popular consensus has been that aldermanic
posts were sought not for the monetary gains its holders
derived (Mexico City aldermen received thirty-three pesos
as annual salary), but for the social prestige that went
with such positions. The monetary advantages derived from
ownership of municipal seats will be shown later in the
thesis. For the present, however, it should be noted
that the great number of aldermen seeking other royal
appointments after their municipal posts (thirty of them)
points to the importance of such council jobs as means to
improve mobility and not necessarily as purely honorific
things.
 53

This last point explains, in part, the reason why

forty-six of them bought their positions as opposed to
fifteen who inherited them. It will also be shown later in
the chapter that aldermanic requests for royal jobs cited
the money they paid for their seats as part of their
qualification for office. Other qualifications often
mentioned included the number of their relatives who were
either councillors or royal administrators.
It seems, therefore, that there was an interplay
between the means of gaining aldermanic seats, the number
of one's relations in either the city council or the
Spanish bureaucracy and an alderman's appointment to a
higher position in the Spanish bureaucracy.
Although sixty-three members had relations in
either the town council or the Spanish bureaucracy, the
number is actually smaller since part or all of the twenty-
eight members with relations in the council may be included
in the thirty-five that had other relatives in the Spanish
system. This adjustment makes sense and compares favorably
with the number of people that bought their aldermanic
seats (46), and the thirty-one of them that subsequently
received royal appointments to serve in the Spanish
bureaucracy.
To help clarify the importance of the means of entry
into the town council, a word is in order regarding the
development of the idea of sale and renunciation of
aldermanic seats.
 54

The disorder of the comuneros movement was still

fresh in the minds of the Spanish court when mainland
America was being colonized. The King, therefore, did not
want to see municipal councils in America acquire the
degree of independence that town councils had in Spain
prior to the Comunero revolt. He sought to appoint a
majority of the aldermen especially in the larger towns.
A measure of royal control was achieved quite
early in Mexico City. The King employed two means to
achieve this. As early as 1525 the crown appointed three
aldermen for life. The second was the sale of aldermanic
seats. But there were other considerations involved in the
sale of public offices. It served as a means of public
patronage while yielding needed finance for the royal
treasury.
But the sale of public office had other implications
especially for this study. It signaled the advent of
private traffiking in aldermanic seats. The sale of
municipal seats drastically changed the composition of its
membership by the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Only those who could afford the money (from 6,000-8,000
pesos) bought aldermanic seats.
The act of purchase meant that owners of aldermanic
seats could utilize them until their death. But no one was
prepared to retain his seat for the rest of his life, as
aldermen from 1527 onwards devised means of renouncing their
 55

seats to relatives or selling them for money. Renunciation

added an extra dimension to the nature of town government.
Outside of the fact that only rich persons could buy
aldermanic seats, renunciation meant that present owners
had the right to pass on their council seats to whomever
they pleased. In most cases, the beneficiaries were
relations of the aldermen.
The importance of renunciation for our purpose
is that by the beginning of the period of this study, most
aldermen had either purchased their seats or got them from
their relatives through the system of renounciation. The
Castilla family furnishes a good example.
Pedro Lorenzo de Castilla was father of Luis de
Castilla, Both were Mexico City aldermen. Both applied
in 1592 for permission to renounce their seats. Luis
Felipe's request was granted by the King refused Pedro's.
Luis sold his aldermanic seat for 4,000 ducats. Four years
later Pedro reapplied, this time asking the King's per­
mission to renounce his seat to his son Luis Felipe who,
in 1592, had renounced his seat. The request was denied.
He repeated it in 1598 and it was granted. But Luis
Felipe in 1602 again asked permission to renounce his
seat and the request was further granted.
Any attempt at an analysis of the family back­
ground of aldermen must, therefore, include the role that
the sale and renunciation of aldermanic seats played. The
 56

King, in considering applications for positions in the

bureaucracy, was not apt to forget the fact that an alder­
man had contributed to the royal treasury when he bought
his municipal seat. Such a consideration tended to be
reinforced if the supplicant had relations who had served
the King in various positions.
The significance of the findings from Table I becomes
clearer if we analyze each column independently of the
others, with a view to ascertaining the interrelationships
between the two age groups. The interrelationship between
the number of Spanish-born alderman to American-born
councillors that got their jobs either through purchase or
renunciation is represented in Table II below.4

TABLE II
MEANS OF ENTRY

Young Old

Bought 33(73.9) 13(86,6)

Inherited 13(26.1) 2(13.4)
Totals 46(100) 15(100)

The figures in brackets represent percentage totals

which have been calculated. With age as the independent
variable, a few things become obvious. A greater per­
centage of the older aldermen (86.6) bought their way into
the council.5 Stated differently, older councillors needed
 57

fewer family ties to get admitted into the city government

than did younger people. The differentiation here is
important because those who inherited their aldermanic
posts did so by renunciation from a member of their family
g
who already had such a municipal post.
Taken independently, however, a greater percentage
of councillors bought rather than inherited their posts
(80.2 purchases as opposed to 19.7 by renunciation).
Furthermore, a far greater number of the young purchased
rather than inherited their positions (73.9 purchases to
26.1 renunciation). The figures in Table II are further
broken down to show the proportion of the young to the
old that bought or inherited council seats for both
American and Spanish-born aldermen. The result of such a
breakdown is shown in Table III.

TABLE III
MEANS OF ENTRY: SPANISH AND AMERICAN BORN

American Spanish —
Young Old Young Old

Bought 26(72.7) 4(80) 7(77.8) 9(90)

Inherited 11(27.3) 1(20) 2(22.2) 1(10)
Total 37 5 9 10
 58

The same trend is noticeable for both Spanish and

American-born aldermen, A greater percentage of the older
members purchased their posts (American, 80; Spanish, 90)
in comparison to the young (American, 72.7; Spanish, 77.8).
From another point of view, however, a larger percentage
of young aldermen both Spanish and American inherited their
positions rather than purchased them (49%). Furthermore,
a greater number of Spanish-born councillors bought their
posts (16 out of 19) in comparison to their American counter­
parts (30 out of 42). More importantly, however, a larger
percentage of American aldermen inherited their positions
(47.3) in comparison to the Spanish councillors (32.2).
Younger members were more represented in this category than
older ones (13 to 2).
A number of conclusions could be drawn from the
above. A greater number of council seats for this period
were occupied by American-born Spaniards. Of the total
number of Spaniards in the council, about fifteen percent
got their jobs through inheritance, showing the relatively
fewer Spaniards in the council from whom they can inherit
positions. Spaniards buying positions into the city
government may, therefore, see it as a means of entrance
into the predominantly Creole society. More will be said
on this later in the chapter, The American-born, on the
other hand, may look to aldermanic seats as means of
advancement. This last point will be clearer in Table IV
 59

which is designed to determine the interrelation between

the number of the young to old members that occupied royal
positions before and after their aldermanic seats.

TABLE IV
TO DETERMINE NUMBER OF ALDERMEN THAT HAD ROYAL
POSTS BEFORE AND AFTER MUNICIPAL POSTS

Young Old

Posts Before 4(12.9) 9(69)

Posts After 27(87.1) 4(31)
Total 31 13

A greater percentage of old councillors tended to

occupy posts in the Spanish bureaucratic system before buy-
ing their aldermanic posts (69% as opposed to 31%).7
Besides, a large number of the overall membership especially
among the Creoles had "noble" backgrounds, most of them
dating back to the days of the conquest.
In comparison, a larger number of young councillors
sought and obtained posts in the Spanish administrative
system during and after their membership in the municipal
o
council. Young officials may have sought their posts
for different reasons. The percentage of their number that
applied for other posts after their aldermanic office
suggests the fact that many of them used their office for
upward mobility. The significance of this becomes clearer
 60

in a further breakdown of Table IV. The result is shown

in Table V.

TABLE V
POSTS BEFORE AND AFTER ALDERMANIC SEATS

Spanish American
Young Old Young Old

Before 2(40) 6(86) 2(7) 3(50)

After 3(60) 1(14) 24(93) 3(50)
Total 5 7 26 6

Both young Spanish and American-born aldermen were

prominent in the category of those obtaining posts after
their aldermanic seats (27 of them). Only a handful of
them occupied royal positions before their council office,
(4 of them). The young Spanish councillor did occupy a
greater percentage of royal seats before his aldermanic
post than did his American counterpart (40% as opposed to
7% for Americans). The young Creole, more so than his
Spanish counterpart, may have seen the council as an
important means to upward mobility. The trend for the
older American-born councillor is more difficult to
determine. The same proportion of the members in this
category occupied royal posts before and after their
aldermanic seats. The percentages for older Spanish-born
 61

councillors are easier to analyze. They help to strengthen

the contention of office as either a last stage in a career
in the bureaucracy, or as a means of entry into Mexican
society. A relatively few percentage of them applied for
other jobs after their municipal jobs (14% as opposed to
86% before).
The significance of this contention is further
appreciated if we determine the number of members in Table V
that purchased or inherited their positions. The result
is shown in Tables Via and VIb.

TABLE Via
TO DETERMINE NUMBER THAT BOUGHT OR INHERITED THEIR POST AND
THE NUMBER THAT HAD ROYAL POSITIONS BEFORE THEIR
ALDERMANIC JOBS

Spanish American
Young Old Young Old

Bought ~ 6 2 2
Inherited 2 1
Total 2 6 2 3
 62

TABLE VIb
TO DETERMINE NUMBER THAT BOUGHT OR INHERITED THEIR POSTS
AND THE NUMBER THAT OCCUPIED ROYAL POSITIONS AFTER
THEIR ALDERMANIC JOBS

Spanish American
Young Old Young Old

Bought 20

Inherited 4
Total 24

It seems that of all Spanish-born aldermen that

occupied royal positions before and after their council
seats, only two inherited their positions, while ten
purchased them. Of the American-born councillors, only
five inherited their posts, while twenty-seven got them
by purchase. Perhaps, the significance of these figures
is that the majority of the councillors realized the socio­
economic importance of city government in order to purchase
positions. That many later utilized their positions for
social, economic, or political gain cannot be overemphasized.
The story of Leandro Gatica may have been an extreme
example of finding venues for upward movement through the
municipal council. Appointed by the city to accompany
the Armada de Barlovento (a trading fleet between New Spain
and the mother country), the young administrator was
entrusted with merchandise worth over 150,000 ducados by
citizens of New Spain. Gatica was supposed to dispose of
 63

the goods in Spain and return back with the money earned
from sales. He never did. He purchased an aldermanic
seat in 1633 while in Spain and came back to Mexico a
respectful alderman.9 Gatica was not satisfied. By 1644,
he applied to the council of the Indies for either the post
of Governador or correqidor anywhere in New Spain.That was
unfortunate for Gatica, as citizens who had been defrauded
ten years back appealed to the King to reject the request.
There are many other examples.^'1' It will suffice,
however, to cite two others which are fairly representative
of young American-born aldermen seeking municipal council
positions as stepping stones to higher positions in the
Spanish bureaucracy. Francisco Zapata (Capata) Maldonado's
father served the King as corregidor of Alcaraz in Aragon,
later promoted to the oidorship of the Audiencia of Guadala­
jara and New Spain. Finally, he served as Alcalde de
Corte for Mexico City Audiencia.12 Francisco followed in
his father's footsteps. He bought an aldermanic post
between 1600 and 1610. By 1618 he had already served as
Alcalde Mayor and later correqidor of the town of Tacuba,
correqidor of Tialnepant, and Alcalde Mayor of Ascapuzalco
and Tenazuca.13 But he was not satisfied for between 1619
and 1623 he again applied to the King to be considered for
more royal positions.1'*
The story of Hernando (Fernando) de la Barrera
furnishes another example. He came from a family with a
 64

long tradition of service to the King. His aunt Cathelina

de la Barrera married Antonio Bravo de Lagunos, judge of the
Audiencia in Seville. Hernando's cousin was fiscal of the
inquisition in Cerdena and his in-law Pedro Bravo de
Lagunos of the Augustinian order was an official of the
holy office of the inquisition in Seville. Another in-law
Joan Bravo de Laguna also a priest, was a consultor to the
holy office in Lima. Hernando bought his aldermanic post
when he was eighteen years old, and used it for thirty
years, interrupted only when he accepted royal appointments
to various posts of justices and commissions. He also
acted as Alcalde Mayor for certain areas including
Cumpange. By 1644, he applied to the King for a pension
in the form of either the office of corregidor or governor
and encomienda.
The two important features which were common to
these examples and many others were the facts that alder­
men seeking new positions cited their municipal posts
(and the money they paid for them) and their family attain
ments as sufficient qualifications for a merced. The idea
of their family backgrounds and attainments as further
qualifications for consideration for new posts will be
dealt with later. For the present, it will be rewarding
to analyze the interrelationship between the two age groups
and the ratio that had relations (marital or otherwise)
to people in the municipal council and in the Spanish
 65

bureaucracy. The attempt here is to find out which groups

and types of councillors needed family connections in the
two administrative systems to get on. Table VII will deal
with councillors who had other relations in the municipal
council. The table will also show the means of entry into
the council for these members.

TABLE VII
ALDERMEN WITH RELATIVES IN THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

American Spanish
Young Old Young Old

Bought 8(44.4) 1(50) 3(75) 3(75)

Inherited 10(55.6) 1(50) 1(25) 1(25)
Total 18 A 2 4 4

The results are too close for any meaningful trend

to be determined. The explanation is not difficult to
find. The relationship tended to be a two-way affair.
Younger members may have either older brothers or even
their fathers occupying posts in the council. These posts
may be occupied at the same time or may be inherited by
younger councillors due to renunciation from their fathers.
However, the fathers are also included in the figures above
since they occupied their positions during the period under
study.16 More importantly, there was intermarriage at
various levels among aldermanic families. Many aldermen
 66

married daughters of other councillors, while their

brothers at the same time may marry into the families of
other aldermen. Besides, some councillors were offshoots
of marriages between two aldermanic families. Since this
study covers over half a century, it was not uncommon for
the sons of "second generation" aldermen to get married
into families of other councillors.17
The Cervantes family represents this trend. Leonel
de Cervantes came to Mexico as a conqueror under Cortes. By
the beginning of our period, two of his grandsons,
Alonzo Gomez de Cervantes and Leonel de Cervantes, were
aldermen in Mexico City municipal administration. Since
Alonzo had no male issue, a July 1, 1603 royal cedula
granted him the right to renounce his aldermanic seat to
18
anyone marrying one of his two daughters. Younger Leonel
had many children including Luisa and third Leonel de
Cervantes. Luisa married Alonso de Valdes who was also an
alderman for the period of this study. The family inter­
connections further increased when third Leonel de Cervantes
married Maria de Carvajal (Carbajal), daughter of Antonio
de Carvajal (who was also an alderman) and Catalina de
Tapia, another Mexico City alderman for my period of study.19
This one instance represents intermarriage at various levels
among four aldermanic families—Cervantes, Valdes, Carvajal
and Tapia.
 67

The complexities of these intermarriages have been

represented in Table VII. Another problem of analysis is
that posed by the lack of materials for a majority of the
members. Of the sixty-two aldermen under analysis,
information is available for only twenty-eight. We are
luckier for members who had relatives in the Spanish bureau­
cracy. Information is available for slightly over fifty
percent of them.
An effort was made to overcome this problem by
finding what percentage of those known to have relatives in
the council that sought further positions in the Spanish
system. The reasoning here is that if a large proportion
of these members aspired for higher positions, one could
infer that the trend may have been the same for all the
others. The result of such a breakdown is shown in
Table VIII.

TABLE VIII
TO DETERMINE THE PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS WITH RELATIVES
IN COUNCIL WHO LATER OCCUPIED HIGHER POSTS
IN THE SPANISH BUREAUCRACY

American Spanish
Young Old Young Old

Higher Posts 16(88.9) 1(50) 2(50) 1(25)

No 2(11.1) 1(50) 2(50) 3(75)
Total 18 2 4 4
 68

The only definitive result is the percentage of

young American-born aldermen who later occupied other
positions in the Spanish administrative system. Over 88
percent of them later applied and got jobs with the
Spanish bureaucracy. It may also be inferred that a majority
of their peers did the same. If this is so, one can right­
fully argue that young American-born' aldermen needed family
ties for advancement. In fact, all of these known cases
do cite family connections and family achievements as
criteria for royal reward.
Although the figures are not conclusive for
Spanish-born aldermen for both age groups, it seems both
groups had various reasons for seeking municipal jobs.
All known cases portray older Spaniards as seeking alder-
manic posts as a final resting place in a long career of
bureaucratic service and as a means of integration into
the society. Christoval de Molina and Luis Moreno de
Monrey furnish good examples. Molina came to the Indies in
1595 with Conde de Monterrey, viceroy of Peru. Molina
acted as the viceroy's secretary for the period they were
in Peru. From Peru, he came to New Spain and for the
next seven years acted as Juez repartidor (officer in
charge of alloting Indian labor) for the village of
Tacuba. He later served for two years as corregidor for
the provinces of Cavana and Cavanilla. For the next two
years, he served as treasurer and official judge for the
 69

royal treasury at Potosi. In this position, he was sent

once to Spain as general representative (Procurador general)
for Potosi miners. On his return to Mexico, he served for
the next six years as governor and administrator of the
estate of Cortes. 20 He purchased his aldermanic seat on
November 16, 1618 for 10,000 pesos. By 1622, he had
acquired property in land and land-oriented activities
valued at over 100,000 pesos.21
Luis Moreno de Monrey's parents were citizens of
Sevilla. Coming to the Indies, he first served as visitor
to the royal treasury in Guadalejara. He was appointed
treasurer of Casa de la Moneda in Mexico, and from there
promoted to Secretary of the Audiencia. Leaving this
post, he returned to Guadalejara where he served as
governor. He later moved to Los Angeles where he occupied
various posts. • Returning to Mexico City, he bought an
aldermanic post, and one of his daughters married Francisco
Banegas Figueroa, relator of the Sala de Crimen of the
Audiencia of Mexico. Another married Gonzalo de Prado y
Cordova, Mexico City alderman. By 1622, he had accumulated
over 28,000 ducados and owned various haciendas and other
22
landed properties.
There are many other similar examples of the same
trend. The above two have been chosen as being
representative. They do not exhaust the list. The economic
motives behind the idea of an aldermanic seat for the older
 70

Spaniards will be dealt with in the next chapter. For the

present, however, it should be stressed than an important
consideration for the purchase of office, especially for
the older Spaniard, was social—an opportunity for
integration into Mexican society. Such integration
resulted from the mere fact of occupying a position in the
town council'—the center of Creole influence. Inter­
marriage into prominent Creole families and the opportunity
to own land and acquire wealth became both a means to
entry as well as a result of ownership of aldermanic
posts.
Finally, what percentage of the members had other
relatives in the overall Spanish bureaucracy? Table IX
shows the number of aldermen with relatives in the
bureaucracy.

TABLE IX
TO DETERMINE PERCENTAGE OF ALDERMEN WITH
RELATION IN THE SPANISH BUREAUCRACY

American Spanish

Young 23(92) 6(60)

Old 2(8) 4(40)

Total 25 10

A predominant percentage of young people for both

American and Spanish-born aldermen had relatives in the
 71

Spanish bureaucracy. The young American councillor may

need the relation more than his Spanish counterpart.
However, one thing should be pointed out. Some Creoles had
relations in the bureaucracy through intermarriage to
families of Spaniards acting as royal officials and vice
23
versa.
In the final analysis, Mexico City town government
was dominated by aldermen born in America. Younger
members below forty were in the majority. They saw the
council as a means to upward mobility in a predominantly
status-conscious society. Family relations in both the town
government and the Spanish bureaucracy acted as a leverage.
Older members, especially Spanish-born, became integrated
into the society after becoming aldermen. For some,
however, it served as a final spot in a career of civil
service.
The system of intermarriage between members
restricted the membership to a limited few. The sale of
office worsened it. Of known members, only two were not
connected to families with land-oriented economic systems.
 72

Most of the material for this chapter was taken

from the Ar.chivo de India, Seville, Archivo General de la
Nacion, Mexico AN; Archivo de l'Antiquo Ayuntamiento de la
Ciudad de Mexico, A.A.A.
2
Augustine de Valdes furnishes a very good
example. See "Inventario de bienes" 1622, leg. 259;
"Personas Seculares" 1619, leg. 137, R4; leg. 140, R2.
3The case of Christobal Molina which will be dealt
with later is representative. See Cartas y expedientes de
personas seculares del distrito de esta audiencia 1629,
leg. 147, Rl; 1621, leg. 139, R4; "Inventario debienes de
varios ministros y otros oficiales" 1622, leg. 260, A61, and
Barrio Lorenzot, Compendio, leg. 2, no. 435.
4Materials for the younger members are drawn from
the following archival sources: Cartas y expedientes de
personas seculares del distrito de esta audiencia, leg.
119 R4; 120 R2; leg. 121 Rl and 4; leg. 122 (no ramos
used); leg. 124 Rl; leg. 125 R3; leg. 126 R5; leg. 127 Rl;
leg. 130 R3 and 6; leg. 131 Rl; leg. 132; leg. 134 R3;
leg. 136 R3; leg. 137 R4; leg. 138 R5; leg. 139 R3;
leg. 140 R2; leg. 147 R2 and 3; leg. 150 R5 and 6; leg. 151
R2 and 4; leg. 153 R2; leg. 273. Peticiones y memoriales
de personas seculares 1600, leg. 270; 1610-12, leg. 271;
1613-18 leg. 272; 1619-23, leg. 273; 1623-30, leg. 274;
1631-40, leg. 275; Vinculos y Mayorazgos (A-N), vols. 1,
15-18, 139, 239, 242, 11, 200-283. Cartas y expedientes
del audiencia, 1597-1608, leg. 12; 1609-19, leg. 13 R2;
1631-43, leg. 15 Rl and 2; "Inventario de bienes de oficiales
reales" 1622, leg. 259; 260, 261 and 262. Cartas y
expedientes de corregidors visto en el consejo 1545-1700
leg. 5, Rl. Cartas y expedientes del vissorey visto en el
consejo 1597-1608, leg. 12, Rl; 1602-1603, leg. 14, Rl and
2; 1598, leg. 13 Rl; 1607-1609, leg. 16 R2; 1618-1622 leg.
18 Rl, 1604, leg. 15; 1636, leg. 21 Rl; 1637, leg. 22 Rl.
"Inventario de oficios vendibles," 1605, leg. 177 Rl;
1609, leg. 178 R2 and 4; 1595-1599, leg. 175 Rl, Ramo de
Tierras (A-N), leg. 136, la and 2 a partes, folio 346.
 73

5
Materials for the older members are drawn from
the following archival sources: Peticiones y memoriales,
1606-12, leg. 271; 1613-18, leg. 272; 1619-23, leg. 273;
1623-30, leg. 274. Personas seculares, 1605, leg. 124,
R2; 1606, leg. 125 R3 and 4; 1607, leg. 126 R5; 1609,
leg 128. R5; 1615, leg. 133-149 R5; 1618, leg. 122; 1620,
leg. 138 Rl; 1621, leg. 139 R4; 1622, leg. 140 R5; 1624,
leg. 142 Rl; 1629, leg. 147 Rl. Inventario de bienes de
oficiales reales, 1622, leg. 260, 261 and 262. Velasco to
council, 1607-09, leg. 16 Rll, Aug. 13, 1608. Audiencia to
council, 1597-1608, leg. 15 R4; 1604-06, leg. 12. Patronato
no. 62 Rl and 4; no. 221 R2; REales cadulas, testimonios y
copias de ellas, 1529-1715, leg. 7. Oficios vendibles,
1600, leg. 176.
g
J, Parry has made an excellent study of the sale
of public office and its effect on the Spanish administrative
system. See The Sale of PUblic Office in the Spanish Indies
Under the Hapsburgs, (University of California PressJ.
Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1953.
7Peticiones y memoriales, 1606-12, leg. 271, 1623-30,
leg. 274; 1619-23, leg. 273; Personas seculares, 1605,
leg. 124 R2, 1607, leg. 126 R5; 1609, leg. 128 R5, 1615,
leg. 133-149 R5, 1618, leg. 122, 1620, leg. 138 Rl.
Inventario de bienes, 1622, leg. 260, 261 and 262.
O
Personas seculares, leg. 120 R2, leg. 121 Rl and
4, leg. 124 Rl, leg. 125 R3, leg. 126 R5, leg. 130 R3 and
6, leg. 131 Rl, leg. 132, leg. 134 R3, leg. 136 R3, leg. 137
R4; Peticiones y memoriales, 1600, leg. 270, 1610-12,
leg. 271; Audiencia to council, 1597-1608, leg. 12, 1609-
19, leg. 13 R2, inventario de bienes, 1622, leg, 259, 260.
g
Personas seculares, 1638, leg. 151 R4.

"^Personas seculares, 1644, leg. 153 R2.

"^See footnote 8.
12
Peticiones y memoriales, 1623-30, leg. 274.
13Personas seculares, 1618, leg. 136 R3.
 74

"^Peticiones y memoriales, 1619-23, leg. 273.

IK
Personas seculares, 1644, leg. 153 R2.
16
There are numerous examples. There are three
members of the Geronimo Lopez family represented. The
relationship is further complicated by the fact that mem­
bers of this family are married to families of other
aldermen. Personas seculares, 1618, leg. 122, nos. 35 and
36; 1638; leg. 151 R2; "Peticiones y Memoriales," 1619-23,
leg. 273; General de Parte no. 6, Expd. 539, Fo. 297 AN;
no. 152, ppl 203-204; Archivo Notorias, seccion de
Protocolo, no. 4, 1624-1629. The same was true of the
families of Alonso de Valdes and Francisco de Solis. Both
families also had father and son represented in the council.
While other members of their families got married into
families of alderman. See for example: Personas .seculares,
1616, leg, 134-150 R3; 1620, leg. 138 R5; 1602, leg. 121
Rl; 1606, leg. 125 R3; 1608, leg. 127 Rl; 1607, leg. 126
R5; 1605, leg. 124 Rl; Peticiones y memoriales 1619-1623,
leg. 273; 1613-1618, leg. 272.
17See footnote 16.

18Personas seculares, 1610, leg. 129, no. 45, R3.

19Personas seculares, 1607, leg. 126, no. 40, R5.

20
Personas seculares, 1609, leg. 128 R5; 1621, -
leg. 139 R4; 1629, leg. 147 Rl.
21Inventario de bienes, 1622, leg. 260.

22Personas seculares, 1633, leg. 140 R5.

