TERM 2

CASE LAW BOARD PROJECT

1. Carlill Vs Carbolic Smoke Ball Co 1. [1893]1 QB 256 (CA)

2. Vishaka Vs State of Rajasthan 2. AIR 1997 SC 3011

3. S R Bommai Vs UOI 3. 1994 SCC (3) 1

4. Mohammed Ahmed Khan Vs Shah Bano Begum 4. 1985(3) SCR 844

5. Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd)Vs UOI 5. (2017) 10 SCC 1

(Aadhar case)

CASE 1 –

Carlill Vs Carbolic Smoke Ball Co

TYPE OF CASE: LAW OF CONTRACT

CITATION: [1893]1 QB 256 (CA)

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 7th December,1892

PETITIONER: Louisa Carlill

RESPONDENT Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.

NAME OF THE JUDGES/BENCH:

1. Justice Lindley
2. Justice Bowen
3. Justice Smith

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company made a product called the "smoke ball"
which claimed to be a cure for influenza and several other diseases. The Company
published advertisements claiming that it would pay £100 to anyone who got sick
with influenza after using its product according to the instructions set out in the
advertisement.
£100 reward will be paid by the Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts
the increasing epidemic influenza colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after
having used the ball three times daily for two weeks, according to the printed
directions supplied with each ball. £1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank,
Regent Street, showing our sincerity in the matter.
Mrs. Louisa Carlill saw the advertisement, bought one of the balls and used it three
times daily for nearly two months until she contracted the flu on 17 January 1892.
She claimed £100 from the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company. They ignored two letters
from her husband, a solicitor. On a third request for her reward, they replied with
an anonymous letter that if it is used properly, the company had complete
confidence in the smoke ball's efficacy, but "to protect themselves against all
fraudulent claims" they would need her to come to their office to use the ball each
day and be checked by the secretary. John Carlill (Louisa Carlill's husband)
brought a claim to court. The barristers representing Carlill argued that the
advertisement and her reliance on it was a contract between her and the company,
and so they ought to pay. The company argued it was not a serious contract. The
defendants contended that they could not be bound by the advert as it was an
invitation to treat rather than an offer on the grounds that the advert was: mere
‘puff’ and lacking true intent; that an offer could not be made ‘to the world’; the
claimant had not technically provided acceptance; the wording of the advert was
insufficiently precise; and, that there was no consideration, as necessary for the
creation of a binding contract in law.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:

1.Whether there was any binding effect of the contract between the parties?
2.Whether the contract in question required a formal notification of acceptance?
3.Whether Mrs Carlill was required to communicate her acceptance of the offer to
the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company?
4.Whether Mrs Carlill provided any consideration in exchange for the reward of 100
pounds offered by the company?

JUDGEMENT:

The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the company’s arguments and held that
there was a completely binding contract for £100 with Mrs. Carlill Among the
explanations given by the three judges were {1} That the advertisement was a one-
sided offer to the complete world {2} The satisfying conditions for using the smoke
ball constituted acceptance of the offer. {3} That buying or merely using the smoke
ball constituted good consideration, because it been definite harm incurred at the
behest of the corporate and, furthermore, more people buying smoke balls by
counting on the advert was a transparent benefit to Carbolic {4} That the company’s
claim that £1000 was deposited at the Alliance Bank showed the intense intention
to be legally bound.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The three Lord Justices of Appeal who gave judgments in this case all decided in
favour of Mrs Carlill. Each, however, used slightly different reasoning, arguments,
and examples. The process, therefore, of distilling the ‘reason for the decision’ of
the court is quite a delicate art. The ratio of the case can be put as follows: Offers
must be sufficiently clear to allow the courts to enforce agreements that follow from
them. The offer here was ‘a distinct promise expressed in language which is
perfectly unmistakable’. It could not be a ‘mere puff’ in view of the £1,000 deposited
specially to show good faith. An offer may be made to the world at large and the
advert was such an offer. It was accepted by any person, like Mrs Carlill, who
bought the product and used it in the prescribed manner. Mrs Carlill had accepted
the offer by her conduct when she did as she was invited to do and started to use
the smoke ball. She had not been asked to let the company know that she was
using it.
In unilateral contracts, the communication of acceptance is not expected or
necessary. These contracts are treated as offers where the language is clear that an
ordinary person would construe an intention to offer anyone who relies on this offer
and performs the required conditions thereby accepts the offer and forms an
enforceable contract.
 1. A contractual offer must be made to a specific person or identified group of
persons. This group can be as large as ‘everyone in the world’. The
advertisement was not a unilateral offer to all the world, but an offer
restricted to those who acted upon the terms contained in the
advertisement.
2. That satisfying conditions for using the smoke ball constituted acceptance
of the offer.
3. That purchasing or merely using the smoke ball constituted good
consideration I.e., If the company can only get the public to have confidence
enough to use it, will react and produce a sale which is directly beneficial to
them. This is referred to as ‘executed consideration’
That the company's claim that 1000 was deposited at the Alliance Bank showed the
serious intention to be legally bound.

