Transforming Political Authority: UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Author(s): Richard J. Ponzio

Source: Global Governance , April–June 2007, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April–June 2007), pp. 255-
275
Published by: Brill

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800657

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Global Governance 13 (2007), 255-275

Transforming Political Authority:

UN Democratic Peacebuilding
in Afghanistan

Richard J. Ponzio

This study examines the leadership role of the United Nations, from 2001
to 2005, in helping the government and people of Afghanistan to build
democratic institutions and practices at national and local levels. The UN,
seeking a better form of governance that could also politically unite non
Taliban factions, pursued with Afghan elites a risky strategy of democra
tization with a "light footprint" during a low-intensity insurgency. From
interim to transitional to elected authorities, UN-facilitated political devel
opment activities have, in effect, initiated a transformation in the notion
and sources of authority among Afghans?from rule by religious scholars,
tribal elders, and warlords to a hybrid model of governance involving
democratically elected leaders. By helping Afghans reconcile the inherent
tensions between these competing forms of authority, international peace
builders contributed to improved conditions of governance and a reduction
in intrastate political violence. The case of Afghanistan affirms the bene
fits of democratization after war that seeks to bridge the gap in concep
tions between old and new authority types. Drawing on these findings,
policy recommendations are advanced to further strengthen the UN sys
tem's democratic peacebuilding work in facilitating the political (recon
struction of war-shattered societies. Keywords: peacebuilding, democra
tization, conflict management, governance, Afghanistan, authority.

In a growing number of instances after the Cold War, the United Nations
and other international actors have sought to rebuild or establish new
political institutions in states or territories recovering from violent con
flict. From Afghanistan, Iraq, and the western Balkans to less prominent
wars in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Central America, and the South Pacific,
the international community's response involves extensive intrusions into
the domestic affairs of sovereign states. Extending beyond the narrow man
dates of traditional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, these
interventions aspire to restructure local political authority within a demo
cratic framework.
In support of the Bonn Agreement1 of 5 December 2001, UN Security
Council Resolutions 1383 and 1401 established an integrated, international

255

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256 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Mazar-e Sharif

Kabul

Jalalabad j
AFGHANISTAN

Kandahar

peacebuilding operation in Afghanistan, under the leadership of the UN

Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UN AM A). From the creation of a Tran
sitional Authority in June 2002, through a loya jirga (grand assembly of
elders) consultative process, to the passage of a new constitution (January
2004) , to national presidential elections (October 2004), and to National
Assembly and Provincial Council elections (September and November
2005) , Afghanistan manifests both the strengths and limitations of the UN
system when seeking to build a durable peace through democratic political
transformation.
As part of my examination of UN peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan
during the period 2001-2005, I present in this article a twofold argument:
first, contrary to the views of some scholars and practitioners, democratic
authority institutionalization should remain at the center of peacebuilding
strategy, because it facilitates the conditions necessary to mediate compet
ing domestic interests and to address the root causes of a conflict peace
fully; and, second, one often overlooked problem of international peace
building stems from the divergent conceptions, between internationals and
the local population, of authority and its sources of legitimacy. I further

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 Richard J. Ponzio 257

consider the practice of democratic peacebuilding vis-?-vis the innumerable

challenges the UN system faced during the Bonn Agreement implementa
tion period. To maintain its relevance in responding to state failure, the UN
will need to adapt better to postwar environments and to articulate new
approaches for democratic peacebuilding.2

The Justification for Democratic

Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Introduced in Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in

a Fragmented World,3 the notion of democratic peacebuilding4 is premised
on a fundamental belief, rooted in empirical research, that building stable
and democratic governing institutions is essential to assuage competing
domestic interests and to consolidate peace by tackling the root causes of a
conflict. At its core, democratic peacebuilding refers to a dynamic, long-term
process of institutionalizing and expanding democratic authority5 within a
weak state or territory to reduce the propensity toward violent conflict. Two
major benchmarks for success include (1) the conditions established for capa
ble governing institutions legitimized through democratic authority, and (2)
the steady reduction of violence for resolving intrastate political disputes.6
The UN has managed or recently initiated thirty democratic peacebuilding
operations since the end of the Cold War.7 Yet, a highly contentious debate
continues about the merits of democracy promotion after war and the capac
ity of the UN system to lead such difficult endeavors.
Research demonstrates that carefully established inclusive and respon
sive governing institutions after war can contribute significantly to initiat
ing mediation between factions and to addressing the root sources of a vio
lent conflict.8 However, postwar democratization efforts are fraught with
challenges and, when poorly managed, can lead to instability and violence.
Why then in Afghanistan did the international community?with the UN as
its main vehicle for facilitating political transition?pursue a high-risk dem
ocratic peacebuilding strategy with a "light footprint" during a low-inten
sity, yet highly volatile, insurgency?

Democratization During Afghanistan's Low-Intensity War

Amid competing agendas between and within international actors in
Afghanistan, two major factors drove the democratic peacebuilding agenda
reflected in the Bonn Agreement and guided by the United Nations. First,
defeating the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and Hezb-i-Islami requires an effective
political response. International experience from 2002 to the present shows
that foreign-led military approaches toward undermining a well-financed

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258 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

and organized insurgency face severe limitations, particularly when the

local population is impoverished and susceptible to aiding antigovernment
elements. Democratization allowed for the major anti-Taliban/Al-Qaida/
Hezb-i-Islami power brokers to work together and have a stake in the new,
post-Bonn conference governance structure in Afghanistan. It also created
the possibility that the voices of marginalized groups would be represented.
The legitimacy generated for the new political order from these two dis
parate sets of actors remains fundamental to erecting an Afghan state capa
ble of coopting potential spoilers via political means. From the outset of the
Bonn process, influential voices within the UN and international community
viewed the expansion of democratic authority as a politically expedient tool
for quelling dissent and sometimes addressing grievances among those with
the ability to exact political violence.
Second, international peacebuilders (from the UN and major donor
countries) arrived in Afghanistan with a preconceived ideology that democ
ratization, at least over the medium-to-long term, contributes to better
forms of governance and socioeconomic development, including in fragile
states.9 The value attached to democratic institutions and practice, in terms
of aiding economic, social, and political progress, is reflected in interna
tional inputs to the Bonn Agreement (December 2001), the new constitution
(January 2004), the Afghanistan Compact (January 2006), and the interim
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (January 2006).10 Although
issues of national security/counterterrorism,11 regional hegemony, reduction
of the opium trade, and control of natural resource flows further inform the
high level of international engagement in Afghanistan, efforts to restructure
local power within a democratic framework represent, to some extent, what
many international actors seek to achieve.
While the international community in general and the UN in particular
championed the democratic peacebuilding agenda articulated in the Bonn
Agreement, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lakhdar
Brahimi 's famous "light footprint" approach to Statebuilding in Afghanistan
translated into a tenuous international reach because, in particular, UN staff
and financial resources were limited, and, at least from 2002 until late
2003, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was restricted to
the capital. Keeping in mind the thoughtful objective of local ownership
from the start of the mission, Brahimi felt that a UN operation on the scale
of the East Timor transitional administration was "not necessary and not
possible."12 Nevertheless, precisely because of the challenging security and
physical environments, a near-dysfunctional state apparatus, and the recog
nition that the Bonn Agreement is essentially a framework for further polit
ical negotiations rather than a final status agreement, I argue in subsequent
sections of this article that far more and better-spent political development
and other reinforcing types of aid were and continue to be required?but