 CHAPTER III
THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

This chapter will try to establish what economic

group or groups were prominent in the municipal council.
Did councillors come from one economic sector or more?
Economic variables to be used include haciendas,
encomiendas, mining, mayorazgos, house ownership (urban
real estate), civil service jobs, etc. Such activities
like haciendas were land-oriented economies. But while
inheritance of a mayorazgo might have involved land owner­
ship, they also contained such properties as houses,
slaves and jewelry. An effort will therefore be made to
delineate what aspects of economic ventures aldermen were
involved in within a given economic sector.
The approach will be that used in the previous
chapter. Attempt will be made to determine the percentage
of the young and old that were involved in what economic
sector. Were younger members more into trade or land
holding? What percentage of the young and old inherited
mayorazgos? Were more American-born aldermen involved in
land activities than their Spanish counterparts? Is there
any interrelationship between family and economic
background?
Seventeenth Century Mexico City lent itself to all
forms of economic activities. Land and land-oriented
75
 76

activities predominated. Social norms placed a premium

on land. Status in society was determined by the economic
activities in which one was engaged.
The first conquerors were rewarded by the King .with
tribute and labor grants in the form of encomiendas. By
the beginning of the 17th Century, encomiendas were
gradually giving way to haciendas as the predominant
economic activity. 2 Second and third generation sons of
conquerors were often prominent land owners and so were
many of Mexico City's aldermen. Many councillors were
descendants of conquerors.3 Some of them, therefore,
inherited large tracts of land fran their families. There are
also numerous requests at this period for land grants of
all sorts. Mexico City aldermen often requested such
grants.^
Many land holders supplemented their holdings
through purchase and royal grants. Following the inaugura­
tion of Mexico City municipal government, the councillors had
the right to grant tracts of land to settlers. Such powers
were later transferred to the viceroy and the audiencia.
The Seccion de la Parte of Mexico's Archivo de la Nacion
and Ramo de Tierra are full of requests for land grants
during the period covered by this study.
Mining was another important economic activity in
this period. With commerce and trade, they supplemented
land activities as the main avenues of wealth. The
 77

restrictive nature of the Atlantic trade due to the

consulado system meant that settlers could only be involved
in internal trade. But this trade was also restricted as
inter-viceroyalty trading was difficult, A few aldermen,
however, made their wealth through trade. Such aldermen
may also have relations involved in mining. The majority
of the councillors, however, were involved in land and
land-oriented activities.
The textile industries (obrajes) an incipient form
of capitalism was important at this period. Arising out
of the sheepherding industry, it came to occupy an
important economic situation by mid .sixteenth century.
The average obraje housed its own employees which may vary
anywhere from thirty (the minimum if any gains are to be
made) to forty-five. This number of employees was necessary
since wool production was highly technical, with the chief
operations being washing, carding, spinning and weaving.
Some citizens directed their energies to textile
manufactures. A number of councillors supplemented their
economic activities with ownership of textile industries.
It is not known, however, how much capital lay-out was
involved. Of direct relevance to this analysis was a 1622
royal order asking every public servant to submit an
inventory of his wealth and land holdings. More than any
one document, this report furnishes a wealth of information
on the economic background of municipal council members.
 78

Because of this report, this chapter will include

information on the amount of capital various members had
in their possession by 1622. An effort will be made to
determine the worth in monetary terms of each economic
holding.
A schematic representation of the various activities
each member was involved in is shown in Appendix I. The
horizontal rows represent names of the aldermen while the
vertical columns represent the various economic activities.
Although encomiendas were on the decline they have been
included in the categories as certain members inherited
them. Besides, an annual rent of about 2,000 pesos on
such holdings make them economically important.
The figures in column 2 represent the approximate
worth of the haciendas in pesos. The numbers show how
many haciendas there were. A hacienda may contain up to
two or more estancias. Furthermore, estancias were used
for various purposes—as places for the raising of cows
(ganado mayor) or sheep etc. (ganado menor). The third
column, flour and sugar mills, may also be part of the
hacienda. They have been separated for easier analytical
purpose and their worth (where given) are not included in
the hacienda column.
Capillanias (column 6) are not economic ventures as
such. They are outgrowths of mayorazgos and wills of
dying Mexicans who set up church funds for specific number
 79

of masses to be said for the repose of their souls and a

lot to serve as the family's burial place. This category
has been included as the money set aside for them at times
go as high as 8,000 pesos. In a way, they are a measure
not only of the religious faith of its founder but of their
economic standing. The same is true of the last column
(charity organization), It has been included as a measure
of the financial position of its founder.
Mines and obrajes represent other means of economic
wealth. Their respective worths are indicated where known.
The worth of trading activities is more difficult to
determine. Their value has been indicated where known.
Otherwise, the type of trade is indicated. The column
"others" represent the amount of money an alderman may have
in his possession as of 1622. Included in this category
are dowries, overall worth of household belongings like
jewelry, slaves, mules, etc. and cash in hand. The column
on mayorazqos represents either the worth of the entail or
how many there are. Some of the entails were created by the
aldermen or inherited as survivors of its original founders
or through marriage. Finally, single astericks on the name
of an alderman means that he is Spanish-born while a double
asterick means he is over 40.
Table I is a general profile of the economic
activities aldermen were involved in. The number of alder­
men involved in various economic activities is shown. The
 TABLE I
GENERAL PROFILE OF ALDERMANIC ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

Charity
Mayor- Organi-
Encomienda Hacienda Mills Obrajes Mines Capillanias Trade Houses Others azgos zations

26 39 13 1 5 25 14 32 14 31 14
50% 77% 26% 2% 10% 50% 28% 64% 28% 62% 28%

oo
o
 81

percentage of the members involved in the various economic

activities is also included.
About fifty percent of known members had encomienda
holdings. This compares with seventy-seven percent who
owned haciendas. Royal refusals to extend the life of
most encomiendas at this time will explain why only about
half of the known aldermen possessed encomienda grants.
In comparison, the rising interest in large landed estates
at this point is fully mirrored in the percentage of alder-
men with haciendas.
On the other hand, interest in urban real estate
was great, as sixty-four percent of the aldermen possessed
them. This compares favorably with sixty-two percent of
the members who entailed their wealth into mayorazgos.
There is a trend here because family entails were usually
but not mainly made up of hacienda holdings and urban real
estate.
An attempt will now be made to analyze each economic
activity independently in order to see the type of members
that were involved.
Even though encomienda grants to conquerors and
their descendants were in a stage which Lesley B. Simpson
calls the "Tamed Encomienda,"6 they have been included in
the analytical categories as some of the aldermen inherited
such grants. Outside of the monetary value of such grants,
(some had an annual rent of up to 2,000 pesos), they point
 82

to the type of socio'-economic background from which some of

the councillors come from. Table II is a representation of
aldermen who inherited such tribute grants,7

TABLE II
NUMBER OF ALDERMEN WITH OR WITHOUT ENCOMIENDAS
Not
Known to Hold Encomiendas Known to Hold Encomiendas
Young Old Totals Young Old Totals

Ameri­
can
Born 20(39.3%) 4(7.7%) 24(47%) 6(11.9%) 2(3.8%) 8(15.7%)
Span­
ish
Born 1(1.9%) 1(1.9%) 2(3.8%) 8(15.7%) 9(17,6%) 17(33.3%)
Totals 21(41.2%) 5(9.6%) 26(50.8%)14(27.6%) 11(21.4) 25(49%)

From the above table, forty-seven percent of

American-born aldermen had encomienda holdings as compared
to 3.8% of Spaniards. The figures for American aldermen
reveal that 39.3 percent of young aldermen inherited
encomiendas while 7.7 percent of the old had such holdings.
On the whole about 41.2 percent of young aldermen had
encomiendas as compared to 9.6 percent for older members.
Taken jointly, about 50,8 percent of aldermen had
encomiendas.
The above percentages will make more sense if we
compare them to the percentages for those without informa*-
tion on encomienda holdings. High points of such a
 83

comparison reveals that information is lacking for 33.3

percent of Spanish, aldermen (young-15.7%; old-17.6%) as
opposed to 15.7 percent for American aldermen (young-11.9%;
old-3.2%), On the whole, there is no information on 27.6
percent of young aldermen and 21.4 percent of older coun­
cillors. Taken jointly, this represents about 49 percent
of the aldermen.
Although we don't know this, it is possible that a
lot more aldermen may have inherited encomiendas. However,
from the percentages of both unknown and known aldermen
with encomiendas, a far greater number of American aldermen
inherited encomiendas. This points to the fact that a
greater proportion of American-born aldermen either were
descendants of conquerors or may have married into such
families. Families like the Valdez, Cervantes, Caravajal
g
and Lopez are representative.
But there were other examples, Juan de Samano,
Hernan Perez de Bocanegra, Ruiz de la Mota all relations
of Mexico City aldermen were encomenderos, receiving yearly
tributes worth several thousand pesos. Most of them were
also cattle barons. Jeronimo Ruiz de la Mota, for example,
was encomendero for Chapa de Mota. In 1550, the King gave
him title to seven estancias inside chapa de Mota. He also
9
went into cattle trading at Jilotepec.
The Bocanegra family was another example. They
owned an encomienda in the Acambara<-Apaseo region.
 84

Tributes from the holding was worth 4,000 pesos by 1557.

At the same time, they acquired large farms in the same
region which brought an additional 6,000 pesos, Hernan
Perez owned a vineyard, an inn, three mills and a string
of cattle and sheep estancias in the same Apaseo region.
The significance of the figures in Table II will be
appreciated if we further break them down to show only the
number of American-born aldermen (young and old) who
inherited encomiendas, The result is shown in Table III.

TABLE III
AMERICAN-BORN ALDERMEN WITH ENCOMIENDAS

Young Old

Yes 20(77) 4(67)

No 6(23) 2(33)
Total 26 6

A greater number of both young and old American-

born aldermen were encomienda owners. Their annual rent
varied from 2,000 to 6,000 pesos depending on the number
of grants they inherited."'"''' One will not be wrong in
assuming, at this point, that a majority of American-born
aldermen had some relation (marital or otherwise) with
conquerors, and that many of them came from families with
land and land-oriented activities as one of the main
 85

sources of economic life. This last point is further

clarified if we consider Table IV which deals with the
number of aldermen who had haciendas and/or estancias.12

TABLE IV
ALDERMEN WITH HACIENDA—ESTANCIA HOLDINGS

Young Old Totals

American
Born 21(50) 6(37.5) 27
Spanish
Born 5(14) 7(38•6) 12
Unknown 9 3 12
Total 35 16 51

Of the known figures, five young American-born

aldermen, four young Spaniards and three old Spanish
aldermen were not involved in haciendas. On the other
hand, all known American-born aldermen over forty have
hacienda holdings. Taken collectively, Table IV does not
reveal much. Over 60% of young American-born aldermen were
land based while only 14% of their Spanish counterparts had
such interests. In sum, about 74% of young aldermen had
interests in land and land-oriented economies. However,
both Spanish and American-born aldermen seem to be equally
divided in terms of land activities among the older
members. Taken jointly, they represent over 70% of the
older councillors.
 86

To put it somewhat differently, since only five

out of the twenty-six young American-born aldermen did not
own haciendas, about 81% of them possessed agrarian
interests. With the same reasoning, since four of the
nine young Spanish-born councillors did not own haciendas,
over 50% of them were agriculturists.
The percentages are even higher for older members.
All known American-born aldermen had haciendas, while
three out of ten Spanish-born councillors did not have
them.
The monetary worth of some of the holdings where
known have been indicated in Appendix I. The story of
Jeronimo Lopez is instructive. Inheriting practically
nothing from his father who was a conqueror in Cortes' army,
he built a financial empire worth over 1,000,000 pesos.
He had over 200 haciendas. Some of his holdings were so
extensive that the King annexed part of his land to found a
new settlement—San Andres Chochones.13 Don Jeronimo
went further. He became the first to organize a form of
company of hacienda owners. His partners in this con­
glomerate were Baltasar de la Cabena, Alonzo Perez de
Bocanegra, Gaspar de Valdez and Baltasar de Valdez."^
It should be pointed out that the haciendas
represented a variety of economic activities including
estancias, for cows, sheep, goats, etc., Cganado mayor and
ganado menor), land for agricultural products and mills
 87

(flour and sugar). It will be informative to determine the

number of aldermen with haciendas that were involved in
cattle grazing, crop raising, etc.
Available evidence points to the fact that almost
all haciendas owners grazed gows, sheep, goatg, etc.,
while at the same time raising crops.15 Haciendas, by their
16
very nature, are usually self-sufficient. However,
involvement in sugar and flour mills were the exception
rather than the rule. For this reason, a column was
provided in Table I to show aldermen with mills as part
of their hacienda holdings.
Operation of the mills did require both capital and
technical know how. It is not surprising if only 13 out of
39 aldermen with haciendas were involved in sugar and
flour mills. Nine of these were American-born (7 young and
2 old), while four were Spanish-born (1 young and 3 old),
The same trend is present in the ownership of
obrajes (textile factories) and in mines. There were
about twenty-five in existence in early 17th Century
Mexico.17 Only one alderman—Luis Maldonado (....) was
18
American-born, involved in such an enterprise. A
possible explanation might be that obraje operation lacked
social prestige. Once a man made a small fortune from an
obraje, he got out, reinvested his profits in either
purchasing a bureaucratic post or in landed estate. It
will be interesting to see how many aldermen may have been
 88

involved in obrajes before purchasing their aldermanic

positions.
Aldermanic involvement in mining was slightly-
better. There are five known aldermen (all young Creoles)
who had mining interests.19 Unfortunately, there is no
data to indicate the worth of such mines. Appendix I
has indicated the names of those in mining and the number
of sites each had.20 Besides, some councillors after
having made their wealth in mining invested such profits
into land.
The Rivadeneira family, for example, grew rich in
the Pachua mines. With the wealth, they acquired land in
the papaloapan region. By 1610, Don Fernando had forty-
six estancias. This holding later gave rise to the great
hacienda known as La Estanzuela. Between 1610 and 1612
the family founded the big entail of Estrada-Carbajal" with
fifty-seven estancias which had thirty-eight laboring
black slaves.^
Initially, one of my aims was to find out if younger
aldermen made their wealth in trade. If such were the case,
these merchant aldermen might have brought a different
view point into the municipal council. This hypothesis
seemed appealing because of the law of mayorazqo which
forbade the division of family property, with most of the
wealth passing to the first son. This avenue of inquiry
yielded meager results. Some families were wealthy enough
 89

to divide their properties into three or more entails.

There were other options opened to the younger sons.
Some entered either the religious orders or the secular
clergy, while others married into other wealthy families.
Alonzo Gomez de Cervantes, lacking a male heir for
example, had a royal permission to renounce his aldermanic
seat to either one of his future sons-in-law. The same
sons-in-law were also to inherit his properties.22
Of all known cases, only twelve aldermen had trad­
ing interests, Eight of these were young American-born,
three old Spaniards and one young Spanish alderman.23
Their trading involvement ranged from the sale of wine to
hiring out mules, operating stalls and selling agricultural
products. With the exception of Gordian Cassasano who had
a semi-trading organization and Leandro Gatica who was an
outright trader, all other councillors supplemented their
economic activities with trade.24 Involvement in trade
was socially frowned upon. Francisco de Solis, son of the
Conquistador Pedro de Solis, was censured for having made
his wealth in "vile trade," While alcalde ordinario of
Mexico City, he married an Audiencia judge's daughter,
acquired land, operated a small sugar refinery and later
25
bought an aldermanic seat.
Coming from a background where land and land-
oriented activities were important determinants on the
social.hierarchy it was not wholly respectable to be
 90

primarily involved in trade. Leandro Gratica's case has

been noted in an earlier chapter, . Its importance to the
present analysis is that Gatica used the money he got as a
trader to buy an aldermanic seat. But he, Francisco de
Solis and Gordian Cassassano were exceptions rather than
the rule.
Investment in urban real estate may have been as
important as land ownership. Some family entails were
made up exclusively of urban real estate while it was
prominent in others. Tavle V below is a representation of
such house ownership.2 6

TABLE V
NUMBER OP ALDERMEN WHO OWNED HOUSES

Young Old

American
Born 17(47.50%) 6(37.50%)
Spanish
Born 4(11%) 5(31.50%)
Others 14 5
Total 35 16

A total of thirty-two members were in real estate.

The worth of some of the houses is given in Appendix I.
Viewed collectively, about fifty-eight percent of young
councillors invested in housing compared to about sixty-nine
 91

percent of older aldermen. These figures make more sense

if viewed from another point of view, as shown in Table VI.

TABLE VI
AMERICAN-BORN ALDERMEN WITH INVESTMENT IN HOUSING

Young Old

Yes 17(65%) 6 (100%)

No 9(35%)
Total 26 6

The results show that of all known cases about

sixty-five percent of young American-born aldermen invested
in housing, while all of the older American-born councillors
did the same. In the same way, four out of nine young
Spanish-born aldermen invested in urban real estate as
compared to five out of ten older Spanish-born aldermen.
It would seem, therefore, that urban holdings were as
important as land ownership.
The entailment of personal property (mayorazgo)
will now be analyzed not because it was an economic activity
but because it was a measure of capital wealth.27 Table VII
below shows the number of aldermen with such entails.
 92

TABLE VII
ALDERMEN WITH ENTAILS (MAYORAZGOS)

Young Old

American
Born 20(57%) 4(25%)
Spanish 3(8.50%) 4(25%)
Born
Unknown 12 8
Total 35 16

Table VII shows that thirty-one out of fifty-one

members had entails. This represents well over fifty per­
cent of known cases. Furthermore, both young and old
American-born councillors seem to have been more involved
in founding entails than their Spanish counterparts.
Spanish-born aldermen may not have had entails simply
because many came to Mexico as a final resting place in a
long career of bureaucratic service. This was especially
true of the older Spaniards. Younger Americans did not
fare better.
Statistically, while twenty out of twenty-six of
young American-born councillors had entails, only three
out of nine young Spanish aldermen had them. More
importantly, almost all of these three acquired them through
marriage to Mexican citizens.^
 93

Of greater significance is the worth of some of the

entails which is shown in Appendix I. Many American alder-
manic families were not just oligarchs and land-owners but
very rich families for 17th Century Mexico. At least
thirteen of them were rich enough to afford establishing
29
charity organizations of various types and values.
Of the thirteen who had charity organizations ten
were young and three old. The reason for the greater number
of the young was due to their inheritance of entails which
often stimulated the establishment of a charity organization,
But viewed differently, about fifty percent of both young
and old American-born aldermen respectively, had charity
organizations.
Another important index of the wealth of aldermen
was their establishment of capillanias (family burial
place and masses to be said for the dead). Table VIII
shows the number of aldermen with such establishments."^

TABLE VIII
ALDERMEN WITH CAPILLANIAS

Young Old

American
Born 15(43%) 4(25%)
Spanish
Born 3(8.50%) 3(19%)
Unknown 17 9
Total 35 16
 94

About fifty-one percent of the young had such

establishment while only forty-four percent of the old did.
Taken independently, fifteen out of twenty-six young
American aldermen had family burial places. This represents
roughly 58% of all known young American councillors. As
for older American-born aldermen, four out of six had such
an establishment. The percentages for Spanish-born
aldermen are much lower. For the young, three out of nine
and three out of ten for the old. A possible explanation
may be that Spaniards regarded their stay in Mexico as
temporary. If this was the case, they may have preferred
using their family burial places in Spain.
In the final analysis, agrarian interests pre­
dominated as the principal economic activity of Mexico
City municipal council members for the period of this
study. Interest in land was only equalled by their
interest in bureaucratic posts and real estate. American-
born aldermen having been longer in the scene naturally
were more involved.
Marriage and inheritance were more important
factors in acquiring land for many councillors especially
those from the peninsula. Trade was utilized by some
councillors as secondary ventures—avenues for marketing
their agricultural products.
Perhaps in conclusion, one should note that a
large percentage of aldermen mostly those born in America
 95

came from families of conquerors with deep roots in Mexico.

We must now turn our attention to how these councillors
reacted to differing social issues.
 96

L, B. Simpson, The Encomienda in New Spain,

(Berckeley & Los AngelesJ^ 1950 is the best known story of
such tribute and labor grants.
2
F. Chevalier has an excellent study on the rise
of haciendas in New Spain. See Land and Society in
Colonial Mexico, ed. with forward by L. B. Simpson.
(Berkeley & Los Angeles, 1966).
3Paso y Troncoso, vols. I, p. 78; IX, p. 13; XIII,
pp. 4-5, 9, 36-37, 45, 73; XV, pp. 126-127, 219.
4
General de Parte 5, expl. 238, fo. 52, July, 1599;
7, exp. 0297 fi 94 Ramo de Tierra, 1693, vol. 155, expl.
6, fo. 20.
5Materials for this table are drawn from the
following archival sources: Inventario de Bienes 1622
leg. 260, A.G.I.; Seccion de Protocolos (Archivo de
Notorias, Mexico (nos. 106, 1625-26; no. 4 1624-29; no. 49,
1621; no. 107 c 1622 and no. 335, 1631; Vinculos y mayorazgos
(A.G.I.) vols. 1, 15-18, 40, 51, 77, 97, 111, 116, 139,
239, 200-283, 242, 229, 222, 268, and 233; Escituras censos
(A.A.A.) leg. 2, expd. 4, vol. 2012; leg. 3, expd, 5-19;
leg. 4, expd, 2, vol. 2012; Ramo de Tierras (A.G.N.) 1608,
vol. 168, 29 Parte expd. 2, fo. 36; 1615, vol. 80, expd, 2,
fo. 136; 1589, vol. 16, expd. 1, fo. 63; 1653 vol. 104,
expd. 5, fo. 21; 1669-82, vol. 127, 29 parte, expd. 3, fo.
199, 1670, vol, 30, expd. 2, fo. 134; 1686-88, vol. 136, 1
ayza, partes fo. 346; General de Parte (A.G.N.) vol. 3,
expd. 556, fo. 267; vol. V, expd. 43-43V, 142v, 1415, fo. 319,
197, fo. 43, 243v-244; vol. 6, expd. 352, fo. 229, 1039 F
452; vol. 7, expds. 281, fo. 182, 297, fo. 194, 570 fo.
366; vol. XI, no. 264, Bienes, Nationales (A.G.N.) vols.
53, no. 53; 56 nos. 8-9, 25, 87; 29 Nos. 50, 64; 54 nos.
1, 2, 7; 58 nos. 8, 14, 19; 62 no. 21; 66 no. 9; 18 no.
32; 27 no. 76; 91 no. 75; 78 no. 52; 128 no. 5; 132 no.
39; 137 no. 150; 185 no. 79; 194 no. 5; 185 no. 50.

Lesley B, Simpson, The Encomienda in New Spain,

p. 145 f.
J
Paso y Trancoso, vol. I, p. 78; IX, p. 13; XIII,
pp, 4-5, 9, 36-37, 45, 73.
 97

^Ibid.
9Chevalier, p. 119.

"^Chevalier, p. 120.

"^Paso y Trancoso, vol. I, p. 78; IX, p. 13; XIII,

pp, 4-5, 9, 36-37, 45, 73.
12The types and sizes of haciendas may have varied.
The important thing is that they were land-oriented
activities.

"^Chevalier, pp. 143-4.

"^General de Parte 5, expd. 544, fo. 119 (Nov.

1599) A.G.N.
15See footnote 5 above.

1 £•
See Chevalier, Land and Society in Colonial Mexico,
ed. with forward by L. B. Simpson. (Berkeley & Los
Angeles, 1966).
17Charles Gibson, The Aztecs, p. 243.

18Escrituras censos, legajo no. 2, expd. no. 4,

vol. 2012, A.A.A.
19See footnote 5 above.

20
The Ibarra family is examplary, Diego de Ibarra
was one of the first to begin mining the rich mines of
Zacatecas, in association with Christobal de Onate and
Juan de Tolosa its discovered in 1546. By 1554, a cousin
of Diego—Francisco and others had discovered other mines
in Fresuillo, San Alto, San Martin, Mazapil, Avino, etc.
A descendant of theirs—Diego de Ibarra an alderman
inherited some of these. See Chevalier, p. 42.

^Chevalier, p. 145.
 98

22
Reales Cedulas, testimonios y copias de ella
1529-1715, leg. 7, March 11, 1593, A.G.I.
2^Personas Seculares 1638, leg. 151, 24; Protocolos
nos. 106, 1625-26; no. 4, 1624-29; noxa 1621; no. 107c 1622,
no, 335, 1631; Vinculos y mayorazgos vds. 40, 51, 77, 111,
116, 139.

2^Paso y Trancoso Vol. XI, p. 98; General de Parte

vol. 3, exp. 556, fo. 267; Bienes Nationales vol. 195,
no. 6; Personas Seculares 1638, leg. 151, r, 4, (A.G.I.)

^Chevalier, p. 144.
26Vinculos y mayorazgos vols. I, 15-18, 40, 51,77,
97, 111, 116, 139, 239, 200-283, 242, 229, 222, 268, 233;
Ramo de Tierra, 1608-—vol. 168, 2a parte, expd. 2, fo. 36;
Inventario de Bienes 1622, leg. 260.
9Q
See footnote 23.
29Bienes Nationales vols. 53 no. 53; 56 nos. 8-9,
25 and 87; 29 nos 50, 64, 54 nos. 1, 2, 7; 58 nos. 8, 14, 19
62 no. 21; 66 no. 9; 18 no. 32; 27 no. 76; Inventario de
Bienes 1622, leg. 260.
30
See footnote 5 above.
 CHAPTER IV
MUNICIPAL ROLL-CALL ANALYSIS:
ISSUES AND OPINIONS

Mexico City government dealt with a multiplicity of

subjects. Issues ranged from the election of officials in
charge of city duties, to regulation of the granaries.
This broad spectrum included concern for collection of city
taxes, public works, payment of the alcabala (sales tax),
reception of visiting dignitaries, etc.
The election of city officials (on a yearly basis),
the question of the alcabala, acceptance and/or rejection
of viceregal orders, salary payments and public works
were most hotly debated. The city council arrived at
decisions on these issues through a voice vote. The
corregidor as president accepts the majority opinion as
binding. Aldermen dissatisfied with any such result were
free to appeal to the Audiencia. Such an action was used
either when the voting was too close or when the corregidor
overruled the council.
Aldermanic representation at the outset was
limited to twelve. Such members had "voice" and "vote"
("voz y voto"). The advent of the sale of public offices
changed the nature of representation. Four new members
(with voting rights) were added to the original twelve. The
99
 100

new members were drawn primarily from among the peninsular

Spaniards. Originally appointed to royal positions in
the colony (Contador, Factor, Correo mayor, Deposiario
general), their authority was extended to include right
to "voice" and "vote" in the common council. With two to
three other Spaniards, they represented a separate regional
group which might, on occasion, form an "opposition" to
the predominant American-born aldermen.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the
relationship•between these groups. Their approach to the
city's problems is the subject being dealt with. Do they
see city problems as individuals or as members of two
separate groups? In short, what is the index of group and/or
intragroup cohesiveness? O ne other variant will be the
age dichotomy. Do younger aldermen (under 40) tend to
cohere in opposition to older members or is ethnic
differentiation more important?
For a satisfactory answer to these questions, it
will be instructive to begin by analyzing the agreement
indexes for the two ethnic groups. Disagreement indexes
could be arrived at by subtracting the percentage of
"yea" votes for the Spaniards from that for Americans
(%Ys-%Ya). The agreement index is stated as ]00<-(%Ys-
%Ya). The result of such an analysis for the fifty voting
issues is shown in Appendix II. —
 101

Table I represents the agreement indexes for both

ethnic groups on the issue of the election of minor city
officials.

TABLE I
AGREEMENT INDEXES: ELECTION OF MINOR CITY OFFICIALS

Issue Spanish American Agreement Index

4 100 72.7 72.7

5 40 63.6 76.4
7 100 54.5 54.5
11 100 63.6 63.6
12 60 81.8 78.2

Index = 69.8

The agreement index between the two regional

groups was quite high—69.8. Since the same high level
of agreement was achieved by the two ethnic groups on the
fifty issues (91.46), ethnicity was not very important in
the consideration of specific issues.
This contention is further supported by an
analysis of the agreement indexes between Spaniards and
Americans on the question of the sales tax. The result
is shown in Table II.
 102

TABLE II
SALES TAX: INDEX OF ETHNIC AGREEMENT

Issue Spanish American Agreement Index

33 100 100 75
34 50 18.4 68.4
35 100 100 100
36 50 25 75
37 75 66.6 91.6

Index = 82

Just as in the issue of the election of minor city

officials, there was a high level of agreement among Spanish
and American aldermen on the question of the sales tax (82).
A consideration of the third issuer—Audiancia and viceregal
directives revealed the same high level of agreement
among both ethnic groups (89.4). The result is shown in
Table III.
 103

TABLE III
AUDIENCIA AND VICEREGAL DIRECTIVES:
ETHNIC INDEX OF AGREEMENT

Issue Spanish American Agreement Index

6 80 50 70
10 100 72.7 72.7
13 66.6 62.5 95.9
15 0.0 50 50
19 100 66.7 66.7
21 66.6 58.3 91.7

Index = 89.4

The high level of agreement among Spanish and

American aldermen reveals that regional differentiation
was not very important in determining the way an aldeirman
would vote on any given issue. But if ethnic background
was not very important, what role did age play?
Appendix III represents the agreement index for
both young and old on the fifty issues. As in the ethnic
dichotomy the two age groups achieved a high level of
agreement on the fifty issues.
The high levels of agreement for both ethnic groups
and for both the young and old leads one to conclude that
aldermen acted more as a unified whole than as Spaniards,
Americans, young, and" old. One can also conclude that the
 104

the idea of the city council as an institutional whole

was more important than age and regional differences.
Another way to check this contention is to analyze
the cohesion scores for both ethnic and age groups to
see how high or low they were. Low cohesion scores will
further support the conclusion that aldemen acted in unison.
The Rice index of cohesion will be used to analyze
the two categoric groups. 2 Cohesion is the extent of
deviation of votes on a legislative roll call from the
distribution that would be expected with.,all influences
operating at a random fashion. If one hundred members vote
in a random fashion, their votes will be equally divided
between "yeas" and "nays." Rice called this "minimum
cohesion" with an index value of zero. "Complete cohesion"
with an index value of 100 will be reached when all
members vote on the same side. The range of the index is,
therefore, 0 to 100. The degree of variation from 50.0
towards 0.0 or 100.0 becomes important.3
The index may be derived by a conversion of the
number of votes for each group into percentages of the
total number of persons voting in each category. The
absolute percentage difference in the two categories is the
Rice index.
This measure has been chosen because of the very
few aldermen voting on any given issue (from twelve to
seventeen.) The original approach was to analyze all of
 105

the recorded issues. This proved impossible. Fewer than

ten members voted on many issues. The degree of
participation (no less than twelve members) was, therefore,
chosen as the criterion for selecting the votes to be
analyzed.
The selection may seem arbitrary. It is hoped
to compensate.for this by finding absolute percentage
indexes for all of the years for which votes have been
chosen. Furthermore, the problem of mistaken inference
which may result from the use of ethnic and age differ­
entiations will be minimized by the use of a third variable-—
issues being voted on. Index of cohesion based on
respective issues will, therefore, be found for both
regional and age groups.
The use of the degree of participation as the
criterion for the selection of votes resulted in the
utilization of only fifty voting issues out of over four
hundred. Topically, they include the election of minor
city officials, the question of sources of funds for the
city, relations with the viceroy and audiencia, the
regulation of city granaries and the granting of bids for
the suppliers of various city needs. The system used in
selecting the issues, dictated 1621 as a terminal date. 4
The same system of selection resulted in using 1599 as the
commencement date.^
 106

Ethnic dichotomy was first utilized to analyze the

fifty issues. The attempt was to determine the indexes - —
of cohesion between American and Spanish born aldermen.
The use of the Rice index of cohesion resulted in certain
percentages which are shown in Appendix IV.
The first column represents the issues being
voted on. Numerical figures of 1 to 50 (depending on the
date sequence) have been assigned to them for purposes of
identification. Column two shows the "yea'1 and "nay"
votes for Spanish-born aldermen. It also shows the index
of cohesion on the votes for each issue for the Spanish
aldermen. Column three presents similar data for American-
born aldermen. The fourth column has been included to
identify the date the issue was voted on.
The letters "Y" and "N" under "votes" in columns
two and three represent the "yeas" and "nays" votes. The
figures directly after are the number of councillors voting
on each side of the issue. The final figures represent
percentages of the various votes. The index of cohesion
was arrived at by finding the absolute percentage
difference in the two categoric votes. For purposes of
comparison, indexes of cohesion were found for all of the
fifty voting issues for both regional groups.
An analysis of the mean index of cohesion on the
fifty voting issues for both groups shows that Spanish-
born aldermen were more successful in approaching "maximum
 107

cohesion" (56.2) than were the Americans (44.56). These

figures were arrived at by a simple mathematical division
of the indexes of cohesion by fifty (the total number of
issues).
The above results reveal that aldermen had
considerations in mind other than their regional backgrounds
in voting for or against an issue.
Table IV represents the indexes of cohesion by
both groups on the issue of election of minor city officials.
The various issues have been identified by assigning them
their original numbers from Appendix II.

TABLE IV
COMPARATIVE INDEXES OF COHESION ON THE ELECTION
OF MINOR CITY OFFICIALS

Index of Cohesion Index of Cohesion

Issue Spanish Born American Born

#4 100.0 45.5
#5 20.0 27.2
#7 100.0 9.0
#11 100.0 27.2
#12 20.0 63.6

TAble I shows that while the Spanish-born aldermen

reached maximum cohesion on three electoral issues, the
American aldermen only approached that level on one
occasion. Various explanations could be found to explain
 108

the lack of cohesion in the American councillor's stand on

city elections. The most obvious hypothesis would be that,
representing a society in which they had lived all their
lives, they were bound to have friends, family, relations,
associates, etc, whom they may have wanted to see elected.
The multiplicity of individual preferences may have
resulted in the lack of unison in the election of city
officials. His Spanish counterpart on the other hand, may
not have been hampered by these loyalties. Indeed, in a
society where wealth, social status and more importantly,
family connections were important in determining ascribed
statuses, the American aldermen succumbed to a prevailing
g
social norm. Spanish aldermen coming to the Indies for a
limited period of time did not have to cope with this
problem. Many of them occupied various administrative
positions in other parts of the Indies before coming to
Mexico to serve in the town council.7 Their familial and
extra-familial connections especially in Mexico were
therefore limited.
Table V shows the indexes of cohesion on various
issues dealing with the payment of the sales tax to the
King in Spain. The debates on such payments are usually
hard and prolonged. They invariably find most American-
born aldermen in agreement, especially in opposition or
reduction of such payments.
 109

TABLE V
SALES TAX: INDEX OF ETHNIC COHESION

Index of Cohesion Index of Cohesion

Issue Spanish Born American Born

#33 50.0 100.0

#34 0.0 63.2
#35 100.0 100.0
#36 0.0 50.0
#37 50.0 33.2

The Airierican aldermen achieved "maximum cohesion"

on two of the issues (No. 33 and 35), and were above average
on issues 34 and 36. The Spanish aldermen did not fare as
well. The percentages are more meaningful when further
analyzed. They reveal that while the American were
willing to pay the sales tax as was customary (issue no. 33),
they were largely opposed (Y=2, N=10) to the payment of
100,000 pesos as requested by the King (issue no. 34).
However, they were willing (100%) to suspend action on
such payments until an unspecified later date (issue no. 35).
A reconsideration of the same motion two weeks
later revealed that only one of their members had shifted
his stand to support the payment of 100,000 pesos (issue
no. 36; Y=3, N=9). Finally, a greater number agreed to
pay the reduced amount of 90,000 pesos (issue no. 37).
However, the index of cohesion was low as four out of the
 110

twelve members opted for a further reduction of the

p
amount to 85,000 pesos. It follows, therefore, that
payments of the sales tax did not cause too much friction.
Contrary to expectations, American-born aldermen
displayed a far "minimum level of cohesion" in comparison
to Spanish aldermen in their votes on issues relating to
viceregal directives. Table VI is a schematic representa­
tion of the two groups' responses.

