T.11 (R) Rmlnlu - SCC O I M L M C C, 2022

10TH RMLNLU – SCC MEDIA LAW MOOT, 2022 MEMORIAL for
RESPONDENT
T.11(R)
RMLNLU – SCC ONLINE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION,

2022
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
PEACE PALACE
THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS
TO SUBMIT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

THEM CONCERNING THE BAN ON CHIRP AND OTHER MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 36(2) OF
THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF QINQUEST

...APPLICANT
V.
THE REPUBLIC OF WINLAND

...RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RESPONDENT
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RESPONDENT
-TABLE OF CONTENTS-
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ii-iv

List of Abbreviations ...............................................................................................................v
Index of Authorities ......................................................................................................vi-xxvii
Statement of
Jurisdiction .................................................................................................xxviii
Statement of Facts .......................................................................................................xxix-xxx
Issues
Raised ........................................................................................................................xxxi
Summary of Arguments .........................................................................................xxxii-xxxiii
1. That, the present case is not maintainable before the Hon’ble Court.........................1
1.1. There exist no rational for an International Forum to entertain the present
dispute
…………………………………………………………………………………….....1
1.1.1. The matter at hand does not classify as a ‘dispute’.................................................1
1.1.2. The present matter falls within the domestic jurisdiction of Winland......................2
1.2. The instant matter cannot be admitted by the Court in good faith..............................2
1.2.1. There exists no consent from Winland to the acceptance of jurisdiction of the
Court...................................................................................................................................2
1.2.2. The requirement to substantiate claims has not been fulfilled by Qinquest.............3
2. That, the ban imposed on Chirp does not act in contravention of the Right to
Freedom of Speech and Expression of the citizenry as propounded by the Winlandan
Constitution as well as under International Law..................................................................4
2.1. The impugned ban is saved by the functionality of Article 29 of the Winlandan
Constitution...........................................................................................................................4
2.1.1...........Public Order and National Interest precede Right to Freedom of Speech and
Expression..........................................................................................................................5
2.1.2.. .The ban is the least restrictive measure that can be remedy the situation and fulfil
Winland’s legitimate aim....................................................................................................6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RESPONDENT
2.2. The Right to Freedom of Expression is subject to restrictions under International

Law………………………………………………………………………………………….6
2.2.1. The restrictions permissible upon Freedom of Expression under Three-Part Test
in pursuance of the ICCPR must be strictly
interpreted…………………………………………7
2.2.1.1. The Restrictions acted towards bonafide Furtherance of a Legitimate

Aim…………………………………………………………………………………...…..8
2.2.1.2. The Restrictions were requisite in a Democratic Society………………….8
3. That, the ban imposed on Chirp, is not contentious to the Right of Self-
Determination and Right to Life and Personal Liberty warranted by the Winlandan
Constitution as well as International Instruments................................................................9
3.1. Winland is a welfare state that must work in pursuance of the greatest good of
greatest numbers...................................................................................................................9
3.1.1................The ban did not vitiate the Doctrines of Proportionality and Reasonability
..........................................................................................................................................10
3.1.2...............The ban did not work in contravention of tests of balancing of interest and
necessity............................................................................................................................11
3.2. Runerians are not entitled to claim Right to Self-Determination in the instant case11
3.2.1. The Runerians cannot be qualified as “peoples” for the purposes of Self-
Determination...................................................................................................................11
4. That, the presidential order mandating the ban on Chirp and the subsequent
directive of mandatorily divesting the assets of Chirp and its affiliate entities, is tenable
…………………………………………………………………………………………..13
4.1. The Presidential Order falls within the vires of the powers of the Executive as
prescribed by the Winlandian Constitution........................................................................13
4.1.1. The President need not prove the existence of circumstances that may warrant
‘immediate action’ and that his satisfaction alone is enough to sustain the executive
action taken during period of emergency.........................................................................14
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RESPONDENT
4.1.2. The impugned presidential order is not violative of the GFEPA and does not
vitiate the limits of discretionary powers granted to the executive..................................14
4.2. In arguendo, the Presidential Order is not antithetical to the global environment of
free trade and competitive markets.....................................................................................15
4.2.1. The “less favourable” treatment meted out to companies affiliated to adversaries
of Winlandan, has legitimate reasons..............................................................................16
4.2.2. In arguendo, the impugned Order is within the permissible limits of justifiable
discrimination as a measure of security exception...........................................................17
5. That, President Palpatine’s quip of addressing Sickness Virus as “Dragonvirus”

does not qualify as an act of defamation of the State of Qinquest.....................................17
5.1. State entities do not have the requisite locus standi to sue for defamation...............18
5.1.1. Maintaining defamation suits filed by public or elected entities, vitiates the Right
of Fair Criticism as well as that of Speech and Expression.............................................18
5.1.2. Citizens have a right to be informed of the truth and that truth is a good defence
against defamation...........................................................................................................19
5.2. In arguendo, President Palpatine’s remark was made in his personal capacity and
was not attributable to Winland..........................................................................................19
5.1.1. The essentials of application of ARSIWA have not been met.................................20
5.1.2. The statement in itself, did not overtly defame Qinquest........................................20
Prayer for Relief……………………………………………………………….,………..xxxiv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
RESPONDENT
-LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS-
Abbreviation Corresponding Expansion
& And
¶ Paragraph
Annex. Annexure
Anr. Another
Art. Article
Committee on the Elimination of Racial

CERD
Discrimination
cl. Clause
Cri. LJ Criminal Law Journal
HLR Harvard Law Review
Hon’ble Honourable
International Covenant on Civil and

ICCPR
Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social
ICESR
and Cultural Rights
ILR International Law Review
S. Section
SCC Supreme Court Cases Online
United Nations Declaration of Human

UDHR
Rights
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
vi
RESPONDENT
-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-
LEGAL SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
Bibliographic Information Corresponding

Page
1. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), art 2.2, 1868

18
U.N.T.S. 120 (1994)
2. Charter of the United Nations, art. 1(2), 1 UNTS XVI (1945). 12
3. G. A. Res. 62/61, Responsibility of States for Internationally

21
Wrongful Acts, art. 8 (2008)
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Art. XX, 55

17
U.N.T.S. 194 (1947)
5. General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 18
art. XIV bis, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994)
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999
12
U.N.T.S. 171 (1966)
7. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(1), 33 UNTS 993

1
(1946)
JUDGEMENTS OF THE ICJ AND THE PCIJ

Page
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
7
RESPONDENT
1. Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953 (United States of

3
America v. Czechoslovakia), ICGJ 179 (ICJ 1956)
8. Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954 (United States of

3
America v. USSR), [1958] ICJ Rep 158
9. Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954 (United States of

3
America v. USSR), [1959] ICJ Rep 276
10. Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952 (United States of
America v. USSR) 3
11. Ambatielos (Greece v. United Kingdom), [1952] ICJ 1 1
12. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council

3
(India v. Pakistan), 1971 I.C.J. 347
13. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the

3
Congo v. Belgium), [2002] ICJ 1
14. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of

3
America), I.C.J. Reports 2004, 12
15. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New

1
Application: 1962), [1970] ICJ 1
16. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras),

3
[1988] ICJ Rep 69
17. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary

3
Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 240
18. Certain Property (Liechtenstein v Germany), Judgment, Preliminary

2
Objections, [2005] ICJ Rep 6
19. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti

2
v. France)
20. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy),

3
1987 ICJ 3
8
RESPONDENT
21. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),

3
[1974] I.C.J 175
22. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) 3
23. Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] ICJ Rep 3 3
24. LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), [1998] ICJ Rep 432 3
25. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and

3
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6
26. Monetary Gold case (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and United
2
States of America), [1954] ICJ Rep 19
27. Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco cases, PCIJ, Series B, No.
2
4, 1923; 2 AD, p. 349
28. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), [1974] ICJ Rep 253 3
29. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa), [1966] ICJ Rep 6 1
30. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of

3
America (United States of America v. Hungary),1954 I.C.J. 99
31. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment,

22
I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, at p. 29
32. Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia and New Zealand (intervening) v.

2
Japan), Judgment, ICGJ 471 (ICJ 2014)
ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE ICJ

Page
9
RESPONDENT
1. Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of

independence in respect of Kosovo, Written Statement of Argentine, 13
Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J
33. Application of the Genocide Convention, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595,
2
621
34. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South

Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 13
Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶52-5
35. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 1, ¶162 13
CASES ADJUDICATED BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Page
1. Sürek v Turkey App no 23927/94 (ECtHR, 1999) 9
36. Bayev and Others v Russia, App nos 67667/09 (ECtHR, 2017) 7
37. Brannigan and McBride v The United Kingdom, App nos, 14553/89
9
(ECtHR, 1993)
38. Cengiz and Others v Turkey App nos 48226/10 and 14027/11
7
(ECtHR, 2015)
39. Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App no 28957/95 (ECtHR,
7
2002)
40. City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595; Castells v. Spain, 14
20
EHRR 445
41. Cossey v United Kingdom, App no 10843/84 (ECtHR, 1990) 7
42. Handyside v United Kingdom, App no 5393/72 (ECtHR, 1976) 7
10
RESPONDENT
43. Janowski v. Poland, (2000) 29 EHRR 705 (ECtHR 2000) 8, 20
44. Khuzhin and Others v Russia, App no 13470/02 (ECtHR, 2008); 7
45. Kövesi v Romania, App no 3594/19 (ECtHR, 2020) 7
46. Leander v Sweden, 9248/81 (ECtHR. 1987) 18
47. Lingens v. Austria, (1986) 8 EHRR 407 (ECtHR, 1986) 8
48. Lopes Gomez da Silva v. Portugal, Application No. 37698/97

20
(ECtHR)
49. Marckx v Belgium, 6833/74 (ECtHR, 1979) 18
50. Morice v France, App no 29369/10 (ECtHR, 2015) 7
51. Oberschlick v. Austria, Application No. 11662/85 (ECtHR 20
52. Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 14 E.H.R.R. 153

8
(ECtHR 1991)
53. Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, App nos 14238/88
7
(ECtHR, 1992)
54. Özgür Gündem v Turkey, App no 23144/93 (ECtHR, 2000) 7
55. Pavel Ivanov v Russia, App no 35222/04 (ECtHR, 1996) 7
56. Perinçek v Switzerland, App no 27510/08 (ECtHR, 2015) 7
57. Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v Turkey App nos
8
41340/98 (ECtHR, 2003)
58. Stoll v Switzerland, App no 69698/01 (ECtHR, 2007) 7
59. Tammer v. Estonia, (2003) 37 EHRR 43 8
60. Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, Application No. 13778/88 (ECtHR) 9, 20
61. Wabl v. Austria, Application No. 24773/94 (ECtHR) 20
62. Worm v Austria App no 22714/93 (ECtHR, 29 August 1997) 7
63. Zana v Turkey, App no 69/1996 (ECtHR, 1997) 9
11
RESPONDENT
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Page
1. HRC, Mukong v Cameroon, (Comm no 458/1991) UN Doc

8
CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991
64. HRC, Velichkin v Belarus, (Comm no 1022/2001) UN Doc
8
CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001
CASES ADJUDICATED BY THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS

Page
1. Decision Regarding Communication 004/2013 (Lohé Issa Konaté v

The Republic of Burkina Faso) (Afr. Comm’n Hum. & Peoples’ Rts., 8
5 December 2014)
65. Decision Regarding Communications 128/94; 130/94 and 152/96
(Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Law Project v Nigeria) 9
(Afr. Comm'n Hum. & Peoples' Rts., 31 October 1998)
66. The Law Society of Zimbabwe v The Minister of Transport and

8
Communications and Another (2004) AHRLR 292
CASES ADJUDICATED BY THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Page
1. IACtHR, Ricardo Canese v Paraguay, judgement of 31 August 2004,

