Employees Union of Bayer Phils. v.

Bayer Phils

Union 1, affiliated with a Federation, and headed by Facundo negotiated with Bayer for the signing of a CBA which
resulted in a deadlock when Union 1 rejected Bayer’s wage-increase proposal. This resulted to a strike so the Labor
Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. Pending the resolution, Remigio’s group, without authority from
the union, accepted Bayer’s wage-increase proposal. The Labor Secretary then issued an arbitral award ordering
Union 1 and Bayer to execute aa CBA which was subsequently registered with DOLE. Barely six months after the
signing of the CBA, Remigio’s group solicited signatures from union members to disaffiliate from the federation and
to rename the union, among others; basically, it wanted to form another Union (Union 2). Thereafter, Union 1 and
Union 2 sought recognition from Bayer and demanded remittance of the union dues. Bayer initially decided to not
deal with either union and placed the union dues in a trust account. Union 1 then filed the 1 st ULP complaint against
Bayer for non-remittance of dues. While the first ULP case was pending, Bayer decided to remit the union dues to
Union 2. Labor Arbiter dismissed the 1st complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, Union 1 then filed a second
ULP complaint against Bayer for gross violation of the CBA and violation of the duty to collectively bargain. On the
same date, Union 2 and Bayer agreed to sign a new CBA. Thus, Union 1 filed a motion for TRO/injunction before the
NLRC, which was denied.

So in this case, Union 1 was arguing that Bayer’s acts of negotiating with Union 2 constitutes ULP. Bayer counters
that there can be no ULP because the requisites for ULP, that the violation of the CBA should be gross and that it
should involve a violation in the economic provisions of the CBA, were not satisfied. Whether Bayer’s act of
negotiating and dealing with Union 2 despite the validly existing CBA of Bayer with Union 1 constitutes ULP? YES.

When a valid and binding CBA had been entered into by the workers and the employer, the latter is duty-bound to
observe the terms and conditions in it, even those bearing on union dues and representation. If the employer grossly
violates its CBA with the duly recognized union, the former may be held administratively and criminally liable for
unfair labor practice. The CBA serves as a contract between the parties and has the force and effect of law between
them during the period of its duration. Compliance with the terms and conditions of the CBA is mandated by express
policy of the law primarily to afford protection to labor and to promote industrial peace. As such, the Court rules
that when an employer proceeds to negotiate with a splinter union despite the existence of its valid CBA with the
duly certified and exclusive bargaining agent, the former indubitably abandons its recognition of the latter and
terminates the entire CBA which is in violation of its duty to collectively bargain.

Furthermore, the Court clarifies, that the requisites of ULP as pronounced in Silva (i.e. that the violation of the CBA
should be gross and that it should involve a violation in the economic provisions of the CBA) should not be construed
to apply to violations of the CBA which can be considered as gross violations per se, such as utter disregard of the
very existence of the CBA itself.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:
What was the ULP here? Violation of the CBA and duty to bargain. Employer dealt with the splinter group which is
not the exclusive bargaining representative. It became a blatant disregard of the majority status, hence disregard of
CBA.
 Prince Transport v. Garcia

PTI, a transport-service company, hired Garcia et al. for their operations. When their commissions were reduced by
PTI, Garcia et al. attended several meetings to discuss the protection of their interests. They asked for cash advances,
some were denied and some were approved. Suspecting the formation of a union, PTI transferred PTI transferred
all union members and sympathizers to its sub-company Lubas. Lubas eventually stopped its operations due to PTI’s
refusal to maintain and repair the units being used. Garcia, et al. filed various complaints against PTI charging the
company with illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and illegal deductions. LA ruled that there was no ULP
committed by PTI but Lubas illegally dismissed 40 employees. However, when it reached the CA, it reversed and
ruled that PTI was guilty of ULP, the transfer being indicative of PTI’s intent to frustrate the efforts of the employees
to organize themselves.

WoN PTI committed unfair labor practices? YES.

SC applied piercing the veil of corporate fiction on the sub-company, PTI failed to refute that despite the transfer,
the DTRs, reports, etc. were all made, performed, filed and kept at PTI’s office. As such in this case, the SC ruled that
PTI’s actions amounted to ULP. Under the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of ULP if it interferes with, restrains or
coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours
of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. The transfer to Lubas left Garcia, et al. to their own devices as to the operations of Lubas. The
Court, in affirming the CA, noted that PTI withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts,
and repair and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition; which left
Garcia, et al. virtually jobless. Hence, ULP is present in this case.

