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Title : R. v Hancock (Reginald Dean)
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Status: Positive or Neutral Judicial Treatment

*455 Regina Appellant v Hancock First Respondent and

Shankland Second Respondent
House of Lords
27 February 1986

[1986] 2 W.L.R. 357

[1986] A.C. 455

Lord Scarman , Lord Keith of Kinkel , Lord Roskill , Lord Brightman and Lord Griffiths
Lord Lane C.J. , Leonard and Rose JJ.
1985 Dec. 11, 12; 1986 Feb. 27
1985 Oct. 21; 31
Crime—Homicide—Murder—Mental element—Concrete block dropped from bridge
on to highway killing taxi driver—Prime purpose not to kill or cause injury—Whether
death natural consequence of action—Whether foreseeability of probable
consequences relevant—Whether meaning of intent requiring elaboration
The defendants, who were miners on strike, pushed a block of concrete and a
concrete post from a bridge over a three-lane highway on which a miner was
being taken to work by taxi. The block hit the taxi's windscreen and the driver
was killed. The defendants were tried on a charge of murder. The case for the
Crown was that the defendants had agreed that they would together perform
acts, each having the intention either to kill or cause serious injury, that they did
act in concert and that the acts in fact done by the defendant who pushed the
block killed the taxi driver. The defendants' case was that their intention was not
to kill or harm anyone since they thought that the block and post were
positioned over the middle lane when the taxi was being driven in the nearside
lane, and that their intention was only to block the road or to frighten. In relation
to the intent necessary to sustain a charge of murder, the judge adhering to the
guidelines laid down by the House of Lords in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 ,
929, directed the jury that they might find it helpful to ask themselves, "Was
death or serious injury a natural consequence of what was done? Did a
defendant foresee that consequence as a natural consequence?" The
defendants were convicted and appealed. The Court of *456 Appeal, holding
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that the judge's direction was inadequate and potentially misleading and that he
should have explained to the jury that in the context of foreseeability and intent
"natural consequence" meant highly likely, quashed the convictions for murder
and substituted verdicts of manslaughter.
On appeal by the Crown: -
dismissing the appeal, that where it was necessary to direct a jury on the issue
of intent by reference to foresight of consequences, the words "natural
consequences" were not by themselves sufficient to imply probability; that the
judge should refer to probability and explain to the jury that the greater the
probability of the consequence the more likely it was that the consequence was
foreseen and that if it was foreseen the more likely it was that it was intended;
and that, since the judge's direction was liable to have misled the jury into
concentrating exclusively on the causal link between the act and its
consequences, the Court of Appeal had been right to quash the convictions for
murder (post, pp. 472A-E, 473C-F, 474G - 475A).
Dictum of Lord Bridge of Harwich in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 929,
H.L.(E.) disapproved.
Per curiam. The laying down of guidelines by the Court of Appeal for use in
directing juries in cases of complexity is a function to be exercised sparingly,
and limited to cases of real difficulty. If it is done, the guidelines should avoid
generalisation so far as is possible and encourage the jury to exercise their
common sense in reaching what is their decision on the facts. Guidelines are
not rules of law: judges should not think they must use them. A judge's duty is to
direct the jury in law and help them on the particular facts of the case. The use
of the guidelines formulated by Lord Lane C.J. in the Court of Appeal in the
present case is not recommended (post, pp. 473G-H, 474E-F, G - 475A).
Decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), post, p. 457F; [1985] 3
W.L.R. 1014 affirmed.
The following cases are referred to in the opinion of Lord Scarman:

Reg. v. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55; [1974] 2 W.L.R. 607; [1974] 2 All E.R. 41 , H.L.
(E.)

Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 ; [1985] 2 W.L.R. 648; [1985] 1 All E.R.
1025, H.L.(E.) .

Reg. v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290 ; [1960] 3 W.L.R. 546; [1960] 3 All E.R. 161,
H.L.(E.) .

The following additional cases were cited in argument in the House of Lords.

Leung Kam-Kwok v. The Queen (1984) 81 Cr.App.R. 83 , P.C.

Rex v. Steane [1947] K.B. 997 ;[1947] 1 All E.R. 813 , C.C.A.
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Southern Portland Cement Ltd. v. Cooper [1974] A.C. 623;[1974] 2 W.L.R.

152;[1974] 1 All E.R. 87 , P.C.

The following cases are referred to in the judgment of the Court of Appeal:

Reg. v. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55; [1974] 2 W.L.R. 607; [1974] 2 All E.R. 41,
H.L.(E.) .

Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 ; [1985] 2 W.L.R. 648; [1985] 1 All E.R.
1025, H.L.(E.) .
*457

Reg. v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290 ; [1960] 3 W.L.R. 92; [1960] 2 All E.R. 450,
C.C.A. .

Rex v. Steane [1947] K.B. 997 ; [1947] 1 All E.R. 813, C.C.A. .

APPEALS against conviction.

The appellants, Reginald Dean Hancock and Russell Shankland, in the Crown Court
at Cardiff (Mann J. and a jury), together with a co-defendant, Anthony Glyndwr
Williams, were tried on an indictment charging in count 1, murder; in count 2,
conspiracy to damage property intending to endanger the life of another; and, in
count 3, conspiring to damage property being reckless as to whether the life of
another would be endangered. On 16 May 1985 the appellants were convicted by a
majority of 10 to 2 on count 1 and the jury were discharged from returning verdicts
against them on counts 2 and 3. The co-defendant was found not guilty by direction
on count 1 and was acquitted on counts 2 and 3. Each appellant was sentenced to
life imprisonment. They applied for leave to appeal against conviction on the ground,
inter alia , that the jury had been misdirected on the question of intent. Leave to
appeal was granted by the court at the outset of the hearing of the application.
The facts are stated in the judgment.
Representation

Gareth Williams Q.C. and Christopher Pitchford for Hancock.

John Prosser Q.C. and Lord Elystan-Morgan for Shankland.

Martin Thomas Q.C. and Philip Rees for the Crown.

Cur. adv. vult.