9
Series C, No. 111
REPORTS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
12
RESPONDENT

Page
1. Canada — Periodicals, (WT/DS31/AB/R) 17
1. EC — Asbestos, (WT/DS135/AB/R) 17
2. European Communities - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and

17
Marketing of Seal Products (WT/DS400/AB/R)
3. European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and
17
Distribution of Bananas, (WT/DS27/AB/R)
4. Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II, (WT/DS8/AB/R) 17
5. Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, (WT/DS75/AB/R) 17
6. Korea — Various Measures on Beef, (WT/DS161/AB/R) 17
7. Panel Report, China –Electronic Payment Services, (WT/DS413/R) 17
8. Philippines - Distilled Spirits, (WT/DS396/AB/R) 17
9. Philippines - Taxes on distilled spirits, (WT/DS396/AB/R) 17
10. Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit (WT/DS512/AB/R) 18
11. Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines), (WT/DS371/AB/R) 17
12. United States — Clove Cigarettes, (WT/DS406/AB/R) 17
13. United States - Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting

18
Services, (WT/DS285/AB/R)
14. US — COOL, (WT/DS384/AB/R) 17
15. US – Tuna II (Mexico), (WT/DS381/AB/R) 17
CASES EMANATING FROM DOMESTIC JURISDICTION

Page
13
RESPONDENT
1. A. Sowkath Ali, v. Union of India, (2000) 7 SCC 148 5
14
RESPONDENT
16. A.K. Roy v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 710 15
17. Ahamad Nasser v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No. 166 of 1999 5
18. Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 93 S.E.2d 274 21
19. American Commc’n Networks v. Williams, 568 S.E.2d 683 21
20. Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 25 10
21. Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal, AIR (39) 1952
4
Calcutta 150
22. Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 36 10
23. Asoke Kumar Sarkar & Anr. v. Radha Kanto Pandey & Ors., 1966
20
SCC OnLine Cal 15
24. Associated Provisional Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation,
11
[1948] 1 KB 223
25. B. Kota Mallaiah And Others v. Commissioner & Registrar Of Co-
15
Operative Societies, 1990 SCCOnLine AP 324
26. Bachan Singh v. State Of Punjab, 1982 3 SCC 24 10
27. Balsubramania v. Raja Gopala Charier, 1944 SCC OnLine Mad 9 20
28. Bata India Ltd. v. A.M. Turaz, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5387 20
29. Benoarilal Sarma Case, (1944) L.R. 72 I.A. 57 16
30. Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer, (1982) AC 888 19
31. C. Narayanaswamy And Others, Etc. v. State Of Karnataka And

15
Another, 1991 SCCOnLine Kar 141
15
RESPONDENT
32. C.J.R v. Radfordshire (1855) 24 LJQB 81 (84) 10
33. Chintaman Rao v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 10
34. Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank's case, (2007) 4 SCC

12
669
35. Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316 4
36. Committee of Management of Panchaiyappa's Trust v. Official

6
Trustee of Madras & another, 1994 1 SCC 475
37. Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, 1996 2 SCC 405 16
38. Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] 1 All

20
ER 1011
39. Dr. Shashi Tharoor v. Arnab Goswami, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12049 20
40. Dr. Yogesh Chandra Govil & Etc. Etc. v. State Of U.P & Others, 1990
15
SCCOnLine All 790
41. Ellis v. Home Office (1953) 2 All ER 149 10
42. Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma And Others, AIR 1945 PC 48 15
43. Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of India, 1985 2 SCR
16
287
44. Fathima Beebi v. M.K Ravindranathan & Others, 1974 SCCOnLine
15
Ker 34
45. Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608 6
46. Geetha v. A.K. Dhamodharan, CDJ 2011 MHC 3809 5 20
47. Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi, 2008 4 SCC 720 16
48. Gullapalli Nageshwar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1959 AIR 11

16
RESPONDENT
1376
49. Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit & Ors v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,
15
AIR 2001 SC 1980
50. Hatfill v. The New York Times, Co., 532 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2008) 21
51. Haycox v. Dunn, 104 S.E.2d 800 21
52. Hingorani v. State of Bihar, 2003 6 SCC 1 6
53. Hustler v. Falwell, 56 U.S.L.W. 4180 21
54. J. Mohapatra and Co. v. State of Odisha,(1984) 4 SCC 103 11
55. K. Nagaraj & Ors v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1985 SC
15
551
56. K. Nagraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1985 1 SCC 523 14
57. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 10
58. K.S. Sundram v. S. Vishwanathan & Anr., AIR 2013 (NOC) 216
22
(Mad)
59. Kachrulal Bhagirath Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra 2005 9 SCC 36 6
60. Kalyani Stores v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1686 10
61. Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others,
16
(1995) 1 SCC 574
62. King-Emperor v. (1882) 7 App. Cas. 829, 835 16
63. KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 6
64. Lalit Narayan Mishra And Another v. State Of Bihar And Others,
15
1986 SCCOnLine Pat 172
17
RESPONDENT
65. Laxmi Khandasri v. State of U.P, AIR 1981 SC 873 4
66. Leary v United States 395 US 6 (1969) 8
67. Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Vishwanath Verma and others,

4
1994 Supp (3) SCC 569
68. M. Maniklal v. State Of Mysore And Others, AIR 1977 SC 361 15
69. M. Patel v. Union of India 1960 2 SCR 362 5
70. Madhu Limaya v. S.D.M Monghyr . 1970 3 SCC 746 5
71. Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Oram, (2010) 11 SCC 269 6
72. Modern Dental College case (2016) 7 SCC 353 10
73. Monro v American Cyanamid Corporation, [1944] KB 432 3
74. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammad

5
Usmanbhai, 1986 3 SCC 20
75. N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India 5
76. Nag Raj v. State of A.P.. AIR 1985 SC 551 15
77. Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430 4
78. National Legal Services Association v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC

10
1863
79. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, 2014 5 SCC 438 5
80. New York Times v. Sullivan, US SC 1964 19
81. Nyambirai v National Social Security Authority and Anor 1995 (9) 8
18
RESPONDENT
BCLR 1221
82. Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 22–23 (U.S. June 26,
20
2015)
83. Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 7,11
84. P.K. Niyogi v. Praveen Nishi, 2018 SCC OnLine Chh 680 20
85. Pathumma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2 SCC 1: AIR 1978 SC 771 6
86. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 (Canada) 8
87. R v. Goldstein, 1983 (1) WLR 151 11
88. R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex

19
parte Pirbhai 107 ILR, p. 462
89. R. v Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 SCR 295 (Canada) 8
90. R. Venugopala Naidu & others v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities &

6
others, A.I.R 1990 SC 444
91. R.C Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 1 SCC 248 14
92. R.K Garg v. Union of India, 1981 4 SCC 675 14
93. R.M Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471 6
94. Radheshyam Tiwari v. Eknath Dinaji Bhiwapurkar & Ors., 1984

20
SCCOnLine Bom 153
95. Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of India,
15
(2001) 2 SCC 294
96. Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 3 SCC 646 5
97. Rajgopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632 20
19
RESPONDENT
98. Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147 6
99. Ram Singh v. The State of Delhi, 1951 AIR 270 16
100. Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 11
101. Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 714 (4th Cir.
21
1991)
102. Russell v. The Queen, (1878) 3 App. Cas. 889 16
103. S. Rangarajn v. P. Jagjivan Ram, 1989 SCC (2) 574 6
104. S.K.G Sugar Ltd. v. State Of Bihar And Others, AIR 1974 SC
15
1533
105. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 (3) SCC 1 14
106. Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and

11
Exchange Board of India, (2012) 10 SCC 603
107. Sat Pal v. Lt. Gou., AIR 1979 SC 1550 15
108. Satwant Singh Sawhney v. Passport Officer (1967) 3 SCR 525 6
109. Sharma Transport v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2002 2 SCC 188 16
110. Shenandoah Pub. House, Inc. v. Gunter, 427 S.E.2d 370 (1993) 21
111. Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR

8
177 (Canada)
112. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) 21
113. St. John’s Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director,

16
NCTE, 2003 3 SCC 321
20
RESPONDENT
114. State of A.P. v. McDowell, (1996) 3 SCC 709 11
115. State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation, AIR 1981 SC 463 10
116. State of Punjab v. (In Both the Appeals), AIR 1969 SC 903 15
117. State of Tamil Nadu v. V.P. Krishnamurthy, 2006 4 SCC 517 16
118. Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221 7
119. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Ors.,

20
(2016) 7 SCC 221
120. Suchita Srivastava v. Administration of Chandigarh, AIR 2010 SC
10
235
121. Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn. (2009) 9 SCC 1 6
122. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, (1991) 4 All ER 817 20
123. Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd v. U.T. Chandigarh and Others (2004 (2)
7
SCC 130)
124. The Queen v. Burah, 276 U.S. 394 16
125. TVL Sundram Granites v. Imperial Granites Ltd & others, 1999 8
6
SCC 150
126. U.P Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P 1995 4
15
SCC 738
127. Union of India & Others v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary, AIR 1979
15
SC 1415
128. Union of India v. C. Dinakar, 2004 6 SCC 118 6
129. Union of India v. R.S. Saini, 1999(2) SCC 151 15
21
RESPONDENT
130. Union of india v. S.R. Sharma, AIR 1985 SC 710 15
131. V.G. Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196 4
132. Venkata v. State of A.P., AIR 1985 SC 724 15
133. Vineet Narain v. Union of India, 1996 2 SCC 199 6
134. Vir Sanghvi Petitioner v. Outlook Media Private Limited & Ors.,
20
2018 SCC OnLine Del 6391
135. Virendra v. State of Punjab, [1958] 1 SCR 308 5
INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Page
1. G.A. Res. 1723 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/Res/1723/16 (1961) 14
136. G.A. Res. 441 (V), U.N. Doc. A/Res/441/5 (1950) 14
137. General Recommendation 21, The right to self-determination,

14
U.N. Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII, 125 (1996)
138. HRC, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion
8
and Expression, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011)
139. HRC, Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion
7
and expression, UN Doc A/74/486 (2019)
140. S.C. Res. 724, U.N. Doc. S/Res/724 ¶7 (1991) 14
141. UNGA, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial

12
Countries and Peoples, art. 2, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV) (1960)
142. UNGA, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the 13
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence
22
RESPONDENT
and Sovereignty, A/RES/36/103 (1965)

143. UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN 7
Doc A/HRC/29/32 (2015)
REGULATIONS

Page
1. The Rules of the Court (ICJ), art. 38, ¶2 (1978) 3
ACADEMIC MATERIALS AND SOURCES
BOOKS, TREATISES AND DIGESTS

Page
1. 2 J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

13
415 (SAGE 2006)
1. 2 M. S. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION

2
(Longmans 1961)
2. 2(11) SHABTAI ROSENNE, ROSENNE’S LAW AND PRACTICE 181-9

1
(Brill 2014)
3. 7 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO

2
INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (Routledge 1997)
4. 8 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University

1
Publications 2017)
23
RESPONDENT
5. 8 P. DAILLIER, M. FORTEAU AND A. PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL

2
PUBLIC 483 (Gale 2009)
6. ANDREAS ZIMMERMAN, ET AT., STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL

COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 109 (Oxford University Press 3
2012)
7. ANNA LENA SVENSSON MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION: WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES AND THE CASE-LAW 17
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING ORGANS (Martinus Nijhoff
1998)
8. CLAIRE WARDLE & HOSSEIN DERAKHSHAN, INFORMATION
DISORDER: TOWARD AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORK FOR 8
RESEARCH AND POLICY MAKING (Council of Europe 2017)
9. CRISTECU, THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION: HISTORICAL AND
CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ON THE BASIS OF UN INSTRUMENTS 102 13
(UN 1981)
10. DOMINIKA BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF 8
HUMAN RIGHTS (Council of Europe 2018)
11. ELS J. KINDT, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION ISSUES OF
BIOMETRICAPPLICATIONS: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS 11
(Springer Business and Science Media 2013)
12. IGINIO GAGLIARDONE ET AL., COUNTERING ONLINE HATE SPEECH

