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J. R. Statist. Soc. A (1990)
153, Part 1, pp. 73-94
SUMMARY
Many of Lenin's arguments were based on statistical analysis, and in the Soviet milieu he is
widely praised as a statistician. In this paper we first examine the background and influences
of Lenin's statistics and also consider his statistical arguments, some of which are often cited
in the Soviet literature. Our general conclusions are that (a) in his earlier work Lenin
exhibited innate craftmanship in analysing large-scale statistical data, (b) his statistics owes
much to V. E. Postnikov, P. N. Skvortsov and F. A. Shcherbina whose influence has been
downplayed, (c) Lenin was not beyond turning his analysis to political ends, (d) his
influence among established statisticians in the Russian Empire, including the zemstvo
statisticians, was quite modest and (e) he was instrumental in establishing official statistical
organs in the USSR.
Keywords: CENSUSES IN USSR; CENTRAL STATISTICAL ADMINISTRATION OF USSR; PEASANTRY
IN RUSSIAN EMPIRE; STRATIFICATION; TYPICAL SAMPLING; ZEMSTVO STATISTICS
1. INTRODUCTION
The authority of V. I. Lenin (1870-1924) has been one of the most durable
phenomena in the USSR during the 70 years of the Soviet state. It has been kept
continuously on a high level since Lenin's death in January 1924 with peaks coinciding
with the periods of decline of influence of his successors. Thus at the height of Stalin's
regime after World War 11(1946-53) Stalin's authority was at least as great as Lenin's,
but to fill the vacuum of de-Stalinization Lenin's authority intensified during the
Khrushchev era and the early years of Brezhnev's era (1954-70), slightly diminishing
during the peak period of Brezhnev's consolidation of power (the later 1970s and early
1980s). At present, in the first years of Gorbachev's era of de-Brezhnevization and
de-Stalinization Lenin's authority remains intact and his pronouncements have not as
yet been challenged even in the avant-garde, pro-reform and pro-democratic, liberal
press in the Soviet Union.
Among numerous manifestations of Lenin's personality cult were the articles on
Lenin's contributions to statistics which have made their yearly appearance in Vestnik
Statistiki-the official monthly journal of the Central Statistical Administration
(CSA) (Tsentral'noe Statisticheskoe Upravleniye: since 1987 known as the State
Committee on Statistics) usually in the April (fourth) issue to coincide with Lenin's
birthday. These articles have been especially adulatory on special anniversaries such
as the 100th in 1970 and the 110th in 1980. Many books have been written devoted to
the analysis of Lenin's philosophy of, and contributions to, statistics. The most recent
is the book by T. V. Ryabushkin (1914-87) (a long time member of the International
Statistical Institute who also served twice as Vice-President of this organization)
tAddress for correspondence: College of Business and Management, University of Maryland, College Park, MD
20742, USA.
? 1990 Royal Statistical Society 0035-9238/90/153073 $2.00
74 KOTZ AND SENETA [Part1,
Leninskoye Naslediye i Statistika (Lenin's Heritage and Statistics) (Ryabushkin,
1978). Ryabushkin also coedited several volumes dealing with the development of
statistical science in Lenin's work in 1969 and 1979 to honour Lenin's 100th and 110th
birthdays. The recent book by Ryabushkin et al. (1986) TeoreticheskiyeKontseptsii v
Otechestvennoi Statistike (Theoretical Concepts of Motherland Statistics) contains
extensive bibliographical material on Soviet publications devoted to 'the deve-
lopment and methodology of statistics in Lenin's works as well as utilization of
Lenin's scientific heritage in the theory and practice of Soviet statistics'. During
the years 1963-73 the publishing house Statistika published books by Gurevich
(1963), Malyi (1963, 1965), Ryabushkin (1964), Pisarev (1964), Suslov (1965),
Libkind (1967) (which deals with 'The analysis of American agricultural censuses
in V. I. Lenin's works') and Ovsienko and Vitalina (1967) in addition to the
trilogy, edited by Ryabushkin (1970-73), V. L Lenin i Sovremennaya Statistika
(V. L Lenin and Modern Statistics). Gurevich (1959) lists 86 publications of Lenin
which touch on the problems of statistics, while Ryabushkin (1973) extends this list
to 149 items.