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 Richard J. Ponzio 259

aid without either the executive functions or the mentality associated with
international administration. On an annual per-capita assistance basis after
the first two years of foreign intervention, the United States and its allies
spent far more in reconstructing Bosnia ($679), East Timor ($233), Iraq
($206), and other postconflict settings than in Afghanistan ($57);13 and the
total budget for UN AM A alone, from April 2002 to December 2005, was a
meager $193 million.14 The political success achieved to date is thus as much
a reflection of Afghan resilience, war-weariness, and widespread desire for
change as it is skillful?yet underresourced?democratic development sup
port of the UN system.

From Interim to Transitional to Elected Authorities:

The UN's Role in the Transformation of the Afghan Polity

Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, in 1988-1989, and sub

sequent US disengagement, Afghanistan inherited an illegitimate and weak
state and a crippled economy, with multiple armed groups spread across the
country.15 With the collapse of the Najibullah-led communist regime in
1992, rival mujahidin (holy warriors) commanders vied for control of Kabul,
resulting in further disintegration of the state. The power vacuum and crim
inality that ensued gave rise to the Taliban movement in 1994, which sought
to establish a pure Islamic regime with aid largely from Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and the Al-Qaida network. Although, by mid-1998, the Taliban suc
ceeded in controlling most of Afghanistan, the National Islamic United
Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, commonly known as the Northern
Alliance and consisting of former mujahidin factions, held out until the US
led coalition joined forces with them to oust the Taliban from power in No
vember 2001.
The gathering in Bonn that followed, from 27 November to 5 Decem
ber 2001, represented a historic opportunity for the people of Afghanistan
to emerge from a perpetual cycle of conflict. While some commentators
argue that the Bonn Agreement's emphasis on creating democratic institu
tions in Afghanistan is an unrealistic and misguided part of the country's
reconstruction program,16 the overarching approach adopted by the United
Nations and international community took the opposite view: that the peo
ple of Afghanistan will never see enduring peace and public security with
out basic open and accountable institutions of governance. With thirty months
to draft a new constitution and elect a "fully representative government . . .
through free and fair elections,"17 the Bonn timetable was tight. According
to the former head of the UN Special Mission in Afghanistan (UNSMA),
Francesc Vendrell, "Since 1991, the UN emphasized the need to look at the
causes of conflict, which often meant the absence of political pluralism,

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260 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

rule of law, human rights, and legitimate civil institutions. . . . Yes, maybe
the Bonn calendar was too short. But we [in the UN who proposed the
timetable] questioned the staying commitment of the international commu
nity and felt that many things needed to be done at once."18 Toward aiding
the Afghanistan Interim and Transitional Authorities in reaching each of the
Bonn Agreement political milestones, the UN Security Council vested con
siderable responsibility?read: de facto, rather than de jure, authority?in
the integrated UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, including the UN
Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Office for Project Services
(UNOPS).

Bonn, the Loya Jirgas, and a New Constitution

Besides the initially favorable security environment created by the UN
backed intervention and the desire for peace among the Afghan signatories
to the Bonn Agreement, the quick consensus reached in Bonn can be attributed
to foundations laid over the previous decade through the "Rome process"
negotiations, involving the former king, Zahir Shah.19 At its core, the Rome
approach proposed the convening of a large, traditional loya jirga that
would gather tribal elders and other groups from across the nation to estab
lish a more representative transitional administration and resolve other out
standing conflicts.20 Although the Bonn Agreement was an imperfect doc
ument, it had an important characteristic: it set into motion an inclusive
political process that would be driven locally, with mechanisms established
to accommodate diverse interest groups and power brokers across the coun
try. But to succeed, Afghan citizens needed to be convinced that a state
existed, that it was led by a capable central government, and, hence, that
the regional militia commanders were to be weakened.21
In addition to the above factors, the UN's Lakhdar Brahimi and his
team of advisers proved instrumental to the outcome achieved. From the
start, Brahimi built on his earlier involvement in UNSMA and the Rome
process and leveraged skillfully his personal relations and knowledge of
key Afghan personalities. When a disagreement about representation in Bonn
erupted among the Afghans, the US envoy to the talks, James Dobbins, ex
plained, "Lakhdar Brahimi told the four groups how many each could
bring."22 Ashraf Ghani, another participant in Bonn and finance minister
during the Afghanistan Transitional Authority, went further in stating that
"Lakhdar Brahimi was a critical driver in achieving Bonn's successful out
come. UN engagement in Afghanistan is the major difference compared to
political reconstruction efforts in Iraq, where the US plays the dominant
role."23 Though Brahimi was recognized for his constructive influence in
Bonn, his continued involvement and personal relationships with then Af
ghanistan Interim Authority chairman Hamid Karzai and powerful Northern

