Conscientious Objection, Ethics of

Hitomi Takemura, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan

© 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
This is an update of Michael K. Duffey, Conscientious Objection, Ethics of, In Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, & Conflict (Second Edition), edited by
Lester Kurtz, Elsevier Inc, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-012373985-8.00037-4.

Introduction 268
Jewish and Christian Roots 268
Refusal of Military Service in Other Religious Traditions 269
Islam 269
Hinduism 270
Buddhism 270
Origins of Modern Conscientious Objection in the West 270
Conscientious Objection in the Era of Mass Conscription 271
Conscientious Objection as a Universal Human Right 272
Contested Issues 273
References 274
Relevant Websites 275

Introduction

Conscientious objection has been a problem in abortion and vaccinations, but it also has been a problem in relation to military
service. Conscientious objection to participation in an armed conflict or in military service arises for persons opposed to defending
their society by use of lethal force. Opposition to life-taking in this context may be understood as a religious duty, a moral duty, or
both. A conscientious objector feels duty bound to act according to deeply held religious or philosophical beliefs. Religious consci-
entious objectors, for example, might interpret the commandment “Thou shall not kill” as the divine injunction against killing any
human beings. They might claim that as “created in the image and likeness of God” human beings are inviolable and deserve to be
treated with respect. They may also appeal to the exhortation of Jesus to “Love your enemies and do good to those who hate you”
(Luke 6:27) and to Jesus’ personal example refusing violence in his own defense. The conviction that it is wrong to kill might be
based on nontheistic beliefs about the inviolability of human beings. Conscientious objectors may oppose the notion that other
human beings are “enemies” because of different ethnic identity or national membership. They may object that preparing for
and engaging in an armed conflict involves demonizing other human beings, obscuring, or denying their full humanity and the
respect due to them as such.
The refusal of citizens to kill other human beings in defense of the state presents a conflict of dutiesdthat of the state to defend
its citizens, and that of the citizen to act on behalf of conscience prohibiting life-taking. How will the individual’s duty be accom-
modated? Should the state be required to provide alternative service? What sort of obligation does citizenship entail? Political
authorities claim an opposing duty of providing for the common defense. The ethical issues surrounding conscientious objection
have to do with how personal conscience and societal need can be accommodated.
In terms of accommodating people who refuse armed service, Western governments since the 17th century have gradually recog-
nized the right of individuals whose objection to any armed conflict was absolute to be assigned either to noncombatant military
roles ordif they refuse even thatdto some form of civilian community service. In countries that recognize the right of conscientious
objection, the trend continues to be toward accommodating objectors with alternative service that is nonpunitive and more favor-
ably regarded by the general citizenry. However, although the legal recognition of the right of citizens to object selectively to an
armed conflict remains contested, there has been movement toward recognition of objection based on the just-war framework
for making moral judgments about particular armed conflict (see section on “Conscientious Objection as a Universal Human
Right”).

Jewish and Christian Roots

The ancient narratives about the origins and deliverance of Israel from numerous more powerful nations celebrate Yahweh’s might
rather than the Israelites’ military prowess. The Hebrew scriptures attribute Israel’s prosperity to its fidelity to Yahweh and practice of
Yahweh’s justice and mercydagain, not to the strengths of its own arms. In the evolving religious consciousness of Israel,
God’s warrior image is overshadowed by the image of God’s compassion, forgiveness, and faithfulness. God calls upon the Israelites
to give refuge to the vulnerable. A central mitzvah (command) of Judaism is to “seek shalom and pursue it.” The Book of Deuteronomy
speaks of various exemptions from bearing arms, including some for those who are “afraid and tender-hearted.” Axelrad interprets this

