Black defines "practice of law"
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO, Petitioner, v.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,
and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management, Respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano
co-counsel for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of
far-reaching proportions While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court’s decision
in this case would indubitably have a profound
effect on the political aspect of our national
existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section
1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not
have been candidates for any elective position
in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after
Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and
eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for al least ten years."
(Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice
of law as a legal qualification to an appointive
office.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
as:
and the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where
he is held out to be an attorney, using a letterhead
describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients
in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel
about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees
for services rendered by his associate." (Black’s Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is
also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the
business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or
appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or
while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged
in the practice of law." (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S.
Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers
Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-177)
stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance
before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in
no small part of work performed outside of any court
and having no immediate relation to proceedings in
court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal
advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings,
they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or
counselor at law bear an intimate relation to
the administration of justice by the courts. No
valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn
between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that
part which involves advice and drafting of
instruments in his office. It is of importance to
the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953
ed.], p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in
Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis
ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of
the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following
any line of employment in the profession. If
what he does exacts knowledge of the law and
is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he
follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the
statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law
is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986
Constitutional Commission show that it has
adopted a liberal interpretation of the term
"practice of law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session,
may I make a manifestation which I forgot to
do during our review of the provisions on the
Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the
qualifications of the members of the Commission on
Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for
by Section 1 is that ‘They must be Members of the
Philippine Bar’ — I am quoting from the provision —
‘who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years.’"
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed
in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA. We have to interpret this to mean
that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the
COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in
their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we
deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of
the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at
least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the
COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore,
lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the
provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is
yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this
is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Thank you."cralaw virtua1aw library
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not
engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood,
means "an individual or organization engaged
in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers
are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members
called shareholders. In either case, the
members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or
more inexperienced salaried attorneys called
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking
to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics
[West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as "the
performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of
law. (State Bar Ass’n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]).
Because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.
(Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in
behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most
lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a
large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to
litigate and the litigating lawyer’s role colors
much of both the public image and the
self-perception of the legal profession.
(Ibid.).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In this regard thus, the dominance of
litigation in the public mind reflects history,
not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that
the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer,
once articulated on the importance of a
lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one
who principally tries cases before the courts.
The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know
that in most developed societies today,
substantially more legal work is transacted in
law offices than in the courtrooms. General
practitioners of law who do both litigation and
non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more
time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as
business counseling than in trying cases. The
business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer,
the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed]
that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be
effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance
Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average
general practitioner will engage in a number of legal
tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal
skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and
other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers
of lawyers in specialized practice will usually perform
at least some legal services outside their specialty.
And even within a narrow specialty such as tax
practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role
such as advice-giving to an importantly different one
such as representing a client before an administrative
agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types —
a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion
of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer
to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer
skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document
drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers
find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation
are both effective for many clients and a source of
employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work
or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove
from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent
is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers’ work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the
client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most
common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily,
herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate
law practice, a departure from the traditional concept
of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular
those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding
the major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems
of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research
function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to
be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data
processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure
must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a model", of the
decisional context or a segment thereof is developed
to test projected alternative courses of action in terms
of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are
regularly engaged in predicting and projecting
the trends of the law, the subject of corporate
finance law has received relatively little
organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal
education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital
necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for
productive contributions by those trained
primarily in the law can be improved through
an early introduction to multi-variable
decisional contexts and the various
approaches for handling such problems.
Lawyers, particularly with either a master’s or
doctorate degree in business administration
or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have
some appreciation for the concepts and
analytical techniques of other professions
which are currently engaged in similar types
of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving
corporate finance problems would require the
services of an astute attorney because of the
complex legal implications that arise from
each and every necessary step in securing
and maintaining the business issue raised.
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan.
11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate
lawyer is assiduously referred to as the
"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a
clientele composed of the tycoons and
magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate
lawyers, many people could not explain what
it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the
number of attorneys employed by a single
corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large
corporations farm out all their legal problems
to private law firms. Many others have
in-house counsel only for certain matters.
Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and
purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern
or jurisdiction may include, inter alia:
corporate legal research, tax laws research,
acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the
Securities and Exchange Commission), and in
other capacities which require an ability to
deal with the law.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of
the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as
determining policy and becoming involved in
management. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have
a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one’s work actually fits into the
work of the organization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first
hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the
running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer’s services may
sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation
(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter
the international law field. After all, international law
is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, this is an area
coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the
lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A
bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the
excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly
needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are
we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code
and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into
the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal
primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are
of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2)
an introduction to usable disciplinary skills applicable
to a corporate counsel’s management responsibilities;
and (3) a devotion to the organization and
management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as
intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel’s total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy
sciences affect the counsel’s role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process,
including the resulting strategic repositioning that the
firms he provides counsel for are required to make,
and the need to think about a corporation’s strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is
being reduced as firms deal both with global
multinational entities and simultaneously with
sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly
collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other — often with those who are competitors in other
arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer’s participation in
decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stockholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of
governance through participation on boards and other
decision-making roles. Often these new patterns
develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws
are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for
global operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as
well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology.
New collaborative arrangements for
promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from
older, more adversarial relationships and
traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In Europe,
Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan’s MITI is world famous.
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning,
the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises
a distinct group within the managerial
structure of all kinds of organizations.
Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has
been found to be related to indentifiable
factors in the group-context interaction such
as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment, coordinating
work with outsiders, promoting team
achievements within the organization. In
general, such external activities are better
predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial
capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis
the managerial mettle of corporations are
challenged. Current research is seeking ways
both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of
financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate
counsel, three factors are
apropos:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First System Dynamics. The field of systems
dynamics has been found an effective tool for
new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems.
An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic,
managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the
systems dynamics principles more accessible
to managers — including corporate counsels.
(Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users
to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law
department, it can be used to appraise the
settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost
and risk involved in managing a portfolio of
cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management.
Computer-based models can be used directly
by parties and mediators in all kinds of
negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A
simulation case of an international joint venture may
be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management
of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires
special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel’s responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing
legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework
within which are undertaken those activities of the
firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to
be directly supportive of this nation’s evolving
economic and organizational fabric as firms change to
stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not
adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed
in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate
Counsel’s Office. The general counsel has emerged in
the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm’s strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that
knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer’s aim is
not the understand all of the law’s effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only
to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation.
"Business Star, The Corporate Counsel," April 10,
1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the
bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p.
4).chanrobles law library : red
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991,
he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition praying that
said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and
void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%.
He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.)
and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group
(1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa
Rica and Panama, which involved getting
acquainted with the laws of
member-countries, negotiating loans and
coordinating legal, economic, and project
work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive
officer of an investment bank and
subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and
National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod’s work involved being knowledgeable
in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in
its accreditation hearings before the Comelec.
In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman
of the Bishops Businessmen’s Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the
under privileged sectors, such as the farmer
and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying
for and engaging in affirmative action for the
agrarian reform law and lately the urban land
reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal
knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as
a member of the Constitutional Commission
(1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers, for which
he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of
Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo)
(Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating
team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel
acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an
operations officer (such as an official involved in
negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members
of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff
Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila,
1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country’s
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2)
borrower’s representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in
any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as
key factors in maintaining their countries’ sovereignty.
(Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser
of the United States Agency for International
Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World
Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973).
(Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even
more so than purely re negotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily,
a sovereign lawyer may work with an international
business specialist or an economist in the formulation
of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of
technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an
unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of
Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not
only define the responsibilities of both parties, but
must also state the recourse open to either party
when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a
complete debt restructuring represents a devotion to
that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua
non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to
the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of
whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: ‘They carry no banners, they
beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that
bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery.’ (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of
Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of
the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and
Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the
term "practice of law", particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a three years, without re appointment. Appointment to
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
— verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil
Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the
Court said:chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary
power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee
should possess the qualifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide." (Emphasis
supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of
Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171
SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is
qualified, as in this case, and all the other
legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to
the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the
ground that another person is more qualified
for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon
the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of
whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess
the qualifications required by law." (Emphasis
supplied).
The appointing process in a regular
appointment as in the case at bar, consists of
four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission
(in the Philippines, upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of its certificate
of confirmation, the President issues the
permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance
e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14,
1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p.
200)
The power of the Commission on
Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is mandated by
Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall
be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven
years without re appointment. Of those first appointed,
three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for
any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of
the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla’s separate opinion,
suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law
is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice,
as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly
what was intended by the eminent framers of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla’s
definition would require generally a habitual law
practice, perhaps practiced two or three times a week
and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a
year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from
the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law
practice." . . is what people ordinarily mean by the
practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by
way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that
the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of
law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a
phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the
law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what
the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the
fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for over
ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practicing law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can
even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more
qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one
thing, how can an action or petition be brought
against the President? And even assuming that he is
indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained
since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
during the public hearings on Monsod’s confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such
an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court’s corrective power, since no
abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that
would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for
has been clearly shown.chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad

Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments
rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the
nominee, whom the Commission has
confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the
confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be
incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim
"We must interpret not by the letter that
killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and
Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson’s beloved) for help
in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that — years prior to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
"No blade shall touch his
No blood shall flow from his
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah)
was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson’s eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, Accused the procurator of reneging on
his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did
any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow
from his veins?" The procurator was clearly
relying on the letter, not the spirit of the
agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is
hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ.,
concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss
the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).
Sarmiento, J., is on
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
I concur with the decision of the majority
written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the
result; it does not appear to me that there has
been an adequate showing that the
challenged determination by the Commission
on Appointments — that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections should, on the basis of his stated
qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be
confirmed — was attended by error so gross as to
amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently
merits nullification by this Court in accordance with
the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. I therefore vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The records of this case will show that when the Court
first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only
to require the respondents to comment on the Petition,
but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from
assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while
the Court deliberated on his constitutional
is qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a
TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even
embarrassment to all parties concerned were the
Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod’s
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition
then in relation to established jurisprudence already
showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not
possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
skin; After considering carefully respondent Monsod’s
comment, I am even more convinced that the
veins." constitutional requirement of" practice of low for at
least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents
deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the
core issue to be resolved in this petition is the proper
construal of the constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of COMELEC, including
the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art IX(C),
Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving
the construction of constitutional provisions are best
left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution
and defining constitutional boundaries."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific
standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are
that he must have been "engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounded duty
of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly
leave. understood, "practice" refers to the actual
performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it
connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action. 1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that
matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment
or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or
customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and
is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide,
cannot be said to be in the "practice of medicine." A
certified public accountant who works as a clerk,
cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is
employed as a business executive or a
corporate manager, other than as head or
attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency,
cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of
People v. Villanueva: 2 practice of law presupposes the existence of
"Practice is more than an isolated appearance
for it consists in frequent or customary actions,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one’s self
out to the public as a lawyer and demanding
payment for such services (State v. Bryan, 4
S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647.) . . ." (Emphasis
supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent
Commission on Appointments in a asked:chanrob1es
Memorandum it prepared, enumerated
several factors determinative of whether a
particular activity constitutes "practice of
law." It states:
"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’
implies customarily or habitually holding
one’s self out to the public as a lawyer (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in
all courts in the country (People v. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance
for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that
one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services
are available to the public for compensation,
as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v.
Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging for
services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill
is within the term ‘practice of law’ (Ernani
Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People’s
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and,
one who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay
for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin,
supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert and
Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If
compensation is expected, `all advice to
clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are
practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette Et. Al., v.
Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359).
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice, or
procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience is within the term `practice of law’.
(Martin supra).
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the
lawyer-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer
undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of
law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such
as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he
cannot be said to be engaged in the practice of his
profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed.,
p. 30)." 3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be
useful aids in determining whether or not respondent
Monsod meets the constitutional qualification of
practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of
his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be
virtual 1aw library
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks
which are peculiar to the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or
habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks
habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST
TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent
Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded
that if ever he did perform any of the tasks which
constitute the practice of law, he did not do so
HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and
activities which could be latitudinarianly considered
activities peculiar to the practice of law, like the
drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or
activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as
"practice of law." To become engaged in the practice
of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of
acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People v.
Villanueva: 4
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood
or in consideration of his said services."cralaw
virtua1aw library
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and
to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the
position of COMELEC Chairman for not having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10)
years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my
brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same.
There are certain points on which I must differ with
him while of course respecting his viewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited
from examining the qualifications of the
respondent simply because his nomination
has been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee’s
credentials is made on the basis of the
established facts, not the discretion of that
body. Even if it were, the exercise of that
discretion would still be subject to our
review.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what
was involved was the discretion of the
appointing authority to choose between two
claimants to the same office who both
possessed the required qualifications. It was
that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the
sovereign people may be ousted by this Court
for lack of the required qualifications, I see no
reason why we cannot disqualify an appointee
simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be
declared ineligible by this Court in an
appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that
he has been found acceptable by no less than
the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that
what we would be examining is not the
wisdom of his election but whether or not he
was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the
private respondent, I fear that the ponencia
may have been too sweeping in its definition
of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the
numerous activities accepted as embraced in
the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling
that one does not even have to be a lawyer to
be engaged in the practice of law as long as
his activities involve the application of some
law, however peripherally. The stock broker
and the insurance adjuster and the realtor
could come under the definition as they deal
with or give advice on matters that are likely
"to become involved in litigation."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The lawyer is considered engaged in the
practice of law even if his main occupation is
another business and he interprets and
applies some law only as an incident of such
business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A.
Considering the ramifications of the modern
society, there is hardly any activity that is not
affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about
and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be
part of a business concern to be considered a
practitioner. He can be so deemed when, on
his own, he rents a house or buys a car or
consults a doctor as these acts involve his
knowledge and application of the laws
regulating such transactions. If he operates a
public utility vehicle as his main source of
livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged
in the practice of law because he must obey the Public
Service Act and the rules and regulations of the
Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining
the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . .
in or out of court, commonly understood to be the
practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The
decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to
consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the
practice of law even if he does not earn his living, or at
least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation.
The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is
derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting
wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent’s credentials are impressive, to be
sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for ten years as
required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he
has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an
executive and economist and not as a practicing
lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the
various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his
experience and prestige as a businessman and not as
an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is
focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was
acting as a lawyer when he lobbied in Congress for
agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL
and the Constitutional Commission (together with
non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a
member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved
that his activities in these capacities extended over
the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the
law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many
other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no
less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully
vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that
engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for
public office would be settled one way or another in
fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the
result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view
that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of
law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while
on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on
the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not
practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was
no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one of official leave with no instructions
left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not
taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.chanrobles law library
There are two key factors that make our task difficult.
First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional
Commission on Appointments whose duty is
precisely to look into the qualifications of
persons appointed to high office. Even if the
Commission errs, we have no power to set
aside error. We can look only into grave abuse
of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness.
Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod
possesses superior qualifications in terms of
executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in
international banking and finance, and instant
recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the
petitioner. What is before us is compliance
with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I
cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has
never engaged in the practice of law for even
one year. He is a member of the bar but to say
that he has practiced law is stretching the
term beyond rational limits.
The professional life of the respondent follows:
"1.15.1 Respondent Monsod’s activities since his
passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the
following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate),
University of Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist,
Industry Department; Operations, Latin American
Department; Division Chief, South Asia and Middle
East, International Finance Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group Executive of various
companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation,
Philippine Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric
Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive
Officer

A person may have passed the bar 6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies Chief
examinations. But if he has not dedicated his Executive Officer
life to the law, if he has not engaged in an
activity where membership in the bar is a 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to — Member
have been engaged in the practice of law.
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the
Engaging in the practice of law is a December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
qualification not only for COMELEC chairman
but also for appointment to the Supreme 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief
Court and all lower courts. What kind of Executive Officer of the following
Judges or Justices will we have if there main companies:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
occupation is selling real estate, managing a
business corporation, serving in fact-finding a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
committee, working in media, or operating a
farm with no active involvement in the law, b. Dataprep, Philippines
whether in Government or private practice,
except that in one joyful moment in the c. Philippine SUN systems Products, Inc.
distant past, they happened to pass the bar
examinations? d. Semirara Coal Corporation

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in e. CBL Timber Corporation

the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the Member of the Board of the Following:chanrob1es
practice envisioned is active and regular, not virtual 1aw library
isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent,
incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the
be "engaged" in an activity for ten years Philippines
requires committed participation in
something which is the result of one’s decisive b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
choice. It means that one is occupied and
involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
pledged to carry it out with intent and
attention during the ten-year period. d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

I agree with the petitioner that based on the e. Graphic Atelier

bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to
the Commission on Appointments, the latter f. Manila Electric Company
has not been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for
an alleged one year period after passing the h. Philippine Electric Corporation
bar examinations when he worked in his
father’s law firm. Even then his law practice i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
must have been extremely limited because he
was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
in Economics at the University of
Pennsylvania during that period. How could k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
he practice law in the United States while not
a member of the Bar there? l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation"
(Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which
even remotely indicates that respondent
Monsod has given the law enough attention or
a certain degree of commitment and
participation as would support in all sincerity
and candor the claim of having engaged in its
practice for at least ten years. Instead of
working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working
for him. Instead of giving legal advice of legal
services, he was the one receiving that advice
and those services as an executive but not as
a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on
Appointments show an effort to equate
"engaged in the practice of law" with the use
of legal knowledge in various fields of
endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic
work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be
helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and
loose with a term, which even an ordinary
layman accepts as having a familiar and
customary well-defined meaning. Every
resident of this country who has reached the
age of discernment has to know, follow, or
apply the law at various times in his life. Legal
knowledge is useful if not necessary for the
business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer,
fisherman, market vendor, and student to
name only a few. And yet, can these people
honestly assert that as such, they are
engaged in the practice of law?.
The Constitution requires having been
"engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years." It is not satisfied with having been "a
member of the Philippine bar for at least ten
years.."
Some American courts have defined the
practice of law, as follows:
"The practice of law involves not only
appearance in court in connection with
litigation but also services rendered out of
court, and it includes the giving of advice or
the rendering of any services requiring the
use of legal skill or knowledge, such as
preparing a will, contract or other instrument,
the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n
v. Tinkoff, 399 III. 282, 77 N.E.2d 693;
People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass’n v.
People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,
176 N.E. 901, and cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay
down a formula or definition of what
constitutes the practice of law.’Practicing law’
has been defined as ‘Practicing as an attorney
or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice
or rendition of any sort of service by any
person, firm or corporation when the giving of
such advice or rendition of such service
requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill.’ Without adopting that
definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel . Illinois State Bar
Ass’n v. People’s Stock Yards State Bank, 344 III. 462,
176 N.E. 901." (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773,
776).
For one’s actions to come within the purview of
practice of law they should not only be activities
peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should also be
performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"Respondent’s answers to questions propounded to
him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not
he ever prepared contracts for the parties in
real-estate transactions where he was not the
procuring agent. He answered: ‘Very seldom.’ In
answer to the question as to how many times he had
prepared contracts for the parties during the
twenty-mine years of his business, he said: ‘I have no
idea.’ When asked if it would be more than half a
dozen times his answer was I suppose.’ Asked if he did
not recall making the statement to several parties that
he had prepared contracts in a large number of
instances, he answered: ‘I don’t recall exactly what
was said.’ When asked if he did not remember saying
that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the
parties therefor in instances where he was not the
broker in the deal, he answered: Well, I don’t believe
so, that is not a practice.’ Pressed further for an
answer as to his practice in preparing contracts and
deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he
finally answered: ‘I have done about everything that
is on the books as far as real estate is concerned.’
x x x
Respondent takes the position that because he is a
real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal
work in connection with real-estate transactions,
especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds,
mortgages, notes and the like. There is no doubt but
that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that
x x x
". . . An attorney, in the most general sense, is a
person designated or employed by another to act in
his stead; an agent; more especially, one of a class of
persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or
defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these
professional persons are attorneys at law, and
non-professional agents are properly styled ‘attorneys
in fact;’ but the single word is much used as meaning
an attorney at law. A person may be an attorney in
facto for another, without being an attorney at law.’
Abb. Law Dict.’Attorney.’ ‘A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, ‘is an officer of a court
of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend
actions in such court on the retainer of clients.’The
principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the
court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of
his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his
client informed as to the state of his business; (4) to
keep his secrets confided to him as such. . . . His
rights are to be justly compensated for his services.’
Bouv. Law Dict. tit.’Attorney.’ The transitive verb
‘practice,’ as defined by Webster, means ‘to do or
perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to
perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaining; . . . to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real
life; to exercise, as a profession, trade, art.
etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,’ etc. . . ."
(State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis
supplied)
Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business
also should be active and continuous. Isolated
business transactions or occasional, incidental and
casual transactions are not within the context of doing
business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam
Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 288
[1986]).

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the
practice of law denotes frequency or a
succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case
of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109
[1965]):
x x x qualification of having engaged in the practice of law
". . . Practice is more than an isolated
appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent
habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1,
87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one’s self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. . . ." (at p. 112)
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader,
and member of the Constitutional Commission may
possess the background, competence, integrity, and
dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President,
Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor
but the Constitution in prescribing the specific
for at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC
Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed
for that office. The Constitution charges the public
respondents no less than this Court to obey its
mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on
Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in
confirming the nomination of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.

It is to be noted that the Commission on

Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a
required component of the meaning of
practice of law in a Memorandum prepared
and issued by it, to wit:

"1. Habituality. The term ‘practice of law’

implies customarily or habitually holding
one’s self out to the public as a lawyer (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when
one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general
practice of law (U S. v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil.
146), or when one takes the oath of office as a
lawyer before a notary public, and files a
manifestation with the Supreme Court
informing it of his intention to practice law in
all courts in the country (People v. De Luna,
102 Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance,

for it consists in frequent or customary action,
a succession of acts of the same kind. In other
words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA log citing State v. Cotner,
127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115).

x x x

While the career as a businessman of

respondent Monsod may have profited from
his legal knowledge, the use of such legal
knowledge is incidental and consists of
isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to
the practice of law was not required for
membership in the Constitutional Commission
or in the Fact-Finding Commission on the
1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr.
Monsod while a member may be likened to
isolated transactions of foreign corporations
in the Philippines which do not categorize the
foreign corporations as doing business in the
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the
Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in
19791 and passed the same year's bar
examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees.3 He
was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13
May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled
date, allegedly because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys5 given by the
Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his
old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized
that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he
had signed at the entrance of the PICC was
probably just an attendance record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was
already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was
not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated "under the mistaken belief that since he
had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in
the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and
compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for
his MCLE compliances to be credited.10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was
unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012,
Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he be
allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 201212 and submitted a Report and
Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant
petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory
conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s
prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine
and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension
from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is
warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral
character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party
who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own
lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When
asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file
the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what
can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you
don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a
combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna
happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come
here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for
disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more than
what we can say of other individuals who were successfully
admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court,
this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the
strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that
he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character
required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able
legal practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel
Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a
full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar.1âwphi1 While the
practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court will
not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals
who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand
the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner
Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since
1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but
based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment."22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a
person from the legal consequences of his acts23 as it
negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar,
Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had
signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking
was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
moment he realized that what he had signed was
merely an attendance record, he could no longer
claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have
known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing therein
that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of
this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law
without taking the necessary steps to complete all
the requirements for admission to the Bar, he
willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice
of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without
authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature
of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after
the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite
clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt
of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law, we refrain from making any finding
of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge
pertaining thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely
prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by
the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance
with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous
violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is
not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend
him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit
to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by
allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of this Resolution. For his
transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to
fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one
year period, petitioner is warned that he is not
allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the
Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner
Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this
Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay
a FINE of ₱32,000 for his unauthorized practice of
law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT
ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY
WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will
be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5161, August 25, 2015
RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the Petition1 filed by respondent
Rolando S. Torres (respondent) who seeks judicial
clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys.
Records show that respondent was administratively
charged by his sister-in-law, complainant Isidra
Ting-Dumali (complainant), for "presentation of false
testimony; participation in, consent to, and failure to
advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature
in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and
gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of
profiting from such forgery."2 The particular charges
are:
According to the complainant, the respondent took
advantage of his relationship with her and her
brothers and used his profession to deprive them of
what was lawfully due them even if it involved the
commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act.
She attributes to the respondent the following acts or
omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to,
and failed to advise against, the perjury
committed by his wife Felicisima and his
sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11
November 1986, wherein the two made it appear
that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses
Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting, knowing fully
well that the same was false. He presented that
document to the Register of Deeds of Cavite for
the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in
the names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was
later sold to Antel Holdings[,] Inc. for
P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and
received by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to,
and failed to advise against, the forgery of
complainant's signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995
involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in
Italy at that time working as an overseas
contract worker. He even presented the
falsified document to the Register of
Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over
the property in favor of his wife
Felicisima and sister-in law Marcelina.
The forgery or falsification was made to
enable them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel
Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and
misappropriated by Felicisima and
Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:
Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of
the Original Copy. and Owner's Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No.
1605 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cavite, filed by
complainant's sisters Marcelina and
Felicisima on 24, October 1995, the
respondent made gross misrepresentation
and offered false testimony to the effect
that Marcelina and Felicisima are the
only children and legal heirs of the late
spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante
for the purpose of obtaining a new title
in their names. With the reconstituted
title, and with the express conformity of
the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina
were able to sell Lot 1605 to Antel
Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and
profited from the sale to the exclusion
of their other siblings. Partial payment
was even received pending the
reconstitution proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent
made gross and false misrepresentations
for the purpose of profiting therefrom
when he requested the buyer through a
certain Mrs. Ong to release the full
payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense
that the order of reconstitution would be
released within a month when he knew that
it would be impossible because he
presented evidence in the reconstitution
case only on 12 August 1997. To facilitate
the release of the money, he even used the
stationery of the Philippine National
Bank, of which he was an employee.3
In a Resolution4 dated April 14, 2004, the
Court found merit in the complaint and, thus,
held respondent guilty of gross misconduct
and of violating the lawyer's oath, as well as
Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, resulting in his disbarment
from the practice of law:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres
guilty of gross misconduct and violation
of the lawyer's oath, as well as Canons
1 and 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, thereby rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the
legal profession. He is thus
ordered DISBARRED from the practice of
law, and his name is ordered stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.
x x x x5
Aggrieved, respondent filed on May 20,
2004 a Motion for Reconsideration6 of the
aforesaid Resolution, which the Court denied
with finality in the Resolution7 dated June 29,
2004.
Unperturbed, he filed on September 15, 2004 a
Motion for Leave to File and Admit Second Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which the Court denied for lack of
merit in the Resolution9 dated November 9, 2004,
stating that "[n]o further pleadings will be
entertained."
On January 26, 2006, respondent filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Lift Disbarment10 begging that compassion,
mercy, and understanding be bestowed upon him by
the Court in that his disbarment be lifted. The same
was, however, expunged from the records in a
Resolution11 dated June 13, 2006.
Still insistent, respondent wrote letters addressed to
former Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga12 and former
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban,13 reiterating his
pleas for compassion and mercy. However, these
letters were similarly expunged from the records in a
Resolution14 dated September 5, 2006, considering
the previous directive that no further pleadings will be
further entertained in this case. These were followed
by numerous submissions either seeking his
reinstatement to the bar15 or the reduction of his
penalty of disbarment to suspension, 16 all of which
were either expunged from the records17 or
denied18 by the Court.
More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, or
on June 23, 2015, respondent filed the instant
Petition once more seeking judicial clemency from the
Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Court's Ruling
"Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who demands
it, but rather, a special privilege granted and
continued only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. The same reasoning applies to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising
its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court
should see to it that only those who establish their
present moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be
readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the
practice of law are never permanently closed on a
disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal
profession as well as to the general public to ensure
that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a
matter of justice."19redarclaw
"The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to
the practice of law is whether the Iawver has
sufficiently rehabilitated himself or herself in
conduct and character. Whether the applicant shall
be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. The Court will take into
consideration his or her character and standing prior
to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he or she was disbarred, his or her
conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time
that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the
application for reinstatement."20redarclaw
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Judicial Clemency21 the Court laid down the following
guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:
1. There 'must be proof of remorse
and reformation. These shall
include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and
prominent members of the
community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt
in an administrative case for the same
or similar misconduct will give rise to
a strong presumption of
non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from
the imposition of the penalty to
ensure a period of reform.
3. The age of the person asking for
clemency must show that he still
has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use
by giving him a chance to redeem
himself.
4. There must be a showing of
promise (such as intellectual
aptitude, learning or legal
acumen or contribution to legal
scholarship and the development
of the legal system or
administrative and other relevant
skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors
and circumstances that may justify
clemency.22 (emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Applying the foregoing standards to this case,
the Court finds that the instant petition is not
meritorious.
While more than ten (10) years had already
passed since his disbarment on April 14, 2004,
respondent's present petition has failed to
show substantial proof of his reformation as
required in the first guideline above.
The principle which should hold true not only
for judges but also for lawyers, being officers
of the court, is that judicial "[c]lemency, as an
act of mercy removing any disqualification,
should be balanced with the preservation of
public confidence in the courts. Thus the
Court will grant it only if there is a showing
that it is merited. Proof of reformation and
a showing of potential and promise are
indispensable."23redarclaw
In this case, the only ostensible proof of
reformation that respondent has presented is
a Certification24 dated June 5, 2015 signed by
Reverend Nelson D. Feranil, Administrative
Pastor of the Buenavista Evangelical Church
in General Trias, Cavite, which generally
states that respondent, "before and after his
disbarment," has been "assisting the poor and
indigent litigants in our community," and that "he has
been very active in spreading the [w]ords and gospel
of the Almighty God[,] being an active member of the
Couples of Christ FFL." Aside from these bare
statements, no other proof was presented to specify
the actual engagements or activities by which
respondent had rendered free legal services to
indigents or had ministered to the members of his
community or church, hence, insufficient to
demonstrate any form of consistency in his supposed
desire to reform.
The other testimonials which respondent submits,
particularly that of Atty. Teofilo Pugeda Jr., who
stated that "[a]s a former law practitioner,
[respondent] is humble, simple, and respectful to
fellow lawyers, Court Personnel, and the Presiding
Judge," and that "[h]e used to give free legal advice
and assisted indigent litigants in their court
cases,"25 and that of Atty. Manuel Medina, retired City
Prosecutor of Cavite, who stated that "[d]uring my
years as Prosecutor x x x I always met him in the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite City where I can say in
all honesty and candor that he was an exemplary
officer of the court, punctual[,] and always prepared
in handling his court cases,"26 all relate to conduct or
attributions prior to respondent's disbarment; hence,
these are incompetent evidence to prove his
reformation which connotes consistent improvement
subsequent to his disbarment.
In similar vein, the testimonials attached to his
previous Motion for Reconsideration27 filed on May 20,
2004 which he now incorporates in support of his
present petition,28 is equally insufficient to conclude
that he has already reformed. This is because all these
testimonials were executed in May 2004.29 Thus, they
can only attest to respondent's conduct or attributions
a mere month removed from his disbarment on April
14, 2004.
More significantly, it should be discerned that the root
cause of respondent's disbarment was his fraudulent
acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein.
However, no proof was presented to show that he had
reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with her so
as to show remorse for his previous faults. The
dismissal of the criminal complaint against him
for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents,
filed by complainant is no proof of remorse since the
same was based on lack of probable
cause.30 Likewise, its dismissal,' could not prove that
he was actually innocent of the administrative charges
against him, since the parameters and considerations
of an administrative case are evidently different from
that in a criminal case. As in this case, the lack of
probable cause against respondent as found by the
prosecutor does not negate his administrative liability
already adjudged by this Court. That the prosecutor
found that respondent "merely rendered legal
services to the Ting siblings"31 does not mean that he
rendered the same in accordance with the lawyer's
oath and ethical canons.
To add, no other evidence was presented in his
Petition to demonstrate his potential for public service,
or that he - now being 68 years of age32 - still has
productive years ahead of him that can be put to good
use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. Thus,
the third and fourth guidelines were neither complied
with.
While the Court sympathizes with the
predicaments of disbarred lawyers - may it be
financial or reputational in cause - it stands
firm in its commitment to the public to
preserve the integrity and esteem of the Bar.
As held in a previous case, "in considering [a
lawyer's] application for reinstatement to the
practice of law, the duty of the Court is to
determine whether he has established moral
reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding
its feeling of sympathy or pity."33 Ultimately,
with the above discussed guidelines not
complied with, the Court has to be objective
and, therefore, denies the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No.7054 November 11, 2014
CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA,
JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound
Appeal for Judicial Clemency1 filed by Atty.
Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. (respondent), who seeks to
be reinstated as a member of the Philippine Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court
disbarred the respondent from the practice of law
on the following grounds: abuse of court
procedures and processes; filing of multiple actions
and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and
deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before
the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer;
and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in
court.
The material portions of the subject Decision
provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the
respondent committed various acts of professional
misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the
exacting ethical standards imposed on members of
the Bar. We cannot, agree, however, that only a
penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of
law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommendedpenalty of
suspension for two (2) years.
Given the respondent’s multiple violations, his past
record as previously discussed, and the nature of
these violations which shows the readiness to
disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for
the orderly administration of justice,we believe and
so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to
disbar the respondent to keep him away from the
law profession and from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a
continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession
serves. Not even his ardor and overzealousness in
defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits
at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of
the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this
Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the
respondent’s first ethical infraction of the same nature. We
penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures
and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any
lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited
traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondent’s professional legal career for the sake of the
public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM
Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005
and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11,
2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of
the Lawyer’s Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon
10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01,
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;and
Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold
that the respondent should be DISBARREDfrom the practice
of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial
Clemency and Compassion3 praying that his license to
practice law be restored based on humanitarian
considerations, but the Court En Bancresolved to deny the
petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an
Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy4 asking the Court to
take a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He
maintained that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he
committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe
penalty of disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame
on another individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General
Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free
himself from liability by claiming that one of the charges
leading to his disbarment was not of his own doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied
the appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011,
reiterating his pleas for the Court’s compassion and
mercy.6 He sought the Court’s forgiveness stating that he
has learned his lesson; but at the same time, questioning the
Court’s finding for lackof factual support. He appended to his
appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership
dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of
Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a
Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter11 addressed
to the Members of the Court En Banc once again reiterating
his prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among
others that for more than three years that he has been
disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved
in any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the
services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine,
CommonwealthAvenue as Eucharistic Minister
leader, has conducted regular monthly lectures on
the subject of marriage at the Diocese of
Novaliches, and has participated as monthly
financial contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena
City. He also begged the Court to no longer prolong
his penalty since it had already served its purpose.
The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more
prayed for his reinstatement professing repentance
and remorse for what he did.13 He pleaded for the
Court’s consideration, and vowed that he will no
longer misuse the rules of procedure but instead,
devote his time and energy for its proper
observance and implementation. He also stated
that for almost three years of being disbarred from
the practice of law, he has never been involved in
any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He
promised to maintain at all times a high degree of
legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair
dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal
profession in accordance with the values and
morals embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court
denied his petition for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the
respondent filed on March 27, 2013 a
letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his
previousrequests for reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the
reconsideration of the resolutions dated August 2,
2011, July3, 2012, and October 9, 2012, the Court,
on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with finality.16 On
July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound
Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating his
apologies to the Court. He stressed that the penalty
of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health;
he has now become most frail and weak; and he
had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at
stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly.
He also stressed that in the years that he had been
excluded from the practice of law, he devoted his
time to Christian and charity pursuits serving with all
humility as a Lay Minister and a regular lecturer on
Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter Church,
Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not
because he intends to practice law again, but to be
made whole, to recover from being shattered, and
to finally have peace of mind. Heexpressed his
sincere repentance and deep remorse by taking full
responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also prayed
that his disbarment be lifted and that he be
reinstated as a member of the Philippine bar. As
part of his petition, he submitted a Medical
Abstract18 evidencing his diagnosis for chronic
kidney disease, and a certification19 from St. Peter
Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City,
proving that he and his family are dedicated
parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right granted to everyone who
demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted
and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness inintellectual attainment and in moral
character.21 The same reasoning applies to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see
to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness
and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus,
though the doors to the practice of law are never
permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes
a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public
to ensure that if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a
matter of justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice
of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated
himself or herself in conduct and character.23 Whether the
applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to
a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court.24 The
lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is again worthy of
membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration
his or her character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was
disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and
the application for reinstatement.25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the
Bar, the respondent had demonstrated an active
involvement and participation in community and church
activities by joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible
Study and Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the
respondent worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz,
Marinduque rendering free legal assistance to his townmates
who were inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the
respondentwas appointed as a Municipal Administrator and
had continued extending assistance to the indigent
residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in
various community projects, through the Marinduque
Jaycees, where he served as President from 1980 to 1981,
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Marinduque
Chapter, where he served as a member, Director, and
President from 1982 to 1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent
acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to have taken
full responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no
longerquestioned the Court’s decision. According to him, he
has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his
disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect on his
professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and
to realize the gravity of his mistakes. After his disbarment,
the respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated
his time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that
significantly contributed to his character reformation.He
professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment,
he has been an active member of the Couples for Christ,
Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through
his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the
ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for
Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage
Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish
Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not
inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct
prior to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had
sufficiently achieved moral reformation.
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia,26 the Court,
in deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia,
considered that 15 years had already elapsed from the time
hewas disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to
acknowledge his infractions and to repent. The Court also
took into account the fact that Atty. Mejiais already of
advanced years, has long repented, and suffered
enough. The Court also notedthat he had made a
significant contribution by putting up the Mejia Law
Journal containing his religious and social writings;
and the religious organization named "El Cristo
Movement and Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and
Mind." Furthermore, the Court considered that Atty.
Mejia committed no other transgressions since he
was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,27 the Court granted the reinstatement of
the disbarred lawyer (found to be guilty of
intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and
considered the period of three (3) years as
sufficient time to do soul-searching and to prove
that he is worthy to practice law. In that case, the
Court took into consideration the disbarred lawyer’s
sincere admission of guilt and repeated pleas for
compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw,28 the Court reinstated
Atty. Antiniw (who was found guilty of malpractice in
falsifying a notarized deed of sale and subsequently
introducing the document in court) after considering
the long period of his disbarment (almost 15 years).
The Court considered that during Atty. Antiniw’s
disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian
and civic services, and retained an unblemished
record as an elected public servant, as shown by
the testimonials of the numerous civic and
professional organizations, government institutions,
and members of the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct
of the disbarred attorney before and after his
disbarment, the time that had elapsed from the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement,
and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys’
sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that
the passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient
to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his
professional transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the
respondent was accused and was found guilty of
gross misconduct.1âwphi1 The respondent, in an
earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio
E. Revilla,Jr.,29 was likewise found guilty of gross
misconduct for committing willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; misusing court
procedure and processes to delay the execution of
a judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in
the illegal practice of law – mostly the same
grounds on which the Decision dated December 4,
2009 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus Builders,
we granted the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration and reduced the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from two (2)
years to six (6) months out of compassion to the
respondent.
Considering the respondent’s earlier disbarment
case(and subsequent reduction of the penalty
imposed as an act of clemency), and another
disbarment case against him still pending review by
the Court, we are not fully and convincingly satisfied
that the respondent has already reformed. The
period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably
long considering the nature and perversityof the
respondent’s misdeeds. We believe that it is still
early for the Court to consider the respondent’s
reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's
sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.1âwphi1 While he
expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full
responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to
pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and
to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion.
The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily
showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership
in the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that
the respondent had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the
respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we stress that in
considering his application for reinstatement to the practice
of law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has
established moral reformation and rehabilitation,
disregarding its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this
point, this requirement was not met. Until such time when the
respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his
membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the
practice of law stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal
for Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 6148 January 22, 2013
FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent.
RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF
EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed
by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) who
seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
Records show that in the Decision1 dated February 27, 2004,
the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for
having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant
Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine
Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was
still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct
in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The dispositive
portion of the subject Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is found
guilty of gross immorality and is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law. He is likewise ORDERED to show
satisfactory evidence to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline and to this Court that he is supporting or has made
provisions for the regular support of his two children by
complainant.
Let respondent’s name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.2
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and
Mercy3 which the Court denied with finality in the
Resolution4 dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or
on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant
Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy)5 seeking
judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit
as a second motion for reconsideration and
accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the
Resolution dated September 4, 2012.6 On
December 18, 2012, the same petition was
endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice
President7 for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to
look into the substantive merits of the case.
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37,
Appealing for Clemency,8 the Court laid down the
following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial
clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation.
These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or
chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent
members of the community with proven integrity
and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an
administrative case for the same or similar
misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of
non-reformation.
2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the
imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of
reform.
3. The age of the person asking for clemency must
show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance
to redeem himself.
4. There must be a showing of promise (such as
intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the
development of the legal system or administrative
and other relevant skills), as well as potential for
public service.
5. There must be other relevant factors and
circumstances that may justify
clemency.9 (Citations omitted)
Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law,
the applicant must, like any other candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character.10
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the
Court finds the instant petition meritorious.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and
acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal
profession and in his personal life. He has asked
forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves
and maintained a cordial relationship with them as
shown by the herein attached pictures.11 Records
also show that after his disbarment, respondent
returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and
devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care
of his ailing mother until her death in 2008.12 In
2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the
Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed
the position of Local Assessment Operations
Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office,
which office he continues to serve to date.13 Moreover, he is
a part-time instructor at the University of Cagayan Valley and
F.L. Vargas College during the School Year
2011-2012.14 Respondent likewise took an active part in
socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends
who are in dire need.
The following documents attest to respondent’s reformed
ways: (1) Affidavit of Candida P. Mabborang;15 (2) Affidavit of
Reymar P. Ramirez;16 (3) Affidavit of Roberto D. Tallud;17 (4)
Certification from the Municipal Local Government
Office;18 (5) Certification by the Office of the Municipal
Agriculturist/Health Officer, Social Welfare Development
Officer;19 (6) Certification from the Election Officer of Enrile,
Cagayan;20 (7) Affidavit of Police Senior Inspector Jacinto T.
Tuddao;21 (8) Certifications from nine (9) Barangay
Chairpersons;22 (9) Certification from the Office of the
Provincial Assessor;23 (10) Certification from the Office of the
Manager, Magsaka ca Multi-Purpose Cooperative;24 and (11)
Certification of the Office of the Federation of Senior Citizens,
Enrile Chapter.25 The Office of the Municipal Treasurer also
certified that respondent has no monetary accountabilities in
relation to his office26 while the Office of the Human
Resource Management Officer attested that he has no
pending administrative case.27 He is not known to be
involved in any irregularity and/or accused of a crime. Even
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) attested that he
has no record on file as of May 31, 2011.28
Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly
supported by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cagayan
Chapter29 and by his former and present colleagues.30 His
parish priest, Rev. Fr. Camilo Castillejos, Jr., certified that he
is faithful to and puts to actual practice the doctrines of the
Catholic Church.31 He is also observed to be a regular
churchgoer.32 Records further reveal that respondent has
already settled his previous marital squabbles,33 as in fact,
no opposition to the instant suit was tendered by
complainant Teves. He sends regular support34 to his
children in compliance with the Court’s directive in the
Decision dated February 27, 2004.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed
from the time respondent was disbarred and recognizes his
achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National
High School,35 and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated
government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports;
Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service
Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and
State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice.36 From the
attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that
respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At
5837 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him
that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law
profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is
ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its
errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show
compassion to those who have reformed their ways,38 as in
this case.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the
practice of law.1âwphi1 He is, however, reminded that such
privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to
the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict
compliance with the rules and the law are continuing
requirements.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby
ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
April 12, 2016
A.C. No. 10781
[Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2764]
COBALT RESOURCES, INC., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RONALD AGUADO, Respondent.
DECISION
Per Curiam:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment
filed by Cobalt Resources, Inc. (CRI) against
respondent Atty. Ronald C. Aguado (Atty.
Aguado) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for violation of Rules 1.01 and
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
the lawyer's oath.
The Antecedents
In its Complaint,1 CRI alleged that on March 5, 2010,
a group of armed men, clad in vests bearing the
mark "PASG" and pretending to be agents of the
Presidential Anti-Smuggling Group (PASG),
hi-jacked its delivery van which was then loaded
with cellular phones worth P1.3 million; that Dennis
Balmaceda (Balmaceda), the driver of the delivery
van, and his companions were all forcibly taken
away at gun point and were dropped at the Country
Hill and Golf Club; that Balmaceda called Antonio
Angeles (Angeles), the Security Director of CRI,
who immediately reported the incident to the
Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation
Detection Unit (PNP-CIDU); that with the use of
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) Tracking Device
installed in the cellular phones, Angeles and the
PNPCIDU tracked down the location of the cellular
phones to be in front of Pegasus Bar along Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City; that the PNP-CIDU, together
with Angeles proceeded to Pegasus Bar and found
three (3) vehicles parked in front of the bar: (1)
Toyota Fortuner with Plate No. UNO-68 owned by
Atty. Aguado, (2) Chevrolet Optra with Plate No.
ZDW-764 and (3) a motorcycle with Plate No.
NK-1180; that when the PNP-CIDU approached the
vehicles, Anthony Palmes (Palmes) ran but he was
chased by the police officers and was arrested; that
Atty. Aguado who was then standing in the
reception area of Pegasus Bar was not arrested as
none of the police officers knew, at that time, of his
participation in the crime; that the PNP-CIDU
searched the vehicles and found the cellular
phones, the Identification Card (ID) showing Atty.
Aguado as Legal Consultant of the PASG, the
Mission Order identifying Atty. Aguado as the
Assistant Team Leader, and a vest bearing the
mark PASG.
CRI further averred that the men who hijacked its
delivery van used the fake mission order when it
flagged down the delivery van; that the mission
order identified Atty. Aguado as the assistant team
leader and authorized the armed men to seize
CRI’s cellular phones; that the PASG issued a
certification stating that the mission order was fake;
that Atty. Aguado carried an ID bearing his picture
and name which showed that he was a PASG legal
consultant; and that this ID was likewise fake as
evidenced by a certification issued by the PASG.
Based on the Sinumpaang Salaysay,2 dated September 8,
2010, executed by Palmes, CRI concluded that it was Atty.
Aguado who prepared the fake mission order and
masterminded the crime as he was the one who conceived it
and laid down the nitty-gritty details of its execution; and that
it was he who recruited the armed men who actually
executed the hijacking.
Eventually, two separate Informations for Robbery3 and
Carnapping4 were filed against Atty. Aguado and several
others.
The IBP directed Atty. Aguado to submit his answer but,
despite several extensions, he failed to do so.
The IBP then set the case for mandatory conference.
In his Conference Brief,5 Atty. Aguado denied the allegations.
He averred that "on March 5, 2010, at about 11:00 to 12:00
in the afternoon,"6 his Toyota Fortuner with Plate No.
UNO-68 was carnapped along Scout Mandarin while in the
custody of his driver; that he reported the incident to the
police authorities; that on March 7, 2010, he was awakened
by relatives informing him that his name was on the front
page of several tabloids in a story connecting him to the
alleged hijacking; and that he was indicted in the case
because of the ID found hanging in his carnapped vehicle.
In its Report and Recommendation,7 dated May 3, 2011, the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty.
Aguado liable for unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful
conduct in falsifying the ID and mission order showing him as
the Legal Consultant and the Assistant Team Leader,
respectively, of the PASG. The IBP-CBD recommended that
he be suspended for two (2) years. It, however, deferred the
issue of Atty. Aguado’s purported participation in the alleged
hijacking incident as the issue pertained to a judicial function.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report of the CBD, as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules
and considering that Respondent committed unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct by falsifying the ID
and Mission Order, Atty. Ronaldo Aguado is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years.8
Not satisfied, CRI filed a motion for reconsideration9 praying
that the May 3, 2011 report of the IBP-CBD be set aside and
that a new resolution ordering the disbarment of Atty.
Aguado be issued. CRI claimed that Atty. Aguado deserved
the ultimate penalty of disbarment as the falsification of
public documents was sufficiently established and, as the
CBD knew, he masterminded the hijacking using his
profession to commit the crime.
On July 25, 2013, Atty. Aguado also filed a motion for
Reconsideration10 of the March 20, 2013 Resolution praying
that it be set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the
complaint. He averred that the charges of usurpation of
authority and falsification filed against him had been
dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City; that he could not be presumed to be the author of the
falsification because he was never in possession of the
falsified ID and mission order; and that he never used, took
advantage or profit therefrom. Atty. Aguado asserted that
this case should, at the very least, be suspended pending
the resolution of the robbery and carnapping charges against
him.
In a Resolution,[[11] dated September 27, 2014, the Machine copy.
IBP Board of Governors denied both motions and
affirmed its March 20, 2013 Resolution. ATTY. HARON:

Pursuant to Section 12(c), Rule 139-B of the Rules This is the copy.
of Court, CRI filed a petition for review12 before the
Court. CRI was firm in its stand that Atty. Aguado
be meted out the penalty of disbarment for his COMM. CACHAPERO:
falsification of a PASG mission order and ID and for
his involvement in the hijacking of the CIR delivery Take a look, is that a machine copy?
van and its cargo.
ATTY. HARON:
Similarly, Atty. Aguado filed a petition for review
insisting on his innocence and praying for the Yes, Your Honor. Annex "F" states that Atty. Ronald C.
dismissal of the complaint. Aguado is the assistant team leader of the team by mission
order.
The Court’s Ruling
COMM. CACHAPERO:
The Court finds merit in the petition of CRI.
He is only asking, the respondent is the one who owns that
It must be emphasized that a disbarment document. He is not yet asking whether that document is
proceeding, being administrative in nature, is authentic or not.
separate and distinct from a criminal action filed
against a lawyer and they may proceed ATTY. AMON:
independently of each other.13 A finding of guilt in
the criminal case does not necessarily mean a
finding of liability in the administrative case.14 In the Yes, Your Honor, as written here.
same way, the dismissal of a criminal case on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence against an COMM. CACHAPERO:
accused, who is also a respondent in an
administrative case, does not necessarily exculpate
Yes, he is the one.
him administratively because the quantum of
evidence required is different. In criminal cases,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is required.15 "In ATTY. HARON:
administrative cases for disbarment or suspension
against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is Would the respondent also like to admit that the
clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of identification card and the mission order were found
proof rests upon the inside his Toyota Fortuner, Plate No. UNO-68.
complainant."16 Preponderance of evidence means
"evidence which is more convincing to the court as
ATTY. AMON:
worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto."17
Of which he is the owner, yes.
Clearly, Atty. Aguado committed the act complained
of as it was established that he was in possession ATTY. HARON:
of a falsified ID showing him as a legal consultant of
the PASG and mission order identifying him as the Admitted also, Your Honor.
Assistant Team Leader of the anti-smuggling
operation. Although Atty. Aguado claimed in his
Conference Brief that he was indicted merely on the ATTY. HARON:
basis of an ID found hanging in his carnapped
Toyota Fortuner,18 his counsel, Atty. Letecia Would the respondent also like to admit the certifications
Amon (Atty. Amon), during the mandatory Annexes "G" and "H" issued by the PASG are genuine and
conference held on February 25, 2011, duly executed. I’m showing counsel copies of the
acknowledged that the ID and mission order were certifications, Your Honor, marked as Annexes "G" and "H"
found in the Toyota Fortuner owned by Atty. which bears the seal of that office, Your Honor.
Aguado, thus:
COMM. CACHAPERO:
ATTY. HARON:
What is your proposal Atty. Haron?
Is she willing to admit that respondent is the same
person referred to in the document called mission x x x.19 [Emphasis supplied]
order marked as Annex "F" issued by the PASG.
Moreover, the Sinumpaang Salaysay20 of Palmes explicitly
ATTY. AMON: described Atty. Aguado’s participation in the crime as
follows:
I have no exact knowledge on that, Your Honor.
xxx
ATTY. HARON:
2. Alam ko kung sinu-sino ang mga taong kasama sa
I’m showing counsel for respondent with a copy of a pagplano at pagsasagawa ng nasabing ‘hijacking’. Bagamat
mission order marked as Annex "F"…. may partisipasyon ako sa krimen, hindi ko alam na ang
gagawing paghuli sa mga nasabing cellphone ay labag sa
COMM. CACHAPERO: batas dahil ako ay pinaniwala na ang gagawin naming
paghuli sa mga cellphone ng Cobalt ay isang
lehitimong operasyon ng PASG.
3. Bago pa man naganap ang nasabing hijacking ay
dati akong empleyado ng Cobalt na nakatalaga sa
Delivery Section/Pull Out Service. Ngunit hindi
nagtagal ay nag-resign ako.
4. Noong ikalawang lingo ng Pebrero, nilapitan ako
ni Jaime "James" Abedes at sinabi sa akin ng kung
pwede ay i-monitor ko daw ang ruta ng delivery van
ng Cobalt at ako ay bibgyan niya ng "budget" upang
ang kanyang grupo ay makapagsagawa ng ‘seizure
operations.’
5. Noong una ay nag-alangan akong sumangayon
sa mungkahi ni James ngunit ako ay pinapanatag
niya na lahat ng dokumento at papeles ay kumpleto.
Sabi pa ni James, "Si Atty. Aguado ang magbibigay
ng complete documents at Mission Order dahil
naka-direkta siya sa PASG Malacañang para
ma-flag down ang delivery van".
6. Ako ay naniwala sa kanyang sinabi dahil sa
pagbanggit niya na may kasama kaming abogado.
Dahil dito ay pumayag ako sa mungkahi ni James.
7. Kinabukasan ay nagkita kami ni James sa Caltex
Pioneer corner Shaw Boulevard. Nalaman ko kay
James na may hawak siyang Security Guard doon.
Pinakilala niya ako kay Eliseo De Rosas alias
Nonoy na isa ring tauhan ni James. Siya ay may
gamit na Honda na motorsiklo na kulay berde na
may plakang 1180 NK. Noong araw din na iyon ay
nagtungo kami sa Brixton Street upang i-monitor
ang warehouse ng Cobalt dahil may warehouse
ang Cobalt sa Brixton Street.
8. Pagkatapos naming pumunta sa Brixton Street
ay nagtungo naman kami sa P. Tuazon Street kung
saan may mga clients ang Cobalt, at doon naming
nakita ang delivery van na Mitsubishi L-300 ng
Cobalt.
9. Sinimulan namin ni Nonoy ang pagmonitor ng
ruta ng delivery van ng Cobalt. Sa aming ginawang
pag-monitor ay napansin naming madalas
magpakarga ng gas ang nasabing delivery van sa
Petron Station sa Ortigas Avenue corner B.
Serrano Street. Isang lingo kaming nag-monitor ni
Nonoy sa ruta ng Cobalt.
Ipinaalam naming kay James ang nakakalap
naming impormasyon. Noong natiyak naming ang
ruta ng delivery van ay nagpaschedule si James ng
‘meeting’ kay Atty. Aguado.
10. Ika-22 ng Pebrero 2010 alas-6 ng gabi sa
McDonald’s Quezon Avenue ay nag meeting kami.
Ang mga kasama sa meeting ay si James, Atty.
Aguado, Joe Almonte, at Nonoy. Noong kami ay
nandoon ay lumipat ng lamesa si Atty. Aguado,
James at Joe Almonte at sila ay nagusap.
11. Pagkatapos ng usapan nila ay pumunta sa amin
si James at sinabi sa amin kung ano ang kanilang
napagusapan. Sinabi sa amin ni James na
mag-iisue daw ng Mission Order si Atty. Aguado. Si
Atty. Aguado na rin daw ang magbubuo ng grupo
ng mga lalake upang i-flag down ang delivery van
ng Cobalt.
12. Noong ika-25 ng Pebrero 2010 alas 7 ng gabi,
ay muli kaming nagkita nila James, Nonoy at Joe
Almonte sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue. Pagsapit
ng alas-8 ng gabi ay tumawag si Atty. Aguado na
nasa Starbucks Cafe sa Tomas Morato Avenue daw siya
naka-puwesto. Kaya’t kaming apat ay sumunod sa
Starbucks. Pagdating naming sa Starbucks ay nandoon nga
si Atty. Aguado at may kasama siyang isang pulis.
13. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis sila Atty. Aguado at James
sakay ng Toyota Fortuner na may plakang UNO-68. Sinabi
sa amin ni James na sila ay magsasagawa ng "ocular" ng
lugar kung saan gagawin ang pag-flag down ng delivery van.
Nang sila ay magbalik, kami ay sinabihan na gagawin namin
ang operasyon sa umaga ng kinabukasan (ika-26 ng
Pebrero, Biernes).
Ayon pa sa kanila, ako raw ay pupuwesto sa Petron Station
sa may Boni Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue ng alas-8 ng
umaga upang doon abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van.
Samantalang, ang mga taong magsasagawa ng pag flag
down (pawang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado) ay pupuwesto na rin
sa may Benitez Street. Kapag nakita ko na raw ang delivery
van ay agad akong tumawag kay James upang ipagbigay
alam ang pagdaan nito at i-alert ang mga nasabing mga
lalake, pagkatapos ay tumungo raw ako sa Benitez Street
upang siguraduhin na tama ang delivery van na
ipa-flagdown.
Pagkatapos ng meeting ng gabi na iyon ay isa-isa na kaming
nagsi-uwian.
14. Kaya’t kinabukasan, ika-26 ng Pebrero, alas-8 ng umaga
ay nagtungo ako sa nasabing Petron Station. Ngunit
tumawag si James na hindi raw matutuloy ang operation
dahil kulang sa tao si Atty. Aguado.
15. Kami (ako, Joe Almonte at Nonoy) ay muling pinulong ni
James sa McDonald’s Quezon Avenue noong ika-1 ng
Marso alas-7 ng gabi. Bandang alas-8 ng gabi ay dumating
na rin si Atty. Aguado. Sila Atty. Aguado, James at Joe
Almonte [ay] nag-usap sa labas ng Smoking Area
samantalang kami ni Nonoy ay nanatili sa loob.
16. Nang matapos ang usapan ay sinabi sa amin ni James
na nag-set ulit ng operation si Atty. Aguado kinabukasan,
ika-2 ng Marso, Martes, ngunit hintayin daw naming ang
feedback mula kay Atty. Aguado dahil kelangan daw ng
gamit ang mga tao ni Atty. Aguado.
17. Muli akong nagtungo kinabukasan, ika-2 ng Marso,
alas-8 ng umaga, ngunit maya-maya lamang ay tumawag sa
akin si James at sinabi niya sa akin na hindi na naman daw
tuloy ang operation dahil hindi nakakuha ng gamit ang mga
tao ni Atty. Aguado.
Sa puntong ito ay sinabi ko na kay James na sana sigurado
ang mga papeles ni Atty. Aguado dahil ayaw ko ng illegal na
trabaho. Sinabi naman sa akin ni James na kumpleto naman
daw ang mga papeles at legal ang gagawing operation.
18. Ika-4 ng Marso 2010, ay tumawag sa akin si James at
sinabi niya sa akin na tuloy na daw ang operation
kinabukasan (ika-5 ng Marso). Sinabi rin niya sa akin na
alas-8 ng umaga ay kailangan daw na naka-puwesto na ako
sa Petron Station.
19. Kaya noong ika-5 ng Marso 2010, alas-8 ng umaga, ako
ay pumuwesto na sa Petron Gasoline Station sa Boni
Serrano corner Ortigas Avenue sakay ng isang motorsiklo.
Bandang alas-8:30 ng umaga ay dumating naman si James
sakay ng isang Chevrolet na may plakang ZDW 764 at may
kasama pa siya na pinakilala sa aking "Larry."
Bandang alas-9 ng umaga ay dumating ang Toyota Fortuner
ni Atty. Aguado. Nakita ko na sakay ng nasabing Toyota
Fortuner si Atty. Aguado at Joe Almonte. Hindi sila bumaba
bagkus ay nagpakarga lamang ito ng gasolina sa nasabing
Petron Station. Hindi nagtagal ay umalis na rin sila.
Sumunod namang umalis si James at Larry sakay
ng Chevrolet.
20. Bandang alas-9:30 ng umaga, nakita ko na
dumating ang delivery van ng Cobalt sa Petron
upang ito ay magpakarga ng gasolina. Tumawag
ako kay James gamit ang aking cellphone at sinabi
ko, "Nandito na ang delivery van na white, may
plakang NKQ 734." Sumagot si James, "ok
nakapuwesto na kami. Andito na kami sa area."
21. Agad akong umalis patungo sa Benitez Street
upang abangan ang pagdaan ng delivery van
upang ma-flag down ito. Gamit ang aking
motorsiklo, ako ay dali-daling nagtungo sa Benitez
Street.
Pagdating ko doon ay nakita ko ang nasabing
Chevrolet ni James at isang L-300 van na kulay
blue-green na may plakang DFN-733. Nadatnan ko
rin ang tatlong lalake na pawang armado at
nakasuot ng tsalekong may tatak na PASG at
nag-aabang sa gilid ng daan. Mayroon din akong
napansin na nakasakay sa loob ng nasabing
blue-green na L-300 van ngunit hindi ko na
nabilang ang dami nila.
22. Ako ay pumunta sa Chevrolet (driver side), at
binuksan naman ni James ang bintana nito. Sinabi
ko ulit sa kanya na parating na ang delivery van.
Sumagot siya, "Sige. Timbrehan mo lang sila pag
malapit na. Hintayin mo relay kung saan ka
susunod ." Pagkatapos noon ay umalis na sila.
23. Pagkaalis nila, kami at nang tatlong nasabing
lalake ay nag-abang sa pagdaan ng delivery van.
Nang makita ko itong paparating, agad kong
sinabi "approaching na. yang puti, yang
puti." Pagkatapos noon ay agad pinara ng isa sa
mga nasabing lalakeng nakasumbrero ang delivery
van. Sumenyas ito sa driver ng delivery van na itabi
ito sa gilid. Pilit binuksan ng tatlong lalake ang
magkabilang pintuan ng delivery van at nang
mabuksan ang mga nasabing pintuan ay agad
hinila palabas ang tatlo nitong pahinante at agad
silang pinosasan.
xxxx
From the foregoing, it can be clearly deduced that
Atty. Aguado had participation in the crime as
charged in the complaint, from the planning stage
up to its execution. These falsified documents
found in his possession, as certified found in his
possession, as certified as evidenced by the PASG,
were used to facilitate the commission of the crime.
The well-settled rule is that "in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of
and who used a forged document is the forger and
therefore guilty of falsification."21 Atty. Aguado
failed to rebut the allegations. Other than the police
blotter showing that he reported the carnapping of
his vehicle, Atty. Aguado presented no other
convincing evidence to support his denial of the
crime. He also failed to show any ill motive on the
part of Palmes in testifying against him whom he
claimed to have met only in February 2010.
Moreover, his story of the carnapping of his
Fortuner cannot be given credence considering his
inconsistent statements on the matter. In this
regard, the Court quotes a portion of the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Oliver
Cachapero. Thus:
He, too, blabbered about the supposed carnapping of his
Fortuner car on the same day the hijacking was staged by
supposed PASG personnel suggesting that he was a victim
and not a perpetrator. However, his allegations in this regard
is put in serious doubt. In the QC PD alarm sheet,
Respondent reported that the carnapping took place at 2:30
of March 5, 2010 while in his sworn statement, he claimed
that his car was carnapped at 4:31 p.m. the precise time the
supposed carnapping was staged is too vital that
Respondent could not have overlooked the same in his
narration of facts in his counter-affidavit or in his statement
before the police authorities expecially because he
supposedly reported the incident on the very same day it
happened. But as correctly observed by the Complainant,
even if the report on the time of the carnapping incident
would have been properly made, the hijacking took place
much earlier and therefore the same does not negate the
commission of the crime by the Respondent. Also, the
reporting did not prove the fact of carnapping especially
where, as in this case, no eyewitness account was
presented, no suspect apprehended, and no criminal case
was filed.22
The Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR) explicitly mandates:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
It must be emphasized that a membership in the Bar is a
privilege laden with conditions,23 and granted only to those
who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers as instruments in the effective and
efficient administration of justice.24 As officers of the courts
and keepers of the public’s faith, lawyers are burdened with
the highest degree of social responsibility and so mandated
to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.25 They are expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency but also this high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity and fair dealing.26
Atty. Aguado has committed acts that showed he was unfit
and unable to faithfully discharge his bounden duties as a
member of the legal profession. Because he failed to live up
to the exacting standards demanded of him, he proved
himself unworthy of the privilege to practice law. As
vanguards of our legal system, lawyers, are expected at all
times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal professor
and to refrain from any act or omission which might diminish
the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity
of the legal profession.27
In several cases, the Court, after finding the lawyer guilty of
gross dishonesty, imposed the supreme penalty of
disbarment for engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
acts by falsifying documents. In Brennisen v. Atty.
Contawi, 28 the Court disbarred the lawyer when he falsified
a special power of attorney so he could mortgage and sell
his client's property. In Embido v. Atty. Pe, Jr.,29 the penalty
of disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who
authored the falsification of an inexistent court decision.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald C. Aguado is DISBARRED for
gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN OFF the roll of attorneys.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be made part of his personal records; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10483, March 18, 2016
THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., PICO LOCAL CENTER,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDWIN A.
PANTE, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANIEL D.
MANGALLAY, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case against the
respondent attorney did not arise from any
attorney-client relationship gone wrong
between the parties but from the ejectment
action in which the respondent attorney, as
the plaintiff, successfully defeated the local
congregation of the Christian Spiritists in the
Philippines, Inc., Pico Local Center (CSP-PLC),
whose church building and other structures
were the objects of the action. After the
defendants filed their notice of appeal, the
parties agreed to settle among themselves,
with the defendants withdrawing the notice of
appeal and agreeing to voluntarily vacate and
remove their structures by August 31, 2013 in
consideration of the respondent's financial
assistance of P300,000.00. But, despite
receiving the respondent's financial
assistance, the defendants reneged on their
end of the agreement; hence, at the
respondent's instance, the trial court issued
the writ of execution and the writ of
demolition, by virtue of which the structures
of the defendants were ultimately demolished.
The demolition impelled the CSP-PLC,
represented by its local Minister, Edwin A.
Pante (Pante), to bring the disbarment
complaint against the respondent based on
his allegedly gross misconduct and deceit in
causing the demolition of the structures
without the demolition order from the court,
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and
disobedience to a lawful order of the court,
positing that he thereby abused his legal
knowledge.
Antecedents
Pante avers that the CSP-PLC constructed its
church building on the land located in JE 176
Pico, La Trinidad, Benguet, which was owned
by Maria Omiles who had bought it from Larry
Ogas;1 that on June 11, 2012, Omiles and
Pastor Elvis Maliked received the summons
issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La
Trinidad, Benguet requiring them to answer
the complaint for unlawful detainer filed
against them by the respondent; that based
on the allegations of the complaint (docketed
as Civil Case No. R-1256 entitled Daniel
Dazon Mangallay v. Maria Tomino Omiles and
all persons staying with and/or acting on her behalf,
including all Officers and/or patrons of the Church of
the Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, represented
by Pastor Elvis S. Maliked), the respondent claimed
ownership of the land where the church of the
CSP-PLC had been erected, attaching the copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 45241 issued by
the Register of Deeds of Benguet, and the deed of
absolute sale executed between him and one Pedro
Loy;2 that the MTC later on decided the case by
declaring the respondent to have the better right of
possession; and that the MTC further declared that
the CSP-PLC was a builder in good faith, without
prejudice to the respondent exercising his option to
appropriate the building in accordance with Article
448 of the Civil Code.3
As earlier mentioned, the respondent sought and
obtained the writ of execution from the MTC after the
defendants, including the complainant, reneged on
the promise to voluntarily vacate and surrender the
premises by August 31, 2013 in consideration of the
respondent's financial assistance of P300,000.00. The
writ of execution was issued on December 13, 2013
and the writ of demolition on December 19, 2013.
Sheriffs Joselito S. Tumbaga and John Marie O. Ocasla,
accompanied by the respondent and elements of the
Philippine National Police, implemented the writ of
execution and writ of demolition on January 22 and
January 23, 2014 by demolishing the church building
and the pastoral house of the CSP-PLC.4
Pante now insists that the demolition was done
without a demolition order from the MTC; that the
dismantled materials worth P462,236.00 were
forcibly taken away by the respondent, who had taken
advantage of his legal knowledge to cause the
premature demolition of the structures sans the
demolition order; that such taking away of the
dismantled materials constituted robbery and
malicious mischief; and that his act warranted his
disbarment.
In response, the respondent denies any wrong doing.
He counters that the demolition was backed up by a
court order;5 that after receiving the decision of the
MTC, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement by virtue of which the CSP-PLC withdrew
its appeal and promised to voluntarily vacate and
surrender the disputed premises in consideration of
P300,000.00 to be paid by him;6 that despite his
having paid the same, the CSP-PLC did not vacate the
premises even within the grace period given to
them;7 that he then moved for the execution of the
judgment, and his motion was granted by the
MTC;8 that the sheriffs report dated November 21,
20139 stated that after the CSP-PLC did not comply
with the writ of execution to remove or demolish its
structures on the premises; that he consequently
sought from the MTC the writ of demolition; and that
the MTC issued the writ of demolition.10
The respondent avers that it was not he but the
sheriffs who implemented the writ of demolition; that
the sheriffs report dated January 30, 2014 stated that
the conduct of the implementation was peaceful, and
that Pante and the other members of the church
personally observed the conduct of the demolition;
and that the sheriffs report further stated that Pante
showed no defiance of the lawful order of the court.11
The respondent submits that there was nothing wrong
in his appropriating the dismantled materials to
ensure compensation for the expenses incurred in the
demolition; and that the complaint for his
disbarment should be dismissed.
Ruling of the Court
The complaint for disbarment is absolutely
devoid of merit and substance.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, provides as follows:
Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings
for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by
the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) upon the verified complaint of any
person. The complaint shall state
clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by
affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu
proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers,
or at the instance of any person, initiate
and prosecute proper charges against
erring attorneys including those in the
government service. Provided, however,
That all charges against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan,
and Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals and
lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly
charged with them, shall be filed with the
Supreme Court; Provided, further, That
charges filed against Justices and
Judges before the IBP, including those
filed prior to their appointment in the
Judiciary, shall immediately be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication
Six (6) copies of the verified complaint
shall be filed with the Secretary of the
IBP or the Secretary of any of its chapter
who shall forthwith transmit the same to
the IBP Board of Governors for assignment
to an investigator. (As amended, Bar
Matter No. 1960, May 1, 2000.)
Under the foregoing rule, the proceedings for
the disbarment, suspension or discipline of an
attorney may be taken by the Court, motu
proprio, or by the IBP itself upon the verified
complaint of any person.
Should the disciplinary complaint against the
attorney be filed directly with the Court, the
complaint is referred to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The reference to the IBP is resorted to
whenever the factual basis for the charge may
be contested or disputed, or may require the
reception of the evidence of the complainant
and the respondent attorney. After the
referral and hearings, the IBP renders its
findings and recommendations on the
complaint, subject to the review by the
Court.12 Yet, the Court may dispense with the
referral to the IBP and resolve the charge
without delay. This happens particularly when
the charge is patently frivolous, or insincere,
or unwarranted, or intended only to harass
and spite the respondent attorney.
The Court has not enunciated any rule that prohibits
the direct filing with it of administrative complaints
against attorneys in order to emphasize its role as the
guardian of the legal profession with the ultimate
disciplinary power over attorneys. The disciplinary
power of the Court is both a right and a duty.13 Quite
recently, however, the Court has revised Rule
139-B14 to eliminate any ambiguity about the
authority of the Court to directly receive
administrative complaints against attorneys, thus:
Section 1. How Instituted. - Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or upon the filing of a verified
complaint of any person before the Supreme
Court or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP). The complaint shall state clearly and
concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having
personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged
and/or by such documents as may substantiate
said facts.
The IBP shall forward to the Supreme Court for
appropriate disposition all complaints for
disbarment, suspension and discipline filed
against incumbent Justices of the Court of
Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals and
judges of lower courts, or against lawyers in
the government service, whether or not they are
charged singly or jointly with other respondents,
and whether or not such complaint deals with acts
unrelated to the discharge of their official
functions. If the complaint is filed before the
IBP. six (6) copies of the verified complaint
shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or
the Secretary of any of its chapter who shall
forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of
Governors for assignment to an investigator.
x x x x
B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT
Section 13. Investigation of complaints. - In
proceedings initiated by the Supreme Court, or
in other proceedings when the interest of
justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer
the case for investigation to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, or to any officer of the Supreme
Court or judge of a lower court, in which case
the investigation shall proceed in the same
manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save
that the review of the report of investigation
shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
The complaint may also be referred to the IBP
for investigation, report, and recommendation,
[bold emphasis supplied to indicate the
revisions]
Under the foregoing revisions of Rule 139-B, the
administrative complaints against attorneys are
generally not dismissed outright but are instead
referred for investigation, report and
recommendation either to the IBP, or the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC), or any office of the Court or
even a judge of a lower court. Such referral ensures
that the parties' right to due process is respected as to
matters that require further inquiry and which cannot
be resolved by the mere evaluation of the documents
attached to the pleadings.15 Consequently, whenever
the referral is made by the Court, the IBP, the OBC or
other authorized office or individual must conduct the
formal investigation of the administrative complaint,
and this investigation is a mandatory requirement
that cannot be dispensed with except for valid and
compelling reasons because it serves the
purpose of threshing out all the factual issues
that no cursory evaluation of the pleadings
can determine.16
However, the referral to the IBP is not
compulsory when the administrative case can
be decided on the basis of the pleadings filed
with the Court, or when the referral to the IBP
for the conduct of formal investigation would
be redundant or unnecessary, such as when
the protraction of the investigation equates to
undue delay. Dismissal of the case may even
be directed at the outset should the Court find
the complaint to be clearly wanting in
merit.17 Indeed, the Rules of Court should not
be read as preventing the giving of speedy
relief whenever such speedy relief is
warranted.
It is upon this that we dispense with the need
to refer the complaint against the respondent
to the IBP for the conduct of the formal
investigation. The documents he submitted to
substantiate his denial of professional
wrongdoing are part of the records of the trial
court, and, as such, are sufficient to establish
the unworthiness of the complaint as well as
his lawful entitlement to the demolition of the
structures of the defendants in Civil Case No.
R-1256.
Specifically, the demolition was authorized by
the order issued by the MTC on December 19,
2013.18 In the execution of the final and
executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256,
the sheriffs dutifully discharged their
functions. The presence of the respondent
during the execution proceedings was by no
means irregular or improper, for he was the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The
complainant was then represented by Pante
and some other members of the congregation,
who did not manifest any resistance' or
objection to any irregularity in the conduct of
the execution. After all, elements of the
Philippine National Police were also present to
ensure the peaceful implementation of the
writ of execution.
Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all
criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking
away the materials of the demolished
structures. The parties put an end to their
dispute by the defendants, including the
complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw
their notice of appeal and undertaking to
voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over
the premises to the respondent by August 31,
2013 in exchange for the latter's financial
assistance of the P300,000.00. The
respondent paid the amount in the MTC on
March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on
received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles,
Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the
representatives of the CSP-PLC on the same
day.19 But the latter reneged on their part of
the agreement without returning the
P300,000.00 to the respondent, who was left
to exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the
judgment against them. It is notable that the
judgment expressly directed him "to exercise
his option pursuant to the provisions of Article
448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines
within thirty (30) days from the finality of this
judgment insofar as the improvements introduced by
the defendants on the subject property."20 Article 448
of the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of the
premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment
of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548."
His act of taking the materials of the demolished
structures was undoubtedly the exercise of the right
of appropriating them in light of the fact that the
P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance
was most likely meant to indemnify the supposed
builders in good faith.
The respondent has called attention to the letter of the
Christian Spiritists in the Philippines, Inc.,21 the
mother organization to which the CSP-PLC belonged,
to the effect that it was disavowing knowledge of or
participation in the disbarment complaint, and that it
was categorically declaring that the complaint had
been filed by Pante only for his personal interest at the
expense of the congregation. The sentiments
expressed in the letter manifested the inanity of the
complaint, and the ill motives behind Pante's filing of
the complaint against the respondent. The proper
outcome for such a complaint is its immediate
dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the complaint
for disbarment against Atty. Daniel Dazon Mangallay
for its utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY.
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono
A. Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply with
the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B.
Arnado (complainant) called the attention of this
Court to the practice of respondent of indicating
"MCLE application for exemption under process" in his
pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, and
"MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration"
in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant informed the
Court that he inquired from the MCLE Office about the
status of respondent's compliance and received the
following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from
Prof. Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano),
MCLE's Executive Director:
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY.
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP
MIS AMIS ORIENTAL Chapter did not comply with the
requirements of Bar Matter [No.] 850 for the
following compliance periods:
1. First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001
-April 14, 2004)
2. Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004
-April 14, 2007)
3. Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007
-April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed
an Application for Exemption from the MCLE
requirement on (sic) January 2009 but was DENIED
by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic) its January
14, 2009 meeting.
1 1986 snap elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the
Court referred this case to he MCLE
Committee for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa
Jean D. Reyes (Atty. Reyes), Assistant
Executive Officer of the MCLE Office,
forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case
together with the MCLE Governing Board's
Evaluation, Report and Recommendation.2 In
its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August
2013,4 the MCLE Governing Board, through
retired Supreme Court Associate Justice
Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE
Chairman, informed the Court that
respondent applied for exemption for the First
and Second Compliance Periods covering 15
April 2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004
to 14 April 2007, respectively, on the ground
of "expertise in law" under Section 3, Rule 7 of
Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing
Board denied the request on 14 January 2009.
In the same letter, the MCLE Governing Board
noted that respondent neither applied for
exemption nor complied with the Third
Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14
April 2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court
directed the Second Division Clerk of Court
to furnish respondent with complainant's
letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise
required respondent to file his comment
within ten days from notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3
February 2014, respondent alleged that he
did not receive a copy of the 5 August 2013
letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was
wondering why his application for exemption
could not be granted. He further alleged that
he did not receive a formal denial of his
application for exemption by the MCLE
Governing Board, and that the notice sent by
Prof. Feliciano was based on the letter of
complainant who belonged to Romualdo and
Arnado Law Office, the law office of his
political opponents, the Romualdo family.
Respondent alleged that the Romualdo family
controlled Camiguin and had total control of the
judges and prosecutors in the province. He further
alleged that the law firm had control of the lawyers in
Camiguin except for himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a
lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for
about 50 years. He stated:
x x x x
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first
outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON C.
AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over
government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the
Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment
because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd to
get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of
CORAZON C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the results of the
issues which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;
xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the national canvassing
before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for
President against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other
counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN
CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003
COUP CASES for leading generals like ABENINA and
COMMENDAOR and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as
the SIX OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR ANTONIO
TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting
the constitutionality and validity of the 2010 national
elections, still undecided up to this day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case
in the Supreme Court on the constitutionality and
legality of the Corona impeachment which the SC only
decided after the Senate decided his case and former SC
Chief Justice Corona conceding to the decision, thus the
SC declaring the case moot and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the
Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior member
of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the
Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional
Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of
Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition
in Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate
in the complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT
FERDINAND MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty
years now with appearances before the Supreme Court when
Justices were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in
the Court of Appeals; and numerous courts all over the
country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a
number of lawyers who have exemptions from the
MCLE;
x x x x
6 Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on
Respondent further claimed that he had
written five books: (1) Leaders From Marcos
to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables and Emerging
Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change;
(4) Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities;
and (5) Corona Impeachment. Thus, he asked
for a reconsideration of the notice for him to
undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption
from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative,
for him to be allowed to practice law while
complying with the MCLE requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court
referred respondent's Compliance and
Comment to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the
OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25
November 2014, the OBC reported that
respondent applied for exemption for the First
and Second Compliance Periods on the
ground of expertise in law. The MCLE
Governing Board denied the request on 14
January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed
respondent of the denial of his application in a
letter dated 1 October 2012. The OBC
reported that according to the MCLE
Governing Board, "in order to be exempted
(from compliance) pursuant to expertise in
lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No.
850, the applicant must submit sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing proof to establish
his expertise in a certain area of law." The
OBC reported that respondent failed to meet
the requirements necessary for the
exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires
practicing members of the Bar to indicate in
all their pleadings filed with the courts the
counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar
Matter No. 1922. The OBC further reported
that the MCLE Office has no record that
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration;
and thus, his representation in a pleading that
his "MCLE Application for Exemption [is] for
Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12
of Bar Matter No. 850 and Section 12 of the
MCLE Implementing Regulations,
non-compliance with the MCLE requirements
shall result to the dismissal of the case and
the striking out of the pleadings from the
records.7 The OBC also reported that under
Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, a member of the Bar who failed
to comply with the MCLE requirements is
given 60 days from receipt of notification to
explain his deficiency or to show his
compliance with the requirements. Section
12(e) also provides that a member who fails
to comply within the given period shall pay a
non-compliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a
delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) upon the recommendation of the
MCLE Governing Board. The OBC reported that the
13 August 2013. The OBC also reported that on 14
August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board
recommended that cases be filed against respondent
in connection with the pleadings he filed without the
MCLE compliance/exemption number for the
immediately preceding compliance period and that
the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his
responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that
respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements jeopardized the causes of his clients
because the pleadings he filed could be stricken off
from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a
delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of
non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The
OBC further recommended respondent's suspension
from the practice of law for six months with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC
also recommended that respondent be directed to
comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE
Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is
administratively liable for his failure to comply with
the MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to
undergo continuing legal education "to ensure that
throughout their career, they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice
of law."8 The First Compliance Period was from 15
April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance
Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and
the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to
14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered
respondent's pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and
2012 which means respondent also failed to comply
with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth
Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that
respondent failed to comply with the four compliance
periods. The records also showed that respondent
filed an application for exemption only on 5 January
2009. According to the MCLE Governing Board,
respondent's application for exemption covered the
First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did
not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance
Period. The MCLE Governing Board denied
respondent's application for exemption on 14 January
2009 on the ground that the application did not meet
the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3,
Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE
Office failed to convey the denial of the application for
exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only
informed respondent, through its letter dated 1
October 2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it
received inquiries from complainant, Judge Sinfroso
Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor
Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's MCLE
compliance. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration after one year, or on 23
October 2013, which the MCLE Governing
Board denied with finality on 28 November
2013. The denial of the motion for
reconsideration was sent to respondent in a
letter9 dated 29 November 2013, signed by
Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his
responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar
Matter No. 850. His application for exemption
for the First and Second Compliance Periods
was filed after the compliance periods had
ended. He did not follow-up the status of his
application for exemption. He furnished the
Court with his letter dated 7 February
201210 to the MCLE Office asking the office to
act on his application for exemption but
alleged that his secretary failed to send it to
the MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the
Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the
MCLE Office enjoined him to comply with the
requirements for the First to Third Compliance
periods. It was reiterated in the 29 November
2013 letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for
exemption. The OBC also reported that a
Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to
respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section
12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations,
respondent has 60 days from receipt of the
notification to comply. However, in his
Compliance and Comment before this Court,
respondent stated that because of his
involvement in public interest issues in the
country, the earliest that he could comply
with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14
February 2014 and that he already registered
with the MCLE Program of the University of
the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations provides:
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
x x x x
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any
of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or
evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing
legal education requirement will receive a
Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific
deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from
the receipt of the notification to explain the
deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the
requirements. Such notice shall be written in
capital letters as follows:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH
THE MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT
OF THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU
AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED
TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF
OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete
his compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit
units earned during this period may only be counted toward
compliance with the prior period requirement unless units
in excess of the requirement are earned in which case the
excess may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of
the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule
13 9-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014
MCLE Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his
deficiencies for the First Compliance Period. He is still
delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. The Court has not been furnished
proof of compliance for the First Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of
respondent towards Complying with the requirements
of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his
application for exemption, filed after the compliance
periods, would be granted. He purportedly wrote the
MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application
but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter.
He now wants the Court to again reconsider the MCLE
Office's denial of his application for exemption when
his motion for reconsideration was already denied
with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28
November 2013. He had the temerity to inform the
Court that the earliest that he could comply was on
10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the 60-day
period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, and without even
indicating when he intended to comply with his
deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to
allow him to continue practicing law while complying
with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While
it acted on respondent's application for exemption on
14 January 2009, it took the office three years to
inform respondent of the denial of his application. The
MCLE Office only informed respondent on 1 October
2012 and after it received inquiries regarding the
status of respondent's compliance. Hence, during the
period when respondent indicated "MCLE application
for exemption under process" in his pleadings, he was
not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing Board
on his application for exemption. However, after he
had been informed of the denial of his application for
exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a
motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his
motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and
is still aking, his time to satisfy the requirements of
the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated
"MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration"
in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for
reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements and disregard of the directives of the
MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent
member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing
Regulations state that the MCLE Committee should
recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the listing
of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing
that prevents the Court from using its administrative
power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and
from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare
such lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.