Certainly, in the 1930s even competent statisticians alluded seriously to Lenin's
work on grouping (see Boiarskii et al. (1935); the authorship represents a spectrum of
statistical talent of the time-in 1938 both Brand and Khotimskii were branded as
enemies of the people (Bolshevik, 1938)). Eventually this seems to have degenerated to
lip service and it is not clear how much attention is being paid now by practising Soviet
statisticians to this flood of adulatory publications on Lenin by the hierarchy of the
Soviet statistical establishment. However, an early feeble criticism of this overkill is
mentioned even in the conservative VestnikStatistiki when one of the more outspoken
Soviet senior statistician-educators, F. D. Livshitz (1897-1975) (at a meeting in May
of 1969 devoted to a discussion of publications that had appeared in Vestnik in the
previous few years) expressed some reservations ('highly questionable' in the opinion
of the editors) as to the content of papers dealing with 'Lenin's statistical theoretical
heritage' published during the 1960s (Livshitz, 1969).
Lenin is credited in Soviet publications as a craftsman in utilizing statistical
methodology for analysis of data. (This view has also been expressed by Willetts
(1967) in a non-Soviet publication on Lenin). It is also claimed that he was very
attentive to the most recent developments in statistical methodology (Ryabushkin
(1978), p. 38), that he served as an inspiration and as a teacher of Soviet statisticians
(Vestnik Statistiki, 1965) and that he established the statistical organs in the USSR
(Vestnik Statistiki, 1955). The last claim is perhaps the least objectionable. His
contributions to statistics have been subdivided into political statistics (Suslov, 1979),
economic statistics (Ryabushkin, 1978), labour statistics (Malyi, 1963; Pisarev, 1964),
statistical analysis (Ryabushkin, 1964), industrial statistics (Suslov, 1965) and it is
even asserted (Ovsienko; 1958) that Lenin, in his works, established the foundations
of contemporary statistical science.
An article of the adulatory kind by an eminent probabilist is available in English
(Gnedenko, 1970). As one reads such monotonously repetitious Soviet assessments of
Lenin as a statistician, starting with the obituary published in Vestnik Statistiki in
1924 written by P. I. Popov (1872-1950) (reprinted in the July issue of the same
journal in 1988) and Pisarev (1949) in the first issue of Vestnik Statistiki after its non-
appearance for more than a decade, one cannot help but wonder at the degree of
accuracy in the appraisals of Lenin's talents and his role as a statistician.
1990] LENIN AS A STATISTICIAN 75
The purpose of this paper is to present a non-Soviet and hopefully more objective
view of Lenin as a statistician (though we must keep in mind that he was primarily a
politician) and to comment briefly on his involvement in running statistical agencies in
the USSR in the last 6 years of his life as head of the Soviet state. These facets of
Lenin's activity have been neglected hitherto in western publications on Lenin.
TABLE 1
Ostrogozhsk Uezd, Voronezh Gubernia
tThe unit of land area used is the dessiatina (about 2.7 acres).
82 KOTZ AND SENETA [Part1,
TABLE 2
Distribution of 24 households
tAccording to Lenin's footnote the seven former 'poor peasants' have been subdivided in this way.
TABLE 3
Distribution of 66 households
TABLE 4
Costs of labour and tools and machinery in the USA
3.2.2. Means
Lenin clearly understood that to calculate a grand mean from stratum means they
must be weighted by the relative number in each stratum. See for example his
correction to a calculation by M. K. Gorbunova (1840-193 1), a leading female statis-
tician (Lenin (1958), volume 3, p. 443). Yet, it is ironical that in another article in this
edition (volume 23, pp. 242-245: 'Capitalism and taxes' (1913)) there is an incorrect
and misleading use of means in an example involving stratification. Using the fact that
at the time there were 16 million families (income earners) in the USA, and indirect
taxes amounted to $600 million, the grand mean indirect tax per family is $37.5. From
the facts that there were 8.8 million 'workers" families with a total income of $4800
million and 0.5 million 'capitalist' families with a total income of $5500 million, he
deduces that the total indirect tax on 'workers' is 8.8 million x $37.5 = $330 million,
which as a percentage of income amounts to (330/4800) x 100 = 7Gb, while the total
indirect tax on capitalists is 0.5 million x $37.5 = $19 million, giving a percentage of
income (19/5500) x 100 = 0.35/o. Of course the stratum means for indirect tax for
each of the workers and capitalists may be quite different from those obtained by
Lenin.