268 Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace, and Conflict, 3rd edition, Volume 4 https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-820195-4.00088-1
 Conscientious Objection, Ethics of 269

to include “those who are physically robust but so gentle and compassionate as to be unsuitable for service as warriors” (Axelrad,
1986).
Throughout much of their history of persecution the Jewish people seldom responded with organized military force. The Macca-
beans who tried to drive out the Seleucids in the 2nd century BCE were brutally defeated. A more effective means was a later temple
sit-in to prevent the profaning of the Temple by another invading force.
In CE 70 a group of Jews known as the Zealots staged an unsuccessful revolt against the Romans. Jewish Christians refused to join
the Zealots on the grounds that Jesus had forbidden the use of violence. Over the next three centuries Roman authorities attempted
to compel Christians to perform military duties for the Empire. (The Romans did not impose military service on the communities of
the Jewish diaspora throughout the Empire.) Christian objections were twofold: first, they could not kill other human beings;
second, Army service also entailed participation in the civic cult of worshiping the gods of Rome and was idolatrous. Roman author-
ities regarded the refusal of Christians to bear arms and to participate in the civic cult as intolerable acts of disloyalty to Rome and
grounds for severe punishmentdusually execution. Christian converts from families associated with the military profession expe-
rienced a crisis of conscience regarding whether continued military service was compatible with their Christian profession. Christian
writers such as Tertullian, Justin Martyr, and Origen insisted on the absolute incompatibility between the teachings of Jesus and
service in the Roman Army.
However, when in the 4th century the official Roman attitude toward Christians changed so did the Christian view of service in
defense of the Empire (Bainton, 2008). In 312 Emperor Constantine determined that it was in the interest of the Empire to make
peace with the Christian church and issued the Edict of Toleration. The persecution of Christians declined dramatically and in 375
Christianity was accorded the status of the privileged religion of the Empire. The expansion and consolidation of Christianity was
tied directly to the political stability and security of the Empire. St. Augustine in the early 5th century appealed to the notion of
morally justifiable warfare in defense of the goods that the Empire secured for its citizens. He enumerated the conditions under
which it was licit for Christians to take up arms in defense of the Empire. Augustine also prescribed the virtuous conduct required
of Christians commanding and serving in the Roman legions. Over the next millennium several other eminent Christian moralists
prescribed the conditions under which war-making was legitimate and the conditions under which it must be conducted. In brief,
the jus ad bellum conditions for undertaking war required (1) a just cause, (2) undertaken with upright intention, (3) by a legitimate
political authority, (4) as a last resort (5) with a calculus that greater good than evil would result. Regarding the conduct of war, the
jus in bello conditions required that (1) civilians not be intentionally attacked and (2) the destructiveness to the adversary’s military
forces be kept to the minimum necessary to subdue them. Augustine asserted that Christians were exercising love for their innocent
neighbors as good citizens. While lay Christians could now take up arms in protection of the Empire, some Christian vocations were
viewed as incompatible with bearing arms: priests, brothers, monks, and nuns who had taken religious vows were expected to reflect
the higher ideal of imitating the refusal of Jesus to shed the blood of another.
The Middle Ages provided a very mixed picture of Christian attitudes toward war-making. The monastic tradition attracted Chris-
tians desirous of a nonviolent way of life. Church leaders initiated ecclesiastical rules to limit warfare. The Truce of God prohibited
making war on certain daysdSundays and Fridaysdand in the liturgical seasons of Lent and Advent. The Peace of God prohibited
attacking civilians and destroying their property and protected religious and church property as well. Yet the Church invoked brutal
Crusades against Muslims in the Holy Land and permitted attacks by Crusaders on Jewish communities along their way. Popes
enticed soldiers by the thousands to fight by promising forgiveness of their sins and eternal life. Likewise, church authorities spon-
sored Inquisitions in which alleged heretics were tortured and executed from the 12th to the 14th centuries. However, some of the
great reform movements within the Catholic Church were initiated by such saints as Francis of Assisi and Ignatius of Loyola whose
military service led them to crises of faith from which emerged vibrant nonviolent religious communities. St. Francis continues to
epitomize the ideal of unarmed active Christian peacemakers.
Throughout their coexistence with Christians and later with Muslims, Jews sought to practice their faith in peace as minority
communities assimilated or not to various degrees in largely Gentile lands. Jews seldom if ever took up arms in their own defense
during centuries of persecution in Christian Europe. Jews throughout Europe did not participate in military service but were more
often the victims of state violence. Only in World Wars I and II in support of the Western powers and later in support of Israel did
Jews undertake military service.