4 November. LORD LANE C.J.

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read the following judgment of the court. On 16 May 1985 at the Crown Court at
Cardiff, before Mann J. and a jury, these appellants (leave having been given to
them by this court to appeal against conviction) were convicted of murder on count 1
of the indictment by a majority verdict after a trial lasting eight working days. They
were sentenced to life imprisonment. The jury were discharged from giving verdicts
on count 2 (conspiracy to damage property intending to endanger the life of another)
and count 3 (conspiracy to damage property being reckless as to whether the life of
another would thereby be endangered).
Another man, Anthony Glyndwr Williams, was found not guilty by direction on count
1 (murder) and acquitted on counts 2 and 3.
A considerable body of the facts was not in dispute. At about 5.15 a.m. on 30
November 1984 a convoy taking a miner, David Williams, to work during the miners'
strike was travelling in the near side lane of the Heads of the Valleys Road and
passing under Rhymney Bridge. The convoy comprised the following vehicles: first,
a police motor cycle; next a police Land Rover with driver and observer; third, a taxi
driven by David Wilkie with David Williams, the miner, as a passenger; and finally a
police Sherpa van bringing up the rear.
*458
A concrete block weighing 46 1b. and measuring 18 in. by 9 in. by 5 in. or
thereabouts came from the bridge, struck the taxi's windscreen and killed Wilkie the
driver. At almost the same time a concrete post weighing some 65 1b. also came
from the bridge, fell on to the inside lane of the carriageway and hit the taxi a
glancing blow. Both appellants had, shortly before 5 a.m. that morning, placed the
post on the parapet rail of the bridge. The appellant Hancock placed the block on the
rail. The two appellants waited for the arrival of the convoy.
The appellant Hancock admitted in a written statement that he had pushed the block
which killed Wilkie and he pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The appellant Shankland
admitted in chief that he "flipped" the post over the rail with his fingers. He too
apparently accepted that he was guilty of manslaughter. The Crown were not
content with those admissions and the trial of the murder charge took place.
The Crown relied upon a number of pieces of evidence, the principal of which were
as follows: the two policemen in the Land Rover immediately ahead of the taxi said
that as they approached the bridge along the Heads of the Valleys Road, they saw
two figures standing on the bridge in such a way as to make them fear that
something was going to be thrown off the bridge at them. Indeed Police Constable
Paul, the observer in the vehicle, pushed himself back in the seat of the Land Rover
in order to avoid what he thought was likely to be the impact of the object upon the
vehicle or upon him. Material was found on the hand-rail of the bridge over the near
side lane which matched material which was discovered on the concrete block after
the accident. There was evidence of ill-feeling between Hancock and David Williams
prior to 30 November. On 24 November 1984 Hancock was involved in an incident in
which a bottle was thrown at David Williams's house. On 29 November 1984
Hancock was involved in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent David Williams from
going to work, this time by severing a lamp post. There was further evidence of what
the appellants had said to Carol Hopkins after the incident, she being Hancock's girl
friend.
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The prosecution case in brief was that the appellants had agreed that they would
together perform acts, each having the intention either to kill or to cause serious
injury, that they did act in concert and that the acts in fact done by Hancock killed
David Wilkie.
The case of the two appellants was that they had no intention to kill or to inflict harm
of any sort on the occupants of the taxi or anyone else. The two of them thought that
the objects which they were pushing into the road were over the middle lane of the
three-lane carriageway and so would not fall on the convoy. Their intention was to
block the road or to frighten the members of the convoy.
The judge in a direction to the jury, which was admirably clear and succinct, gave
them this direction on the question of intent:

"You may think that critical to the resolution of this case is the question of
intent. In determining whether a person intended to kill or to cause really
serious injury, you must have regard to all of the evidence which has
been put before you, and draw from it such inferences as to you seem
proper and appropriate. You may or may *459 not, for the purpose of
considering what inferences to draw, find it helpful to ask: Was death or
serious injury a natural consequence of what was done? Did a defendant
foresee that consequence as a natural consequence? That is a possible
question which you may care to ask yourselves."

That direction is based upon the decision of the House of Lords in Reg. v. Moloney
[1985] A.C. 905 . As Lord Bridge of Harwich himself observed, at p. 926:

"The golden rule should be that, when directing a jury on the mental
element necessary in a crime of specific intent, the judge should avoid
any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent, and leave it to
the jury's good sense to decide whether the accused acted with the
necessary intent, unless the judge is convinced that, on the facts and
having regard to the way the case has been presented to the jury in
evidence and argument, some further explanation or elaboration is strictly
necessary to avoid misunderstanding. In trials for murder or wounding
with intent, I find it very difficult to visualise a case where any such
explanation or elaboration could be required, if the offence consisted of a
direct attack on the victim with a weapon... Even where the death results
indirectly from the act of the accused, I believe the cases that will call for
a direction by reference to foresight of consequences will be of extremely
rare occurrence."

It is submitted by the appellants in the present case that the judge was wrong in
treating this as one of the cases where such a direction was justified.
In our judgment one of the occasions upon which some further explanation may be
required is where the defendant's motive or purpose is not primarily to kill or injure,
but the methods adopted to achieve the purpose are so dangerous that the jury may
come to the conclusion that death or injury to some third party is highly likely. This, in
our judgment, is a good example of that sort of case. The jury might find that the
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 7

primary purpose of the appellants was to prevent David Williams going to work at the
pit; to extend the ambit of their so called "picketing" activities to ensure that he never
reached the pit. They might conclude that they did not wish to cause him or the taxi
driver or the policemen any serious injury, but that is not the end of the matter. They
were entitled to consider whether they were satisfied that to project these objects
into the road as they did was something which was highly likely to cause serious
injury to those travelling in the vehicles. The judge was, in our view, correct to treat
this as one of those rare cases in which an explanation of the meaning of intent was
desirable. Mann J. accordingly gave the direction which we have already set out
based upon the guidelines set out by Lord Bridge of Harwich in Reg. v. Moloney and
agreed by the remainder of their Lordships. Those guidelines were as follows, at p.
929:

"In the rare cases in which it is necessary to direct a jury by reference to

foresight of consequences, I do not believe it is *460 necessary for the
judge to do more than invite the jury to consider two questions. First, was
death or really serious injury in a murder case... a natural consequence
of the defendant's voluntary act? Secondly, did the defendant foresee
that consequence as being a natural consequence of his act? The jury
should then be told that if they answer yes to both questions it is a proper
inference for them to draw that he intended that consequence."

