RULE 50

Tan vs. Link; GR 172849; Dec. 10, 2008; 573 SCRA 479

FACTS:

Respondent Link sold his eight parcels of to petitioners FBMPC and Almocera. The certificates of title to
the subject properties remained in the name of respondent Link.
 
Unknown to petitioners, respondent Link had voluntarily offered the subject properties for sale under the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The subject properties were initially
valued at around P2,000,000.00. Respondent Link, purportedly in connivance with officers of the Cebu
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) an application for valuation of the subject properties. 
 
Upon their discovery of the transgressions committed by Link, petitioners wrote a letter, claimed in their
letter that the subject properties had already been sold to them by respondent Link. They further
requested that any claim, request, or undertaking involving the subject properties by other individuals or
entities be set aside.
 
Acting on petitioners’ letter, respondent required the parties to file their respective position papers.
Respondent Kintanar subsequently issued an Order denying for want of merit petitioners’ letter/motion for
payment of just compensation for the subject properties.
 
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. It was already respondent Arrieta, a Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator, who acted on petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and denied the same.
 
Respondent Kintanar issued an Order inhibiting himself from resolving any further incident or motion in
DARAB Cases and directing the DARAB Clerk of Court to immediately forward the records of the cases to
respondent Maquiling, another Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator.
 
Despite the foregoing attempts of petitioners to preclude any other action on the pending DARAB cases,
petitioner Tan was informed by LBP officials that the release of funds to pay respondent Link just
compensation for the subject properties was already imminent unless a restraining order or injunction
would be issued by the regular courts.

Hence, petitioners instituted Civil Case. The RTC granted respondent Link’s motion: this Court is
constrained to respect the said DARAB proceedings and the Orders they had issued, for after all, this
Court is not the appellate court of the DARAB.
 
If [herein petitioners] want to set aside the DARAB Orders, they should have directed their case to the
Court of Appeals and not to this Court.
 
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the same court. Petitioners
filed their Notice of Appeal.  RTC issued an Order dismissing petitioners’ Notice of Appeal. Petitioners’
Motion for was denied by the RTC in another.
 
Petitioners sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari. The Court of
Appeals, however, affirmed the RTC Orders. Petitioner Tereso Tan contend that the notice of appeal was
made on August 29, 2003 and the payment of docket fee was made on September 1, 2003, which is the
last day for filing the notice of appeal because the 15th day of the period to file appeal fell on August 30,
2003, a Saturday.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC was correct in denying petitioners’ appeal on the ground of late payment of
docket fees. – YES.
 
RULING:
The dismissal of an appeal as the inevitable aftermath of the late payment of the appellate docket
fee has been mandated since the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure under Section 4
of Rule 41.
 
The payment of docket fees is a requirement in filing an ordinary appeal from the decision or final order of
the RTC, as provided in Rule 41, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now require that appellate docket and other lawful fees must be
paid within the same period for taking an appeal. This is clear from the opening sentence of Section 4,
Rule 41 of the same Rules that, "[w]ithin the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the
clerk of the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the
appellate court docket and other lawful fees."
 
The use of the word "shall" underscores the mandatory character of the Rule. The term "shall" is a
word of command, one which has always been or which must be given a compulsory meaning, and it is
generally imperative or mandatory.
 
The right to appeal is purely a statutory right. Not being a natural right or a part of due process, the
right to appeal may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the rules provided therefor.
For this reason, payment of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional.
 
This Court has consistently upheld the dismissal of an appeal or notice of appeal for failure to pay the full
docket fees within the period for taking the appeal. The payment of docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal. Without such payment, the appellate court does
not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action and the decision sought to be
appealed from becomes final and executory.
 
There are, admittedly, exceptions to the general rule on the timely payment of appellate docket fees
which are also embodied in jurisprudence. Yet a common thread in all of said cases is an exceptionally
meritorious reason why the appellate docket fees in the cases were not timely paid.
 