POSSIBLE QUESTION:
In Prince Transport, Inc. v. Garcia, the Supreme Court held that any unjust transfer of work assignment that is
considered an invalid exercise of management prerogative may be construed as an unfair labor practice? FALSE.
 Manila Mining Employees Corp. v. Manila Mining

MMC was a mining company required by law to maintain a tailing pond to store waste material from its mining
operations. An environmental compliance certificate (EEC) is required to operate a tailing pond. The Union in this
case was newly created so it send a request with MMC to bargain collectively through the submission of CBA
proposals. However, after this occurred, the DENR did not issue another permit upon the expiry of the old one as
MMC was unable to obtain the consent of the community, thus leading to the closure of the tailing pond. MMC was
compelled to shut down its mining operations and temporarily laid-off more than 400 workers. MMC also called for
a suspension of the CBA negotiations with the union until resumption of mining operations. 11 rank-and-file union
members, aggrieved, filed a complaint for ULP arguing that MMC did not want to bargain with the Union and instead
of submitting a counter-proposal, they terminated the union officers and active members, among others. The LA
and the NLRC ruled that there was a valid lay-off that did not constitute ULP. The union claims that unilateraly
suspending the CBA negotiations was an ULP; the Union also claims bad faith in laying-off employees as a result of
MMC’s own failure to get a permit.

The issue is WoN the acts of MMC amounted to ULP? NO.

For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown that the employer was motivated by ill-will, bad
faith or fraud, or was oppressive to labor. The law does not compel one of the parties to accept the proposal of
another party, what it contemplates is that both parties should approach the negotiation with an open mind and
make reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement Suspension of negotiations is not equal to refusal
to bargain. In this case, the union could not prove bad faith in the failure of MMC to obtain the consent of the
community to get a permit. The SC affirmed the rulings of the LA and the NLRC. It it cannot be said that MMC
deliberately avoided the negotiation. It merely sought a suspension and in fact, even expressed its willingness to
negotiate once the mining operations resume. There was valid reliance on the suspension of mining operations for
the suspension, in turn, of the CBA negotiation. The Union failed to prove bad faith in MMCs actuations.
 Central Azucarera de Bais Employees Union v. Central Azucarera de Bais

UNION 1, representing the rank-and-file bargaining unit, sent a proposed CBA, seeking increases in wages and
several benefits. The COMPANY responded with a counter-proposal, where they agreed to most benefits, but
refused to grant additional and separate Christmas bonuses. UNION 1 gave an amended proposal where it reduced
its previous demands on wages & bonuses, but the COMPANY maintained its position, hence, a deadlock. The UNION
1 filed a notice of strike with the NCMB, which began conciliation proceedings. When the UNION 1 requested for
copies of the COMPANY's financial statements a year after and the resumption of conciliation meetings, the
COMPANY informed the NCMB that conciliation should be considered moot and academic since 90% of the rank &
file employees withdrew their support from UNION 1 and re-organized into a new union (UNION 2). The COMPANY
likewise said that a new CBA had been concluded and was ratified by rank & file workers constituting 91% of the
collective bargaining unit. NCMB failed to react to this letter by the COMPANY and neither did it convene with UNION
1 and COMPANY. Thus, UNION 1 filed a complaint of ULP, for refusal to bargain.

W/N Central Azucarera de Bais (COMPANY) is GUILTY of ULP for refusal to bargain? NO.

The SC ruled that COMPANY is not liable for ULP. For a charge of unfair labor practice to prosper, it must be shown
that CAB was motivated by ill will, bad faith, or fraud, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy, and, of course, that social humiliation, wounded feelings or grave anxiety
that resulted in suspending negotiations. The COMPANY believed that UNION 1 was no longer the representative of
the workers. It just wanted to foster industrial peace by bowing to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of its
rank and file workers and by negotiating and concluding in good faith a CBA with UNION 2. Such actions of the
COMPANY are nowhere tantamount to anti-unionism, the evil sought to be punished in cases of unfair labor
practices.

Further, the SC ruled that Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. By
imputing bad faith to the actuations of the COMPANY, UNION 1 has the burden of proof to present substantial
evidence to support the allegation of ULP. Apparently, UNION 1 refers only to the circumstances mentioned in the
letter-response, namely, the execution of the supposed CBA between the COMPANY and UNION 2 and the request
to suspend the negotiations, to conclude that bad faith attended CAB's actions. For the Court, UNION 1 in simply
relying on the said letter-response, it failed to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice to rebut the presumption
of good faith.
 BPI Employees Union-Davao v. BPI

A service agreement between BOMC BOMC (BPI Operations Management Corporation, created by a CB Circular)
and BPI was implemented, wherein BOMC undertook to provide services such as check clearing, delivery of bank
statements, and fund transfers. In this agreement, no BPI employee was displaced and those transferred to BOMC
were given other assignments. The Manila Union of the BPI Employees Union filed a complaint for ULP. The LA
decided the case in favor of the union, but was reversed by the NLRC. Meanwhile, a merger between FEBTC and BPI
took effect, with BPI as the surviving corporation. Because of the merger, BPI and FEBTC’s cashiering functions were
transferred to BOMC. The Davao Union objected to the transfer, contending that the functions rightfully belonged
to the BPI employees and that the union members were deprived of membership (since there would be reduction
of number of positions in the bargaining unit) because of the former FEBTC personnel who, by virtue of the merger,
would have formed part of the bargaining unit pursuant to the union shop provision. The union filed a formal protest
and requested BPI to submit the BOMC issue to the grievance procedure under the CBA, but BPI did not consider it
as grievable, instead, a conference was held. BPI invoked management prerogative stating that the creation of the
BOMC was to preserve more jobs. The union argued that BPI undermined the existence of the union since it reduced
or divided the bargaining unit. Due to the issue not being settled, the union again asked for a grievance procedure,
but it was ignored. It then filed a notice of strike, while BPI filed a petition for the SOLE to assume jurisdiction over
the case. Upon appeal to the CA, it affirmed the NLRC’s decision and held that it was well within BPI’s prerogatives
to determine what conditional tasks should be performed, who should best perform it and what should be done to
meet the exigencies of business. It pointed out that the union did not, by the mere fact of the merger, become the
bargaining agent of the merged employees as the union’s right to represent said employees did not arise until it was
chosen by them.