7
(UNESCO Publishing 2015)
13. JOHANNESBURG PRINCIPLES ON NATIONAL SECURITY, FREEDOM OF

9
EXPRESSION AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION, (Article 19 1995)
14. J GOODWIN, THE LAST DEFENCE OF WEDNESBURY 445,452 (Oxford

11
2012)
24
RESPONDENT
15. T. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES,

12
247 (2000)
JOURNAL ARTICLES

Page
1. Andrew Mitchell & Tania Voon, Free Trade Agreements and Public
18
International Law, 321 UNI. OF MLBRN. LGL. STU. (2008)
2. Carolyn A. Dubay, A Refresher on the Principle of Non-Intervention,

17
SPRING ED. INT. JU. MNTR. (2014)
3. David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech,

Communicative Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 9
29 GEORGIA LAW REV. 1 (1994)
4. Edoardo Celeste, Digital punishment: social media exclusion and the

constitutionalizing role of national courts, 35(2) INT. REV. OF L., 10
COMPUTERS & TECHNOLOGY 162 (2021).
5. Elena Laura Alvarez Ortega, The Attribution of International

Responsibility to a State for the Conduct of Private Individuals within 20
the Territory of Another State, J. ANA. L. (2014).
6. Free Trade Agreements and the WTO Exceptions, CRS 7 (2008);

Walter Goode, Negotiating free-trade agreements: a guide, DFAT 15
(2005)
25
RESPONDENT
7. Geeta Moni & Raghav Srinivas, Defamation in International Law:

The Legal Implications of Trump Calling COVID-19 “Chinese 18
Virus”, 53 CORNELL INT. LAW J. 49,50 (2020)
8. Macdonald S et al., Regulating Terrorist Content on Social Media:

Automation and the Rule of Law, 15 INT'L J. OF LAW IN CONT. 183 16
(2019)
9. Michael O’Flaherty, Freedom of Expression: Article 19 of the ICCPR

and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No 34, 12 13
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 627 (2012)
16. Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the
GATT says and what the United States does, 19(2) PENN LAW REV. 18
263 (2014)
17. Robert D. Sack, Protection of Opinion under the First Amendment:

Reflections on Alfred Hill, “Defamation and Privacy under the First 21
Amendment”, 100 COLUMBIA LAW REV.298, (2000)
18. Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011

18
UTAH L. REV. 697 (2011)
19. Rolv Ryssdal, Opinion: The Coming Age of the European Convention
7
on Human Rights,1 EURO. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REV. 18,26 (2019)
20. Stijn Smet, Freedom of expression and the right to reputation:

Human rights in conflict, 26 (1) AMERICAN UNI. INTL. LAW REV.183, 7
192 (2010)
21. Thürer, D & T. Burri, Self-determination, OXFORD PUBL. I`TNL L.,

12
MPEPIL 6, 15 (2008
26
RESPONDENT
ONLINE SOURCES

Page
1. Anjana Susarla, Unraveling the Impact of Social Media on

Extremism: Implications for Technology Regulation and Terrorism
Prevention, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY (2019)
8
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/Unraveling
%20the%20Impact%20of%20Social%20Media%20on
%20Extremism.pdf
2. Carme Colomina et al., The impact of disinformation on democratic
processes and human rights in the world, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
THINK TANK (April 14
2021)https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/65
3635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf
3. Evgeniya Melnikova, Yarovaya Law. The Death of the Russian

Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST (July 11 2016)
8
www.huffingtonpost.com/evgeniya-melnikova/yarovaya law-the-
deathof_b_10864882.html
4. Frank LaRue et al, Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and

the Internet, ARTICLE 19 (2005),
9
https://www.article19.org/resources/joint-declaration-freedom-
expression-internet/
5. Free Speech in India: Uptick in Defamation, Attacks on Media Cause

for Concern, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP (December 19 2014)
19
https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/12/free-speech-india-uptick-
defamation-attacks-media-cause-concern/
27
RESPONDENT
6. Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion: A

Dialogue, FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (2014)
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
10
daa/file/295276/
March_14_Hate_speech_freedom_of_expression_and_freedom_of_re
ligion_final___.doc
2. Larry Greenemier, Hatred Goes Viral: Inside Social Media’s Efforts

to Combat Terrorism, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (May 24 2017)
17
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/when-hatred-goes-viral-
inside-social-medias-efforts-to-combat-terrorism/
7. Limitations, ARTICLE 19 (Nov 25 2021)

8
www.article19.org/pages/en/limitations.html.
8. Myanmar: UN Fact-Finding Mission releases its full account of

massive violations by military in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan States,
UNHRC (September 18 2018) 15
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?
NewsID=23575&LangID=E
9. Principles of the trading system, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (June
15 2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm#:~:t
17
ext=without%20discrimination%20%E2%80%94%20a%20country
%20should,giving%20them%20%E2%80%9Cnational%20treatment
%E2%80%9D
10. Regardless of Frontiers: The International Right to Freedom of

Expression in the Digital Age, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.
12
(April 4, 2012), https://cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-
Regardless_of_Frontiers_v0.5.pdf.
28
RESPONDENT
11. Regional expert meeting on Article 20, Towards an interpretation of

article 20 of the ICCPR: Thresholds for the prohibition of incitement
to hatred Work in Progress, OHCHR (9 February 2010) 9
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/expression/iccpr/vienna/crp7
callamard.pdf
22. The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of

Expression and Access to Information, ARTICLE 19 (1 October 1995)
7
https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.p
df
MISCELLANEOUS AUTHORITIES

Page
1. Åaland Island, Report by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of

13
Nations Council Document B7 21/68/106, 318 (1921)
23. Affaire relative à la concession des phares de l’Empire ottoman,

20
UNRIAA, vol. XII (Sales No. 63.V.3) (1956)
24. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Ebola, Infectious

19
Disease, Series 1, (1976)
25. Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia, Extraordinary European

Political Cooperation Ministerial Meeting, EC Press Release 61/91 14
(1991)
26. ICCPR, Third Periodic Reports of States Parties due in 1991,

Addendum, Report Submitted by Shri Lanka, CCRP/C/70/Add.6, 12
(1944)
29
RESPONDENT
27. Kosovo, Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Republic

of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, Oral Proceedings, 3 December 12
2009, ¶36
28. Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on

13
Conflict in Georgia, 2008/901/CFSP, (2009)
29. Report on the Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of

Miskito Origin, I.A.C.H.R., OAS, OEA/Ser.L/V.II.62, Doc. 10, Eev. 13
3, ¶9 (1983)
30. The Arbitration Commission of the European on the former

12
Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, 31 I.L.M. 1497 (1992)
31. The position of States as Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and
13
Thailand, ratifying the ICCPR, Badinter Commission, Opinion No 2
30
RESPONDENT
-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that; the Applicant has approached the
Hon’ble International Court of Justice (ICJ) under Article 36(2)1 of the ICJ Statute. The
dispute in question relates to the rights under Article 19 of ICCPR 2, Article 9 of UDHR3,
Article XXIV of GATT4 and other provisions of international law, as per the submissions of
the Applicant.
However, the Respondent reserves the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court.
1
Article 36(2), ICJ Statute:
The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognise as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of
the Court in all legal disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
2
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), art. 19, 999 UNTS 171 (1966).
3
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Refugee Convention, art. 19, 189 UNTS 137 (1948).
4
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Art. XXIV, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
31
RESPONDENT
-STATEMENT OF FACTS-
I. RELEVANT DESCRIPTION OF THE TWO NATIONS:
WINLAND QINQUEST
POLITICAL PROFILE
Republic of Winland is a holistically powerful Qinquest is another fast-growing global

country having a multiparty democratic power and the ideological adversary of
system and is currently governed by the Winland. It is solely governed by the
Winlandan Republican Right Party (WRRP), Qinquest Communist Party (QCP). The
with President Palpatine as the Head. Head of QCP, Mr. Cho Hak Wei, often
engages in colourful rhetoric, that is
especially veered towards Winland.
RELIGION
The religious spectrum of Winland is Although Qinquest officially espouses

bifurcated into two main communities: state atheism, in reality, Runeria is widely
majority comprising of Devoted, the practised by the people as well as QCP
adherants of Church of Devtaan, and around members.
10% constituted by Runerians, who practise
the faith of Runeria.
CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS
Recently, a strong nationalist discourse QCP has been working through

among Runerians, believing themselves to be international organizations, like the UN, to
the original inhabitants of Winland, was legitimize its authoritarianism. In
perpetuated and this was countered by pursuance of its national expansion
Devoteds. This sparked animosity between agenda, it brought a resolution restricting
the two communities. free speech that faced global backlash.
II. FACTS OF THE DISPUTE:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
xxxii
RESPONDENT
LAUNCH OF CHIRP APP
Chirp, a social media application by Technocrat, was initially launched in Qinquest, and
later on, it was launched worldwide with the claims of QCP to facilitate free internet. The
ultimate beneficial Holding Company of Technocrat is based out of the Cayman Islands.
Chirp allows sharing of information in all digital forms, and has a set of rules for operation,
for example, privacy policy, posts that can be taken down, etc.
PANDEMIC AND ANTI-VACCINE CAMPAIGNS ON CHIRP
A uniquely hazardous Sickness Pandemic engulfed the world and countries, including
Winland and Qinquest, developed vaccines to combat it. However, several anti-vaccine
campaigns, engaging an audience of around 31 million, started on Chirp in Winland and
started spreading misinformation against the vaccine.
CENSORSHIP BY QCP
In Qinquest, Chirp censored the content that was against the ideologies of QCP. According
to policy analysts, information shared by users on Chirp can be accessed by Qinquest
authorities to track individuals and build dossiers that could be deployed for potential
blackmail. The employment of QCP employees in Chirp and their conduct further strongly
signalled their affiliation to the QCP government.
CONDITIONS LEADING TO CHIRP BAN IN WINLAND
A faction of users started alleging Runerians to be the ‘superspreaders’ of the

Sickness pandemic in Winland, which led to astrocities against Runerians. Then,
there were grave national security threats due to surveillance by Qinquest via Chirp.
Furthermore, the app collected personal information of minors without parental
control, exposing them to sexual predators and catalysing pornography. As a result,
President Palpatine declared a financial emergency under GFEPA, followed by a ban
on Chirp and directive to divest the assets of Chirp and its affiliates.
ALLEGED DEFAMATION OF QINQUEST BY PRESIDENT PALPATINE
In a reactionary backlash to the criticism received from Qinquest on the ban on Chirp in
Winland, President Palpatine called out Sickness Virus as ‘Dragonvirus’. Qinquestians
condemned this remark as being defamatory since Dragon is their national symbol.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xxxiii
RESPONDENT
-STATEMENT OF ISSUES-
ISSUE 1
WHETHER, THE INSTANT CASE IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE COURT?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER, THE BAN ON CHIRP VITIATES THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXPRESSION PROPOUNDED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF WINLAND AND INTERNATIONAL LAW?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER, THE BAN INVOKED ON CHIRP IS CONTENTIOUS TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-

DETERMINATION AND RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY WARRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF
WINLAND AND INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS?
ISSUE 4
WHETHER, THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER MANDATING THE BAN ON CHIRP AND SUBSEQUENT
DIVESTMENT OF ASSETS OF CHIRP AND ITS AFFILIATE ENTITIES, IS TENABLE?
ISSUE 5
WHETHER, PRESIDENT PALPATINE’S RHETORIC OF CALLING SICKNESS VIRUS AS

