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The Impact of Foreign Exchange Controls on the Economic Performance of

Emerging Economies and South Africa in Particular

Thulani Sithole

27528872

A research project submitted to the Gordon Institute of Business Science,

University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Business Administration.

November 2008

© University of Pretoria
ABSTRACT

Capital controls relaxation is one critical macroeconomic policy

component that constitutes the broader framework of economic reform

policies. Research work has been done, especially on developed

countries, to establish if relaxation of capital controls does improve

economic performance of a country. The literature reviewed supports this

notion but the results from causal studies lack consistency, especially when

studying the emerging economies.

This research reviewed the literature on the impact of capital account

liberalization and the pace thereof on economic growth of emerging

economies. Then, a quantitative research methodology was followed

whereby 67 emerging economies, geographically grouped into five

continents, were studied over a period of 25 years, 1980 to 2005. The

economic growth rate was traced as the emerging economies relaxed or

tightened their capital controls to establish if there was any kind of

relationship. It was statistically proven that in emerging economies

relaxation of capital controls had a significantly low impact on economic

growth and that a gradual relaxation approach positively impacted

economic performance.

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DECLARATION

I declare that this research project is my own work. It is submitted in partial

fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Business

Administration at the Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of

Pretoria. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in

any other university. I further declare that I have obtained the necessary

authorization and consent to carry out this research.

Name: Thulani Innocent Sithole

Date: 13 November 2008

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to make the following acknowledgements of individuals who

inspired and supported me through the MBA and research project.

ƒ Andile Sithole, my wife, for being supportive, caring and patient

during the challenging times.

ƒ Spesihle and Mangaliso, my children, for the inspiration.

ƒ Mike Holland, my supervisor, for being supportive, understanding

and providing me with clear direction.

ƒ Ilze du Plooy, my statistician, for her relentless efforts to make this

study a successful one.

ƒ Leanne Kinghorn, who edited this report and made it look good.

ƒ The staff of GIBS Information Centre for assisting me in obtaining

literature for the research.

ƒ My fellow students who assisted me in a number of ways

throughout the MBA.

ƒ The Director, Prof. Nick Binedell, and the staff of GIBS who have

made the last two years a fulfilling and excellent learning

experience.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................................... 1 

DECLARATION ................................................................................................................................ 2 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................... 3 

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................................... 4 

TABLE OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... 8 

1.  INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM ...................................................... 10 

1.1.  RESEARCH PROBLEM ........................................................................................................ 10 

1.1.1.  WHY RELAX CAPITAL CONTROLS? ...................................................................... 10 

1.1.2.  WHY GRADUAL APPROACH? ................................................................................ 14 

1.1.3.  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 16 

1.2.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................... 17 

1.3.  IS THERE A NEED FOR THIS RESEARCH? ..................................................................... 18 

1.4.  WHY SOUTH AFRICA IN PARTICULAR? ...................................................................... 21 

2.  LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................... 22 

2.1.  BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS ................. 22 

2.2.  ECONOMIC GROWTH ..................................................................................................... 25 

2.3.  ECONOMIC FREEDOM .................................................................................................... 26 

2.4.  EMERGING ECONOMIES ................................................................................................ 28 

2.5.  CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION......................................................................... 30 

2.6.  CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION IN EMERGING ECONOMIES ................ 31 

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2.7.  SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS ........................................... 33 

2.8.  OTHER RESEARCH STUDIES ............................................................................................. 40 

2.8.1.  ECONOMIC FREEDOM INDICATORS EMPLOYED ........................................... 41 

2.8.2.  RESEARCH OUTCOMES ............................................................................................ 42 

2.8.3.  CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 44 

3.  RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS ............................................................................................. 45 

3.1.  PROPOSITION 1 .................................................................................................................. 45 

3.2.  PROPOSITION 2 .................................................................................................................. 45 

4.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .......................................................................................... 47 

4.1.  POPULATION ....................................................................................................................... 50 

4.2.  SIZE OF THE SAMPLE ......................................................................................................... 52 

4.3.  PROCESS OF DATA ANALYSIS ...................................................................................... 54 

4.4.  DEFENDING THE METHODOLOGY ............................................................................... 55 

4.5.  LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH .................................................................................. 56 

5.  RESULTS .................................................................................................................................. 58 

5.1.  IMPACT OF RELAXATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

 .................................................................................................................................................. 58 

5.1.1.  AFRICA ........................................................................................................................... 59 

5.1.1.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 59 

5.1.1.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 60 

5.1.2.  AMERICA ....................................................................................................................... 61 

5.1.2.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 61 


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5.1.2.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 62 

5.1.3.  ASIA ................................................................................................................................. 63 

5.1.3.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 63 

5.1.3.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 64 

5.1.4.  ALL EMERGING ECONOMIES ................................................................................ 65 

5.1.4.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 65 

5.1.4.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 66 

5.1.5.  SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................................................ 67 

5.1.5.1.  ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH ................................ 67 

5.1.5.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 68 

5.2.  IMPACT OF PACE OF RELAXATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON ECONOMIC

GROWTH ............................................................................................................................... 69 

5.2.1.  AFRICA ........................................................................................................................... 69 

5.2.1.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 69 

5.2.1.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 70 

5.2.2.  AMERICA ....................................................................................................................... 72 

5.2.2.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 72 

5.2.2.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 73 

5.2.3.  ASIA ................................................................................................................................. 74 

5.2.3.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 74 

5.2.3.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 75 

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5.2.4.  ALL EMERGING ECONOMIES ................................................................................ 76 

5.2.4.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 76 

5.2.4.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 77 

5.2.5.  SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................................................ 78 

5.2.5.1.  MEDIAN GRAPH ...................................................................................................... 78 

5.2.5.2.  CORRELATION STUDY ........................................................................................... 79 

6.  DISCUSISION OF RESULTS ............................................................................................... 80 

6.1.  RELAXATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS INCREASES THE GDP IN THE EMERGING

ECONOMIES ........................................................................................................................ 80 

6.1.1.  AFRICA ........................................................................................................................... 80 

6.1.2.  AMERICA ....................................................................................................................... 83 

6.1.3.  ASIA ................................................................................................................................. 84 

6.1.4.  ALL EMERGING ECONOMIES ................................................................................ 85 

6.1.5.  SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................................................ 87 

6.2.  IMPACT OF PACE OF RELAXATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON ECONOMIC

GROWTH ............................................................................................................................... 88 

7.  CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................... 94 

7.1.  BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................... 94 

7.2.  FINDINGS .............................................................................................................................. 95 

7.3.  SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................ 97 

7.4.  RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................... 98 

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7.5.  FUTURE RESEARCH IDEAS ................................................................................................ 99 

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................... 101 

APPENDICES .................................................................................................................................... 0 

TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Capital inflows to emerging economies ........................................... 19 

Figure 2: FDI to emerging economies ............................................................... 24 

Figure 3: Impact of exchange controls on economic growth (Africa case) 59 

Figure 4: Impact of exchange controls on economic growth (America) ..... 61 

Figure 5: Impact of foreign exchange controls on economic growth (Asia) 63 

Figure 6: Impact of exchange controls on economic growth (All emerging

economies) ......................................................................................................... 65 

Figure 7: Impact of exchange controls on economic growth (South Africa)67 

Figure 8: Impact of the pace of eliminating exchange controls on economic

growth (Africa) .................................................................................................... 70 

Figure 9: Impact of the pace of eliminating exchange controls on economic

growth (America)................................................................................................ 72 

Figure 10: Impact of the pace of eliminating exchange controls on economic

growth (Asia) ....................................................................................................... 74 

Figure 11: Impact of eliminating exchange controls on economic growth (All

emerging economies)........................................................................................ 76 


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Figure 12: Impact of the pace of eliminating exchange controls on economic

growth (South Africa) .......................................................................................... 78 

TABLE OF TABLES

Table 1: Emerging economies ........................................................................... 53 

Table 2: Correlation study for Africa.................................................................. 60 

Table 3: Correlation study for America ............................................................. 62 

Table 4: Correlation study for Asia .................................................................... 64 

Table 5: Correlation study for all emerging economies .................................. 66 

Table 6: Correlation study for South Africa ....................................................... 68 

Table 7: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in Africa)70 

Table 8: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in America)

.............................................................................................................................. 73 

Table 9: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in Asia) 75 

Table 10: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in all emerging

economies) ......................................................................................................... 77 

Table 11: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in South Africa)

.............................................................................................................................. 79 

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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The irresistible forces of globalisation have resulted in an increased

integration of markets across political and geographical boundaries, and

falling of government-imposed barriers to international flows of goods,

services, and capital. It has affected all countries with different economic

sizes and structures, developed and developing countries.

Globalization affects economic growth in different countries differently.

International financial arrangements which increase risk, and force the

developing countries to bear risk, increase the incomes of those countries

which have a comparative advantage in absorbing risk (the developed

countries) at the expense of those who have that comparative

disadvantage (the developing countries) (Stiglitz, 2003).

1.1.1. WHY RELAX CAPITAL CONTROLS?

Takacs (1990) suggests that as part of protection from these international

financial arrangements (which are of capitalist nature in origin), developing

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countries should rely on exchange controls to control their balance of

payments and to protect domestic industries.

According to Asiedu and Lien (2004), capital controls represent a country’s

attempt to shield itself from risks associated with fluctuations in international

capital flows. The other reason could be that in a country with a fragile

banking system, for instance, allowing households to invest abroad freely

could precipitate an exodus of domestic savings and jeopardize the

banking system’s viability. And short-term capital inflows can be quickly

reversed when a country is hit with an adverse macroeconomic shock,

thereby amplifying its macroeconomic effect. Some developing countries

also use capital controls to steer the composition of inflows toward more

stable forms, such as foreign direct investment (FDI).

Unlike Asiedu and Lien (2004), Kose and Prasad (2004) argue that access to

capital markets should allow countries to “insure” themselves to some

extent against fluctuations in their national incomes, such that national

consumption levels are relatively less volatile. Since good and bad times

are not synchronized across countries, capital flows can, to some extent,

offset volatility in countries’ own national incomes.

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However, these restrictions distort trade and domestic resource allocation

and limit a country's ability to respond to changing conditions (Takacs,

1990).

The literature from macroeconomics studies suggests that the relaxing of

foreign exchange controls improves countries’ economic growth.

Angermann (2005) supports this view by stating that a country is dependent

on new capital coming in from abroad and is generally likely to benefit

from deregulation methods.

In economic theory, capital account liberalization should allow for more

efficient global allocation of capital, from capital-rich industrial countries

to capital-poor developing economies. This should have widespread

benefits, by providing a higher rate of return on people’s savings in industrial

countries and by increasing growth, employment opportunities, and living

standards in developing countries.

According to Kose and Prasad (2004), capital account liberalization may

also be interpreted as signalling a country’s commitment to good

economic policies. For a country with an open capital account, a

perceived deterioration in its policy environment could be punished by

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domestic and foreign investors, who could suddenly take capital out of the

country. Inflows stemming from liberalization should also facilitate the

transfer of foreign technological and managerial know-how and

encourage competition and financial development, thereby promoting

economic growth.

Yusuf (1999) warns developing economies that before relaxing capital

controls it is important to remember the lessons learnt from the Asian

financial crisis, which inflicted large human and financial costs. The most

important is that gaps in the institutional infrastructure make financial

systems extremely fragile. Many developing countries also lack an

institutional framework conducive to foreign direct investment, and

therefore lose out on the many benefits such flows could provide.

Ghosh, Goretti, Joshi, Ramakrishnan, Thomas and Zalduendo (2008) further

state that while capital inflows are generally beneficial to recipient

countries, they can also complicate macroeconomic management by

overheating the economy, deteriorating the external balance, and

increasing a country’s vulnerability to a change in market sentiment.