OBITER DICTA:
In the course of his reasoning, Bowen LJ gave the legal answer to a set of facts
which were not in issue in this case. This answer was, thus, an obiter dictum. He
did this because it assisted him in clarifying the answer to Mrs Carlill’s case. He
said: If I advertise to the world that my dog is lost, and that anybody who brings
the dog to a particular place will be paid some money, are all the police or other
persons whose business it is to find lost dogs to be expected to sit down and write
me a note saying that they have accepted my proposal? Why, of course, they at
once look [for] the dog, and as soon as they find the dog, they have performed the
condition? If such facts were ever subsequently in issue in a court case, then the
words of Bowen LJ could be used by counsel as persuasive precedent.
CONCLUSION:
This is one of the most frequently cited cases in the English common contract law.
It is a perfect example of unilateral contracts. It also points out the problems
associated with unilateral contracts. This case also helps in understanding the
essentials of normal contracts as this is a case of exception to these principles
owing to lack of need for acceptance of offer and consideration. The commercial
uncertainties created due to such a vacuum in unilateral contracts it also affects
the concept of privity of contracts. Thus, this case has become a foundation case
for Contract law. Altogether, the judgement was well put together, however, the
underlying implications of the judgment have become an evergreen subject of
debate in commercial circles.
CASE 2-
Vishaka Vs State of Rajasthan

TYPE OF CASE Public Interest Litigation (PIL)

CITATION

DATE OF JUDGEMENT 13/08/1997

PETITIONER VISHAKA

RESPONDENT STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND OTHERS

NAME OF THE JUDGES/BENCH:

1. J.S. Verma (Chief Justice)
2. Sujata V. Manohar
3. B.N. Kirpal
FACTS OF THE CASE

Bhanwari Devi who was a social activist/worker in Women’s Development

Project (WDP) run by the Government of Rajasthan. She worked under a
social development program at rural level which was about to stop child
marriage in a village and this social program was administered/ initiated by
the Rajasthan’s state government. Bhanwari Devi en-devoured to stop the
marriage of the Ramkaran Gujjars (thakurs) daughter, who was merely less
than one year old i.e. she was an infant only. As a part of her duty,
Bhanwari Devi tried to terminate the marriage of her infant daughter.
However, the marriage was performed the next day and no police action was
taken against it. Later, it was established by the villagers that the police
visits were a result of Bhanwari Devi’s actions.
On 22nd September 1992, five men i.e., four from the above-mentioned
Gurjar family- Ram Sukh Gujjar, Gyarsa Gujjar, Ram Karan Gujjar, and
Badri Gujjar along with one Shravan Sharma, attacked Bhanwari Devi’s
husband and brutallygang-raped her
The police had attempted to play all dirty tricks to prevent her from filing
any complaint due to which there was a delay in the investigation as well as
medical examination which was deferred for 52 hours only to find that no
reference of rape was mentioned in the report.
At the police station, she was continually and grossly taunted by the women
countable for the whole of midnight.
In past midnight she was asked by the policeman to leave her lehnga as the
evidence of that incident and go back to her village. She was just left with
the bloodstained dhoti of her husband to wrap her body, because of which
they needed to go through their entire night in that police station.
In the absence of adequate proof and with the help of the local MLA Dhanraj
Meena, all the accused managed to get an acquittal in the Trial Court.
Women activists and organisations chose not to be silent and raised strong
protests and voices against the acquittal.
A PIL was filed by a women’s rights organisation known as ‘Vishaka’ which
focused on the enforcement of the fundamental rights of women at the
workplace under the provisions of Article 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the
Constitution of India and the need to protect their sexual harassment at the
workplace.
ISSUES OF THE CASE
1. Whether sexual harassment in the workplace is a violation of Fundamental
Rights under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution?
2. Whether International Convention can be applied in cases of the absence of
appropriate domestic laws?
3. Whether there is a need for mandatory guidelines to be laid in the light of
Sexual harassment at the workplace?
JUDGEMENT
Chief Justice J.S Verma delivered the verdict in Vishakha’s case on behalf of
Justice Sujata Manihar and Justice B.N Kripal on the basis of a writ petition filed
by Vishakha, the case’s victim.
Firstly, the court ruled that such an incident is a crystal clear violation of Article
14, 15, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the Court indicated few other
provisions relevant, in particular, Article 42 (Provision for Just and humane
conditions of work and maternity relief) and 51A (Fundamental duties of the
citizen).

Secondly, the Court dealt with the application of international conventions

in the absence of required Domestic Law. The court highlighted that a
relevant International Convention which is consistent with the fundamental
rights as well in harmony within its scope can be applied for the promotion
of the Object of the Constitutional guarantee as implied under the Article 51
(c) and Article 253 (Power of the Parliament to enact laws for the
implementation of the International Conventions and Norms) read along
with the Entry 14 under the Union List in the 7th Schedule of the Indian
Constitution. In addition to this, the court also emphasized Article
73 (Extent of Executive power of the Union).