TABLE 5
Reanalysis of US farm data
TABLE 6t
Condition of Russian peasants (ungrouped data; individual years)
Improved 15 8 8 21 32 38
Worsened 44 53 64 34 16 15
TABLE 7
Condition of Russian peasants (grouped data)
Improved 10 30
Worsened 54 22
86 KOTZ AND SENETA [Part1,
purely economic strikes was 25 /o of the total number of textile workers. We note that,
since the politically conscious elements would tend to participate in both kinds of
strikes (which are not mutually exclusive), Lenin's conclusions here are not
surprising, and it would seem invalid to total (as Lenin does) over the two kinds of
strikes in each group.
Even a simple device such as a x2 test for the homogeneity of the proportion of
political strikers who are metal workers (as distinct from those who are textile
workers) over the four quarters indeed yields a highly significant result.
In a follow-up analysis (p. 403) Lenin attempts to prove that results of strikes
depend 'on the force of their onslaught' (i.e. number of strikers involved). This kind
of reasoning for 1905 is based on the data set in Table 9.
If we compare in the manner of Lenin Table 9 with the total workers involved in
strikes (from Table 8) (Table 10), Lenin's hypothesis is not supported by the data, and
Lenin, recognizing this, nevertheless engages in statistical and political apologetics.
However, Lenin realized quite clearly (see Lenin (1933)) that the advantage of
cross-classification over summary measures is that detail is not lost and considered
that such tables introduced a revolution in the science of agricultural economics. We
mention also his considerable proficiency with graphical methods (see Gurevich
(1959), p. 214-228, and Berezin (1988a) for examples). His unfinished paper
'Statistics and sociology' written in January of 1917 (Lenin (1958), volume 30,
pp. 349-356) contains some useful observations on 'dangers of isolating facts and
playing with examples' in the social sciences.
TABLE 8
Number of strikers in Russia in 1905
TABLE 9
Results of strikes in Russia
Quarter 1 2 3 4
No. of economic strikers 316 000 151 000 109 000 245 000
On July 25th, 1918, V. I. Lenin signed the first Statute of State Statistics which
established the CSA as a semi-independent statistical institution. However, the CSA
was in competition with the statistical offices of the Supreme Council of the National
Economy ( Vysshyi Sovet Norognogo Khozyaistva (VSNKH)), which was established
earlier in December 1917 (see the revealing article by Zav'ialov (1989) on the activities
of the VSNKH and his first chairman, A. I. Rykov, during the early years of the
Soviet state), and the powerful State Planning Commission (Gosplan) almost from its
inception as the main agency for the collection and analysis of data. The first director
of the CSA was an experienced zemstvo statistician, P. I. Popov (1872-1950) (who
had known Lenin since 1905), who, before his appointment, served as the head of the
Branch of Statistics and Census at the VSNKH. It was P. I. Popov who presented
Lenin with his plan of organizing the Soviet state statistics and received his approval
on July 25th, 1918. The head of Gosplan in the early years of the Soviet state
(1921-30) was a close associate and Lenin's friend, the influential Gleb M.
Krzhizhanovskii (1872-1959), who apparently was privy to the dealings between
Popov and Lenin. Lenin was quite suspicious about the ideological loyalty of the
scientific workers at the newly established CSA. At the meeting of the Petrograd
Soviet (March 12th, 1919) speaking of the statistical experts who work at the CSA,
Lenin (1958) (volume 38, p. 16) says, '. . . a majority of these specialists are right-
wing SR, mensheviks and even kadets ...'. In 1920, reporting to the 9th Convention
of the (Communist- Bolshevik) Party, Lenin (volume 40, p. 255) refers with irony to
the materials obtained from the CSA: 'Their summaries were carried out by statis-
ticians who cannot be under suspicion of being bolsheviks'. His last general remark
about the CSA, written in 1922, was: 'The CSA should not be "academic" or
"independent", which is what it 9/10 is now due to the old bourgeois habit, but an
organ of socialist construction'. It would seem that Lenin was not happy with the way
that P. I. Popov was running the CSA. As indicated in the article by Oksenoit (1988),
p. 56 (the public director of the newly established Muzei Statistiki (Museum of
Statistics) at the Goskomstat-the State Committee on Statistics), Popov devoted
much attention to the development of problems of statistical methodology, organiza-
tion of publications, especially of VestnikStatistiki and the bulletin of the CSA. Lenin
did not approve the academically oriented activities of the CSA. In a letter to G. M.