Despite the 1997 turmoil in financial markets, many emerging economies

continue to face positive capital flows and balance of payments pressures.

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The consequences and desirability of capital account liberalization among

developing countries is likely to remain a topic of debate for the

foreseeable future. People on one side of this debate will maintain those

countries that open up to financial flows will set the stage for more rapid

development. Those on the other side will question the advantages

actually conferred by capital account liberalization and, furthermore, will

argue that countries become more vulnerable to financial disruptions not of

their own making when their governments relinquish control over the inflow

and outflow of capital (Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek, 2002).

The first research problem presented by the arguments above is how the

governments and monetary authorities of emerging economies can align

their policies in order to benefit from globalisation. This study will monitor

economic growth as emerging countries open their economies – more

specifically, as they relax capital controls.

1.1.2. WHY GRADUAL APPROACH?

Takacs (1990) warns against the big-bang approach of eliminating quotas

because it may lead to problems in adjustment and the balance of

payments.

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Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002) quote from the report of the Managing

Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to the International

Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) on Progress in Strengthening the

Architecture of the International Financial System and Reform of the IMF,

saying, “In a number of discussions in recent years on issues related to

capital account issues, the Executive Board has emphasized the substantial

benefits of capital account liberalization, but stressed the need to carefully

manage and sequence liberalization in order to minimize risks.”

Capital account liberalization should not be viewed as a one-shot, all-or-

nothing phenomenon that under all circumstances is welfare-improving; a

pragmatic policy would design a gradual and opportunistic approach to

capital account liberalization that takes into account individual country

circumstances (Prasad and Rajan, 2008).

Visser (2002) however argues that easing of exchange control is noble, but

the process is critical and dangerous. Gradual easing of exchange controls

can be catastrophic as speculators exploit expectations of further easing,

creating a constant negative bias to the currency.

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The second research problem raised by the arguments above is about the

pace of relaxation of capital controls, and this shall also be further explored

by this research.

1.1.3. CONCLUSION

Zagha and Nankani (2006) claim that the financial liberalization that took

place in developing countries in the late 1980s and the 1990s was sparked

by the growing difficulties of using capital controls in a world of increased

trade, travel, migration and communications. It differed in timing, speed,

and content across countries. It often involved giving central banks more

independence, opening up capital accounts, and privatizing state banks

and pension systems.

Quite substantial research has been done on the relaxation of capital

controls, but there are mixed results – especially when studying emerging

economies. The major contributing factor to this phenomenon is the fact

that emerging economies have different economic arrangements, which

poses a challenge to conventional economic reforms policies.

Due to globalisation forces, countries are forced to partner and have

arrangements to exchange goods and capital, and this makes relaxation of


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controls inevitable. As a result, the focus has shifted to the approach and

the pace of relaxing capital controls. This research provides more insights

into the pace and the approach of relaxing capital controls.

1.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The aim of this research is a causal study on the impact of relaxation of

capital controls on economic growth. The research further compares

economic performance of those emerging economies that relaxed their

foreign exchange controls at a gradual pace and those that adopted a

big-bang approach.

A total of 67 emerging economies – grouped into four continents of

developing economies, namely Asia, Oceania, Latin America and Africa –

as well as economies in transition in Europe are utilised in the study. GDP

measures economic performance over a period of 25 years – 1980 to 2005.

Gwartney and Lawson (2007) provide the Economic Freedom of the World

(EFW) indices and specifically the international market capital controls that

is the foreign exchange controls measure in this study.

Canales-Kriljenko (2004) acknowledges that foreign exchange markets in

developing markets are often the most active and important asset in
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developing and transition economies, yet little research on the subject

have systematically documented their structures and main characteristics.

This research seeks to provide empirical evidence to support either side of

the argument on the relaxation of foreign exchange controls and the pace

at which they are relaxed, and will attempt to provide economic

characteristics and structures of emerging economies.

1.3. IS THERE A NEED FOR THIS RESEARCH?

Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002) point out that while industrial countries

have largely liberalized their capital accounts, and there has been some

movement towards more widespread capital account liberalization among

developing countries, the majority of developing countries retain controls

over capital flows. There is mixed evidence that capital account

liberalization promotes long-run economic growth in emerging economies.

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Figure 1: Capital inflows to emerging economies

Dorsey (2008) state that the increased flows shown by Figure 1, are being

attracted by improved economic policies, a liberalized trade and

investment environment, and more stable economic performance.

In support of performing this study, Berggren (2003) states that Adam Smith

argued that market processes satisfy people’s demands spontaneously.

Even though he (Adam Smith) realized that free markets are not perfect, he

understood that, generally speaking, they, more than any alternatives, are

able to advance wealth and welfare. The question is: Should the emerging

economies embrace free market processes as is, and what level of

pragmatism is required?

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Berggren (2003) states that research on economic freedom is still at an early

stage and calls for more carefully designed causality studies; studies of

more variables that economic freedom can be expected to affect; and a

continuing development of economic theory that puts the role of

institutions at the centre of the analysis.

Kose and Prasad (2004) provide support that the evidence is not quite as

compelling as the theory, however. While emerging market countries that

have liberalized their capital accounts typically have had higher growth

rates, on average, than those that have not, this association does not imply

a causal relationship.

This research is carefully designed to give compelling evidence to support

either side of the argument. It focuses on emerging economies; and utilises

data collected from a reliable source – the IMF – and performed over a

period of 25 years. The outcome of this research is a major contribution to

the literature of macroeconomics.

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1.4. WHY SOUTH AFRICA IN PARTICULAR?

Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) state that South Africa is often described as

an engine of growth in Africa, in the sense that South African economic

growth is believed to have a substantial impact on growth in other African

countries. This is achieved through international trade, with higher South

African growth contributing to a rise in import demand that is directly

reflected in an increase in the net exports of other countries. In theory,

higher international trade infuses international movement of capital.

Emerging market countries have not been able to use international

financial markets effectively to reduce consumption volatility. International

investors are willing to lend to them in good times but tend to pull back in

bad times, thereby amplifying swings in the domestic macro-economy

(Kose and Prasad, 2004).

Therefore South Africa as an emerging economy in Africa has to do well in

its economic reforms and use the international financial markets effectively

to benefit the country and the continent. It is believed that the literature

gathered and the outcomes of the study will be used for future MBA class

discussions and will be beneficial to the monetary authorities of South

Africa.

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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The governments and monetary policy authorities of emerging markets,

going through economic reform, are facing a dilemma as to whether they

should relax exchange controls; and if they do, the second question is what

the speed of relaxing controls should be to positively impact economic

performance. The topics below assess literature from other research work

done on this topic and seek to provide clarity and define all components of

the study.

2.1. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE


CONTROLS

McAleese (2004) defines the balance of payments as a statement of all

transactions between residents of home country and the outside world

during a specified period of time. These transactions are grouped under

two accounts – the current account and the capital account.

The current account is a record of cross-border transactions in goods,

services, balance of trading and investment income also known as factor

income, and unilateral transfers also known as balance of international

transfers.

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Capital account in a country’s balance of payments covers a variety of

financial flows, mainly FDI, portfolio flows (including investment in equities or

stock market), and bank borrowing which have in common the acquisition

of assets in one country by residents of another. It is possible, in principle, to

control these flows by placing restrictions on those flows going through

official channels (Kose and Prasad, 2004).

Stock markets provide services to the non-financial economy that are

crucial for long-term economic development. The ability to trade securities

easily may facilitate investment, promote the efficient allocation of capital,

and stimulate long-term economic growth. Policymakers should consider

reducing impediments to stock market development. Easing restrictions on

international capital flows would be a good place to start (Levine, 1996).

Countries favour FDI (as shown by Figure 2), among other reasons, because

it usually involves flows that are relatively long term and not subject to rapid

reversals associated with changes in investor sentiment. Some countries,

like Chile, have also used selective capital controls to try to induce a shift

from shorter to longer term inflows by imposing an implicit tax on capital

inflows reversed within less than a year (Kose and Prasad, 2004).

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Figure 2: FDI to emerging economies

Foreign exchange controls are defined as limits on the amount of foreign

currency that can be taken into a country, or of domestic currency that

can be taken abroad (The Economist, 2008).

Foreign exchange controls can be broadly classified into two categories:

(a) administrative or direct controls, and (b) market-based or indirect

controls. Direct controls restrict capital transactions and the transfer of

funds through outright prohibitions, including restrictions on capital account

transactions, restrictions on current account transactions, repatriation

requirements and restrictions on the use of funds. Market-based controls

include multiple exchange rate systems, taxation of cross-border flows, and


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other indirect regulatory controls. These types of controls affect capital

movements indirectly by increasing the costs associated with capital

movements and associated transactions (Asiedu and Lien, 2004).

According to Frenkel, Nickel, Schmidt and Stadtmann (2001) a capital

control that can be modelled as a tax on capital flows can reduce

exchange rate volatility following different types of shocks, but, at the same

time, two additional effects occur. First, since the tax leads to a new steady

state of the economy, its implementation initially triggers exchange rate

volatility, including overshooting, which is the phenomenon it tries to curtail.

Second, capital controls increase the risk premium of domestic assets so

that the domestic interest rates rises and the incentives to invest in the

capital of the economy decrease.

This research focuses on administrative or direct controls employed on

portfolio flows and FDI forms of capital account markets in emerging

economies.

2.2. ECONOMIC GROWTH

Gross national product (GNP) is the output produced by productive factors

owned by permanent residents of a country, whereas the gross domestic


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product (GDP) is the output produce by the productive factors located in

the country, regardless of their owner’s nationality (McAleese, 2006).

Kyrkilis and Pantelidis (2003) suggest that GNP is the most important

determinant of outward FDI. The outward FDI position of countries is

influenced by national characteristics, and the same type of endowments

have different significance for different countries.

For the purpose of this study, GDP rate is used since the focus is on the

economic growth due to capital that is owned by locals and foreigners in

emerging countries.

2.3. ECONOMIC FREEDOM

Economic freedom and political democracy is not the same thing.

Democracy relates to political decision-making, and economic freedom

relates to interaction through exchange and markets. Economic freedom is

about the freedom of individuals to decide how they will develop and use

their productive abilities, exchange goods and services with others,

compete in markets, and keep the fruits of their labour (Gwartney and

Lawson, 2007).

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This research focuses on the components that are designed to measure

restraints that affect international exchange, namely administrative

restraints, and exchange rate and capital controls.

Ball and Rausser (1995) discovered that after a period of about five years of

economic reform, the political regime and economic performance of a

country correlate. The politically more open countries tend to do better in

inflation controlling.

No single reform by itself is sufficient for fast growth or for sound

development. A moderate degree of freedom is necessary in political and

economic areas to improve growth perspectives (Vega-Gordillo and lvarez-

Arce, 2003).

Rogoff (2002) further warns that even where some limited form of capital

control is warranted on economic grounds, actual implementation is all too

often dominated by political considerations, and the results are not pretty.

A few powerful political stakeholders benefit but only at a high cost to other

citizens.

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Although these arguments present an interesting case for South Africa,

which became a democratic state in 1994 and has, to a large degree,

adopted “economic freedom” policies, this research is not set to prove the

relationship between political and economic freedom, and it assumes

political impact to be constant.

2.4. EMERGING ECONOMIES

Emerging economies are low-income, rapid-growth countries using

economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth. They fall into two

groups: developing countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle

East; and transition economies in the former Soviet Union and China

(Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and Wright, 2000). This research focuses a lot on the

developing economies that are stratified into four continents, namely Asia,

Africa, (Latin) America and Oceania.

Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) provides some characteristics

of these emerging economies as follows: emerging markets generally do

not have the level of market efficiency and strict standards in accounting

and securities regulation to be on par with advanced economies (such as

the United States, Europe and Japan), but emerging markets will typically

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have a physical financial infrastructure, including banks, a stock exchange

and a unified currency.

Emerging economies have standards of living lower than developed

economies and economies in transition. Many have deep and extensive

poverty. Developing countries are usually importers, rather than

developers, of innovations in science and technology. They also tend to be

more vulnerable and weak to sudden economic shocks.

The countries in this list include those that are not considered either High

Income or Economies in Transition (UNCTAD, 2006). This research focuses a

lot on the developing economies class of emerging economies.

Emerging markets are sought out by investors for the prospect of high

returns, as they often experience faster economic growth as measured by

GDP. Investments in emerging markets come with much greater risk due to

political instability, domestic infrastructure problems, currency volatility and

limited equity opportunities (many large companies may still be "state-run"

or private). Also, local stock exchanges may not offer liquid markets for

outside investors. Bodenstein, Plumper and Schneider (2003) note that on

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average governments in transition lifted non-tariff barriers to trade and

raised capital controls at the same time.

These policies are contradictory and this raises the need for more research

work to be done in emerging economies to help educate governments

and monetary authorities of these countries so that they can formulate

sound policies.

2.5. CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION

Kose and Prasad (2004) aver that capital account liberalization poses major

risks if implemented without supporting policies. Opening the capital

account while maintaining a fixed exchange rate regime has been

followed by crisis in many countries. Countries that have maintained or only

gradually eased capital controls while moving toward a more flexible

exchange rate regime generally seem to have had better outcomes.

Capital controls exert negative effects on growth because they induce a

dampening effect on investment activity. Policymakers – in deciding about

the appropriateness of capital controls – need to weigh the negative

growth effect of this policy against the possible positive effect of reduced

exchange rate volatility (Frenkel, Nickel, Schmidt and Stadtmann, 2001).


30
According to Obstfeld (2004), the superior performance of the emerging

economies should not only be ascribed to financial openness but also to

the superior institutional infrastructure of the economy. Improvement of

that infrastructure is critical, both in moving the poorest countries toward

improved living standards and in ameliorating the difficulties emerging

economies have encountered during financial globalisation.

The studies that cover an appropriate period of time seem to find an

inverse relationship between foreign exchange controls and economic

performance (Asiedu and Lien, 2004). This is further supported by De Haan

and Sturm (2000) stating that that greater economic freedom fosters

economic growth.

2.6. CAPITAL ACCOUNT LIBERALIZATION IN EMERGING


ECONOMIES

Prasad, E.S. and Rajan, R. (2008) state that the main benefits of capital

account liberalization for emerging markets appear to be indirect, more

related to their role in building other institutions than to the increased

financing provided by capital inflows. Emerging countries do not have

much of a choice but to plan for capital account liberalization, because

31
capital accounts are de facto becoming more open over time irrespective

of government attempts to control them.

To poor countries with weak policies and institutions, capital account

liberalization should not be a major priority. However, poor countries that

are resource-rich have to deal with capital inflows and their mixed benefits,

and therefore need to ensure that capital account liberalization is aligned

and supported by other policies. This is the lesson for South Africa and other

African countries.

Harvie (1999) concludes, after studying China’s economic reform, that

there is no simple or singular blueprint for the successful economic transition

from a planned to a market economy. A number of key policy areas can

be identified, however, including that of macroeconomic stabilisation,

price and market reform, restructuring and privatisation, and the need to

redefine the role of the state.

While there is general agreement on these basic measures, major

disagreement exists about the sequencing of such reforms. The two major

approaches are that of a big-bang versus a gradual approach. However,

in reality the big-bang approach has been primarily limited to the

32
implementation of a rapid macroeconomic stabilization program, with the

process of restructuring the economy – including that of privatisation and

the development of institutions required in the context of a market

economy – taking a much longer period of time.

Asiedu and Lien (2004) argue that capital controls have no impact on FDI

to sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. This may be explained by the

fact that FDI in the two regions are resource seeking, mainly in fuel, oil and

mineral resources. Such investments tend to be less sensitive to the policy

environment and country conditions. Another explanation is that foreign

investors do not consider government liberalization policies as credible. A

third explanation for the ineffectiveness of liberalization is that the restrictive

policies did not bind in the first place.

2.7. SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONTROLS

Geography is a factor that should be taken into account in explaining

cross-country variations in growth rates; geographic location is an

unalterable fact, and there is nothing that can be done about it, though

much can be done in terms of the other determinants of economic growth

(Cole, 2003).

33
Mbaku (2003) feels that if African countries are to deal effectively with

poverty and significantly improve living standards, they must create

institutions that protect property rights and allow individuals the freedom to

engage in mutually beneficial trade by adopting a constitution that

safeguards economic freedom.

Increased flows are being attracted by improved economic policies, a

liberalized trade and investment environment, and more stable economic

performance in many countries. During the 1990s, net capital flows to

developing countries increased markedly. In 1996, net private capital flows

were $190 billion, almost four times larger than in 1990. During 1990-97,

annual net private capital inflows were also larger than those preceding

the 1982 debt crisis, and more heavily concentrated. Most of the surge was

concentrated in Asia and Latin America (Lopez-Mejia, 1999)

Stals (1999), the former South African Reserve Bank Governor, highlights that

the important precondition for the incorporation of the South African

financial markets in the global economy was the lifting of exchange

controls. The country relied on the inflows of capital to generate the foreign

exchange reserves that would be needed for the financing of any outflows

following the removal of the controls.

34
Harris (1999) points out that South Africa is the only country in sub-Saharan

Africa with sophisticated financial markets and substantial private capital

inflows, and thus it can benefit from foreign investments.

Exchange controls were first introduced in South Africa during the Second

World War as a means of protecting South Africa's foreign exchange

reserves. Recent years have seen a relaxation in exchange control

regulations in South Africa. The dual currency system of the financial and

commercial rand was abolished on 13 March 1995. Any investment or

repatriation of capital is now through the medium of the rand (Dasso, 2007).

South Africa, since 1994, has gradually relaxed capital controls but retains

some, including the requirement that exporters repatriate their foreign

exchange earnings within six months. These types of requirements deter

FDI. The strength of the rand may present an opportune time to ease

capital controls further (Ahmed, Arezki and Funke, 2005).

Dasso (2007) provides a summary of capital control relaxation efforts

affecting South African individuals and corporates, and some are listed

35
below. (The detailed and updated descriptions can be sourced from the

SARB Exchange Control Manual.)

ƒ The blocked assets owned by foreigners are being unwound.

ƒ The limits permitted for pension funds and unit trusts invested offshore

have been increased over the period, and from October 2005 it was

at an overall limit of 15% of total assets.

ƒ With effect from 26 October 2004, exchange control limits applicable

to foreign direct investments by South African corporates were

completely abolished.

ƒ Offshore loans accessed after 18 February 2004 are subjected to fewer

exchange control restrictions.

ƒ The exchange control requirement that companies and mandated

parastatals must obtain a majority (50% +1) interest in all foreign direct

investments is replaced with the lower requirement of a significant

interest of at least 25%.

36
ƒ Banks will be allowed to hold non-African foreign assets of up to 20% of

their domestic regulatory capital, and African foreign assets of up to

40%.

ƒ Restrictions on current account transactions, such as the transfer of

buying commissions, payment for computer packages purchased on

a commercial basis, maintenance payments in respect of computer

software, and the importation of books, newspapers, periodicals as

well as medical preparations and correspondence course material no

longer apply.

ƒ Payments for services rendered by non-residents will, in most cases, not

require exchange control approval; this includes directors' fees

payable to non-residents.

ƒ South African individuals are allowed to purchase fixed property in

Southern African Development Community countries.

ƒ Foreign companies, governments and institutions may list on South

Africa's bond and securities exchanges, and South African private

37
individuals are able to invest, without restriction, in inward listed

instruments on South African exchanges.

ƒ South African corporates are allowed to retain foreign currency

earnings in the form of export proceeds and service receipts for up to

180 days.

ƒ South African institutional investors may invest an additional 5% of their

total retail assets in African securities issued and listed on the JSE

Limited by acquiring foreign currency denominated portfolio assets in

Africa through foreign currency transfers from South Africa, or

indirectly, by acquiring rand denominated foreign exposures via an

inward listed African security.

ƒ Restrictions on the opening and operation of customer foreign

currency accounts with local authorised dealers by businesses making

profits or commissions on foreign transactions are removed, subject to

the 180-day limit for the repatriation of funds.

38
ƒ South African corporates are allowed to utilise part of their local cash

holdings to repay up to 20% of outstanding foreign debt raised to

finance foreign investments.

ƒ South Africans are allowed to make imports over the internet and pay

with their credit cards. The limit per transaction is R20 000.

ƒ Of paramount importance, the JSE has been granted permission to

establish a rand currency futures market. This will enable South African

investors to participate directly in the currency market through a

transparent and regulated domestic channel.

Ahmed, Arezki and Funke (2005) discovered that for South Africa, there are

a number of policy variables that contribute to the lower share of FDI and

higher share of portfolio flows. South Africa also scores lower than its major

competitors in terms of growth, infrastructure, and law and order. They

suggest that lower currency volatility would contribute to an increase in the

share of FDI. Additional trade liberalization should help increase South

Africa’s attractiveness as a destination for FDI. And, although South Africa

has increased its net international reserves significantly to fight volatility,

39
compared with other emerging market economies, South Africa’s foreign

reserves, however, remains somewhat low.

Reinhart (2005) states that no policy recipe can ensure the best use and the

most sustained inflow of capital. Successful policy responses have varied

across countries and have not relied on a single instrument. Several factors

determine the appropriate policy response in a particular country, including

its record in fighting inflation, the openness of its economy to foreign trade,

the state of public finances, the size and liquidity of the domestic bond

market, the health of domestic banks, the flexibility of fiscal policy, and the

quality of the regulatory and supervisory framework designed to oversee

the financial sector. South Africa is applauded for its world class financial

sector.

2.8. OTHER RESEARCH STUDIES

Out of a number of statistical studies that have been done on this subject,

the only study that closely resembles the one done on this research was

done by Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002).

They estimated the effects of a variety of measures of capital account

liberalization on economic growth. They presented estimates of growth


40
regressions that augment a standard economic growth model with

different indicators of capital account openness or stock market

liberalization.

2.8.1. ECONOMIC FREEDOM INDICATORS EMPLOYED

A variety of economic freedom indicators or measures, discussed below,

were constructed from published regulations.

The Share Measure used the information from the IMF’s Annual Report on

Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions to construct, for each

country, a variable reflecting the proportion of years in which countries had

liberalized capital accounts.

An Intensity Measure attempted to capture the intensity of enforcement of

controls on both the capital account and the current account through a

careful reading of the narrative descriptions in the Annual Report on

Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.

The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)

Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements was an alternative measure of

capital account liberalization, albeit one available only for OECD member
41
countries. It was provided in various issues of the Code of Liberalization of

Capital Movements published by the OECD about every other year.

Montiel and Reinhart, in a series of papers, developed and used an

alternative measure of intensity of controls on international transactions

based on annual information for 15 countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,

Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia,

Mexico, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Uganda) for the period 1990–

1996.

2.8.2. RESEARCH OUTCOMES

Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002) concluded that there is mixed evidence

that capital account liberalization promotes long-run economic growth.

They suspect that this was because their study could not present a common

cross-country picture of capital account openness and that their indicators

were somehow imperfect.

Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002) close by pointing out that as better

indicators are developed, and as a longer time series that encompasses a

wider range of experiences is obtained, it would be expected that the

understanding of this important topic will be refined.