 Thirdly, the court acknowledged the need for guidelines to render Gender
equality and emphasized the significance played by the International
Convention and Norms as the very nature of protection of sexual
harassment and right to work with dignity being universal. 

RATIO DECIDENDI
The judge did not expressly provide the ratio decidendi, but on the following ground
the apex court has provided the judgement:
Taking into consideration both the civil and the penal laws in India, but none of
them adequately provides any specific protection or any provision that could help
to prevent sexual harassment at the workplace. There is an increase in the effort to
guard against such violations and the resentment towards incidents of sexual
harassment is also increasing.
OBITER DICTA
The Chief Justice of India, J. S. Verma wrote the judgement for himself and the
bench. The court did not go on the matter of criminal nature as a separate case
involving that is prevalent. The present petition involved the sexual harassment of
women at workplace. There was no safeguard mechanism to protect the working
condition or statute at force. Thus, there was the need for the mechanism to put in
action.
CONCLUSION
The constitutional principles of equality and liberty have been upheld by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the Vishaka Judgement. The Supreme Court of
India’s judgement only proposed guidelines to alleviate the problem of sexual
harassment.
India finally enacted a law on the prevention of sexual harassment against female
employees at the workplace, The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“Sexual Harassment Act”)
which came into effect on 23 April 2013.
Though extensive regulations like The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace
(Prevention, Prohibition, and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“Sexual Harassment Act”) have
been enacted to protect women in India, the country still ranks as the most unsafe
for women. As a result, even if laws do not exist, it is everyone’s responsibility to
safeguard women’s safety and dignity.The constitutional principles of equality and
liberty have been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in
the Vishaka Judgement. The inception of the law against sexual harassment has
inspired many women to raise their voices against the suffering that they were
silently subjected to until the year 1997. Vishaka Guidelines formed the basis for
the establishment of The Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention,
Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. The true spirit of Judicial Activism has been
portrayed in the Vishaka Judgement and it has been an inspiration to other
nations. However, Bhanwari Devi, the spark that ignited the need for appropriate
legislation to safeguard women against sexual harassment, even after two decades,
is still awaiting justice to be served. It is paramount to take note of the fact that,
though such comprehensive laws have been enacted to safeguard women in India,
it still ranks as the most dangerous country for women. Maybe it is time to
question ourselves, is it the law or is it us that must be responsible?

CASE 3-
S R Bommai Vs UOI

TYPE OF CASE

CITATION AIR 2017 SC 2734

DATE OF JUDGEMENT 11/03/1994

PETITIONER S.R. BOMMAI

RESPONDENT UNION OF INDIA

NAME OF JUDGES/BENCH

1. S.R. Pandian
2. A.M. Ahmadi
3. Kuldip Singh
4. J.S. Verma
5. P.B. Sawant
6. K. Ramaswamy
7. S.C. Agarwal
8. Yogeshwar Dayal
9. B.P. Jeevan Reddy