‘DRAGONVIRUS’ QUALIFIES AS AN ACT OF DEFAMATION OF THE STATE OF QINQUEST?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xxxiv
RESPONDENT
-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS-
I. THAT, THE INSTANT CASE IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT
Firstly, there exist no rational for an International Forum to entertain the present dispute,
because the present case does not classify as a ‘dispute’ but is an artificially constructed case,
and also because it falls under the domestic jurisdiction of Winland, and hence does not fall
within the jurisdiction of the Court as per Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ
Secondly, the instant matter cannot be admitted by the Court in good faith because there
exists no consent from Winland to the acceptance of Court’s jurisdiction and because the
claims are not sufficiently substantiated, as per Articles 36, 38, and 40 of the ICJ Statute.
II. THAT, THE BAN IMPOSED ON CHIRP DOES NOT ACT IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION OF THE CITIZENRY AS
PROPOUNDED BY THE WINLANDAN CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Firstly, the impugned ban is saved by the functionality of Article 29 of the Winlandan
Constitution. As discussed in V.G. Row v. State of Madras, the nature of the alleged infringed
right, underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil
sought to be remedied, the proportionality of the imposition, and the prevailing conditions at
the time should all enter into the judicial verdict. Corollary to the prevailing conditions, every
fundamental right is subject to the vires of the restrictions mandated under Article 29 of the
Constitution of Winland.
Secondly, the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression is subject to Restrictions under
International Law. For a restriction to be reasonable in the eyes of law, it must fulfil the
three-part test of legality, legitimacy, and proportionality. Therefore, the restrictions
permissible upon Freedom of Expression under Three-Part Test in pursuance of ICCPR must
be strictly interpreted.
III. THAT, THE BAN IMPOSED ON CHIRP IS NOT CONTENTIOUS TO THE RIGHT OF
SELF-DETERMINATION AND RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xxxv
RESPONDENT
WARRANTED BY THE CONSTITUTION OF WINLAND AS WELL AS

INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Firstly, Winland is a welfare state, and it must work in pursuance of the greatest good of
greatest numbers. The duties of the Winlandan state to consider public welfare must be
considered on the grounds that the ban did not vitiate the doctrines of proportionality and
reasonability, and because the ban did not work in contravention of tests of balancing of
interest and necessity.
Secondly, Runerians are not entitled to claim Right to Self-Determination in the instant case,
as under the Friendly Relations Declaration and other Resolutions, the right to self-
determination can only be exercised within the confines prescribed by the other principles,
including territorial integrity. Additionally, Runerians may not claim the Right to Self-
Determination on the grounds that the Runerians cannot be qualified as “peoples” for the
purposes of self-determination.
IV. THAT, THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER MANDATING THE BAN ON CHIRP AND
THE SUBSEQUENT DIRECTIVE OF MANDATORILY DIVESTING THE ASSETS OF
CHIRP AND ITS AFFILIATE ENTITIES, IS TENABLE.

Firstly, the Presidential Order falls within the vires of the powers of the Executive as
prescribed by the Winlandan Constitution. If the president is satisfied that it is necessary or
expedient for the interest of the state and its security, he may direct any agency of
government to block the public access of any information.
Secondly, in arguendo, the Presidential Order is not antiethical to the global environment of
free trade and competitive markets. Article XX of the GATT, 1994 provides that any party
may enforce measures that are necessary to protect public morals, to secure compliance with
the law, etc.
V. THAT, PRESIDENT PALPATINE’S QUIP OF ADDRESSING THE SICKNESS VIRUS AS

“DRAGONVIRUS” DOES NOT QUALIFY AS AN ACT OF DEFAMATION OF THE
STATE OF QINQUEST
Firstly, state entities do not have the requisite locus standi to sue for defamation. Maintaining
defamation suits filed by Public or Elected Entities vitiates the Right of Fair Criticism as well
as Speech and Expression. Additionally, citizens have a Right to be Informed of the Truth.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xxxvi
RESPONDENT
Secondly, in arguendo, President Palpatine’s remark was made in his personal capacity and
was not attributable to Winland. Palpatine’s remark was not even defamatory as the
provisions of ARISWA have not been met and the statement in itself did not overtly defame
Qinquest.
- ARGUMENTS ADVANCED -
1. THAT, THE PRESENT CASE IS NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE COURT
1. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that, the Court that the present matter is
not maintainable before this Court on the grounds that, [1.1.] there exist no rational for an
International Forum to entertain the present dispute and because, [1.2.] the instant matter
cannot be admitted by the Court in good faith.
1.1. There exists no rational for an International Forum to entertain the present
dispute
2. It is humbly submitted that Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
entails that the Court can exercise its judicial function upon the consent of the parties to a
legal dispute brought before it, firstly, by the conclusion of a special agreement; 5
secondly, by invocation of a jurisdictional clause in a treaty;6 thirdly, by virtue of
declarations made by states recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction as compulsory, fourthly,
in all legal disputes concerning the matters specified in Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute; 7
or lastly, by accepting jurisdiction for a case brought against them (Forum Prorogatum
doctrine)8. However, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present case brought by
Qinquest because, [1.1.1] The present case does not classify as a ‘dispute’ but is an
artificially constructed case, and because, [1.1.2] it falls under the domestic jurisdiction of
Winland.
5
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(1), 33 UNTS 993 (1946).
6
Id.
7
Statute of ICJ supra note 5.
8
8 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Publications 2017). Also see 2(11) SHABTAI
ROSENNE, ROSENNE’S LAW AND PRACTICE 181-9 (Brill 2014).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xxxvii
RESPONDENT
1.1.1. The matter at hand does not classify as a ‘dispute’
3. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that, before proceeding to the jurisdiction
and admissibility, there has to be an identifiable dispute at the outset. In order to
determine the existence of a "dispute” within the meaning of the Court's Statute, it is not
sufficient for an applicant to somehow construct opposing views between two States, but
that the claims contained therein must constitute a true reflection of legal problems which
exist according to indisputable facts.9 The present case is peculiar in the sense that the
unilateral “claims” brought by the Applicants have objectively nothing to do with their
own nation.
1.1.2. The present matter falls within the domestic jurisdiction of Winland
4. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, under the doctrine of domestic
jurisdiction, states have no right to encroach upon the internal matters of other states. 10
This basic rule of international law is a consequence of the equality and sovereignty of
states11 and is mirrored in article 2(7) of the UN Charter 12, to which both Winland and
Qinquest13 are signatories. In the present case, the claims concerning the validity of ban of
Chirp in Winland fall exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of Winland. The
administration of Winland has the legislative supremacy 14 to formulate its own laws on
the principles enshrined in its Constitution, as long as it does not breach any international
obligations.
1.2. The instant matter cannot be admitted by the Court in good faith
5. It is humbly adduced before the Court that the instant matter cannot be admitted by the
Court in good faith, because, [1.2.1] there exists no consent from Winland to the
9
See, Ambatielos (Greece v. United Kingdom), [1952] ICJ 1; South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa),
[1966] ICJ Rep 6; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New Application: 1962), [1970]
ICJ 1; Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), [1992] ICJ Rep 240.
10
2 M. S. RAJAN, UNITED NATIONS AND DOMESTIC JURISDICTION (Longmans 1961); 8 P. DAILLIER, M.
FORTEAU AND A. PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 483 (Gale 2009).
11
See, R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE
UNITED NATIONS (Oxford 1963); 25 A. CANÇADO TRINDADE, THE DOMESTIC JURISPRUDENCE OF STATES IN
THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 715 (1976).
12
United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, art. 2(7), 1 UNTS XVI (1945).
13
MOOT PROPOSITION, p. 6, ¶14.
14
7 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (Routledge
1997).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xxxviii
RESPONDENT
acceptance of Court’s jurisdiction and because, [1.2.2.] the claims are not sufficiently
substantiated.
1.2.1. There exists no consent from Winland to the acceptance of jurisdiction of the Court
6. Consent of the parties15, in any form, is paramount to the Court’s jurisdiction under
Article 36 of the ICJ Statute.16 Moreover, such consent must be ‘voluntary and
indisputable’.17 This was greatly emphasised by the Court in Corfu Channel case18
wherein seven-judge bench, thereby, discarded UK’s argument and established consent as
a prerequisite to jurisdiction. In the present case as well, there is no consent from Winland
to the Court’s jurisdiction19, and hence, the matter falls beyond the Court’s power to
exercise jurisdiction over the same.
1.2.2. The requirement to substantiate claims has not been fulfilled by Qinquest
7. A claim is not admissible in the Hon’ble Court unless it is sufficiently substantiated. 20 For
the legal security and effective administration of justice to be maintained, there has to be
a clear indication of the subject as well as parties to the dispute, as mandated by Article
40, paragraph 1, second clause, of the ICJ Statute, 21 and upheld in many cases22 like the
one concerning Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru23. Moreover, Article 38, paragraph 2
15
See, Monetary Gold case (Italy v. France, United Kingdom and United States of America), [1954] ICJ Rep 19;
The Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of U.S. (U.S. v. Hungary), 1954 I.C.J. 99; Aerial Incident case
(USA v. USSR), 1959 I.C.J. 276; Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia and New Zealand (intervening) v. Japan),
Judgment, ICGJ 471 (ICJ 2014); Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v.
France).
16
See, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
1986 I.C.J. 14; Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18; Interpretation of Peace Treaties with
Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion (Second Phase), [1950] ICJ Rep 221; See also Cameroon v.
Nigeria, ICJ Reports, 2002 303; and Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda), 2002
I.C.J. 219.
17
See, Application of the Genocide Convention, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 595, 621.
Certain Property (Liechtenstein v Germany), Judgment, Preliminary Objections, [2005] ICJ Rep 6.
18
Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco cases, PCIJ, Series B, No. 4, 1923; 2 AD, p. 349.
19
MOOT PROPOSITION, p.17, ¶1.
20
See, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan), 1971 I.C.J. 347; Fisheries
Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] ICJ Rep 3; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of
Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J 175; Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), [1974] ICJ Rep 253.
21
Statute of ICJ supra note 5, at art. 40.
22
See, Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), [1988] ICJ Rep 69; Elettronica Sicula
S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), 1987 I.C.J. 3; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 1995 I.C.J. 6; Fisheries Jurisdiction
(Spain v. Canada); LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), [1998] ICJ Rep 432; Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), [2002] ICJ 1; Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mexico v. United States of America), I.C.J. Reports 2004, 12.
23
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary Objections, I.C.J. Reports 1992, p. 240.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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RESPONDENT
of the Rules of Court particularizes that the written application for the institution of
proceedings shall succinctly specify; firstly, the legal grounds upon which the jurisdiction
of the Court is said to be based; secondly, the precise nature of the claim; and thirdly,
statement of the facts and grounds on which the claim is based.24
8. Placing reliance on the aforementioned judicial dicta, However, in the present matter,
Qinquest has failed miserably in substantiating its claims against Winland. This is
because firstly, there is no sustainable ground for establishing the jurisdiction of Court
since Winland has never approved of it in the first place.25 The claim for damages due to
alleged defamation of Qinquest by President Palpatine is also incapable of being admitted
because defamation suits, that fall under torts, are never been brought before the Hon’ble
Court but governed by the rules lex loci delicti.26 Secondly, Qinquest has no accurate
information on the losses suffered by it, if any, due to the ban, or even the record of
victims. Thirdly, Qinquest is silent on the extent of its control over Chirp since it is afraid
of getting caught in its own bait.
9. In light of the aforementioned arguments, it is most humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble
Court that it should not entertain such artificially constructed and politically tainted case
that questions the judicial integrity of the Court, and over which the Court has no
sustainable grounds for exercising jurisdiction since it lacks the consent of the
Respondent State of Winland, and falls within the domestic jurisdiction of Winland itself.
2. THAT, THE BAN IMPOSED ON CHIRP DOES NOT ACT IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION OF THE CITIZENRY AS
PROPOUNDED BY THE WINLANDAN CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
10. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that, the ban imposed on Chirp does not
act in contravention of the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression of the citizenry as
propounded by the Winlandan Constitution as well as under International Law, on the
24
The Rules of the Court (ICJ), art. 38, ¶2 (1978).
25
See, Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of America (United States of
America v. Hungary),1954 I.C.J. 99; Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953 (United States of
America v. Czechoslovakia), ICGJ 179 (ICJ 1956); Aerial Incident of 7 October 1952 (United States of
America v. USSR); Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954 (United States of America v. USSR), [1958] ICJ Rep
158; and Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954 (United States of America v. USSR), [1959] ICJ Rep 276.
26
See, Monro v American Cyanamid Corporation, [1944] KB 432.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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RESPONDENT
ground that, [2.1.] the impugned ban is saved by the functionality of Article 29 of the
Winlandan Constitution, and because, [2.2.] the Right to Freedom of expression is subject
to Restrictions under international law, insofar as may be required in a democratic
society.
2.1. The impugned ban is saved by the functionality of Article 29 of the Winlandan
Constitution
11. It is most humbly averred before the Hon’ble Court that, there exists no idealistic
archetypal approach towards determining the reasonableness for every given state action,
and the yardstick for reasonability, has to be set in consonance with any given statute,
while gleaning upon the prevalent circumstances and raison d’etre behind such action.27
As has been discussed in V.G. Row v. State of Madras, the nature of the right alleged to
have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and
urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the proportionality of the imposition,
the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. 28 Thereto,
corollary to the prevailing conditions, every fundamental right is subject to the vires of
the restrictions mandated under Article 29 of the Constitution of Winland.29
12. The spirit of “public order” as mandated by Article 29, has, often been constructed in a
compendious sense to be one and the same as “in general public interest”.30 Reiterating
on further lines of thoughts, the expression `in the interest of general public' is of wide
import comprehending public order, public health, public security, morals, economic
welfare of the community and the objects mentioned in Part IV of the Constitution. 31
Placing utmost reliance on the aforesaid legal postulates, it is pleaded before the Court
that, the restrictions sanctioned by the impugned state action, fall squarely under the
ambit of “public interest”, as, they were pursuant to the aspiration of, protecting national
27
V.G. Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196. See also, Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Vishwanath
Verma and others, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 569: AIR 1995 SC 189; Anwar Ali Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal,
AIR (39) 1952 Calcutta 150; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301.
28
V.G. Row v. State of Madras, AIR 1952 SC 196. See also, Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC
430; Collector of Customs v. Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316; Laxmi Khandasri v. State of U.P, AIR 1981
SC 873; Virendra v. The State of Punjab, [1957] AIR SC 896.
29
MOOT PROPOSITION, ANNEXURE C.
30
See, Virendra v. State of Punjab, (1958) 1 SCR 308; Rajendra Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1979) 3 SCC
646; Madhu Limaya v. S.D.M Monghyr . (1970) 3 SCC 746.
31
Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammad Usmanbhai, 1986 3 SCC 20. See also,
N.K. Bajpai v. Union of India, (2012) 4 SCC 653.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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RESPONDENT
security interests from “foreign adversaries” in trying times of the Sickness pandemic,32
considering Chirp, conspicuously affiliated to the QCP, not only stored sensitive user data
in its databases33, which the Qinquestan Government could access at any moment 34, it also
harboured dangerous anti-vaccine voices that proselytize vaccine-hesitancy35 amongst the
general citizenry, thereby creating a menace for the Winlandan Government in its efforts
to control the pandemic. Thereto, at the end of the day, the impugned ban furthers the
purposes of general public interest and public health on the grounds that [2.1.1.] public
order and National Interest precede Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression and
because, [2.1.2.] the ban is the least restrictive measure that can fulfil Winland’s
legitimate aim.
2.1.1. National Interest precedes Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression
13. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that, every right in the Constitution
within its widest amplitude is clipped with reasonable restrictions 36. As was laid down in
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India 37, when any state action is challenged
on the grounds of infraction of fundamental rights, it will be ascertained first, whether it
affects a liberty interest, secondly, whether the liberty in question is within the sphere on
constitutionally protected liberties and thirdly, whether the interference with such interest
is justified by a countervailing legitimate State interest38. Exerting due emphasis on the
ratio forestated, in the instant case, while it may be argued that the ban impinges upon the
rights of the Winlandan citizens to express themselves on Chirp, the same is outweighed
by the gravity of the actions of Chirp that threaten the privacy and safety of Winlandan
citizens, especially minors,39 while being ultimately answerable to an adversary of
Qinquest, a state that is not only adversary of Winland, but also stands opposed to the
principles of liberty and democracy that Winland prides itself upon40, thus making it
32
MOOT PROPOSITION, p.8, ¶ 30.
33
34
35
36
See, Ahamad Nasser v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No. 166 of 1999; A. Sowkath Ali, v. Union of India, (2000)
7 SCC 148; M. Patel v. Union of India (1960) 2 SCR 362.
37
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India,(2014) 5 SCC 438.
38
See, KS Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1; R.M Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1
SCC 471; Satwant Singh Sawhney v. Passport Officer (1967) 3 SCR 525; Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi
(1981) 1 SCC 608; Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Admn. (2009) 9 SCC 1.
39
40
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xlii
RESPONDENT
crystal clear and self-justifying that the state has a legitimate rationale behind passing the
impugned order banning Chirp.
2.1.2. The ban is the least restrictive measure that can remedy the situation and fulfil
Winland’s legitimate aim
14. It is humbly adduced before the Hon’ble Court that, the State understands that, while
regulating exercise of fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of
measures has been made by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object
of the legislation or the purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be, as was
laid down in the case of Om Kumar v. Union of India.41 Placing due emphasis and respect
upon the forestated judgment, it is pleaded that, during dire times like that of the Sickness
pandemic, it is only reasonable for the state to come up with stringent measures to
mitigate any contingencies that may arise, that threaten to flare up the disorder caused by
the pandemic. Chirp acting as a platform promoting vaccine hesitancy, 42 could not have
been accorded with any greater leniency than a total ban upon its functionality,
considering the tremendous repercussions that its nonchalance may bring for Winland.
2.2. The Right to Freedom of Expression is subject to Restrictions under International