Krzhizhanovskii, the Head of Gosplan, he states that 'the CSA should be
reprimanded for academism .... They sit and write volumes but do not think about
essential problems . . ' (Ryabushkin, 1978).
According to Lenin (1958) (volume 52, p. 215), the CSA should deal with solving
practical problems: 'One should mold the CSA into an organ of analysis of the current
rather than "scientific" issues'; 'Statisticians should be our practical assistants and
not academics'. In an angry letter to Popov (August 16th, 1921) Lenin (1958) (volume
53, pp. 121-122) severely reprimands him, stating that 'my instructions [in a letter of
88 KOTZ AND SENETA [Part1,
June 4th, 1921] are being totally ignored and the whole activity, the whole organiza-
tion of the CSA is incorrect'. Insulted Popov wrote to Lenin on August 19th, 1921,
disputing the allegations and asking to be relieved of his duties. On August 20th,
Lenin writes to Popov (volume 53, pp. 131-132), refusing Popov's resignation and
insisting that his earlier instructions be fulfilled. Shortly thereafter (August 22nd,
1921; volume 53, p. 333) Lenin wrote a personal letter to G. M. Krzhizhanovskii,
saying, 'Possibly, I am partly to blame for this. I may have caused this hysteria by
being overly strict. But, in essence, I am right and I shall persist. I do not accept his
resignation.'
The instructions seem to pertain to some curtailment of inessential activities of the
CSA and to postponing their implementation 'to a better time'. However, the
underlying cause of the friction and demands seems to be the serious difficulties and
contradictions between the CSA and Gosplan. It emerges from Lenin's cor-
respondence that the bone of contention was Lenin's demand (volume 53, p. 122) that
'The Chairman or Director of the CSA should operate with greater contact with
Gosplan according to direct instructions and assignments from the Chairman of
Gosplan and its presidium'. The Director of the CSA was originally a non-voting
member of the Soviet of Peoples' Commissars (equivalent to the Council of Ministers)
and eventually became a member of the presidium of Gosplan in 1921. These contra-
dictions were also discussed at the last meeting between Lenin and Popov on
December 5th, 1922 (a week before Lenin's last working day in the Kremlin)-he
suffered two attacks of illness, thrombosis of the brain on December 13th, 1922 (see
Weber and Weber (1980), p. 193). It seems that Lenin attempted to smooth out the
contradictions between the CSA and Gosplan before transferring power to his
deputies, A. I. Rykov, L. B. Kamenev and A. D. Tsiupuna. However, it follows from
the memoirs of L. A. Fotieva (1881-1975) (Lenin's personal secretary in 1920-24) and
I. K. Voronov (1925) that as late as February 1923 Lenin was in touch with Popov
concerning the status of the CSA census conducted in Petrograd, Moscow and
Kharkov and requested his own staff to press Popov so that the materials of the census
would be ready for publication before the next party conference. Meanwhile in 1923,
the VSNKH consolidated its activities related to industrial statistics and the operation
of the CSA was restricted to conducting population censuses and yearly surveys.
An anecdote described by N. A. Milyutin (1889-1942), who was at that time a
member of the Collegium of the Peoples' Commissariat for Labour and the Council
of Labour and Defense is very characteristic of Lenin's attention to minute details
involving statistical data, in particular statistical tables (Milyutin, 1965).
Unfortunately, Milyutin does not specify the date but it follows from the previously
mentioned memoirs of L. A. Fotieva that the incident may have taken place at the last
meeting with Popov on December 5th, 1922, when inter alia the materials of the
survey on the (overall) number of Soviet government workers were discussed. At that
meeting Popov stated that the number of pilots in the Agricultural Peoples
Commissariat was reduced by 100%. Lenin inquired what pilots were doing in the
Agricultural Commissariat. Popov replied that they were needed to combat vermin.