Refusal of Military Service in Other Religious Traditions

Islam
From its earliest period Islam legitimated the defensive use of force. For Muhammad, even the violence of war could be perceived as
an instrument of Allah’s will if it was carried out in self-defense after every nonmilitary means to seek peaceful settlement had failed.
Jihad can refer to the inner struggle for perfection. It can also refer to armed struggle against the enemies of Islam. Some Qur’anic
texts interpret jihad as warrants for self-defense. Other verses commend jihad to spread the faith. Yet Islamic law forbids forcible
conversion.
Jihad as warfare to restore justice and intervene in the suffering of the weak establishes strict conditions regarding the conduct of
war. Medieval Islamic attitudes toward violence may have been similar to those of their Christian territorial rivals. The strictest prac-
titioners of Islam were not pacifists but cautioned restraint. Muslim political rulers extended religious tolerance to Christians and
Jews living within their realms. Religious leaders rejected conversion by means of the sword. Unlike the separation of church and
270 Conscientious Objection, Ethics of

state in modern Western thought, in traditional Islam religious values should be integrated into and govern all human enterprises.
This has given rise to the recent militant politics and martyrdom to defend Islamic societies against the incursion of unbelievers.
Islam also endorses a form of nonviolence known as “quietism,” a “prudential postponement of adopting offensive measures
when the probability of success is outweighed by the likelihood of destruction and suffering” (Smock, 1995). In the 20th century
many Muslims have advocated nonviolent resistance to injustice. Some pacifists exist among Muslims and many Muslims have
urged nonviolent means of resisting oppression. For example, most Palestinians in the Occupied Territories have remained nonvi-
olent despite land confiscation and daily harassment by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Jalabi (2018) claims that the word Islam
comes from the Arabic Salam (peace) and should be translated as peacemaker, since it is “a verb noun referring to the active moving
or spreading of peace.”
However, as noted below Muslim countries with conscription do not recognize the right of conscientious objection to their
citizens.

Hinduism
Hinduism exhibits deep respect for human life and promotes the virtues of compassion, patience, and forbearance. The Bhagavad
Gita urges self-control and the overcoming of anger that leads to violence (Chapple, 1993). The Upanishads and Vedas promote
ahimsa (nonharm). Jainism, originally a reform movement within Hinduism, requires the taking of a vow against the use of
violence. Some interpreters of Hinduism emphasize the nonviolent character of its worldview. It was Gandhi who invoked ahimsa
as the principal means of overcoming injustice in all spheres of life. He refused to support the British in World War II on the grounds
that colonialism was inherently unjust and violent.
Other interpretations of Hinduism accent the duty of defense against unjust aggression. India, with the largest Hindus popula-
tion in the world, has neither a military draft nor any laws permitting conscientious objection. Because Hinduism lacks centralized
religious authorities, there is less likelihood that adherents of nonviolence and the right of conscience would promote national
legislation affording the right of conscientious objection.

Buddhism
Buddhism extols nonviolence. In early Buddhism, peace is taught as the peace of mind of individuals. After the Chinese conquered
Tibet, the Dalai Lama called the Chinese “our best teachers”dmeaning that their abusive treatment of the Tibetans thoroughly
tested the Tibetan Buddhists’ commitment to the principle of nonviolent living. A strict requirement of nonviolence is found espe-
cially among Buddhist monks. The 20th-century movement known as Engaged Buddhism popularized by Hahn (1992) and many
others emphasizes working for justice by nonviolent means, working to alleviate human suffering by means of meditation that leads
to an increase in mindfulness and the capacity to absorb suffering rather than inflict it on others.
Countries with large Buddhist populations such as Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Japan have neither military drafts nor
legislation permitting conscientious objection. Buddhist monks hold considerable moral authority, but in periods of wartime
conscientious objection has been permitted only to monks, with the defensive use of force sanctioned by many Buddhists.