The OBC recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of aw for six
months. We agree. In addition, his listing as a
delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to
suspension because he shall not be permitted
to practice law until such time as he submits
proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of
Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors
has notified the MCLE Committee of his
reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations. Hence, we deem it
proper to declare respondent as a delinquent
member of the IBP and to suspend him from
the practice of law for six months or until he
has fully complied with the requirements of
the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later,
and he has fully paid the required
non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Office to promptly act on matters
that require its immediate attention, such as
but not limited to applications for exemptions,
and to communicate its action to the
interested parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A.
Adaza to be exempted from MCLE compliance
as the matter had already been denied with
finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28
November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a
delinquent member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the
practice of law for SIX MONTHS, or until he
has fully complied with the MCLE
requirements for the First, Second, Third, and
Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later,
and he has fully paid the required
non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty.
Homobono A. Adaza's personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office
and the IBP Governing Board for their
appropriate actions.
A.C. No. 10952
ENGEL PAUL ACA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RONALDO P. SALVADO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the October 11, 2014 Resolution1 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors (IBP-BOG) which adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation2 of the
Investigating Commissioner suspending Atty. Ronaldo P.
Salvado (Atty. Salvado) from the practice of law.
The Complaint:
On May 30, 2012, Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative
complaint3 for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010,
he met Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty.
Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced
himself as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several
businesses including but not limited to the lending business;
that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the
complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that
he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every
month; and that he was assured of a profitable investment
due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients and
investors.
Because of these representations coupled by the assurance
of Atty. Salvado that he would not place his reputation as a
lawyer on the line, complainant made an initial investment in
his business. This initial investment yielded an amount
corresponding to the principal plus the promised interest. On
various dates from 2010 to 2011, complainant claimed that
he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with
promises of high rates of return.
As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued
several post-dated checks in the total amount of
P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus
interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank Account
number 040331-00087-9, fully described as follows:
Check Date
Amount
Number Issued

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary August 14,

0060144 P657 ,000.00
2011

September
0060147 P 530,000.00
29, 2011

September
0060190 P60,000.00
29, 2011

October
0060194 P90,000.00
16, 2011

October P2,
0060206
17, 2011 120,000.00

October
0060191 P1,060,000.00
29, 2011

November
0060195 P1,590,000.00
16, 2011
Upon presentment, however, complainant was
shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks
were dishonored as these were drawn from
insufficient funds or a closed account.
Complainant made several verbal and written
demands upon Atty. Salvado, who at first, openly
communicated with him, assuring him that he would
not abscond from his obligations and that he was
just having difficulty liquidating his assets and
collecting from his own creditors. Complainant was
even informed by Atty. Salvado that he owned real
properties that could serve as payment for his
obligations. As time went by, however, Atty.
Salvado began to avoid complainant's calls and text
messages. Attempts to meet up with him through
common friends also proved futile. This prompted
complainant to refer the matter to his lawyer Atty.
Divina, for appropriate legal action.
On December 26, 2011, Atty. Divina personally
served the Notice of Dishonor on Atty. Salvado,
directing him to settle his total obligation in the
amount of P747,000.00, corresponding to the cash
value of the first two (2) PSBank checks, within
seven (7) days from receipt of the said
notice.6 Nevertheless, Atty. Salvado refused to
receive the said notice when Atty. Divina's
messenger attempted to serve it on him.
Sometime in April 2012, complainant yet again
engaged the services of Atty. Divina, who, with his
filing clerk and the complainant's family, went to
Atty. Salvado's house to personally serve the
demand letter. A certain "Mark" who opened the
gate told the filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no
longer residing there and had been staying in the
province already.
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived
bearing Atty. Salvado. Complainant quickly alighted
from his vehicle and confronted him as he was
about to enter the gate of the house. Obviously
startled, Atty. Salvado told him that he had not
forgotten his debt and invited complainant to enter
the house so they could talk. Complainant refused
the invitation and instead told Atty. Salvado that
they should talk inside his vehicle where his
companions were.
During this conversation, Atty. Salvado assured
complainant that he was working on "something" to
pay his obligations. He still refused to personally
receive or, at the least, read the demand letter.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle
his obligations.
For complainant, Atty. Salvado's act of issuing
worthless checks not only constituted a violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) or the
"Anti-Bouncing Checks Law," but also reflected his
depraved character as a lawyer. Atty. Salvado not
only refused to comply with his obligation, but also
used his knowledge of the law to evade criminal
prosecution. He had obviously instructed his
household staff to lie as to his whereabouts and to
reject any correspondence sent to him. This resort
to deceitful ways showed that Atty. Salvado was not
fit to remain as a member of the Bar.
The Defense of the Respondent
On July 24, 2012, Atty. Salvado filed his
Answer,7 denying that he told complainant that he
had previously entered into various government
contracts and that he was previously engaged in some other
businesses prior to engaging in the lending and
rediscounting business. Atty. Salvado asserted that he never
enticed complainant to invest in his business, but it was Atty.
Divina's earnings of good interest that attracted him into
making an investment. He further stated that during their
initial meeting, it was complainant who inquired if he still
needed additional investments; that it was Atty. Divina who
assured complainant of high returns; and that complainant
was fully aware that the money invested in his businesses
constituted a loan to his clients and/or borrowers. Thus, from
time to time, the return of investment and accrued interest
when due – as reflected in the maturity dates of the checks
issued to complainant- could be delayed, whenever Atty.
Salvado' s clients requested for an extension or renewal of
their respective loans. In other words, the checks he issued
were merely intended as security or evidence of investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were
instances when he would request complainant not to deposit
a check knowing that it was not backed up by sufficient funds.
This arrangement had worked until the dishonor of the
checks, for which he readily offered his house and lot located
in Marikina City as collateral.
The Reply of Complainant
On August 30, 2012, complainant filed his Reply,8 pointing
out that Atty. Salvado did not deny receiving money from him
by way of investment. Thus, he must be deemed to have
admitted that he had issued several postdated checks which
were eventually dishonored. Atty. Salvado 's claim that it was
complainant himself who prodded him about making
investments must be brushed aside for being self-serving
and baseless. Assuming arguendo, that complainant indeed
made offers of investment, Atty. Salvado should have easily
refused knowing fully well that he could not fund the checks
that he would be issuing when they become due. If it were
true that the checks were issued for complainant's security,
Atty. Salvado could have drafted a document evidencing
such agreement. His failure to present such document, if one
existed at all, only proved that the subject checks were
issued as payment for complainant's investment.9
Complainant also clarified that his complaint against Atty.
Salvado was never meant to harass him. Despite the
dishonor of the checks, he still tried to settle the dispute with
Atty. Salvado who left him with no choice after he refused to
communicate with him properly.
Thereafter, the parties were required to file their respective
mandatory conference briefs and position
papers.1âwphi1 Atty. Salvado insisted that he had acted in
all honesty and good faith in his dealings with the
complainant. He also emphasized that the title to his house
and lot in Greenheights Subdivision, Marikina City, had been
transferred in the name of complainant after he executed a
deed of sale as an expression of his "desire and willingness
to settle whatever is due to the complainant."10
Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
On January 2, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for six ( 6) months for
engaging in a conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law and for behaving in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Salvado's act of issuing
checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted
willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which undermine the
public confidence in the legal profession.
The IBP-BOG Resolution
On October 11, 2014, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved
the recommendation with modification as to the period of
suspension. The IBP-BOG increased the period of
Atty. Salvado's suspension from six (6) months to
two (2) years.
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the
IBP-BOG nor a petition for review before this Court
was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this
Court the entire records of the case for appropriate
action with the IBP Resolution being merely
recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain
finality, pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court.11
The Court's Ruling
The parties gave conflicting versions of the
controversy. Complainant, claimed to have been
lured by Atty. Salvado into investing in his
businesses with the promise of yielding high
interests, which he believed because he was a
lawyer who was expected to protect his public
image at all times. Atty. Salvado, on the other hand,
denied having enticed the complainant, whom he
claimed had invested by virtue of his own desire to
gain profits. He insisted that the checks that he
issued in favor of complainant were in the form of
security or evidence of investment. It followed,
according to Atty. Salvado, that he must be
considered to have never ensured the payment of
the checks upon maturity. Atty. Salvado strongly
added that the dishonor of the subject checks was
"purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence,
with the unfortunate result that he himself was a
victim of failed lending transactions xxx."12
The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and
adopts its recommendation in part.
First. A perusal of the records reveals that
complainant's version deserves credence, not only
due to the unambiguous manner by which the
narrative of events was laid down, but also by the
coherent reasoning the narrative has employed.
The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on
representations made by lawyers. As a man of law,
a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community,
looked up to as a model citizen.13 A man, learned in
the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to make
truthful representations when dealing with persons,
clients or otherwise. For the Court, and as the
IBP-BOG had observed, complainant's being
beguiled to part with his money and believe Atty.
Salvado as a lawyer and businessman was typical
human behavior worthy of belief. The Court finds it
hard to believe that a person like the complainant
would not find the profession of the person on
whose businesses he would invest as important to
consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado's stature as a
member of the Bar had, in one way or another,
influenced complainant's decision to invest.
Second. It must be pointed out that the denials
proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor
of the checks. His strained explanation that the
checks were mere securities cannot be
countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected
to fully comprehend the legal import of bouncing
checks. In Lozano v. Martinez,14 the Court ruled
that the gravamen of the offense punished
by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the
law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making and circulation of worthless checks.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law.
Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves
scant consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that
promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the
land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the
worthless checks, he discredited the legal profession and
created the public impression that laws were mere tools of
convenience that could be used, bended and abused to
satisfy personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel,15 the
Court wrote that the issuance of worthless checks
constituted gross misconduct, and put the erring lawyer's
moral character in serious doubt, though it was not related to
his professional duties as a member of the Bar. Covered by
this dictum is Atty. Salvado's business relationship with
complainant. His issuance of the subject checks display his
doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated
Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
Third. Parenthetically, the Court cannot overlook Atty.
Salvado's deceiving attempts to evade payment of his
obligations.1âwphi1 Instead of displaying a committed
attitude to his creditor, Atty. Salvado refused to answer
complainant's demands. He even tried to make the
complainant believe that he was no longer residing at his
given address. These acts demonstrate lack of moral
character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties imposed
on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. The
subsequent offers he had made and the eventual sale of his
properties to the complainant, unfortunately cannot overturn
his acts unbecoming of a member of the Bar.
Fourth. The Court need not elaborate on the correctness of
the Investigating Commissioner's reliance on jurisprudence
stating that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own and may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases, including violations of B.P. 22.
Accordingly, the only issue in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers is the respondent's fitness to remain as a
member of the Bar. The Court's findings have no material
bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may
choose to file against each other.16
All told, the Court finds that Atty. Salvado's reprehensible
conduct warrants a penalty commensurate to his violation of
the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ronaldo P.
Salvado GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule
7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all
courts all over the country. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to the personal records of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014
CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-BOG),
dated January 3, 20131 and March 22,
2014,2 adopting and approving the findings of the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found
Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco)
administratively liable for multiple violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and
recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1)
year from the practice of law.
On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a
complaint, dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by Caroline
Castañeda Jimenez (complainant)against Atty.
Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On
October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his
Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory
conference was held and terminated. Only the
counsel for Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of
the said conference addressed to complainant was
returned with the notation "unknown at the given
address." No new address was provided by the
complainant. Both parties wererequired to submit
their respective position papers. For this purpose,
Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer. The
Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez
(Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against
complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano,
Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron,
Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The
said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial
owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and
Development Corporation (Clarion), which was
incorporated specifically for the purpose of
purchasing a residential house located in Forbes
Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The
incorporators and original stockholders of Clarion
were as follows:
Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00
Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00
Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00
Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles
of Incorporation, the above-named stockholders,
except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed
of assignment of their respective shares in favor of
complainant, who was then Jimenez’s common-law
partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only
₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its purpose of
purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan
from the complainant in the amount of ₱80,750,000.00.
Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the
amount of ₱117,000,000.00 from Gerardo Contreras. To
effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount
which was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however,
was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to appear
that the Forbes property was purchased for ₱78,000,000.00
only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not
reflected in the books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua
assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez by virtue of a
deed of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares
were transferred to complainant based on a deed of
assignment. The remaining one (1) share was transferred to
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in
Clarion’s General Information Sheet (GIS)filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly,
the subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:
Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00
Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to
complainant by another deed of assignment, making her the
holder of Clarion shares amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.
According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in
the United States in 2004, he learned from Atty. Francisco
that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the
complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United
States Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was about to go after
their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading
complainant to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to
Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment.
Again, this was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.
Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that,
through fraudulent means, complainant and her
co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property
for sale sometimein August 2004. The said property was
eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc.
(Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without
Jimenez’s knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at
₱78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed
to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment
for the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the
proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence
of complainant.
Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s
alleged participation in the fraudulent means in selling the
Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with
Jimenez’s money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all
the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and
beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents,
however, misappropriated and converted the fundsfor their
personal use and benefit.
In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco
executed an affidavit reiterating its factual averments.6 A
perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following
claims and admissions, among other things, of Atty.
Francisco:
1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking
for assistance in the documentation of the sale of the Forbes
property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco asked
her if she had secured permission from Mark
Jimenez and complainant answered in the
affirmative.
2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a
resolution authorizing him to negotiate the sale of
the property.
3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account
with Security Bank, San Francisco Del Monte
branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he
withdrew the amount and handed the same to
Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of
complainant.
4. All transfers of shares were caused without any
consideration. The transfer taxes, however, were
paid.
5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines,
he was able to confirm that the sale of the Forbes
property was without his knowledge and approval.
The proceeds of the sale had already been farmed
out to different corporations established by
complainant and her sister.
6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were
premeditated in order to steal the money of Mark
Jimenez.
The Complaint
Complainant was shocked upon reading the
allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by
Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed
when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on
whom she relied as her personal lawyer and
Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of
Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case
against Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting
interests. According to her, she usually conferred
with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications
of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the
principal documents relative to the sale and transfer
of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted
by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively
participated in the transactions involving the sale of
the Forbes property. Without admitting the truth of
the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued
that its execution clearly betrayed the trust and
confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For
this reason, complainant prayed for the disbarment
of Atty. Francisco.
The Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez
initially engaged his services in 1998 for the
incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of
purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park,
where he intended to live with his long-time partner,
the complainant; that the original incorporators and
stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares
in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in
the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also
pursuant to Jimenez’s orders; and that as the
corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he
prepared all the legal documentation togive effect to
the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of
the Forbes property.
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004,
Jimenez was imprisoned in the United States for
excessive contributions to the Democratic Party;
that during this time, Jimenez’s son, Marcel, and the
complainant, asked him again to changethe ownership of
Clarion shares in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s
properties in a tax evasion case; that he acceded to the
request on the belief that this was in accordance with
Jimenez’s wishes; and that as a result, almost 100% of
Clarion’s ownership was transferred in the name of
Geraldine Antonio.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant
tasked him to talk to prospective buyers and to negotiate the
sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for
₱118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to
believe that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they were
in constant communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false when
Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered that the
proceeds of the sale were coursed through other
corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that
Jimenez likewise learned of the successive sale of his other
properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the
members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the
estafa case against the complainant and the others. As a
witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty.
Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and
circumstances surrounding the said transactions.
Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule
on disclosures of privileged communication nor the
proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the
ground that complainant was not his client. He was the
lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never
of the complainant. He might have assisted her in some
matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez
had given him authority to do so. Further, though he acted as
legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship
between him and complainant was formed, as a corporation
has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders.
While he admitted that the legal documentation for the
transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were
prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law
firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his
capacity as the corporate secretary and legal counsel
ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he
served no conflicting interests because it was not a "former
client" and a "subsequent client" who were the opposing
parties in litigation.
He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his
client, the rule on privileged communication does not apply
to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless
prove, the requisites for the application of the privilege.
When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer, the
complainant should have established, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed
existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.
Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case
was but a truthful narration of facts by a witness, Atty.
Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,9 where the Court ruled
that "the fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant had
been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was no
ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case, he merely
attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course
of which, he defended and served Jimenez as a client. This
was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal
motives and purposes were not covered by the privilege. It
was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7, 2011,
the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr.
(Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of
violations of the CPR and recommended that he be
suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law. Initially,
the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent
affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in the
estafa case did not affect the investigation
conducted by the CBD as it was not an ordinary
court which accepted compromises or withdrawals
of cases. After weighing on the claims of the parties,
the Investigating Commissioner concluded that
nothing in the records would show that a
lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty.
Francisco and Jimenez.11 The circumstances would
show that Atty. Francisco was an original
incorporator and shareholder of Clarion. He was
also the legal counsel and corporate secretary of
the said corporation, the articles of incorporation of
which did not include Jimenez as an original
incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001,
when Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas Chua
and Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s participation in
Clarion affairs again stopped when he assigned the
entirety of his shares in favor of complainant.
Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of
Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report
stated that it would appear that the latter permitted
misrepresentations as to Clarion’s ownership to be
reported to the SEC through its GIS. The
Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty.
Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of
shares within Clarion were "without any
consideration," ran counter to the deeds of
assignment that he again admittedly executed as
corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted
to have simulated the loan and undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes
property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon
1 of the CPR. Further, when he executed the
affidavit containing allegations against the interest
of Clarion and complainant, the Investigating
Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the
rule on privileged communication and engaged in
an act that constituted representation of conflicting
interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the
CPR.
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG
adopted and approved, in toto, the findings and
recommendation of the CBD against Atty.
Francisco.
The respondent received a copy of the said
resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its
reconsideration.13
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the
IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of
suspension of one (1) year is too severe
considering that in his more than three decades of
practice, he had never been involved in any act that
would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action
upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client,
Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis involving his
children and common-law partner that he
experienced a major upheaval in his professional
life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect
in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco
reiterated that his participation in the execution of
the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes
property were all connected to his capacity as
Clarion’s corporate secretary and legal counsel, not
to mention his ties with his client and friend,
Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to
Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty
extended to the incorporators and shareholders of
Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought advice in
her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no
fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own words,
Atty. Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice
versa."14
Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was
an affidavit executed by Jimenez, stating that he had
retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999.
Espousing Atty. Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted that
Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the companies
he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty. Francisco to
execute all the documentation to show his ownership of
these companies, including Clarion. These documents were
in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When
Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001,Atty. Francisco personally
assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the
proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in
prison in the United States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited
and told him that his children, Myla and Marcel, were then
facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian
Telekoms, Inc., without his knowledge. He asked Atty.
Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal and to
wait until he could go home. When he filed the criminal cases
against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a
frivolous kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According
to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes against him
were now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty.
Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from performing his
duties as a lawyer.
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the
respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The Court’s Ruling
Violations of Canons 1 and 10
of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to
laws and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer
is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid
any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyer’s
personal deference to the law not only speaks of his
character but it also inspires respect and obedience tothe
law, on the part of the public.
Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be
observed by all lawyers.
Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not
necessarily imply the element of criminality although the
concept is broad enough to include such element.16 To be
"dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive,
defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty,
probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straight
forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means the
proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation,
artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of
the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party
imposed upon.18
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to
possess good moral character. Lawyers should act
and comport themselves with honesty and integrity
in a manner beyond reproach, inorder to promote
the public’s faith in the legal profession.19 "To say
that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect
the law is to state the obvious, but such statement
can never be over emphasized. Considering that, of
all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most
sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative
that they live by the law."20
When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he
also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no
falsehood," and conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.21
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco
clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty. He
is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful
conduct when he admitted to having allowed his
corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to
the SEC, the significant matters regarding its
corporate purpose and subsequently, its corporate
shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the
SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS,
Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned
the validity of these transfers of shares, making it
appear that these were done for consideration
when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious,
albeit upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The
Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing
out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment
which he executed as corporate counsel. In his long
practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to
assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in
the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules
enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of
Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register
valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to
advance the interests of his clientele with patent
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty.
Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan
entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes
property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat
the government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore,
Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave
legal infractions and was content to have granted
the requests of the persons involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to
Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to complainant’s
misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind
eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of drafting, or at the
very least, permitting untruthful statements to be
embodied in public documents. If the Court allows
this highly irregular practice for the specious reason
that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’
flawed scheming and machinations, the Court
would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity.
This would undermine the role of lawyers as officers
of the court.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers
that their support for the cause of their clients
should never be attained at the expense of truth
and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to
the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only
within the bounds of the law. It needs to be
emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client
must not be pursued at the expense of truth and
justice, and mustbe held within the bounds of
reason and common sense. His responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does
not warranta course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions.22
In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he
lacks candor regarding his dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR
provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good
faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR
provides that "a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the
Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the
court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice.
They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and
upholding truth and the rule oflaw. They are expected to act
with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.23
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties
as a lawyer embodied in the CPR, namely, to avoid
dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to
actwith candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon
10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to
do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the same.
Rule on Conflicting Interests and
Disclosure of Privileged
Communication
With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of
conflicting interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the
IBP-BOG.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideallybe imbued with the highest level of trust
and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that
must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered
exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a
client can only entrust confidential information to his/her
lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions withthe client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this
regard isto avoid representing conflicting interests…"25 Thus,
even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at
stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the
same would trigger a violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest.
In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the
application of the rule on conflict of interest in this wise:
In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting
interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires them to
oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have particularized
various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies
within this proscription. One test is whether a lawyer is
duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one
client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the
other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to
be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other
client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another
test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential
information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.
The proscription against representation of
conflicting interest applies to a situation where the
opposing parties are present clients in the same
actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no moment
that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend
for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose
for the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other
as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough
that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom
would lose the suit, are present clients and the
nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective
retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
clients.
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on
conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client
relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to
protect the fiduciary nature of the ties between an
attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may
not be precluded from accepting and representing
other clients on the ground of conflict of interests, if
the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor
of a party in the first place.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco
violated the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny of
the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that
the complainant failed to establish that she was a
client of Atty. Francisco.
First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s
client remains unsubstantiated, considering its
detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged
was that Atty. Francisco was Clarion’s legal counsel
and that complainant sought advice and requested
documentation of several transfers of shares and
the sale of the Forbes property. This was only
successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed,
drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction
and that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion.
There was no detailed explanation as to how she
supposedly engaged the services of Atty. Francisco
as her personal counsel and as to what and how
she communicated with the latter anent the
dealings she had entered into. With the complaint
lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made
by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a detailed
narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez
and Clarion, would have to prevail.
Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of
narrative details presented by the parties. Atty.
Francisco’s claim thathe was the counsel of Clarion
and Jimenez, and not of the complainant, was
clearly established in a sworn statement executed
by Jimenez himself. Complainant’s evidence pales
in comparison with her claims of being the client of
Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that
lacked particularity of circumstances.
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted
not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s answer. This
could have given her opportunity to present
evidence showing their professional relationship.
She also failed to appear during the mandatory
conference with the IBP-CBD without even
updating her residential address on record. Her
participation in the investigation of the case
apparently ended at its filing.
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers
enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by
preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence means
that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It
means evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether
or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may
consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of
the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts
towhich they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and
also their personal credibility so far as the same may
ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses,
although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily
with the greater number.27
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his
entanglement with this fiasco among the members of
Jimenez’s family by taking an upfront and candid stance in
dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could
have been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were
performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and
Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion
does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of
evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to
discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was her
lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion
and, based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice
it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco
committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.
Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not
apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,28 the Court elucidated on the
factors essential to establish the existence of the said
privilege, viz:
In fine, the factors are as follows:
(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a
prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are
protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the
prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the
latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to
make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he
wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the
lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the
lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client. xxx
(2) The client made the communication in confidence.
The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.
A confidential communication refers to information
transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney
and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of
the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for
which it was given.
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground.
Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer
pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the
opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity, are not privileged communications,
the element of confidentiality not being present.
(3) The legal advice must be sought from the
attorney in his professional capacity.
The communication made by a client to his attorney
must not be intended for mere information, but for
the purpose of seeking legal advice from his
attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a
client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.
If the client seeks an accounting service, or
business or personal assistance, and not legal
advice, the privilege does not attach to a
communication disclosed for such purpose.
[Emphases supplied]
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the
Court holds that the evidence on record fails to
demonstrate the claims of complainant. As
discussed, the complainant failed to establish the
professional relationship between her and Atty.
Francisco. The records are further bereft of any
indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in
confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of
what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor
a recital of circumstances under which the
confidential communication was relayed. All that
complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she
sought legal advice from respondent in various
occasions."29 Considering that complainant failed to
attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no
testimony as to the specific confidential information
allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her
consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. As held in Mercado,
such confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is
not enough to merely assert the attorney-client
privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid then that
complainant, who has the burden of proving that the
privilege applies, failed in this regard.
The Penalty
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating of the lawyer’s oath and/or for
breaching the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance
of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and
who possess good moral character.32 The
appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on
the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on
the surrounding facts.33
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1)
deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of
a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the
lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance
as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy
to continue as an officer of the court.
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of
interests and disclosure of privileged communication, the
acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing
Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and in
other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco
GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty.
Edgar B. Francisco and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of
Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their
information and guidance.
Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date
of his receipt of this Decision so that the Court can determine
the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V.
AGTANG, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of
Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with
modification the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of
respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from
the practice of law for one (1) year for ethical
impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid
obligations to complainant.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda
Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.
In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed
respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from
receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and
complainant sent a query as to the status of her
complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating
Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for
mandatory conference/hearing on November 16,
2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5)
days before the scheduled conference when
respondent filed his verified Answer.6
During the conference, only the complainant
together with her husband appeared. She
submitted a set of documents contained in a
folder, copies of which were furnished the
respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said
documents would be reviewed and the parties
would be informed if there was a need for
clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case
would be submitted for resolution based on
the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the
mandatory conference showed that
respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the
morning or after the proceeding was
terminated.
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed
her Reply to respondent’s Answer.
On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted
copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of
the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case
Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering
respondent [defendant therein] to pay
complainant and her husband the sum of
P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively,
with interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus
cost of suit.10
Complainant’s Position
From the records, it appears that complainant
was referred to respondent in connection with
her legal problem regarding a deed of
absolute sale she entered into with Tierra
Realty, which respondent had notarized. After
their discussion, complainant agreed to
engage his legal services for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they
signed a contract. Complainant paid
respondent P20,000.00 as acceptance fee and
P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a
letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in
relation to the legal problem referred by
complainant. He then visited the latter in her
home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00,
payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his
car. Complainant, having trust and confidence
on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to
lend the amount without interest. A
promissory note13 evidenced the loan.
In November 2009, complainant became
aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to
transfer to its name a lot she had previously
purchased. She referred the matter to
respondent who recommended the immediate
filing of a case for reformation of contract with
damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
requested and thereafter received from
complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as
filing fee.14 When asked about the exorbitant
amount, respondent cited the high value of
the land and the sheriffs’ travel expenses and
accommodations in Manila, for the service of
the summons to the defendant corporation.
Later, complainant confirmed that the fees
paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65,
entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty and
Development Corporation, only amounted to
P22,410.00 per trial court records.15
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds,
complainant also discovered that respondent was the
one who notarized the document being questioned in
the civil case she filed. When asked about this,
respondent merely replied that he would take a
collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case.
Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by
respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed
that: 1] the major differences in the documents
issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the
contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional
sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint
discussed the method of payment which was not the
point of contention in the case; and 4] the very
anomalies she complained of were not mentioned.
Respondent, however, assured her that those matters
could be brought up during the hearings.
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant,
requesting that the latter extend to him the amount of
P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency
or emergency.”16 Complainant obliged the request
and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.
On August 31, 2010, respondent came to
complainant’s house and demanded the sum of
P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in
exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant
expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she
eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was
covered by a receipt,17 stating that “it is understood
that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after
favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On
November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the
remaining amount be given by complainant prior to
the next hearing of the case, because the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again,
complainant handed to respondent the amount of
P25,000.00.18
On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was
dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14,
2010, when she personally checked the status of the
case with the court. She went to the office of
respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the
office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited
complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant
went to see respondent and requested him to prepare
a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the
motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts
because the Land Registration Authority would not
accept the documents unless these were amended;
and to make the additional averment that the
defendant was using false documents.
On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to
complainant a copy of the reply with a message from
him that the matters she requested to be included
were mentioned therein. Upon reading the same,
however, complainant discovered that these matters
were not so included. On the same occasion, the
driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s
directive for the reimbursement of the value of a
bottle of wine given to the judge as a present.
Complainant was also told that oral
arguments on the case had been set the
following month.19
On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to
terminate the services of respondent as her
counsel and wrote him a letter of
termination,20 after her friend gave her copies
of documents showing that respondent had
been acquainted with Tierra Realty since
December 2007. Subsequently, complainant
wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay
her the amounts he received from her less the
contract fee and the actual cost of the filing
fees. Respondent never replied.
Respondent’s Position
In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he
was 72 years old and had been engaged in the
practice of law since March 1972, and was
President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from
1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of
complainant’s case, but he qualified that he
was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He
likewise admitted acting as counsel for
complainant for which he claimed to have
received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and
P5,000.00 for incidental fees. Anent the loan
of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it
was complainant, at the behest of her
husband, who willingly offered the amount to
him for his patience in visiting them at home
and for his services. The transaction was
declared as “no loan” and he was told not to
worry about its payment. As regards the
amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing
fees, respondent claimed that the said
amount was suggested by the complainant
herself who was persistent in covering the
incidental expenses in the handling of the
case. He denied having said that the sheriffs
of the court would need the money for their
hotel accommodations. Complainant’s
husband approved of the amount. In the
same vein, respondent denied having asked
for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received
P22,000.00 from complainant. He also denied
having told her that the case would be
discussed with the judge who would rule in
their favor at the very next hearing. Instead,
it was complainant who was bothered by the
possibility that the other party would befriend
the judge. He never said that he would
personally present a bottle of wine to the
judge.
Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s
comment as to his representation of Tierra
Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing
wrong in this situation since complainant was
fully aware that another counsel was assisting
him in the handling of cases. Having been
fully informed of the nature of her cause of
action and the consequences of the suit,
complainant was aware of the applicable law
on reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of
counterclaim, respondent demanded just
compensation for the services he had
rendered in other cases for the complainant.
Reply of Complainant
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered
respondent’s defenses by making reference to the
receipts in her possession, all evidencing that
respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the
complaint. Complainant also emphasized that
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long
before she met him. While respondent was employed
as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial
Government of Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the
preparation of several documents involving Flying V,
an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who
likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted
that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to
respondent was never considered as “no loan.”
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the
Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution,
dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause
against respondent for estafa.23
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the
Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty
of ethical impropriety and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG
adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating
Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the
balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.
Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on
January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition
thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been filed
in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest
had been issued.26
In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied
respondent’s motion for reconsideration but modified
the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law
by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months.
Respondent was likewise ordered to return the
balance of the filing fee received from complainant
amounting to P127,590.00.
No petition for review was filed with the Court.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Court’s Ruling
The Court sustains the findings and recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR.
The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his
alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing
conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the
penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established
that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the
performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may
be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether
his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or
whether it renders him unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court.”27
In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging
in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional and private capacity. As a lawyer,
he clearly misled complainant into believing
that the filing fees for her case were worth
more than the prescribed amount in the rules,
due to feigned reasons such as the high value
of the land involved and the extra expenses to
be incurred by court employees. In other
words, he resorted to overpricing, an act
customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of
P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the
same amounted only to P22,410.00. His
defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of
credence. For one, it is highly improbable that
complainant, who was then plagued with the
rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her
financial resources. Assuming that the
complainant was more than willing to shell out
an exorbitant amount just to initiate her
complaint with the trial court, still, respondent
should not have accepted the excessive
amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected
to be knowledgeable in the matter of filing
fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose
to his client the actual amount due, consistent
with the values of honesty and good faith
expected of all members of the legal
profession.
Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the
relationship between the counsel and his
client imposes on the lawyer the duty to
account for the money or property collected
or received for or from his client.”28 Money
entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose
but not used for the purpose should be
immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to
return upon demand the funds held by him on
behalf of his client gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the
same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a
gross violation of general morality as well as
of professional ethics. It impairs public
confidence in the legal profession and
deserves punishment.29
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this
duty. As pointed out, he received various
amounts from complainant but he could not
account for all of them. Worse, he could not
deny the authenticity of the receipts
presented by complainant. Upon demand, he
failed to return the excess money from the
alleged filing fees and other expenses. His
possession gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use to
the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust
reposed in him by, the client.30 When a lawyer
receives money from the client for a particular
purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the
money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer
must immediately return the money to the
client.31
Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive
and unwarranted amounts from his client, respondent
displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for
the amount of P50,000.00 as “representation
expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge
handling the case, in exchange for a favorable
decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt
showing that he initially took the amount of P
25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded
and received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly,
this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that
necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of
disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money
from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to
ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an
abuse of his client’s trust but an overt act of
undermining the trust and faith of the public in the
legal profession and the entire Judiciary. This is the
height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers
owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the
administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer
indulge in any act that would damage the image of
judges, lest the public’s perception of the
dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous
doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that
the amount was given gratuitously would not excuse
him from any liability. The absence of proof that the
said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no
moment. To tolerate respondent’s actuations would
seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.
As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as
early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty
as he failed to inform his client of the status of the
case, and left the client to personally inquire with the
court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of
misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.
Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards
complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he
likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR,
which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.” In his private capacity, he
requested from his client, not just one, but two loans
of considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his
client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the
repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to
extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in
the moment of urgency or emergency” but was only
given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions
were evidenced by promissory notes and receipts, the
authenticity of which was never questioned by
respondent. These acts were committed by
respondent in his private capacity, seemingly
unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but
were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant
because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as
a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the
defenses raised by respondent, was it implied that
these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the
rules. The loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were
surely not protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Respondent’s assertion that the
amounts were given to him out of the liberality of
complainant and were, thus, considered as “no loan,”
does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of
requesting and receiving money as loans from his
client and thereafter failing to pay the same
are indicative of his lack of integrity and sense
of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent
has not yet paid his obligations to
complainant.
Time and again, the Court has consistently
held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitutes gross misconduct, for which a
lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension
from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice
and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal
proficiency, but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so
that the people’s faith and confidence in the
judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial
obligations.32
Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of
“conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is
not confined to one’s behavior exhibited in
connection with the performance of the
lawyer’s professional duties, but also covers
any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which his license and the law
vest him with. Unfortunately, respondent
must be found guilty of misconduct on both
scores.
With respect to respondent’s alleged
representation of conflicting interests, the
Court finds it proper to modify the findings of
the Investigating Commissioner who
concluded that complainant presented
insufficient evidence of respondent’s
“lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra
Realty.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides
that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.” The relationship between a lawyer and
his/her client should ideally be imbued with
the highest level of trust and confidence. This
is the standard of confidentiality that must
prevail to promote a full disclosure of the
client’s most confidential information to
his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange
of information between them. Needless to
state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his
part, is duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in all dealings and
transactions with the client. Part of the
lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid
representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus,
even if lucrative fees offered by prospective
clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline
professional employment if the same would
trigger the violation of the prohibition against
conflict of interest. The only exception
provided in the rules is a written consent from
all the parties after full disclosure.
The Court deviates from the findings of the
IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent
liable for representing conflicting interests in handling
the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a
corporation to which he had rendered services in the
past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that
respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of
sale, which was the very document being questioned
in complainant’s case. While the Investigating
Commissioner found that the complaint in Civil Case
No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said
contract, and that only the intentions of the parties as
to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court
still finds that the purpose for which the proscription
was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the
dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the
allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra
Realty and the clear admission of respondent that he
was the one who notarized the assailed document.
Regardless of whether it was the validity of the entire
document or the intention of the parties as to some of
its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence
in action when he accepted complainant’s case,
knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of
the very transaction under question. Neither his
unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a
collaborating counsel would excuse him from such
indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was
retained by clients who had close dealings with each
other. More significantly, there is no record of any
written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is
prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney
and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree, but also because of the principles of public
policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to
deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this
confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.”34
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even
disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney,
for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of
the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a form
of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted
to those who are qualified and who possess good
moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty for an
errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.37
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit;
(2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3)
grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's
oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an
attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may
be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and
good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer
of the court.
Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent
disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton
betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the
public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
suspension for three (3) months recommended by the
IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of
respondent. The acts of the respondent
constitute malpractice and gross misconduct
in his office as attorney. His incompetence
and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit
to continue discharging the trust reposed in
him as a member of the Bar.
For taking advantage of the unfortunate
situation of the complainant, for engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning
the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining
the trust and faith of the public in the legal
profession and the entire judiciary, and for
representing conflicting interests, respondent
deserves no less than the penalty of
disbarment.38
Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to
return the money he borrowed from
complainant in his private capacity.
In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held
that it cannot order the lawyer to return
money to complainant if he or she acted in a
private capacity because its findings in
administrative cases have no bearing on
liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the
lawyer’s professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the
only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member
of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the
determination of respondent’s administrative
liability. Its findings have no material bearing
on other judicial actions which the parties
may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive
respondent of his right to appeal since
administrative cases are filed directly with the
Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence
required in civil cases is different from the
quantum of evidence required in
administrative cases. In civil cases,
preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which,
in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthier of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In
administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is needed. Substantial evidence,
which is more than a mere scintilla but is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
would suffice to hold one administratively
liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to
consider the prescriptive period applicable to
civil cases in contrast to administrative cases
which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering
respondent to return the amount of
P127,590.00 representing the balance of the
filing fees he received from complainant, as
this was intimately related to the
lawyer-client relationship between them.
Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00
which respondent received from complainant,
as representation expenses for the handling
of the civil case and for the purported
purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge.
These were connected to his professional
relationship with the complainant. While
respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said
amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with
mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return
the same as it was borne out of their professional
relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent
was already adjudged as liable for the personal loans
he contracted with complainant, per the small claims
cases filed against him.
All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court
with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure
the proper and honest administration of justice by
“purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proven themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney.”44
WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V.
Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law
and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda
Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.
Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator to be
circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 9872 January 28, 2014
NATIVIDAD P. NAVARRO and HILDA S.
PRESBITERO, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. IVAN M. SOLIDUM, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This case originated from a complaint for disbarment, dated
26 May 2008, filed by Natividad P. Navarro (Navarro) and
Hilda S. Presbitero (Presbitero) against Atty. Ivan M.
Solidum, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
From the Report, dated 1July 2009, of the IBP-CBD, we
gathered the following facts of the case:
On 4 April 2006, respondent signed a retainer agreement
with Presbitero to follow up the release of the payment for
the latter’s 2.7-hectare property located in Bacolod which
was the subject of a Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The agreement also
included the payment of the debts of Presbitero’s late
husband to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), the sale of
the retained areas of the property, and the collection of the
rentals due for the retained areas from their occupants. It
appeared that the DAR was supposed to pay ₱700,000 for
the property but it was mortgaged by Presbitero and her late
husband to PNB for ₱1,200,000. Presbitero alleged
that PNB’s claim had already prescribed, and she
engaged the services of respondent to represent
her in the matter. Respondent proposed the filing of
a case for quieting of title against PNB. Respondent
and Presbitero agreed to an attorney’s fee of 10%
of the proceeds from the VOS or the sale of the
property, with the expenses to be advanced by
Presbitero but deductible from respondent’s fees.
Respondent received ₱50,000 from Presbitero,
supposedly for the expenses of the case, but
nothing came out of it.
In May 2006, Presbitero’s daughter, Ma. Theresa P.
Yulo (Yulo), also engaged respondent’s services to
handle the registration of her 18.85-hectare lot
located in Nasud-ong, Caradio-an, Himamaylan,
Negros. Yulo convinced her sister, Navarro, to
finance the expenses for the registration of the
property. Respondent undertook to register the
property in consideration of 30% of the value of the
property once it is registered. Respondent obtained
₱200,000 from Navarro for the registration
expenses. Navarro later learned that the
registration decree over the property was already
issued in the name of one Teodoro Yulo. Navarro
alleged that she would not have spent for the
registration of the property if respondent only
apprised her of the real situation of the property.
On 25 May 2006, respondent obtained a loan of
₱1,000,000 from Navarro to finance his sugar
trading business. Respondent and Navarro
executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and
agreed that the loan (a) shall be for a period of one
year; (b) shall earn interest at the rate of 10% per
month; and (c) shall be secured by a real estate
mortgage over a property located in Barangay Alijis,
Bacolod City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 304688. They also agreed that respondent
shall issue postdated checks to cover the principal
amount of the loan as well as the interest thereon.
Respondent delivered the checks to Navarro,
drawn against an account in Metrobank, Bacolod
City Branch, and signed them in the presence of
Navarro.
In June 2006, respondent obtained an additional
loan of ₱1,000,000 from Navarro, covered by a
second MOA with the same terms and conditions
as the first MOA. Respondent sent Navarro,
through a messenger, postdated checks drawn
against an account in Bank of Commerce, Bacolod
City Branch. Respondent likewise discussed with
Navarro about securing a "Tolling Agreement" with
Victorias Milling Company, Inc. but no agreement
was signed.
At the same time, respondent obtained a loan of
₱1,000,000 from Presbitero covered by a third MOA,
except that the real estate mortgage was over a
263-square-meter property located in Barangay
Taculing, Bacolod City. Respondent sent Presbitero
postdated checks drawn against an account in
Metrobank, Bacolod City Branch.
Presbitero was dissatisfied with the value of the
263-square-meter property mortgaged under the
third MOA, and respondent promised to execute a
real estate mortgage over a 1,000-square-meter
parcel of land adjacent to the 4,000-square-meter
property he mortgaged to Navarro.
However, respondent did not execute a deed for the
additional security.
Respondent paid the loan interest for the first few months.
He was able to pay complainants a total of ₱900,000.
Thereafter, he failed to pay either the principal amount or the
interest thereon. In September 2006, the checks issued by
respondent to complainants could no longer be negotiated
because the accounts against which they were drawn were
already closed. When complainants called respondent’s
attention, he promised to pay the agreed interest for
September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of
the interest to 7% for the succeeding months.
In November 2006, respondent withdrew as counsel for Yulo.
On the other hand, Presbitero terminated the services of
respondent as counsel. Complainants then filed petitions for
the judicial foreclosure of the mortgages executed by
respondent in their favor. Respondent countered that the
10% monthly interest on the loan was usurious and illegal.
Complainants also filed cases for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against respondent.
Complainants alleged that respondent induced them to grant
him loans by offering very high interest rates. He also
prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be
drawn against his son’s accounts. Complainants further
alleged that respondent deceived them regarding the identity
and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed
them a different property from that which he owned.
Presbitero further alleged that respondent mortgaged his
263-square-meter property to her for ₱1,000,000 but he later
sold it for only ₱150,000.
Respondent, for his defense, alleged that he was engaged in
sugar and realty business and that it was Yulo who
convinced Presbitero and Navarro to extend him loans. Yulo
also assured him that Presbitero would help him with the
refining of raw sugar through Victorias Milling Company, Inc.
Respondent alleged that Navarro fixed the interest rate and
he agreed because he needed the money. He alleged that
their business transactions were secured by real estate
mortgages and covered by postdated checks. Respondent
denied that the property he mortgaged to Presbitero was
less than the value of the loan. He also denied that he sold
the property because the sale was actually rescinded.
Respondent claimed that the property he mortgaged to
Navarro was valuable and it was actually worth more than
₱8,000,000.
Respondent alleged that he was able to pay complainants
when business was good but he was unable to continue
paying when the price of sugar went down and when the
business with Victorias Milling Company, Inc. did not push
through because Presbitero did not help him. Respondent
also denied that he was hiding from complainants.
Respondent further alleged that it was Yulo who owed him
₱530,000 as interest due for September to December 2005.
He denied making any false representations. He claimed that
complainants were aware that he could no longer open a
current account and they were the ones who proposed that
his wife and son issue the checks. Respondent further
alleged that he already started with the titling of Yulo’s lot but
his services were terminated before it could be completed.
A supplemental complaint was filed charging respondent
with accepting cases while under suspension. In response,
respondent alleged that he accepted Presbitero’s case in
February 2006 and learned of his suspension only in May
2006.
After conducting a hearing and considering the position
papers submitted by the parties, the IBP-CBD found that
respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent borrowed ₱2,000,000
from Navarro and ₱1,000,000 from Presbitero which he
failed to pay in accordance with the MOAs he executed. The
IBP-CBD found that based on the documents presented by
the parties, respondent did not act in good faith in
obtaining the loans. The IBP-CBD found that
respondent either promised or agreed to pay the
very high interest rates of the loans although he
knew them to be exorbitant in accordance with
jurisprudence. Respondent likewise failed to deny
that he misled Navarro and her husband regarding
the identity of the property mortgaged to them.
Respondent also mortgaged a property to
Presbitero for ₱1,000,000 but documents showed
that its value was only ₱300,000. Documents also
showed that he sold that property for only ₱150,000.
Respondent conspired with Yulo to secure loans by
promising her a 10% commission and later claimed
that they agreed that Yulo would "ride" on the loan
by borrowing ₱300,000 from the amount he
obtained from Navarro and Presbitero. Respondent
could not explain how he lost all the money he
borrowed in three months except for his claim that
the price of sugar went down.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent misled
Navarro and Presbitero regarding the issuance of
the postdated checks, and there was nothing in the
records that would show that he informed them that
it would be his wife or son who would issue the
checks. The IBP-CBD also found that respondent
had not been transparent in liquidating the money
he received in connection with Presbitero’s VOS
with DAR. He was also negligent in his accounting
regarding the registration of Yulo’s property which
was financed by Navarro.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of
violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his
son as if they were from his own account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot
he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of
the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from
complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his
loans although he knew that it was exorbitant; and
(6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he
issued were dishonored as the accounts were
already closed.
The IBP-CBD also found that respondent violated
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he failed to
properly account for the various funds he received
from complainants.
In addition, the IBP-CBD found that respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits borrowing money
from a client unless the client’s interest is fully
protected or the client is given independent advice.
On the matter of practicing law while under
suspension, the IBP-CBD found that the records
were not clear whether the notice of suspension
respondent received on 29 May 2006 was the
report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD or the
final decision of this Court. The IBP-CBD likewise
found that there was insufficient evidence to prove
that respondent mishandled his cases.
The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be meted the
penalty of disbarment.
In Resolution No. XIX-2011-267 dated 14 May 2011, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD with modification by
reducing the recommended penalty from disbarment to
suspension from the practice of law for two years. The IBP
Board of Governors likewise ordered respondent to return
the amount of his unpaid obligation to complainants.
Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that
the penalty of disbarment be instead imposed upon
respondent.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The records show that respondent violated at least four
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
With respect to his client, Presbitero, it was established that
respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on the loan he
obtained from her. He drafted the MOA. Yet, when he could
no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he
drafted on the ground that the interest rate was
unconscionable. It was also established that respondent
mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for
₱1,000,000 but he later sold the property for only ₱150,000,
showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of the
mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale
was eventually rescinded did not distract from the fact that
he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the
property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his
client Presbitero and to Navarro belonged to his son, Ivan
Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He
only claimed that complainants knew that he could no longer
open a current bank account, and that they even suggested
that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we
are inclined to agree with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he
made complainants believe that the account belonged to him.
In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the
first batch of checks he issued to Navarro. Respondent sent
the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of
checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and
complainants believed that the checks belonged to accounts
in respondent’s name.
It is clear that respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We have ruled that conduct, as
used in the Rule, is not confined to the performance of a
lawyer’s professional duties.1 A lawyer may be disciplined for
misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity.2 The test is whether his conduct shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as
an officer of the court.3
In this case, the loan agreements with Navarro were done in
respondent’s private capacity. Although Navarro financed
the registration of Yulo’s lot, respondent and Navarro had no
lawyer-client relationship. However, respondent was
Presbitero’s counsel at the time she granted him a loan. It
was established that respondent misled Presbitero on the
value of the property he mortgaged as a collateral for his
loan from her. To appease Presbitero, respondent even
made a Deed of Undertaking that he would give her another
1,000-square-meter lot as additional collateral but
he failed to do so.
Clearly, respondent is guilty of engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional capacity with respect to his client,
Presbitero, and in his private capacity with respect
to complainant Navarro. Both Presbitero and
Navarro allowed respondent to draft the terms of
the loan agreements. Respondent drafted the
MOAs knowing that the interest rates were
exorbitant. Later, using his knowledge of the law, he
assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared.
He issued checks that were drawn from his son’s
account whose name was similar to his without
informing complainants. Further, there is nothing in
the records that will show that respondent paid or
undertook to pay the loans he obtained from
complainants.
Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST
ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the
counsel and his client imposes on the lawyer the
duty to account for the money or property collected
or received for or from his client.4 We agree with the
IBP-CBD that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. In
this case, the IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent
received various amounts from complainants but he
could not account for all of them.
Navarro, who financed the registration of Yulo’s
18.85-hectare lot, claimed that respondent received
₱265,000 from her. Respondent countered that
₱105,000 was paid for real estate taxes but he
could not present any receipt to prove his claim.
Respondent also claimed that he paid ₱70,000 to
the surveyor but the receipt was only for ₱15,000.
Respondent claimed that he paid ₱50,000 for filing
fee, publication fee, and other expenses but again,
he could not substantiate his claims with any receipt.
As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, respondent had
been less than diligent in accounting for the funds
he received from Navarro for the registration of
Yulo’s property.
Unfortunately, the records are not clear whether
respondent rendered an accounting to Yulo who
had since passed away.
As regards Presbitero, it was established during the
clarificatory hearing that respondent received
₱50,000 from Presbitero. As the IBP-CBD pointed
out, the records do not show how respondent spent
the funds because he was not transparent in
liquidating the money he received from Presbitero.
Clearly, respondent had been negligent in properly
accounting for the money he received from his
client, Presbitero.1âwphi1 Indeed, his failure to
return the excess money in his possession gives
rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation
of the trust reposed in him by, the client.5
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:
Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature
of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer
lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.
Here, respondent does not deny that he borrowed
₱1,000,000 from his client Presbitero. At the time he secured
the loan, respondent was already the retained counsel of
Presbitero.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a
MOA, postdated checks and real estate mortgage, it turned
out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property
he mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn
from his account but from that of his son. Respondent
eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself
prepared on the ground that the interest rate imposed on his
loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued by
respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the
accounts were already closed. The interest of his client,
Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected.
Respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.6 In his dealings
with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence
reposed in him by his client.
We modify the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors imposing on respondent the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years. Given the
facts of the case, we see no reason to deviate from the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD imposing on respondent
the penalty of disbarment. Respondent failed to live up to the
high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
required of him as a member of the legal profession.7 Instead,
respondent employed his knowledge and skill of the law and
took advantage of his client to secure undue gains for
himself8 that warrants his removal from the practice of law.
Likewise, we cannot sustain the IBP Board of Governors’
recommendation ordering respondent to return his unpaid
obligation to complainants, except for advances for the
expenses he received from his client, Presbitero, that were
not accounted at all. In disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is
still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.9 Our
only concern is the determination of respondent’s
administrative liability.10
Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action
which the parties may choose to file against each
other.11 Nevertheless, when a lawyer receives money from a
client for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney
relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client
showing that the money was spent for that particular
purpose.12 If the lawyer does not use the money for the
intended purpose, he must immediately return the money to
his client.13 Respondent was given an opportunity to render
an accounting, and he failed. He must return the full amount
of the advances given him by Presbitero, amounting to
₱50,000.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Ivan M. Solidum, Jr.
GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and
Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court DISBARS him from the practice of law
effective immediately upon his receipt of this Decision.
Atty. Solidum is ORDERED to return the advances he
received from Hilda S. Presbitero, amounting to ₱50,000,
and to submit to the Office of the Bar Confidant his
compliance with this order within thirty days from finality of
this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and
the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a
copy of this Decision be attached to the personal
records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10945
(Formerly CBD 09-2507)
ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES
ORZAME, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The fiduciary duty of every lawyer towards his client
requires him to conscientiously act in advancing
and safeguarding the latter's interest. His failure or
neglect to do so constitutes a serious breach of his
Lawyer's Oath and the canons of professional
ethics, and renders him liable for gross misconduct
that may warrant his suspension from the practice
of law.
Antecedents
Complainants Spouses Angelito Ramiscal and
Mercedes Orzame (Ramiscals) engaged the legal
services of respondent Atty. Edgar S. Orro to
handle a case in which they were the defendants
seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a
parcel of land situated in the Province of Isabela.1
Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee
from them, the respondent handled the trial of the
case until the Regional Trial Court (RTC) decided it
in their favor.1âwphi1 As expected, the plaintiffs
appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA), and they ultimately filed their appellants’ brief.
Upon receipt of the appellants’ brief, the respondent
requested from the complainants an additional
amount of P30,000.00 for the preparation and
submission of their appellees’ brief in the CA. They
obliged and paid him the amount requested.2
Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
The respondent did not inform the Ramiscals of the
adverse decision of the CA which they only learned
about from their neighbors. They endeavored to
communicate with the respondent but their efforts
were initially in vain. When they finally reached him,
he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his
fee in filing a motion for reconsideration in their
behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would
already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the
amount sought. To their dismay, they later
discovered that he did not file the motion for
reconsideration; hence, the decision attained
finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their
property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable
worth of P3,391,600.00.3
Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this
administrative complaint against the respondent.
The Court referred the complaint to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate evaluation, report
and recommendation.4
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
Despite due notice, the Ramiscals and the respondent did
not appear during the scheduled mandatory conferences set
by the IBP. Neither did they submit their respective evidence.
IBP Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda rendered his findings
to the effect that the respondent had violated Canon 18,
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the
practice law for one year.5
On October 11, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XXI-2014-829,6 whereby it adopted the report
of IBP Commissioner Almeyda but modified his
recommendation of the penalty by increasing the period of
suspension to two years, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and for
violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility aggravated by his disregard of the notices
from the Commission and considering the extent of the
damage suffered by Complainant, Atty. Edgar S. Orro is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
Ruling of the Court
We agree with the IBP’s findings that the respondent did not
competently and diligently discharge his duties as the lawyer
of the Ramiscals.
Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine
Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer’s Oath, by which he vows,
among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice,
and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of
my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he
contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
Canon 18, viz.:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client
and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the
status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time
to the client's request for information.
It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the
lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and
confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client
relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to
serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their
cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion.7 To accord
with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the
lawyer to be always mindful of the former’s cause and to be
diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs.8 As an essential
part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE, with the STERN
entitled to the periodic and full updates from the WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be
lawyer on the developments of the case.9 The dealt with more severely.
lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations
violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the
Professional Responsibility.10 Bar Confidant, to be appended to the respondent's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
As a member of the Law Profession in the and to all courts in the Philippines for their information and
Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing guidance.
professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously
failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his SO ORDERED.
knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity
to his clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause,
he gave his unqualified commitment to advance
and defend their interest therein. Even if he could
not thereby guarantee to them the favorable A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657 February 23, 2004
outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his
commitment nonetheless because he did not file HEINZ R. HECK, complainant,
the motion for reconsideration in their behalf vs.
despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had JUDGE ANTHONY E. SANTOS, REGIONAL TRIAL
requested for that purpose. He further neglected to COURT, BRANCH 19, CAGAYAN DE ORO
regularly update them on the status of the case, CITY,1 respondent.
particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving
them in the dark on the proceedings that were
gradually turning against their interest. Updating the DECISION
clients could have prevented their substantial
prejudice by enabling them to engage another CALLEJO SR., J.:
competent lawyer to handle their case. As it
happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them
May a retired judge charged with notarizing documents
whatever legal remedies were then available. His
without the requisite notary commission more than twenty
various omissions manifested his utter lack of
years ago be disciplined therefor? This is the novel issue
professionalism towards them.
presented for resolution before this Court.

We further underscore that the respondent owed it

The instant case arose when in a verified Letter-Complaint
to himself and to the entire Legal Profession of the
dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck prayed for the
Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP
disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial
as the national organization of all the members of
Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of
the orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and
to appear in the administrative investigation of his The complainant alleged that prior to the respondent’s
misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated the
his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings. He notarial law, thus:
thereby exposed a character flaw that should not
tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. 11 He Judge Santos, based on ANNEX "A," was not duly
should always bear in mind that his being a lawyer commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but still
demanded that he conduct himself as a person of subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis) notarized
the highest moral and professional integrity and documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting January 1980
probity in his dealings with others. 12 He should uncommissioned until the 9th of January 1984.
never forget that his duty to serve his clients with
unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it the
a) Judge Santos was commissioned further January 16th
corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to
1986 to December 31st 1987 and January 6th 1988 to
the Bar, and to the public in general. 13
December 31st 1989 but the records fail to show any entry at
the Clerk of Court after December 31st 1985 until December
There can be no question that a lawyer is guilty of 31st 1989.
misconduct sufficient to justify his suspension or
disbarment if he so acts as to be unworthy of the
b) Judge Santos failed to forward his Notarial Register after
trust and confidence involved in his official oath and
the expiration of his commission in December 1989.2
is found to be wanting in that honesty and integrity
that must characterize the members of the Bar in
the performance of their professional ...
duties. 14 Based on all the circumstances in this
case, we approve the recommendation of the IBP WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing complainant pray[s] to
for the respondent's suspension from the practice of order respondent:
law for a period of two years. Although the Court
imposed a six-month suspension from the practice
of law on lawyers violating Canons 17 and 18 of 1. To disbar Judge Anthony E. Santos and to prohibit him
the Code of Professional Responsibility, 15 the from all future public service.
recommended penalty is condign and proportionate
to the offense charged and established because his 2. To forfeit [the] retirement benefits of Judge Santos.
display of disrespectful defiance of the orders of the
IBP aggravated his misconduct. 3. To prohibit Judge Santos from future practice of Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the 4. To file a criminal suit against Judge Santos.

Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY.
EDGAR S. ORRO guilty of violating Canon 17, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period for TWO YEARS
5. To conduct a speedy investigation and not to grant/accept
any delaying tactics from Judge Santos or any agency and or
public servants involved in this administrative case.
6. To pay all costs and related costs involved in this
administrative case.
and prays for other relief in accordance with equity
and fairness based on the premises.3
The complainant submitted a certification from
Clerk of Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, which contained the
following:
THIS CERTIFIES that upon verification from the
records found and available in this office, the
following data appear:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a
duly commissioned notary public in the following
years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
2. Based on the records of transmittals of notarial
reports, Atty. Anthony E. Santos submitted his
notarial reports in the ff. years:
a. January 1980 report - was submitted on Feb. 6,
1980
b February to April 1980 report - was
submitted on June 6, 1980
c. May to June 1980 report - was submitted on July
29, 1980
d. July to October 1980 report - submitted but no
date of submission
e. November to December 1980-no entry
f. January to February 1981 - no entry
g. March to December 1981 - submitted but no date
of submission
h. January to December 1982 - submitted but no
date of submission
i. January to June 1983 - submitted on January 5,
1984
j. July to December 1983 - no entry
k. January to December 1984 - submitted on
January 20, 1986
l. January to December 1985 - submitted on
January 20, 1986
4. Records fail to show any entry of transmittal of
notarial documents under the name Atty. Anthony
Santos after December 1985.
5. It is further certified that the last notarial
commission issued to Atty. Anthony Santos was on
January 6, 1988 until December 31, 1989.4
In his Answer dated June 13, 2001, the respondent judge
categorically denied the charges against him. He also
submitted a certification5 from Clerk of Court, Atty.
Sabio-Beja, to prove that there was no proper recording of
the commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro as
well as the submitted notarized documents/notarial register.
The respondent further averred as follows:
That the complainant has never been privy to the documents
notarized and submitted by the respondent before the Office
of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental, nor his rights prejudiced on account of the said
notarized documents and therefore not the proper party to
raise the said issues;
That the complainant was one of the defendants in Civil
Case No. 94-334 entitled Vinas Kuranstalten Gesmbh et al.
versus Lugait Aqua Marine Industries, Inc., and Heinz Heck,
for Specific Performance & Sum of Money, filed before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City,
wherein respondent is the Presiding Judge. The undersigned
resolved the case in favor of the plaintiffs.6
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court Administrator
recommending the need to resort to a full-blown investigation
to determine the veracity of the parties’ assertions, the Court,
in a Resolution dated September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a)
treat the matter as a regular administrative complaint; and (b)
refer the case to Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the
Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
recommendation.7
In his Letters dated December 10, 2001 and February 1,
2002, the complainant requested that the hearing be held at
Cagayan de Oro City. Justice Cruz initially denied the
request but upon the complainant’s insistence, the matter
was forwarded to the Court, which favorably acted thereon in
a Resolution dated July 8, 2002.8 The complainant
presented his evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before
retired Court of Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.9
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following
recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on May 22,
2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial Law by (a)
notarizing documents without commission; (b) tardiness in
submission of notarial reports; and (c) non-forwarding of his
notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration of his
commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he be
suspended from the practice of law and barred from being
commissioned as notary public, both for one year, and his
present commission, if any, be revoked.10
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did not
adduce evidence in his defense, while the complainant
presented documentary evidence to support the charges:
It is noteworthy that in his answer, respondent did not claim
that he was commissioned as notary public for the years
1980 to 1983 nor deny the accuracy of the first certification.
He merely alleged that "there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor of
the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register." And,
as already observed, he presented no evidence, particularly
on his appointment as notary public for 1980 to 1983
(assuming he was so commissioned) and submission of
notarial reports and notarial register.
On the other hand, the second certification shows that "there
were only two Record Books available in the notarial section"
of the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Cagayan de Oro City); and
that the "(f)irst book titled Petitions for Notarial Commission
contains items on the Name, Date Commission was issued
and Expiration of Commission of the notary public.
First entry appearing was made on December
1982."
If respondent was commissioned in 1980 to 1983,
then the "first book" would disclose so (at least, for
the years 1982 and 1983). However, he did not
present said book. Neither did he present a
certification from the Clerk of Court, RTC of
Misamis Oriental, or documents from his files
showing that he was commissioned in 1980 to 1983.
Similarly, he did not submit a certificate of
appointment for all those years. Under Section 238
of the Notarial Law, such certificate must be
prepared and forwarded by the Clerk of Court, RTC,
to the Office of the Solicitor General, together with
the oath of office of the notary public.11
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on
the evidence presented by the complainant, that the
respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983
without being commissioned as a notary public
therefor, considering that his earliest commission of
record was on January 9, 1984.12
The Procedural Issues
Before the Court passes upon the merits of the
instant complaint, a brief backgrounder.
On the Applicability of Resolution A.M. No.
02-9-02-SC
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M.
No. 02-9-02-SC,13 to wit:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of
regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline
of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative
case shall also be considered a disciplinary action
against the respondent justice, judge or court
official concerned as a member of the Bar. The
respondent may forthwith be required to comment
on the complaint and show cause why he should
not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar.
Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in
one decision or resolution.
Before the Court approved this resolution,
administrative and disbarment cases against
members of the bar who were likewise members of
the court were treated separately. Thus, pursuant to
the new rule, administrative cases against erring
justices of the CA and the Sandiganbayan, judges,
and lawyers in the government service may be
automatically treated as disbarment cases. The
Resolution, which took effect on October 1, 2002,
also provides that it shall supplement Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court, and shall apply to administrative
cases already filed where the respondents have not
yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the
foregoing resolution, since the respondent filed his
Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
The Procedure To Be Followed In Disbarment Cases
Involving A Retired Judge For Acts Committed While He
Was Still A Practicing Lawyer
The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent is a
retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his disbarment;
and (3) the acts constituting the ground for disbarment were
committed when the respondent was still a practicing lawyer,
before his appointment to the judiciary. Thus, the respondent
is being charged not for acts committed as a judge; he is
charged, as a member of the bar, with notarizing documents
without the requisite notarial commission therefor.
Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court on Disbarment
and Discipline of Attorneys provides:
Section 1. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court
motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall
state clearly, and concisely the facts complained of and shall
be supported by affidavits of persons having personal
knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such
documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon
referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter Board of
Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including
those in the government service: Provided, however, That all
charges against Justices of the Court of Tax Appeals and
lower courts, even if lawyers are jointly charged with them,
shall be filed with the Supreme Court: Provided, further, That
charges filed against Justices and Judges before the IBP,
including those filed prior to their appointment to the
Judiciary, shall be immediately forwarded to the Supreme
Court for disposition and adjudication.14
The investigation may thereafter commence either before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), in accordance
with Sections 2 to Sections 12 of Rule 139-B, or before the
Supreme Court in accordance with Sections 13 and 14, thus:
Section 13. Supreme Court Investigators. - In proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other
proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the
Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the
Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or
judge of a lower court, in which case the investigation shall
proceed in the same manner provided in Sections 6 to 11
hereof, save that the review of the report shall be conducted
directly by the Supreme Court.
Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General or other Court
designated Investigator. Based upon the evidence adduced
at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other
Investigator designated by the Supreme Court shall submit
to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact
and recommendations together with the record and all the
evidence presented in the investigation for the final action of
the Supreme Court.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for disbarment
is cognizable by the Court itself, and its indorsement to the
IBP is not mandatory. The Court may refer the complaint for
investigation, report and recommendation to the Solicitor
General, any officer of the court or a judge of a lower court,
on which the Court will thereafter base its final action.15
Although the respondent has already retired from the
judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and as
such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the Supreme
Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 616of the 1987
Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the filing of the
complaint, the respondent was still the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City. As
such, the complaint was cognizable by the Court
itself, as the Rule mandates that in case the
respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax Appeals
or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed with
the Supreme Court.17
The Substantive Issues
The Retirement Or Resignation Of A Judge Will Not
Preclude The Filing Thereafter Of An Administrative
Charge Against Him For Which He Shall Still Be
Held Answerable If Found Liable Therefor
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise
been separated from the service does not
necessarily divest the Court of its jurisdiction to
determine the veracity of the allegations of the
complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary authority over
members of the bench. As we held in Gallos v.
Cordero:18
The jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing
of the administrative complaint was not lost by the
mere fact that the respondent, had ceased in office
during the pendency of his case. The Court retains
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent
public official innocent of the charges or declare him
guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with
injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications... If innocent, respondent public official
merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he has served well
and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and
imposable under the situation.19
However, recognizing "the proliferation of
unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal
cases against members of the judiciary for
purposes of harassment," we issued A.M. No.
03-10-01-SC20 which took effect on November 3,
2003. It reads in part:
1. If upon an informal preliminary inquiry by the
Office of the Court Administrator, an administrative
complaint against any Justice of the Court of
Appeals or Sandiganbayan or any Judge of the
lower courts filed in connection with a case in court
is shown to be clearly unfounded and baseless and
intended to harass the respondent, such a finding
should be included in the report and
recommendation of the Office of the Court
Administrator. If the recommendation is approved
or affirmed by the Court, the complainant may be
required to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt of court. If the complainant is a lawyer,
he may further be required to show cause why he or
she should not be administratively sanctioned as a
member of the Bar and as an officer of the court.
2. If the complaint is (a) filed within six months
before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or
Judge; (b) for an alleged cause of action that
occurred at least a year before such filing and (c)
shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the
respondent, it must forthwith be recommended for
dismissal. If such is not the case, the Office of the
Court Administrator must require the respondent to
file a comment within ten (10) days from receipt of
the complaint, and submit to the Court a report and
recommendation not later than 30 days from receipt
of the comment. The Court shall act on the
recommendation before the date of compulsory
retirement of the respondent, or if it is not possible
to do so, within six (6) months from such date
without prejudice to the release of the retirement
benefits less such amount as the Court may order
to be withheld, taking into account the gravity of the cause of
action alleged in the complaint.
Thus, in order for an administrative complaint against a
retiring or retired judge or justice to be dismissed outright,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must
have been filed within six months from the compulsory
retirement of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action
must have occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3)
it is shown that the complaint was intended to harass the
respondent.
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March 21,
2001 was received by the Office of the Court Administrator
on March 26, 2001.21 The respondent retired compulsorily
from the service more than a year later, or on May 22, 2002.
Likewise, the ground for disbarment or disciplinary action
alleged to have been committed by the respondent did not
occur a year before the respondent’s separation from the
service. Furthermore, and most importantly, the instant
complaint was not prima facie shown to be without merit and
intended merely to harass the respondent. Clearly, therefore,
the instant case does not fall within the ambit of the
foregoing resolution.
A Judge May Be Disciplined For Acts Committed Before His
Appointment To The Judiciary
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts
committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary.22 In fact,
even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it provides for
the immediate forwarding to the Supreme Court for
disposition and adjudication of charges against justices and
judges before the IBP, including those filed prior to their
appointment to the judiciary.23 It need not be shown that the
respondent continued the doing of the act or acts
complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence on record
supports the charge on the respondent, considering the
gravity of the offense.
Indeed, there is jurisprudence to the effect that the act
complained of must be continuing in order for the respondent
judge to be disciplined therefor. In Sevilla v. Salubre,24 the
respondent judge was charged with violating Canon 16 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, for acts committed
while he was still a practicing lawyer. The respondent therein
refused to turn over the funds of his client despite demands,
and persisted in his refusal even after he was appointed as a
judge. However, the Court also stated in this case that the
respondent’s subsequent appointment as a judge will not
exculpate him from taking responsibility for the
consequences of his acts as an officer of the court.25
In the case of Alfonso v. Juanson,26 we held that proof of
prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for
administrative discipline against a judge if he is not charged
with immorality prior to his appointment. We ratiocinated,
thus:
...[I]t would be unreasonable and unfair to presume that
since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness,
he could never retrace his steps and walk proud and tall
again in that path. No man is beyond information and
redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the exalted position of
a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a
high price for that honor - his private and official conduct
must at all times be free from the appearance of
impropriety. ...27
The Court ruled in that case that the complainant failed to
prove the charges by substantial evidence.28 The
complainant therein presented evidence pertaining to the
respondent’s previous indiscretion while still a practicing
lawyer; no evidence was, however, adduced to prove that
the latter continued to engage in illicit acts after being
appointed to the bench. Thus, the respondent was
exonerated in this case because the complainant failed to
present evidence that the indiscretion continued
even after the respondent was appointed to the
judiciary.
The practice of law is so ultimately affected
with public interest that it is both the right and duty
of the State to control and regulate it in order to
promote the public welfare. The Constitution vests
this power of control and regulation in this
Court.29 The Supreme Court, as guardian of the
legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power
over attorneys, which authority is not only a right
but a bounden duty as well. This is why respect and
fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.30
Notarizing Documents Without The Requisite
Commission Therefore Constitutes Malpractice, If
Not The Crime Of Falsification Of Public
Documents
It must be remembered that notarization is not an
empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary,
it is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public.31 Notarization by a notary
public converts a private document into a public one,
making it admissible in evidence without the
necessity of preliminary proof of its authenticity and
due execution.32
The requirements for the issuance of a commission
as notary public must not be treated as a mere
casual formality.33 The Court has characterized a
lawyer’s act of notarizing documents without the
requisite commission therefore as "reprehensible,
constituting as it does not only malpractice, but also
the crime of falsification of public documents."34 For
such reprehensible conduct, the Court has
sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial
commission and disqualification from acting as
such, and even disbarment.35
In the case of Nunga v. Viray,36 the Court had the
occasion to state -
Where the notarization of a document is done by a
member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has
no authorization or commission to do so, the
offender may be subjected to disciplinary action.
For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial
Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal
intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly
proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."37
The importance of the function of a notary public
cannot, therefore, be over-emphasized. No less
than the public faith in the integrity of public
documents is at stake in every aspect of that
function.38
The Charge Against The Respondent Is Supported
By The Evidence On Record
The respondent did not object to the complainant’s
formal offer of evidence, prompting the
Investigating Justice to decide the case on the
basis of the pleadings filed.39 Neither did he claim
that he was commissioned as notary public for the years
1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy of the first certification.
The respondent merely alleged in his answer that "there was
no proper recording of the commissioned lawyers in the City
of Cagayan de Oro nor of the submitted Notarized
Documents/Notarial Register." Furthermore, as found by the
Investigating Justice, the respondent presented no evidence
of his commission as notary public for the years 1980 to
1983, as well as proof of submission of notarial reports and
the notarial register.40
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to
answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against
him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a member
of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he deny the
charges; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence
against him.41
The respondent’s allegation that the complainant was not a
party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such was
not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney may be
disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his
duties as an attorney and counselor which include the
statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule 13842 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Any interested person or the
court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.
There can be no doubt as to the right of a citizen to bring to
the attention of the proper authority acts and doings of public
officers which citizens feel are incompatible with the duties of
the office and from which conduct the citizen or the public
might or does suffer undesirable consequences.43
An Administrative Complaint Against A Member Of The Bar
Does Not Prescribe
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership
of the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the legal profession, but its continued
possession is essential to maintain one’s good standing in
the profession. It is a continuing requirement to the practice
of law and therefore does not preclude a subsequent judicial
inquiry, upon proper complaint, into any question concerning
one’s mental or moral fitness before he became a lawyer.
This is because his admission to practice merely creates a
rebuttable presumption that he has all the qualifications to
become a lawyer.44 The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it
pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.45
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong to
a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.46 As we held in the
leading case of In re Almacen:47
[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for
his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have
prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the
office of an attorney. ....48
In a case involving a mere court employee49 the
Court disregarded the Court Administrator’s
recommendation that the charge for immorality
against the respondent be dismissed on the ground
that the complainants failed to adduce evidence
that the respondent’s immoral conduct was still
ongoing. Aside from being found guilty of illicit
conduct, the respondent was also found guilty of
dishonesty for falsifying her children’s certificates of
live birth to show that her paramour was the father.
The complaint in this case was filed on August 5,
1999, almost twenty years after the illicit affair
ended.50 The Court held that administrative
offenses do not prescribe.51
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than that an administrative complaint
against an erring lawyer who was thereafter
appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after
twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule
were otherwise, members of the bar would be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as
no private complainant would immediately come
forward, they stand a chance of being completely
exonerated from whatever administrative liability
they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court
to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well
as the administration of justice. No matter how
much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time
of the institution of the complaint, erring members of
the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining
arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is
aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and
bar, to deter them from committing acts which
violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.
This should particularly apply in this case,
considering the seriousness of the matter involved -
the respondent’s dishonesty and the sanctity of
notarial documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of
the administrative complaint, will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes
documents without the requisite authority therefor.
At Most, The Delay In The Institution Of The
Administrative Case Would Merely Mitigate The
Respondent’s Liability
Time and again, we have stressed the settled
principle that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess the qualifications required by law
for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is
expected and required of a member of the bar.52 By
his actuations, the respondent failed to live up to
such standards;53 he undermined the confidence of
the public on notarial documents and thereby
breached Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which requires lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. The
respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof which
proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.54 In
representing that he was possessed of the requisite
notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so
authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we
will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the
esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls
for it, we will likewise not disbar him where a lesser penalty
will suffice to accomplish the desired end.55 Furthermore, a
tempering of justice is mandated in this case, considering
that the complaint against the respondent was filed
twenty-four years after the commission of the act complained
of;56 that there was no private offended party who came
forward and claimed to have been adversely affected by the
documents so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that
the respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the
full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.57 The
Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is
found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the requisite
notarial commission therefor. He is hereby ORDERED to pay
a fine in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., join Mr. Justice J. C. Vitug in his separate
opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION
(Concurring in the Result)
VITUG, J.:
Allow me to express, very briefly, my views on the various
scenarios appurtenant to the subject of inquiry.
In A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, respondent Judge, now retired,
has been charged on 21 March 2001, while still an
incumbent judge, with having transgressed, prior to his
appointment to the judiciary, the Notarial Law.
A. Exceptionally, a judge may be held administratively
accountable for acts committed before his appointment
to the Judiciary.
Generally, a judge is not made to account administratively
for acts committed prior to his appointment. In Sevilla v
Salubre,1 respondent judge was charged with
misappropriating for his own benefit money entrusted to him
by his client while he was still a practicing lawyer. He,
however, continued to ignore, even after his appointment in
the judiciary, his previous client’s demand for restitution. The
Court explained: “Being the visible representation of law, and
more importantly, of justice, the people see in the
respondent the intermediary of justice between two
conflicting interests. If while still in active litigation practice
lawyers do not know how to (so) uphold this kind of justice to
their clients previous to their appointment as Judges, how
then could people expect them to render judgments in the
cases before them?” In the earlier case of Alfonso v.
Juanson2 where respondent judge was simply admonished
for “appearance of impropriety,” the Court said that he could
not be disciplined for immoral acts committed prior to his
appointment in the judiciary absent showing that he
continued to engage in these acts after his appointment.
B. The retirement or resignation of a judge could
preclude the filing thereafter of an administrative charge
against him for an infraction committed during his
incumbency.
The filing of an administrative proceeding against a
judge is predicated on the holding of his office or
position in the judiciary; thus, his resignation or
retirement from office could bar an administrative
case3 from being initiated. An administrative charge
already pending upon resignation or retirement is
not necessarily rendered moot since the penalty
that can still be imposed, if the respondent is found
guilty, goes beyond just dismissal from the service.
Noteworthy is A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC which
provides that if a complaint against a judge is filed
within six months before his compulsory retirement
for an alleged infraction occurring at least a year
before such filing, and shown prima facie to be
intended to harass the judge, the complaint must
forthwith be recommended for dismissal.
C. A judge, already retired, may, but only under
certain conditions, be subject to disciplinary
action for acts committed prior to his
appointment to the judiciary.
A judge, already retired, may yet be subject to
disciplinary sanction for an act committed prior to
his appointment in the judiciary if (a) the judge has
persisted, even after his appointment to the
judiciary, in his assailed act, and (b) the
administrative charge is filed while still an
incumbent in the judiciary.
D. If, such as in the instant administrative case,
the two conditions, above, are not shown,
respondent judge may still be disciplinarily
dealt with for his misconduct not as a judge but
as a lawyer.
A disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer is sui
generis; neither purely civil nor purely criminal. It is
not - and it does not involve - a trial of an action or a
suit; it is rather an investigation into the conduct of
an officer of the court. Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor. Interest in the service of the profession
is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney may
still be a fit person to continue enjoying his
privileges as such.4 It may thus be concluded that
the administrative complaint can still be pursued.
While the cause of action does not prescribe, it is to
be assumed, however, that the complaint must be
filed within a reasonable time. What may or may not
be a reasonable time is determined by
circumstances peculiar and pertinent to the
case.5 The administrative charge for alleged
violation of the Notarial Law in this instance is said
to have been committed more than twenty years
ago by respondent judge prior to his appointment in
the judiciary, filed several years after that
appointment and just about a year prior to his
retirement. No specific injury or damage has been
shown for the alleged violation. The circumstances
are enough, in my view, to warrant the dismissal of
the complaint, and I so vote.
Adm. Case No. 6490 September 29, 2004
(CBD 03-1054)
LILIA TABANG and CONCEPCION
TABANG, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
On February 3, 2003, complainants Lilia Tabang and her
mother, Concepcion Tabang, filed before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or
suspension against respondent Atty. Glenn C. Gacott for
gross misconduct, deceit and gross dishonesty.
Complainants allege as follows:
Sometime between the years 1984 and 1985, Lilia sought
the legal advice of then incumbent Judge Eustaquio Gacott,
father of herein respondent, regarding her desire to buy a
30-hectare agricultural land in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto
Princesa, Palawan, which consists of several parcels of land
belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott informed Lilia
that under the agrarian reform program of the government,
she is prohibited from acquiring vast tracks of agricultural
land, as she already owns other parcels of land. Judge
Gacott then advised her to put the title of the lands in the
names of fictitious persons and to keep the titles with her for
easy disposition. Following the advice of Judge Gacott, Lilia
bought the parcels of land using fictitious names. Eventually,
Lilia was able to secure individual titles over these parcels of
land in the names of 7 fictitious persons to wit:
TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla
TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy
TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio
TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez
TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan
TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy
TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes
Respondent knows this fact. Later on, Lilia and Concepcion
decided to sell the subject parcels of land because they
needed money for their medication and other necessary
expenses. On the pretext that he is going to help them sell
the subject property to prospective buyers, respondent
borrowed the seven land titles from complainants. However,
despite the lapse of one year from the time he borrowed the
titles, respondent still failed to negotiate the sale of the
property. He informed herein complainants that he lost all the
seven land titles. Respondent then advised complainants to
file a petition in court for re-issuance of title. Following
respondent’s advice, Lilia Tabang, in the guise of acting as
the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious owners,
filed a case for the re-issuance of title to the seven parcels of
land. However, in the course of the proceedings, the public
prosecutor noticed that the signatures of the alleged owners
in the seven individual Special Power of Attorney executed in
favor of Lilia Tabang appear to have been signed by the
same person because of the similarities in their strokes. The
public prosecutor informed the trial court of this fact
prompting the latter to summon the alleged principals. To
avoid embarrassment and possible sanctions from the court
because the alleged principals are in fact fictitious, Lilia
withdrew the case without prejudice to the re-filing of the
same. Subsequently, Lilia filed a new set of cases for
re-issuance of title, changing the signatures of the
fictitious owners. Upon knowledge that a new set of
cases was filed, respondent executed or caused to
be executed several documents, among which
were Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and
Affidavits of Recovery purportedly signed by the
principals of Lilia Tabang. Respondent caused the
annotation of these documents in the land titles
covering the subject properties. Thereafter,
respondent caused the publication of a notice
representing himself as the owner of the subject
parcels of land and indicating therein his desire to
sell the said properties. Eventually, respondent was
able to sell the seven parcels of land to seven
individuals. However, only three of these buyers
were legitimate, while the remaining four are
dummies of respondent. As a result of selling the
three parcels of land, respondent was able to
receive ₱3,773,675.00. None of the proceeds of the
sale was remitted to complainants.
Complainants contend that in executing the various
Revocation of Special Power of Attorney and
Affidavit of Recovery, affixing thereon the
signatures of the fictitious registered owners of the
disputed parcels of land, and in arrogating the
ownership over the said lands upon himself,
respondent committed gross misconduct,
dishonesty and deceit. Complainants likewise
allege that this is not the only case wherein
respondent sold properties of his clients to third
persons without his clients’ knowledge and
consent.1
Respondent filed his Answer to the Complaint
denying the material allegations of the
complainants. He claims that the seven land titles
covering the subject properties are valid and duly
executed; and denies complainants’ allegations that
the alleged owners are fictitious. Respondent
further claims that the registered owners voluntarily
sold the seven parcels of land to different
individuals and his only participation in the said sale
is that he was authorized by the registered owners
to collect from the buyers the full payment of the
lands sold. He further denies that complainant Lilia
Tabang is the real owner and that she merely acted
as a broker who was trying to promote the sale of
the properties; that when she came to know that the
properties were sold by their registered owners, she
called up the law office of respondent and
demanded that she be given her share or "balato" in
the sale of the properties equivalent to 20% of the
gross sales because of her alleged efforts exerted
in promoting the sale of the subject parcels of land;
that when respondent turned her down, Lilia
threatened to put him in bad light and seek his
disbarment. Respondent further denies
complainants’ allegation that he sold real properties
of some of his clients to third persons claiming that
in all these cases his role was merely to notarize
the documents of sale executed voluntarily by his
clients and the buyers of their properties.2
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1054,
was assigned by the IBP to Commissioner Lydia A.
Navarro for report and recommendation.
Commissioner Navarro conducted a mandatory
conference on November 25, 2003 after which she
required the parties to submit their respective
position papers, together with all the necessary
documents and duly verified affidavits of their
witnesses, if any. In a report dated March 4, 2004,
Commissioner Navarro found respondent guilty of
gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.3 Accordingly she recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six
months.4
On April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed
a resolution adopting the report of Commissioner Navarro.
However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and
imposed the supreme punishment of disbarment.5
We do not agree with the IBP Resolution. The case should
be remanded for further proceedings.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of
his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
are deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, grossly
immoral conduct, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to the practice of law, willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, corrupt
or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in
nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically
any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no
time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership
therein.6
Nonetheless, the power to disbar must be exercised with
great caution.
For the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory proof. Indeed, considering the
serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, the Supreme Court has consistently held
that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.7
Moreover, in complaints for disbarment, a formal
investigation is a mandatory requirement which may not be
dispensed with except for valid and compelling
reasons.8 Rule 139-B provides for the procedure of
investigation in disbarment and disciplinary proceedings
against attorneys before the IBP, thus:
Sec. 8. Investigation. – Upon joinder of issues or upon failure
of the respondent to answer, the Investigator shall, with
deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the
case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and
administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full
opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his
behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if
upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the
investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three
(3) months from the date of its commencement, unless
extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon
prior application.
Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other
lawful order issued by the Investigator shall be dealt with as
for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge
shall be filed by the Investigator before the IBP Board of
Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to
show cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board
of Governors may thereafter conduct hearings, if necessary,
in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for
hearings before the Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as
practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors
shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations,
which shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
Court for final action and if warranted, the
imposition of penalty. (Emphasis ours)
In the present case, the Investigating
Commissioner initiated the formal investigation by
conducting a mandatory conference between the
complainants and the respondent after both parties
have filed their complaint and answer, respectively.
The mandatory conference was supposedly held for
the purpose of defining the issues and enabling the
parties to stipulate facts. However, no definitive
result was reached during the conference as
respondent continued to deny all the allegations of
the complainants. After the mandatory conference
was held, no further hearings were conducted.
Instead, the Investigating Commissioner merely
required the parties to submit their respective
position papers, including all the necessary
documents and duly verified affidavits of witnesses,
if any. On the sole basis of the pleadings filed by
both parties and of the documents attached thereto,
the Investigating Commissioner submitted her
Report and Recommendation to the IBP Board of
Governors.
Considering the gravity of the charges imputed
against the respondent and the imposition of the
penalty of disbarment being prayed for by
complainants, the Investigating Commissioner
should not have simply relied on the parties’
position papers and the pieces of documentary
evidence submitted by them. She should have
proceeded with the investigation by conducting
formal hearings and calling upon the parties to
present additional evidence to support their
respective contentions. In the case of the
complainants, the Investigating Commissioner
should have required the presentation of the
persons who allegedly executed the affidavits
presented in evidence to prove the veracity of the
allegations contained in said affidavits, at the same
time affording respondent the opportunity to cross-
examine the supposed affiants. The failure of the
complainants to move for the presentation of the
persons alleged to have executed the subject
affidavits does not render the IBP powerless to
conduct further investigation, considering its power
to issue subpoena under the Rule.
In the same manner, the Investigating
Commissioner should have compelled the persons
named by the respondent as the original owners as
well as the buyers of the subject properties to
appear before her. The appearance of these
witnesses could have easily been facilitated
considering that the residence and office addresses
of the three of the supposed buyers are all located
in Makati while the residence of three of the original
owners are located within Manila and the remaining
four are residing in the province of Cavite which is
very near Metro Manila. To repeat, under the
above-quoted Rule, the Investigating
Commissioner is authorized to issue subpoena to
compel the appearance of persons and witnesses
before it.
It bears to point out that majority of the pieces of
evidence presented by complainants and
respondent consists of affidavits and photocopies of
documents. Not one of the persons who executed
these affidavits and instruments was presented or
subpoenaed by the Commissioner to identify their
affidavits and give the adverse party opportunity to
confront the witnesses in a formal hearing.
Consequently, no judgment could be rendered fairly and
squarely on the issues raised in the subject administrative
matter.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative case is
hereby REMANDED to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6470 July 8, 2014
MERCEDITA DE JESUS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUVY MELL SANCHEZMALIT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before the Court is a disbarment complaint filed by
Mercedita De Jesus (De Jesus) against respondent Atty.
Juvy Mell Sanchez-Malit (Sanchez-Malit) on the following
grounds: grave misconduct, dishonesty, malpractices, and
unworthiness to become an officer of the Court.
THE FACTS OF THE CASE
In the Affidavit-Complaint1 filed by complainant before the
Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she alleged
that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and notarized
a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall that falsely
named the former as its absolute and registered owner. As a
result, the mortgagee sued complainant for perjury and for
collection of sum of money. She claimed that respondent
was a consultant of the local government unit of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, and was therefore aware that the market stall was
government-owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also
notarized two contracts that caused complainant legal and
financial problems. One contract was a lease agreement
notarized by respondent sometime in September 1999
without the signature of the lessees. However, complainant
only found out that the agreement had not been signed by
the lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for
another copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale
agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant entered into
with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17 February 1998.
Respondent drafted and notarized said agreement, but did
not advise complainant that the property was still covered by
the period within which it could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint,
complainant subsequently submitted three Special Powers
of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and an Affidavit
of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino), complainant’s
secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not signed by the
principals named therein and bore only the signature of the
named attorneyin-fact, Florina B. Limpioso (Limpioso).
Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated complainant’s allegations
against respondent.2
On 4 August 2004, the Second Division of the Supreme
Court issued a Resolution requiring respondent to submit her
comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from receipt
of notice.3
In her Comment,4 respondent explained thatthe mortgage
contract was prepared in the presence of complainant and
that the latter had read it before affixing her signature.
However, complainant urgently needed the loan proceeds so
the contract was hastily done. It was only copied
from a similar file in respondent’s computer, and the
phrase "absolute and registered owner" was
inadvertently left unedited. Still, it should not be a
cause for disciplinary action, because complainant
constructed the subject public market stall under a
"Build Operate and Transfer" contract with the local
government unit and, technically, she could be
considered its owner. Besides, there had been a
prior mortgage contract over the same property in
which complainant was represented as the
property’s absolute owner, but she did not complain.
Moreover, the cause of the perjury charge against
complainant was not the representation ofherself as
owner of the mortgaged property, but her guarantee
that it was free from all liens and encumbrances.
The perjury charge was even dismissed, because
the prosecutor found that complainant and her
spouse had, indeed, paid the debt secured with the
previous mortgage contract over the same market
stall.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent
countered that the document attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint was actually new. She gave the
court’s copy of the agreement to complainant to
accommodate the latter’s request for an extra copy.
Thus, respondent prepared and notarized a new
one, relying on complainant’s assurance that the
lessees would sign it and that it would be returned
in lieu of the original copy for the court.
Complainant, however, reneged on her promise.
As regards the purchase agreement of a property
covered by a CLOA, respondent claimed that
complainant was an experienced realty broker and,
therefore, needed no advice on the repercussions
of that transaction. Actually, when the purchase
agreement was notarized, complainant did not
present the CLOA, and so the agreement
mentioned nothing about it. Rather, the agreement
expressly stated that the property was the subject
of a case pending before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB);
complainant was thus notified of the status of the
subject property. Finally, respondent maintained
that the SPAs submitted by complainant as
additional evidence wereproperly notarized. It can
be easily gleaned from the documents that the
attorney-in-fact personally appeared before
respondent; hence,the notarization was limited to
the former’s participation in the execution ofthe
document. Moreover, the acknowledgment clearly
stated that the document must be notarized in the
principal’s place of residence.
An exchange of pleadings ensuedafter respondent
submitted her Comment. After her rejoinder,
complainant filed an Urgent Ex-ParteMotion for
Submission of Additional Evidence.5 Attached
thereto were copies of documents notarized by
respondent, including the following: (1) an Extra
Judicial Deed of Partition which referred to the
SPAs naming Limpioso as attorney-in-fact; (2) five
SPAs that lacked the signatures of either the
principal or the attorney-in-fact; (3) two deeds of
sale with incomplete signatures of the parties
thereto; (4) an unsigned Sworn Statement; (5) a
lease contract that lacked the signature of the
lessor; (6) five unsigned Affidavits; (7) an unsigned
insurance claim form (Annual Declaration by the
Heirs); (8) an unsigned Invitation Letter toa
potential investor in Japan; (9) an unsigned Bank
Certification; and (10)an unsigned Consent to
Adoption.
After the mandatory conference and hearing, the
parties submitted their respective Position
Papers.6 Notably, respondent’s Position Paper did not tackle
the additional documents attached to complainant’s Urgent
Ex ParteMotion.
THE FINDINGS OF THE IBP
In his 15 February 2008 Report, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. recommended the
immediate revocation of the Notarial Commission of
respondent and her disqualification as notary public for two
years for her violation of her oath as such by notarizing
documents without the signatures of the parties who had
purportedly appeared before her. He accepted respondent’s
explanations with respect to the lease agreement, sale
contract, and the three SPAs pertaining to Limpioso.
However, he found that the inaccurate crafting of the real
estate mortgage contract was a sufficient basis to hold
respondent liable for violation of Canon 187 and Rule
18.038 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus, he
also recommended that she besuspended from the practice
of law for six months.9
The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-245 dated 22 May 2008, unanimously adopted
and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with the modification that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.10
Respondent filed her first Motion for Reconsideration11 and
Second Motion for Reconsideration.12 She maintained that
the additional documents submitted by complainant were
inadmissible, as they were obtained without observing the
procedural requisites under Section 4, Rule VI of Adm. No.
02-08-13 SC (2004 Rules on Notarial Practice).13 Moreover,
the Urgent Ex ParteMotion of complainant was actually a
supplemental pleading, which was prohibited under the rules
of procedure of the Committee on Bar Discipline; besides,
she was not the proper party to question those documents.
Hence, the investigating commissioner should have
expunged the documents from the records, instead of giving
them due course. Respondent also prayed that mitigating
circumstances be considered, specifically the following:
absence of prior disciplinary record; absence of dishonest or
selfish motive; personal and emotional problems; timely
goodfaith effort to make restitution or to rectify the
consequences of her misconduct; full and free disclosure to
the disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the
proceedings; character or reputation; remorse; and
remoteness of prior offenses.
The IBP Board of Governors, inits Resolution No.
XX-2012-119 dated 10 March 2012, deniedrespondent’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of substantial reason to
justify a reversal of the IBP’s findings.14
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, Director for
Bar Discipline Pura Angelica Y. Santiago – through a letter
addressed to then acting Chief Justice Antonio T. Carpio –
transmitted the documents pertaining to the disbarment
Complaint against respondent.15
THE COURT’S RULING
After carefully reviewing the merits of the complaint against
respondent and the parties’ submissions in this case, the
Court hereby modifies the findings of the IBP.
Before going into the substance of the charges against
respondent, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural
matters raised by respondent.
Respondent argues that the additional documents submitted
in evidence by complainant are inadmissible for having been
obtained in violation of Section 4, Rule VI of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice. A comparable argument was raised in
Tolentino v. Mendoza,16 in which the respondent
therein opposed the admission of the birth
certificates of his illegitimate children as evidence of
his grossly immoral conduct, because those
documents were obtained in violation Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
1993.17 Rejecting his argument, the Court reasoned
as follows:
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides that "evidence is admissible
when it isrelevant to the issue and is not excluded
by the law or these rules." There could be no
dispute that the subject birth certificates are
relevant to the issue. The only question, therefore,
is whether the law or the rules provide for the
inadmissibility of said birth certificates allegedly for
having been obtained in violation of Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1993 only provides for sanctions against
persons violating the ruleon confidentiality of birth
records, but nowhere does itstate that procurement
of birth records in violation of said rule would render
said records inadmissible in evidence. On the other
hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides
for the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a
result of illegal searches and seizures. It should be
emphasized, however, that said rule against
unreasonable searches and seizures is meant only
to protect a person from interference by the
government or the state. In People vs. Hipol, we
explained that: The Constitutional proscription
enshrined in the Bill of Rights does not concern
itself with the relation between a private individual
and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State and its agents.
The Bill of Rights only tempers governmental power
and protects the individual against any aggression
and unwarranted interference by any department of
government and its agencies. Accordingly, it cannot
be extended to the acts complained of in this case.
The alleged "warrantless search" made by Roque,
a co-employee of appellant at the treasurer's office,
can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and
seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as
private individuals, obtained the subject birth
records as evidence against respondent, the
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence
do not provide for the exclusion from evidence of
the birth certificates inquestion, said public
documents are, therefore, admissible and should
be properly taken into consideration in the
resolution of this administrative case against
respondent.18
Similarly, the 2004 Rules on Notarial Law contain
no provision declaring the inadmissibility of
documents obtained in violation thereof. Thus, the
IBP correctly consideredin evidence the other
notarized documents submitted by complainant as
additional evidence.
Respondent’s argument that the Urgent
Ex-ParteMotion of complainant constitutes a
supplemental pleading must fail as well. As its very
name denotes, a supplemental pleading only
serves to bolster or adds something to the primary
pleading. Its usual office is to set up new facts
which justify, enlarge or change the kind of relief with respect
to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in
the original complaint.19 Accordingly, it cannot be said that
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion filed by complainant was a
supplemental pleading. One of her charges against
respondent is that the latter notarizedincomplete documents,
as shown by the SPAs and lease agreement attached to the
Affidavit-Complaint. Complainant is not legally barred from
submitting additional evidence to strengthen the basis of her
complaint.
Going now into the substance of the charges against
respondent, the Court finds that she committed misconduct
and grievously violated her oath as a notary public.
The important role a notary public performs cannot be
overemphasized. The Court has repeatedlystressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but
one invested with substantive public interest. Notarization
converts a private document into a public document, making
it admissible in evidence without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, a notarized document is, by law, entitled
tofull faith and credit upon its face. It is for this reason that a
notary public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of his notarial duties;
otherwise, the public's confidence in the integrity of a
notarized document would be undermined.20
Where the notary public admittedly has personal knowledge
of a false statement or information contained in the
instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the notarial
seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary
public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the
notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished.21 In this case,
respondent fully knew that complainant was not the owner of
the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contractdoes not make respondent any less guilty. If at all, it
only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a wrongful act.
Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of
Canon 122 and Rules 1.0123 and 1.0224 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease
agreement executed by complainant sometime in September
199925 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy of the
agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could have
given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It even
appears that said lease agreement is not a rarityin
respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show that
on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent has
notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or lacking
signatures of the parties. Technically, each document maybe
a ground for disciplinary action, for it is the duty of a notarial
officer to demand that a document be signed in his or her
presence.26
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed it are the very same ones who executed
it and who personally appeared before the said notary public
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.27 Thus, in acknowledging that the parties personally
came and appeared before her, respondent also violated
Rule 10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
her oath as a lawyer that she shall do no
falsehood.29 Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who
were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their
oath as notaries public.30 Even so, the rule is that disbarment
is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the court and the Court will not disbar a lawyer where a
lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired
end.31 The blatmt disregard by respondent of her basic
duties as a notary public warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of law
and perpetual disqualification to be commissioned
as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Juvy Mell
Sanchez-Malit is found guilty of violating Canon 1
and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as her oath as
notary public. Hence, she is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE YEAR effective immediately.
Her notarial commission, if still existing, is
IMMEDIATELY REVOKED and she is hereby
PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from being
commissioned as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered into the
personal records of respondent as a member of the
bar and furnished to the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED
A.C. No. 5816
DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN
E. BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for
disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0. Perez (Dr. Perez)
with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27,
2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty.
Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo)
(respondents) for gross immorality and violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and
Atty. Catindig had been friends since the
mid-1960’s when they were both students at the
University of the Philippines, but they lost touch
after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths
of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It
was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court
Dr. Perez.2
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was
already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez),
having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the
Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which
was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of
Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig
however claimed that he only married Gomez
because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid
that Gomez would make a scandal out of her
pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which
could have jeopardized his scholarship in the
Harvard Law School.4
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the
process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country
to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he
would eventually marry her once the divorce had
been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty.
Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig
assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their
marriage.5
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in
the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA).
Their union was blessed with a child whom they named
Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty.
Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was
obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and
Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she
confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured
Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains
a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the
laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt
their son.7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his
promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his
marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still
have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition.8
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an
anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s
scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later,
she came upon a love letter10 written and signed by Atty.
Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said
letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo,
promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed."
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo
requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such
time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage.
On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare
the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez
and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.12
In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed
the respondents to file their respective comments, which
they separately did on November 25, 2002.14
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married
Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that
she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations,
as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their
union was blessed with four children, their relationship
simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de
facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the
agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented.
Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property
regime of complete separation of property. She likewise
advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the
Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and
comfort it may provide them.16
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge
of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic,
appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action
under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce
by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic
court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the
foregoing, including the fact that the divorce
decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not
have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding
that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig
and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded
that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig
married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage was not valid since his previous marriage
to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only
married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he
was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely
desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their
relationship.19
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr.
Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from
developing.20
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he
left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr.
Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He
asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to
her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact
rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty.
Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an
affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was
employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty.
Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she
could not reciprocate his feelings since he was
married and that he was too old for her. She said
that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still
pursued her, which was the reason why she
resigned from his law firm.22
On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90
days from notice.23
On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the
mandatory conference of the administrative case on
July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29,
2003. During the conference, the parties
manifested that they were already submitting the
case for resolution based on the pleadings already
submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the
parties to submit their respective position papers
within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty.
Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers
on October 17, 200325 and October 20,
2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position
paper27 on October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the
Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued
a Report and Recommendation,28 which
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for
gross immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr.
Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous
marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and
illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of
disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined
that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence
and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a pattern of
grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his
disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled;
it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor
of law, both in his official and personal conduct, must display
exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and
his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely
caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How
can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his
peers and the community to look up to him as a model
worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of
morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding
knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting
marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the
generally accepted moral standards of the community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present
clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged
affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued
a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10,
2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, claiming
that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on
Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that,
under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of
persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said
that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the
Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’
testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of
committing any felony; that he never concealed the status of
his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted
that he had always been transparent with both Gomez and
Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated
December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed
gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the
parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees
with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of
much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning.
Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but
it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s
good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity. Good moral character is more than just
the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so
because "vast interests are committed to his care;
he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client’s property,
reputation, his life, his all."34 (Citation omitted)
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for
grossly immoral conduct. Thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis ours)
"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor."35 Immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a
moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable members of the community. Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The
Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme
penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.36
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a
previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by
the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct
that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a
wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was
then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig
started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again.
Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children
after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then
already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy
problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto
separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership
of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the
Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in
the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr.
Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he
could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a
semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce
decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic
was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were
both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still
validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless
his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity.
Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing
circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social
propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful
disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty.
Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the
logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the
USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy
by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine
jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is
true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is
a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various
legal strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his
otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the
very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the
highest degree.1âwphi1
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and
despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her
and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided
to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez.
Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much
younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his
firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr.
Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a
grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern
showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct
is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but
on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member
of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages
the generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the
inviolable social institution of marriage.’"37 In various cases,
the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a
lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a
child.38
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a
mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking
advantage of his legal skills in the process. He
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar,
which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously
affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.
Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless,
in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels
the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears
to be the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations
against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits
contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty.
Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he
indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous
marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably,
such admission provides ample basis for the Court
to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair
between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating
Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to
prove the claimed amorous relationship between
the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was
mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her
that the respondents were indeed having an affair
and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension
or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence
required m suspens10n or disbarment proceedings
is preponderance of evidence.39
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was
received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter
indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged
relations between the respondents; it does not
prove the veracity of the allegations therein.
Similarly,. the supposed love letter, if at all, only
provesAtty.that Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter
professing his love for her. It does not prove that
Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty.
Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross
immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the
records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise,
copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court
Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo
1s hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10676 September 8, 2015
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment1 filed by Atty.
Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007
against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit
relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an
educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant
claims that respondent's actions involve deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of
the Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends and both
graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP) College
of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or
barkada with several of their classmates. After passing the
bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar
in 1991, they were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin
(Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant
avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series
of adulterous and illicit relations with married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit
relations involved:
a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College
of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant had personal
knowledge of such illicit relations;
b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or
from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married to
Jardiolin;
c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also
being romantically involved with DDD;
d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002,
despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still being
romantically .involved with CCC;
e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime
during the period from May 2004 until the filing of
the Petition, while still being romantically involved
with CCC.3
Complainant claims that respondent, with malice
and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by
representing himself to be a bachelor, thereby
convincing the two women to start a love affair with
him, when in. truth, he was then still married to
Jardiolin.4
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers
that sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000,
respondent, as a lawyer of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC),
represented the interest of Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings
filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development
Corporation (KOC). However, despite being a
public officer and a government counsel,
respondent conspired with Atty. Abraham Espejo,
legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case,
thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that
of the Philippine Government.5
Complainant further claims that respondent even
attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in
exchange for the latter's cooperation in the
dismissal of the cancellation proceedings in favor of
KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting
KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly
rewarded with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate
number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was
seen several times by respondent's classmates and
officemates being driven and parked by respondent
in his own home and in the OGCC premises itself.6
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case,
complainant claims that respondent was
summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning rampant
faking of land titles in the Philippines, which
included an investigation of the alleged spurious
land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final
Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and
Justice & Human Rights Committees recommended
that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for
graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or
disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave
misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code.7
It was further alleged that, during the pendency of
the Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to
conceal the evidence by requesting complainant's
parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion
B. Ecraela, to have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in
their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite
period of time. Respondent's request, however, was
refused by the spouses when they learned that the
vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry.8
It appears from the documents presented by
complainant that the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against
respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3 (b)
of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019.9 Complainant also
claims that respondent abused his authority as an
educator in Manuel L. Quezon University, San
Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and
Maryknoll College, where respondent induced his
male students to engage in "nocturnal
preoccupations" and entertained the romantic
gestures of his female students in exchange for
passing grades.10 The Petition was docketed as CBD Case
No. 07-1973.
In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar
Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
respondent to file his verified answer.
In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present
any counter-statement of facts in supp01i of his defense.
Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers
from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that
petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges
against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the
Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment"
lacked formal requirements, and thus, should be treated as a
mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the
e-mail messages attached to the petition were inadmissible
for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence.13 He claims that the identities of the
owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the allegations of
illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not properly
established. Respondent further argues that the statements
of complainant's witnesses were merely self-serving and
deserved scant consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's
Answer),14 stating that the allegations in the complaint were
deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make
specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by
Complainant),15 respondent simply denied all of
complainant's accusations in the petition, allegedly for "lack
of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth or falsity thereof."16
On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the
case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007,17 which
respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent filed a
Motion to Cancel Hearing,18 praying for the resetting of the
mandatory conference allegedly due to a previously
scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion
was opposed by complainant and eventually denied by
Commissioner Villadolid in his Order19 dated August 28,
2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several
persons who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses was
granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case
was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's
witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective
subpoenas21 were issued.
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration,22 praying that the
Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the
hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of
October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD
that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known as
"sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at
least one to two weeks while his eyes are being treated.
Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical
certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan was
suffering from sore eyes.
During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007,
complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that based
on his personal verification with the court personnel of
Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque
City, there was no case calendared for hearing on the date of
the previous setting. Complainant also argued that this is
another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings
because he knew that complainant worked overseas and
was only in the country for a limited period of time. Finding
merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's motion was
denied and complainant was allowed to present his
witnesses.23 Complainant presented his witnesses, as
follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda
(ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos),
Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W.
Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and
Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the
KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee Report, as well as on his recollection
that the Senate Report had recommended the
disbarment of respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were
presented to establish that the email messages
submitted by complainant indeed originated from
respondent based on their familiarity with
respondent, paiiicularly, the email messages which
contained references to his daughter, his
relationship with complainant, and respondent's
high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent
personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend
and that sometime in 2002 or 2003, she saw
respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still
being married to his wife. Atty. Litong also recalled
encountering respondent at a party sometime in
2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived
to be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also
confirmed that respondent had, in more than one
occasion, brought with him his students during their
drinking sessions and had even one student driving
for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty.
Litong's statements about respondent's
preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus also
testified that ODD called her at her office sometime
in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that the latter had
broken up with respondent upon learning that he
was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based
on her telephone conversation with DDD that
respondent did not tell the latter his actual marital
status. Aside from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled
that during complainant's farewell party in February
2007, respondent introduced CCC as his girlfriend
of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were
made to affirm the execution of their affidavits since
their testimonies were based on the affidavits that
complainant included in his petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was
concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was
terminated and the parties were directed to submit
their respective verified position papers with
supporting documentary evidence within thi1iy (30)
days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic
notes. After which, the case was considered
submitted for report and recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received
complainant's Manifestation (with
Comments),24 pertaining to respondent's Motion to
Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to
formally request for records from Branch 77 of MTC,
Parañaque City to verify respondent's claim that he
had a hearing in said court during the first
scheduled mandatory conference. On the same
date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's
Compliance (with Comments),25 submitting the
certified photo copies of the Senate Committee
Final Report No. 367, the Resolution dated January
22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information
dated June 30, 2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's
Position Paper.26 Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred
from submitting his verified position paper and that any
decision or judgment would have to be based solely on
complainant's Verified Position Paper.28
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and recommendation,
Commissioner Villadolid rendered a Report,29 finding that
there is more than sufficient evidence establishing
respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and
moral character as an officer of the court and member of the
bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the
Revised Penal Code30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the
Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite
respondent's denials, complainant was able to present
certified true copies of the relevant documents which support
his allegations in the petition.
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner
Villadolid discredited complainant's asse1iion that
respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged
adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Rep01i,
complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving
the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to this
adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible.
However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit in
complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly
immoral conduct by having illicit relations with ODD, CCC,
and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent
disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. which
as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly
provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution. is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.
xxxx
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon I,
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that .. a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"'
nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public
or private life. behave in scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession".32
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following
conclusion and recommendation: V.
Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is
more than sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's
gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character
as an officer of the court and member of the bar, this
Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should
reform his conduct in a manner consistent with the norms
prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility.33
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP
issued a Resolution34 adopting and approving, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of
Governors disbarred respondent, thus:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules and
considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of
the 1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath,
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby
DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off
from the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration35 dated July 3, 2013, to
which complainant was required to submit his
comment.36
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated
June 28, 2012)37 dated August 17, 2013. Similarly,
respondent was required to comment on
complainant's motion in an Order38 dated August 27,
2013. On the same date, complainant filed his
Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration).39 Subsequently,
respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the
Motion for Reconsideration with Leave40 dated
September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the
Comment and/or Opposition41 dated September 20,
2013.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed a resolution denying respondent's motion
for reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for
Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to
this Court on November 11, 2014.43
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondent
committed gross immoral conduct, which would
warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records, the
Court agrees with the Board of Governors'
resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's grossly
immoral conduct was fully supported by the
evidences offered.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life.
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess
and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession.44 Good moral character is not only required for
admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored
fraternity.45
We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension proceedings against a member of
the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition
of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We
explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence
adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence
which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section I of
Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the
following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b)
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying. the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses' interest or want of interest. and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the
trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not
mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or
there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the
decision should be against the party with the burden of proof,
according to the equipoise doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in
suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden
of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations
in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In
case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the
equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the
respondent.46
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant
evidence the grounds by which respondent has been found
committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal
affairs. This Court has, in numerous occasions, revoked the
licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only failed
to retain good moral character in their professional and
personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the
institution of marriage by maintaining illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred
because he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred
by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of
the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his unfitness to be
a lawyer.47
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala
when the Court revoked his privilege to practice law after his
philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in
Arnobit v. Arnobit.48 We ruled:
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the community.
A member of the bar and an officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but must also so
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public
by creating the impression that he is flouting those
moral standards.
xxxx
The fact that respondent s philandering ways are
far removed from the exercise of his profession
would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may
be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his
profession, would show him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges with which his
license and the law invest him. To borrow from
Orbe v. Adaw, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section
27, Rule 138. of the Rules of Court are not !imitative
and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x
x of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity."
To reiterate, possession of good moral character is
not only a condition precedent to the practice of law,
but a continuing qualification for all members of the
bar.49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O.
Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig,50 the Court
disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for blatantly
and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage
by resorting to various legal strategies to render a
facade of validity to his invalid second marriage,
despite the existence of his first marriage. We said:
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance.
which makes 'a mockery of the inviolable social
institution of marriage." In various cases, the Court
has held that disbarment is warranted when a
lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an
illicit relationship with another woman who has
borne him a child.51 (emphasis ours.)
In the present case, complainant alleged that
respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit
relations with both married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007, including
complainant's own wife. Through documentary
evidences in the form of email messages, as well as
the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish
respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by
preponderant evidence. Respondent's main
defense against the alleged illicit relations was that
the same were not sufficiently established. In his
answer, respondent simply argued that
complainant's petition contains self-serving
averments not supported by evidence. Respondent
did not specifically deny complainant's allegations
and, instead, questioned the admissibility of the
supporting documents.1âwphi1 Due to
respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and
even submit his own position paper, the existence
of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC
remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that
respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution, to wit:
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships,
Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution
and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under
oath to protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically A1iicle XV,
Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State.52 (emphasis in the original.)
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with
Commissioner Villadolid' s findings that respondent violated
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well
as Rule I 0.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 10 - A LA WYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 -A lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled
by any artifice.
xxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure
and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the
subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for graft
and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue
Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees to be
investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same
as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367"
herein attached as Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended by the
abovementioned committees to suffer the penalty of
disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein
attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft
and corruption against him is still pending with the
Sandiganbayan."53
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed
out in his Answer that complainant failed to adduce
additional evidence that a case had been filed against him,
and that complainant's statements were merely self-serving
averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply,
respondent even specifically denied complainant's
averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the
IBP-CBD Report, viz:
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions
in his Answer were made in attempt to mislead this
Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or
denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic)
clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to
take advantage of Complainant's position of being not
present in the country and not being able to acquire the
necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the
Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as
well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which states that
"a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the
rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect
only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through
his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of
him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an
officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the
Commission finds that Respondent has violated
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, for which he should be
disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)
In denying complainant's allegations, respondent
had no other intention but to mislead the IBP, which
intention was more so established because
complainant was able to submit supporting
documents in the form of certified true copies of the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and
Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's
finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath
which he took before admission to the Bar, which
states:
I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines: I will support its Constitution and obey
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not
wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same: I will delay no man for money
or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable
arrogance by making a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of his
legal skills by attacking the Petition through
technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the
degree of morality required of him as a member of
the bar, thus warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing,
the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the
IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly,
respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is
found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating
Section 2 of A1iicle XV of the 1987 Constitution,
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03,
and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath
and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the
personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar Confidant
and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the
Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by
the Cou1i Administrator to all the cou1is in the
country for their information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3,
2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G.
Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio).
The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No.
10457, were consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30
September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment
against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant. The
case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia alleged that in
1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two
children, Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and
Virginia separated. He became a dentist and practiced his
profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in1992,
Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage,
which was eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño,
representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action
for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia
Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita
was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old.
The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from
Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned
abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended
Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned that
Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No.
CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole.
Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral
turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to
continue his practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August 2008,
Garcia filed a similar complaint against him before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273.
Sesbreño alleged that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by
resentment and desire for revenge because he acted as pro
bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court
referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for investigation, report
and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008,
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño
before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreño is practicing
law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal
Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only
on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence.
Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice
of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, Garcia
submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño
alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C.
No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged
that his sentence was commuted and the phrase
"with the inherent accessory penalties provided by
law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the
accessory penalty was not deleted, the
disqualification applies only during the term of the
sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that homicide
does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed
that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by extreme
malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him
for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD
Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole
issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is
involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD
ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found
Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal,
this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and
sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that
Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27
July 2001 following his acceptance of the conditions
of his parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment
or suspension. Citing International Rice Research
Institute v. National Labor Relations
Commission,1 the IBPCBD further ruled that
homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude
depending on the degree of the crime. The
IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court
convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and
found that the circumstances leading to the death of
the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD
stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his
companion Christopher Yapchangco was shown to
be a foe of respondent and neither had the victim
Luciano nor his companion Christopher shown to
have wronged the respondent. They simply
happened to be at the wrong place and time the
early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano
solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of
moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme
Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the
respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme
arrogance and feeling of self-importance.
Respondent acted like a god who deserved not to
be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have
shattered the stillness of the early morning with
their boisterous antics, natural display of loud
bravado of drunken men who had one too many.
Respondent’s inordinate over reaction to the
ramblings of drunken men who were not even
directed at respondent reflected poorly on his
fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
Respondent was not only vindictive without a cause;
he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.2
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty.
Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for
having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the
IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be
disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013,
the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for reconsideration
before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño alleged that the IBP-CBD
misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He
alleged that the attendant circumstances in Sorianoare
disparate, distinct, and different from his case. He further
alleged that there was no condition set on the grant of
executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his
full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreño alleged that
after his wife died in an ambush, he already stopped
appearing as private prosecutor in the case for bigamy
against Garcia and that he already advised his clients to
settle their other cases. He alleged that Garcia already
withdrew the complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying Sesbreño’s motion for
reconsideration. The IBPCBD transmitted the records of the
case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD
Case No. 08-2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the
Court’s Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the Court
consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the
crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD
and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February
2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February
2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as
attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.4 Moral
turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to
society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.5
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves
moral turpitude was discussed by this Court in International
Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide
do not involve moral turpitude.1âwphi1 Homicide may or
may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act
and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of
statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally
but not always, crimes mala in seinvolve moral turpitude,
while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be
ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist
by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and
yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which
involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows
therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and
indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the
process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are
reached.7
In People v. Sesbreño,8 the Court found Sesbreño guilty of
homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal
Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul
H. Sesbreñois hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and
hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory
penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of
₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.9
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we
agree with the IBPCBD that the circumstances
show the presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano
Amparado (Amparado) and his companion
Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were
walking and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when
the latter, without any provocation from the former,
went out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started
firing at them. According to Yapchangco, theywere
about five meters, more or less, from the gate of
Sesbreño when they heard the screeching sound of
the gate and when they turned around, they saw
Sesbreño aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and
Amparado ran away but Amparado was hit. An
eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled
that he heard shots and opened the window of his
house. He saw Yapchangco and Amparado running
away while Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly,
hitting Rabanes’ house in the process. Another
witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down
after being shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle
of the street, carrying a long firearm, and walking
back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD
correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco
were just at the wrong place and time. They did not
do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing
done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death
of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the
executive clemency restored his full civil and
political rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty.
Parcasio10 to bolster his argument. In thatcase, Atty.
Parcasio was granted "an absolute and
unconditional pardon"11 which restored his "full civil
and political rights,"12 a circumstance not present
inthese cases. Here, the Order of
Commutation13 did not state that the pardon was
absolute and unconditional. The accessory
penalties were not mentioned when the original
sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation
and they were also not mentioned in stating the
commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the
authority conferred upon me by the Constitution
and upon the recommendation of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of
prisoner RAUL SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by
the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme
Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of from 9 years and 1 day to 16 years and 4
months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of
₱50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of from 7 years and 6
months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an
indemnity of ₱50,000.00.14
Again, there was no mention that the executive
clemency was absolute and unconditional and
restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the
President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.15 In this case, the executive clemency
merely "commuted to an indeterminate prison term
of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment"
the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is
a mere reduction of penalty.16 Commutation only
partially extinguished criminal liability.17 The penalty for
Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served the
commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was
released from prison. More importantly, the Final Release
and Discharge18 stated that "[i]t is understood that such x x x
accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly
remitted herein shall subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has
no application here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted
pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was
a full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege.19 It is granted only to those
possessing good moral character.20 A violation of the high
moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer,
including the penalty of disbarment.21
WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is
DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of this
Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the
country. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8172, April 12, 2016
ALEX NULADA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO
S. PAULMA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a verified
complaint1 for disbarment by reason of dishonesty
and conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
filed by Complainant Alex Nulada (complainant)
against respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma
(respondent).
The Facts
Complainant alleged that on September 30, 2005,
respondent issued in his favor a check in the amount
of P650,000.00 as payment for the latter's debt.
Because of respondent's standing as a respected
member of the community and his being a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Miagao,2 Province of Iloilo, complainant accepted the
check without question.3
Unfortunately, when he presented the check for
payment, it was dishonored due to insufficient fluids.
Respondent failed to make good the amount of the
check despite notice of dishonor and repeated
demands, prompting complainant to file a criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
224 against respondent,5 before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Province of Iloilo,
docketed as I.S. No. 2006-637,6 which issued
a Resolution7 dated May 26, 2006
recommending the filing of the appropriate
information against respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court of Miagao, Province of
Iloilo (MTC).8 Subsequently, said information
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2604.9
After due proceedings, the MTC rendered a
Decision10 dated October 30, 2008 finding
respondent guilty of violation of BP 22 and
ordering him to pay the amount of
P150,000.00 as fine, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay.
Furthermore, he was ordered to pay: (1) the
sum of P650,000.00 representing the amount
of the check with interest pegged at the rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum
computed from the time of the filing of the
complaint; (2) filing fees in the amount of
P10,000.00; and (3) attorney's fees in the
amount of P20,000.00 plus appearance fees
of P1,500.00 per hearing.11
Records show that respondent appealed his
conviction to the Regional Trial Court of
Guimbal, Iloilo, Branch 67 (RTC), docketed as
Criminal Case No. 346.12 In a The Court's Ruling
Decision dated March 13, 2009, the RTC
13
affirmed in toto the MTC ruling. On April 16,
2009, the RTC Decision became final and
executory.14
Prior to the promulgation of the RTC Decision,
or on February 12, 2009, complainant filed
this administrative complaint before the Court,
through the Office of the Bar Confidant.
In his defense,15 respondent denied that he
committed dishonesty against complainant,
as prior to September 30, 2005, he informed
the latter that there were insufficient funds to
cover the amount of the check. Respondent
claimed that he merely issued the check in
order to accommodate a friend in whose favor
he obtained the loan, stressing that he did not
personally benefit from the proceeds
thereof.16 Unfortunately, said friend had died
and respondent had no means by which to
pay for the amount of the check.17 He also
claimed that complainant threatened him and
used his unfunded check to the latter's
personal advantage.18
Thereafter, the Court, in its Resolution dated
November 14, 2011,19 referred this
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for its investigation,
report, and recommendation.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
After conducting mandatory conferences, the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
IBP issued a Report and
Recommendation20 dated June 26, 2013,
recommending that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months for violation of the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR),
as well as for having been found guilty of a
crime involving moral turpitude.21
It found that the offense for which respondent was
found guilty of, i.e., violation of BP 22, involved moral
turpitude, and that he violated his lawyer's oath and
the CPR when he committed the said offense.
Stressing the importance of the lawyer's oath, the IBP
held that by his conviction of the said crime,
respondent has shown that he is "unfit to protect the
administration of justice or that he is no longer of
good moral character"22 which justifies either his
suspension or disbarment.23
Subsequently, or on October 10, 2014, the IBP Board
of Governors issued a Notice of Resolution24 adopting
and approving with modification the IBP's Report and
Recommendation dated June 26, 2013, suspending
respondent from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years for having violated the lawyer's oath and the
CPR, as well as for having been found guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude.25cralawred
The Issue Before the Court
The issue advanced for the Court's resolution is
whether or not respondent should be administratively
disciplined for having been found guilty of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
The Court sustains the findings and conclusions of the
CBD of the IBP, as approved, adopted, and modified
by the IBP Board of Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, Or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do
so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates all members of the bar
"to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law x x x." Rule 1.01 thereof specifically provides that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." By taking the lawyer's
oath, a lawyer becomes a guardian of the law and an
indispensable instrument for the orderly
administration of justice.26 As such, he can be
disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue
to be an officer of the court.27cralawred
In Enriquez v. De Vera,28 the Court discussed the
purpose and nature of a violation of BP 22 in relation
to an administrative case against a lawyer, as in this
case, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[BP] 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the
interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account users. The gravamen of the offense
defined and punished by [BP] 22 [x x x] is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting
it in circulation; the law is designed to
prohibit and altogether eliminate the
deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing
checks with insufficient funds, or with no credit,
because the practice is deemed a public nuisance,
a crime against public order to be abated.
x x x x
Being a lawyer, respondent was well aware of the
objectives and coverage of [BP] 22. If he did not,
he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the
law was penal in character and application. His
issuance of the unfunded check involved herein
knowingly violated [BP] 22, and exhibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of
his illegal act to public interest and public
order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath
that enjoined him to support the Constitution and
29
obey the laws.
Clearly, the issuance of worthless checks in
violation of BP Blg. 22 indicates a lawyer's
unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
on him, shows such lack of personal honesty
and good moral character as to render him
unworthy of public confidence, and
constitutes a ground for disciplinary action.30
In this case, respondent's conviction for
violation of BP 22, a crime involving moral
turpitude, had been indubitably established.
Such conviction has, in fact, already become
final. Consequently, respondent violated the
lawyer's oath, as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the CPR, as aptly found by the IBP and, thus,
must be subjected to disciplinary action.
In Heenan v. Espejo,31 the Court suspended
therein respondent from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years when the latter
issued checks which were dishonored due to
insufficiency of funds. In A-1 Financial
Services, Inc. v. Valerio,32 the same penalty
was imposed by the Court to respondent who
issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Likewise, in Dizon v. De Taza,33 the Court
meted the penalty of suspension for a period
of two (2) years to respondent for having
issued bouncing checks, among other
infractions. Finally, in Wong v. Moya
II,34 respondent was ordered suspended from
the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, because aside from issuing worthless
checks and failure to pay his debts,
respondent also breached his client's trust
and confidence to his personal advantage and
had shown a wanton disregard of the IBP's
Orders in the course of its proceedings.
Accordingly, and in view of the foregoing
instances when the erring lawyer was
suspended for a period of two (2) years for
the same violation, the Court finds it
appropriate to mete the same penalty to
respondent in this case.
As a final word, it should be emphasized that
membership in the legal profession is a
privilege burdened with conditions.35 A lawyer
is required to observe the law and be mindful
of his or her actions whether acting in a public
or private capacity.36 Any transgression of
this duty on his part would not only diminish
his reputation as a lawyer but would also
erode the public's faith in the legal profession
as a whole.37 In this case, respondent's
conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected
of him as a member of the bar, for which he must
suffer the necessary consequences.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Orlando S. Paulma is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of
this Resolution. He is warned that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty.
Paulma's personal record with the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and copies be served to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the
land.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10134 November 26, 2014
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COURT EMPLOYEES
(PACE), represented by its President, ATTY. VIRGINIA C.
RAFAEL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDNA M. ALIBUTDAN-DIAZ, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the complaint for suspension or disbarment
filed by the Philippine Association of Court Employees
(PACE) through its president, Atty. Virginia C. Rafael (Atty.
Rafael), on July 17, 2008 against Atty. Edna M.
Alibutdan-Diaz (Atty. Diaz), former National Treasurer of
PACE, before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).1
PACE, the umbrella association of 1st and 2nd level court
employees in the Judiciary held its 11th National
Convention/Seminar in Davao City from October 6 to 8, 2005.
As then National Treasurer of PACE, Atty. Diaz was
entrusted with all the money matters of PACE.
The complainant alleged that the liquidation for the 11th
PACE national convention was submitted by Atty. Diaz only
on March 29, 2007, during the 12th PACE national
convention in Iloilo City2; that during the 12th convention, an
election of officers was conducted and Atty. Diaz ran for the
position of National Treasurer, but she was not elected; that
on the last day of the convention or on March 31, 2007,the
outgoing Board of Directors, including Atty. Diaz, passed and
approved Resolution No. 1-2007 appropriating the amount of
30,000.00as term-end bonus for each PACE official qualified
thereto; that Atty. Diaz did not submit a liquidation report for
the 12th convention; that there was no turn over of monies
belonging to the association as a matter of procedure
despite a letter of demand, dated June 20, 2007 sent to Atty.
Diaz;3 and that the new set of PACE officers issued Board
Resolution No. 00-07 directing past president, Rosita D.
Amizola; and past treasurer, Atty. Diaz, to explain why they
failed to liquidate the finances of PACE for the Davao and
Iloilo conventions.4
In her defense, Atty. Diaz countered that she had filed the
Statement of Liquidation for the 11th national convention in
Davao in less than a week after the said convention;
that it was duly audited by the national auditor,
Letecia Agbayani; that the net proceeds of that
convention was "fully accounted, liquidated and
entirely deposited to PACE accounts;"5 that she
also filed the Statement of Liquidation for the 12th
national convention on May 22, 2007; that the
report, together with the cash, checks and original
receipts, were received by Rosita Amisola and
witnessed by former PACE officers;6 that she
denied running for re-election as PACE national
treasurer during the Iloilo convention as she had
already filed her certificate of candidacy for Board
Member of the First District of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay;7 that the approval of the ₱30,000.00
term-end bonus did not rest with her solely, rather, it
was approved by the previous board of directors;
and that she never sponsored the bonus, as it was
initiated by Aliven Maderaza and seconded by Atty.
Lourdes Garcia and Sarah Ampong.
On her part, Atty. Garcia averred that she was not
privy to the disbursement of the said term-end
bonus.8
Initially, the case was assigned to IBP
Commissioner Elpidio G. Soriano. After an
exchange of pleadings, the mandatory conference
was held. Afterwards, the protagonists were
directed to submit their respective position papers.
Thereafter, the case was re-assigned to IBP
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez (Commissioner
Fernandez).9
The lone issue here is whether or not Atty. Diaz
violated Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which reads:
"A lawyer should not engage in an unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In his Report and Recommendation, dated June 28,
2010, Commissioner Fernandez recommended the
dismissal of the case against Atty. Diaz for lack of
merit. Atty. Diaz offered documentary evidence to
show that she was able to submit the liquidation
reports for the two aforementioned conventions of
PACE. He also took note that Atty. Rafael herself
acknowledged the liquidation report made by Atty.
Diaz with respect to the Davao City
convention.10 As to the sufficiency and
completeness of these reports, this would be better
resolvedthrough an audit rather than in disbarment
proceedings.1âwphi1 Besides, Commissioner
Fernandez did not consider the position of Atty.
Diaz as national treasurer of PACE to have any
connection with her being as a lawyer. Thus,
according to him, she should be sanctioned in
accordance with the by-laws of PACE instead of a
disbarment case.11
As regards the accusation that Atty. Diaz ran for
re-election in the PACE elections even though she
was no longer connected with the Judiciary and
therefore disqualified, Commissioner Fernandez
opined that the best evidence, which was the
"certificate of candidacy," was never offered,12 and
that Atty. Diaz, being a lawyer, knew that her bid for
re-election would be a useless exercise since she
would not beable to assume office if she won.13
Finally, Commissioner Fernandez believed Atty.
Diaz’s assertion that she never sponsored the
appropriation of the 30,000.00 term-end bonus and
that the approval of Resolution No. 1-2007 was a
collegial action among the Board of Directors.
Again, Commissioner Fernandez was of the view
that her participation in the passage of the questioned board
resolution was not connected to her being a lawyer.14
On November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
(IBP-BOG) passed a resolution adopting and approving the
report and recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez,
and dismissed the complaint against Atty. Diaz.15
On reconsideration, the IBP-BOG issued the Extended
Resolution,16 dated June 21, 2013, granting the
complainant’s motion for reconsideration. It reversedand set
asideits earlier resolution and suspended Atty. Diaz from the
practice of law for one (1) year.17
The IBP-BOG explained that the questions regarding (i) Atty.
Diaz’ liquidation of PACE funds;(ii) her running for re-election
when she was no longer with the Judiciary; and (iii) her
entitlement to the term-end bonus when she was no longer
working in the Judiciary, constituted a "triple -whammy" of
questionable actions18 committed by Atty. Diaz in
contravention of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
This Court agrees with the IBP-BOG and adopts its June 21,
2013 Extended Resolution. Everyone should keep in mind
that the practice of law is only a privilege. It is definitely not a
right. Inorder to enjoy this privilege, one must show that he
possesses, and continues to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a
practitioner's honorable membership in the legal profession.
Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation
and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties,
the other counsels and the courts. They are bound by their
oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according
to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity
to the courts and their clients.19 Time and again, the Court
has held that the practice of law is granted only to those of
good moral character. The Bar maintains a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Thus, lawyers must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are
dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation
of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies
the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including
suspension and disbarment.20
It bears stressing that Atty. Diaz is a servant of the law and
belongs to that profession which society entrusts with the
administration of law and the dispensation of justice. For this,
he or she is an exemplar for others to emulate and should
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. Necessarily, this Court has been exacting in its
demand for integrity and good moral character from
members of the Bar. They are always expected to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and
integrity of this noble profession.21
Atty. Diaz' delay in the liquidation of the finances of PACE;
her running for re-election, including her non-admission that
she ran for said election as shown not by her certificate of
candidacy but by the affidavits of former PACE officers; and
her involvement in the approval or passage of the
questioned term-end bonus of PACE officers, including
herself even though she was no longer working in the
Judiciary, were definitely not the candor the Court speaks of.
There was much to be desired in Atty. Diaz' actions/
inactions.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edna M. Alibutdan-Diaz is found
GUILTY of violating Chapter 1, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) months.
This decision shall be immediately executory.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Court
Administrator for its distribution to all courts of the
land; the IBP; and the Office of the Bar Confidant to
be entered into respondent's personal records as a
member of the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10576 January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by
Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine
Antenor-Cruz Limpin for allegedly filing a false
General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) thus violating
Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los
Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter
as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member
of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned
from his post effective August 11, 2008 and
transferred to St. Luke's Medical Center as the Vice
President for Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate
Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the
SEC a GIS for LCI for "updating purposes". The
GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business
transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008,
LCI applied for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission
on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty.
Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR
by knowingly listing him as a stockholder, Chairman
of the Board and President of LCI when she knew
that he had already resigned and had never held
any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the
BOD or been President of LCI. He also never
received any notice of meeting or agenda where his
appointment as Chairman would be taken up. He
has never accepted any appointment as Chairman
and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing
Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and
President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to
comply with SEC requirements. It would have been
corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for
voluntary dissolution shortly thereafter. She averred that the
GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her
certification served to attest to the information from the last
BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008.5
She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder.
Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin
a text message and asked him to meet with her so hemay
sign a Deed of Assignment concerning shareholdings.
Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would
meet with her on Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however,
neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for
reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s
positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on November 27,
2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting,
Atty. Limpin presented Secretary’s Certificates dated May 16,
20066 , May 22, 20067 , and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarin’s
signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending
criminal complaints against the directors and officers of LCI,
where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas,
et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et al.9 and SEC v. Legacy
Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a
defense that the November 27, 2008 GIS was spurious
and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that "when
the criminal prosecution based on the same act charged is
still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the
criminal case to avoid contradictory findings."11 During the
mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties
stipulated that the complaint filed by Senator Roxas was
dismissed as to Guarin.12
Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present
sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment.1âwphi1 She
stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as
proof of any unethical conduct, harassment and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.0214 of the CPR and thus
recommended that she be suspended from the practice of
law for three months. It noted that based on the submissions
of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI
consequently making him ineligible tobe a member of the
BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the
President of LCI but was a mere signatory of LCI’s bank
accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin
untrue.15
Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles
had the authority to appoint or designate directors or officers
of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was
not legally permissible. Despite knowing this to be irregular,
she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified
that Guarin was a stockholder, chairman and president of the
company. The Secretary’s Certificates with Guarin’s
signature Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since
inthese Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of
bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a
stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013
Resolution16 adopted in totothe CBD Report. Atty. Limpin
moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21,
2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty.
Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01and Rule 1.02 of the
CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty
is to comply with the rules of procedure, ratherthan
seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who
assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who
connives in violating the law commits an act which
justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
Disbarment proceedings are sui generisand can
proceed independently of civil and criminal
cases.1âwphi1 As Justice Malcolm stated "[t]he
serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent.
The presumption is that the attorney is innocent of
the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty
as an officer of the court in accordance with his
oath."21
Grounds for such administrative action against a
lawyer may be found in Section 27,22 Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. Among these are (1) the use of
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office and (2) any violation of the oath which
he is required to take before the admission to
practice.
After going through the submissions and
stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP
that there is no indication that Guarin held any
share to the corporation and that he is therefore
ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD and be the
president of the company.23 It is undisputed that
Atty. Limpin filed and certified that Guarin was a
stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that
she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she
made a due verification of the statements contained
therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin
would sign a Deed of Assignment is
inconsequential: he never signed the instrument.
We also note that there was no submission which
would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact
a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that
contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed
an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a
lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
CPR.1âwphi1
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself
to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr.
de los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD
and officers of the corporation despite the rules
enunciated in the Corporation Code with respect to
the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has
transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty.
Limpin's action m submitting a false document we
see it fit to increase the recommended penalty to
six months suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine
A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin from the
practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon
finality of this Decision, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,
vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for
disbarment dated February 1, 2008 filed by complainant
Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S.
Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for
fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for failing to
keep his client informed of the status of the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized
illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan, secured the services of
respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property
against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad
Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement, respondent
filed the corresponding complaint3 before the Regional Trial
Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually
dismissed by the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for
lack of cause of action and insufficiency of evidence.5 While
respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August
14, 2007,6 complainant learned of the same only on August
24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office.7 On such
occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of
₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs,
but since complainant could not produce the said amount at
that time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the
amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of the
reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the
RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of
₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice
of appeal9 before the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed
complainant’s appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent,
however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed
complainant an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly
issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the
submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his
filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the
notice. Considering the technical requirements for such kind
of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested
for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was
then that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order
was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of
Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative
complaint for disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009,
respondent alleged that it was complainant’s failure to timely
produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees
that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him,
he informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary
period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same.
He also claimed to have assisted complainant "not for money
or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was
blamed for the court’s unfavorable decision.16
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated
September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found
respondent administratively liable, and accordingly
recommended that the penalty of suspension for a
period of one (1) year be meted out against him.18
The Investigating Commissioner found
complainant’s imputations against respondent to be
well-founded, observing that instead of meeting
complainant’s allegations squarely, particularly, the
issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the
partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved
on arguments that hardly had an effect on the
issues at hand.19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not
find credence in respondent’s accusation that the
spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from
complainant, ratiocinating that it was respondent
who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover
up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of
complainant’s appeal and make it appear that there
is still an available relief left for Tan.20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board
of Governors unanimously adopted and approved
the aforesaid report and recommendation.21
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court
concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be
imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the
lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated
on the developments of his case as it is crucial in
maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney
to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his
client’s case. He should notify his client of any
adverse decision to enable his client to decide
whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of
the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of
trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer
should not leave the client in the dark on how the
lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this
connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in
mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance
would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly,
the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client
who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good
amount of professional learning and competence but also a
whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007,
respondent already knew of the dismissal of complainant’s
partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never
bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the
latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he
visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury, respondent
was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal only
on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary
period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly,
respondent failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence
as men of the legal profession commonly possess and
exercise in such matters of professional employment.24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of
complainant’s appeal by fabricating the November 9, 2007
Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it
appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due
course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In so
doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and
deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and
unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant.
Accordingly, respondent clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not
only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether
in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to
continue his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect
to serve his client’s interests with utmost diligence and
competence as well as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect
should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively
sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing
a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep complainant in the
dark and conceal his case’s true status through the use of a
falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross
Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as
unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable;
they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to
practice law.28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in
Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive, viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are
disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s
relationship with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the
essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an
attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral
character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent to
the admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a
lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts
his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar,
and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of
law.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where
lawyers failed to inform their clients of the status of their
respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of
six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court
suspended the lawyer for the same period for his
failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of
the dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in
Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty was
imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to
update his client of the status of his cases,
notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by
falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of
Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In
Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the
lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in
order to mortgage and sell his client’s property. Also,
in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was
meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in
existent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts
of falsification in order to misrepresent to his client,
i.e., complainant, that he still had an available
remedy in his case, when in reality, his case had
long been dismissed for failure to timely file an
appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter.
To the Court, respondent’s acts are so
reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so
flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability
to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His
actions erode rather than enhance the public
perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in
view of the totality of his violations, as well as the
damage and prejudice caused to his client,
respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is
hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN
OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this
Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
OCA IPI No. 12-204-CA-J
Re: VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DISBARMENT
OF AMA LAND, INC. (REPRESENTED BY
JOSEPH B. USITA) AGAINST COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES HON.
DANTON Q. BUESER, HON. SESINANDO E.
VILLON AND HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Unfounded administrative charges against sitting
judges truly degrade their judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for
the Judiciary. The complainant may be held liable
for indirect contempt of court as a means of
vindicating the integrity and reputation of the judges
and the Judiciary.
AMA Land, Inc., (AMALI) brought this administrative
complaint against Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser,
Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and Associate Justice
Ricardo R. Rosario, all members of the Court of Appeals
(CA), charging them with knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, gross misconduct, and violation of their oaths on
account of their promulgation of the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 118994 entitled Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.
v. The Honorable Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
264, Assigned in San Juan, and AMA Land, Inc.
Antecedents
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey
condominium project located along Epifanio Delos Santos
Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack, Mandaluyong
City.1 Due to the project’s location, AMALI would have to use
Fordham Street as an access road and staging area for the
construction activities. In that regard, AMALI needed the
consent of the Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.
(WWRAI). Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI,
which ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a
field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed with a
temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the field
office and set up a fence to deny access to AMALI’s
construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a
petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of way in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The petition,
which included an application for a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
(WPMI), was docketed as Civil Case No. 65668.2 On July 24,
1997, the RTC granted AMALI’s prayer for the WPMI.3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium project
into a 34-storey building of mixed use (to be known as the
AMA Residences) after AMALI’s petition for corporate
rehabilitation was approved.4
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No. 65668
an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a TRO
and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) contained in its
answer. The denial of the prayer for injunction by the RTC
impelled WWRAI to bring a petition for certiorari with an
application for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in
the CA to enjoin the RTC from proceeding in Civil Case No.
65668.5
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted AMALI
to file an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve Temporary
Restraining Order and later on a Compliance and Motion for
Reconsideration.
On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction and
required AMALI to file its Comment. AMALI complied and
filed a Comment which also served as its motion for partial
reconsideration of the July 28, 2011 Resolution. On October
12, 2011, AMALI filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve and to
Approve Counterbond. Allegedly, these motions were left
unresolved when the CA Tenth Division, which included
Associate Justices Bueser and Rosario, required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda.6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of the
CA promulgated a decision granting the petition of WWRAI.7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on certiorari in
this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 202342, entitled AMA Land,
Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents Association, Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint, alleging
that respondent Justices had conspired with the counsels of
WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata and Atty. Myra
Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering an unjust judgment.
AMALI stated that the decision of the CA had been rendered
in bad faith and with conscious and deliberate intent to favor
WWRAI, and to cause grave injustice to AMALI. In thereby
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
respondent Justices were guilty of gross
misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as well as Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1,
Rule 1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has
the burden of proving the allegations of the
complaint by substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so
will lead to the dismissal of the complaint for its lack
of merit. This is because an administrative charge
against any official of the Judiciary must be
supported by at least substantial evidence.10 But
when the charge equates to a criminal offense,
such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy
sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing
of culpability on the part of the judicial officer should
be nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
especially because the charge is penal in
character.11
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing
its charge of knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes
a serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised
Penal Code, provides that any judge who
"knowingly render[s] an unjust judgment in any
case submitted to him for decision" is punished with
prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification. To commit the offense, the offender
must be a judge who is adequately shown to have
rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely
committed an error of judgment or taken the
unpopular side of a controversial point of law.12 The
term knowingly means "sure knowledge, conscious
and deliberate intention to do an injustice."13 Thus,
the complainant must not only prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the judgment is patently
contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but
that it was also made with deliberate intent to
perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence
of malice, corrupt motives or improper
consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield
a judge from the charge of rendering an unjust
decision.14 In other words, the judge was motivated
by hatred, revenge, greed or some other similar
motive in issuing the judgment.15 Bad faith is,
therefore, the ground for liability.16 The failure of the
judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render him administratively liable.17
But who is to determine and declare that the
judgment or final order that the judicial officer
knowingly rendered or issued was unjust? May
such determination and declaration be made in
administrative investigations and proceedings like a
preliminary investigation by the public prosecutor?
The answers to these queries are obvious – only a
superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate
or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions
involved may make such determination and
declaration. Otherwise, the public prosecutor or
administrative hearing officer may be usurping a basic
judicial power of review or supervision lodged by the
Constitution or by law elsewhere in the appellate court.
Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the validity
of the proceedings in the CA through an administrative
complaint. The attack in this manner reflected the pernicious
practice by disgruntled litigants and their lawyers of resorting
to administrative charges against sitting judges instead of
exhausting all their available remedies. We do not tolerate
the practice. In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L.
Ongjoco, Chairman of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN
Multi-Purpose and Transport Service Cooperative, against
Hon. Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and
Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of
Appeals,18 we emphatically held that the filing of
administrative complaints or even threats of the filing
subverted and undermined the independence of the
Judiciary, to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the
administrative complaint was to take respondent Justices to
task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of
upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the
groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his
unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at all,
for even a mere threat of administrative investigation and
prosecution made against a judge to influence or intimidate
him in his regular performance of the judicial office always
subverts and undermines the independence of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought against
any judge in relation to the performance of his official
functions are neither complementary to nor suppletory of
appropriate judicial remedies, nor a substitute for such
remedies. Any party who may feel aggrieved should resort to
these remedies, and exhaust them, instead of resorting to
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions. (Bold
emphasis supplied)
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges against
judicial officers who rule against it in its cases. That
impression is not at all devoid of basis.1âwphi1 The
complaint herein is actually the second one that AMALI has
brought against respondent Justices in relation to the
performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its first
complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA Land, Inc.
against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinando E. Villon
and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario, Associate Justices of the
Court of Appeals,19 AMALI accused respondent Justices of:
(a) dishonesty and violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross
misconduct, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or
order, in violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court; and (b) violating provisions of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct. The Court dismissed the first complaint
upon finding that it centered on the propriety of the
interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The Court appropriately
observed:
A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’
respective allegations disclosed that the acts complained of
relate to the validity of the proceedings before the
respondent CA Justices and the propriety of their orders in
CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done in the exercise of
their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is replete with cases
holding that errors, if any, committed by a judge in the
exercise of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected
through administrative proceedings, but should instead be
assailed through available judicial remedies. Disciplinary
proceedings against justices do not complement,
supplement or substitute judicial remedies and, thus, cannot
be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies
accorded to parties aggrieved by their erroneous orders or
judgments.
xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for
review on certiorari challenging the questioned
order of the respondent CA justices which is still
pending final action by the Court. Consequently, a
decision on the validity of the proceedings and
propriety of the orders of the respondent CA
Justices in this administrative proceeding would be
premature. Besides, even if the subject decision or
portions thereof turn out to be erroneous,
administrative liability will only attach upon proof
that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or
attended by fraud or corruption, which were not
sufficiently shown to exist in this case. Neither was
bias as well as partiality established. Acts or
conduct of the judge clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly shown
before he can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or
malice cannot be inferred simply because the
judgment or order is adverse to a party. Here, other
than AMALI’s bare and self-serving claim that
respondent CA Justices "conspired with WWRAI’s
counsel in knowingly and in bad faith rendering an
unjust judgment and in committing xxx other
misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and
partiality was alleged except for the claim that
respondent CA Justices misapplied the law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the presumption that the
respondent judge has regularly performed his
duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters raised
are best addressed to the evaluation of the Court in
the resolution of AMALI’s petition for review on
certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action
prior to the final resolution of the judicial issues
involved constitutes an abuse of court processes
that serves to disrupt rather than promote the
orderly administration of justice and further clog the
courts’ dockets. Those who seek relief from the
courts must not be allowed to ignore basic legal
rules and abuse of court processes in their efforts to
vindicate their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first.
They are identical, with the complaint herein
containing only a few but insignificant changes in
relation to the first. Both were intended to intimidate
or to disparage respondent Justices in the
performance of their judicial functions.
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints
by AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an
outright disrespect of the authority of the CA and of
this Court. Unfounded administrative charges
against judges truly degrade the judicial office, and
interfere with the due performance of their work for
the Judiciary. Although the Court did not then deem
fit to hold in the first administrative case AMALI or
its representative personally responsible for the
unfounded charges brought against respondent
Justices, it is now time, proper and imperative to do
so in order to uphold the dignity and reputation of
respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of the rest
of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives
have thereby demonstrated their penchant for
harassment of the judges who did not do its bidding,
and they have not stopped doing so even if the
latter were sitting judges. To tolerate the actuations
of AMALI and its representatives would be to
reward them with undeserved impunity for an
obviously wrong attitude towards the Court and its
judicial officers.
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or apprehend
being held to account or to answer for performing his judicial
functions and office because such performance is a matter of
public duty and responsibility. The office and duty to render
and administer justice area function of sovereignty, and
should not be simply taken for granted. As a recognized
commentator on public offices and public officers has
written:20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority
and reason, that no civil action can be sustained against a
judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming
to have been injured by the officer’s judicial action within his
jurisdiction. From the very nature of the case, the officer is
called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the matter,
and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed
when he has exercised it, however erroneous or disastrous
in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to
others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been
advanced in support of this rule. Thus it is said of the judge:
"His doing justice as between particular individuals, when
they have a controversy before him, is not the end and object
which were in view when his court was created, and he was
selected to preside over or sit in it. Courts are created on
public grounds; they are to do justice as between suitors, to
the end that peace and order may prevail in the political
society, and that rights may be protected and preserved. The
duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is public; the
individual advantage or loss results from the proper and
thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty
for which his controversy is only the occasion. The judge
performs his duty to the public by doing justice between
individuals, or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals,
he may be called to account by the State in such form and
before such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as
the duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress,
as for an individual injury, is not admissible."21
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized
representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice
President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of
AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present
complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not be
held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the unfounded
and baseless charges against respondent Justices not only
once but twice. To be clear, the filing of unfounded and
baseless administrative charges against sitting judicial
officers may constitute indirect contempt under Section 3(d),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon
within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of
his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another
to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner
disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice;
(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a
court, and acting as such without authority;
(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as
to prevent the court from issuing process to bring
the respondent into court, or from holding him in
custody pending such proceedings. (3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo
Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines:22
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful
disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In
its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or
disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative
or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings
by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its
presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a
body. In its restricted and more usual sense,
contempt comprehends a despising of the authority,
justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of
court is generic, embracing within its legal
signification a variety of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts, and need not be specifically granted by
statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a
judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no
question that courts have the power by virtue of
their very creation to impose silence, respect, and
decorum in their presence, submission to their
lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and
their officers from the approach and insults of
pollution. The power to punish for contempt
essentially exists for the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and for the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and,
consequently, for the due administration of justice.
The reason behind the power to punish for
contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees
the stability of their institution; without such
guarantee, the institution of the courts would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.23 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the
administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E.
Villon and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for
its utter lack of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph B.
Usita, the Senior Assistant Vice President of AMA
Land, Inc., and all the members of the Board of
Directors of AMA Land, Inc. who had authorized
Usita to bring the administrative complaint against
respondent Associate Justices to show cause in
writing within 10 days from notice why they should
not be punished for indirect contempt of court for
degrading the judicial office of respondent
Associate Justices, and for interfering with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10681 February 3, 2015
SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and BLESILDA S.
CONCEPCION, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case that stemmed from a Verified
Complaint1 filed by complainants Spouses Henry A.
Concepcion (Henry) and Blesilda S. Concepcion (Blesilda;
collectively complainants) against respondent Atty. Elmer A.
dela Rosa (respondent), charging him with gross misconduct
for violating, among others, Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The Facts
In their Verified Complaint, complainants alleged that from
19972 until August 2008,3 respondent served as their
retained lawyer and counsel. In this capacity, respondent
handled many of their cases and was consulted on various
legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a
pawnshop business towards the end of 2005. Said business,
however, failed to materialize.4
Aware of the fact that complainantshad money intact from
their failed business venture, respondent, on March 23, 2006,
called Henry to borrow the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, which
he promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter.
Henry consulted his wife, Blesilda, who, believing that
respondent would be soon returning the money, agreed to
lend the aforesaid sum to respondent. She thereby issued
three (3) EastWest Bank checks5 in respondent’s name:6
Check No. Date Amount Payee
Elmer dela
0000561925 03-23-06 ₱750,000.00
Rosa
Elmer dela
0000561926 03-23-06 ₱850,000.00
Rosa
Elmer dela
0000561927 03-23-06 ₱900,000.00
Rosa
Total: ₱2,500,000.00
Upon receiving the checks, respondent signed a piece of
paper containing: (a) photocopies of the checks; and (b) an
acknowledgment that he received the originals of the
checksand that he agreed to return the ₱2,500,000.00, plus
monthly interest of five percent (5%), within five (5) days.7 In
the afternoon of March 23, 2006, the foregoing checks were
personally encashed by respondent.8
On March 28, 2006, or the day respondent promised to
return the money, he failed to pay complainants. Thus, in
April 2006, complainants began demanding payment but
respondent merely made repeated promises to pay soon. On
July 7, 2008,Blesilda sent a demand letter9 to respondent,
which the latter did not heed.10 On August 4, 2008,
complainants, through their new counsel, Atty. Kathryn
Jessica dela Serna, sent another demand letter11 to
respondent.12 In his Reply,13 the latter denied borrowing any
money from the complainants. Instead, respondent claimed
that a certain Jean Charles Nault (Nault), one of his
other clients, was the real debtor. Complainants
brought the matter to the Office of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de
Oro City. The parties, however, failed to reach a
settlement.14
On January 11, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental
Chapter received complainants’
letter-complaint15 charging respondent with
violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR. The rule
prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from
clients unless the latter’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice.16
In his Comment,17 respondent denied borrowing
₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, insisting that
Nault was the real debtor.18 He also claimed that
complainants had been attempting to collect from
Nault and that he was engaged for that specific
purpose.19
In their letter-reply,20 complainants maintained that
they extended the loan to respondent alone, as
evidenced by the checks issued in the latter’s name.
They categorically denied knowing Nault and
pointed out that it defies common sense for them to
extend an unsecured loan in the amount of
₱2,500,000.00 to a person they do not even know.
Complainants also submitted a copy of the Answer
to Third Party Complaint21 which Nault filed as
third-party defendant in a related collection case
instituted by the complainants against
respondent.22 In said pleading, Nault explicitly
denied knowing complainants and alleged thatit
was respondent who incurred the subject loan from
them.23
On November 23, 2010, the IBP-Misamis Oriental
Chapter endorsed the letter-complaint to the
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),24 which
was later docketed as CBD Case No. 11-2883.25 In
the course of the proceedings, respondent failed to
appear during the scheduled mandatory
conferences.26 Hence, the same were terminated
and the parties were directed to submit their
respective position papers.27 Respondent, however,
did not submit any.
The IBP Report and Recommendation
On April 19, 2013, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Jose I. de La Rama, Jr.
(Investigating Commissioner), issued his
Report28 finding respondent guilty of violating: (a)
Rule 16.04 of the CPR which provides that a lawyer
shall not borrow money from his clients unless the
client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of
the case or by independent advice; (b) Canon 7
which states that a lawyer shall uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the IBP; and (c) Canon 16 which
provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all monies
and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.29
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the
checks were issued in respondent’s name and that
he personally received and encashed them. Annex
"E"30 of the Verified Complaint shows that
respondent acknowledged receipt of the three (3)
EastWest Bank checks and agreed to return the
₱2,500,000.00, plus a pro-rated monthly interest of
five percent (5%), within five (5) days.31
On the other hand, respondent’s claim that Nault was the
real debtor was found to be implausible. The Investigating
Commissioner remarked that if it is true that respondent was
not the one who obtained the loan, he would have responded
to complainants’ demand letter; however, he did not.32 He
also observed that the acknowledgment33 Nault allegedly
signed appeared to have been prepared by respondent
himself.34 Finally, the Investigating Commissioner cited
Nault’s Answer tothe Third Party Complaint which
categorically states that he does not even know the
complainants and that it was respondent alone who obtained
the loan from them.35
In fine, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that
respondent’s actions degraded the integrity of the legal
profession and clearly violated Rule 16.04 and Canons 7 and
16 of the CPR. Respondent’s failure to appear during the
mandatory conferences further showed his disrespect to the
IBP-CBD.36 Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that respondent be disbarred and that he be
ordered to return the ₱2,500,000.00 to complainants, with
stipulated interest.37
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and by the applicable laws and rule, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report in Resolution No.
XX-2013-617 dated May 11, 2013,38 but reduced the penalty
against the respondent to indefinite suspension from the
practice of law and ordered the return of the ₱2,500,000.00
to the complainants with legal interest, instead of stipulated
interest.
Respondent sought a reconsideration39 of Resolution No.
XX-2013-617 which was, however, denied in Resolution No.
XXI-2014-29440 dated May 3, 2014.
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not respondent
should be held administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s findings except as to its
recommended penalty and its directive to return the amount
of ₱2,500,000.00, with legal interest, to complainants.
I.
Respondent’s receipt of the ₱2,500,000.00 loan from
complainants is amply supported by substantial evidence. As
the records bear out, Blesilda, on March 23, 2006, issued
three (3) EastWest Bank Checks, in amounts totalling to
₱2,500,000.00, with respondent as the payee.41 Also, Annex
"E"42 of the Verified Complaint shows that respondent
acknowledged receipt of the checks and agreed to pay the
complainants the loan plus the pro-rated interest of five
percent (5%) per month within five (5) days.43 The dorsal
sides of the checks likewise show that respondent personally
encashed the checks on the day they were issued.44 With
respondent’s direct transactional involvement and the actual
benefit he derived therefrom, absent too any credible
indication tothe contrary, the Court is thus convinced that
respondent was indeedthe one who borrowed the amount of
₱2,500,000.00 from complainants, which amount he had
failed to return, despite their insistent pleas.
Respondent’s theory that Nault is the real debtor hardly
inspires belief. While respondent submitted a document
purporting to be Nault’s acknowledgment of his debt to the
complainants, Nault, in his Answer to Third Party Complaint,
categorically denied knowing the complainants and incurring
the same obligation.
Moreover, as correctly pointed out by complainants,
it would be illogical for them to extend a
₱2,500,000.00 loan without any collateral or
security to a person they do not even know. On the
other hand, complainants were able to submit
documents showing respondent’s receipt of the
checks and their encashment, as well as his
agreement to return the ₱2,500,000.00 plus interest.
This is bolstered by the fact that the loan
transaction was entered into during the existence of
a lawyer-client relationship between him and
complainants,45 allowing the former to wield a
greater influence over the latter in view of the trust
and confidence inherently imbued in such
relationship.
Under Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, a lawyer
is prohibited from borrowing money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected:
CANON 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his clients that may come into his
possession.
Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from
his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client."
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with trust and confidence. And as true as
any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse. The rule against
borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is
intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client.46 The rule
presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to
renege on his obligation.47 In Frias v. Atty.
Lozada48 (Frias) the Court categorically declared
that a lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as
what herein respondent did, is unethical, to wit:
Likewise, her act of borrowing money from a client
was a violation of [Rule] 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case and by independent advice.
A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan, as what
respondent did, is very unethical.1âwphi1 It comes
within those acts considered as abuse of client’s
confidence. The canon presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the
legal maneuverings to renege on her
obligation.49 (Emphasis supplied)
As above-discussed, respondent borrowed money
from complainants who were his clients and whose
interests, by the lack of any security on the loan,
were not fully protected. Owing to their trust and
confidence in respondent, complainants relied
solely on the former’s word that he will return the
money plus interest within five (5) days. However,
respondent abused the same and reneged on his
obligation, giving his previous clients the runaround
up to this day. Accordingly, there is no quibble that
respondent violated Rule 16.04 of the CPR.
In the same vein, the Court finds that respondent also
violated Canon 7 of the CPR which reads: CANON 7 - A
LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY
AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by
blatantly refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the
trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients, and, in so
doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession.Thus, he should be equally held administratively
liable on this score.
That being said, the Court turns tothe proper penalty to be
imposed and the propriety of the IBP’s return directive.
II.
The appropriate penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the
surrounding facts.50
In Frias, the Court suspended the lawyer from the practice of
law for two (2) years after borrowing ₱900,000.00 from her
client, refusing to pay the same despite court order, and
representing conflicting interests.51 Considering the greater
amount involved in this case and respondent's continuous
refusal to pay his deQt, the Court deems it apt to suspend
him from the practice of law for three (3) years, instead of the
IBP's recommendation to suspend him indefinitely.
The Court also deems it appropriate to modify the IBP's
Resolution insofar as it orders respondent to return to
complainants the amount of ₱2,500,000.00 and the legal
interest thereon. It is settled that in disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the
court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the
Bar.52 In such cases, the Court's only concern is the
determination of respondent's administrative liability; it
should not involve his civil liability for money received from
his client in a transaction separate, distinct, and not
intrinsically linked to his professional engagement. In this
case, respondent received the ₱2,500,000.00 as a loan from
complainants and not in consideration of his professional
services. Hence, the IBP's recommended return of the
aforementioned sum lies beyond the ambit of this
administrative case, and thus cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found
guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) years effective upon finality of this Decision, with a
stem warning that a commission of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely. This Decision is immediately
executory upon receipt.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all the
courts.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 191247 July 10, 2013
FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE GUZMAN,
PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, and ROSELLA DE
GUZMANBAUTISTA, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
November 23, 20091 and the February 11,
20102 Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Manila (RTC), in Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled
"Loreta A. Chong v. Sps. Pedro and Rosita de
Guzman," denying the Motion to Determine
Attorney's Fees filed by the petitioner.
The Facts
Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and
Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de Guzman) engaged
the legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr.
(petitioner) as defense counsel in the complaint
filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong)
for annulment of contract and recovery of
possession with damages involving a parcel of land
in Parañaque City, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 1292, with an area of 266 square
meters, more or less. Petitioner’s legal services
commenced from the RTC and ended up in this
Court.3 Spouses de Guzman, represented by
petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the
case was pending before this Court, Spouses de
Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter,
they were substituted by their children, namely:
Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de Guzman,
Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman
(respondents).4
On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to
Determine Attorney’s Fees5 before the RTC. He
alleged, among others, that he had a verbal
agreement with the deceased Spouses de Guzman
that he would get 25% of the market value of the
subject land if the complaint filed against them by
Chong would be dismissed. Despite the fact that he
had successfully represented them, respondents
refused his written demand for payment of the
contracted attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted that
he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25%
percent of the value of the subject land on the basis
of quantum meruit.
On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the
assailed order denying petitioner’s motion on the
ground that it was filed out of time. The RTC stated
that the said motion was filed after the judgment
rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by this
Court, had long become final and executory on
October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote that considering
that the motion was filed too late, it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case because a final decision
could not be amended or corrected except for
clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a
variance of the judgment rendered if his claim for
attorney’s fees would still be included.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
The Issues
This petition is anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DETERMINE ATTORNEY’S
FEES ON THE GROUND THAT IT LOST JURISDICTION
OVER THE CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE
HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING
THAT PETITIONER’S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES
WOULD RESULT IN A VARIANCE OF THE JUDGMENT
THAT HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT
THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION DID NOT BAR
PETITIONER FROM FILING THE MOTION TO RECOVER
HIS ATTORNEY’S FEES.6
Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal
services and orally agreed to pay him 25% of the market
value of the subject land. He argues that a motion to recover
attorney’s fees can be filed and entertained by the court
before and after the judgment becomes final.
Moreover, his oral contract with the deceased spouses can
be considered a quasi-contract upon which an action can be
commenced within six (6) years, pursuant to Article 1145 of
the Civil Code. Because his motion was filed on September 8,
2009, he insists that it was not yet barred by prescription.7
For their part, respondents counter that the motion was
belatedly filed and, as such, it could no longer be granted. In
addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue when it
awarded the amount of ₱10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Respondents further assert that the law, specifically Article
2208 of the Civil Code, allows the recovery of attorney’s fees
under a written agreement. The alleged understanding
between their deceased parents and petitioner, however,
was never put in writing. They also aver that they did not
have any knowledge or information about the existence of an
oral contract, contrary to petitioner’s claims. At any rate, the
respondents believe that the amount of 25% of the market
value of the lot is excessive and unconscionable.8
The Court’s Ruling
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed this
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court because of the denial of his motion to determine
attorney’s fees by the RTC. Apparently, the petitioner
pursued the wrong remedy. Instead of a petition for review
under Rule 45, he should have filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 because this case involves an error of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court.
Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts which prohibits direct resort to this Court unless the
appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower
tribunals.9 In this case, petitioner should have first elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) which has concurrent
jurisdiction, together with this Court, over special civil actions
for certiorari.10 Even so, this principle is not absolute and
admits of certain exceptions, such as in this case,
when it is demanded by the broader interest of
justice.11
Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has
allowed a petition to prosper despite the utilization
of an improper remedy with the reasoning that the
inflexibility or rigidity of the application of the rules
of procedure must give way to serve the higher
ends of justice. The strict application of procedural
technicalities should not hinder the speedy
disposition of the case on the merits.12 Thus, this
Court deems it expedient to consider this petition as
having been filed under Rule 65.
With respect to the merits of the case, the Court
finds in favor of petitioner.
In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is
necessary to discuss the two concepts of attorney’s
fees – ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary
sense, it is the reasonable compensation paid to a
lawyer by his client for legal services rendered. In
its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court
to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing
party as indemnity for damages.13 Although both
concepts are similar in some respects, they differ
from each other, as further explained below:
The attorney’s fee which a court may, in proper
cases, award to a winning litigant is, strictly
speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that
which a client pays his counsel for the latter’s
professional services. However, the two concepts
have many things in common that a treatment of
the subject is necessary. The award that the court
may grant to a successful party by way of attorney’s
fee is an indemnity for damages sustained by him in
prosecuting or defending, through counsel, his
cause in court. It may be decreed in favor of the
party, not his lawyer, in any of the instances
authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorney’s
fee which a client pays his counsel refers to the
compensation for the latter’s services. The losing
party against whom damages by way of attorney’s
fees may be assessed is not bound by, nor is his
liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the
prevailing party with his lawyer. The amount
stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however,
be taken into account by the court in fixing the
amount of counsel fees as an element of damages.
The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party
litigant and not to his lawyer. It forms part of his
judgment recoveries against the losing party. The
client and his lawyer may, however, agree that
whatever attorney’s fee as an element of damages
the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as
his compensation or as part thereof. In such a case,
the court upon proper motion may require the losing
party to pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the
prevailing party.
The two concepts of attorney’s fees are similar in
other respects. They both require, as a prerequisite
to their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of
professional services by a lawyer. As a client may
not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of his
lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a
party be not held liable for attorney’s fees as
damages in favor of the winning party who enforced
his rights without the assistance of counsel.
Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control
and modification. And the rules governing the
determination of their reasonable amount are
applicable in one as in the other.14 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
In the case at bench, the attorney’s fees being claimed by
the petitioner refers to the compensation for professional
services rendered, and not as indemnity for damages. He is
demanding payment from respondents for having
successfully handled the civil case filed by Chong against
Spouses de Guzman. The award of attorney’s fees by the
RTC in the amount of ₱10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de
Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and
this Court, is of no moment. The said award, made in its
extraordinary concept as indemnity for damages, forms part
of the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to
be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by
respondents) and not to petitioner. Thus, to grant petitioner’s
motion to determine attorney’s fees would not result in a
double award of attorney’s fees. And, contrary to the RTC
ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and
executory decision or variance in judgment.
The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1)
How can attorney’s fees for professional services be
recovered? (2) When can an action for attorney’s fees for
professional services be filed? The case of Traders Royal
Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC15 is
instructive:
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of
bonus differentials in NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466,
private respondent’s present claim for attorney’s fees may be
filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated,
especially after its earlier decision had been reviewed and
partially affirmed. It is well settled that a claim for attorney’s
fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the
services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate
action.
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering
attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be
availed of only when something is due to the client.
Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main
litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is
at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney’s fees
only arises when something has been recovered from which
the fee is to be paid.
While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before the
judgment is rendered, the determination as to the propriety
of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in
abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer’s claim
for attorney’s fees may arise has become final. Otherwise,
the determination to be made by the courts will be premature.
Of course, a petition for attorney’s fees may be filed before
the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds
thereof delivered to the client.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has
two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees.
Hence, private respondent was well within his rights when he
made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for
holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the
award’s complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may
file a claim for fees in the same action only before the
judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him
of his aforestated options and render ineffective the
foregoing pronouncements of this Court. [Emphases and
underscoring supplied]
In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in
the main action, which is permitted by the rules. As to the
timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the questioned
motion to determine attorney’s fees was seasonably filed.
The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision
became final and executory on October 31,
2007.1âwphi1 There is no dispute that petitioner filed his
Motion to Determine Attorney’s Fees on September 8, 2009,
which was only about one (1) year and eleven (11) months
from the finality of the RTC decision. Because petitioner
claims to have had an oral contract of attorney’s
fees with the deceased spouses, Article 1145 of the
Civil Code16 allows him a period of six (6) years
within which to file an action to recover professional
fees for services rendered. Respondents never
asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de
Guzman refused petitioner’s legal representation.
For this reason, petitioner’s cause of action began
to run only from the time the respondents refused to
pay him his attorney’s fees, as similarly held in the
case of Anido v. Negado:17
In the case at bar, private respondent’s allegation in
the complaint that petitioners refused to sign the
contract for legal services in October 1978, and his
filing of the complaint only on November 23, 1987
or more than nine years after his cause of action
arising from the breach of the oral contract between
him and petitioners point to the conclusion that the
six-year prescriptive period within which to file an
action based on such oral contract under Article
1145 of the Civil Code had already lapsed.
As a lawyer, private respondent should have known
that he only had six years from the time petitioners
refused to sign the contract for legal services and to
acknowledge that they had engaged his services
for the settlement of their parents’ estate within
which to file his complaint for collection of legal fees
for the services which he rendered in their favor.
[Emphases supplied]
At this juncture, having established that petitioner is
entitled to attorney’s fees and that he filed his claim
well within the prescribed period, the proper remedy
is to remand the case to the RTC for the
determination of the correct amount of attorney’s
fees. Such a procedural route, however, would only
contribute to the delay of the final disposition of the
controversy as any ruling by the trial court on the
matter would still be open for questioning before the
CA and this Court. In the interest of justice, this
Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and
simply resolve the matter at this level. The Court
has previously exercised its discretion in the same
way in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay:18
In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees
between the attorney and his client, and the
intervention of the courts is sought, the
determination requires that there be evidence to
prove the amount of fees and the extent and value
of the services rendered, taking into account the
facts determinative thereof. Ordinarily, therefore,
the determination of the attorney’s fees on quantum
meruit is remanded to the lower court for the
purpose. However, it will be just and equitable to
now assess and fix the attorney’s fees of both
attorneys in order that the resolution of "a
comparatively simple controversy," as Justice
Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank Employees
Union-Independent v. NLRC, would not be
needlessly prolonged, by taking into due
consideration the accepted guidelines and so much
of the pertinent data as are extant in the
records.19 [Emphasis supplied]
With respect to petitioner’s entitlement to the
claimed attorney’s fees, it is the Court’s considered
view that he is deserving of it and that the amount
should be based on quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he
deserves – is used as basis for determining an
attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an
express agreement. The recovery of attorney’s fees
on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that prevents an
unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the
legal services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids
unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney himself. An
attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable
compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause,
taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of
legal fees.20
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists
the guidelines for determining the proper amount of attorney
fees, to wit:
Rule 20.1 – A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors
in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or
required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of
acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the
schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits
resulting to the client from the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or
established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for
respondents’ deceased parents in the civil case for
annulment of contract and recovery of possession with
damages. He successfully represented Spouses de Guzman
from the trial court level in 1990 up to this Court in 2007, for a
lengthy period of 17 years. After their tragic death in 2003,
petitioner filed a notice of death and a motion for substitution
of parties with entry of appearance and motion to resolve the
case before this Court.21 As a consequence of his efforts, the
respondents were substituted in the place of their parents
and were benefited by the favorable outcome of the case.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel
for deceased Spouses de Guzman and respondents for
almost seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that it was
not an easy task for petitioner to defend his clients’ cause for
such a long period of time, considering the heavy and
demanding legal workload of petitioner which included the
research and preparation of pleadings, the gathering of
documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various
legal work necessary to the defense of Spouses de Guzman.
It cannot be denied that petitioner devoted much time and
energy in handling the case for respondents. Given the
considerable amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted
by petitioner, and the quality of work shown by him in
ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner
clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable attorney’s fees
for services rendered. Justice and equity dictate that
petitioner be paid his professional fee based on quantum
meruit.
The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the
attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure him his honorarium
lawfully earned as a means to preserve the
decorum and respectability of the legal profession.
A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection
against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of
his client as the client against abuse on the part of
his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to
see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful
manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid
his just fees. With his capital consisting of his brains
and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not
only in money but in expenditure of time and energy,
he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal
against any attempt on the part of his client to
escape payment of his just compensation. It would
be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to
secure justice for his client he himself would not get
his due.22
The Court, however, is resistant in granting
petitioner's prayer for an award of 25% attorney's
fees based on the value of the property subject of
litigation because petitioner failed to clearly
substantiate the details of his oral agreement with
Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable
amount of attorney's fees should be 15% of the
market value of the property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to
Determine Attorney's Fees filed by petitioner Atty.
Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based on quantum meruit,
the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15%
of the market value of the parcel of land, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the time of
payment.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9860 September 11, 2013
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA,
MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN
OROLA-BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA
OROLA-CALIP, and
KARENOROLA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court’s resolution is a disbarment
complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Joseph
Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule
15.03, Canon 15 (Rule 15.03) of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section
20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Rules).
The Facts
Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all
surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola-Belarga
(Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip
(Marjorie) are the children of the late Trinidad
Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q.
Orola (Emilio).2
Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter
of Maricar Alba-Orola (Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola
(Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named
complainants and the son of Emilio.3
In the settlement of Trinidad’s estate, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and
docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the parties
were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty.
Villa) as counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna,
Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie (Heirs of Trinidad); (b)
Atty.Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and
in behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs4 of the late
Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), with respondent as collaborating
counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel for and in
behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of
Trinidad’s estate. In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs
of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of
Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the
appointment of the latter’s son, Manuel Orola, which the
RTC granted in an Order5 dated September 20, 2007 (RTC
Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, respondent
filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for
Emilio in the same case and moved for the reconsideration
of the RTC Order.6
Due to the respondent’s new engagement, complainants
filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines(IBP), claiming that he violated: (a)
Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent
conflicting interests in the subject case;7 and (b) Section
20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of
Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed that while Maricar,
the surviving spouse of Antonio and the mother of Karen,
consented to the withdrawal of respondent’s appearance,
the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he
had already entered his appearance for Emilio on October
10, 2007.9 In this accord, respondent failed to disclose such
fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to
obtain their written consent as required under the Rules.10
For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned
charges, contending that he never appeared as counsel for
the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He pointed
out that the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of
Trinidad were represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of
Antonio were exclusively represented by Atty.
Azarraga.11 He averred that he only accommodated
Maricar's request to temporarily appear on her behalf as their
counsel of record could not attend the scheduled June16
and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat
were free of charge.12 In fact, he obtained Maricar’s
permission for him to withdraw from the case as no further
communications transpired after these two hearings.
Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to
represent Emilio in the same case.13 He added that he had
no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had other heirs
and, in this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed
to him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any
instance.14 Finally, he clarified that his representation for
Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather
than a litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged
between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance on
December 6, 2007.16 In support of his assertions, respondent
submitted the affidavits of Maricar17 and Atty.
Azarraga18 relative to his limited appearance and his
consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as counsel
for Emilio.
The Recommendation and Action of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15,
2008submitted by IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I.
De La Rama, Jr.(Investigating Commissioner), respondent
was found guilty of representing conflicting interests only
with respect to Karen as the records of the cases how that he
never acted as counsel for the other complainants. The
Investigating Commissioner observed that while
respondent's withdrawal of appearance was with
the express conformity of Maricar, respondent
nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen,
who was already of age and one of the Heirs of
Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the
Code.20
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner
held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule
138 of the Rules as complainants themselves
admitted that respondent "did not acquire
confidential information from his former client nor
did he use against the latter any knowledge
obtained in the course of his previous
employment."21 Considering that it was
respondent's first offense, the Investigating
Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment
too harsh a penalty and, instead, recommended
that he be severely reprimanded for his act with
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
would be dealt with more severely.22
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification the aforementioned report in its
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December
11, 2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding
the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules but
imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6)
months suspension from the practice of law.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was
denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-2013-1725 dated
January 3, 2013.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not
respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court concurs with the IBP’s finding that
respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but
reduced the recommended period of suspension to
three (3) months.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS ANDTRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer
is prohibited from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition
is founded on the principles of public policy and
good taste.26 It behooves lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount
importance in the administration of justice.27 In
Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the Court explained
the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is" whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of
the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge
of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.29 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
It must, however, be noted that a lawyer’s immutable duty to
a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of
the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
client’s interests only on matters that he previously handled
for the former client and not for matters that arose after the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated.30
Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with
the IBP’s finding that respondent represented conflicting
interests and, perforce, must be held administratively liable
therefor.
Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating
counsel not only for Maricar as claimed by him, but for all the
Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In the
course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio
succeeded in removing Emilio as administrator for having
committed acts prejudicial to their interests. Hence, when
respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of
seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case,
he clearly worked against the very interest of the Heirs of
Antonio – particularly, Karen – in violation of the
above-stated rule.
Respondent's justification that no confidential information
was relayed to him cannot fully exculpate him for the charges
against him since the rule on conflict of interests, as
enunciated in
Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from
representation with respect to opposing parties in the same
case.1âwphi1 In other words, a lawyer cannot change his
representation from one party to the latter’s opponent in the
same case. That respondent’s previous appearances for and
in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio was only a friendly
accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since
the aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote
or merely probable or even if the lawyer has acted in good
faith and with no intention to represent conflicting interests.31
Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement
by Emilio was more of a mediator than a litigator and for the
purpose of forging a settlement among the family members
render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion,
his conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04,32 Canon
15 of the Code similarly requires the lawyer to obtain the
written consent of all concerned before he may act as
mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Irrefragably, respondent failed in this respect as the records
show that respondent was remiss in his duty to make a full
disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilio’s counsel
to all the Heirs of Antonio – particularly, Karen – and equally
secure their express written consent before consummating
the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a lawyer who
acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent
any of the parties to it.33 Accordingly, for
respondent’s violation of the aforestated rules,
disciplinary sanction is warranted.
In this case, the penalty recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner was increased from
severe reprimand to a suspension of six(6) months
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that
the said resolution is bereft of any explanation
showing the bases of the IBP Board of Governors’
modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a),
Rule 139-B of the Rules which specifically
mandates that "the decision of the Board upon such
review shall be in writing and shall clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it
is based."34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the
change in the recommended penalty without any
ample justification therefor. To this end, the Court is
wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the
importance of the requirement to announce in plain
terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that
its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state
the facts and the reasons on which the same is
based is akin to what is required of courts in
promulgating their decisions. The reasons for
handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station
than any other portion of the ratio.35
In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into
consideration the following factors:
first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is
undisputed that respondent merely accommodated
Maricar's request out of gratis to temporarily
represent her only during the June 16 and July 14,
2006 hearings due to her lawyer's unavailability;
third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had
no knowledge that the late Antonio had any other
heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually
acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as
counsel for and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be
said that he acted in good faith; and fourth,
complainants admit that respondent did not acquire
confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio
nor did he use against them any knowledge
obtained in the course of his previous employment,
hence, the said heirs were not in any manner
prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with
Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. Lakin,
Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for a period of
three months to the counsel therein who
represented parties whose interests are hostile to
his other clients in another case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador
Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months, with
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014
REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case against respondent Atty.
Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional and unethical
conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private
complainant Rebecca Marie Uy Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca),
represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo
(Bella).
The Facts
Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the
late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was adjudged as the
sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an
Order2 dated August 10, 1999 issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l
(SP 95-75201). At the time of her death, Pacita was a
stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in
acquiring, developing, and leasing real properties, namely,
Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development
Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation, Distelleria La
Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3
In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through
her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that respondent, her
alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and
refused to comply with the court order in SP 95-75201
declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s
properties, as well as her requests for the accounting and
delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits
coming from Pacita’s stockholdings in the aforementioned
corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged a
commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor of Philippine
Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite
an existing Trust Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993
(subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his
capacity as President of URCI, already recognized her to be
the true and beneficial owner of the same.10 Accordingly, she
demanded that respondent return the said property by
executing the corresponding deed of conveyance in her
favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the
proceeds therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation,
Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2, 2005 or
after she had already instituted various legal actions and
remedies that respondent and URCIagreed to transfer the
subject property to her pursuant to a compromise
agreement.12
In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent
denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the affirmative
defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out
that Rebecca had filed several cases raising the single issue
on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement.
He also contended that the parties’ transactions in this case
were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a complaint
having been filed until Bella came into the picture and
instituted various suits covering the same issue.14 As such,
he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed
for the payment of moral damages and attorney’s fees by
way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for
the reason that "the facts surrounding the same
arose out of a misunderstanding and
misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their
dispute."17
However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a
Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18 praying that the investigation of the
charges against respondent continue in order to
weed out erring members of the legal profession.19
The Report and Recommendation of the IBP
On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
issuedhis Report and Recommendation,20 finding
respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the
penalty of suspension for a period of six (6)
months.21
On matters of procedure, the Investigating
Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to
withdraw did notserve as a bar for the further
consideration and investigation ofthe administrative
case against respondent. As basis, he cites Section
5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides
that "[n]o investigation shall be interrupted or
terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges,
or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same." Separately, the Investigating Commissioner
denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that
disciplinary cases are sui generis and may,
therefore, proceed independently.22
On the merits of the charge, the Investigating
Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the
good moral character required from members of the
Bar when the latter failed to comply with the
demands of Rebecca under the subject trust
agreement, not to mention his unworthy and
deceitful acts of mortgaging the subject property
without the former’s consent. In fine, respondent
was found guilty of serious misconduct in violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the
above-stated penalty was recommended.23
In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The basic issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to
the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of
misconduct, viz.:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the
errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the factual
circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise
to the present administrative case largely constitutes an
internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the
parties. This is clearly exhibited by Rebecca’s motion to
withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise
agreement forged in Civil Case No. 04-108887 which
involves the subject property’s alleged disposition in violation
of the subject trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his
failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca – which she
takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust
agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of mortgaging the
subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from
his own assertion of the rights he believed he had over the
subject property. The propriety of said courses of action
eludes the Court’s determination,for that matter had never
been resolved on its merits in view of the aforementioned
settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw
that the allegations she had previously made arose out of a
"misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute"
and even adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her]
the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x toher entire
satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully
convinced that [her] complaint has no basis in fact and in
law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts,
the observations of the Investigating Commissioner, as
adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the
finding of "serious misconduct" which would warrant its
recommended penalty.1âwphi1
Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that
respondent committed some form of misconduct by, as
admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding
the apparent dispute over the same. Regardless of the
merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited
prudent restraint becoming of a legal exemplar. He should
not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of
committing a property violation nor any action which would
endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the Bar
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent
blemished not only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but
also that of the legal profession. In other words, his conduct
fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
guardian of law and justice. Although to a lesser extent as
compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court
still holds respondent guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1
of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well
as the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court
believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found
GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to
pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00 within ten (10) days from receipt
of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's
record in this Court as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7360 July 24,2012
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN,
JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I.
Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty. Joselito M.
Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three
causes of action against Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty.
Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the
same case for which he previously appeared as
prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then
colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio)
for P30,000; and (3) the Sandiganbayan convicted
Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct
bribery. Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP)
Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B. Funa
(Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the
first cause of action and recommended the penalty
of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP
twice modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation:
first, to a suspension of six months, then to a
suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay
City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa appeared as public
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People
of the Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo,
et al." (Esperon case), for the complex crime of
double frustrated murder, in which case Atty.
Catalan was one of the private complainants. Atty.
Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of
prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial
Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused
Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private counsel in a
case where he previously appeared as public
prosecutor, hence violating Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also
alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa
and the accused are relatives and have the same
middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias
in the accused’s favor. Atty. Silvosa caused
numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by
arguing against the position of the private
prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor
Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to
relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling the Esperon
case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the
accused on 16 November 2005. On 23 November
2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as
counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate
bail pending finality of judgment of the Esperon
case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan
presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In a case for
frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was
a respondent, Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of
the investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical
injuries. During the hearing before Comm. Funa, Pros.
Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time,
Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings
and uphold the charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented
the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776,
convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18 May 2006.
Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty.
Silvosa before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s
father-in-law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still
remained in detention for more than two years. Atty. Silvosa
demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the
case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an
entrapment operation for Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television
program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual
entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted
as evidence, and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite
Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the Sandiganbayan
convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal
Case No. 27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA
GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of direct
bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, one year, one month and eleven days
of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six
months and twenty days of prision correccional, as
maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa
states that he resigned as prosecutor from the Esperon case
on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its decision in
the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the
accused’s bail. Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was
only for the purpose of the reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa
also denies any relationship between himself and the
accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros.
Toribio’s allegations as "self-serving" and "purposely dug by
[Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his
conviction by the Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he
asserts that "conviction under the 2nd paragraph of Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a
crime.’" He further claims that "it is not the lawyer in
respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a public
officer, the charge against respondent for which he was
convicted falling under the category of crimes against public
officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008,
Comm. Funa found that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility [are] quite
clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal Case No.
10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in
said case would be unavailing. The fact is that he is
presumed to have acquainted himself with the facts of said
case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the
case. Such would constitute sufficient intervention in the
case. The fact that, subsequently, [Atty. Silvosa]
entered his appearance in said case only to file
a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still
constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such act is
sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty
to dissect a claim of bribery that occurred more than
seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting
allegations are merely based on the word of one
person against the word of another. With [Atty.
Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of
witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone
unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the
alleged incident occurred more than seven (7)
years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment
case was filed on November 2006. Such a long
period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the
veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the
bribe money could not be ascertained and verified
with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly
points out that herein complainant has no personal
knowledge about the charge of extortion for which
[Atty. Silvosa] was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
[Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor was
he ever involved in said case. The findings of the
Sandiganbayan are not binding upon this
Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding
are not binding in a disbarment proceeding. No
evidence has been presented relating to the alleged
extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that
[Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First Charge in
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and should be given the penalty of
REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of
Comm. Funa and suspended Atty. Silvosa from the
practice of law for six months. In another Resolution
dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors increased the penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s
suspension from the practice of law to two years.
The Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice
of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1
March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first
cause of action and modify its recommendations in
the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that
"A lawyer shall not, after leaving government
service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on
the hand, relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that "A
lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons the
cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on
Canon 14 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty.
Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he entered his
appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond
Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa conveniently forgot
Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the
same case on two occasions can only be described as
desperate. He claims his participation as public prosecutor
was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial
conference. He likewise claims his subsequent participation
as collaborating counsel was limited only to the
reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to
take heed of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his
professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor — when he is
listening to his client’s preliminary statement of his case, or
when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is
drawing his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s
pleadings, or advocating his client’s cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the
bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for
testing incompatibility of interests. This stern rule is designed
not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from
fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer
from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. It is
founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has
been said in another case, the question is not necessarily
one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney
has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife,
not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only
thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting
interests applies although the attorney’s intentions were
honest and he acted in good faith.5
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and
casts doubt on its veracity by emphasizing the delay in
presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. Funa, by
stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of
the facts with certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa.
Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling, however, the records show
that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio and
failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999,
a day after the failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by
Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the IBP-Bukidnon
Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make
false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the
other hand, merely denied the accusation and dismissed it
as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still
maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an
administrative complaint against a member of the bar does
not automatically exonerate a respondent. Administrative
offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act
complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a
criminal proceeding are not binding in a disbarment
proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by
any interested person. There can be no doubt of the
right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the
proper authority acts and doings of public officers
which a citizen feels are incompatible with the
duties of the office and from which conduct the
public might or does suffer undesirable
consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the
disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio,
or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person. The
complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits
of persons having personal knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may
substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or
upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a Chapter
Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person,
initiate and prosecute proper charges against erring
attorneys including those in government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the
complainant in Criminal Case No. 27776, and that
Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not
presented as a witness in the present case. There
is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in
Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public
record and is already final. Atty. Catalan supported
his allegation by submitting documentary evidence
of the Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case
No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted, against
his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude is a ground for disbarment. Moral
turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys
by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from
his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he
is required to take before admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer
review a final judgment of conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving
moral turpitude. In Magno v. COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect
admitted all the elements of the crime of direct
bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift
or present by himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing some
crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to
refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do;
and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he
executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The
fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and
deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors,
denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary
to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude. (Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his
failed attempt at bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the
penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s final
conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under
one of the grounds for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule
138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa’s
conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a
penalty more severe than suspension because we find that
Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting standards of
morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His
excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer,
but as a public officer, is unacceptable and betrays the
unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The practice
of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself
unfit to exercise this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is
hereby DISBARRED and his name ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to
be appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration
for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6116 August 1, 2012
ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint for
disbarment filed by complainant Engr. Gilbert
Tumbokon against respondent Atty. Mariano R.
Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross misconduct
constituting deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
In his Complaint,1 complainant narrated that
respondent undertook to give him 20% commission,
later reduced to 10%, of the attorney's fees the
latter would receive in representing Spouses
Amable and Rosalinda Yap (Sps. Yap), whom he
referred, in an action for partition of the estate of the
late Benjamin Yap (Civil Case No. 4986 before the
Regional Trial Court of Aklan). Their agreement
was reflected in a letter2 dated August 11, 1995.
However, respondent failed to pay him the agreed
commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's
fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about ₱
40 million. Instead, he was informed through a
letter3 dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed
to pay the same after respondent had agreed to
reduce his attorney's fees from 25% to 17%. He
then demanded the payment of his
commission4 which respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has
not lived up to the high moral standards required of
his profession for having abandoned his legal wife,
Milagros Hilado, with whom he has two children,
and cohabited with Mae FlorGalido, with whom he
has four children. He also accused respondent of
engaging in money-lending business5 without the
required authorization from the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he
accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee
basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed
the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and
claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay
complainant's commission which he clarified in his
July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint and for the
corresponding sanction against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Florencio B. Gonzales, for filing a
baseless complaint.6
In the Resolution7 dated February 16, 2004, the
Court resolved to refer this administrative case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his
Report and Recommendation8 dated October 10,
2008, the Investigating IBP Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for
one (1) year from the active practice of law, for
violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1;
Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
same in its Resolution No. XIX-2010-4539 dated August
28, 2010. Respondent moved for reconsideration10 which
was denied in Resolution No. XIX-2011-141 dated October
28, 2011.
After due consideration, We adopt the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess and continue to
possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such,
lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard
of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the
legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance
with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11 Lawyers
may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of
the above standards whether in their professional or in their
private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had
attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was
belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have
undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but
passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly,
respondent has violated Rule 9.02,12 Canon 9 of the Code
which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide
a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice
law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case
at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he
abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with
whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral
character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the
Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations
outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage
and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently, We find no reason to
disturb the IBP's finding that respondent violated the
Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money
lending not to have been sufficiently established.1âwphi1 A
"business" requires some form of investment and a sufficient
number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit
on a consistent basis.15 The lending of money to a single
person without showing that such service is made available
to other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed
asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of
lending.
Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be
sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the power to
disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as
member of the bar,16 or the misconduct borders on the
criminal, or committed under scandalous
circumstance,17 which do not obtain here. Considering the
circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year as recommended.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. MARIANO R.
PEFIANCO is found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the same Code
and SUSPENDED from the active practice of law ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon notice hereof.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the
personal record of respondent as a member of the
Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation
to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7593
ALVIN S. FELICIANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARMELITA BAUTISTA
LOZADA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated
August 2, 2007 filed by Alvin S. Feliciano
(complainant) against respondent Atty. Carmelita
Bautista-Lozada (Atty. Lozada) for violation of
Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records,
are as follows:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc
promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656 entitled
"Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista
Lozada"3 suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Carmencita
Bautista Lozada is hereby found guilty of violating
Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and
executory decision of the Court of Appeals. She is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years from notice, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts
of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as
well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, for their
information and guidance, and let it be entered in
respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.4
On May 4, 2006, the Court denied with finality Atty.
Lozada's motion for reconsideration.5
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for
injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction docketed as Civil Case no. 101-V-07
entitled "Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S.
Feliciano, et al.," where complainant was one of the
respondents, complainant lamented that Atty.
Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and
her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively
participated in the proceedings of the case before
Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela
City. To prove his allegation, complainant submitted
certified true copies of the minutes of the hearings,
dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007,
wherein Atty. Lozada signed her name as one of
the counsels,6 as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada
conducted direct examination and cross-examination of the
witnesses during the trial proceedings.7
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing
as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law
constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the
Court which suspended her from the practice of law for two
(2) years.
On September 12, 2007, the Court resolved to require Atty.
Lozada to comment on the complaint against him.8
In her Comment9 dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada
explained that she was forced by circumstances and her
desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled
in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good
faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto Lozada is not
within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is
defending her husband and not a client.1awp++i1 She
insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and
his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no
choice but to give him legal assistance.10
On January 30, 2008, the Court referred the instant case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation.11
In its Report and Recommendation12 dated March 9, 2009,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Lozada guilty of violating
Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the
practice of law as imposed by the Court. Thus, the IBP-CBD
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.
On May 14, 2011, however, the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve with modification the report
and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it
recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended from
the practice of law for three (3) months.
RULING
We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors with
modification.
Indeed, this Court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate
the practice of law. When this Court orders a lawyer
suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case,
the lawyer must desist from performing all functions requiring
the application of legal knowledge within the period of
suspension.13
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in
or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It includes
"[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which]
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."14
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based
on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for
and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and cross-
examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the
findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of
Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in the practice of law in
June-July 2007 were done within the period of her two
(2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would
then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot
practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when
Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her husband in
Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the
proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two
(2)-year suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada's defense of good faith fails to
convince. She knew very well that at the time she
represented her husband, she is still serving her
two (2)-year suspension order. Yet, she failed to
inform the court about it. Neither did she seek any
clearance or clarification from the Court if she can
represent her husband. While we understand her
devotion and desire to defend her husband whom
she believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty.
Lozada should not forget that she is first and
foremost, an officer of the court who is bound to
obey the lawful order of the Court.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended, willful disobedience to any
lawful order of a superior court is a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor.1âwphi1 - A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing
as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.15
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher
penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact that it is
part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity,
families will always look out and extend a helping
hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a
spouse. Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's
actuation was prompted by her affection to her
husband and that in essence, she was not
representing a client but rather a spouse, we deem
it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
Following the recent case of Victor C. Lingan v. Atty.
Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga,16 citing
Molina v. Atty. Magat,17 where this Court
suspended further respondents from the practice of
law for six (6) months for practicing their profession
despite this court's previous order of suspension,
we, thus, impose the same penalty on Atty. Lozada
for representing her husband as counsel despite
lack of authority to practice law.
Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to
purge the law profession of unworthy members of
the bar. It is intended to preserve the nobility and
honor of the legal profession. While the Supreme
Court has the plenary power to discipline erring
lawyers through this kind of proceedings, it does so
in the most vigilant manner so as not to frustrate its
preservative principle. The Court, in the exercise of
its sound judicial discretion, is inclined to impose a
less severe punishment if, through it, the end desire
of reforming the errant lawyer is possible.18
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty.
Carmelita S. Bautista- Lozada is found GUILTY of
violating Section 27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of
six (6) months from the practice of law, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office
of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar
Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to
respondent’s record as member of the Bar.
Atty. Lozada is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of
her receipt of this Decision, so that we can determine the
reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8330
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment
or suspension filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez
against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina
De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of
several post-dated checks.
Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her
Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The
Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera)
disbarment or suspension in relation to the latter's issuance
of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan.2
According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in
building cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera
through the business by subcontracting the cell site
acquisition to Atty. De Vera.3
Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed 500,000.00
from Teresita with interest of 20,000.00 per month until fully
paid.4 However, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty.
De Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a
common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by
mortgaging her property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De
Vera issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31,
2006 for 500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two
more checks to cover the interest agreed upon.7
Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained
another loan from Teresita’s sister in the amount of
100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty. De Vera
issued IBank Check No. 317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for
100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her
sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8
Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks
for payment. However, the checks "bounced" for being
drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to
encash the checks for a second time. However, the checks
were dishonored because the account was closed.9
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However,
she failed to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita to file
complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.10
The Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office issued the Resolution
dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, an
Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently,
a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court.11
In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that
Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for
violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.12
On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera
to comment on the Complaint.13
Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24,
2010. She presented her version of the facts.
According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006,
Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting
Project to Atty. De Vera’s group. The project
involved twenty-nine (29) Globe Telecom sites
across Northern and Southern Luzon.15
Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay
the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus, they
agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs
for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would
cover the costs for application of building permits.
Teresita, thus, owed her 195,000.00 per site.16
Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the
downpayment by March 2006.17 At that time,
Teresita had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to
Globe Telecom.18 However, Teresita did not have
the funds required for the application of building
permits that costs around 100,000.00 for each cell
site.19
Teresita was constrained to borrow 500,000.00
from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita
approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter
lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The main
reason Teresita gave was that she had been
frequently arguing with her husband regarding the
loan.20
Atty. De Vera denies the 100,000.00 loan from
Teresita’s sister.21 She only lent Teresita another
check as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]"22
Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not
drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value.
The checks were not meant to be deposited.23
Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present
administrative case is baseless. She points out that
the proceedings before the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office were under reinvestigation
since she did not have the opportunity to answer
the criminal complaint.24
Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint
for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint
was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in
any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or]
abused her position against the interests of the
complainant."25
Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was
abused.26 In addition, "[a]ll the bare allegations that
[Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita]
to mortgage her property and that the checks
issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon
maturity do not constitute deceitful conduct on the
part of [Atty. De Vera]."27
On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera’s Answer
and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision
within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the] records[.]"28
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines scheduled mandatory conferences where the
parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked
exhibits.29 Upon the termination of the mandatory
conferences, the parties were "directed to submit their
respective verified position papers within a period of thirty
(30) days from receipt of the Order."30
Both parties failed to file their position papers.31
The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found Atty.
De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and
recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year
from the practice of law.32 The Investigating Commissioner
ruled:
Respondent’s assertion that the checks she issued to
complainant were not security for the loans she obtained but
mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no
credence; it is contrary to the ordinary experience.
....
. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows
[sic] that indeed respondent incurred monetary obligations
from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to the
latter as security for the payment of the loans.
Assuming . . . that respondent’s version of facts were [sic]
true, she is still guilty of serious misconduct.
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the
act of making and issuing . . . worthless check[s]; that is, a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay
his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless
checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of debt — though
not intended to be presented for payment — has the same
effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of
B.P. Blg. 22.
....
As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law,
especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the
provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious
misconduct.
. . . [A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in
connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity[.]33 (Citation omitted)
In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only
violate the law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer and
transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.34 The Investigating Commissioner found that
Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions:
Cannon [sic] 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.35
The dispositive portion of the Investigating
Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation36 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is
guilty of serious misconduct and it is recommended
that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year
from the practice of law.37
In the Notice of Resolution No.
XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors resolved
to adopt the Investigating Commissioner’s
recommendation:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above- entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that
Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a
worthless check, the Attorney’s Oath and Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.39
(Emphasis in the original)
Teresita filed the Partial Motion for
Reconsideration40 dated September 17, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of
Governors’ Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the
Motion for Reconsideration41 dated September 21,
2013.
In the Notice of Resolution No.
XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors denied
the parties’ respective motions:
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for
Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent,
there being no cogent reason to reverse the
findings of the Commission and the resolution
subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration
of the matters which had already been threshed out
and taken into consideration. Moreover,
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was filed
out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension of
Time which is a prohibited pleading under Rule
139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at
times to delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution No.
XX- 2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby
AFFIRMED.43
(Emphasis in the original)
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed
serious misconduct and should be held
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor
of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of
this case, we resolve to adopt and approve the
recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Board of Governors.
Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that
she did not incur the loans alleged by Teresita, and the
checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as
payment for the loan. She also raises the prematurity of the
administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the
criminal proceedings considering that "the allegations of
deceitful conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the criminal
acts complained of."44
This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled
that the lawyer’s act of issuing worthless checks, punishable
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious
misconduct.
In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer
guilty of serious misconduct for issuing post-dated checks
that were dishonored upon presentment for payment:
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
has as yet been obtained against respondent Collado. We
do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal
charges raised against her is essential, so far as either the
administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge
against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the
checks when she did not have enough money in her bank
account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be
gainsaid that the acts with which she was charged would
constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider
that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P.
Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a
member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error
of judgment";47 it is serious or gross when it is flagrant.48
We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation to an administrative case
against a member of the bar:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to
safeguard the interest of the banking system and the
legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of
the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 . . . is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, or
any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to
prohibit and altogether eliminate the deleterious and
pernicious practice of issuing checks with insufficient funds,
or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
....
Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the
objectives and coverage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. If he
did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for the
law was penal in character and application. His issuance of
the unfunded check involved herein knowingly violated Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his indifference towards
the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and
public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer’s Oath that
enjoined him to support the Constitution and obey the
laws.49 (Citations omitted)
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his
or her actions whether acting in a public or private
capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD
THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De
Vera incurred monetary obligations from Teresita.
Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to
Teresita. She refused to answer for her liabilities by
denying the existence of the loan and claiming that
the checks were mere "show checks."51 However,
she failed to present evidence to prove those
allegations.
The Decision52 wherein the trial court found
Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for
540,000.00,53 and on which Atty. De Vera relies
upon, is not sufficient evidence to hold that there
was no separate transaction between Teresita and
Atty. De Vera. The Decision involved the post-dated
checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane
only.54 Mary Jane merely claimed that she had no
personal knowledge of any transaction between
Teresita and Atty. De Vera.55
The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed
out that Atty. De Vera's allegation of "lending" her
checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human
experience. As a lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed
to know the consequences of her acts. She issued
several post-dated checks for value that were
dishonored upon presentation for payment.
Membership in the bar requires a high degree of
fidelity to the laws whether in a private or
professional capacity. "Any transgression of this
duty on his part would not only diminish his
reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the
public's faith in the Legal Profession as a
whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise
disciplined 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty
in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which
showed him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer to him."'571âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in
Atty. De Vera's personal record with the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for circulation to all the
courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10628 July 1, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified
Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by
complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against
respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a
lawyer, filed a Complaint2 for damages against his own
brother, Marcelo 0. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino
represented, together with other defendants, therein. In the
said complaint, Orlando stated the following data:
"IBP-774058-12/07 /09-QC x x x MCLE Compliance No.
II-00086893 /Issued on March 10, 2008."4 Maximino claimed
that at the time of the filing of the said complaint. Orlando’s
IBP O.R. number should have already reflected payment of
his IBP annual dues for the year 2010, not 2009, and that he
should have finished his third Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Compliance, not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from
Marcelo that the latter had filed a separate case for grave
threats and estafa5 against Orlando .. When Maximino was
furnished a copy · of the complaint, he discovered that,
through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him
and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as
counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he
charged exorbitant fees, saying, among others: " x x x Better
dismiss [your] hi-track lawyer who will impoverish [you] with
his unconscionable [professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown
in court records, never appeared even once, that's why you
lost in the pre-trial stage. x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your]
lawyer. He is out to squeeze a lot of money from [you]. x x x
daig mo nga mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records
show that Orlando even prepared a Notice to Terminate
Services of CounseI7 in the complaint for damages, which
stated that Maximina "x x x has never done anything to
protect the interests of the defendants in a manner not
befitting his representation as a seasoned law practitioner
and, aside from charging enormous amount of professional
fees and questionable expenses, said counsel's contracted
services reached as far only in preparing and filing uncalled
for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a Compromise
Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for his
signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint
charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the
entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210, and prayed
for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of
damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him
and claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE
compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the
Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise
Agreement were all made upon the request of Marcelo when
the latter was declared in default in the aforementioned civil
case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive
language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a
"brother-to-brother communication" and were
uttered in good faith.12
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and
estafa filed by Marcelo against Orlando was
downgraded to unjust vexation13 and, on June 19,
2012, after voluntarily entering a plea of guilty,
Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust
vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying
Marcelo by "texting insulting, threatening and
persuading words to drop his lawyer over a case x x
x. "14
IBP Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30,
2013, the IBP Commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the case against Orlando, finding that a
transgression of the MCLE compliance requirement
is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to
disclose the required information would merely
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction
of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the
IBP Commissioner find any violation of the CPR so
gross or grave as to warrant any administrative
liability on the part of Orlando, considering that the
communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who
are brothers, was done privately and not directly
addressed to Maximino nor intended to be
published and known by third persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
Commissioner's Report and Recommendation and
dismissed the case against Orlando, warning him to
be more circumspect in his dealings. Maximino
moved for reconsideration17 which was however
denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with
modification deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for
review on certiorari.19
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint
against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on
lawyers who meet high standards of legal
proficiency and morality.20 It is a special privilege
burdened with conditions before the legal
profession, the courts, their clients and the society
such that a lawyer has the duty to comport himself
in a manner as to uphold integrity and promote the
public's faith in the profession.21 Consequently, a
lawyer must at all times, whether in public or private
life, act in a manner beyond reproach especially
when dealing with fellow lawyers.22
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as
Canon 8 of the CPR provides:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it
should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the
dignity of the legal profession.1âwphi1 The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in
the dignity of the judicial forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v.
People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's use of the words
"lousy," "inutile," "carabao English," "stupidity," and "satan" in
a letter addressed to another colleague as defamatory and
injurious which effectively maligned his integrity. Similarly,
the hurling of insulting language to describe the opposing
counsel is considered conduct unbecoming of the legal
profession.25 In this case, the IBP found the text messages
that Orlando sent to his brother Marcelo as casual
communications considering that they were conveyed
privately. To the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the
messages cannot be treated lightly. The text messages were
clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino, as evident
from the use of the word ''polpol" (stupid). Likewise,
Orlando's insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the
services of Maximino indicates Orlando's offensive conduct
against his colleague, in violation of the above-quoted rules.
Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of
unjust vexation in the criminal case filed against him by
Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that
he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a
departure from the judicial decorum which exposes the
lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a
lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion
of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe
such conduct of nobility and uprightness which should
remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and
may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the
standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to
Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar,
Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words,
being fully aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom
fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for
Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial
proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional
conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.27 While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use
of offensive and abusive language.28 The Court has
consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party.
Considering the circumstances, it is glaringly clear how
Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino
to his client.29
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922,
the Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the
required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint
for damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a
ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be
cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the
expunction thereof from the records.30
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty.
Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 as well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing
with his professional colleagues and STERNLY
WARNED that a commission of the same or similar
acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7594, February 09, 2016
ADELPHA E.
MALABED, Complainant, v. ATTY.
MELJOHN B. DE LA PEÑA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is an administrative
complaint filed by Adelpha E. Malabed
(complainant) against Atty. Meljohn B. De la
Peña (respondent) for dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
In her Complaint1 dated 7 August 2007,
complainant charged respondent with
dishonesty for "deliberately and repeatedly
making falsehood" that "misled the Court."
First, complainant claimed that the Certificate
to File Action in the complaint filed by
respondent refers to a different complaint,
that is the complaint filed by complainant's
brother against Fortunato Jadulco. In effect,
there was no Certificate to File Action, which
is required for the filing of a civil action, in the
complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his
client Fortunato Jadulco.
Second, complainant alleged that respondent
did not furnish her counsel with a copy of the
free patent covered by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. 1730, but respondent
forwarded a copy to the Court of Appeals.
Complainant claimed that she could not
properly defend herself without a copy of the
title. She further claimed that the title
presented by respondent was fabricated. To
support such claim, complainant presented
Certifications from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
and the Registry of Deeds in Naval, Biliran,
allegedly confirming that there is no file in
their offices of OCT No. 1730.
Complainant also alleged that respondent was
guilty of conflict of interest when he
represented the occupants of the lot owned by
complainant's family, who previously donated a parcel
of land to the Roman Catholic Church, which deed of
donation respondent notarized.
Complainant further accused respondent of conniving
with Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naval, Biliran, Branch
16 Judge Enrique C. Asis, who was his former client in
an administrative case, to rule in his clients' favor.
Complainant narrated the outcomes in the "cases of
Estrellers which were filed in the [Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC)] and reversed by the RTC, in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction to favor
respondent x x x and his client[s] x x x."
Complainant charged respondent with grave
misconduct when he defied the accessory penalty of
his dismissal as a judge. Respondent worked as
Associate Dean and Professor of the Naval Institute of
Technology (NIT) - University of Eastern Philippines
College of Law, which is a government institution, and
received salaries therefor, in violation of the
accessory penalty of dismissal which is his perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in any
government office.
In his Comment2 dated 16 December 2007,
respondent basically denied the charges against him.
Respondent alleged that "the [Certificate to File Action]
he used when he filed Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for
quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval, Biliran was the certification of
Lupon Chairman, the late Rodulfo Catigbe, issued on
May 9, 2001."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent also claimed that the free patent title was
attached to the folio of the records in Civil Case No.
B-1118 and he furnished a copy of the same to
complainant's counsel. Assuming opposing counsel
was not furnished, respondent wondered why he
raised this matter only upon filing of the instant
complaint.
Respondent argued that notarization of the deed of
donation had no relation to the case filed against the
occupants of the lot. Respondent likewise stressed
that the matter regarding Judge Asis's rulings
favorable to his clients should be addressed to Judge
Asis himself.
As regards the charge of grave misconduct for defying
the accessory penalty of dismissal from the service,
respondent admitted that he accepted the positions of
Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT - University
of Eastern Philippines College of Law, which is a
government institution. However, respondent
countered that he was no longer connected with the
NIT College of Law; and thus, this issue had become
moot. Respondent further claimed that his
designation as Assistant Dean was only temporary,
and he had not received any salary except honorarium.
Respondent stated that he even furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the MCLE Office a copy
of his designation as Associate Dean, and since there
were no objections, he proceeded to perform the
functions appurtenant thereto. He likewise submitted
an affidavit from Edgardo Garcia, complainant in the
administrative case against him, who interposed no
objection to his petition for judicial clemency filed
before this Court.
Complainant filed a Reply-Affidavit4 on 22 January
2008. Respondent filed a Rejoinder to Reply5 on 20
February 2008. Complainant filed a Surrejoinder to
the Rejoinder to Reply6 on 20 February 2008.
All these submissions basically reiterated the
respective arguments of the parties and
denied each other's
allegations.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the IBP
In his Report and
Recommendation,7 Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commissioner Norberto B.
Ruiz noted the foul language used by
respondent in his pleadings submitted before
the IBP. Respondent described complainant's
counsel as "silahis" and accused complainant
of "cohabiting with a married man x x x before
the wife of that married man died." According
to the IBP Commissioner, such offensive
language "[is a] clear manifestation[] of
respondent's gross misconduct that seriously
affect his standing and character as an officer
of the court."
With respect to the charges of dishonesty and
grave misconduct, the IBP Commissioner
found that respondent is guilty of the same
"as evidenced by the numerous documents
attached by complainant in all the pleadings
she has submitted." Respondent committed
acts of dishonesty and grave misconduct (1)
for using a Certificate to File Action which was
used in a complaint filed by complainant's
brother Conrado Estreller against Fortunato
Jadulco, who is respondent's client; (2) for
not furnishing complainant's counsel with a
copy of the free patent covered by OCT No.
1730 which was attached to the Comment
respondent filed with the Court of Appeals;
and (3) for accepting the positions of
Associate Dean and Professor of the NIT -
University of Eastern Philippines College of
Law and receiving salaries therefor, in
violation of the accessory penalty of
prohibition on reemployment in any
government office as a result of his dismissal
as a judge.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one year.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors issued a Resolution adopting the
IBP Commissioner's recommendation. The
Resolution reads:
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2011-137
Adm. Case No. 7594
Adelpha E. Malabed vs. Atty.
Meljohn De La Peña
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED
the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding
the recommendation fully supported by
the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and finding Respondent
guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct, Atty. Meljohn B. De La Peña
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
9
law for one (1) year.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether respondent is
guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Ruling of the Court
Respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.
Using foul language in pleadings
In his Comment, respondent called complainant's
counsel "silahis by nature and complexion"10 and
accused complainant of "cohabiting with a married
man x x x before the wife of that married man
died."11 In his Rejoinder, respondent maintained that
such language is not foul, but a "dissertation of truth
designed to debunk complainant's and her counsel's
credibility in filing the administrative
case."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We are not convinced. Aside from such language
being inappropriate, it is irrelevant to the resolution of
this case. While respondent is entitled and very much
expected to defend himself with vigor, he must refrain
from using improper language in his pleadings.
In Saberon v. Larong,13 we stated:
x x x
[W]hile a lawyer is entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded
members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial
to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyers language even
in his pleadings must be dignified.
For using improper language in his pleadings,
respondent violated Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states:
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Non-submission of certificate to file action
The submission of the certificate to file action, which
evidences the non-conciliation between the parties in
the barangay, is a pre-condition for the filing of a
complaint in court.14 Complainant claims that there is
no such certificate in the complaint filed by
respondent on behalf of Fortunato Jadulco, et al.
Instead, what respondent submitted was the
certificate to file action in the complaint filed by
complainant's brother, Conrado Estreller, against
Fortunato Jadulco.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent counters that what he used "when he filed
Civil Case No. [B-] 1118 for Quieting of Title, etc. x x
x was the certification x x x issued on May 9, 2001, x
x x."
Based on the records, the complaint for quieting of
title in Civil Case No. B-1118 was filed with the RTC on
18 October 2000. The Certificate of Endorsement,
which respondent claimed was the certificate to file
action he used in Civil Case No. B-1118, was
issued on 9 May 2001, or after the filing of the
complaint on 18 October 2000. It is apparent
that the Certificate of Endorsement did not
exist yet when the complaint in Civil Case No.
B-1118 was filed. In other words, there is no
truth to respondent's allegation that the
subject matter of Civil Case No. B-1118 was
brought before the Lupon Tagapamayapa and
that a certificate to file action was issued prior
to the filing of the complaint. Clearly,
respondent misrepresented that he filed a
certificate to file action when there was none,
which act violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS
AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any
in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of
a paper, x x x.
Failure to furnish opposing counsel with copy
of title
With regard to respondent's alleged act of not
furnishing complainant's counsel with a copy
of the free patent title, we find that it does not
constitute dishonesty.
Admittedly, the Court of Appeals was
furnished a copy of OCT No. 1730, which
means that a copy of the title exists. There is
no showing that respondent deliberately did
not furnish complainant's counsel with a copy
of the title. The remedy of complainant should
have been to file with the Court of Appeals a
motion to furnish complainant or counsel with
a copy of the title so she and her counsel could
examine the same.
Moreover, whether OCT No. 1730 is
fabricated, as complainant alleges, is a
question of fact demanding an examination of
the parties' respective evidence. Obviously,
this matter falls outside the scope of this
administrative case, absent any clear and
convincing proof that respondent himself
orchestrated such fabrication. The DENR and
Registry of Deeds certifications do not prove
that respondent manufactured OCT No. 1730.
Such documents merely confirm that OCT No.
1730 does not exist in their official records.
Conflict of interest
Complainant accuses respondent of conflict of
interest when the latter allegedly notarized a
deed of donation of a parcel of land executed
by complainant's family in favor of the Roman
Catholic Church. Eventually, respondent
allegedly sought to litigate as counsel for the
opposing parties who are occupants in the lot
owned by complainant's family.
Suffice to state that notarization is different
from representation. A notary public simply
performs the notarial acts authorized by the
Rules on Notarial Practice, namely,
acknowledgments, oaths and affirmations,
jurats, signature witnessings, and copy certifications.
Legal representation, on the other hand, refers to the
act of assisting a party as counsel in a court action.
As regards complainant's serious accusations against
respondent of conniving with Judge Asis and
conspiring with the latter to render judgments
favorable to respondent's clients, such are bare
allegations, without any proof. Complainant simply
narrated the outcomes of the proceedings in Civil
Case Nos. 1017, 860 and 973, which were filed by the
Estrellers in the MCTC and reversed by the RTC.
Complainant conveniently failed to present any
concrete evidence proving her grave accusation of
conspiracy between respondent and Judge Asis.
Moreover, charges of bias and partiality on the part of
the presiding judge should be filed against the judge,
and not against the counsel allegedly favored by the
judge.
Violation of prohibition on reemployment in
government office
In our 9 February 1994 Resolution,16 we dismissed
respondent as Acting Judge of Municipal Trial Court of
Naval, Leyte and Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte for
partiality, with prejudice to reappointment to any
public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
There is no dispute that respondent knows full well the
consequences of his dismissal as a judge, one of which
is the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in any government office,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Despite being disqualified, respondent
accepted the positions of Associate Dean and
Professor of NIT-College of Law, a government
institution, and received compensation therefor.
Respondent alleges that his designation was only
temporary, and "no fixed salary was attached to his
designation except for honorarium." Respondent also
claims that he furnished a copy of his designation to
the OBC and MCLE office as a "gesture of x x x respect,
courtesy and approval from the Supreme Court." He
further avers that complainant in the administrative
case against him (as a judge) posed no objection to
his petition for clemency.
Respondent's contentions are untenable. The
prohibition on reemployment does not distinguish
between permanent and temporary appointments.
Hence, that his designation was only temporary does
not absolve him from liability. Further, furnishing a
copy of his designation to the OBC and MCLE office
does not in any way extinguish his permanent
disqualification from reemployment in a government
office. Neither does the fact that complainant in his
previous administrative case did not object to his
petition for clemency.
In view of his disqualification from reemployment in
any government office, respondent should have
declined from accepting the designation and desisted
from performing the functions of such
positions.17 Clearly, respondent knowingly defied the
prohibition on reemployment in a public office
imposed upon him by the Court.
In Santeco v. Avance,18 where respondent lawyer
"willfully disobeyed this Court when she continued her
law practice despite the five-year suspension order,"
the Court held that failure to comply with
Court directives constitutes gross misconduct,
insubordination or disrespect which merits a
lawyer's suspension or even disbarment.
Gross Misconduct
In sum, respondent committed gross
misconduct for (1) misrepresenting that he
submitted a certificate to file action issued by
the Lupon Tagapamayapa when in fact there
was none prior to the institution of the civil
action of his client, Fortunato Jadulco, in Civil
Case No. B-1118; (2) using improper
language in his pleadings; and (3) defying
willfully the Court's prohibition on
reemployment in any government office as
accessory penalty of his dismissal as a judge.
Gross misconduct is defined as "improper or
wrong conduct, the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies a wrongful intent and
not a mere error in
judgment."19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, gross misconduct is a ground for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. — A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In view of respondent's repeated gross
misconduct, we increase the IBP's
recommended penalty to suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty.
Meljohn B. De la Peña GUILTY of gross
misconduct and accordingly SUSPEND him
from the practice of law for two (2) years with
a WARNING that the commission of the same
or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of
the Bar Confidant, and all courts in the
Philippines for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10687 July 22, 2015
MABINI COLLEGES, INC. represented by MARCEL N.
LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA, JR., and MA. PAMELA
ROSSANA A. APUYA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against
respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo for allegedly violating
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing
conflicting interests and Canon 15 of the same Code which
enjoins a lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in
all his dealings and transactions with clients.
The salient facts of the case follow:
In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board
of Trustees which was divided in to two opposing factions.
The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was composed of
Romulo M. Adecam Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro,
and Pilar I. Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban
Group, was composed of Justo B. Lukban, Luz I. Garcia,
Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.
In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its
corporate secretary with a total monthly compensation and
honorarium of ₱6,000.
On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an
unnumbered Board Resolution which authorized Pilar I.
Andrade, the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the
Complainant at that Time, and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice
President for Administration and Finance, to apply for a loan
with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch,
Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant.
On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to
oppose the loan application because the Adeva Group
appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano, who were
allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and
Transfer Book of the complainant, as members of the Board
of Trustees. The Lukban Group also alleged that the
complainant was having financial difficulties.
On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure
the latter of complainant’s financial capacity to pay the loan.
On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the
amount of ₱200,000 which was secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over the properties of the complainant.
On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) issued an Order which nullified the
appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the
Adeva Group as members of the Board of Trustees of the
complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to
inform the latter of the SEC Order.
On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant
acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the
latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP’s legal
counsel, herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it
was only upon receipt of such letter that it became
aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of
RBP.
On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased
the loan to ₱400,000.
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the
Real Estate Mortgage.
On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for
Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for RBP.
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the
present complaint for disbarment against the
respondent for allegedly representing conflicting
interests and for failing to exhibit candor, fairness,
and loyalty.
Respondent raised three defenses against the
complaint for disbarment. First, respondent argued
that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garia Jr., and Ma.
Pamela Rossana Apuya cannot represent the
complainant in this disbarment case because they
were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors
to file the complaint. Second, respondent claimed
that he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict
of interest which applies only to the legal counsel of
complainant. Respondent argued that he merely
served as the corporate secretary of complainant
and did not serve as its legal counsel. Third,
respondent argued that there was no conflict of
interest when he represented RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage because all the documents
and information related to the loan transaction
between RBP and complainant were public record.
Thus, respondent claimed that he could not have
taken advantage of his position as the mere
corporate secretary of the complainant.
On February 14, 2013, the Investigating
Commissioner issued a Report and
Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests and
recommending that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for at least one year. The
Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent
appeared for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant
herein. The Investigating Commissioner cited cast
vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 showing that
respondent was paid by complainant for his
retained legal services. According to the
Investigating Commissioner, these vouchers
debunk respondent’s claim that the complainant
merely appointed him as its corporate secretary.
The Investigating Commissioner also held that the
personality of complainant’s representative to file
this administrative case is immaterial since
proceedings for disbarment, suspension or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the
Supreme Court motu prprio or by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint
of any person.
On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the
IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-7704 which
affirmed the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner and imposed a penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one year
against respondent.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP
issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-2905 which denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.
The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of
representing conflicting interests when he entered his
appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage filed by complainant against RBP.
We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of the IBP
Board of Governors. Indeed, respondent represented
conflicting interest in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that [a]
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or
on totally unrelated cases.6 based on the principles o public
policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing
conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate
the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyer, which is
of paramount importance in the administration of justice.7 in
Maturan v. Gonzales,8 we further explained the rationale for
the prohibition:
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of
attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.1âwphi1 A lawyer becomes familiar with
all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from
his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong
ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take
advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must have the
fullest confidence of his client. For if the confidence is
abused the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
Meanwhile, Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to
determine the existence of conflict of interest:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is whether or not in behalf of one client it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but is his duty to oppose it
for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client. This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of
the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge
of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations
where in a lawyer would be representing a client whose
interest is directly adverse to any of his present or former
clients.10 it also applies when the lawyer represents a client
against a former client in a controversy that is related,
directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous
litigations in which he appeared for the former client.[11] this
rule applies regardless of the degree of adverse
interests.12 what a lawyer owes his former client is to
maintain inviolate the client’s confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter
in which he previously represented him.13 a lawyer may only
be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the
former client only if the former client consents to it
after consultation.14
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find
that respondent represented conflicting interests
when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage filed by the complainant,
respondent’s former client, against RBP.
The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent was compensated by complainant for
his retained legal services is supported by the
evidence on record, the cash vouchers from 1994
to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent’s
former client. And respondent appeared as counsel
of RBP in a case filed by his former client against
RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing
conflicting interests since respondent failed to show
any written consent of all concerned (particularly
the complainant) given after a full disclosure of the
facts representing conflicting interests.15
We also note that the respondent acted for the
complainant’s interest on the loan transaction
between RBP and the complainant when he sent a
letter dated May 14, 1999 to RBP to assure the
latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to
pay the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for
annulment of mortgage, he clearly acted against
the interest of the complainant, his former client.
Contrary to the respondent’s claim, it is of no
moment that all the documents and information in
connection with loan transaction between RBO and
the complainant were public records. In Hilado v.
David,16 we laid down the following doctrinal
pronouncements:
The principle which forbids an attorney who has
been engaged to represent a client from thereafter
appearing on behalf of the client’s opponent applies
equally even though during the continuance of the
employment nothing of a confidential nature was
revealed to the attorney by the client (Christian vs.
Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 Hawaii, 553, Footnote
7, C. J. S., 828)
Where it appeared that an attorney representing
one party in litigation had formerly represented the
adverse party with respect to the same matter
involved in the litigation, the court need not inquire
as to how much knowledge the attorney acquired
from his former client during that relationship,
before refusing to permit the attorney to represent
the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C.
330;286, F994)
In order that a court may prevent an attorney from
appearing against a former client, it is unnecessary
that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which
the former client’s affairs might have a bearing on
the matters involved in the subsequent litigation on
the attorney’s knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second
Judicial Dist. Court, 274 P., 7;51 Nev., 264)
This rule has been so strictly enforced that is has
been held that an attorney, on terminating his
employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel
against his client in the same general matter, even
though, while acting for his former client, he
acquired no knowledge which could operate to his
client’s disadvantage in the subsequent adverse
employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. 1.,
432; 77 Atl., 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by
the lawyer from his client is irrelevant in determining the
existence of conflict of interest.
Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a
complaint for disbarment is imbued with public interest which
allows for a liberal rule on legal standing. Under Section 1,
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, [p]roceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be
taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
complaint of any person. Thus, in the present case, we find
that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela
Rossana A. Apuya can institute the complaint for disbarment
even without authority from the Board of Directors of the
complainant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered Resolution No.
XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-290 of the IBP
Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from
the practice of law for one year against respondent Atty.
Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA,
AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A.
VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U.
ESCUETA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 108113 September 20, 1996
PARAJA G. HAYUDINI, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
These case touch the very cornerstone of every State's
judicial system, upon which the workings of the contentious
and adversarial system in the Philippine legal process are
based — the sanctity of fiduciary duty in the client-lawyer
relationship. The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is
also what makes the law profession a unique position of trust
and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling.
In this instance, we have no recourse but to uphold and
strengthen the mantle of protection accorded to the
confidentiality that proceeds from the performance of the
lawyer's duty to his client.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
The matters raised herein are an offshoot of the institution of
the Complaint on July 31, 1987 before the Sandiganbayan
by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government against Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares
of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case No. 33
(Civil Case No. 0033), entitled "Republic of the Philippines
versus Eduardo Cojuangco, et al."1
Among the dependants named in the case are
herein petitioners Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U.
Escueta and Paraja G. Hayudini, and herein private
respondent Raul S. Roco, who all were then
partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion,
Regala and Cruz Law Offices (hereinafter referred
to as the ACCRA Law Firm). ACCRA Law Firm
performed legal services for its clients, which
included, among others, the organization and
acquisition of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental
services where its members acted as incorporators,
or simply, as stockholders. More specifically, in the
performance of these services, the members of the
law firm delivered to its client documents which
substantiate the client's equity holdings, i.e., stock
certificates endorsed in blank representing the
shares registered in the client's name, and a blank
deed of trust or assignment covering said shares. In
the course of their dealings with their clients, the
members of the law firm acquire information relative
to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. As members of the
ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private
respondent Raul Roco admit that they assisted in
the organization and acquisition of the companies
included in Civil Case No. 0033, and in keeping with
the office practice, ACCRA lawyers acted as
nominees-stockholders of the said corporations
involved in sequestration proceedings.2
On August 20, 1991, respondent Presidential
Commission on Good Government (hereinafter
referred to as respondent PCGG) filed a "Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint" and "Third
Amended Complaint" which excluded private
respondent Raul S. Roco from the complaint in
PCGG Case No. 33 as
party-defendant.3 Respondent PCGG based its
exclusion of private respondent Roco as
party-defendant on his undertaking that he will
reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom he
acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case No. 33.4
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended
Complaint on the strength of the following
allegations:
14. Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J.
Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U.
Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul Roco of the
Angara Concepcion Cruz Regala and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed
conspired and confederated with each other in
setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC, and
more than twenty other coconut levy funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San
Miguel Corporation shares and its
institutionalization through presidential directives of
the coconut monopoly. Through insidious means
and machinations, ACCRA, being the wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation,
became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total
outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation
number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders
of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books
show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of February, 1984.5
In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint,
petitioners ACCRA lawyers alleged that:
4.4 Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts
with which their codefendants are charged, was in
furtherance of legitimate lawyering.
4.4.1 In the course of rendering professional and legal
services to clients, defendants-ACCRA lawyers, Jose C.
Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala, Rogelio A. Vinluan and
Eduardo U. Escueta, became holders of shares of stock in
the corporations listed under their respective names in
Annex "A" of the expanded Amended Complaint as
incorporating or acquiring stockholders only and, as such,
they do not claim any proprietary interest in the said shares
of stock.
4.5 Defendant ACCRA-lawyer Avelino V. Cruz was one of
the incorporators in 1976 of Mermaid Marketing Corporation,
which was organized for legitimate business purposes not
related to the allegations of the expanded Amended
Complaint. However, he has long ago transferred any
material interest therein and therefore denies that the
"shares" appearing in his name in Annex "A" of the
expanded Amended Complaint are his assets.6
Petitioner Paraja Hayudini, who had separated from ACCRA
law firm, filed a separate answer denying the allegations in
the complaint implicating him in the alleged ill-gotten wealth.7
Petitioners ACCRA lawyers subsequently filed their
"COMMENT AND/OR OPPOSITION" dated October 8, 1991
with Counter-Motion that respondent PCGG similarly grant
the same treatment to them (exclusion as parties-defendants)
as accorded private respondent Roco.8 The Counter-Motion
for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for
hearing on October 18, 1991 in accordance with the
requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
In its "Comment," respondent PCGG set the following
conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission
of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship;
and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments
petitioners executed in favor of its client covering their
respective
shareholdings.9
Consequently, respondent PCGG presented supposed proof
to substantiate compliance by private respondent Roco of
the conditions precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to
respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated
May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for
reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b)
Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in
(a); and (c) Letter of the Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law
Offices dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent PCGG
in behalf of private respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of the evidence of the
PCGG against Roco in its Complaint in PCGG Case No.
33. 10
It is noteworthy that during said proceedings, private
respondent Roco did not refute petitioners' contention that
he did actually not reveal the identity of the client involved in
PCGG Case No. 33, nor had he undertaken to reveal the
identity of the client for whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder. 11
On March 18, 1992, respondent Sandiganbayan
promulgated the Resolution, herein questioned, denying the
exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33, for their
refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent
PCGG. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not
revealing the identity of the client for whom they
have acted, i.e. their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot
excuse themselves from the consequences of their
acts until they have begun to establish the basis for
recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity
of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they
have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has
demonstrated his agency and that Roco has
apparently identified his principal, which revelation
could show the lack of cause against him. This in
turn has allowed the PCGG to exercise its power
both under the rules of Agency and under Section 5
of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA
72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA
lawyers the same conditions availed of by Roco; full
disclosure in exchange for exclusion from these
proceedings (par. 7, PCGG's COMMENT dated
November 4, 1991). The ACCRA lawyers have
preferred not to make the disclosures required by
the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge
the PCGG for keeping them as party defendants. In
the same vein, they cannot compel the PCGG to be
accorded the same treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October
8, 1991 filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in
by Atty. Paraja G. Hayudini for the same treatment
by the PCGG as accorded to Raul S. Roco is
DENIED for lack of merit. 12
ACCRA lawyers moved for a reconsideration of the
above resolution but the same was denied by the
respondent Sandiganbayan. Hence, the ACCRA
lawyers filed the petition for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 105938, invoking the following grounds:
I Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners'
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers
who undisputably acted as lawyers in serving as
nominee-stockholders, to the strict application of
the law of agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not considering petitioners
ACCRA lawyers and Mr. Roco as similarly situated
and, therefore, deserving of equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco
had revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the
identities of the client(s) for whom he acted as
nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the
disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as
would make the classification reasonable under the equal
protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and
undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco in violation of the
equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not holding that, under the facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers
from revealing the identity of their client(s) and the other
information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the attorney-client
privilege includes the identity of the client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG are not
limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA lawyers' alleged
client(s) but extend to other privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not requiring that the dropping of
party-defendants by the PCGG must be based on
reasonable and just grounds and with due consideration to
the constitutional right of petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the
equal protection of the law.
Petitioner Paraja G. Hayudini, likewise, filed his own motion
for reconsideration of the March 18, 1991 resolution which
was denied by respondent Sandiganbayan. Thus, he filed a
separate petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108113,
assailing respondent Sandiganbayan's resolution on
essentially the same grounds averred by petitioners in G.R.
No. 105938.
Petitioners contend that the exclusion of respondent Roco as
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33 grants him a
favorable treatment, on the pretext of his alleged undertaking
to divulge the identity of his client, giving him an advantage
over them who are in the same footing as partners in the
ACCRA law firm. Petitioners further argue that even granting
that such an undertaking has been assumed by private
respondent Roco, they are prohibited from revealing the
identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and
fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the
confidentiality of information obtained during such
lawyer-client relationship.
contention, alleging that the revelation of the identity of the
client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required
(deeds of assignment) protected, because they are evidence
of nominee status. 13
In his comment, respondent Roco asseverates that
respondent PCGG acted correctly in excluding him as
party-defendant because he "(Roco) has not filed an
Answer. PCGG had therefore the right to dismiss Civil Case
No. 0033 as to Roco 'without an order of court by filing a
notice of dismissal'," 14 and he has undertaken to identify his
principal. 15
Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.
I
It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded
by the PCGG as co-defendants to force them to
disclose the identity of their clients. Clearly,
respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the
"bigger fish" as they say in street parlance. This
ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to
cut a deal with petitioners — the names of their
clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint.
The statement of the Sandiganbayan in its
questioned resolution dated March 18, 1992 is
explicit:
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not
revealing the identity of the client for whom they
have acted, i.e, their principal, and that will be their
choice. But until they do identify their clients,
considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to be debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot
excuse themselves from the consequences of their
acts until they have begun to establish the basis for
recognizing the privilege; the existence and identity
of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they
have been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants
herein. (Emphasis ours)
In a closely related case, Civil Case No. 0110 of the
Sandiganbayan, Third Division, entitled "Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. Presidential Commission on
Good Government" respondent PCGG, through
counsel Mario Ongkiko, manifested at the hearing
on December 5, 1991 that the PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA that their "so called
client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco;" that "it was Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco who furnished all the monies to
those subscription payments in corporations
included in Annex "A" of the Third Amended
Complaint; that the ACCRA lawyers executed
deeds of trust and deeds of assignment, some in
the name of particular persons; some in blank.
We quote Atty. Ongkiko:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
With the permission of this Hon. Court. I propose to
establish through these ACCRA lawyers that, one,
their so-called client is Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco.
Second, it was Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco who
furnished all the monies to these subscription
payments of these corporations who are now the
petitioners in this case. Third, that these lawyers
executed deeds of trust, some in the name of a
particular person, some in blank. Now, these blank
deeds are important to our claim that some of the
shares are actually being held by the nominees for
the late President Marcos. Fourth, they also
executed deeds of assignment and some of these
assignments have also blank assignees. Again, this
is important to our claim that some of the shares are
for Mr. Conjuangco and some are for Mr. Marcos.
Fifth, that most of thes e corporations are really just
paper corporations. Why do we say that? One:
There are no really fixed sets of officers, no fixed
sets of directors at the time of incorporation and
even up to 1986, which is the crucial year. And not
only that, they have no permits from the municipal
authorities in Makati. Next, actually all their
addresses now are care of Villareal Law Office.
They really have no address on records. These are
some of the principal things that we would ask of
these nominees stockholders, as they called
themselves. 16
It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their
clients as defendants in the complaint. Petitioners are being
prosecuted solely on the basis of activities and services
performed in the course of their duties as lawyers. Quite
obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the
complaint is merely being used as leverage to compel them
to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG
to nail these clients. Such being the case, respondent PCGG
has no valid cause of action as against petitioners and
should exclude them from the Third Amended Complaint.
II
The nature of lawyer-client relationship is premised on the
Roman Law concepts of locatio conductio
operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person
lets his services and another hires them without reference to
the object of which the services are to be performed, wherein
lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for
hire, 17 and mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on
whom reliance could be placed makes a contract in his name,
but gives up all that he gained by the contract to the person
who requested him. 18 But the lawyer-client relationship is
more than that of the principal-agent and lessor-lessee.
In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an
attorney is more than a mere agent or servant, because he
possesses special powers of trust and confidence reposed
on him by his client. 19 A lawyer is also as independent as the
judge of the court, thus his powers are entirely different from
and superior to those of an ordinary agent.20 Moreover, an
attorney also occupies what may be considered as a
"quasi-judicial office" since he is in fact an officer of the
Court 21 and exercises his judgment in the choice of courses
of action to be taken favorable to his client.
Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are
rules, ethical conduct and duties that breathe life into it,
among those, the fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very
delicate, exacting and confidential character, requiring a very
high degree of fidelity and good faith, 22 that is required by
reason of necessity and public interest 23 based on the
hypothesis that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a
good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of
justice. 24
It is also the strict sense of fidelity of a lawyer to his client
that distinguishes him from any other professional in society.
This conception is entrenched and embodies centuries of
established and stable tradition. 25 In Stockton v. Ford,26 the
U. S. Supreme Court held:
There are few of the business relations of life involving a
higher trust and confidence than that of attorney and client,
or generally speaking, one more honorably and faithfully
discharged; few more anxiously guarded by the law, or
governed by the sterner principles of morality and justice;
and it is the duty of the court to administer them in a
corresponding spirit, and to be watchful and industrious, to
see that confidence thus reposed shall not be used to the
detriment or prejudice of the rights of the party bestowing
it. 27
In our jurisdiction, this privilege takes off from the old Code of
Civil Procedure enacted by the Philippine Commission on
August 7, 1901. Section 383 of the Code specifically "forbids
counsel, without authority of his client to reveal any
communication made by the client to him or his advice given
thereon in the course of professional
employment." 28 Passed on into various provisions of the
Rules of Court, the attorney-client privilege, as currently
worded provides:
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client,
be examined as to any communication made by the
client to him, or his advice given thereon in the
course of, or with a view to, professional
employment, can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the
consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired
in such capacity. 29
Further, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 20. It is the duty of an attorney: (e) to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to
accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval.
This duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that:
Canon 17. A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client:
The lawyers owes "entire devotion to the interest of
the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability," to the end that nothing be
taken or be withheld from him, save by the rules of
law, legally applied. No fear of judicial disfavor or
public popularity should restrain him from the full
discharge of his duty. In the judicial forum the client
is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy
and defense that is authorized by the law of the
land, and he may expect his lawyer to assert every
such remedy or defense. But it is steadfastly to be
borne in mind that the great trust of the lawyer is to
be performed within and not without the bounds of
the law. The office of attorney does not permit,
much less does it demand of him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicanery.
He must obey his own conscience and not that of
his client.
Considerations favoring confidentially in
lawyer-client relationships are many and serve
several constitutional and policy concerns. In the
constitutional sphere, the privilege gives flesh to
one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the
accused, the right to counsel. If a client were made
to choose between legal representation without
effective communication and disclosure and legal
representation with all his secrets revealed then he
might be compelled, in some instances, to either
opt to stay away from the judicial system or to lose
the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too
high, or if it amounts to self incrimination, then the
flow of information would be curtailed thereby
rendering the right practically nugatory. The threat
this represents against another sacrosanct
individual right, the right to be presumed innocent is
at once self-evident.
Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one
seeking legal services opens the door to a whole
spectrum of legal options which would otherwise be
circumscribed by limited information engendered by
a fear of disclosure. An effective lawyer-client
relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of
confidence which exists between lawyer and client which in
turn requires a situation which encourages a dynamic and
fruitful exchange and flow of information. It necessarily
follows that in order to attain effective representation, the
lawyer must invoke the privilege not as a matter of option but
as a matter of duty and professional responsibility.
The question now arises whether or not this duty may be
asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners'
client(s) in the case at bar. Under the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must
be in the affirmative.
As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be
shrouded in mystery 30 Under this premise, the general rule
in our jurisdiction as well as in the United States is that a
lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of this client. 31
The reasons advanced for the general rule are well
established.
First, the court has a right to know that the client whose
privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and
blood.
Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the
attorney-client relationship has been established. The
attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of
the relationship.
Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing
party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. "A party
suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." 32 He
cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown
forces. 33
Notwithstanding these considerations, the general rule is
however qualified by some important exceptions.
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer's
advice.
In Ex-Parte Enzor, 34 a state supreme court reversed a lower
court order requiring a lawyer to divulge the name of her
client on the ground that the subject matter of the
relationship was so closely related to the issue of the client's
identity that the privilege actually attached to both.
In Enzor, the unidentified client, an election official, informed
his attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to
violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that
end. In her testimony, the attorney revealed that she had
advised her client to count the votes correctly, but averred
that she could not remember whether her client had been, in
fact, bribed. The lawyer was cited for contempt for her
refusal to reveal his client's identity before a grand jury.
Reversing the lower court's contempt orders, the state
supreme court held that under the circumstances of the case,
and under the exceptions described above, even the name
of the client was privileged.
U .S. v. Hodge and Zweig,35 involved the same exception, i.e.
that client identity is privileged in those instances where a
strong probability exists that the disclosure of the client's
identity would implicate the client in the very criminal activity
for which the lawyer's legal advice was obtained.
The Hodge case involved federal grand jury proceedings
inquiring into the activities of the "Sandino Gang," a gang
involved in the illegal importation of drugs in the United
States. The respondents, law partners, represented
key witnesses and suspects including the leader of
the gang, Joe Sandino.
In connection with a tax investigation in November
of 1973, the IRS issued summons to Hodge and
Zweig, requiring them to produce documents and
information regarding payment received by Sandino
on behalf of any other person, and vice versa. The
lawyers refused to divulge the names. The Ninth
Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals,
upholding non-disclosure under the facts and
circumstances of the case, held:
A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee
arrangements may be privileged where the person
invoking the privilege can show that a strong
probability exists that disclosure of such information
would implicate that client in the very criminal
activity for which legal advice was sought Baird
v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680. While in Baird Owe
enunciated this rule as a matter of California law,
the rule also reflects federal law. Appellants
contend that the Baird exception applies to this
case.
The Baird exception is entirely consonant with the
principal policy behind the attorney-client privilege.
"In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled
disclosure from the legal advisors must be removed;
hence, the law must prohibit such disclosure except
on the client's consent." 8 J. Wigmore, supra sec.
2291, at 545. In furtherance of this policy, the
client's identity and the nature of his fee
arrangements are, in exceptional cases, protected
as confidential communications. 36
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil
liability; his identity is privileged. For instance, the
peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass
v. Terminal Cab Corporation,37 prompted the New
York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the
effect that he could not reveal the name of his client
because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.
In the said case, Neugass, the plaintiff, suffered
injury when the taxicab she was riding, owned by
respondent corporation, collided with a second
taxicab, whose owner was unknown. Plaintiff
brought action both against defendant corporation
and the owner of the second cab, identified in the
information only as John Doe. It turned out that
when the attorney of defendant corporation
appeared on preliminary examination, the fact was
somehow revealed that the lawyer came to know
the name of the owner of the second cab when a
man, a client of the insurance company, prior to the
institution of legal action, came to him and reported
that he was involved in a car accident. It was
apparent under the circumstances that the man
was the owner of the second cab. The state
supreme court held that the reports were clearly
made to the lawyer in his professional capacity. The
court said:
That his employment came about through the fact
that the insurance company had hired him to
defend its policyholders seems immaterial. The
attorney is such cases is clearly the attorney for the
policyholder when the policyholder goes to him to
report an occurrence contemplating that it would be
used in an action or claim against him. 38
xxx xxx xxx
All communications made by a client to his counsel, for the
purpose of professional advice or assistance, are privileged,
whether they relate to a suit pending or contemplated, or to
any other matter proper for such advice or aid; . . . And
whenever the communication made, relates to a matter so
connected with the employment as attorney or counsel as to
afford presumption that it was the ground of the address by
the client, then it is privileged from disclosure. . .
It appears . . . that the name and address of the owner of the
second cab came to the attorney in this case as a
confidential communication. His client is not seeking to use
the courts, and his address cannot be disclosed on that
theory, nor is the present action pending against him as
service of the summons on him has not been effected. The
objections on which the court reserved decision are
sustained. 39
In the case of Matter of Shawmut Mining Company,40 the
lawyer involved was required by a lower court to disclose
whether he represented certain clients in a certain
transaction. The purpose of the court's request was to
determine whether the unnamed persons as interested
parties were connected with the purchase of properties
involved in the action. The lawyer refused and brought the
question to the State Supreme Court. Upholding the lawyer's
refusal to divulge the names of his clients the court held:
If it can compel the witness to state, as directed by the order
appealed from, that he represented certain persons in the
purchase or sale of these mines, it has made progress in
establishing by such evidence their version of the litigation.
As already suggested, such testimony by the witness would
compel him to disclose not only that he was attorney for
certain people, but that, as the result of communications
made to him in the course of such employment as such
attorney, he knew that they were interested in certain
transactions. We feel sure that under such conditions no
case has ever gone to the length of compelling an attorney,
at the instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his
retainer, but the nature of the transactions to which it related,
when such information could be made the basis of a suit
against his client. 41
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an
attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the
said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the client's name is privileged.
In Baird vs. Korner,42 a lawyer was consulted by the
accountants and the lawyer of certain undisclosed taxpayers
regarding steps to be taken to place the undisclosed
taxpayers in a favorable position in case criminal charges
were brought against them by the U.S. Internal Revenue
Service (IRS).
It appeared that the taxpayers' returns of previous years
were probably incorrect and the taxes understated. The
clients themselves were unsure about whether or not they
violated tax laws and sought advice from Baird on the
hypothetical possibility that they had. No investigation was
then being undertaken by the IRS of the taxpayers.
Subsequently, the attorney of the taxpayers delivered to
Baird the sum of $12, 706.85, which had been previously
assessed as the tax due, and another amount of money
representing his fee for the advice given. Baird then sent a
check for $12,706.85 to the IRS in Baltimore, Maryland, with
a note explaining the payment, but without naming his clients.
The IRS demanded that Baird identify the lawyers,
accountants, and other clients involved. Baird refused on the
ground that he did not know their names, and declined to
name the attorney and accountants because this constituted
privileged communication. A petition was filed for the
enforcement of the IRS summons. For Baird's repeated
refusal to name his clients he was found guilty of civil
contempt. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, a
lawyer could not be forced to reveal the names of
clients who employed him to pay sums of money to
the government voluntarily in settlement of
undetermined income taxes, unsued on, and with
no government audit or investigation into that
client's income tax liability pending. The court
emphasized the exception that a client's name is
privileged when so much has been revealed
concerning the legal services rendered that the
disclosure of the client's identity exposes him to
possible investigation and sanction by government
agencies. The Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within
that exception to the general rule. Here money was
received by the government, paid by persons who
thereby admitted they had not paid a sufficient
amount in income taxes some one or more years in
the past. The names of the clients are useful to the
government for but one purpose — to ascertain
which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that
it may check the records for that one year or several
years. The voluntary nature of the payment
indicates a belief by the taxpayers that more taxes
or interest or penalties are due than the sum
previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt
for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is
criminal guilt is undisclosed. But it may well be the
link that could form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict an individual of a federal crime.
Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt are
the reasons the attorney here involved was
employed — to advise his clients what, under the
circumstances, should be done. 43
Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist
other situations which could qualify as exceptions to
the general rule.
For example, the content of any client
communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege if
it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal
problem on which the client seeks legal
assistance. 44 Moreover, where the nature of the
attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to
be confidential, the identity of the client has been
held to be privileged, since such revelation would
otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45
Summarizing these exceptions, information relating
to the identity of a client may fall within the ambit of
the privilege when the client's name itself has an
independent significance, such that disclosure
would then reveal client confidences. 46
The circumstances involving the engagement of
lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of
the alleged client's name would lead to establish
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which there would
be not attorney-client relationship).
The link between the alleged criminal offense and
the legal advice or legal service sought was duly
establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the
PCGG itself. The key lies in the three specific
conditions laid down by the PCGG which
constitutes petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution
should they accede thereto:
(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;
(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client
relationship; and
(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners
executed in favor of their clients covering their respective
shareholdings.
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in
their capacity as lawyers, regarding the financial and
corporate structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their
professional advice in the form of, among others, the
aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their client's
shareholdings.
There is no question that the preparation of the aforestated
documents was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to
their clients. More important, it constituted an integral part of
their duties as lawyers. Petitioners, therefore, have a
legitimate fear that identifying their clients would implicate
them in the very activity for which legal advice had been
sought, i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in
the aforementioned corporations.
Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation of
the client's name would obviously provide the necessary link
for the prosecution to build its case, where none otherwise
exists. It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that would
inevitably form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
the (client) of a . . . crime." 47
An important distinction must be made between a case
where a client takes on the services of an attorney for illicit
purposes, seeking advice about how to go around the law for
the purpose of committing illegal activities and a case where
a client thinks he might have previously committed
something illegal and consults his attorney about it. The first
case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the
same cannot be invoked for purposes illegal. The second
case falls within the exception because whether or not the
act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal,
his name cannot be used or disclosed if the disclosure leads
to evidence, not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which
might lead to possible action against him.
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the
privilege cannot be invoked or used as a shield for an illegal
act, as in the first example; while the prosecution may not
have a case against the client in the second example and
cannot use the attorney client relationship to build up a case
against the latter. The reason for the first rule is that it is not
within the professional character of a lawyer to give advice
on the commission of a crime. 48 The reason for the second
has been stated in the cases above discussed and are
founded on the same policy grounds for which the
attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.
In Matter of Shawmut Mining Co., supra, the appellate court
therein stated that "under such conditions no case has ever
yet gone to the length of compelling an attorney, at the
instance of a hostile litigant, to disclose not only his retainer,
but the nature of the transactions to which it related, when
such information could be made the basis of a suit against
his client." 49 "Communications made to an attorney in the
course of any personal employment, relating to the subject
thereof, and which may be supposed to be drawn out in
consequence of the relation in which the parties stand to
each other, are under the seal of confidence and entitled to
protection as privileged communications."50 Where the
communicated information, which clearly falls within the
privilege, would suggest possible criminal activity but there
would be not much in the information known to the
prosecution which would sustain a charge except that
revealing the name of the client would open up other
privileged information which would substantiate the
prosecution's suspicions, then the client's identity is so
inextricably linked to the subject matter itself that it
falls within the protection. The Baird exception,
applicable to the instant case, is consonant with the
principal policy behind the privilege, i.e., that for the
purpose of promoting freedom of consultation of
legal advisors by clients, apprehension of
compelled disclosure from attorneys must be
eliminated. This exception has likewise been
sustained in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings51 and Tillotson v. Boughner.52 What
these cases unanimously seek to avoid is the
exploitation of the general rule in what may amount
to a fishing expedition by the prosecution.
There are, after all, alternative source of information
available to the prosecutor which do not depend on
utilizing a defendant's counsel as a convenient and
readily available source of information in the
building of a case against the latter. Compelling
disclosure of the client's name in circumstances
such as the one which exists in the case at bench
amounts to sanctioning fishing expeditions by lazy
prosecutors and litigants which we cannot and will
not countenance. When the nature of the
transaction would be revealed by disclosure of an
attorney's retainer, such retainer is obviously
protected by the privilege. 53 It follows that petitioner
attorneys in the instant case owe their client(s) a
duty and an obligation not to disclose the latter's
identity which in turn requires them to invoke the
privilege.
In fine, the crux of petitioners' objections ultimately
hinges on their expectation that if the prosecution
has a case against their clients, the latter's case
should be built upon evidence painstakingly
gathered by them from their own sources and not
from compelled testimony requiring them to reveal
the name of their clients, information which
unavoidably reveals much about the nature of the
transaction which may or may not be illegal. The
logical nexus between name and nature of
transaction is so intimate in this case the it would be
difficult to simply dissociate one from the other. In
this sense, the name is as much "communication"
as information revealed directly about the
transaction in question itself, a communication
which is clearly and distinctly privileged. A lawyer
cannot reveal such communication without
exposing himself to charges of violating a principle
which forms the bulwark of the entire attorney-client
relationship.
The uberrimei fidei relationship between a lawyer
and his client therefore imposes a strict liability for
negligence on the former. The ethical duties owing
to the client, including confidentiality, loyalty,
competence, diligence as well as the responsibility
to keep clients informed and protect their rights to
make decisions have been zealously sustained.
In Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy
v. Boon,54 the US Second District Court rejected the
plea of the petitioner law firm that it breached its
fiduciary duty to its client by helping the latter's
former agent in closing a deal for the agent's benefit
only after its client hesitated in proceeding with the
transaction, thus causing no harm to its client. The
Court instead ruled that breaches of a fiduciary
relationship in any context comprise a special breed
of cases that often loosen normally stringent
requirements of causation and damages, and found
in favor of the client.
To the same effect is the ruling in Searcy, Denney,
Scarola, Barnhart, and Shipley
P.A. v. Scheller55 requiring strict obligation of
lawyers vis-a-vis clients. In this case, a contingent
fee lawyer was fired shortly before the end of
completion of his work, and sought payment quantum
meruit of work done. The court, however, found that the
lawyer was fired for cause after he sought to pressure his
client into signing a new fee agreement while settlement
negotiations were at a critical stage. While the client found a
new lawyer during the interregnum, events forced the client
to settle for less than what was originally offered. Reiterating
the principle of fiduciary duty of lawyers to clients
in Meinhard v. Salmon56 famously attributed to Justice
Benjamin Cardozo that "Not honesty alone, but
the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior," the US Court found that the lawyer
involved was fired for cause, thus deserved no attorney's
fees at all.
The utmost zeal given by Courts to the protection of the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege and lawyer's loyalty to
his client is evident in the duration of the protection, which
exists not only during the relationship, but extends even after
the termination of the relationship. 57
Such are the unrelenting duties required by
lawyers vis-a-vis their clients because the law, which the
lawyers are sworn to uphold, in the words of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, 58 ". . . is an exacting goddess, demanding of her
votaries in intellectual and moral discipline." The Court, no
less, is not prepared to accept respondents' position without
denigrating the noble profession that is lawyering, so extolled
by Justice Holmes in this wise:
Every calling is great when greatly pursued. But what other
gives such scope to realize the spontaneous energy of one's
soul? In what other does one plunge so deep in the stream of
life — so share its passions its battles, its despair, its
triumphs, both as witness and actor? . . . But that is not all.
What a subject is this in which we are united — this
abstraction called the Law, wherein as in a magic mirror, we
see reflected, not only in our lives, but the lives of all men
that have been. When I think on this majestic theme my eyes
dazzle. If we are to speak of the law as our mistress, we who
are here know that she is a mistress only to be won with
sustained and lonely passion — only to be won by straining
all the faculties by which man is likened to God.
We have no choice but to uphold petitioners' right not to
reveal the identity of their clients under pain of the breach of
fiduciary duty owing to their clients, because the facts of the
instant case clearly fall within recognized exceptions to the
rule that the client's name is not privileged information.
If we were to sustain respondent PCGG that the
lawyer-client confidential privilege under the circumstances
obtaining here does not cover the identity of the client, then it
would expose the lawyers themselves to possible litigation
by their clients in view of the strict fiduciary responsibility
imposed on them in the exercise of their duties.
The complaint in Civil Case No. 0033 alleged that the
defendants therein, including herein petitioners and Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr. conspired with each other in setting up
through the use of coconut levy funds the financial and
corporate framework and structures that led to the
establishment of UCPB, UNICOM and others and that
through insidious means and machinations, ACCRA, using
its wholly-owned investment arm, ACCRA Investment
Corporation, became the holder of approximately fifteen
million shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total capital
stock of UCPB as of 31 March 1987. The PCGG wanted to
establish through the ACCRA lawyers that Mr. Cojuangco is
their client and it was Cojuangco who furnished all the
monies to the subscription payment; hence, petitioners acted
as dummies, nominees and/or agents by allowing
themselves, among others, to be used as instrument in
accumulating ill-gotten wealth through government
concessions, etc., which acts constitute gross abuse of
official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust,
unjust enrichment, violation of the Constitution and
laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
By compelling petitioners, not only to reveal the
identity of their clients, but worse, to submit to the
PCGG documents substantiating the client-lawyer
relationship, as well as deeds of assignment
petitioners executed in favor of its clients covering
their respective shareholdings, the PCGG would
exact from petitioners a link "that would inevitably
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict the
(client) of a crime."
III
In response to petitioners' last assignment of error,
respondents alleged that the private respondent
was dropped as party defendant not only because
of his admission that he acted merely as a nominee
but also because of his undertaking to testify to
such facts and circumstances "as the interest of
truth may require, which includes . . . the identity of
the principal."59
First, as to the bare statement that private
respondent merely acted as a lawyer and nominee,
a statement made in his out-of-court settlement with
the PCGG, it is sufficient to state that petitioners
have likewise made the same claim not merely
out-of-court but also in the Answer to plaintiff's
Expanded Amended Complaint, signed by counsel,
claiming that their acts were made in furtherance of
"legitimate lawyering."60 Being "similarly situated" in
this regard, public respondents must show that
there exist other conditions and circumstances
which would warrant their treating the private
respondent differently from petitioners in the case
at bench in order to evade a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
To this end, public respondents contend that the
primary consideration behind their decision to
sustain the PCGG's dropping of private respondent
as a defendant was his promise to disclose the
identities of the clients in question. However,
respondents failed to show — and absolute nothing
exists in the records of the case at bar — that
private respondent actually revealed the identity of
his client(s) to the PCGG. Since the undertaking
happens to be the leitmotif of the entire
arrangement between Mr. Roco and the PCGG, an
undertaking which is so material as to have justified
PCGG's special treatment exempting the private
respondent from prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan should have required proof of the
undertaking more substantial than a "bare
assertion" that private respondent did indeed
comply with the undertaking. Instead, as
manifested by the PCGG, only three documents
were submitted for the purpose, two of which were
mere requests for re-investigation and one simply
disclosed certain clients which petitioners (ACCRA
lawyers) were themselves willing to reveal. These
were clients to whom both petitioners and private
respondent rendered legal services while all of
them were partners at ACCRA, and were not the
clients which the PCGG wanted disclosed for the
alleged questioned transactions.61
To justify the dropping of the private respondent
from the case or the filing of the suit in the
respondent court without him, therefore, the PCGG
should conclusively show that Mr. Roco was treated
as species apart from the rest of the ACCRA
lawyers on the basis of a classification which made
substantial distinctions based on real differences.
No such substantial distinctions exist from the
records of the case at bench, in violation of the equal
protection clause.
The equal protection clause is a guarantee which provides a
wall of protection against uneven application of status and
regulations. In the broader sense, the guarantee operates
against uneven application of legal norms so
that all persons under similar circumstances would be
accorded the same treatment. 62 Those who fall within a
particular class ought to be treated alike not only as to
privileges granted but also as to the liabilities imposed.
. . . What is required under this constitutional guarantee is
the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons
under similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person
under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If
law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that
fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion,
whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding the rest.63
We find that the condition precedent required by the
respondent PCGG of the petitioners for their exclusion as
parties-defendants in PCGG Case No. 33 violates the
lawyer-client confidentiality privilege. The condition also
constitutes a transgression by respondents Sandiganbayan
and PCGG of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.64 It is grossly unfair to exempt one similarly
situated litigant from prosecution without allowing the same
exemption to the others. Moreover, the PCGG's demand not
only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients
but also on documents related to the suspected transactions,
not only in violation of the attorney-client privilege but also of
the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever
way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at
the expense of such rights.
An argument is advanced that the invocation by petitioners
of the privilege of attorney-client confidentiality at this stage
of the proceedings is premature and that they should wait
until they are called to testify and examine as witnesses as to
matters learned in confidence before they can raise their
objections. But petitioners are not mere witnesses. They are
co-principals in the case for recovery of alleged ill-gotten
wealth. They have made their position clear from the very
beginning that they are not willing to testify and they cannot
be compelled to testify in view of their constitutional right
against self-incrimination and of their fundamental legal right
to maintain inviolate the privilege of attorney-client
confidentiality.
It is clear then that the case against petitioners should never
be allowed to take its full course in the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners should not be made to suffer the effects of further
litigation when it is obvious that their inclusion in the
complaint arose from a privileged attorney-client relationship
and as a means of coercing them to disclose the identities of
their clients. To allow the case to continue with respect to
them when this Court could nip the problem in the bud at this
early opportunity would be to sanction an unjust situation
which we should not here countenance. The case hangs as
a real and palpable threat, a proverbial Sword of Damocles
over petitioners' heads. It should not be allowed to continue
a day longer.
While we are aware of respondent PCGG's legal mandate to
recover ill-gotten wealth, we will not sanction acts which
violate the equal protection guarantee and the right against
self-incrimination and subvert the lawyer-client confidentiality
privilege.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division)
promulgated on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992
are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered to
exclude petitioners Teodoro D. Regala, Edgardo J.
Angara, Avelino V. Cruz, Jose C. Concepcion,
Victor P. Lazatin, Eduardo U. Escueta and Paraja G.
Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB Civil Case
No. 0033 entitled "Republic of the Philippines v.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al."
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur in
the result.
Romero and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., took no part.
Mendoza, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained
calumny hurled against it, is still the noblest of
professions. It exists upon the thesis that, in an
orderly society that is opposed to all forms of
anarchy, it so occupies, as it should, an exalted
position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time,
principles have evolved that would help ensure its
effective ministration. The protection of
confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship is
one, and it has since been an accepted firmament
in the profession. It allows the lawyer and the client
to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full
trust and confidence essential in a justice system
that works on the basis of substantive and
procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is not
without its pitfalls, and demands against it may be
strong, but these problems are, in the ultimate
analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor that have
made and will make that rule endure.
I see in the case before us, given the attendant
circumstances already detailed in the ponencia, a
situation of the Republic attempting to establish a
case not on what it perceives to be the strength of
its own evidence but on what it could elicit from a
counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable for
the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach
the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly
disguised threat of incrimination.
Accordingly, I join my other colleague who vote for
the GRANT of the petition.
DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting
The impressive presentation of the case in
the ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan makes difficult
the espousal of a dissenting view. Nevertheless, I
do not hesitate to express that view because I
strongly feel that this Court must confine itself to the
key issue in this special civil action for certiorari, viz.,
whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in not excluding the defendants,
the petitioners herein, from the Third Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033. That issue,
unfortunately, has been simply buried under the
avalanche of authorities upholding the sanctity of
lawyer-client relationship which appears to me to be
prematurely invoked.
From the undisputed facts disclosed by the pleadings and
summarized in the ponencia, I cannot find my way clear to a
conclusion that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse
of discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners' prayer
in their Comment to the PCGG's Motion to Admit Third
Amended Complaint.
The prerogative to determine who shall be made defendants
in a civil case is initially vested in the plaintiff, or the PCGG in
this case. The control of the Court comes in only when the
issue of "interest" (§ 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court) as, e.g.,
whether an indispensable party has not been joined, or
whether there is a misjoinder of parties (§ 7, 8, and 9, Id.), is
raised.
In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop or exclude
from the complaint original co-defendant Raul Roco because
he had allegedly complied with the condition prescribed by
the PCGG, viz., undertake that he will reveal the identity of
the principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in
the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 0033. In short,
there was an agreement or compromise settlement between
the PCGG and Roco. Accordingly, the PCGG submitted a
Third Amended Complaint without Roco as a defendant. No
obstacle to such an agreement has been insinuated. If
Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a
lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely answerable
therefor to his principals/clients and, probably, to this Court
in an appropriate disciplinary action if warranted. There is at
all no showing that Civil Case No. 0033 cannot further be
proceeded upon or that any judgment therein cannot be
binding without Roco remaining as a defendant. Accordingly,
the admission of the Third Amended Complaint cannot be
validly withheld by the Sandiganbayan.
Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal motion to be
excluded but only made the request to that effect as a rider
to their Comment to the Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint, entitled to be excluded from the Third Amended
Complaint such that denial thereof would constitute grave
abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part? To me, the
answer is clearly in the negative.
The petitioners seek to be accorded the same benefit
granted to or to be similarly treated as Roco. Reason and
logic dictate that they cannot, unless they too would make
themselves like Roco. Otherwise stated, they must first
voluntarily adopt for themselves the factual milieu created by
Roco and must bind themselves to perform certain
obligations as Roco. It is precisely for this that in response to
the petitioners' comment on the aforementioned Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint the PCGG manifested that
it is willing to accord the petitioners the treatment it gave
Roco provided they would do what Roco had done, that is,
disclose the identity of their principals/clients and submit
documents substantiating their claimed lawyer-client
relationship with the said principals/clients, as well as copies
of deeds of assignments the petitioners executed in favor of
their principals/clients. The petitioners did not do so because
they believed that compliance thereof would breach the
sanctity of their fiduciary duty in a lawyer-client relationship.
It, indeed, appears that Roco has complied with his
obligation as a consideration for his exclusion from the Third
Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan found that
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has
demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack
of action against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to
exercise its power both under the rules of agency and under
Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-1 in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
As a matter of fact, the PCGG presented evidence to
substantiate Roco's compliance. The ponencia itself so
stated, thus:
. . . respondent PCGG presented evidence to
substantiate compliance by private respondent
Roco of the conditions precedent to warrant the
latter's exclusion as party-defendant in PCGG Case
No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to respondent PCGG of the
counsel of respondent Roco dated May 24, 1989
reiterating a previous request for reinvestigation by
the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b) Affidavit
dated March 8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter
aforestated in (a); and (c) Letter of Roco, Bunag,
and Kapunan Law Offices dated September 21,
1988 to the respondent in behalf of private
respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence
by the PCGG it Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33.
(Id., 5-6).
These are the pieces of evidence upon which the
Sandiganbayan founded its conclusion that the
PCGG was satisfied with Roco's compliance. The
petitioners have not assailed such finding as
arbitrary.
The ponencia's observation then that Roco did not
refute the petitioners' contention that he did not
comply with his obligation to disclose the identity of
his principals is entirely irrelevant.
In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners
did not, therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco.
They cannot claim the same treatment, much less
compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for
nothing whatsoever. They have no right to make
such a demand for until they shall have complied
with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they
cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds allowed by law (e.g.,
those enumerated in § 1, Rule 16, Rules of
Court). The rule of confidentiality under the
lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude
a party. It is merely aground for disqualification of a
witness (§ 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may
only be invoked at the appropriate time, i.e., when a
lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness,
as when, having taken the witness stand, he is
questioned as to such confidential communicator or
advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to
produce, through subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, letters or other documents containing the
same privileged matter. But none of the lawyers in
this case is being required to testify about or
otherwise reveal "any [confidential] communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment." What they are being
asked to do, in line with their claim that they had
done the acts ascribed to them in pursuance of their
professional relation to their clients, is to identify the
latter to the PCGG and the Court; but this, only if
they so choose in order to be dropped from the
complaint, such identification being the condition
under which the PCGG has expressed willingness
to exclude them from the action. The revelation is
entirely optional, discretionary, on their part. The
attorney-client privilege is not therefor applicable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any
abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioners'
prayer for their exclusion as party-defendants
because they did not want to abide with any of the
conditions set by the PCGG. There would have
been abuse if the Sandiganbayan granted the
prayer because then it would have capriciously,
whimsically, arbitrarily, and oppressively imposed
its will on the PCGG.
Again, what the petitioners want is their exclusion from the
Third Amended Complaint or the dismissal of the case
insofar as they are concerned because either they are
invested with immunity under the principle of confidentiality
in a lawyer-client relationship, or the claims against them in
Civil Case No. 0033 are barred by such principle.
Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I still submit that
the lawyer-client privilege provides the petitioners no refuge.
They are sued as principal defendants in Civil Case No.
0033, a case of the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Conspiracy is imputed to the petitioners therein. In short,
they are, allegedly, conspirators in the commission of the
acts complained of for being nominees of certain parties.
Their inclusion as defendants in justified under § 15, Article
XI of the Constitution — which provides that the right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel — and E.O. No. 1 of 28 February 1986, E.O. No. 2
of 12 March 1986, E.O. No. 14 of 7 May 1986, and the Rules
and Regulations of the PCGG. Furthermore, § 2, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court requires that the complaint or information
should be "against all persons who appear to be responsible
for the offense involved."
Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to agree with the
majority opinion that the petitioners are immune from suit or
that they have to be excluded as defendants, or that they
cannot be compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their
principals, all because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege.
This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
§ 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned
in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him,
or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
The majority seeks to expand the scope of the Philippine rule
on the lawyer-client privilege by copious citations of
American jurisprudence which includes in the privilege the
identity of the client under the exceptional situations narrated
therein. From the plethora of cases cited, two facts stand out
in bold relief. Firstly, the issue of privilege contested therein
arose in grand jury proceedings on different States, which
are preliminary proceedings before the filing of the case in
court, and we are not even told what evidentiary rules apply
in the said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is
invoked in the court where it was already filed and presently
pends, and we have the foregoing specific rules
above-quoted. Secondly, and more important, in the cases
cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned were merely
advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for
the charges against their said clients. Here, the counsel
themselves are co-defendants duly charged in court as
co-conspirators in the offenses charged. The cases cited by
the majority evidently do not apply to them.
Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the
lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a
crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. I
quote, with emphases supplied, from 81 AM JUR 2d,
Witnesses, § 393 to 395, pages 356-357:
§ 393. Effect of unlawful purpose.
The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
attorney-client privilege from attaching. The
attorney-client privilege does not generally exist
where the representation is sought to
further criminal or fraudulent conduct either past,
present, or future. Thus, a confidence received by
an attorney in order to advance a criminal or
fraudulent purpose is beyond the scope of the
privilege.
Observation: The common-law rule that the
privilege protecting confidential communications
between attorney and client is lost if the relation is
abused by a client who seeks legal assistance to
perpetrate a crime or fraud has been codified.
§ 394. Attorney participation.
The attorney-client privilege cannot be used to
protect a client in the perpetration of a crime in
concert with the attorney, even where the attorney
is not aware of his client's purpose. The reason for
the rule is that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advised on the
commission of crime. Professional responsibility
does not countenance the use of the attorney-client
privilege as a subterfuge, and all conspiracies,
either active or passive, which are calculated to
hinder the administration of justice will vitiate the
privilege. In some jurisdictions, however, this
exception to the rule of privilege in confined to such
intended acts in violation of the law as are mala in
se, as distinguished from those which are merely
mala prohibita.
§ 395. Communication in contemplation of crime.
Communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
covered by the cloak of privilege ordinarily existing
in reference to communications between attorney
and client. But, the mere charge of illegality, not
supported by evidence, will not defeat the privilege;
there must be at least prima facie evidence that the
illegality has some foundation in fact.
Underhill also states:
There are many other cases to the same effect, for
the rule is prostitution of the honorable relation of
attorney and client will not be permitted under the
guise of privilege, and every communication made
to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not
only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at
once in the interest of justice. In accordance with
this rule, where a forged will or other false
instrument has come into possession of an attorney
through the instrumentality of the accused, with the
hope and expectation that the attorney would take
some action in reference thereto, and the attorney
does act, in ignorance of the true character of the
instrument, there is no privilege, inasmuch as full
confidence has been withheld. The attorney is then
compelled to produce a forged writing against the
client. The fact that the attorney is not cognizant of
the criminal or wrongful purpose, or, knowing it,
attempts to dissuade his client, is immaterial. The
attorney's ignorance of his client's intentions
deprives the information of a professional character
as full confidence has been withheld. (H.C.
Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of Criminal Case
Evidence, vol. 2, Fifth ed. (1956), Sec. 332, pp. 836-837;
emphasis mine).
125 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED, 516-519,
summarizes the rationale of the rule excepting
communications with respect to contemplated criminal or
fraudulent acts, thus:
c. Rationale of rule excepting communications with respect
to contemplated criminal or fraudulent act.
Various reasons have been announced as being the
foundation for the holdings that communications with respect
to contemplated criminal or fraudulent acts are not
privileged.
The reason perhaps most frequently advanced is that in
such cases there is no professional employment, properly
speaking. Standard F. Ins. Co v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky
679, 211 SW. 441, 5 ALR 972; Cummings v. Com. (1927)
221 Ky 301, 298 SW 943; Strong v. Abner (1937) 268 Ky
502, 105 SW(2d) 599; People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich
69, 23 NW 594; Hamil & Co. v. England (1892) 50 Mo App
338; Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226
SW 308; Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A
1054; Covency v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 AM Dec
287; People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden (1934) 150 Misc
714, 270 NYS 362 (affirmed without opinion in (1934) 242
App Div 611, 271 NYS 1059); Russell v. Jackson (1851) 9
Hare 387, 68 Eng Reprint 558; Charlton v. Coombes (1863)
4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751; Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14
QB Div (Eng) 153 — CCR; Re Postlethwaite (1887) LR 35
Ch Div (Eng) 722.
In Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153 — CCR, the
court said: "In order that the rule may apply, there must be
both professional confidence and professional employment,
but if the client has a criminal object in view in his
communications with his solicitor one of these elements
must necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire
with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is
avowed, the client does not consult his adviser professionally,
because it cannot be the solicitor's business to further any
criminal object. If the client does not avow his object, he
reposes no confidence, for the state of facts which is the
foundation of the supposed confidence does not exist. The
solicitor's advice is obtained by a fraud."
So, in Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679,
211 SW 441, 5 ALR 972, the court said: "The reason of the
principle which holds such communications not to be
privileged is that it is not within the professional character of
a lawyer to give advice upon such subjects, and that it is no
part of the profession of an attorney or counselor at law to be
advising persons as to how they may commit crimes or
frauds, or how they may escape the consequences of
contemplated crimes and frauds. If the crime or fraud has
already been committed and finished, a client may advise
with an attorney in regard to it, and communicate with him
freely, and the communications cannot be divulged as
evidence without the consent of the client, because it is a
part of the business and duty of those engaged in the
practice of the profession of law, when employed and relied
upon for that purpose, to give advice to those who have
made infractions of the laws; and, to enable the attorney to
properly advise and to properly represent the client in court
or when prosecutions are threatened, it is conducive to the
administration of justice that the client shall be free to
communicate to his attorney all the facts within his
knowledge, and that he may be assured that a
communication made by him shall not be used to his
prejudice."
The protection which the law affords to communications
between attorney and client has reference to those which are
legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful
employment, and does not extend to communications made
in contemplation of a crime, or perpetration of a
fraud. Strong v. Abner (1937) 368 Ky 502, 105 SW
(2d) 599.
The court in People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich
69, 23 NW 594, in holding not privileged
communications to an attorney having for their
object the communication of a crime, said: "They
then partake of the nature of a conspiracy, or
attempted conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to
divulge such communications, but under certain
circumstances it might become the duty of the
attorney to do so. The interests of public justice
require that no such shield from merited exposure
shall be interposed to protect a person who takes
counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The
relation of attorney and client cannot exist for the
purpose of counsel in concocting crimes."
And in Coveney v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33,
37 Am Dec 287, the court was of the opinion that
there could be no such relation as that of attorney
and client, either in the commission of a crime, or in
the doing of a wrong by force or fraud to an
individual, the privileged relation of attorney and
client existing only for lawful and honest purposes.
If the client consults the attorney at law with
reference to the perpetration of a crime, and they
co-operate in effecting it, there is no privilege,
inasmuch as it is no part of the lawyer's duty to aid
in crime — he ceases to be counsel and becomes a
criminal. Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq
455, 21 A 1054.
The court cannot permit it to be said that the
contriving of a fraud forms part of the professional
business of an attorney or solicitor. Charlton
v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751.
If the client does not frankly and freely reveal his
object and intention as well as facts, there is not
professional confidence, and therefore no
privilege. Matthews v. Hoagland (NJ) supra. See to
the same effect Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205
Mo App 495, 226 SW 308.
There is no valid claim of privilege in regard to the
production of documents passing between solicitor
and client, when the transaction impeached is
charged to be based upon fraud, that is the matter
to be investigated, and it is thought better that the
alleged privilege should suffer than that honestly
and fair dealing should appear to be violated with
impunity. Smith v. Hunt (1901) 1 Ont L Rep 334.
In Tichborne v. Lushington, shorthand Notes (Eng)
p. 5211 (cited in Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div
(Eng) 172 — CCR), the chief justice said "I believe
the law is, and properly is, that if a party consults an
attorney, and obtains advice for what afterwards
turns out to be the commission of a crime or a fraud,
that party so consulting the attorney has no
privilege whatever to close the lips of the attorney
from stating the truth. Indeed, if any such privilege
should be contended for, or existing, it would work
most grievous hardship on an attorney, who, after
he had been consulted upon what subsequently
appeared to be a manifest crime and fraud, would
have his lips closed, and might place him in a very
serious position of being suspected to be a party to
the fraud, and without his having an opportunity of
exculpating himself . . . There is no privilege in the
case which I have suggested of a party consulting
another, a professional man, as to what may
afterwards turn out to be a crime or fraud, and the
best mode of accomplishing it."
In Garside v. Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS (Eng) 39, although the
question of privilege as to communications between attorney
and client was not involved, the question directly involved
being the competency of a clerk in a business establishment
to testify as to certain information which he acquired while
working in the establishment, the court strongly approved of
a view as stated arguendo for plaintiff, in Annesley
v. Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr (Eng) 1229, as follows: "I
shall claim leave to consider whether an attorney may be
examined as to any matter which came to his knowledge as
an attorney. If he is employed as an attorney in any unlawful
or wicked act, his duty to the public obliges him to disclose it;
no private obligations can dispense with that universal one
which lies on every member of society to discover every
design which may be formed, contrary to the laws of society,
to destroy the public welfare. For this reason, I apprehend
that if a secret which is contrary to the public good, such as a
design to commit treason, murder, or perjury, comes to the
knowledge of an attorney, even in a cause where he is
concerned, the obligation to the public must dispense with
the private obligation to the client."
The court in McMannus v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213,
said; "It would be monstrous to hold that if counsel was
asked and obtained in reference to a contemplated crime
that the lips of the attorney would be sealed, when the facts
might become important to the ends of justice in the
prosecution of crime. In such a case the relation cannot be
taken to exist. Public policy would forbid it."
And the court in Lanum v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36,
observed that this rule was not in contravention of sound
public policy, but on the contrary, tended to the maintenance
of a higher standard of professional ethics by preventing the
relation of attorney and client from operating as a cloak for
fraud.
Communications of a client to an attorney are not privileged
if they were a request for advice as to how to commit a fraud,
it being in such a case not only the attorney's privilege, but
his duty, to disclose the facts to the court. Will v. Tornabells
& Co. (1907) 3 Porto Rico Fed Rep 125. The court said: "We
say this notwithstanding the comments of opposing counsel
as to the indelicacy of his position because of his being now
on the opposite side of the issue that arose as a
consequence of the communication he testifies about, and is
interested in the cause to the extent of a large contingent fee,
as he confesses."
The object of prohibiting the disclosure of confidential
communications is to protect the client, and not to make the
attorney an accomplice or permit him to aid in the
commission of a crime. People vs. Petersen (1901) 60 App
Div 118, NYS 941.
The seal of personal confidence can never be used to cover
a transaction which is in itself a crime. People
v. Farmer (1909) 194 NY 251, 87 NE 457.
As to disclosing the identity of a client, 81 AM JUR 2d,
Witnesses, § 410 and 411, pages 366-368, states:
§ 410. Name or identity of client.
Disclosure of a client's identity is necessary proof of the
existence of the attorney-client relationship and is not
privileged information. Thus, the attorney-client privilege is
inapplicable even though the information was communicated
confidentially to the attorney in his professional capacity and,
in some cases, in spite of the fact that the attorney may have
been sworn to secrecy, where an inquiry is directed to an
attorney as to the name or identity of his client. This general
rule applies in criminal cases, as well as in civil
actions. Where an undisclosed client is a party to an action,
the opposing party has a right to know with whom he is
contending or who the real party in interest is, if not the
nominal adversary.
§ 411. Disclosure of identity of client as breach of
confidentiality.
The revelation of the identification of a client is not
usually considered privileged, except where so
much has been divulged with regard to to legal
services rendered or the advice sought, that to
reveal the client's name would be to disclose the
whole relationship and confidential communications.
However, even where the subject matter of the
attorney-client relationship has already been
revealed, the client's name has been deemed
privileged.
Where disclosure of the identity of a client might
harm the client by being used against him under
circumstances where there are no countervailing
factors, then the identity is protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
In criminal proceedings, a client's name may be
privileged if information already obtained by the
tribunal, combined with the client's identity, might
expose him to criminal prosecution for acts
subsequent to, and because of, which he had
sought the advice of his attorney.
Although as a general rule, the identity of a
defendant in a criminal prosecution is a matter of
public record and, thus, not covered by the
attorney-client privilege, where the attorney has
surrendered to the authorities physical evidence in
his possession by way of the attorney-client
relationship, the state must prove the connection
between the piece of physical evidence and the
defendant without in any way relying on the
testimony of the client's attorney who initially
received the evidence and, thus, the attorney may
not be called to the stand and asked to disclose the
identity of the client. However, an attorney cannot
refuse to reveal the identity of a person who asked
him to deliver stolen property to the police
department, whether a bona fide attorney-client
relationship exists between them, inasmuch as the
transaction was not a legal service or done in the
attorney's professional capacity.
Distinction: Where an attorney was informed by a
male client that his female acquaintance was
possibly involved in [a] his-and-run accident, the
identity of the female did not come within scope of
attorney-client privilege although the identity of the
male client was protected. (emphases supplied)
WIGMORE explains why the identity of a client is
not within the lawyer-client privilege in this manner:
§ 2313. Identity of client or purpose of suit. — The
identity of the attorney's client or the name of the
real party in interest will seldom be a matter
communicated in confidence because the
procedure of litigation ordinarily presupposes a
disclosure of these facts. Furthermore, so far as a
client may in fact desire secrecy and may be able to
secure action without appearing as a party to the
proceedings, it would be improper to sanction such
a wish. Every litigant is in justice entitled to know
the identity of his opponents. He cannot be obliged
to struggle in the dark against unknown forces. He
has by anticipation the right, in later proceedings, if
desired, to enforce the legal responsibility of those
who may have maliciously sued or prosecuted him
or fraudulently evaded his claim. He has as much
right to ask the attorney "Who fees your fee?" as to
ask the witness (966 supra). "Who maintains you
during this trial?" upon the analogy of the principle
already examined (2298 supra), the privilege
cannot be used to evade a client's responsibility for the use
of legal process. And if it is necessary for the purpose to
make a plain exception to the rule of confidence, then it must
be made. (Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 8, (1961), p. 609;
emphases supplied).
In 114 ALR, 1322, we also find the following statement:
1. Name or identity.
As is indicated in 28 R.C.L. p. 563, it appears that the rule
making communications between attorney and client
privileged from disclosure ordinarily does not apply where
the inquiry is confined to the fact of the attorney's
employment and the name of the person employing him,
since the privilege presupposes the relationship of client and
attorney, and therefore does not attach to its creation.
At the present stage of the proceedings below, the
petitioners have not shown that they are so situated with
respect to their principals as to bring them within any of the
exceptions established by American jurisprudence. There
will be full opportunity for them to establish that fact at the
trial where the broader perspectives of the case shall have
been presented and can be better appreciated by the court.
The insistence for their exclusion from the case is
understandable, but the reasons for the hasty resolution
desired is naturally suspect.
We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an
authority that the lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to
prevent the disclosure of a client's identity where the lawyer
and the client are conspirators in the commission of a crime
or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are mandated not
to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon
1, Code of Professional Responsibility) and to employ only
fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And under the Canons of
Professional Ethics, a lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind
that his great trust is to be performed within and not without
the bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the
honor of his profession and the best interest of his client
when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress
upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with
the strictest principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These
canons strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege whenever
he conspires with the client in the commission of a crime or a
fraud.
I then vote to DENY, for want of merit, the instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J. and Regalado, J., concur.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is an important petition for certiorari to annul the
resolutions of the respondent Sandiganbayan denying
petitioners' motion to be excluded from the Complaint for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth on the principal ground
that as lawyers they cannot be ordered to reveal the identity
of their client.
First, we fast forward the facts. The Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) filed Civil Case No. 33 before
the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., for
the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Sued as
co-defendants are the petitioners in the cases at bar —
lawyers Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.
Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin,
Eduardo Escueta and Paraja Hayudini. Also included as a
co-defendant is lawyer Raul Roco, now a duly elected
senator of the Republic. All co-defendants were then
partners of the law firm, Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala
and Cruz Law Offices, better known as the ACCRA Law Firm.
The Complaint against Cojuangco, Jr., and the
petitioners alleged, inter alia, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
The wrongs committed by defendants acting singly
or collectively and in unlawful concert with one
another, include the misappropriation and theft of
public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth,
extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and
other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse of power as more fully described (in
the subsequent paragraphs of the complaint), all at
the expense and to the grave and irreparable
damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino people.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J.
Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Regalio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U.
Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul S. Roco of
Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala, and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed,
conspired and confederated with each other in
setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC and more
than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations,
including the acquisition of the San Miguel
Corporation shares and the institutionalization
through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation,
became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total
outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation
number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders
of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books
show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of 7 June 1984.
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the legal
services offered and made available by their firm to
its clients include: (a) organizing and acquiring
business organizations, (b) acting as incorporators
or stockholders thereof, and (c) delivering to clients
the corresponding documents of their equity
holdings (i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in blank
or blank deeds of trust or assignment). They
claimed that their activities were "in furtherance of
legitimate lawyering."
In the course of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan, the PCGG filed a Motion to Admit
Third Amended Complaint and the Third Amended
Complaint excluding lawyer Roco as party
defendant. Lawyer Roco was excluded on the basis
of his promise to reveal the identity of the principals
for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in the case.
The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners to
comment on the motion. In their Comment,
petitioners demanded that they be extended the
same privilege as their co-defendant Roco. They
prayed for their exclusion from the complaint.
PCGG agreed but set the following conditions: (1)
disclosure of the identity of their client; (2)
submission of documents substantiating their
lawyer-client relationship; and (3) submission of the
deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor
of their client covering their respective
shareholdings. The same conditions were imposed
on lawyer Roco.
Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG conditions
contending that the attorney-client privilege gives them the
right not to reveal the identity of their client. They also
alleged that lawyer Roco was excluded though he did not in
fact reveal the identity of his clients. On March 18, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of petitioners in Case
No. 33. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing
the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their
principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the
privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to the debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have
been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has
demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack
of course against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to
exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under
Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers
the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in
exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7,
PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA
lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required
by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG
for keeping them as a party defendants. In the same vein,
they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991
filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G.
Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded
to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit.
Sandiganbayan later denied petitioners' motions for
reconsideration in its resolutions dated May 21, 1988 and
September 3, 1992.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who indisputably
acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the
strict application of the law agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and
Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or
had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s), the disclosure does not constitute a
substantial distinction as would make the
classification reasonable under the equal protection
clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned
favoritism and undue preference in favor of Mr.
Roco and violation of the equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their client(s) and the other
information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG
are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other
privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not requiring that the
dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be
based on reasonable and just grounds and with due
consideration to the constitutional right of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection
of the law.
The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case
where the hinge issue involves the applicability of
attorney-client privilege. It ought to be noted that
petitioners were included as defendants in Civil
Case No. 33 as conspirators. Together with Mr.
Cojuangco, Jr., they are charged with having ". . .
conspired and confederated with each other in
setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CICI and
more than twenty other coconut levy funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San
Miguel Corporation shares and the
institutionalization through presidential directives of
the coconut monopoly." To stress, petitioners are
charged with having conspired in the commission of
crimes. The issue of attorney-client privilege arose
when PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the
complaint on condition they reveal the identity of
their client. Petitioners refused to comply and
assailed the condition on the ground that to reveal
the identity of their client will violate the
attorney-client privilege.
It is thus necessary to resolve whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it rejected petitioners' thesis that to
reveal the identity of their client would violate the
attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common
law.1 For the first time in this jurisdiction, we are
asked to rule whether the attorney-client privilege
includes the right not to disclose the identity of
client. The issue poses a trilemma for its resolution
requires the delicate balancing of three opposing
policy considerations. One overriding policy consideration is
the need for courts to discover the truth for truth alone is the
true touchstone of justice.2 Equally compelling is the need to
protect the adversary system of justice where truth is best
extracted by giving a client broad privilege to confide facts to
his counsel.3 Similarly deserving of sedulous concern is the
need to keep inviolate the constitutional right against
self-incrimination and the right to effective counsel in criminal
litigations. To bridle at center the centrifugal forces of these
policy considerations, courts have followed to prudential
principle that the attorney-client privilege must not be
expansively construed as it is in derogation of the search for
truth.4 Accordingly, a narrow construction has been given to
the privilege and it has been consistently held that "these
competing societal interests demand that application of the
privilege not exceed that which is necessary to effect the
policy considerations underlying the privilege, i.e., the
privilege must be upheld only in those circumstances for
which it was created.'"5
Prescinding from these premises, our initial task is to define
in clear strokes the substantive content of the attorney-client
privilege within the context of the distinct issues posed by the
petition at bar. With due respect, I like to start by stressing
the irreducible principle that the attorney-client privilege can
never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud.
Communications to an attorney having for their object the
commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature of a
conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such
communications, but under certain circumstances it might
become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of
public justice require that no such shield from merited
exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes
counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of
attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in
concocting crimes."6 In the well chosen words of retired
Justice Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.7 I hasten to
add, however, that a mere allegation that a lawyer conspired
with his client to commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the
privilege.8 As early as 1933, no less than the Mr. Justice
Cardozo held in Clark v. United States9 that: "there are early
cases apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality,
not supported by any evidence, will set the confidences
free . . . But this conception of the privilege is without
support . . . To drive the privilege away, there must be
'something to give colour to the charge;' there must be prima
facie evidence that it has foundation in fact." In the petition at
bar, however, the PCGG appears to have relented on its
original stance as spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners
are co-conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the
attorney-client privilege. The PCGG has agreed to exclude
petitioners from the Complaint provided they reveal the
identity of their client. In fine, PCGG has conceded that
petitioner are entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege if
they reveal their client's identity.
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-client
privilege since the PCGG is no longer proceeding against
them as co-conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the
more specific issue of whether the attorney-client privilege
includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as
contended by the petitioners. As a general rule, the
attorney-client privilege does not include the right of
non-disclosure of client identity. The general rule, however,
admits of well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan
failed to recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are
accurately summarized in In re Grand Jury
Investigation,10 viz:
The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the general
rule that the identity of a client is, with limited exceptions, not
within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege.
See: In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026,
1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Jones), 517 F. 2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651 F. 2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.
1981); Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1082, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966);
In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359,
361 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363,
365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979).
The Circuits have embraced various "exceptions" to
the general rule that the identity of a client is not
within the protective ambit of the attorney-client
privilege. All such exceptions appear to be firmly
grounded in the Ninth Circuit's seminal decision
in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1960). In
Baird the IRS received a letter from an attorney
stating that an enclosed check in the amount of
$12,706 was being tendered for additional amounts
due from undisclosed taxpayers. When the IRS
summoned the attorney to ascertain the identity of
the delinquent taxpayers the attorney refused
identification assertion the attorney-client privilege.
The Ninth Circuit, applying California law, adjudged
that the "exception" to the general rule as
pronounced in Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230,
149 P. 566 (1915) controlled:
The name of the client will be considered privileged
matter where the circumstances of the case are
such that the name of the client is material only for
the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt
on the part of such client of the very offenses on
account of which the attorney was employed.
Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The identity of the
Baird taxpayer was adjudged within this exception
to the general rule. The Ninth Circuit has continued
to acknowledge this exception.
A significant exception to this principle of
non-confidentiality holds that such information may
be privileged when the person invoking the privilege
is able to show that a strong possibility exists that
disclosure of the information would implicate the
client in the very matter for which legal advice was
sought in the first case.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.
1982). Accord: United States v. Hodge and Zweig,
548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189,
190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Witness
(Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982). This
exception, which can perhaps be most succinctly
characterized as the "legal advice" exception, has
also been recognized by other circuits. See: In re
Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291
(1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631
F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S.1083, 101 S.Ct. 869-70, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981).
Since the legal advice exception is firmly grounded
in the policy of protecting confidential
communications, this Court adopts and applies its
principles herein. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra.
It should be observed, however that the legal
advice exception may be defeated through a prima
facie showing that the legal representation was
secured in furtherance of present or intended
continuing illegality, as where the legal
representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy.
See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Decus Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), supra, 695 F.2d at 365 n. 1;
In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449, U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed. 2d
291 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari),
631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083,
101 S.Ct. 869, 66 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1981); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.
1971). See also: Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15, 53,
S.Ct. 465, 469, 77, L.Ed. 993 (1933); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir.
1982 (en banc).
Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a
client is not privileged arises where disclosure of the identity
would be tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected
confidential communication. In Baird, supra, the Ninth Circuit
observed:
If the identification of the client conveys information which
ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual
privileged communication between attorney and client, then
the privilege should extend to such identification in the
absence of another factors.
Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth Circuit
promulgated the following exception:
To the general rule is an exception, firmly embedded as the
rule itself. The privilege may be recognized where so much
of the actual communication has already been disclosed that
identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a
confidential communication.
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965).
Accord: United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir.
1975); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d
499 1963); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir.
1965); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir.
1944). See also: Chirac v. Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat)
280, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826). The Seventh Circuit has added to
the Harvey exception the following emphasized caveat:
The privilege may be recognized where so much of the
actual communication has already been disclosed [not
necessarily by the attorney, but by independent sources as
well] that identification of the client [or of fees paid] amounts
to disclosure of a confidential communication.
United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976
(emphasis added). The Third Circuit, applying this exception,
has emphasized that it is the link between the client and
the communication, rather than the link between the client
and the possibility of potential criminal prosecution, which
serves to bring the client's identity within the protective ambit
of the attorney-client privilege. See: In re Grand Jury
Empanelled February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469,
473 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979). Like the "legal advice" exception, this
exception is also firmly rooted in principles of confidentiality.
Another exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit's en
banc decision of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is recognized when
disclosure of the identity of the client would provide the "last
link" of evidence:
We have long recognized the general rule that matters
involving the payment of fees and the identity of clients are
not generally privileged. In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
(United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975); see
cases collected id. at 670 n. 2. There we also recognized,
however, a limited and narrow exception to the general rule,
one that obtains when the disclosure of the client's identity
by his attorney would have supplied the last link in an
existing chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the
client's indictment.
I join the majority in holding that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated
the metes and bounds of the attorney-client
privilege by failing to recognize the exceptions
discussed above.
Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority when
it ruled that petitioners need not prove they fall
within the exceptions to the general rule. I
respectfully submit that the attorney-client privilege
is not a magic mantra whose invocation will ipso
facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes it with its
protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the
privilege.11 The person claiming the privilege or its
exceptions has the obligation to present the
underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the
privilege.12 When these facts can be presented only
by revealing the very information sought to be
protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the
lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in
an in camera hearing.13 The hearing can even be in
camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held that "a
well-recognized means for an attorney to
demonstrate the existence of an exception to the
general rule, while simultaneously preserving
confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move
the court for an in
camera ex-parte hearing.14 Without the proofs
adduced in these in camera hearings, the Court has
no factual basis to determine whether petitioners
fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that
petitioners have not adduced evidence that they fall
within any of the above mentioned exceptions for as
aforestated, the Sandiganbayan did not recognize
the exceptions, hence, the order compelling them to
reveal the identity of their client. In ruling that
petitioners need not further establish the factual
basis of their claim that they fall within the
exceptions to the general rule, the majority held:
The circumstances involving the engagement of
lawyers in the case at bench therefore clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of
the alleged client's name would lead to establish
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which there would
be no attorney-client relationship). Furthermore,
under the third main exception, revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case,
where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the
word of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of
a . . . crime.
I respectfully submit that the first and third
exceptions relied upon by the majority are not
self-executory but need factual basis for their
successful invocation. The first exception as cited
by the majority is ". . . where a strong probability
exists that revealing the clients' name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer's advice." It seems to me evident
that "the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer's advice" is a question of fact which must
first be established before there can be any ruling
that the exception can be invoked. The majority
15
cites Ex Parte Enzor, and
U S v. Hodge and Zweig,16 but these cases leave
no doubt that the "very activity" for which the client
sought the advice of counsel was properly proved.
In both cases, the "very activity" of the clients reveal
they sought advice on their criminal activities. Thus,
in Enzor, the majority opinion states that the
"unidentified client, an election official, informed his
attorney in confidence that he had been offered a bribe to
violate election laws or that he had accepted a bribe to that
end."17 In Hodge, the "very activity" of the clients deals with
illegal importation of drugs. In the case at bar, there is no
inkling whatsoever about the "very activity" for which the
clients of petitioners sought their professional advice as
lawyers. There is nothing in the records that petitioners were
consulted on the "criminal activities" of their client. The
complaint did allege that petitioners and their client
conspired to commit crimes but allegations are not evidence.
So it is with the third exception which as related by the
majority is "where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime."18 Again, the rhetorical questions that
answer themselves are: (1) how can we determine that
PCGG has "no case" against petitioners without presentation
of evidence? and (2) how can we determine that the name of
the client is the only link without presentation of evidence as
to the other links? The case of Baird vs. Koerner19 does not
support the "no need for evidence" ruling of the majority. In
Baird, as related by the majority itself, "a lawyer was
consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place
the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the US
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It appeared that the
taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect
and the taxes understated.20 Once more, it is clear that the
Baird court was informed of the activity of the client for which
the lawyer was consulted and the activity involved probable
violation of the tax laws. Thus, the Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that
exception to the general rule. Here money was received by
the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they
had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one
or more years in the past. The names of the clients are
useful to the government for but one purpose — to ascertain
which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may
check the records for that one year or several years. The
voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers that more tax or interest or penalties are due than
the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt
for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt
are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed —
to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should
be done.
In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird was properly
established by the parties. In the case at bar, there is no
evidence about the subject matter of the consultation made
by petitioners' client. Again, the records do not show that the
subject matter is criminal in character except for the raw
allegations in the Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated
predicate of the majority ruling that revealing the identity of
the client ". . . would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime." The silent implication is unflattering and unfair to
petitioners who are marquee names in the legal profession
and unjust to their undisclosed client.
Finally, it ought to be obvious that petitioners' right to claim
the attorney-client privilege is resolutory of the Complaint
against them, and hence should be decided ahead and
independently of their claim to equal protection of the law.
Pursuant to the rule in legal hermeneutics that courts should
not decide constitutional issues unless unavoidable, I also
respectfully submit that there is no immediate necessity to
resolve petitioners' claim to equal protection of the law at this
stage of the proceedings.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a
qualified dissent from the majority opinion.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring:
The legal profession, despite all the unrestrained
calumny hurled against it, is still the noblest of
professions. It exists upon the thesis that, in an
orderly society that is opposed to all forms of
anarchy, it so occupies, as it should, an exalted
position in the proper dispensation of justice. In time,
principles have evolved that would help ensure its
effective ministration. The protection of
confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship is
one, and it has since been an accepted firmament
in the profession. It allows the lawyer and the client
to institutionalize a unique relationship based on full
trust and confidence essential in a justice system
that works on the basis of substantive and
procedural due process. To be sure, the rule is not
without its pitfalls, and demands against it may be
strong, but these problems are, in the ultimate
analysis, no more than mere tests of vigor that have
made and will make that rule endure.
I see in the case before us, given the attendant
circumstances already detailed in the ponencia, a
situation of the Republic attempting to establish a
case not on what it perceives to be the strength of
its own evidence but on what it could elicit from a
counsel against his client. I find it unreasonable for
the Sandiganbayan to compel petitioners to breach
the trust reposed on them and succumb to a thinly
disguised threat of incrimination.
Accordingly, I join my other colleague who vote for
the GRANT of the petition.
DAVIDE, JR., J.: dissenting
The impressive presentation of the case in
the ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan makes difficult
the espousal of a dissenting view. Nevertheless, I
do not hesitate to express that view because I
strongly feel that this Court must confine itself to the
key issue in this special civil action for certiorari, viz.,
whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in not excluding the defendants,
the petitioners herein, from the Third Amended
Complaint in Civil Case No. 0033. That issue,
unfortunately, has been simply buried under the
avalanche of authorities upholding the sanctity of
lawyer-client relationship which appears to me to be
prematurely invoked.
From the undisputed facts disclosed by the
pleadings and summarized in the ponencia, I
cannot find my way clear to a conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not acting favorably on the petitioners'
prayer in their Comment to the PCGG's Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint.
The prerogative to determine who shall be made
defendants in a civil case is initially vested in the
plaintiff, or the PCGG in this case. The control of
the Court comes in only when the issue of "interest"
(§ 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court) as, e.g., whether an
indispensable party has not been joined, or whether
there is a misjoinder of parties (§ 7, 8, and 9, Id.), is
raised.
In the case below, the PCGG decided to drop or exclude
from the complaint original co-defendant Raul Roco because
he had allegedly complied with the condition prescribed by
the PCGG, viz., undertake that he will reveal the identity of
the principals for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in
the companies involved in PCGG Case No. 0033. In short,
there was an agreement or compromise settlement between
the PCGG and Roco. Accordingly, the PCGG submitted a
Third Amended Complaint without Roco as a defendant. No
obstacle to such an agreement has been insinuated. If
Roco's revelation violated the confidentiality of a
lawyer-client relationship, he would be solely answerable
therefor to his principals/clients and, probably, to this Court
in an appropriate disciplinary action if warranted. There is at
all no showing that Civil Case No. 0033 cannot further be
proceeded upon or that any judgment therein cannot be
binding without Roco remaining as a defendant. Accordingly,
the admission of the Third Amended Complaint cannot be
validly withheld by the Sandiganbayan.
Are the petitioners, who did not file a formal motion to be
excluded but only made the request to that effect as a rider
to their Comment to the Motion to Admit Third Amended
Complaint, entitled to be excluded from the Third Amended
Complaint such that denial thereof would constitute grave
abuse of discretion on the Sandiganbayan's part? To me, the
answer is clearly in the negative.
The petitioners seek to be accorded the same benefit
granted to or to be similarly treated as Roco. Reason and
logic dictate that they cannot, unless they too would make
themselves like Roco. Otherwise stated, they must first
voluntarily adopt for themselves the factual milieu created by
Roco and must bind themselves to perform certain
obligations as Roco. It is precisely for this that in response to
the petitioners' comment on the aforementioned Motion to
Admit Third Amended Complaint the PCGG manifested that
it is willing to accord the petitioners the treatment it gave
Roco provided they would do what Roco had done, that is,
disclose the identity of their principals/clients and submit
documents substantiating their claimed lawyer-client
relationship with the said principals/clients, as well as copies
of deeds of assignments the petitioners executed in favor of
their principals/clients. The petitioners did not do so because
they believed that compliance thereof would breach the
sanctity of their fiduciary duty in a lawyer-client relationship.
It, indeed, appears that Roco has complied with his
obligation as a consideration for his exclusion from the Third
Amended Complaint. The Sandiganbayan found that
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has
demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack
of action against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to
exercise its power both under the rules of agency and under
Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-1 in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
As a matter of fact, the PCGG presented evidence to
substantiate Roco's compliance. The ponencia itself so
stated, thus:
. . . respondent PCGG presented evidence to substantiate
compliance by private respondent Roco of the conditions
precedent to warrant the latter's exclusion as
party-defendant in PCGG Case No. 33, to wit: (a) Letter to
respondent PCGG of the counsel of respondent Roco dated
May 24, 1989 reiterating a previous request for
reinvestigation by the PCGG in PCGG Case No. 33; (b)
Affidavit dated March 8, 1989 executed by private
respondent Roco as Attachment to the letter aforestated in
(a); and (c) Letter of Roco, Bunag, and Kapunan Law Offices
dated September 21, 1988 to the respondent in behalf of
private respondent Roco originally requesting the
reinvestigation and/or re-examination of evidence by the
PCGG it Complaint in PCGG Case No. 33. (Id., 5-6).
These are the pieces of evidence upon which the
Sandiganbayan founded its conclusion that the
PCGG was satisfied with Roco's compliance. The
petitioners have not assailed such finding as
arbitrary.
The ponencia's observation then that Roco did not
refute the petitioners' contention that he did not
comply with his obligation to disclose the identity of
his principals is entirely irrelevant.
In view of their adamantine position, the petitioners
did not, therefore, allow themselves to be like Roco.
They cannot claim the same treatment, much less
compel the PCGG to drop them as defendants, for
nothing whatsoever. They have no right to make
such a demand for until they shall have complied
with the conditions imposed for their exclusion, they
cannot be excluded except by way of a motion to
dismiss based on the grounds allowed by law (e.g.,
those enumerated in § 1, Rule 16, Rules of
Court). The rule of confidentiality under the
lawyer-client relationship is not a cause to exclude
a party. It is merely aground for disqualification of a
witness (§ 24, Rule 130, Rules of Court) and may
only be invoked at the appropriate time, i.e., when a
lawyer is under compulsion to answer as witness,
as when, having taken the witness stand, he is
questioned as to such confidential communicator or
advice, or is being otherwise judicially coerced to
produce, through subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise, letters or other documents containing the
same privileged matter. But none of the lawyers in
this case is being required to testify about or
otherwise reveal "any [confidential] communication
made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment." What they are being
asked to do, in line with their claim that they had
done the acts ascribed to them in pursuance of their
professional relation to their clients, is to identify the
latter to the PCGG and the Court; but this, only if
they so choose in order to be dropped from the
complaint, such identification being the condition
under which the PCGG has expressed willingness
to exclude them from the action. The revelation is
entirely optional, discretionary, on their part. The
attorney-client privilege is not therefor applicable.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan did not commit any
abuse of discretion when it denied the petitioners'
prayer for their exclusion as party-defendants
because they did not want to abide with any of the
conditions set by the PCGG. There would have
been abuse if the Sandiganbayan granted the
prayer because then it would have capriciously,
whimsically, arbitrarily, and oppressively imposed
its will on the PCGG.
Again, what the petitioners want is their exclusion
from the Third Amended Complaint or the dismissal
of the case insofar as they are concerned because
either they are invested with immunity under the
principle of confidentiality in a lawyer-client
relationship, or the claims against them in Civil
Case No. 0033 are barred by such principle.
Even if we have to accommodate this issue, I still
submit that the lawyer-client privilege provides the
petitioners no refuge. They are sued as principal
defendants in Civil Case No. 0033, a case of the
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Conspiracy is
imputed to the petitioners therein. In short, they are,
allegedly, conspirators in the commission of the
acts complained of for being nominees of certain
parties.
Their inclusion as defendants in justified under § 15, Article
XI of the Constitution — which provides that the right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel — and E.O. No. 1 of 28 February 1986, E.O. No. 2
of 12 March 1986, E.O. No. 14 of 7 May 1986, and the Rules
and Regulations of the PCGG. Furthermore, § 2, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court requires that the complaint or information
should be "against all persons who appear to be responsible
for the offense involved."
Hypothetically admitting the allegations in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 0033, I find myself unable to agree with the
majority opinion that the petitioners are immune from suit or
that they have to be excluded as defendants, or that they
cannot be compelled to reveal or disclose the identity of their
principals, all because of the sacred lawyer-client privilege.
This privilege is well put in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
§ 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.
— The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned
in confidence in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be
examined as to any communication made by the client to him,
or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to,
professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of
the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
The majority seeks to expand the scope of the Philippine rule
on the lawyer-client privilege by copious citations of
American jurisprudence which includes in the privilege the
identity of the client under the exceptional situations narrated
therein. From the plethora of cases cited, two facts stand out
in bold relief. Firstly, the issue of privilege contested therein
arose in grand jury proceedings on different States, which
are preliminary proceedings before the filing of the case in
court, and we are not even told what evidentiary rules apply
in the said hearings. In the present case, the privilege is
invoked in the court where it was already filed and presently
pends, and we have the foregoing specific rules
above-quoted. Secondly, and more important, in the cases
cited by the majority, the lawyers concerned were merely
advocating the cause of their clients but were not indicted for
the charges against their said clients. Here, the counsel
themselves are co-defendants duly charged in court as
co-conspirators in the offenses charged. The cases cited by
the majority evidently do not apply to them.
Hence, I wish to repeat and underscore the fact that the
lawyer-client privilege is not a shield for the commission of a
crime or against the prosecution of the lawyer therefor. I
quote, with emphases supplied, from 81 AM JUR 2d,
Witnesses, § 393 to 395, pages 356-357:
§ 393. Effect of unlawful purpose.
The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
attorney-client privilege from attaching. The attorney-client
privilege does not generally exist where the representation is
sought to further criminal or fraudulent conduct either past,
present, or future. Thus, a confidence received by an
attorney in order to advance a criminal or fraudulent purpose
is beyond the scope of the privilege.
Observation: The common-law rule that the privilege
protecting confidential communications between attorney
and client is lost if the relation is abused by a client who
seeks legal assistance to perpetrate a crime or
fraud has been codified.
§ 394. Attorney participation.
The attorney-client privilege cannot be used to
protect a client in the perpetration of a crime in
concert with the attorney, even where the attorney
is not aware of his client's purpose. The reason for
the rule is that it is not within the professional
character of a lawyer to give advised on the
commission of crime. Professional responsibility
does not countenance the use of the attorney-client
privilege as a subterfuge, and all conspiracies,
either active or passive, which are calculated to
hinder the administration of justice will vitiate the
privilege. In some jurisdictions, however, this
exception to the rule of privilege in confined to such
intended acts in violation of the law as are mala in
se, as distinguished from those which are merely
mala prohibita.
§ 395. Communication in contemplation of crime.
Communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
covered by the cloak of privilege ordinarily existing
in reference to communications between attorney
and client. But, the mere charge of illegality, not
supported by evidence, will not defeat the privilege;
there must be at least prima facie evidence that the
illegality has some foundation in fact.
Underhill also states:
There are many other cases to the same effect, for
the rule is prostitution of the honorable relation of
attorney and client will not be permitted under the
guise of privilege, and every communication made
to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not
only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under
certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at
once in the interest of justice. In accordance with
this rule, where a forged will or other false
instrument has come into possession of an attorney
through the instrumentality of the accused, with the
hope and expectation that the attorney would take
some action in reference thereto, and the attorney
does act, in ignorance of the true character of the
instrument, there is no privilege, inasmuch as full
confidence has been withheld. The attorney is then
compelled to produce a forged writing against the
client. The fact that the attorney is not cognizant of
the criminal or wrongful purpose, or, knowing it,
attempts to dissuade his client, is immaterial. The
attorney's ignorance of his client's intentions
deprives the information of a professional character
as full confidence has been withheld. (H.C.
Underhill, A Treatise on the Law of Criminal Case
Evidence, vol. 2, Fifth ed. (1956), Sec. 332, pp.
836-837; emphasis mine).
125 AMERICAN LAW REPORTS ANNOTATED,
516-519, summarizes the rationale of the rule
excepting communications with respect to
contemplated criminal or fraudulent acts, thus:
c. Rationale of rule excepting communications with
respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent act.
Various reasons have been announced as being
the foundation for the holdings that communications
with respect to contemplated criminal or fraudulent
acts are not privileged.
The reason perhaps most frequently advanced is that in
such cases there is no professional employment, properly
speaking. Standard F. Ins. Co v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky
679, 211 SW. 441, 5 ALR 972; Cummings v. Com. (1927)
221 Ky 301, 298 SW 943; Strong v. Abner (1937) 268 Ky
502, 105 SW(2d) 599; People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich
69, 23 NW 594; Hamil & Co. v. England (1892) 50 Mo App
338; Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205 Mo App 495, 226
SW 308; Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq 455, 21 A
1054; Covency v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33, 37 AM Dec
287; People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden (1934) 150 Misc
714, 270 NYS 362 (affirmed without opinion in (1934) 242
App Div 611, 271 NYS 1059); Russell v. Jackson (1851) 9
Hare 387, 68 Eng Reprint 558; Charlton v. Coombes (1863)
4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751; Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14
QB Div (Eng) 153 — CCR; Re Postlethwaite (1887) LR 35
Ch Div (Eng) 722.
In Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div (Eng) 153 — CCR, the
court said: "In order that the rule may apply, there must be
both professional confidence and professional employment,
but if the client has a criminal object in view in his
communications with his solicitor one of these elements
must necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire
with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is
avowed, the client does not consult his adviser professionally,
because it cannot be the solicitor's business to further any
criminal object. If the client does not avow his object, he
reposes no confidence, for the state of facts which is the
foundation of the supposed confidence does not exist. The
solicitor's advice is obtained by a fraud."
So, in Standard F. Ins. Co. v. Smithhart (1919) 183 Ky 679,
211 SW 441, 5 ALR 972, the court said: "The reason of the
principle which holds such communications not to be
privileged is that it is not within the professional character of
a lawyer to give advice upon such subjects, and that it is no
part of the profession of an attorney or counselor at law to be
advising persons as to how they may commit crimes or
frauds, or how they may escape the consequences of
contemplated crimes and frauds. If the crime or fraud has
already been committed and finished, a client may advise
with an attorney in regard to it, and communicate with him
freely, and the communications cannot be divulged as
evidence without the consent of the client, because it is a
part of the business and duty of those engaged in the
practice of the profession of law, when employed and relied
upon for that purpose, to give advice to those who have
made infractions of the laws; and, to enable the attorney to
properly advise and to properly represent the client in court
or when prosecutions are threatened, it is conducive to the
administration of justice that the client shall be free to
communicate to his attorney all the facts within his
knowledge, and that he may be assured that a
communication made by him shall not be used to his
prejudice."
The protection which the law affords to communications
between attorney and client has reference to those which are
legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful
employment, and does not extend to communications made
in contemplation of a crime, or perpetration of a
fraud. Strong v. Abner (1937) 368 Ky 502, 105 SW (2d) 599.
The court in People v. Van Alstine (1885) 57 Mich 69, 23
NW 594, in holding not privileged communications to an
attorney having for their object the communication of a crime,
said: "They then partake of the nature of a conspiracy, or
attempted conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such
communications, but under certain circumstances it might
become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of
public justice require that no such shield from merited
exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes
counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of
attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in
concocting crimes."
And in Coveney v. Tannahill (1841) 1 Hill (NY) 33,
37 Am Dec 287, the court was of the opinion that
there could be no such relation as that of attorney
and client, either in the commission of a crime, or in
the doing of a wrong by force or fraud to an
individual, the privileged relation of attorney and
client existing only for lawful and honest purposes.
If the client consults the attorney at law with
reference to the perpetration of a crime, and they
co-operate in effecting it, there is no privilege,
inasmuch as it is no part of the lawyer's duty to aid
in crime — he ceases to be counsel and becomes a
criminal. Matthews v. Hoagland (1891) 48 NJ Eq
455, 21 A 1054.
The court cannot permit it to be said that the
contriving of a fraud forms part of the professional
business of an attorney or solicitor. Charlton
v. Coombes (1863) 4 Giff 372, 66 Eng Reprint 751.
If the client does not frankly and freely reveal his
object and intention as well as facts, there is not
professional confidence, and therefore no
privilege. Matthews v. Hoagland (NJ) supra. See to
the same effect Carney v. United R. Co. (1920) 205
Mo App 495, 226 SW 308.
There is no valid claim of privilege in regard to the
production of documents passing between solicitor
and client, when the transaction impeached is
charged to be based upon fraud, that is the matter
to be investigated, and it is thought better that the
alleged privilege should suffer than that honestly
and fair dealing should appear to be violated with
impunity. Smith v. Hunt (1901) 1 Ont L Rep 334.
In Tichborne v. Lushington, shorthand Notes (Eng)
p. 5211 (cited in Reg. v. Cox (1884) LR 14 QB Div
(Eng) 172 — CCR), the chief justice said "I believe
the law is, and properly is, that if a party consults an
attorney, and obtains advice for what afterwards
turns out to be the commission of a crime or a fraud,
that party so consulting the attorney has no
privilege whatever to close the lips of the attorney
from stating the truth. Indeed, if any such privilege
should be contended for, or existing, it would work
most grievous hardship on an attorney, who, after
he had been consulted upon what subsequently
appeared to be a manifest crime and fraud, would
have his lips closed, and might place him in a very
serious position of being suspected to be a party to
the fraud, and without his having an opportunity of
exculpating himself . . . There is no privilege in the
case which I have suggested of a party consulting
another, a professional man, as to what may
afterwards turn out to be a crime or fraud, and the
best mode of accomplishing it."
In Garside v. Outram (1856) 3 Jur NS (Eng) 39,
although the question of privilege as to
communications between attorney and client was
not involved, the question directly involved being
the competency of a clerk in a business
establishment to testify as to certain information
which he acquired while working in the
establishment, the court strongly approved of a
view as stated arguendo for plaintiff, in Annesley
v. Anglesea (1743) 17 How St Tr (Eng) 1229, as
follows: "I shall claim leave to consider whether an
attorney may be examined as to any matter which
came to his knowledge as an attorney. If he is
employed as an attorney in any unlawful or wicked
act, his duty to the public obliges him to disclose it;
no private obligations can dispense with that
universal one which lies on every member of
society to discover every design which may be
formed, contrary to the laws of society, to destroy the public
welfare. For this reason, I apprehend that if a secret which is
contrary to the public good, such as a design to commit
treason, murder, or perjury, comes to the knowledge of an
attorney, even in a cause where he is concerned, the
obligation to the public must dispense with the private
obligation to the client."
The court in McMannus v. State (1858) 2 Head (Tenn) 213,
said; "It would be monstrous to hold that if counsel was
asked and obtained in reference to a contemplated crime
that the lips of the attorney would be sealed, when the facts
might become important to the ends of justice in the
prosecution of crime. In such a case the relation cannot be
taken to exist. Public policy would forbid it."
And the court in Lanum v. Patterson (1909) 151 Ill App 36,
observed that this rule was not in contravention of sound
public policy, but on the contrary, tended to the maintenance
of a higher standard of professional ethics by preventing the
relation of attorney and client from operating as a cloak for
fraud.
Communications of a client to an attorney are not privileged
if they were a request for advice as to how to commit a fraud,
it being in such a case not only the attorney's privilege, but
his duty, to disclose the facts to the court. Will v. Tornabells
& Co. (1907) 3 Porto Rico Fed Rep 125. The court said: "We
say this notwithstanding the comments of opposing counsel
as to the indelicacy of his position because of his being now
on the opposite side of the issue that arose as a
consequence of the communication he testifies about, and is
interested in the cause to the extent of a large contingent fee,
as he confesses."
The object of prohibiting the disclosure of confidential
communications is to protect the client, and not to make the
attorney an accomplice or permit him to aid in the
commission of a crime. People vs. Petersen (1901) 60 App
Div 118, NYS 941.
The seal of personal confidence can never be used to cover
a transaction which is in itself a crime. People
v. Farmer (1909) 194 NY 251, 87 NE 457.
As to disclosing the identity of a client, 81 AM JUR 2d,
Witnesses, § 410 and 411, pages 366-368, states:
§ 410. Name or identity of client.
Disclosure of a client's identity is necessary proof of the
existence of the attorney-client relationship and is not
privileged information. Thus, the attorney-client privilege is
inapplicable even though the information was communicated
confidentially to the attorney in his professional capacity and,
in some cases, in spite of the fact that the attorney may have
been sworn to secrecy, where an inquiry is directed to an
attorney as to the name or identity of his client. This general
rule applies in criminal cases, as well as in civil
actions. Where an undisclosed client is a party to an action,
the opposing party has a right to know with whom he is
contending or who the real party in interest is, if not the
nominal adversary.
§ 411. Disclosure of identity of client as breach of
confidentiality.
The revelation of the identification of a client is not usually
considered privileged, except where so much has been
divulged with regard to to legal services rendered or the
advice sought, that to reveal the client's name would be to
disclose the whole relationship and confidential
communications. However, even where the subject matter of
the attorney-client relationship has already been revealed,
the client's name has been deemed privileged.
Where disclosure of the identity of a client might
harm the client by being used against him under
circumstances where there are no countervailing
factors, then the identity is protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
In criminal proceedings, a client's name may be
privileged if information already obtained by the
tribunal, combined with the client's identity, might
expose him to criminal prosecution for acts
subsequent to, and because of, which he had
sought the advice of his attorney.
Although as a general rule, the identity of a
defendant in a criminal prosecution is a matter of
public record and, thus, not covered by the
attorney-client privilege, where the attorney has
surrendered to the authorities physical evidence in
his possession by way of the attorney-client
relationship, the state must prove the connection
between the piece of physical evidence and the
defendant without in any way relying on the
testimony of the client's attorney who initially
received the evidence and, thus, the attorney may
not be called to the stand and asked to disclose the
identity of the client. However, an attorney cannot
refuse to reveal the identity of a person who asked
him to deliver stolen property to the police
department, whether a bona fide attorney-client
relationship exists between them, inasmuch as the
transaction was not a legal service or done in the
attorney's professional capacity.
Distinction: Where an attorney was informed by a
male client that his female acquaintance was
possibly involved in [a] his-and-run accident, the
identity of the female did not come within scope of
attorney-client privilege although the identity of the
male client was protected. (emphases supplied)
WIGMORE explains why the identity of a client is
not within the lawyer-client privilege in this manner:
§ 2313. Identity of client or purpose of suit. — The
identity of the attorney's client or the name of the
real party in interest will seldom be a matter
communicated in confidence because the
procedure of litigation ordinarily presupposes a
disclosure of these facts. Furthermore, so far as a
client may in fact desire secrecy and may be able to
secure action without appearing as a party to the
proceedings, it would be improper to sanction such
a wish. Every litigant is in justice entitled to know
the identity of his opponents. He cannot be obliged
to struggle in the dark against unknown forces. He
has by anticipation the right, in later proceedings, if
desired, to enforce the legal responsibility of those
who may have maliciously sued or prosecuted him
or fraudulently evaded his claim. He has as much
right to ask the attorney "Who fees your fee?" as to
ask the witness (966 supra). "Who maintains you
during this trial?" upon the analogy of the principle
already examined (2298 supra), the privilege
cannot be used to evade a client's responsibility for
the use of legal process. And if it is necessary for
the purpose to make a plain exception to the rule of
confidence, then it must be made. (Wigmore on
Evidence, vol. 8, (1961), p. 609; emphases
supplied).
In 114 ALR, 1322, we also find the following
statement:
1. Name or identity.
As is indicated in 28 R.C.L. p. 563, it appears that
the rule making communications between attorney
and client privileged from disclosure ordinarily does not apply
where the inquiry is confined to the fact of the attorney's
employment and the name of the person employing him,
since the privilege presupposes the relationship of client and
attorney, and therefore does not attach to its creation.
At the present stage of the proceedings below, the
petitioners have not shown that they are so situated with
respect to their principals as to bring them within any of the
exceptions established by American jurisprudence. There
will be full opportunity for them to establish that fact at the
trial where the broader perspectives of the case shall have
been presented and can be better appreciated by the court.
The insistence for their exclusion from the case is
understandable, but the reasons for the hasty resolution
desired is naturally suspect.
We do not even have to go beyond our shores for an
authority that the lawyer-client privilege cannot be invoked to
prevent the disclosure of a client's identity where the lawyer
and the client are conspirators in the commission of a crime
or a fraud. Under our jurisdiction, lawyers are mandated not
to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system (Rule 1.02, Canon
1, Code of Professional Responsibility) and to employ only
fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client (Rule 19.01, Canon 19, Id.). And under the Canons of
Professional Ethics, a lawyer must steadfastly bear in mind
that his great trust is to be performed within and not without
the bounds of the law (Canon 15, Id.), that he advances the
honor of his profession and the best interest of his client
when he renders service or gives advice tending to impress
upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with
the strictest principles of moral law (Canon 32, Id.). These
canons strip a lawyer of the lawyer-client privilege whenever
he conspires with the client in the commission of a crime or a
fraud.
I then vote to DENY, for want of merit, the instant petition.
Narvasa, C.J. and Regalado, J., concur.
PUNO, J., dissenting:
This is an important petition for certiorari to annul the
resolutions of the respondent Sandiganbayan denying
petitioners' motion to be excluded from the Complaint for
recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth on the principal ground
that as lawyers they cannot be ordered to reveal the identity
of their client.
First, we fast forward the facts. The Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG) filed Civil Case No. 33 before
the Sandiganbayan against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., for
the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth. Sued as
co-defendants are the petitioners in the cases at bar —
lawyers Teodoro Regala, Edgardo J. Angara, Avelino V.
Cruz, Jose Concepcion, Rogelio A. Vinluan, Victor P. Lazatin,
Eduardo Escueta and Paraja Hayudini. Also included as a
co-defendant is lawyer Raul Roco, now a duly elected
senator of the Republic. All co-defendants were then
partners of the law firm, Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala
and Cruz Law Offices, better known as the ACCRA Law Firm.
The Complaint against Cojuangco, Jr., and the petitioners
alleged, inter alia, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
The wrongs committed by defendants acting singly or
collectively and in unlawful concert with one another, include
the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the
nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement
and other acts of corruption, betrayal of public trust and
brazen abuse of power as more fully described (in the
subsequent paragraphs of the complaint), all at the expense
and to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff
and the Filipino people.
Defendants Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Edgardo J.
Angara, Jose C. Concepcion, Teodoro D. Regala,
Avelino V. Cruz, Regalio A. Vinluan, Eduardo U.
Escueta, Paraja G. Hayudini and Raul S. Roco of
Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala, and Abello law
offices (ACCRA) plotted, devised, schemed,
conspired and confederated with each other in
setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CIC and more
than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations,
including the acquisition of the San Miguel
Corporation shares and the institutionalization
through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly. through insidious means and
machinations, ACCRA, using its wholly-owned
investment arm, ACCRA Investments Corporation,
became the holder of approximately fifteen million
shares representing roughly 3.3% of the total
outstanding capital stock of UCPB as of 31 March
1987. This ranks ACCRA Investments Corporation
number 44 among the top 100 biggest stockholders
of UCPB which has approximately 1,400,000
shareholders. On the other hand, corporate books
show the name Edgardo J. Angara as holding
approximately 3,744 shares as of 7 June 1984.
In their Answer, petitioners alleged that the legal
services offered and made available by their firm to
its clients include: (a) organizing and acquiring
business organizations, (b) acting as incorporators
or stockholders thereof, and (c) delivering to clients
the corresponding documents of their equity
holdings (i.e., certificates of stock endorsed in blank
or blank deeds of trust or assignment). They
claimed that their activities were "in furtherance of
legitimate lawyering."
In the course of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan, the PCGG filed a Motion to Admit
Third Amended Complaint and the Third Amended
Complaint excluding lawyer Roco as party
defendant. Lawyer Roco was excluded on the basis
of his promise to reveal the identity of the principals
for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the
companies involved in the case.
The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners to
comment on the motion. In their Comment,
petitioners demanded that they be extended the
same privilege as their co-defendant Roco. They
prayed for their exclusion from the complaint.
PCGG agreed but set the following conditions: (1)
disclosure of the identity of their client; (2)
submission of documents substantiating their
lawyer-client relationship; and (3) submission of the
deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor
of their client covering their respective
shareholdings. The same conditions were imposed
on lawyer Roco.
Petitioners refused to comply with the PCGG
conditions contending that the attorney-client
privilege gives them the right not to reveal the
identity of their client. They also alleged that lawyer
Roco was excluded though he did not in fact reveal
the identity of his clients. On March 18, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of petitioners
in Case No. 33. It held:
xxx xxx xxx
ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing
the identity of the client for whom they have acted, i.e., their
principal, and that will be their choice. But until they do
identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the
privilege claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even
begin to the debated. The ACCRA lawyers cannot excuse
themselves from the consequences of their acts until they
have begun to establish the basis for recognizing the
privilege; the existence and identity of the client.
This is what appears to be the cause for which they have
been impleaded by the PCGG as defendants herein.
5. The PCGG is satisfied that defendant Roco has
demonstrated his agency and that Roco has apparently
identified his principal, which revelation could show the lack
of course against him. This in turn has allowed the PCGG to
exercise its power both under the rules of Agency and under
Section 5 of E.O. No. 14-A in relation to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72).
The PCGG has apparently offered to the ACCRA lawyers
the same conditions availed of by Roco; full disclosure in
exchange for exclusion from these proceedings (par. 7,
PCGG's COMMENT dated November 4, 1991). The ACCRA
lawyers have preferred not to make the disclosures required
by the PCGG.
The ACCRA lawyers cannot, therefore, begrudge the PCGG
for keeping them as a party defendants. In the same vein,
they cannot compel the PCGG to be accorded the same
treatment accorded to Roco.
Neither can this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Counter Motion dated October 8, 1991
filed by the ACCRA lawyers and joined in by Atty. Paraja G.
Hayudini for the same treatment by the PCGG as accorded
to Raul S. Roco is DENIED for lack of merit.
Sandiganbayan later denied petitioners' motions for
reconsideration in its resolutions dated May 21, 1988 and
September 3, 1992.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend:
I
The Honorable Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in subjecting petitioners ACCRA lawyers who indisputably
acted as lawyers in serving as nominee-stockholders, to the
strict application of the law agency.
II
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in not considering petitioners ACCRA lawyers and
Mr. Roco as similarly situated and, therefore, deserving of
equal treatment.
1. There is absolutely no evidence that Mr. Roco had
revealed, or had undertaken to reveal, the identities of the
client(s) for whom he acted as nominee-stockholder.
2. Even assuming that Mr. Roco had revealed, or had
undertaken to reveal, the identities of the client(s), the
disclosure does not constitute a substantial distinction as
would make the classification reasonable under the equal
protection clause.
3. Respondent Sandiganbayan sanctioned favoritism and
undue preference in favor of Mr. Roco and violation of the
equal protection clause.
III
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not holding that, under the
facts of this case, the attorney-client privilege
prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their client(s) and the other
information requested by the PCGG.
1. Under the peculiar facts of this case, the
attorney-client privilege includes the identity of the
client(s).
2. The factual disclosures required by the PCGG
are not limited to the identity of petitioners ACCRA
lawyers' alleged client(s) but extend to other
privileged matters.
IV
The Honorable Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in not requiring that the
dropping of party-defendants by the PCGG must be
based on reasonable and just grounds and with due
consideration to the constitutional right of
petitioners ACCRA lawyers to the equal protection
of the law.
The petition at bar is atypical of the usual case
where the hinge issue involves the applicability of
attorney-client privilege. It ought to be noted that
petitioners were included as defendants in Civil
Case No. 33 as conspirators. Together with Mr.
Cojuangco, Jr., they are charged with having ". . .
conspired and confederated with each other in
setting up, through the use of the coconut levy
funds, the financial and corporate framework and
structures that led to the establishment of UCPB,
UNICOM, COCOLIFE, COCOMARK, CICI and
more than twenty other coconut levy funded
corporations, including the acquisition of San
Miguel Corporation shares and the
institutionalization through presidential directives of
the coconut monopoly." To stress, petitioners are
charged with having conspired in the commission of
crimes. The issue of attorney-client privilege arose
when PCGG agreed to exclude petitioners from the
complaint on condition they reveal the identity of
their client. Petitioners refused to comply and
assailed the condition on the ground that to reveal
the identity of their client will violate the
attorney-client privilege.
It is thus necessary to resolve whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when it rejected petitioners' thesis that to
reveal the identity of their client would violate the
attorney-client privilege. The attorney-client
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications known to the common
law.1 For the first time in this jurisdiction, we are
asked to rule whether the attorney-client privilege
includes the right not to disclose the identity of
client. The issue poses a trilemma for its resolution
requires the delicate balancing of three opposing
policy considerations. One overriding policy
consideration is the need for courts to discover the
truth for truth alone is the true touchstone of
justice.2 Equally compelling is the need to protect
the adversary system of justice where truth is best
extracted by giving a client broad privilege to
confide facts to his counsel.3 Similarly deserving of
sedulous concern is the need to keep inviolate the
constitutional right against self-incrimination and
the right to effective counsel in criminal litigations.
To bridle at center the centrifugal forces of these
policy considerations, courts have followed to
prudential principle that the attorney-client privilege must not
be expansively construed as it is in derogation of the search
for truth.4 Accordingly, a narrow construction has been given
to the privilege and it has been consistently held that "these
competing societal interests demand that application of the
privilege not exceed that which is necessary to effect the
policy considerations underlying the privilege, i.e., the
privilege must be upheld only in those circumstances for
which it was created.'"5
Prescinding from these premises, our initial task is to define
in clear strokes the substantive content of the attorney-client
privilege within the context of the distinct issues posed by the
petition at bar. With due respect, I like to start by stressing
the irreducible principle that the attorney-client privilege can
never be used as a shield to commit a crime or a fraud.
Communications to an attorney having for their object the
commission of a crime ". . . partake the nature of a
conspiracy, and it is not only lawful to divulge such
communications, but under certain circumstances it might
become the duty of the attorney to do so. The interests of
public justice require that no such shield from merited
exposure shall be interposed to protect a person who takes
counsel how he can safely commit a crime. The relation of
attorney and client cannot exist for the purpose of counsel in
concocting crimes."6 In the well chosen words of retired
Justice Quiason, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.7 I hasten to
add, however, that a mere allegation that a lawyer conspired
with his client to commit a crime or a fraud will not defeat the
privilege.8 As early as 1933, no less than the Mr. Justice
Cardozo held in Clark v. United States9 that: "there are early
cases apparently to the effect that a mere charge of illegality,
not supported by any evidence, will set the confidences
free . . . But this conception of the privilege is without
support . . . To drive the privilege away, there must be
'something to give colour to the charge;' there must be prima
facie evidence that it has foundation in fact." In the petition at
bar, however, the PCGG appears to have relented on its
original stance as spelled out in its Complaint that petitioners
are co-conspirators in crimes and cannot invoke the
attorney-client privilege. The PCGG has agreed to exclude
petitioners from the Complaint provided they reveal the
identity of their client. In fine, PCGG has conceded that
petitioner are entitled to invoke the attorney-client privilege if
they reveal their client's identity.
Assuming then that petitioners can invoke the attorney-client
privilege since the PCGG is no longer proceeding against
them as co-conspirators in crimes, we should focus on the
more specific issue of whether the attorney-client privilege
includes the right not to divulge the identity of a client as
contended by the petitioners. As a general rule, the
attorney-client privilege does not include the right of
non-disclosure of client identity. The general rule, however,
admits of well-etched exceptions which the Sandiganbayan
failed to recognize. The general rule and its exceptions are
accurately summarized in In re Grand Jury
Investigation,10 viz:
The federal forum is unanimously in accord with the general
rule that the identity of a client is, with limited exceptions, not
within the protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege.
See: In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026,
1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Jones), 517 F. 2d 666, 670-71 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Fine), 651 F. 2d 199, 204 (5th Cir.
1981); Frank v. Tomlinson, 351 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1082, 86 S.Ct. 648, 15 L.Ed.2d 540 (1966);
In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir.
1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th
Cir. 1979).
The Circuits have embraced various "exceptions" to the
general rule that the identity of a client is not within the
protective ambit of the attorney-client privilege. All such
exceptions appear to be firmly grounded in the Ninth Circuit's
seminal decision in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 633
(9th Cir. 1960). In Baird the IRS received a letter
from an attorney stating that an enclosed check in
the amount of $12,706 was being tendered for
additional amounts due from undisclosed taxpayers.
When the IRS summoned the attorney to ascertain
the identity of the delinquent taxpayers the attorney
refused identification assertion the attorney-client
privilege. The Ninth Circuit, applying California law,
adjudged that the "exception" to the general rule as
pronounced in Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230,
149 P. 566 (1915) controlled:
The name of the client will be considered privileged
matter where the circumstances of the case are
such that the name of the client is material only for
the purpose of showing an acknowledgment of guilt
on the part of such client of the very offenses on
account of which the attorney was employed.
Baird, supra, 279 F.2d at 633. The identity of the
Baird taxpayer was adjudged within this exception
to the general rule. The Ninth Circuit has continued
to acknowledge this exception.
A significant exception to this principle of
non-confidentiality holds that such information may
be privileged when the person invoking the privilege
is able to show that a strong possibility exists that
disclosure of the information would implicate the
client in the very matter for which legal advice was
sought in the first case.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir.
1982). Accord: United States v. Hodge and Zweig,
548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215, 218 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Sherman, 627 F.2d 189,
190-91 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Witness
(Salas), 695 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1982). This
exception, which can perhaps be most succinctly
characterized as the "legal advice" exception, has
also been recognized by other circuits. See: In re
Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 994, 101 S. Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed.2d 291
(1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari), 631
F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S.1083, 101 S.Ct. 869-70, 66 L.Ed.2d 808 (1981).
Since the legal advice exception is firmly grounded
in the policy of protecting confidential
communications, this Court adopts and applies its
principles herein. See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), supra.
It should be observed, however that the legal
advice exception may be defeated through a prima
facie showing that the legal representation was
secured in furtherance of present or intended
continuing illegality, as where the legal
representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy.
See: In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Decus Tecum
(Marger/Merenbach), supra, 695 F.2d at 365 n. 1;
In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449, U.S. 994, 101 S.Ct. 531, 66 L.Ed. 2d
291 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Tinari),
631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir 1980); cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1083, 101 S.Ct. 869, 66 L.Ed. 2d 808 (1981); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Lawson), 600 F.2d 215,
218 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Friedman, 445
F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir. 1971). See also: Clark
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15, 53, S.Ct. 465, 469,
77, L.Ed. 993 (1933); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1028-29 (5th Cir. 1982
(en banc).
Another exception to the general rule that the identity of a
client is not privileged arises where disclosure of the identity
would be tantamount to disclosing an otherwise protected
confidential communication. In Baird, supra, the Ninth Circuit
observed:
If the identification of the client conveys information which
ordinarily would be conceded to be part of the usual
privileged communication between attorney and client, then
the privilege should extend to such identification in the
absence of another factors.
Id., 279 F.2d at 632. Citing Baird, the Fourth Circuit
promulgated the following exception:
To the general rule is an exception, firmly embedded as the
rule itself. The privilege may be recognized where so much
of the actual communication has already been disclosed that
identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a
confidential communication.
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965).
Accord: United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248, 252 (7th Cir.
1975); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951, 83 S.Ct. 505, 9 L.Ed.2d
499 1963); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir.
1965); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir.
1944). See also: Chirac v. Reinecker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat)
280, 6 L.Ed. 474 (1826). The Seventh Circuit has added to
the Harvey exception the following emphasized caveat:
The privilege may be recognized where so much of the
actual communication has already been disclosed [not
necessarily by the attorney, but by independent sources as
well] that identification of the client [or of fees paid] amounts
to disclosure of a confidential communication.
United States vs. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101, 1115 (7th Cir. 1976
(emphasis added). The Third Circuit, applying this exception,
has emphasized that it is the link between the client and
the communication, rather than the link between the client
and the possibility of potential criminal prosecution, which
serves to bring the client's identity within the protective ambit
of the attorney-client privilege. See: In re Grand Jury
Empanelled February 14, 1978 (Markowitz), 603 F.2d 469,
473 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1979). Like the "legal advice" exception, this
exception is also firmly rooted in principles of confidentiality.
Another exception, articulated in the Fifth Circuit's en
banc decision of In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680
F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982 (en banc), is recognized when
disclosure of the identity of the client would provide the "last
link" of evidence:
We have long recognized the general rule that matters
involving the payment of fees and the identity of clients are
not generally privileged. In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
(United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975); see
cases collected id. at 670 n. 2. There we also recognized,
however, a limited and narrow exception to the general rule,
one that obtains when the disclosure of the client's identity
by his attorney would have supplied the last link in an
existing chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the
client's indictment.
I join the majority in holding that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion when it misdelineated
the metes and bounds of the attorney-client privilege by
failing to recognize the exceptions discussed above.
Be that as it may, I part ways with the majority when it ruled
that petitioners need not prove they fall within the exceptions
to the general rule. I respectfully submit that the
attorney-client privilege is not a magic mantra whose
invocation will ipso facto and ipso jure drape he who invokes
it with its protection. Plainly put, it is not enough to assert the
privilege.11 The person claiming the privilege or its
exceptions has the obligation to present the
underlying facts demonstrating the existence of the
privilege.12 When these facts can be presented only
by revealing the very information sought to be
protected by the privilege, the procedure is for the
lawyer to move for an inspection of the evidence in
an in camera hearing.13 The hearing can even be in
camera and ex-parte. Thus, it has been held that "a
well-recognized means for an attorney to
demonstrate the existence of an exception to the
general rule, while simultaneously preserving
confidentiality of the identity of his client, is to move
the court for an in
camera ex-parte hearing.14 Without the proofs
adduced in these in camera hearings, the Court has
no factual basis to determine whether petitioners
fall within any of the exceptions to the general rule.
In the case at bar, it cannot be gainsaid that
petitioners have not adduced evidence that they fall
within any of the above mentioned exceptions for as
aforestated, the Sandiganbayan did not recognize
the exceptions, hence, the order compelling them to
reveal the identity of their client. In ruling that
petitioners need not further establish the factual
basis of their claim that they fall within the
exceptions to the general rule, the majority held:
The circumstances involving the engagement of
lawyers in the case at bench therefore clearly
reveal that the instant case falls under at least two
exceptions to the general rule. First, disclosure of
the alleged client's name would lead to establish
said client's connection with the very fact in issue of
the case, which is privileged information, because
the privilege, as stated earlier, protects the subject
matter or the substance (without which there would
be no attorney-client relationship). Furthermore,
under the third main exception, revelation of the
client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case,
where none otherwise exists. It is the link, in the
word of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain
of testimony necessary to convict the (client) of
a . . . crime.
I respectfully submit that the first and third
exceptions relied upon by the majority are not
self-executory but need factual basis for their
successful invocation. The first exception as cited
by the majority is ". . . where a strong probability
exists that revealing the clients' name would
implicate that client in the very activity for which he
sought the lawyer's advice." It seems to me evident
that "the very activity for which he sought the
lawyer's advice" is a question of fact which must
first be established before there can be any ruling
that the exception can be invoked. The majority
15
cites Ex Parte Enzor, and
16
U S v. Hodge and Zweig, but these cases leave
no doubt that the "very activity" for which the client
sought the advice of counsel was properly proved.
In both cases, the "very activity" of the clients reveal
they sought advice on their criminal activities. Thus,
in Enzor, the majority opinion states that the
"unidentified client, an election official, informed his
attorney in confidence that he had been offered a
bribe to violate election laws or that he had
accepted a bribe to that end."17 In Hodge, the "very
activity" of the clients deals with illegal importation
of drugs. In the case at bar, there is no inkling
whatsoever about the "very activity" for which the
clients of petitioners sought their professional
advice as lawyers. There is nothing in the records
that petitioners were consulted on the "criminal
activities" of their client. The complaint did allege
that petitioners and their client conspired to commit crimes
but allegations are not evidence.
So it is with the third exception which as related by the
majority is "where the government's lawyers have no case
against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would
form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime."18 Again, the rhetorical questions that
answer themselves are: (1) how can we determine that
PCGG has "no case" against petitioners without presentation
of evidence? and (2) how can we determine that the name of
the client is the only link without presentation of evidence as
to the other links? The case of Baird vs. Koerner19 does not
support the "no need for evidence" ruling of the majority. In
Baird, as related by the majority itself, "a lawyer was
consulted by the accountants and the lawyer of certain
undisclosed taxpayers regarding steps to be taken to place
the undisclosed taxpayers in a favorable position in case
criminal charges were brought against them by the US
Internal Revenue Service (IRS). It appeared that the
taxpayers' returns of previous years were probably incorrect
and the taxes understated.20 Once more, it is clear that the
Baird court was informed of the activity of the client for which
the lawyer was consulted and the activity involved probable
violation of the tax laws. Thus, the Court held:
The facts of the instant case bring it squarely within that
exception to the general rule. Here money was received by
the government, paid by persons who thereby admitted they
had not paid a sufficient amount in income taxes some one
or more years in the past. The names of the clients are
useful to the government for but one purpose — to ascertain
which taxpayers think they were delinquent, so that it may
check the records for that one year or several years. The
voluntary nature of the payment indicates a belief by the
taxpayers that more tax or interest or penalties are due than
the sum previously paid, if any. It indicates a feeling of guilt
for nonpayment of taxes, though whether it is criminal guilt is
undisclosed. But it may well be the link that could form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
federal crime. Certainly the payment and the feeling of guilt
are the reasons the attorney here involved was employed —
to advise his clients what, under the circumstances, should
be done.
In fine, the factual basis for the ruling in Baird was properly
established by the parties. In the case at bar, there is no
evidence about the subject matter of the consultation made
by petitioners' client. Again, the records do not show that the
subject matter is criminal in character except for the raw
allegations in the Complaint. Yet, this is the unstated
predicate of the majority ruling that revealing the identity of
the client ". . . would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime." The silent implication is unflattering and unfair to
petitioners who are marquee names in the legal profession
and unjust to their undisclosed client.
Finally, it ought to be obvious that petitioners' right to claim
the attorney-client privilege is resolutory of the Complaint
against them, and hence should be decided ahead and
independently of their claim to equal protection of the law.
Pursuant to the rule in legal hermeneutics that courts should
not decide constitutional issues unless unavoidable, I also
respectfully submit that there is no immediate necessity to
resolve petitioners' claim to equal protection of the law at this
stage of the proceedings.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I respectfully register a qualified
dissent from the majority opinion.
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V.
HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and
GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar,
petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of
respondent Sandiganbayan, promulgated on
December 22, 1993, which denied petitioner's
motion for the discharge of respondent Generoso S.
Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its
resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of its preceding disposition.1
The records show that during the dates material to
this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of
Court and Acting Stenographer of the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur.
Respondent Paredes was successively the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then
Governor of the same province, and is at present a
Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a
practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances pertinent to the
criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in
1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent
over Lot No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public
Land Subdivision Survey. His application was
approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to
him, an original certificate of title was issued in his
favor for that lot which is situated in the poblacion of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an
action2 for the cancellation of respondent Paredes'
patent and certificate of title since the land had
been designated and reserved as a school site in
the aforementioned subdivision survey. The trial
court rendered judgment3 nullifying said patent and
title after finding that respondent Paredes had
obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently,
respondent Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes
in that civil case.4
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial
court, upon the subsequent complaint of the
Sangguniang Bayan and the preliminary
investigation conducted thereon, an information for
perjury5 was filed against respondent Paredes in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.6 On November 27,
1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed
by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the
dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
prescription, hence the proceedings were
terminated.7 In this criminal case, respondent
Paredes was likewise represented by respondent
Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter
haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary
investigation on the charge that, by using his former
position as Provincial Attorney to influence and
induce the Bureau of Lands officials to favorably act
on his application for free patent, he had violated
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
For the third time, respondent Sansaet was
Paredes' counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a
resolution8 recommending the criminal prosecution of
respondent Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his
aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and,
because of its legal significance in this case, we quote some
of his allegations in that motion:
. . . respondent had been charged already by the
complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984
under the same set of facts and the same evidence . . . but
said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the
court upon recommendation of the Department of Justice.
Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and
the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto
attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will
be a case of double jeopardy for respondent
herein . . . 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the
Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent Paredes with a
violation of Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense
was later granted in respondent court's resolution of August
1, 1991 11 and the case was dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who
had initiated the perjury and graft charges against
respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman
seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for
falsification of public documents. 12 He claimed that
respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein
co-respondents, simulated and certified as true copies
certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,
dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes
supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on the
perjury charge. 13 These falsified documents were annexed
to respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of the
Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against
him, in order to support his contention that the same would
constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a
certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received
by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in
connection with that perjury case; and a certification of
Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño that said perjury case in his
court did not reach the arraignment stage since action
thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by
the Department of Justice. 14
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but
Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the
submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a
so-called Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications, 15 respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes
contrived to have the graft case under preliminary
investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by
making it appear that the perjury case had been dismissed
by the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by
respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were
prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in
the house of respondent Paredes. To evade responsibility for
his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did
so upon the instigation and inducement of respondent
Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his
discharge as a government witness in the consolidated
cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the
prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, the
Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges
against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for
the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state
witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this
evaluative legal position:
. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe
that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of
deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly
induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel
for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty.
Sansaet had control over the case theory and the
evidence which the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty.
Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged
communication between the lawyer and his client
which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that
resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any further
controversy, he decided to file separate
informations for falsification of public documents
against each of the herein respondents. Thus, three
criminal cases, 18 each of which named one of the
three private respondents here as the accused
therein, were filed in the graft court. However, the
same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the
People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of
respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was
submitted that all the requisites therefor,
as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet
was concerned. The basic postulate was that,
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent
Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to
prove the confabulated falsification of documents
by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent
Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the
attorney-client privilege adverted to by the
Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private
respondents in their opposition to the prosecution's
motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on
this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was
able to establish that client and lawyer relationship
existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino
Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period
alleged in the information. In view of such
relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and
other confidential matter must have been disclosed
by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet,
as his lawyer in his professional capacity. Therefore,
the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts
surrounding the offense charged in the information
is privileged. 19
Reconsideration of said resolution having been
likewise denied, 20 the controversy was elevated to
this Court by the prosecution in an original action
for the issuance of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari against respondent Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the
petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1)
whether or not the projected testimony of
respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is
barred by the attorney-client privilege; and (2)
whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is
eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps
criminis.
As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan
ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which
existed between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet
during the relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case
and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by
respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his
lawyer. Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further
since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness
against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter's
consent." 21
The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client
privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof
and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an
exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that
evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting
mental cobwebs in these cases.
1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential
communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in connection
with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before
respondent court, and this may reasonably be expected
since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel
therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness
the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and
Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than
verbal statements being made to him by Paredes as to the
fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the
evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to "any
communication," without distinction or qualification. 22
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential
rule was taken, there is no particular mode by which a
confidential communication shall be made by a client to his
attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney but
extends as well to information communicated by the client to
the attorney by other means. 23
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process,
considering their past and existing relations as counsel and
client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such
falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed
between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that
criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the
undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by
Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion for
reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft
case before the Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the acts and words of
the parties during the period when the documents were
being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes
would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him
to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and
confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at
the instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the latter
stands charged, a distinction must be made between
confidential communications relating to past crimes already
committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by
the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced
intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within
the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.
Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the
instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that
respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts
of respondents Paredes and Honrada that have already
been committed and consummated.
The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by
a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now, insofar
as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are
concerned, those crimes were necessarily committed in the
past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege,
however, the period to be considered is the date when the
privileged communication was made by the client to the
attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or
with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future.
In other words, if the client seeks his lawyer's advice with
respect to a crime that the former has theretofore
committed, he is given the protection of a virtual
confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege
declares cannot be broken by the attorney without
the client's consent. The same privileged
confidentiality, however, does not attach with
regard to a crime which a client intends to commit
thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which
he seeks the lawyer's advice.
Statements and communications regarding the
commission of a crime already committed, made by
a party who committed it, to an attorney, consulted
as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily,
the unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect
that communications between attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated criminal
acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing
in reference to communications between attorney
and client. 25 (Emphases supplied.)
3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be
elicited from Sansate as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts
and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time
he and Honrada, either with the active or passive
participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in
the process of falsifying, the documents which were
later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and
culminated in the criminal charges now pending in
respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the
confidential communications thus made by Paredes
to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to
the crime of falsification which had not yet been
committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in
confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of
a future offense, those communications are outside
the pale of the attorney-client privilege.
4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator
in the commission of that crime of falsification which
he, Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted
upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order
that a communication between a lawyer and his
client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful
purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the
privilege from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been
pointed out to the Court that the "prosecution of the
honorable relation of attorney and client will not be
permitted under the guise of privilege, and every
communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a
conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but
which the attorney under certain circumstances
may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of
justice." 27
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for
respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such
unlawful communications intended for an illegal
purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless
covered by the so-called mantle of privilege. To
prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the
genesis of a crime which was later committed
pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection
thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and
practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the
consequential inquiry as to whether respondent
Sansaet qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for
discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for
the State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived
at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass
upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the
prosecution which are now submitted for our resolution in the
petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of
some ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass
upon the query as to whether or not respondent Sansaet was
qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court
from resolving that issue as prayed for by petitioner. Where
the determinative facts and evidence have been submitted to
this Court such that it is in a position to finally resolve the
dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and
the expeditious administration thereof to resolve the case on
the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private
respondents here stand charged in three separate
informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of
February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing
of criminal charges for falsification of public documents
against all the respondents herein. That resolution was
affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further
controversy, one information was filed against each of the
three respondents here, resulting in three informations for
the same acts of falsification.
This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away
during the deliberations in this case by the following
discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:
Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block
Sansaet's discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless,
be discharged even if indicted under a separate information.
I suppose the three cases were consolidated for joint trial
since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of
the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division
of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents,
or involving common questions of law and fact. Accordingly,
for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet stood as
co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It
is of no moment that he was charged separately from his
co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure uses the word jointly, which was
absent in the old provision, the consolidated and joint trial
has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or
joint defendants, especially considering that they are
charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons
indicted for the same offense and tried together are called
joint defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco
along the same vein, there having been a consolidation of
the three cases, the several actions lost their separate
identities and became a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of
action involved had originally been joined in a single
action. 29
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the
situation "(w)hen two or more persons are charged with the
commission of a certain offense" was too broad and
indefinite; hence the word "joint" was added to indicate the
identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all
together charged therewith substantially in the same manner
in point of commission and time. The word "joint" means
"common to two or more," as "involving the united activity of
two or more," or "done or produced by two or more working
together," or "shared by or affecting two or more. 30 Had it
been intended that all the accused should always be indicted
in one and the same information, the Rules could have said
so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the
circumstances obtaining in the present case and the
problems that may arise from amending the information.
After all, the purpose of the Rule can be achieved
by consolidation of the cases as an alternative
mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a
conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule
is that since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act
of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all
members of the conspiracy. Now, one of the
requirements for a state witness is that he "does not
appear to be the most guilty." 31 not that he must be
the least guilty 32 as is so often erroneously framed
or submitted. The query would then be whether an
accused who was held guilty by reason of
membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state
witness.
33
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. we find
this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real
mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the
others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised
fee. Although he did not actually commit any of the
stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas
as a state witness. All the perpetrators of the
offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy
that made them equally guilty.
However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et
al., 34 two conspirators charged with five others in
three separate informations for multiple murder
were discharged and used as state witnesses
against their confederates. Subsequent thereto,
in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 one of
the co-conspirators was discharged from the
information charging him and two others with the
crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was not
the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man,
he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to
open the account with the bank and which led to the
commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of
respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as
guilty as his co-accused, and should not be
discharged as he did not appear to be not the most
guilty, is untenable. In other words, the Court took
into account the gravity or nature of the acts
committed by the accused to be discharged
compared to those of his co-accused, and not
merely the fact that in law the same or equal
penalty is imposable on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but
not explicity articulated found expression in People
vs. Ocimar, et al., 36 which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez
does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of
a co-accused to become a state witness. He argues
that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be
discharged and utilized as a state witness, for not
one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing
not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts that
since accused Bermudez was part of the
conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity
for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the
presentation of four (4) other witnesses, none of
them could positively identify the accused except
Bermudez who was one of those who pulled the
highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of
cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the life
of Capt. Cañeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of
Bermudez that clinched the case for the
prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct
evidence was available for the prosecution to prove the
elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as
indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material points
as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision.
Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the
evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party
without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a
highway robbery. But even assuming that he later became
part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most
guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set
free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to
jail. And by "most guilty" we mean the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the
offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty
imposed. While all the accused may be given the same
penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered
least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation
in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence
that he has at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor
General that the rule on the discharge of an accused to be
utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and
individual participation in the commission of the crime, which
may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the
other accused. Since Bermudez was not individually
responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the
robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said
then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence,
his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly
warranted. (Emphasis ours.)
The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon
conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is based on
the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and
translated into concerted physical action although of varying
acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code
is based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of
the mens rea which is considered the predominant
consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the
same penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one
is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be
equated with the procedural rule on the discharge of
particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other
considerations, such as the need for giving immunity to one
of them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial
experience that the candid admission of an accused
regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify
truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules provide for certain
qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial
experience distilled into a judgmental policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the
other requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as
a state witness are present and should have been favorably
appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to
the actual commission of the falsification charged in the
criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the
prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing
the guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly
deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There is
thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of
the case, hence there is absolute necessity for the testimony
of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that
purpose. Said respondent has indicated his conformity
thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules,
detailed the substance of his projected testimony in
his Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on
its material points by reputable witnesses, identified
in the basic petition with a digest of their
prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco
C. Ariño, Municipal Circuit Trial Court in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor
and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A.
Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who
initiated the criminal cases through his
letter-complaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang
Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who
participated in the resolution asking their Provincial
Governor to file the appropriate case against
respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who
obtained the certification of non-arraignment from
Judge Ariño.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not
appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time
been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this respondent,
both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor
General strongly urge and propose that he be
allowed to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that,
on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may
propose but it is for the trial court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the
proposal and make the corresponding disposition. It
must be emphasized, however, that such discretion
should have been exercised, and the disposition
taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues
herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue
of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.
This change of heart and direction respondent
Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the
retirement of two members of its Second
37
Division and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely
anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment 38 dated
June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its
resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and
new members thereof 39 declared:
4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22,
1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based,
was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T.
Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and
Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;
5) That while the legal issues involved had been
already discussed and passed upon by the Second
Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after
going over the arguments submitted by the
Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on
the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the
Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are
amenable to setting aside the questioned
Resolutions and to grant the prosecution's motion
to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state
witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme
Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to
that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is
hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impunged
resolutions and ORDERING that the present reliefs
sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and
given due course by respondent Sandiganbayan.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G.
VIZCONDE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Adm. Case No. 10299
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is the Resolution1 of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper
and inappropriate conduct tending to influence and/or giving
the appearance of influence upon a public official. The Joint
Report and Recommendation submitted by Commissioner
Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent
beissued a warning not to repeat the same nor any similar
action, otherwise the Commission will impose a more severe
penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April
2013.2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108
are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G. Vizconde, while
complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O.
Lozano. At the time of the filing of the complaints,
respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients
Richard S. Brodett and Joseph R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to
the Complaint as the "Alabang Boys") werethe accused in
cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) for the illegal sale and use of dangerous drugs.3 In a
Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the
charges were dropped for lack of probable cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask
clarificatory questions during the evaluation of the case,
several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and
"cover-up" allegedly prevalent in investigations of the drug
trade.This prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs
to conduct its own congressional hearings. It was revealed
during one such hearing that respondenthad prepared the
release order for his three clients using the letterhead ofthe
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the stationery of then
Secretary Raul Gonzales.5
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of
Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC), sent a
letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They
stated that respondent had admitted to drafting the release
order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and
unethical act. They argued that respondent had no authority
to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for acts
unbecoming a member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint
on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states
that a lawyer shall upholdthe Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal
processes.7 Atty. Lozano contended that
respondent showed disrespect for the law and legal
processes in drafting the said order and sending it
to a high-ranking public official, even though the
latter was not a government prosecutor.8 Atty.
Lozano’s verified ComplaintAffidavit was filed with
the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and
docketed as CBD Case No. 09-2356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a
Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of
respondent and showing unqualified support for the
VACC’s filing of disbarment proceedings.10 On 27
February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his
Complaint on the ground that a similar action had
been filed by Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the
Court referred both cases to the IBP for
consolidation, as well as for investigation, report
and recommendation. RESPONDENT’S VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint
Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against
his clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that
the resolution also ordered the immediate release
of Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high
hopes of the accused, together with their families,
came crashing down when the PDEA still refused to
release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of
his clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him
to prepare and draft the release order. Respondent
admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the
Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything
may be expedited."13 In any case, respondent
continues, the drafted release order was not signed
by the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere
scrap of paper with no effect at all."14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING
COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints
remained unsubstantiated, while the
letter-complaint of Jimenez and Vizconde had not
been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced
to prove the charges.
However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11
and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted the
release order specifically for the signature of the
DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order
to the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it
tended to influence a public official. Hence,
Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of
violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued
a warning not to repeat the same or any similar
action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may
conduct its own investigation into charges against
members of the bar, irrespective of the form of
initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party to the case, but a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is
basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor
in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The
real question for determination in these
proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the
bar.17
As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we
reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly
executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate
the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the
facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as
all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the
respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.18 (Emphasis supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in
finding reasonable grounds to hold respondent
administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by
the Investigating Commissioner, states that "a lawyer shall
rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing the court." We believe that other
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility
likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the
regular courts, but even in all other venues in the justice
sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times
demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee
on Bar Discipline, respondent stated that the PDEA refused
to release his clients unless it received a direct order from
the DOJ Secretary. This refusal purportedly impelled him to
take more serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my
only recourse was to see the Secretary himself personally.
The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic]
kasihe is very political also so he opens his office. If I’m not
mistaken that day because of the timing we will afraid [sic]
that Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit
sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was very sad x x x
kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed
na ang kaso. So, what I did was thinking as a lawyer now…I
prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for
signing authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just
sign it and send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho yon. And
then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si
Blancaflor.
xxxx
So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I
will see the Secretary first with the parents of Rodette, yong
nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 o’clock
or 1:30 in the afternoon. By then, that draft was still with
Blancaflor. Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami,
so we sat down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin
inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on
this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million
na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong Fifty Million, hindi
naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko
pwede ho bang maki-usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I
can do. I will study the matter, those particular words, I will
study the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter
of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not pushing us
away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the
case.19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with
Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;" and that "because
of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a
political family, my father was a Congressman. So,
he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows
my sister was a Congresswoman of Pasay and they
weretogether in Congress. In other words, I am not
a complete stranger to him."20 Upon questioning by
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent
admitted that he was personally acquainted with the
Secretary; however, they were not that close.21
These statements and others made during the
hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he
personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite
the fact that the case was still pending before the
latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of
the draft release order on official DOJ stationery
despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in
view of "expediting the case."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested
a clear intent to gain special treatment and
consideration from a government agency. This is
precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be
regulated by the codified norms for the bar.
Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act
that tends to influence, or may be seen to influence,
the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s
faith inthe judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but
to the administration of justice.1âwphi1 To that end,
their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The
conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and
ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to bythe lawyer, even inthe pursuit
of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable
and unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or
abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system." Further,
according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall not state or
imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding rule,
Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon
his client compliance with the laws and the
principles of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause
must always be within the bounds of the law.23 A
self-respecting independence in the exercise of the
profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a
member of the bar. In the present case, we find that
respondent fell short of these exacting standards.
Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere
slap on the wrist that would not serve as
commensurate penalty for the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua,
the Court saw fit to impose a six-month suspension
against a judge who likewise committed acts of
influence peddling whenshe solicited ₱100,000.00
from complainant Santos when the latter asked for
her help in the case of her friend Emerita Muñoz,
who had a pendingcase with the Supreme Court,
because respondent judge was a former court
attorney of the high court.24 We find that the same
penalty is appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty.
Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof
violating Rules 1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon
13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
which he is SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law
for six (6) months effective immediately. This also
serves as an emphaticWARNING that repetition of
any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be appended to the respondent’s
bar records. The Court Administrator is hereby directed to
inform the different courts of this suspension.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 8954 November 13, 2013
HON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel
for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863 captioned as
Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a
suit for damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court of San
Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge
Maribeth Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan issued
an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily
inhibited from hearing Civil Case No. 1863. The said Order
reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical
actuations, his traits of dishonesty and discourtesy not only
to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the
bench and judges, would amount to grave misconduct, if not
a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action
of a member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar
Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to
the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation
and sanction.2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the pronouncements of Judge
Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty.
Flores. Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to
the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal for
investigation, report and recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and
Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate
Fernandez (Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of
the case as follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal docketed as Civil Case No.
1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P.
Censon represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo
Flores appeared as counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent
Atty. Flores entered his appearance and was given time to
file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty.
Flores filed his Pre-Trial Brief but without proof of MCLE
compliance hence it was expunged from the records without
prejudice to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the
required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked
for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times
(August 11, September 8) for failure of respondent
Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief
indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court
a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15
and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty.
Flores a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief
with stern warning that failure to do so shall be
considered a waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a
Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010
stating among others, the following allegations:
xxxx
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar,
you promised to serve truth, justice and fair play. Do
you think you are being truthful, just and fair by
serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which
reason even Erap was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1 But even worse is a
lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie.
Again the Philippine Constitution commands: Give
every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the
plaintiff is violative of the foregoing divine and
human laws.
xxxx
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial
Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place
of compliance. During the preliminary conference
on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores
manifested that he will submit proof of compliance
of his MCLE on the following day. On December 1,
2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to
appear and to submit the said promised proof of
MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty.
Flores filed a Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove
your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign
to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have
asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this
case because I feel I cannot do anything right in
your sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have
failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his
compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using
intemperate language in his pleadings. The
Investigating Judge recommended that Atty. Flores
be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Judge.7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial
court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE compliance
notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court
orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue
them should be respected, but because of the respect and
consideration that should be extended to the judicial branch
of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our
Government is to be a government of laws and not of men.
Respect must be had not because of the incumbents to the
positions, but because of the authority that vests in them.
Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branc
the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State
which has instituted the judicial system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his
pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores is expected
to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins all attorneys
to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this
respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his
client full devotion to his client's genuine interest and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as
well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he
must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled
to voice his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech which must be exercised
responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from
responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's
fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of
truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done
within the confines of reason and common sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and
not commensurate with the infractions committed by the
respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction
committed by respondent. Also, we are not prepared to
impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year
suspension for humanitarian reasons. Respondent
manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice
of law for half a century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight
years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to
be more circumspect in his acts and to obey and respect
court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED
in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN WARNING that the
repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6332 April 17, 2012
IN RE: SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION DATED
28 APRIL 2003 IN G.R. NOS. 145817 AND 145822
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Factual Background
This administrative case originated when
respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña filed an
Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to Resolve
Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 30
January 20031 (the subject Motion to Inhibit) in two
consolidated petitions involving respondent that
were pending before the Court.2 This motion is
directed against the then ponente of the
consolidated petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
and reads in part:
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA,
pro se, respectfully states:
1. Despite all the obstacles respondent has had to
hurdle in his quest for justice against Urban Bank
and its officials, he has remained steadfast in his
belief that ultimately, he will be vindicated and the
wrongdoers will get their just deserts [sic]. What
respondent is about to relate however has, with all
due respect, shaken his faith in the highest Court of
the land. If an anomaly as atrocious as this can
happen even in the august halls of the Supreme
Court, one can only wonder if there is still any hope
for our justice system.
2. Private respondent wishes to make clear that he
is not making a sweeping accusation against all the
members of this Honorable Court. He cannot
however remain tight-lipped in the face of the
overwhelming evidence that has come to his
knowledge regarding the actuation of the ponente
of this Honorable Division.
3. In the evening of 19 November 2002, private
respondent received a call from the counsel for
petitioners, Atty. Manuel R. Singson (through his
cell phone number 09189137383) who very
excitedly bragged that they had been able to secure
an order from this Honorable Court suspending the
redemption period and the consolidation of
ownership over the Urban Bank properties sold
during the execution sale. Private respondent was
aghast because by them, more than two weeks had
lapsed since the redemption period on the various
properties had expired. At that juncture in fact,
Certificates of Final Sale had already been issued
to the purchasers of the properties. The only step
that had to be accomplished was the ministerial act
of issuance of new titles in favor of the purchasers.
4. Private respondent composed himself and tried
to recall if there was any pending incident with this
Honorable Court regarding the suspension of the
redemption period but he could not remember any.
In an effort to hide his discomfort, respondent
teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to
get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained
that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they
could not afford to lose the properties involved (consisting
mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in
Makati City) as it might again cause the bank (now Export
Industry Bank) to close down.
5. Since private respondent himself had not received a copy
of the order that Atty. Singson was talking about, he asked
Atty. Singson to fax him the "advance" copy that they had
received. The faxed "advance" copy that Atty. Singson
provided him bore the fax number and name of Atty.
Singson’s law office. A copy thereof is hereto attached as
Annex "A".
6. Private respondent could not believe what he read. It
appeared that a supposed Motion for Clarification was filed
by petitioners through Atty. Singson dated 6 August 2002,
but he was never furnished a copy thereof. He asked a
messenger to immediately secure a copy of the motion and
thereafter confirmed that he was not furnished a copy. His
supposed copy as indicated in the last page of the motion
was sent to the Abello Concepcion Regala and Cruz
(ACCRA) Law Offices. ACCRA, however, was never
respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of some of
the petitioners. Respondent’s copy, in other words, was sent
to his opponents.
7. The Motion for Clarification was thus resolved without
even giving respondent an opportunity to comment on the
same. In contrast, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the Resolution dated 19 November 2001 had been
pending for almost a year and yet petitioners’ motions for
extension to file comment thereon [were] being granted left
and right.
8. In view of these circumstances, private respondent filed
on 10 December 2002, an Urgent Omnibus Motion (to
Expunge Motion for Clarification and Recall of the 13
November 2002 Resolution). He filed a Supplement to the
said motion on 20 December 2002.
9. While private respondent was waiting for petitioners to
respond to his motion, he received sometime last week two
documents that confirmed his worst fears. The two
documents indicate that this Honorable Court has not
actually granted petitioners’ Motion for Clarification. They
indicate that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of
this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had bragged about
WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously received were
two copies of the official Agenda of the First Division of this
Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the
questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both
copies (apparently secured from the office of two different
members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the
ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of
the Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely
NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in
the 13 November 2002 Resolution. This makes the 13
November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that was
released to the parties) a falsified document because it
makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in
fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at
by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are
hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C."
11. At this point, private respondent could not help but
conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of what Atty.
Singson was bragging to him about. The clear and
undeniable fact is the Honorable members of this Division
agreed that petitioners’ Motion for Clarification would only be
NOTED but the ponente responsible for the 13 November
2002 Resolution misrepresented that the same was
GRANTED.
12. Respondent is not just speculating here. He is
CERTAIN that the ponente has a special interest in
this case. Recently, he also found out that the
ponente made a special request to bring this case
along with him when he transferred from the Third
Division to the First Division. Respondent has a
copy of the Resolution of this Honorable Court
granting such request (hereto attached as Annex
"D"). Indeed, this circumstance, considered with all
the foregoing circumstance, ineluctably
demonstrates that a major anomaly has occurred
here.
13. In view of these, private respondent is
compelled to move for the inhibition of the ponente
from this case. This matter should be thoroughly
investigated and respondent is now carefully
considering his legal options for redress. It has
taken him seven years to seek vindication of his
rights against petitioners, he is not about to relent at
this point. In the meantime, he can longer expect a
fair and impartial resolution of this case if the
ponente does not inhibit himself.
14. This Honorable Court has time and again
emphasized the importance of impartiality and the
appearance of impartiality on the part of judges and
justices. The ponente will do well to heed such
pronouncements.
15. Finally, it is has now become incumbent upon
this Honorable Court to clarify its real position on
the 19 November 2001 Resolution. It is most
respectfully submitted that in order to obviate any
further confusion on the matter, respondent’s
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 09 December 2002
(as well as the Supplement dated 19 November
2002) should be resolved and this Honorable Court
should confirm that the stay order contained in the
19 November 2001 Resolution does not cover
properties already sold on execution. xxx
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)
In support of his claims to inhibit the ponente, Atty.
Peña attached to the subject Motion to Inhibit two
copies of the official Agenda for 13 November 2002
of the First Division of this Court, which he claimed
to have anonymously received through the
mail.3 He also attached a copy of the Court’s
internal Resolution regarding the transfer of the
case from the Third Division to the First Division,
upon the request of Justice Carpio, to establish the
latter’s alleged special interest in the case.4
In response, the Court issued a resolution on 17
February 2003 to require Atty. Peña and Atty.
Manuel R. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the
consolidated petitions, to appear before the Court
on 03 March 2003 for an Executive Session.5
The reason for the required appearance of the two
lawyers in the Executive Session is explained in the
Court’s Resolution dated 03 March 2003.6 It states:
The executive session started at 10:20 a.m. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. formally opened the
executive session and then requested Associate
Justice Jose C. Vitug to act as chair. Justice Vitug
stated that the executive session was called
because the Court is perturbed by some statements
made by respondent Atty. Magdaleno Peña
involving strictly confidential matters which are
purely internal to the Court and which the latter
cites as grounds in his "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion."
Respondent/movant Atty. Magdaleno Peña and counsel for
petitioner Atty. Manuel R. Singson attended the session.
The matters under inquiry were how respondent was able to
obtain copies of the documents he used as annexes in his
motion to inhibit, and whether the annexes are authentic.
The court also clarified that these matters were to be taken
as entirely different and apart from the merits of the main
case.
Justice Vitug called the attention of respondent to the three
(3) annexes attached to the motion to inhibit, Annexes "B",
"C" and "D," questioned how the latter was able to secure
copies of such documents which are confidential to the Court
and for the sole use of the Office of the Clerk of Court, First
Division and the Justices concerned.
Annex "B" is alleged to be a photocopy of the supplemental
agenda of the First Division for November 13, 2002 (pages
61-62), with an entry in handwriting reading "10 AC" on the
left side and what appear to be marginal notes on the right
side of both pages. Annex "C" is alleged to be a photocopy of
the same supplemental agenda of the First Division for
November 13, 2002, with marginal notes on the right side of
pages 61-62. Annex "D" appears to be a photocopy of the
resolution dated September 4, 2002 of the Third Division
transferring the instant case to the First Division (an internal
resolution).
Atty. Peña was made to understand that all his statements
taken during this executive session were deemed under oath.
Atty. Peña acceded thereto.
Atty. Peña was asked whether he knows any personnel of
the Court who could possibly be the source. Atty. Peña
replied in the negative and added that he obtained those
documents contained in the annexes through ordinary mail
addressed at his residence in Pulupandan, Negros
Occidental, sometime in the second or third week of January
2003; but failed to give the exact date of his receipt. He said
Annexes "B" and "C" were contained in one envelope while
Annex "D" was mailed in a separate envelope. He did not
bring the envelopes but promised the Court he would do his
best to locate them. On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty.
Peña admitted that the envelopes may no longer be found.
He was unable to respond to the observation of the Chief
Justice that the Court would be in no position to know
whether the envelopes he would later produce would be the
same envelopes he allegedly received. Atty. Peña further
admitted that his office did not stamp "Received" on the
envelopes and the contents thereof; neither did he have
them recorded in a log book.
When asked by the Chief Justice why he relied on those
annexes as grounds for his motion to inhibit when the same
were coursed only through ordinary mail under unusual
circumstances and that respondent did not even bother to
take note of the postal marks nor record the same in a log
book, Atty. Peña answered that he was 100% certain that
those documents are authentic and he assumed that they
came from Manila because the Supreme Court is in Manila.
At this juncture, Atty. Peña was reminded that since he
assured the authenticity of Annexes "B", "C" and "D", he
should be willing to accept all the consequences if it turns out
that there are no such copies in the Supreme Court or if said
annexes turn out to be forged. Atty. Peña manifested that he
was willing to accept the consequences.
When further asked by the Court whether he had seen the
original that made him conclude that those photocopies are
authentic, he replied in the negative, but he believed that
they are official documents of the Court inasmuch
as he also received a copy of another resolution
issued by the Court when the same was faxed to
him by Atty. Singson, counsel for petitioner.
Atty. Peña expressed his disappointment upon
receiving the resolution because he was not even
furnished with a copy of petitioner’s motion for
clarification, which was resolved. He found out that
his copy was addressed to Abello Concepcion
Regala and Cruz Law Offices, which was never
respondent’s counsel and was in fact the counsel of
some of the petitioners.
He also expressed misgivings on the fact that the
motion for clarification was acted upon even without
comment from him, and he admitted that under said
circumstances, he made imputation of bribery as a
joke.
As to the statement of the Chief Justice making it of
record that Justice Carpio and Justice Azcuna
denied that Annex "B" is their copy of pp. 61 and 62
of the agenda, Justice Carpio also said that per
verification, Annex "B" is not Justice Santiago’s
copy. Thus, Justice Carpio added that Annex "B"
does not belong to any of the Justices of the First
Division. It was also pointed out that each of the
Justices have their respective copies of the agenda
and make their own notations thereon. The official
actions of the Court are contained in the duly
approved minutes and resolutions of the Court.
Meanwhile, Justice Vitug called the attention of
both Atty. Peña and Atty. Singson to paragraphs 3
and 4 of respondent’s "Urgent Motion to Inhibit and
to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion,
which contain the following allegations: "(Atty.
Singson) very excitedly bragged that they had been
able to secure an order from this Honorable Court
suspending the redemption period and the
consolidation of ownership over the Urban Bank
properties sold during the execution sale. Private
respondent was aghast because by then, more
than two weeks had lapsed since the redemption
period on the various properties had expired. In an
effort to hide his discomfort, respondent (Atty. Peña)
teased Atty. Singson about bribing the ponente to
get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact
explained that they obviously had to exert extra
effort because they could not afford to lose the
properties involved."
For his part, Atty. Singson admitted that he faxed a
copy of the resolution dated November 13, 2002 to
Atty. Peña and expressed his belief that there was
nothing wrong with it, as the resolution was officially
released and received by his office. He explained
that his staff merely copied the parties in the
resolution of February 13, 2002 when the motion for
clarification was prepared. Hence, the respondent
was inadvertently not sent a copy.
Atty. Singson further denied the allegations made in
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to inhibit,
reasoning that all he said was about the suspension
of the redemption period which was the subject of
the motion for clarification. Atty. Singson branded
as false the allegation of Atty. Peña that he, Atty.
Singson, resorted to bribery in order that the
suspension of the redemption period would be
granted.
On questions by the Chief Justice, Atty. Peña
admitted that he was only joking to Atty. Singson
when on the cellular phone he intimated that Justice
Carpio could have been bribed because he has a new
Mercedes Benz. When pressed many times to answer
categorically whether Atty. Singson told him that Justice
Carpio was bribed, Atty. Peña could not make any candid or
forthright answer. He was evasive.
After further deliberation whereby Atty. Peña consistently
replied that his only source of the documents in the annexes
is the regular mail, the Court Resolved to require Atty.
Magdaleno Peña within fifteen (15) days from today to
SHOW CAUSE why he should not be held in contempt and
be subjected to disciplinary action as a lawyer if he will not
be able to satisfactorily explain to Court why he made
gratuitous allegations and imputations against the Court and
some of its members that tend to cast doubt or aspersion on
their integrity.
Atty. Manuel Singson was also required to submit within
fifteen (15) days from today his response to the allegations of
Atty. Peña, particularly those in paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 of
respondent’s motion to inhibit.
The Court excused Attys. Peña and Singson from the
executive session at 11:35 a.m. and resumed its regular
session on the agenda.
In connection with the pleadings filed in these cases, the
Court Resolves to GRANT the motion by counsel for
petitioner praying that intervenor-movant Unimega
Properties’ Holdings Corp. be directed to furnish aforesaid
counsel with a copy of the motion for reconsideration and
intervention and that they be granted an additional period of
ten (10) days within which to file comment thereon and
require said intervenor-movant to SUBMIT proof of such
service within five (5) days from notice.
The manifestation and comment of petitioners in G.R. No.
145882, Benjamin de Leon, et al., on the motion for
reconsideration with intervention by Unimega Property
Holdings Corp. is NOTED. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Peña duly submitted his Compliance with the Court’s
Order, where he stated that:7
PRIVATE RESPONDENT MAGDALENO M. PEÑA, pro se,
respectfully submits the following explanation in compliance
with the Resolution of this Honorable Court dated 3 March
2003:
1. This Honorable Court in its 3 March 2003 Resolution
required respondent to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt and be subjected to disciplinary action as a
result of the allegations he made in his "Urgent Motion to
Inhibit and to Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus
Motion" dated 30 January 2003. As this Honorable Court
stated during the 3 March 2003 hearing, the members of the
Court were "perturbed" by some statements respondent
made in the motion.
2. At the outset, respondent wishes to apologize for the
distress his statements may have caused the members of
this Honorable Court. While such distress may have been
the unavoidable consequence of his motion to inhibit the
ponente, it was certainly not his intended result.
3. In the course of the discussion during the 3 March 2003
hearing, it appeared that this Honorable Court was most
concerned with how respondent was able to secure Annexes
"B" and "C" of his motion (referring to the two copies of the
Supplemental Agenda of the First Division for 13 November
2002) and why respondent used those documents as basis
for his Urgent Motion to Inhibit.
4. Respondent had explained that he received the two
annexes by ordinary mail at his residence in Brgy. Ubay,
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental sometime during the second
week of January. The sender of the document was
unknown to respondent because there was no
return address. Despite efforts to locate the
envelope in which these documents came, he was
unable to do so.
5. Respondent has no record keeper or secretary at
his residence. Since he is often in Manila on
business, it is usually the househelp who gets to
receive the mail. While he had given instructions to
be very careful in the handling of documents which
arrive by registered mail, the envelopes for
Annexes "A" and "B" may have been misplaced or
disposed by the househelp because it did not bear
the stamp "registered mail."
6. When respondent read the documents, he had
absolutely no reason to doubt their authenticity. For
why would anyone bother or go to the extent of
manufacturing documents for the benefit of
someone who does not even know him? The
documents contained a detailed list of the incidents
deliberated by this Honorable Court on 13
November 2002. Definitely, not just anyone could
have access to such information. Moreover,
respondent subsequently received another mail
from apparently the same sender, this time
containing a pink copy of this Honorable Court’s 4
September 2002 Resolution (Annex "D", Urgent
Motion to Inhibit) transferring this case from the
Third Division to the First Division. The receipt of
this last document somehow confirmed to
respondent that whoever sent him the copies of the
Supplemental Agenda really had access to the
records of this Honorable Court.
7. Respondent wishes to reiterate that the main
basis of his motion to inhibit was the information
relayed to him by Atty. Singson during their
telephone conversation on 19 November 2002. As
stated in respondent’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit,
while Atty. Singson did not categorically claim that
they had bribed the ponente to secure the 13
November 2002 resolution, however, he made no
denial when respondent, in order to obtain
information, half-seriously remarked that this was
the reason why the ponente had a brand new car.
Atty. Singson retorted that obviously, they had to
take extra-ordinary measures to prevent the
consolidation of ownership of the properties sold as
the bank may again close down. Indeed, one would
normally be indignant upon being accused of
bribery but Atty. Singson even chuckled and
instead justified their "extra-ordinary" efforts.
8. Respondent very well knew that mere suspicion
was not enough. An implied admission of bribery on
the part of Atty. Singson, sans evidence, may not
have been sufficient basis for a motion to inhibit.
However, respondent did not have to look far for
evidence. Atty. Singson in not denying the
allegation of bribery is considered an admission by
silence, under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. Further, Atty. Singson faxed to him the
"advance copy" of the 13 November 2002
Resolution. To respondent, that was solid evidence
and in fact to this day, Atty. Singson fails to explain
exactly when, from whom, and how he was able to
secure said advance copy. The records of this
Honorable Court disclosed that Atty. Singson’s
official copy of the 13 November 2002 Resolution
was sent to him by registered mail only on 20
November 2002 (a copy of the daily mailing report
is hereto attached as Annex "A"). Why then was he
able to fax a copy to respondent on 19 November
2002 or a day before the resolution was released
for mailing?
9. Despite all these, respondent hesitated to file a motion to
inhibit. He only finally decided to proceed when he received
the copies of the Supplemental Agenda. To emphasize, the
Supplemental Agenda merely confirmed what Atty. Singson
had earlier told him. Contrary to the apparent impression of
this Honorable Court, respondent’s motion is not primarily
anchored on anonymously received documents but on the
word of petitioner’s counsel himself. The copies of the
Supplemental Agenda are merely corroborative (albeit
extremely convincing) evidence.
10. Indeed, any conscientious lawyer who comes into
possession of the information relayed by Atty. Singson and
the copies of the Supplemental Agenda would bring them to
the attention of this Honorable Court. In doing so,
respondent was compelled by a sense of duty to inform this
Honorable Court of any apparent irregularity that has come
to his knowledge. It was not done out of spite but a deep
sense of respect.
11. In all honesty, respondent had been advised by
well-meaning friends to publicize the incident and take legal
action against the parties involved. Instead, respondent
decided that a motion to inhibit before this Honorable Court
was the most appropriate channel to ventilate his concerns.
Respondent is not out to cast aspersions on anybody, most
especially members of this Honorable Court. He had to file
the Urgent Motion to Inhibit because he sincerely believed,
and still firmly believes, that he could not get impartial justice
if the ponente did not recuse himself.
12. Respondent sincerely regrets that documents considered
confidential by this Honorable Court leaked out and assures
this Honorable Court that he had absolutely no hand in
securing them. Respondent just found himself in a position
where he had to come out with those documents because
his opponent was crude enough to brag that their
"extra-ordinary" efforts to secure a stay order from a certain
ponente had bore fruit. Respondent has devoted at least
seven years of his life to this cause. He almost lost his life
and was nearly driven to penury fighting this battle. Certainly,
he cannot be expected to simply raise his hands in
surrender.
13. At this point, respondent is just relieved that it was
confirmed during the 3 March 2003 hearing that Annex "C" of
his Urgent Motion to Inhibit is a faithful reproduction/"replica"
of the relevant portions of the Supplemental Agenda (TSN
dated 3 March 2003, pp. 72-73 and 81) on record with the
first Division. With this, respondent rests his
case. 8 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Atty. Singson, as part of his Compliance
and Affidavit dated 28 July 2003,9 categorically denied
having bragged to Atty. Peña and that he did not employ
"extra efforts" to obtain a favorable suspension order from
the Court.10
After considering and evaluating the submissions made by
the two lawyers, the Court ordered that a formal investigation
be undertaken by the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) on
the actions of Atty. Peña.11 The Court’s Resolution dated 28
April 2003 in the consolidated petitions, which is the subject
matter of this separate administrative case, reads:
On January 30, 2003, respondent Magdaleno M. Peña filed
an Urgent Motion to Inhibit the ponente of the instant case.
Respondent Peña attached to his Urgent Motion Annex "B",
a copy of pp. 61-62 of the First Division’s Agenda of 13
November 2002. Respondent Peña claimed that Annex "B"
bears the recommended actions, in handwritten notations, of
a member of the Court (First Division) on Item No. 175 of the
Agenda. Item No. 175(f) refers to the Urgent Motion for
Clarification filed by petitioner on 7 August 2002. The
purported handwritten notation on Annex "B" for Item No.
175 (f) is "N", or to simply note the motion. However, the
Court issued a Resolution on 13 November 2002 granting
the Urgent Motion for Clarification. In his Urgent
Motion to Inhibit, respondent Peña claimed that the
Resolution of 13 November 2002 was forged
because the recommended and approved action of
the Court was to simply note, and not to approve,
the Urgent Motion for Clarification.
Thus, respondent Peña stated in his Urgent motion
to Inhibit:
"9. While private respondent was waiting for
petitioners to respond to his motion, he received
sometime last week two documents that confirmed
his worst fears. The two documents indicate that
this Honorable Court had not actually granted
petitioners’ Motion for Clarification. They indicate
that the supposed 13 November 2002 Resolution of
this Honorable Court which Atty. Singson had
bragged about WAS A FALSIFIED DOCUMENT!
10. What private respondent anonymously received
were two copies of the official Agenda of the First
Division of this Honorable Court for 13 November
2002, the date when the questioned Resolution was
supposedly issued. In both copies (apparently
secured from the office of two different members of
the Division, one of which is the copy of the ponente
himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of
the Division had agreed that petitioners’ Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were
merely NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to
what was stated in the 13 November 2002
Resolution. This makes the 13 November 2002
Resolution (at least the version that was released to
the parties) a falsified document because it makes it
appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification
when in fact no such Resolution exists. The real
Resolution arrived at by the First Division which can
be gleaned from the Agenda merely NOTED said
motion. Copies of the two Agenda are hereto
attached as Annexes "B" and "C".
11. At this point, private respondent could not help
but conclude that this anomaly was confirmatory of
what Atty. Singson was bragging about. The clear
and undeniable fact is the Honorable members of
this Division agreed that petitioner’s Motion for
Clarification would only be NOTED but the ponente
responsible for the 13 November 2002 Resolution
misrepresented that the same was GRANTED."
On 3 March 2003, the Court called respondent
Peña and Atty. Manuel Singson, counsel for
petitioner Urban Bank, to a hearing to determine,
among others, the authenticity of the annexes to
respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit,
including Annex "B". In the hearing, respondent
Peña affirmed the authenticity of the annexes and
even manifested that he was willing to accept the
consequences if the annexes, including Annex "B",
turned out to be forgeries.
In the same hearing, the members of the Court
(First Division) informed respondent Peña that the
handwritten notations on Annex "B" did not belong
to any of them. In particular, Justice Carpio, to
whom the case was assigned and the apparent
object of respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to
Inhibit as the "ponente responsible for the 13
November 2002 Resolution," stated that his
recommended action on Item No. 175(f) was "a & f,
see RES," meaning on Items 175(a) and (f), see
proposed resolution. In short, the handwritten
notations on Annex "B", purportedly belonging to a
member of the Court, were forgeries. For ready
reference, attached as Annexes "1" and "2" to this
Resolution are a copy of pp. 61-62 of Justice Carpio’s 13
November 2002 Agenda, and a copy of Justice Carpio’s
recommended actions for the entire 13 November 2002
Agenda, respectively.
In the same hearing, the Court directed respondent Peña to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt and
subjected to disciplinary action for submitting the annexes to
his Motion to Inhibit. In his Compliance dated 3 April 2003,
respondent Peña did not give any explanation as to why he
attached "B" to his Urgent Motion to Inhibit. In fact, in his
Compliance, respondent Peña did not mention at all Annex
"B". Respondent Peña, however, stated that he "just found
himself in a position where he had to come out with those
documents because his opponent was crude enough to brag
that their ‘extra-ordinary’ efforts to secure a stay order from a
certain ponente had bore fruit." In petitioner’s Opposition to
the Urgent Motion to Inhibit, Atty. Singson stated that he
"categorically denied that he had bragged to PEÑA about the
Resolution of this Honorable Court dated November 13,
2002 and that extra efforts have been exerted to obtain the
same."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DIRECTS
the Office of the Bar Confidant to conduct a formal
investigation of respondent Atty. Magdaleno M. Peña for
submitting to the Court a falsified document, Annex "B",
allegedly forming part of the confidential records of a
member of the Court, in support of his Motion to Inhibit that
same member of the Court. The Office of the Bar Confidant
is directed to submit its findings, report and recommendation
within 90 days from receipt of this Resolution.12 (Emphasis
supplied.)
During the proceedings with the OBC, Attys. Peña13 and
Singson14 duly submitted their respective Affidavits.
While the administrative case was still pending, some of the
other parties in the consolidated petitions – specifically,
Benjamin L. de Leon, Delfin Gonzalez, Jr., and Eric L. Lee,
(the De Leon Group), the petitioners in G.R. No. 145822 –
manifested before the Court other malicious imputations
allegedly made by Atty. Peña during the course of the
proceedings in the said petitions. They moved that these be
considered as sufficient and additional basis to cite him for
contempt of court.15 The Court likewise referred this matter
to the OBC.16
In reply to the accusations leveled against him by the De
Leon Group, respondent Peña denied having used abrasive,
insulting and intemperate language in his pleadings; and
argued that his statements therein were privileged and could
not be used as a basis for liability.17 He also accused Urban
Bank and its directors and officers of violating the rule
against forum shopping by dividing themselves into separate
groups and filing three Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817, 145818
and 145822) against the same Decision of the Court of
Appeals with the same causes of actions and prayers for
relief.18
The OBC thereafter conducted a hearing, wherein
respondent Peña and Atty. Singson appeared and testified
on matters that were the subject of the administrative
cases.19 Several hearings were also held with respect to the
additional contempt charges raised by the De Leon Group.
Thereafter, respondent Peña filed his Memorandum.20
The OBC submitted to the Court its Report on the instant
administrative case and made recommendations on the
matter (the OBC Report). As a matter of policy, this Court
does not quote at length, nor even disclose the dispositive
recommendation of the OBC in administrative investigations
of members of the bar. However, Atty. Peña, despite the fact
that the OBC Report is confidential and internal, has
obtained, without authority, a copy thereof and has formally
claimed that this Court should apply to him the non-penalty
of an admonition against him, as recommended by
the OBC.21
Furthermore, he has already voiced suspicion that
the present ponente of the consolidated
petitions22 from which this separate administrative
case arose, Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
would exclude or suppress material evidence found
in the OBC report from her ponencia in the parent
case in alleged gratitude to the alleged help that
Justice Carpio had given her by allegedly
recommending her to the Supreme Court.23 The
specific allegation on the supposed loyalty by one
Member of the Court to another, without any
extrinsic factual basis to support it, is too
undignified to warrant a response in this Decision.
To allay his fears that Justice Sereno would
participate in any undue attempt to suppress
material evidence, the Court shall summarize and
quote from the OBC Report the four charges of
professional misconduct in connection with the
instant administrative case.
On the first charge of gratuitous imputations against
members of the Court, the OBC found that
respondent Peña gave the impression that some
anomaly or irregularity was committed by the
Court’s First Division in issuing the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution. According to
respondent, Justice Carpio, the then ponente of the
consolidated petitions, purportedly changed the
action of the First Division from simply "NOTING"
the motion for clarification filed by Urban Bank to
"GRANTING" it altogether. The OBC opines that
although respondent Peña may appear to have
been passionate in the subject Motion to Inhibit, the
language he used is not to be considered as
malicious imputations but mere expressions of
concern based on what he discovered from the
internal documents of the Court that he had
secured.24 Moreover, the OBC ruled that
respondent did not make a direct accusation of
bribery against Justice Carpio, and the former’s
remark about the latter having received a new
Mercedes Benz was not made in the presence of
the court, but was uttered in a private mobile phone
conversation between him and Atty.
Singson.25 Respondent’s profound apologies to the
Court were also taken cognizance by the OBC,
which suggests the imposition of a simple warning
against any such future conduct.26
Further, the OBC recommended the dismissal of
the second charge that respondent supposedly
submitted falsified documents to this Court as
annexes in the subject Motion to Inhibit, specifically
Annex "B" which appears to be a photocopy of the
agenda of the First Division on 13 November 2002
with some handwritten notes.27 It reasoned that the
submission of falsified documents partakes of the
nature of a criminal act, where the required proof is
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but respondent
Peña is not being charged with a criminal offense in
the instant case. The OBC noted the statement of
the Clerk of Court during the 03 March 2003
Executive Session that Annex "B" does not exist in
the records.28
On the third charge for contempt against
respondent filed by the De Leon Group and Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan, their counsel, the OBC likewise
suggests the dismissal of the same. To recall,
respondent submitted pleadings in the consolidated
petitions where he allegedly charged Atty. Vinluan
of having used his influence over Justice Arturo B.
Buena to gain a favorable resolution to the benefit
of his clients.29 The OBC suggests that respondent
be acquitted of the charge of using abrasive and
disrespectful language against Members of the Court and his
fellow lawyers, but nevertheless recommends that
respondent be advised to refrain from using unnecessary
words or statements in the future.30
Finally, the OBC desisted from making a finding on the fourth
charge of forum-shopping leveled by respondent Peña
against Urban Bank and the individual bank directors. In his
counter-suit, respondent accused the bank and its directors
and officers of having violated the rule against
forum-shopping by splitting into three distinct groups and
filing three separate petitions to question the unfavorable
decision of the Court of Appeals.31 However, since not all the
parties to the consolidated petitions participated in the
hearings in the instant case, the OBC recommends that
separate proceedings be conducted with respect to this
counter-suit in order to afford Urban Bank and all of the
concerned directors and officers, including their respective
counsel, to defend themselves and present witnesses and/or
evidence in support of their cause.32
Taking the foregoing in consideration, the OBC submitted
the following recommendations for approval of this Court:
RECOMMENDATIONS:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, it is
respectfully recommended the following:
A. On the charge of gratuitous allegations:
1. To DISMISS the charge on the ground that the statements
in his Motion to Inhibit, etc., do not constitute malicious
imputations as he was merely expressing his concern of
what he has discovered based on the documents he has
obtained. However, let this case serve as his FIRST
WARNING, being an officer of the court, to be more cautious,
restraint and circumspect with his dealings in the future with
the Court and its Member.
2. To ADMONISH respondent for making such non-sense
and unfounded joke against Honorable Justice Antonio T.
Carpio the latter deserves due respect and courtesy from no
less than the member of the bar. Likewise, Atty. Singson
should also be ADVISED to be more cautious in his dealing
with his opposing counsel to avoid misconception of facts.
B. On the charge of falsification:
1. To DISMISS the charge of submitting falsified documents
on ground of lack of legal basis. A charge of submitting
falsified documents partakes of the nature of criminal act
under Art. 172 of the Revised penal Code, and the quantum
of proof required to hold respondent guilty thereof is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. This is to avoid conflicting findings
in the criminal case. The administrative proceedings of the
same act must await of the outcome in the criminal case of
falsification of document.
C. On the contempt of court filed by private complainant:
1. To DISMISS the charge considering that the statements
cited by Atty. Peña in his pleadings previously filed in related
cases, while it may appear to be offending on the part of the
complainant, but the same do not categorically contain
disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language or intemperate
words that may tend to discredit the name of the complainant.
Respondent merely narrated the facts based of his own
knowledge and discoveries which, to him, warranted to be
brought to the attention of the court for its information and
consideration. He must be ADVISED however, to refrain
from using unnecessary words and statements which may
not be material in the resolution of the issued raised therein.
D. On the counter-charge of forum-shopping
1. To RE-DOCKET the counter-charge of forum
shopping, as embodied in the Comment dated 22
August 2003 of Atty. Peña, as a separate
administrative case against the petitioners and
counsels in G.R. 145817, G.R. No. 145818 and G.R.
No. 145822;
2. To FURNISH the petitioners and their counsel a
copy of the said comment dated 22 August 2003 for
their information.
3. To REQUIRE the petitioners and their counsel,
SINGSON VALDEZ & ASSOCIATES, represented
by ATTY. MANUEL R. SINGSON, ANGARA
ABELLO CONCEPCION REALA & CRUZ
represented by ATTY. ROGELIO A. VINLUAN,
ATTY. STEPHEN GEORGE S. D. AQUINO and
ATTY. HAZEL ROSE B. SEE to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof.33 (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUES
In these administrative matters, the salient issues
for the Court’s consideration are limited to the
following:
(a) whether respondent Peña made gratuitous
allegations and imputations against members of the
Court;
(b) whether he can be held administratively liable
for submitting allegedly "falsified documents"
consisting of internal documents of the court;
(c) whether he can likewise be held administratively
liable for the contempt charges leveled against him
in the Manifestation and Motion filed by the De
Leon Group; and
(d) whether Urban Bank and the individual bank
directors and officers are guilty of forum shopping.
OUR RULING
A. First Charge: Malicious and Groundless
Imputation of Bribery and Wrongdoing against a
Member of the Court.
We do not adopt the recommendation of the OBC
on this charge.
Respondent Peña is administratively liable for
making gratuitous imputations of bribery and
wrongdoing against a member of the Court, as seen
in the text of the subject Motion to Inhibit, his
statements during the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session, and his unrelenting obstinacy in hurling
effectively the same imputations in his subsequent
pleadings. In moving for the inhibition of a Member
of the Court in the manner he adopted, respondent
Peña, as a lawyer, contravened the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers.34 They are to abstain from
offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the court35 and must refrain from attributing to a
judge motives that are not supported by the record
or have no materiality to the case.36
While lawyers are entitled to present their case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of foul and abusive
language.37 Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not
derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.38 A lawyer’s
language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but
respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession.39
In the subject Motion for Inhibition, respondent Peña
insinuated that the then ponente of the case had been
"bribed" by Atty. Singson, counsel of Urban Bank in the
consolidated petitions, in light of the questioned 13
November 2002 Resolution, suspending the period of
redemption of the levied properties pending appeal. The
subject Motion to Inhibit reads in part:
4. Private respondent [Peña] composed himself and tried to
recall if there was any pending incident with this Honorable
Court regarding the suspension of the redemption period but
he could not remember any. In an effort to hide his
discomfort, respondent teased Atty. Singson about bribing
the ponente to get such an order. Much to his surprise, Atty.
Singson did not even bother to deny and in fact explained
that they obviously had to exert extra effort because they
could not afford to lose the properties involved (consisting
mainly of almost all the units in the Urban Bank Plaza in
Makati City) as it might cause the bank (now Export Industry
Bank) to close down.40 (Emphasis supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session by the First
Division of this Court, respondent Peña explained that his
reference to the bribe was merely a "joke" in the course of a
telephone conversation between lawyers:
CHIEF JUSTICE DAVIDE:
Regarding that allegation made by Atty. Peña on [sic] when
you made mention earlier of him saying about Justice
Carpio?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, Your Honor, he said "kaya pala may bagong Mercedez
[sic] si Carpio, eh."
CHIEF JUSTICE:
He said to you that?
ATTY. SINGSON:
Yes, that was what he was referring to when he said about
bribery.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. PEÑA:
First of all I would like to … everything that he said, he told
me that he got, they got a stay order, it is a stay order from
the Supreme Court through Justice Carpio and then I gave
that joke. That was just a joke really. He got a new
Me[r]cedez [sic] Benz, you see, he was the one who told me
they got a stay order from the Supreme Court through
Justice Carpio, that was what happened …
CHIEF JUSTICE:
You mean you made a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
You Honor?
CHIEF JUSTICE;
You made a joke after he told you supposedly that
he got (interrupted)
ATTY. PEÑA:
He got a stay order from Justice Carpio.
CHIEF JUSTICE:
And you say that is the reason why he got a new
Mercedez [sic] Benz, you made it as a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
Your Honor, that is a joke between lawyers.
CHIEF JUSTICE;
That is correct, you are making it as a joke?
ATTY. PEÑA:
Your Honor, I think, because how they got
(interrupted)
CHIEF JUSTICE:
If it were a joke why did you allege in your motion
that it was Atty. Singson who said that Justice
Carpio was bribed or the ponente was bribed, is
that also another joke?41 (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent Peña insinuated ill motives to the then
ponente of the consolidated petitions with respect
to the issuance of the 13 November 2003
Resolution. To respondent’s mind and based on his
interpretation of the two copies of the Agenda which
he anonymously received, the First Division agreed
only to simply note Urban Bank’s Motion for
Clarification. Nevertheless, the questioned
Resolution, which Atty. Singson sent to him by
facsimile, had instead granted the Motion. Hence,
respondent Peña attributed the modification of the
action of the First Division to simply "note" the
Motion, one apparently unfavorable to respondent
Peña, to Justice Carpio, who had supposedly
received a Mercedes Benz for the supposedly
altered resolution.
However, as pointed out by the Court in the
Resolution dated 03 March 2003, each Justice has
his own respective copy of the Agenda, where he
can make his own handwritten notations on the
action for each item and case, but "[t]he official
actions of the Court are contained in the duly
approved minutes and resolutions of the
Court."42 Hence, contrary to the insinuations made
by respondent Peña, Justice Carpio had not altered
the action of the First Division in granting Urban
Bank’s Motion for Clarification in the consolidated
petitions, as in fact, this was the approved
resolution agreed upon by the Justices then present.
The ponente of the case had not recommended that
the Motion for Clarification be simply noted, but in
fact, had referred to a separate resolution, i.e., "a) &
f) – See RES.," disposing of the said item (F)
including item (A), which is the Motion to Inhibit
Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban. In addition
to the official minutes of the 13 November 2002
Session,43 Justice Carpio submitted for the record
his written recommendation on the agenda item
involving the consolidated petitions, to prove that
this was his recommendation, and the minutes confirm the
approval of this recommendation.44
The Court, through a unanimous action of the then Members
of the First Division, had indeed adopted the recommended
and proposed resolution of Justice Carpio, as the then
ponente, and granted the Motion for Clarification filed by
Urban Bank. It is completely wrong for respondent Peña to
claim that the action had been issued without any sufficient
basis or evidence on record, and hence was done so with
partiality. A mere adverse ruling of the court is not adequate
to immediately justify the imputation of such bias or prejudice
as to warrant inhibition of a Member of this Court, absent any
verifiable proof of specific misconduct. Suspicions or
insinuations of bribery involving a member of this Court, in
exchange for a favorable resolution, are grave accusations.
They cannot be treated lightly or be "jokingly" alleged by
parties, much less by counsel in pleadings or motions. These
suspicions or insinuations strike not only at the stature or
reputation of the individual members of the Court, but at the
integrity of its decisions as well.45
Respondent Peña attempts to draw a connection and direct
correlation between Urban Bank’s failure to furnish him a
copy of its Motion for Clarification, purportedly denying him
an opportunity to refute the allegations therein, and the
supposedly corrupt means by which the unfavorable
Resolution was thereby obtained. This is completely
untenable and irresponsible. Had he simply confined the
issue to an alleged deprivation of due process, then there
would hardly be any controversy regarding his conduct as a
lawyer and an officer of the Court. The purported lack of
notice of the Motion for Clarification filed the bank in the
consolidated petitions could have been raised as a valid
concern for judicial resolution. Instead, respondent Peña
insinuates ill motives on the part of Members of the Court
imputing the failure of a private party to give him due notice
to be, in effect, a failure of the Court. This merits the exercise
of the Court’s disciplinary powers over him as a member of
the Bar. To allege that bribery has been committed by
members of the judiciary, a complainant – especially, a
lawyer – must go beyond mere suspicions, speculations,
insinuations or even the plain silence of an opposing
counsel.
Based on the two lawyers’ disclosures during the 03 March
2003 Executive Session, respondent Peña appears to have
been caught by surprise by his telephone conversation with
Atty. Singson, who informed him of the suspension of the
redemption period by the Court and its issuance of a Stay
Order over the execution pending appeal. The astonishment
of respondent would seem natural, since he was caught
unawares of Urban Bank’s Motion for Clarification, which
was the subject matter of the 13 November 2002 Resolution.
His supposed joke, which he himself initiated and made
without provocation, was disdainful all the same, as it
suggested that the bank had obtained the Order from this
Court in exchange for an expensive luxury automobile.
Atty. Peña cannot be excused for uttering snide and
accusatory remarks at the expense of the reputation and
integrity of members of this Court, and for using those
unsubstantiated claims as basis for the subject Motion for
Inhibition. Instead of investigating the veracity of Atty.
Singson’s revelations, respondent read too much into the
declarations and the purported silence of opposing counsel
towards his joke. Respondent made unfounded imputations
of impropriety to a specific Member of the Court. Such
conduct does not befit a member of the legal profession and
falls utterly short of giving respect to the Court and upholding
its dignity.
Respondent Peña’s defense that the allegation of bribery
and collusion between Justice Carpio, Atty. Singson and the
petitioners was a "joke" fails to convince, as in fact, he was
deadly serious about the charges he raised. Respondent
insisted that his alleged insinuation of ill motives was just a
"joke" between two lawyers engaged in a private telephone
conversation regarding the case. Although the
courts and judicial officers are entitled to due
respect, they are not immune to criticisms nor are
they beyond the subject matter of free speech,
especially in the context of a private conversation
between two individuals. In this case, though,
respondent himself was responsible for moving the
private matter into the realm of public knowledge by
citing that same "joke" in his own Motion for
Inhibition filed before this Court. In general, courts
will not act as overly sensitive censors of all private
conversations of lawyers at all times, just to ensure
obedience to the duty to afford proper respect and
deference to the former. Nevertheless, this Court
will not shy away from exercising its disciplinary
powers whenever persons who impute bribery to
judicial officers and bring such imputations
themselves to the court’s attention through their
own pleadings or motions.
Contrary to his assertion that the accusation of
bribery was only made in jest, respondent has
never backed down since he first made the
accusation in January 2003 and continually raises
as an issue in the consolidated petitions how
Justice Carpio purportedly changed the agreed
action of the First Division when he issued the
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, even
after the Court in the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session had precisely explained to him that no
impropriety had attended the issuance of the said
Resolution. In the Motions to Inhibit dated 21
January 201046 and 22 August 2011,47 he
repeatedly insists on the "anomalous/unusual
circumstances" surrounding the issuance by Justice
Carpio of the same questioned Resolution, which
was allegedly contrary to the handwritten notes
made in the copies of the Agenda that he received.
Respondent Peña most recently capitalized on the
purported alteration or falsification supposedly
committed by Justice Carpio by filing an ethics
complaint against the latter, where he alleged that:
Sometime thereafter, respondent Peña received a
copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st Division of this
Honorable Court with a notation in handwriting
"10AC" on the left side and marginal notes on the
right side. A perusal thereof, reveals that when this
Honorable Court took up the matter of the Motion
for Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank, this
Honorable Court merely "N" or "Noted" the Motion
for Clarification of petitioner Urban Bank and did not
grant the same.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the foregoing (I was not furnished a
copy of the Motion for Clarification, or required to
comment by the Honorable Justice Carpio and
opposing counsel, Atty. Singson, being able to
secure an advance copy of the assailed 13
November 2002 Resolution), the matter brought out
in the Executive Session and the admission made
by Atty. Enriqueta Vidal and the Honorable Hilario
Davide and the Honorable Justice Vitug with regard
to his copy of the Suppl [sic] Agenda – 1st Division
of this Honorable Court which was sent to
respondent Peña was correct and that the Motion
for Clarification was merely "N" or "NOTED".
However, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued a
Resolution "Granting" the Motion for Clarification.
Therefore, the Honorable Justice Carpio issued the
13 November 2002 Resolution in an
anomalous/falsified manner and in clear
contravention of this Honorable Court’s Decision to
merely "Note" the same. A clear judicial
administrative violation.48 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, the bribery "joke" which respondent himself initiated
has gotten the better of him. Respondent has convinced
himself of the veracity of his own malicious insinuations by
his own repetitious allegations in his subsequent pleadings.
The Court in the past refrained from imposing actual
penalties in administrative cases in the presence of
mitigating factors, such as the acknowledgment of the
infraction and the feeling of remorse.49 In this case, the
"profound" apologies50 offered by respondent Peña for his
insinuations against Justice Carpio are insincere and
hypocritical, as seen by his later actions. Although he
expressed remorse for having caused the Court distress
because of his statements,51 he refuses to acknowledge any
unethical conduct on his part for his unfounded accusations
against the actions of Justice Carpio with respect to the
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution. Worse, he has
persisted in attributing ill-motives against Justice Carpio,
even after the latter had recused himself from the case since
2003.
This is not the first time that respondent resorted to initiating
unfounded and vicious attacks against the integrity and
impartiality of Members of this Court. Earlier in the
proceedings of the consolidated petitions, respondent
assailed how retired Justice Arturo B. Buena showed bias in
favor of the De Leon Group, when the latter’s petition in G.R.
No. 145822 was reinstated on a second motion for
reconsideration:52
It has come to the attention and knowledge of herein
respondent that petitioner’s counsel has been making
statement to the effect that they could get a favorable
resolution from the Supreme Court, on their second motion
for reconsideration. In short, petitioners’ counsel is
practically saying that they are sure to get the Supreme
Court to entertain the second motion for reconsideration
even if it violates the rules.53
1. The motion for voluntary inhibition is directed at Justice
Buena because it was he who penned the challenged
Resolution, which granted the second motion for
reconsideration in violation of the Rules. It was he who
crafted, drafted and finalized the said Resolution. It was he
who tried to justify the violation of the Rules. It was from
Justice Buena’s office that contents of the challenged
Resolution was apparently "leaked" to the petitioners’
counsel long before its promulgation.54
What miracle did Atty. Vinluan perform and what
phenomenon transpired? Why are herein petitioners "very
special" in the eyes of Justice Buena?55
It is quite obvious that the partiality of Justice Buena has
been affected by his relationship with Atty. Vinluan, as
evidenced by the above-described facts and
circumstances.56
Surprisingly, Justice Arturo B. Buena, the assigned ponente,
reinstated the petition without any explanation whatsoever,
and in gross violation of Sec. 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. This was highly irregular by itself. But what
made reinstatement more suspicious was the fact that even
before the release of the Resolution reinstating the petition in
G. R. No. 145822, the counsel for petitioners, Atty. Rogelio
Vinluan, was already boasting that he would be able to
reinstate their petition. Obviously, even before the release of
the Resolution in question, Atty. Vinluan already knew what
Justice Buena’s resolution would be.57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In no less than six motions,58 he similarly accused former
Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban of prejudice based on
his affiliation with the Rotary Club, wherein some of the
directors and officers of Urban Bank were also members. He
even claimed that Justice Panganiban went to Urban Bank to
meet with some of the directors and officers, who consulted
him on the legal issues arising from criminal suits in relation
to the facts of the main petitions, citing only an
unnamed "reliable source":
The friendship and close relationship of the three
(Justice Panganiban and Urban Bank’s Arsenio
‘Archit’ Bartolome and Teodoro ‘Ted’ Borlongan)
went beyond their being Rotarians. As a matter of
fact, Justice Panganiban was seen a couple of
times going to Urban Bank to see Archit and/or Ted,
before the bank’s closure. Respondent has also
discovered, through a reliable source, that Justice
Panganiban was known to have been consulted,
and his legal advice sought, by Borlongan and
Bartolome, in connection with the above-entitled
cases, while the same was still pending with the
Court of Appeals and in connection with the four (4)
criminal cases filed the with the MTC [Municipal
Trial Court] at Bago City by herein respondent
against Borlongan, et al., for "introducing falsified
documents in a judicial proceeding". In the latter
cases, it was even Justice Panganiban who
furnished a copy of the SC Decision in Doris Ho vs.
People (his own ponencia) to Bartolome and
Borlongan, for the purpose of giving his friends a
legal basis in questioning the issuance of the
warrants of arrest against Borlongan and the rest of
his co-accused in Criminal Case Nos. 6683 to 6686,
MTC Bago City (now appealed to Supreme Court;
see Footnote No. 1 below).59 (Emphasis supplied.)
Lastly, respondent Peña raised the issue of
"unmitigated partiality" against retired Justice
Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura on the ground that the
latter resolved a separate case involving related
issues to the main petitions in favor of the opposing
parties:
3. The Petitioners in G. R. No. 143591, entitled
"Teodoro C. Borlongan, et al., v. Magdaleno M.
Peña, et al", are also the same petitioners in the
above-entitled consolidated cases G. R. Nos.
145817 and 145822; and the respondents in the
above-entitled consolidated case G. R. No. 162562.
Under the circumstances, herein private
respondent is ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN that the
extreme bias and prejudice of Justice Nachura
against him in G. R. No. 143591 would certainly be
carried over to the above-entitled consolidated
cases.60 (Emphasis supplied.)
Not only has respondent Peña failed to show
sincere remorse for his malicious insinuations of
bribery and wrongdoing against Justice Carpio, he
in fact continually availed of such unethical tactics
in moving for the inhibition of eleven Justices of the
Court.61 Indeed, his pattern of behavior can no
longer be seen as isolated incidents that the Court
can pardon given certain mitigating circumstances.
Respondent Peña has blatantly and consistently
cast unfounded aspersions against judicial officers
in utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities to
the Court.
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,62 the Court chose to
indefinitely suspend Atty. Alan Paguia, when the
latter imputed devious motives and questioned the
impartiality of members of the Court, despite its
earlier warnings:
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will
not denounce criticism made by anyone against the
Court for, if well-founded, can truly have
constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it
will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system,
let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to
practice law in the Philippines.
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that the lawyer should observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed,
should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally
imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede,
obstruct and pervert the dispensation of justice.
Respondent Peña’s actions betray a similar disrespectful
attitude towards the Court that cannot be countenanced
especially for those privileged enough to practice law in the
country. To be sure, Atty. Paguia has just been recently
reinstated to the practice of law after showing sincere
remorse and having renewed his belief and respect for the
Court, almost eight years from the time the penalty was
imposed. Thus, the Court orders respondent Peña be
indefinitely suspended from the practice of law for his
apparently irredeemable habit of repeatedly imputing
unfounded motives and partiality against members of the
Court.
B. Second Charge: Submission of Falsified Internal Court
Documents.
We likewise reject the recommendation of the OBC with
respect to the second charge.
It must be noted that the Court, in its Resolutions dated 03
March 2003 and 28 April 2003, expressed administrative
concern over Atty. Peña’s behavior on three points: (1) his
submission of a falsified court document, (2) his access to
Supreme Court documents that are highly restricted and
confidential, and (3) his use of court documents (genuine or
false) in his pleadings.
Respondent Peña submitted a falsified internal court
document, Annex "B," had illegal access to confidential court
documents, and made improper use of them in the
proceedings before this Court. The Court directed the initial
investigation by the OBC based on the charge that
respondent Peña had submitted a falsified document to this
Court.63 The charge of falsification stems from his
submission of an alleged copy of the Court’s
Agenda64 (Annex "B") purportedly belonging to a member of
the Division handling the case. The pertinent portion of the
subject Motion to Inhibit reads:
10. What private respondent anonymously received were
two copies of the Official Agenda of the First Division of this
Honorable Court for 13 November 2002, the date when the
questioned Resolution was supposedly issued. In both
copies (apparently secured from the office of two different
members of the Division, one of which is the copy of the
ponente himself), it is clearly indicated that the members of
the Division had allegedly agreed that petitioners’ Motion for
Clarification and Urgent Motion to Resolve were merely
NOTED and NOT GRANTED contrary to what was stated in
the 13 November 2002 Resolution (at least the version that
was released to the parties) a falsified document because it
makes it appear that a Resolution was issued by the First
Division granting petitioners’ Motion for Clarification when in
fact no such Resolution exists. The real Resolution arrived at
by the First Division which can be gleaned from the Agenda
merely NOTED said motion. Copies of the two Agenda are
hereto attached as Annexes "B" and "C".65 (Emphasis
supplied.)
During the 03 March 2003 Executive Session, respondent
Peña expressed his absolute conviction that the document
attached as Annex "B" was an exact copy of the Agenda of
the then ponente of the case.66 It was later discovered,
however, that no such copy existed, either in the latter’s
records or in those of any other member of the Division
concerned:
CHIEF JUSTICE:
We make of record again that insofar as Annex B is
concerned it was confirmed by the Office of the
Clerk of Court of this Division that the original of that
does not appear in the record, is not in the record
and that nobody, none of the members of the
division has a copy of, that copy of Annex B of your
pleading does not come from anyone of the
members of the division. That is the position of the
Court now as explained earlier. Specifically Mr.
Justice Carpio said that Annex B, specifically with
that capital A. capital C preceded by 10 did not
come from his office, was not based on the
document in his office and that is also true to each
of the members of this Division.67 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The falsification, subject of the instant
administrative case, lies in the fact that respondent
Peña submitted to the Court a document he was
absolutely certain, at the time of such submission,
was a copy of the Agenda of the then ponente. In
supporting the subject Motion to Inhibit, respondent
misled the Court by presenting a document that
was not what he claimed it to be. Contrary to the
assurances made in the same motion68 he made
allegations that were false and submitted
documents that were not borne out by the records
of this case. Instead of verifying the contents of
Annex "B," which came to him through dubious
means, he unquestioningly accepted their
genuineness and veracity. Despite the Court’s own
explanation that Annex "B" does not exist, he
continues to insist on its existence.
Candor and truthfulness are some of the qualities
exacted and expected from members of the legal
profession.69 Thus, lawyers shall commit no
falsehood, nor shall they mislead or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.70 As disciples of truth,
their lofty vocation is to correctly inform the court of
the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusions.71 Courts are entitled to expect only
complete honesty from lawyers appearing and
pleading before them.72 In the instant case, the
submission of a document purporting to be a copy
of the Agenda of a member of this Court is an act of
dishonesty that puts into doubt the ability of
respondent to uphold his duty as a disciple of truth.
Respondent Peña would argue, however, that
falsification – as a criminal act under the Revised
Penal Code – was not judicially established during
the proceedings of the OBC investigation and, thus,
he cannot be held liable for falsification. The
comparison of the present administrative and
disciplinary proceedings with a criminal charge of
falsification is misplaced.
The subject matter of administrative proceedings is
confined to whether there is administrative liability
for the submission of a falsified document – namely
Annex "B," which respondent Peña claims (albeit
mistakenly) to be a genuine copy of the Agenda of
the ponente. The issue, then, is whether he
transgressed the ethical standards demanded of
lawyers, by which they should be truthful in their
dealings with and submissions to the Court. The
investigation clearly does not include the
determination of criminal liability, which demands a
different modicum of proof with respect to the use of
falsified documents. At this time, the Court makes
no definitive pronouncement as to the guilt of
respondent over his violation of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code regarding the use of
falsified documents.
In brief, respondent led this Court to believe that what he
submitted was a faithful reproduction of the ponente’s
Agenda, just to support the subject Motion to Inhibit. The
original of the purported copy was later found to have been
inexistent in the court’s records. Regardless of whether or
not Annex "B" was criminally falsified or forged is immaterial
to the present disposition. What is now crucial is whether
respondent was candid and truthful in claiming absolute
certainty with respect to the genuineness and authenticity of
his submissions.
The assertion of respondent Peña that the typewritten
contents of Annexes "B" and "C" appear to be genuine and
accurate is unconvincing and cannot exonerate him from
liability. Although Annex "C" was determined to be in the
Court’s records,73 the bare similarity of its typewritten
contents with those of Annex "B" will not shield him from
disciplinary action. Although the typewritten contents of the
two Agendas appear identical, the handwritten notes located
at the right-hand side are different. Respondent, in fact,
claims that the handwritten notes come from two different
members of the Division, one of them the then ponente of
the case.
The subject Motion to Inhibit is anchored on the veracity of
the handwritten remarks – not on the printed contents –
which are allegedly contrary to the substance of the Court’s
13 November 2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson.
Respondent Peña cannot claim the genuineness of Annex
"B" (which is not in the records), based on the apparent
identity of its printed contents with those of Annex "C" (which
is in the records). The handwritten notes are markedly
different and, according to him, made by two different
members of the Court. In his Motion to Inhibit, respondent
failed to substantiate his assertion that Annex "B" and the
notes made therein belonged to any member of this Court.
More importantly, the Court notes that respondent Peña has
not explained, to the Court’s satisfaction, how he managed
to obtain internal and confidential documents.
Respondent Peña would have the Court believe that he
happened to obtain the two copies of the Agenda (Annexes
"B" and "C") and the internal Resolution (Annex "D") in two
separate envelopes anonymously sent via ordinary mail. He
supposedly received them sometime during the second or
the third week of January 2002 in his home-cum-office in
Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.74 He, however, failed to
present the envelopes containing the documents, but
explained that these may have already been thrown away,
since he had no system of recording incoming
communications in his home/office in the province. The
Court is not persuaded by his account of the receipt of these
restricted court documents.
The Agenda, the Court’s action thereon, as well as the
Resolution (Annex "D"), are internal documents that are
accessible only to court officers,75 who are bound by strict
confidentiality. For respondent Peña to have been able to
secure originals or photocopies of the Court’s Agenda is
disturbing because that ability implies a breach of the rules of
strict confidentiality in the Court. Notably, the Agenda
purportedly sent to him did not contain all the items for
deliberation by the Court’s First Division for that day; the
copies sent were limited to the incidents pertaining to his
pending case. This circumstance can hardly be considered
as random, since the exact item (Item No. 175) of concern
for him – specifically, the Court’s action on Urban Bank’s
Motion for Clarification –was what had been sent directly to
his provincial home/office, and what he conveniently
acquired thereby.
The Court finds it hard to believe that confidential court
records just coincidentally and anonymously appeared in the
provincial home/office of respondent Peña through ordinary
mail. Also incredible is his explanation that the envelopes
that contained the documents, and that could have led to the
identification of their source were opportunely
misplaced or thrown away, despite the grave
importance he had ascribed to them. It is highly
improbable that a personnel of the Court would
breach the rules of strict confidentiality76 to send to
litigants or their counsel the Court’s Agenda,
together with handwritten notes and the internal
resolutions of the Court, without any prodding or
consideration, and even at the risk of incurring
grave criminal and administrative
penalties.77 Respondent Peña’s account of having
lost the envelopes appears too convenient an
excuse to assuage the Court’s skepticism towards
this breach of confidentiality within its own halls.
Worse, respondent Peña flaunted his continued
access – as recent as 2010 – to other internal and
confidential records in the proceedings of this case.
Despite the administrative proceedings leveled
against him for having "illicitly" obtained the
confidential Agenda of the Court’s First Division, he
brazenly resorted again to such unethical behavior
by surreptiously acquiring no less than the
confidential and still unreleased OBC Report on the
very administrative case of which he himself is the
subject.
In his Motion to Vacate/Recall dated 20 February
2010,78 respondent Peña prayed that the
questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution be
recalled on the ground that there was a mistake in
its issuance based on the copies of the Agenda he
had mysteriously received. In support of this motion,
he casually cited and attached a photocopy of the
confidential OBC Report.79 This OBC Report has
not been released to any party, and was then in fact
still under deliberation by this Court. Curiously, the
attached photocopy bears marks corresponding to
the unreleased copy of the signed OBC Report, as
it actually appears in the rollo of the administrative
case.80 Unfortunately, respondent did not explain in
the said motion how he was able to obtain a copy
thereof.
Regardless of the means employed by respondent,
his acquisition of the OBC Report from the Court’s
own records already speaks of an appalling pattern
of unethical behavior that the Court will no longer
ignore. Even as he was the subject of an
administrative case for obtaining confidential court
records, he continued to have access to other
internal documents of the Court. His actions have
established that he is incorrigible and not likely to
change. His continued obstinacy in disregarding
ethical standards and ignoring the rule of
confidentiality of court records deserves nothing
less than the ultimate penalty of disbarment from
the profession.
Moreover, in the subject Motion to Inhibit,
respondent Peña even tried to bolster his claim that
the then ponente of the case had a special interest
in the case by attaching an internal resolution of the
Court.81 In the said Internal Resolution dated 04
September 2002, the two consolidated petitions
(G.R. Nos. 145817 and 145822) were transferred
from the Third Division to the First Division, where
Justice Carpio was subsequently assigned.82 How
respondent Peña was again able to secure this
internal document is another disturbing mystery in
this case, especially since the resolution was sent
by the Third Division Clerk of Court to the First
Division Clerk of Court, the Raffle Committee and
the Judicial Records Office only, and not to any of
the parties. Similar to the copies of the Agenda of
the First Division, respondent Peña again
purportedly received this Internal Resolution by
mail.83 What is more alarming in this instance is that
he received not just any photocopy of the Court’s Resolution,
but a pink copy itself, the very same material used for such
internal resolutions in the Court’s records. As he himself
admitted, respondent Peña could not have gotten hold of the
said internal Resolution, which was on its face declared an
internal matter, without the assistance of a person who had
access to the records of his case in the Court.
This claimed "major anomaly" of the transfer of the case,
which is being decried by respondent in the subject Motion to
Inhibit, stems from his gross misunderstanding of the internal
rules of the Court.
Upon the reorganization of the members of various Divisions
due to the retirement of other Justices, the cases already
assigned to a Member-in-Charge are required to be
transferred to the Division to which the Member-in-Charge
moves.84 Hence, in this case, Justice Carpio, similar to other
members of the Court at that time, did not lose his case
assignments but brought them with him when he transferred
to the First Division. In fact, the transfers of the assigned
cases to the new Division are made by request from the
Member-in-Charge, because otherwise the rollo of the cases
of which he is Member-in-Charge will be retained by a
Division in which he is no longer a member. Thus, the
transfer of the two consolidated petitions to the First Division
that is being heavily criticized by respondent Peña was
simple compliance with the established internal procedures
of the Court, and not attributable to any undue interest or
malicious intention on the part of the then ponente to retain
the case for himself. Respondent had raised "irresponsible
suspicions"85 against the integrity of the ponente without any
understanding of the Supreme Court’s processes in the
transfer of cases.
Respondent Peña had, in fact, previously used this
deplorable tactic of obtaining internal court records to call for
the inhibition of Justices of the Court. In previously moving
for the inhibition of Justice Buena, he assailed how
supposedly the retired Justice violated the rules with respect
to a second motion for reconsideration when the latter
reinstated the Petition of the De Leon Group in G.R. No.
145822. Respondent attributed the special treatment
extended by Justice Buena to his supposed association with
the De Leon Group’s counsel, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan of the
ACCRA Law Office. To establish this special treatment, he
attached a complete copy of the Minutes of the
Division86 composed of 58 pages and showing 77 cases
dismissed by the Court due to failure to pay the required fees,
which Justice Buena allegedly did not reinstate:
10. A review of the records of the Supreme Court will show
that for the past several months alone, seventy-seven
petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court, mainly for
failure to pay the required fees. Out of that number, NONE
WERE REINSTATED upon the filing of a SECOND MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION. If Justice Buena willingly
disregarded the Rules by reinstating petitioners’ petition (De
Leon Group Petition in G. R. No. 145822) upon the filing of a
second motion for reconsideration, then he should have
reinstated also the aforesaid 77 cases in order to be fair. At
the very least, he should now reinstate all of said 77 cases if
only to show that he is not biased in favor of herein
petitioners. He could not and will not do so, however,
because those cases are not favored ones. Photocopies of
the case titles and numbers, as well as the resolutions
dismissing the aforesaid seventy-seven cases, consisting of
58 pages, are attached hereto collectively as Annex "A".87
Respondent Peña was able to attach to this motion for
inhibition the portions of the Court’s Minutes on 12 April 2000,
07 February 2001, 12 February 2001, 14 February 2001, 26
February 2001, 28 March 2001, 14 April 2001, 18 April 2001,
26 April 2001, 16 May 2001, 11 July 2001, 08 August 2001,
13 August 2001, 20 August 2001, 29 August 2001, 05
September 2001, 24 September 2001, 08 October 2001 and
others which were undated. The attached Minutes pointed to
specific cases which were dismissed for failure to pay the
necessary fees, among others. It was unclear if the
cases were specifically assigned to Justice Buena
or if respondent Peña represented any of the
parties therein.
Nevertheless, what stands out is that he obtained
confidential Minutes of the Court pertaining to other
cases, which specifically dismissed or denied
petitions on the failure of the parties to pay
necessary fees. This could not have just been mere
coincidence again since it required some legal
understanding and familiarity with the cases in
order to be able to sift through and identify the kinds
of cases, which were dismissed or denied on such
grounds. Although the parties to these cases were
notified and given copies of the Court’s resolutions,
what respondent Peña obtained were the actual
copies of the Minutes that included other items in
the Court’s Agenda and that were not released to
the public. Under the Court’s own Internal Rules,
only the Minutes pertinent to the parties are those
that are distributed to the parties concerned.88 Yet,
respondent was able to attach wholesale Minutes of
dozens of cases to his pleading.
Although the above confidential documents that
were accessed by respondent – totaling 58 pages
in all – are not the subject of the investigation of the
administrative case, his previous receipt or
acquisition of the minutes of the Court as early as
2000 confirm in no uncertain terms his access to
internal records of the Court, not just of his case,
but of other pending cases and that this access has
continued as late as 2010. It seems rather ironic
that respondent Peña would accuse his fellow
lawyers of allegedly having an "inside track" to
members of the Court, when he in turn, on record,
had mysteriously easy access to confidential court
documents. That internal documents of the Court
(whether voluminous or in relation to his case or
otherwise) would suddenly find themselves in the
hands of respondent Peña through registered mail
is too incredible for this Court to attribute any good
faith on his part.
Even if the Court were to give some modicum of
credence to the unlikely story of how respondent
Peña came upon these internal documents, it looks
with disapproval upon his actions with respect to
those documents, which were supposedly sent to
him anonymously. If indeed lawyers were sent
official judicial records that are confidential in nature
and not easily accessible, the ethical recourse for
them would be to make a candid and immediate
disclosure of the matter to the court concerned for
proper investigation, and not as proof to further the
merits of their case. In fact, respondent himself
acknowledged that reporting the "leaked out"
documents was a duty he owed to the Court89 –
more so in this case, since the documents were
sent anonymously and through dubious
circumstances.
No issue would have arisen with respect to his
continuing fitness to be a member of the legal
profession, if he had simply reported his receipt of
the "leaked" court documents, and nothing more.
Yet, he not only failed to immediately disclose the
suspicious circumstances of his having obtained
confidential court records; he even had the tenacity
to use the documents sent through suspicious
means to support his request for inhibition. As a
lawyer, he should have known better than to hinge
his motions and pleadings on documents of
questionable origins, without even verifying the
authenticity of the contents by comparing them with
sources of greater reliability and credibility.
If respondent Peña entertained doubts as to the veracity of
the Division’s actions with respect to the pending incidents in
his case, as allegedly embodied in the anonymous Agendas
sent to him, then he should have simply checked the records
to verify the genuineness of the questioned 13 November
2002 Resolution faxed to him by Atty. Singson. It is through
officially released resolutions and decisions that parties and
their counsel are informed of and guided by the Court’s
actions on pending incidents, and not by the confidential and
handwritten notes of the individual members of the Court.
Respondent’s wholesale reliance on copies of the Agenda
purported to be those of individual members of the Court and
anonymously sent to him is grossly misplaced.
The Court has already explained that there was in fact no
discrepancy between the agreed upon action of the Division
and the questioned 13 November 2002 Resolution, contrary
to the assertions of respondent Peña. He grounded the
subject Motion to Inhibit on the fact that the anonymously
sent copies of the Agenda indicate that the Motion for
Clarification filed by Urban Bank should simply be
noted,90 but it was instead granted by the Court. The Court,
however, made clear during the 03 March 2003 Executive
Session, that there was nothing irregular about annotating
the first item with "SEE RES" (See Resolution) and marking
the rest of the incidents with "N" (Noted). In fact, these
annotations conform with the recommended actions
submitted by the ponente for that particular item.91 The
Resolution identified in the first item governs and contains
the actual disposition of two of the incidents in the pending
case.92 To be sure, what governs as the final action of the
Court en banc or in Division is the minutes of the
proceedings,93 which lists the dispositions of the items taken
up during the session, reviewed by the members, and finally
approved by the Chief Justice or the Division chairperson.
Contrary to respondent’s suspicions, the action taken by the
Division in its 13 November 2002 Session was accurately
reflected in the questioned Resolution released by the Court.
Respondent Peña has no one else to blame but himself,
since he "allegedly," blindly and mistakenly relied on
"anonymously sent" unverified photocopies of the Court’s
Agenda, in order to support his call for the inhibition of a
member of the Court. Neither can he rely on the alleged
"bragging" of Atty. Singson – which the latter denies – to
impute ill motive to judicial officers. Whether Atty. Singson
actually exerted "extraordinary efforts" to secure the
suspension Order or freely divulged it in their telephone
conversation, respondent should have been more
circumspect in making grave accusations of bribery (jokingly
or not) without any extrinsic evidence or proof to back up his
claim.
Respondent Peña is sanctioned for knowingly using
confidential and internal court records and documents, which
he suspiciously obtained in bolstering his case. His unbridled
access to internal court documents has not been properly
explained. The cavalier explanation of respondent Peña that
this Court’s confidential documents would simply find
themselves conveniently falling into respondent’s lap through
registered mail and that the envelopes containing them could
no longer be traced is unworthy of belief. This gives the
Court reason to infer that laws and its own internal rules
have been violated over and over again by some court
personnel, whom respondent Peña now aids and abets by
feigning ignorance of how the internal documents could have
reached him. It is not unreasonable to even conclude that
criminal liabilities have been incurred in relation to the
Revised Penal Code94 and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, with Atty. Peña benefitting from the
same.95 Respondent’s actions clearly merit no other penalty
than disbarment.
This second penalty of disbarment is all the more justified by
the earlier imposition of an indefinite suspension. If taken
together, these two violations already speak of respondent
Peña’s inherent unworthiness to become a member of the
Bar. Although an indefinite suspension opens up the
possibility of future reinstatement after a clear
showing of remorse and a change of ways (as in
the case of Atty. Paguia), respondent has shown to
be incorrigible and no longer deserves the
compassion of the Court. Not only has respondent
thumbed his nose on the integrity of the persons
occupying the Bench by casting grave aspersions
of bribery and wrongdoing, he has also showed
disdain for the sanctity of court procedures and
records by his haughty display of illegal access to
internal Supreme Court documents.
C. Third Charge: Respondent Peña’s insinuations
of wrongdoing and collusion between members of
the Court and another counsel.
Aside from attributing bribery to the ponente,
respondent Pena’s allegations of collusion between
previous members of the Court and the counsel for
the De Leon Group are unfounded and contravene
the ethical duties of respondent to the Court and his
fellow lawyers. His actions reveal a pattern of
behavior that is disconcerting and administratively
punishable.
However, considering the ultimate penalty of
disbarment earlier imposed on respondent Peña,
the Court no longer finds the need to squarely rule
on the third charge, as any possible administrative
liability on this matter would be a mere superfluity.
D. Fourth Charge: The charge of forum shopping is
not the proper subject of the present allegations of
administrative misconduct.
The counter-charge of forum shopping has been
made by respondent Peña against petitioners and
their respective counsel in his defense.96 However,
this is already beyond the scope of the subject
matter of this administrative case. It will be recalled
that he assailed the fact that Urban Bank, the De
Leon Group, and the other group of bank officers
filed three separate Petitions (G.R. Nos. 145817,
145818 and 145822, respectively) before the Court.
They all questioned therein the rulings of the
appellate court affirming the grant of execution
pending appeal.
Considering that this claim is the subject of
administrative penalties, and that other interested
parties did not participate in the investigation
conducted by the OBC herein, prudence and equity
dictate that the Court reserve judgment for the
meantime until the subject is fully ventilated and all
parties are given an opportunity to argue their
cases.
The charges of forum shopping are hereby
dismissed without prejudice to the filing and/or
hearing of separate administrative
complaints97 against petitioners Urban Bank,
Corazon M. Bejasa, Arturo E. Manuel, Jr., P. Siervo
H. Dizon, Delfin C. Gonzales, Jr., Benjamin L. de
Leon and Eric L. Lee, and their respective counsel
of record. Considering their deaths, petitioners
Teodoro C. Borlongan and Ben T. Lim, Sr., can no
longer be included in any future administrative
action in relation to these matters. On the other
hand, Ben Y. Lim, Jr., was mistakenly impleaded by
respondent Peña and therefore, is not a real and
direct party to the case.
EPILOGUE
As parting words, the Court herein highlights the
disorder caused by respondent Peña’s actions in
the administration of justice. In order to foreclose resort to
such abhorrent practice or strategy in the future, the Court
finds the need to educate the public and the Bar.
Lawyers shall conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness
and candor towards their professional colleagues.98 They
shall not, in their professional dealings, use language that is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.99 Lawyers shall
use dignified language in their pleadings despite the
adversarial nature of our legal system.100 The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in
the dignity of a judicial forum.101
The Court cannot countenance the ease with which lawyers,
in the hopes of strengthening their cause in a motion for
inhibition, make grave and unfounded accusations of
unethical conduct or even wrongdoing against other
members of the legal profession. It is the duty of members of
the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to
advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justness of the cause
with which they are charged.102
It has not escaped the Court’s attention that respondent
Peña has manifested a troubling history of praying for the
inhibition of several members of this Court or for the re-raffle
of the case to another Division, on the basis of groundless
and unfounded accusations of partiality. A sampling of his
predilection for seeking the inhibition of, so far, eleven
Justices of this Court, in an apparent bid to shop for a
sympathetic ear, includes the following:
1. Peña’s Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban) dated 12 January 2001;
2. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Arturo Buena) dated
20 August 2001;
3. Letter Complaint (Re: Justice Buena) dated 28 October
2001;
4. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 18
February 2002;
5. Reply (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 15 March 2001;
6. Urgent Motion to Inhibit (re: ponente) dated 30 January
2003;
7. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing)
dated 08 July 2004;
8. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28
December 2004;
9. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Eduardo Antonio B. Nachura)
dated 17 December 2007;
10. Motion for Inhibition (Re: Justice Panganiban) dated 28
December 2004;
11. Reiteratory Motion to Recuse dated 03 March 2006 (Re:
Justice Panganiban);
12. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Nachura) dated 07 January
2008;
13. Urgent Consolidated Motion to Reiterate Request for
Inhibition (Re: Justice Antonio T. Carpio) dated 02 June
2008;
14. Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle (Re: Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco) dated 10 July 2008;
15. Supplement to the Urgent Motion for Re-Raffle
(Re: Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Dante O.
Tinga) dated 04 August 2008;
16. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re:
Justices Carpio Morales, Tinga and Velasco) dated
14 August 2008;
17. Urgent Consolidated Motion for Re-Raffle (Re:
Justices Arturo D. Brion, Leonardo A. Quisumbing,
Carpio Morales, Tinga, Velasco, Quisumbing) dated
28 August 2008;
18. Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justice Carpio) dated 21
January 2010;
19. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit (Re: Justices
Carpio Morales and Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno)
dated 30 March 2011;
20. Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit dated 22 August
2011 (Re: Justice Sereno); and
21. Very Urgent Motion to Re-Raffle dated 01
September 2011 (Re: Justices Carpio, Jose Perez
and Sereno).
The grounds for inhibition of the Justices in these
motions of respondent ranged from flimsy and
sparse relations between the parties and the
members of the Court to wild accusations of
partiality on mere conjectures and surmises. For
example, respondent accused former Chief Justice
Panganiban of bias based on his affiliation with the
Rotary Club, in which the late Teodoro Borlongan,
then President of Urban Bank, was likewise an
officer.103 He moved for the inhibition of Justice
Sereno on the ground that she was "a close judicial
ally" of Justice Carpio, and in turn, the latter,
according to respondent, was antagonistic toward
him during the Court’s 03 March 2003 Executive
Session in this administrative case.104
Meanwhile, respondent recently sought to have the
case re-raffled from the Court’s Third Division
because Justice Jose Portugal Perez, a member
thereof, was allegedly appointed to the Court
through the endorsement of former Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, who was a close ally of
the then Chairman Emeritus of Urban Bank, former
President Fidel V. Ramos.105 He similarly sought
the inhibition of Justice Dante O. Tinga for his close
professional and political ties with former President
Ramos.106 He likewise assailed the partiality of
Justice Arturo D. Brion, considering he is a law
school classmate and fraternity brother of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, who was then
Presidential Legal Counsel of former President
Ramos. Thus, according to respondent Peña,
"President Ramos, through Justice Corona, will
most likely exercise his influence over the
Honorable Justice Brion."107
Curiously, in asking for the inhibition of Justice
Nachura for his alleged partiality in favor of Urban
Bank because of his decision in a related
case108 and his prior appointment as
Undersecretary of Education during the Ramos
presidency, respondent Peña impliedly prayed that
his case be specifically retained in the Court’s Third
Division.109 Respondent’s peculiar request, which
was not included in his other motions, gives the
impression that in his quest to have Justice
Nachura inhibit himself, respondent nonetheless
did not want his case to be raffled out of the Third
Division. If his only intention was to raise the
possibility of bias against Justice Nachura alone, then it
would not matter whether his case remained with the Third
Division, with another member being designated to replace
Justice Nachura, or raffled to another Division altogether.
Respondent Peña’s odd prayer in his motion for inhibition
bore signs of an intent to shop for a forum that he perceived
to be friendly to him, except for one member.
In Chin v. Court of Appeals,110 the Court warned against
litigants’ contumacious practice in successively asking for
the inhibition of judges, in order to shop for one who is more
friendly and sympathetic to their cause:
We agree that judges have the duty of protecting the integrity
of the judiciary as an institution worthy of public trust and
confidence. But under the circumstances here, we also
agree that unnecessary inhibition of judges in a case would
open the floodgates to forum-shopping. More so, considering
that Judge Magpale was not the first judge that TAN had
asked to be inhibited on the same allegation of prejudgment.
To allow successive inhibitions would justify petitioners’
apprehension about the practice of certain litigants shopping
for a judge more friendly and sympathetic to their cause than
previous ones.
As held in Mateo, Jr. v. Hon. Villaluz, the invitation for judges
to disqualify themselves need not always be heeded. It is not
always desirable that they should do so. It might amount in
certain cases to their being recreant about their duties. It
could also be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit a
judge in the hope of getting another more amenable to his
persuasion. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court’s warning in Chin applies squarely to the multiple
and successive requests for inhibition and re-raffle filed by
respondent Peña. Lest other litigants follow his lead, the
Court condemns in no uncertain terms the practice of
shopping for a justice, most especially in the highest tribunal
of the land. This abhorrent practice is indeed one of the
reasons why this administrative case has dragged on for
years. Not only does it impute ill motive and disrepute to the
members of the Court, but it likewise delays the
administration of justice.
Oddly enough, respondent Peña has been less concerned
about the inordinate delay in resolving the case than about
making sure that the "wrong" or "unfriendly" Justices – in his
perception – do not sit and rule on the issues. He has thrived
on the protracted interruptions caused by his numerous
motions for inhibition and re-raffle, resulting in the case
languishing in this Court for years and clogging its dockets.
Respondent stands out for this disorderly behavior and must
be made an example so that litigants be reminded that they
cannot bend or toy with the rules of procedure to favor their
causes. Worse, respondent has thrown no less than the
rules of basic courtesy in imputing sinister motives against
members of the Court.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent
Peña has violated several canons of professional and ethical
conduct expected from him as a lawyer and an officer of the
court. His conduct, demeanor and language with respect to
his cause of action – in this Court, no less – tend to
undermine the integrity and reputation of the judiciary, as
well as inflict unfounded accusations against fellow lawyers.
Most disconcerting for this Court is his uncanny ability to
obtain confidential and internal court records and to use
them shamelessly in his pleadings in furtherance of his
cause.
In addition, the Court cannot just make short shrift of his
inclination towards casually moving for the inhibition of
Justices of the Court based on unfounded claims, since he
has not shown remorse or contrition for his ways. Atty. Peña
has shown and displayed in these proceedings that he has
fallen short of the ethical standards of the noble profession
and must be sanctioned accordingly.1âwphi1
PREMISES CONSIDERED, for violating Canons 8,
10 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for failing to give due respect to
the Courts and his fellow lawyers, respondent Atty.
Magdaleno M. Peña is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN
from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to
respondent Peña’s personal record in the Office of
the Bar Confidant and other copies thereof be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The En Banc Clerk of Court is directed to
INVESTIGATE how respondent was able to secure
copies of the following: (a) copies of the Agenda
dated 13 November 2002 of the Court’s First
Division, attached as Annexes "B" and "C" of
respondent Peña’s Urgent Motion to Inhibit and to
Resolve Respondent’s Urgent Omnibus Motion
dated 30 January 2003; (b) the Internal Resolution
dated 04 September 2002, attached as Annex "D"
of the same motion; (c) the Report and
Recommendation dated 11 December 2007, issued
by the Office of the Bar Confidant, attached as
Annex "5" of respondent Peña’s Motion to
Vacate/Recall dated 20 February 2010; and (d) the
Minutes of the Court, consisting of 58-pages,
attached as Annex "A" of the Reply (to Petitioners’
Opposition to Motion to Urgent Motion to Inhibit)
dated 31 October 2001 filed by respondent Peña.
She is further required to SUBMIT such an
investigation report with recommendations on the
administrative and disciplinary liabilities, if any, of all
court personnel possibly involved therein, as well
as suggestions for protecting confidential and
internal court documents of pending cases within
NINETY (90) DAYS from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5581 January 14, 2014
ROSE BUNAGAN-BANSIG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated
January 8, 2002 filed by complainant Rose
Bunagan-Bansig (Bansig) against respondent Atty.
Rogelio Juan A. Celera (respondent) for Gross
Immoral Conduct.
In her complaint, Bansig narrated that, on May 8,
1997, respondent and Gracemarie R. Bunagan
(Bunagan), entered into a contract of marriage, as
evidenced by a certified xerox copy of the certificate
of marriage issued by the City Civil Registry of
Manila.2 Bansig is the sister of Gracemarie R.
Bunagan, legal wife of respondent.
However, notwithstanding respondent's marriage
with Bunagan, respondent contracted another
marriage on January 8, 1998 with a certain Ma.
Cielo Paz Torres Alba (Alba), as evidenced by a certified
xerox copy of the certificate of marriage issued by the City
Registration Officer of San Juan, Manila.3
Bansig stressed that the marriage between respondent and
Bunagan was still valid and in full legal existence when he
contracted his second marriage with Alba, and that the first
marriage had never been annulled or rendered void by any
lawful authority.
Bansig alleged that respondent’s act of contracting marriage
with Alba, while his marriage is still subsisting, constitutes
grossly immoral and conduct unbecoming of a member of
the Bar, which renders him unfit to continue his membership
in the Bar.
In a Resolution4 dated February 18, 2002, the Court resolved
to require respondent to file a comment on the instant
complaint.
Respondent failed to submit his comment on the complaint,
despite receipt of the copy of the Court's Resolution, as
evidenced by Registry Return Receipt No. 30639. Thus, the
Court, in a Resolution5 dated March 17, 2003, resolved to
require respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for failing to file
his comment on the complaint against him.6
On December 10, 2002, Bansig filed an Omnibus Ex Parte
Motion7 praying that respondent's failure to file his comment
on the complaint be deemed as a waiver to file the same,
and that the case be submitted for disposition.
On May 4, 2003, in a Motion, respondent claimed that while
it appeared that an administrative case was filed against him,
he did not know the nature or cause thereof since other than
Bansig's Omnibus Motion, he received no other pleading or
any processes of this Court. Respondent, however,
countered that Bansig's Omnibus Motion was merely a ploy
to frighten him and his wife from pursuing the criminal
complaints for falsification of public documents they filed
against Bansig and her husband. He also explained that he
was able to obtain a copy of the Court's Show Cause Order
only when he visited his brother who is occupying their
former residence at 59-B Aguho St., Project 3, Quezon City.
Respondent further averred that he also received a copy of
Bansig's Omnibus Motion when the same was sent to his law
office address.
Respondent pointed out that having been the family's
erstwhile counsel and her younger sister's husband, Bansig
knew his law office address, but she failed to send a copy of
the complaint to him. Respondent suspected that Bansig
was trying to mislead him in order to prevent him from
defending himself. He added that Bansig has an unpaid
obligation amounting to ₱2,000,000.00 to his wife which
triggered a sibling rivalry. He further claimed that he and his
wife received death threats from unknown persons; thus, he
transferred to at least two (2) new residences, i.e., in
Sampaloc, Manila and Angeles City. He then prayed that he
be furnished a copy of the complaint and be given time to file
his answer to the complaint.
In a Resolution8 dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to (a)
require Bansig to furnish respondent with a copy of the
administrative complaint and to submit proof of such service;
and (b) require respondent to file a comment on the
complaint against him.
In compliance, Bansig submitted an Affidavit of Mailing to
show proof that a copy of the administrative complaint was
furnished to respondent at his given address which is No.
238 Mayflower St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City,
as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 2167.9
On March 17, 2004, considering that respondent
failed anew to file his comment despite receipt of
the complaint, the Court resolved to require
respondent to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure.10
On June 3, 2004, respondent, in his
Explanation,11 reiterated that he has yet to receive a
copy of the complaint. He claimed that Bansig
probably had not complied with the Court's Order,
otherwise, he would have received the same
already. He requested anew that Bansig be
directed to furnish him a copy of the complaint.
Again, on August 25, 2004, the Court granted
respondent's prayer that he be furnished a copy of
the complaint, and required Bansig to furnish a
copy of the complaint to respondent.12
On October 1, 2004, Bansig, in her
Manifestation,13 lamented the dilatory tactics
allegedly undertaken by respondent in what was
supposedly a simple matter of receipt of complaint.
Bansig asserted that the Court should sanction
respondent for his deliberate and willful act to
frustrate the actions of the Court. She attached a
copy of the complaint and submitted an Affidavit of
Mailing stating that again a copy of the complaint
was mailed at respondent's residential address in
Angeles City as shown by Registry Receipt No.
3582.
On May 16, 2005, the Court anew issued a Show
Cause Order to respondent as to why he should not
be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for
failure to comply with the Resolution dated July 7,
2003 despite service of copy of the complaint by
registered mail.14
On August 1, 2005, the Court noted the returned
and unserved copy of the Show Cause Order dated
May 16, 2005 sent to respondent at 238 Mayflower
St., Ninoy Aquino Subd. under Registry Receipt No.
55621, with notation "RTS-Moved." It likewise
required Bansig to submit the correct and present
address of respondent.15
On September 12, 2005, Bansig manifested that
respondent had consistently indicated in his
correspondence with the Court No. 238 Mayflower
St., Ninoy Aquino Subdivision, Angeles City as his
residential address. However, all notices served
upon him on said address were returned with a note
"moved" by the mail server. Bansig averred that in
Civil Case No. 59353, pending before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Tuguegarao City,
respondent entered his appearance as counsel with
mailing address to be at "Unit 8, Halili Complex, 922
Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City."16
On February 13, 2006, the Court resolved to resend
a copy of the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005 to respondent at his new address at Unit 8,
Halili Complex, 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon
City.17
On June 30, 2008, due to respondent's failure to
comply with the Show Cause Order dated May 16,
2005, for failure to file his comment on this
administrative complaint as required in the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to:
(a) IMPOSE upon Atty. Celera a FINE of ₱1,000.00
payable to the court, or a penalty of imprisonment
of five (5) days if said fine is not paid, and (b)
REQUIRE Atty. Celera to COMPLY with the
Resolution dated July 7, 2003 by filing the comment required
thereon.18
In a Resolution19 dated January 27, 2010, it appearing that
respondent failed to comply with the Court's Resolutions
dated June 30, 2008 and July 7, 2003, the Court resolved to:
(1) DISPENSE with the filing by respondent of his comment
on the complaint; (2) ORDER the arrest of Atty. Celera; and
(3) DIRECT the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to (a) ARREST and DETAIN Atty. Celera
for non-compliance with the Resolution dated June 30, 2008;
and (b) SUBMIT a report of compliance with the Resolution.
The Court likewise resolved to REFER the complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.20
However, the Return of Warrant21 dated March 24, 2010,
submitted by Atty. Frayn M. Banawa, Investigation Agent II,
Anti-Graft Division of the NBI, showed that respondent
cannot be located because neither Halili Complex nor No.
922 Aurora Blvd., at Cubao, Quezon City cannot be located.
During surveillance, it appeared that the given address, i.e.,
No. 922 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City was a vacant lot
with debris of a demolished building. Considering that the
given address cannot be found or located and there were no
leads to determine respondent's whereabouts, the warrant of
arrest cannot be enforced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, meanwhile, in
compliance with the Court's Resolution, reported that as per
their records, the address of respondent is at No. 41 Hoover
St., Valley View Royale Subd., Taytay, Rizal.
Respondent likewise failed to appear before the mandatory
conference and hearings set by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
despite several notices. Thus, in an Order dated August 4,
2010, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, of the
IBP-CBD, declared respondent to be in default and the case
was submitted for report and recommendation. The Order of
Default was received by respondent as evidenced by a
registry return receipt. However, respondent failed to take
any action on the matter.
On January 3, 2011, the IBP-CBD, in its Report and
Recommendation, recommended that respondent Atty.
Celera be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the
practice of law.
RULING
A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, but is rather an investigation by the court
into the conduct of its officers.22 The issue to be determined
is whether respondent is still fit to continue to be an officer of
the court in the dispensation of justice. Hence, an
administrative proceeding for disbarment continues despite
the desistance of a complainant, or failure of the complainant
to prosecute the same, or in this case, the failure of
respondent to answer the charges against him despite
numerous notices.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations in
the complaint. Substantial evidence has been defined as
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion. For the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the
respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. Considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this
Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence
is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative
penalty.23
In the instant case, there is a preponderance of
evidence that respondent contracted a second
marriage despite the existence of his first marriage.
The first marriage, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 3, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
Gloria C. Pagdilao, states that respondent Rogelio
Juan A. Celera contracted marriage on May, 8,
1997 with Gracemarie R. Bunagan at the Church of
Saint Augustine, Intramuros, Manila; the second
marriage, however, as evidenced by the certified
xerox copy of the Certificate of Marriage issued on
October 4, 2001 by the City Civil Registry of San
Juan, Manila, states that respondent Rogelio Juan
A. Celera contracted marriage on January 8, 1998
with Ma. Cielo Paz Torres Alba at the Mary the
Queen Church, Madison St., Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Bansig submitted certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates to prove that respondent
entered into a second marriage while the latter’s
first marriage was still subsisting. We note that the
second marriage apparently took place barely a
year from his first marriage to Bunagan which is
indicative that indeed the first marriage was still
subsisting at the time respondent contracted the
second marriage with Alba.
The certified xerox copies of the marriage contracts,
issued by a public officer in custody thereof, are
admissible as the best evidence of their contents,
as provided for under Section 7 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original
document is a public record. – When the original of
a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be
proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof.
Moreover, the certified xerox copies of the marriage
certificates, other than being admissible in evidence,
also clearly indicate that respondent contracted the
second marriage while the first marriage is
subsisting. By itself, the certified xerox copies of the
marriage certificates would already have been
sufficient to establish the existence of two
marriages entered into by respondent. The certified
xerox copies should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents. For purposes
of this disbarment proceeding, these Marriage
Certificates bearing the name of respondent are
competent and convincing evidence to prove that
he committed bigamy, which renders him unfit to
continue as a member of the Bar.24
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
Respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of
the Bar. He made a mockery of marriage, a sacred
institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of
contracting a second marriage while his first marriage is
subsisting constituted grossly immoral conduct and are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.25
This case cannot be fully resolved, however, without
addressing rather respondent’s defiant stance against the
Court as demonstrated by his repetitive disregard of its
Resolution requiring him to file his comment on the complaint.
This case has dragged on since 2002. In the span of more
than 10 years, the Court has issued numerous directives for
respondent's compliance, but respondent seemed to have
preselected only those he will take notice of and the rest he
will just ignore. The Court has issued several resolutions
directing respondent to comment on the complaint against
him, yet, to this day, he has not submitted any answer
thereto. He claimed to have not received a copy of the
complaint, thus, his failure to comment on the complaint
against him. Ironically, however, whenever it is a show cause
order, none of them have escaped respondent's attention.
Even assuming that indeed the copies of the complaint had
not reached him, he cannot, however, feign ignorance that
there is a complaint against him that is pending before this
Court which he could have easily obtained a copy had he
wanted to.
The Court has been very tolerant in dealing with
respondent's nonchalant attitude towards this case;
accommodating respondent's endless requests,
manifestations and prayers to be given a copy of the
complaint. The Court, as well as Bansig, as evidenced by
numerous affidavits of service, have relentlessly tried to
reach respondent for more than a decade; sending copies of
the Court's Resolutions and complaint to different locations -
both office and residential addresses of respondent.
However, despite earnest efforts of the Court to reach
respondent, the latter, however conveniently offers a mere
excuse of failure to receive the complaint. When said excuse
seemed no longer feasible, respondent just disappeared. In
a manner of speaking, respondent’s acts were deliberate,
maneuvering the liberality of the Court in order to delay the
disposition of the case and to evade the consequences of his
actions. Ultimately, what is apparent is respondent’s
deplorable disregard of the judicial process which this Court
cannot countenance.
Clearly, respondent's acts constitute willful disobedience of
the lawful orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court is in itself alone a sufficient cause
for suspension or disbarment. Respondent’s cavalier attitude
in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court
constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution.
Respondent’s conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. We have repeatedly held that a Court’s
Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere request, nor
should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively." Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with
the Court’s orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in his
character; it also underscores his disrespect of the Court's
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof."26
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. The practice of soliciting cases for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Considering respondent's propensity to disregard
not only the laws of the land but also the lawful
orders of the Court, it only shows him to be wanting
in moral character, honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is, thus, unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find
respondent ATTY. ROGELIO JUAN A. CELERA,
guilty of grossly immoral conduct and willful
disobedience of lawful orders rendering him
unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name stricken of the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately.1âwphi1
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith record it
in the personal file of respondent. All the Courts of
the Philippines and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines shall disseminate copies thereof to all
its Chapters.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51,
SORSOGON CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court has had enough of the respondent, a law
practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical
practice of filing frivolous administrative cases
against judges and personnel of the courts because
the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant
from hearing a pending case. Hence, the
complainant has initiated this complaint for the
disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross
misconduct and gross violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Antecedents
On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered
his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William
Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City,
presided by complainant Judge Jose L.
Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty.
Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering
his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty.
Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No.
2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the
RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between
the incumbent Presiding Judge and the
undersigned," where" he does not appear before
the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also
hear cases handled by the undersigned."2
Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle
through an order issued on February 14, 2007,3 viz:
xxxx
This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just
because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was not
even the original counsel of the litigant.
Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the
integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province as
hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court
case is based on his whimsical dictates.
This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as
well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge which
were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack
ofmerit. This is why he should not have accepted this
particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in
this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition. It is the
lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not
to appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This
is unethical practice in the first order.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty.
Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED. Relative to the Motion to
Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C.
Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby DENIED
for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138
of the Rules of Court.
So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new
counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the
Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’sunethical
practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the
inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous
adverse incidents between them.
On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular
administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to submit
his comment.5
In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge
Madrid’s issuance of the February 14, 2007 order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the
right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and impartial
trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the
motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest issued
against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid
himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed
from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.
On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for
appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also
indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M. OCA
IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose
L. Madrid and Court Stenographer MerlynD. Dominguez,
both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon
City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid).8
On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed
for its lack of merit the administrative complaint against
Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil
Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v.
Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to
file administrative or criminal complaints against
judges and court personnel whenever decisions,
orders or processes were issued adversely to him
and his clients.9
In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon
Chapter submitted its report with the following
findings and recommendation:10
xxxx
The documentary evidence offered by
complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S.
Dealca filed by himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and
acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm.
Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3)
OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No.
05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No.
05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual
evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by
himself and as counsel for the complainants against
court officers, judges and personnel as a
consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in
cases that respondent had handled as counselfor
the parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the
respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid &
Judge Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP
Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of
the court, and the case aroused (sic) out ofthe
unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter
members that was adverse to the position of the
respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic]
out of the cases handled by respondent for the
complainants who failed to secure a favorable
action from the court.
Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ
was a result of the case before the sala of Judge
Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs.
Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and
Damages, that was handled by respondent for the
complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an
off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
"Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph
H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala
ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51).
Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against
defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his
appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result
of an adverse order, this ombudsman case arose.
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ
was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled
"Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas,
with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most
Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party
defendant that was heard, tried, decided and
pending execution before the sala of Judge
Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).
Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ
was also a consequence of Civil Case No.
2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap
V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending
before the sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid
(RTC 51).
All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the
adverse ruling rendered by the court against the
clients of the respondent that instead of resorting to
the remedies available under the Rules of
Procedure, respondent assisted his clients in filing
administrative and criminal case against the judges and
personnel of the court.
The other documentary evidence of the complainants such
as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003 in
Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs.
JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF
RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334
entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY
VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board ofGovernors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No.
XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and
APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks
(sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative
Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida)
– The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe
Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for
lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No.
6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia Jao vs. Atty.
Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum
Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by
Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical
Records" which provides for the dismissal of the cases
against all the accused, do not show participation on the part
of the respondent that he signed the pleadings, although the
verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the
respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining to
persons other than judges and personnel of the court that
are not squarely covered by the present investigation against
respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that
respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the
rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia
Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case
resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby
Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All
these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in
determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a
member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead
of going through the procedures provided for by the Rules of
Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the
court.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in
view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of
SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6)
monthsfrom finality of the decision be ordered against
respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP
IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately
submitted his Report and Recommendation11 finding Atty.
Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous administrative
and criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca
be suspended from the practice of law for one year because
his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or
legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.
In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of
Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed the
administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:
RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for
lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition,13 which the IBP
Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration,
and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14
Issues
(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and
criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in
seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal
Case No. 2006-6795?
Ruling of the Court
We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.
I assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He
Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of
initiating unfounded suits
Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the
administrative and criminal cases he filed against
judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid.
He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty
bound to bring and prosecute cases against
unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court
personnel.15
We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.
Although the Court always admires members of the
Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance
to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable
judges and inefficient or undeserving court
personnel, any acts taken in that direction should
be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self
interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of
the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that
reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge
Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the
Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin
the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca
exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and
penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP
Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing
of charges against judges, court personnel and
even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all
stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to
his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that
he was thereby crossing the line of propriety,
because neither vindictiveness nor harassment
could be a substitute for resorting tothe appropriate
legal remedies. He should now be reminded that
the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice
to the parties according to law, not to harass
them.17
The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and
duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by
an attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment,
suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath
exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to
"wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must
be upheld and keep inviolable.19
As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of
his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate
groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has
also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
thuswise:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to
see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be
unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and
caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’ propensities to
litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own
impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s
duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges
against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield
them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and
harass them, among other things.21
Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to
disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded
complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid,
increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person
should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to litigate, the
right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty.
Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and
criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his
fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part,
considering that he made allegations against them therein
that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully
deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time
and serious consideration.
Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various
complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even
the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:
With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary
dismissal of cases filed against erring judges and court
personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the
facts and the law of the case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute
resolutions the Court could have promulgated in frequently
dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing
would not advance his cause now. He thereby demonstrated
his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the
Court.The minute resolutions have been issued for the
prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever the
Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit
through a minute resolution, it is understood that the
challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of
fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the
minute resolution then constitutes the actual adjudication on
the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or
itsdenial of due course indicates the Court’s agreement with
and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court
a quo.26
The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not
apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issuesin
disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v.
Court of Appeals:27
The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases
by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where
the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision
appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in
accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws,
where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for
non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due
course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal
basis.
xxxx
The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed
Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions,
provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.
The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was
the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc.
v. Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that
the minute resolutions violated Section 14,29 Article
VIII of the Constitution. The Court, throughJustice
Regalado, declared that resolutions were not
decisions withinthe constitutional contemplation, for
the former "merely hold that the petition for review
should not be entertained and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the
petition to review the decisionof the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain
the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the
constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases
submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and
after the filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other
pleadings, but not where the petition was being
refused due course, with the resolutions for that
purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus,
when the Court, after deliberating on the petition
and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due
course to the petition and stated that the questions
raised were factual, or there was no reversible error
in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.30
II
Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should
have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his
motion toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in
the impartiality of the judiciary."31 However, IBP
Commissioner Hababag has recommended that
Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to
inhibit considering that the motion, being purely
based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual
and legal bases.32
The recommendation of IBP Commissioner
Hababag is warranted.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the
legal causes for their clients. As a consequence,
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations
upon them.33
In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently
state:
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.
xxxx
Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge
motives not supported by the record or haveno
materiality to the case.1âwphi1
In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote
confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the
respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the
judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.34
The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the
following averment, to wit:
Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent
Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not appear
before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does
not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx x x.35 (Bold
emphasis supplied)
Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear
cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges
could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear
the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and
the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all,
should have been assiduously substantiated by him because
it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in
general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that
could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any
document to support it.
Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the
inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear
to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in
handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred
duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in
order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a
particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a
counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s
partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the
presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble
role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence
and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As such, Atty.
Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as
expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.
On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not
the first administrative complaint to be ever brought against
Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the
Philippines,39 we reprimanded him for violating Canon 22
and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same
offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly,
based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers
found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule
11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty.
Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES
respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating
Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for one year effective from notice of this
decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction
in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
and to all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 8644 January 22, 2014
[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2908]
AIDA R. CAMPOS, ALISTAIR R. CAMPOS and
CHARMAINE R. CAMPOS, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ELISEO M. CAMPOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a complain for disbarment1 on
grounds of serious misconduct, immorality and
dishonesty filed against Atty. Eliseo M. Campos
(Eliseo), former presiding judge of the Municipal
Trial Court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. The
complainants herein are his wife, Aida R. Campos
(Aida), and their children, Alistair R. Campos
(Alistair) and Charmaine R. Campos (Charmaine).
Antecedents
Eliseo and Aida were married in 1981. Alistair was
born in 1982, and Charmaine, in 1986.
In 1999, Eliseo purchased by installment a
936-square meter lot (the property) in Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur from a certain Renato Alimpoos.
Eliseo thereafter applied for the issuance of a title in
Alistair’s name. Alistair was then a student without
an income and a capacity to buy the property. In
2006, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-28258 covering the property was issued in
Alistair’s name. Meanwhile, Alistair got married and
his wife and child likewise resided in Eliseo’s house
until 2008.2
On July 16, 2008, Eliseo filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur,
Branch 7, a Petition3 for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. He alleged that both he and Aida are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with
essential marital obligations. He claimed that during
the first few days of their marriage, he realized that
he finds no gratification in engaging in sexual
intercourse with his wife. He alleged that he is a
homosexual. He also averred that Aida experienced
severe pain when she delivered Alistair.
Consequently, Aida no longer wanted to bear
children. He likewise ascribed acts of infidelity to
Aida.
On September 10, 2008, Eliseo executed an
Affidavit of Loss4 wherein he represented himself as
the owner of the property covered by OCT No.
P-28258. He declared that he unknowingly lost the
owner’s certificate of title which used to be in his
files. On September 15, 2008, he caused the
annotation5 of the said affidavit in the copy of OCT
No. P-28258 kept in the Register of Deeds of
Bayugan, Agusan del Sur. In the Affidavit of No
Loss6 executed on October 21, 2008 and likewise
inscribed7 in the certificate of title, Alistair refuted
Eliseo’s representations.
On November 26, 2008, Alistair filed before the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bayugan,
Agusan del Sur a complaint for perjury8 against
Eliseo. Alistair stated that the owner’s copy of OCT No.
P-28258 was in his possession. Eliseo was aware of such
fact, but he still deliberately and maliciously asserted a
falsehood.
In Eliseo’s Counter-Affidavit,9 he insisted that he is the sole
owner of the property covered by OCT No. P-28258. Eliseo
continued:
That when I applied for titling of said lot, I caused it to be
registered in the name of [Alistair], who was still single, as I
have some other properties (land) under my name;
That I never intended to give it to [Alistair] as he still has a
sister;
That when the title was released, it was kept in our files;
That when I filed an annulment case against my wife which is
now pending before the [RTC] of Bayugan, I offered to my
wife as a settlement to have our properties settled. One of
[these properties] is this lot, which I asked to be sold and its
proceeds be divided between us. I have learned that my wife
refused to have that property sold claiming that I could not
sell the house and lot as it is in the name of our son, herein
complainant Alistair R. Campos;
xxxx
That my son’s statement in his complaint affidavit that the
Owner’s Duplicate of the Title of the Lot has long been in his
actual, physical and personal possession, is utterly false, as
the title was previously in our possession in our files as the
property is undersigned's own exclusive property. x x x
That when I learned that together with my wife, he is going to
apply for a loan making the title of the lot as collateral, I
decided to file a petition for cancellation of the title under my
son's name Alistair R. Campos, and asked Mrs. Azucena A.
Ortiz, to get a certified copy of the title from the Register of
Deeds to be used in the filing of a petition for cancellation of
the title in my son’s name;
That I was told by Mrs. Ortiz, that she was told by the
Register of Deeds, that I have to execute an affidavit of loss
so that I can be given a certified copy. Since the title is not in
my possession after I left my residence and I cannot find it
from my files, I let Mrs. Ortiz prepare an affidavit of loss and I
signed it. I have also instructed her to [cause the annotation
of the affidavit on the certificate of title] to protect my interest
as the real owner of the lot, to counter or stop my wife and
son from using the titles as collateral of a loan;
x x x x.10
Subsequently, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Agusan del Sur dismissed for lack of probable cause
Alistair’s complaint for perjury against Eliseo.11 The
resolution, which dismissed the complaint, in part, reads:
"[W]hen [Eliseo] found out that the title of the lot he bought
was missing and could not be found in his files, he did the
proper actions to protect his rights thereto by executing an
Affidavit of Loss.
x x x [W]hen [Eliseo] sensed that his wife is about to obtain a
loan using the title as collateral without his consent and to
protect his right as owner of the property, he went to the
Register of Deeds to cancel his son’s ownership over the lot
in question with the intent to revert back its ownership in his
name. However, when asked to produce a copy of its
duplicate original, [Eliseo] could not present the same as it
was already lost and could not be retrieved from his files. To
prove its loss, an Affidavit of Loss was executed by [Eliseo]
attesting to the fact of its unavailability.
x x x It can be deduced that the act of [Eliseo] was
done in good faith. x x x The intent of [Eliseo] in
executing the Affidavit is not tainted with a corrupt
assertion of falsehood since there was a firm belief
that indeed, the title is not anymore found in his files.
It could not be located and the title is kept by
[Alistair] who took sides with [Aida] who has plans
to enjoy the benefits from the title using it as a
collateral in obtaining a loan from the lot covered by
the said title. [Had Alistair been truthful to Eliseo,
the former could have informed the latter of the]
whereabouts of the title and could have sought
permission from his father when he took the copy of
the title from [Eliseo’s] files. By not informing
[Eliseo], he could not be faulted for executing such
Affidavit and neither can he be found guilty of
perjury as there was no malice on his part to do the
same. x x x."12 (Citation omitted)
On February 11, 2009, Aida filed a Complaint13 for
Legal Separation, Support and Separation of
Conjugal Properties against Eliseo. Aida alleged
that Eliseo confessed under oath that he is a
homosexual. However, Eliseo, in effect,
contradicted the said confession when he admitted
to Alistair and Charmaine that he was then
intimately involved with another woman. Aida
likewise claimed that Eliseo is temperamental and
had stopped giving support to their family.
On April 6, 2009, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed
before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
an administrative complaint14 for serious
misconduct, immorality and dishonesty against
Eliseo. Formal investigation was thereafter
conducted.
Pending the resolution of the above-mentioned
administrative complaint against Eliseo, he
resigned from his judicial post on July 1, 2009.15
On September 14, 2009, after the conclusion of a
hearing on Eliseo’s Petition for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage before the RTC of Bayugan, Agusan
del Sur, Judge Eduardo Casals (Judge Casals)
called the parties for a conference in his chamber.
A scuffle ensued inside the chamber. The police
blotter filed promptly after the incident indicated that
Eliseo choked Charmaine and attempted to box but
failed to hit Alistair.16
On June 4, 2010, Aida, Alistair and Charmaine filed
the instant complaint for disbarment17 against
Eliseo. They alleged that Eliseo committed acts of
dishonesty, immorality and serious misconduct in (a)
causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in
Alistair’s name; (b) subsequently misrepresenting
himself as the real owner of the lot covered by OCT
No. P-28258; (c) falsely declaring under oath in the
Affidavit of Loss executed on September 10, 2008
that the owner’s copy of OCT No. P-28258 is
missing despite his knowledge that the said title is
with Alistair; (d) stating in his Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage that he is a
homosexual albeit admitting to his children that he
has an intimate relation with another woman; and (e)
choking and boxing his children on September 14,
2009.
After Eliseo’s submission of his comment,18 the
Court referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.19
In Eliseo’s Position Paper20 filed with the IBP’s
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), he interposed
the following defenses: (a) the complainants are
engaged in forum shopping in view of pending administrative
and civil cases in all of which the issues of immorality and
homosexuality have already been raised;21 (b) the
complaint is instituted merely to harass him as a
consequence of his refusal to provide a monthly support of
Php60,000.00 to his wife and children;22 (c) he has no
extra-marital relation but he once told Alistair and Charmaine
in jest that due to Aida’s infidelity, he intends to live
separately with another woman who may be more caring and
loving than his wife;23 and (d) to protect his rights and
prevent the complainants from using as a collateral for a loan
the house and lot covered by OCT No. P-28258, he
executed the Affidavit of Loss on September 10, 2008 as a
pre-requisite to his filing of an action in court for the
registration of the property in his name.24 Further, Eliseo
refuted Alistair and Charmaine’s claims relative to the scuffle
which occurred on September 14, 2009 inside the chamber
of the judge hearing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage. Eliseo insists that if Alistair and Charmaine’s
claims were true, they could have presented independent
witnesses to corroborate their version of the incident, and
medical certificates to prove that they indeed sustained
injuries. What follows is Eliseo’s account of what had
transpired:
[A]fter adjournment of the hearing of the annulment case, the
judge called the parties to his chamber for a conference.
[Aida] however was reluctant to go unless her children would
join her. The judge then called all of them to the chamber.
Once there, the Judge inquired about [Eliseo’s] proposal for
settlement. While [Eliseo] was explaining to the judge,
[Charmaine] reacted by raising her voice uttering unprintable
words to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo] requested her to calm down
reminding her that they were still in court. But she continued
her tirade at [Eliseo] with greater intensity even calling him a
bad father, and that she despised him. x x x Charmaine had
already been ejected by the judge out of the court for lack of
decorum and respect. The order for her removal arose after
she interrupted the court several times by shouting at
[Eliseo]. When she was already outside the court premises,
she was even heard by a certain Samuel Pasagdan saying
that [Eliseo] should watch out after the hearing as she was
going to attack him. The prior incident (where she was
thrown out of court) made her angrier in the chamber. So
when she continued with her unpleasant and scandalous
utterances by again interrupting [Eliseo] who was asked by
the judge to talk about his proposal for settlement, [Eliseo]
walked to her and held her by her shoulder to put some
sense to her that she really had to calm down out of respect
[for] the judge. There was no choking of Charmaine. But, this
sight of holding Charmaine by the shoulder was viewed
differently by [Alistair] who flung with force and recklessness
a bag containing an unknown hard object to [Eliseo]. [Eliseo]
was hit and in pain. At this point, Charmaine suddenly held
[Eliseo] from behind so he could not defend himself from the
onslaught of Alistaire (sic) who was poised to attack him.
[Eliseo] was forced to elbow Charmaine to break free from
her hold. There was a brief exchange of punches between
Alistair and [Eliseo] before the Presiding Judge broke the
fray. This incident could not have happened if not for
Charmaine’s own misdemeanor and initial provocation.25
Aida, Alistair and Charmaine did not attend the hearing held
on March 18, 2011, but Atty. Gener Sansaet came to
represent them. Eliseo appeared on his own behalf, with Atty.
Alex Bacarro as collaborating counsel.
During the hearing, Eliseo insisted that the allegations
against him of (a) immorality and psychological incapacity in
having extra-marital affairs; and (b) serious misconduct in
the execution of the Affidavit of Loss need not be resolved
anymore in the instant disbarment complaint since they are
already the subjects of other pending cases.26 He also
expressed his doubt that Alistair is his biological son.27 He
also alleged that Aida, who had served for three terms as a
Provincial Board Member, had a lover, who was likewise a
political figure.28 Aida harbored the impression that Eliseo’s
filing of his Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage caused the downfall of the former’s
political career.29
The Report and Recommendation of the CBD
On June 11, 2012, CBD Commissioner Romualdo
A. Din, Jr. (Commissioner Din, Jr.) submitted his
Report and Recommendation30 to the IBP Board of
Governors. Commissioner Din, Jr. recommended
the dismissal of the instant disbarment complaint
against Eliseo for lack of evidence. Commissioner
Din, Jr. ratiocinated that:
The main issue in the case at bar is whether or not
[Eliseo] committed serious misconduct sufficient to
cause his disbarment. The determination of
[Eliseo’s] culpability is dependent on the following:
1. whether or not [Eliseo] was dishonest with
regards to the statements he made in his Petition
for Annulment. [Corollarily] whether or not [Eliseo] is
guilty of immoral conduct; 2. Whether or not the
statements raised in the Affidavit of Loss
concerning the certificate of title of the Campos’
property were untrue; and 3. Whether or not [Eliseo]
choked his daughter, Charmaine, during the
amicable settlement of the annulment case in the
(sic) Judge Casal’s (sic) chambers.
The Commission finds in the negative. Gross or
serious misconduct has been defined as "any
inexcusable, shameful and flagrant unlawful
conduct on the part of the person concerned in the
administration of justice which is prejudicial to the
rights of the parties or to the right determination of a
cause, a conduct that is generally motivated by a
predetermined, obstinate or intentional purpose
(Yumol, Jr. vs. Ferrer, Sr., 456 SCRA 457).
As a consequence of finding of gross misconduct
has been held to be "a ground for the imposition of
the penalty of suspension or disbarment because
good character is an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for the
continuance of such privilege." (Cham v. Atty.
Paita-Moya[,] A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008).
In the same vein, the Supreme Court has likewise
held that: "A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred
for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is
not only a good condition precedent to the practice
of law but also a good qualification for all members
of the bar (Manaois v. Deciembre, A.M. Case No.
5564, August 20, 2008).
In the case at bar, the complainants’ averments of
[Eliseo’s] alleged transgressions, i.e. the
incongruence of his homosexuality and the
extramarital relation of [Eliseo] as grounds for
annulment compared with the complainants’
allegation that [Eliseo] admitted that he has a
mistress; the alleged choking of [Charmaine]; and
the execution of the Affidavit of Loss despite
knowledge of the fact that the certificate of title was
with [Alistair] who is the registered owner of the
subject property taken on their own is a valid
ground to find [Eliseo] guilty of gross misconduct.
However, [Eliseo] has succinctly rebutted each and
every single allegation of the complainants making
the case at fore a battle of opposing narration of
facts.
More importantly, the pieces of evidence presented by the
complainants are insufficient to prove their claim beyond the
degree of evidence required of them by law to satisfy and
overcome.
Basic and fundamental is the rule that "the burden of proof is
upon the complainant and the Court will exercise the
disciplinary power only if the former establishes the case by
clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence."
xxxx
In the case at bar, [apart] from the allegations in the
complaint, no other evidence was presented by the
complainants to bolster their claims. Aside from the
statements made in the complaint, no other corroborative or
collaborating evidence documentary or testimonial from
independent, third person was presented to convince this
Commission by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof that
[Eliseo] is guilty of the allegations contained
therein.31 (Citation omitted)
The Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
The IBP Board of Governors, however, reversed the findings
of Commissioner Din, Jr. In the Extended Resolution issued
on March 20, 2013, the Board suspended Eliseo from the
practice of law for two years. Thus:
[T]he Board, upon a thorough perusal of the records, finds
sufficient evidence to sustain misconduct on the part of
[Eliseo] as a lawyer, specifically his filing an Affidavit of Loss
of Title to Real Property which Title was in the name of
Alistair, his son, and which was in the latter’s possession,
substantiated with annexes and affidavits. The same holds
true for the alleged choking incident in the Judge’s chamber
which was caused to be blottered, Annex "G". [Eliseo] also
admitted his infidelity albeit he postulated the defense of
homosexuality. All these, taken together, fall short of the
ethical standards set forth for lawyers in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.32
Issues
Whether or not Eliseo committed acts of dishonesty,
immorality and serious misconduct in:
I.
Causing the issuance of OCT No. P-28258 in Alistair’s
name;
II.
Subsequently misrepresenting himself as the real owner of
the lot covered by OCT No. P-28258;
III.
Falsely declaring under oath in the Affidavit of Loss executed
on September 10, 2008 that the owner's copy of OCT No.
P-28258 is missing despite his knowledge that the said title
is with Alistair;
IV.
Stating in his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
that he is a homosexual albeit admitting to his children that
he has an intimate relation with another woman; and
V.
Choking and boxing his children on September 14, 2009.
This Court’s Ruling
Of the five issues raised herein, only the allegation
of Eliseo’s engagement in the scuffle inside the
chamber of Judge Casals on September 14, 2009
shall be resolved. Anent the foregoing, this Court is
compelled to once again impose a fine upon Eliseo
for violating Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he conducted
himself in a manner not befitting a member of the
bar.
This Court affirms the findings of the IBP Board of
Governors that Eliseo deserves to be sanctioned
for his unbecoming behavior.
In recommending the imposition upon Eliseo of a
penalty of two years of suspension from the
practice of law, the IBP Board of Governors
considered all the three charges of immorality,
dishonesty and misconduct against the former.
However, this Court, on February 8, 2012, in A.M.
No. MTJ-10-1761, had already imposed upon
Eliseo a fine of Php20,000.00 for simple
misconduct in causing the issuance of OCT No.
P-28258 in Alistair’s name when the subject
property actually belongs to the former. The
charges of (a) immorality in engaging in
extra-marital affairs; and (b) dishonesty in executing
the Affidavit of Loss on September 10, 2008, were,
on the other hand, dismissed by the Court after
finding either the evidence of the complainants as
insufficient or the issues raised being already the
subjects of Eliseo’s pending Petition for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
It is worth emphasizing that the instant disbarment
complaint and A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 are anchored
upon almost the same set of facts, except that in
the former, the issue of occurence of the scuffle on
September 14, 2009 is raised as well. This Court
does not intend to punish Eliseo twice for the same
acts especially since they pertain to his private life
and were not actually committed in connection with
the performance of his functions as a magistrate
before.
In Samson v. Caballero,33 the Court emphasized
what "automatic conversion of administrative cases
against justices and judges to disciplinary
proceedings against them as lawyers" means, viz:
This administrative case against respondent shall
also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding
against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance
with AM. No. 02-9-02-SC. This resolution, entitled
"Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative
Cases Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special
Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Them Both as
Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine
Bar," provides:
"Some administrative cases against Justices of the
Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of
regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are
likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of
members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other
forms of breaches of conduct that have been
traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline
of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case
shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a
member of the Bar. x x x. Judgment in both respects may be
incorporated in one decision or resolution."
xxxx
Under the same rule, a respondent "may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why
he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as member of the Bar." xxx In other
words, an order to comment on the complaint is an order to
give an explanation on why he should not be held
administratively liable not only as a member of the bench but
also as a member of the bar. This is the fair and reasonable
meaning of "automatic conversion" of administrative cases
against justices and judges to disciplinary proceedings
against them as lawyers. This will also serve the purpose of
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC to avoid the duplication or unnecessary
replication of actions by treating an administrative complaint
filed against a member of the bench also as a disciplinary
proceeding against him as a lawyer by mere operation of the
rule. Thus, a disciplinary proceeding as a member of the bar
is impliedly instituted with the filing of an administrative case
against a justice of the Sandiganbayan, Court of Appeals
and Court of Tax Appeals or a judge of a first- or
second-level court.34 (Citations and emphasis omitted)
The above-cited case suggests the superfluity of instituting a
disbarment complaint against a lawyer when an
administrative case had been previously filed against him or
her as a magistrate. Ideally therefore, the instant disbarment
complaint should have been consolidated with A.M. No.
MTJ-10-1761. However, it is well to note that Samson v.
Caballero35 was promulgated by the Court on August 5, 2009
subsequent to the filing of the instant disbarment complaint
on April 6, 2009. Further, while all the allegations in A.M. No.
MTJ-10-1761 are replicated in the instant disbarment
complaint, the last issue of engagement in the scuffle is an
addition to the latter. Hence, this Court shall now resolve the
said issue to write finis to the parties’ bickerings.
In the instant disbarment complaint, tirades and bare
accusations were exchanged.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that
not one of the parties had presented even one independent
witness to prove what transpired inside the chamber of
Judge Casals on September 14, 2009. That a scuffle took
place is a fact, but the question of who started what cannot
be determined with much certainty.
While admitting his engagement in the scuffle, Eliseo
vigorously attempts to justify his conduct as self-defense on
his part.36
While this Court finds credence and logic in Eliseo’s
narration of the incident, and understands that the
successive acts of the parties during the tussle were
committed at a time when passions ran high, he shall not be
excused for comporting himself in such an undignified
manner.
Rule 7.03, Canon 737 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility explicitly proscribes a lawyer from engaging in
conduct that "adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
The case of Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Ong,38 on the other hand,
is instructive anent what constitutes unbecoming conduct,
viz:
Unbecoming conduct "applies to a broader range of
transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of
ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method."39
Sans any descriptive sophistry, what Eliseo did was
to engage in a brawl with no less than his own
children inside the chamber of a judge. This Court
shall not countenance crude social behavior.
Besides, the courtroom is looked upon by people
with high respect and is regarded as a sacred place
where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts
settled, and justice solemnly
dispensed.40 Misbehavior within or around the
vicinity diminishes its sanctity and
dignity.41 Although Alistair and Charmaine were not
entirely faultless, a higher level of decorum and
restraint was then expected from Eliseo, whose
conduct failed to show due respect for the court and
lend credit to the nobility of the practitioners of the
legal profession.
Further, albeit not raised as an issue, this Court
views with disfavor Eliseo’s statement during the
hearing conducted by the CBD on March 18, 2011
that he doubts Alistair to be his biologiocal son.42 As
a lawyer, Eliseo is presumably aware that ascribing
illegitimacy to Alistair in a proceeding not instituted
for that specific purpose is nothing short of
defamation.
All told, Eliseo violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility when he
conducted himself in a manner not befitting a
member of the bar by engaging in the scuffle with
his own children in the chamber of Judge Casals on
September 14, 2009 and recklessly expressing his
doubt anent the legitimacy of his son Alistair during
the hearing before the CBD.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds that respondent
Eliseo M. Campos violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. A FINE of
Five Thousand Pesos (Php5,000.00) is hereby
imposed upon him, with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6281 September 26, 2011
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D.
Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda.1
The facts, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the
owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890
square meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno,
Las Piñas, Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant
initiated Land Registration Commission (LRC) Case
No. M-226 for the registration of the aforesaid
property. The case was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 275. During
the course of the proceedings, complainant engaged the
services of respondent Atty. Carpio as counsel in the said
case when his original counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez,
figured in a vehicular accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent
agreed that complainant was to pay respondent Twenty
Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and
Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee.
Complainant paid respondent the amounts due him, as
evidenced by receipts duly signed by the latter. During the
last hearing of the case, respondent demanded the
additional amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00)
for the preparation of a memorandum, which he said would
further strengthen complainant's position in the case, plus
twenty percent (20%) of the total area of the subject property
as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's demand for it
was contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant
co-owned the subject property with his siblings, and he could
not have agreed to the amount being demanded by
respondent without the knowledge and approval of his
co-heirs. As a result of complainant's refusal to satisfy
respondent's demands, the latter became furious and their
relationship became sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in LRC Case
No. M-226, granting the petition for registration, which
Decision was declared final and executory in an Order dated
June 5, 1998. On March 24, 2000, the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) sent complainant a copy of the letter
addressed to the Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Piñas City,
which transmitted the decree of registration and the original
and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to get the
owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to discover that the
same had already been claimed by and released to
respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4, 2000,
complainant talked to respondent on the phone and asked
him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the OCT, which he
had claimed without complainant's knowledge, consent and
authority. Respondent insisted that complainant first pay him
the PhP10,000.00 and the 20% share in the property
equivalent to 378 square meters, in exchange for which,
respondent would deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT.
Once again, complainant refused the demand, for not having
been agreed upon.
In a letter3 dated May 24, 2000, complainant reiterated his
demand for the return of the owner's duplicate of the OCT.
On June 11, 2000, complainant made the same demand on
respondent over the telephone. Respondent reiterated his
previous demand and angrily told complainant to comply,
and threatened to have the OCT cancelled if the latter
refused to pay him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on April 6, 2000,
respondent registered an adverse claim on the subject OCT
wherein he claimed that the agreement on the payment of
his legal services was 20% of the property and/or actual
market value. To date, respondent has not returned the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his
co-heirs despite repeated demands to effect the same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the
appropriate penalty upon respondent, complainant invokes
the following provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable
fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
properties of his client when due or upon demand. x
xx
In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his
alleged retaining lien over the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not
turn over to complainant the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94 because of complainant's refusal,
notwithstanding repeated demands, to complete
payment of his agreed professional fee consisting
of 20% of the total area of the property covered by
the title, i.e., 378 square meters out of 1,890 square
meters, or its equivalent market value at the rate of
PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus, yielding a
sum of PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire
378-square-meter portion and that he was ready
and willing to turn over the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94, should complainant pay him
completely the aforesaid professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of
PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the
amount earlier paid to him will be deducted from the
20% of the current value of the subject lot. He
alleged that the agreement was not reduced into
writing, because the parties believed each other
based on their mutual trust. He denied that he
demanded the payment of PhP10,000.00 for the
preparation of a memorandum, since he considered
the same unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him
and complainant for the payment of the 20%
professional fees, respondent invoked the principle
of "quantum meruit" to justify the amount being
demanded by him.
In its Report and Recommendation4 dated June 9,
2005, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months for unjustly withholding from
complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
in the exercise of his so-called attorney's lien. In
Resolution No. XVII-2005-173,5 dated December
17, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting
the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Pending the resolution of his motion for
reconsideration, respondent filed a petition for
review6 with this Court. The Court, in a
Resolution7 dated August 16, 2006, directed that
the case be remanded to the IBP for proper
disposition, pursuant to this Court's resolution
in Noriel J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.8
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672, dated
December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated
December 17, 2005, with modification that
respondent is ordered to return the complainant's
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen
days from receipt of notice. Hence, the present
petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, which affirmed with modification the
findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that
would legally give him the right to retain the property of his
client until he receives what is allegedly due him has been
paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically
provides:
Section 37. Attorney’s liens. – An attorney shall have a lien
upon the funds, documents and papers of his client, which
have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the
same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid,
and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments
for the payment of money, and executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a
litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused
written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power
over such judgments and executions as his client would
have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just
fees and disbursements.
An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence
of the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-client
relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client's funds,
documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for
attorney's fees.9 Further, the attorney's retaining lien is a
general lien for the balance of the account between the
attorney and his client, and applies to the documents and
funds of the client which may come into the attorney's
possession in the course of his employment.10
In the present case, complainant claims that there is no such
agreement for the payment of professional fee consisting of
20% of the total area of the subject property and submits that
their agreement was only for the payment of the acceptance
fee and the appearance fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no proof of
any agreement between the complainant and the respondent
that the latter is entitled to an additional professional fee
consisting of 20% of the total area covered by OCT No. 0-94.
The agreement between the parties only shows that
respondent will be paid the acceptance fee and the
appearance fees, which the respondent has duly received.
Clearly, there is no unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that
would entitle respondent to retain his client's property. Hence,
respondent could not validly withhold the title of his client
absence a clear and justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's
title with the obvious aim of forcing complainant to agree to
the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by
respondent of the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien,
which by no means is an absolute right, and cannot at all
justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property
to his client when due or upon demand.11
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by
unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver the title of the
complainant, despite repeated demands, in the guise of an
alleged entitlement to additional professional fees. He has
breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST
ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon
demand.1âwphi1 However, he shall have a lien
over the funds and may apply so much thereof as
may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to
his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has
secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant
fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees."
It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose
additional professional fees upon his client which
were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time
of the engagement of his services. At the outset,
respondent should have informed the complainant
of all the fees or possible fees that he would charge
before handling the case and not towards the near
conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for
the complainant to determine if he has the financial
capacity to pay respondent before engaging his
services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled
to the payment of additional professional fees on
the basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no
merit. "Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he
deserved' is used as a basis for determining the
lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a
contract but recoverable by him from his
client."12 The principle of quantum meruit applies if
a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon
for his services. In such a case, he would be
entitled to receive what he merits for his services,
as much as he has earned.13 In the present case,
the parties had already entered into an agreement
as to the attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus,
the principle of quantum meruit does not fully find
application because the respondent is already
compensated by such agreement.
The Court notes that respondent did not inform
complainant that he will be the one to secure the
owner's duplicate of the OCT from the RD and
failed to immediately inform complainant that the
title was already in his possession. Complainant, on
April 3, 2000, went to the RD of Las Piñas City to
get the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to
be surprised that the said title had already been
claimed by, and released to, respondent on March
29, 2000. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially
in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a
manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship
with his clients should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith and fairness.14 By
keeping secret with the client his acquisition of the
title, respondent was not fair in his dealing with his
client. Respondent could have easily informed the
complainant immediately of his receipt of the
owner's duplicate of the OCT on March 29, 2000, in
order to save his client the time and effort in going
to the RD to get the title.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the
property belonging to his client and imposing
unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of
said title deserve the imposition of disciplinary
sanction. Hence, the ruling of the IBP Board of
Governors, adopting and approving with
modification the report and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months and that respondent be
ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 0-94 is hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period
from notice given to respondent within which to return the
title should be modified and, instead, respondent should
return the same immediately upon receipt of the Court's
decision.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision. He is ordered to
RETURN to the complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 0-94 immediately upon receipt of this decision. He is
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the
Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of Atty.
Macario D. Carpio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016
NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ROMEO
G. AGUILOS, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This administrative case relates to the performance of
duty of an attorney towards his client in which the
former is found and declared to be lacking in
knowledge and skill sufficient for the engagement.
Does quantum meruit attach when an attorney fails to
accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to
perform during his professional engagement?
Antecedents
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged
respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with
misconduct for the latter's refusal to return the
amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his
professional services despite his not having
performed the contemplated professional services.
She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal
services of the respondent to represent her in the
annulment of her marriage with her estranged
husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that the respondent
accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at
P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of
P5,000.00/hearing; that she then gave to him the
initial amount of P90,000.00;1 that she had gone to
his residence in May 2005 to inquire on the
developments in her case, but he told her that he
would only start working on the case upon her full
payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only
learned then that what he had contemplated to file for
her was a petition for legal separation, not one for the
annulment of her marriage; that he further
told her that she would have to pay a higher
acceptance fee for the annulment of her
marriage;2 that she subsequently withdrew
the case from him, and requested the refund
of the amounts already paid, but he refused to
do the same as he had already started
working on the case;3 that she had sent him a
letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to
demand the return of her payment less
whatever amount corresponded to the legal
services he had already performed;4 that the
respondent did not heed her demand letter
despite his not having rendered any
appreciable legal services to her;5 and that
his constant refusal to return the amounts
prompted her to bring an administrative
complaint against him6 in the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
In his answer dated May 21, 2007,7 the
respondent alleges that the complainant and
her British fiancee sought his legal services to
bring the petition for the annulment of her
marriage; that based on his evaluation of her
situation, the more appropriate case would be
one for legal separation anchored on the
psychological incapacity of her husband; that
she and her British fiancee agreed on
P150,000.00 for his legal services to bring the
action for legal separation, with the fiancee
paying him P70,000.00, as evidenced by his
handwritten receipt;8 that for purposes of the
petition for legal separation he required the
complainant to submit copies of her marriage
contract and the birth certificates of her
children with her husband, as well as for her
to submit to further interviews by him to
establish the grounds for legal separation;
that he later on communicated with her and
her fiancee upon finalizing the petition, but
they did not promptly respond to his
communications; that in May 2005, she
admitted to him that she had spent the money
that her fiancee had given to pay the balance
of his professional fees; and that in June 2005,
she returned to him with a note at the back of
the prepared petition for legal separation
essentially requesting him not to file the
petition because she had meanwhile opted to
bring the action for the annulment of her
marriage instead.
The respondent admits that he received the
demand letter from Atty. Martinez, but states
that he dismissed the letter as a mere scrap of
paper because the demand lacked basis in law.
It is noted that he wrote in the last part of his
answer dated May 21, 2007 in relation to the
demand letter the following:
Hence, respondent accordingly treated the said
letter demand for refund dated 15 August 2005
(Annex "B" of the complaint) as a mere scrap of
paper or should have been addressed by her
counsel ATTY. ISIDRO S.C. MARTINEZ,
who unskillfully relied on
an unverified information furnished him, to
the urinal project of the MMDA where it may serve
its rightful purpose.
9 (3)
Findings and Recommendation of the
IBP
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) summoned the parties to a mandatory
conference on August 3, 2007,10 but only the
complainant and her counsel attended the conference.
On his part, the respondent sent a letter dated July 20,
2007 to the IBP-CBD to reiterate his answer.11 Due to
his non-appearance, the IBP-CBD terminated the
conference on the same day, but required the
complainant to submit a verified position paper within
10 days. She did not submit the position paper in the
end.
In his commissioner's report dated July 25,
2008,12 IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La
Rama, Jr. declared that the respondent's insistence
that he could have brought a petition for legal
separation based on the psychological incapacity of
the complainant's husband was sanctionable because
he himself was apparently not conversant with the
grounds for legal separation; that because he
rendered some legal services to the complainant, he
was entitled to receive only P40,000.00 out of the
P70,000.00 paid to him as acceptance fee, the
P40,000.00 being the value of the services rendered
under the principle of quantum meruit; and that,
accordingly, he should be made to return to her the
amount of P30,000.00.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.
observed that the respondent's statement in the last
part of his answer, to the effect that the demand letter
sent by Atty. Martinez in behalf of the complainant
should be treated as a scrap of paper, or should have
been addressed "to the urinal project of the MMDA
where it may serve its rightful purpose," was uncalled
for and improper; and he opined that such offensive
and improper language uttered by the respondent
against a fellow lawyer violated Rule 8.0113 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
IBP Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.
ultimately recommended as follows:
The undersigned Commissioner is most
respectfully recommending the following:
To order the respondent to return
to the complainant the amount of
P30,000.00 which he received for
the purpose of preparing a petition
for legal separation. Undersigned
(1) believes that considering the
degree of professional services he
has extended, the amount of
P40,000.00 he received on March 10,
2005 would be sufficient payment
for the same.
For failure to distinguish between
the grounds for legal separation
(2)
and annulment of marriage,
respondent should be sanctioned.
Lastly, for failure to conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness
towards his colleagues and for
using offensive or improper
language in his pleading, which was
filed right before the Commission
on Bar Discipline, he must also be
sanctioned and disciplined in order
to avoid repetition of the said
 misconduct.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is most
respectfully recommended that Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos be ordered to return to complainant
Nenita D. Sanchez the amount of P30,000.00 which
the former received as payment for his services
because it is excessive.
It is also recommended that the Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of six (6) months for failure to show
his respect to his fellow lawyer and for using
offensive and improper language in his
pleadings.
Through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476
dated September 20, 2008,14 the IBP Board of
Governors affirmed the findings of
Investigating Commissioner De La Rama, Jr.,
but modified the recommendation of the
penalty, viz.:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED AND APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and
considering respondent's failure to show respect
to his fellow lawyer and for showing offensive
and improper words in his pleadings, Atty. Romeo
G. Aguilos, is hereby WARNED and Ordered to
Return the Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos
to complainant within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice.
15
The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration,16 which the IBP Board of
Governors denied through Resolution No.
XXI-2014-177 dated March 23, 2014.17
Issues
The two issues for consideration and
resolution are: (a) whether or not the
respondent should be held administratively
liable for misconduct; and (b) whether or not
he should be ordered to return the attorney's
fees paid.
Ruling of the Court
We adopt and affirm Resolution No.
XVIII-2008-476 and Resolution No.
XXI-2014-177, but modify the recommended
penalty.
1.
Respondent was liable for misconduct,
and he should be ordered to return the
entire amount received from the client
The respondent offered himself to the
complainant as a lawyer who had the requisite
professional competence and skill to handle
the action for the annulment of marriage for
her. He required her to pay P150,000.00 as
attorney's fees, exclusive of the filing fees and
his appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing. Of
that amount, he received the sum of
P70,000.00.
On the respondent's conduct of himself in his
professional relationship with the complainant as his
client, we reiterate and adopt the thorough analysis
and findings by IBP Investigating Commissioner De La
Rama, Jr. to be very apt and cogent, viz.:
As appearing in Annex "4", which is the
handwritten retainer's contract between the
respondent and the complainant, there is a
sweeping evidence that there is an
attorney-client relationship. The respondent
agreed to accept the case in the amount of
P150,000.00. The acceptance fee was agreed upon
to be paid on installment basis. Excluded in the
agreement is the payment of appearance fee,
filing fee and other legal documentation.
That next question is - for what case the
P150,000.00 was intended for? Was it intended
for the filing of the annulment case or legal
separation?
In the verified Answer filed by the respondent,
even the latter is quite confused as to what
action he is going to file in court. The
intention of the British national and the
complainant was to get married. At that time and
maybe up to now, the complainant is still legally
married to a certain Jovencio C. Sanchez. That
considering that the two are intending to get
married, we can safely assume that the
complainant was contemplating of filing a
petition for annulment of marriage in order to
free her from the marriage bond with her husband.
It is only then, granting that the petition will
be granted, that the complainant will be free
to marry the British subject. The legal
separation is but a separation of husband and
wife from board and bed and the marriage bond
still exists. Granting that the petition for
legal separation will be granted, one is not free
to marry another person.
A reading of the answer filed by the respondent
would show that he himself is not well versed
in the grounds for legal separation. He stated
the following;
. . . respondent suggested to them to file
instead a legal separation case for the
alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband to comply with his marital obligations
developed or of their marriage on February 6,
1999. (please see par. 2 of the Answer).
If the intention was to file a petition for legal
separation, under A.M. 02-11-11-SC, the grounds
are as follows:
Sec. 2. Petition-
(a) Who may and when to file - (1) A petition for legal
separation may be filed only by the husband or the wife,
as the case may be, within five years from the time of
the occurrence of any of the following causes:
(a) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
(b) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(c) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the
petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such
corruption or inducement;
(d) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to
imprisonment of more than six years, even if
pardoned;
(e) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the
respondent;
(f) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the
respondent;
(g) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent
bigamous marriage, whether in or outside the
Philippines;
(h) Sexual infidelity or perversion of the
respondent;
(i) Attempt on the life of petitioner by the
respondent; or
(j) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent
without justifiable cause for more than one year.
Psychological incapacity, contrary to what
respondent explained to the complainant, is not
one of those mentioned in any of the grounds for
legal separation.
Even in Article 55 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, psychological incapacity is never
a ground for the purpose of filing a petition for
legal separation.
On the other hand, psychological incapacity has
always been used for the purpose of filing a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage.
That as provided for by Article 36 of the New
Family Code, it stales that "a marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."
That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal
developments and participate in continuing legal
education program (Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent
repetition of such kind of advise that respondent
gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he
should be able to distinguish between the grounds
for legal separation and grounds for annulment
of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his
answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the
basic provisions of the law.
18
Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his
professional competence and skill to the
complainant. As the foregoing findings reveal,
he did not know the distinction between the
grounds for legal separation and for
annulment of marriage. Such knowledge
would have been basic and expected of him as
a lawyer accepting a professional
engagement for either causes of action. His
explanation that the client initially intended to
pursue the action for legal separation should
be disbelieved. The case unquestionably
contemplated by the parties and for which his services
was engaged, was no other than an action for
annulment of the complainant's marriage with her
husband with the intention of marrying her British
fiancee. They did not contemplate legal separation at
all, for legal separation would still render her
incapacitated to re-marry. That the respondent was
insisting in his answer that he had prepared a petition
for legal separation, and that she had to pay more as
attorney's fees if she desired to have the action for
annulment was, therefore, beyond comprehension
other than to serve as a hallow afterthought to justify
his claim for services rendered.
As such, the respondent failed to live up to the
standards imposed on him as an attorney. He thus
transgressed Canon 18, and Rules 18.01, 18.02 and
18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to
wit:
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a
legal serviee which he knows or should know that
he is not qualified to render. However, he may
render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel
a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal
matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
(Emphasis supplied)
The next to be dealt with is the matter of the
attorney's fees. We can easily agree that every
attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at
the special instance and request of his client. As long
as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to
represent and serve the interests of the client, he
should have a reasonable compensation for such
services.19
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the
retainer's agreement between the client and the
attorney, which constitutes the law between the
parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good
morals, good customs, public policy or public
order.20 The underlying theory is that the retainer's
agreement between them gives to the client the
reasonable notice of the arrangement on the fees.
Once the attorney has performed the task assigned to
him in a valid agreement, his compensation is
determined on the basis of what he and the client
agreed.21 In the absence of the written agreement,
the lawyer's compensation shall be based on quantum
meruit, which means "as much as he deserved."22 The
determination of attorney's fees on the basis
of quantum meruit is also authorized "when the
counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish
the case to its conclusion."23 Moreover, quantum
meruit becomes the basis of recovery of
compensation by the attorney where the
circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will
be contrary to the parties' expectation to deprive the
attorney of all compensation.
Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case
what is reasonable compensation based on the
obtaining circumstances,24 provided that the attorney
does not receive more than what is Janette Anne, all surnamed Sanchez (Annexes 4, 5, 6
reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule and 7); and (d) finalizing her petition for legal
138 of the Rules of Court, to wit: separation (Annex 8) in the later part of April, 2007.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; The opinion of IBP Investigating Commission De la

