Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts - 388 U.S. 130, 87 S. Ct.

1975 (1967)

RULE:

The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press require a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with
"actual malice," that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. 

FACTS:

The two instant libel cases involved the issue of the applicability, to public figures
who are not public officials, of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in
New York Times Co. v Sullivan. That case required, under the constitutional
guaranties of freedom of speech and press, a federal rule which prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
In No. 37, the plaintiff, a well-known figure in coaching ranks, brought a libel action
against the publisher of the Saturday Evening Post in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia, based on an article in defendant's magazine
charging him with having "fixed" a football game between the University of Georgia
and the University of Alabama. At the time of the article plaintiff was the athletic
director of the University of Georgia, but was employed by a private corporation and
not by the state itself. The trial was completed before the decision in the New York
Times Case was handed down, and the only defense was truth, although defendant's
counsel were aware of the progress of the latter case. One of the instructions to the
jury made the award of punitive damages depend upon a finding of actual malice,
defined as encompassing the notion of ill will, spite, hatred, and an intent to injure
one, and as also denoting a wanton or reckless indifference or culpable negligence
with regard to the rights of others. In No. 150, the plaintiff, a private citizen of some
political prominence, instituted a libel action in a Texas state court against the
Associated Press for distributing a news dispatch which, in giving an eyewitness
account of the riots on the campus of the University of Mississippi in connection with
the enforcement by federal marshals of a court decree ordering the enrollment of an
African-American student stated that the plaintiff had taken command of the violent
crowd, had personally led a charge against federal marshals, and encouraged and
advised the rioters.The Court reviewed two cases to consider the impact of its
decision that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press required a
federal rule that prohibited a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proved that the
statement was made with "actual malice" on libel actions instituted by persons who
were not public officials, but were "public figures" involved in issues in which the
public had an important interest.

ISSUE:

Should public figures prove the existence of actual malice to recover damages for
defamation?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:

The Supreme Court of the United States concluded that these libel actions could not
be left entirely to state libel laws, unlimited by any overriding constitutional
safeguard, but that the rigorous requirements of the Court's decision regarding public
officials was not the only appropriate accommodation of the conflicting interests at
stake. The Court held that a "public figure" who was not a public official could also
recover damages for a defamatory falsehood, whose substance made substantial
danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct that
constituted an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting
ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.