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 Richard J. Ponzio 261

Alliance figures would prove essential to keeping the political process on

track.24
From 10 to 21 June 2002, in Kabul, the second key milestone of the
Bonn process was met within the agreed time frame: the convening of the
Emergency loya jirga (ELJ) to "decide on a Transitional Authority . . . and
lead Afghanistan until such time as a fully elected government can be
elected."25 Prior to the gathering, the UN supported the new Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission in the complex task of holding
elections for 1,051 district-level delegates, with an additional 450 seats re
served for professional groups and another fifty appointed by Chairman
Karzai.26 Besides moving the country toward a more representative gov
ernment, another achievement of the ELJ was that no major group opted
out from the political process?both fundamental aims of the United
Nations. However, complaints abounded of pressure tactics and intimida
tion by leaders of informal militia groups, poor chairing, unclear procedural
rules, and accusations that key decisions were made outside the loya jirga
tent.27 Several of my interviewees, who participated in or observed the ELJ,
reported similar events. With the continued efforts of the US-led coalition
to "root out terrorism," an unofficial policy in the international community
of politically accommodating and sometimes recruiting Afghan militia
groups overshadowed concerns for institutionalizing stable, democratic
authority.28
After President Karzai formed, in late 2002, a nine-member Constitu
tional Drafting Commission to prepare the initial draft constitution, a larger,
thirty-five member Constitutional Review Commission scrutinized the text.
The UN further assisted the Transitional Authority in organizing public
consultations to provide inputs from citizens prior to the Constitutional loya
jirga (CLJ), held 14 December 2003-4 January 2004. "This was the first
Afghan constitutional process where the outcome was open to political
debate, and the UN insisted on introducing a measure of public consultation
into the process," wrote Barnett Rubin.29 Though the UN reports that the
consultations reached some 178,000 Afghans through 556 meetings around
the country and in the refugee communities of Pakistan and Iran, observers
have highlighted flaws in the planning and execution, particularly the failure
to release the draft constitution until only a month before the CLJ.30 Despite
these problems, Sibghatullah Al-Mojaddedi, the elected chairman of the CLJ
and former president, described the consultations as "essential for reaching
consensus," and he applauded the direct assistance provided to him by the
UN at the CLJ.31 During a ten-day stalemate, starting on 23 December,
Brahimi, along with US ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, played a central role
in persuading major power brokers to overcome their differences.32 Brahimi
was roundly criticized?fairly or unfairly?for appearing to participate in
"back-room deals," to support US interest in a strong presidential system,

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262 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

and to appease conservative Islamists.33 While legitimate debates continue

on the constitutional status of Islam, the devolution of authority to the
provinces and districts, and the appropriateness of presidentialism versus par
liamentarism, the 2004 constitution makes significant democratic gains over
the 1964 and other earlier constitutions in terms of ensuring the legal equal
ity of men and women, encouraging all languages in multilingual areas, and
strengthening the connection between citizens and the state through new
provincial, district, and village Councils.

The Bonn Commissions, Security Sector Reform, and the

2004-2005 Elections: The Rebirth of Afghan Democracy?
Alongside the high-profile loya jirgas and elections, UNAMA and UNDP
supported three other Bonn commissions and reforms in the security sector,
each critical to creating the conditions for the expansion of democratic
authority. By 2004, with institutional support from UNDP, the Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission had established ten field offices
with 300 staff, processed more than 100 complaints, and held some 200
human rights education workshops.34 Far less progress is reported for the
Judicial Commission and Independent Administrative Reform and Civil
Service Commission, both mired in overcoming old procedures (or per
ceived conflicting sharia principles in the case of the judiciary), bureau
cratic wrangling with other state bodies, and weak leadership. After an ini
tially slow start, accelerated reforms in the security sector were observed in
2004 and 2005, with the training of 25,000 in the Afghanistan National
Army (ANA) and 55,000 in the Afghanistan National Police (ANP). In addi
tion to offering policy advice and participating in coordination meetings on
building democratic, civilian control of the security forces with the gov
ernments of Afghanistan, the United States, and Germany, both UNDP and
UNAMA led the disarmament, demobilization, and r?int?gration of over
63,000 former combatants.35 UNDP also helped build the Ministry of Inte
rior's fiscal management capacity by managing a trust fund for the payment
of police salaries.
With political and operational leadership provided by UNAMA, UNDP,
and UNOPS to the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) secretariat,
co-led with the government of Afghanistan, the October 2004 presidential
elections and September-November 2005 National Assembly and Provin
cial Council elections?costing US$318 million36?were the most expensive
and complex Bonn Agreement undertakings. Because of violence against
election workers and other operational challenges during voter registration,
presidential elections were postponed from June until October 2004, and the
National Assembly and Provincial Council elections, which were postponed
until the following April, were eventually held in September and November

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 Richard J. Ponzio 263

2005.37 Although the estimated voter turnout for the September 2005 wolesi
jirga (lower house) and Provincial Council elections dropped by 20 percent
compared to the October 2004 presidential elections, both achieved re
spectable voter turnout rates, with 50 percent and 70 percent of registered
voters, respectively (43 percent in 2005 and 41 percent in 2004 were female
voters).38 In November 2005, meshrano jirga (upper house) elections, in
volving recently elected provincial councilors, were organized by the JEMB.
The rushed preparations for the elections concerned many observers and
practitioners. "With only six months to prepare a parliamentary election that
normally takes twelve months, there was no time for effective capacity
building of national staff," explained Peter Erben, the JEMB chief inter
national electoral officer.39 Besides international recognition of both elections
as "free and fair" and peaceful, it is noteworthy that women hold 27 percent
of the wolesi jirga and 17 percent of the meshrano jirga seats. In addition,
thirty-four candidates were disqualified prior to the September 2005 elec
tions due to their alleged links with illegally armed groups.40 In terms of
long-term capacity development for the new institutions, UNDP and UN AM A
initiated both a $15 million parliamentary strengthening program in early
2005 and a $10.5 million support initiative for the new Independent Electoral
Commission in early 2006; they are currently planning training and civic
education activities for Provincial Councils and their constituents.
Some analysts argue that the formal completion of the Bonn process
with the swearing in of the new National Assembly, on 19 December 2005,
offers Afghans a second democratic opportunity, following their country's
failed attempt at parliamentary democracy in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Through thousands of village-level jirgas (local conflict resolution coun
cils) and national loya jirgas, the fiercely independent Afghan people have
practiced indigenous forms of consultative governance for hundreds of
years. However, history also reveals the repercussions of moving too
swiftly with far-reaching changes without full buy-in from the political
establishment. Failing to reconcile their political reforms with the interests
of traditional Afghan authorities, King Amanullah Khan in the 1920s and
the communists in the 1980s and early 1990s both met violent ends. The
current modernization project could meet a similar fate if Afghan elites, UN
personnel, and their foreign backers ignore the traditional power brokers.