agreement as to fees - An attorney shall Rama, Jr. in favor of the respondent was too generous.
be entitled to have and recover from his We cannot see how the respondent deserved any
client no more than a reasonable compensation because he did not really begin to
compensation for his services, with a
perform the contemplated tasks if, even based on his
view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of version, he would prepare the petition for legal
the services rendered, and the separation instead of the petition for annulment of
professional standing of the attorney. marriage. The attorney who fails to accomplish the
No court shall be bound by the opinion of tasks he should naturally and expectedly perform
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the during his professional engagement does not
proper compensation, but may disregard discharge his professional responsibility and ethical
such testimony and base its conclusion on duty toward his client. The respondent was thus guilty
its own professional knowledge. A of misconduct, and may be sanctioned according to
written contract for services shall the degree of the misconduct. As a consequence, he
control the amount to be paid therefor may be ordered to restitute to the client the amount
unless found by the court to be received from the latter in consideration of the
unconscionable or unreasonable. professional engagement, subject to the rule
on quantum meruit, if warranted.
The courts supervision of the lawyer's
compensation for legal services rendered is Accordingly, the respondent shall be fined in the
not only for the purpose of ensuring the amount of P10,000.00 for his misrepresentation of his
reasonableness of the amount of attorney's professional competence, and he is further to be
fees charged, but also for the purpose of ordered to return the entire amount of P70,000.00
preserving the dignity and integrity of the received from the client, plus legal interest of 6% per
legal profession.25cralawred annum reckoned from the date of this decision until
full payment.
The respondent should not have accepted the
engagement because as it was later revealed,
2.
it was way above his ability and competence
to handle the case for annulment of marriage.
Respondent did not conduct himself with
As a consequence, he had no basis to accept
courtesy, fairness and candor towards his
any amount as attorney's fees from the
professional colleague
complainant. He did not even begin to
perform the contemplated task he undertook
The Rules of Court mandates members of the
for the complainant because it was
Philippine Bar to "abstain from all offensive
improbable that the agreement with her was
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
to bring the action for legal separation. His
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
having supposedly prepared the petition for
required by the justice of the cause with which he is
legal separation instead of the petition for
charged."26 This duty of lawyers is further emphasized
annulment of marriage was either his way of
in the Code of Professional Responsibility, whose
covering up for his incompetence, or his
Canon 8 provides: "A lawyer shall conduct himself
means of charging her more. Either way did
with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his
not entitle him to retain the amount he had
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing
already received.
tactics against opposing counsel." Rule 8.01 of Canon
8 specifically demands that: "A lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
The written receipt dated March 10, 2005
offensive or otherwise improper."
shows that the respondent received
P70,000.00 as acceptance fee. His refusal to
The Court recognizes the adversarial nature of our
return the amount to the complainant rested
legal system which has necessitated lawyers to use
on his claim of having already completed the
strong language in the advancement of the interest of
first phase of the preparation of the petition
their clients.27 However, as members of a noble
for legal separation after having held
profession, lawyers are always impressed with the
conferences with the complainant and her
duty to represent their clients' cause, or, as in this
British fiancee. In this respect, IBP
case, to represent a personal matter in court, with
Investigating Commission De la Rama, Jr.
courage and zeal but that should not be used as
opined that the respondent could retain
license for the use of offensive and abusive language.
P40,000.00 of the P70,000.00 because the
In maintaining the integrity and dignity of the legal
respondent had rendered some legal services
profession, a lawyer's language - spoken or in his
to the complainant, specifically: (a) having
pleadings - must be dignified.28 As such, every lawyer
the complainant undergo further interviews
is mandated to carry out his duty as an agent in the
towards establishing the ground for legal
administration of justice with courtesy, dignity and
separation; (b) reducing into writing the
respect not only towards his clients, the court and
grounds discussed during the interviews
judicial officers, but equally towards his colleagues in
based on her statement in her own dialect
the Legal Profession.
(Annexes 1 and 2) after he could not
understand the written statement prepared
for the purpose by her British fiancee; (c)
The respondent's statement in his answer that the
requiring her to submit her marriage contract
demand from Atty. Martinez should be treated "as a
with her husband Jovencio C. Sanchez (Annex
mere scrap of paper or should have been addressed
3), and the certificates of live birth of her four
by her counsel x x x to the urinal project of the MMDA
children: Mary Joy, Timothy, Christine, and
where it may service its rightful purpose"
constituted simple misconduct that this Court
cannot tolerate.
In his motion for reconsideration, the
respondent tried to justify the offensive and
improper language by asserting that the
phraseology was not per se uncalled for and
improper. He explained that he had sufficient
cause for maintaining that the demand letter
should be treated as a mere scrap of paper
and should be disregarded. However, his
assertion does not excuse the offensiveness
and impropriety of his language. He could
have easily been respectful and proper in
responding to the letter.
As penalty for this particular misconduct, he is
reprimanded, with the stern warning that a
repetition of the offense will be severely
punished.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated
September 20, 2008 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors, with
the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G.
Aguilos is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for
misrepresenting his professional competence
to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his
use of offensive and improper language
towards his fellow attorney, with the stern
warning that a repetition of the offense shall
be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos
to RETURN to the complainant within thirty
(30) days from notice the sum of P70,000.00,
plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned
from the date of this decision until full
payment.
Let copies of this decision be attached to the
personal records of Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos as
a member of the Philippine Bar, and be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for proper
dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4191 June 10, 2013
ANITA C. PENA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CHRISTINA C. PATERNO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed against respondent Atty.
Christina C. Paterno for acts violative of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law.
On February 14, 1994, complainant Anita C. Peña, former
head of the Records Department of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), filed an
Affidavit-Complaint1 against respondent Atty. Christina C.
Paterno. Complainant alleged that she was the owner of a
parcel of land known as Lot 7-C, Psd-74200, located in
Bayanbayanan, Parang, Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-61244,2 Register of
Deeds of Marikina, with an eight-door apartment constructed
thereon. She personally knew respondent Atty. Christina C.
Paterno, as respondent was her lawyer in a legal separation
case, which she filed against her husband in 1974, and the
aforementioned property was her share in their property
settlement. Complainant stated that she also knew
personally one Estrella D. Kraus, as she was respondent's
trusted employee who did secretarial work for respondent.
Estrella Kraus was always there whenever she visited
respondent in connection with her cases.
Moreover, complainant stated that, sometime in 1986,
respondent suggested that she (complainant) apply for a
loan from a bank to construct townhouses on her property for
sale to interested buyers, and that her property be offered as
collateral. Respondent assured complainant that she would
work out the speedy processing and release of the loan.
Complainant agreed, but since she had a balance on her
loan with the GSIS, respondent lent her the sum of
₱27,000.00, without any interest, to pay the said loan. When
her title was released by the GSIS, complainant entrusted it
to respondent who would handle the preparation of
documents for the loan and follow-up the same, and
complainant gave respondent the authority for this purpose.
From time to time, complainant inquired about the
application for the loan, but respondent always assured her
that she was still preparing the documents required by the
bank. Because of her assurances, complainant did not
bother to check on her property, relying on respondent's
words that she would handle speedily the preparation of her
application.
Further, complainant narrated that when she visited her
property, she discovered that her apartment was already
demolished, and in its place, four residential houses were
constructed on her property, which she later learned was
already owned by one Ernesto D. Lampa, who bought her
property from Estrella D. Kraus. Complainant immediately
confronted respondent about what she discovered, but
respondent just brushed her aside and ignored her. After
verification, complainant learned that her property was sold
on November 11, 1986 to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
and respondent was the Notary Public before whom the sale
was acknowledged.3 Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.,
through its Managing Partner, Estrella D. Kraus, sold the
same to one Ernesto D. Lampa on April 13, 1989.4
Complainant stated in her Complaint that she did
not sell her property to Krisbuilt Traders Company,
Ltd., and that she neither signed any deed of sale in
its favor nor appeared before respondent to
acknowledge the sale. She alleged that respondent
manipulated the sale of her property to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. using her trusted employee,
Estrella D. Kraus, as the instrument in the sale, and
that her signature was forged, as she did not sign
any deed selling her property to anyone.
In her Answer,5 respondent alleged that Estrella D.
Kraus never worked in any capacity in her law office,
and that Estrella and her husband, Karl Kraus
(Spouses Kraus), were her clients. Respondent
denied that she suggested that complainant should
apply for a loan from a bank to construct
townhouses. She said that it was the complainant,
on the contrary, who requested her (respondent) to
look for somebody who could help her raise the
money she needed to complete the amortization of
her property, which was mortgaged with the GSIS
and was about to be foreclosed. Respondent stated
that she was the one who introduced complainant
to the Spouses Kraus when they were both in her
office. In the course of their conversation,
complainant offered the property, subject matter of
this case, to the Spouses Kraus. The Spouses
Kraus were interested, and got the telephone
number of complainant. Thereafter, complainant
told respondent that she accompanied the Spouses
Kraus to the site of her property and the Office of
the Register of Deeds. After about three weeks, the
Spouses Kraus called up respondent to tell her that
they had reached an agreement with complainant,
and they requested respondent to prepare the deed
of sale in favor of their company, Krisbuilt Traders
Company, Ltd. Thereafter, complainant and the
Spouses Kraus went to respondent's office where
complainant signed the Deed of Sale after she
received Sixty-Seven Thousand Pesos (₱67,000.00)
from the Spouses Kraus. Respondent alleged that
complainant took hold of the Deed of Sale, as the
understanding was that the complainant would, in
the meantime, work for the release of the mortgage,
and, thereafter, she would deliver her certificate of
title, together with the Deed of Sale, to the Spouses
Kraus who would then pay complainant the balance
of the agreed price. Complainant allegedly told
respondent that she would inform respondent when
the transaction was completed so that the Deed of
Sale could be recorded in the Notarial Book.
Thereafter, respondent claimed that she had no
knowledge of what transpired between complainant
and the Spouses Kraus. Respondent stated that
she was never entrusted with complainant's
certificate of title to her property in Marikina (TCT
No. N-61244). Moreover, it was only complainant
who negotiated the sale of her property in favor of
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. According to
respondent, complainant's inaction for eight years
to verify what happened to her property only meant
that she had actually sold the same, and that she
concocted her story when she saw the prospect of
her property had she held on to it. Respondent
prayed for the dismissal of the case.
On February 28, 1995, complainant filed a
Reply,6 belying respondent's allegations and
affirming the veracity of her complaint.
On March 20, 1995, this case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation and recommendation.7 On April 18,
1996, complainant moved that hearings be
scheduled by the Commission on Bar Discipline. On
November 8, 1999, the case was set for its initial
hearing, and hearings were conducted from March 21, 2000
to July 19, 2000.
On August 3, 2000, complainant filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence. Thereafter, hearings for the reception of
respondent's evidence were set, but supervening events
caused their postponement.
On July 4, 2001, respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence,8 which was opposed by complainant. The
Investigating Commissioner denied respondent's prayer for
the outright dismissal of the complaint, and directed
respondent to present her evidence on October 24, 2001.9
The Register of Deeds of Marikina City was subpoenaed to
testify and bring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November
11, 1986, which caused the cancellation of TCT No. 61244 in
the name of complainant and the issuance of a new title to
Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. However, the Register of
Deeds failed to appear on March 1, 2002. During the hearing
held on July 29, 2003, respondent's counsel presented a
certification10 from Records Officer Ma. Corazon Gaspar of
the Register of Deeds of Marikina City, which certification
stated that a copy of the Deed of Sale executed by Anita C.
Peña in favor of Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd., covering a
parcel of land in Marikina, could not be located from the
general file of the registry and that the same may be
considered lost. Hearings continued until 2005. On February
17, 2005, respondent was directed by the Investigating
Commissioner to formally offer her evidence and to submit
her memorandum.
Before the resolution of the case by the IBP, respondent filed
a Motion to Dismiss before the IBP on the ground that the
criminal case of estafa filed against her before the RTC of
Manila, Branch 36, which estafa case was anchored on the
same facts as the administrative case, had been dismissed
in a Decision11 dated August 20, 2007 in Criminal Case No.
94-138567. The RTC held that the case for estafa could not
prosper against the accused Atty. Christina C. Paterno,
respondent herein, for insufficiency of evidence to secure
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, considering the
absence of the Deed of Sale and/or any competent proof that
would show that Anita Peña's signature therein was forged
and the transfer of the land was made through fraudulent
documents.
The issue resolved by the Investigating Commissioner was
whether or not there was clear and preponderant evidence
showing that respondent violated the Canons of Professional
Responsibility by (a) deceiving complainant Anita C. Peña;
(b) conspiring with Estrella Kraus and Engr. Ernesto Lampa
to enable the latter to register the subject property in his
name; and (c) knowingly notarizing a falsified contract of
sale.
On January 6, 2009, Atty. Albert R. Sordan, the Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP, submitted his Report and
Recommendation finding that respondent betrayed the trust
reposed upon her by complainant by executing a bogus
deed of sale while she was entrusted with complainant's
certificate of title, and that respondent also notarized the
spurious deed of sale. Commissioner Sordan stated that
there was no evidence showing that respondent actively
conspired with any party or actively participated in the
forgery of the signature of complainant. Nevertheless,
Commissioner Sordan stated that complainant's evidence
supports the conclusion that her signature on the said Deed
of Sale dated November 11, 1986 was forged.
Although no copy of the said Deed of Sale could be
produced notwithstanding diligent search in the National
Archives and the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Commissioner Sordan stated that the
interlocking testimonies of the complainant and her witness,
Maura Orosco, proved that the original copy of the owner's
duplicate certificate of title was delivered to
respondent.12 Commissioner Sordan did not give
credence to respondent's denial that complainant
handed to her the owner's duplicate of TCT No.
N-61244 in November 1986 at the GSIS, as Maura
Orosco, respondent's former client who worked as
Records Processor at the GSIS, testified that she
saw complainant give the said title to respondent.
Commissioner Sordan gave credence to the
testimony of complainant that she gave respondent
her owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 61244 to
enable respondent to use the same as collateral in
constructing a townhouse, and that the title was in
the safekeeping of respondent for seven
years.13 Despite repeated demands by complainant,
respondent refused to return it.14 Yet, respondent
assured complainant that she was still the
owner.15 Later, complainant discovered that a new
building was erected on her property in January
1994, eight years after she gave the title to
respondent. Respondent argued that it was
unfathomable that after eight years, complainant
never took any step to verify the status of her loan
application nor visited her property, if it is untrue
that she sold the said property. Complainant
explained that respondent kept on assuring her that
the bank required the submission of her title in
order to process her loan application.16
Commissioner Sordan stated that respondent
enabled Estrella B. Kraus to sell complainant's land
to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd.17 This was
evidenced by Entry No. 150322 in TCT No. 61244
with respect to the sale of the property described
therein to Krisbuilt Traders Company, Ltd. for
₱200,000.00.18 Respondent alleged that
complainant signed the Deed of Sale in her
presence inside her office.19 However, respondent
would neither directly confirm nor deny if, indeed,
she notarized the instrument in her direct
examination,20 but on cross-examination, she
stated that she was not denying that she was the
one who notarized the Deed of Sale.21 Estrella
Kraus' affidavit22 supported respondent's defense.
Respondent presented her former employee Basilio
T. Depaudhon to prove the alleged signing by
complainant of the purported Deed of Absolute Sale,
and the notarization by respondent of the said Deed.
However, Commissioner Sordan doubted the
credibility of Depaudhon, as he affirmed that his
participation in the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale
was mere recording, but he later affirmed that he
saw the parties sign the Deed of Absolute Sale.23
Commissioner Sordan stated that the unbroken
chain of circumstances, like respondent's testimony
that she saw complainant sign the Deed of Sale
before her is proof of respondent's deception.
Respondent's notarization of the disputed deed of
sale showed her active role to perpetuate a fraud to
prejudice a party. Commissioner Sordan declared
that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence and fealty to her office by attesting that
the alleged party, Anita Peña, appeared before her
and signed the deed when in truth and in fact the
said person did not participate in the execution
thereof. Moreover, respondent should be faulted for
having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the deed of sale in her notarial
register.
According to Commissioner Sordan, these gross
violations of the law made respondent liable for
violation of her oath as a lawyer and constituted
transgressions of Section 20 (a),24 Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and Canon 125 and Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Sordan recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law and her name stricken-off
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately, and
recommended that the notarial commission of respondent, if
still existing, be revoked, and that respondent be perpetually
disqualified from reappointment as a notary public.
On August 28, 2010, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed Resolution No. XIX-20-464, adopting and approving
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
and finding Respondent guilty of her oath as a lawyer,
Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty.
Christina C. Paterno is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law and her name stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys. Furthermore, respondent's notarial commission if
still existing is Revoked with Perpetual Disqualification from
reappointment as a Notary Public.
The Court adopts the findings of the Board of Governors of
the IBP insofar as respondent has violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Notarial Law, and agrees
with the sanction imposed.
The criminal case of estafa from which respondent was
acquitted, as her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, is different from this administrative case, and each
must be disposed of according to the facts and the law
applicable to each case.26 Section 5,27 in relation to Sections
128 and 2,29 Rule 133, Rules of Court states that in
administrative cases, only substantial evidence is required,
not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil cases. Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.30
Freeman v. Reyes31 held that the dismissal of a criminal
case does not preclude the continuance of a separate and
independent action for administrative liability, as the weight
of evidence necessary to establish the culpability is merely
substantial evidence. An administrative case can proceed
independently, even if there was a full-blown trial wherein,
based on both prosecution and defense evidence, the trial
court eventually rendered a judgment of acquittal, on the
ground either that the prosecution failed to prove the
respondent's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, or that no crime
was committed.32
The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and the
public from the misconduct of the officers of the court and to
ensure the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable and trustworthy men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.33 The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary
power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing
and satisfactory evidence.34
In this case, Investigating Commissioner Sordan gave
credence to complainant's testimony that she gave
respondent her owner's copy of the certificate of title to her
property as respondent would apply for a bank loan in
complainant's behalf, using the subject property as collateral.
Complainant's testimony was corroborated by Maura Orosco,
a former records processor in complainant's office at the
GSIS and also a client of respondent, who stated that she
saw complainant give her title to respondent.35 Respondent
admitted in her Answer36 that she executed the
Deed of Sale per the request of the Spouses Kraus.
The said Deed of Sale was notarized by respondent
as evidenced by Entry No. 15032237 in
complainant's title, TCT No. N-61244. As the Deed
of Sale could not be presented in evidence, through
no fault of the complainant, nonetheless, the
consequence thereof is failure of complainant to
prove her allegation that her signature therein was
forged and that respondent defrauded complainant
by facilitating the sale of the property to Krisbuilt
Traders Company, Ltd. without complainant's
approval. However, complainant proved that
respondent did not submit to the Clerk of Court of
the RTC of Manila, National Capital Region her
Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,
when the Deed of Sale was executed.
The pertinent provisions of the applicable Notarial
Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended,
states that every notary public shall keep a notarial
register,38 and he shall enter in such register, in
chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, among others, and, when the instrument
is a contract, he shall keep a correct copy thereof
as part of his records, and he shall likewise enter in
said records a brief description of the substance
thereof.39
A ground for revocation of a notary public's
commission is failure of the notary to send the copy
of the entries to the proper clerk of the Court of First
Instance (RTC) within the first ten days of the month
next following or the failure of the notary to forward
his notarial register, when filled, to the proper clerk
of court.40
In this case, the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila
issued a Certification,41 dated February 22, 1994,
stating that respondent was duly appointed as a
Notary Public for the City of Manila for the year
1986, and that respondent has not yet forwarded to
the Clerk of Court's Office her Notarial Report for
the month of November 1986, when the Deed of
Sale was executed and notarized by her. Hence, a
copy of the Notarial Report/Record and the said
Deed of Sale could not also be found in the National
Archives per the certification42 of the Archives
Division Chief Teresita R. Ignacio for Director
Edgardo J. Celis. The failure of respondent to fulfill
her duty as notary public to submit her notarial
register for the month of November 1986 and a
copy of the said Deed of Sale that was notarized by
her on the same month is cause for revocation of
her commission under Section 249 of the Notarial
Law.43 Lawyers commissioned as notaries public
are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of
their offices, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest.44
Pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended for
any deceit or dishonest act, thus:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. – A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilfull
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Given the facts of this case, wherein respondent was in
possession of complainant's copy of the certificate of title
(TCT No. N-61244) to the property in Marikina, and it was
respondent who admittedly prepared the Deed of Sale,
which complainant denied having executed or signed, the
important evidence of the alleged forgery of complainant's
signature on the Deed of Sale and the validity of the sale is
the Deed of Sale itself. However, a copy of the Deed of Sale
could not be produced by the Register of Deeds of Marikina
City, as it could not be located in the general files of the
registry, and a certification was issued stating that the Deed
of Sale may be considered lost.45 Moreover, respondent did
not submit to the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Manila her
Notarial Report for the month of November 1986,46 including
the said Deed of Sale, which was executed on November 11,
1986. Hence, Investigating Commissioner Sordan opined
that it appears that efforts were exerted to get rid of the
copies of the said Deed of Sale to prevent complainant from
getting hold of the document for the purpose of handwriting
verification from an expert to prove that her alleged signature
on the Deed of Sale was forged. The failure of respondent to
submit to the proper RTC Clerk of Court her Notarial
Register/Report for the month of November 1986 and a copy
of the Deed of Sale, which was notarized by her within that
month, has far-reaching implications and grave
consequences, as it in effect suppressed evidence on the
veracity of the said Deed of Sale and showed the deceitful
conduct of respondent to withhold the truth about its
authenticity. During her testimony, it was observed by the
Investigating Commissioner and reflected in the transcript of
records that respondent would neither directly confirm nor
deny that she notarized the said Deed of Sale.
For the aforementioned deceitful conduct, respondent is
disbarred from the practice of law. As a member of the bar,
respondent failed to live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following
Canons:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the
legal system.
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.1âwphi1
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Christina C. Paterno is
DISBARRED from the practice of law, pursuant to Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as well as for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and the notarial
commission of Atty. Christina C. Paterno, if still existing, is
perpetually REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record.
Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
The Bar Confidant is hereby DIRECTED to strike
out the name of Christina C. Paterno from the Roll
of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa
Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had
all the documents notarized before one Atty.
DonatoManguiat (Atty.
Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification

and immediately disowned the signature affixed in the
affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring
that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document
on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the
MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo
Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the
FIRST DIVISION affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge
Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a
pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among
others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s
SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere
UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount
WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondents. of time to have the affidavits personally signed by the
affiants but still hastily filed the election protest with
DECISION full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were
falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the
complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not
This administrative case stemmed from a appear before the MeTC, although promptly notified,
Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not
incompetence, and gross misconduct of offer any explanation as to why he was not able to
respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Vera) in his handling of the election protest
case involving the candidacy of The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and
MariecrisUmaguing (Umaguing), daughter of asked for an explanation regarding his
Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing non-appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained
(complainants), for the that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo.
instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received
of Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo
as ELEC. CASE No. Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for
07-1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only
appear for the case if the complainants would give him
The Facts P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge
Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
the position of SK Chairman in the SK
Elections for the year 2007 but lost to her rival On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and
Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De
vote.3 Because of this, complainants lodged Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the
an election protest and enlisted the services complainants asked the former to withdraw as their
of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007, counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in
complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to excessive fees he collected from them, considering
pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus that he only appeared twice for the
various court appearance fees and case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty.
Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to De Vera’s disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
prepare and file the case but the former
moved at a glacial pace and only took action In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently
when the November 8, 2008 deadline was denied all the accusations lodged against him by
looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the complainants. He averred that he merely prepared
preparation of the necessary documents and the essential documents for election protest based on
attachments for the election protest. Two (2) the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then
of these attachments are the Affidavits6 of explained that the signing of Lachica’s falsified
material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise
(Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which stated that it was Christina Papin who should be
was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal
the time that the aforesaid affidavits were offense. He added that he actually sought to rectify his
needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to
they were unfortunately unavailable. To Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to
remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he
instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and supposedly felt that he could no longer serve
Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of
nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera
and ask them to sign over the names.7 The then withdrew from the case.18 To add, he pointed out
signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names
that along with his Formal Notice of
Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants
executed a document entitled “Release
Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him,
discharges him and his law firm from all
causes of action that complainants may have
against him, including the instant
administrative case.
After the conduct of the mandatory
conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar
Discipline, the matter was submitted for
report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the
IBP
In a Report and Recommendation20 dated
December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner
found the administrative action to be
impressed with merit, and thus recommended
that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2)
months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While no sufficient evidence was found to
support the allegation that Atty. De Vera
participated in the falsification of Lachica’s
affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled
oppositely with respect to the falsification of
Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De
Vera deliberately omitted to comment on. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that
the testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen,
Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip
approached her and asked if she could sign
the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that
Atty. De Vera was present during its signing,
and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera
that she was not Almera – was found to be
credible as it was too straightforward and
hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the
backdrop in which the allegations were
made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits
was done on November 7, 2007, or one day
before the deadline for the filing of the
election protest, showed that Atty. De Vera
was really pressed for time and, hence, his
resort to the odious act of advising his client’s
campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look
for kin and relatives of the affiants for and in
their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the
deadline set for the filing of the election
protest.23 To this, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s
first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice, and therefore, his
conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics
of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012,
the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to
adopt the findings of the IBP Commissioner.
Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified
document in court, a two (2) month
suspension was imposed against Atty. De
Vera.
On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board
of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated
February 11, 2014, affirming with
modification their December 14, 2012
Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension from
two (2) months to one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De
Vera should be held administratively liable.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP,
as the same were duly substantiated by the records.
However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period
of suspension to six (6) months.
Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his
client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to
be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy.
These expectations, though high and demanding, are
the professional and ethical burdens of every member
of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full
expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of
this country has taken upon admission as a bona
fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man
for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
29
help me God. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to
obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing
any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to
the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his
clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has
to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be
an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values
of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are
emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that
“[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”
After an assiduous examination of the records, the
Court finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the
IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De Vera
sanctioned the submission of a falsified
affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his
desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for
filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the
Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating
Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa
Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that
nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same,
and in recognition too of the fact that the IBP and its
officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s
credibility during disciplinary proceedings, as they –
similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to
first-hand observe their demeanor and attorney is called to answer to the court for
comportment. The assertion that Atty. De his conduct as an officer of the court. The
Vera authorized the falsification of Almera’s complainant or the person who called the
affidavit is rendered more believable by the attention of the court to the attorney’s alleged
misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
absence of Atty. De Vera’s comment on the
generally no interest in the outcome except as
same. In fact, in his Motion for
all good citizens may have in the proper
Reconsideration of the IBP Board of administration of justice.37
Governors’ Resolution dated December 14,
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the
2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty.
Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code
De Vera on this score. Instead, he only
of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified
asserted that he was not the one who
document before a court.
notarized the subject affidavits but another
notary public, who he does not even know or
As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v.
has seen in his entire life,31 and that he had
Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the lawyer
no knowledge of the falsification of the
therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for
impugned documents, much less of the
filing a spurious document in court. In view of the
participation in using the
antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate
same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the
to impose the same here.
Court views the same to be a mere general
denial which cannot overcome Elsa
Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for
Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he
reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
indeed participated in the procurement of her
P60,000.00,40 comprised of Atty. De Vera’s
signature and the signing of the affidavit, all
acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically
in support of the claim of falsification.
related to his professional engagement,41 for he had
actually admitted his receipt thereof in his Answer
before the IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The final lining to it all – for which the IBP
Board of Governors rendered its
As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering
recommendation – is that Almera’s affidavit
exhortation in Samonte:
was submitted to the MeTC in the election
protest case. The belated retraction of the Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
questioned affidavits, through the Answer to designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, privilege to practice law in this country should
for this Court, merit significant consideration remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only
as its submission appears to be a mere thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to
afterthought, prompted only by the discovery remain as members of the Law Profession. Any
of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly resort to falsehood or deception, including
improbable for Atty. De Vera to have adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds
remained in the dark about the authenticity of committed against clients and the rest of the
the documents he himself submitted to the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to
court when his professional duty requires him continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member
to represent his client with zeal and within the
of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty
bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited
lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.43
from handling any legal matter without
adequate preparation34 or allow his client to
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera
dictate the procedure in handling the
(respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the
case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
On a related point, the Court deems it apt to
is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice
clarify that the document captioned “Release
of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a
Waiver & Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in
stern warning that any repetition of the same or
his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have
similar acts will be punished more severely.
discharged him from all causes of action that
complainants may have against him, such as
Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to
the present case, would not deny the Court its
complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing
power to sanction him administratively. It was
the amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly
held in Ylaya v. Gacott36 that:
received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to
A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of his professional engagement within ninety (90) days
interest of the complainant. What from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply
matters is whether, on the basis of the with the foregoing directive will warrant the
facts borne out by the record, the charge imposition of further administrative penalties.
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has
been proven. This rule is premised on the Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
proceeding for suspension or disbarment personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this
is not a civil action where the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
complainant is a plaintiff and the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator,
respondent lawyer is a defendant. which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the
Disciplinary proceedings involve no country for their information and guidance.
private interest and afford no redress
for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the SO ORDERED.
public welfare. They are undertaken for
the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official administration
of persons unfit to practice in them. The
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 10537 February 3, 2015
REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MERCEDES
BUHAYANG-MARGALLO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
When an action or proceeding is initiated in our
courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of their
clients. Lawyers are expected to prosecute or
defend the interests of their clients without need for
reminders. The privilege of the office of attorney
grants them the ability to warrant to their client that
they will manage the case as if it were their own.
The relationship between an attorney and client is a
sacred agency. It cannot be disregarded on the
flimsy excuse that the lawyer accepted the case
only because he or she was asked by an
acquaintance. The professional relationship
remains the same regardless of the reasons for the
acceptance by counsel and regardless of whether
the case is highly paying or pro bono.
Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo’s (Atty.
Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal,
terminating the case of her client not on the merits
but due to her negligence. She made it appear that
the case was dismissed on the merits when, in truth,
she failed to file the Appellant’s Brief on time. She
did not discharge her duties of candor to her client.
This court resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by
Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
In the Resolution2 dated March 21, 2014, the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines affirmed with modification its earlier
Resolution3 dated March 20, 2013. In its delegated
capacity to conduct fact finding for this court, it
found that respondent Atty. Margallo had violated
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility.4 Consequently, the Board of
Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.5
6
In the Complaint filed on January 20, 2010 before
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo
Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he engaged Atty.
Margallo’s services as legal counsel in a civil case
for Quieting of Title entitled "Spouses Roque v.
Ramirez."7 The case was initiated before the
Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch
68.8
According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him
on or about March 2004, as per a referral from a
friend of Ramirez’s sister.9 He alleged that Atty.
Margallo had offered her legal services on the
condition that she be given 30% of the land subject
of the controversy instead of attorney’s fees.10 It
was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo
₱1,000.00 per court appearance.11
On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated
a Decision adverse to Ramirez.12 Atty. Margallo advised him
to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal
before the Court of Appeals.13
The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the
Court of Appeals sometime in 2008.14 On December 5, 2008,
the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellant’s
Brief. Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she
would have one prepared.15
On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to
follow up on the Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Margallo informed
him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents
necessary for the brief.16
On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of
the brief, but he was told that there was still no word from the
Court of Appeals.17
On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that
his Appeal had been denied.18 She told him that the Court of
Appeals’ denial was due to Ramirez’s failure to establish his
filiation with his alleged father, which was the basis of his
claim.19 She also informed him that they could no longer
appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of
Appeals had been promulgated and the reglementary period
for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.20
Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered
that the Appellant’s Brief was filed on April 13, 2009 with a
Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond
the reglementary period.21
Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17
and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Codeof
Professional Responsibility.22 By way of defense, Atty.
Margallo argued that she had agreed to take on the case for
free, save for travel expense of ₱1,000.00 per hearing. She
also claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his
mother that they only had a 50% chance of winning the
case.23 She denied ever having entered into an agreement
regarding the contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the
land subject of the controversy.
Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the
Appeal except that the mother of Ramirez had begged her to
do so.24 She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to
see her for document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored
her. When he finally showed up on March 2009, he merely
told her that he had been busy.25 Her failure to immediately
inform Ramirez of the unfavorable Decision of the Court of
Appeals was due to losing her client’s number because her
8-year-old daughter played with her phone and accidentally
erased all her contacts.26
Mandatory conference and findings of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines
The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3,
2010.27 Only Ramirez appeared despite Atty. Margallo
having received notice.28 The mandatory conference was
reset to July 22, 2010. Both parties then appeared and were
directed to submit their position papers.29 Commissioner
Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be
reprimanded for her actions and be given a stern warning
that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt with
more severely.30 This was based on his two key findings.
First, Atty. Margallo allowed the reglementary period for filing
an Appellant’s Brief to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no
longer wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all
means possible to protect the interest of her client.31 Second,
Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel,
resulting in the loss of Ramirez’s statutory right to
seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.32
In the Resolution33 dated March 20, 2013, the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline. The Board of Governors resolved to
recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo
with a stern warning that repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on July 16, 2013.34 In the
Resolution dated March 21, 2014, the Board of
Governors granted Ramirez’s Motion for
Reconsideration and increased the recommended
penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2)
years.35
On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition
for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court.36 She alleged that the
recommended penalty of suspension was too
severe considering that she had been very careful
and vigilant in defending the cause of her client.
She also averred that this was the first time a
Complaint was filed against her.37 Ramirez
thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his
Motion for Reconsideration previously filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on
Atty. Margallo’s Petition for Review.38 In the
Resolution39 dated October 14, 2014, this court
granted Ramirez’s Motion. Atty. Margallo filed her
Reply40 on October 6, 2014.
This court’s ruling
The Petition is denied for lack of merit.
The relationship between a lawyer and a client is
"imbued with utmost trust and
confidence."41 Lawyers are expected to exercise
the necessary diligence and competence in
managing cases entrusted to them. They commit
not only to review cases or give legal advice, but
also to represent their clients to the best of their
ability without need to be reminded by either the
client or the court. The expectation to maintain a
high degree of legal proficiency and attention
remains the same whether the represented party is
a high-paying client or an indigent litigant.42
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
provide:
CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE
CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS
CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed
of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to client’s request for information.
In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr.,43 a
lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his
absence in a scheduled preliminary conference,
which resulted in the case being submitted for
resolution. This was aggravated by the lawyer’s
failure to inform his client about the adverse ruling of the
Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the litigant from further
pursuing an Appeal. This court found that these actions
amounted to gross negligence tantamount to breaching
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
The relationship between an attorney and his client is one
imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this light, clients
are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of
diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a lawyer is expected
to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the
case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it
for a fee or for free.
....
Case law further illumines that a lawyer’s duty of
competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the
cases entrusted to the counsel’s care or giving sound legal
advice, but also consists of properly representing the client
before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch,
and urging their termination without waiting for the client or
the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer’s negligence in fulfilling his duties
subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence or
carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has
consistently held that the lawyer’s mere failure to perform the
obligations due his client is per se a violation.44 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her
duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.
The lack of communication and coordination between
respondent Atty. Margallo and her client was palpable but
was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost
complainant Ramirez his entire case and left him with no
appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned not
because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but
because a person privileged to act as counsel failed to
discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her
assumption that complainant Ramirez was no longer
interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was
no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her
client. This is an admission that she abandoned her
obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption.
Respondent Atty. Margallo failed to exhaust all possible
means to protect complainant Ramirez’s interest, which is
contrary to what she had sworn to do as a member of the
legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly violated
Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the
interests of another, use their authority or power for their
benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies,
there is information assymetry between the principal and the
entrusted agent. That is, there are facts and events that the
agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal.
This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an
attorney client relationship. Lawyers are expected not only to
be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see
their relevance in relation to their causes of action or their
defenses. The salience of these facts is not usually patent to
the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the
relevant legal provisions that are invoked with their
jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies of
the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices
and must decide the mode of appeal to protect the interest of
his or her client.
Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her
client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between the
lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the
better knowledge of facts, events, and remedies.
While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer
to engage, he or she usually does so on the basis
of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that
the client discovers the level of diligence,
competence, and accountability of the counsel that
he or she chooses. In some cases, such as this one,
the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer
and the client, therefore, it is the lawyer that should
bear the full costs of indifference or negligence.
Respondent Atty. Margallo’s position that a
two-year suspension is too severe considering that
it is her first infraction cannot be sustained. In
Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we observed:
As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases
show that lawyers who have been held liable for
gross negligence for infractions similar to those of
the respondent were suspended for a period of six
(6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who
failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite
due notice which resulted in the submission of the
case for decision was found guilty of gross
negligence and hence, suspended for six (6)
months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F. Ballesteros, Sr. v.
Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and
was absent during the pre-trial conference was
likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v.
Juanino, a lawyer who neglected a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons
17 and 18 of the Code was also suspended for six
(6) months. Thus, consistent with existing
jurisprudence, the Court finds it proper to impose
the same penalty against respondent and
accordingly suspends him for a period of six (6)
months.45 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients
without procedural remedies. On the other hand,
respondent Atty. Margallo’s neglect resulted in her
client having no further recourse in court to protect
his legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the
utmost prejudice of complainant Ramirez who relied
on her alleged competence as counsel, must not be
tolerated. It is time that we communicate that
lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted to
them. There should be no more room for an inertia
of mediocrity.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the
constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.46 Under the current rules, the duty to assist
fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar,
however, can only be recommendatory, consistent
with the constitutional powers of this court. Its
recommended penalties are also, by its nature,
recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines that recognizes
that the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty
of two-year suspension. We read this as a showing
of its desire to increase the level of professionalism
of our lawyers.
This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the
penalties imposed in order to address a current
need in the legal profession. The desire of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure a higher
ethical standard for its members' conduct is
laudable. The negligence of respondent Atty.
Margallo coupled with her lack of candor is
reprehensible.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED.
The Recommendations and Resolution of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED AND
AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely. This decision is
immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 10583 February 18, 2015
[Formerly CBD 09-2555]
ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
A.C. No. 10584
[Formerly CBD 10-2827]
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty.
Victor Rey Santos for violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and
Canon 15, Rule 15 .033 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino
(Bernardino) filed a Letter-Complaint4 against Atty. Victor
Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and
subjected to disciplinary action.5
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt,
Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty.
Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when
in fact, she died in 1990.6
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to -support
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication7 executed by Mariano Turla,
husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of the Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos states:
Being her surviving spouse, I am. the sole legal heir entitled
to succeed to and inherit the estate of said deceased who
did not leave any descendant or any other heir entitled to her
estate.9 (Emphasis in the original underscoring supplied)
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter
of Rufina and Mariano Turla,10 filed a Complaint11 for sum of
money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
temporary restraining order against Bernardino, docketed as
Civil Case No. 09-269.12
The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu
Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla,13 which allegedly
contradicts the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos
drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients with
conflicting interests.15
In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified
during cross-examination:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY:
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that
you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the plaintiff[,] since she
was about four years old.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,]
considering that you are a Ninong of the plaintiff,
isn’t it?
A : I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla,
I was just recently married to one of her cousins.
....
Q : Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C.
Turla and Rufina C. Turla?
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my
knowledge of her relationship[s].
THE COURT
: What’s the name of the mother?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Q : And wife died ahead of Mariano, isn’t it?
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And of course, being the daughter of Rufina
Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina Turla, isn’t it?
A : Of course.
Q : Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr.
Witness.
You recall[,] of course[,] and admitted [sic] in court
that you drafted this document which you requested
to be marked as Exhibit B.
THE COURT
: Exhibit?
ATTY. CARINGAL
: "B", your Honor, in particular reference to the
Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra judicial
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina
De Castro Turla[,] and I have just learned from you
as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the
plaintiff here[,] Marilu Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
Q : And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this
Extra Judicial.
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the
question regarding my legal ethics because it is not the issue
in this case.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
....
Q : . . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four
and appearing to have been duly notarized on or about 29th
[of] June 1994 with document number 28, page number 7,
book
number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P.
Angara. I call your attention to the document[,] more
particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and marked as Exhibit 7-A
for the defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote,
"Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled
to succeed to and inherit the estate of the said deceased
who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any other
heir entitled to her estate."16 Mr. Witness, is this particular
provision that you have drafted into this document . . . true or
false?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question
regarding the matter that would impugn the legitimacy of the
plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,]is impertinent and immaterial in this
case[.] [I]t was only the wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right
to impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been
the subject of my continuing objection from the very
beginning.
THE COURT
: But then again[,] you have presented this document as your
Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have practically opened the floodgate to . . .
questions on this document.
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . .
properties owned by the late Mariano Turla, your Honor.
That is why that’s only [sic] portion I have referred to in
marking the said documents, your Honor.
THE COURT
: So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a
manifestation.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: What is the answer, is it true or false, your
Honor[?]
ATTY. REY SANTOS
: My answer regarding the same would be subject
to my objection on the materiality and impertinency
and relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this
case.
THE COURT
: So anyway, the court has observed the continuing
objection before[,] and to be consistent with the
ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the
question[.] [I]s it true or false?
THE WITNESS
: No, that is not true.
ATTY. CARINGAL
: That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you
admit before this court that you have drafted a
document that caused the transfer of the estate of
the decease[d] Rufina Turla.
THE WITNESS
: Yes, sir.
....
ATTY. CARINGAL
Q : This document, this particular provision that you
said was false, you did not tell anybody[,] ten or five
years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
THE WITNESS
: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . .
asked him what about Lulu17 she is entitled [sic] to a
share of properties and he . . . told me, "Ako na ang
bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan". So, he
asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of
Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole
[sic]properties for himself.18 (Emphasis supplied)
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos
by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal (Atty. Caringal).
This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to
Bernardino’s Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that
Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting
interests.21 He also alleged that in representing
Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos would necessarily go
against the claims of Mariano Turla.22
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was
allegedly violating the so-called "Dead Man’s
Statute"23 because "he [would] be utilizing
information or matters of fact occurring before the
death of his deceased client. Similarly, he . . .
[would] be unscrupulously utilizing information
acquired during his professional relation with his
said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of
trust . . . or of privileged communication[.]"24
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos
violated Canon 1225 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he filed several cases against
the other claimants of Mariano Turla’s estate.26 In other
words, he engaged in forum shopping.27
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule
10.0128 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. The
Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina
Turla, but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29 Atty. Santos’
wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano Turla’s niece.30 As part of the
family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other
heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the
document some fifteen years ago, he is fully aware of all the
circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that time, the [sic]
Lynn Batac Santos was then employed at the BIR[sic] who
arranged for the payment of the taxes due. There is some
peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] of a husband and wife team
where the lawyer makes the document while the wife who is
a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the taxes
due the government;
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken
about the fact recited in the Affidavit of Adjudication, etc. that
said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) "did not leave any
descendant, xxx, or any other heir entitled to her estate’
[sic] . . . [.]32 (Emphasis in the original)
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the
statement in Mariano Turla’s affidavit that Rufina Turla had
no other heir.33
Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging
to the heirs of Mariano Turla for his own benefit. The funds
involved were rental income from Mariano Turla’s properties
that were supposed to be distributed to the heirs. Instead,
Atty. Santos received the rental income.34 Lastly, Atty.
Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article
262 of the Civil Code in his arguments.35
In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the
death certificate.37 He explained that the death certificate
and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given to him by
Mariano Turla and that he was not aware that there was a
falsified entry in the death certificate.38
As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos
argued that he did not represent and was not representing
conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was already
dead.39 Further, "he [was] representing Marilu Turla against
those who ha[d] an interest in her father’s estate."40 Mariano
Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication never stated that there
was no other legal heir but only "that Mariano Turla was the
sole heir of Rufina Turla."41
Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos
insisted that he did not commit forum shopping because the
various cases filed had different issues.42
As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the
funds used were being held by his client as the special
administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43 According to
Atty. Santos, payment of attorney’s fees out of the estate’s
funds could be considered as "expenses of
administration."44 Also, payment of Atty. Santos’ legal
services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing
to question.45
On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision
of law, he discussed that Article 262 of the Civil Code is
applicable because it was in force when Marilu Turla’s birth
certificate was registered.46
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines recommended that Atty. Santos be
suspended for three (3) months.47
It found that Bernardino failed to prove his
allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the death
certificate was falsified and used it to support
Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication.48 Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed
to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from
Mariano Turla’s estate.49
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision,
the Commission on Bar Discipline stated that the
evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos
"knowingly cited a repealed law."50 Further, Atty.
Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The
various cases filed involved different parties and
prayed for different reliefs.51
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed
with Bernardino and Atty. Caringal that Atty. Santos
represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The
Report and Recommendation53 of the Commission
on Bar Discipline stated:
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically
proscribes members of the bar from representing
conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has
explained that "the proscription against
representation of conflicting interest finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with
respect to the same general matter and is
applicable however slight such adverse interest
may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is
remote or merely probable does not make the
prohibition inoperative."
....
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent
represented Mariano Turla is no secret. The
respondent has in a number of
pleadings/motions/documents and evenon the
witness stand admitted that he drafted Mariano
Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication which expressly
states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.
And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu
Turla who claimed to be Mariano Turla’s daughter.
To substantiate her claim that she is Mariano
Turla’s daughter, the respondent admitted that he
relied on the birth certificate presented by Marilu
Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only the
daughter of Mariano Turla but also of Rufina Turla
as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented
stating that Rufina Turla is Marilu Turla’s mother.
This means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir
to Rufina Turla’s inheritance and was deprived of
the same because of the Affidavit of Adjudication
which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he
is his wife’s sole heir.
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing
to represent Marilu Turla[,] placed himself in a
position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano
Turla’s Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only
heir of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted)
In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board
of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and
approved the findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline.
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP
Board of Governors in the Resolution57 dated
March 22, 2014.
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through
a letter of transmittal dated July 15, 2014,58 pursuant to Rule
139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court which provides:
RULE 139-B
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.—
....
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and
recommendations which, together with the whole record of
the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court
for final action.
The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty.
Santos violated the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3) months
from the practice of law is proper.
This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP
Board of Governors’ Resolution. However, this court
modifies the recommended penalty of suspension from the
practice of law from three (3) months to one (1) year.
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 — A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary
obligation in a lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers must treat
all information received from their clients with utmost
confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform
their counsels of the facts of their case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty.
Salunat,60 this court explained what conflict of interest
means:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The
test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose
it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the
other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also
those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of
the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge
of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the
performance thereof.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest
exists, respondent would necessarily refute Mariano Turla’s
claim that he is Rufina Turla’s sole heir when he agreed to
represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla
was not the only heir. As stated in the Report of the
Commission on Bar Discipline:
Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness
stand during his April 14, 2009 testimony in the Civil
Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed with
the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: "I called
the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him
what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of
properties and he . . . told me, ‘Ako na ang bahala
kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan.’ So he asked
me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication
wherein he claimed the whole [sic] properties for
himself." This very admission proves that the
respondent was privy to Marilu Turla’s standing as
a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turla’s
estate.62 (Citation omitted)
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception,
specifically, "by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the
facts."63 Respondent had the duty to inform Mariano
Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of
interest and to obtain their written consent.
Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while
respondent represented Marilu Turla in March
2009.65 It is understandable why respondent was
unable to obtain Mariano Turla’s consent. Still,
respondent did not present evidence showing that
he disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously
represented Mariano Turla and assisted him in
executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus,
the allegation of conflict of interest against
respondent was sufficiently proven.
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of
Governors’ finding that respondent violated Canon
10, Rule10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which states:
CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any
artifice.
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline
explained:
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue
of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor[sic] finds that the
respondent’s act of failing to thwart his client
Mariano Turla from filing the Affidavit of
Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the
existence of Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the
estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to
uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be
the stewards of justice and protectors of what is just,
legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and
acting dishonestly[,] not only was he in
contravention of the Lawyer’s Oath but was also in
violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.66 (Emphasis in the
original)
As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to
uphold the rule of law. In doing so, lawyers are
expected to be honest in all their
dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent was far from
being honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla
had another heir, he acceded to Mariano Turla’s
request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication.68
This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of
Governors’ Resolutions dated May 10, 2013 and March 22,
2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines that has the authority to impose sanctions on
lawyers. This is wrong.
The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in
this court under the 1987 Constitution: ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
....
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
....
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this court’s
"plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys"70 and
discussed:
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court
to discipline officers of the court and members of the court
and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regular and
guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary
authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers
stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate
admission to the practice of law, which includes as well
authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart
from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of
the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent
power incidental to the proper administration of justice and
essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he
is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society.71 (Citations omitted)
This court’s authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, specifically:
RULE 138
ATTORNEYS AND ADMISSION TO BAR
....
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or
by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court
emphasized the authority of this court to impose
disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice
of law.
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the
constitutionally mandated duty to discipline
lawyers.73 Under the current rules, the duty to assist
fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar,
however, can only be recommendatory, consistent
with the constitutional powers of this court.
Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature,
recommendatory.74
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, which provides that "[p]roceedings
for the disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines . . . upon the verified complaint of any
person." However, this authority is only to assist this
court with the investigation of the case, to
determine factual findings, and to recommend, at
best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring
lawyer.
We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty.
Echanez:75
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the
practice of law is imbued with public interest and
that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the
State—the administration of justice—as an officer
of the court." Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing."76 (Citations omitted)
Only this court can impose sanctions on members
of the Bar.1âwphi1 This disciplinary authority is
granted by the Constitution and cannot be
relinquished by this court.77 The Resolutions of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best,
recommendatory, and its findings and
recommendations should not be equated with
Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey
Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The findings of fact and
recommendations of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10,
2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and
ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey
Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same
or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as attorney, to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
courts throughout the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 10567 February 25, 2015
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J.
CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UYV
ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G.
DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY.
RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M.
PENALOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This is an administrative case stemming from a
complaint-affidavit1 dated December 4, 2009 filed by
complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging
respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia (Atty. Valencia),
Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty. Ciocon ), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty.
Dabao ), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De La
Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela),
Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr. (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K.
Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa (Atty.
Penalosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifica1ly the rule
against conflict of interest.
The Facts
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed
the services of the law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia
De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office(law firm), of
which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La
Paz, Dionela, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for two
(2) consolidated labor cases2 where he was impleaded as
respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was
assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were
terminated on June 5, 2008 upon the agreement of both
parties.3
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft
was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms
Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms) acting through a
certain Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however,
was represented by the law firm, the same law office which
handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant
filed this disbarment case against respondents, alleging that
they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the
CPR,5 to wit:
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
xxxx
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
xxxx
CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE
CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS
TERMINATED.
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they his death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela from the practice
indeed operated under the name Valencia Ciocon of law for one year, being the handling counsel of
Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica complainant’s labor cases.
Law Office, but explained that their association is
not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to The Issue Before the Court
certain "arrangements." According to them, each
lawyer contributes a fixed amount every month for
the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses The essential issue in this case is whether or not
for cases, such as transportation, copying, printing, respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in
mailing, and the like are shouldered by each lawyer violation of the pertinent provisions of the CPR.
separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive
his own professional fees exclusively.7 As such, the The Court’s Ruling
lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other
lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:
case be handled collaboratively. Respondents
claim that this has been the practice of the law firm
since its inception. They averred that complainant’s CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR,
labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm. TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
Moreover, respondents asserted that the qualified
theft case filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. xxxx
Peñalosa, a new associate who had no knowledge
of complainant’s labor cases, as he started working
RULE 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
for the firm after the termination
interests except by written consent of all concerned given
thereof.8 Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that
after a full disclosure of the facts.
he indeed handled complainant’s labor cases but
averred that it was terminated on June 13,
2008,9 and that complainant did not have any xxxx
monthly retainer contract.10 He likewise explained
that he did not see the need to discuss CANON 21 – A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE
complainant’s labor cases with the other lawyers as CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT EVEN
the issue involved was very simple,11 and that the AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS
latter did not confide any secret during the time the TERMINATED.
labor cases were pending that would have been
used in the criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept
claimed that the other lawyers were not aware of
of conflict of interest in this wise:
the details of complainant’s labor cases nor did they
know that he was the handling counsel for
complainant even after the said cases were closed There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents
and terminated.12 The IBP’s Report and inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
Recommendation parties.1âwphi1 The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but
it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
September 26, 2011, the IBP Commissioner found
when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not
respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of
only cases in which confidential communications have been
interest and recommended that they be
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been
reprimandedtherefor, with the exception of Atty.
bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
Dabao, who had died on January 17, 2010.14 The
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
IBP found that complainant was indeed represented
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in
in the labor cases by the respondents acting
any matter in which he represents him and also whether he
together as a law firm and not solely by Atty.
will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first
Dionela. Consequently, there was a conflict of
client any knowledge acquired through their connection.
interest in this case, as respondents, through Atty.
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the
Peñalosa, having been retained by FEVE Farms,
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
created a connection that would injure complainant
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty
in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the
to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
termination of attorney-client relation provides no
dealing in the performance thereof.20
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former
client.15 As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients
whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or
In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP
on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the
Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP
principles of public policy and good taste.21 In this case, the
Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with
Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that respondents
modification. Instead of the penalty of reprimand,
represented conflicting interests and must therefore be held
the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case
liable. As the records bear out, respondents’ law firm was
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor
act shall be dealt with more severely.
cases instituted against him. However, after the termination
thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE
Complainant filed a motion for Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for qualified theft
reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the
Governors granted in its Resolution18 dated March Court observes, the law firm’s unethical acceptance of the
23, 2014 and thereby (a) set aside its February 12, criminal case arose from its failure to organize and
2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the implement a system by which it would have been able to
IBP Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the
with modification, (1) reprimanding the respondents end of, among others, ensuring that every engagement it
for violation of the rule on conflict of interest; (2) accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest. As
dismissing the case against Atty. Dabao in view of an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged
as a collective, assigns legal work to a
corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the law
firm to value coordination in deference to the
conflict of interest rule. This lack of coordination, as
respondents’ law firm exhibited in this case,
intolerably renders its clients’ secrets vulnerable to
undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the
balance the lawyer-client relationship’s primordial
ideal of unimpaired trust and confidence. Had such
system been institutionalized, all of its members,
Atty. Dionela included, would have been wary of the
above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling the firm
to decline FEVE Farms’ subsequent engagement.
Thus, for this shortcoming, herein respondents, as
the charged members of the law firm, ought to be
administratively sanctioned. Note that the Court
finds no sufficient reason as to why Atty. Dionela
should suffer the greater penalty of suspension. As
the Court sees it, all respondents stand in equal
fault for the law firm’s deficient organization for
which Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the
CPR had been violated. As such, all of them are
meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction would be dealt with more severely.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents'
pronounced liability is not altered by the fact that
the labor cases against complainant had long been
terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client
relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with
that of the former client. The client's confidence
once reposed should not be divested by mere
expiration of professional employment.22
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V.
Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia,
Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T.
Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon
M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03,
Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and are therefore
REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
infraction would be dealt with more severely.
Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is
DISMISSED in view of his death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to
respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further,
let copies of this Resolution be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2439 (Formerly: OCA I.P.I. No.
12-3989-RTJ), August 26, 2015
ARIEL "AGA"
MUHLACH, Complainant, v. EXECUTIVE JUDGE
MA. ANGELA ACOMPAÑADO-ARROYO,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, SAN JOSE CITY,
CAMARINES SUR, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This resolves the complaint dated 6 November 2012
filed by Ariel "Aga" Muhlach (complainant) charging
Executive Judge Ma. Angela Acompañado-Arroyo (EJ
Arroyo), Regional Trial Court (RTC), San Jose City,
Camarines Sur with gross ignorance of the law and
abuse of discretion.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
On 5 October 2012, Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar
Malate, Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand Fernando Felix
Monasterio filed a petition before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of San Jose-Presentacion,
Camarines Sur praying for the exclusion of Ariel and
Charlene Mae G. Muhlach (Spouses Muhlach) from the
list of voters of Precinct No. 10A, Brgy. San Juan, San
Jose, Camarines Sur. The case was docketed as Spec.
Pro. No. 80.
On even date, Hon. Angel A. Tadeo, MCTC, San
Jose-Presentacion, Camarines Sur voluntarily recused
himself from hearing the case on the ground that
petitioner Edgar Malate is a cousin of his late
mother-in-law and Francisco Perico-Dazon is the
son-in-law of the his former clerk of court, Florecito V.
Patrocinio.1
Acting on such inhibition, EJ Arroyo scheduled the
raffle of the case among judges of the first level courts
within her administrative jurisdiction to determine
who among them will be assigned to try and decide
the case.
The case was eventually raffled to Judge Ricky C.
Begino (Judge Begino).
In an Order2 dated 12 October 2012, Judge Begino set
the case for hearing on 16 October 2012.
On 15 October 2012, Spouses Muhlach filed a motion
to dismiss Spec. Procs. No. 80.
In the morning of 16 October 2012, the Office of the
Clerk of Court received a copy of the Order of
Inhibition of Judge Begino, which states that:
An (sic) oral motion of the counsel of the respondents,
undersigned judge hereby inhibit (sic) himself from
further trying and ruling of this case to avoid any doubt
3
as to the impartiality of this court.
In the morning of 16 October 2012 also, the counsel
for Spouses Muhlach filed with MCTC, San
Jose-Presentacion an Urgent Omnibus Motion: 1) to
inhibit the Judge Begino; and 2) to re-raffle
and assign the case to another judge.
In the afternoon of the same date, EJ Arroyo
issued the assailed order which rendered
ineffective the order of inhibition of Judge
Begino. It further directed Judge Begino to
continue to hear and decide the case. EJ
Arroyo noted that the counsel for Spouses
Muhlach's oral motion failed to state'the
grounds to justify the inhibition of the judge.
It likewise did not explain why doubts as to
the impartiality of the court could exist.4
Judge Begino proceeded with the hearing of
the case and on 19 October 2012, resolved,
among others, the 16 October 2012 Urgent
Motion to Inhibit filed by counsel for the
Spouses Muhlach. He ruled, thus:
The Court is not convinced of the merit
being shown by [Spouses Muhlach] for the
Undersigned Judge (Judge for brevity) to
inhibit from hearing and deciding this
case.
The movants miserably failed to show what
judicial actuations made by the Judge
which may be perceived that he has already
predetermined the facts and issues
involved in this case. If, the judicial
actuations they are referring to is in
connection with the Order of the Judge
denying their Motion to Dismiss, the same
is not sufficient for a Judge to inhibit
himself from hearing and deciding the
case considering that the denial was
based on law.
x x x x
All told, the [Spouses Muhlach[s] belief
that the Judge and his sibling Agnes are
political allies of Mr. Fuentebella is
unfounded, untrue and baseless.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion to
Inhibit the Honorable Presiding Judge
Ricky C. Begino and to Re-Raffle and
Assign Case to Another Presiding Judge is
hereby ordered DENIED. The undersigned
Judge will continue to hear and decide
this case with the assurance to all
parties concerned that he will take his
role to dispense justice according to law
and evidence without fear or favor.5
Dissatisfied, Spouses Muhlach filed on 23
October 2012 an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration (of the Orders dated 17 and
19 October 2012).
In a Decision6 dated 25 October 2012, Judge
Begino granted the petition for exclusion filed
by Francisco Perico Dizon, Edgar Malate,
Crispin Imperial and Ferdinand Fernando Felix
Monasterio. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
petition to exclude ARIEL AQUINO MUHLACH
and CHARLENE MAE BONNIN MUHLACH from the
list of voters of Precinct No. 10A
Barangay, San Juan, San Jose, Camarines
Sur is hereby GRANTED. The Election
Registration Board is hereby ordered
to EXCLUDE THE NAMES OF THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS FROM THE LIST OF VOTERS OF
PRECINCT NO. 10A BARANGAY SAN JUAN, SAN
JOSE, CAMARINES SUR and REMOVE THEIR
REGISTRATION RECORDS FROM THE CORRESPONDING
BOOK OF VOTERS and to ENTER THE ORDER OF
EXCLUSION therein; and thereafter, to PLACE THE
RECORDS IN THE INACTIVE FILE, for lack of
residency requirement.7
Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant
administrative complaint against EJ Arroyo. He
accused EJ Arroyo of having issued the Order dated 16
October 2012 with abuse of authority and with gross
ignorance of law and procedure. Complainant
contended that EJ Arroyo had no authority to reverse
Judge Begino's order inhibiting himself as such power
is vested solely in the Supreme Court.
In her comment,8 EJ Arroyo explained that
immediately upon receipt of Judge Begino's order of
inhibition, she noticed that the order, on its face, was
improper or defective. She stressed that the
procedure prescribed for the disqualification of a
judge must be substantially followed, citing the
resolution of the Supreme Court dated 31 August
1978 in A.M. No. 2128-JC.9 She averred that she was
not ignorant of Administrative Circular No. 1 dated 28
January 1998 when she issued the questioned order.
Under the cited circular, the duty of the executive
judge is to appoint another trial judge under his/her
supervision to handle the inhibited case or to elevate
the matter to the Supreme Court. Considering that
the inhibition order issued by Judge Begino was
"patently defective," she saw no point in referring the
same to the Court, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, for evaluation "because in the first
place, there was nothing for the latter to evaluate."
EJ Arroyo further explained that the subject case is a
petition for exclusion of the names of Spouses
Muhlach from the list of voters which should be
decided within ten days from its filing as provided for
under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8189.10 In view of the
status of the Spouses Muhlach, EJ Arroyo claimed that
no judge would want to handle the case. Thus, when
she received a copy of Judge Begino's order of
inhibition, she felt that it was her duty as executive
judge to ensure that the case is decided, as much as
possible, within the period prescribed under the law.
She reasoned that if she were to approve Judge
Begino's inhibition order which, on its face, was
defective, nothing would stop other judges from
recusing themselves from the case on flimsy grounds.
She felt that it would result in an endless cycle leaving
the case unresolved.
EJ Arroyo surmised that the complaint was filed for
the sole purpose of delaying the resolution of Spec.
Pro. No. 80. She alleged that after Judge Begino
decided the case in favor of the petitioners and
ordered the exclusion of Spouses Muhlach from the
voters list, Spouses Muhlach appealed the decision to
the RTC. It was raffled to Branch 40 presided over by
Judge Noel Paulite (Judge Paulite) who eventually
rendered a decision affirming the decision of Judge
Begino. Spouses Muhlach thereafter filed a Motion for
the Inhibition of Judge Paulite on 13 November 2012,
after the instant complaint was filed on 7 November
2012. EJ Arroyo submits that should Judge Paulite
grant the motion for inhibition, a dilemma would arise
because the case would be assigned to Branch 58
where she is the presiding judge, there being only two
branches in RTC San Jose. She claimed that such
scenario would lead her to inhibit from the case
because of the administrative complaint filed against
her. Consequently, the case will be referred to the
nearest RTC and raffled among the judges in that
jurisdiction. She opined that other delaying tactics
may be employed, and soon, it would already
be elections day without the case having
decided.11
Finally, she averred that she had been a judge
for 11 years and this is the first time that an
administrative case has been filed against her.
We find the charges of ignorance of the law
and abuse of discretion bereft of merit.
The rule on inhibition and disqualification of
judges is set forth in Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. -
No judge or judicial officer shall sit in
any case in which he, or his wife or child,
is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in
which he is related to either party within
the sixth degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules
of civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his
ruling or decision is the subject of
review, without the written consent of
all parties in interest, signed by them
and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound
discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The aforesaid rule enumerates the specific
grounds upon which a judge may be
disqualified from participating in a trial. It
must be borne in mind that the inhibition of
judges is rooted in the Constitution,
specifically Article III, the Bill of Rights, which
requires that a hearing is conducted before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal because
unquestionably, every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. All the other elements of due
process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision would
come from a partial and biased
judge.12 Certainly, a presiding judge must
maintain and preserve the trust and faith of
the parties-litigants.
We agree with EJ Arroyo that the inhibition of
Judge Begino is lacking in some elements.
Judge Begino simply ruled that he is inhibiting
from the case to avoid any doubts as to the
impartiality of the court. Although voluntary
inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience
and sound discretion on the part of the judge,
such should still comply with the provisions of
the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137
of the Rules, that is, it should be based on just
or valid reasons. In the subject order, the
reason for the inhibition of the judge was not
stated. Neither could it be determined from
the motion of the Spouses Muhlach's counsel
since the motion was done orally, in violation
of Section 213 of the same rule.
When EJ Arroyo declared that Judge Begino's
order of inhibition was ineffective, she was in
a way, returning the case back to the
presiding judge for the latter to either cure
the deficiency or take cognizance of the case if he
finds no basis for the motion. As EJ Arroyo explained,
she was aware that she had no authority to revoke or
disapprove the order of inhibition, as such is vested
only in the Supreme Court. It was for that reason that
she used the word "ineffective." Tersely put, EJ Arroyo
did not reverse the Order of Inhibition of Judge Begino.
She correctly asked that the Order be completed to
comply with the Rule on Inhibition of Judges.
When Judge Begino continued with the proceedings, it
was a manifestation and admission on his part that he
can hear and decide the case with the cold neutrality
expected from an impartial magistrate. His.
subsequent ruling on the Urgent Omnibus Motion filed
by counsel for the Spouses Muhlach affirmed EJ
Arroyo's position that the earlier order issued on the
basis of the oral motion was defective. The assailed
order of EJ Arroyo was issued in the proper exercise of
her administrative functions.
Moreover, to be held liable for gross ignorance of the
law, the judge must be shown to have committed an
error that was gross or patent, deliberate or
malicious.14 Here, it was clearly established that the
only intention of EJ Arroyo was to ensure that the case
is decided expeditiously and within the period
provided under the law. There was no showing that
she was moved by ill-will or malicious intention to
violate existing Court issuances. In fact, bad faith may
be attributed to the complainant for filing successive
motions for inhibition.
While it was pronounced in relation to the
performance by judges of their judicial functions, we
find that in the matter of their administrative duties, it
can likewise be said that as a matter of public policy, a
judge cannot be subjected to liability for any of his
official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he
acts in good faith. To hold otherwise would be to
render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his
judgment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises,
the instant administrative complaint filed by Ariel
"Aga" Muhlach against Executive Judge Ma. Angela
Acompafiado-Arroyo, Regional Trial Court, San Jose
City, Camarines Sur for ignorance of the law and
abuse of discretion is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405 January 12,
2015
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 12-3919-RTJ]
ANTONIO S. ASCAÑO, JR., CONSOLACION D.
DANTES, BASILISA A. OBALO, JULIETA D.
TOLEDO, JOSEPH Z. MAAC, EMILIANO E.
LUMBOY, TITA F. BERNARDO, IGMEDIO L.
NOGUERA, FIDEL S. SARMIENTO, SR., DAN T.
TAUNAN, AMALIA G. SANTOS, AVELINA M.
COLONIA, ERIC S. PASTRANA, and MARIVEL B.
ISON Complainants,
vs.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE S. JACINTO, JR.,
Branch 45, Regional Trial Court, San Jose
Occidental Mindoro, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ:
This is an administrative Complaint1 for gross and
serious violations of the Canons of the Code of
Judicial Conduct & Judicial Ethics and Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against
Judge Jose S. Jacinto Jr. (respondent) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. Complainants Antonio Ascafio,
Jr., Consolacion D. Dantes, Basilisa A. Obalo,
Julieta D. Toledo, Joseph Z. Maac, Fidel S.
Sarmiento, Sr., Dan T. Taunan, Amalia G. Santos,
Emiliano E. Lumboy, Tita F. Bernardo, Igmedio L.
Noguera, Avelina Colonia, Eric S. Pastrana, and
Marivel B. Ison (collectively, complainants) were
allegedly section leaders of the lessees of market
stalls in the public market ofOccidental Mindoro.
The Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro (the Municipality), Jose T.
Villarosa (Mayor Villarosa or the Mayor) allegedly
wanted to demolish the public market, so that the
Municipality can use the space to erect the new
"San Jose Commercial Complex."2 Thus, on 26
June 2012, complainants filed a Petition for
Prohibition With Urgent Application for the Issuance
of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (WPI) against the
Municipality and Mayor Villarosa. The case was
docketed as Special Civil Action No. R-1731 and
was raffled to respondent’s sala.
Respondent issued a TRO, which had a 72-hour
validity, on 27 June 2012. Hearings for the
determination of the propriety of extending the TRO
or issuing the WPI against the Municipality were
scheduled on 2 and 3 July 2012. Mayor Villarosa
waived his right to present his evidence and
submitted the case for resolution.3
While the entire entourage of Mayor Villarosa, none
of whom were parties to the case, were all allowed
inside the courtroom during the 2 July 2012
hearing,4 only 12 out of the more than 500
members accompanying complainants on that day
were allowed to enter.5 Worse, upon the motion of
the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out
of the courtroom except for Julieta D. Toledo, who
was scheduled to giveher testimony that day.6
Complainants claimed that the questions propounded by
respondent to their witnesses "were all geared towards
establishing" that they should have no right to oppose the
Mayor’s plan, as "this will be good for all and the progress
and development of the municipality."7
After the hearing, respondent issuedan open-court Order
stating that "the Court is not inclined to extend for seventeen
(17) days the said TRO."8
At the next hearing held on 3 July2012, Mayor Villarosa
stepped out of the courtroom to take a call. He exited
through the door used by the judge and the employees of the
court.9 According to complainants, the Mayor did not speak
to anyone, not even his lawyer, before leaving the courtroom.
Thus, it came as a surprise to everyone when respondent
suddenly explained that the Mayor had to excuse himself for
an important appointment.10
Respondent eventually issued an Order lifting the TRO.11
Petitioners claimed that during the hearings held on 2 and 3
July 2012, respondent "argued, berated, accused, scolded,
confused and admonished petitioners without basis or
justification."12 They further claimed that respondent judge
asked complainants "confusing and misleading questions all
geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause
of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their
adversary."13
Complainants alleged that it is common knowledge to the
entire community of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, that
respondent is beholden to Mayor Villarosa and is identified
with the causes, friends, and allies of the latter.14 They also
alleged that all cases in the RTC before respondent involving
Mayor Villarosa or his relatives, political allies, supporters,
and close friends were decided in favor of the Mayor or his
relatives and supporters.15 Thus, complainants filed the
instant complaint charging respondent with serious violations
of the canons of the Codes of Judicial Conduct and Judicial
Ethics and for Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
Respondent denied the foregoing accusations and cited
several cases in which he issued an order/ruling against
Mayor Villarosaand the latter’s supposed supporters.16
In a Resolution17 dated 25 November 2013, this Court
referred the Complaint to the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals, Manila (CA) "for raffle among the Justices
thereat, for investigation, report and recommendation." The
case was raffled to CA Justice Pedro B. Corales on 24
February 2014. This Court received his Report and
Recommendation (Report)18 on 9 June 2014.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of Justice
Corales.
Petitioners failed to substantiate their allegation that
respondent acted with bias and partiality. Mere suspicion
that a judge is partial is not enough.19 Clear and convincing
evidence is necessary to prove a charge of bias and
partiality.20 The circumstances detailed by petitioners failed
to prove that respondent exhibited "manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" in the
discharge of his judicial functions, as required by Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019, when he issued the Order lifting the TRO.
This Court cannot accept the contention that respondent’s
bias and partiality can be gleaned from the mere fact that he
did not allow the "more than 500 members" who
accompanied petitioners during the hearing to enter the
courtroom. As indicated in the report, due to the standard
sizes of our courtrooms, it is highly improbable that this huge
group could have been accommodated inside.21 With
respect to the exclusion of the other witnesses while Julieta
Toledo was giving her testimony, this is sanctioned
by Section 15, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.22
We now go to the claim of petitioners that
respondent berated, scolded, confused and
admonished their witnesses without basis or
justification. According to the investigating justice,
respondent failed to submit the transcript of notes
for the 3 July 2012 hearing without plausible
reason.23 As regards what transpired in the 2 July
2012 hearing, the investigating justice found that
apart from raising his voice when addressing
Toledo and making "abrasive and unnecessary
statements to her,"24 respondent also made the
following"insulting, sometimes needlessly lengthy
statements"25 in open court:
1. Respondent declared that he no longer wanted to
go to the market, because he might be mistreated
by petitioners.26
2. He told petitioners: "Mga taga-palengke na
nagkakaso sa akin xxx pero ‘di naman nila alam
ang kanilang ginagawa."27
3. He told Toledo while the latter was testifying:
"[B]asta na lang kayo pirma pirma na gawa naman
ng abogado niyo."28
4. He asked Toledo: "You mentioned about that
‘walang pwesto na nakikipwesto sa inyo,’ is that not
a violation to your lease contract that you are
allowing somebody to occupy your portion so that
they can also engage in business? Is this not an
additional earning on your part and you are violating
your lease contract? Is that not depriving the coffer
of the Municipal Government?"29 The investigating
justice found that the foregoing statements
"definitely imperiled the respect and
deference"30 rightly due to respondent’s position.
We agree.
As stated in the report, respondent raised his voice
and uttered abrasive and unnecessary remarks to
petitioners’ witness.31 Respondent failed to conduct
himself in accordance with the mandate of Section
6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary,32 which reads:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and
decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to
litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall
require similar conduct of legal representatives,
court staff and others subject to their influence,
direction or control.
A Judge should be considerate, courteous and civil
to all persons who come to his court,33 viz:
It is reprehensible for a judge to humiliate a lawyer,
litigant or witness. The act betrays lack of patience,
prudence and restraint. Thus, a judge must at all
times be temperate in his language. He must
choose his words, written or spoken, with utmost
care and sufficient control. The wise and just man is
esteemed for his discernment. Pleasing speech
increases his persuasiveness.34
This Court likewise finds that respondent violated
Section 1 of Canon 2 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, which read:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct
above reproach, but that it isperceived to be so inview of a
reasonable observer.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of their activities.1âwphi1 The above
provisions clearly enjoin judges not only from committing
acts of impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance
of impropriety.35 This is because appearance is as important
as reality in the performance of judicial functions. A judge —
like Ceasar's wife — must not only be pure and faithful, but
must also be above suspicion.36
In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not
asking for the court’s permission to leave while the trial was
ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s
advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the
abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had
an important appointment to attend. Respondent does not
deny this in his Comment.37 It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and
not respondent judge, who had the duty of explaining why
the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s
permission.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; they must also
avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which may
erode the people's faith in the Judiciary.38 Members of the
Judiciary should be beyond reproach and suspicion in their
conduct, and should be free from any appearance of
impropriety in the discharge of their official duties, as well as
in their personal behavior and everyday life.39
The actions of respondent no doubt diminished public
confidence and public trust in him as a judge.1âwphi1 He
gave petitioners reason to doubt his integrity and impartiality.
Petitioners cannot be blamed for thinking that respondent
must have directly communicated with Mayor Villarosa.
Otherwise, he would not have been able to explain that the
Mayor could no longer return to attend the hearing after
leaving, when not even the latter’s own lawyers knew that.
Thus, respondent is also guilty of violating Section 2 of
Canon 3, which reads:
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct,
both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal p rofession and litigants in
the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
It is clear from all the foregoing that respondent is guilty of
conduct unbecoming a judge.
We note that in a previous case, Taran v. Jacinto, Jr.,40 this
Court has already found Respondent Judge Jacinto liable for
his failure to supervise his personnel closely and for issuing
orders relayed over the phone. Judge Jacinto was found
guilty of violating Supreme Court Circular No. 26-97 by
failing to compel his Clerk of Court to issue official receipts
for all monies received by the latter. In the foregoing case,
respondent judge was fined in the sum of ₱11,000 and was
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be
dealt with more severely. Under Section 10 in relation to
Section 11(C), paragraph 1 of Rule 14041 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct"
is classified as a light charge, punishable by any of
the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than
₱1,000, but not exceeding ₱10,000; and/or (2)
censure; (3) reprimand; (4) admonition with
warning.42
Considering that this is respondent judge's second
infraction already, the Court finds that the penalties
of a fine in the amount of Pl 0,000 and admonition
with warning, as recommended by the investigating
justice, are proper under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent Judge
Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. guilty of unbecoming conduct
and is hereby FINED in the amount of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱10,000) and
REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 June 16, 2015
[Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC]
OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATION, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:
On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved
this case by disposing it as follows:
WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:
1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue
delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision
and in failing to resolve 101 motions within the
90-day reglementary period. He is FINED twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00), with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with
more severely.
2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of
duty, dishonesty and grave misconduct. She is
DISMISSED from the service. She is DIRECTED to
RESTITUTE the amount of ₱1,817,378.59
representing the amount of shortages in her
collections. Her withheld salaries are to be applied
to her accountabilities. The Office of Administrative
Services, OCA is DIRECTED to compute Ms.
Salimpade's leave credits and forward the same to
the Finance Division, Fiscal Management
Office-OCA which shall compute the money value
of the same, the amount to be deducted from the
shortages to be restituted.
3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of
duty. He is DISMISSED from the service. He is also
ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the
amount of ₱58,100.00
4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED
₱5,000, which should be deducted from her retirement
benefits.
The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is
DIRECTED to file appropriate criminal charges against
Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En. Salimpade and Eduardo
Esconde.
SO ORDERED.
As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the
case are as follows:
On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
conducted a judicial audit and physical inventory of cases at
the Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano,
Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut was the acting
presiding judge in both courts.
xxx xxx xxx
Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also
conducted in the MTCs of Bayombong and Solano as well as
the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.
In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was
Clerk of Court II, the audit team found an unremitted amount
of ₱18,702.oo representing the court's collection from
August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was
deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by the audit
team, in the Land Bank of the Philippines account.
Furthermore, 31 booklets of accountable forms issued to Ms.
Salimpade by the Property Division, SC and OCA were not
accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF) collection of ₱348,993.60 from
January 1990 to August 2003. However, only ₱186,330.98
was remitted by Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of
₱162,662.62; the total Clerk of Court General Fund (CCGF)
collections from January 1996 to August 2003 (audit scope)
showed an unremitted amount of ₱30,411. 70; and as of
August 31, 2003 the Fiduciary Fund had a total cash
shortage of ₱1,864,304.27 which covered the collections
from 1995 to August 2003.
In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by
Salimpade as of August 31, 2003 totalled ₱2,057,378.59.
Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that
Judge Balut, since 1995 had been getting money from the
JDF collections. She had given in to the requests of Judge
Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted that she lent her
co-employees money which she took from her collections.
Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over
₱240,000.00 to Salimpade and the latter issued a
certification stating that the former had completely settled his
monetary accountability to the MTC, Bayombong. Judge
Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court
Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit
slip evidencing the turnover of the ₱240,000.00.
The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly
submit her monthly report of collections, as required in
Supreme Court Circular No. 32-93. Consequently,
Salimpade's salaries were withheld effective August 2003 to
the present.
In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's
collection disclosed that Eduardo Esconde, Clerk of Court,
had an unremitted/undeposited cash on hand amounting to
₱59,545.oo. However, the Official Receipts issued to cover
said amounts were not accounted for. The said cash amount
was deposited on August 21, 2003 to Land Bank JDF
Account No. 0591-0116-34.
A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to
July 2003 also showed a total cash shortage of
₱106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003,
Esconde deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank
accounts sums corresponding to the said shortage.
Esconde explained to the audit team that Judge
Balut borrowed various amounts from the
collections. He stated that Judge Balut started
borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk
of Court of MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to
MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of Judge
Balut. But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was
designated Acting Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano
and continued the practice of borrowing money
from the collections of the court.
In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found
that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of Court, succeeded
Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without
proper turnover of accountabilities. The team also
found that the amount of ₱540.00, part of the JDF
collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003,
remained undeposited at the time of audit. Said
amount was remitted to the Chief Accountant,
Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs.
Ramos opened an account at the Rural Bank of
Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court
instead of maintaining an account with Landbank.
Said account was closed on September 11, 2003
and an account was opened at Landbank,
Bambang, on the same date. A comparison of the
court's CCGF collections and remittances for the
period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a
shortage of ₱510.00. Mr. Esconde incurred during
his incumbency a cash shortage of ₱430.00 while
Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱80.00 as of
July 31, 2003. From August 2003 to June 5, 2004,
Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of ₱430.00. She
deposited the amount of ₱400.00 on August 23,
2004 leaving a shortage of 1!30.00. Withdrawals
from the Fiduciary Fund account on various dates,
totalling ₱243,900.00 for the refund and return of
cash bonds to 20 litigants, were not supported by
any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did
not acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded.
The Fiduciary Fund collection of the court from April
1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted to
₱2,064,978.00. As of August 31, 2003, however,
the amount of ₱846,710.00 was unaccounted for by
Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the
shortages incurred were of their own doing and they
instead pointed to Judge Balut as the offender.
Ramos related to the audit team the constant
requests/orders of Judge Balut to hand over to him
money from the Fiduciary Fund
collections.1âwphi1 In these instances, she
requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the
back portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash
recipient. However, not all of the transactions were
evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt. Ramos
further stated that Judge Balut also collected the
money through Salvador Briones, Court Interpreter
of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also
appeared at the back portion of withdrawal slips as
cash recipient. The total withdrawals from the
Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge Balut, as
evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the
signatures of Judge Balut and Briones, for the
benefit of the former, as cash recipients, amounted
to ₱193,500.00.
Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary
Fund account totalling ₱90,500.oo were also given
to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this class
of withdrawals were notations such as "Judge," "for
Judge," "taken by Judge xxx" and "given to Judge"
written by Ramos.
On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating
that his accountability with the Fiduciary Fund collection of
MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe as of April 2002 amounted
to .₱207,774.42. However, before the final report on the
court's shortages was completed, various amounts totalling
₱802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut, Esconde and
Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51, as
restitution/payment of part of the shortage of ₱846, 710.00.
As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of
her accountability. On the other hand, Esconde still had a
balance of accountability in MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe of
₱58,100.oo which, as of the time this case was submitted by
the OCA for the Court's consideration, has remained
unsettled. (Emphases supplied)
In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent Judge
Alexander Balut (Judge Balut) to pay a fine for his failure to
decide 33 cases and 101 motions without properly
requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule
on the administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to
the result of the financial audit for the reason that he was not
given a chance to present his side on the matter.
Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
in its Memorandum,2 sought reconsideration of the Court's
decision stating that although Judge Balut was not formally
required to comment on the findings of the audit team
regarding the shortage in the court collections, he was not
denied due process of law. The OCA explained that Judge
Balut was able to present his side in his Letter3 to OCA,
dated December 9, 2006. The OCA, thus, asked for the
re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut
be required to comment on the findings of the financial audit.
In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the Court
directed Judge Balut to comment on the audit report and,
upon the recommendation5 of the OCA, referred the matter
to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
recommendation.6
Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation,
recommended the dismissal of the charges against Judge
Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly substantiate and prove
the participation of Judge Balut in the financial transactions
of the courts. On his admission that he borrowed money from
the judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no
longer be penalized as he was previously fined by the Court
in its October 9, 2007 Resolution.
The Court finds itself unable to agree with the
recommendation of the CA.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is
substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.7 The standard of substantial evidence is justified
when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent
is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.8
A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually
messed with the court collections. The three clerks of court
of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe
categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money from
the court funds and executed certifications to that effect.
They separately reported that Judge Balut had been
borrowing money from the various funds of the court
collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk of Court
of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal
slips9 where the back portions were signed either by Judge
Balut or his court interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the
recipient of the cash withdrawn from the funds of the court.
These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of Ramos
such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to
Judge" to serve as her reminder that the money withdrawn
were given to Judge Balut.
Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the
Certification10 stating that his cash accountability as
of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was
₱207,774.42 and there were certifications issued by
the clerks of court attesting that he had settled his
accountabilities with the court funds.
The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be
penalized for his admission that he had borrowed
money from the judiciary fund because the Court
already fined him in its October 9, 2007 resolution is
erroneous. In the said resolution, the Court
categorically stated that Judge Balut was fined for
undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for
decision and for failing to resolve 101 motions
within the 90-day reglementary period.
Once again, the Court stresses that judges must
adhere to the highest tenets of judicial
conduct.11 Because of the sensitivity of his position,
a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the
highest degree of honesty and integrity and to
observe exacting standards of morality, decency
and competence.12 He should adhere to the highest
standards of public accountability lest his action
erode the public faith in the Judiciary.13
Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing
money from the collections of the court. He
knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of court
violate the circulars on the proper administration of
court funds.14 He miserably failed to become a role
model of his staff and other court personnel in the
observance of the standards of morality and
decency, both in his official and personal conduct.
The act of misappropriating court -funds constitutes
dishonesty and grave misconduct, punishable by
dismissal from the service even on the first
offense.15 For said reason, the respondent
deserves a penalty no lighter than dismissal. This
Court has never tolerated and will never condone
any conduct which violates the norms of public
accountability, and diminish, or even tend to
diminish, the faith of the people in the justice
system.16
The Court has considered the recommendation of
imposing the penalty of suspension. That, however,
would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En.
Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of Bayombong
and Solano; and Clerk of Court Eduardo Esconde
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe,
who were both dismissed from the service for the
same offense. Clerk of Court Lydia Ramos was
fined but only because she had already retired from
the service. And it would send a wrong message to
the public that the Court has different standards -
one for the magistrates and another for the
rank-and-file.
The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash
liabilities will not shield him from the consequences
of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in
the Court collections deserves administrative
sanction and not even the full payment of his
accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It
matters not that these personal borrowings were
paid as what counts is the fact that these funds
were used outside of official business."17
Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would
not serve to mitigate his liability. His offense was
not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series
of acts committed in a span of several years. In
other words, he was a repeated offender,
perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not once,
not twice, but several times in three (3) different stations. In
the case of In Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit
Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal
City,18 it was written:
For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge
Sardido has been charged with grave misconduct. Admitting
that he indeed "borrowed" money from court funds, the latter
recounted that on four occasions in 1994, he had borrowed
₱130,ooo to be able to purchase a car and thereafter
borrowed intermittently through the years, for reasons
ranging from the schooling needs of his children to the illness
of his parents. That he intended to repay the amounts
"borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should never be used
outside of official business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct states:
"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not
accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as
may be allowed by law."
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the
judge is the visible representation of the law, and more
importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw
their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to
return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law
and weave an example for others to follow."
Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido
has not only miserably failed to present himself as an
example to his staff and to others, but has also shown no
compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules and
regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross
ignorance of the law tarnish the image of the judiciary and
would have warranted the maximum penalty of dismissal.
were it not for the fact that he had already been dismissed
from the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) WHEREFORE, finding Judge
Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the Court
hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with
prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government,
including government-owned and controlled corporations,
except the money value of accrued earned leave credits.
Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist
immediately from rendering any order or decision, or from
continuing any proceedings, in any case whatsoever,
effective upon receipt of a copy of this resolution.
This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a
copy of this resolution be immediately served on the
respondent.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI
No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04, 2015
JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE
MEINRADO P. PAREDES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
For consideration is the Report and
Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa
Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals,
Cebu City, submitted to this Court pursuant to
its January 14, 2013 Resolution,2 referring
the complaint filed by Jill M.
Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge
Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge
Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, for
investigation, report and recommendation.
The_Facts
In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September
5, 2011, Jill charged Judge Paredes with grave
misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge
Paredes in Political Law Review during the first
semester of school year 2010-2011 at the
Southwestern University, Cebu City. She
averred that sometime in August 2010, in his
class discussions, Judge Paredes named her
mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis (Judge
Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu
City, as one of the judges involved in the
marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes
also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis
was abusive of her position as a judge,
corrupt, and ignorant of the law.
Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge
Tormis in his discussions not only once but
several times. In one session, Judge Paredes
was even said to have included in his
discussion Francis Mondragon
Tormis (Francis), son of Judge Tormis, stating
that he was a “court-noted addict.”4 She was
absent from class at that time, but one of her
classmates who was present, Rhoda L.
Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the
inclusion of her brother. To avoid humiliation
in school, Jill decided to drop the class under
Judge Paredes and transfer to another law
school in Tacloban City.
Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled
“Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge
Tormis”5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was
suspended from the service for six (6) months
for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail
bond for the temporary release of an accused
for the warrant she had issued in a case then
pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was
the one who reviewed the findings conducted
therein and he recommended that the penalty be
reduced to severe reprimand.
Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed
an offense worse than that committed by her
mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge
Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of
Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for the temporary
release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled, “People
of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio,” docketed as
Criminal Case No. 148434-R,6 then pending before
Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).
Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be
administratively sanctioned for his actuations.
Comment of Judge Paredes
In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge
Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated
that Judge Tormis had several administrative cases,
some of which he had investigated; that as a result of
the investigations, he recommended sanctions
against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her
daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his
class the case of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge
Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her
sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by
the Court; that he never personally attacked Judge
Tormis’ dignity and credibility; that the marriage
scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience
for all the judges and should be discussed so that
other judges, court employees and aspiring lawyers
would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage
scams were also discussed during meetings of RTC
judges and in schools where remedial law and legal
ethics were taught; that he talked about past and
resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of
Judge Tormis; that there was nothing wrong in
discussing the administrative cases involving Judge
Tormis because these cases were known to the legal
community and some were even published in the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and other
legal publications; and that when he was the
executive judge tasked to investigate Judge Tormis,
he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his
advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still
his student, she did not complain about or dispute his
discussions in class regarding the administrative
liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also
brought to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern
University or of the local authorities; that he admitted
saying that Judge Tormis had a son named Francis
who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had
no place in the judiciary; and that he suggested that
Francis should be removed from the judiciary.
He denied, however, having stated that Francis was
appointed as court employee as a result of the
influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential
person and it is the Supreme Court who determines
the persons to be appointed as court
employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her
drug dependent son to apply for a position in the
judiciary.
Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge
Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash
bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary release of
Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though
that the approval of the bail bond was in accordance
with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC
which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for
bail and other urgent matters on weekends,
official holidays and special days. Judge
Paredes explained that he merely followed the
procedure. As Executive Judge, he issued a
temporary receipt and on the following
business day, a Monday, he instructed the
Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond
to the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond
and issued an official receipt. It was not his
fault that the Clerk of Court acknowledged the
receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon
of March 21, 2011.
Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the
discussions relative to the administrative
cases of Judge Tormis could not be the
subject of an administrative complaint
because it was not done in the performance of
his judicial duties.
Reply of the Complainant
In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23,
2011, Jill countered that her mother had
nothing to do with the filing of the present
complaint; that she was forced to leave her
family in Cebu City to continue her law studies
elsewhere because she could no longer bear
the discriminating and judgmental eyes of her
classmates brought about by Judge Paredes’
frequent discussions in class of her mother’s
administrative cases; that her mother was
indeed one of the judges implicated in the
marriage scams, but when Judge Paredes
discussed the matter in his classes, the case
of her mother was not yet resolved by the
Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still
premature; and that Judge Paredes was
aware that administrative cases were
confidential in nature.
Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her
family was evident when Judge Paredes
branded her brother, Francis, as a “drug
addict.”
Rejoinder of Judge Paredes
In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011,
Judge Paredes asserted that it was not
premature to discuss the marriage scams in
class because the scandal was already
disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also
written in many legal publications, and that
the drug addiction of Francis was known in the
Palace of Justice of Cebu City.
In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012,
the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) stated that the
conflicting allegations by the parties
presented factual issues that could not be
resolved based on the evidence on record
then. Considering the gravity and the
sensitive nature of the charges, a full-blown
investigation should be conducted by the CA.
On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the
recommendation of the OCA, the Court
referred the administrative complaint to the
Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu Station, for
investigation, report and recommendation
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the
records.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the
records were received by, Justice Diy. Thereafter,
the appropriate notices were issued and the
confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards,
Justice Diy received the respective memoranda of the
parties.
In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge
Paredes’ act of discussing Judge Tormis’ cases in class
where she was present was an open display of
insensitivity, impropriety and lack
of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and abusive
conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of
behavior demanded of magistrates. She asserted
that the defense of Judge Paredes that he could not be
made administratively liable as the act was not made
in the performance of his official duties did not hold
water because a judge should be the embodiment of
what was just and fair not only in the performance of
his official duties but also in his everyday life.
Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated
the subjudice rule when he discussed the marriage
scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that
time, the case was still being investigated; that the
administrative case relative to the marriage scam was
decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes was
not the Executive Judge of the MTCC when he
received the cash bail bond in the Guiguio case; that
he could not prove that the executive judge of the
MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail
bond; and that the assertion of Judge Paredes of his
being an anti-corruption judge and a lone nominee of
the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of
Judicial Excellence did not exculpate him from
committing the acts complained of.
In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes
reiterated the allegations contained in his previous
pleadings. He added that the marriage scams
scandalized the Judiciary and became public
knowledge when Atty. Rullyn Garcia of the OCA held a
press conference on the matter; that, hence, every
citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in
the hierarchy of rights, freedom of speech and
expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never
intervened in the present case; that if he indeed made
derogatory remarks against Judge Tormis, she should
have filed a criminal action for oral defamation; and
that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be
considered an abuse, but was meant for the
protection of the
Judiciary.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found
Judge Paredes guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
judge. She opined that his use of intemperate
language during class discussions was
inappropriate. His statements in class, tending to
project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the
laws and procedure, were obviously and clearly
insensitive and inexcusable.
Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes
that his discussions of the administrative case of
Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to
freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary15 which
urged members of the Judiciary to be models of
propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis
Section 6 which stated that “Judges, like any other
citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such
rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a
manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the
judiciary.”16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes’
position that he could not be held
administratively liable for his comments
against Judge Tormis and Francis as these
were uttered while he was not in the exercise
of his judicial functions. Jurisprudence,17 as
well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
required that he conduct himself beyond
reproach, not only in the discharge of his
judicial functions, but also in his other
professional endeavors and everyday
activities.
Justice Diy found merit in Jill’s allegation that
Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule
when the latter discussed the marriage scams
involving Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said
issue was still being investigated. She cited,
as basis for Judge Paredes’ liability, Section 4,
Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
As regards Judge Paredes’ receipt of the cash
bail bond in relation to the Guioguio case,
Justice Diy absolved him of any liability as the
charge of grave misconduct was not
supported by sufficient evidence. She
accepted Judge Paredes’ explanation that he
merely followed the procedure laid down in
Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC
when he approved the bail bond.
Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up
with the following recommendations,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The undersigned Investigating Justice
finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty
of conduct unbecoming of a The subjudice rule restricts comments and
judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is
classified as a light offense under
Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules
of Court, penalized under Section 11 (c)
thereof by any of the following: (1) a
Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not
exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes’ first
offense and considering the factual
milieu and the peculiar circumstances
attendant thereto, it is respectfully
recommended that Judge Paredes be meted
out with the penalty of REPRIMAND with a
warning that a repetition of the same or
a similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.18
The Court’s Ruling
The Court adopts the findings and
recommendations of Justice Diy except as to
the penalty.
Misconduct is defined as a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer. The
misconduct is grave if it involves any of the
additional elements of corruption, willful
intent to violate the law, or to disregard
established rules, which must be established
by substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple
misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent
to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave
misconduct, consists in the act of an official or
fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses
his station or character to procure some benefit for
himself or for another person, contrary to duty and
the rights of others.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a
direct relation to and be connected with the
performance of his official duties.20 Considering that
the acts complained of, the remarks against Judge
Tormis and Francis, were made by Judge Paredes in
his class discussions, they cannot be considered as
“misconduct.” They are simply not related to the
discharge of his official functions as a judge. Thus,
Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for misconduct,
much less for grave misconduct.
Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another
thing.
On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a
proceeding is before or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be
expected to affect the outcome of such
proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of
the process. Nor shall judges make any comment
in public or otherwise that might affect the fair
trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis
supplied)
disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in
order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of
justice.21 The rationale for the rule was spelled out
in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was
stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized
society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune
from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that
the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage
scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the
investigation relative to the said case had not yet
been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was
promulgated by the Court only on April 2, 2013.24 In
2010, he still could not make comments on the
administrative case to prevent any undue influence in
its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams,
where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved,
was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice
Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge
Paredes violated Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although
the reasons of Judge Paredes for discussing the
marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his
objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad
taste. The pendency of the administrative
case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the
marriage scams did not give Judge Paredes
unrestrained license to criticize Judge Tormis
in his class discussions. The publicity given
to the investigation of the said scams and the
fact that it was widely discussed in legal
circles let people expressed critical opinions
on the issue. There was no need for Judge
Paredes to “rub salt to the wound,”25 as
Justice Diy put it.
Judge Paredes in using intemperate language
and unnecessary comments tending to
project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and
ignorant judge in his class discussions, was
correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming
of a judge by Justice Dy.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to
exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4
instructs:
CANON 4 for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and Francis
PROPRIETY
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all
of their activities.
xxx
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public
scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent
with the dignity of the judicial office.
A judge should always conduct himself in a
manner that would preserve the dignity,
independence and respect for himself, the
Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He must
exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint. He should
choose his words and exercise more caution
and control in expressing himself. In other
words, a judge should possess the virtue of
gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should
not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued,
ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh
words, snide remarks and sarcastic
comments. He is required to always be
temperate, patient and courteous, both in
conduct and in language.
In this case, records show that Judge Paredes
failed to observe the propriety required by the
Code and to use temperate and courteous
language befitting a magistrate. Indeed,
Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct
unbecoming of a judge.
When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself
and included Francis, whose condition and
personal circumstances, as properly observed
by Justice Diy, had no relevance to the topic
that was then being discussed in class, it
strongly indicated his intention to taint their
reputations.
The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in
his class discussions was never denied by Judge
Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking
his right to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon
4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that
judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom
of expression. Such right, however, is not without
limitation. Section 6, Canon 4 of the Code also
imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the
exercise of their freedom of expression, they should
always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the
impartiality and independence of the Judiciary. In
the exercise of his right to freedom of expression,
Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the
Judiciary of which he is a part. He should have
avoided unnecessary and uncalled for remarks in his
discussions and should have been more circumspect
in his language. Being a judge, he is expected to act
with greater circumspection and to speak with
self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this
standard.
The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge
Paredes that he cannot be held administratively liable
in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be
reminded of the ethical conduct expected of him as a
judge not only in the performance of his judicial duties,
but in his professional and private activities as
well. Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the Code
mandates:
CANON 2
INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper
discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only
is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges
must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not
merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)
Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes,
whether committed in or out of the court, should not
be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It
should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics
mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of
a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his
performance of his judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a
public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. A judge’s official life cannot
simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence. Thus, being a subject of constant public
scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen. He should
personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest
public service. The personal behavior of a judge,
both in the performance of official duties and in
private life should be above suspicion.