Law
15. Freedom of expression43 is not an absolute right44 and the right to social expression cannot
be viewed in isolation45 and is required to be balanced with the imposition of reasonable
restrictions.46 For a restriction to be reasonable in the eyes of law, it must fulfil the three-
41
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386. See also, Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd v. U.T. Chandigarh and
Others (2004 (2) SCC 130); Subramaniam Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221.
42
43
Worm v Austria App no 22714/93 (ECtHR, 29 August 1997).
44
HRC, Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, UN Doc A/74/486 (2019).
45
Stijn Smet, Freedom of expression and the right to reputation: Human rights in conflict, 26 (1) AMERICAN
UNI. INTL. LAW REV.183, 192 (2010).
46
Cossey v United Kingdom, App no 10843/84 (ECtHR, 1990); Rolv Ryssdal, Opinion: The Coming Age of the
European Convention on Human Rights,1 EURO. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REV. 18,26 (2019); Özgür Gündem v
Turkey, App no 23144/93 (ECtHR, 2000); Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App no 28957/95 (ECtHR,
2002); Pavel Ivanov v Russia, App no 35222/04 (ECtHR, 1996).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xliii
RESPONDENT
part test of legality47, legitimacy48 and proportionality.49 Thitherto, the same is argued on
the ground that, [2.2.1] the restrictions permissible upon Freedom of Expression under
Three-Part Test in pursuance of the ICCPR must be strictly interpreted.
2.2.1. The restrictions permissible upon Freedom of Expression under Three-Part Test in
pursuance of the ICCPR must be strictly interpreted
16. It is humbly proffered before the Court that, some degree of consistency and protection
have been developed over time, in the nature of application of restrictions on
manifestations of Freedom of Expression in International Law. Under the ambit of Article
19 of the ICCPR, for a restriction to be legitimate, a three-part test must be met; firstly,
the interference must be provided for by law. This requirement will be fulfilled only
where the law is accessible and “formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen
to regulate his conduct”,50 secondly, the interference must pursue a legitimate aim. The
word “necessary” means that there must be a “pressing social need” for the restriction.
The reasons given by the State to justify the restriction must be “relevant and sufficient”
and the restriction must be proportionate to the aim pursued. Thitherto, in order to
establish the veracity of the test in the instant case, the Applicants plead before the Court
that, [2.2.1.1.] the restrictions acted towards bonafide furtherance of a legitimate aim and
[2.2.1.2] The Restrictions were requisite in a democratic society.51
2.2.1.1. The Restrictions acted towards bonafide Furtherance of a Legitimate Aim
47
Cengiz and Others v Turkey App nos 48226/10 and 14027/11 (ECtHR, 2015).
48
Bayev and Others v Russia, App nos 67667/09 (ECtHR, 2017); Khuzhin and Others v Russia, App no
13470/02 (ECtHR, 2008); Kövesi v Romania, App no 3594/19 (ECtHR, 2020); Morice v France, App no
29369/10 (ECtHR, 2015); Perinçek v Switzerland, App no 27510/08 (ECtHR, 2015); Stoll v Switzerland, App
no 69698/01 (ECtHR, 2007); Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, App nos 14238/88 (ECtHR, 1992).
49
The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information,
ARTICLE 19 (1 October 1995) https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf ;
UNHRC, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, UN Doc A/HRC/29/32 (2015); Handyside v United Kingdom, App no 5393/72 (ECtHR, 1976);
HRC, Mukong v Cameroon, (Comm no 458/1991) UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991; HRC, Velichkin v
Belarus, (Comm no 1022/2001) UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/1022/2001; Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and
Others v Turkey App nos 41340/98 (ECtHR, 2003).
50
DOMINIKA BYCHAWSKA-SINIARSKA, PROTECTING THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION UNDER THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Council of Europe 2018). See also, Observer and Guardian v. the
United Kingdom, 14 E.H.R.R. 153 (ECtHR 1991) and Lingens v. Austria, (1986) 8 EHRR 407 (ECtHR, 1986).
51
See, Janowski v. Poland, (2000) 29 EHRR 705 (ECtHR 2000); Tammer v. Estonia, (2003) 37 EHRR 43.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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RESPONDENT
17. Any restriction upon an individual’s freedom of expression must be imposed in

furtherance of protecting a legitimate interest. 52 While ascertaining objectives holding
‘sufficient importance’53, Courts have identified ‘protection of rights of others’ and
‘preservation of public order’ as legitimate aims for restricting free speech. 54 Exerting due
emphasis on the forestated ratios and corroborating the same with the facts of the instant
case, functioning of Chirp, risked the Right to Privacy 55 of millions of Winlandan citizens
who used the platform for entertainment purposes. Additionally, it posed a national
security risk, as Chirp owed direct allegiance to an adversary nation, i.e, Qinquest, whose
laws empowered56 it to directly seek data and intelligence outputs from Chirp. Hitherto, in
pursuance of such legitimate aims, Winlandan Government was entitled to impose a ban
on Chirp.
2.2.1.2. The Restrictions were Requisite in a Democratic Society
18. For a restriction on free speech to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’, it must