TABLE VI
INDEX OF COHESION ON AUDIENCIA AND VICEREGAL DIRECTIVES

Index of Cohesion Index of Cohesion

Issue Spanish Born American Born

#6 60.0 0.0
#10 100.0 45.4
#13 33.2 25.0
#15 100.0 0.0
#19 100.0 33.4
#21 33.2 16.6

While the Spanish councillors were almost unanimous

in accepting or rejecting any viceregal interference in
council affair, the Americans, on the other hand, were not
as successful. In fact, a majority of votes cast by the
latter on the issue of viceregal intervention tended to be
more positive than negative. That is, a majority of
 Ill

American-born aldermen voted in favor of the rulings.

One would have expected the opposite view to be
true especially when Mexico City,- Council had from the
beginning championed the cause of all New Spain. More
importantly, their lack of cohesion conflicts with the
historical fact of their unending struggle to safeguard
their rights and privileges viz-a-viz King and viceroy.
Some of these struggles were extensively dealt with in
chapter one of this thesis. Such issues as their right
to control the admission of royal officials having "voice"
and "vote" in common council, to freely elect city officials
and to safeguard their preeminence in the face of viceregal
onslaught were forever alive in petitions and memorials
sent to the King through their representative.
Perhaps the only explanation for the dichotomy may
be that either the issues in question were not very
important or that aldermen did not find common cause from
an ethnic point of view. Their "mean index of cohesion"
based on ethnic differentiation for the fifty case issues
(44.56 as opposed to 56.2 for the Spaniards) seems to
further support this contention. Besides, they succeeded in
achieving a measure of cohesion above average in only one
of three case issues (the sales tax) dealt with in
Tables I and III.
Comparatively, the index of disagreement between
the two regional groups was 10.6% as opposed to their
 112

index of agreement—89.4%• A consideration of the

indexes of agreement for the three case issues (69.8;
82; and 89.4) reveals that ethnic differences did not
divide aldermen while considering specific issues. If
regional differences were not very important what was?
Another method of determining the reasons for the
voting trends is to find the role age played within each
group. Table VII presents the result of such a
subdivision.
 TABLE VII

ELECTIONARY ISSUE—INDEXES BASED ON IN-GROUP AGE PERFORMANCE

Spanish-Born American-Born
Issue Young Index Old Index Young Index Old Index

Y=3-100% Y=2=100% Y=6=85.7% Y=2=50%

#4 100 100 71.4 0.0
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0% N=l=14.3% N=2=50%
Y=l-33.4% Y=l=50% Y=5=71.4% Y=2=50%
#5 33.2 0.0 42.8 0.0
N=2=66.4% N=l=50% N=2=28.6% N=2=50%
Y=4=100% Y=l=100% Y=5=71.4% Y=l=25%
#7 100 100 42.8 50.
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0% N=2=28.6% N=3=75%
Y=3=100% Y=2=100% Y=6=75% Y=l=33.4%
#11 100 100 50 33.2
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0% N=2=75% N=2=66.6%
Y=2=66.6% Y=l-50% Y=5=71.4% Y=4=100%
#12 33.2 0.0 42.8 100
N=l=33.4 N=l=50% N=2=28.6% N=0=0.0%
Mean Index 73.3 60.0 50.0 36.6
 114

The result is not definitive. The figures, however,

reveal a trend. They show that age differentiation was
sufficiently a factor within each ethnic group. The young
in both categoric groups achieved a higher level of
cohesion than the old (73.3 to 60.0) mean index for
Spaniards and 50.0 to 36.6 for American-born aldermen).
On the whole, Spanish councillors were more impressive
performers.
Looked at differently, the index of disagreement
between young and old Spaniards was 0, while their
agreement index was 100. For Americans, their disagreement
index was 23.75 and their agreement index was 76.25.
Collectively, the disagreement index between young and
old was 11.6 as compared to their agreement index of 88.4.
It follows, therefore, that age as a controlled factor was
not important as a determinant.
The age dichotomy within each regional group is
further illustrated by the next case issue—the sales tax.
The result is schematically represented in Table VIII.
 TABLE VIII

THE SALES TAX—INDEX OF ETHNIC GROUP AGE PERFORMANCES

Spanish-Born American-Born
Issue Young Index Old Index Young Index Old Index

Y=2=66.6% Y=l=100% Y=8=100% Y=2=100%

#33 33.2 100 100

0\0
N=l=33.4% N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0%

o
O
O
a
II
II
Y=l=33.4% Y=l=100% Y=l=10% Y=l=50%
#34 33.2 80.0 0.0
N=2=66.6% N=0=0.0% • N=9=90% N=l=50%
Y=2=100% Y=2=100% Y=8=100% Y=l=100%
#35 100 100 100
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0%
Y=l=33.4% Y=l=100% Y=0=0.0% Y=3=100%
#36 33.2 100 100
N=2=66.6% N=9=9.0% N=9=100% N=0=0.0%
Y=2=66.6% Y=l=100% Y=6=60% Y=2=100%
#37 33.2 20.0 100

3!

0\0
N=l=33.4% N=0=0.0% N=4=40%

O
O
II
II
Mean Index 46.4 80.0

H
M
U1
 116

It is unfortunate that the number of older councillors

voting on both sides are too few for any meaningful trend
to be determined. The young present a different picture.
The young American aldermen achieved a very high level
of cohesion. Although the young Spaniards did not reach
average cohesion, their division on each of the issues
was quite constant. In fact, their performance was defined
by the constancy and similarity of their stand on each of
the issues.
Looked at differently, the disagreement index
between the young and old Spaniard was 40% while that
between the American aldermen was 36%. Conversely, the
agreement index for Spaniards was 60% while that for
Americans was 64%. Taken jointly, the disagreement index
between the young and old was 38% and the agreement index
was 62%.
Table IX shows the result of a similar test for
the third case issue—viceregal intervention on city
activities,
 TABLE IX

INDEX OF COHESION BASED ON AGE DIFFERENTIATION FOR EACH REGIONAL GROUP

Spanish-Born American-Born
Issue Young Index Old Index Young Index Old Index

Y=2=66.6% Y=2=100% Y=3=50% Y =2=50%

#6 33.2 0.0 0.0
N=l=33.4% N=0=0.0% N=3=50% N=2=50%
Y=3=100% Y=2=100% Y=5=71.4% Y=3=75%
#10 100 42.8 50
N=0=0.0% N=9=9.0% N=2=28.6% N=l=25%
Y=l=50% Y=l=100% Y=3=60% Y=2=66.6%
#13 0.0 20 33.2
N=l=50% N=0=0.0% N=2=40% N=l=33.4%
Y=0.0.0% Y=0=0.0% Y=3=50% Y=l=50%
#15 100 0.0 0.0
N=2=100% N=l=100% N=3=50% N=l=50%
Y=3=100% Y=l=100% Y=7=77.7% Y=l=33.4%
#19 100 55.4 33.2
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0% N=2=22.3% N=2=66.6%
Y=0=0.0% Y=2=100% Y=4=50% Y=3=75%
#21 100 0.00 50
N=l=100% N=0=0.0% N=4=50% N=l=25%
Mean Index 72.1 17.7 27.7
 118

The number of aldermen voting in the ranks of old

Spaniards is too few to merit any meaningful consideration.
Outside of young Spaniards, the mean index for the
Americans is quite below average (17.7 for the young and
27.7 for the old). The index of disagreement between
young and old was 14.6 and their agreement index was
85.4%.
Taking all three case issues into consideration,
the issues in question seem not to have had a very
important part to play since the levels of agreement were
quite high in comparison to the low cohesive scores.
Another test of the conclusion that aldermen
acted in unison is to find out what role family connections
played. Such connections were both marital and familial.
An analysis of the indexes of cohesion based on measures
of interpersonal agreements will help to show if familial
relationship was important in the vote.
Essentially, interpersonal agreement is the number
of times two legislators agree on a series of roll calls.
The three case issues already analyzed will be used for
this purpose. However, not all the sixteen cases con­
tained in the three case issues will be utilized. In
short, the index of interpersonal agreement will be
expressed as a function of the total number of possible
agreements; especially when some members were not present
9
for all the roll-calls.
 119

Geronimo Lopez and Alonzo de Valdez were related

through marriage. Both members participated in seven out
of the sixteen cases (issues 7, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 10).
They disagreed on two (issues 11 and 12). Another com­
parison between the performances of Geronimo Lopez and
Gasper de Valdez, brother of Alonzo de Valdez reveals
that out of five issues in which both participated (issues
7, 4, 5, 6 and 15), they agreed on two (nos. 4 and 15).
A similar comparison between the two Valdezes—
Alonzo and Gasper—shows that they voted alike on one of
four issues (no. 4). The same cross-check between
Francisco de Trejo, a relative of both the Lopez and
Valdez families through marriage, and Geronimo Lopez
shows that they agreed on four of nine issues. Francisco
de Trejo and Alonzo de Valdez were in agreement on six
of ten issues. The same high level of agreement resulted
between Trejo and Gasper de Valdez (four out of six
issues).
Of the six interpersonal performances considered,
the index of intra-group cohesion was 22 of 41 votes. In
short, the index of agreement was about average.
Finally, age was used as a third variable in
analyzing aldermanic performance. The approach was to use
age in the same way that regional differentiation was
used, to analyze the fifty issues. The attempt is different
from results presented in earlier tables dealing with age.
 120

While the former attempt was to see the role of age within
each ethnic group, the present effort is the analysis of
the age dichotomy in an uncontrolled manner. The result
is presented in Appendix V.
The mean index of cohesion was above average for
both age groups. The older members were more successful
in their mean index towards "maximum cohesion"'—54.9 as
opposed to 51.0 for younger councillors. The index of
disagreement between the young and old was 0, while the
index of agreement was 100. A utilization of the three
case issues dealing with election, payment of the sales
tax and the question of viceregal directives resulted in
the following mean indexes:
Election: Young = 53.3; Old = 27.9.
Sales Tax: Young = 74.0; Old = 86.6.
Relation to the viceroy: Young = 33.8; Old = 41.6.
This compares with the mean indexes on the same
issues already dealt with for the regional groups:
Election: Spaniards = 68.0; Americans = 34.5.
Sales tax: Spaniards = 40.0; Americans = 69.3.
Relation to viceroy: Spaniards = 71.0; Americans =
19.8.
In comparison, the agreement indexes for the young
and old on the three case issues was:
 Election: 88.4
Sales Tax: 62
Relation to the viceroy: 85.4
The agreement indexes for the two ethnic groups
was:
Election: 69.8.
Sales tax: 82
Relation to the viceroy: 89.4.
From the above figures, while the cohesion scores
for the young and old was 53.7 and 52 respectively, their
agreement index for the same issues was 78.6. Further­
more, while the cohesion scores for Spaniards and Americans
was 59.6 and 41.2 respectively, their agreement index
was 80.4.
The high level of agreement among both young and
old Spanish and American aldermen leads one to conclude
that they acted as a group while considering the city's
problems. Their collective action is not very surprising
since the majority of them came from the same social
and economic background.
Since their voting action reveals that they acted
as a group, it will now be interesting to analyze the
legislations they passed for the welfare of the society.
 122

Perhaps that statement should be modified to mean

a separate regional entity not necessarily in opposition.
The overall number of Spaniards in the council varied with
time.
2
This approach was first suggested to me by
Professor Peter Smith.
3
Taken from Lee F. Anderson et al. Legislative
Roll-Call Analysis, Northwestern University Press,
Evanston, 1966, pp. 29-40.

^Council meeting of August 26, 1621.

5See minutes of the Council for November 3, 1599.

Professor John L. Phelan has made a study of

this phenomenon as it worked in the higher echelon of the
Spanish bureaucracy. See The Kingdom of Quito in the
Seventeenth Century, University of Wisconsin Press,
Madison, 1967. See especially pp. 130-133.
7See Chapter II.

o
See Minutes of September 9, 1616.
9For further details on this methodology, see
Lee F. Anderson et al. Legislative Roll-Call Analysis,
p. 40.
 CHAPTER V
THE COUNCIL AND SOCIAL GROUPS:
THE URBAN WORKER

The remaining part of this thesis will deal with

the relationship between the council and other socio­
economic groups in the society--the urban worker (gremios—
guilds), mestizos, Indians and Blacks, property owners
(hacendados) and their price regulatory activities. The
first part of this thesis has been limited to a background
of the aldermen. The second part is a story of their
performance. It is hoped to determine the interrelation­
ship, if any, between background and performance.
This chapter is a study of the interrelation
between the municipal council and the urban worker as
represented by the gremios (urban guild). The guilds
covered a whole gamut of municipal crafts from shoe making
to gold smithing and leather works. They represented a
separate estate with ascribed status and privileges
(fueros). Their status and privilege was in part
Utilitarian (changing with conditions in Mexico).
As urban economic organizations, they came under
the direct control of the town council. Mexico City
government was in charge of enacting ordinances for the
control, organization and operation of these guilds. This
123
 124

chapter will deal with the ordinances and regulations

promulgated by the council for an orderly functioning of
the guilds.
The approach will be to analyze the various
ordinances (ordenanzas) passed by the town council and
see the effects, if any, they had on personal initiative
and trade expansion. Furthermore, an effort will be made
to see if there is any correlation between the nature of
these ordinances and what we already know about the
social and familial background of the aldermen.
Following the tradition in the peninsula, Mexico
City town guilds formed a distinct estate with defined
rights and privileges. Although primarily economic in
nature, the guilds carried out certain social functions
for their members through their mutual aid associations.
Representing a socio-economic entity, their rights and
privileges were not only traditional but functional."'"
One way of approach will be to analyze the various
ordinances from a thematic point of view. Just as the
guilds covered all aspects of pre-capitalist economic
ventures, the ordinances covered every minute detail
necessary for an orderly economic development. In
particular, almost all of the laws included safeguards for
the consumer, protection of children of qualified master
guilders (maestros), regulations whereby only qualified
citizens could own shops, a specified period of apprenticeship
 125

before one could become a maestro, laws prohibiting

hoarding and the subsequent increase in prices, regulation
against mergers, expansion and monopolies; discrimination
against unmarried white males and the non-white majority
and finally fair wages and hours of work.
Mexico City aldermen displayed a keen interest
for good quality, fair prices and correct labeling. The
above three concerns tended to merge into one in the
ordinances to the benefit of the consumer and the small
craftsman. The ordinance for leather workers furnishes a
good example,^
Members of the gremio complained to the city
council that some of the leather maestros with the means
to travel outside the city often bought up all the
leather in the surrounding villages. Such leather could
last them for over a year. Since there were only five
citizens doing this, the majority of the guild members
were forced to buy from these five resulting in the rise
in production costs. The complainers wanted the council
to prohibit this trend.
The complaint itself is interesting because a
city ordinance in the mid-sixteenth century forbade any
member of any guild from purchasing his wares outside of
the city. The argument behind this was that indians
wishing to sell their wares to artisans should bring them
to the city where all the guild members would have an
 126

opportunity to bid for them in public. Such a move was

designed to prevent hoarding, lower prices and protect
the smaller artisans.
To combat this the council ordinance of November 9,
1606, stipulated that no shoemaker personally or through
an intermediary should leave the city for the purpose of
buying up leather goods either in small or large quantities,
and that the leather must be brought to the city by those
who sell them where they are required to sell them to all
examined maestros. Furthermore, no maestro could resell
his leather except in the form of shoes, More importantly
all leather goods purchased must first be declared with
the city officials. To ensure observance, a fine of
fifteen pesos was imposed on anyone contravening the
ordinance.
Another facet of the same law prohibited shoe
makers from selling their shoes outside of the city. The
reasoning was that many maestros failed to declare such
wares to city officials with the hope of making exhorbitant
profits outside of the city. Such a move, the law argued,
not only led to unfair prices but to reduction in quality.
Although the law did not say so, the ordinance
favored smaller shoemakers and more importantly, the
consumer. The concern with hoarding and unfair practices
meant that the poorer shoemaker had a fighting chance.
As for the consumer, a check on prices at least ensured
 127

that he was paying for what he received. The third and

fourth parts of this ordinance were explicit on this point
even though they did not mention the consumer.
Both parts of the ordinance stated:
many shoemakers to cover the bad quality of
their leather, tan them contrary to the many
ordinances of this city .... Any such
offenders will be liable to forfeiture of
all leather and a fine of 300 gold pesos. . .
and
because many badly cut and badly made shoes
are often sold contrary to the ordinance, every
leatherman will be expected to show his wares
on the visit of the corregidor [council
president] and his deputies and officials of
the shoe gremio. Failure to comply will mean
a fine of 10 gold pesos.^
It seems the ordinance was effective, as the
council did not receive further complaints until 1632. On
this occasion, it was revealed that monopoly buying and
hoarding still went on. Responding, the council, appointed
a juez veedor to see to the enforcement of the 1606
ordinance. Furthermore, the juez veedor and a deputy were
henceforth to receive salaries so that they devote all
their energies to enforcing the law. Their salary was to
5
be derived from taxing shoe makers and leather traders.
As late as 1659, the council was forced to re-enact
the same ordinance because of "the abuses the leather
i '

workers inflict on the public, not only in Mexico City but

g
in all of New Spain." According to the origin of the
problem, leather owners, sell their wares to shoemakers
 128

without first declaring their worth and quality to the

city officials. This enabled shoe makers to re-tan the
leather from their original colors to white (the most
expensive). Such a practice was deceitful and led to
unfair prices.
To prevent this, the new law made it mandatory for
every seller to furnish full information on the quality
and type of leather of which each shoe was made. Any
misinformation or adulteration of the ware meant a fifty
peso fine for the first offence, one hundred pesos for a
second offence and two hundred pesos and loss of license
for the third offence. The shoemaker was also made
responsible for the acts of his assistants.7
The same concern for fair practice and lower
prices was voiced in the ordinance for tailors. Part
of the reason for the law was the high prices charged
by tailors and the fraud perpetuated on the public by
auctioneers. To combat this, it became mandatory for all
officials of the guild to elect four of their members
every year who would act as veedores. Such elected
officials were expected to use their office for the
protection and enforcement of the law. They were to hold
g
office only for as long as they enforced the law.
Furthermore, the practice was forbidden whereby
people wishing to auction their clothes got friends to bid
for them with a view to raising their prices. Penalty was
 129

placed at 10 gold pesos and seizure of said clothes. The

official in charge of the auction would be fined 10 gold
pesos and suspension of license if he was involved in the
fraud. Furthermore, no one was allowed to resell clothes
bought at an auction until the expiration of a month.
Besides, such resale was not to exceed the original price
paid for the clothes during the auction. Any offender
received a 10 gold pesos fine, loss of all clothes and a
twenty day jail sentence.9
Almost all of the ordinances have a part dealing
with fair practices and low prices. It is hoped that
the above examples are sufficiently representative.
Part of the reasons for the concern for prices
will be dealt with in a later chapter. For the present,
however, it should be noted that the fear of scarcity due
to hoarding and the subsequent high prices was alive all
through the seventeenth century. Indeed, it has been
graphically proven that periods of high prices and
scarcity coincided with the two seventeenth century Mexico
City riots.Whether these ordinances were enforced or
not is a mute question at this point. It is the opinion
of the writer that theoretically, the fear of shortages of
basic commodities and the possible resultant social dis­
turbances acted as incentives for a close watch on prices.
Aldermanic concern for prices theoretically led
to the protection of the consumer; theoretically because
 130

the practice tended to conflict with the reality. The

control on prices was designed primarily to prevent any
social upheaval and not for consumer protection.
More importantly, price controls could be looked
at within an overall framework of hispanic bureaucratic
mentality. The concern for minuteness of details which
may not correspond to the reality of the situation was
very prevalent in the ordinances.12 The ordinance for
wax and candle makers furnishes a good example. Originally
issued in 1618, the law was designed to prevent fraud and
any adulteration in the manufacture of candles.
To this effect, the law was explicit on how each
type of wax or candle was to be made. There were three
types of wax that could be used for candles and chandeliers-'-
china, castillian and campeche. Castillian wax could be
mixed with that from China but not that from campeche.
While permitting candles weighing under two pounds to be
made in part from campeche wax, it prohibited bigger
candles from being made from such wax. The law even
stipulated the type of rope (burner) to be put in candles--
cotton for candles under two pounds and hemp for those
weighing over two pounds. However, wax from China could
not be mixed with any other. Each candle was to bear the
mark or seal of its maker for identification purposes.
To enforce this, every candle maker was required
to present his wares for inspection at least once a year
to city officials. Failure was liable to a 200 peso fine
 131

for first offense, double that for the second offense and
the confiscation of all candles and wax and a four month
suspension of license; for the third offense, a two year
suspension of license.
The interest in details was also present in the
requirements for examination before one could become a
maestro. To begin with, no one could practice any craft
or art without first being examined.14 Specifications
for the examinations were very explicit and varied with
each craft guild. Essentially, however, they were
designed to test the knowledge of the would-be maestro in
all aspects of the craft. The issuance of a certificate
depended on how much the examinee knew about the said
art.15 Consider the instruction given to examiners for
the carpenters.
The would-be maestro must know how to construct
"una cuadra de media naranja de lazolese, y una cuadra de
mocaralse cuadrada, y ochabada amedinado. ..." He was
to be acquainted with the theoretical as well as the
practical aspects of carpentry. More importantly the
person being examined must have a sense of accuracy and
geometric order in wood cutting and in the use of wood to
construct any object.16 Even then, no one could practice
or own a shop until he had presented his certificate of
examination to the council itself. For the examination
the council insisted on choosing qualified maestros and
 132

the veedor of the given art to act as the examiner.

The city's interest in fair prices was not limited
to actions against hoarding and rules for examination.
At times, the city acted directly to set down market
prices for specific wares. This was true of the law
governing hawkers which set down exact prices for
17
particular foods and fruit derived products.
Aldermanic drive for fair prices tended to dis­
courage initiative and expansion. Municipal deterent to
disobedience of the law included the imposition of fines
and suspension of license or imprisonment. Although such
deterents proved to be positive influences in certain
crafts, they acted as deterents to initiative and innovation
in others.
Specifically, all of the laws prohibited licensed
maestros from having more than one stall. Furthermore,
they could not align with other maestros in the same guild
to expand their operations. Most importantly, no maestro
could open up stalls wherever he desired, except in a
specified area of the town already laid down in the city
plan (traza). While such legislation discouraged
innovation and expansion they also discouraged reinvestment
into the guilds—an economic process that was essential
for any concerted economic growth.
However, it is essential to look at the actions
of the council within the context of the time. This was a
 133

period when Spain's application of the mercantilist theory

discouraged any trade between the various "provinces" of
the kingdom. It was a period when every part of the
kingdom was made to channel its trade to the mother
country. Besides application of such an economic theory
also meant that any secondary or primary industry in the
colonies must be discouraged especially if they presented
the threat of competition to the mother country.
Although local handicrafts did not constitute
threats to Spain, the councillors were influenced by
prevailing norms in the society in which they lived.
Emphasis was placed more on the utilitarian nature of any
economic venture than on any other consideration. Further­
more, ethnicity, family connection and socio-economic
bac kground of the individual tended to be important
considerations. Later in the chapter—on the section
dealing with the correlation between the ordinances and
their observance—it will be shown whether the aldermen
had any private economic interests in any of the guilds
and the effect of such interests on the observance of
the ordinance.
But council regulation of city guilds had other
positive qualities. Some of them laid down hours and
wages as well as mandatory holidays and good treatment of
the Indians. Realizing the fact that conflicts are
bound to arise between the employer and employee, the
 134

ordinances tried to set such conflicts into perspective.

Some laid down specific rules about an employer terminating
an employee. In such a case, he must give the worker
fifteen days notice. Indeed, the attempts by the council
to set up hours and days to work were first steps towards
concerted social legislation. Maestros, for example, were
forbidden to keep their workers in the workshop on the day
of a fiesta or on Sundays. Besides, workers had to be
dismissed before a certain time on the eve of any fiesta.
To enforce this regulation the ordinance for hat workers
imposed a 12 peso fine on any offender.19 Besides, the
system of apprenticeship which could lend itself to all
sorts of abuse, was strongly regulated.
Only children between the ages of nine and
eighteen could become apprentices. The apprentice was
required to sign a contract with the master before his
parents and a public notary. Such a contract spelled out
the relationship between the master and his ward. The
young student was required to be faithful, devote himself
to learning the craft, give his services whenever required
by the master, take good care of the tools of his trade
and be well behaved to the maestro and other apprentices
and artisans. He was also charged to keep the family
secrets of the master, put his whole mind to the task and
20
obey other artisans with seniority.
 135

The maestro on his part, was to teach the

apprentice every aspect of the art. His behavior was to
be unreproachable so as to act as an example to his wards.
He was also to be in charge of the ward's feeding, clothing
and housing; look after his health and take care of him in
cases of illness. He was expected to help the apprentice
acquire sufficient knowledge of the craft within a pre­
scribed period of time. The duration varied, with the
average time of apprenticeship placed at between one to
three years. Some masters were required to teach their
ward to read and write and in some cases, the precepts of
the Catholic faith. The master was required to give the
apprentice a set of clothing or thirty pesos at the end
of their apprenticeship. Carrera Stampa writing about
the financial arrangement between the master and his ward
says that "It is not the apprentice who pays to be taught
21
but the master who pays for the service he is loaned."
If the apprentice was not ready at the end of his
period of learning, the maestro at his expense was
required to either continue the training or provide
sufficient funds for the ward to be apprenticed to another
master. To avoid excessive corporal punishments, the
ordinances specified types of punishments, the master
could mete out and the consequences to the master of
other forms of punishment.
 136

To protect both parties, there were rules govern­

ing the abrogation of the contract. If the apprentice ran
away as a result of excessive punishment or bad living
conditions, the master could not replace him until a
period specified in the contract. Furthermore, if he did
not return to his original master, his parents were
required to find another apprentice for the master at
their expense.22 The law provided other means of termina­
ting the contract by mutual agreement, death of either party
to the agreement, sale of the stall to another master,
mental incapacity or illness of either party, grave assault
on the master by the apprentice, continued disobedience
of the ward and failure of the word to work hard. If the
apprentice was responsible for the end of the contract,
23
the master had a right to inform other maestros.
To enforce these regulations, veedores could
intervene in any guild to impose fines and to see that
the guild was well run. They were also empowered to
suspend certain rights of masters or even close down their
stalls if they were not obeying city laws.24 Veedores
could also impose prison terms of from five to thirty days
and banishment for one to two years on masters failing to
25
obey the ordinances.
But the city provided safeguards against
arbitrariness and victimization of artisans by unscrupulous
veedores. Veedores were charged with representing masters
 137

before the council and other royal officials. Besides,

they could only visit a stall in the company of a justice.
Such a visit could either be spontaneous or as a result of
a denuncer. Anyone reporting a master to the council
had to furnish sufficient evidence and if a master felt
that he had been mistreated by a veedor, he had the
right to appeal first to the council and then to the
, . . 2 6
audiencia.
Gremio members could appeal for a hearing on any
problems they may encounter. They could also appeal for
the revision of certain aspects of an ordinance. Once a
year, they had the opportunity to gather in city chambers
to discuss any problems they may have and to help elect
two of their members to serve as veedores for that year.
The city also acted as court of first instance in litiga­
tions between masters. If dissatisfied, the litigants
could appeal such a decision to the audiencia. Indeed,
the council could only impose a fine of thirty ducados.
Anything higher had to be appealed to the audiencia.27
Further safeguards were provided in the way some
ordinances are passed. Usually the city had to take into
consideration, social, economic and geographic conditions
in drafting an ordinance. .-It was also common to consult
city lawyers. Furthermore, the viceroy had the right to
review any ordinance before approving it, Besides,
members of the guild requiring the ordinance were allowed
 138

to present their case before any passage. After passage,

the ordinance had to be proclaimed many times through the
streets, by the town crier. All members of the guild had
the right to consult the law at any time in city hall.
As Carrera Stampa has argued, the city "jealously guarded
the human, social and judicial rights of the artisan . . .
28
the gremio lived by the city for the city."
The same checks and balances were also evident in
ordinances dealing with teachers and the education of the
young. The philosophy behind the laws for schools was
that each teacher was to devote himself with character
and responsibility to the art of teaching the wards in
his care. To this end, the city passed various laws whose
salient points included the examination of all persons
wanting to open up schools. Such an examination was to
take place in council chambers in the presence of two
experts in whatever subjects the would-be teacher wanted
to dedicate ELmself. Those already examined were to
gather each year to elect two of their best members who
29
would then be responsible for the examinations each year.
Only "cristianos viejos" could be admitted to any
such examination as the teacher was expected to impart
good christian behavior and customs to his pupils.
Furthermore, all those wishing to open schools must be
versed in Spanish, poetry, and the art of writing. They
also must be informed on the basic rules of mathematics-—
 139
30
adding, subtraction, division and multiplication.
Anyone wishing to be a teacher must devote full
time to the profession He could not for example own a
vegetable stand in the city, neither could he get another
person to aid him in his teaching. Religion was to be an
essential part of the student's upbringing. To accomplish
this, the teacher must teach religion to his wards every
morning, followed by the commandments every evening.
The teacher was expected to test his students on their
knowledge of God once a week.31
The law also offered safeguards for sons and wives
of guild members. In the event of the death of a maestro,
his children were permitted to continue their father's
trade without having to submit to a new examination. Such
a privilege, however, was limited to the first three
years following the death of the maestro. After this
date, no family member could proceed without submitting
to an examination. Almost all of the ordinances contain
sections granting this privilege to family members of a
maestro.
Perhaps the negative aspect of council legislation
was the stipulation against the practice of any craft by
the predominant non-white majority. All of the ordinances
prohibited the examination of Blacks, Indians and Mestizos
as potential maestros.
 140