FACTS OF THE CASE

The Governor of Karnataka received nineteen letters by the council of ministers

stating that they are withdrawing the support from the ruling party and hence due
to the non-majority Governor forwarded a report to the president about the
deflection of Council Of Ministers from the party in
ruling. The Governor stated in the report that the existing Chief Minister Mr. S.R.
Bommai failed to call in majority for the majority of assembly and thus the
president’s rule should be imposed in the State under Article 356(1) of the
Constitution of India. The very next day of sending the report, seven out of the
nineteen ministers complained about the misrepresentation in their respective
letters and Hence Mr. S.R. Bommai, the Chief Minister and the Law Minister visited
the to summon the assemble same day in order to prove the Majority of his
government in the assembly. The report of the same was forwarded to the President
But again on the same day, the President received another report from the
Governor which states that Mr. S.R. Bommai, the then Chief Minister of Karnataka
has lost his confidence of Majority and has requested the president to proclaim the
emergency in the state under Article 356. On the basis of this report, the president
proclaimed the emergency. A writ petition was filed challenging the validity of the
proclamation in the special 3 judges bench of Karnataka High Court but it was
dismissed and Thus he preferred this appeal. The Similar question of law arose in
the case of Meghalaya, Nagaland, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Himanchal
Pradesh and hence all the petitions were heard conjointly by the 9 judges bench of
Supreme Court.
OR
Article 356 was called as a ‘dead letter’ by Bhimrao Ambedkar. The same was
reiterated in the instant case. Janta Dal was the ruling party in the State of
Karnataka in the year 1989 headed by S.R. Bommai. There was a question of
proving majority as many members defected. A suggestion was made by the Chief
Minister to the Governor that the ruling party should be given a chance to prove
majority in the house of the government through the virtue of the floor test.
The Governor did not comply with the same and suggested to the President that
Article 356(1) can be applied as S.R. Bommai had not proved his majority in the
house and there was no other party competent enough to replace the ruling party.
The proclamation for the same was made under Article 356(1) of the Indian
Constitution and S.R. Bommai filed a petition against the aforementioned action in
the Karnataka High Court. A President’s rule degrades the federal aspect of the
nation with which it was formed. The Court held that the reasons why the
proclamation was issued can be held under judicial review. But in its judgment,
the Hon’ble Court said that the Governor’s intentions cannot be questioned and
facts in Governor’s reports cannot be deemed as inadmissible as it was based on
facts and there was reasonability in the reports. It was also observed by the court
that the floor test was not necessary and it was not a prerequisite condition to the
Governor’s report. Hence, the High Court upheld the report and the proclamation.
Similar proclamations were upheld by courts in the states Meghalaya, Nagaland,
Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and Rajasthan.The petitioner further appealed
in the Hon’ble Supreme Court wherein the case, along with other cases which held
the same judgement in the high courts, was heard. The court gave some guidelines
so that Article 356 is not misused.
 The floor test is necessary and that in itself will adjudge the majority of the
Council of Ministers.
 If Article 356 is misused, the court will give remedy to the aggrieved.
 Article 356(3) provides for a limitation of President’s proclamation. Thus,
until the Parliament gives their approval, the President shall not dissolve the
government.
 A warning and a time of one week should be given to the state to reply.
 The court can question the material behind the satisfaction of the President
in issuing of Proclamation.
 If the proclamation that is announced is made invalid by the court, then the
assembly can be revived.
The Supreme Court also held that Article 356(1) is not barred from judicial review.
The Supreme Court laid out the interpretation and issued guidelines with respect
to the use and the misuse of Article 356. The issue of constitutional cause vs.
administrative cause was differentiated by the same case. It gave certain powers to
the state government as well. This is one of the landmark cases in the Indian
Judicial System.

ISSUES OF THE CASE

Whether the president’s rule inflicted in the six states is constitutionally valid?
Whether the president has unchained rules to proclaim Article 356(1) of the Indian
Constitution. The answer to this question depends upon the answers to the
subsequent questions:
If yes, what is the scope of the judicial review in this regard?
What is the meaning of the phrase “a situation has arisen in which the government
of the state cannot be carried on under the provisions of this constitution” used in
Article 356 (1)?
Or
1) Whether the presidential rule proclaimed under article 356 is justified.
2) Whether the President enjoys unrestricted power to proclaim emergency.
3) Whether the proclamation comes under the scope of Judicial review
Or
 Whether the imposition of the President’s Rule was constitutional or
unconstitutional?
 What is the purview of judicial review?
 Does the President have unrestricted access under Article 356(1)?
 What is the interpretation of Article 356(1)?

RATIO DECIDENDI

The court held that “the exercise of power by the President under Article 356(1) to
issue Proclamation is subject to the judicial review at least to the extent of
examining whether the conditions precedent to the issuance of the Proclamation
have been satisfied or not. This examination will necessarily involve the scrutiny as
to whether there existed material for the satisfaction of the President that a
situation had arisen in which the Government of the State could not be carried on
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”

The judge did not expressly provide the ratio decidendi, but on the following ground
the apex court has provided the judgement:
Taking into consideration both the civil and the penal laws in India, but none of
them adequately provides any specific protection or any provision that could help
to prevent sexual harassment at the workplace.
There is an increase in the effort to guard against such violations and the
resentment towards incidents of sexual harassment is also increasing.
https://www.latestlaws.com/articles/supreme-court-case-analysis-vishaka-and-
ors-v-state-of-rajasthan-and-ors-by-kavisha-gupta

OBITER DICTA
http://ncwapps.nic.in/pdfReports/Sexual%20Harassment%20at%20Workplace
%20(English).pdf

The expression there is that the “Government of the Federation cannot be carried
on in accordance with provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the
electorate is necessary”.Commenting upon the said expression, Shafiur Rahman, J.
in Khaja Ahmad Tariq Rahim v.Federation of Pakistan2l (PLD at p. 664)

CONCLUSION

CASE 4
Mohammed Ahmed Khan Vs Shah Bano Begum

TYPE OF CASE:

CITATION:

DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 23/04/1985

PETITIONER: MOHAMMED AHMED KHAN

RESPONDENT: SHAH BANO BEGUM AND ORS.

