G.R. No.

138334               August 25, 2003

ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO, Petitioner,
vs.
The Court of Appeals and CARAVAN TRAVEL & TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In May 1991, petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed "Jewels
of Europe". The package tour included the countries of England, Holland, Germany, Austria, Liechstenstein,
Switzerland and France at a total cost of P74,322.70. Petitioner was given a 5% discount on the amount, which
included airfare, and the booking fee was also waived because petitioner’s niece, Meriam Menor, was
respondent company’s ticketing manager.
Pursuant to said contract, Menor went to her aunt’s residence on June 12, 1991 – a Wednesday – to deliver
petitioner’s travel documents and plane tickets. Petitioner, in turn, gave Menor the full payment for the package
tour. Menor then told her to be at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday, two hours before
her flight on board British Airways.
Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on Saturday, June 15, 1991, to take the flight
for the first leg of her journey from Manila to Hongkong. To petitioner’s dismay, she discovered that the flight
she was supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She learned that her plane ticket was for the
flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to complain.
Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take another tour – the "British Pageant" – which included
England, Scotland and Wales in its itinerary. For this tour package, petitioner was asked anew to pay
US$785.00 or P20,881.00 (at the then prevailing exchange rate of P26.60). She gave respondent US$300 or
P7,980.00 as partial payment and commenced the trip in July 1991.
Upon petitioner’s return from Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of P61,421.70,
representing the difference between the sum she paid for "Jewels of Europe" and the amount she owed
respondent for the "British Pageant" tour. Despite several demands, respondent company refused to reimburse
the amount, contending that the same was non-refundable.1 Petitioner was thus constrained to file a complaint
against respondent for breach of contract of carriage and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-
133 and raffled to Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
In her complaint,2 petitioner alleged that her failure to join "Jewels of Europe" was due to respondent’s fault
since it did not clearly indicate the departure date on the plane ticket. Respondent was also negligent in
informing her of the wrong flight schedule through its employee Menor. She insisted that the "British Pageant"
was merely a substitute for the "Jewels of Europe" tour, such that the cost of the former should be properly set-
off against the sum paid for the latter.
For its part, respondent company, through its Operations Manager, Concepcion Chipeco, denied responsibility
for petitioner’s failure to join the first tour. Chipeco insisted that petitioner was informed of the correct departure
date, which was clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket. The travel documents were given to petitioner
two days ahead of the scheduled trip. Petitioner had only herself to blame for missing the flight, as she did not
bother to read or confirm her flight schedule as printed on the ticket.
Respondent explained that it can no longer reimburse the amount paid for "Jewels of Europe", considering that
the same had already been remitted to its principal in Singapore, Lotus Travel Ltd., which had already billed
the same even if petitioner did not join the tour. Lotus’ European tour organizer, Insight International Tours
Ltd., determines the cost of a package tour based on a minimum number of projected participants. For this
reason, it is accepted industry practice to disallow refund for individuals who failed to take a booked tour.3
Lastly, respondent maintained that the "British Pageant" was not a substitute for the package tour that
petitioner missed. This tour was independently procured by petitioner after realizing that she made a mistake in
missing her flight for "Jewels of Europe". Petitioner was allowed to make a partial payment of only US$300.00
for the second tour because her niece was then an employee of the travel agency. Consequently, respondent
prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the balance of P12,901.00 for the "British Pageant" package tour.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision,4 the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to return and/or refund to the plaintiff the amount of Fifty Three Thousand Nine
Hundred Eighty Nine Pesos and Forty Three Centavos (P53,989.43) with legal interest thereon at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum starting January 16, 1992, the date when the complaint was filed;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as and for
reasonable attorney’s fees;
3. Dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim, for lack of merit; and
4. With costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.5
The trial court held that respondent was negligent in erroneously advising petitioner of her departure date
through its employee, Menor, who was not presented as witness to rebut petitioner’s testimony. However,
petitioner should have verified the exact date and time of departure by looking at her ticket and should have
simply not relied on Menor’s verbal representation. The trial court thus declared that petitioner was guilty of
contributory negligence and accordingly, deducted 10% from the amount being claimed as refund.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which likewise found both parties to be at fault. However, the