Time and time again, the ordinances stress that

non-whites could be apprenticed, could learn any particular
trade but could never become maestros, neither could they
set up their own workshops. Whatever knowledge they may
have on any given craft had to be utilized by a white
maestro. A black slave, for example, could not utilize
his knowledge once his master died.32
The actions of the aldermen have to be
looked at within the context of seventeenth century
America. This was a period when limpieza de sangre
(purity of blood), and cristiano viejo (traditional
Catholicism) were joined with ascribed statues,
functional estates and familial connections to determine
ones position in the social hierarchy. It was a time
when American-born Spaniards (Creoles) were discriminated
against in favor of their Spanish counterparts. Further­
more, social norms made a clear distinction between single
and married men in favor of the latter. The argument is
not the moral one of discrimination against certain
ethnic groups but rather that of the ordering of groups
within the social hierarchy. The position of individual
liberty was subjected to that of the group to which he
belonged.
The effort to this point has been a thematic
presentation of the various ordinances given by the city.
What remains to be determined is the correlation between
 141

the law and its observance. An attempt will also be made

to see if there was any client-patron relationship in the
guilds; that is if aldermen tended to be silent partners in
some of the guilds. Furthermore, what was the role of
the viceroy as a buffer between the councillors and the
gremio members? Finally how did the guild members view
one another?
The frequent re-enactment of many of the ordinances
gives the impression that many of the laws may have been
broken at one point or another. Usually, the occasion for
a new ordinance came as a result of complaints from
members of a given gremio. The petitions usually mentioned
such problems as the uselessness of the law due to its
antiquity, the fact that some people are opening up
stalls without being examined, the fact that single men
own stalls and the impediments being put on the way of
33
certain maestros by rich and powerful citizens.
These complaints point to a number of conclusions.
The fact that gremio members complain about the antiquity
of some of the laws presupposes that the council may not
have been consciencious in their enforcement of the laws
as they were in passing them. Indeed, that the viceroy
had to confirm all city ordinances and was responsible
for issuing permits to maestros before they could open up
stalls gives the impression that the council may not have
always lived up to its responsibilities.
 142

The example of Diego de Abrego is instructive. He

had been practicing his trade for over two years without
being examined. Worse still, he was a bachelor and could
therefore not be examined nor own a shop. Members of
the gremio appealed not to the council but to the viceroy
to stop Abrego from practicing. In his reply Abrego
admitted that he was guilty as charged but argued that he
was forced to set up a stall in order to maintain his
mother and brother. The viceroy in his ruling granted
Abrego an examination with the argument that neither he
nor his predecessors recognized the council's restriction
against single white males from owning shops.34 The
viceroy's stand reveals a few things. He was basically
opposed to discrimination against bachelors.
Although the council's ordinances were against
hoarding and the cornering of the market, it is interesting
to note that many of the complaints from artisans on this
score often cited the fact that a few of their members were
able to monopolize the markets because they had powerful
sponsors.35 Although no councillor was mentioned by name,
the fact that the viceroy in response to such complaints
often warned city officials not to put impediments in the
way of artisans is revealing.
Perhaps, what could be said is that even if
councillors were indirectly involved in certain guilds,
the viceroy acted as a buffer to see that gremio members
 .143

got a fair deal. The artisans themselves also guarded

their privileges jealously. Their frequent complaints
against usurpation of their respective trades by powerful
citizens further confirms this. Outside of the mutual
aid association, individual artisans also helped their
members through monetary loans and exchange of children
as apprentices,
Such mutual aid actions and the close watch on
privileges combined with viceregal actions, kept a
meaningful balance between the councillors and the artisans.
Indeed, all viceregal permits to artisans to own shops
included clauses providing for punishment for any city
36
official putting impediments on the way of the artisans.
In retrospect, the ordinances were far ahead of
their times in regulating working conditions and providing
specific means of redress of grievances for guild members.
Their concern with fair practices benefited the whole
community. The consumer particularly stood to gain from
check on prices and the quality of the crafts. However,
such regulations were aimed exclusively for the benefit of
those who could afford them—the white minority.
Even though there were rules preventing non-whites
from becoming masters, a lot of them occupied important
even though lower positions within the artisan guilds.
Besides, their theoretical exclusion was not a trait
peculiar to the city council alone. As a functional
 144

corporation, the guilds saw to it that their privileges

were preserved.
Perhaps, the one blot on the city's efforts was
their discouragement of expansion due to laws against
having more than one stall or going into partnership with
another maestro. But such regulations came in part from
the city's emulation of the practice in the peninsula.
The resultant effect was to reinforce the patrimonial
nature of the society and keep the estates and functional
corporations.
In the final analysis, the minuteness to detail,
the constant re-enactment of the laws, the increasing role
of non-whites in the guilds, and the constant intervention
of the viceroy revealed that there was a wide gap between
the law and its observance.
 145

In the sense that such rights and privileges

changed with the nature of the Mexican colonial society
and the interests of the councillors.
2
"Ordenanzas del Estanco de Cordovanes" in Seccion
de Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo I, No. 431, folios 39-42, Nov. 9,
1606, Archivo del Antiguo Ayuntamiento de la Ciudad de
Mejico.
3
"Ordenanzas del Estanco de Cordovanes" in Barrio
Lorenzot, folio 40-41.
4"Ordenanzas del Estanco de Cordovanes" in Barrio
Lorenzot, folio 41.
5"Otro ordenanza del Estanco de los Cordovanes"
in Seccion de Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo I, No. 431, July 21,
1632, folio 43.
g
"Otro ordenanza de los Curtidores" Seccion de
Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo I, No. 431, Sept. 18, 1659, folio 35,
7"Otro ordenanza de los Curtidores" Barrio Tomo
I, No. 431, folios 36039.
O
"Ordenanzas para el oficio de sastres y
jubeteros" in Leqislacion del trabajo en los siglos XVI,
XVII, XVIII, p. 84,
Q
"Ordenanzas para el oficio de sastres y jubeteros"
July 14, 1600, Leqislacion del tralajo. 86.

"^See for example, "Ordenanzas, para el oficio de

Aprensadores" Sept. 21, 1605 in Leqislacion del trabajo
pp. 93-95; "Ordenanza sobre el trato de los Cordobanes"
Legislacion del trabajo, April 26, 1606, pp. 96-97; and
"Ordenanzas para el oficio de Cereros y bondad que ha de
tener la cera que vendieren" Feb. 15, 1618 in Leqislacion
del trabajo pp. 103-104.
11Guthrie, C., "Colonial Economy, Trade, Industry
and Labor in Seventeenth Century Mexico City" Reviste de
Historia de America no. 7, 1939, pp. 104-132.
 146

12Professor Phelan has documented this trend as

it worked in the higher Spanish bureaucracy. See The
Kingdom of Quito in the 17th Century, University of
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1967.
13"Ordenanzas para el oficio de Cerenos y Bondad
que ha de tener la cera que vendieren," Feb. 15, 1618,
Legislacion del trabajo, pp. 103-104.

"^"Ordenanza de los Batiojas" in Barrio Lorenzot,

Tomo I, No. 431, folios 340-342; "Ordenanza de los tiradoves
de oro plata" in Lorenzot, Tomo I, No. 431, folio 320-323;
"Ordenanzas de los confiteros" Lorenzot, Tomo II, No. 432,
folio 40-48 to mention just a few.
15"Ordenanzas que han de guardar los torneros" in
Lorenzot, Tomo I, No. 431, folio 221; "Ordenanzas de los
agueteros y clavidores de antas" Lorenzot, Tomo I, No. 431,
folios 297.
16 "Ordinanzas de los oficios de Carpinteros; Las
cosas de que han de examinar los Carpinteros assi de la
tienda, como de obras de fuera" and "Las cosas en que se
han de examinar los maestros que huvieren de usar el
dicho arte" in Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo I, No. 431, folios
194-196.
17"Ordenanza sobre que tenedores puedan vender
frutar comprandola," Sept. 2, 1619, in Barrio Lorenzot,
Tomo I, No. 431, folios 121-123.
18
See for example, "Ordenanzas de los confiteros"
July 9, 1622, in Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo II, No. 432,
folios 40-48.
19"Otro ordenanza de Gorreros" Barrio Lorenzot,
Tomo II, no. 432, folio 68; Legislacion del trabajo, p. 6;
"Ordenanza para los obrajes" Legislacion del trabajo,
pp. 68-74.
on
Barrio Lorenzot, No. 431, folios 56, 60, 85, 93,
95, 109, 183, 333.
21
M. Carrera Stampa, Los Gremios Mexicanos, Ibero
Americana publicaciones S.A., Mexico, 1954, p. 27.
 147

22
Carrera Stampa, p. 35.
23Artesanos Gremios, A.A.A., 283, leg. 3, exp. 23,
f. 47,
24Artesanos Gremios, A.A.A., leg. 1, exp. 5, f. 42;
exp. 6 f. 68; exp, 4, f. 64-71, 81-89; 382 exp. 10, f.
60-67; leg. 2, exp. 16, f. 44; exp. 26, f. 68-69.
25Artesanos Gremios, A.A.A., 382, leg. exp. 10,
f. 76-79, 142-143.
26
Artesanos Gremios, A.A.A., 381, leg. 1, exp. 6,
f. 84-87, 88-98; 382, leg. 2, exp. 8, f. 10-12.
27Artesanos Gremios, A.A.A., 381, leg. 3, exp. 18,
f. 3-4; leg. 1, exp. 2, f. 26; 382, leg. 2, exp. 16, f.
104-105; 383, leg. 3, exp. 18, f, 3-4.
28
Carrera Stampa, 149.
29"Ordenanzas sobre los maestros de ensenar ninos"
in Richard Konetzke, Coleccion de documentos para la
historia de la formacion social de' hispano' Americano,
pp. 65-66; Legislacion del trabajo, p. 87.

"Ordenanzas sobre los maestros de ensenar ninos"

Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo II, No. 432, folio 96-97.
31"Ordenanzas sobre los maestros de ensenar ninos"
Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo, II, No. 432, folio 97; Legislacion
del trabajo, p, 88.
32All of the ordinances contained regulations
against non-whites becoming maestros.
33"Licencia a Nicolas de Almano para poner tienda
de su oficio de tirador de oro y plata, dando los fianzas
a costumbrados" in General de Parta, 5 exp. 408, folio 90,
Sept. 1599, Archivo General de la Nacion, Mexico; Actas
de Cabildo de la Ciudad de Mexico, July 28, 1600, Barrio
Lorenzot, Tomo I, No. 431, folio 39, Legislacion del
trabajo, f. 9.
34"Para que los veedores y personas a quien tocare
el examen del oficio de batiojas, examinen luego a Diego
de Abergo, oficial del dicho oficio" General de Parte,
 148

5, exp. 1350, folio 299, Feb. 1601.

35"Ordenanza sobre el trato de los cordobanes"
Leqislacion del trabajo, p. 96; "Ordenanzas del estanco de
cordobanes" Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo I, Nol 431, folio 39.
36There are numerous examples. See "Licencia a
melchor de Azuaga para pener tienda de batioja de Panes
de oro" in General de Parte, A.G.N. 5, exp. 985, folio 206
"Licencia a Cristobal de sotomayor para tener tienda de
batioja segun se exprese" General de Parte A.G.N, exp.
131, folio 28.
 CHAPTER VI
THE NON-WHITE MAJORITY AND THEIR EMPLOYERS

Mexico City by the end of the sixteenth century had

become a multi-racial society. Juridicial, economic, and
health reasons led to the importation of African peoples as
slaves by the first third of the sixteenth century.
Together with Spaniards and Indians, they constituted
three separate and juridically recognized socio-economic
groups. The social interaction among these groups gave
rise to other racially mixed groups (Castas), whose social
position was also juridically recognized in a somewhat
vague fashion. Varying population counts put the city's
total population by the beginning of the seventeenth
century between 150,000-400,000.'''
According to Gage, about 5,000 Indians lived in
2
the city at the lowest point of the decline. This seems
low, Counts for 1560's placed the Indian city population
between 18,000 and 21,636. The total city population
was 75,665.3 In the same period, the mestizo population
was placed at 2,000 and mulattoes at 1,000. By early
seventeenth century their numbers had swollen to between
40,000 to 50,000. The white population was about 70,000
by the end of the colonial period. As for the seventeenth
century figures, Gibson states that
149
 150

the Indian population of the city outnumbered

the Spanish by ten to one in the middle
sixteenth century, that whites outnumbered
Indians by more than two to one in the late
eighteenth century, and that Indians
approximately equaled the intermediate
classes at the end of colonial times.^
Scattered data collected from the Archivo Parochial
in Mexico City representing births give the total number
of Spaniards in the Parish Church of the Cathedral, (the
Sagratio metropolitano) between 1603-1604 as 522, blacks
and mulattoes at 394. For the Parish of Santa Catarina
in 1618, the same records registered 187 Spaniards, 44
Indians, 80 blacks, and 9 mulattoes. In 1643, the Parish
of La Santa Veracruz registered 204 Spaniards, one
castizo, 23 mestizos, 17 blacks and 46 mulattoes.
The significance of these figures is that they
showed a steady increase in the non-Indian population of
the city for the period under study. This figure,
however, is important only in the way it affected relation­
ships in the society.
The main source of labor for city public works were
the Indians. The system of the repartimento, required that
for three or four times in a year (one to two weeks at a
time), each Indian was to work for the city in the
construction and maintenance of churches, convents, canals,
and aquaducts for poor renumerations. But this labor
force was channeled illegally to private means by city
officials. The attempt by the King in 1601 to end the use
 151
g
of Indian labor met with little success. Indians were
also used in obrajes (textile factories). The work
was burdensome and city efforts at investigating working
conditions often proved abortive as her inspectors were
usually bought off. By 1646, however, the King intervened
to end the use of Indian labor in factories. After this
date, blacks took over.7
For their subsistence, Indians hunted ducks,
gathered hay for horses, collected worms, ants, and
flies for birdseed, made silk floss for silk traders and
made salt from Lake Texcoco. They were also important in
the hawking of food and vegetables. Some were employed
as domestic servants by Spaniards. Together with blacks
and mulattoes, they occupied the lower rung of the craft
O
guilds. The mestizos were used as artisans, overseers,
and shopkeepers, while other mixed blood acted as executioners,
public criers, butchers, coachmen, and kitchen boys.9
The majority of the city's non-white population,
however, subsisted by charity, begging, and vagabondage.
The city was plagued by saramullos (vagrants and idlers)
and leperos (beggars and vagrants). Their number which
was estimated at three to four thousand by mid sixteenth
century had increased by the seventeenth century.'1'®
When Spaniards dispossessed Indians of their homes and
land they sought refuge in the city. Blacks fleeing the
mines, haciendas and obrajes further swelled this group.
 152

Together with children of unwanted unions, they

constituted a socio-economic problem for the city's white
.4. 11
minority.
The city's answer in association with the church
and wealthy citizens was the dispensation of food, money,
and clothing. Growing out of a Catholic tradition, the
Spaniards felt a paternalistic concern for the less
fortunate. This concern led to the establishment of
nine hospitals for non-whites in the city. The same
concern led the city council to undertake a house to house
12
collection on September 22, 1629 for the poor,
Charity, however, was a stop-gap measure. The
disproportionate concentration of wealth and economic
opportunity among a handful of Spaniards tells the story.
Mexican colonial society was characterized by a wide gap
between the rich and the poor, between whites and non-
whites. Spaniards controlled trade, industry, agricultural
estates, and the choicest lands. With the exception of
the poor whites, they also occupied all but the lowest
positions in the ecclesiatical and civil hierarchies.
An explanation of this state of affairs must go
back to the notion of society as applied by the Spaniards.
Such an exercise will also help in a better understanding
of Mexico City council's performance with the non-whites.
On the eve of the Spanish conquest, Spanish society
identified its citizens in terms of ascribed functions and
 153

statuses, the system of shared values and a distinct and

unequal juridical differentiation expressed in general
legal codes or specific fueros (privileges). From this
resulted two differentiating and mutually inclusive
categories: functional corporations and medieval estates.
The estates represented a trichotomy of church, nobility
and commoner, while the corporations differentiated between
various socio-economic organizations including the town
council, urban guilds, etc.13
More important, the position of the estate on the
social hierarchy depended on its functionality and the
prevailing social norm. Thus, the soldier, especially
during the reconquest, came to be assigned a high social
value and was usually identified with the nobility. Such
military function and the resultant social status came to
be recognized by the law in the Fuero de Hidalquia which
exempted the noble from taxation, imprisonment, etc.14
The functional corporations also had special juridical
status and privileges. In theory, purity of blood was a
requirement to enter the corporations. Besides,
hierarchies of social rank existed within the estates and
corporations.
The Spaniards brought these distinctions with them
to the New World. In the American setting, however, such
claims to nobility tended to be loosely extended to include
all Spaniards especially in the face of the overwhelming
 154

conquered Indian majority. Such consciousness and claim

to nobility, however, did not come as a result of lineage
or royal concession but from a feeling of personal excellence
15
and achievement from the wars of conquest.
In the New World, however, the existence of large
Indian and later black groups and the deliberate inter­
vention of the crown led to some changes in the ordering
of groups within the society as it existed in Spain. The
result was a new social trichotomy of Spanish, caste, Indian
and black, each with a definable social and juridical
status,
The Spanish section of this trichotomy possessed
a measure of homogeneity deriving in part from its assumed
superior culture and as the conqueror. Such presumptions
were reinforced by Limpieza de Sangre and Cristianos
viejos. Their common claim to nobility further reinforced
this common identity. Such pretensions led Alexander von
Humboldt to remark that "Any white person although he
rides his horse barefoot, imagines himself to be of the
nobility."16 More importantly, such pretensions came to
be legally recognized, especially in the exemption from
tribute.
As for the blacks, they were regarded as "viles,
17
traidores" and the most "immorales de la humanidad."
As slaves or the descendants of slaves they could not
bear arms, enter military service or intermarry with
 155

Indians or whites.18 The castes, on the other hand, were

deplored as lazy, vicious, and a threat to social and
political stability.
As for the Indiana, they had an inferior status
which was juridically recognized. Regarded as perpetual
minors and wards of the crown, they were placed under the
control of royal officials, in encomiendas and in
missions. Like the Blacks and castes, they could not bear
arms nor ride horses. However, they received certain
privileges and immunities which amounted to a fuero
(privilege).
The three estates contained hierarchical differ­
entiations resulting in part from ascribed status due to
descent, nobility, and degree of whiteness, and in part
from status achieved through royal favor and wealth.
Within the white estate, the upper nobility comprised
the conquerors. Below them came the first settlers whose
position came from merits attained in the initiation of
colonization. These two groups were rewarded with
encomiendas. They merged by the seventeenth century and
became known as benemeritos de Indias. Although initially
they tried to evolve into a military nobility in the
Middle Ages, this never occurred. The encomienda system
proved deficient as a military institution, due mainly to
the restless nature of the encomenderos and their
reluctance to bear arms. Besides, their descendants were
 156

interested in the institution for purely honorific

reasons. The result, therefore, was the organization
of the citizen's militia and regular troops by the end of
the sixteenth century.19 The crown's opposition to the
emergence of a military nobility further prevented this
trend.
The Indian estate also had its upper nobility.
This group inherited its rank from pre-conquest caciques.
Juridically, they tended to be identified with the white
nobility, since they were exempted from tribute payments
and certain legal inhibitions. Below them were Indian
nobles who had important positions within their respective
communities, At the base were the Indian masses.
This social organization was, however, complicated
by the rivalry which existed within the white estate
between American born Spaniards (criollos) and those
Spaniards born in the peninsula (Chapetones), The Chapetones
felt themselves superior to the criollos. Such superiority,
however, was a matter of practice and never legally
sanctioned. But the rivalry between these two groups was
intense, beginning with the children of the first
20
conquistadors and continuing to the wars of independence.
Within the context of the estates and functional
corporations, there existed juridical orders, regulating
the actions of the non-whites. Initially, the idea was
for a separate and distinct development for the Indians.
 157

Although blacks had certain rights, various ordinances,

on the other hand, tended to wittle down such rights.
As slaves and "viles" a 1580 law declared that
blacks working for encomenderors were acting as bad
influences on the Indians, since their presence led the
latter to drunkeness, vices, and evil customs. The law,
therefore, prohibited such blacks from living in Indian
towns.21 Similarly, they were forbidden to intermarry
with Indians as this was deemed undesirable.
Perhaps one constant factor in determining the
treatment of blacks in colonial Mexico was the fear of
slave revolts. Such fear led the city to legislate on
the number of blacks who could congregate at any place in
one time. At no time could more than three blacks or
mulattoes be seen together. Offenders were to be corporally
punished (200 lashes of the whip). To avoid vagrancy and
its resultant effects, the same law made it mandatory for
all unemployed free blacks to agree to work for any master
assigned to them.^
The fear of revolts, coupled with the social status
accorded arms bearing and horse back riding resulted in
the prohibition of blacks from carrying arms. A distinction
was made, however, in 1552 whereby free blacks could be
allowed to carry arms if it was proved to be for their
personal safeguard. As it was stated:
 158

Negroes, free or slave, shall not carry weapons

of any kind, in public or secret, by day or by
night, except when they should be with their
masters, under penalty of loss of said arms for
the first offense . . . and for the second
offense, besides losing them, ten days in jail;
and for the third offense, if a slave,
will be given 100 lashes of the whip, and if
free perpetual exile from the p r o v i e n c e . 2 3
The same law prohibited armed assault by a black
on a Spaniard. Any black found guilty of such an offense
received one of the severest corporal punishments: a
hundred lashes and a nail driven in his hand and for a
second offense, amputation of the hand.
The fear of revolt further imposed harsh punish­
ments on figitive slaves and their protectors. Any slave
absent from his master for about four days received fifty
lashes. If away for over one week and it was shown that
he had gone beyond one league, one hundred lashes, then
iron fetters weighing twelve pounds shall be tied to his
foot which he has to drag around for two months. Any
attempt at cutting off the fetter would be punishable
by 200 lashes for first offense and for the second offense
another 200 lashes and an extension of the period of the
fetter to four months.2 4 More important, slaves absent for
25
over six months received the death penalty. In this
instance, any blacks giving shelter to such fugitive slaves
would be exiled from the Indies after the payment of a
9c
fine. The death penalty was also prescribed for any
blacks persuading another to hide for over four months.
 159

For the same offense, a Spaniard was fined and sent to

exile.
Socially, black women could not wear silk clothing
or jewelry. This restriction was moderated for black
women married to Spaniards. Unlike other black women,
they could wear jewelry but could not wear coats made
from any other fabric except mantillas. Such coats were
to be worn only around the waist under penalty of losing
them.27 By 1582, another royal ordinance forbade mestizas
and black women from dressing in Indian clothing. The
law compelled them to dress like Spanish women under
penalty of 100 lashes in addition to a fine of four reales.
The law did not apply to women married to Indian men.2 8
The emphasis placed on the degree of acculturation
and one's economic position initially helped mestizos.
Before the seventeenth century they could be absorbed
into the clergy and teaching profession. Their sharp
increase by the seventeenth century made this impossible.
Because of his illegitimate origin, the mestizo faced
racial discrimination. As Juan Lopez de Velasco wrote:
There are many mestizos, sons of Spaniards and
Indians . . . and each day the number increases
everywhere . . . they don't enjoy the rights
and privileges of the Spaniards, nor are they
allowed to have Indians.29
Like blacks they were forbidden to bear arms
without licenses. However, those living in the Spanish
sector of the city and had an employment could be given
 160

licenses. The King's special dispensation was required

before they could hold any important public office. Royal
orders prohibited their entrance into the religious and
military orders and their abode in Indian towns. Like
other non-whites, they were required to pay tribute and
work in mines and fields.
Indians as wards of the Spanish state were subjected
to a series of protective legislation. Their paternalistic
nature arose out of concern for the declining Indian
population in the seventeenth century. The law prohibited
Indians to be used in factories, sugar mills, and vineyards.
They could not be sentenced in personal service to private
individuals. Utilization of their labor must be accompanied
by fair wages. A special court was created to which they
could appeal any unfair acts of Spanish officials.
While trying to protect the Indian as a potential
source of labor, the crown also issued other legislations
which restricted the Indians' activities. While a small
class of Indian notables enjoyed preferential treatment,
the mass could not carry arms, ride horse back, move from
one town to another, buy wine nor dress like Spaniards.
More importantly, every adult male was required to pay
tribute. At first the city Indians were exempt because
they were used in city jobs. The need for more workers
changed this.^ ®
The layout of the city was also closely related
to its ethnic composition. Cortez built the Mexican
 161

capital on the ruin of the old Indian city of Tenochititlan.

Concern for the control of Indian labor and prevention
against uprising influenced the choice. Following a
traza (plan) the Spaniards occupied an area of thirteen
blocks from the center. The area surrounding this traza
comprised the Indian section of the city, called San Juan
Tenochititlan. It was made up of four barrios: Santa
Maria Cuepopan,.San Sebastian Atzacualco, San Pablo
Zoquipan and San Juan Moyotlan.
The Indian section of the city was administered
by Indian notables. Such native government had authority
over tribute collection. They also had their own income
from property rentals, sales and tributes. The Indians
were legally not subject to the Spanish town government.31
Theoretically, two parallel systems of government
existed. By the seventeenth century, however, the Indian
government was progressively deprived of any substantial
economic and political power. Economically, the Spaniards
gradually assumed control over the regulation of markets
and supplies. Indian markets became mixed. Ultimate
authority rested with the Spaniards who imposed heavy
labor and tribute demands on the Indians.
Part of the reason for this was due to the rising
urban population and the shifts within it. Progressive
miscegenation, the penetration of the traza by Indians
and the spread of non-Indian populations outside the traza
 162

made the political divisions meaningless.32 Invariably,

the Spanish officials had authority in those areas where
Indian and Spanish life came into contact. The fluidity
of population moves, accompanied by the rise in the
numbers of mestizos and other mixed blood may explain
the tendency at this period towards rigidity of ethnic
and social lines.
However, it should be remarked that the hardening
of racial and social lines was, like the law, more
theoretical than real. Non-white groups formed auxiliary
units of the army. Blacks and mulattoes entered into
union with Indians and possibly whites even if such
marriages were not legally recognized. Mestizos through
the lightness of their skin and wealth may have acted
as members of the Spanish community. The laws were more
important as an indication of the Utopian ideals of the
ruling group and as indexes of attitudes and norms that
regulated Mexican society.
Viewed from this point, the actions of the city
council in regulating its non-white population become
meaningful. The council's relation with her urban Indians
began almost as soon as the traza was drawn. The problem
centered around Indian usurpation of city grazing lands
(ejidos). Indians deprived of their lands saw city
33
ejidos as alternative areas of cultivation. The problem
was complicated by rising city population and the need for
 163

more land. The rise in the urban population, with its

concomitant usurpation of Indian lands coupled with Indian
needs for land, meant that city boundaries were always
changing.34 Such changes invariably led to a series of
law suits with the Indian communities since the city
council, representing the white sector of the population
had no political jurisdiction over the Indians. The
audiencia acted by early seventeenth century to confirm
the areas of Indian land which the city had already
usurped.
Labor recruitment represented another area of
early concern for city administrators. Before 1564,
Indians in the city were exempt from tribute payments in
return for their use in city public works, especially
in the construction and maintenance of various buildings.36
Recruitment of such labor was undertaken in conjunction
with royal officials through the city's obrero mayor. By
1551, however, following the petition of the city council,
the city's Indian population began to pay tribute of about
eleven reales a year, with a third going to the city
government.37
The city council showed its concern for Indians
in other ways. All through the sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries, the city through its procurador to
the Spanish court made appeals to the King to place
encomiendas in perpetuity.38 The same concern for Indian
 164

labor also influenced the city in their concern for the

preservation of the Indians. City letters to the King on
this score often argued that the Indians must be preserved
since their death led to labor shortages. In 1581, for
example, the city argued that miners could not pay the
diezmo (royal tax on mining) due to low productivity as
a result of the decline in the Indian population.39
The same attitude was noticeable in the city's
refusals before 1602 to pay Indians for jobs done for the
city. Despite viceregal efforts, the city before 1602
refused to pay Indians used in city jobs with the reasoning
that such Indians had always been used before the conquest
without being paid.40 In 1602 they rescinded their
position but with a proviso which stated that such payments
were to be made:
Without prejudice to the rights of the city and
its wealth . . , and with the understanding that
Indians have always cleaned aquaducts without
renumerations.41
The city's stand is interesting. It shows that
its concern was predominantly with safeguarding her
rights vis a vis viceroy and audiencia. Invariably, the
Indian became the pawn in the power struggle. It should
be pointed out, however, that viceregal concern was
genuine at least on this matter as he was also forcing
hacienda and sugar mill owners to stop using Indian labor
except in absolute necessity. In such a case, the Indian
must be well paid.^
 165

As for the craft guilds, Indians had always been

expert craftsmen before the arrival of the Spaniards.
Some of the city's Indian population continued this tra­
dition, and in the sixteenth century they were sufficiently
numerous to try to create a separate Indian craft guild
to oppose the Spanish guilds. In 1551, for example,
Indian lace makers organized to petition the viceroy to
prevent Spanish lace makers from entering their houses to
seize their goods and molest them.43 Indian candle makers
at the same time had procedure for examination to become
masters. There were also systems of apprenticeship set
up xn other crafts.44
The threat to the Spanish guilds militated against
the development of a distinct and rival Indian artisan
guilds. By the seventeenth century, city ordinance
gradually forbade the opening of stalls by Indians and
their examination to become master artisans. The white
population pushed them into assuming subordinate roles
within the white guilds.
City ordinances also tried at the outset to
regulate the hawking of food and vegetables by Indians in
the main plaza. The effort failed and by the seventeenth
century the city permitted them to sell freely in the city.
The permit, however, was associated with the loss of
45
control of the Indian market by Indian political leaders.
The permit therefore, was a poor substitute for the initial
 166

authority the Indian government had for regulation of its

trade and economic life within the city.
But the city displayed a measure of paternalism
to its less fortunate Indians. Mention has been made of
city regulations giving preference to Indians in grain
distribution. The council as early as 1570 appealed to
the King to permit the building of city hospital for the
poor and non-whites.46 Their paternalistic concern for the
poor also made her carry out a door to door collection
47
(September 22, 1629) of money for the less fortunate.
Occasionally too, she opted for the defense of the poor
as in 1629 when the council fined the city clerk and the
alquacil for maltreating an Indian fish seller.'*®
The city's treatment of other ethnic groups followed
the same lines. They opposed the presence of Jews, even
repented ones, in the city. In 1602, the city appealed
to the King to order that such persons be forced to leave
New Spain and return to Spain.49 While pleading for equal
treatment for Spaniards born in Mexico, the city was
50
opposed to equal treatment between whites and non-whites.
Eventually, relations between the various groups
hinged on the severe decline of the Indian population.
This decline had an effect on the colonial economy. New
Spain's economy for example began to contract after the
epidemic of 1576-1579. As the Indian population decreased
so also did their productive capacity. The decline was
 167

not helped by changes in agriculture introduced by the

Spaniards. Less intensive plow cultivation replaced the
hoe. The increase in cattle and sheep meant invasion and
ruin of Indian lands.
At the same time that the rural population was
declining, the urban population was rising. But since
the increase was among non-Indian groups, the problem of
obtaining labor and food persisted. The Indian inevitably
bore the burden of supporting a growing number of
Spaniards. Caught between the demands of the Spanish
government and impoverished tributaries, the Indian
officials became extortioners of their own people. Since
tribute assessments did not keep pace with population
decline, it meant over taxing surviving barrio members.
The solution sought in the importation of slaves proved
unsatisfactory as their number was too small and costly to
provide a permanent ^solution.
In the final analysis, all groups within the city
suffered from the decline. City blacks and mixed groups
increasingly had to take over some of the labor duties
required of Indians, The city's relation to them
correspondingly changed. The hardening of racial and
social lines coming out of economic necessities hurt the
non-whites. Paternalistic conern for the less fortunate
became subordinated to economic necessity.
 168

Primary sources which have estimates of the city's

population at various points in the seventeenth century
include: Juan Diez de la Calle for 1646. His count which
was strictly for official purposes was based on church
records. Thomas Gage the English traveller whose accounts
tend to be exaggerated. Juan Lopez de Velasco a royal
cosmographer who wrote for the 1670's and Antonio Vazquez
de Espinosa. Secondary writers include Gonzalo Aquirre
Beltram, La poblacion Negra de Mexico 1519-1810 (Mexico,
1946); Angel Rosenbalt, La poblacion Indigena de America
desde 1492 hasta la actualidad (Buenos Aires, 1945);
Woodro Borah, Nexv Spain's Century of Depression Ibero
Americana no. 35, 1951; Sherbourne F. Cook, L. B. Simpson,
The population of Central Mexico in the Sixteenth Century,
Ibero Americana no. 31, 1948.
2
Gage, Travel in New Spam, p. 122.
3Charles Gibson, The Aztecs Under Spanish Rule,
Stanford University Press, 1964, p. 378,
4
Gremelli Carreri, Las Cosas mas considerables,
p. 42.
5
Gibson, p. 380.
g
Mercedes A.G.N, vol. 4, folio 190V; vol. 5,
folio 6r, 240 r.
7Recopilacion lib. vi tit, xiii, ley vii, lib iv.

g
Barrio Lorenzot, vol. 1, folio 130.
g
Gonzalo Gomes de Cervantes, La Vida Economia y
Social de Nueva Espana al finalizer del siglo XVI
(Mexico, 1944).

