There are no widely agreed-upon criteria for evaluating whether elements of Dworkin's work

are incorrect, making his jurisprudence doubly contentious.1

This chapter argues that Dworkin's morality explanation has limited implications for law.

Concept of Law
Interpretivst approach to morality

1
Joseph Raz argued that the judicial need to consider morality does not imply that morality is
incorporated into the law.2
When pedigreed standards run out the Judges are required to look beyond the law and apply
extra legal principles to the case at hand, and they do so with great discretion. Strong
discretion, then, does not imply the existence of "extra-legal” principles are free to use for the
judges as they please. Judges, on the other hand, are legally constrained to adopt some extra-
legal standards, notably the morally best ones.3
It is obvious that law and morality interact in a variety of ways. 4 Dworkin too is concerned with
a form of engagement between law and morality
Dworkin identifies turns out to support only the notion that judicial acts have moral meaning or
import of some sort

JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND CONCEPT OF LAW

CONSTRUCTIVE INTERPRETATION
Dworkin lays out his constructive interpretation theory in Law’s Empire5, to challenge the
positivist views of law particularly Hart’s6. Interpreting Law is an important aspect of
Dworkin’s conception of law. Dworkin's constructive interpretation theory is an attempt to
prove that normative conceptions are interpretive concepts.7
A suit can raise three types of issues: legal issue, factual issue and issue pertaining to political
morality. Legal issue refers to what is the concerned law and factual issue on the other hand
is concerned with what actually occurred. However, the third issue seeks to determine what s
fair and just outcome should be.
Even when the results are undesired, Dworkin contended that the integrity of the law has
moral importance.

Dworkin makes the arguments that law and legal practices, by the virtue of their nature, are
interpretive concepts. The judge should endeavour to establish the value underlying a legal
practice or rule, by outlining a scheme of interests, purposes, or principles that the practise
can be considered to serve in order to reach the optimal interpretation.

Moral concepts, like their legal counterparts, are interpretive concepts that are justified when they
are supported by a particular interpretation of a social practice.

CONCLUSION
A lot has been left out of in this discussion, only a portion of Dworkin's critique has been
addressed.
Dworkin offers compelling reasons for rejecting common varieties of skepticism about law and
morality, his alternative to skepticism is problematic. I argue that the moral justification for a
2
Joseph Raz, ‘The Authoirty of Law’
3
Philip Soper, ‘Legal Theory and Obligations of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin Dispute’ 75 (1977).
4
Jon L. Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and The Law’ (1969) 14 Am J Juris 1.
5
1986
6
1994
7
deontological right is better understood to be a matter of reason and principle than a matter of
interpretation. Since Dworkin claims that constructive interpretation is a matter of reason and
principle, the aim of Part III is to show that Dworkin's position fails to provide an adequate
conception of moral justification