NAME OF THE JUDGES/BENCH:

1. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)

2. MISRA RANGNATH
3. DESAI, D.A.
 4. REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J)
5. VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)

FACTS OF THE CASE

In 1932, Shah Bano was married to Mohd. Ahmad khan, who was a renowned
lawyer in Indore.
# They were the parents of 3 sons and 2 daughter i.e. in total they have 5
children.# After 14 yrs. Of their marriage Shah Bano's husband married another
women who was younger than him.# In 1975, when Shah Bano age was of 62 yrs ,
she was disowned by her husband and was thrown out from her matrimonial home
along with her children.# In April 1978, she brought a appeal under Sec. 125 of
code of criminal procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in the presence of judicial magistrate of
Indore after when she was thrown away from her matrimonial home by her
husband.# Shah Bano filled this suit in 1978 because her husband has abandoned
her from the maintenance of Rs. 200 per month which he guaranteed to give.# A
wife who is without any income and is neglected by her husband is entitle to
maintenance, which includes a divorced wife who is not remarried[2].# In Nov.
1978, he gave divorce to his wife Shah Bano by articulating or uttering "Triple
Talaq and it was irrevocable.# The argument or conflict between Shah Bano's
children and her husband's other wife were vital reason or grounds on which
divorce was relinquished and furnished.# After he pronounce irrevocable Triple
Talaq, he took a safeguard that since because of this divorce she has been
terminated to be her legal wife and due to which he was not accountable to furnish
her with maintenance or alimony.# The local court ( magistrate) court directed
Mohd. Ahmad to furnish her Rs. 25 per month to Shah Bano in a form of
maintenance.# Shah Bano in July 1908, apart from this, made a plea to High
Court of M.P, to alter the amount of maintenance to Rs. 179 every month.# Shah
Bano's precedent went to Supreme Court and filled a petition against the verdict of
High Court of Madhya Pradesh.# Her husband essential argument after divorce he
cannot keep any form of alliance or connection with his divorce wife because it is
not allowed by Islamic laws/Islam and is "Haram" & hence he is not legally
responsible to maintain her wife.
Or
Mohd Ahmed Khan (the appealing party) who was a lawyer by profession, married
to Shah Bano Begum (the respondent) in 1932, had three sons and two daughters
from this marriage. In 1975, when Shah Bano’s age was 62 years, she was
disowned by her spouse and was tossed out from her marital home together with
her children. In 1978, she filed an appeal in the presence of Judicial Magistrate of
Indore, because she was abandoned from the maintenance of Rs. 200 per month,
which was guaranteed to be provided by him. She demanded Rs. 500 per month as
maintenance. Subsequently, the husband gave her irrevocable triple talaq on
November 6th, 1978, and used it as a defence to not pay maintenance.  The
magistrate, in August 1979, directed the husband to pay an entirety of Rs 25 per
month as maintenance. Shah Bano in July 1908 made a plea to the High Court of
M.P, to change the sum of maintenance to Rs. 179 each month, and high court
increased the maintenance to the said amount i.e. Rs. 179 per month.  The same
was challenged by the spouse within the Supreme Court as a special leave petition
to the High court’s decision.
Or
Mohd. Ahmed Khan (Appellant), who is an advocate by profession, was married to
Shah Bano Begum (Respondent) in 1932. Two daughters & three sons were born of
that marriage. In 1975, the appellant drove the respondent out of the matrimonial
home. In April 1978, the respondent filed a petition against the appellant under
section 125 of the code of criminal procedure in the court of learned judicial
magistrate (first class), Indore seeking maintenance at the rate of Rs 500 per
month. On November 8, 1978, the appellant divorced the respondent by an
irrevocable talaq. his defense for the respondent's petition for maintenance was
that she had ceased to be his wife by reason of the divorce granted by him, and was
therefore under no obligation to maintain her, that he had already paid her
maintenance at the rate of Rs 200 per month for about two years and that, he had
deposited a sum of Rs 3000 in the court by way of dower during the period of the
iddat. August 1979 the learned magistrate directed the applicant to pay a princely
sum of Rs 25 per month to the respondent by way of maintenance. It may be
mentioned that the respondent has alleged that the appellant earns a professional
income of about Rs 60,000 per year. In July 1980, in a revision application filed by
the respondent, the high court of Madhya Pradesh enhanced the amount of
maintenance to Rs. 179.20 per month. The husband by special leave appealed
before the Division Bench which further refers this appeal to a larger bench by an
order dated 03.02.1981.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Whether a Muslim divorced wife is a wife for the purpose of 125 Cr.P.C?
Whether there is any conflict between the provisions of section 125 Cr.P.C and
those of the Muslim Personal Law on the liability of the Muslim husband to provide
for the maintenance of his divorced wife?
Whether section 125 Cr.P.C overrides the Muslim Personal Law if there is any
conflict between the two?
Whether the respondent's application under section 125 Cr.P.C is liable to be
dismissed because of the provision contained in section 127(3) (b) of Cr.P.C?
OR
Whether Section 125 of the Code Of Criminal Procedure is concerned with Muslims
or not.
# Whether the amount of Mehr given by the husband on divorce is adequate to get
the husband rid and is liable to maintain his wife or not.
# whether Uniform Civil Code applies to all religions or not.
OR

Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether the “WIFE” definition
includes a divorced Muslim woman?
Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether it overrides personal
law?
Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 125. Whether a Muslim husband’s
obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife is in or not in the conflict
between section 125 and Muslim Personal Law?
Criminal Procedure Code (II of 1974), Section 127(3) (b). What is the sum payable
on divorce? The meaning of Mehar or dower is not summed payable on divorce?