"^Norman F. Martin, Los Vagabundos en la Nueva

Espana en el Siglo XVI, (Mexico, 1957), p. 65.

"'""''Martin, pp. 83, 102, 105, 120.

 169

12
Barrio, Compa'ndio, A.A.A. 3, no, 436, bk. 27,
folio 155.
13The following analysis of the social structure
of Mew Spain is taken from Lyle McAlister, "Social
Structure and Social Change in New Spain" in Howan F.
Cline, Ed., Latin American History: Essays on its Study
and Teaching, University of Texas Press, Austin and London,
1967, Vol. XI, pp. 750-764.
14Recopilacion de las leyes lib. V, tit, ii, ley XV.

15Richard Konetzke, "La formacion de-la nobleza

en Indias" Estudios Americanos, III (1951) p. 356.
16
Richard Konetzke, p. 356, see also pp. 341-346.
17
A.G.N. General de Parte Vol. 7, folio 84. See
also A.G.N. Ordenanzas Vol. 2, folios 36v-37v. and
Gonzalo Aquirre Beltran, La Poblacion negra de Mexico
1519-1810 (Mexico, 1946) pp. 187-190.
1 ft
Beltran, 187-190.
19Konetzke, "Estado y soceidad en las Indias"
Estudios Americanos, III, (1951), pp. 38-39.
20
Antonio Tibesar has made a study of this rivalry
as it existed in the religious orders especially in Peru
see "The Alternativa: A Study of Spanish-Creole Relations
in Seventeenth Century Peru," The Americas XI (1955) 229-
283, Richard Konetzke has made a study of the legal
aspects: "La condicion legal de los criolos y las causas
de la independencia" Estudios Americanos, II (1950), 31-54.
21Raids on Indian Villages by blacks was common.
See A.G.N. General de Parte Vol. 3, folio 256.
2 2Eusebio Bentura Balena ed., Recopilacion
. Sumaria
de todas autos los autos acordadbs de la real audiencia, y
sala del crimen de esta Nueva espana y provid'encias de
su superior gobierao~ I 4 vols., Mexico, 1787, II, 73,
23
Recopilacion, Lib, VII, tit. V., ley XV,
 170

24
Recopilacion, Lib. VII, tit. V, ley XXI.

2 Recopilacion, Lib. VII, tit. V., ley XXI,

26
Recopilacion, Lib. VII, tit. V, ley XXII.

27Recopilacion, Lib. VII, tit. V, ley XXVIII.

28
A.G.N. Ramo de Ordenanzas Vol. I, folio 75.
29Geoqrafia y descripcion universal de las Indias
(ed.) Justo Zaragoza (Madrid, 1894) p"I 43, Quoted in Rosenblat
p. 217.
30
Actas del Cabildo, vol. 14, p. 123.
31Gibson, pp. 370-371,

32Gibson, p. 376.
33Tierras
. y ejidos A.A.A., vol. 1, no, 4065,
exps. 4, 6; vol. 2, no. 4066, exp , 41.

"^Tierras y ejidos A.A.A. vol. 2, no, 4066, exp.

38, folio 4r.
35_.
Tierras y ejidos A.A.A., vol. 1, no. 4065, exp
1, 4, vol. 2, no. 4066, exp. 38.
36Mercedes A.G.N, vol. 4, folio 190 v, vol, 5,
folio 6r, 240 r.

^Actas de Cabildo, vol. 14, p. 123.

OO
Cartas y expedientes del Cabildo 1595-1664,
A.G.I, leg. 318, Jan. 14, 1604.

"^Cartas y expedientes del Cabildo, 1524-1595,

leg. 317.
40Actas de Cabildo, vol. 14, minutes of May 26,
1600, pp. 115-118.
 171

^Actas de Cabildo, vol. 15, minutes of March 14,

1602, p. 19~! '
49
General' de Parte A.G.N. 5, exp. 1282, folio 287;
Viceroy to council of the Indies 1632-1636, no. 31, leg. 20.

^"^Mercedes A.G.N., vol. 3, folio 244r-244v,

44Barrio Ordenanzas, vol. 1, no, 431, folio 326r.

45Barrio Ordenanzas, vol. 2, no, 432, folio 118r.

46
Cartas y expediente del Cabildo, 1525-1595,
A.G.I, leg. 317.

^Barrio, Compendio 3, no. 436, bk, 27, folio 155,

48Barrio, Compendio 3m no,, 436, bk, 27, folio 150.

49
Actas de Cabildo 15, minutes of April 27, 1602,
P, 41.
50Cartas y expediente de Cabildo 1524t-1595, A.G.I,
leg. 317, 381; Barrio Compendio 3, no. 436, bk. 630;
personas seculares 1646, leg. 154, R. 1.
 CHAPTER VII
ALDERMEN AS REGULATORS: GRAIN STORAGE AND PRICE FIXING

Hobsbawn in his Primitive Rebels has argued that

there was an unwritten contract in all preindustrial
societies whereby rulers and ruled agreed to certain
obligations between them. As he put it:
It is the business of the ruler and his
aristocracy to provide a livelihood for his
people , . . provided he (the ruler) and
they (the aristocracy) did their duty, they
received active and enthusiastic popular
support .... The rulers and the parasitic
poor thus lived in a sort of symbiosis.
The popuj^ce defended their ruler as long as he
provided the means to sustenance. But if he did not, they
rioted. This mechanism was well understood by both sides
and it caused few problems. Problems, however, resulted
if the ruler sought to replace existing norms by other
political ideals. More importantly, the threat to perennial
rioting kept rulers ready to control prices and to distribute
work or favors to the ruled.
The notion of the "unwritten contract" will act as
a point of departure in analyzing aldermanic price
regulatory ordinances. There can be no doubt that the
council strove to maintain the unwritten contract. The
degree of their success would be dealt with later in the
chapter. However, one must make a distinction between
172
 173

Hobsbawn's analytical construct and the situation as the

aldermen perceived it. Mexico City aldermen were not
conscious of the unwritten contract neither did they
consciously articulate the fear that if they did not act,
the crowd will riot. The notion of the unwritten contract
is being utilized here for purely analytical purposes.
Municipal attempts at price fixation began at the
time of Cortes. Following the conquest, the first council
felt the necessity for an ordinance that would regulate
the prices of certain basic commodities. 2 This ordinance
will be reproduced in part in the appendix. However, such
an ordinance regulated only the selling of certain goods
without any provision for buying and storage especially
of maize, farina and wheat-*—the three most important
grains. Besides, it did not provide substitute sources in
cases of emergency.
Partly to correct these shortcomings, and partly
to instill some order into the unregulated buying of
grains, the council in early 1580 petitioned the King for
authority to set up graneries (positos and alhondigas).
The result was the creation of city positos on March 8,
1580. Part of the reason given by aldermen for the set-up
included lack of order in grain buying, the absence of an
effective mechanism for price regulation and the idea of
3
helping the poor sustain themselves at lesser costs.
 174

The city immediately got twenty-nine houses and

shops (casas y tiendas) with an annual rent of 3,000 pesos.
Initially, the houses were built as a joint venture with
the Cathedral. With time, however, the church claimed
1,000 pesos of the rent leaving the city with 2,000
4
pesos.
The ordinance set up mechanisms and rules for the
purchase, storage and sale of grains. Two officials'—an
alderman and a mayordomo were to be elected at the
beginning of each year. They were charged with controlling
the amount of maize to be preserved in the posito. Such
persons were to be honorable and respected. Similar
officials were to be appointed for wheat. All four must
post bonds as prevention against misuse of their office,
which was to last for one year. Such appointees could
not be re-elected for the same post until the expiration
of four years. The officials were expected to furnish
full particulars of their stewardship at the end of their
term in office, before the clerk and president of the
council or in his absence, an alcalde ordinario.
Afraid of the illegal use of posito funds, the
ordinance stipulated that none of the money from the sale
of grains could be utilized unless for the increase in
the quantity of the grains. But, any new purchases must
be approved by the council and justice. In such a case,
the council will name people for the new purchase and the
source from which the grains would be bought.
 175

Persons appointed to buy grains were not supposed

to buy for themselves or any other person. Furthermore,
those from whom the grains were to be bought informed the
council ahead of time of their prices, and were expected
to take an oath to the effect that such grain was grown
by them and not simply bought for speculative re-sale.
Salaries for officials appointed to buy grains was placed
at two pesos a day. To sell or lend grain to anyone
officials in charge of the granaries needed the approval
of the justice and the council. This stipulation applied
equally to all citizens including royal and councillar
officials. Any loss in grains resulting from illegal
lending was to be paid for by the official responsible.
All transaction was placed on a cash basis.
Granary officials upon assumption of office took
an oath before the justice and clerk of the house to the
effect that they would use their office for the benefit
of the granaries especially in periods of scarcity. They
were by extension required to abide by the prices fixed
by the council. Such oath was also compulsory for every
corregidor and alcalde ordinario.
For better accounting, the city clerk recorded
all buying and selling within the positos. Such a record
acted as a source reference when the city audited the
records of the granary officials. The concern for better
accounting and the elimination of fraud dictated other
measures.
 176

A box with three separate keys was provided as a

safe for all the money got from the sale of grains. The
justice, alderman and mayordomo in charge of the granary
each kept a key to the box. Furthermore, the box had to
be kept at the Monastary of Saint Agustin, under the care
of the prior. To remove money from the box, the two
granary officials, the justice, clerk of the house and
the person to receive the money had to be present. The
recipient must sign a receipt for any money he received.
The ordinance mandated a monthly visit of the officials
and justice to the granaries.
Afraid of favoritism by granary officials each
official was made responsible for the recovery of either
grain or money lent by them without authorization. Such
money must be recovered within eight days or the officer
responsible paid a twenty peso fine for each additional
day.
Arguing that the Indians who lived in the city
especially in San Juan and el barrio de Santiago Tlaltelolco
had no lands in which to plant maize or wheat, the council
gave them priority in the sale of grains. A certain quota
was also reserved for the royal Indian hospital. Finally,
the law placed the salary of the alderman acting as
granary official at 175 pesos a year and that of the
mayordomo at 330 gold pesos. The King gave his approval
5
to the ordinance on December 7, 1580.
 177

Following the establishment of the office of alcalde

mayor in 1583, the city moved to control every aspect of
grain distribution. The new official was expected to
live in the alhondiga; and was charged with the sale of
all grains. No more grains could be bought or sold outside
of the alhondiga. Besides, the council stopped the practice
of letting farmers use storage facilities in the
alhondiga. Henceforth, no farmer could store his products
in city facilities beyond twenty days, at the end of
which the city forced their owners to sell at whatever
price the residue would bring.
The new law required all grain farmers who were
also bakers, to declare how much grain they had harvested
and what amount they had used in baking. This was designed
to prevent the citizens from using farming as a means to
obtaining an undue supply of grain. To protect consumers,
bakers were not to buy until after twelve noon, and then
only in amounts sufficient for one or two days' operations.
Finally, the law prohibited anyone from entering the
alhondiga with a gun.^
Some problems persisted. The ordinances had not
set up the amount of grain each household could buy neither
did they regulate the prices. In 1609 therefore, the
council set about to put grain distribution on a more
efficient basis. To this end a new ordinance prohibited
private individuals from storing their grain in the
 178

alhondiqa. This new measure had become necessary as the

twenty-day free storage provision had led to hoarding
and speculation for higher prices. One fanega of maize
was set as the maximum quantity an individual could receive
in a day.
The pattern of the day to day buying and selling
in the granary was also set up. Every day at nine in the
morning, the alcalde distributed grain to the waiting
vendors without payment. Sales continued freely with the
warden making sure prices offered never exceeded the
maximum set for the day. If, after the first part of the
day supplies still remained, the supervising officer
(diputado) was to decree that further trading was to
continue. Prices for the second half of the day was
expected to conform to the price set earlier in the day.
If prices for the second half of the day were lower, they
were supposed to be set at the opening price for the
second part of the day. To prevent speculators from
raising prices, no grain could be kept back as long as
demand lasted,
The alcalde was forbidden to allow gambling or any
type of games in the granary. Furthermore, his continuance
in office depended on his performance and the type of
company he kept. He could not for example be seen with
certain types of women.7 Further regulations were added
from time to meet various problems.8 In cooperation with
 179

the viceroy, the city was allowed to collect grains from

fourteen leagues around the city.9 The distance increased
in times of famine.'1'0
Other areas in which the council legislated
included setting up prices for meat slaughtered for the
city. Separate legislations were set up to deal with
beef, pork, lamb and chickens. Canicerias (public con­
trolled meat markets) were set up. At first three of
these were opened up but further demands led to opening
four more. Sale of meat was left to individuals through
a system of open bidding. Sale prices were, however,
fixed by the city. The contractor retained his bid as
long as he conformed to the prices and other regulations
fixed by the council.'1''''
The regulation of meat sale proved onerous.
Constant shortages was common. At times the viceroy
intervened to nominate someone to supply the city with
meat. To combat scarcity and rising prices, the council
appealed and got an extension of its meat regulatory
12
powers to include the areas of Xochimilco and Tacubaya.
Other problems involved royal and religious officials,
whom it was discovered, were receiving preferential treat­
ment in the purchase of meat. The greatest difficulty,
however, centered in the illegal meat trade that went on
outside of the Carniceria. Some estancieros avoided the
law and taxes by selling their cattle alive. It was also
 180

customary for petty traders to bring in meat to the city

displayed on racks. Such meat was sold by the piece
without regard to weights set up by the city. Finally,
two other illegal meat markets—one in the palace of
the archbishop and the other in the palace of the Marques
del Valle, further complicated attempts by the city to
regulate prices.''"3
To combat some of these problems, the city in 1605
appointed two meat inspectors instead of one for each
Carniceria. Their period of office was extended to three
months as a means of further acquainting them with
conditions in the meat industry.14 The performance of the
Carniceria was revealed to the city council in 1611. At
this date, 1,207 head of cattle had been slaughtered. It
cost the city 8,449 pesos at seven pesos per head of
cattle. Sheep cost ten and one-half reales each.
Sales was not very successful. Beef was sold for
6,076 pesos. The tongues and viscera brought an
additional 8,379 pesos, 1 real, plus 166 pesos and 6
reales for the viscera plus an additional 450 pesos for
the wool and 50 pesos for the skins. Taken together, the
city received about 17,535 pesos. Put in other terms, the
city lost about 392 pesos. With administrative costs, the
15
total loss came to about 2,670 pesos.
 181

In contrast, the council was more successful in

regulating the distribution and price of grain. Maize
furnishes a good example.16 Prices fluctuated all through
the century based on supply and demand. Prices, while
falling far below the fixed rate of about ten reales a
fanega in times of plenty, doubled in times of scarcity.
Gutrie has graphically demonstrated that there was a high
correlation between natural disaster, the rise in prices
and the two seventeenth century Mexico City riots.17
The price of maize in early 1600 was 18 reales but
the city succeeded in forcing it down- to 12 reales later
that year. The price in the open market dropped further
the next year to ten reales—two reales below the official
price. Draught in late 1607 forced the city to purchase
a lot of grain and sell at a loss in order to avoid rocket­
ing prices. Good crops in 1610 forced prices down again
to eight and nine reales. This trend continued to 1618.
The city's effort to this point had been to
participate in the market as an active buyer in order to
force down prices. It discontinued this practice after
1618 except in times of extreme emergency. After this
date, the city was satisfied in the role of supervisor
through the mechanism set up in the alhondiga.
The city's withdrawal as an active participant
combined with bad crop years led to further rises in the
price of maize. From the base price of 12 reales, corn
 182
18
increased by 1620 to 20 reales a fanega. The year 1624
was particularly bad. Council intervention had reduced
prices from 20 reales to 18 and then 14 reales. Her
withdrawal from the market, however, led to new highs
for the century—from 14 reales to 40 and at times 50
reales.
It was no mystery that the first city riot occurred
at this point. More will be said about the role of the
city council in the high prices later. For the present,
however, it was obvious that city administrators had
broken the unwritten contract.
One might ask why the city broke the unwritten
contract, To answer this, we must go back to the period
following the establishment of the granary to analyze the
performance of the council and the problems with which
they had to deal. The problems have been broken down for
purposes of analysis to: outright embezzlement of granary
funds, lack of funds for city administration arising in
part from the embezzlement of funds, favoritism to
councillar and royal families, impediments put in the way
of city officials by certain viceregal actions and hoarding
and speculation.
It is no longer sufficient to explain Mexico
City's economic problems in 1624 by allusion to scarcity
due to draught and rivalries within the bureaucracy.
Both of these factors admittedly were important but from a
 183

different point of view. They help to explain the immediate

causes but fail to explain the remote causes. It is the
belief of this writer that such remote reasons which began
with the establishment of the granaries were always present
(even though underneath).
The first evidence comes from a judicial review
and auditing of city funds undertaken by Dr. Eugenio de
Salazar, judge of the audiencia in Mexico. Although
the review took place on November 3, 1597, and covered the
period between 1580 and 1597, it was the only one of its
kind in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Its
19
findings were therefore very important. The investiga­
tion covered all areas of municipal spending. The full
report will be included in the appendix. For now, only
the section that dealt with the posito will be considered.
The investigation revealed that Francisco Hidalgo
the first administrator (mayordoma) of the posito between
1586-1592 handled 25,333 pesos. Of this amount, he could
not account for 11,415 pesos. The oydor recommended that
he repay the 11,415 pesos. The second administrator
Gonzalo de Menendez de Valdez[1592-1593] embezzled 2,855
pesos which he was ordered to repay. In the same period,
Estaban Cassasano also an administrator could not account
for 2,000 pesos. In 1594 it was further revealed he owed
the city an additional 2,596 pesos.
 184

Outside of the fact that these officials were

appointed by the city council, it is obvious that the
mechanism which the city set up for the keeping and
accounting of city funds was either faulty or unenforced.
More importantly, both Cassasano and Gonzalo were related
to two aldermen--Alonzo de Valdez and Gordian Cassasano.
But there were other indictments. Alonzo Fernandez
de Flandez, who was appointed by the city to collect part
of the rent from the posito between 1592 and 1594, could
not account for 5,811 pesos. Another cargo was bought
against him for the period between May and December 1591
for an additional 4,000 pesos.
Hernando de Lora mayordomo for 1595 and 1596 was
entrusted with 12,602 fanegas of maize. He sold 6,502
fanegas at one and one-half pesos a fanega, and 6,903
fanegas at ten reales a fanega. From this he collected
17,379 pesos. Cargo was brought against him for 3,856
pesos. The same Hernando was appointed by the city in
1594 to receive the tribute maize from the Indians at
Tlaxcala. He received 7,200 fanegas. The city ordered
the maize to be resold at one and one-half reales a
fanega. From this Lora derived 10,800 pesos. The inquiry
revealed that of this amount, he paid to the city treasury
only 8,332 pesos. A further cargo of 2,477 pesos was
therefore brought against him.
 185

The oydor brought further charges against alderman

Guillen Brondat for his administration of the posito in
1591, Of the 130,364 pesos he dealt with, there was a
shortage of 5,000 pesos which the investigator mandated
he repay to the city. His request that he be permitted to
repay at the rate of 1,000 pesos a year was accepted.
Another mayordomo, Diego Mexia de la Cerda embezzled 4,082
pesos. More importantly Alonso de Valdez an alderman and
his mayordomo Gonzalo Menendez de Valdez were asked by the
investigator to restitute to a tributary Indian group, 231
fanegas of maize "que recibieron demasiado de los dichos
indios que no son del posito para que se le buelban y
restituyan." They were also made to repay to the city an
additional 46 pesos.
The investigator uncovered additional misuse of
716 pesos by Estaban Cassasano and an additional 25 pesos
for the excess maize he collected from the Indians of
Mizquiaguala, He was further charged with Gasper de
Valdez (an alderman) of embezzling an additional 115 pesos
for maize which they got from Indians in 1593. Francisco
de Trejo Carbajal (alderman) and Hernando de Lora his
mayordomo were asked to repay 2,542 pesos as part of the
money they collected in 1595 and 1596 but failed to pay
into the treasury. Finally, two other aldermen—Luis de
Rivera and Gasper Perez Monterrey were charged with
embezzling 2,383 fanegas of maize worth 5,955 pesos in
current sale price.
 186

The investigation came up with numerous other

indictments which will be fully reproduced in the
appendix. For the present, however, it is interesting to
note that none of the officials accused of embezzlement
put up any defense. Indeed in his summary statement, Dr.
Salazar indicted the whole city council and their mayor-
domos. The irregularities were not limited to the
granaries but included embezzlement of money from the
Sisa, excessive use of city funds by aldermen for their
personal clothing for receiving a new viceroy or arch­
bishop, unregulated use of city funds for sumptuous dinners
during the visit of aldermen to city ejidos. Two
representative examples of the type of expenses incurred
for such dinners has been included in the appendix.
Interrelated to the question of --th©-js-i-suse---of-_£;i±3£_.
funds was the constant pecuniary problems the city was
faced with in this period. Financial instability was a
key factor in the performance of the city. Outside of out­
right embezzlement, the city's monetary problems came in
part from a careless auditing.
The pages of the Actas de Cabildo are full of list
of people owing the city various sums. Such debts came
from failure of certain persons to pay city taxes and
from city officials who failed to give account of their
stewardship to the council. Alonso de Alcocer who was
mayordomo of the sisa in 1598 had by 1601 not given the
 187

city an account of his year in office. The city was not

particularly disturbed by this until the corregidor
forced them to deal with the matter or face fines of
1,000 pesos each. 20
City ordinances made it mandatory for all officials
to give an inventory of their year in office and hand over
to the city treasurer any money coming out of said offices.
Part of the explanation was given by Baltasar Mexia
Salmeron alderman and alguacil mayor for 1600. In a pro­
test to the city on April 17, 1600, he accused aldermen
of abaiting minor city officials and of also being directly
guilty of not giving account of their year in office to the
city. Under such circumstances, it was not surprising if
aldermen decided to be lax in asking minor city officials
to pay up their debts to the city. He also argued that the
city in contravention of its ordinance often re-appointed
the same city officials knowing fully well that said
officials had not given an account of their previous
year in office. The result he summarized was that city
employees often embezzled and owed the city various sums
which go undetected for two to three years.21
This state of affairs led to the council being
unable to pay for various city jobs and fiestas.22 In
fact, almost all of the fiestas in this period had to be
organized from loans from the viceroy. More importantly,
the city's poverty led on many occasions to their inability
 188

to purchase grains for the city. On such occasions, they

either borrowed money from the viceroy or the latter
usurped city rights to appoint his representative to do
the buying. The practice of the viceroy taking over
city rights to buy maize in times of scarcity was gulling
to the city. In a 1604 memorandum, they appealed to the
King to stop such an action.
In his defense, the viceroy pointed out that city
granaries had been empty for a while without the aldermen
doing something to assure a continued supply of grain.
He argued that such a situation often led to speculation,
23
hoarding and the rise in prices.
Because the granary treasury was often empty, the
city often had to resort to buying grains on credit or
borrowing from the Sisa for which a viceregal permit was
required. On April 28, 1600, the viceroy prohibited the
24
city from buying any more grain on credit. The only
venue left open in times of money shortage was to borrow
from the Sisa.
Other problems with the viceroy included the
extent of city limit and the issuance by the viceroy of
licenses to private citizens authorizing them to buy
grain outside of the city. Although legally the city
could not go beyond 14 leagues to buy grain except in times
of scarcity, occasionally they disregarded this ruling.
But the viceroy was always alert to such transgressions.
 189

In 1599, for example, he ordered the city to pay into the

royal treasury within eight days, all the money they made
from the sale of grain which they bought from areas out-
side their 14 league jurisdiction.25
While putting impediments on the way of the council
to buy grain outside of the 14 leagues, the viceroy was
issuing permits to private citizens which authorized
them to purchase any food stuff from outside the city for
their personal use. There were very many instances of
such permits. 2 6 The permits allowed their bearers to
purchase any food stuff five leagues outside of the city.
There can be no doubt that such permits infringed on city
rights since royal orders had given the council control of
fifteen leagues outside of the city and fourteen leagues
for grain purchases. More importantly, such licenses meant
that the city's efforts at price fixation and the prevention
of hoarding and speculation, were ineffective.
The viceroy also intervened in other ways. At times
he moved without consulting the council to review prices
of certain commodities. Such review often led to changes
in prices of some food stuffs.27 The council constantly
appealed to the King to stop the viceroy since his involve­
ment went against city rights and only complicated her
efforts at price regulation.2 8 At other times, the viceroy
simply ordered the city to furnish individuals or monasteries
and convents with grain. Such grain were never paid for.29
 190

Other problems that the city faced include that of

hoarders and speculation and favoritism to aldermen and
their friends. Although city ordinances anticipated grain
speculators, enforcement was often difficult. Outside
of the problems imposed by the actions of the viceroy,
some aldermen also aided in bringing about conditions
favorable for speculation. The Marques de Galves, for
example, accused eight aldermen of being in association
with some citizens for the purchase of grains outside of
city limits for resale at higher prices in the city.30
Another problem was that of favoritism. The city
on more than one occasion bought maize from a member of
31
the council despite the law against such a practice.
City members often appealed to the viceroy that they be
given preferential treatment whereby they receive grain
and other food stuff without payments and before their
sale to the citizens.32 In making such a request the city
was mindful of the fact that the royal officials were
receiving such a preferential treatment.33 Mention has
already been made of the two separate meat markets that
were allowed to function in the archbishop's and marques
del Valle palaces. Occasionally, the city complained
about some royal officials owing the granary and refusing
to meet their obligation.34 There can be no doubt that
all of these problems conditioned the success and/or
failure of the city council to set fair prices for basic
commodities,
 191

In retrospect, a wide disparity existed between

city efforts to legislate for fair prices. But the
prospect was not all dismal. They succeeded on many
occasions to holding down the price of grain. Their
price fixing efforts at least prevented an uncontrolled
rise in the price of grains.
That they failed in 1624 was owed in part to
rivalries inherent in the system. Perhaps the worst
blot on their record was the utter disregard for orderly
auditing arrangements. However, their performance on
this score must be viewed from a broader context of colonial
society. In the final analysis, however, such misdeeds
worked to curtail the effectiveness of the legislations
passed for a better society.
 192

F. J. Hobsbawn, Primitive Rebels: Studies in

Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries/ Manchester University Press, 1959,
Reprint 1963, p. 112, also pp. 108-111. As a Marxist,
Hobsbawn regards any society without a proletarit as
primitive. This term however, is misleading since
Hobsbawn was dealing with nineteenth century Italian
and Spanish towns. A more accurate term will be
traditional.
2
Lucas Alaman, Dissertaciones, Vol. I, app.
pp. 314-316.
3Cartas y expediente del Cabildo, 1595-1664,
leg. 318 A.G. 1.
4Cartas y expediente del Cabildo, leg. 318 A.G.I,

5
Actas del Posito: original y paleografia, libro
34, 1580-1612, Tomo I, no. 425, folios 1 to 10, A.A.A.
£
Actas del Posito, libro 34, 1580-1612, Tomo I, no.
425, folios 11-13, A.A.A.
7
Barrio Lorenzot, Tomo II, no. 436, folios 81-84,
Actas del Cabildo, XXI, 154-155, XXII, 221-223; XXIII,
226. See also Fabian de Fonseca y Carlos de Urrutia,
Historia general de Real Hacienda (por orden del virey
conde de Revillagigo) 1852, 6 vol., vol. 5, pp. 403-408.

^Legislaciou del trabajo siglos XVI, XVII, XVIII

102, also Actas del Posito libro 34 no. 425, folios 7-8;
6 and 43.
Q
"Auto sobre el maize que se manda tomar ..."
in General de Parte, Tomo 3, expediente 45, folio 24
A.G.N.

"^Barrio compendio 3, no. 436, bk. 24, folio 52.

i:LActas XIX, 310; XXXII, 133.

 193

12"Para que Rodrigo Jorge haga comprar cierta

Cantidad de Carnes para el abasto de esta ciudad"
General de Parte, 6, Exp. 441, folio 26, March 1603 A.G.N.;
Actas XVI, pp. 18-19, 54.

13Actas XVII, 475-476; XIX 275; XXII, 151-152.

14Actas XVI, 63, 67, 265.

15Actas XVIII, 124-125.