Whether or not BPI’s act of outsourcing functions formerly performed by union members violates the CBA? The
SC held in the negative.

Art. 261 of the Labor Code provides that violations of a CBA, except those which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the CBA. In this case, the alleged
violation of the union shop agreement in the CBA, even assuming it was malicious and flagrant, is not a violation of
an economic provision in the agreement. The provisions relied upon by the union were those articles referring to
the recognition of the union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all rank-and-file employees. It
failed to take into consideration its recognition of the bank’s exclusive rights and prerogatives, likewise provided in
the CBA, which included the hiring of employees, promotion, transferees, and dismissals for just cause.

Further, the Court emphasized that contracting out of services is not illegal per se. It is an exercise of business
judgment or management prerogative. Absent proof that the management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. In this case, bad faith cannot be
attributed to BPI because its actions were authorized by the by the Circular issued by the Monetary Board of the
BSP. The circular covered amendments in the bank service contracts. A finding of ULP necessarily requires the
alleging party to prove it with substantial evidence. Union failed to discharge this burden.
 Pepsi Cola Products v. Molon et al.

Pepsi adopted a company-wide retrenchment program denominated as Corporate Rightsizing Program. To

commence with its program, it sent a notice of retrenchment to the DOLE as well as individual notices to the affected
employees informing them of their termination from work. Subsequently, Pepsi notified the DOLE of the initial batch
of 47 workers to be retrenched. Among these employees were 6 elected officers and 29 active members of the
Union, including the respondents. Due to this, the Union filed a Notice of Strike before the NNCMB due to Pepsi’s
alleged acts of union busting/ULP. It claimed that Pepsi’s adoption of the retrenchment program was designed solely
to bust their union so that Pepsi’s company union would garner the majority vote. Eventually, Pepsi and the Union
agreed to settle their labor dispute arising from the company’s retrenchment program and thus, executed the
Agreement. Included in the agreement was that in accepting the separation pay, a quitclaim would be made but
without prejudice to the filing of the case by the Union with the NLRC. As such, respondents still filed separate
complaints for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. The NLRC ruled in favor of Pepsi however this was reversed in the CA.

Whether respondents’ retrenchment was valid and was there ULP? 1st: YES; 2nd: NO.

Pepsi had validly implemented its retrenchment program. Records disclose that both the CA and the NLRC had
already determined that Pepsi complied with the requirements of substantial loss and due notice to both the DOLE
and the workers to be retrenched. PEPSI-COLA’s financial statements are substantial evidence which carry great
credibility and reliability viewed in light of the financial crisis that hit the country which saw multinational
corporations closing shops.

As for the ULP, Pepsi is not guilty of Union Busting as it retrenched its employees in good faith. Furthermore, the
fact that Pepsi’s rightsizing program was implemented on a company-wide basis dilutes respondents’ claim that
Pepsi’s retrenchment scheme was calculated to curtail union activities, much less diminish its constituency. Further,
the Court noted that Pepsi tried to sit down with its employees to arrive at mutually beneficial criteria which would
have been adopted for their intended retrenchment. Pepsi’s cooperation during the NCMB-supervised conciliation
conferences can also be gleaned from the records. It is also important to point out that the Union here was not the
exclusive bargaining union and that there was a union shop clause in force at that time, hence, if it was really the
intention of Pepsi to specifically remove the union members, Pepsi need not implement a retrenchment program
considering that the union shop clause already gave it ample justification to terminate them. As such, it is then hardly
believable that union affiliations were even considered by Pepsi in the selection of the employees to be retrenched.
 Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca Cola Bottlers

Coca-Cola has several bottling plants all over the country, one of which is located in Cebu City. In Cebu City, there
are 20 bottling operators who work for its Bottling Line 1 while there are 12-14 bottling operators who man its
Bottling Line 2. All of them are male and they are members of Union. The bottling operators work in two shifts. The
bottling operators are compensated with overtime pay if the shift extends beyond eight (8) hours. In 1974, the
bottling operators of then Bottling Line 2 were provided with chairs upon their request. In 1988, the bottling
operators of then Bottling Line 1 followed suit and asked to be provided also with chairs. Their request was likewise
granted. Sometime in September 2008, the chairs provided for the operators were removed pursuant to a national
directive of Coke. This directive is in line with the "I Operate, I Maintain, I Clean" program of Coke for bottling
operators, wherein every bottling operator is given the responsibility to keep the machinery and equipment assigned
to him clean and safe. The program reinforces the task of bottling operators to constantly move about in the
performance of their duties and responsibilities. With this task of moving constantly to check on the machinery and
equipment assigned to him, a bottling operator does not need a chair anymore, hence, Coke’s directive to remove
them. Furthermore, Coke rationalized that the removal of the chairs is implemented so that the bottling operators
will avoid sleeping, thus, prevent injuries to their persons. Union initiated the grievance machinery of the CBA. Even
after exhausting the remedies contained in the grievance machinery, the parties were still at a deadlock with
petitioner still insisting on the removal of the chairs and respondent still against such measure. Both parties availed
of the conciliation/mediation proceedings before the NCMB. Arbitration Committee ruled for Union, CA reversed.
Union was saying not valid exercise of management prerogative, violation of labor law, violation of CBA, violation of
Art. 100.