JUDGEMENT

The verdict of Shah Bano case was conveyed by C.J, CHANDRACHUD.

# All India Muslim Personal Law Board and Jamiat ulema-e-Hind were the two
Muslim Bodies accompanied the lawsuit as an intervenor.# On 3rdFeb. 1981,
Supreme Court gave an like-minded conclusion in this case and banished the plea
of Mohd. Ahmad Khan and validate the verdict of High Court.On 3rdFeb. 1981,
Supreme Court gave an like-minded conclusion in this case and banished the plea
of Mohd.Ahmad Khan and validate the verdict of High Court.
# The court held that Section 125[3]of Code Of Criminal Procedure solicited to
Muslims too, without any sought of discrimination.
# Supreme Court in this case duly held that, since responsibility of Muslim
husband towards her divorced wife is limited to the extent of " Iddat" period , even
though this situation does not contemplates the rule of law that is mentioned in
Section 125 of CrPc.,1973[4]
# According to Supreme Court this rule according to Muslim Law was against
humanity or was wrong because here a divorced wife was not in a condition to
maintain herself.
# Thus at the end, after very long procedure court finally concluded that the
husband is legal liability will come to an end if divorced wife is competent to
maintain herself.
# But this situation will be reversed in the case when wife is not able in a condition
to to finance or maintain herself after the Iddat period, she will be entitle to receive
maintenance or alimony under Section 125 of CrPc.
 OR
Muslim divorced wife is a wife for 125 Cr.P.C- Clause (B) of the explanation to
section 125(1) which defines "wife" as divorced women who have not remarried and
it nowhere contains any words of limitation to justify the exclusion of Muslim
women from its scope, Section 125 is truly secular in nature.  There is no conflict
between the provisions of 125 Cr.P.C and those of Muslim personal law on
husband's liability to provide for the maintenance of divorced women unable to
maintain herself- If the divorced women is able to maintain herself, the husband's
liability to provide maintenance for her ceases with the expiration of the period of
iddat. If she is unable to maintain herself, she is entitled to take recourse to section
125 of Cr.P.C, and the husband is bound to maintain herself even after the
expiration of the "iddat" period.  Section 125 Cr.P.C overrides the Muslim personal
law if there is a conflict between the two- The court held that-" A Muslim men can
have as many as four wives at the same time but not more when he marries a fifth
wife when he has already four, the marriage is not void, but merely irregular". This
explanation confers upon the wife the right to refuse to live with her husband if he
contracts another marriage, leave alone 3 or 4 other marriages.  The payment of
Mehar by the husband on divorce is not adequate to exculpate him of any
obligation to pay maintenance to the wife- Justice Krishna Iyer in Bai Tahira V. Ali
Hussain Fidaalli Chothia 3 held that “The payment of illusory amounts (referring to
‘Mehar’) by way of customary or personal law requirement is to be considered
within the reduction of maintenance rate but cannot annihilate that rate unless it’s
a reasonable substitute.” The SC in this case held “There is no escape from the
conclusion that a divorced Muslim wife is entitled to apply for maintenance.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that, Sir James Fitz James Stephen who piloted
the Chapter 9 of CrPC in which Section 125 occurs, described it as ‘mode of
preventing vagrancy.’ The Court stated that S.125, S.127(3)(b) of Code of Criminal
Procedure are of secular character and has no place for religion professed by the
spouses. S.125 was enacted to provide quick and summary remedy to persons who
are unable to maintain themselves. It is of prophylactic nature and cut across
barriers of religion. The liability imposed by it is founded upon individual’s
obligation to prevent destitution and vagrancy in the society. It is moral edict of
law. Morality can’t be clubbed with religion.

OBITER DICTA

The Supreme court in Bai Tahira and Fazlunbi case has made error in the context
of S.127(3)(b). In these cases, the Supreme Court has made remark that payment
of Mahr as customary discharge is within the cognizance of S.127(3)(b). But the
provision contained in S.127(3)(b) is introduced by misconception that mahr is
amount payable on Divorce. Article 44 of Indian Constitution, where provision is
made for Uniform Civil Code has become a dead letter. There is no evidence of any
official activity for the formulation of UCC. The Uniform Civil Code will remove
desperate loyalties to laws with conflicting ideologies and help for national
integration.