Reconciling the Authority Gap

and Other Challenges Ahead

Although a broad range of factors influences success or failure in democratic

peacebuilding, one largely overlooked problem stems from how differently
internationals and the local population often view authority and its sources of

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264 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

legitimacy. A wide divergence in views, if that gap is rejected as unimportant,

simply misunderstood, or deemed too complicated to manage, can result in
a weak transition that is insensitive to political and social realities by pro
ducing (1) a lack of trust in international actors by the local population; (2)
a reduced ability to build the legitimacy and effectiveness of new, demo
cratic authorities and to limit the influence of multiple "informal authori
ties"; and (3) a tendency for the local population to shift their allegiance
back to antidemocratic, antigovernment elements, and informal criminal
organizations.
Tanja Hohe offers an example of UN democratic peacebuilders ignor
ing this wide difference in views about authority vis-?-vis East Timor when
she writes, "The Transitional Administration built institutions based on the
assumption that there were no strong concepts and ideas existing on the
local level, and that the population just had to be 'taught' democracy. . . .
Local perception of [local governance] practices was perceived as cultural
'folklore' and was not accorded much significance. Therefore, international
attempts often failed or had a marginal impact."41 By failing to adequately
prepare for local conditions and later to incorporate local voices in political
reconstruction activities, similar mistakes were made in Cambodia, Kosovo,
Rwanda, and Somalia.42 The gap in conceptions of authority is significant in
postwar peacebuilding, because if managed poorly it can exacerbate latent
tensions and destabilize democratization, adversely affecting broader recov
ery efforts.
This argument starts from the basic assumption that some divergence
of views exists between international peacebuilders and a majority of their
local counterparts in relation to their understanding and the norms they
attach to the notion of authority. In the case of Afghanistan, my research
finds that, as of late 2005, religious leaders, "warlord" commanders, and
tribal elders were viewed as wielding more power and influence than
elected officials. For instance, in response to the national survey question
"In your local community, who commands power and the capability to
influence the behavior of Afghans?," respondents first noted religious
scholars (38 percent), then commanders (24 percent), tribal elders (23 per
cent), and elected officials (16 percent).43 Concurrent focus group studies
and interviews across Afghanistan further exhibited that local populations
frequently embrace a conception of authority rooted in traditional rules,
dominant individuals, and personal relationships, whereas external actors
tend to favor one based on rational persuasion, democratic decisionmaking
procedures, an administrative organ to enforce decisions, and the rule of
law. The gap between local and international conceptions of what consti
tutes authority is a complex political phenomenon?one that must be skill
fully managed and eventually reconciled for a democratic peacebuilding
operation to succeed.

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 Richard J. Ponzio 265

Implications of the Authority Gap

for Afghan Governance and Stability
On the perceived divergence in interpretations of authority for democratic
peacebuilding in Afghanistan, my field research offers two significant findings:

By convening Emergency and Gonstitutional loya jirgas prior to the

2004 presidential and 2005 National Assembly and Provincial Council elec
tions, as well as carefully coopting potential spoilers in the democratic
institution-building project, the UN-facilitated Bonn Agreement implemen
tation period demonstrated several promising steps toward bridging com
peting conceptions of authority in a manner that accommodates traditional
and ascending power brokers within Afghanistan. This, in turn, contributed
to both improved conditions for capable governing institutions legitimized
through democratic authority and a reduction of violence for resolving intra
state political disputes.
Although slowly closing, the gap in conceptions of authority between
international peacebuilders and the local population could easily widen
again?with severe consequences for efforts to consolidate peace?unless
sufficient capacity is invested to extend democratic authority to where most
Afghans reside, in the provinces and, especially, rural areas. Moreover,
many UN and other international officials remain indifferent or unaware of
the opposing political factions (beyond the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and Hezb-i
Islami) that seek to undermine, in the words of the Bonn Agreement, "the
establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, and fully representative
Government."44

For the first conclusion, it is important to acknowledge that even with

the initial military rout of the Taliban and Al-Qaida, introducing democracy
would be challenging, given that Afghanistan, in late 2001, was a highly
factionalized, poor, rural, physically rugged, predominantly illiterate, and
socially conservative agrarian society with a dysfunctional government.
Although few of my interviewees claimed that the negotiators in Bonn were
fully representative of Afghans,45 almost all deemed the political process,
initiated under the supervision of the United Nations, legitimate and wel
comed it enthusiastically. Asked, "In which areas have the United Nations
system succeeded since 2001 in Afghanistan?," the public perceptions sur
vey found that political development (including elections and a new gov
ernment, constitution, and National Assembly) and peacebuilding (includ
ing resolving conflict and promoting human rights) received the highest
recognition among Afghans, at 61 percent and 40 percent, respectively.46
By late 2005, following the first democratic elections for the presidency,
the National Assembly, and Provincial Councils, my focus group studies

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266 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

and individual interviews further conveyed widespread support for the

newly elected authorities?results perhaps colored by unrealistic expecta
tions.47 Specifically, many interviewees cited the use of the loya jirga and
the engagement of religious leaders and tribal elders as fundamental to
legitimizing the new constitution and elected authorities. Arguably, the
foundations were laid, in an accelerated period under difficult circum
stances, for the democratic governing institutions to prove their value to an
anxious electorate in a largely receptive environment.
Although the UN and broader international community remained com
mitted to the full ascendancy of democratic legal authority over the long
term, a convergence of views emerged among international peacebuilders
and Afghan elites from the start of Bonn, that a coexistence of traditional
and new authorities would be required to rule the country during at least the
short-to-medium term (i.e., five to twenty years), as the state slowly pro
jected its authority, even if this meant the cooptation of suspected war crim
inals. This implicit policy of accommodation was seen as a better alternative
to other possible approaches, such as colonization, transitional international
administration, or partition?and also better than focusing only on coun
terinsurgency efforts and allowing the Afghans to fend for themselves polit
ically, which most Afghans interviewed, let alone foreign observers, con
ceded would have led to civil war again. Reconciling the multiple,
competing Afghan authorities therefore required a pragmatic approach to (or
"hybrid model" of) governance, based on a web of domestic partnerships at
various levels and reliance on traditional institutions and approaches to gov
ernance?reinforced by foreign resources and political support.
Similar to assessing progress on issues of governance, gauging success
in reducing violent conflict for resolving intrastate disputes should draw on
a mix of qualitative and quantitative indicators, especially when reliable
official statistics are rare. In response to the question, "How much would
you say the Bonn process has helped to reduce violence and promote peace
ful solutions in Afghanistan?," a remarkable 92 percent of Afghan inter
viewees felt that their new political institutions were helping to improve con
flict management within the country. Though this view was widely echoed
in five of the focus groups, a sixth focus group in Mazar-e Sharif (all Dari
speaking females) discussed at length the "insecurity and disorder" created
by allowing criminals to be elected or appointed to senior government
posts. These sentiments recurred regularly in interviews with Afghans,
albeit from a minority opinion that appeared to emanate chiefly from self
proclaimed liberals. With the demobilization of more than 63,000 former
combatants, the establishment of the Afghan National Army, the reorgani
zation of the police, the extension of ISAF to the north and west of the
country, and the slow curbing of power and cooptation of major regional
commanders,48 considerable progress was achieved, from late 2001, in assert