We are asked to rule that those guidelines are (a) obiter and (b) erroneous in law.
No doubt, as Lord Bridge of Harwich said, at p. 920, the guidelines were not
necessary to decide the appeal before their Lordships' House and so were obiter . A
much more difficult problem is whether we are, as the appellants submit we should
be, driven to the conclusion that they may have misled the jury in the present case.
The submission is that the words "natural consequence" in the passage just cited
are ambiguous.
It is plain from reading the rest of the speech of Lord Bridge of Harwich that he was
using the words to convey a specific meaning. He said, at p. 929:

"I think we should now no longer speak of presumptions in this context

but rather of inferences. In the old presumption that a man intends the
natural and probable consequences of his acts the important word is
'natural.' This word conveys the idea that in the ordinary course of events
a certain act will lead to a certain consequence unless something
unexpected supervenes to prevent it. One might almost say that, if a
consequence is natural, it is really otiose to speak of it as also being
probable."
The following observations are to be found, at p. 925:

"looking on their facts at the decided cases where a crime of specific

intent was under consideration, including Reg. v. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55
itself, they suggest to me that the probability of the consequence taken to
have been foreseen must be little short of overwhelming before it will
suffice to establish the necessary intent."
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Unfortunately in the passage already cited, in which the guidelines are set out, at p.
929, there is no corresponding definition of what is meant by "natural consequence."
The submission of the appellants here is that without such definition a jury might
understand the words as including something which followed in an unbroken causal
chain from the initial event, whether it was highly likely or not. They would not
confine the words to the limited meaning which Lord Bridge of Harwich intended they
should bear.
We think there is substance in that submission. Indeed Mr. Thomas, on behalf of the
Crown, as we understood him, was driven to concede that the expression "natural
consequence" without more is potentially misleading. We hope that we are not guilty
of any discourtesy to their Lordships in saying what we do. It is a matter which can
be put right with ease by any judge who feels that he is obliged to direct a jury
according to the guidelines in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 929 by explaining to the jury
that "natural consequence" in the guidelines *461 means that it must have been
highly likely that the defendant's act would cause death or serious injury before the
inference can be drawn that he had the necessary intent.
Thus the judge in the present case was unwittingly led into misdirecting the jury by
reason of the way in which the guidelines in Moloney were expressed.
The real problem is to decide to what extent the high degree of likelihood, viewed
objectively, of death or serious injury resulting can be taken into account by the jury
in determining the defendant's intention. It seems to us that the law is now back to
the situation in which it was when the Court of Criminal Appeal delivered judgment in
Reg. v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290 , 297. That view is reinforced by the fact that Lord
Bridge of Harwich [1985] A.C. 905 , 929 himself cites with approval the very same
passage from Rex v. Steane [1947] K.B. 997 , 1004 as was relied on by the Court of
Criminal Appeal in Reg. v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290 , 300.
If one adapts the judgment in Reg. v. Smith to cater for what seems to us to be an
ambiguity in the words "natural consequence," one arrives at a formulation which
can perhaps best be explained to a jury by relating it to the evidence and the burden
of proof.
In cases in which the defendant's motive or purpose was not primarily to kill or injure,
the judge should ask the jury to consider some such questions as these. (a) Are you
sure that the defendant did the act which caused death, knowing what he was doing
and intending to do it? If no, you must find him not guilty of both murder and
manslaughter. If yes, go on to consider the next question. (b) Are you sure that the
defendant's act was of a kind which was highly likely to cause death or really serious
bodily injury? If no, you must find him not guilty of murder, but he may be guilty of
manslaughter. If yes, go on to consider the next question. (c) On the evidence
considered as a whole, which will of course include the defendant's evidence and
that of his witnesses, are you sure that the defendant appreciated that what he did
was highly likely to cause death or really serious bodily injury? If your answer is "no",
you must not find him guilty of murder, but he may be guilty of manslaughter. If your
answer is "yes", there is evidence before you from which you can infer that the
defendant intended to cause death or really serious bodily injury, but you must not
find him guilty of murder unless you feel sure that he so intended. If however you are
sure, the fact that he may not have desired that result is irrelevant. Desire and intent
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 9

are two different things.