Origins of Modern Conscientious Objection in the West

Developments during the Protestant Reformation had important ramifications for the development of conscientious objection first
as a claim made by citizens against the demands of the state, and second, as an accommodation made toward such citizens by the
state. The first modern Christian conscientious objectors were members of the radical wing of Protestant Reformation in the 16th
century. Intending to reform the church more radically than Luther had, sects of Christians were determined to model the life of the
early Church by separating themselves from behaviors of the state that violated the teachings of Jesusdincluding the taking up of
arms. Their separatist views led them to refuse the commands of the political rulers under whom they lived, often resulting in their
fierce persecution.
Mennonites in the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland, Pietists (Brethren) in Germany, and Quakers in England all
refused to take up the sword. They are known as “absolute pacifists” because they hold that as Christians, they are always pro-
hibited from taking up arms. Although compulsory military service did not yet exist, if ordered to bear arms, the pacifist convic-
tions of members of these denominations known as peace churches were informally accommodated by permitting them to pay
a fine or undertake other service. Some refused to pay taxes for military purposes or to make weapons. Members of these sects
sought refuge to practice their faith without opposition in the New World, beginning migration to the colonies of North America
in the 1680s.
In Britain’s American colonies members of these peace churches refused military participation and were granted conscientious
objector accommodation. The earliest recognition of the right of members of these traditional peace churches to refuse military
service was gradually accepted in the colonies. Although these Nonresistant Christians, as they became known, refused to serve
in or train for the colonial militias, their fellow colonists recognized their overall civic and economic contributions and accommo-
dated their religious convictions. Beginning in Massachusetts in 1665, laws exempting members of these sects from military service
 Conscientious Objection, Ethics of 271

on grounds of religious freedom were passed. Eventually, 12 of the 13 colonies had such laws. Rhode Island’s law even provided
forms of alternative civilian service, to aid civilians in the event of an attack upon the colony. Conscientious objectors were required
to pay fines and special taxes “to assist the common cause.” Mennonites were more cooperative in the payment of fines or taxes than
were Quakers, whose property was sometimes seized for refusal to pay.
During the debate on the Bill of Rights in 1789 James Madison proposed the inclusion of a clause stating “no person religiously
scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to bear arms in person.” However, the measure was rejected since the national
government was to possess only a small military force in peacetime to be drawn from militias recruited by the states which either
had or could provide accommodation for conscientious objectors.