correspond to a pressing social need57 and must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.58 While assessing the need for a restriction on free speech, States are entitled to a
‘margin of appreciation’.59 This implies that States are better placed to deal with the
exigencies of the situation owing to their direct and continuous contact with pressing
needs present therein.60
52
HRC, Mukong v Cameroon, (Comm no 458/1991) UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991; Decision Regarding
Communication 004/2013 (Lohé Issa Konaté v The Republic of Burkina Faso) (Afr. Comm’n Hum. & Peoples’
Rts., 5 December 2014); HRC, General Comment No. 34, Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, UN
Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011); The Law Society of Zimbabwe v The Minister of Transport and Communications
and Another (2004) AHRLR 292.
53
R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 (Canada); R. v Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1 SCR 295 (Canada); Leary v
United States 395 US 6 (1969); Singh v Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 SCR 177 (Canada);
Nyambirai v National Social Security Authority and Anor 1995 (9) BCLR 1221.
54
Regional expert meeting on Article 20, Towards an interpretation of article 20 of the ICCPR: Thresholds for
the prohibition of incitement to hatred Work in Progress, OHCHR (9 February 2010)
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/expression/iccpr/vienna/crp7callamard.pdf .
55
56
MOOT PROPOSITION, p.11, ¶ 46 and ANNEXURE B.
57
Thorgeirson v Iceland App no 13778/88 (ECtHR, 1992); Decision Regarding Communications 128/94;
130/94 and 152/96 (Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Law Project v Nigeria) (Afr. Comm'n Hum. &
Peoples' Rts., 31 October 1998); Sürek v Turkey App no 23927/94 (ECtHR, 1999)
58
IACtHR, Ricardo Canese v Paraguay, judgement of 31 August 2004, Series C, No. 111 ; Zana v Turkey, App
no 69/1996 (ECtHR, 1997).
59
Id.
60
Brannigan and McBride v The United Kingdom, App nos, 14553/89 (ECtHR, 1993).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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RESPONDENT
3. THAT, THE BAN IMPOSED ON CHIRP, IS NOT CONTENTIOUS TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-
DETERMINATION AND RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL LIBERTY WARRANTED BY THE
WINLANDAN CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
19. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that, the ban imposed on Chirp is not
contentious to the Right of Self-determination and Right to Life and Personal Liberty
warranted by the Winlandan Constitution as well as international instruments on the
grounds that, [3.1] Winland is a welfare state that must work in pursuance of the greatest
good of greatest numbers and because, [3.2] Runerians are not entitled to claim Right to
Self-Determination in the instant case.
3.1. Winland is a welfare state that must work in pursuance of the greatest good of greatest
numbers
20. It is humbly asseverated before the Hon’ble Court that, the expression “public safety”
means the state or condition of freedom from danger or risk for the people at large 61.
Likewise, in Pathumma v. State of Kerala62, the Apex Court held that reasonableness of a
restriction has to be examined in the stand point of the interest of the general public and
not from the point of view of the person upon whom the restrictions are imposed and that
the law cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because, in a given case, it operates
harshly on certain persons63. A welfare State exists for the largest good of the largest
number64 and, when a question involving greater public interest or public good including
enforcement of fundamental right arises, Winlandan Courts bestowed enormous
consideration to public interest65. There is immense pressure upon the government to act
as a welfare state, as is stipulated in the Directive Principles of State Policy 66, and provide
safety to its citizenry. A welfare state, must do everything in its power to protect the
61
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301. See also, S. Rangarajn v. P. Jagjivan
Ram, (1989) SCC (2) 574; Kachrulal Bhagirath Agrawal v. State of Maharashtra 2005 9 SCC 36.
62
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2 SCC 1: AIR 1978 SC 771.
63
Id.
64
See, Ram & Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1147; R. Venugopala Naidu & others v.
Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities & others, A.I.R 1990 SC 444; Committee of Management of Panchaiyappa's
Trust v. Official Trustee of Madras & another, (1994) 1 SCC 475; TVL Sundram Granites v. Imperial Granites
Ltd & others, (1999) 8 SCC 150; Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Mathias Oram, (2010) 11 SCC 269.
65
See, Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 199; Union of India v. C. Dinakar, 2004 6 SCC 118;
Kapila Hingorani v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 1.
66
INDIA CONST., art. 38(1).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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RESPONDENT
health and safety of public.67 Hitherto, the respondents plead before the Hon’ble Court to
consider the duties of public welfare of the Winlandan state on the grounds that, [3.1.1]
the ban did not vitiate the doctrines of proportionality and reasonability and because,
[3.1.2] the ban did not work in contravention of tests of balancing of interest and
necessity.
3.1.1. The ban did not vitiate the Doctrines of Proportionality and Reasonability
21. It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that, proportionality is an essential facet
of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and
quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the
law.68 As was held in the landmark judgment of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India69, four
subcomponents of proportionality which need to be satisfied, were taken note of; firstly, a
measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal, secondly, it must be a suitable
means of furthering this goal, thirdly, there must not be any less restrictive but equally
effective alternative, and lastly, the measure must not have a disproportionate impact on
the rightholder.70 Corroborating the ratio of the forestated judgment with the instant case,
the state action that mandated the ban of chirp, was the only suitable means of achieving
the forestated aim, as the nuisance caused by Chirp, be it in terms of exposure of minors
towards pornographic material71, data security issues72 as well exercise of unwarranted
censorship measures73, could not have been contained by any other lesser restrictive
means.
22. It is duly asseverated that, in the event of the constitutionality of a law being challenged,
the question that arises is whether the administrative or legislative order is ‘rational’ or
‘reasonable’.74 The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only
have to see whether the view of the legislator is one which no reasonable person could
67
See, Kalyani Stores v. State of Orissa, AIR 1966 SC 1686; State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation, AIR
1981 SC 463; Ellis v. Home Office (1953) 2 All ER 149; C.J.R v. Radfordshire (1855) 24 LJQB 81 (84).
68
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 25. See also, Chintaman Rao v. State Of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118; Bachan Singh v. State Of Punjab, (1982) 3 SCC 24.
69
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
70
See, Modern Dental College case (2016) 7 SCC 353; Ashok Kumar Thakur v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC
36; National Legal Services Association v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1863; Suchita Srivastava v.
Administration of Chandigarh, AIR 2010 SC 235.
71
MOOT PROPOSITION, p 11, ¶ 48.
72
MOOT PROPOSITION, p. 10, ¶ 45.
73
MOOT PROPOSITION, p. 7, ¶ 27.
74
J GOODWIN, THE LAST DEFENCE OF WEDNESBURY 445,452 (Oxford 2012).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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RESPONDENT
have taken.75 In the instant case, reckoning the profundity of the situation, it is perfectly
reasonable for state to restrict functioning of entities like Chirp that pose as security
threats.
3.1.2. The ban did not work in contravention of tests of balancing of interest and necessity.
23. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that, in a democracy with multifaceted
and varied interests like ours, it is only reasonable for certain interests to clash against
each other, and to resolve such dispute, the tests of necessity and balancing of interests
are applied.76 According to the test of necessity suggested in Coimbatore District Central
Cooperative Bank's case77 and Sahara India case78 the balancing test permits scrutiny of
excessive onerous penalties or infringement of rights or interests and a manifest
imbalance of relevant considerations. In the instant case, the Right to Freedom of
Expression must be balanced against the duty of the state to ensure public safety. In
exceptional cases like this, security considerations must be given priority over the Right
to Expression.
3.2. Runerians are not entitled to claim Right to Self-Determination in the instant case
24. Applicants may rely on the erga omnes character of self-determination in order to justify
its support for the referendum. However, the context of this principle is only limited to
situations of colonial and alien domination. 79 In any event, under the Friendly Relations
Declaration,80 the Right of Self-Determination can only be exercised within the confines
prescribed by the other principles, including territorial integrity. 81 Hence, Runerians may
not claim the Right to Self-Determination on the grounds that, [3.2.1] the Runerians
cannot be qualified as “peoples” for the purposes of Self-Determination.
75
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611.
76
Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2012) 10 SCC 603.
77
Coimbatore District Central Cooperative Bank's case, (2007) 4 SCC 669.
78
Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited v. Securities and Exchange Board of India, (2012) 10 SCC 603.
79
UNGA, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, art. 2, G.A. Res.
1514 (XV) (1960); Thürer, D & T. Burri, Self-determination, Oxford Publ. I`tnl L., MPEPIL 6, 15 (2008).
80
G.A. Res. 37/42, U.N. Doc. A/Res/37/42 (1982); G.A. Res. 38/16, U.N. Doc. A/38/47 (1983); G.A. Res.
61/150, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/150 (2006); G.A. Res. 62/144, U.N. Doc. A/Res/62/144 (2007).
81
The Arbitration Commission of the European on the former Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 2, 31 I.L.M. 1497
(1992); T. MUSGRAVE, SELF-DETERMINATION AND NATIONAL MINORITIES, 247 (2000).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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RESPONDENT
3.2.1. The Runerians cannot be qualified as “peoples” for the purposes of Self-
Determination
25. The Charter,82 the Friendly Relation Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights83 provide for a Right to Self-Determination of “peoples”. This term is
not defined, but there is wide consensus that “people” encompasses the whole population
of a given State or non-self-governing territory and does not, in particular, include ethnic
groups or minorities.84 Thus, this Court has described the Right to Self-Determination as
one embracing “all peoples and territories which have not yet attained independence,”85
thereby referring to the whole population, not to its constituent ethnic groups. The
Declaration on Inadmissibility used the terms “nations” and “peoples” as synonyms.86
26. Similarly, in the Åaland Island case, it was noted that international law does not permit
“separation of a minority from the State of which it forms part.”87 This is supported both
by the position of eminent scholars88 of international law and vast state practice.89
Moreover, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights declared Self-
Determination to be the right of a people to choose their form of political organization
and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, but “this does not mean,
however, that it recognizes the right to self-determination of any ethnic group as such.”90
In Kosovo case, the most recent occasion on this question before the Court, many States
submitted in their oral or written pleadings that “people” does not include minority or
ethnic groups on the territory of an existing State.91
82
Charter of the United Nations, art. 1(2), 1 UNTS XVI (1945).
83
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966).
84
Kosovo, Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations, Oral
Proceedings, 3 December 2009, ¶36; ICCPR, Third Periodic Reports of States Parties due in 1991, Addendum,
Report Submitted by Shri Lanka, CCRP/C/70/Add.6, (1944).
85
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 1, ¶162; Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276,
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶52-5.
86
UNGA, Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection
of their Independence and Sovereignty, A/RES/36/103 (1965).
87
Åaland Island, Report by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Council Document B7
21/68/106, 318 (1921).
88
2 J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 415 (SAGE 2006).
89
The position of States as Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand, ratifying the ICCPR, Badinter
Commission, Opinion No 2.
90
Report on the Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, I.A.C.H.R., OAS,
OEA/Ser.L/V.II.62, Doc. 10, Eev. 3, ¶9 (1983).
91
Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo, Written
Statement of Argentine, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
xlix
RESPONDENT
27. Corroborating the forestated ratios with the case at hand, the Runerians do not possess
any Right to external Self-Determination, as they are a minority community within the
state of Winland, and while they enjoy the right to cultural development and protection 92,
i.e, the right to internal Self-Determination, 93 they do not identify as a population of a
non-self-governing body under foreign dominion. Additionally, self-determination, as a
philosophical principle, is often read into the idea of independence and self-sustenance. 94
In the instant case, the Runerian population of Winland has no such secessionist
tendencies, nor are they desirous of an existence beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
Winland, thitherto, they may not exercise the Right to Self-determination.
28. Hence, considering the Right to external Self-Determination is not applicable upon
Runerians and their Right to internal Self-Determination is preserved, the state action of
banning of Chirp, did not serve antithetical to any rights of the Runerians en masse.
4. THAT, THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER MANDATING THE BAN ON CHIRP AND THE
SUBSEQUENT DIRECTIVE OF MANDATORILY DIVESTING THE ASSETS OF CHIRP AND ITS