42
43
2.8.3. CONCLUSION

This proposed research will employ the Economic Freedom of the World

(EFW) index provided by Gwartney and Lawson (2007), which present a

cross country picture over a period of 25 years (1980 to 2005).

Cole (2003) supported the use of the EFW index as the measure of

economic freedom and stated that it is quite robust with respect to major

changes in the model specifications. It is, moreover, a report card with

considerable predictive power.

The highest number of emerging economies studied by Edison, Klein, Ricci

and Sloek (2002) is 29, and this study covers 69 emerging economies over

the same period of time. Therefore it can be confidently stated that the

results from the study done on this research are more robust and that this

study provides sound ground for future researches.

44
3. RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS

The aim of the intended research is to do a causal study on the impact of

relaxation of capital controls on the economic growth of emerging

economies. The research will further compare economic performance of

those emerging economies that relaxed their foreign exchange controls at

a gradual pace and those that adopted a big-bang approach. The

following propositions are made for the research.

3.1. PROPOSITION 1

Relaxation of capital controls increases the GDP in the emerging

economies.

3.2. PROPOSITION 2

Gradual abolishment of capital controls improves the GDP in emerging

economies.

A lot of research work has been done to test Proposition 1 but the results are

not conclusive, especially when studying emerging economies. As

highlighted by Edison, Klein, Ricci and Sloek (2002) the major concern is to

obtain accurate indicators of economic freedom.

45
The literature reviewed supports Proposition 2 but there is no quantitative

study done (not even for developed economies) to prove that gradual

relaxation of capital controls improve economic performance. The studies

done in the proposed research are critically chosen to provide robust results

about the pace of relaxation.

46
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This was a causal research to study the relationship between capital control

relaxation and economic performance of emerging economies. Zikmund

(2003) defined causal research as a research conducted to identify cause-

and-effect relationships among variables when the research problem has

already been narrowly defined.

The research design for this quantitative research was a secondary data

study. Zikmund (2003) defined secondary data as data that have been

previously collected for some purpose other than the one at hand.

Econometric data to measure economic performance of countries was

sourced from credible sources, namely the IMF and United Nations (UN).

The EFW report by Gwartney and Lawson (2007) provided the EFW index for

all countries in the world under the jurisdiction of the IMF and the World

Bank.

The EFW index measured the degree to which the policies and institutions of

countries support economic freedom. The cornerstones of economic

freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete,

and security of privately owned property. Forty-two data points were used

to construct a summary index and to measure the degree of economic


47
freedom in five broad areas: (1) size of government; (2) legal structure and

security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade

internationally; and (5) regulation of credit, labour and business.

This index included a number of new components based on the World

Bank’s Doing Business ratings.

The index used in this research was under the fourth component above,

namely freedom to trade internationally. The components in this area are

designed to measure a wide variety of restraints that affect international

exchange: tariffs, quotas, hidden administrative restraints, and exchange

rate and capital controls. In order to get a high rating in this area, a

country must have low tariffs, a trade sector larger than expected, easy

clearance and efficient administration of customs, a freely convertible

currency, and few controls on the movement of capital (Gwartney and

Lawson, 2007).

The international capital market controls index is comprised of foreign

ownership or investment restrictions. This sub-component is based on the

following two questions in the Global Competitiveness Report: “Foreign

ownership of companies in a country is rare, limited to minority stakes and

48
often prohibited in key sectors (= 1) or prevalent and encouraged (= 7)”;

and, “In a country, rules governing foreign direct investment are damaging

and discourage foreign direct investment (= 1) or beneficial and

encourage foreign direct investment (= 7)”. This information is sourced from

the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (Gwartney and

Lawson, 2007).

The second sub-component is capital controls. The IMF reports on up to 13

different types of international capital controls. The 0 to 10 ( where 0

represents a typically tightened capital controls and 10 typically relaxed

controls) rating is the percentage of capital controls not levied as a share of

the total number of capital controls sourced from the International

Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange

Restrictions(Gwartney and Lawson, 2007).

This research focused on the capital controls subcomponent, and the

international capital market controls index was used as just a capital control

index. The index presented an independent value that was defined by

Zikmund (2003) as a variable that is expected to influence the dependent

variable. The GDP sourced from the IMF website was the dependant

variable; Zikmund (2003) defined it as the variable that is to be predicted or

49
explained. The dataset, the capital control relaxation index and economic

growth, is shown in Appendix A.

A statistical analysis of this causal study was performed to prove any

relationships as stated by the propositions in Chapter 3.

4.1. POPULATION

Although emerging economies contain approximately 80% of the global

population, they represent about 20% of the world's economies, and have

poor-run institutions that make it difficult for recognisable institutions like the

World Bank and the IMF to access information from them. It was therefore

impractical to quantify the number of emerging economies participating in

the global market.

However, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD) Handbook of Statistics (2006) has a total of 169 developing

economies that were geographically grouped as follows: 57 in Africa, 44 in

America, 40 in Asia and 28 in Oceania. There are few transition economies

listed, and as such this study included a high number of developing

economies.

50
51
4.2. SIZE OF THE SAMPLE

For the purpose of this study, a sample of the economic leaders among

developing countries that are generally seen as the emerging market were

utilised. A total of 67 (with capital control relaxation index being the limiting

factor) emerging economies selected are as shown by the table below.

AFRICA   LATIN AMERICA   ASIA   OCEANIA  EUROPE 


Russian 
Algeria  Argentina  China  Fiji  Federation 
Benin  Bahamas  India     
Botswana  Belize  Indonesia     
Islamic Republic of 
Burundi  Bolivia  Iran     
Cameroon  Brazil  Malaysia     
Central African Republic  Chile  Pakistan     
Chad  Colombia  Philippines     
Congo  Costa Rica  Sri Lanka     
Dominican 
Côte d'Ivoire  Republic  Syrian Arab Republic     
Democratic Republic of 
Congo  Ecuador  Thailand     
Egypt   El Salvador  Turkey     
Ethiopia  Haiti  United Arab Emirates     
Gabon  Honduras       
Ghana  Hungary       
Guinea‐Bissau  Mexico       
Jamaica  Nicaragua       
Kenya   Panama       
Madagascar  Paraguay       
Malawi  Peru       
Mali  Uruguay       
Mauritius  Venezuela       
Niger         
Nigeria         
Senegal         
Sierra Leone         
Togo         
Trinidad and Tobago         
Uganda         
52
AFRICA   LATIN AMERICA   ASIA   OCEANIA  EUROPE 
Rwanda         
South Africa         
Tunisia         
 Zambia             
 Zimbabwe             

Table 1: Emerging economies

The convenience sampling procedure was employed because the UN and

IMF are world recognisable and trustworthy organisations and their

publications are comprehensive. Secondly, there was sufficient literature

on these countries to perform a proper study. The greatest motivation for

choosing these countries was the availability of data to perform a study,

namely the EFW index and GDP. Zikmund (2003) defines convenience

sampling as a sampling procedure used to obtain those units most

conveniently available. Compared to previous studies done on emerging

economies, this was by far the largest sample; hence accurate results are

expected from this research.

The unit of analysis for this research is emerging economies. To effectively

test the dependent variable which is economic performance, these

emerging economics were grouped to sample frames, for example as per

region. The regions are Asia, America, Africa and Oceania.

53
4.3. PROCESS OF DATA ANALYSIS

To test for the propositions described in chapter 3, two statistical tests were

performed. The pace of relaxation of capital controls was calculated as a

difference between consecutive points, i.e. CC (n) = CC(x+1)-CC(x), where

CC represents capital control relaxation.

Firstly, the median graph to visually check if there was any relationship

between the relaxation of capital controls and the economic performance

of the emerging economies grouped in continents was drawn in Excel.

To quantify this relationship, a correlation report was drawn (in NCSS) to see

if the there was correlation between the capital control relaxation index

and GDP rate, and to what level of significance that correlation was. If

there is correlation, the coefficient must be < 0.05 for a 5% or < 0.01 for a 1%

level of significance, and the strength of that correlation is measured by R2.

At first, the regression analysis was considered but it was eliminated from the

analysis because there were only ten points to plot and the test was not to

test linear relationship between two variables, rather it was done to see if

the GDP rate did follow capital control adjustments.

54
4.4. DEFENDING THE METHODOLOGY

The most critical component of the dataset was the EFW index. The

accuracy of the results depends on this index. As previously mentioned, the

EFW index as the measure of economic freedom was quite robust and is a

report card with considerable predictive power.

Ayal and Karras (1998) identified six elements of EFW which were shown to

be statistically significantly correlated with multifactor productivity and

capital accumulation. Freedom of citizens to engage in capital

transactions with foreigners was one of them.

To show the general behaviour of emerging economies grouped all

together or in continents, the median and the mean graph were plotted.

Zikmund (2003) defines these measures as follows: the mean is the measures

of central tendency, the arithmetic average; and the median is the

measure of central tendency that is the midpoint, the value below which

half the values in the sample falls. The mean takes all data points into

consideration, but might be misleading because extreme values can distort

it. It is therefore always better to use it with the standard deviation. The

median is not affected by extreme values, the outliers. After critically


55
analysing the data it was decided that median was a better measure for

this study as it is not affected by the outliers.

The study looked at the impact of economic freedom on economic growth

over a long time series of 25 years, from 1980 to 2005. The EFW indices and

GDP rates were put into a number of different statistical analysis methods to

investigate any relationship between economic freedom and economic

growth.

4.5. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

The limitations of the research that was conducted can be summarized as

follows:

ƒ The impact of other external factors, such as political stability,

competition policy, rule of law, level of corruption and crime, and

private sector and government efficiency are kept constant for this

study.

ƒ The study will focus on those emerging economies which have enough

data to perform a study. There are possible sampling errors and the

data to be used might not be as accurate.

ƒ Inaccuracy of the EFW index. Kose and Prasad (2004) pointed out

that there might be limitations to the EFW. They stated that many

developing countries, including a few in Africa, have no significant


56
controls but have experienced only minimal inflows. The IMF (which

has jurisdiction over current account, but not capital account,

restrictions) maintains a detailed compilation of member countries’

capital account restrictions. But even these provide, at best, rough

indications because they do not measure the intensity or effectiveness

of capital controls.

ƒ The data is sourced from the IMF and World Bank and both these

institutions are regarded as the custodians of a number of economic

reform policies which are routed from open market policies. Therefore

the EFW index might be manipulated to prove that open market

policies are the way to go.

ƒ Although the study is done over a period of 25 years, from 1980 to

2005, only the fifth-year data is given; as a result the study has a

dataset of only 10 points. This data might be insufficient to make a

definite conclusion that the relaxation of capital controls would lead

to an increase in GDP. A longer time period might be necessary to do

that.

57
5. RESULTS

The results of the research are divided into two sections. The first section

contains results from the tests done to check the impact of relaxation of

capital controls on economic growth, and the second set of results are from

the statistics done to check if the pace of relaxation of capital controls has

an impact on economic growth.

5.1. IMPACT OF RELAXATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS ON


ECONOMIC GROWTH

The statistical analysis was performed for all emerging economies grouped

together, and also for geographically groupings, namely Africa, America,

and Asia. Oceania and Europe each had one country and were therefore

excluded from groupings studies. A separate study was then done on

South Africa. On each account two tests were performed, namely median

graphs for visual presentation and a correlation study to quantify results

presented by the graph.

58
5.1.1. AFRICA

5.1.1.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of capital control relaxation on

economic growth of emerging African economies. As the controls were

relaxed in 1985, the GDP rate rose from 2.5 to 3.7, but from 2003 the capital

controls were tightened and GDP rate still continued to grow from 4% to

above 5%.