16
Gutrie has made a study of the effects of
Mexico City council's price control efforts. See
"Colonial Economy, Trade, Industry and Labor in Seventeenth
Century Mexico City" Revista de Historia de America, no. 7,
1939, p. 104-132.
17Gutrie, "Colonial Economy," pp. 113-115.

1P
Actas XIV, 53, 223-224, 286-287; XVI, 223;
XVII, 305^-306, 523-524; XIX, 310; XIX, 59-60.
19Cartas y expediente del Cabildo, 1595-1664,
leg. 318 A.G.I.
20
Actas de Cabildo: minutes of April 5, 1600,
February 16, 1601, vol. 14, pp. 90-93, 210-211.
21Actas de Cabildo: minutes of council meeting
for April 17, 1600, vol. 14, 105.
OO
Actas de Cabildo: Minutes of April 14, 1600,
April 21, 1600, vol. 14, pp. 77, 81, 95-96, 93, 101-102.
23Personas seculares 1604, no. 123, leg. 37, R.
2, A,G,I.
94
Actas de Cabildo: Minutes of April 28, 1600.
25
General de Parte 5, exp. 76, folxo 17, April 17,
1599,
 194

26
See for example: "Licencia a pedro Blanco para
que pueda comprar gallinas . . ." General' d'e Parte 5,
exp. 414, folio 90; "Licencia a Juan de Salazar para que
guardando las ordenanzas fuera de los cinco leguas, puede
comprar gallinas y otros bastinnentos" General de Parte
5, exp. 446, folio 95; "Para que el padre Ajustin de
Sena rector del Colegio de san idefonso en cuanto a la
licencia que pretende para comprar mil fanegas de trigo
en el valle de Atlixo" General de Parte 5, Exp. 864,
folio 181, May 1600; "Licencia a Dominguez Quenado para
resgator . . , garbanzas y otros bastimientos fuera de los
cinco leguas" General de Parte 5, exp. 968, folio 204,
June 30, 1600. This by no means exhausts the list.
27General de Parte, Vol. 3, folio 24 exp. 45;
vol. 6, exp"I 441, folio 261; A.G.N. Actas del posito
original y paleografia, Libro 34, no. 425 A.A.A. Barrio
Lorenzot Compendio vol. 3, no. 436 bk. 27, folio 162 A.A.A.
28
Persona seculares 123, leg. 37, Re, A.G. I.
29"Para que del posito del maiz se den ciento
cincuenta fanegas al colegio de San Gregorio" General de
Parte 5, exp. 728, folio 153, A.G.N.
30Barrio Lorenzot Compendio 3, no. 436, bk. 26,
folio 97 A.A.A.
31Actas de Cabildo: Minutes of city meeting of
October 16, 1600, Vol. 14, 149.
3 2See for example the request on March 10, 1600
in Actas de Cabildo: Minute of March 10, 1600 in vol. 14,
77; Cartas y expediente del Cabildo 1524-1595, leg. 317,
A.G.X •
33"Para que se haga con el tesorero Juan de Ibarra
lo que se hace con los oficiales reales sus companeros
en darle repartimento de maiz, Zacate y lanar" General
de Parte 5, exp. 1386, folio 311, A.G.N.

^Barrio Lorenzot, Compendio 3, no. 436, bk. 27,

folio 144, A.A,A.
 CONCLUSION

Between 1580 and 1650, Mexico City town government

effectively retained its claim as spokesman for all of
New Spain. Such claims transcended purely theoretical
formulations to meaningful action. However, while
representing all of New Spain, her approach differed with
the various ethnic groups. Invariably, the Creole elite
benefitted more than any other group.
This result should come as no surprise, since the
city council was primarily by the Spaniards for the
Spaniards. The Indian population had a parallel common
council even if not as effective as its Spanish counter­
part. Besides, the twin philosophy of distinct and
unequal juridial representation which fashioned the
Spanish patrimonial state loomed large even on the city
level.
Indeed in more than one sense, Mexico City town
government represented an extension of the Spanish
bureaucratic system. The "conflicting standards"
hypothesis advanced for the Spanish bureaucracy was also
present in the relation between citizen and council,
viceroy-audiencia and the council. The mutual checks and
balances in the relation of the council to its citizens
and the Audiencia had its parallel to that in the overall
system.
195
 196

From the uncertain beginnings in the 1520's, city

administration had become formalised by the turn of the
century. The city's rights in relation to the Audiencia
and Spain had been defined. The performance of the
municipal council therefore depended on the caliber of
men that acted as city administrators.
The majority were descendants of conquerors.
Socially, they represented the upper cadres of the city's
white population. Economically the majority owned land
or were involved in land-connected activities. Their
interest in land was equalled by their desire for higher
administrative positions in the Spanish bureaucracy,
which many did get. They also showed a keen interest in
urban real estate and in trade as a secondary venture.
Although a majority of them were young Creoles,
the membership was more diverse to include young and old
Spaniards.
However, neither the socio-economic dichotomy nor
the regional differentiations was as important as the idea
of the municipal council as a collective institution in
the determination of legislations for the whole city.
It is now a myth to argue that councillors sought
their posts for purely honorific reasons. The practice
of renouncing aldermanic seats to members of one's
immediate or extended family assured the continuity of
such posts among certain families. Intermarriage among
 197

councillors further extended such a continuity.

Aldermen frequently cited their aldermanic seats
as sufficient qualifications for consideration in jobs
within the Spanish bureaucracy. Besides, many of them
acted as qobernadores and royal visitors of some provinces
at various points during their term of office as councillors.
Such jobs carried salaries. But aldermen derived other
pecuniary advantages from their positions. The misuse
of public funds, the channeling of Indian labor into
private use and the preferential treatment in the dis­
tribution of certain basic commodities were not motivated
by honorific reasons but genuine material self-interest.
However, there is no conclusive evidence that such
actions represented a concerted effort by aldermen to
enrich themselves. The ethnic dichotomy between aldermen
born in Spain and those born in America was as important
as the age differentiation between younger and older
aldermen. While younger aldermen sought council positions
as means to upward social and bureaucratic advancement,
their older counterparts sought their positions for other
reasons. Municipal seats served the older Spanish alder­
man as a final resting point in a successful career of
civil service. Invariably, he received other advantages.
His aldermanic post served both as a means to acceptance
in a Creole society and as a means to marry into the
Mexican elite. To the older American alderman, municipal
 198

seats afforded his family a continuity in social status

and prestige.
But once in the municipal council, their personal
backgrounds seemed subjected to the idea of the town
council as a collective institution for the governing of
the whole society. As spokesmen for all of New Spain,
they strove to persuade the king to grant encomiendas in
perpetuity, for equal treatment and economic opportunity
for Creoles and for the retention and safeguard of city
rights and privileges.
Mindful of the necessity for fair working
conditions, their ordinances for city guilds tried to
maintain some meaningful balance between the employer and
the employee, and between the producer and the consumer.
Laws regulating hours of work, the relation between the
master and his ward, fair wages and correct labeling were
far in advance of their times.
Their price fixing and grain storage efforts were
equally commendable. Although never totally able to con­
trol hoarding and speculation, they were successful on many
occasions in keeping down prices of basic commodities.
The city's relationship to her predominant non-
white majority left a lot to be desired. But the actions
of the aldermen must be judged from the point of view of
seventeenth century Spanish bureaucratic practices. The
period was one in which indidividual liberty was subjected
to that of the group to which the individual belonged.
Distinct and unequal juridical status fashioned the
relation of the groups to each other. The inability of
the aldermen to transcend such group differentiations
did not distract from their other achievements.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

The most important archival materials for this

study came from the Archivo General de Indias in Seville
(A.G.I.)/ the Archivo General de la Nacion in Mexico
(A.G.N.), and the Archivo de la Antiguo Ayuntamiento de
la Ciudad de Mexico (A.A.A.).
A three month stay in Seville during the Summer
of 1971 enabled me to consult the following documents
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I, Cartas y expedientes de Audiencia de Mexico visto en

el consejo, legs. 12-15.
Cartas y expedientes del Cabildo de la ciudad de
Mexico visto en el consejo, legs. 317 and 318.
Cartas y expedientes de Correqidores visto en el
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Cartas y expedientes de personas seculares del distrito
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Inventario de oficios vendibles, legs. 175-178.
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Bienes Nacionales, vols. 18, 27, 29, 53, 54, 56, 58,
62, 66, 78, 91, 128, 132, 137, 185, 194 and 195.
General de Parte, nos. 3, 5-7, 11 and 131.
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97, 111, 116, 139, 200-283.
200
 201

III. Prom the Archivo del Antiguo Ayuntamiento de la ciudad

de Mexico (A.A.A.) the following:
Actas del Posito - Original y Paleografia, lib. 34.
Artesanos Gremios, nos. 283, 381 and 382.
Ayuntamientos, Alcaldes Ordinarios, vol. 405.
Cedulas y Reales Ordenes, vs. 2977-2979.
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Tierras y Ejidos, vols. 1-2, nos. 4065-4066.
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Mss. vs. 431-433.
c. Compendio del Cedularia nuevo de la Muy Noble
Ynsigne y Muy Leal e Ymperial Ciudad de
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 GLOSSARY

Alcabala Sales tax

Alcalde Judge and Municipal Council Member
Alcalde Mayor Official in charge of a district
Alguacil Constable
Alhondiga Municipal granary and grain market
Audiencia Court and governing body under the
viceroy or the area of its jurisdiction
Ayuntamiento Municipal council
Baldias Vacant or public lands
Barrio Town quarter
Caballeria Unit of agricultural land; about 105 acres
Cabildo Municipal council
Capilla Chapel
Carniceria Slaughterhouse or meat market
Cedula Royal or other order
Ciudad City
Contador Accountant
Corregidor Spanish officer in charge of a district
Corregimiento Office, institution or jurisdiction of a
corregidor
Dehesa Common pasture land
Denuncia Accusation or statement of land claim
Ejido Type of community land
Encomendero Owner of an encomienda
207
 208

Encomienda Grant of Indians as tribute payers or the

area of the Indians granted
Escribano Secretary or scribe
Estancia Farm
Estancia de
ganado mayor Cattle ranch
Estancia de
ganado menor Sheep or goat ranch
Fanega Unit of measure; about 1.5 bushels
Fiscal Fiscal; prosecutor
Fuero Rights and privilege
Gobernador Governor
Hacendado Hacienda owner
Hacienda Large landed estate
Juez Judge
Justicia Justice or a judge
Mayordomo Mayordomo; custodian
Merced Grant, generally of land
Mestizo Person of mixed white and Indian ancestry
Obraje Workshop, especially for woolen cloth
Oidor Judge of an audiencia
Peso Monetary unit of eight reales
Posito Municipal storehouse
Propios Public land or property
Pueblo Town
Real Monetary unit; one-eighth of a peso
Regidor Alderman
 209

Regimiento Institution, office or jurisdiction of

aldermanic rule
Repartidor Official in charge of a labor repartimiento
Repartimiento Distribution, forced sale, or labor draft
Residencia Court or trial held at the end of a term
in office
Traza The central, Spanish portion of Mexico
City
 APPENDIX I

ECONOMIC HOLDINGS OF ALDERMEN

Encom- Hacien- CapilL- Mayor- Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others az gos Organization

Diego Munoz

Diego de
Soto
Cabezon

Juan Caballero
de Medina

Luiz de Tovar 61
Godines* hac 1 20,000 20,000 71,790 value
3 6,580 103,000
ps

Gordian has a
Cassasano* 2 trade
sugar aveg.

Diego de 7 1 2 1,000
Ochandino* 48,750 50,000 8,000 ps rent
ps of
state
Diego Moreno 2 1 5 1
de Monroy* 2,000 9,000 1,000 inher-
ps 450 ps rent 29,000 ited
rent rent a yr.
 APPENDIX I.—(Cont.)

Encomr- Hacien- Capillr Mayor- Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Juan Rodriguez 1
de Figuroa 50,000
ps

Juan Luys 1
de Rivera 3,000
ps

Luis Pacheco 10,000 120,000 15,000 11,750

Mexia ps ps ps

Alvaro de 1
Castillo* 85,000 4,000 86,000 40,000 1
ps ps ps

Francisco value
Rodriguez de 125,000
Guevara rent 34,500
6,000
ps a yr

Luis Felipe 1
de Castillo* 3,000
ps

to
 APPENDIX I.-T-(Cont.)

Encom- Hacien­ Capill- Mayors- Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Martin de in
Briviesca sugar 250,000 65,000 50,000
Roldan or value ps ps
mules 150,000
Antonio de N over
Monroy y 2
Figueroa

Fernando de 1
Angulo 4,000
Reynoso ps

Luis Moreno* 2 hac. 2

de Monroy ** 2,000 28,000
ps rent ducados
a yr.

Christobal de* houses

Molina ** & stalls
worth
100,000
ps with
rent of
7,000
 APPENDIX I.—(Cont.)

Encom- Hacien- Capill- Mayors Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Raphel de ** 1 1 2,000
Trexo Carvaja 5 est. 50 ps a yr.
a yr. rent

Juan Mares

Baltasar de 1
Herrera 8,000
Guillen ps 400
rent yr

Diego Lopez
de Zarate

Melchor de
Vera

Diego de
Barahona

Nicolas
Barahona

Juan Francisco
de Bertiz

Antonio
Fernandez
Mansilla
 APPENDIX I.r"-(Cont.)

Encom- Hacien- Capill- Mayor- Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Juan de
Tores
Loranca** 2

Andres
Balmaceda

Francisco de 2
Torres over 2
Santaren* 1,000
ps

Guillen
Brondat 12 12
Juan de *
Ibarra **

Francisco de
Irrarazabal

Francisco
Cervantes
Carbajal

Diego de
Orejon
Osorio
 APPENDIX I.—(Cont.)

Encom- Hacien- Capill- Mayors Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Felipe
Moran

Alonzo Sanchez
de Montemolin

Fernando de
la Barrera

Leonel de 3 2
Cervantes** 900 ps 2,000
a yr. ps. a yr

Leonel de
Cervantes

Alonso de 4 over
Valdes 4,000 over 7,000 6,000
10,00 ps a
yr
Juan de Vera

Francisco de 3 2
Solis** 6,000 1,000 3.,000 3,000 30,000
rent rent
a yr.
 APPENDIX I.T-(Cont.)

Encom- Hacien- Capill- Mayor Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Jeronimo Lopez up to 3
(el mozo)** 200 up to
1,000,000
ps

Alonzo Gomez
de Cervantes

Francisco de
Trejo Carvajal

Antonio de 1 4 54,000
Carvaj al 2,200 28 est 50,000
ps a 16,000 as 2,175 ps.
yr ps money

Augustine de 4 1
Valdes 40,000 1,400 23,168 48,000 1,400

Juan de 2,000 over 1 fir 4 hac. 10

Cervantes ps a 2 hac 1,200 over prodr- 14,000
Carvaj al yr a yr 5,000 ucts a yr. 33,000 4
ps a value
yr

Jeronimo 100 est

Lopez over 76,000 1 1
450,000 2 294,000
 APPENDIX I.--(Cont.)

Encom- Hacien- Capill- Mayors Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Francisco de inher- 639,000

Solis 1 ted 9 mar aver- 1 1
fathers stalls dis

Rodriguez de
Chavez

Juan de
Orduna 2

Juan de
Sakedo

Francisco de
Briviesca
Roldan

Francisco de
Solis y 1 12 1
Barrasa 2,000

Antonio de
Montova y
Cardenas

Alonzo Diez 1
de la 2,000
Barrera a yr
 APPENDIX I.-^(Cont.)

Encomr- Hacienr> Capill- Mayor- Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Diaz de la *
Barrera **

Diego de 1
Baredes form
Birviesca mayor-
azgo

Francisco
Escudero 1
de Figueroa sugar

Baltasar 3
Mexia 7,000
Salmeran ps

Gonzola de * 4(L)
Cordova ** 24,000 in
ps mules 4,200

Francisco
Moran de la
Cerda

Francisco 1 worth 4 hac 1 1 for nuns

de las 3f000 land 1,100 through worth
Casas ps rent work marriage 4,000 ps
1,900 14,000 a yr
ps yr ps
 APPENDIX I.—(Cont.)

Encom- Hacien­ Capill- Mayor- Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Alonso de 4 in mules 35,000 1

Rivera y 600 ps over ps 6,000 1 for nuns
Avendano yr 10,000 a yr
a yr. inher­
ited

Francisco * 1 1 (S)
de Castillo** through 8,000
brother ps
Juan

Alonso de *
Saatoyo **

Pedro Nunez
del Prado *
y Cordova**

Gaspar
Valdes

Luis goods 1 for nuns

Maldonado to 1 for orphan
Spain worth 20,000

Leadro in
Gatica wine
 •N

APPENDIX I.r~-(Cont.)

Encomr- Hacien*- Capillr Mayor<- Charity

ienda da Mills Obrajes Mines ianias Trade Houses Others azgos Organization

Luis de
Torres
Santaren

Pedro
Alzate

Francisco
de Valverde

to
to
o
 221

APPENDIX II

AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT INDECES:

SPANISH AND AMERICAN BORN ALDERMEN

Spanish American Disagreement Agreement

Y=3=75% Y=5=41.7% 33,3 66,7

Y=2=40% Y=8=72,7% 32.7 67.3

3 Y=2=40% Y=6=54.5% 14.5 85.5

4 Y=5=100% Y=8=7 2.7% 27.3 72.7

5 Y=2=40% Y=7=63.6% 23.6 76.4

6 Y=4=80% Y=5=50% 30 70

7 Y=5=100% Y=6-54.5% 45,5 54,5

8 Y=l=20% Y=0=0 20 80

9 Y=4=100% Y=6=60% 40 60

10 Y=5=100% Y=8=72.7% 27.3 72.7

11 Y=5=100% Y=7=63.6 36.4 63 .6

12 Y=3=60% Y=9=81.8% 21,8 78.2

13 Y=2=66.6% Y=5=62.5% 4.1 95.9

14 Y=4=100% Y-10=100% 0.0 100

15 Y=0=0.0 Y=4=50% 50 50

16 Y=l=33.4% Y=3=37,5% 4.1 95.9

17 Y=4=100% Y=8=100% 0 100

18 Y=4=100% Y=7=87.5% 12.5 87.5

19 Y=4=100% Y=8=66.7% 33,3 66,7

20 Y=2=66.6% Y=4=40% 26.6 73.4

 222

APPENDIX II.—(Cont,)

Issue
No. Spanish American Disagreement Agreement

21 Y=2=66.6% Y=7=58.3% 8.3 91.7

22 Y=2=100% Y=10=100% 0.0 100
23 Y=l-50% Y=2=18.2% 31.8 68.2
24 Y=0=0.0% Y=2=18.2% 18.2 81.8
25 Y=2=100% Y=9=90% 10 90
26 Y=l-33.4% Y=6=75% 41.6 58.4
27 Y=3=60% Y=10=81.2% 21,2 78.8
28 Y=6=100% Y=5=100% 0.0 100
29 Y=3=100% Y=8=68.5% 31.5 68.5
30 Y=4=80% Y=6=46.2% 33.8 66,2
31 Y=3=75% Y=6=54.5% 20.5 79.5
32 Y=3=100% Y=10=100% 0.0 100
33 Y=3=75% Y=ll=100% 25 75
34 Y=2=50% Y=2=18.4% 31.6 68.4
35 Y=4=100% Y=9=100% 0.0 100
36 Y=2=50% Y=3=25% 25 75
37 Y=3=75% Y=8=66.6% 8.4 91.6
38 Y=2=66,6% Y=4=50% 16.6 83.4
39 Y=2=50% Y=3=23.2% 26.8 73.2
40 Y=2=50% Y=7=70% 20 80
41 Y=0=0.0% Y=2=20% 20 80
42 Y=5=83,3% Y=10=90.8% 7,5 92.5
 223

APPENDIX II, —(Cont.)

Issue
No. Spanish American Disagreement Agreement

43 Y=4=80% Y=6=66.7 13.3 86.7

44 Y=l=33,3% Y=4=44.4% 11.1 88.9

45 Y=3=60% Y=4=57% 3 97

46 Y=2=50 Y=l=14.3 35.7 64.3

47 Y=3=60% Y=6=40% 20 80

48 Y=l=25% Y=3=27.1% 2.1 97.9

49 Y=4=80% Y=8=80% 0,0 100

50 Y=4=80% Y=3=57% 23 77
 224

APPENDIX III

AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT INDECES:

YOUNG AND OLD ALDERMEN

Issue
No Young Old Disagreement Agreement

1 Y=7=63.6% Y=l*-20% 43.6 56.4

2 Y=7=70% Y=3=50% 20 80
3 Y=4=40% Y=4=66.6% 26,6 73,4
4 Y=9=90% Y=4=66.6% 23.4 76.6
5 Y=6=60% Y=3=50% 10 90
6 Y=5=55,5% Y=4=66.6% 11.1 88.9
7 Y=9=81,8% Y=2=40% 41.8 58.2
8 Y=0=0.0% Y=l=13.4% 13.4 86.6
9 Y=5=55,5% Y=5=100% 44.5 55.5
10 Y=8=80% Y=5=83.3% 3.3 96.7
11 Y=9=81,8% Y=3=60% 21.8 78.2
12 Y=7=70% Y=5=83.3% 13.3 86.7
13 Y=4=57.1% Y=3=75% 17.9 82.1
14 Y=10=100% Y=4=100% 0.0 100
15 Y=6=75% Y=2=66.6% 8.4 91.6
16 Y=4=50% Y=l=33.4% 16.6 83.4
17 Y=9=100% Y=3=100% 0.0 100
18 Y=8=100% Y=4=80% 20 80
19 Y=10=83.3% Y=2=50% 23.3 76.7
20 Y=4=50% Y=3=60% 10 90
21 Y=4=44,5% Y=5=83.3% 38.8 61.2
 225

APPENDIX III.(Cont.)

Young Old Disagreement Agreement

22 Y=7=100% Y=5=100% 0.0 100

23 Y=3=37.4% Y=0=0.0% 37.4 62.6

24 Y=l-12.5% Y=l=20% 7.5 92.5

25 Y=6=85.6% Y=5=100% 14.4 85.6

26 Y=5=71.4% Y=2=50% 21.4 78.6

27 Y=9=75% Y=4=80% 5 95

28 Y=9=100% Y=3=100% 0.0 100

29 Y=9=69 .2% Y=2=66.6% 2.6 97.4

30 Y=8=57.1% Y=2=50% 7.1 92.9

31 Y=8=66.6% Y=l=33.4% 33.2 66.8

32 Y=ll=100% Y=2=100% 0.0 100

33 Y=10=90.9% Y=4=100% 9.1 90.9

34 Y=2=8.5% Y=2=6 6.6% 58,1 41.9

35 Y=10=100% Y=3=100% 0.0 100

36 Y=l=8.4% Y=4=100% 91.6 8.4

37 Y=8=61,5% Y=3=100% 38.5 61.5

38 Y=4=50% Y=2=66.6% 16.6 83.4

39 Y=4=30.8% Y=l=25 % 5.8 94.2

40 Y=7=77.7% Y=l=20% 57.7 42.3

41 Y=2=18,2% Y=0=0.0% 18.2 81.8

42 Y=ll=91.5% Y=4=100% 8.5 91.5

 226

APPENDIX III. (Cont.)

Issue
No. Young Old Disagreement Agreement

43 Y=7=63,6% Y=3=100% 36.4 63.6

44 Y=3=33,4% Y=2=66.7% 33.3 66.7

45 Y=6=66.6% Y=l=33.4% 33.2 66.8

46 Y=6=100% Y=3=60% 40 60

47 Y=7=46.7% Y=2=40% 6.7 93.3

48 Y=3=25% Y=l=33.4% 8.4 91.6

49 Y=9=75% Y=3=100% 25 75

50 Y=5=55.5% Y=2=66.6% 11.1 88.9

 227

APPENDIX IV
ETHNIC INDEX OF COHESION: SPANISH AND AMERICAN ALDERMEN

Spanish Born American Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

1. Law that Council

council law Y=3=75% Y=5=41,7% meeting of
yers be 50 16.6 Nov. 3,
elected on N=l=25% N=7=58.3% 1599
1st of
every year.
2. On of the
former admin-
istrator of Y=2=40% Y=8-72.7%
maize gran- 20 45.4 Jan. 4,
ary should N=3=60% N=3=27.7% 1601
be re­
elected.
3. Capellan
for city
council Y=2=40% Y=6=54.5%
and found­ 20 9.0 Jan, 4,
er's day N=3=60% N=5=45.5% 1601
(San
Yplito).

4. Re­
election
of clerk Y=5=100% Y=8=72.7%
of alhon- 100 45.4 Jan. 4,
diqa N=0=0.0% N=3=27.3% 1601
(granery).
5. Re­
election of
Alonzo de Y=2=40% Y=7=63.6%
Morales as 20 27,02 Jan. 4,
fiel con- N=3=60% N=4=36,4% 1601
traste
(weights and
measures).
 228

APPENDIX IV. —(Cont.)

Spanish' Born ••••-• American Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

6. On if to
consult the
viceroy on Y=4=80% Y=5=50%
on election 60 0.0 Jan. 4,
of obrero N=l=20% N=5=50% 1601
mayor.
7. On elec­
tion of
Pedro Nunez Y=5=100% Y=6=54.5%
(alderman) 100 9.0 Jan. 4,
as admini­ N=0=0.0% N=5=45.5% 1601
strator of
farina,
8.If alder­
men from
other cities Y=l=20% Y=0=0.0%
could have 60 100 March 23,
the same N=4=80% N=9=100% 1601
honored
seats as
those of
Mexico in
public
ceremonies.
9. Water to
be put into Y=4=100% Y=6=60%
Colegio de 100 20 Sept. 17,
Nuestra N=0=0.0% N=4=40% 1601
senora del
carmen.

10, On of to
accept or
reject vice­
regal ruling Y=5=100% Y=8=72.7%
that a pro- 100 45.4 Jan. 12,
curador mayorN=0=0.0% N=3=27.3% 1601
cannot be
elected for
a second
term.
 229

APPENDIX IV.—(Cont.)

Spanish: Born American Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

11. Election
of obrero Y=5=100% Y=7=63.6%
mayor de 100 27.2 Jan, 12,
propios N=0=0.0% N=4=36.4% 1601

12. Election
of admini­ Y=3=60% Y=9=81,8%
strator of 20 63.6 Jan. 12,
farina N=2=40% N=2=18,2% 1601

13. If to
accept
audiencia1s
rejection of Y=2=66.6% Y=5=62,5%
council 33.2 25 Jan. 25,
election of N=l=33.4% N=3=37.5% 1601
obrero and
procurador
mayores.
14. On for­
eign &
Spanish Y=4=100% Y=10=100%
merchants-— 100 100 Jan. 28,
their pay- N=0=0.0% N=0=0,% 1601
ment of city
dues should
they be made
to pay.
15. On if
officials
appointed by
the viceroy Y=0=0.0% Y=4=50%
to act in 100 May 6,
place of N=3=100% N=4=50% 1602
original
owners of
posts be as
important as
city alder­
men.
 230

APPENDIX IV.—(Cont.)

Spanish. Born American Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

16. On whether
to abolish
the office Y=l=33.4% Y=3=37.5%
of corr- 33.2 25 May 8,
egidor 11=2=66.6% N=5=62,5% 1602
(council
president).

17 If alder-
men should
go to
couadalajara Y=4=100% Y=8=100%
to receive 100 100 May 8 r
the new N=0=0.0% N=0=0,0% 1603
viceroy
despite roy­
al cedula
prohibiting
it.
18. On if to
obtain funds
for the Y=4=100% Y=7=87.5%
construction 100 75 Aug, 13,
of San N=0=0.0% N=l=12,5% 1603
Ypolito
(founders
day) church
from the
the viceroy.

19. On if to
accept
viceroy's Y=4=100% Y=8=66.7%
list of ten 100 33.4 Jan, 1,
names as the N=0=0,0% N=4=33.3% 1604
basis for
election of
alcalde
ordinanos.
 231

APPENDIX IV.-T-(Cont.)

Spanish' Born American Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

20. On if to
allow active
treasure to
have voice Y=2= 6 6 . 6 % Y=4=40%
in council 33.2 20 Jan. 1,
in place of N=l=33.4% N=6=60% 1605
the original
owner who is
occupied in
other city
business.
21. If to
accept
viceroy's
list of 8 Y=22=66.6% Y=7.58.3%
names as the 33,2 16.6 Jan. 1,
basis from N=l=33.4% N=5.41.7% 1606
which to
elect 2 al­
caldes ordin-
arios.
22. Despite
the lack, of Y=2=100% Y=10=100%
funds, should 100 100 June 30,
city cele- N=0=0.0% N=0=0,0% 1606
brate
founder's
day?
23. On of to
give a new Y=l=50% Y=2=18.2%
alcalde 63.6 June 1,
ordinario, N=l=50% N=9=81,8% 1607
older status
before an
old one.
 232

APPENDIX IV.--(Cont.)

Spanish: Born Am'er'xcan Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

24. Request by-

alderman
Trejo that
city depart
from its Y-0=0,0% Y=2=18.2%
custom and 100 63.6 Jan. 2,
abolish the N=2=100% N=9=81.8% 1607
post of
mayordomo de
propios (admin­
istration of
taxes),
25. On if to
accept Simon Y=2=100% Y=9=90%
Enrique as 100 80 Feb, 22,
alderman and N=0=0.0% N=l=10% 1607
Depositario
General.
26. On whether
to send a
new alderman
to take the Y=l=33.4 Y=6=75%
place of 33.2 50 Mar. 14,
valdez in N=2=66.6 N=2=25% 1607
the Spanish
court due to
the ineffic-
ency of the
latter?
27. Should an
alderman act Y=3=60% Y=10=81.2%
as supervis- 20 62.4 Jan. 3,
or of the N=2=40% N=2=18.8% 1608
granary?
28. On if to
spend 500ps Y=6=100% Y=5=100%
for purchase 100 100 Jan. 23,
of maize due N=0=0.0% N=0=0,0% 1609
to scarcity.
 233

APPENDIX IV.t— CCont.l

Spanish Born American Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

29, If to
appeal to the
viceroy to
revoke law Y=3=100% Y=8=68.5%
prohibiting 100 37.0 Jan. 2,
contador de N=0=0.0% N=5=31.5% 1612
propios from
serving a
second term.

30. On if two
aldermen
should be Y=4=80% Y=6=46.2%
elected to 60 7.06 July 27,
receive the N=l=20% N=7=53.8% 1612
victory.

31. On if to
accept an Y=3=75% Y=6=54.5%
alderman1s 50 9.0 Aug. 3,
refusal to N=l=25% N=5=45.5% 1612
meet the
viceroy.
32. If to
permit hos­
pital of Y=3=100% Y=10=100%
Expiritu 100 100 Aug. 17,
Santo to N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0% 1615
build
portales.