Whether or not Coca-Cola violated its employee’s rights? NO.

The Court ruled that management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of
employment. The exercise of management prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good
faith and with due regard to the rights of labor. In this case, the rights of the Union members under any labor law
were not violated. Additionally, the decision to remove the chairs was done with good intentions as Coke wanted
to avoid instances of operators sleeping on the job while in the performance of their duties and responsibilities with
heavy machinery.

There is no law that requires employers to provide chairs for bottling operators. The CA correctly ruled that the
Labor Code, specifically Article 132 thereof, only requires employers to provide seats for women. No similar
requirement is mandated for men or male workers. It must be stressed that all concerned bottling operators in this
case are men.

As to the CBA, the Court ruled that benefits and/or privileges, not expressly given in the CBA but which are presently
being granted by the company and enjoyed by the employees, shall be considered as purely voluntary acts by the
management and that the continuance of such benefits and/or privileges, no matter how long or how often, shall
not be understood as establishing an obligation on the company's part. Since the matter of the chairs is not expressly
stated in the CBA, it is understood that it was a purely voluntary act on the part of Coke; hence, no obligation to
continue.

The Court further completely agrees with the CA ruling that the removal of the chairs did not violate the general
principles of justice and fair play because the bottling operators’ working time was considerably and the break
period, when they could sit down, was increased to 30 minutes between rotations. The bottling operators’ new work
schedule is certainly advantageous to them because it greatly increases their rest period and significantly decreases
their working time. Lastly, the operators’ chairs cannot be considered as one of the employee benefits covered in
Article 100 of the Labor Code. SC in this case recalling previous jurisprudence stated that the term "benefits"
mentioned in the non-diminution rule refers to monetary benefits or privileges given to the employee with monetary
equivalents; chairs, of course, were not monetary benefits.
 Goya v. Goya Employees Union

Goya hired contractual employees from PESO to perform temporary and occasional services in its factory in Marikina.
The Union requested for a grievance conference considering that contractual workers do not belong to the
categories of employees stipulated in the existing CBA. The grievance, being unresolved, was referred to the NCMB
for voluntary arbitration. For failing to settle amicably with the Voluntary Arbitrator, they submitted for resolution
the issue on whether Goya is guilty of unfair labor acts by engaging the services of PESO under the CBA, laws, and
jurisprudence. The Union argued that the hiring of contractual employees is in gross violation of the CBA tantamount
to unfair labor practice since the work of the contractual workers were previously assigned to regular workers and
union members. According to the union, it violated a provision in the the CBA where it would not be possible to
anymore hire probationary and casual employees. The company argued that: 1) Contracting arrangements are
allowed by law and within management prerogative, 2) Contracting did not prejudice the union since no single
employee was terminated nor were the work hours nor bargaining unit were affected, and 3) the CBA provision
provided for the definition of the categories of employees and does not put a limitation on the company's right to
engage the services of job contractors.

Voluntary Arbitrator: No ULP but the company violated the CBA for not keeping in with its letter and spirit. Instead
of engaging PESO for temporary or occasional services, it should have directly hired causal employees instead in
accordance with the spirit of the CBA.

CA: Dismissed Goya's petition. CA citing the Voluntary Arbitrators Resolution ruled that “While the engagement of
PESO is in of the CBA, it does not constitute unfair labor practice as it is not characterized under the law as a gross
violation of the CBA. Violations of a CBA, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as
unfair labor practice. Gross violations of a CBA means flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic
provisions of such agreement. x x x”

SC decided to rule on the petition even if Goya’s corporate life ceased. Firstly, SC affirmed the VA’s authority to rule
on the matter stating that if the submitted issues are germane to or interrelated or intertwined with the issue
submitted for resolution, the VA can resolve.

Whether Goya committed Unfair Labor Practice? NO. While it was ruled that there was a violation of the CBA,
ULP is only committed if there’s a gross violation of the agreement.

Whether contracting out of services from PESO was a valid exercise of management prerogative? NO. Having the
right of management prerogative is different from its valid exercise. The right to exercise management prerogative,
in this case, was limited by the CBA.