Figure 3: Impact of exchange controls on economic growth (Africa case)

59
5.1.1.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  0.473637 

CC median  0.000000  0.166732 

Table 2: Correlation study for Africa

There is a positive correlation of 0.473637 and the significance level is

0.166732, which is greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= (0.473637)2= 22.43%,

therefore only 22% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the

relaxation of capital controls.

60
5.1.2. AMERICA

5.1.2.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of capital control relaxation on

economic growth of Latin American economies. These economies are

somewhat a bit opened when compared with Africa. There is a somewhat

inversely proportional relationship between capital control relaxation and

economic growth between 1995 and 2002.

Figure 4: Impact of exchange controls on economic growth (America)

61
5.1.2.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  0.065133 

CC median  0.000000  0.858124 

Table 3: Correlation study for America

There is positive correlation of 0.065133 and the significance level is

0.858124, which is greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 0.424%, therefore only

0.424% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the relaxation

of capital controls.

62
5.1.3. ASIA

5.1.3.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of capital control relaxation on

economic growth of emerging Asian economies. These economies are

somewhat a bit opened when compared with Africa, and there is

somehow no synchronism between capital control relaxation and

economic growth.

Figure 5: Impact of foreign exchange controls on economic growth (Asia)

63
5.1.3.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  0.145737 

CC median  0.000000  0.687885 

Table 4: Correlation study for Asia

There is a positive correlation of 0.145737  and the significance level is

0.687885, which is greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 2.124%, therefore only

2.124% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the relaxation

of capital controls.

64
5.1.4. ALL EMERGING ECONOMIES

5.1.4.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of capital control relaxation on

economic growth of all 69 emerging economies. There seem to be a

positive relationship between the capital control relaxation and economic

growth between 1993 and 2000.

Figure 6: Impact of exchange controls on economic growth (All emerging

economies)

65
5.1.4.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  0.230194 

CC median  0.000000  0.522296 

Table 5: Correlation study for all emerging economies

There is a positive correlation of 0.230194 and the significance level is

0.522296, which is greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 5.2989%, therefore only

5.2989% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the relaxation

of capital controls.

66
5.1.5. SOUTH AFRICA

5.1.5.1. ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

The graph below shows the impact of capital control relaxation on

economic growth in South Africa. There seem to be no relationship

between the capital control relaxation and economic growth.

Figure 7: Impact of exchange controls on economic growth (South Africa)

67
5.1.5.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  0.41679 

CC median  0.000000  0.23082 

Table 6: Correlation study for South Africa

There is a positive correlation of 0.41679 and the significance level is

0.23082, which is greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 17.371%, therefore only

17.371% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the relaxation

of capital controls.

68
5.2. IMPACT OF PACE OF RELAXATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS
ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

Again, the statistical analysis was performed for all emerging economies

grouped together, and also for geographically groupings, namely Africa,

America and Asia. Oceania and Europe each had one country and were

therefore excluded from groupings studies. A separate study was done on

South Africa. On each account two tests were performed, namely median

graphs for visual presentation and a correlation study to quantify results

presented by the graph.

5.2.1. AFRICA

5.2.1.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of the pace of capital control relaxation

on economic growth of Africa. The pace of relaxation of capital controls

seems to have an inversely proportional relationship with economic growth

rate.

69
Figure 8: Impact of the pace of eliminating exchange controls on economic

growth (Africa)

5.2.1.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  Change in CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  ‐0.572733 

Change  in  CC  0.000000  0.106999 

median 

Table 7: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in Africa)

70
There is a negative correlation of -0.572733 and the significance level is

0.106999, which is greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 32.8023%, therefore only

32.8023% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the

relaxation of capital controls.

71
5.2.2. AMERICA

5.2.2.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of the pace of capital control relaxation

on economic growth of Latin America. The pace of relaxation of capital

controls seems to have a positive relationship with economic growth rate.

Figure 93: Impact of the pace of eliminating exchange controls on economic

growth (America)

72
5.2.2.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  Change in CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  0.463417 

Change  in  CC  0.000000  0.208986 

median 

Table 8: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in

America)

There is a positive correlation of 0.463417and the significance level is

0.208986, which is greater than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 21.4775%, therefore only

21.4775% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the

relaxation of capital controls.

73
5.2.3. ASIA

5.2.3.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of the pace of capital control relaxation

on economic growth of Asia. The pace of relaxation of capital controls

seems to have a positive relationship with economic growth rate between

years1985 to 2000.

Figure 10: Impact of the pace of eliminating exchange controls on economic

growth (Asia)

74
5.2.3.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  0.324798 

CC median  0.000000  0.393769 

Table 9: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in Asia)

There is a positive correlation of 0.324798 and the significance level is

0.393769, which is higher than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 15.5054%, therefore only

15.5054% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the

relaxation of capital controls.

75
5.2.4. ALL EMERGING ECONOMIES

5.2.4.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of the pace of capital control relaxation

on economic growth of all emerging economies. The pace of relaxation of

capital controls seems to have no relationship with economic growth rate.

Figure 11: Impact of eliminating exchange controls on economic growth (All

emerging economies)

76
5.2.4.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  0.140940 

CC median  0.000000  0.717589  

Table 10: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in all

emerging economies)

There is a positive correlation of 0.140940 and the significance level is

0.717589, which is higher than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 1.986405%, therefore only

1.98640% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the

relaxation of capital controls.

77
5.2.5. SOUTH AFRICA

5.2.5.1. MEDIAN GRAPH

The graph below shows the impact of the pace of capital control relaxation

on the economic growth of South Africa. The pace of relaxation of capital

controls seems to have no relationship with economic growth rate.

Figure 12: Impact of the pace of eliminating exchange controls on economic

growth (South Africa)

78
5.2.5.2. CORRELATION STUDY

The Pearson Correlations Section gives the following results.

  GDP median  CC median 

GDP median  1.000000  ‐0.358355 

CC median  0.000000  0.343645 

Table 11: Correlation study (Pace of eliminating exchange controls in South

Africa)

There is a negative correlation of -0.358355 and the significance level is

0.343645, which is higher than 0.05. This means that there is no significant

association on the 5% level of significance. R2= 12.87629%, therefore only

12.87629% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the

relaxation of capital controls.

79
6. DISCUSISION OF RESULTS

This chapter interprets results to details and attempts to answer the research

objectives. It is divided into two sections as per the propositions in chapter

3. Each section will discuss results from each test done, compare it with

literature and then conclude for each proposition.

6.1. RELAXATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS INCREASES THE GDP IN


THE EMERGING ECONOMIES

Like in Chapter 5, the section is further dived to continents, all emerging

economies grouped together and South Africa on its own.

6.1.1. AFRICA

The visual presentation on Figure 3 shows that when controls were relaxed in

1985, the GDP rate rose from 2.5 to 3.7, but when the capital controls were

tightened from 2003, the GDP rate continued to grow from 4% to above 5%.

Actually it looks like the GDP is lagging behind the capital control

relaxation. The correlation study shows that only 22% of the variation in GDP

pattern can be described by the relaxation of capital controls.

80
It is noted that African countries took some time to open up their

economies and as stated by Vega-Gordillo and lvarez-Arce (2003), there

will be delays reflecting the particular circumstances of each country.

Unfortunately, such delays represent a danger to both freedom and

development.

As discovered by Ball and Rausser (1995), after a period of about five years

of economic reform, the political regime and economic performance of a

country correlates. The politically more open countries tend to do better in

inflation controlling.

The other reason for the rise in GDP when the capital controls are tightened

could be that while generating revenue is not the purpose of the capital

controls, some capital controls imply higher government revenue. Thus,

their spending can have positive effects on the real sector of the economy.

In this case, this effect could mitigate the negative output effects of

applying capital controls (Frenkel, Nickel, Schmidt and Stadtmann, 2001).

The statistical fact that only 22% of the variation in GDP pattern can be

described by the relaxation of capital controls means that the remaining

81
78% can be ascribed to other factors, such as capital inflows from

donations, political stability, domestic output, etc.

In comparison with other emerging market economies, South Africa seems

to be a moderate globaliser. The globalisation process in South Africa is also

mainly driven by trade. Both net FDI inflows and portfolio inflows seem to

have a very limited impact on economic growth in the country due to their

high levels of volatility (Loots, 2006).

As shown by Appendix B, a table of correlations of relaxation of capital

controls and economic growth of individual countries, only in Chad (with

R2=49%) and in Sierra Leone (with R2= 51%) a significant impact of

relaxation of capital controls on economic growth can be recognised.

These countries are poor and, Sierra Leone in particular was dependent on

humanitarian aid for a long time, hence high dependency on foreign

capital.

Asiedu and Lien (2004) argue that capital controls have no impact on FDI

to sub-Saharan Africa. This may be explained by the fact that FDI in the

region is resource seeking, mainly mineral resources. Such investments tend

to be less sensitive to the policy environment and country conditions.

82
Another explanation is that foreign investors do not consider government

liberalization policies as credible. A third explanation for the ineffectiveness

of liberalization is that the restrictive policies did not bind in the first place.

6.1.2. AMERICA

As shown by Figure 4, the impact of capital controls on economic growth of

emerging (Latin) American economies are somewhat a bit relaxed when

compared with Africa and there is an inverse relationship between control

relaxation and economic growth. Only 0.424% of the variation in GDP

pattern can be described by the relaxation of capital controls.

The reason for this poor performance while these countries have relaxed

their capital controls can be attributed to the fact that Latin America was

traditionally plagued by fiscal instability and high inflation.

Elson (2006) noted that unlike Asian countries – where a key driver in the

trade dynamics was FDI by multinational corporations, which are

channelled into manufacturing – in Latin America, during 1996–2000,

roughly half of FDI flows were related to mergers and acquisitions in

connection with the privatization of state-owned utilities and domestic

banks.
83
Appendix B shows a table of the correlations of relaxation of capital

controls and economic growth of individual countries. Honduras with

R2=41%, Hungary with R2=73% and Panama R2=52% have GDPs that are

significantly dependent on relaxation of capital controls. Unlike Costa Rica,

which has an efficient private sector, these countries have poor domestic

production and highly depend on capital inflows from North America and

from the region.

It can be concluded that even though Latin American countries have

opened up their economies, they have failed to align their fiscal policies

and monetary policies to support their economic reform efforts.

6.1.3. ASIA

As shown by Figure 5, the impact of capital controls on economic growth of

emerging Asian economies are somewhat a bit relaxed when compared

with Africa and there is synchronism between control relaxation and

economic growth. Only 2.124% of the variation in GDP pattern can be

described by the relaxation of capital controls.

84
It is interesting to note that Asian economies are as not as opened as Latin

America’s, but Asia (except for the duration of the Asian Financial Crisis) far

outperforms Latin America. This can also be attributed to the reasons

stated in Section 6.1.2.

Harvie (1999), focusing on China as an “Asian Superpower”, attributes its

success to a number of key developments including the adoption of an

open door policy, which encouraged resource allocation into areas of

production, labour intensive light manufactured goods, the attraction of FDI

and Western technology, a gradual and pragmatic approach to

economic reform, with a logical sequencing of its major measures; the

elimination of market entry barriers and stimulation of competition between

the state and non-state sectors; all underpinned by a gradual approach in

relaxing capital controls. This discussion is continued in Section 6.2.

6.1.4. ALL EMERGING ECONOMIES

As shown by Figure 6, there seem to no relationship between the capital

control relaxation and economic growth of emerging economies grouped

85
together. Only 5.2989% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described

by the relaxation of capital controls.

Collectively, emerging economies have the highest GDP rate of just above

5%. As previously stated by Prasad and Rajan (2008), the main benefits of

capital account liberalization in emerging markets appear to be indirect

and more related to their role in building other institutions than to the

increased financing provided by capital inflows. There, the benefits may not

be manifested by the improved economic performance.