Returning to the submissions made to us, the prosecution contend that, assuming
that there was a material misdirection, nevertheless the evidence of intent to do
really serious harm was so overwhelming that it would be a proper case for the
application of the proviso. They advanced the following arguments in support of that
contention. The judge was very careful to emphasise that the paramount
consideration was intention and that the question of foresight was only one aspect of
that matter. There was ample evidence quite apart from questions of foresight upon
which the jury could, and it is suggested almost certainly did, conclude that the
appellants intended at least to cause serious *462 injury; for instance, the evidence
of the two policemen in the Land Rover, though it should be noted that each of them
insisted that it was a clear moonlight night when in fact there was no moon and
10/10ths cloud cover. The prosecution further draw attention to what the appellants
actually admitted they did as already described.
On the other hand, after the jury had been considering their verdict for upwards of
five hours, they returned with a note saying that they were having difficulties
"because of lack of knowledge, particularly with regard to intent and foreseeable
consequences." The judge then understandably gave them a further direction in
almost the same terms as those which he had originally used. The judge said this to
the jury with reference to their note: "If I may say so, it shows a precise perception of
a point which has troubled lawyers."
It is clear therefore that the "guideline" directions were central to the jury's problems.
Mr. Gareth Williams submits that if a proper direction had been given there is "a
workable possibility" that the verdict would have been different. We agree. Not
without some hesitation, therefore, we have reached the conclusion that this is not a
proper case in which to apply the proviso.
We accordingly allow the appeal of each of these appellants and substitute in each
case for the verdict of murder one of manslaughter.
Appeals allowed. Convictions quashed. Verdicts of manslaughter substituted.
Sentences of eight years' imprisonment imposed.
4 November. On an application by the Crown the court, in accordance with section
33(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 , certified that a point of law of general public
importance was involved in the decision, namely, "Do the questions to be considered
by a jury set out in the speech of Lord Bridge of Harwich in Reg. v. Moloney [1985]
A.C. 905 , 929 as a model direction require amplification?"
Leave to appeal refused. Legal aid for solicitor and junior counsel for application for
leave to appeal, and for solicitor and two counsel for appeal if leave granted. (L. N.
W.)
Representation
Solicitors: Cartwrights, Cardiff ; Gareth J. Davies, Bargoed ; Director of Public
Prosecutions .
APPEAL from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). The defendants, Reginald
Dean Hancock and Russell Shankland, were charged upon indictment with the
murder on 30 November 1984 of David Wilkie. On 16 May 1985 at the Crown Court
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at Cardiff (Mann J. *463 and a jury) they were convicted by a majority of 10 to 2 and
sentenced to life imprisonment. On 31 October 1985 the Court of Appeal (Criminal
Division), ante, p. 457F (Lord Lane C.J., Leonard and Rose JJ.) allowed the
defendants' appeals, quashed the convictions for murder, substituted verdicts of
manslaughter and sentenced each defendant to a term of eight years' imprisonment.
The Court of Appeal refused the Crown leave to appeal but in accordance with
section 33(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, certified that a point of law of general
public importance was involved in the decision.
On 19 November 1985 the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords (Lord Scarman,
Lord Templeman and Lord Mackay of Clashfern) allowed a petition by the Crown for
leave to appeal.
The facts are set out in the opinion of Lord Scarman.
Martin Thomas Q.C. and Philip Rees for the Crown. The certified question should be
answered in the negative. There are clear guidelines as to how, in an appropriate
case, the judge should approach the issue of intent . Mann J.'s direction is an
admirable example of how the guidelines should be used in practice.
The following propositions are clearly established: (1) the intent necessary to
establish the crime of murder is the intention to kill or to cause really serious harm,
and (2) foresight of consequences is not the equivalent of intent, regardless of
whether the consequences are certain, probable or likely: see per Lord Hailsham of
St. Marylebone L.C. in Reg. v. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 , 75, 79. The jury's task is to
decide whether they are sure that the defendant's intention has been proved. The
defendant's foresight of consequences is important as an element, but not
necessarily the only element, from which the defendant's intention may be inferred.
The fact that the defendant does not desire the consequences is irrelevant: see
Byrne J. giving the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Reg. v. Smith [1961] A.C. 290
which emphasises that inference of intention may (not must) be drawn and makes
reference to degrees of likelihood. The strength of the inference to be drawn varies
according to the circumstances.
The fact that the consequences are of a degree of likelihood which is less than
probable does not mean that an inference of intention may not be drawn: the
inference might be supported by other evidence as to the defendant's state of mind.
On the guidelines laid down in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 929, the jury could
infer intention if they were satisfied that the victim's death was a natural
consequence, i.e., part of a chain of causation, and that the defendant foresaw it as
a consequence. Mann J. in the present case offered the questions set out in the
guidelines to the jury as a possible aid to ascertaining the defendant's intention,
which the jury could ask themselves if they so wished. He did not suggest that the
questions were the test for ascertaining intention. A natural consequence is an event
which follows a chain of causation without any supervening act. The fact that a *464
defendant foresees a consequence may (not must) be an element from which his
intention may be ascertained.
There are two possible approaches to the way in which a jury might draw an
inference of intention from foresight of consequences. The first approach is that the
jury might be asked to find, looking at it objectively, that the consequence was
certain, highly probable or likely. That categorisation of consequences was the
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 11

approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in the present case. Then the jury would
have to be satisfied, looking at the issue subjectively, that the defendant foresaw that
consequence. They could then decide without more, that his intention had been
established. The second, and correct approach, is to dispense altogether with any
attempt to categorise degrees of likelihood because the words used to categorise
degrees of likelihood mean different things to different people. Leung Kam-Kwok v.
The Queen (1984) 81 Cr.App.R. 83 , 88, illustrates the danger of using words such
as "likely" or "probable" in this context.
The dropping of a concrete block towards the windscreen of a car might not be
"highly likely" or "probable" to kill because the defendant might well have missed the
windscreen. But that did not mean that the jury had to ignore that consequence
altogether. The killing of the taxi driver in the present case was a natural
consequence of the defendants' act although it might not have been a probable
consequence.
The proper approach is not to categorise degrees of likelihood but to ask the jury to
decide whether the death of the victim was a natural consequence of a chain of
causation started by the defendants' acts. The jury's task is to find out what the
intention of the defendant was. The chain of causation can be limited either (1) to
what is highly likely, or (2) to what is foreseeable. If the defendant has foreseen the
consequence, that does not alone establish intention but it does assist the jury to
decide what the intention was.
The desired result in the present case was to stop the working miner going to work.
If that result was achieved by causing the death of the taxi driver, that was a
concomitant result. In order to achieve the desired result, the defendants meant to
hit the taxi and at least to risk serious bodily harm.
In construing intention, the jury would be entitled to look at the desired result and at
other evidence in the case which pointed towards intention. In addition to
considering whether the consequence was foreseen there were many other factors
from which the jury could infer intention. In his direction to the jury Mann J.
emphasised that intent had to be proved by the Crown and the jury could not
possibly have thought that foresight was to be equated to intent. The only conclusion
that the jury could have come to on the facts of this case was that the basis of the
defendants' case, which was that they only meant to frighten or obstruct, was
untruthful and that the basis of the Crown's case was right.
The Court of Appeal misinterpreted the speech of Lord Bridge of Harwich in Reg. v.
Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 929, when Lord Lane C.J. said, ante, pp. 460F - 461A,
that Lord Bridge intended to give the words "natural consequences" a limited
meaning and said that it must mean *465 "highly likely." The guidelines of Lord
Bridge of Harwich do not have that restricted meaning. The words "natural
consequences" mean consequences which would follow an act without a
supervening event. The scale on which the words "highly likely" are to be interpreted
by a jury is so uncertain as to make the position less clear.
There were other factors in this case which the jury were entitled to take into
consideration in coming to their conclusion. The defendant Hancock had attacked
the home of the working miner and threatened to "get at" him. The day before the
killing he had cut down a telegraph pole. On the night before the killing the defendant
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 12

