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Class Wars Among Devoted Football Supporters. Hooligan Bourgeoisie and Non-Hooligan Proletariat Grodecki2020
Class Wars Among Devoted Football Supporters. Hooligan Bourgeoisie and Non-Hooligan Proletariat Grodecki2020
To cite this article: Mateusz Grodecki & Radosław Kossakowski (2020): Class wars among
devoted football supporters. Hooligan bourgeoisie and non-hooligan proletariat, Soccer & Society,
DOI: 10.1080/14660970.2020.1828076
Article views: 47
ABSTRACT
The paper explores a phenomenon of growing divisions within the Polish
football supporters, namely between the hooligans and the rest of
devoted supporters. There are three primary aims of the paper: 1) to
explain the origin of the more apparent division in the devoted suppor
ters’ community; 2) to characterize the division, and thus – 3) to analyse its
potential consequences. The paper draws on 96 interviews with football
supporters and a desk research conducted within two different research
projects. The analysis shows that divisions occurred as a result of the
exploitation of supporters’ cultural, symbolic and economic resources by
hooligan groups. What developed as a consequence was a sense of
distinct interests between hooligans and the rest of devoted supporters.
We interpret this arising awareness using Marx’s categories describing
transformation from ‘class in itself’” to “class for itself”.
Introduction
The paper explores a phenomenon of growing divisions within the devoted football supporters in
Poland. The term ‘devoted supporter’ draws on a definition of supporter suggested by Richard
Giulianotti – it refers to an individual who has a ‘long-term personal and emotional investment in
the club’ and is characterized by the impossibility of ‘switching allegiances to a rival club’.1 Devoted
supporters in Poland are organized community of football supporters, divided into formal and/or
informal ‘task groups’ responsible for activity in some areas of the rivalry of the ‘stands culture’2 or
represent a particular district of a club’s city or other smaller towns, where supporters of a particular
club are present (fan clubs). Unlike other countries like Italy, Greece, or Spain, in Poland, there is
a clear ‘division of function’3 between ultras and hooligans. Hooligans and ultras are both organized
fan groups, but the former is focused on the competitive violence,4 while the latter engages in the
rivalry about the choreographies and supporting the team during games. These differences are
rooted in the history of Polish fandom culture. Hooligans were the first subculture at Polish stands
based on the English patterns of support (the first groups were set up in the 1970s) and have gained
the ‘monopoly on violence’5 within the supporters’ community. Ultras groups came about later (in
the turn of the century), following the Italian model of performances (however, over time, polish
groups have created their own aesthetic forms), but due to the hooligans’ ‘monopoly on violence’,
they focused mainly on performative aspects of supporting.6
Despite the division of function, all groups constituted one community of devoted supporters of
a particular club, characterized by common norms and rules and most importantly by strong,
CONTACT Mateusz Grodecki mgrodecki@aps.edu.pl Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, The Maria Grzegorzewska
University, Warsaw 02-353, Poland
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 M. GRODECKI AND R. KOSSAKOWSKI
internal solidarity. In this particular environment, what is becoming more and more apparent is its
dichotomous division into hooligans – a smaller group in terms of quantity, but a dominant one in
terms of significance, control and power – and the rest, the majority of devoted supporters. This is
interesting, since so far, football supporters of one club in Poland have been considered as a rather
homogenous community.7 The community was characterized by enormous solidarity, and there
fore has not been analysed in terms of internal divisions. What is more, hooligans have been
considered as club’s representatives in a different area of rivalry – as protectors of club’s colours,
and therefore have often been romanticized.8 Over time, however, the hooligans have become
a separate group (in an informal way), having interests that are distinct from those of the rest of
devoted supporters. What unites them is their specific code and behaviour patterns, as well as –
what’s crucial for this analysis – the control over symbolic and economic resources of the devoted
supporters’ community as a whole.
Polish hooligans have become a particular kind of ‘bourgeoisie of the stands’ that have managed
to establish a strong system of subordination over all the other groups of devoted supporters.