Emerging economies have very diverse economic characteristics among

themselves. In Asia, FDI is attracted by efficient labour and manufacturing,

and in Africa FDI is seeking natural resources. The timing and approach of

capital controls was never aligned right across. Most African countries only

opened their economies in the 80s. The Asian countries had high

performance irrespective of its relatively closed economy, and African

countries have relatively closed economies and have performed poorly.

With consideration of all these points, it is a huge challenge to collectively

define a common behaviour of these economies as they go through

economic reforms.

86
The other question raised by Prokopijevic (2002), is if advances in economic

freedom lead to growth and prosperity, is it not logical to assume that more

growth would lead to more liberalization? And if so, is it not logical to

expect a rising popularity of permanent liberalization policies simply to

capture the benefits that flow from constant liberalization? He discovered

that growth caused by liberalization does not induce further liberalization

(putting aside some isolated cases), and neither is liberalization a

permanent policy in any state.

6.1.5. SOUTH AFRICA

As shown by Figure 7, there seem to no relationship between capital control

relaxation and economic growth in South Africa. Only17.371% of the

variation in GDP pattern can be described by the relaxation of capital

controls, which is much better than for all emerging countries grouped

together.

With the highest growth rate of about 6%, South Africa still faces challenges

of relatively poor infrastructure, law and order problems and low foreign

reserves. According to Ahmed, Arezki and Funke (2005) lower currency

volatility would contribute to an increase in the share of FDI, and the

87
strength of the rand may present an opportune time to ease capital

controls further.

South Africa is a resource-rich country and has to develop policies that will

help it appropriately invest its foreign capital inflows. It is also seen as the

economic harbour of the African continent, therefore most investors will use

it as the highway to other African countries. This presents an opportunity to

attract FDI, but it needs to correct other factors, especially the political

environment.

6.2. IMPACT OF PACE OF RELAXATION OF CAPITAL CONTROLS


ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

Again, the statistical analysis was performed for all emerging economies

grouped together, and also for geographically groupings, namely Africa,

America and Asia. A separate study was then done on South Africa. On

each account, two tests were performed, namely median graphs for visual

presentation and a correlation study to quantify results presented by the

graph.

This section discusses results of all tests done on emerging countries.

88
As shown by Figure 8, there seem to be an inversely proportional

relationship between the capital control relaxation and economic growth

of emerging African economies. There is a negative correlation of

-0.572733, and the negative correlation means that as the pace of

relaxation was increased the GDP rate decreased and vice versa. Exactly

32.8023% of the variation in GDP pattern can be described by the

relaxation of capital controls, which is relatively significant.

For America, as shown in Figure 9, the sudden drop in 1987 and the sudden

tightening of capital controls in the early 90s resulted in a sharp fall of the

GDP rate. Only after 2002, when the rate of change of capital control was

kept minimal, there seem to be stable growth. The big-bang approach

employed by Latin America in the early 90s had very severe outcomes, one

of them being high inflation.

As for Asia, as shown in Figure 10, it is clear that the 1997 crisis taught them

financial discipline. Post these financial crises, the capital controls were

gradually opened and systematically controlled, and this resulted in

flourishing economic growth.

89
When all emerging economies are grouped together (as represented by

Figure 11), collectively they adopted a gradual approach from as early as

the early 90s, and this had a positive impact on economic growth.

South Africa as well has managed to improve its GDP by employing gradual

approach of eliminating capital controls in the mid 90s. This is represented by

Figure 12.

Appendix C shows a table of correlations of the pace of relaxation of

capital controls and economic growth of individual countries. In Africa,

only Botswana (with R2=41%), in Europe only Russia (with R2=91), in Latin

America Chile (with R2 =41%) and Paraguay with (R2=56%), and in Asia

Indonesia with (R2=48%) have economic growth that is significantly

dependent on the pace of relaxation of capital controls. It is noted that in

respective regions, countries with sophisticated economies or

controversially-run economic regimes – South Africa in Africa, Brazil in Latin

America and China in Asia – are not featured here. These countries have

employed a gradual approach in relaxing capital controls and their

economies have flourished, and there cannot be a correlation between

the variables.

90
These results are in agreement with the assertion of Prasad and Rajan (2008)

that a pragmatic policy would design a gradual and opportunistic

approach to capital account liberalization that takes into account

individual country circumstances. Failure to comply with this principle can

result in poor performance, as in the case of Latin America.

Kose and Prasad (2004), in support of South Africa and other African

emerging economies, aver that countries that have maintained or only

gradually eased capital controls while moving toward a more flexible

exchange rate regime generally seem to have had better outcomes.

To conclude, Harvie (1999) listed a number of factors that should be

considered by emerging economies going through economic reforms, and

these include the following:

ƒ The speed, intensity and consistency of implementation of

economic reform policy and liberalization;

ƒ The extent of liberal entry and competition in markets, both from

domestic sources and foreign; the imposition of hard budget

constraints on state or former state enterprises; and appropriate

fiscal incentives for local governments;

91
ƒ The degree of openness of the domestic economy to foreign

trade and competition, to FDI and to foreign technology;

ƒ The availability of domestic savings and the provision of a pool

of funds for desperately needed domestic investment; and

ƒ The fact that governments have a crucial role to play in

supporting economic growth through the establishment of

good infrastructure, support for technical training and local

technology absorption, and the promotion of exports and FDI.

Those emerging economies, especially in Asia, that have flourished have

the above mentioned factors in common.

Krueger (2004) added that sound governance at the national and

corporate level; effective and respected institutions; a well-established

legal system; recognition of, and protection for, property rights; and a well-

functioning financial sector are all vital ingredients for lasting economic

success.

Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) concluded from their study that the quality

of institutions overrides everything else. Institutions are the only positive and

significant determinant of income levels. A basic institutional framework

92
includes of rule of law, independent judiciary, free press, and participatory

politics.

93
7. CONCLUSIONS

7.1. BACKGROUND

Globalisation has forced countries of different economic backgrounds to

exchange goods, services and capital. The financial arrangements that

resulted from these forces have by far supported the developed

economies. As part of protection from exploitation, fragile emerging

economies have employed a number of economic policies – one of them

being foreign exchange controls.

However, emerging economies depend on foreign capital inflow to grow

their economies, and unfortunately foreign exchange controls lead to

negative sentiments among foreign investors. This leaves emerging

economies with no choice but to embrace economic reform policies and

relax their capital controls. The challenge is how these countries,

characterised by poor institutional infrastructure and unstable political

environment, can ensure that they are positively impacted by these

economic reform policies. What policies should be adopted to benefit

from foreign capital? The findings from the research work previously done

on the emerging economies are inconsistent, and there remains a lack of

94
consensus regarding the impact of foreign exchange controls on economic

growth. The other challenge concerns the pace at which these capital

controls should be relaxed. If emerging economies speedily eliminate

controls, will they be able to absorb the pressures from the large capital

inflows with their poor institutions? And if they go slow, will they not miss out

on this opportunity as investors move their capital somewhere else?

This research was conducted to provide empirical evidence about the

impact of relaxation of foreign exchange controls, and about the impact of

the pace of the relaxation of capital controls on the economic growth of

emerging economies.

7.2. FINDINGS

The research was performed on 67 emerging economies over a period of

25 years, 1980 to 2005. These countries were grouped per continent, and a

separate study was performed for South Africa.

Two tests were performed per group of countries. To provide a common

behaviour of countries a median of control relaxation indices of countries

being studied was calculated and that was plotted with GDP. This visual

presentation was then supported by a correlation study to describe the


95
level of significance in the relationship between capital control relaxation

and economic growth.

The findings reveal that although there is a correlation between capital

control relaxation and economic growth it is of low significance. This effect

was not consistent over the period of study. From the visual presentation it

was noted that the GDP had a response delay of about 5 years after

capital control was relaxed. In contrast to the theory, in Africa, and in South

Africa particularly, there was a higher significance of correlation between

relaxation of capital controls and economic growth. This can be attributed

to the fact that Africa is resource-rich and relative to other continents is

poor, so there is a high dependence on foreign capital inflows that is

received as donations and capital investments on natural resources. This

does not mean that Africa has superior economic policies that ensure

translation of this capital into flourishing economies; it might mean that this

continent needs foreign capital to survive.

The major contribution of this research was on the study of the impact of

capital control relaxation on economic growth. There was clear evidence

that gradual relaxation of capital controls has a positive impact on

economic growth. It was evident from the visual presentations that when

96
there were low adjustments on capital controls, the GDP increased.

American countries who adopted a big-bang approach had very poor

results.

7.3. SUMMARY

It is statistical proven in this research that the relaxation of foreign exchange

controls has a statistical low significant impact on the economic

performance of emerging economies, and the gradual relaxation of

capital controls impact economic growth positively. Perhaps, it is not just

about relaxing capital controls. If emerging economies have poorly run

institutions, inefficient domestic production, dysfunctional governments and

undisciplined fiscal policies, the perceived benefits of relaxing capital

controls shall never be manifested. Of course the recent world economic

growth led by the USA and UK has been a result of surging commodity

prices, and this pulled up emerging economies as well.

97
7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS

Monetary authorities and governments of emerging economies have to

embrace economic reform policies and should be very systematic in their

approach. They need to be pragmatic as each country’s policies will

depend on the situation of that country. It is critical that those policies

support investment in building institutional infrastructure to attract more

foreign investors. And such policies should promote domestic savings as

well in order to improve reserves, which attract FDI.

South Africa, as the economic hub of Africa, should continue to gradually

and systematically relax its capital controls and use that to bolster its

infrastructure, especially in transportation to improve the ease of doing

business, which will further attract foreign investment. The floating currency

and inflation targeting do support this economic reform policy.

The current turmoil in financial markets has really challenged capitalism and

its economic liberty or free market policies. Most importantly, it has

redefined the role of government in a free market system. Much of the

banking industry in the UK and USA has been nationalised. A lesson for

emerging markets is that as they gradually open their economies, they

98
should involve and clearly define the role of government in their attempt to

grow their economies.

7.5. FUTURE RESEARCH IDEAS

The research was an attempt to use statistical analysis to provide empirical

findings about the impact of foreign exchange controls on economic

growth. There are a few ideas listed below that should be considered for

future research work.

ƒ A study should be performed that will encompass all the

components of the EFW index, not just foreign exchange

controls.

ƒ As the EFW index grows, there will be a lot of data points. A

study should be done over a longer period with more data

points.

ƒ A study should be done that will be independent of IMF

measures.

ƒ The study should include all developing economies and

economies in transition.

ƒ Since there is a delay of about five years between capital

control adjustment and GDP rate, perhaps the GDP rate should

be moved forward by 5 years when plotted with capital control


99
index. In that case a linear relationship will be expected and

the more statistical analysis, like regression, can be performed.