appellate court held that petitioner is more negligent than respondent because as a lawyer and well-traveled
person, she should have known better than to simply rely on what was told to her. This being so, she is not
entitled to any form of damages. Petitioner also forfeited her right to the "Jewels of Europe" tour and must
therefore pay respondent the balance of the price for the "British Pageant" tour. The dispositive portion of the
judgment appealed from reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated October 26, 1995 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby ENTERED requiring the plaintiff-appellee to
pay to the defendant-appellant the amount of P12,901.00, representing the balance of the price of the British
Pageant Package Tour, the same to earn legal interest at the rate of SIX PERCENT (6%) per annum, to be
computed from the time the counterclaim was filed until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes
final and executory, the rate of TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest per annum shall be additionally imposed on
the total obligation until payment thereof is satisfied. The award of attorney’s fees is DELETED. Costs against
the plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.6
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,7 petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 on the
following grounds:
I
It is respectfully submitted that the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in reversing and
setting aside the decision of the trial court by ruling that the petitioner is not entitled to a refund of the cost of
unavailed "Jewels of Europe" tour she being equally, if not more, negligent than the private respondent, for in
the contract of carriage the common carrier is obliged to observe utmost care and extra-ordinary diligence
which is higher in degree than the ordinary diligence required of the passenger. Thus, even if the petitioner and
private respondent were both negligent, the petitioner cannot be considered to be equally, or worse, more
guilty than the private respondent. At best, petitioner’s negligence is only contributory while the private
respondent [is guilty] of gross negligence making the principle of pari delicto inapplicable in the case;
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals also erred in not ruling that the "Jewels of Europe" tour was not indivisible and
the amount paid therefor refundable;
III
The Honorable Court erred in not granting to the petitioner the consequential damages due her as a result of
breach of contract of carriage.8
Petitioner contends that respondent did not observe the standard of care required of a common carrier when it
informed her wrongly of the flight schedule. She could not be deemed more negligent than respondent since
the latter is required by law to exercise extraordinary diligence in the fulfillment of its obligation. If she were
negligent at all, the same is merely contributory and not the proximate cause of the damage she suffered. Her
loss could only be attributed to respondent as it was the direct consequence of its employee’s gross
negligence.
Petitioner’s contention has no merit.
By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of persons
obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a fixed price.9 Such
person or association of persons are regarded as carriers and are classified as private or special carriers and
common or public carriers.10 A common carrier is defined under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons,
corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or
both, by land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.
It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of transporting
either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier. Respondent did not
undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since its covenant with its customers is simply to
make travel arrangements in their behalf. Respondent’s services as a travel agency include procuring tickets
and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking customers for tours.
While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent company, this does not
mean that the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most, respondent acted merely as an agent of the
airline, with whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her carriage to Europe. Respondent’s obligation to
petitioner in this regard was simply to see to it that petitioner was properly booked with the airline for the
appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of destination, meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline.
The object of petitioner’s contractual relation with respondent is the latter’s service of arranging and facilitating
petitioner’s booking, ticketing and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast, the object of a contract of
carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this sense that the contract between the parties in
this case was an ordinary one for services and not one of carriage. Petitioner’s submission is premised on a
wrong assumption.
The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is determinative of the degree of care
required in the performance of the latter’s obligation under the contract. For reasons of public policy, a
common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by law to carry passengers as far as human care and
foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and with due regard for all the
circumstances.11 As earlier stated, however, respondent is not a common carrier but a travel agency. It is thus
not bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation, as petitioner
claims.
Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care required of
respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code.12 This connotes reasonable
care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have observed when confronted with a
similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence attended the performance of an obligation is: did
the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.13
In the case at bar, the lower court found Menor negligent when she allegedly informed petitioner of the wrong
day of departure. Petitioner’s testimony was accepted as indubitable evidence of Menor’s alleged negligent act
since respondent did not call Menor to the witness stand to refute the allegation. The lower court applied the
presumption under Rule 131, Section 3 (e)14 of the Rules of Court that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced and thus considered petitioner’s uncontradicted testimony to be sufficient proof of her
claim.
On the other hand, respondent has consistently denied that Menor was negligent and maintains that
petitioner’s assertion is belied by the evidence on record. The date and time of departure was legibly written on
the plane ticket and the travel papers were delivered two days in advance precisely so that petitioner could
prepare for the trip. It performed all its obligations to enable petitioner to join the tour and exercised due
diligence in its dealings with the latter.
We agree with respondent.
Respondent’s failure to present Menor as witness to rebut petitioner’s testimony could not give rise to an
inference unfavorable to the former. Menor was already working in France at the time of the filing of the
complaint,15 thereby making it physically impossible for respondent to present her as a witness. Then too, even
if it were possible for respondent to secure Menor’s testimony, the presumption under Rule 131, Section 3(e)
would still not apply. The opportunity and possibility for obtaining Menor’s testimony belonged to both parties,
considering that Menor was not just respondent’s employee, but also petitioner’s niece. It was thus error for the
lower court to invoke the presumption that respondent willfully suppressed evidence under Rule 131, Section
3(e). Said presumption would logically be inoperative if the evidence is not intentionally omitted but is simply
unavailable, or when the same could have been obtained by both parties.16
In sum, we do not agree with the finding of the lower court that Menor’s negligence concurred with the
negligence of petitioner and resultantly caused damage to the latter. Menor’s negligence was not sufficiently
proved, considering that the only evidence presented on this score was petitioner’s uncorroborated narration of
the events. It is well-settled that the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation
cannot take the place of evidence.17 If the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation
to prove his exception or defense.18
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the evidence on record shows that respondent exercised due diligence in
performing its obligations under the contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services to
petitioner. As correctly observed by the lower court, the plane ticket19 issued to petitioner clearly reflected the
departure date and time, contrary to petitioner’s contention. The travel documents, consisting of the tour
itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were likewise delivered to petitioner two days prior to the trip. Respondent
also properly booked petitioner for the tour, prepared the necessary documents and procured the plane tickets.
It arranged petitioner’s hotel accommodation as well as food, land transfers and sightseeing excursions, in
accordance with its avowed undertaking.
Therefore, it is clear that respondent performed its prestation under the contract as well as everything else that
was essential to book petitioner for the tour. Had petitioner exercised due diligence in the conduct of her
affairs, there would have been no reason for her to miss the flight. Needless to say, after the travel papers
were delivered to petitioner, it became incumbent upon her to take ordinary care of her concerns. This
undoubtedly would require that she at least read the documents in order to assure herself of the important
details regarding the trip.
The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for the
resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due
care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation so demands.20 There is
no fixed standard of diligence applicable to each and every contractual obligation and each case must be
determined upon its particular facts. The degree of diligence required depends on the circumstances of the
specific obligation and whether one has been negligent is a question of fact that is to be determined after
taking into account the particulars of each case.21 1âwphi1
The lower court declared that respondent’s employee was negligent. This factual finding, however, is not
supported by the evidence on record. While factual findings below are generally conclusive upon this court, the
rule is subject to certain exceptions, as when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will affect the result of the case.22
In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that respondent company performed its duty diligently and
did not commit any contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot recover and must bear her own damage.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51932 is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the amount of
P12,901.00 representing the balance of the price of the British Pageant Package Tour, with legal interest
thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, to be computed from the time the counterclaim was filed until the finality
of this Decision. After this Decision becomes final and executory, the rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed
until the obligation is fully settled, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a
forbearance of credit.23
SO ORDERED.