Petitioners’ excuse is not satisfactory. Petitioner Tan’s late arrival at Bogo, Cebu was not unpreventable
for he could have left much, much earlier for his destination, considering that the traffic congestion is
almost infamous in Cebu, a fact certainly known to Tan. Their failure to pay the docket fees on time
manifested their lack of foresight and planning. Petitioner Tan having arrived after office hours, he cannot
expect any RTC employee to have stayed behind.
 
We further explained the rule on payment of dockets when we held that:
 
In all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in the matter of paying the docket
fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a
relaxation of the application of the rules, such as: 

(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; 

(2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
prescribed procedure; 
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time
of the default; 
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; 
(5) the merits of the case; 
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules; 
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; 
(8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; 
 (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault; 
(10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; 
(11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; 
(12) importance of the issues involved; and 
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. 
 
Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally
meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.

Heirs of Jose Esplana vs CA, GR 155758; Oct. 31, 2008

FACTS:

Esplana filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession, quieting of title with damages against
Pedro de Lima. The parcels of land are irrigated rice lands which form part the intestate estate of the late
spouses Esplana. The MTC decided the case as an action for forcible entry, which was later dismissed.

On appeal, the RTC held that forcible entry was only incidental to the issue of ownership. The case was
remanded to the MTC.

The MTC then found preponderance of evidence in favor of defendant, dismissing the complaint. The
RTC affirmed the decision.

Esplana’s counsel then received a copy of the RTC decision on February 21, 2002.

On March 7, 2002, Jose Esplana’s counsel filed before the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of 30
days within which to file a petition for review reckoned from March 8, 2002. He stated that he could not
submit the petition on the deadline, March 8, 2002, due to Jose Esplana’s untimely death, his day to day
court appearance and the voluminous paper work in his office.

The CA then granted petitioners only 15 days, reckoned from March 23, 2002, within which to file the
petition for review subject to the caveat that a petition filed after March 23, 2002 shall be expunged
from the records of the case.

Petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution on May 29, 2002. However, he
already filed the petition for review on April 5, 2002, which was within the 30-day extension requested for.

In a Resolution promulgated on June 27, 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and
expunged it from the records of the case for having been filed out of time on April 5, 2002, instead of the
deadline, March 23, 2002.

Petitioners, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration alleging that they filed
the motion for extension to file the petition for review within 30 days from March 8, 2002 considering that
the original petitioner, Jose Esplana, had just died and they had to attend the wake and that they had just
manifested their desire to appeal the case of their father. Attached to the Manifestation was the Death
Certificate of Jose Esplana showing that he died on December 12, 2001. Thus, petitioners alleged that
their failure to file the petition on time was due to the sudden death of their father and the inefficiency of
the postal service.

The CA denied the MR.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal. – NO.

RULING:

Sec. 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court is very clear that petitioners are allowed an extension of only 15
days to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Although a further extension not to exceed
15 days may be granted for the most compelling reason, the grounds stated by petitioners do not entitle
them to a further extension.

SECTION 1. How appeal taken; time for filing.—A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the
Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition
for review with the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the
corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and
furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition
shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed
or of the denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after
judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to
file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.

The death certificate presented by petitioners before the Court of Appeals showed that Jose Esplana died
on December 12, 2001. Taking into consideration our custom in holding a wake, it can be assumed that
the wake ended sometime in December, 2001. Petitioners’ counsel received the RTC Decision dated
February 6, 2002 on February 21, 2002, which is more than two months after the death of Jose Esplana.
At the time of notice of the RTC Decision, petitioners were just undecided about appealing the RTC
decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Court holds that petitioners’ indecision to appeal their case before the Court of Appeals is clearly not
a compelling reason to grant them a further extension of 15 days to file their petition for review.

Further, before the Court of Appeals may grant the 15-day extension to file a petition for review, Sec. 1,
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful
fees and the deposit of the necessary amount for costs before the expiration of the reglementary
period. These, petitioners failed to do.1avvphi1

In the Resolution of October 1, 2002 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
stated that petitioners did not only fail to file their petition for review within the 15-day extension granted,
but they also failed to pay the full amount of the docket and other legal fees within the reglementary
period, that is, on or before March 8, 2002, the last day for petitioners to file their petition.

Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court.  The
requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and for orderly
discharge of judicial business.