Conscientious Objection in the Era of Mass Conscription

At the end of the 18th century the first citizen army in Europe was assembled by means of conscription, gradually replacing
armies of paid mercenaries. In 1793 the French National Assembly attempted to draft 300,000 French citizens, mostly from
among the destitutes, migrants, and prisoners. Some caught in local draft roundups managed to pay a commutation fee or
hire a substitute. A few years later the National Assembly required military training for all males aged 20–25 and service for 5
years in a reserve army. Prussia initiated mass conscription in 1815, followed by Germany in the later 19th century. Early draft
efforts were often unsuccessful in filling the ranks and preventing desertion. By the outset of World War I, Italy, Russia, Austro-
Hungary, and Japan all had compulsory military service. None of these conscription systems recognized or tolerated conscien-
tious objection, contributing to the migration of some draft age men from Italy, Russia, and Germany to the United States in the
19th century. In the late 19th century, some of the most culturally assimilated Jews entered military and civil service careers,
intent to demonstrate their patriotism.
According to Moskos and Chambers (1993) the legal recognition of conscientious objection in Europe and North America pro-
ceeded in three stages. In the first stage, claimants were exempted from military combat because of their membership in historic
peace churches. In 1863 the United States passed conscription legislation that included provision for exemption for members of
the historical peace churches that had objected to militia service in the colonial period. In 1916 Britain introduced its first conscrip-
tion law, which included a provision recognizing the right of conscientious objection for members of historical peace churches. The
US conscription law of 1917 exempted “members of any well recognized religious sect or organization whose then existing creed or
principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form ..” While the mood of the country was not sympathetic toward
conscientious objectors, those whose objections were based on religious convictions rather than nonreligious ones were more toler-
ated. Those who objected on nonreligious grounds were sent to prison.
However, they were still obliged to serve in noncombatant roles. Jehovah’s Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists were also
recognized as peace churches. However, Jehovah’s Witnesses often went to prison for refusing to serve in any form of government
alternative service. Jehovah’s Witnesses contribute to the growing recognition of a human right to conscientious objection to mili-
tary service by using domestic and international courts to exercise their human rights in international human rights law.
In the second stage, witnessed in the United States during World War II, members of mainline Protestant churches and Catholics
received conscientious objector status if they demonstrated that their pacifist beliefs were sincerely held. At this stage forms of
nonmilitary alternative service were developed and administered under civilian supervision. Those refusing alternative service
were sent to prison.
The third and present stage has expanded the grounds for legal recognition of conscientious objection to include those whose
convictions are based on nonreligious as well as religious beliefs. The conviction that it is morally wrong to kill another human
being may also be derived from nonreligious beliefs such as that respect for human life is due to all persons. In 1922 Norway
became the first Western nation to grant conscientious objector status on nonreligious grounds. In United States v. Welsh in
1970 the US Supreme Court held that deeply held moral beliefs warranted a “religious” claim to conscientious objection. Where
the right of conscientious objection is recognized, it may be grounded on either religious or nonreligious beliefs.
Before the draft was ended in 1973 in the United States the number of conscientious objectors rose to unprecedented levels, due
to the rising unpopularity of the war in Vietnam. In 1972, 100 000 males were drafted while 130 000 received conscientious
objector status and performed civilian alternative service under civilian supervision. In that same time period, numbers of consci-
entious objection in European countries also rose significantly. For example, since the end of World War II the effort of the Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) to alter the military culture of the Nazi era has led to a liberalization of laws recognizing conscientious
objection. In its 1949 constitution the FRG guarantees the right to dissent to compulsory military service. After joining NATO in
1959 and reinstating compulsory military service, Germany nonetheless offered alternative service to “any person who opposes
armed conflict between states.” Applicants for conscientious objector status can be exempted from military service whether they
oppose all war or a particular war, on religious or on moral grounds, or are currently in military service or not. Since the 1980s
the number of conscientious objectors performing alternative service has grown toward 100 000 annually. In the FRG alternative
service provides a major source of social assistance to the aged and the handicapped. Alternative service has come to be seen as the
moral equivalent to military service. In fact, the functioning of the German social welfare system depends on the services of large
numbers of persons exempted from military service.
272 Conscientious Objection, Ethics of

Conscientious Objection as a Universal Human Right

Since 1987 the United Nations Commission on Human Rights had recognized that “conscientious objection to military service
should be considered a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion recognized by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” This Commission on Human Rights
and its successor Human Rights Council set up by the United Nations General Assembly track the recognition of the right of consci-
entious objection in national constitutions and legislation (Table 1). They also urge the nations of the world to permit persons

Table 1 Global survey of conscientious objection.

Nations recognizing conscientious objection Nations not recognizing conscientious objection

Albania Afghanistan
Angola Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina Azerbaijan (although article 76 (II) of its constitution recognizes such
Austria right, has not yet introduced legislation to give effect to the right to
Belarus conscientious objection in practice)
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bangladesh
Brazil Bolivia
Bulgaria Cambodia
Canada China
Chile Costa Rica (without armed forces)
Croatia Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Czech Republic Dominican Republic (without armed forces)
Colombia Egypt
Cyprus Eritrea
Ecuador Ethiopia
Federal Republic of Germany Iran
Georgia Iraq
Greece Ireland (military recruitment has been voluntary)
Guatemala Kazakhstan
Guyana Kuwait (reintroducing conscription in 2017)
Hungary Jordan
Italy Lebanon
Latvia Lao Democratic People’s Republic
Lithuania Libya
Luxembourg Mauritius (without compulsory military service)
Macedonia Morocco (reintroducing conscription in 2018)
Mexico Niger (without conscription)
Moldova Peru
Montenegro Senegal
Mozambique Singapore
Netherlands Somalia
New Zealand Syria
Norway Tunisia
Paraguay Turkey
Poland Venezuela
Portugal Vietnam
Republic of Korea Yemen
Russian Federation Thailand
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden (reintroducing conscription 2017)
Switzerland
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States of America
Zimbabwe

