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2.1. Private provision of public goods congestion function and variety function,
which characterize the unique characteristics
There has been an extensive research of peer-to-peer networks.
literature on public goods (Samuelson 1954,
1955; Olson 1965; Hardin 1968; Clarke 2.2. Peer-to-Peer papers
1971; Groves, 1973; Groves and Ledyard
While peer-to-peer networks may
1977; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984; Cornes
significantly influence the distribution of
and Sandler 1996; Sandler 1997). Following
information goods both in consumer markets
the definition of Mas-Colell et al., a public
and within businesses, few academic studies
good is “a commodity for which use of a
have analyzed the behavior of these
unit of the good by one agent does not
networks, and most that have focus on
preclude its use by other agents” (1995, p.
technical issues, such as server architecture,
359).
data structure, and (Yang and Hector 2002).
As noted above, previous research on
One common theme in the P2P is a
P2P networks suggests that content being
high incidence of free-riding — users
shared in these networks have some of the
consuming network resources without
properties of public goods (Asvanund et al.
providing resources to the network. In a
2001; Krishnan et al. 2003). Specifically,
seminar paper, Adar and Huberman (2000)
most P2P implementations are non-
analyze free-riding in the Gnutella v0.4
excludable in the sense that if a resource is
network by sampling messages on the
provided at all it is provided to the entire
Gnutella network for a 24-hour period. The
community. Likewise, resources provided
authors find that almost 70% of Gnutella
over P2P networks are non-rivalrous to the
users are free-riders. Moreover, the authors
extent that all users share. However, when
find that the top 1% of sharing hosts returns
some users free-ride, these same network
50% of all responses. In more recent
resources become rivalrous.
research, Asvanund et al (2003) find that
Moreover, in most P2P networks, peers 42% of Gnutella v0.6 users are free-riders.
download content for free. Content in P2P
Some authors have attempted to solve
networks is therefore subject to the free-
the free-riding problem by applying
rider problem: peers do not need to provide
incentive design to P2P networks. The most
content in exchange of the one they desire.
common of these solutions apply
This characteristic in the distribution of
telecommunications models for pricing
public goods can lead to the well-known
network resources in the presence of scarcity
“tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968)
(e.g., MacKie-Mason and Varian 1995;
where inadequate incentives lead to over-
Wang, Peha and Sirbu 1996). For example,
consumption and under-provision of
Golle et al (2001) attempt to provide a
community resources.
solution to free-riding in P2P networks by
With respect to the private provision of incorporating micro-payments. Similarly,
public goods literature, our paper is different Chandan and Hogenborn (2001) interpret
in the information setting from Palfrey and P2P networking as a technology of wireless
Rosenthal (1984, 1988) and Nitzan and communications. They consider peer’s
Romano (1990). Our model assumes that decision as a node’s decision to make a
individuals have complete information while connection in the wireless network, just like
their models assume that individuals have in cellular systems. They argue since
incomplete information about certain congestion overwhelms other network
characteristics of others. We don’t allow effects in a wireless network, peering
altruism in the basic model. We also extend technology with pricing will mitigate the
Gradstein and Nitzan (1990) and Gradstein congestion.
(1992) by explicitly modeling the
Other authors have proposed non- P2P networks have elements of both social
priced mechanisms based on reciprocity and computer-supported interaction.
among users. For example, Vishnumurthy et However, our research differs from these
al. (2003) implement a system they call literatures in terms of both the underlying
KARMA. This system tracks both a user’s assumptions about individual behavior and
contribution to and consumption of network the analytic methods employed.
resources. Each user receives a Karma score
Computer networks that link people as
that governs their ability to consume
well as machines are referred to as CSSNs
network resources in the future. Kamvar et
(Wellman et al. 1996). The economies of
al. (2003) propose a similar scheme. In their
communication and coordination are
system users can use their prior
different in CSSNs than in face-to-face
contributions of network resources to
communication. Examples of such networks
purchase the right to make query requests
include Usenet, BBSs, chat, MUDs, and list
from other users.