CONCLUSION

This was the case of a Triple Talaq verdict which according to me was a historic
verdict as it maintains the truth and faith of the people in the judiciary as in this
case, "Justice and equality has overcome religion". According to me this lawsuit
was milestone in judiciary as it was courageous, bold, impartial and unique
decision. This judgement has marked the importance of maintenance which should
be provided to the divorced Muslim women who are not in the condition to earn
and maintain themselves.
Even though the verdict of Shah Bano case given by the Supreme Court was
invalidate by the endorsement of Muslim Women Ac[6]t, the court held in further
verdict's that divorced Muslim. women, under Section 125 of CrPc can affirm
maintenance or alimony from their former husband, or apart from this divorced
Muslim women can assert or claim for round some money or amount under
Muslim Women Act. The Supreme Court even though after dirty politics passed the
judgement that was impartial and at last it had maintained the trust and faith of
citizens in judiciary.
OR
Though the court took a long time the decision of rejecting the appeal is very
historic because it keeps up the truth and faith of the individuals in the judiciary.
This judgment has marked the significance of maintenance which ought to be given
to the divorced Muslim women who are not in the condition to earn and maintain
themselves.  The Shah Bano judgment pulled in a lot of opposition with
authoritative bodies being against the decision for the reason of it being against the
provisions of Islamic law, but SC passed the impartial judgment and at last, it had
maintained the trust and faith of citizens in the judiciary. This lead to enactment of
the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 which given Muslim
women receiving a huge, one-time payment from their husbands amid the period of
Iddat, instead of a maximum month to month payment of ₹500 – an upper limit
which has since been expelled.
OR
The Shah Bano judgment although attracted a lot of opposition was according to be
a landmark judgment because the Supreme Court even though dirty politics
passed the verdict that was impartial and that had maintained the trust and faith
of citizens in the judiciary. The case had spurred the debate in India on the
Uniform Civil Code, and enormous pressure was exerted by radical orthodox
Muslim organizations as according to them it was against the provisions of Islamic
law and teachings. This judgment has marked the significance of maintenance
which ought to be given to the divorced Muslim women and they should not be
thrown on the streets without the roof over their heads and without any means of
sustaining themselves and their children. This case will be marked in the history of
the Indian judiciary as in this case, "Justice and equality has overcome religion".
According to me this lawsuit was without any ambiguity a milestone in the
judiciary as it was courageous, bold, and impartial and in a true sense a unique
decision.

CASE-5
Justice KS Puttaswamy (Retd)Vs UOI(Aadhar case)

TYPE OF CASE

CITATION

DATE OF JUDGEMENT

RESPONDENT UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

PETITIONER JUSTICE KS PUTTASWAMY

NAME OF THE JUDGES/BENCH

1.JUSTICE J.S KHEHAR (CJI)

2.JUSTICE JASTI CHELAMESWAR
3.JUSTICE D Y CHANDRACHUD
4.JUSTICE ROHINTON NARIMAN
5.JUSTICE R K AGARWAL
6. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
7.JUSTICE A NAZEER
8.JUSTICE SA BOBDE
9.JUSTICE A M SAPRE
FACTS OF THE CASE

‘Unique Identification for BPL Families’ was a project which was initiated by
the Government of India. A Committee was set up for the project. The creation of a
Unique Identification database was suggested by the Committee for the said
project. The project was decided to be set up in three phases. In January 2009, the
Planning Commission of India passed a notification on UIDAI (Unique Identification
Authority of India). In 2010, the National Identification Authority of India Bill was
passed by the Commission. Retired Justice K S Puttaswamy and Mr. Parvesh
Sharma in November 2012 filed a PIL Writ Petition in the Supreme Court
challenging the validity of Aadhaar.The scheme was challenged as it was violative of
Fundamental Rights. The scheme violated the right to privacy under Article 21 of
the Indian citizens. After filing this writ petition, a series of orders were passed.
The Aadhaar Act was passed in 2016. The petitioners then filed another writ
petition challenging the vires of the Act. This writ petition was then merged with
the previous one and was treated as one writ petition. Jairam Ramesh who was the
Former Union minister and Congress leader moved Supreme Court in May 2017.
He challenged the decision to treat the Aadhaar Bill as a money bill.On 24th
August 2017, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to privacy is a Fundamental
Right under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. On 17th January 2018, the
hearing of Aadhaar Case was started in Supreme Court. The Supreme Court on
25th April 2018 questioned the Centre on linking the Aadhaar with mobile. On
26th September 2018, the Supreme Court held Aadhaar card to be valid but struck
down certain provisions such as mandatory linking of Aadhaar with mobile, bank
accounts and school admissions.
ISSUES OF THE CASE

Whether the Aadhaar Project violates the right to privacy of the citizens and is
unconstitutional based on this ground?
Whether the Aadhaar Act can be treated as a ‘Money Bill’ within the meaning of
Article 110 of the Indian Constitution?
Whether Section 57 of the Aadhar Act can be regarded as unconstitutional?
Whether the notifications which mandate linking of Aadhaar with bank accounts
and linking of the mobile number of the citizens with Aadhaar, are valid under the
Indian Constitution?
Whether certain actions which were taken by the respondents are in contravention
of the interim orders passed by the Court?