Based on information reported by the UN Commission on Human Rights Report “Civil and Political Rights,” Including the Question of Conscientious
Objection to Military Service (E/CN.4/2006/51) and E/CN.4/2002/188, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Reports
(A/HRC/35/4; A/HRC/41/23). In addition, based on Amnesty International, the Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service, Amicus Curiae
Opinion Submitted to the Constitutional Court of South Korea, POL 31/001/2014 (2014); the United Kingdom Home Office, Country Policy, and
Information Note Iran: Military Service, version 2.0 (April 2020).
 Conscientious Objection, Ethics of 273

already serving in the armed forces whose opposition to bearing arms has crystallized during military service to be granted consci-
entious objector status. They also urge nations who have not yet done so to establish programs of alternative civilian service “not of
a punitive nature,” to establish independent decision-making bodies to determine whether claims of conscientious objection are
valid, and to promulgate information about this human right to young people who face decisions about military service and partici-
pating in war. The Human Rights Council promotes “best practices” in the upholding of the right of conscientious objection by
seeking and disseminating information from member nations, intergovernmental organizations, and human rights nongovern-
mental organizations such as International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), the Quaker, Amnesty International, War Resisters’
International (WRI), Jehovah’s Witnesses (Office of the General Counsel), European Organization of Military Associations and
Trade Unions (EUROMIL), European Bureau for Conscientious Objection (EBCO), and the Movement of Conscientious Objectors
(MCO). By resolution 20/2, the Human Rights Council requested the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) to prepare a quadrennial analytical report on conscientious objection to military service, in particular on new
developments, best practices, and remaining challenges. The latest report (A/HRC/41/23) recognizes the enactment, drafting, or
amendment of legislation on conscientious objection in a number of countries. It also recommends availability of information
of conscientious objection, cost-free access to application procedure for conscientious objectors, availability of the application of
conscientious objection to all persons affected by military service, recognition of selective conscientious objection, nondiscrimina-
tion on the basis of the grounds for conscientious objection and between groups, nonpunitive conditions and duration of alterna-
tive service, and so on.
In recent years, the right to conscientious objection to military service has been increasingly emphasized as a human right for
young people, particularly at the United Nations. Conscientious objection to military service concerns young people because mainly
people who are around 18 years old are conscripted for their national armies. Article 12(1) of the Ibero-American Convention on
the Rights of Youth recognizes the right to conscientious objection to military service as a youth right. The establishment of the right
of young people to refuse conscientious objection to military service is probably linked to the establishment of the ban on child
soldiers in international law.
When the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR) were drafted and ratified, States maintained a conscription system.
Therefore, article 4(3)(b) of the ECHR, article 8(3)(c)(ii) of the ICCPR, and article 6(3)(b) of the IACHR stipulate that military
service or any alternative service required by the law of conscientious objectors shall not be regarded as forced or compulsory labor.
As a consequence, numerous early cases of the United Nations Human Rights Committee which may consider the claims of indi-
viduals asserting violations of their Covenant rights and a lack of domestic redress indicated that article 18 of the Covenant, which
protects freedom of religion, does not guarantee a right to conscientious objection. The European Court of Human Rights was in
a similar situation. In 1991, a change in the United Nations Human Rights Committee’s attitude finally occurred. In obiter dictum in
J.P. v. Canada, the Committee stated, for the first time, that conscientious objection to military service was certainly protected by
article 18. Subsequently, it is clearly stated that the right to conscientious objection to military service could be derived from article
18 of the ICCPR inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force might seriously conflict with the freedom of conscience and the right
to manifest one’s religion or belief by the Committee’s General Comment No. 22 of 1993.
However, it was only in 2011 that the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights considered conscientious objec-
tion to military service in relation to the provisions of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion provided for in article 9 of the
ECHR in Bayatyan v. Armenia. The Grand Chamber considered that article 9 was applicable to his case and there had been a viola-
tion of article 9 by Armenia. In Europe, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in its article 10(2) guarantees the
right to conscientious objection in general, not limited to the one of military service, “in accordance with the national laws.”
Since 2000s, in the Republic of Korea, the judicial branch is improving the human rights situation against military refusals with
the democratization of the society. On June 28, 2018, while the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea ruled that criminally
punishing conscientious objectors to military service is unconstitutional. At the same time, ordered the government to revise the
Military Service Act by December 31, 2019, to have those who refuse conscription serve through alternative duties (Const. Ct.,
No. 2011 Hun-Ba 379). On November 1, 2018, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Korea overturned the conviction of a Jehovah’s
Witness on refusing to do mandatory military service. In December 2019, the Parliament of the Republic of Korea passed a new law
to provide conscientious objectors with alternative service. However, the duration of such service is still criticized as very long.