POSSIBLE QUESTION:
In Goya, Inc. v. Goya Inc. Employees Union, the hiring of contractual employees constituted a violation of the CBA.
Considering that this would affect the salaries of the existing employees, the Court held that such act constituted
ULP and a case was properly filed with the Labor Arbiter? FALSE.
 T&H Shopfitters v. T&H Shopfitters Workers Union

The union officers/members and other employees held their first formal meeting to discuss the formation of a union.
The following day, 17 employees were barred from entering the employer’s factory in Castillejos, Zambales and
ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters’ warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport Zone purportedly because of expansion.
Afterwards, said 17 employees were repeatedly ordered to go on forced leave due to the unavailability of work.
Therafter, DOLE issued a certificate of registration in favor of the Union. Union officers/members contended that
the affected employees were not given regular work assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to
perform their functions. This development prompted them to seek the assistance of the NCMB. Subsequently, an
agreement between the employer and Union was reached. Employers agreed to give priority to regular employees
in the distribution of work assignments. Union officers/members averred, however, that employers never complied
with its commitment but instead hired contractual workers. Afterwards, Union filed a petition for certification
election. An order was issued to hold the certification election in both T&H Shopfitters and Gin Queen. Meanwhile,
the director of Gin Queen informed its employees of the expiration of the lease contract between Gin Queen and its
lessor in Castillejos, Zambales and announced the relocation of its office and workers to Cabangan, Zambales. Some
of the union officers/members, who visited the site in Cabangan, discovered that it was a "talahiban" or grassland.
Later, the said union officers and members were made to work as grass cutters in Cabangan. Due to these
circumstances, the employees assigned in Cabangan did not report for work. As a consequence, the Union president
was made to explain why he should not be terminated for insubordination. The other employees who likewise failed
to report in Cabangan were meted out with suspension. Thereafter, employers sponsored a field trip to Iba,
Zambales, for its employees. The officers and members of the Union were purportedly excluded from the field trip.
On the evening of the field trip, an employee campaigned against the union in the forthcoming certification election.
The following day, the employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center in Zambales to cast their
votes. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by employers, the votes for "no union" prevailed. Hence, Union filed its
protest with respect to the certification election proceedings

The issue in this case is WON the petitioner corporations are guilty of Unfair Labor Practice? YES.

SC ruled that the various acts of petitioner companies, taken together, reasonably support an inference that were
orchestrated to restrict respondent employees’ free exercise of their right to self-organization. The Court notes that
the Company’s undisputed actions prior and immediately before the scheduled certification election, while
seemingly innocent or unrelated, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting their exclusive
bargaining representative. The questioned acts of petitioner corporations, namely: (1) sponsoring a field trip to
Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the scheduled certification election; (2) the
active campaign by sales officer of the petitioner corporations against the union prevailing as a bargaining agent
during the field trip; (3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center; (4) the continuous hiring of
subcontractors performing respondents’ functions; (5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work on a
rotational basis for union members, all reek of interference on the part of the petitioner companies.

POSSIBLE QUESTION:
In T&H Shopfitters Corporation / Gin Queen Corporation v. T&H Shopfitters Corporation / Gin Queen Workers
Union, the Court held that the employer cannot at any time sponsor an excursion for employees as this will be
considered as an unfair labor practice? FALSE.
 Mendoza v. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union

Mendoza was a member of the Manila Water Union. The events of this case started when the union, through its
Secretary sent a letter to Mendoza informing him that the union could not deduct the increased P200 union fee
because he failed to give a check off authorization, and to pay his union dues. As such officers of the Union informed
the President through a letter that Mendoza and several others failed to pay the union dues in violation of the
union’s constitution and by-laws. Thus, the President referred the charge to the union grievance committee for
investigation. After a hearing, the committee recommended that Mendoza be suspended for 30 days which the
executive board unanimously approved. Thereafter, a letter was sent to Mendoza informing him of his suspension.
Mendoza filed a letter stating his intention to appeal, but was denied by the President because the period of appeal
has expired. Mendoza then urged that an appeal be taken to the general membership assembly, but the executive
board did not act on it. Thereafter, Mendoza was again suspended for failure to pay union dues, which he again
appealed, but was again unheeded. During his suspension, the elections for union officers took place. He filed a
petition to run was Vice President, but was disqualified for not being a member of good standing because of his
suspension. Afterwards, he was again notified of his failure to pay union dues, but this time his penalty was
expulsion. In all 3 suspensions and the expulsion, it was always after the EB unanimously approved the
recommendation of the grievance committee. Again he filed an appeal to the executive board, but it was unheeded.
Mendoza thereafter joined another Union and was elected the president. Other union 1 members wanted to join
union 2, but they were threatened that if they did so, they would not get benefits from the new CBA. In union 1’s
proposed CBA, a provision stated that in the event of retrenchment, non-union 1 members shall be removed first,
and that only union 1 members would receive a bonus. Mendoza filed a complaint with the LA for unfair labor
practice (his illegal termination from union 1 for non-payment of dues) and for unlawful interference, coercion, and
violation of the rights of the employees to self-organization because of the CBA which contained provisions
discriminatory against non-union 2 members. The officers of union 1 countered that such is an intra- union dispute
that is not within the jurisdiction of the LA.

W/N the labor arbiter has jurisdiction over the case at bar? YES. While it is true that some of Mendoza’s causes of
action constitute intra-union cases cognizable by the BLR for being an intra-union dispute, Mendoza’s charge of
unfair labor practices falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiters.