JUDGEMENT
The Aadhaar Act was held to be valid by the Supreme Court. The Hon’ble Court
stated that sufficient security measures have been taken by the Government in
order to keep the data safe which the citizens have been asked to reveal for
Aadhaar. A five-judge bench led by CJI Dipak Misra decided the case. The Bench
asked the Government to take measures to provide more security in order to
protect the data obtained by the people. It was also stated by the Court that the
information which has been obtained by Aadhaar should not be released to the
commercial banks, payment banks, and e-wallet companies. E-wallet companies
like Paytm asked their customers to get their KYC done by using their Aadhaar
cards. It was held by the Court that such information of Aadhaar should not be
released to them. It was also stated by Bench that telecom companies cannot seek
details of Aadhaar from their customers when they buy a new sim card and even
schools shall not ask students to provide their Aadhaar number for appearing in
board exams or for admissions.
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Aadhaar and made it mandatory for
availing the benefits and subsidies of the Government. The Act ensures that the
benefits and subsidies of the Government are received by the people for whom it is
meant. The Court held Section 57 of the Act to be unconstitutional and was,
therefore, struck down. 
The court held that Aadhaar card shall be made mandatory for availing the welfare
schemes, benefits, and subsidies that are provided by the Government as it
empowers the poor and ensures that the benefits and subsidies are received by the
sections of society for which it was meant. Section 57 of the Aadhaar Act was held
to be unconstitutional and was struck down. The Supreme Court held that children
would not be denied the benefits of any Government scheme if they do not have an
Aadhaar card. The Bench of the Supreme Court also struck down the national
security exception under the Aadhaar Act.
The Court also explained the difference between an identity card and Aadhaar.
Aadhaar has a unique identification and hence can’t be duplicated like other
identity cards. Further, the Court also stated that the objective of Aadhaar is to
give identity and empower the poor of the society by making sure that they are able
to avail the benefits and subsidies which are provided by the Government for them.
Therefore, the Aadhaar has been made compulsory for availing the Government
welfare schemes.

The 9-judge bench has unanimously held that the right to privacy is part of Article
21 of Constitution but also stated that the requirement under Aadhaar Act to
give one’s demographic and biometric information does not violate fundamental
right of privacy.
The SC imposing certain restrictions held that Collection of data, its storage and
use does not violate fundamental Right of Privacy.
The State while enlivening right to food, right to shelter etc. envisaged under
Article 21 cannot encroach upon the right of privacy of beneficiaries nor
former can be given precedence over the latter.
Section 57, to the extent, which permits use of Aadhaar by the State or any body
corporate or person, in pursuant to any contract to this effect is
unconstitutional and void. Thus, the last phrase in main provision of
Section 57, i.e., “or any contract to this effect” is struck down.
Aadhaar Act has been rightly passed as Money Bill. The decision of
Speaker certifying the Aadhaar Bill, 2016 as Money Bill is not immuned from
Judicial Review.The Aadhaar Act does not violate the interim orders
passed in Writ Petition (C) No. 494 of 2012 and other Writ Petitions.

RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court 9 judge bench unanimously recognized that under Article 21 of
the Indian Constitution privacy is natural and inalienable part right to life and
personal liberty. M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh overruled by the court to the
scope of it not recognizing the privacy as a fundamental right.Right to Privacy as a
natural right: Puttaswamy holds right to privacy inheres in every individual as a
natural right. It is inalienable and attached to every individual as a pre-condition
for being able to exercise their freedom.

The bench unanimously recognized Right to Privacy is protected as an intrinsic

part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the
freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and the right is not an absolute
right and The body of case law that developed subsequent to Kharak Singh,
recognizing the right to privacy, enunciated the correct position of law.

OBITER DICTA:

Justice D. Y. Chandrachud was of the opinion that “natural rights are inalienable

because they are inseparable from the human personality and all human beings
retain their inalienable rights whatever their situation remains”. Justice
Chandrachud’s dissenting opinion stated that Aadhaar is unconstitutional from the
very beginning when it was passed in the parliament as a money bill, Art. 110 he
argued that for a bill to be categorized as Money Bill it must contain “only
provisions” covers all or any issue set out in Article 110 clause 1(a) to (g).

CONCLUSION

The Court's broad interpretation of the right to privacy has paved the way for a
wide range of claims. While the exact boundaries of the right will continue to
develop on a case by case basis, it is clear that privacy claims will often have to be
weighed against other competing interests. In the absence of a defined hierarchy
among the various rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, the
decision in each case will vary based on facts at hand and the judicial
interpretation. For instance, can the dignity of a married woman, which is central
to her privacy and liberty, be infringed by a law on marital rape so as to shield the
"private affairs" of the family? Does the efficiency of having a meta-database of
information on all citizens trump the autonomy of those who resist its adoption?
Can an individual's "right to be forgotten" on the Internet override the open
information needs of many others? In fact, just last week, a PIL was filed before the
Delhi High Court that the restitution of conjugal rights provision in the Hindu
Marriage Act and Special Marriage Act is violative of the right to privacy. The real
test of privacy will lie in how subsequent Courts apply the Puttaswamy decision to
determine these varied questions.