100
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1
APPENDICES

Appendix A: GDP and capital control relaxation controls for emerging economies

   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Algeria                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 2 1.7 1.7 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.5
GDP  ‐5.4 5.6 1.3 3.8 2.2 2.6 4.7 6.9 5.2 5.1
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls 0 0 2 ‐0.3 0 1.1 ‐0.1 0.2 0.6
                                
Argentina                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 9.5 6.6 5.8 5.2 5.6 3.5 2.9
GDP  0.7 ‐7 ‐1.3 ‐2.8 ‐0.8 ‐4.4 ‐10.9 8.8 9 9.2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 9.5 ‐2.9 ‐0.8 ‐0.6 0.4 ‐2.1 ‐0.6
                                
Bahamas                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.5
GDP  7.1 4.1 ‐1.6 4.4 1.9 0.8 2.3 1.4 1.8 2.5
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 1.5 0 ‐0.7 0 0.7 0
                                
Belize                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  5 5 5 5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
GDP  5 ‐1.4 11.2 0.7 13 5 5.1 9.3 4.6 3.5
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 ‐4.2 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Benin                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 3
GDP  9.3 4.3 9 6 4.9 6.2 4.5 3.9 3.1 2.9
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 ‐0.4
                                
Bolivia                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 5 7.8 7.8 6.3 6.3 6.2 5.9
GDP  0.6 ‐1.7 4.6 4.7 2.5 1.7 2.5 2.7 4.2 4
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 3 2.8 0 ‐1.5 0 ‐0.1 ‐0.3
                                
Botswana                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  5 5 5 5 6.9 6.9 7.2 6.9 7.1 6.9
GDP  12 7.2 6.8 4.5 8.3 4.9 5.7 6.2 6.3 3.8
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 1.9 0 0.3 ‐0.3 0.2 ‐0.2
                                
Brazil                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 3.6 4.2 4.2 5.9 5.6 5.5 6.2
GDP  9.2 7.9 ‐4.2 4.2 4.3 1.3 2.7 1.1 5.7 2.9
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 3.6 0.6 0 1.7 ‐0.3 ‐0.1 0.7
                                
Burundi                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.9
GDP  ‐6.8 11.8 3.5 ‐7.9 ‐0.9 2.1 4.4 ‐1.2 4.8 0.9
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Cameroon                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0.8 0.8 3.9 3.9 4 3.6
GDP  9.9 8.1 ‐6.2 3.3 4.2 4.5 4 4 3.7 2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0.8 0 3.1 0 0.1 ‐0.4
                                
Central African Republic                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDP  ‐3 3.7 ‐3.8 4.9 1.8 0.3 ‐0.6 ‐7.6 1.3 2.2

1
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Chad                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.3
GDP  ‐6 7.9 3.2 ‐0.8 ‐0.9 11.7 8.5 14.7 33.6 7.9
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 2.3 0.4 0.1 ‐0.5
                                
Chile                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 6.5 4.3 7 6.7 6.9 7.7 7.7
GDP  7.9 2 3.7 10.6 4.5 3.5 2.2 4 6 5.7
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 4.5 ‐2.2 2.7 ‐0.3 0.2 0.8 0
                                
China                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 2 5 4.9 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.7
GDP  7.9 13.5 3.8 10.9 8.4 8.3 9.1 10 10.1 10.4
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    2 3 ‐0.1 ‐2.2 0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2
                                
Colombia                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 6 3.9 3.9 2.9 4.1 3.6 3.8
GDP  4.4 3.1 4.3 5.2 2.9 1.5 1.9 3.9 4.9 4.7
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 6 ‐2.1 0 ‐1 1.2 ‐0.5 0.2
                                
Congo, Democratic Republic of                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 2 2.3 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.3 0
GDP  2.4 0.5 ‐6.6 0.7 ‐6.9 ‐2.1 3.5 5.8 6.6 6.5
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0.3 0.8 0 0 ‐0.8 ‐2.3
                                
Congo, Republic of                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDP  12.7 2.4 1 4 7.6 3.8 4.6 0.8 3.5 7.8

2
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Costa Rica    
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 5 5 8 9.6 9.6 8.7 8.8 8 8.3
GDP  0.8 0.7 3.6 3.9 1.8 1.1 2.9 6.4 4.3 5.9
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    3 0 3 1.6 0 ‐0.9 0.1 ‐0.8 0.3
                                
Côte d’Ivoire                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8
GDP  5.2 3.6 ‐1.1 7.1 ‐4.6 0 ‐1.6 ‐1.7 1.6 1.8
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.8
                                
Dominican Republic                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 2 6.5 6.5 5.8 5.8 5.5 5.8
GDP  8 ‐2.1 ‐5.5 4.7 8.1 3.6 4.4 ‐1.9 2 9.3
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 4.5 0 ‐0.7 0 ‐0.3 0.3
                                
Ecuador                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 5 7.7 7.7 5.6 6.1 6.7 6.7
GDP  4.9 4.4 3 1.7 2.8 5.3 4.2 3.6 8 6
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 3 2.7 0 ‐2.1 0.5 0.6 0
                                
Egypt                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 7.1 7.3 7.3 5.8 5.6 5.8 6
GDP  3.4 7.4 2.3 4.5 5.4 3.5 3.2 3.2 4.1 4.5
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 7.1 0.2 0 ‐1.5 ‐0.2 0.2 0.2
                                
El Salvador                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 5 8.9 8.2 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.5
GDP  ‐8.6 0.6 4.8 6.4 2.2 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.9 3.1

3
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 3 3.9 ‐0.7 ‐0.9 0 0.1 0.1
                                
Ethiopia                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.5
GDP  4 ‐11.4 2.6 6.1 5.9 7.7 1.2 ‐3.5 13.1 10.2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.5
                                
Fiji                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  5 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDP  ‐1.7 ‐3.8 5.8 4.9 ‐1.4 2 3.2 1.1 5.4 0.7
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 ‐3 0 ‐2 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Gabon                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDP  0 5.8 5.1 5 ‐1.9 2.1 ‐0.3 2.4 1.1 3
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Ghana                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 1.5 2.3 4.8 5.2 5.4 2.3
GDP  0.5 5.1 3.3 4 3.7 4.2 4.5 5.2 5.6 5.9
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 1.5 0.8 2.5 0.4 0.2 ‐3.1
                                
Guinea­Bissau                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 5 5 0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
GDP  16 4.3 4.6 4.4 7.5 0.2 ‐7.1 ‐0.6 2.2 3.2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 5 0 ‐5 0.8 0 0 0 0
                                
Haiti                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 2 2 0 2.3 6.5 7.3 9.1
GDP  7.3 0.8 ‐0.4 3.3 1.3 ‐0.6 ‐0.5 0.2 ‐2.6 0.4

4
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 2 0 ‐2 2.3 4.2 0.8 1.8
                                
Honduras                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 5 6.6 6.2 4.8 4.9 5.2 5
GDP  0.7 4.2 0.1 4.1 5.7 2.6 2.7 3.5 5 4.1
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 5 1.6 ‐0.4 ‐1.4 0.1 0.3 ‐0.2
                                
Hungary                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 6.4 4.5 8.8 8.1 8.2 8.1 5.9
GDP  0.2 ‐0.3 ‐3.5 3.4 5.2 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.8 4.2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 6.4 ‐1.9 4.3 ‐0.7 0.1 ‐0.1 ‐2.2
                                
India                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 2.3 2 2 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7
GDP  3.6 5.3 5.6 7.6 5.4 3.9 4.5 6.9 7.9 9
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 2.3 ‐0.3 0 1.6 0 0.1 0
                                
Indonesia                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 3.8 4.8 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7
GDP  9.9 2.5 7.2 8.2 5.4 3.6 4.5 4.8 5 5.7
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 3.8 1 ‐1.6 0.4 0 0.1 0
                                
Iran                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDP  ‐14.9 4.2 19.6 2.7 5.1 3.7 7.5 7.2 5.1 4.4
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Jamaica                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 8 8.2 8.2 6.9 6.4 6.5 6.5
GDP  ‐4 ‐0.9 4.9 1 0.7 1.5 1.1 2.3 1 1.4

5
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 6 0.2 0 ‐1.3 ‐0.5 0.1 0
                                
Kenya                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 8 5.4 5.4 6.2 6.2 5.8 5.6
GDP  5.6 4.1 4.1 4.3 0.6 4.7 0.3 2.8 4.6 5.8
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 8 ‐2.6 0 0.8 0 ‐0.4 ‐0.2
                                
Madagascar                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 3 3 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.5
GDP  0.8 1.2 3.1 1.7 4.7 6 ‐12.7 9.8 5.3 4.6
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 3 0 1.6 0.2 ‐0.2 ‐0.1
                                
Malawi                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 2 0.8 0.8 4.3 4 4 3.3
GDP  0.4 4.6 5.7 13.8 0.8 ‐4.1 1.9 4.2 5 2.3
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 ‐1.2 0 3.5 ‐0.3 0 ‐0.7
                                
Malaysia                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  5 5 5 6.2 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.1 3.8
GDP  7.4 ‐0.9 9 9.8 8.9 0.3 4.4 5.5 7.2 5.2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 1.2 ‐2.5 0 ‐0.1 0.3 0.2 ‐0.3
                                
Mali                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.4
GDP  3.3 ‐1.9 16.5 2.4 ‐3.2 12.1 4.3 7.2 2.4 6.1
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 3.4 ‐0.1 0 0.1
                                
Mauritius                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 8 7.8 7.8 6.1 6.5 6.5 6.7
GDP  11.4 4.8 4.9 4.4 7.2 4.2 1.5 3.8 4.7 3.1

6
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 6 ‐0.2 0 ‐1.7 0.4 0 0.2
                                
Mexico                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 5 6.4 5.1 5.1 4.9 4.7 4.4 4.5
GDP  9.5 2.2 5.1 ‐6.2 6.6 0 0.8 1.4 4.2 2.8
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 3 1.4 ‐1.3 0 ‐0.2 ‐0.2 ‐0.3 0.1
                                
Nicaragua                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 5 8 8 7.1 7.3 7 7
GDP  4.6 ‐4.1 ‐0.1 5.9 4.1 3 0.8 2.5 5.3 4.3
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 5 3 0 ‐0.9 0.2 ‐0.3 0
                                
Niger                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDP  4.9 7.7 ‐1.3 2.6 ‐1.4 7.1 3 4.5 ‐0.8 7.4
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Nigeria                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 7 7 6.5 6.1 6.1 6.2
GDP  2.9 10.5 13.8 2.3 5.4 3.1 1.5 10.7 6 7.2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 7 0 ‐0.5 ‐0.4 0 0.1
                                
Pakistan                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 2 0.8 0.8 3.9 3.8 4.2 3.7
GDP  8.5 7.6 4.5 5 4.3 2 3.2 4.8 7.4 7.7
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 ‐1.2 0 3.1 ‐0.1 0.4 ‐0.5
                                
Panama                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  8 8 8 10 9.1 9.1 8.5 8.8 7.7 8.6
GDP  4.5 4.9 8.1 1.8 2.7 0.6 2.2 4.2 7.5 6.9

7
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 2 ‐0.9 0 ‐0.6 0.3 ‐1.1 0.9
                                
Paraguay                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  5 5 5 10 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.5 7.2 7.2
GDP  11.7 3.9 2.9 5.5 ‐3.3 2.1 0 3.8 4.1 2.9
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 5 ‐2.9 0 0 0.4 ‐0.3 0
                                
Peru                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 8.6 8.9 8.9 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.8
GDP  7.7 2.1 ‐5.1 8.6 3 0.2 5 4 5.1 6.7
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 6.6 0.3 0 ‐1.3 0 0.1 0.1
                                
Philippines                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 6.6 4.6 4.6 3.1 3.1 2.9 3.5
GDP  5.1 ‐7.3 3 4.7 6 1.8 4.4 4.9 6.4 4.9
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 4.6 ‐2 0 ‐1.5 0 ‐0.2 0.6
                                
Russia                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 3.5 2.9 3.2 3.4 4 4.1 4
GDP  na na na ‐4.1 10 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls   0 0 3.5 ‐0.6 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.1 ‐0.1
                                
Rwanda                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 1.5 1.5 2.3 2.3 3.8 3.8
GDP  ‐3.6 4.4 0.4 35.2 6 6.7 9.4 0.9 4 6
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 1.5 0 0.8 0 1.5 0
                                
Senegal                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 2.3 0 3.5 3.5 4.2 0.8
GDP  ‐0.8 3.3 ‐0.7 5.4 3.2 4.6 0.7 6.7 5.8 5.3