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 Richard J. Ponzio 267

ing democratic, civilian control by the elected government in Kabul. Despite

the consequent decline in intrastate political violence, however, an inter
nationally driven insurgency and unrestrained opium industry49 continue to
fuel significant violence in parts of Afghanistan, undermining the new demo
cratic authorities.50
For the second conclusion, my research found that expectations for the
new democratic institutions to deliver peace and development were exceed
ingly high, even though the human, financial, and technical resources and
political authority of the state rarely extend beyond provincial capitals. A
large number of the interviewees and focus group participants indicated that
their respect for a ruling authority?whether, for example, a religious, tribal,
militia, or elected government leader?hinged primarily on its ability to solve
people's problems. Consequently, many Afghans still turn to their traditional
village-level jirgas, manteqas (regional groups of settlements with shared
affinities), and qawms (tribes or solidarity networks) for the provision of basic
services and dispute resolution.51 Relatively high voter turnout rates at the 2004
and 2005 elections can be deceptive;52 Afghans will turn away from the newly
elected authorities, and view them as yet another foreign-driven ideological
experiment, if essential public amenities, such as clinics, schools, irrigation
canals, roads, and protection from crime, are not quickly provided.53
Moreover, whether inside54 or outside the government and National
Assembly, a significant number of former mujahidin commanders, gross
human rights violators, conservative ideologues, and drug smugglers re
main capable of stifling freedom of expression, a rule-based system, and
other basic democratic norms advanced via the Bonn process through vio
lent intimidation and corruption. "Ending warlords" was the most common
response (41 percent) among Afghans who were asked in the national sur
vey, "What is still needed for Afghan citizens to fully enjoy and utilize their
rights and freedoms?" Besides extending the government's presence in the
form of policing and public services to previously neglected parts of the
country, dismantling the power base of the less understood, yet highly ob
structive, midlevel factional commanders is critical to entrenching demo
cratic authority and preventing political paralysis and further fragmentation.

Policy Lessons for Future Democratic

Peacebuilding Operations

Through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of Afghanistan since late 2001,

this study sought to demonstrate both the strengths and limitations of the UN
system when seeking to build a durable peace through democratic political
transformation. Even in a country with severe ethnic divisions, high inse
curity, low socioeconomic indicators, near-ruined state institutions, and

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268 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

scant experience with pluralism and the rule of law, the UN and its associ
ated agencies display a high degree of political adeptness, cultural sensitiv
ity, and technical competence on matters related to the institutionalization
and expansion of democratic authority. Viewed by most Afghans as a neu
tral mediator that respected their traditional institutions and norms of gov
ernance, the UN helped to forge political consensus on Bonn-related mile
stones by widely consulting the various factions and acknowledging what
was feasible given the cultural and political context in which it worked. In
so doing, the UN helped create the conditions for capable governing insti
tutions legitimized through democratic authority to emerge; these institu
tions, as an expression of their ability to provide public goods, reduced vio
lence as a means for resolving intrastate political disputes.
However, the United Nations exhibited several handicaps during the
Bonn process, including slow bureaucratic operational procedures, mixed
success in coordination with external and UN actors, and a perceived ced
ing of control to powerful countries the option of engaging the Taliban
politically. In at least four key areas, greater UN resources, expertise, and
risk taking?prior to inevitable donor fatigue?would benefit democratic
peacebuilding in Afghanistan and elsewhere:

Accelerate capacity development for transitional and elected leaders

and civilian administrators, particularly in Afghanistan s neglected thirty
four provinces. Democratic authority cannot be embedded in a society sim
ply by signing a legal document that has been accorded international legit
imacy, just as peace does not automatically flow from the signing of a
peace agreement. War-torn societies must undertake a number of well
resourced capacity development steps to ensure that the state is firmly
established and legitimated vis-?-vis its citizens. Although Lakhdar Brahimi
was correct to emphasize the need for homegrown reconstruction, his "light
footprint" approach contributed to far too little aid reaching long-suffering
Afghans, particularly in rural areas and in comparison to other postconflict
situations.55 For example, rather than offering conventional classroom
teaching or concentrating a handful of political advisers in regional hubs
to report events back to Kabul, UNAMA, UNDP, and other UN agencies
should provide mentors?preferably from culturally similar developing
country civil services or Afghan diaspora?to coach provincial and district
level officials in their duties and in core principles of democratic leader
ship. Moreover, increased socioeconomic foreign aid should be carefully
targeted to buttress and help legitimize newly elected authorities.
Promote a democratic culture through the media, civil society, and
civic education. Often after conflict, the UN and the wider donor community
prioritize the needs of the executive at the expense of other democratic
actors. To ensure proper checks and balances, open competition for power,