servers. Recent research in this area has
It is important to note that each of these addressed a variety of topics including the
schemes have limitations when applied to productive or supportive relationships on-
many common P2P settings. In the case of line with network members, the structure
incentives based on monetary payments, and composition in such networks, and the
most P2P networks are collections of widely implications of the changes those networks
dispersed, essentially anonymous bring to the societies (e.g., Wellman et al.
individuals, making person-to-person 1996, Smith and Kollock 1999, and
payments extremely difficult. Likewise DiMaggio et al. 2001).
incentive schemes based on persistent
Significantly, this literature includes
identifies are complicated by the anonymity
several analyses of the provision of
of users and the ease with which users can
resources that share similarities to public
modify their online identity.
goods (see Wasko 2003 for an excellent
Still, these mechanisms represent useful review of this literature). Faraj and Wasko
steps to address the widespread free-riding (2002) investigate the motivation for and
problem in P2P networks and their viability ability of knowledge exchange using three
may be enhanced based on future newsgroups on the Usenet. They also test
development of P2P network technologies. the relationship between social capital and
In particular, several recent papers have knowledge acquisition and contribution.
focused on developing persistent identity Butler (2001) presents a resource-based
and reputation mechanisms for distributed model for social structures to analyze the
communities. Notable papers in this interacting effects of membership size on
literature include Avery et al. (1999) and benefit provision process by sampling from
Dellarocas (2003). Papers applying these an e-mail-based Internet listservs. Lakhani
concepts to a P2P environment include Lai and von Hippel (2000) explore the provision
et al. (2003), Moreton and Twigg (2003), of online technical support among users of
Cohen (2003), Kung and Wu (2003), and Apache open source software.
Woodward and Parkes (2003).
3. A Model of Contribution of
2.3. Social Networks and Virtual Content in Peer-to-Peer Networks
Communities
Our research is also related to the 3.1. Static Symmetric Contribution
literature on social networks (Sharp 1997, Game With Complete Information
Kraut et al. 1998, Kollock 1999, and Faraj In this section we provide a general
and Wasko 2002) and computer-supported overview of our model and an intuition for
social networks (CSSNs) in the sense that our basic results. A more detailed
from not sharing. Likewise, consider the their costs (the number of sharers times the
( )
decision problem of the k * +1 th user who cost of sharing) is maximized.
does not contribute her content. In her case, There are two interesting things to note
it must be true that the utility from the about the socially optimal outcome in our
increased probability of successfully model.
downloading content from the other k First, we find that the equilibrium level
sharers net the cost of sharing is not greater of sharing in the absence of external
than the utility from not sharing. When this incentives is lower than the socially optimal
occurs, the kth user will share and the k+1th level of sharing. That is, content is
user will not share. Again, the concavity of underprovided compared with social
the benefit function ensures that this interior optimum. This is an extension of typical
solution exists. results in the public goods literature that the
Thus, this result implies that for values private provision of public goods is socially
of c within a certain range, a network will inefficient. Without external incentives,
form where some users will be willing to individual network users do not internalize
share content even if others are free-riding. the externality they impose on other network
There are two possible reasons for this. users when deciding whether to share. As a
First, in equilibrium they are better off than result, their sharing levels are below socially
non-sharing. Second, when they decide to optimal levels.
share their content, they may believe that Since the equilibrium number of
some other users might make the same sharers and the socially optimal number of
decision. It is also important to note that sharers differ, a natural question is how we
because each per is homogeneous in our can motivate peers to contribute more
model, there are §¨ n * ·¸ such equilibria, content so that social optimality can be
©k ¹ obtained? In this vein, we note that several
unique up to a permutation of the players’ P2P networks have adopted external
strategies. Thus, it may be difficult to incentive mechanisms to encourage users to
ascertain beforehand which k users might share. For example, the most recent Kazaa
decide to share. But over time, the users will client tracks the sharing level of each peer
establish a mechanism where some of them and moderates a peer’s ability to share based
may share in a period while the rest free- on the level of resources they provide to the
ride. network.