AFFILIATE ENTITIES, IS TENABLE
29. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that the presidential order mandating the
ban on Chirp, and the subsequent directive of mandatorily divesting the assets of Chirp
and its affiliate entities, is tenable, on the grounds that, [4.1] the residential order falls
within the vires of the powers of the Executive as prescribed by the Winlandian
Constitution and because, [4.2] in arguendo, the presidential order is not antithetical to the
global environment of free trade and competitive markets.
4.1. The Presidential Order falls within the vires of the powers of the Executive as
prescribed by the Winlandian Constitution
30. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that, if president is satisfied that it is
necessary or expedient for the interest of the state and its security, he may direct any
92
Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia, Extraordinary European Political Cooperation Ministerial
Meeting, EC Press Release 61/91 (1991).
93
S.C. Res. 724, U.N. Doc. S/Res/724 ¶7 (1991); G.A. Res. 441 (V), U.N. Doc. A/Res/441/5 (1950); G.A. Res.
1723 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/Res/1723/16 (1961); General Recommendation 21, The right to self-determination,
U.N. Doc. A/51/18, annex VIII, 125 (1996).
94
Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Conflict in Georgia, 2008/901/CFSP,
(2009).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
l
RESPONDENT
agency of government to block the public access of any information. 95 On similar lines, in
pursuance of Article 123 of the Constitution 96, the President is bestowed with the
ordinance making power to deal with the unforeseen and urgent circumstances 97 and
provides that the Act of Parliament and the Act by the Executive would have the same
effect.98 It is argued that such a power to such promulgation is granted by the Constitution
and so falls within the vires of the powers of the Executive on the grounds that, [4.1.1.]
the President need not prove the existence of circumstances that may warrant ‘immediate
action’ and that his satisfaction alone is enough to sustain the executive action taken
during period of emergency, and that [4.1.2.] the impugned presidential order is not
violative of the GFEPA and does not vitiate the limits of discretionary powers granted to
the executive.
4.1.1. The President need not prove the existence of circumstances that may warrant
‘immediate action’ and that his satisfaction alone is enough to sustain the executive action
31. It is humbly asseverated before this Hon’ble Court that, if the President is satisfied that a
circumstance needs immediate action and that the action so taken is in the best interest of
the nation and its national security, then he does not need to prove and justify how the
circumstance demanded immediate action.99 His satisfaction and prudent decision are
enough to sustain executive action taken during period of emergency. 100 The bare reading
of Article 35(1) of the Winlandan Constitution suggests that the only essential required is
that the State or the authorized officer needs to be satisfied that it is necessary or
expedient to take such a step.101 It has been observed in numerous cases102 that it lies
95
MOOT PROPOSITION, ANNEXURE C, p. 25.
96
INDIA CONST., art. 123.
97
See, R.K Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675; K. Nagraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1985) 1 SCC 523;
R.C Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, 1994 (3) SCC 1.
98
See, Sat Pal v. Lt. Gou., AIR 1979 SC 1550; Venkata v. State of A.P., AIR 1985 SC 724; Nag Raj v. State of
A.P.. AIR 1985 SC 551 and A. K. Roy v. Union of india, AIR 1985 SC 710.
99
See, Union of India v. R.S. Saini, 1999(2) SCC 151; Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association v. Union of
India, (2001) 2 SCC 294; U.P Rashtriya Chini Mill Adhikari Parishad v. State of U.P 1995 4 SCC 738.
100
101
102
See, Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit & Ors v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1980. See Also,
Union of India & Others v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary, AIR 1979 SC 1415; Dr. Yogesh Chandra Govil &
Etc. Etc. v. State Of U.P & Others, 1990 SCCOnLine All 790; K. Nagaraj & Ors v. State of Andhra Pradesh &
Anr., AIR 1985 SC 551; State of Punjab v. (In Both the Appeals), AIR 1969 SC 903; Fathima Beebi v. M.K
Ravindranathan & Others, 1974 SCCOnLine Ker 34; S.K.G Sugar Ltd. v. State Of Bihar And Others, AIR 1974
SC 1533; A.K. Roy v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1982 SC 710; Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma And Others,
AIR 1945 PC 48; B. Kota Mallaiah And Others v. Commissioner & Registrar Of Co-Operative Societies, 1990
SCCOnLine AP 324; M. Maniklal v. State Of Mysore And Others, AIR 1977 SC 361; Lalit Narayan Mishra
STATEMENT OF FACTS
li
RESPONDENT
solely on the President’s prudence as to determine what circumstances justify

promulgation of ordinance and the necessity of such issuance and further rendered such
question to be not justiciable. Thus, the presidential order is not open for contention on
the grounds of its rationale, as long as it has been promulgated at the satisfaction of
President Palpatine.
4.1.2. The impugned presidential order is not violative of the GFEPA and does not vitiate the
limits of discretionary powers granted to the executive.
32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Winland, has usually been seen to have exercised
commendable judicial restraint when it comes to adjudging the constitutionality of
delegated legislations103 and albeit erring on the side of cautions, has upheld the basic
principle of cooperative federalism underscoring the validity of delegated legislations on
multiple counts.104 Only when delegated legislations grossly infracts the parent statute
beyond reasonable doubt105, it comes under the stringent radar of the judicial machinery.
Moreover, it is not the form or incidental infringement that determines the
constitutionality of a, statute in reference to the fundamental rights, but the reality and
substance.106 Corroborating the postulates stated above with the facts at hand, not only
should the impugned Order be bestowed with the benefit of doubt of constitutionality,
there also exists nothing to prove otherwise.
4.2. In arguendo, the Presidential Order is not antithetical to the global environment of
free trade and competitive markets
33. Without any prejudice to the forestated arguments, it is humbly submitted before the
Hon’ble Court that, in arguendo, the Presidential Order promulgated to safeguard the
national security does not affect the free trade and competitive markets. Article XX of the
GATT, 1994 dealing with general exceptions provides that any party may enforce
And Another v. State Of Bihar And Others, 1986 SCCOnLine Pat 172; C. Narayanaswamy And Others, Etc. v.
State Of Karnataka And Another, 1991 SCCOnLine Kar 141.
103
See, State of Tamil Nadu v. V.P. Krishnamurthy, 2006 4 SCC 517; Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Others v.
State of Karnataka and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 574; Sharma Transport v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2002 2 SCC
188; Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, 1996 2 SCC 405.
104
See, St. John’s Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, NCTE, 2003 3 SCC 321; Benoarilal Sarma
Case, (1944) L.R. 72 I.A. 57; The Queen v. Burah, 276 U.S. 394; Russell v. The Queen, (1878) 3 App. Cas.
889; King-Emperor v. (1882) 7 App. Cas. 829, 835.
105
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi, 2008 4 SCC 720.
106
See, Ram Singh v. The State of Delhi, 1951 AIR 270; Express Newspapers (Private) Ltd. v. The Union of
India, 1985 2 SCR 287.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
lii
RESPONDENT
measures that are necessary to protect public morals, to secure compliance with laws,
etc.107 The Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter “TBT”) Agreement allows striking a
balance between avoiding the creation of unnecessary obstacles to international trade and
the Member States’ right to regulate, as held in the scenario of US-Clove Cigarettes108. To
substantiate the forestated, it is argued that, [4.2.1.] the “less favourable” treatment meted
out to companies affiliated to adversaries of Winlandan, has legitimate reasons, and
[4.2.2.] in arguendo, the impugned Order is within the permissible limits of justifiable
discrimination as a measure of security exception.
4.2.1. The “less favourable” treatment meted out to companies affiliated to adversaries of
Winlandan, has legitimate reasons
34. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that; no ‘less favourable’ treatment was
meted out to Qinquestian company. If the Applicants claim otherwise, the burden of proof
that less favourable treatment is being accorded to the imported product than the domestic
one lies on the shoulders on the complaining party, as was held in US — Tuna II
(Mexico).109 Winland had few of its own social media platforms which were either banned
or heavily censored in Qinquest.110 As their own alternative to Winlandan apps, Qinquest
introduced Chirp.111 Chirp and the other Winlandan social media platform are like
products.112 Since Chirp was built as an alternative to the other platforms, that means it is
closely substitutable application and falls under the scope of Article III:2 of the GATT
1994, as found by the AB in Philippines - Taxes on distilled spirits. 113 Further, Article 2.2
of TBT Agreement suggests that obstacles to international trade may be permitted insofar
as they are not found to be unnecessary, as has been suggested in US-Clove Cigarettes.114
Only certain legitimate objectives like national security requirements, prevention of
107
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947).
108
United States — Clove Cigarettes, (WT/DS406/AB/R).
109
US – Tuna II (Mexico), (WT/DS381/AB/R). See also, Philippines - Distilled Spirits, (WT/DS396/AB/R).
110
MOOT PROPOSITION, p. 5 ¶ 15.
111
112
113
Philippines - Taxes on distilled spirits, (WT/DS396/AB/R). See Also, Canada — Periodicals,
(WT/DS31/AB/R); Korea — Alcoholic Beverages, (WT/DS75/AB/R); Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II,
(WT/DS8/AB/R); European Communities — Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
(WT/DS27/AB/R), Panel Report, China –Electronic Payment Services, (WT/DS413/R).
114
United States — Clove Cigarettes, (WT/DS406/AB/R). See Also, Thailand — Cigarettes (Philippines),
(WT/DS371/AB/R), EC — Asbestos, (WT/DS135/AB/R); Japan — Alcoholic Beverages II, (WT/DS8/AB/R);
Korea — Various Measures on Beef, (WT/DS161/AB/R); European Communities - Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (WT/DS400/AB/R); US — COOL, (WT/DS384/AB/R) .
STATEMENT OF FACTS
liii
RESPONDENT
deceptive activities, etc can form the grounds of exception.115 Establishing the point of
national security concerns, it is asseverated that Chirp has been heavily monitored as has
been found by policy groups and investigation agencies 116 and also had 130 members of
QCP, which means that the information accessed could be used as potential blackmail
material.117 This poses a threat to national security as it is very plausible that information
sensitive to the Winland might as well get leaked and be misused by Qinquest.
4.2.2. In arguendo, the impugned Order is within the permissible limits of justifiable
discrimination as a measure of security exception
35. It is humbly asseverated before this Hon’ble Court that, has recourse to Article XIV bis of
the GATS118, which provides that a member can adopt and enforce any Measure, in the
interest of national or international security, otherwise inconsistent with its obligations. 119
In essence, Article XIV bis, GATS confers unrestricted discretions upon members to
frame measures inconsistent with GATS, in the interest of legitimate security. 120 This is
due to three reasons mainly. Firstly, the plain reading of the text reveals the use of the
term ‘its’ essential security interest, which means that it is the judgment of the member
which is determinative.121 These actions are intrinsically political in nature and can only
be assessed properly by the member in question. Second, this is also supported by the
context of Article XIV, which lacks the ‘it considers’ phraseology which is used in
Article XIV bis, which indicates its self-judging nature. 122 Thirdly, the supplementary
means of interpretation i.e., travaux préparatoires, provides that the provision is self-
judging.123 The travaux préparatoires of the Article XXI, GATT should be given
precedence when interpreting Article XIV bis because both provisions have semantic
similarities. The history of the GATT reveals that members are empowered to take steps
115
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), art 2.2, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (1994).
116
MOOT PROPOSITION, P. 10 ¶ 41.
117
MOOT PROPOSITION, P. 14 ¶ 41-42.
118
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, art. XIV bis, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994).
119
Raj Bhala, National Security and International Trade Law: What the GATT says and what the United States
does, 19(2) PENN LAW REV. 263 (2014).
120
Marckx v Belgium, 6833/74 (ECtHR, 1979) and Leander v Sweden, 9248/81 (ECtHR. 1987).
121
GATS art. XIV bis supra note 118.
122
Roger P. Alford, The Self-Judging WTO Security Exception, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 697 (2011).
123
See, United States - Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, (WT/DS285/AB/R).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
liv
RESPONDENT
to protect their essential security interest, and the political approach, is subject to judicial
deference.124
36. Placing reliance at the forestated provisions of law it is therefore submitted before the
Hon’ble Court that, Winland is at liberty to frame regulations, which may, as a general
rule, be antithetical to the provisions of free-trade, in the interest of national security, and
that Winland does not need to evince the international community as to the rationale
behind claiming such exception, as, the provisions are self-judging in nature.
5. THAT, PRESIDENT PALPATINE’S QUIP OF ADDRESSING SICKNESS VIRUS AS “DRAGON
VIRUS” DOES NOT QUALIFY AS AN ACT OF DEFAMATION OF THE STATE OF QINQUEST
37. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that, President Palpatine’s quip of
addressing Sickness Virus as “Dragon Virus” does not qualify as an act of Defamation of
the State of Qinquest, on the grounds that, [5.1] state entities do not have the requisite
locus standi to sue for defamation and [5.2] in arguendo, President Palpatine’s remark
was made in his personal capacity and was not attributable to Winland.
5.1. State entities do not have the requisite locus standi to sue for defamation
38. It is humbly asseverated before this Hon’ble Court that in matters concerning relations
with foreign states, judicial review is not usually required when matters may be solved at
the diplomatic sphere125 as the principle of independence of foreign states 126 usually
comes into play.In the present case as well, the need for a judicial review is obviated. In
pursuance of this, it is submitted that Qinquest does not have the required locus standi to
sue Winland for defamation on the grounds that [5.1.1] Mmaintaining defamation suits
filed by Public or Elected Entities, vitiates the Right of Fair Criticism and [5.1.2] the
citizens have a Right to be Informed of the Truth and that truth is a defence against
defamation.
124
See, Russia – Measures concerning traffic in transit (WT/DS512/AB/R).
125
R v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Pirbhai 107 ILR, p. 462.
126
Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v. Hammer, (1982) AC 888.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
lv
RESPONDENT
5.1.1. Maintaining defamation suits filed by Public or Elected Entities, vitiates the Right of
Fair Criticism as well as that of Speech and Expression
39. It is humbly proffered before the Hon’ble Court that it is irrational to envisage the right to
sue for defamation to the public bodies.127 Being elected for the public and by the public,
such bodies should be open to unconstrained public criticism 128. The European Court of
Human Rights, by way of its judgement in Lingens v. Austria129, has laid down that public
official, politicians themselves know that they are open to scrutiny and criticism and must
bear a greater tolerance level. Allowing them to sue for defamation makes the criticizers
susceptible to civil action for defamation which in turn would have a deterring effect on
citizen’s freedom of speech.130 In the present case as well, the parties must acknowledge
that occasional usage of vague and inappropriate terms in heated diplomatic debates is
understandable and hence these must be viewed from a higher level of tolerance.
5.1.2. Citizens have a Right to be Informed of the Truth and that truth is a good defence
against defamation
40. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that truth is an exception to defamation
and it is a valid defence in a case of defamation. For a comment to be defence, it must be
a fair expression of opinion and not an assertion. 131 In the instant case, Palpatine only
expressed his opinion and in no way made an assertion because as seen in numerous
historic instances, the name of the virus or microbe is generally associated with the place
of its origin/speculative origin. For example, Ebola derives its name from an African
River although the origin of the virus is still unknown. 132 Zika Virus and Spanish Flu are
127
Rajgopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632. See Also, Derbyshire County Council v. Times
Newspapers Ltd., [1993] 1 All ER 1011; City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595.
128
U.N. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Mexico, U.N. Document CCPR/C/79/Add. 109, 27 July 1999, ¶ 14.
129
Lingens v. Austria, Application No. 9815/82 (ECtHR, 1986). See Also, Lopes Gomez da Silva v. Portugal,
Application No. 37698/97 (ECtHR); Wabl v. Austria, Application No. 24773/94 (ECtHR); Oberschlick v.
Austria, Application No. 11662/85 (ECtHR); Janowski v. Poland, Application No. 25716/94 (ECtHR).
130
Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] 1 All ER 1011. See Also, Rajgopal v. State of
Tamil Nadu, (1994) 6 SCC 632; City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595; Castells v. Spain, 14 EHRR 445.
131
Radheshyam Tiwari v. Eknath Dinaji Bhiwapurkar & Ors., 1984 SCCOnLine Bom 153. See Also,
Balsubramania v. Raja Gopala Charier, 1944 SCC OnLine Mad 9; Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, (1991) 4 All ER
817; Geetha v. A.K. Dhamodharan, CDJ 2011 MHC 3809 5; Asoke Kumar Sarkar & Anr. v. Radha Kanto
Pandey & Ors., 1966 SCC OnLine Cal 15; P.K. Niyogi v. Praveen Nishi, 2018 SCC OnLine Chh 680;
Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, Ministry of Law & Ors., (2016) 7 SCC 221 ; Dr. Shashi Tharoor v.
Arnab Goswami, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12049; Vir Sanghvi Petitioner v. Outlook Media Private Limited &
Ors., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6391.
132
Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, Ebola, Infectious Disease, Series 1, (1976).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
lvi
RESPONDENT
other examples. Similarly, Palpatine, placing reliance on the worldwide-spread notion,