W/N the executive board committed ULP? YES. Union 1’s constitution and by-laws clearly state that in cases of
suspension and termination, the member has 3 and 7 days respectively to file an appeal to the executive board
which will be heard by the general membership assembly. Here, Mendoza was illegally suspended for 2 times, and
thereafter unlawfully expelled from union 1 due to the executive board’s failure to act on his written appeals.
Because of their inaction, Mendoza was unceremoniously suspended, disqualified and deprived of his right to run
for the position of union 1’s Vice President in the election of officers, expelled from union 1, and forced to join
another union. As members of the governing board of union 1, the officers are presumed to know, observe, and
apply the union’s constitution and bylaws, hence, their repeated inactions connote willfulness and bad faith, a gross
disregard of the member’s rights.

For these, the executive board is guilty of unfair labor practices under the Labor Code-- that is, violation of Mendoza’s
right to self-organization, unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of his union membership.
 CEPALCO v. CEPALCO Employees Labor Union

The 2 cases involve TUCP (UNION) filing against CEPALCO and CESCO with the same charges involving two different
contracting arrangement. TUCP is the sole CB agent of the rank-and-file employees of CEPALCO. CEPALCO entered
into a Contract for Meter reading (which was the contention of the first case) and Contract for Warehousing Works
(issue on the second case). As a result of this contracts, the employees and union members of CEPALCO were
relieved, assigned in floating positions, and replaced with CESCO workers. This prompt the union members to file a
complaint in the NLRC for ULP against the companies. UNION claimed that CEPALCO's act of contracting out services,
which used to be part of the functions of the regular union members, is violative of Article 259 (c) of the Labor Code.
UNION then alleged that that it would ultimately result in the dissipation of UNION's membership in CEPALCO. LA
and NLRC dismissed the complaints. CA however found that CESCO is a labor-only contractor while there is NO ULP
on the part of CEPALCO. This was affirmed by the SC, CEPALCO and CESCO failed to show that CESCO has substantial
capital or investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed.

The issue now is Whether or not CEPALCO contracting out services amounted to ULP? NO.

Labor-only contracting is considered as a form of ULP when the same is devised by the employer to "interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization.” ULP cases involves infringement of
the right to self-organize. Without that element, the acts, even if unfair, cannot be said to be ULP. Thus, an employer
may only be held liable for unfair labor practice if it can be shown that his acts affect in whatever manner the right
of his employees to self-organize.

The UNION failed to provide substantially that the contracting out of CEPALCO will interfere with, restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; evidence that would constitute ULP. They focused on
averments against CEPALCO and CESCO’s arrangement; and failed to provide the link to ULP.
 Bukluran ng Manggagawa sa Clothman Knitting v. CA

CKC is a company engaged in knitting/textiles. BMC-SUPER is a union of CKC. There was another union in the
company which was the NLM-Katipunan. BMC-SUPER filed for a petition for certification election. Pending resolution
of the PCE, CKC issued a Memorandum informing the employees of changes in schedule due to decrease in the
orders from customers. Another Memorandum was issued by CKC informing its employees at the Dyeing and
Finishing Division that a there would be a temporary shutdown of operations for 1 week. The affected employees
were advised to go on vacation and verify the changes in the Human Resources Division. CKC was unable to solve its
financial problems, and decided to temporarily shut down its operations at the Dyeing and Finishing Division
effective the next day, scheduled to resume until further notice. CKC notified DOLE of the shutdown. The other
divisions of CKC remained operational. Because of these developments, BMC-SUPER, its members and supporters,
blocked a delivery truck of CKC, and picketed in front of CKC's compound for several days. Eventually, CKC filed with
the NLRC a petition to declare the strike held by BMC-SUPER, its members and supporters, as illegal. The LA ruled in
favor of CKC and declared the strike illegal as well as terminating the employment of those who participated therein.
NLRC and CA affirmed. The Union was alleging that it could not have staged a strike because the operations at the
Dyeing and Finishing Division were temporarily stopped. It insists that it merely protested the unjustified closing of
the respondent's Dyeing and Finishing Division by forming a picket in front of the respondent's compound to urge
its re-opening.

Whether or not BMC-SUPER and its members/supporters are guilty of illegal strike? YES.

According to the SC, the Union’s argument that it was not a strike cannot be appreciated. A strike is any temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute,
on the other hand, includes any controversy or matter concerning the terms or conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. In order for a strike
to be valid, the following requirements must be complied with: (a) notice of strike must be filed; (b) strike-vote must
be taken; and (c) results of the strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, and
non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal.

The actions concerted in this case caused a stoppage of work. Further, based on the contents of the placards, what
they were fighting for was related to a labor dispute. The allegation that there can be no stoppage of work since the
Dyeing and Finishing Division was temporarily shut down is wrong, because the other divisions of CKC were still
functioning, and the evidence shows that even those not belonging to the Dyeing and Finishing Division joined the
concerted actions. Since it was a strike, the requirements must be complied with. These requirements are
mandatory, and non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The intentional of the law in requiring the strike
notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike. Since BMC-SUPER failed to comply with the
aforesaid requirements, the several strikes held are illegal.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:
What is a strike? A strike is any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute.