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail
bond in the Guioguio case, Justice Diy
correctly found that it cannot be regarded as
grave misconduct. The Court finds merit in
the position of Judge Paredes that the
approval, as well as the receipt, of the cash
bail bond, was in accordance with the
rules. Thus:
Finally, the Investigating Officer
disagrees with Jill’s allegation that
Judge Paredes committed grave misconduct
when he personally received cash bail
bond in relation to the Guioguio
case. Judge Paredes justified his
action by stating that he was merely
following the procedure set forth in
Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC,
which authorizes executive judges to act
on petitions for bail on Saturdays after
1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays,
official holidays, and special
days. Said rule also provides that
should the accused deposit cash bail, the
executive judge shall acknowledge
receipt of the cash bail bond in writing
and issue a temporary receipt
therefor. Considering that Judge
Paredes merely followed said procedure,
he cannot be held administratively
liable for his act of receiving the cash
bail bond in the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized
to receive the cash bail bond under
Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under said
provision, the bail bond may be filed
either with the court where the case is
pending, or with any Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any
judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or
the Municipal Trial Court of the place of
arrest.
Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive
judges are authorized to exercise other
powers and prerogatives which are
necessary or incidental to the
performance of their functions in
relation to court administration. In
the instant case, Judge Paredes was
merely exercising powers incidental to
his functions as an Executive Judge since
he was the only judge available when Lita
Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita
Guioguio’s payment for cash bail bond was
made on a Sunday. In addition, the judge
assigned to the court where the Guioguio
case was then pending and the executive
judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not
available to receive the bail
bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge
available since the practice was for one
judge to be present on
Saturdays. However, there was no judge
assigned for duty during Sundays.
Relative to the matter above-discussed,
the insinuation made by complainant Jill
of any irregularity reflected in the
issuance of the two (2) orders of release
of different dates is not backed up by
sufficient evidence.28
Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified
as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section
11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not
less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2)
Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with
warning.
Considering that this is the first offense of Judge
Paredes, the appropriate penalty under the
circumstances is admonition.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P.
Paredes, Presiding Judge of Branch 13 of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for
conduct unbecoming of a judge
and ADMONISHES him therefor.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014
(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)
ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Batangas City, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Decision the administrative
complaints1 filed by Antonio M. Lorenzana (complainant)
against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent), Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose
from the case "In the Matter of the Petition to have Steel
Corporation of the Philippines Placed under Corporate
Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993,
where the respondent was the presiding judge. The
complainant was the Executive Vice President and Chief
Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines
(SCP), a company then under rehabilitation proceedings.
i. Complaint
In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the
complainant alleged that in the course of SP. Proc. No.
06-7993, the respondent committed Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave
Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty,
Grave Bias and Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to Observe the
Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, as shown by the following
instances:
1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr.
as rehabilitation receiver over SCP’s objections and despite
serious conflict of interest in being the duly appointed
rehabilitation receiver for SCP and, at the same time, the
external legal counsel of most of SCP’s creditors; he is also
a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal adviser.
2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she
termed as "consultative meetings" in her Order2 dated May
11, 2007) in places outside her official jurisdiction
(i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and sports club
facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily
dictated the terms, parameters and features of the
rehabilitation plan she wanted to approve for SCP.
She also announced in the meetings that she would
prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.
3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty.
Gabionza is a replica of what the respondent
dictated to him. Thus, the respondent exceeded the
limits of her authority and effectively usurped and
pre-empted the rehabilitation receiver’s exercise of
functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of
the informal meetings be off-record so that there
would be no record that she had favored
Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).
5. The respondent had secret meetings and
communications with EPCIB to discuss the case
without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its
creditors.
6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas
(Anonas) as Atty. Gabionza’s financial adviser and,
at the same time, as her financial adviser to guide
her in the formulation and development of the
rehabilitation plan, for a fee of ₱3.5M at SCP’s
expense. Anonas is also the cousin-in-law of the
managing partner of Atty. Gabionza’s law firm.
7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise
complaints or accusations against SCP, leading to
EPCIB’s filing of a motion to create a management
committee.
8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary
meeting and to issue a subpoena (so that SCP
could confront EPCIB’s witnesses to prove the
allegation that there was a need for the creation of a
management committee), the respondent denied
SCP’s requests and delayed the issuance of the
order until the last minute.
9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the
respondent intimidated SCP’s counsel, Atty.
Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to
speak; refused to recognize his appearances in
court; and made condescending and snide
remarks.
10. The respondent failed to observe the
reglementary period prescribed by the Interim
Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation
(Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan
beyond the 180 days given to her in the Rules,
without asking for permission to extend the period
from the Supreme Court (SC).
11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and
applied Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules (the court’s
power to approve the rehabilitation plan) to include
the power to amend, modify and alter it.
12. The respondent took a personal interest and
commitment to decide the matter in EPCIB’s favor
and made comments and rulings in the proceedings
that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.
13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit
herself and showed special interest and personal
involvement in the case.
ii. Supplemental Complaint
The complainant likewise filed a supplemental
complaint3 dated April 14, 2008 where he alleged that the
respondent committed an act of impropriety when she
displayed her photographs in a social networking website
called "Friendster" and posted her personal details as an
RTC Judge, allegedly for the purpose of finding a compatible
partner. She also posed with her upper body barely covered
by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st
Indorsement4 dated March 18, 2008, referred the complaints
to the respondent for comment.
a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint
The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against
her. While she admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible
rehabilitation plan best suited for SCP, she maintained that
she did so only to render fairness and equity to all the parties
to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if
indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers
was a mere error of judgment that does not call for an
administrative disciplinary action. Accordingly, she claimed
that the administrative complaints were premature because
judicial remedies were still available.5
The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit
informal meetings and conferences. On the contrary, she
argued that informal meetings are even encouraged in view
of the summary and non-adversarial nature of rehabilitation
proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives
the rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the
creditors, then there is all the more reason for the
rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve the
plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also
pointed out that it was SCP which suggested that informal
meetings be called and that she only agreed to hold these
meetings on the condition that all the parties would attend.
As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period,
she contended that she approved the rehabilitation plan
within the period prescribed by law. She argued that the
matter of granting extension of time under Section 11, Rule 4
of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation
court.
The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and
partiality. First, she claimed that her denial of the
complainant’s motion for inhibition was not due to any bias or
prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she
argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor
EPCIB, as evidenced by the fact that EPCIP itself (as some
other creditors did) promptly appealed her decision to the
Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty.
Gabionza as SCP’s rehabilitation receiver because she
disagreed that the grounds the complainant raised warranted
his removal.
She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest.
Lastly, she maintained that the rest of the complainant’s
allegations were not substantiated and corroborated by
evidence.
The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely
abuse her authority in not issuing a subpoena as Section 1,
Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation of the
Rules specifically states that the court may decide matters
on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.
On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that
the allegations were not proven and substantiated by
evidence. Finally, the respondent also believed that
there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas
during the informal meetings.
b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental
Complaint
8
In her comment on the supplemental complaint,
the respondent submitted that the photos she
posted in the social networking website "Friendster"
could hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She
added that an "off-shouldered" attire is an
acceptable social outfit under contemporary
standards and is not forbidden. She further stated
that there is no prohibition against attractive ladies
being judges; she is proud of her photo for having
been aesthetically made. Lastly, she submitted that
the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v. Judge
Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since
the facts are different.
On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a
reply,10 insisting that the respondent’s acts of
posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a
"Friendster" account constituted acts of impropriety,
in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and
2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the
Court re-docketed the complaints as regular
administrative matters, and referred them to the CA
for investigation, report and recommendation.
The CA’s Report and Recommendation
On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene
Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating Justice,
conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of
memoranda by both parties. In her January 4, 2010
Report and Recommendation,15 Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were
partly meritorious. She found that the issues raised
were judicial in nature since these involved the
respondent’s appreciation of evidence.
She also added that while the CA resolved to set
aside the respondent’s decision in the rehabilitation
proceedings, it was not by reason of her ignorance
of the law or abuse of authority, but because the
rehabilitation plan could no longer be implemented
in view of SCP’s financial predicament.
On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in
handling the rehabilitation proceedings, Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to
present any clear and convincing proof that the
respondent intentionally and deliberately acted
against SCP’s interests; the complaint merely relied
on his opinions and surmises.
On the matter of the respondent’s inhibition, she
noted that in cases not covered by the rule on
mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies
within the discretion of the sitting judge and is
primarily a matter of conscience.
With respect to the respondent’s informal meetings,
Justice Gonzales-Sison found nothing irregular
despite the out-of-court meetings as these were
agreed upon by all the parties, including SCP’s
creditors. She also found satisfactory the
respondent’s explanation in approving the
rehabilitation plan beyond the 180-day period
prescribed by the Rules.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison
noted the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with SCP’s
legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges and utterances
were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of
the Justice Gonzales-Sison:
Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she
instead brushed off the matter with what would appear to be
a conceited show of a prerogative of her office, a conduct
that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge.
Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were
uncalled for. xxx. Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that:
judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings
before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the
judge deals in an official capacity. Judicial decorum requires
judges to be temperate in their language at all times. Failure
on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming of a judge,
for which Judge Austria should be held liable.16
On the respondent’s Friendster account, she believes that
her act of maintaining a personal social networking account
(displaying photos of herself and disclosing personal details
as a magistrate in the account) – even during these changing
times when social networking websites seem to be the trend
– constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally
justified by the public’s acceptance of this type of conduct.
She explained that propriety and the appearance of propriety
are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CA’s May 16,
2006 Decision17 in CA-G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering
the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the
procedures prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such
professional incompetence was tantamount to gross
ignorance of the law and procedure, and recommended a
fine of ₱20,000.00. She also recommended that the
respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict
propriety and judicial decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA
In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA
recommended the following:
RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the
consideration of the Honorable Court that:
1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice
Marlene Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;
2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2,
Regional Trial Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be found
GUILTY of conduct unbecoming a judge and for violation of
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct;
3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and
4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain
from further acts of impropriety with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or any similar act will be dealt with
more severely.19
In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the
respondent was not guilty of gross ignorance of the law as
the complainant failed to prove that her orders were
motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.
The OCA also found that the charges of bias and
partiality in handling the rehabilitation proceedings
were not supported by evidence. It accepted the
respondent’s explanation in the charge of failure to
observe the reglementary period.
Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of
grave abuse of authority and gross incompetence
are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the
subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on
allegations of conduct unbecoming of a judge,
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the
OCA shared Justice Gonzales-Sison’s observations
that the respondent’s act of posting seductive
photos in her Friendster account contravened the
standard of propriety set forth by the Code.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the recommendation of both Justice
Gonzales-Sison and the OCA for the imposition of a
fine on the respondent but modify the amount as
indicated below. We sustain Justice
Gonzales-Sison’s finding of gross ignorance of the
law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation
of a management committee without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. The absence of a hearing was
a matter of basic due process that no magistrate
should be forgetful or careless about.
On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;
Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection
It is well settled that in administrative cases, the
complainant bears the onus of proving the
averments of his complaint by substantial
evidence.20 In the present case, the allegations of
grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the
performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and
lack of circumspection are devoid of merit because
the complainant failed to establish the respondent’s
bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely
pointed to circumstances based on mere
conjectures and suppositions. These, by
themselves, however, are not sufficient to prove the
accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence and
is not equivalent to proof."21
"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud,
dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent
judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or
incompetence of official acts in the exercise of
judicial functions and duties, particularly in the
adjudication of cases."22
Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in
the exercise of her judicial functions, these are, at
best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily
available to the complainant. "An administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a
judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as
a motion for reconsideration or an appeal."23 Errors
committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through
administrative proceedings but should be assailed
instead through judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality
We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the
part of the respondent baseless. The truth about the
respondent’s alleged partiality cannot be determined by
simply relying on the complainant’s verified complaint. Bias
and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a
judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to
administer justice without respect to the person, and to give
equal right to the poor and rich.25 There should be clear and
convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of
partiality is not enough.26
In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial
in character, the circumstances cited by the complainant
were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The
complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the
respondent’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of
one party. This kind of evidence would have helped its cause.
The bare allegations of the complainant cannot overturn the
presumption that the respondent acted regularly and
impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainant’s
failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the
allegations of bias and partiality must fail.
On the Charges of Grave Incompetence
and Gross Ignorance of the Law
We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or
mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
renders him liable.27 "[A]s a matter of policy, in the absence
of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his
judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even
though such acts are erroneous."28
In the present case, what was involved was the respondent’s
application of Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules, which
provides:
Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may
approve a rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of
creditors holding a majority of the total liabilities of the debtor
if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor is feasible
and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted
by Atty. Gabionza, subject to the modifications she found
necessary to make the plan viable. The complainant alleged
that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority and
effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver.
We find, however, that in failing to show that the respondent
was motivated by bad faith or ill motives in rendering the
assailed decision, the charge of gross ignorance of the law
against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise would
be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon
to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment."30
To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that
the decision, order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was moved
by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption31 or had
committed an error so egregious that it amounted to bad
faith.
In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the
respondent was motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption,
dishonesty or egregious error in rendering her decision
approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his bare
accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his
allegations with competent proof. Bad faith cannot be
presumed32 and this Court cannot conclude that bad faith
intervened when none was actually proven.
With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the
creation of a management committee without first conducting
an evidentiary hearing for the purpose, however,
we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to
bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross
ignorance of the law, as charged.
Due process and fair play are basic requirements
that no less than the Constitution demands. In
rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be
given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the
existence of an imminent danger of dissipation, loss,
wastage or destruction of the debtor-company’s
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial
to the interest of minority stockholders,
parties-litigants or the general public.33 The
rehabilitation court should hear both sides, allow
them to present proof and conscientiously
deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether
the appointment of a management receiver is
justified. This is a very basic requirement in every
adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate
can disregard.
In SCP’s rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not
given at all the opportunity to present its evidence,
nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly,
the CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the
respondent’s act of denying SCP the opportunity to
disprove the grounds for the appointment of a
management committee was tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion. As aptly observed by Justice
Gonzales-Sison:
[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria)
in creating a MANCOM without observing the
procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.34
Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for
gross ignorance of the law for every erroneous
order that he renders, this does not mean that a
judge need not observe due care in the
performance of his/her official functions.35 When a
basic principle of law is involved and when an error
is so gross and patent, error can produce an
inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we
conclude that the respondent’s act of promptly
ordering the creation of a management committee,
without the benefit of a hearing and despite the
demand for one, was tantamount to punishable
professional incompetence and gross ignorance of
the law.
On the Ground of Failure to Observe
the Reglementary Period
On the respondent’s failure to observe the
reglementary period prescribed by the Rules, we
find the respondent’s explanation to be satisfactory.
Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:
Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. – xxx
The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation
plan is approved by the court upon the lapse of one
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the
initial hearing. The court may grant an extension
beyond this period only if it appears by convincing
and compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance,
however, shall the period for approving or
disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen
(18) months from the date of filing of the petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the
extension beyond the 180-day period carried a good
measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate with particularity
whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or whether
Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently
was this uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the
2008 Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, took
effect.
Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:
Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall
decide the petition within one (1) year from the date of filing
of the petition, unless the court, for good cause shown, is
able to secure an extension of the period from the Supreme
Court.38
Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009
(long after the respondent’s approval of the rehabilitation
plan on December 3, 2007), we find no basis to hold the
respondent liable for the extension she granted and for the
consequent delay.
On the Ground of Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge
On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section
6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:
SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and
courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives,
court staff and others subject to their influence, direction or
control.39
A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that
would preserve the dignity, independence and respect for
himself/herself, the Court and the Judiciary as a whole. He
must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost
sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should choose his words and
exercise more caution and control in expressing himself. In
other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas.41
As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v.
Judge Carretas,42 a judge should be considerate, courteous
and civil to all persons who come to his court; he should
always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to
run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a
sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh
words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.
Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge
Rufon,43 the Court declared that "although respondent judge
may attribute his intemperate language to human frailty, his
noble position in the bench nevertheless demands from him
courteous speech in and out of court.
Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and
courteous, both in conduct and in language."
Accordingly, the respondent’s unnecessary bickering with
SCP’s legal counsel, her expressions of exasperation over
trivial procedural and negligible lapses, her snide remarks,
as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the
Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of
superiority that the Code abhors.
Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the
respondent failed to observe judicial temperament and to
conduct herself irreproachably. She also failed to maintain
the decorum required by the Code and to use temperate
language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should
ensure that [her] conduct is always above reproach
and perceived to be so by a reasonable observer.
[She] must never show conceit or even an
appearance thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44
Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct
unbecoming of a judge and thus violated Section 6,
Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.
On the Ground of Impropriety
We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of
social networking sites in the Internet – a new
medium through which more and more Filipinos
communicate with each other.45 While judges are
not prohibited from becoming members of and from
taking part in social networking activities, we remind
them that they do not thereby shed off their status
as judges. They carry with them in cyberspace the
same ethical responsibilities and duties that every
judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday
activities. It is in this light that we judge the
respondent in the charge of impropriety when she
posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the
public.
Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of
Judicial Conduct does not prohibit a judge from
joining or maintaining an account in a social
networking site such as Friendster. Section 6,
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are
entitled to freedom of expression. This right
"includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and ideas
through any media regardless of
frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an
exercise of one’s freedom of expression. The
respondent judge’s act of joining Friendster is,
therefore, per se not violative of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, however, also imposes a correlative
restriction on judges: in the exercise of their
freedom of expression, they should always conduct
themselves in a manner that preserves the dignity
of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.
This rule reflects the general principle of propriety
expected of judges in all of their activities, whether
it be in the course of their judicial office or in their
personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities:
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public
scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly.
In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a
way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent
disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety
required of her when she posted Friendster photos of herself
wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and made this
available for public viewing.
To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through
social networks, judges must bear in mind that what they
communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter
or part of his or her judicial duties – creates and contributes
to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire
Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true
when the posts the judge makes are viewable not only by his
or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the
general public.
Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a
picture of herself in the attire she wore to her family and
close friends, but when she made this picture available for
public consumption, she placed herself in a situation where
she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object
of the public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber
communications, particularly its speedy and wide-scale
character, renders this rule necessary.
We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting
her photos would seem harmless and inoffensive had this
act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the
visible personification of law and justice, however, judges are
held to higher standards of conduct and thus must
accordingly comport themselves.47
This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the
judicial office and personal matters.1âwphi1 The very nature
of their functions requires behavior under exacting standards
of morality, decency and propriety; both in the performance
of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be
beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard
of conduct when they take their oath of office as magistrates.
Imposable Penalty
Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, gross ignorance of the
law or procedure is classified as a serious charge. Under
Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any
of the following sanctions:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the
benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification
from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations;
provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no
case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three (3), but not exceeding six (6), months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding
₱40,000.00.
On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is
classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of
the Rules of Court. It is penalized under Section 11(C)
thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than
₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and ( 4) Admonition with warning.
Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been
administratively charged or found liable for any wrongdoing
in the past. Since this is her first offense, the Court finds it
fair and proper to temper the penalty for her offenses.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I.
Austria guilty of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE
LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One
Thousand Pesos (₱21,000,00). Judge Austria is
likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain from
further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from
CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.