8
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 2.3 ‐2.3 3.5 0 0.7 ‐3.4
                                
Sierra Leone                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 4.6 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8
GDP  ‐0.6 ‐6.7 1.6 ‐10 3.8 18.2 27.4 9.5 7.4 7.3
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 4.6 ‐0.8 0 0 0 0
                                
South Africa                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 4 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.2 3.9
GDP  6.6 ‐1.2 ‐0.3 3.1 4.2 2.7 3.7 3.1 4.8 5.1
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 2 0.1 0 0 0.2 ‐0.1 ‐0.3
                                
Sri Lanka                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 2 3 3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.5
GDP  5.4 5 6.2 5.5 6 ‐1.5 4 6 5.4 6
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 2 1 0 0.4 0.1 0.1 ‐0.1
                                
Syria                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
GDP  10.5 7.3 10.4 5.4 2.3 3.7 5.9 1.1 2.8 3.3
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
                                
Thailand                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 4.6 4.3 4.3 3.8 3.3 4 3.9
GDP  4.6 4.6 11.6 9.2 4.8 2.2 5.3 7.1 6.3 4.5
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 2.6 ‐0.3 0 ‐0.5 ‐0.5 0.7 ‐0.1
                                
Togo                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GDP  ‐2.3 3.7 5.9 6.8 ‐1 ‐2.3 ‐0.2 5.2 2.3 1.2

9
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
                                
Trinidad & Tobago                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 8 7.5 7.5 6.7 6.8 7 7.1
GDP  10.4 ‐4.1 1.5 4 6.9 4.2 7.9 14.4 8.8 8
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 8 ‐0.5 0 ‐0.8 0.1 0.2 0.1
                                
Tunisia                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 2 2 0.8 0.8 4 4.1 3.9 4.1
GDP  7.4 5.7 7.1 2.4 4.7 5 1.7 5.6 6 4
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 2 0 ‐1.2 0 3.2 0.1 ‐0.2 0.2
                                
Turkey                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 5.5 5.8 5.8 4.3 4 4.2 4
GDP  ‐0.8 4.3 9.3 7.2 7.4 ‐7.5 7.9 5.8 8.9 7.4
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 5.5 0.3 0 ‐1.5 ‐0.3 0.2 ‐0.2
                                
Uganda                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  0 0 0 0 8.5 8.5 8 8.2 8 8.2
GDP  ‐3.4 ‐3 6.5 11.3 5.3 4.8 6.9 4.4 5.7 6.7
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 8.5 0 ‐0.5 0.2 ‐0.2 0.2
                                
United Arab Emirates                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  10 5 5 5 6.2 6.2 6.2 5.5 5.7 6.4
GDP  ‐1.8 ‐2.5 23.6 6.2 12.4 1.7 2.6 11.9 9.7 8.2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    ‐5 0 0 1.2 0 0 ‐0.7 0.2 0.7
                                
Uruguay                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  10 10 10 10 8.7 8.7 7.3 7.6 7.4 7.6
GDP  6 1.5 0.3 ‐1.4 ‐1.4 ‐3.4 ‐11 2.2 11.8 6.6

10
   1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 ‐1.3 0 ‐1.4 0.3 ‐0.2 0.2
                                
Venezuela                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  8 5 5 6.9 8.1 7.8 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.2
GDP  ‐1.9 0.2 6.5 4 3.7 3.4 ‐8.9 ‐7.8 18.3 10.3
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    ‐3 0 1.9 1.2 ‐0.3 ‐3.3 1 0 ‐0.3
                                
Zambia                               
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 2 9.2 9.2 8.4 8.5 9.3 8.7
GDP  3.9 1.2 ‐0.6 ‐2.8 3.6 4.9 3.3 5.1 5.4 5.2
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls    0 0 0 7.2 0 ‐0.8 0.1 0.8 ‐0.6
                                
Zimbabwe    
International Capital Markets Control Index  2 2 2 3.5 2.5 2.5 2 2.3 2.4 2
GDP  10.7 7 7 0.2 ‐7.3 ‐2.7 ‐4.4 ‐10.4 ‐3.8 ‐5.3
Pace of Relaxation of Foreign Exchange Controls 0 1.5 ‐1  0 ‐0.5 0.3 0.1 ‐0.4

                                
   

11
Appendix B: Correlation of relaxation of capital controls and economic growth

for individual emerging economies

Countries R R2 R2*100

Algeria 0.6095 0.371488119 37.14881192

Argentina 0.0422 0.001781281 0.178128147

Bahamas -0.3571 0.127541215 12.75412154

Belize -0.3327 0.110700335 11.07003348

Benin -0.5638 0.317823641 31.78236415

Bolivia 0.31849 0.101437852 10.14378516

Botswana -0.3871 0.149814187 14.9814187

Brazil -0.1546 0.023891938 2.389193846

Burundi - - -

Cameroon -0.0504 0.002537736 0.253773553

Central African Republic - - -

Chad 0.6991 0.488745155 48.87451547

Chile 0.13427 0.018028067 1.802806666

China -0.1826 0.033336774 3.333677429

Colombia 0.06582 0.004332334 0.43323339

Congo, Democratic Republic of -0.1753 0.030746331 3.074633129

Congo, Republic of - - -

Costa Rica 0.38958 0.151774574 15.17745744

Côte d’Ivoire 0.07621 0.005808252 0.580825224

Dominican Republic 0.3394 0.115190169 11.51901689

Ecuador 0.23029 0.053031449 5.30314491

Egypt -0.0527 0.002775553 0.277555321

El Salvador 0.34104 0.11631058 11.63105799


Countries R R2 R2*100

Ethiopia 0.33048 0.109219301 10.92193008

Fiji -0.4745 0.225166086 22.51660864

Gabon - - -

Ghana 0.55243 0.305184003 30.51840033

Guinea-Bissau -0.051 0.002599728 0.259972809

Haiti -0.3928 0.154264285 15.42642849

Honduras 0.6444 0.415245551 41.52455507

Hungary 0.85678 0.734064807 73.40648066

India 0.57323 0.328596166 32.85961659

Indonesia -0.2241 0.05020505 5.020504988

Iran - - -

Jamaica 0.24202 0.058573932 5.857393201

Kenya 0.09281 9.281462136 9.281462136

Madagascar 0.04896 0.002397011 0.239701102

Malawi 0.21655 0.04689521 4.689521011

Malaysia 0.32004 0.102428589 10.24285892

Mali 0.01197 0.000143239 0.014323872

Mauritius -0.4202 0.176594006 17.65940057

Mexico -0.6063 0.367652151 36.76521508

Nicaragua 0.496 0.246018271 24.60182712

Niger - - -

Nigeria -0.2451 0.06008098 6.00809796

Pakistan 0.31636 0.100085709 10.00857092

Panama -0.7214 0.520349985 52.03499845

Paraguay -0.2132 0.045473904 4.547390427

Peru 0.3336 0.111286895 11.12868947

Philippines 0.31158 0.09708103 9.708103039

1
Countries R R2 R2*100

Russia 0.00267 7.11359E-06 0.000711359

Rwanda -0.1704 0.029019687 2.901968652

Senegal 0.32327 0.104506128 10.45061284

Sierra Leone 0.71529 0.511637614 51.16376143

South Africa 0.4168 0.173718254 17.37182541

Sri Lanka -0.1842 0.033921883 3.392188312

Syria -0.3567 0.127202899 12.7202899

Thailand -0.2199 0.048343957 4.834395682

Togo - - -

Trinidad & Tobago 0.43797 0.191821586 19.18215855

Tunisia -0.3925 0.154034146 15.40341456

Turkey -0.0392 0.001534182 0.153418249

Uganda 0.31607 0.099902054 9.990205422

United Arab Emirates -0.4373 0.19126247 19.12624695

Uruguay -0.0244 0.000596597 0.059659677

Venezuela 0.02626 0.000689651 0.068965107

Zambia 0.77412 0.599260372 59.9260372

Zimbabwe -0.2203 0.04854326 4.854326017

2
Appendix C: Correlation of the pace of relaxation of capital controls and

economic growth for individual emerging economies

Countries R R2 R2*100

Algeria 0.091007709 0.00828 0.828240304

Argentina -0.164070022 0.02692 2.691897225

Bahamas -0.049903917 0.00249 0.24904009

Belize -0.581693124 0.33837 33.83668904

Benin -0.318183954 0.10124 10.12410284

Bolivia 0.203577938 0.04144 4.144397671

Botswana 0.644481125 0.41536 41.53559205

Brazil 0.163637106 0.02678 2.677710241

Burundi - - -

Cameroon 0.131855746 0.01739 1.738593776

Central African Republic - - -

Chad 0.043573107 0.0019 0.189861566

Chile 0.637495889 0.4064 40.64010084

China -0.210337002 0.04424 4.424165457

Colombia 0.525160897 0.27579 27.5793968

Congo, Democratic Republic of -0.599169742 0.359 35.90043795

Congo, Republic of - - -

Costa Rica -0.35355251 0.125 12.4999377

Côte d’Ivoire 0.134853406 0.01819 1.818544102

Dominican Republic 0.427202036 0.1825 18.25015793

3
Countries R R2 R2*100

Ecuador -0.426126338 0.18158 18.15836556

Egypt 0.132045834 0.01744 1.743610226

El Salvador 0.407926752 0.1664 16.64042351

Ethiopia 0.334904769 0.11216 11.21612041

Fiji -0.159304673 0.02538 2.537797882

Gabon - - -

Ghana -0.513493391 0.26368 26.3675463

Guinea-Bissau -0.188643968 0.03559 3.558654679

Haiti 0.183475433 0.03366 3.366323448

Honduras 0.335649556 0.11266 11.26606241

Hungary -0.003672442 1.3E-05 0.001348683

India 0.064469383 0.00416 0.415630129

Indonesia 0.693790903 0.48135 48.13458176

Iran - - -

Jamaica -0.108296259 0.01173 1.172807963

Kenya 0.240953873 0.05806 5.805876877

Madagascar -0.323375753 0.10457 10.45718775

Malawi -0.041747683 0.00174 0.174286901

Malaysia -0.094386235 0.00891 0.890876129

Mali -0.04949979 0.00245 0.245022921

Mauritius 0.167586854 0.02809 2.808535356

Mexico -0.2218096 0.0492 4.919949857

Nicaragua 0.480045983 0.23044 23.04441458

Niger - - -

4
Countries R R2 R2*100

Nigeria -0.102030171 0.01041 1.04101558

Pakistan -0.282986638 0.08008 8.008143705

Panama -0.170886542 0.0292 2.920221032

Paraguay 0.746238714 0.55687 55.68722181

Peru 0.455790683 0.20775 20.77451466

Philippines -0.00193325 3.7E-06 0.000373746

Russia -0.953674223 0.90949 90.94945236

Rwanda -0.148127138 0.02194 2.194164907

Senegal -0.43346709 0.18789 18.7893718

Sierra Leone -0.148723632 0.02212 2.211871876

South Africa -0.007554416 5.7E-05 0.005706921

Sri Lanka 0.190895547 0.03644 3.644110971

Syria -0.245738647 0.06039 6.038748287

Thailand 0.39187128 0.15356 15.35631003

Togo - - -

Trinidad & Tobago -0.127955023 0.01637 1.637248804

Tunisia -0.276516491 0.07646 7.64613696

Turkey 0.073950312 0.00547 0.546864857

Uganda -0.018732522 0.00035 0.035090737

United Arab Emirates 0.5125703 0.26273 26.27283125

Uruguay 0.568311421 0.32298 32.29778711

Venezuela 0.318886841 0.10169 10.16888174

Zambia 0.106723376 0.01139 1.138987888

Zimbabwe 0.314560163 0.09895 9.894809623

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