33. On if to
pay the Y=3=75% Y=ll=100%
alcabala 50 100 July 15,
(sales tax) N=l=25% N=0=0.0% 1616
what city
owes,
34. On if to
pay 100,000 Y=2=50% Y=2=18.4%
ps annually 63.2 Aug. 23,
as sales tax N=2=50% N=10=81.6% 1616
 234

APPENDIX IV.^CCont.)

Spanish; Born American Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

35. To sus­
pend action
on payment Y=4=100% Y=9=100%
of sales tax 100 .100 Aug. 23,
for time N=0=0,0% N=0=0.0% 1616
being,

36., 2nd vot­

ing to give
King Y=2=50% Y=3=25%
100,000 ps 50 Sept. 6,
a year for N=2=50% N=9=75% 1616
sales tax,
37. 3rd vot­
ing to give
the King Y=3=75% Y=8=66,6%
90,000 ps a 50 33.2 Sept. 9,
year on the N=l=25% N=4=33.4% 1616
sales tax.
38. Who will
represent
the city in Y=2=66.6% Y=4=50%
a land- 33.2 Oct. 24,
grant from N=l=33,4% N=4=50% 1616
the audiencia
the procurador
mayor (as
usual) or
mayordomo?
39. Whether
to abolish
the office Y=2=50% Y=3=23.2%
of solici- 53.6 •Jan • 2,
fN=10=76.8%
tador de N=2=50% 16
alcabala
(office
usually filled
by an alder­
man).
 235

APPENDIX IV.—(Cont.)

' Spanish: Born American Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

40. Should 3
aldermen be
recommended Y=2=50% Y=7=70%
to the 0 40 Jan. 4,
viceroy for N=2=50% N=3=30% 161
police posts.
41. Should
aldermen
carry Y=0=0.0% Y=2=20%
cuadrillas 100 60 July 16,
in the N=4=100% N=8=80% 16
feast of
the con­
ception?
42. Should an
alderman be
elected to Y=5=83.3% Y=10=90.8%
the post of 66,6 81.6 Jan. 3,
administrate N=l=16,7% N=l=9,2% 161
or of the
granary?

43. Shoud city

accept
Delano's bid Y=4=80% Y=6=66.7%
as sole 60.0 33.4 July 24,
supplier of N=l=20% N=3=33.3% 16
ice to city
on a reduced
price?

44. City to
accept the
insufficient Y=l=33,3% Y =4=44.4%
security 33.4 11.2 Oct. 30,
given by N=2=66.7% N=5=55.6% 162
Juan de Col~
onia as city
tax collector?
 236

APPENDIX IV,r-r, CCont.)

Spanish" Born American' Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

45. Should
council ask
the viceroy Y=3=60% Y=4=57%
for 2,500 ps 20 14.0 Nov. 4,
for found­ N=2=40% N=3=43% 1620
er's day-
feast?
46. On if each
alderman can
donate lOOps Y=2=50% Y=1=14.3%
to city for 71.4 Nov. 7,
founder's N=2=50% N=6=85.7% 1620
day feast,
47. Should
city dismiss
the present
park keeper Y=3=60% Y=6=40%
and save 20 20 Jan. 3,
money by N=2=40% N=9=60% 16
appointing
Miguel
Sanchez on
half the
salary?
48. Encomen-
deros be
allowed to
supply the
granary Y=l=25% Y=3=27,1%
with grains 50 45.8 June 21,
an old prac- N=3=75% N=8=72.9% 16
tice discont­
inued by
the viceroy
but rejected
by the
council.
 237

APPENDIX IV,--'(.Cont,)

Spanish Born American' Born

Index of Index of Date and
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

49. Should
Christobal
de Molina
(alderman
born in • °
Spain) be Y=4=80% Y=8=80%
censored for 60 60 July 21,
asking N=l=20% N=2=20% 16
audiencia to
expedite action
on the appoint­
ment of a new
corregidor
without
council
authorization.

50. Should
city spend
to welcome Y=4=80% Y=3=57%
new viceroy 60 14 Aug. 26,
despite N=l=20% N=4=43% 162
royal cedula
to the
contrary?

Mean index of cohesion

Spanish born 56.2
American born 44.56
 238

APPENDIX V

AGE INDEX OF COHESION FOR YOUNG AND OLD ALDERMEN

Young Old
Index of Index of Dates of
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

Y=7=63.6% Y=l=20%
1 27.2 60 Nov. 3, 15
N=4=36,4% N=4=80%
Y=7=70% Y=3=50%
2 40 0.0 Jan. 4, 16
N=3=30% N=3=50%
Y=4=40% Y=4=66.6%
3 20 33.2 Jan. 4, 16
N=6=60% N=2=33.4%
Y=9=90% Y=4=66.6%
4 80 33.2 Jan • 4, 16
N=l=10% N=2=33.4%
Y=6=60% Y=3=50%
5 20 0.0 Jan. 4, 16
N=4=40% N=3=50%

Y=5=55,5% Y=4=66.6%
6 11 33.2 Jan. 4, 16
N=4=44,5% N=2=33.4%
Y=9=81.8% Y=2=40%
7 63.2 20 Jan. 4, 16
N=2=18.2% N=3=60%
Y=0=0,0% Y=l=13.4%
8 100 73.2 March 23 , 16
N=8=100% N=5=86.6%

Y=5=55.5% Y=5=100%
9 11 100 Sept, 17 , 16
N=4=44,5% N=0=0.0%

Y=8=80% Y=5=83.3%
10 60 66.3 Jan. 12, 16
N=2=20% N=l=16.7%

Y=9=81,8% Y=3=60%
11 63.6 20 Jan. 12, 16
N=2=18.2% N=2=40%
 239

APPENDIX V.—(Cont.)

Young Old
Index of Index of Dates of
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

Y=7=70% Y=5=83.3%
12 40 66.6 Jan. 12, 16
N=3=30% N=l=16.7%
Y=4=57.1% Y=3=75%
13 14.1 50 Jan. 25, 16
N=*3=42.9 N-l=25%
Y=10=100% Y=4=100%
14 100 100 Jan. 28, 16
N=0=0,0% N=0=0.0%

Y=6=75% Y=2=66.6%
15 50 33.2 May 6, 160
N=2=25% N=l=33.4%
Y=4=50% Y=l=33.4%
16 0.0 33,2 May 6, 160
N=4=50% N=2=66.6%
Y=9=100% Y=3=100%
17 100 100 Aug. 8, 160
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0%
Y=8=100% Y=4=80%
18 100 60 Aug, 13, 160
N=0=0,0% N=l=20%

Y=10=83.3% Y=2=5-%
19 66.6 0.0 Jan. 1, 160
N=2=16,7% N=2=50%
Y=4=50% Y=3=60%
20 0.0 20 Jan. 1, 160
N=4=50% N=2=50%

Y=4=44.5% Y=5=83.3%
21 11,0 66.6 Jan. 1, 1606
N-5=55.5% N=l=16,7%
Y=7=100% Y=5=100%
22 100 100 June 30, 160
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0%
 240

APPENDIX V.—(Cont.)

Young Old
Index of Index of Dates of
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

Y=3=37.4% Y=0=0.0%
23 25.2 100 Jan. 1, 160
N=5=62.6 % N=5=100%

Y=l=12.5% Y=l=20%
24 75 60 Jan. 2, 160
N=7=87.5% N=4=80%

Y=6=85.6% Y=5=100%
25 71.2 100 Feb. 22, 160
N=l=14.4% N=0=0.0%
Y=5=71.4% Y=2=50%
26 42.8 0.0 March 14, 160
N=2=28.6% N=2=50%

Y=9=75% Y=4=80%
27 50 60 Jan. 3, 160
N=3=25% N=l=20%
Y=9=100% Y=3=100%
28 100 100 Jan. 23, 160
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0%

Y=9=69.2% Y=2=66.6%
29 38.4 33.2 Jan. 2, 161
N=4=30.8% N=l=33.4%

Y=8=57.1% Y=2=50%
30 14.1 0.0 July 27, 161
N=6=42.9% N=2=50%

Y=8=66.6% Y=l=33.4%
31 33.2 33.2 Aug.-.. 3, 161
N=4=33.4% N=2=66.6%

Y=ll=100% Y=2=100%
32 100 100 Aug. 17, 161
N=0=0,0% N=0=0.0%

Y=10=90,0% Y=4=100%
33 81.8 100 July 15, 161
N=l=9.1% N=0=0.0%
 241

APPENDIX V.—(Cont.)

Young Old
Index of Index of Dates of
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

Y=2=8.5% Y=2=66.6%
34 83.,0 33.2 Aug. 23 , 161
N=ll=91.5% N=l=33.4%

Y=10=100% Y=3=100%
35 100 100 Aug. 23 , 161
N=0=0.0% N=0=0.0%

Y=l=8,4% Y=4=100%
36 83.2 100 Sept. 6 , 161
N=ll=91.6% N=0=0.0%
Y=8=61.5% Y=3=100%
37 23 ,0 100 Sept. 9 , 1616
N=5=38.5% N=0=0.0%
Y=4=50% Y=2=66.6%
38 0.0 33 ,2 Oct. 24 , 161
N=4.=50% N=l=33.4%
Y=4=30.8% Y=l=25%
39 38.4 50 Jan. 2, 161
N=9=69.2% N=3=75%

Y=7=77.7% Y=l=20%
40 55.4 60 Jan. 4, 161
N=2=22,3 N=4=80%

Y=2=18.2% Y=0=0.0%
41 63.3 100 July 16 , 161
N=9=81.8.% N=3=100%
Y=ll=01.5% Y=4=100%
42 83.0 100 Jan. 3, 161
N=2=8.5% N=0=0.0%

Y=7=63.6% Y=3=100%
43 27.2 100 July 24, 1620
N=4=36.4% N=0=0.0%

Y=3=33,4% Y=2=66.7%
44 33.2 33 .4
, Oct. 30, 1620
N=6=66.6% N-1.33.3%
 242

APPENDIX V.—(Cont.)

Young Old
Index of Index of Dates of
Issue Votes Cohesion Votes Cohesion Reference

Y=6=66.6% Y=l=33.4%
45 33.2 33.2 Nov. 4, 1620
N=3=33.4% N=2=66.6%
Y=6=100% Y=3=60%
46 100 20.0 Nov. 7, 1620
N=0=0.0% N=2=40%

Y=7=46.7% Y=2=40%
47 6.6 20.0 Jan. 3, 1621
N=8=53.3% N=3=60%
Y=3=25% Y=l=33.4%
48 50.0 33.2 June 21, 1621
N=9=75% N=2=66.6%
Y=9=75% Y=3=100%
49 50.0 100 July 5, 1621
N=3=25% N=0=0.0%

Y=5=55.5% Y=2=66,6%
50 11.0 33.2 Aug. 26 , 1621
N=4=44.5% N=l=33.4%

Mean Index of Cohesion;

Young = 51.0
Old =54.9
 243

APPENDIX VI
TAKEN FROM THE EXPENSE OF A MEAL PREPARED FOR JUSTICIAS AND
REGIDORES AND OTHER PERSONS WHO WENT TO VISIT THE
OUTSKIRTS AND EJIDOS Y CITY—1594, JUNE 4TH

1. Six pernyles (en casa de palomo) 9 ps

2. Lomos 4 ps
3. Manteca 4 ps
4. Cabecas pies espinazo 4 tomines
5. Telas de puerco 1 ps

6. 3 Camareros 3 ps
7. Cabecas 1 ps
8. Canas de vaca 10 tomines

9. 15 gallinas de la tiera 11 ps
10. 5 Gallos de la tiera 5 ps
2 tomines

11. 30 Gallinas de Castilla 11 ps

12. Polios at a tomin and half each. 5 ps
13. Quebos 8 ps
14. Lenguas de vaca 1 ps
4 tomines

15. 2 ^/2 arrobas de azucar 13 ps

16. 1 arrova de almendra 21 ps
7 tomines

17. Pasa 6 ps
18. Datie 18 ps

19. Arroz 9 ps
20. Abellana 4 ps
21. Nyezes 3 ps
 244

APPENDIX VI.—(Cont.)

22. Acafrm 5 ps
23. Comela 5 ps

24. Pimienta 4 ps
25. 2 arrovas de vino 16 ps
26. Vinagre 4 ps
27. Cabritos 5 ps
2 tomines

28. Harina 5 ps
29. Almizque 4 ps
30. 4 Quintillos de agua de azogore 3 ps
31. Lena 5 ps
32. Leche 4*-l/2 ps

33. Cebollas 2 ps
34. Cacuslas torteros librillos 5 ps
35. Arroz al Carracas 5 ps
36. Limetus 1 ps
4 tomines

37. Chile 2 ps
38. Tomates 1 ps

39. Maize (for tomates) 1 ps

40. Bread 7 ps
4 tomines

41. Fruits 5 ps
42. Agua 2 ps
4 tomines

43. Verdura y cardos 1 ps

4 tomines
 245

APPENDIX VI.—(Cont.)

44. Mostaza, grabmoys 2 ps

45. Tortilla for pepian 1 ps

46. Candles 4 ps

47. Indios y Tupiles to help 5 ps

48. 17 barana de ser villetas que se 13 ps

gastaron and consumed 6 tomines and 6 <

49. Cuchillos (24 of them) 7 ps

50. Azineros 15 ps

51. More to those who served the food 4 ps

52. Indios, another 4 ps
6 tomines
53. Indios de las trompetas 4 ps
ni

Another to those who helped serve 4 ps

•
Total: 298 ps. ap]

Source; A.G.I, leg. 318, 1595-1664.

 246

APPENDIX VII
ANOTHER EXPENSE FOR A MEAL

1, 17 Gallinas de la tierra 12 ps , 4 tomines

2. 4 Gallinas de la tierra 4 ps, 4 tomines

3. 26 Gallinas de Castilla 9 ps, 2 tomines

4. Polios 4 ps, 7 tomines

5. Huevos 3-1/2 ps

6. Azucar 14 ps , 2 tomines

7, Lenguas 2 ps

8, Huevos 24 ps, 6 tomines

10. Pasa 7 ps, 1 tomines

11. Datil 21 ps

12. Arroz 11 ps, 2 tomines

13. Avellana 3 ps

14, Nuezes 4 ps

15, Archiforni 4 ps, 2 tomines

16. Canela y pimienta 5 ps

17. Vinagra 4 ps

18. Anejos 3 ps

19. Pernyles 12 ps

20. Lomos 4 ps, 7 tomines

21. Manteca 4 ps, 4 tomines

22. Pies de puerca cabecas

espinazos 2 ps

23. 3 Carneros 3 ps

24. Vaca 1 ps
 247

APPENDIX VII.—(Cont.)

25. Vaca 1 ps

26, Canas de vaca 1 P S, 1 tomin

27. Maranegos 4 ps, 6 tomines

28, Cabritos 4 ps, 4 tomines

29. Harina 4 ps, 6 tomines

30. Leni 4 ps, 7 tomines

31. Leche 4 ps, 4 tomines

32. Almizque 3-1/2 ps

33. Agua de azachare 3 ps, 3 tomines

34. Chilas 2 ps, 6 tomines

35. Cacuelas y toretorus 4 ps, 3 tomines

36. Jarros y Alcarrazas 4 ps, 1 tomin

37, Mastena 2 ps, 1 tomin

38, Platos 4 ps, 6 tomines

39. Maize 10 tomines

40. Chile, tomatos, pepitas 2 ps, 3 tomines

41. Pan 4 ps

43. Fruits 4 ps, 6 tomines

44. Agua (que se llevo de Mexia) 2 ps, 6 tomines

45. Verduras, ajos, cebollas 2 ps, 4 tomines

46. Tortillas 4 tomines

47. Sal Mortaza grabanas 1 ps, 6 tomines

48. Moscenia 4 tomines

49. Candles 5 tomines

50. Indies to help prepare it 4 ps, 6 tomines

 248
APPENDIX VII.—(Cont.)

51. Persons to serve the meal 5 ps

52. Cuchillos 5 ps
53. Zarrolas de vino 16 ps
54. Zarrollas de Gozaldrino 2 ps
55. cooks 15 ps

56. Mantecas 5 ps
57. Indians who decorated the house 4 ps, 6 tomines
58. Trumpetas 4 ps
59. Person helping with the dance 5 ps

Source; A.G.I, leg. 318, 1595-1664.

 249

APPENDIX VIII
SOURCE OF CITY FINANCES AND ANNUAL EXPENSES

I. Rent
1. 16 stores in San Agustin street
which rented in 1594 7 oblps, 7 tomines

2. 12 stores in Los Roperos street 2508 ps

3. 7 stores in Celada street 950 ps

4. 18 Corredorias de Lonja 3798 ps

5. Maravedi paid on each head of cattle

weighed in Carneceria por el
obligado al abasto and quartillo
paid on each head of ganedo mayor 1059 ps

6. La correduria de cavallos 400 ps

7. La pregoneria publica de los

pregonos remato 520 ps

8. Renta de varas y medidas 501 ps

9. Los derechos del alhondiga del

semilla que en ella entran a
venderse, valued 1136 ps

10. Rights of pregoneria de la almoneda

real 401 ps

11. Los censos que le ciudad tiene

rentaron 713 ps

Total: 19,050 ps

II. Expenses
1. To each Regidor Capitulante
Cly of them) with oficiales
reales, 9000 maravedi or 33 ps 582 ps

2. Procurador mayor of city 300 ps

 250

APPENDIX VIII.—(Cont.)

3. Two city lawyers 100 ps each one 200 ps

4. Obrero mayor 300 ps
5. Alferez general por ayuda de costa for
sacar pendon on San Ypolito day 200 ps

6. Mayordomo of city 500 ps

7. Clerk of cabildo for writing the
letters and testimonies for flotas
and navios de aviso y quenta etc., 450 ps

8. Treasurer of city—with half salary in

propios and half in sisa 400 ps
9. Veedor de los ejidos 200 ps

10. Alcalde of Alhondiga 300 ps

11. Escribano de Alhondiga 200 ps
12. Capellan of cabildo and of Iglesia
of San Ypolito 200 ps
13. Alarife of city (100 ps de propios;
200 ps de sisa) 300 ps

14. Veedor de matadero 200 ps

15. Fiel de la Romana of Carniceria 200 ps

16. Interpreter of city 20 ps

17. Portero of city 200 ps
18. Another portero de maca 70 ps

19. Person assisting in guarding alameda 150 ps

20. The Algebrista of city 300 ps

21. Persona que tiene la campana de la

queda 80 ps

22. Solicitador de caussas y pleitos 100 ps

 251

APPENDIX VIII.—(Cont.)

23. Diego Gentil Portero for carrying seats

of council to church 50 ps
24. Capellan of Herrista de nuestra senora
de los Remedios 400 ps
25. Sacristan of said hernista above (24) 200 ps
26. Contador of city 250 ps
27. Lawyers and procurador of city (each
lawyer 100 ps and procurador
68 ps) 268 PS
Total: 6427 ps app.

III. Ordinary Expenses

1. Juego de Canas (fiesta of San

Ypolito) 4000 ps
2. Fiesta of Corpus Cristi 3000 ps
3, Procurador General when sent by city
to corte in Spain 2,000 ducados if
they send solicitador le da 2,000
ps. 1500 for him and 500 ps for
costas y se sacan al margen por su
malos ojos—1500 ps 1500 ps
4. For remate made on a person to bring
the carritores and mulas of city
for cleaning city 3000 ps
Total: 11500 ps
Grand Total: 17,927' PS

Note: Discrepancy due to avoidance of tomines and granos

used in document but not here. However, the 2
subtotals and the grand total represent the
exact figures as given by the document.
Source: A.G.I, leg. 318, 1593-1664.
 252

APPENDIX IX
CARGOS AGAINST ALDERMEN AND THEIR APPOINTEES

Aldermen and city officials Cargo, Date, and Reason

1. Luis Felipe de Castilla, 200 ps Feb. 17, 1586

Guillen Brondat, Francis­
co Guerrero
2, Diego de Velasco, Alonso 200 ps June 9, 1586
Gomez de Cervantes, Fran­
cisco Guerrero
3. Diego de Velasco, Alonso 100 ps Aug. 30, 1586
Gomez de Cervantes, Fran­
cisco Guerrero
4. Diego de Velasco, Alonso 100 ps Aug. 1586
Gomez de Cervantes, Fran­
cisco Guerrero
5. Pedro de Armentia, Gordian 11,000 ps 1586
Cassasano, Antonio de la
Mota, Luis de Velasco, "de exceso que hicieron en
Geronimo Lopez, Luis Felipe los gastos del recibimiento
de Castilla, Alonso de del Marquis de Villa
Valdez, Alonso Gomez de Manrique"
Cervantes, Andres Vasquez de
Aldana, Guillen Brondat,
Juan Luis de Rivera,
Francisco Guerrero, Alonso
Dominguez, Diego de Velasco,
Gaspar de Rivadeneyra
6. Alonso Gomez de Cervantes 100 ps Dec. 17, 1586
"los quales se le haze
cargo por no aver dado
quenta de los . . . "

7. Luis Felipe de Castilla 100 ps Jan. 13, 1587

"cargo, por no aver dado
quenta de los . . . "

APPENDIX IX.—(Cont.)
Aldermen and city officials
Diego de Velasco, Bernal-
dino de Albornoz, Alonso
de Valdez, Guillen Brondat,
Luis Felipe de Castilla
Diego de Velasco, Alonzo
Gomez de Cervantes,
Francisco Guerrero
Davilla, Andres de Aldana
Alonzo Dominguez
10. Alonzo Gomez de Cervantes
11. Alonzo Gomez de Cervantes
12. Alonzo de Valdez
13. Alonzo de Valdez
14, Alonzo de Valdez
253
Cargo, Date, and Reason
500 ps 1587
"Que mandaron prestar y
prestaron . . . para los
gastos del recibimiento
del Virey . . . los quales
se le hazar cargo por no
aver dado quenta . . . "
80 ps 1587
Money they approved with­
out authorization to
Martin Alonso Flandes,
clerk of the council
150 ps Feb. 16, 1587
Money given him for "gastos
y costas del pleitos" of
the city. No evidence he
spent it for above purpose.
600 ps June 16, 1587
For repairs on Santo Domingo
street. No evidence it
was used for such repairs.
600 ps March 31, 1588
For repairs on Santo
Domingo street. No evidence
it was used for such
repairs.
400 ps June 15, 1588
Money to be used as salary
for Indian workers. No
evidence it was so used.
1000 ps Oct. 31, 1588
For work on city streets.
No evidence of its use.
 254

APPENDIX IX. —(Cont.)

Aldermen and city officials Cargo, Date, and Reason

15. Alonzo Dominguez 200 ps April 10, 1589

and Jan. 17, 1589
Received as procurador
mayor for city pleitos.
No account.

16. Luis Felipe de Castilla, 100 ps March 13, 1589

Alonso de Valdez, Alonzo
Gomez de Cervantas
17. Diego de Velasco and
Alonzo de Valdez
Which they paid as salary
to Hidalgo without
authorization.
100 ps March 8, 1589
Which they paid as salary
to Antonio Perez de
Carrion without authoriza­
tion.

18. Pedro de Castilla, 248 ps Jan. 10, 1599

Alonzo de Valdez, Alonzo
Dominguez, Gaspar Perez,
Francisco de Las Casas.
19. Alonzo de Cervantes,
Juan Luis de Rivera,
Andres Vasquez, Alonzo
Dominguez, Gaspar Perez
Monterey
Which they approved to the
Mayordomo for "juego de
canas" without authoriza­
tion. Besides total
expenses was 140 ps. To
repay 108 ps,
500 ps May 15, 1589
Given to Alonzo de Cervantes
as "ayuda de costa" above
the 200 ps he was authorized
to receive.

20. Alonzo Dominguez 400 ps June 6, 1589

For repairs on city chambers
for which no account was
given,

21. Diego de Velasco 300 ps Oct. 14, 158S

For "Carros y Mulas de la
limpieza desta ciudad-" gave
no account.
 255

APPENDIX IX.—(Cont.)

Aldermen and city officials Cargo, Date, and Reason

22, Luis Felipe de Castilla 200 ps Feb. 5, 1590

23. All the Aldermen
24. Alonzo de Valdez
For "gastos y costas del
pleitos" of city. Gave no
account.
8,755
"Del exceso que hicieron
en los gastos del recibimi
ento del Virey D. Luis de
Velasco.
1000 ps Dec. 30, 1589
and Jan. 16, 1590

Money given him for fire­

works etc, for welcoming
the new viceroy. No
account.
25. Alonzo de Cervantes, 3000 ps May 19, 1590
Diego de Velasco, Bal^
tasar Mexia, Alonzo de Given to Alonzo Gomez
Valdez, Andres Vazguez, Cervantes ayuda de costa"
Gasper de Monterrey, while in- Spain as Procurador
Francisco Guerrero general. The city had no
right to give such money.
26. Geronimo Lopez 190 ps
for city works, gave no
account.
27. Andres Vazguez de Aldana 700 ps March 15, 1590
and June 14, 1590
for city works, gave no
account

28. Baltasar Mexia Salmeron 1700 ps April 24, 1592

Feb. 20, 1591
Jan. 10, 1592

for city works, gave no

account
 256
APPENDIX IX. — (Cont.)

Aldermen and city officials Cargo, Date, and Reason

29. Diego de Velasco 300 ps

work on alameda, no account
30. Gasper Perez de 602 ps Sept. 16 and
Monterrey October 16, 1591

for city pleitos, no

account.

31. Baltasar Mexia Salmeron, 111 ps Oct. 21, 1591

Guillen Brondat, Gasper
Perez de Monterrey As salary to Julio de
Villaseca without
authorization.

32. Geronimo Lopez, Alonzo 81 ps 1591

Dominguez
As excessive salary they
paid to Hidalgo for hiring
carpenters
33. Balr.asar Mexia Salmeron 1000 ps June 22, 1592
Money for city works. No
account.
34. Mexia Haimeron- 3000 ps July 13, 1592
Money for city works. No
account.

35. Gaspar Perez Monterrey 200 ps March 6, 1593

For "costa de pleitos" of
city. No account.

36. Alonzo de Valdez 500 ps Feb. 17, 1593

For "obras de propios" of
city, No account.

37. Juan Luis de Rivera, Alonzo 3000 ps Sept. 15, 1593

de Valdez, Guillen Brondat, Sept. 20, 1593
Gaspar de Valdez, Baltasar
de Herrera Guillen, Perez For giving Alonzo de
Monterrey;- Alonzo Dominguez Cervantes as "ayuda de costs"
as procurador general in
Spain above his salary. Had
no right to do so.
 257

APPENDIX IX.—(Cont.)

Aldermen and city officials Cargo, Date, and Reason

38. Guillen Brondat 100 ps Jan. 25, 1594

For "costa de pleitos" as

39. All the Aldermen
40. Geronimo Lopez, Alonzo
Valdez, Guillen Brondat,
Gaspar de Valdez, Balta-
sar de Herrera Guillen
Total cargo:
procurador mayor. No
account.
8655 ps 1594
Excesses spent for their
personal clothes, money to
welcome a new viceroy.
1000 ps Jan. 21, 1594
For authorizing that the
corregidor (council
president) be given above
money as "ayuda de costa"
48,217 ps approximately

Source: Investigation of oydor, Dr. Eugenio de Salazar

in Cartas y expedientes del cabildo de la ciudad
de Mexico 1595-1664 leg. 318 A.G.I. Sevilla.
 258

APPENDIX X

VICEREGAL PERMITS TO ARTISANS TO PRACTICE THEIR TRADE AS

CONTAINED IN GENERAL DE PARTE A.G.N. MEXICO,
1600-1650

Documents Source and Date

General de
Parte

1. "Licencia a Francisco Sanchez para vol. 6, exp. 327,

que por tiempo de un ano pueda fo. 220. Die. 5,
vender mercaderias de Castilla y 1602.
de la China en la plaza tianguis
y calles de esta ciudad"
2. "Licencia a Gabriel Gonzalez para , Parte
tener tienda de su oficio de vol. 6, exp. 440,
Tirador de plata y oro en esta fo. 216, Marzo 21,
ciudad" 1603.
Parte
3. "Licencia a Francisco Garcia, vol. 6, exp. 439,
para tener tienda de su oficio fo. 261, Marzo 21,
de Tirador de Plata y oro en 1603.
esta ciudad"
Parte
4. "Licencia a Cristobal Nieto para vol. 6, exp. 552,
vender vino y cosas de comer en fo. 301, Julio 14,
una casa que tiene junto a san 1603.
Lazaro, no embargante, y puesta
fuera de traeza"
Parte
5, "Licencia a Antonio Herrera, vol. 6, exp. 707,
oficial de Batihoja para poner fo. 354, Nov. 6,
tienda de su oficio en esta ciudad 1603.
dando la fianza aqui contenida"
Parte
6. "Licencia a Andres Romano, para vol. 6, exp. 781,
que venda sus mercaderias por las fo. 380, Die. 5,
calles y tianguis de esta ciudad" 1603.
Parte
7, "Licencia a Juan Cordero para vol. 6, exp. 816,
poner tienda de tirador de oro" fo. 389, Die. 16,
1603..
Parte
8. "Para que se notifique a Fran­ vol. 6, exp. 924.
cisco Garcia, guarde las fo. 421, Enero 21,
ordenanzas tocantes a tiradores 1604.
de oro y se ejecuten"
 259
APPENDIX X.—(Cont.)

Documents Source and Date

General de
Parte
Parte
9. "Licencia a Lazaro Solano, para vol. 6, exp. 947,
que pueda vender sus mercaderias fo. 428, Enero
por las calles de esta ciudad" 29, 1604.
Parte
10. "Licencia a Gregorio de la vega vol. 7, exp. 150,
vecino de esta ciudad, platero fo. 110, Mayo 6,
de oro, para que pueda tener 1632.
tienda en la calle de San Fran­
cisco dando fianza ordinaria y
guarda las o-denanzas"
Parte
11. "Licencia a Luis de Prado, vecino vol. 7, exp. 156,
de esta ciudad, platero de oro para fo. 113, Mayo 8,
tienda del dicho oficio en la 1632.
calle de San Francisco dando
primero fianza en la forma
ordinario y guardando las
ordenanzas"
Parte
12. "Licencia a Julian de Torres, vol. 7, exp. 292,
vecino de esta ciudad platero de fo. 189, Agosto
oro, para que pueda tener tienda 5, 1632.
del dicho arte de platero de oro
en la calle de San"Francisco,
dando fianza en la forma ordinario"
Parte
13. "Licencia a Francisco Rincon, vol. 7, exp. 318,
Platero de oro para poner tienda fo. 213, Agosto
del dicho oficio en la calle de 19, 1632.
San Francisco de esta ciudad
dando la fianza en la form
ordinaria"
Parte
14. "Licencia a Alonso Dominguez, vol. 7, exp. 436,
curtidor para que pueda Zarrar fo. 298, Die. 5,
en su casa y curtiduria los 1632.
cordobanes machos que curtiere y
bender los en el estanco general
de esta ciudad"
Parte
15."Prorogacion por dos anos de la vol. 8, exp. 125,
licencia que dio el senor Virrey fo. 78, Mayo 11,
Marques de Cerralbo a Luis Lobo 1641.
Castilla para vender por las calles
de esta ciudad, mercaderias de
Castilla, China, y de la tierra"
 260

APPENDIX X. —(Cont.)