'They could then be in the fields possibly, but should not be attached to the
Commissariat; and how many pilots were there before the total reduction?'
commented Lenin. Popov examined his folders containing the detailed data and
replied that, as indicated in the appropriate columns, there had been one and now
there were zero which constitutes a 100%/reduction!
1990] LENIN AS A STATISTICIAN 89
In December 1919, Lenin sent Popov a 'skeleton' of a table dealing with food
consumption before and after the revolution and asked Popov whether such a table
could be constructed by 'the specialists' in the CSA (volume 40, p. 340). He later used
this table in his report to the 9th Party Convention mentioned earlier.
Although Lenin often invited and carefully examined statistical data sent to him
from various statistical offices and on occasion discovered inconsistencies stemming
from inappropriate classification, we have no evidence that it would not have
occurred to him to encourage gross falsification of data to serve his political
purposes-a practice which was not above the scruples of some of his successors,
notably Stalin (see our Section 5). Lenin's (1958) assertion (volume 54, p. 446): 'We
need full and accurate information' is well known and is widely publicized. (For a
succinct discussion of government statistics in totalitarian regimes see Keyfitz (1978),
pp. 420-421.)
Lenin's involvement with statistics in the 1920s was in part via the statistical
sections of the VSNKH. On September 1st, 1921, he wrote a letter to the newspaper
Ekonomicheskaya Zhyzn' which was then the organ of the VSNKH and considered to
be the central economic mouthpiece. For reasons which are perhaps partially due to
the controversial nature of the proposals in this letter, it was not published until over 2
years later on November 6th, 1923, just two months before his death (Lenin, (1958),
volume 44, p. 112-113). Lenin criticizes the newspaper for the absence of analysis of
the current data and proposes a route for reconstruction of its operation. He writes
(volume 44, p. 12): 'The newspaper provides a multitude of most valuable, in
particular statistical material pertaining to our economy. However, there are two
faults with this material: firstly, it is random, incomplete, unsystematic and secondly
it is unprocessed and unanalyzed.'
Lenin suggests that the activities related to the summary and analysis of the current
statistical material in Ekonomicheskaya Zhyzn' be carried out jointly with the
newspaper staff and the workers at Gosplan and the CSA. He also points out that
systematization and analysis is required to pinpoint which enterprises are successful
and which are not. There are also suggestions that monthly summaries be published in
the newspaper which preclude (at least temporarily) similar data from being
duplicated by other statistical agencies.
Even Lenin was apparently unable to fight the statistical bureaucracy of the newly
established state, which may explain the unprecedented delay in publication of the
letter.
Lenin also tried unsuccessfully in 1921 to persuade the CSA and Gosplan to
develop a system of index numbers to evaluate the state of the total economy-'such
an index should be compiled at least once a month by the CSA with Gosplan and be
necessarily compared with "the prewar number" as well as with the 1920 number (and
if possible with 1917, 1918 and 1919)'. He visualized at least 10-15 indices to cover all
aspects of the economy which include data on territory, population, production,
agriculture, transportation and such details as the percentage of underfulfilment of
the sowing plan, the number of out-of-service trains, etc. Letters to G. M.
Krzhizhanovskii and P. I. Popov written between May and September 1921 in this
connection testify to his desperate and perhaps somewhat naive desire and belief that
proper statistical accounting and analysis can greatly assist the economic recon-
struction of a huge country only very recently emerged from an unprecedented
revolution and a 7-year war including a civil war that was still raging. His conviction
90 KOTZ AND SENETA [Part1,
that statisticians must be practical assistants of the Communist party and the Soviet
government was unshaken, as expressed, for example, in his famous slogan
'Socialism is first of all accounting' (Lenin (1958), volume 22, pp. 45, 50). 'Statistics',
lectured Lenin to P. I. Popov in the summer of 1918, discussing the problem of
organizing Soviet statistics, 'as any other scientific discipline, possesses problems and
solves them in the interests of specific classes . . .' (Popov, 1956).
Lenin's direct involvement in the first Soviet population and agricultural censuses
conducted under extremely difficult conditions in August 1920 should be noted. In
May 1920, Lenin dispatched telegrams to all the provincial party committees, to
Moscow, Petrograd and the Siberian committees emphasizing the outstanding
significance of the census and threatening that those who were lax in performing their
duties related to the census would be prosecuted by the Revolutionary Tribunal.