Contested Issues

Since the Vietnam era the Roman Catholic Church and mainstream Protestant Churches have advocated on behalf of granting
conscientious objector status to those who morally object to particular wars on the grounds that they fail to meet the criteria of
morally justifiable war. These so-called selective conscientious objectors, as opposed to “general conscientious objectors,” do not
object to armed conflicts universally but may oppose particular armed conflicts deemed to be unjust. The US government has
refused to recognize the right of selective conscientious objection on the ground that such a judgment would be politically moti-
vated rather than based on deeply held religious or moral convictions. The government also has claimed that such a provision might
unduly limit the ability of the state to recruit military forces. It should be noted that since 1968 the Netherlands and Denmark have
recognized the right of selective conscientious objection. Australia grants the right of selective conscientious objection only to
conscripts not to volunteers.
274 Conscientious Objection, Ethics of

Where volunteer armies have replaced conscripted armies, the issue also arises whether military personnel who have experienced
a “crystallization of conscience” and now oppose serving in either a combatant role or in any military capacity may receive consci-
entious objector status. While US military policy permits the processing of conscientious objector applications from military
personnel, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War the policy was suspended. In the absence of a uniform law governing the process,
inconsistencies, and prejudicial treatment in the granting of conscientious objector status frequently occur. Since the beginning
of the war against Iraq in 2003 some military personnel refused deployment to Iraq on the grounds that the war was in violation
of the jus ad bellum conditions, in particular the requirement of just cause. Increasing numbers of soldiers have refused to be rede-
ployed on the grounds of their personal experiences that military policy involves the widespread intentional killing of civilians and
the torture of enemy combatants, violations of the jus in bello conditions governing the conduct of war and of international military
conventions. Military courts have not accepted their arguments on just-war grounds. However, in 2004 a military officer in the FRG,
Major Florian Phaff, refused an order to provide technical assistance that would support the US military operations in Iraq.
Although he was originally demoted for his refusal, a German court ruled that he was acting within his right of selective conscien-
tious objection by refusing to support the US war in Iraq and ordered his reinstatement. The German Federal Administrative Court
in June 2005 recognized the right to refuse an order based on freedom of conscience, stating that “there are serious legal concerns
about the war against Iraq in view of the use of violence prohibited by the UN Charter and international law.”
Tensions remain between the right of political authorities to conscript citizens for military service and the right of citizens to
refuse on grounds of conscience. Since the 1980s the mainstream churches have stressed the moral obligations of members to apply
the just-war conditions to the wars in which they are expected to fight. In 1985 South African Catholic Bishop Denis Hurley claimed
that the South African Defense Force’s defense of the system of apartheid constituted an unjust use of military force. Hurley urged
Catholics to refuse to do military service, was charged with treason, and later exonerated by the courts. Prior to the collapse of the
Communist regime in East Germany, many East Germans refused to serve in the army on the grounds that it was serving the oppres-
sive and unjust purposes of the government. In both cases the legitimacy of the government use of military power was called into
question.
Similarly, since the 1980s small groups of “refuseniks” have refused to serve in the IDF in Lebanon and in the Occupied Terri-
tories. Israel does not recognize the right of conscientious objection. Furthermore, it is against the law to encourage citizens to refuse
compulsory military service. Many refuseniks have served time in military prisons. However, the IDF informally accommodates