What is a labor dispute? A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning the terms or conditions of
employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.

What are the requirements for a valid strike? (a) notice of strike must be filed; (b) strike-vote must be taken; and
(c) results of the strike-vote must be reported to the DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, and non-compliance
therewith makes the strike illegal.
 Steel Corporation v. SCP Employees Union

Union 1 wanted to represent the R&F employees of the Company so it filed a PCE. Union 2 wanted to intervene, but
its motion was denied. A consent election was conducted, Union 1 and No Union as choices. This was declared a
failure since less than a majority of the R&F employees cast their votes. Thereafter, the Mother Federation of Union
2 filed a PCE in its behalf. This was granted by the Med-Arbiter. Meanwhile, the Company and Union 1 appealed to
the CA. The Med-Arbiter CE proceeded, with Union 1 participating without prejudice to its pending petition with the
CA. Union 2 was declared the winner by the Med-Arbiter in a second conduct of CE. The CA decision came out,
setting aside the DOLE order, and directed the holding of a CE with Union 1 and No Union as choices (Union 2
excluded). Nonetheless, DOLE certified Union 2 as the EBA of the employees, prompting Union 2 to send CBA
proposals to the Company. Company refused to act on the proposals, citing the pending actions of the Company and
Union 1 protesting Union 2’s certification as EBA. Union 2 filed a total of 3 Notices of Strike and went on 2 strikes,
since it wasn’t permitted to strike on its 2nd Notice of Strike. It also filed ULP against Company on grounds of non-
recognition as a certified union; refusal to bargain; discrimination against union officers and members; harassment
and intimidation; and illegal dismissal.

The NLRC declared that the Company had no obligation to recognize Union 2 as the certified BA. It dismissed the
ULP case, declared the strike illegal, and declared loss of employment of union officers of Union 2 due to illegal strike
activities. In the Union 2’s 3rd Notice of Strike, SOLE certified the dispute to the NLRC and directed the employees
to return to work. On MR, the NLRC overturned its own rulings and ordered the Company to collectively bargain and
reinstated the dismissed employees who were union officers. However, the CA affirmed the NLRC’s initial rulings
and held that that the second CE where Union 2 was declared winner was not recognized, so Union 2 has no basis
for its claims and has no right to demand Company to collectively bargain with it.

Whether or not Union 2 held an illegal strike? YES.

Union 2 held an illegal strike. Union 2’s notices of strike were founded on the Company’s continued refusal to
bargain with it. It thus staged the strike to compel the Company to recognize it as the collective bargaining agent,
making it a union-recognition-strike, this is not sanctioned by our Labor Laws. Even if this Court were to uphold the
validity of Union 2’s purpose or objective in staging a strike, still, the strike would be declared illegal for having been
conducted in utter defiance of the Secretary’s return-to-work order and after the dispute had been certified for
compulsory arbitration. The moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry
indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike. As such, the Union’s strike was declared illegal because of: (1) it is a union-recognition-strike which
is not sanctioned by labor laws; (2) it was undertaken after the dispute had been certified for compulsory arbitration;
and (3) it was in violation of the Secretary’s return-to-work order.

WON the union officers who participated in the illegal strike are all deemed to have lost their employment? YES,
they are deemed to have lost their employment. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike or participating in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike, the law provides that a union officer may be terminated from employment.
The law grants the employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having
lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service.

POSSIBLE QUESTION:
Why is a union recognition strike not allowed? The determination of an EBR is through a PCE, it cannot be done
through a strike. Although this is allowed in other jurisdictions, under PH laws, it is not a strikeable issue. (Labor
Code provides strikes for: Bargaining Deadlocks, ULP, and Union-busting)
 Biflex Phils. v. Filflex Industrial & Manufacturing Corp.

The petitioners in this case are the unions, Biflex Union and Filflex Union, and their respective officers. Biflex and
Fiflex are sister companies. The events of this case was started when the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to
protest the accelerating prices of oil. So the unions in this case, led by their officers, staged a work stoppage which
lasted for several days. Thereafter, the companies then filed a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure
to comply with procedural requirements. When the companies resumed their operations, the unions, claiming that
they were illegally locked out, asserted that due to the welga ng bayan, it was difficult to get a ride and that an
apprehension may erupt between the participators in the welga and the authorities. They also assert that the
companies were “slighted” by the workers’ no-show, so they were barred to enter the company premises as a
punishment. Afterwards, the unions filed a notice of strike. The unions also put up tents, tables, and chairs in front
of the main gate of the companies’ premises, asserting that these were for the union members who checked every
morning if they would be allowed to report for work. The companies maintain that the work stoppage was illegal
since the requirements for a valid strike were not complied with: (a) filing of notice of strike, (b) securing a strike
vote, and (c) submission of a report of the strike vote to the DOLE. LA declared the strike as illegal and the officers
lost their employment status. NLRC reversed this saying that there was no strike because no labor or industrial
dispute existed between the parties. So a reinstatement of workers was ordered. CA reinstated the decision of the
LA because of the failure to file a letter of protest or complaint with management and for failing to follow to
requirements of a valid strike.