Documents = Source and Date

General de
Parte

Parte
16. "Licencia a Nicolas Espinosa, para vol. 8, exp. 137,
vender mercaderias de Castilla fo. 87, Agosto,
y de la tierra por los calles de 1641.
esta ciudad por tiempo de un ano."
Parte
17. "Confirmacion de la licencia que vol. 8, exp. 217,
el Sr. Virrey Marques de Carralvo fo. 149, Nov. 16,
dio a Simon Gonzalez Nieto, para 1641.
Parte
18. "Licencia a Sebastian Rodriguiz, vol. 8, exp. 18,
vecino de esta ciudad para vender fo. 12, Die. 24,
menudencias y mercaderias de 1642
Castilla, China, y de la tierra por
las plazas y calles de ella por
tiempo de dos anos"
Parte
19. "Prorrogacion pordos anos mas de vol. 9, exp. 64,
la licencia que dio el Sr. Virrey fo. 39, Marzo 22,
Marques de Villena a Luis Lobo 1643.
Castilla para vender por las
calles de esta ciudad mercaderias
de Castilla, China, y de la tierra"
 261

APPENDIX XII

ORDINANCES ISSUED BY THE CITY IN REGARDS TO THE

CONTROL OF PRICES

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

Alcalde Alhondiga
1. Para que el de la vol. Ill, fs. 22, Nov. 18, 1615
ciudad de Mexico, haga Num. 19
desembarazan los
aposentos de la Alhon­
diga, destinados a la
guarde de bastimientos,
dentro de tres dias.
Alhondiga
1. Que se guarde y cumpla vol. Ill, fs. Nov. 18, 1615
la ordenanza hecha 17v., Num. 15
por el cabildo de la
cuidad de Mexico (22 de
Enero de 1594), sobre
que se venda el maiz en
la Alhondiga, plazas y
tianguis, y no en casas
particulares.
2. Que en la Alhondiga no vol. Ill, fs. Nov. 18, 1615
haya encomenderos que 19, Num. 16
vendan los bastimientos,
en cumplimiento de la
ordenanza inferta de 29
de Enero de 1598.
3. Que se desembaracen los vol. Ill, fs. 22, Nov. 18, 1615
aposentos de la Alhondiga Num. 19
por el Alcalde.

4. Que las horas en que vol. Ill, fs. 23, Nov. 18, 1615
se han de vender basti- Num. 20
mientos en la Alhondiga
de la ciudad de Mexico,
sean de Mexico, sean de
las siete a las doce de la
manana y de las dos a las
cinco de la tarde.
 262

APPENDIX XII.'--(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

5. Que la ord. sobre que vol. Ill, fs. 23v,Nov. 28, 1615
se Venda maiz en las Num. 28
plazas, tianguis y en
la Alhondiga, se observe
solamente para la
Alhondiga.
6. Que el precio de la vol. Ill, fs. 30, June 4, 1616
harina, trigo ye Num. 28
maiz que se hiciere
en la Alhondiga, se
observe durante todo
el dia.
7. Para que se oblique vol. IV, fs. 28, April 23, 1621
a las personas que Num. 22
llevan bastimentos a
pueblos y minas de San
Luis Potosi, a que los
lleven a la Alhondiga
de dicho puesto.
8. Que ante el corregidor vol. IV, fs.45v, June 3, 1622
o Diputado de la Num. 44
Alhondiga de esta
ciudad (Mexico) se
manifieste dentro de
tres dias el maiz que
se tenga.
9. Prohibicion sobre que vol. II, fs. 69v, Oct. 24, 1623
no se venda maiz en la Num. 59
ciudad de Mexico fuera
de la alhondiga.

10. Repeat of number 9.

11. Para que en la alhondiga Vol. IV, July 21, 1627
de San Luis Potosi se fs. 83v,
guarde la ord. del Num. 88
Margues de Guadalcazar
de 18 de Nov, de 1615,
sobre que no haya
encomenderos en ella.
 263

APPENDIX XII. — (Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

12. Para que en la vol. IV, fs. 84, no date

alhondiga de San Luis Num. 89
Potosi, se guarde la
ordenanza del Marques
de Guadalcazar de 4 de
Junio de 1616, sobre que
el precio que se hiciere
por la manana se guarde
durante todo el dia.
Fieles Ejecutores
1. Que los Fieles Ojecu- vol. II, fs. Oct. 25, 1600
tores y el corregidor 107, Num. 91
acudan a sentenciar las
cansas de diputacion.
2. Se encarga la ejecucion vol. II, Feb. 7, 1622
de la ord. de los pan- fs. 210, Num. 234
aderos a los Fiel
Ejecutores y al
corregidor.

3. Ords. para el govierno

de la Fiel Ejecutoria
de la ciudad de Mexico,
aprobada en Real Cedula
de 6 de Mayo de 1724

Grana
1. La orden que ha de vol. II, May 14, 1580
tener el Juez de la fs. 252v,
Corana Num. 286
2. Que los negros y vol. I, fs. 51, May 28, 1580
mulatos no rescaten Num. 48
grana, y las demas
personas que lo hicieren
lo manifiesten ante la
justicia, y que se
guarde la orden que ha
de tener el Juez de la
Corana en los registros
que hiciere.
 264

APPENDIX XII. — (Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

3. Repeat of number 2.
4. Para que los indios vol. I, fs. 54, June 20, 1580
criados de espanoles, Num. 52
puedan rescatar grana
y los que los hacen lo,
rescatadores no haya
rescate por via de
encomienda,
5. Repeat of number 4.
6. Que se guarde lo que vol. I, fs. 55, July, 1580
esta mandado, a cerca de Num. 54
que la grana se cuida
en casa y en poder del
Juez de la Corana, con-
forme al Capitulo de
ord. de 6 de Oct. de
1572.
7. Repeat of number 6.
8. Ordenanza sobre la vol. II, Jan. 26, 1604
grana fs. 147v,
Num. 149
Harina
1. Para que los labra- vol. II, Dec. 12, 1578
dores de la comarca fs. 221,
de lsta ciudad (Mexico),Num. 247
traigan a elle durante
el mes de Diciembre,
16 hanejas de harina
cada uno para vender,
y si no lo hicieren,
no se las den indios
en los repartimientos.
2. Para que ningun pana- vol. I, Feb. 12, 1607
dero ni otra persona fs. 116v,
alguna pueda salir Num. 122
fuera de la ciudad,
qunice leguas a la
redanda a comprar
harina, y que manifiesten
la que tuvieren.
 265

APPENDIX XII.— (Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

3. Prohibicion para que vol. Ill, May 30, 1616

no se lleve harina, a fs. 29,
la habana a la Florida Num. 27
y a otras partes, en
atencion a la escasez.
La prohibicion comprende
desde el 16 de Junio al
ultimo de Octubre,

4. Que se guarde la ord. vol. Ill, June 4, 1616

que previene el primer fs. 30,
precio de la harina y Num. 28
trigo que se hiciere en
la alhondiga se observe
durante todo el dia.
5. Ord, relativas a los vol. IV, fs. 14, Oct. 2, 1620
panaderos y pro- Num. 14
videncias que deben
tomarse en...-la compra
de harina y trigo, a fin
de evitar fraudes.
Legumbres
1. Confirmacion de un vol. II, March 21, 1605
mandamiento, sobre fs. 168,
que hombres solteros Num. 185
no vendan en las pla­
zas y tianguis,
legumbres.
2. Para que guarden y vol. IV, May 24, 1628
cumplan las ordenanzas fs. 118v,
de 23 de Nov. de 1601 Num. 113
y 17 de Agosto de
1619 para ningun
hombre soltero, no
siendo indio, se
entrameta en los puestos
de los indios a vender
legumbres y
bastimientos.
 266
APPENDIX XII. —(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

3. Que se pregone en esta vol. II, Nov. 27, 1636

ciudad (Mexico) que no fs. 318v,
se evite ni estrobe a Num. 361
los endios la venta y
trato de iegumbre y
fruta,

Maiz
1. Para que los jueces y vol. I, Num. 9 Dec. 23, 1578
justicias de los puestos
situados dentro de
catorce leguas a la
redanda de esta ciudad
(Mexico) obliguen a los
indios a sacar y vender
publicamente el maiz, al
precio establicido.
2. Repeat of number 1. vol. II, Dec. 23, 1578
fs, 221v,
Num. 248
3. Que ningun espanol, vol. I, fs. 36, Oct. 31, 1579
mulato o mestizo, Num. 28
vaya a comprar maiz
a las casas de los
indios.
4. Repeat of number 3. Vol. II, Oct. 31, 1579
fs. 234v,
Num. 226
5. Ord. en que se senalan vol. I, fs. 90, July 23, 1585
los lugares de la ciu- Num. 94
dad de Mexico, donde se
han de vender el maiz y
otras cosas.
6. Repeat of number 7 vol. II, July 23, 1585
fs. 281v,
Num. 323
 267

APPENDIX XII.—(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N, Ordenanzas Date

7. Para que los admin- vol. II, May 18, 1601

istradores del maiz fs. 116v,
y Sal Gaarden lo que Num. 98
aqui se declara. Se
refiere a los admin-
istradores de los
congregaciones de minas.

8. Que no se haga vino de vol. II, July 31, 1608

cana de maiz, Esta fs. 207v,
prohibicion es general; Num. 231
pero se refiere con
particularidad al valle
de Toluca.

9. Que se guarde y cumpla vol. Ill, Nov. 18, 1615

la ord. que hizo la fs. 17v,
ciudad de Mexico, en Num. 15
22 de Enero de 1594,
sobre que en casas
particulares no se
venda el maiz, y solo
en la alhondiga, plazas
y tianguis.
10. Para que en la Alhon- vol. Ill, Nov. 18, 1615
diga no haya fs. 19,
encomenderos de los Num. 16
bastimientos de maiz,
trigo, y harina, en
cumplimiento de la ord.
de 29 de Enero de 1598,
agui inserta.

11. Con motivo de la escasez vol. Ill, Nov. 18, 1615

se prohibe cebar ganado fs. 21,
prieto (cerdos) en Num. 17
esta ciudad y catorce
leguas a la redonda, y
en la de los angeles y
diez leguas a la
redonda, con maiz or
trigo. La prohibicion
es haste fin de abril
de 1616.
 268

APPENDIX XII.--(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

12. Que el Alguacil de las vol. Ill, Nov. 18, 1615

Calzadas de Mexico, fs. 21v,
saiga a los caminos para Num. 18
impedir que se quite a
los indios el maiz que
traen.
13. Para que la venta del vol. Ill, Nov. 28, 1615
maiz, que segun fs. 21v,
ordenanza de la ciudad, Num. 21
debia hacerse en la
alhondiga, plazas y
tianguis, se haga
solamente en la
alhondiga
14. Para que se guarde la vol. Ill, June 4, 1616
ord. sobre que el pri- fs. 30,
mera percio del maiz, Num. 28
harina y trigo que se
hiciere en la
Alhondiga, se observe
durante todo el dia.

15. En virtud de la Abun- vol. Ill, Nov. 29, 1617

dancia de cosechas, se fs. 73,
revoca la ordenanza de Num. 53
Nov. de 1615 (no. 14),
que prohibia cebar con
maiz y trigo al ganedo
prieto.
16. Que no se sebe ganedo vol. IV, Oct. 7, 1621
prieto (cerdos) con fs. 33v,
maiz y trigo en esta Num. 29
ciudad y su comarca,
y en la de Los
Angeles, hasta que
otra cosa se provea.

17. Para que las personas vol. IV, fs. 45v, June 3, 1622
que tengan maiz en esta Num. 44
ciudad (Mexico), lo
manisfiesten dentro de
tres dias ante el corre-
gidor o Diputado de la
Alhondiga,
 269

APPENDIX XII.(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

18. Que no se venda maiz Vol. II, Oct. 24, 1623

por junto ni por menudo fs. 69v,
en esta ciudad (Mexico) Num. 59
fuera de la Alhondiga.
19. Repeat of number 23. vol, IV, fs. 67, Oct. 24, 1623
Num. 70
20. Removal de la prohibi- vol. IV, May 6, 1625
cion contenida en el fs. 72v,
mandamiento de 7 de Num. 77
Oct. de 1621 (no, 19),
sobre cebar ganado
prieto (cerdos) con
maiz y trigo.
21. Prohibicion para que vol. IV, April 3, 1628
no se cebe con maiz v fs. 116,
trigo el ganado prieto, Num. 110
en la ciudad de
Mexico, en la de los
Angeles, Tlaxcala y
Huejotcingo y quince
leguas en sus
contornos.
Mercaderes
1. Para que las personas vol. I, Num. 7 Dec. 3, 1578
mercaderos que trigan
cacao y otras
Mercancias, a vender a
Tlaxcala y Tepeaca, y
los puestos de sus
jurisdicciones, lo
manisfiesten ante las
justicias,

2. Repeat of number 1. vol. II, Dec. 3, 1578

fs. 220v,
Num. 246
 270

APPENDIX XII.—(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

3, Que los ensayadores vol. I, Sept. 14, 1608

no puedan tratar in fs. 123 v,
contratar ningun close Num. 132
de mercancias en las
minas donde fueren sus
ministerios.
4. Que se guarde la vol, I, Nov. 21, 1608
prohibicion a los fs. 124,
solteros para que no
vendan inercaderias se
expide para las minas
de sultepec.
5. Que se guarde el auto vol. Ill, July 13, 1613
de la Real Audiencia fs. 36v,
de 17 de septiembre de Num. 31
1583, que prohibe que
anden mercaderes buhoneros
por las calles y casas de
esta ciudad y en cual
quiera otra de la Nueva
Espana.
6. Para que en los puestos vol. I, Dec. 12, 1613
de indios, sujetos y fs. 163,
• cabeceras, no puedan Num. 191
entrar mercachifles.
7. Repeat of number 6. vol. II, fs. 11 Dec., 12, 1613
Num. 10
8. Repeat of number 7 vol. I, May 5, 1614
pudiendo entrar los fs. 166v,
mercachifles a los Num. 195
puestos cabeceras,
con tal de que no
esten mas de tres dias.
9. Repeat of number 8. vol. II, fs. 12, May 5, 1614
Num. 11
10. Se declara que la vol. Ill, fs. 1, June 14, 1614
ordenanza anterior Num. 1
(Nos. 9 and 10) se
entienda tambien para
las ciudades, puestos
y minas de espanoles.
 271

APPENDIX XII.—(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

11. Se aclara la ord. de vol. Ill, fs. 3, July 31, 1614

5 de Ma-o de 1614 (Nos. Num. 4
9 and 10), en el sentido
de que la proh.ibi.cion
no reza en los puestos
donde hay doctrina.
12. Que ningun pasajero, vol. TV, fs. 12, August 22, 1620
gachupin o extranjero, Num. 12
que haya venido en la
flota, ponga tienda de
mercadurias en las
minas de la N.E. La
prohibicion es por
dos anos.
13. Para que las personas vol. IV, Jan. 7, 16 22
que tengan licencias fs. 35v,
para vender mercadunas Num. 32
por las calles y plazas
de esta ciudad las
exhiban dentro de ocho
dias.
14. Para que sin licencia vol. IV, fs. 37, Jan. 31, 1622
pro escrito, nadie Num. 34
pueda vender
mercadurias de
Castilla, de China ni
de la tierra, en las
plazas, tianguis,
calles y casas de la
ciudad de Mexico.

Panaderos
1. Que ningun panadero ni vol, I, Feb. 12, 1607
otra persona alguna, fs. 116v,
pueda salir fuera de Num. 122
esta ciudad, ni quince
leguas a la redonda a
comprar trigo ni harina,
y que manifiesten la que
manifiesten la que tuviere
guardada.
 272

APPENDIX XII. — (Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

2. Se manda al corregidor vol. Ill, Nov. 14, 1617

de esta ciudad, que fs. 73,
hapa la postura del Num. 52
precio del pan que se
vende en ella, hasta
que se provea lo que
mas convenga.
3. Ordenanza relativa a vol. IV, Oct. 2, 1620
los panaderos y provi- fs. I4v,
dencias que deben torn- Num. 14
arse en la oompra de
trigo y harina, a fin de
evitar frandes,
4. Se comete la ejecucien vol. II, fs, 210 Feb. 7, 1622
de la ordenanza de los Num. 234
panaderos, al corregi­
dor y fieles ejecutores.
Pasteleros
1. Que el veedor y demas vol. V, fs. 6 , Feb. 28, 1667
officiales del gremio Num. 8
de pasteleros de esta
ciudad, guarden y cum-
plan sus ordenanzas, sin
excederse en cosa
alguna.

Plazas (mereados)
1. Que en la plaza de San- vol. I, fs. 31v, Aug. 20, 1579
tiago se venda la Num. 22
fruta, chile, tomates y
otra cosas, y solo
despues de las tres de
la tarde, se venda a
regatores.
2. Repeat of number 1. vol. II, fs. 229, Aug. 20, 1579
Num. 260
 273

APPENDIX XII.r-"(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

3. Sobre el precio de vol. I, fs. 44, Jan. 28, 1580

I venta de los huevos, y Num. 39
que solo se vendan en la
plaza mayor, en la que
esta adelante de las
casas del Marques, en
la de Santa Catalina y
en los tianguis de San
Juan, San Hipolito y
Santiago.
4. Repeat of number 3. vol. II, fs. 244, Jan. 28, 1580
Num. 277,
Regatones

1. Que no se de carne vol. II, Dec. 31, 1605

a regatones, y que fs, 173,
esto se entienda con Num. 197
los indios. Es
confirmacion de un
mandamiento del conde
de Monterrey, de 7 de
Agosto de 1601.
2. Ord. sobre el zacate, vol. II, May 17, 1608
y comison dada a Juan fs. 220v
Casaus (Rejidos), Num. 274
para que ponga
remedio a los abusos
de regatores.
3. Para que ninguna vol. I, fs. 159, Aug. 12, 1613
persona pueda salir Num. 188
a comprar ganado prieto
(cerdos) para volverlo
a revender, so pena, de
perdido.
Trigo
1. Para que los labradores vol. I, Num. 8 Dec. 12, 1578
de la comarca de esta
ciudad de Mexico,
traigan a ella, durante
el mes de harina y
trigo para vender.
 274

APPENDIX XII.(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

2. Repeat of number 1 vol. II, fs. 221, Dec. 12, 1578

Num. 247
Para que ninguna vol, II, Feb. 12, 1607
persona saiga fuera de fs. 116v,
esta ciudad, a quince Num. 122
leguas a la redonda,
para comprar trigo y
harina, y las personas
que tuvieren estos
ejectos, los
manifiesten,
4. Para que se guarde la vol. Ill, fs, 19, Nov. 18, 1615
ord, aqui inserta de Num. 16
fecha 29 de Enero de
1598, sobre que no
haya en la Alhondiga en
comenderos que vendan el
trigo, harina y maiz que
entran en ella para el
proveimiento de la
republica.
5. Prohibicion de cebar vol. II, fs. 21, Nov. 18, 1615
ganado prieto (cerdos) Num. 17
en esta ciudad y
catorce leguas a la
redonda, y en la de
puesta y diez leguas
a la redonda, con trigo
y maiz, debido a la
escasez de las cosechas.
6. Con motivo de la vol. Ill, fs. 29, May 30, 1616
escasez de las cosechas Num. 27
se prohibe la costumbre
de llevar trigo y
harina a la Habana y a
la Florida. La pro­
hibicion es hasta el
ultimo de Octubre de
1616.
 275

APPENDIX XII.—(Cont.)

Subject A.G.N. Ordenanzas Date

7. Que se guarde la vol. Ill, fs. 29, June 4, 1616

ordenanza sobre que el Num. 27
primer precio del trigo,
harina y maiz que se
haga en la Alhondiga,
se observe durante
todo el dia.
8. En vista de la abun- vol. Ill, fs. 73, Nov. 29, 1617
dancia de las Num. 53
cosechas, se revola la
prohibicion de 18 de
Nov. de 1615 (no. 5)
sobre cebar ganedo
prieto (cerdos) con
trigo y maiz.

9. Ordenanzas relativas al vol. IV, fs. 14, Oct. 2, 1620

oficio de panaderos y Num. 14
providencias qye deben
tomarse para evitar
frandes en la compra
del trigo y harina.
10, Se establece de nuevo vol, IV, fs, 33v, Oct. 7, 1621
la prohibicion de Num. 29
cebar ganado prieto
(cerdos) con trigo
y maiz.
11. Se levanta la pro~ vol, IV, fs. 72v, May 6, 1625
hibicion sobre cebar Num. 77
ganado prieto (cerdos)
con trigo y maiz.
12. Se prohibe cebar vol. IV, fs. 116, April 3, 1628
ganado prieto con trigo Num, 110
y maiz en Mexico, Los
Angeles, Tlaxcala y
Huejotzingo y en sus
contornos.
 276

APPENDIX XIII

PARTIAL LISTING OF ALDERMEN OR THEIR RELATIONS WITH

LAND HOLDINGS FROM GENERAL DE PARTE

Documents Reference and Date

Parte
1. "Receptoria a las Justicias a vol, 6, exp. 332,
pedimento del Fiscal de su fo. 224, Die. 6,
majestad en la causa que trata 1602.
con D, Cristobal de Onate, sobre
la encomienda de Santiago Tecali"
Parte
2, "Orden para que se den indios a vol, 6, exp, 516,
las haciendas de minas de D. Juan* fo. 289, Junio
Altamirano y D. Francisco 21, 1603,
Carbajal"
Parte
3. "Para que el alcalde mayor de vol. 6, exp. 952,
Hueytlalpa de su parecer en las fo. 429, Enero 29,
diligencias que tiene encomendades 1604.
sobre la mitad de un sitio de
huerta que pretendo. D, Antonio.
de Carbajal"
Parte
4, "Licencia al bachiller Cristobal vol, 6, exp. 1028,
de Cervantes, beneficiado del fo. 449, Feb. 14,
partido de Ixtlahuaco, para que 1604.
que en una estancia de labor
que alii posee pueda tener
veinticuatro vacas mansas"
Parte
5, "Para que los oficiales reales vol. 6, exp, 1040,
de esta ciudad dando fianza a fo, 453, Feb. 20,
Leonel de Cervantes de pagar a su 1604.
cargo los mill ducados en que
fio al contador Alonso
Calderon"
Parte
6. "Licencia a D. Juan Cervantes vol, 7, exp. 281,
Casasus. . . para comprar diez fo. 182, Julio 21,
mill borregas en el valle de 1632
Queretaro para acresentar las
haciendas de ganado menor que
tiene en la provincia de
Tlaxcala ..."
 277

APPENDIX XIIX. — CCont.}

Documents Reference and Date

Parte
"Para que el Alcalde Mayor de vol. 7, esp. 297,
Celaya mida un sitio de estancia fo. 194, Agosto 7,
de D. Gabriel Lopez de Peratter, 1632.
que dice tiene en su
jurisdiccion. . .
Parte
"Para que el Alcalde Mayor de vol. 7, exp. 570r
Texcoco mida cantidad de fo. 366, Abril 9,
caballerias de tierra sitio de 1633.
venta y estancia y otras que dice
tiene en su jurisdiccion el
contador Diego de Ochandiano. ,
Parte
9, "Licencia a D, Francisco de las vol. 7, exp. 590,
casas Alcalde Mayor del partido fo, 375, Abril
de Izucar para hacer ausencia 28, 1633.
del por trienta dias. .
Parte
10. "Para que a D. Diego de Figueroa vol. 7, exp. 593,
y Cordova y la persona que fo. 375, Abril
tuviere su poder pueda matar 170 29, 1633.
bacas a cuenta de 300 contenidos
en el mandamiento. . ."
 278

APPENDIX XIV

PARTIAL LISTING OF ORDINANCES PASSED BY THE CITY COUNCIL

FOR URBAN GUILDS 1580-1650

Date given Date confirmed

Ordinance by council by the Viceroy

Abridores de Cuellos Nov. 7, 1622

Agujeros April 18, 1616 Sept. 20, 1616

Agujeteros y clavadores May 7, 1593 May 14, 1593

de Cintas

Alameda Feb. 7, 1620 Feb. 14, 1620

Alhondiga Nov, 14, 1580 Jan. 16, 1581

Alhondiga Jan. 22, 1594 Jan. 18, 1615

Apren sadores Sept, 19, 1605 Sept, 21, 1605

Arte Mayor de la seda Sept. 7, 1584 Sept. 12, 1584

Arte Mayor de la seda Sept. 17, 1589 Sept. 24, 1589
Arte Mayor de la seda Jan. 24, 1596 May 9, 1596

Arte Mayor de la seda April 5, 1619 April 20, 1619

Bastimientos March 16, 1612

Basuras Sept. 27, 1591 Sept. 30; 1591

Batihojas June 12, 1598 July 15, 1598

Batihojas Feb. 9, 1607 March 3, 1697

Batihojas de Panes de oro Feb. 19, 1599 May 25, 1599

Batihojas Feb. 9, 1607 March 3, 1607

Batihojas de Panes de oro Sept. 7, 1619

Cabras y ovejas Sept, 26, 1588 Sept. 24, 1588

Cacao June 21, 1619 April 8, 1622

 279

APPENDIX XIY. — (Cont.)

Date given Date confirmed

Ordinance by Council by the Viceroy

Cacao June 21, 1619 April 27, 1626

Calceteros, sastres y 1600
roparejeros
Calceteros, juveteros Feb. 25, 1590 July 17, 1590
y sastres
Calceteros Sept. 13, 1600

Candeleros (Cereros y Dec. 3, 1603 Jan. 28, 1604

candeleros)
Carderos May 14, 1592

Carne July 19, 15'82

Carne April 5, 1592 April 30, 1592

Carniceria Jan. 13, 1635
Carpinteros April 9, 1575 June 13, 1575

Carpinteros Dec. 2, 1605

Confiteros July 24, 1603 Oct. 3, 1603

Confiteros Aug. 28, 1623
Confiteros May 14, 1622

Corambre de los Oct. 21, 1591 Nov. 28, 1591

Curtidores
Contra los Regatores Sept, 26, 1597

Corambre de los May 8, 1592 '

Curtidores

Corambres April 29, 1608

Cordobanes May 26, 1606

Cordobanes Nov. 9, 1607 April 28, 1608

 280

APPENDIX XVI. — (Cont.)

Date given Date confirmed

Ordinance by council by the Viceroy

Curtidores y del Herrete Dec. 23, 1592 Jan. 5, 1593

Esclavos April 17, 1589 Oct. 20, 1589

Esclavos Feb. 28, 1626

Esclavos March 9, 1626

Espaderos Nov. 20, 1600 Jan. 15, 1601

Estanco de Cordoban Nov. 9, 1607 April 28, 1608

Estanco de Cordoban April 29, 1608

Estanco de Cordobanes July 21, 1632

Fiel del Repeso del Pan Sept, 17, 1588 Sept. 13, 1588

Fierro Jan. 14, 1602

Fruta, atole, bunuelos July 23, 1585

Fundidores March 13, 1581

Crorreros Nov. 4, 1633 Feb. 21, 1634

Guanteros July 31, 1597 Oct. 24, 1597

Guarnicioneros Feb, 13, 1609

Harina Oct. 20, 1620

Herradores y Albeytares June 8, 1627 Aug. 5, 1627

Hiladores de Seda Sept. 14, 1589 Oct. 9, 1589

Hiladores y Sederos April 12, 1601 Dec. 31, 1602

Juveteros July 16, 1590 July 21, 1590

Labradores March 9, 1594 March 10, 1594

Maestros de Escuela Oct. 9, 1600 Jan. 5, 1601

 281

APPENDIX XVI.—(Cont.)

Date given Date confirmed

Ordinance by council by the Viceroy

Molineros CPuebla) Nov. 15, 1602 March 27, 1604

Pan Feb. 5, 1580 Feb. 5, 1580
Panaderos July 20, 1589 Aug. 11, 1589
Panaderos Oct. 24, 1589 Nov. 16, 1589
—- -- •
Panaderos June 20, 1590 June 20, 1590
Panaderos Jan. 22, 1594 Jan. 22, 1594
Plateros Jan. 26, 1581
Plateros Nov. 8, 1616
Plateros Aug, 22, 1617
Plateros Oct. 20, 1638
Pasteleros April 15, 1611 April 26, 1611
Pesos, Pesas, Maroos, July 27, 1620 March 13, 1621
Romanas, y Medidas
Pregoneros Dec, 20, 1590
Regatones July 31, 1583
Regatones Oct. 6, 1587
Regatones Jan. 21, 1594 Jan. 22, 1594
Regatones Dec. 1, 1604
Regatones Aug. 12, 1613
Roperos Nov. 28, 1588 Dec, 10, 1588
Sayales y Sayaleros Sept. 15,. 1592 Jan. 8, 1593
Sederos Dec. 1, 1591 Dec. 5, 1591
Sederos Sept, 16, 1594 Oct. 14, 1594
 282

APPENDIX XVI.—(Cont.)

Date given Date confirmed

Ordinance by council by the Viceroy

Sederos y Gorreros Dec. 1, 1595 Dec. 5, 1595

Silleros SEpt. 15, 1586 Dec. 15, 1586

Silleros July 18, 1615 Aug. 12, 1615

Sombrereros Sept. 25, 1592 Nov. 21, 1592

Taberneros Feb. 21, 1634
Tejedores de Telas Jan. 24, 1596 May 9, 1596
de oro
Tenderos April 21, 1632 May 21, 1632
Tintoreros Oct. 31, 1583 March 14, 1584
Tintoreros Feb, 22, 1595 April 22, 1595
Tintoreros de Seda Feb. 3, 1594 March 4, 1594
Tiradores de oro y Sept. 7, 1618
Plata
Toneleros Feb. 24, 1595 April 8, 1595
Torneros y Carpinteros Oct. 16, 1597 Oct. 27, 1597
Tundidores Nov. 14, 1580 March 13, 1581
Vacas Oct. 10, 1596 Dec. 24, 1596
Vino Jan. 8, 1582 Jan. 29, 1582

Vino sobre la Traza May 17, 1591 May 18, 1591

Vino sobre la Traza Aug. 27, 1617 Sept. 5, 1617
Zacate May 17, 1608
Zapateros Nov. 11, 1604 Nov. 16, 1604
Zapateros Dec. 20, 1605
Zapateros July 20, 1629 Feb. 22, 1630
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