some objectors by reassigning them to civilian services performed by the Israeli military.
The issue of selective conscientious objection raises questions of the moral responsibility of political leaders and citizens. Some
argue that political leadership applies the jus ad bellum conditions. Others extend the moral discernment more broadly to include
all citizens. The argument that citizens applying jus ad bellum criterion to particular circumstances are making political rather than
moral judgments needs careful attention since political judgments are a species of moral judgments.
Regarding who is responsible for applying the jus in bello, since the Nuremberg trials it is widely recognized and enshrined in
international conventions that combatants cannot evade personal moral responsibility for committing crimes in wartime by
appealing to the defense of simply obeying orders. Both civilians and combatants have rights that must be protected during wartime
by all.
The issue of conscientious objection is often cast as a matter of balancing the right of conscientious objection with the legitimate
right of states to defend themselves. But another moral matter that pertains to the state is the manner in which it trains military
personnel. Especially because most conscripts or enlistees are young and may not yet have fully developed moral consciences, it
is incumbent on military training to encourage respect for morality and humanitarian law. Conversely, if military training involves
breaking down individuals and producing military personnel who obey orders uncritically, the role of conscience in discriminating
between morally right and wrong behavior is undermined. Training that demonizes adversaries and conditions trainees to respond
automatically to situations of threat or opportunity and to act on the basis of destructive passions will undermine their capacity to
exercise moral constraint and discrimination. Trainees must be encouraged to exhibit the moral strength necessary to raise objec-
tions or to protest against wrongful orders even in the face of peer pressure, ostracism, or punishment.
In developed democratic countries, the issue of selective refusal of military service for both conscripts and volunteers is expected
to be dealt with leniency. The soldier’s right to conscientious objection to unjust wars is advocated as early as 1539 by Francisco
Vitoria in De Iure Belli (On the Law of War) by describing that “[i]f the war seems patently unjust to the subject, he must not fight,
even if he is ordered to do so by the prince.” Vitoria’s position has not been recognized by most States, but selective conscientious
objectors are constantly emerging as long as the legality of armed conflict is at stake.

References

Axelrad, A.S., 1986. Call to Conscience: Jews, Judaism and Conscientious Objection. Ktav Publishing House and Jewish Peace Fellowship, Hoboken, NJ and Nyack, NY.
Bainton, R.H., 2008. Christian Attitudes toward War and Peace: A Historical Survey and Critical Re-Evaluation. Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene, OR.
Chapple, C., 1993. Nonviolence to Animals, Earth, and Self in Asian Traditions. SUNY Press, New York.
Hanh, T.N., 1992. Peace is Every Step: The Path of Mindfulness in Everyday Life. Bantam, New York, N.Y.
Jalabi, A., 2018. Making peace with Islam the Muslim as peacemaker. In: Kurtz, L.R. (Ed.), The Warrior and the Pacifist: Competing Motifs in Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam. Routledge, New York, pp. 195–215.
Moskos, C.C., Chambers II, J.W., 1993. The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance. Oxford University Press, New York.
Smock, D.R., 1995. Perspectives on Pacifism: Christian, Jewish, and Muslim Views on Nonviolence and International Conflict. United States Institute of Peace Press, Wash-
ington, DC.
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Relevant Websites

AFSC.org http://www.AFSC.org.
CatholicPeaceFellowship.org http://www.CatholicPeaceFellowship.org.
JewishPeaceFellowship.org http://www.JewishPeaceFellowship.org.
MCC.org http://www.MCC.org.
Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors http://objector.org/.
PPU.org.uk http://www.PPU.org.uk.
SSS.gov https://www.sss.gov/conscientious-objectors/.