Shankland had met the leader of the lodge of the National Union of Mineworkers and
had been warned to be careful about what he said and did. There was evidence of
an agreement between the two defendants, that the event which took place was not
part of a sudden decision but was a considered matter and that there were recurrent
warnings by Williams who was present with them on the bridge. There was evidence
that the defendants had knowledge of the way the police convoy was proceeding
and that they had the concrete objects balanced and ready to throw. Therefore there
was evidence of a premeditated and planned act.
There was consistency in the evidence of the police officers that they saw the
defendants waiting on the bridge with their hands above their heads and holding
objects poised for throwing. There was also before the jury the defendants' own
evidence. The cross-examination revealed that the defendants had an appreciation
of what they did, having regard to their work in the pit where there was a possibility
of a rockfall and the knowledge of the damage that could cause. Therefore the jury
was entitled to take into account that the defendants knew through their job, the
likely consequences of what they were doing. The jury was also entitled to take into
account Shankland's evidence that he was aware that throwing objects on to the taxi
was likely to cause serious injury. The evidence indicating a hostile state of mind in
the defendants was a relevant part of the background which the jury could properly
consider.
This case is not very different from that of a terrorist who places a bomb which
injures somebody who is in the vicinity or someone who tries to defuse it. That injury
is a natural consequence and it must be left to the common sense of the jury to
decide on the facts what inference they are to draw. However, in the present case,
the person to be attacked was clearly identified by the expressions of hostility which
had been made towards him. Therefore the present case is distinguishable from the
terrorist type killing where the victim is unspecified when the bomb is placed and the
inference of intention is more easily drawn.
The jury was very properly directed to have in the forefront of their minds the issue of
intention and that direction was repeated several times. The jury cannot have been
confused as to what they had to be sure about. The term "natural consequence" has
been used since 1870 and they are not obscure or pedantic words. It meant a
consequence which happens as part of a chain of causation without any
supervening event. The death of the driver was the sort of thing one would expect to
happen if a concrete block was dropped on the windscreen of a car. The term
"natural consequence" does not require amplification. The matter *466 was very
properly left to the jury who were properly directed to have all the issues in the
forefront of their minds and who gave long and careful consideration to those issues.
Gareth Williams Q.C. and Christopher Pitchford for the defendant Hancock. The
guidelines in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 were obiter and were erroneous.
"Natural consequence" is unhelpful as a test where the issue of intent is concerned.
The test of whether a given act will lead to a given consequence may mean that it is
probable and, therefore, it is not otiose to speak of probability. Lord Bridge of
Harwich in Moloney refers to the case of Rex v. Steane [1947] K.B. 997 but that
case is far removed from the circumstances of the present one so that its relevance
is limited.
The word "natural" has several meanings. First, it is used to indicate that a particular
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 13

act will lead to a particular consequence. Secondly, something is "natural" if it is the

law of nature that it should occur. In that sense it cannot be the object of human
intention. Thirdly, something is natural if it takes place in the course of nature, even
though neither probable nor desirable. Fourthly, something which occurs as a
consequence of natural things is another meaning of "natural consequence." Fifthly,
it also means something which is overwhelmingly likely.
The direction "natural consequence" is not adequate. The formula must be related to
the facts of the case. That was not done in the present case and the jury were not
assisted in their deliberations. The guidelines in Moloney fetter the trial judge in a
wholly unnecessary way.
The Crown's submission of a natural consequence being a part of an unbroken chain
is of no help in coming to a conclusion about intention. Evidence of foresight can
only go to show willingness to take a risk of causing harm or of exposing to danger.
There is no necessary or appropriate connection between foresight of a natural
consequence and intent unless the consequence is probable or highly likely. If a
consequence is overwhelmingly likely, the probability of its being foreseen is greater
and therefore the likelihood of it being intended is also greater. [Reference was
made to Southern Portland Cement Ltd. v. Cooper [1974] A.C. 623 .]
The model direction for a judge to give in the present circumstances would be as
follows: "Murder is committed when he who unlawfully kills does so intending to
cause death or really serious bodily injury. Before you can convict of murder the
Crown must prove that the defendant intended to kill or cause really serious bodily
injury. To intend is to have a purpose or design that a particular consequence be
brought about. It is not always the same as to desire or wish. Are you sure that the
defendant foresaw death or really serious bodily injury as a consequence of his
intended act? If you are sure on the whole of the evidence that the probability of the
consequence foreseen by the defendant was little short of overwhelming it is a
proper inference to draw that the defendant intended that consequence. However
the final conclusion as to whether intent is proved must be arrived at after
considering the whole of the evidence including that of the defendant." *467
John Prosser Q.C. and Lord Elystan-Morgan for the defendant Shankland. The facts
of this case show that there was an issue of intent. Lord Bridge of Harwich in Reg. v.
Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 928, should not have relied on Southern Portland Cement
Ltd. v. Cooper [1974] A.C. 623 because it was about the question whether children
were likely to trespass on land. That case was about tortious liability and had no
proper or useful place in considering criminality. A high degree of probability would
be the correct direction to the jury. "Natural" is not a suitable direction and "highly
probable" or at least "probable" should be used: see Leung Kam-Kwok v. The
Queen, 81 Cr.App.R. 83 . In the present case use of the guidelines would be
tantamount to telling the jury to convict.
Thomas Q.C. in reply. Whichever definition of "natural consequence" was adopted
by the jury, none of them could have been confusing. The summing-up was
impeccable and on an objective view of the facts a verdict of murder was inevitable.
The jury was satisfied of guilt and convicted accordingly.
12 December. Lord Scarman announced that the Committee would report to the
House that the appeal should be dismissed for reasons to be given later.
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 14

27 February. LORD SCARMAN

My Lords, in this case the Director of Public Prosecutions appeals against the
decision of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), ante, p. 457F quashing the
respondents' convictions of murder and substituting verdicts of manslaughter. The
appeal is brought to secure a ruling from the House upon the refusal of the Court of
Appeal to accept as sound the guidelines formulated by this House in a recent case
in which the House gave guidance as to the direction appropriate to be given by the
judge to the jury in a murder trial in which the judge considers it necessary to direct
the jury upon the issue of intent by reference to foresight of consequences. The case
is Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , and the guidance was in these terms, at p. 929:

"In the rare cases in which it is necessary to direct a jury by reference to

foresight of consequences, I do not believe it is necessary for the judge
to do more than invite the jury to consider two questions. First, was death
or really serious injury in a murder case (or whatever relevant
consequence must be proved to have been intended in any other case) a
natural consequence of the defendant's voluntary act? Secondly, did the
defendant foresee that consequence as being a natural consequence of
his act? The jury should then be told that if they answer yes to both
questions it is a proper inference for them to draw that he intended that
consequence."