Second, we find that it is not
4. Social Optimality necessarily the case that the social optimum
does not require that everyone contribute.
In Section 3, we discussed our results Indeed, the socially optimal level of
that peer-to-peer networks can persist in contributors depends on the ratio of the cost
equilibrium in spite of free-riding. In this of sharing to the number of network
section we discuss how the outcome in a c
network with free riding compares to the participants ( ). When this ratio varies, the
socially optimal outcome. Specifically, we n
social optimum also varies. However,
find that social utility under an equilibrium
whenever full sharing is optimal to the
with free-riding is below the socially
individual, it must be also optimal to the
optimal level of utility.
whole society.
To solve for the social optimal level of
This finding occurs, again, because of
sharing, first note that the players’ strategies
the concavity of the benefit function. The
are socially optimal if the aggregate of
marginal benefit of sharing to the network
individual utilities is maximized. That is, if
declines as the number of users increases. At
the sum of their benefits minus the sum of
some point it is possible that the marginal holders appear to be increasing the implicit
benefit an additional sharer adds to the cost of sharing is by increasing the legal
network does not justify the cost this peer risks to individual network users from
would incur by sharing their content. In this sharing copyrighted information, as noted by
circumstance, the socially optimal outcome the recent prosecution of several college
would be for this user not to share. students found to be sharing copyrighted
materials online. For enterprises
5. Conclusions implementing P2P network products, our
results suggest that forcing all network
We examine the peer-to-peer networks members to share may not be the socially
in a game theoretic model. Individual users optimal outcome. It may be possible that the
face trade-offs between sharing and not cost of sharing to an individual user (in
sharing. In a static game with complete terms of reduced bandwidth, storage, or
information, we show that in equilibrium processing power) may not justify the value
some peers will not share their files. Thus, in this user would provide to other network
contrast to prior predictions in the literature, members.
we find that networks can sustain free-riding
Future research could extend our results
in equilibrium. In spite of free-riding, some
in a variety of ways. First, it may be possible
peers will find it individually rational to
to extend our static model to take into
share as a way to reduce congestion on other
account user incentives in a multi-period
peers they are interested in accessing.
game. Second, it would be interesting to
We then compare the outcome of our analyze what types of incentives can be best
base model to the socially optimal outcome. used to achieve the socially optimal
We find that in a socially optimal outcome, outcome. Third, it may be possible to relax
some users may still be free-riders. This is some of the assumptions employed in this
because at some point it is possible that the model. For example, a model where sharing
cost of sharing for the marginal user may not cost is a function of the number of members
justify the value this user provides to the of the network could be explored. It also
network. However, we also find that the might be possible to model the impact of
level of free-riding in the socially optimal another tactic copyright holders are using to
case is less than the level of free-riding in reduce network performance — introducing
the base case. In the absence of incentives fake content into the network. It might also
on user behavior, network goods will be be possible to explore how changes in the
under-provided. characteristics of heterogeneous peers would
impact network performance as a way to
This analysis should have value for
predict how changes in the profile of P2P
entrepreneurs and designers of P2P
users would impact network outcomes.
networks, for copyright holders seeking to
protect their copyrights in the presence of
P2P networks, and for businesses 6. References
implementing P2P content management
[1] Adar, E, B. A. Huberman. 2000.
systems. For network designers, our results
Free-riding on Gnutella. First Monday
suggest that while networks can persist in
5(10).
spite of free-riding, the aggregate utility of
the network would be improved in the [2] Asvanund, Atip, Karen Clay,
presence of incentives to encourage more Ramayya Krishnan, Michael Smith. 2002.
users to share their content. For copyright An Empirical Analysis of Network
holders, our results suggest that increasing Externalities in Peer-To-Peer Music Sharing
the cost of sharing can reduce the number of Networks. Proceedings of the 23rd
sharers and above a certain point lead to International Conference on Information
network collapse. One way copyright