used the phrase ‘Dragonvirus’ just like it has been done in earlier times. There was no
malice involved in the quip prima facie.
41. Additionally, because of their nature, statements of opinion are not considered false
because they are subjective to the speaker 133, as was upheld in Hustler v. Falwell134.
Hence, even if later on, the origin turns out to be some place other than Qinquest,
Palpatine’s remark cannot be seen as defamatory as it would have been an honest
mistake, as he neither had the knowledge of it being a false statement, nor did he make it
with actual animus.
5.2. In arguendo, President Palpatine’s remark was made in his personal capacity and was
not attributable to Winland
42. Without any prejudice to the forestated arguments, in arguendo, it is humbly submitted
before the Hon’ble Court that, the remarks made in personal capacity cannot be
attributable135 to the State, because, [5.2.1] the provisions of application of ARSIWA have
not been met and [5.2.2] the statement in itself, did not overtly defame Qinquest.
5.1.1. The essentials of application of ARSIWA have not been met
43. It is humbly asseverated before the Hon’ble Court that, only if a person commits an
internationally wrongful act under the direction or control of the State, shall it be
considered an act of the State. 136 Article 11 of ARSIWA strictly envisages that the
conduct of private entities can be essentially attributed to the State if the State itself
‘acknowledges’ or ‘adopts’ such conduct to be its own.137 This was applied in a number of
foreign cases, like United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case 138 and
133
Robert D. Sack, Protection of Opinion under the First Amendment: Reflections on Alfred Hill, “Defamation
and Privacy under the First Amendment”, 100 COLUMBIA LAW REV.298, (2000).
134
Hustler v. Falwell, 56 U.S.L.W. 4180. See also, New York Times v. Sullivan, US SC 1964; Shenandoah Pub.
House, Inc. v. Gunter, 427 S.E.2d 370 (1993); American Commc’n Networks v. Williams, 568 S.E.2d 683;
Haycox v. Dunn, 104 S.E.2d 800; Alexandria Gazette Corp. v. West, 93 S.E.2d 274; St. Amant v. Thompson,
390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 714 (4th Cir. 1991).
135
Elena Laura Alvarez Ortega, The Attribution of International Responsibility to a State for the Conduct of
Private Individuals within the Territory of Another State, J. ANA. L. (2014).
136
G. A. Res. 62/61, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 8 (2008).
137
Id.
138
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, at p. 29.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
lvii
RESPONDENT
Lighthouses Arbitration.139 In the present case as well, President Palpatine cannot be said
to have made the contentious comment in the capacity of being a President of Winland or
on behalf of Winland because such remarks weren’t made in any official platform or
event such as a press conference. Moreover, Republic of Winland has neither
acknowledged nor adopted the conduct of Palpatine as its own, and hence, there are no
maintainable instances to prove the imputability in the present case.
5.1.2. The statement in itself, did not overtly defame Qinquest
44. It is humbly pleaded that Palpatine did not make any uniquely identifiable and sustained
remark overtly defaming Qinquest. Statements are only actionable when they are directly
referred to the plaintiff and injure his reputation, and the Court must strictly interpret the
verbatim of the remarks without reading unspoken words into the statement 140. In absence
of animus against the plaintiff, the contents can be said only to be fair comment and not
defamatory statement.141 In the instant case too, there existed nothing in the verbatim of
the speech that was directly stipulated against Qinquest, and the usage of “Dragon”, in
itself, cannot be assumed to have been a quip against Qinquest, as, the same can have a
multitude of connotations. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court
that Palpatine’s remark may not qualify as defamation of state.
139
Affaire relative à la concession des phares de l’Empire ottoman, UNRIAA, vol. XII (Sales No. 63.V.3)
(1956).
140
Obergefell v. Hodges, No. 14-556, slip op. at 22–23 (U.S. June 26, 2015).
141
K.S. Sundram v. S. Vishwanathan & Anr., AIR 2013 (NOC) 216 (Mad).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
lviii
RESPONDENT
- PRAYER FOR RELIEF -
Wherefore, in light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited and arguments
advanced, it is most humbly implored before the Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to: -
 Firstly, observe that the instant case is not maintainable before the Hon’ble Court;
 Secondly, declare that, the ban imposed on Chirp by the virtue of the Presidential
Order is not violative of the principles of speech and expression enshrined both in the
Winlandan constitution and the International Law;
 Thirdly, hold that, the ban imposed on Chirp by the Presidential order, is not
antithetical to the Rights to Life and Personal Liberty as well as that of Self-
Determination of the Runerians under the Winlandan Constitution as well as
International Law;
 Fourthly, observe that, the Presidential Order and the subsequent directive are tenable
under the principles of international law;
 Lastly, hold that, the statement made by President Palpatine was executed under his
private capacity and does not constitute as defamation of Qinquest.
And /or pass any other order that it may be pleased to, in the interest of Justice, Equity and
Good Conscience, and for this act of kindness, the counsels on behalf of the Respondent shall
duty bound forever pray.
Respectfully
Submitted,
Counsels on behalf of the

Respondent
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

xxxiv

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10TH RMLNLU – SCC MEDIA LAW MOOT, 2022 MEMORIAL for

RMLNLU – SCC ONLINE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION,

IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS

TO SUBMIT TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN

THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF QINQUEST

THE REPUBLIC OF WINLAND

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

Table of Contents ................................................................................................................ii-iv

1.1.1. The matter at hand does not classify as a ‘dispute’.................................................1

2.2. The Right to Freedom of Expression is subject to restrictions under International

2.2.1.1. The Restrictions acted towards bonafide Furtherance of a Legitimate

2.2.1.2. The Restrictions were requisite in a Democratic Society………………….8

5. That, President Palpatine’s quip of addressing Sickness Virus as “Dragonvirus”

5.1.1. The essentials of application of ARSIWA have not been met.................................20

5.1.2. The statement in itself, did not overtly defame Qinquest........................................20

Prayer for Relief……………………………………………………………….,………..xxxiv

Abbreviation Corresponding Expansion

Committee on the Elimination of Racial

Cri. LJ Criminal Law Journal

HLR Harvard Law Review

International Covenant on Civil and

ILR International Law Review

SCC Supreme Court Cases Online

United Nations Declaration of Human

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council

LEGAL SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS

Bibliographic Information Corresponding

1. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), art 2.2, 1868

2. Charter of the United Nations, art. 1(2), 1 UNTS XVI (1945). 12

3. G. A. Res. 62/61, Responsibility of States for Internationally

4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Art. XX, 55

7. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(1), 33 UNTS 993

JUDGEMENTS OF THE ICJ AND THE PCIJ

Bibliographic Information Corresponding

1. Aerial Incident of 10 March 1953 (United States of

8. Aerial Incident of 4 September 1954 (United States of

9. Aerial Incident of 7 November 1954 (United States of

11. Ambatielos (Greece v. United Kingdom), [1952] ICJ 1 1

12. Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council

13. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the

14. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of

15. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (New

16. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras),

17. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Preliminary

18. Certain Property (Liechtenstein v Germany), Judgment, Preliminary

19. Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti

20. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy),

21. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland),

22. Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) 3

23. Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] ICJ Rep 3 3

24. LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), [1998] ICJ Rep 432 3

25. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and

28. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), [1974] ICJ Rep 253 3

30. Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of the United States of

31. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, Judgment,

32. Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia and New Zealand (intervening) v.

ADVISORY OPINIONS OF THE ICJ

Bibliographic Information Corresponding

1. Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of

34. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South