The issue in this case is WoN the CA erred in declaring that the unions were guilty of holding an illegal strike when
circumstances showed that the companies were the ones who were guilty of an illegal lockout? SC ruled in the
negative.

Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an extended sympathy strike. This affects
employers including those without any dispute with the employees. Illegal work stoppage was done because
employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are scheduled to work, instead
join a welga ng bayan. The exercise of the workers’ rights with regard to the exercise of their freedom of expression,
of assembly or to petition the government for redress of grievances, are not absolute. . For the protection of other
significant state interests such as the "right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion
and growth" enshrined in the 1987 Constitution must also be considered, otherwise, oppression or self-destruction
of capital in order to promote the interests of labor would be sanctioned. And it would give imprimatur to workers'
joining demonstrations/rallies even before affording the employer an opportunity to make the necessary
arrangements to counteract the implications of the work stoppage on the business, and ignore the novel "principle
of shared responsibility between workers and employers" aimed at fostering industrial peace. As such, the
requirements for a valid strike are: (a) filing of notice of strike, (b) securing a strike vote, and (c) submission of a
report of the strike vote to the DOLE. The unions/officers were not able to show that they notified the companies of
their intention to join the strike. Also as to their claim of lockout, the LA observed that the unions’ inaction betrays
the weakness of their contention. They did not file a protest with the management or a complaint against the
companies if there was really a lockout. Even if they complied with the requisites, the strike would still be held illegal
because the unions blocked the ingress and egress from the premises. Thus, the officers should bear the
consequences of participating in an illegal strike. According to Art. 264, they may be declared to have lost their
employment status. “May” because it is a management prerogative.

POSSIBLE QUESTION:
What are the 3 general factors that you have to consider in determining the legality of the strike? (1) Must be
based on valid grounds; (2) Compliance with procedural requirements; and (3) Means of conducting the strike must
be legal.
 Bascon & Cole v. CA

The instant controversy arose from an intra-union conflict between the Union and National Labor federation (NFL-
mother federation). The Union asked the hospital to renew their CBA. Federation, however, opposed this move by
its local affiliate. Mindful of the apparent intra-union dispute, the hospital decided to defer the CBA negotiations
until there was a determination as to which union had the right to negotiate the new CBA. Believing that their union
was the certified collective bargaining agent, the members & officers of the Union staged a series of mass actions
inside the hospital’s premises. DOLE issued certifications stating that the Union was not a registered labor
organization. This finding, however, did not deter the Union from fling a notice of strike. Said notice was, however,
disregarded by the NCMB for want of legal personality of the union. The Hospital’s management received reports
that petitioners participated in the Union’s mass actions. Consequently, notices were served on all union members
asking them to explain in writing why they were wearing red and black ribbons and roaming around the hospital
with placards. Petitioners were dismissed from employment because of their participation in the mass action. So
they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. They denied having participated in said mass actions or having received
the notices (1) enjoining them from wearing armbands and putting up placards, with warning that disciplinary
measure would be imposed, and (2) informing them of the schedule of hearing. They admit, however, to wearing
armbands for union identity while nursing patients as per instruction of their union leaders. LA found the termination
complained to be valid and legal, and dismissed the complaint. It held that petitioners were justly dismissed because
they actually participated in the illegal mass action. It also concluded that petitioners received the notices of hearing,
but deliberately refused to attend the scheduled investigation. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor
Arbiter. But the CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC.

Whether or not they were validly terminated for allegedly participating in an illegal strike and/or gross
insubordination? No, they were not validly terminated.

While a union officer can be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike, an ordinary striking employee, like
petitioners herein, must have participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. There must be proof
that they committed illegal acts during the strike. But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial
evidence, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice. Their actual participation in the
illegal strike was limited to wearing armbands and putting up placards. There was no finding that the armbands or
the placards contained offensive words or symbols. Thus, neither such wearing of armbands nor said putting up of
placards can be construed as an illegal act. In fact, per se, they are within the mantle of constitutional protection
under freedom of speech. Evidence on record shows that various illegal acts were committed by unidentified union
members in the course of the protracted mass action. But the petitioner’s cannot be responsible for acts they did
not commit. The law, obviously solicitous of the welfare of the common worker, requires, before termination may
be considered, that an ordinary union member must have knowingly participated in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike. As for willful disobedience, the SC said that the element of willfulness characterized by a perverse
mental attitude on the part of petitioners in disobeying their employers order as to warrant the ultimate penalty of
dismissal is lacking. Wearing armbands and putting up placards to express one’s views without violating the rights
of third parties, are legal per se and even constitutionally protected. Thus, the hospital could have done well to
respect right to freedom of speech instead of threatening them with disciplinary action and eventually terminating
them.

POSSIBLE QUESTIONS:
What is the difference in rule between a union member and a union officer when there is an illegal strike? Union
officer who knowingly participated: can be terminated from employment Union member: must commit illegal acts
to be terminated; mere participation will not cause his or her termination