In the present case, the trial judge having based his direction to the jury on the
guidance which I have quoted, the two accused (respondents to this appeal) were
convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions on the ground
that the judge's guidance may well have *468 misled the jury. The court refused
leave to appeal but certified the following point of general public importance:

"Do the questions to be considered by a jury set out in the speech of Lord
Bridge of Harwich in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 929 as a model
direction require amplification?"
It will be observed that the questions which it was suggested in Moloney that the jury
should ask themselves refer to a "natural" consequence not a "natural and probable"
consequence. The Director now appeals with the leave of the House.
The appeal is of importance for two reasons. First, of course, there is the need to
settle a point of difference between this House and the Court of Appeal. The
Moloney guidance was intended to be authoritative in the sense that it was given to
be followed by judges in appropriate cases, i.e. those "exceptional" cases, as the
House thought, where the foreseeability of death or serious bodily harm may be
relevant to a decision as to the intent underlying the act of violence. The House
realised and declared, however, that the guidance was no part of the ratio decidendi
in the case: Lord Bridge of Harwich, at p. 920F-G. The guidance was offered as an
attempt in a practical way to clarify and simplify the task of the jury. It was not
intended to prevent judges from expressing in other language, if they should deem it
wise in a particular case, guidance designed to assist the jury to reach a conclusion
on the facts in evidence. The judicial function exercised from time to time by
appellate courts of offering guidance either for the benefit of a judge exercising a
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 15

discretion conferred upon him by law or as to the assistance which a judge may
properly give a jury in reaching a conclusion of fact can be helpful but does not result
in, or establish, though it should reflect, a rule of law. And, as this case illustrates,
there is always the danger that the inevitable generality of guidelines intended to
cover a class of case may be such as to be inapplicable or misleading in some
cases - usually through an error of omission.
The dangers inherent in general guidance for the assistance of juries in determining
a question of fact lead me to the second reason for the importance of the appeal,
namely that the cases to which the guidance was expressly limited by the House in
Moloney, i.e. the "rare cases" in which it is necessary to direct a jury by reference to
foresight of consequences, are unlikely to be so rare or so exceptional as the House
believed. As the House then recognised, the guidelines as formulated are applicable
to cases of any crime of specific intent, and not merely murder. But further and
disturbingly crimes of violence where the purpose is by open violence to protest,
demonstrate, obstruct, or frighten are on the increase. Violence is used by some as
a means of public communication. Inevitably there will be casualties: and inevitably
death will on occasions result. If death results, is the perpetrator of the violent act
guilty of murder? It will depend on his intent. How is the specific intent to kill or to
inflict serious harm proved? Did he foresee the result of his action? Did he foresee it
as probable? Did he foresee it as highly probable? If he did, is he guilty of murder?
How is a jury to weigh up the evidence and reach a proper conclusion amidst these
perplexities? *469 The best guidance that can be given to a trial judge is to stick to
his traditional function, i.e. to limit his direction to the applicable rule (or rules) of law,
to emphasise the incidence and burden of proof, to remind the jury that they are the
judges of fact, and against that background of law to discuss the particular questions
of fact which the jury have to decide, indicating the inferences which they may draw
if they think it proper from the facts which they find established. Should not appellate
guidance emphasise the importance of particular facts and avoid generalisation?
This is a question to be considered. The facts of this case would appear to indicate
an affirmative answer.
On 16 May 1985 at the Crown Court, Cardiff, Reginald Dean Hancock and Russell
Shankland were convicted of the murder of Mr. Wilkie. In the dark hours of the early
morning of 30 November 1984 Mr. David Wilkie was driving his taxi along the Heads
of the Valley Road. As he approached the bridge over the road at Rhymney he was
killed when two lumps of concrete hit the car. The two lumps, a block and a post,
had been dropped from the bridge as he approached it.
Mr. Wilkie's passenger was a miner going to work. Mr. Hancock and Mr. Shankland
were miners on strike, and strongly objected to Mr. Wilkie's passenger going to work.
That morning they had collected the block and the post from nearby, had brought
them to the bridge under which the Heads of the Valley Road runs through a cutting,
and had placed them on the parapet on the side facing towards the Rhymney
roundabout. They then awaited the arrival of a convoy escorting the miner on his
way to work. The convoy approached the bridge at about 5.15 a.m.: it consisted of a
police motor-cycle, a police Land Rover, the taxi driven by Mr. Wilkie, and a police
Sherpa van. The convoy was travelling from the Rhymney roundabout towards the
bridge in the nearside lane of the carriageway. Estimates of its speed varied: it was
put somewhere between 30 and 40 m.p.h. As the convoy neared the bridge, the
concrete block struck the taxi's windscreen. The post struck the carriageway some
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 16

4ft. 8in. from the nearside verge. Before, however, the post subsided on the ground,
it was hit by the taxi. The taxi skidded out of control, coming to rest on the
embankment. Mr. Wilkie died from the injuries he received in the wrecking of the taxi
by the two lumps of concrete.
The case for the prosecution was that the two concrete objects were either thrown
from the bridge or pushed over its parapet in the path of the taxi at a time when the
taxi could not avoid being struck by one or both of them. And, as the trial judge told
the jury, the prosecution case could be compressed into one question and answer,
the question being "what else could a person who pushed or threw such objects
have intended but to cause really serious bodily harm to the occupants of the car?"
The answer in the prosecution's submission was that a person acting in that way
could in the circumstances have intended nothing less.
The defence was simple enough: that the two men intended to block the road, to
stop the miner going to work, but not to kill or to do serious bodily harm to anyone.
Hancock told Detective Chief Superintendent Caisley that he did not throw the two
pieces of "masonry" over the bridge but merely "dropped" them. He told him *470
that he dropped them on the side of the bridge "nearest to the roundabout where I
could see them coming." At a later interview Hancock admitted "shoving" the block of
concrete over the parapet of the bridge, but declared that he believed when he did
so that he was standing "over the middle lane," i.e. not over the nearside lane, along
which the convoy was moving. He said that he did not mean to do anyone damage -
"just to frighten him [i.e. the miner going to work] more than anything." Shankland
admitted that he was party to the plan to obstruct the road but denied that they
intended to hurt anyone. Like Hancock, he emphasised that their plan was to drop
the objects in the middle lane of the carriageway, i.e. clear of the lane along which
the convoy was travelling, and that they believed that this was what they did.
Hancock and Shankland were prepared to plead guilty to manslaughter but the
Crown decided to pursue the charge of murder. The issue was ultimately one of
intention. Did they (or either of them) intend to kill or to cause anyone serious bodily
harm?
The case called for a careful direction by judge to jury as to the state of mind
required by law to be proved to their satisfaction before they could return a verdict of
murder. The jury would also want his help in weighing up the evidence. The judge's
direction as to the intention required by law was impeccable. He said:

"If the prosecution has made you satisfied so as to be sure that Dean
Hancock and Russell Shankland agreed that they would, in concert, push
or throw missiles from the bridge, each having the intention either to kill
or to cause really serious injury, then you will find each of them guilty of
murder as the block was thrown or pushed by Dean Hancock in
pursuance of the agreement."
When he came to help them on the facts, he offered guidance along the Moloney
lines:

"You may think that critical to the resolution of this case is the question of
intent. In determining whether a person intended to kill or to cause really
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 17

serious injury, you must have regard to all of the evidence which has
been put before you, and draw from it such inferences as to you seem
proper and appropriate. You may or may not, for the purpose of
considering what inferences to draw, find it helpful to ask: Was death or
serious injury a natural consequence of what was done? Did a defendant
foresee that consequence as a natural consequence? That is a possible
question which you may care to ask yourselves. If you find yourselves not
satisfied so as to be sure that there was an intent to kill or to cause really
serious injury, then it is open to you to return a verdict of not guilty of
murder, but guilty of manslaughter."

The jury was out for five hours. When they returned they told the judge that they had
failed to reach agreement. The judge now gave them the option of a majority verdict.
A few minutes later he received a note from the jury in these terms: *471

"Your Lordship,
"With respect, the jury has discussed at great length the factual aspects
of this case and feel, under the circumstances, confident in dealing with
this matter. However, the precise legal definitions regarding the
committing of murder and manslaughter are causing dissent because of
lack of knowledge, particularly with regard to intent and foreseeable
consequences."
The jury were plainly perplexed. The judge gave them a further direction but did not
go beyond what he had already said in summing up. If they were puzzled by the way
in which the judge had then dealt with the issue of intent, the second direction would
not have helped them. Their problem was how to relate foresight to intention - a
problem which they did not find solved by asking themselves the two questions
relating to natural consequences and foresight which the judge had put to them.
In the Court of Appeal Lord Lane C.J. delivered the judgment of the court. The court
found itself driven to the conclusion that the use by the judge of the Moloney
guidelines may have misled the jury. The guidelines offered the jury no assistance
as to the relevance or weight of the probability factor in determining whether they
should, or could properly, infer from foresight of a consequence (in this case, of
course, death or serious bodily harm) the intent to bring about that consequence.
This was, in the court's view, a particularly serious omission because the case law,
as Lord Bridge of Harwich in Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 925H had recognised,
indicated "that the probability of the consequence taken to have been foreseen must
be little short of overwhelming before it will suffice to establish the necessary intent."
In the court's view the judge's failure to explain the factor of probability was because
he faithfully followed Moloney: "[he] was unwittingly led into misdirecting the jury by
reason of the way in which the guidelines in Moloney were expressed:" ante, p.
461A.
The question for the House is, therefore, whether the Moloney guidelines are sound.
In Moloney's case the ratio decidendi was that the judge never properly put to the
jury the defence, namely that the accused was unaware that the gun was pointing at
his stepfather. The House, however, held it necessary in view of the history of
confusion in this branch of the law to attempt to clarify the law relating to the
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 18

establishment of the mental element necessary to constitute the crime of murder and
to lay down guidelines for assisting juries to determine in what circumstances it is
proper to infer intent from foresight. The House certainly clarified the law. First, the
House cleared away the confusions which had obscured the law during the last 25
years laying down authoritatively that the mental element in murder is a specific
intent, the intent to kill or to inflict serious bodily harm. Nothing less suffices: and the
jury must be sure that the intent existed when the act was done which resulted in
death before they can return a verdict of murder.
Secondly, the House made it absolutely clear that foresight of consequences is no
more than evidence of the existence of the intent; it must be considered, and its
weight assessed, together with all the *472 evidence in the case. Foresight does not
necessarily imply the existence of intention, though it may be a fact from which when
considered with all the other evidence a jury may think it right to infer the necessary
intent. Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C. put the point succinctly and powerfully
in his speech in Reg. v. Moloney [1985] A.C. 905 , 913:

"I conclude with the pious hope that your Lordships will not again have to
decide that foresight and foreseeability are not the same thing as
intention although either may give rise to an irresistible inference of such,
and that matters which are essentially to be treated as matters of
inference for a jury as to a subjective state of mind will not once again be
erected into a legal presumption. They should remain, what they always
should have been, part of the law of evidence and inference to be left to
the jury after a proper direction as to their weight, and not part of the
substantive law."

Thirdly, the House emphasised that the probability of the result of an act is an
important matter for the jury to consider and can be critical in their determining
whether the result was intended.
These three propositions were made abundantly clear by Lord Bridge of Harwich.
His was the leading speech and received the assent of their other Lordships, Lord
Hailsham of St. Marylebone L.C., Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Edmund-Davies,
and Lord Keith of Kinkel. His speech has laid to rest ghosts which had haunted the
case law ever since the unhappy decision of your Lordships' House in Reg. v. Smith
[1961] A.C. 290 and which were given fresh vigour by the interpretation put by some
upon the speeches of members of this House in Reg. v. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55 .
It is only when Lord Bridge of Harwich turned to the task of formulating guidelines
that difficulty arises. It is said by the Court of Appeal that the guidelines by omitting
any express reference to probability are ambiguous and may well lead a jury to a
wrong conclusion. The omission was deliberate. Lord Bridge omitted the adjective
"probable" from the time-honoured formula "foresight of the natural and probable
consequences of his acts" because he thought that "if a consequence is natural, it is
really otiose to speak of it as also being probable" [1985] A.C. 905 , 929B. But is it?
Lord Bridge of Harwich did not deny the importance of probability. He put it thus, at
p. 925:

"But looking on their facts at the decided cases where a crime of specific
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 19

intent was under consideration, including Reg. v. Hyam [1975] A.C. 55

itself, they suggest to me that the probability of the consequence taken to
have been foreseen must be little short of overwhelming before it will
suffice to establish the necessary intent."
In his discussion of the relationship between foresight and intention, Lord Bridge of
Harwich reviewed the case law since the passing of the Homicide Act 1957 and
concluded, at p. 928:

"foresight of consequences, as an element bearing on the issue of

intention in murder, or indeed any other crime of specific intent, belongs,
not to the substantive law, but to the law of evidence."
*473 He referred to the rule of evidence that a man is presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequences of his acts, and went on to observe that the
House of Lords in Smith's case [1961] A.C. 290 had treated the presumption as
irrebuttable, but that Parliament intervened by section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act
1967 to return the law to the path from which it had been diverted, leaving the
presumption as no more than an inference open to the jury to draw if in all the
circumstances it appears to them proper to draw it.
Yet he omitted any reference in his guidelines to probability. He did so because he
included probability in the meaning which he attributed to "natural." My Lords, I very
much doubt whether a jury without further explanation would think that "probable"
added nothing to "natural." I agree with the Court of Appeal that the probability of a
consequence is a factor of sufficient importance to be drawn specifically to the
attention of the jury and to be explained. In a murder case where it is necessary to
direct a jury on the issue of intent by reference to foresight of consequences the
probability of death or serious injury resulting from the act done may be critically
important. Its importance will depend on the degree of probability: if the likelihood
that death or serious injury will result is high, the probability of that result may, as
Lord Bridge of Harwich noted and the Lord Chief Justice emphasised, be seen as
overwhelming evidence of the existence of the intent to kill or injure. Failure to
explain the relevance of probability may, therefore, mislead a jury into thinking that it
is of little or no importance and into concentrating exclusively on the causal link
between the act and its consequence. In framing his guidelines Lord Bridge of
Harwich [1985] A.C. 905 , 929G, emphasised that he did not believe it necessary to
do more than to invite the jury to consider his two questions. Neither question makes
any reference (beyond the use of the word "natural") to probability. I am not
surprised that when in this case the judge faithfully followed this guidance the jury
found themselves perplexed and unsure. In my judgment, therefore, the Moloney
guidelines as they stand are unsafe and misleading. They require a reference to
probability. They also require an explanation that the greater the probability of a
consequence the more likely it is that the consequence was foreseen and that if that
consequence was foreseen the greater the probability is that that consequence was
also intended. But juries also require to be reminded that the decision is theirs to be
reached upon a consideration of all the evidence.
Accordingly, I accept the view of the Court of Appeal that the Moloney guidelines are
defective. I am, however, not persuaded that guidelines of general application, albeit
within a limited class of case, are wise or desirable. Lord Lane C.J. formulated in this
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 20

case ante, p. 461D-G guidelines for the assistance of juries but for the reason which
follows, I would not advise their use by trial judges when summing up to a jury.
I fear that their elaborate structure may well create difficulty. Juries are not chosen
for their understanding of a logical and phased process leading by question and
answer to a conclusion but are expected to exercise practical common sense. They
want help on the practical *474 problems encountered in evaluating the evidence of
a particular case and reaching a conclusion. It is better, I suggest, notwithstanding
my respect for the comprehensive formulation of the Court of Appeal's guidelines,
that the trial judge should follow the traditional course of a summing up. He must
explain the nature of the offence charged, give directions as to the law applicable to
the particular facts of the case, explain the incidence and burden of proof, put both
sides' cases making especially sure that the defence is put; he should offer help in
understanding and weighing up all the evidence and should make certain that the
jury understand that whereas the law is for him the facts are for them to decide.
Guidelines, if given, are not to be treated as rules of law but as a guide indicating the
sort of approach the jury may properly adopt to the evidence when coming to their
decision on the facts.
In a case where foresight of a consequence is part of the evidence supporting a
prosecution submission that the accused intended the consequence, the judge, if he
thinks some general observations would help the jury, could well, having in mind
section 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, emphasise that the probability, however
high, of a consequence is only a factor, though it may in some cases be a very
significant factor, to be considered with all the other evidence in determining whether
the accused intended to bring it about. The distinction between the offence and the
evidence relied on to prove it is vital. Lord Bridge's speech in Moloney made the
distinction crystal clear: it would be a disservice to the law to allow his guidelines to
mislead a jury into overlooking it.
For these reasons I would hold that the Moloney guidelines are defective and should
not be used as they stand without further explanation. The laying down of guidelines
for use in directing juries in cases of complexity is a function which can be usefully
exercised by the Court of Appeal. But it should be done sparingly, and limited to
cases of real difficulty. If it is done, the guidelines should avoid generalisation so far
as is possible and encourage the jury to exercise their common sense in reaching
what is their decision on the facts. Guidelines are not rules of law: judges should not
think that they must use them. A judge's duty is to direct the jury in law and to help
them upon the particular facts of the case.
Accordingly, I would answer the certified question in the affirmative and would
dismiss the appeal. I would propose that the costs of all parties be paid out of central
funds.
LORD KEITH OF KINKEL
My Lords, I have had the benefit of reading in advance the speech of my noble and
learned friend Lord Scarman. I agree with it, and for the reasons he gives would
dismiss the appeal.
LORD ROSKILL
My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech delivered by my
15/07/2020 Delivery | Westlaw India Page 21

noble and learned friend Lord Scarman. For the reasons he gives I too would
dismiss this appeal.
LORD BRIGHTMAN
My Lords, for the reasons given in the speech of my noble and learned friend Lord
Scarman, I too would dismiss this appeal.
*475
LORD GRIFFITHS
My Lords, I have had the advantage of reading in draft the speech delivered by my
noble and learned friend Lord Scarman. For the reasons he gives I too would
dismiss this appeal.
Representation
Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions ; Cartwrights, Cardiff ; Gareth J. Davies,
Bargoed .
Appeal dismissed. Costs out of central funds. (S. H. )

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