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 Richard J. Ponzio 269

and citizen participation in the crucial early stage of democratization, seri

ous efforts must be made to prepare effective watchdog bodies in the media
and civil society and to inform citizens of their democratic rights and
responsibilities. Otherwise, nascent democratic practices and institutions
may soon be overwhelmed by executive-led power politics shortly after the
executive's election is deemed "free and fair," with adverse consequences
for inclusive governance and conflict management. For Afghanistan, this
is the domain where some progress has been achieved by leveraging the
legitimacy of traditional institutions, such as the national- and village-level
Jirgas. However, UNAMA and the UN agencies have little to show in terms
of sustained civic outreach programs. Besides expanding their reach, steps
should be taken to engage community elders and mullahs in helping to
facilitate civic education.
Keep democracy affordable and simplify procedures. Critics of "democ
racy after war" complain that it has become far too costly and complex an
enterprise. In Afghanistan, the 2004 and 2005 elections alone cost $318 mil
lion, exceeding the estimated total government revenue for Afghanistan in
2004 ($269 million). Moreover, the electoral law and 2004 constitution stag
ger unwisely the yet to be held District and Village Council elections every
three years, Provincial Council elections every four years, and presidential
and National Assembly elections every five years. Undoubtedly, democracy
comes with a price, and countries?particularly when foreign aid declines?
must be prepared to sacrifice for their democratic rights. But common sense,
careful planning, and some creativity can keep costs down and the manage
ment of democratic institutions practical and sensitive to local realities.
Bridge political divides and provide hope to former and current com
batants. Keeping, making, enforcing, and building peace rest at the heart of
the UN's global mission, yet in Afghanistan, the world body has refrained
from supporting directly the activities of the Independent National Com
mission on Strengthening Peace.56 By providing financial resources and
technical advice, including advice on how to better engage former Northern
Alliance leaders in the commission's work, the UN should help correct past
mistakes and encourage the commission to serve as a key vehicle for bring
ing about reconciliation and a political accord between the Afghan govern
ment and the Taliban movement and Hezb-i-Islami.57 Besides granting
amnesty to nonwar criminals, the peace agreement should allow for all former
combatants to serve in government and to run for public office. Economic
conditions in Afghanistan remain fragile at best, and particularly in Afghan
istan's "southern arc" (from Jalalabad and the east down through Gardez to
Kandahar and the south), thousands of potentially disaffected young men
remain prime recruiting targets among antigovernment elements. Until this
section of the population believes it has a genuine stake in the nascent po
litical order, coupled with viable livelihoods in their region and neighboring

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270 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

Pakistan, violent extremism will fester. This will remain a threat for the
West too, where Islamic extremism is in ideological opposition to Western
forms of democracy. With the completion of the Bonn era, it is time for the
UN to reengage visibly all peace efforts in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

To maintain its relevance in responding to state failure and the longer-term

imperatives of peace consolidation through the formation of inclusive and
accountable political institutions, the United Nations needs to adapt better
to the changing character of postwar environments and to articulate creative
democratic peacebuilding approaches. These are central challenges for the
UN Peacebuilding Commission. Some innovations may take the form out
lined above, while others are yet to be imagined. Three guiding principles
are to (1) help reconcile competing notions of authority that can paralyze
democratization by introducing a transitional hybrid model of local gover
nance; (2) put a local face on the peacebuilding project and invest seriously
in local capacity from the outset; and (3) favor multilateral approaches
through the UN that ensure political neutrality, technical competence, cul
tural sensitivity, and burden-sharing.
Important steps taken toward sustaining the international political con
sensus and assistance for Afghanistan beyond the Bonn Agreement period are
the Afghanistan Compact and the interim Afghanistan National Development
Strategy, endorsed in January 2006 by world leaders convening in London.
However, both documents fail to prioritize objectives across spheres of secu
rity, governance, and socioeconomic recovery or to discuss delicate issues of
implementation. Understanding the limited reach of democratization to date
and its implications, as examined in this article, is critical to informed, strate
gic decisionmaking that will aid sequentially the broader reconstruction
agenda. In short, democratic governance is easier to start than to embed in a
culture and in institutions; to achieve durable progress, the leadership and
commitment of the people receiving outside assistance must drive the political
transition. A determined insurgency and bumper poppy crop notwithstanding,
the evidence suggests that democracy is taking root in Afghanistan. Although
Afghans must continue to chart their own political future, the UN has far
more to contribute if it is prepared to go the distance. ?

Notes

Richard Ponzio is a DPhil candidate in the Department of Politics and International

Relations at the University of Oxford. He has served in UN, UNDP, and OSCE

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 Richard J. Ponzio 271

peacebuilding op?rations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Pak

istan, Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands. He coedited the special issue on
Afghanistan in International Peacekeeping (January 2007) and coauthored the
Human Development Report 2001 and 2002. For comments on earlier versions of
this article, the author is grateful to Katarina Ammitzboell, Kuniko Ashizawa,
Richard Caplan, Michael Doyle, Par Engstrom, Ian Johnstone, Stina Torjesen, and
participants from the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the
UN System.
1. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, 2001.
2. This paper draws on field research, in 2005 and 2006, in Afghanistan,
involving eighty-three interviews with Afghans (both citizens and leaders) and sen
ior UN officials in six regions; quantitative data collection; six focus groups (gen
der balanced and with ten participants each in three regions) in December 2005;
seven public consultations; and a UNDP-commissioned public opinion survey con
ducted, in October-November 2005, through a two-stage random national sample of
1,039 in-person interviews with adult citizens living in thirty-three of Afghanistan's
thirty-four provinces.
3. "Securing a just, sustainable peace in conflict-prone situations means build
ing strong, transparent states with professional, civilian-led military and police. It
means developing a democratic framework that tolerates diversity. It means build
ing an open civil society that promotes democratic governance and personal secu
rity. And it means instilling in all state institutions?but especially the security
forces?a culture of democracy rooted in respect for the rule of law and individual
rights and dignity. This is the essence of democratic peacebuilding." The preceding
quote is from UN Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002:
Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2002), p. 99. Without defining democratic peacebuilding, an earlier presentation of
the term is made in Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, "International Peace
building: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," American Political Science
Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 795, 800.
4. Coined in the 1970s by Johan Galtung, peacebuilding gained significant cur
rency in the 1990s when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his An Agenda for Peace,
defined postconflict peacebuilding as "action to identify and support structures
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into con
flict." Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace (New York: United Nations,
1992), p. 11; Johan Galtung, Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research,
vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975), pp. 282-304.
5. For this article, authority that is democratic describes state authority regu
lated by institutional checks and balances (constitutional democracy) and demo
cratic norms, such as popular participation, the peaceful contestation of power, and
the rule of law.
6. These two benchmarks build on Elizabeth Cousens's emphasis on "conflict
resolution and opening of political space" as the strategic focus of peacebuilding.
Elizabeth M. Cousens, "Introduction," in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kuman,
eds., Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 2001), p. 13.
7. The country-level UN missions are Afghanistan (UNAMA 2002-), Angola
(UNAVEM II, III, and MONUA 1991-999), Bosnia (UNMIBH 1995-2002),
Burundi (ONUB 2004-), Cambodia (UNTAC 1992-1993), Central African Republic
(MINURCA, BONUCA 1998-), Congo-Kinshasa (MONUC 1999-), C?te d'Ivoire