Similar telegrams were sent in July and September 1920 in which he orders the
provincial statistical bureaus to be provided with adequate facilities for the census
implementation and warns of severe punishment to those who impede the execution
of the census. 'Remember that you will be responsible before the Worker-Peasant
Government for the lack of enthusiasm in conducting the census and its poor
production' (Pisarev, (1949), p. 12).
Popov (1924) asserts that Lenin ordered factories which produced paper for
newspapers to switch to production of paper for the census and these factories
received priority for supplies for the workers' provisions, wood for heating and other
necessities. He also assisted Popov to obtain permission from the Peoples'
Commissar on Education (A. V. Lunacharskii (1875-1933)) who was unlikely to be a
great believer in or admirer of statistical censuses to employ teachers as enumerators
and data processors.
5. CENSUSSTATISTICSUNDER STALIN
The decline of Soviet statistics with Lenin's death and Stalin's ascendancy has
already been sketched in Anderson (1959), Kotz (1965), Seneta (1985) and Zarkovic
(1956). More detailed information on the fate of individual economic statisticians
such as V. G. Groman (1873-?) and P. A. Vikhlaev (1869-1928) may be found in
Jasny (1972), although some of his information (on Shcherbina, for example, whom
he describes as a woman on pp. 200-201) is wrong.
Recently, detailed information has also come to light from Soviet sources about
population census statistics under Stalin. In particular, see Conquest (1986) and
Berezin (1988b). Berezin writes that, during the preparations for the 1937 census,
Stalin called in I. A. Kraval, then in charge of the project, and expressed the opinion
that the population of the Soviet Union was 170 million. The census of January 1937
did not confirm this opinion, and in spite of the conscientiousness with which it was
carried out its results were declared invalid. (Only in 1966 was the population size
given by the census-164 million-revealed.) Kraval was arrested and shot (as were
many of his co-workers) in May 1937. He was rehabilitated in 1956. It is now widely
recognized (Conquest, 1986) that the artificial famine of 1932-33 in Ukraine was
responsible for the deaths of at least 6 million-7 million people which explains some of
the discrepancy; Berezin refers to this only indirectly. The overall picture is more
complex (Conquest, 1986); the projected total for 1937 was at least 177 million.
1990] LENIN AS A STATISTICIAN 91
A new census was ordered, which took place in January 1939 and produced a
sought-after figure of 170.6 million. Berezin argues that natural growth over 2 years
would have added 4 million-5 million people to the 1937 figure, and the removal of
the religious question would have increased the number of respondents in 1939.
It is a hopeful sign that Soviet information such as this is beginning to appear, to
correct views available in the West hitherto such as Jasny's (1957) assertion (doubtless
in good faith):
'The new official data on the net growth of population (Statistical Handbook, 1956,
page 243) implies a population of 193 to 196 million in July 1, 1941, when the Soviet Union
entered World War II. The Soviet population was, however, closer to 200 million in 1941.'
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Professor W. H. Kruskal for motivating us throughout this project and
his valuable comments on the first version of this paper. Our gratitude goes also to
June Pachuta Farris (Slavic Librarian, Regenstein Library, University of Chicago)
and to Ada Boddy (Librarian of the Russian Section of the Glasgow University
Library). Finally, ES thanks SOB and Professor S. M. Stigler for materials, and SK
thanks RK for typing.
Samuel Kotz's research was supported by a US National Science Foundation grant,
Division of Social and Economic Sciences, grant DIR-8811895.
APPENDIX A
B. V. Avilov (1874-?)
In appendix IV, 'Dictionary-index of names', of Lenin (1927), volume 3, B. V. Avilov is
described as a social democrat (i.e. of the same party as Lenin), lawyer by education, by
profession a journalist and statistician. In April 1917 he deviated from the Bolshevik line and
in 1918 divorced himself from active participation in political life. In 1927 he was working in
the Central Statistical Office of the USSR.
In the 'Index of names' of the fifth edition (1958) of volume 3 he is accused of initially
adopting a conciliatory attitude towards the Mensheviks at the 3rd Conference of the Social
Democrats and then deviating by working for the Menshevik newspaper. Neither his
employment with the Central Statistical Office nor his year of death are given.
REFERENCES