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272 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

(UNOCI 2004-), Croatia (UNTAES, 1995-1998 ), East Timor (UNTAET, UNMISET,

UNMIT 1999-), El Salvador (ONUSAL 1991-1995), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS
1999-), Guatemala (MINUGUA 1997), Haiti (UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH 1993
1997, MINUSTAH 2004-), Iraq (UNAMI 2003-), Kosovo (UNMIK 1999-),
Liberia (UNOMIL 1993-1997, UNMIL 2003-), Mozambique (ONUMOZ 1992
1994), Namibia (UNTAG 1989-1990), Nepal (UNMIN 2007-), Nicaragua (ONUCA
and ONUVEN 1989-1992), Palestine (UNSCO 1999-), Papua New Guinea
(UNOMB 1998-2004), Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993-1996), Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL
1999-2005), Somalia (UNOSOM II and then UNPOS 1993-), Sudan (UNMIS
2005-), and Tajikistan (UNTOP 2000-). The list of UN missions is from the United
Nations official website, and only peace operations with a political institution-build
ing component are included in my classification. Immediately successive UN mis
sions are recorded as one continuous mission.
8. See, for example, Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and
Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2006), pp. 35-36, 131, 341; Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jos? Anto
nio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Insti
tutions and Well-being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000). Competing views can be found in Nancy Bermeo, "What the Democ
ratization Literature Says?or Doesn't Say?About Postwar Democratization,"
Global Governance 9, no. 2 (2003); and Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder,
"Democratization and the Danger of War," in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones, and
Steven Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).
9. This view emanates from a wide body of literature, including Christopher
Clague et al., "Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies,"
Journal of Economic Growth 1, no. 2 (1996): 243-276; Amartya Sen, Development
as Freedom (New York: Random House, 2000), p. 181; and UN Development Pro
gramme, Human Development Report 2002, p. 58.
10. Interviews with several Afghans and senior international officials in Af
ghanistan indicate that the international community wielded considerable influence
in the area of democracy promotion through technical, financial, and political sup
port. See also Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and International Community, The
Afghanistan Compact, London, 31 January 2006, pp. 1-3; and Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, "Interim-Afghanistan National Development Strategy," vol. 1 Kabul,
2006, pp. 122-129.
11. Initially, the political institution-building agenda in Afghanistan was driven
by the national security concerns of a single foreign power. After the September 11,
2001, destruction of the World Trade Center towers in New York and the assault on
the Pentagon, the United States announced, on 1 October 2001, that it would sup
port "a political transition and a UN-coordinated reconstruction program" in
Afghanistan. Until these events, Afghanistan remained virtually ignored by the
international community, and some of the Westerners who were interviewed for this
study indicated that removing the Al-Qaida/Taliban threat and achieving stability
were the only objectives that mattered in Afghanistan.
12. Quoted in Simon Chesterman, "Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan: The Future of
UN State-Building" (New York: International Peace Academy, September 2002), p. 4.
13. James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett
Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina, The UN's Role in Nation-building:
From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), p. xxviii.
14. E-mail correspondence with UNAMA's chief budget officer on 11 July
2006.

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 Richard J. Ponzio 273

15. Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Col
lapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), p. x.
16. See, for example, Marina Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, "Rebuilding Afghan
istan: Fantasy Versus Reality" (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Interna
tional Peace, 12 January 2002).
17. Bonn Agreement, p. 2.
18. Interview, 1 May 2006. After leading UNSMA (2000-2001) and playing a
central role in drafting the Bonn Agreement, Vendrell assumed, in July 2002, the
position of EU representative to Afghanistan.
19. Interview with Noorullah Delawari, governor and president of Da
Afghanistan Bank (the Central Bank of Afghanistan), on 20 March 2005.
20. Besides power sharing among the various factions, two other major issues
included the governance role of the former king and whether and how to demobilize
militia groups while establishing a new national army.
21. Interview with Ercan Murat, former UN Development Programme country
director in Afghanistan (2002-2004), on 19 March 2005.
22. Dobbins further noted that the United States encouraged a large political
role for the UN because "the US did not want to make a major commitment.
Afghanistan was isolated and of no interest to the US, except for terrorism. Fol
lowing Bosnia and Kosovo, the US was critical of nation-building activities. The
intervention in Afghanistan was viewed in Washington as only the first in the 'War
on Terror' campaign, and another concern [about getting too involved] was that
Afghans have a history of resisting external actors." Interview, 13 May 2005.
23. Interview, 23 December 2005.
24. Chesterman, "Tiptoeing Through Afghanistan," p. 5.
25. Bonn Agreement, p. 2.
26. Interview with Eckart Schiewek, UNAMA political adviser, 3 June 2006.
27. See, for example, Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The
Mirage of Peace (London: Zed Books, 2004), pp. 165-166.
28. For instance, rather than rock the boat in response to acknowledged irreg
ularities in the ELJ, the UN under-secretary-general for political affairs chose to call
on the Afghan authorities to "address instances where democratic rights have been
abused by those who still equated power with violence and force"?many of whom,
arguably, were serving in positions of official authority. United Nations press
release SC/7429 (2002).
29. Barnett Rubin, "Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan," Journal of De
mocracy 15, no. 3 (2004): 10.
30. Author's interviews, as well as International Crisis Group, "Afghanistan:
The Constitutional Loya Jirga," (Kabul/Brussels: ICG, 2003), pp. 1-2.
31. Interview, 21 February 2006.
32. Interview with Michael Schoiswohl, UNAMA legal adviser, 25 December
2005.
33. However, as Jean Arnault, then UN deputy-SRSG for political affairs and
later SRSG, states, "While the UN facilitated the CLJ, we had no preferred system
[of democratic governance]. Our concern was that the interference of factional pow
ers might have adverse effects for stability." Interview, 25 January 2006.
34. UN secretary-general, "Report of the UN Secretary-General on Afghanistan,
Doc. A/59/58 l-S/2004/925" (New York: United Nations, 2004), p. 11. UNAMA also
initiated a joint political rights verification campaign with the commission.
35. See Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme, latest update on ANBP/
DDR, available at www.undpanbp.org (accessed 31 May 2006).

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274 UN Democratic Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

36. BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.ul^l/hi/world/south_asia/4251580.stm (accessed

1 June 2006), and calculations based on financial data collected from the Afghanistan
Joint Electoral Management Body, www.jemb.org.
37. Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections"
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2005), p. 3. An estimated 10.5
million Afghans were eligible to vote in 2004,
38. Joint Electoral Management Body Secretariat (JEMB), www.jemb.org,
(accessed 28 November 2005).
39. Interview, 3 November 2005.
40. According to Grant Kippen, chairman of the Electoral Complaints Com
mission, "Most dismissed from participating in the election came from their asso
ciation with illegal armed groups (IAGs). We used the electoral process to get at
some 'undesirables/ Some were excluded, but the expectations of many in the inter
national community [to preclude all IAGs from participating] were too high and
unrealistic." Interview, 4 November 2005.
41. Tanja Hohe, "The Clash of Paradigms: International Administration and
Local Political Legitimacy in East Timor," Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, no. 3
(2002) : 570.
42. See, for example, Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe, "Participatory Interven
tion," Global Governance 10 (2004): 289; and Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko,
"Western and Local Approaches to Justice in Rwanda," Global Governance 9, no. 2
(2003) .
43. Multiple responses were allowed.
44. Bonn Agreement, p. 1.
45. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Afghanistan Jean
Arnault (February 2004-January 2006) acknowledged that the "lack of traditional
authority representation in Bonn was very real. But for UN officials, Bonn was not
a point of arrival but departure." Interview, 25 January 2006.
46. Multiple responses were allowed.
47. Many interviewees and focus group participants talked enthusiastically
about "Afghan Islamic democracy" and "democracy under an Islamic framework,"
suggesting that democracy was being internalized. Interestingly, they frequently
equated peace and security with democracy.
48. For instance, Herat governor Ismail Khan?after repeatedly refusing to
hand over lucrative customs revenue to the central authorities?was moved to
Kabul to head up the Ministry of Mines and Energy, and Kandahar's strongman Gul
Agha Shirzai was made governor of a less important Pashtu province (Nangarhar).
Perhaps most significant was President Karzai's decision, after the October 2004
elections, to remove from the helm of the defense ministry Marshal Mohammad
Qaseem Fahim, former leader of the Northern Alliance after the assassination of
Ahmad Shah Massoud on 9 September 2001. Disgruntled, Marshal Fahim shared
with me in an interview, "We [the mujahidin] were once the liberators of
Afghanistan who fought the communists and then the terrorists. Now we are the
main target of the UN and the international community. We are seen as 'enemies'
and 'warlords' and have been sidelined from power" (19 November 2005).
49. The number of provinces where the opium poppy is grown increased from
eighteen in 1999 to thirty-two in 2005. UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "Afghan
istan: Opium Survey 2005" (Vienna: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2005). With
an estimated 59 percent increase in cultivation of the opium poppy in 2006, Afghan
istan accounts for approximately 92 percent of the world's opium supply. "UN
Warns of Soaring Afghan Opium," BBC News, 2 September 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/south_asia/5308180.stm.

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 Richard J. Ponzio 275

50. The International Institute for Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database
documents for Afghanistan more than 10,000 civilian- and military-related fatalities
in 2001 and around 4,000 in 2002; fatalities dropped to between 1,000 and 1,400
from 2003 to 2005 (www.acd.iiss.org/armed conflict, accessed 26 May 2006). How
ever, the RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident Database has recorded, since January
2002, a steady increase in insurgent attacks and fatalities (www.rand.org/ise/projects/
terrorismdatabase, accessed 26 May 2006).
51. When surveyed on the question, "If you have a dispute over property stolen
from your house, would you feel more confident of fair treatment going to the formal
state courts or traditional village-level jugeas?" 38 percent of Afghan respondents cited
traditional village-level jirgas as opposed to only 31 percent for formal state courts.
52. In fact, while the 50 percent turnout rate in 2005 is not unacceptably low,
several interviewed suggested that the 20 percent drop from 2004 indicated a steady
decline of support for Karzai and Western-backed democratization.
53. Voting in the recent elections could reflect more a desire for peaceful
change than a preference for the often inefficient methods associated with democ
racy. Many media analysts already contend that the 29 May 2006 street violence in
Kabul, leaving fourteen dead and over 100 injured (triggered by a US military traf
fic accident), suggests growing resentment?beyond the insurgency?against the
Western-funded democratic state-building project. See for example, Rachel Morar
jee, "Where Does Karzai Go from Here?" Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 2006,
available at www.csmonitor.com/2006/0602/p04s02-wosc.html; and Carlotta Gall,
"Anti-U.S. Rioting Erupts in Kabul; at Least 14 Dead," New York Times, 30 May
2006.
54. One comprehensive analysis of the 2005 wolesi jirga elections estimated
that 133 of 249 members fought in the jihad against the Soviets and approximately
113 belong to or are affiliated with conservative/fundamentalist or moderate/tradi
tional Islamic parties. Andrew Wilder, "A House Divided? Analysing the 2005
Afghan Elections" (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2005), pp.
6-8.
55. "International peacebuilding mandates must take into account the charac
teristics of the factions. . . . The more hostile and numerous the factions, the more
difficult is the peace process, and the more international assistance/authority is
needed to establish peace," contend Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis in their
seminal study on peacebuilding. Doyle and Sambanis, "International Peacebuild
ing," p. 781. Particularly with the continued insurgency, Afghanistan fits Doyle and
Sambanis's description above and warrants additional aid.
56. Established in May 2005 by President Karzai, the commission seeks to con
vince opponents of the government to lay down their arms, accept the Afghan con
stitution, and return to civilian life. To date, the commission claims a role in the suc
cessful return to Afghan civilian life of more than 2,000 antigovernment combatants.
57. As Lakdhar Brahimi reflects, "One of my own biggest mistakes was not to
speak to the Taliban in 2002 and 2003. It was not possible to get them in the tent at
the Bonn conference because of 9/11. . . . But immediately after that, we should've
spoken to those who were willing to speak to us." Quoted in Haroon Siddiqui,
"Expert Advice on Afghanistan," Toronto Star, 14 September 2006, available at
www. thestar.com/NAS App/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_
PrintFriendly&c=Article&cid-1158184237654&call_pageid=970599119419.
Besides the Strengthening Peace Commission, the UN should support politically
and operationally President Karzai's proposal, in October 2006, for a loya jirga of
Pashtun tribes from Pakistan and Afghanistan to end Taliban-associated violence.

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