Hooligan power in the devoted supporters’ community has been legitimatized by the traditional
ideology which, accounting for all the violence and rivalry culture across the group of supporters,
granted hooligans a dominant position as club’s and other supporters’ protectors. The power made
hooligans the dominant ‘class’ that controls all the major resources of the devoted supporters’
community. Hooligans authorize and approve the content of ultras’ choreographies, decide which
groups of supporters from different clubs are friends/enemies, quite often, they control
a ‘commercial’ dimension of fandom activities, such as sale of gadgets, distribution of tickets
provided by club’s authorities, or make profits from ultras’ fundraisings for choreographies.
In recent years, some hooligan groups have started to take advantage of their dominant position
by taking over resources of the devoted supporters’ community with the aim to make profits,
feeding on the ideology of a club’s supporters’ solidarity. However, in devoted supporters’ com
munities, critical voices towards hooligans have been growing stronger, which bears witness to the
emergence of divisions in the devoted supporters’ community. The objectives of the paper are 1) to
explain the origin of the more apparent division in the devoted supporters’ community; 2) to
characterize the division, and thus – 3) to analyse its potential consequences. Since the conflict
being subject of this analysis relates to power relations and its main axis is growing separation and
awareness of different economic interests between two groups within one community, we based the
study upon our reconceptualization of Karl Marx’s classic concept of class conflict.
Some works treating on the topic of football supporters have pointed at the negative perception
of hooligans by other fans, as their violent activities (both physical and verbal) were considered as
destructive for match day experience9 and even stroke fears into non-violent fans, which resulted in
some of them deciding not to attend football games.10 A more recent study by Joel Rookwood and
Geoff Pearson has challenged the dominating view of a unanimous, negative assessment of
hooligans by other fans, showing that supporters perceive hooligans as useful for their clubs in
terms of distraction, protection, and reputation.11
This study contributes to the existing literature by approaching the issue of relations between
hooligans and other supporters from a different perspective, which focuses on the relations of
power and control over symbolic and economic resources of the community and the conse
quences of their exploitation by hooligans. To some extent, a similar process has been observed
among Lazio’s UltraS, where leaders of the group were accused by some other members of
embourgeoisement which was supposedly evinced in a switch of their ideology-driven to
money-driven decisions focused on the merchandising business.12 While the case of Lazio
fans resulted only in schism within Irriducibili, in Argentina the conflict over economic
resources (control of tickets, merchandising, drug trade) of football fans is one of the crucial
factors resulting in violence, division and even death among fans of the same clubs it is the
source of the biggest number of violent incidents, bigger that confrontation with fans of rival
clubs or Police.13 The economical benefits of Argentinian barra bravas (groups of the most
SOCCER & SOCIETY 3
ardent fans) go beyond fandom and even concern controlling profits from car parking or
players’ transfer fees.14 The case of Boca Juniors barra clearly shows that the main leaders use
their power to force not only other fans but club’s authorities as well.15 This paper, however,
aims to explore the process and consequences of growing divisions not only among one group,
but between different kinds of devoted supporters (hooligans vs. rest) within the nationwide
community.
The paper first introduces the theoretical frame of the study that is based on reconceptualization
of classic Karl Marx’s theory of class conflict. It then goes on to an overview of analyses on football
supporters using Marxist and neo-Marxist concepts. Further on, it describes procedures of data
gathering and analysis. The following sections are concerned with the historical process of hooligan
groups ‘professionalization’ and their distinction from the community of devoted supporters. The
remaining part of the paper presents the results in two subsections: activities of hooligan groups
with regards to their economic interests and class distance of non-hooligan supporters against
hooligan supporters.
One can speak of a class as a notion when there are at least two social formations of different
cultures, modes of life, and, most of all, of different interests resulting from uneven access to
economic resources. The conflict of economic interests generates an antagonism between classes.
Marx and Engels describe the essence of the said antagonism in The Communist Manifesto, where
they outline a class conflict occurring between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The axis of the
conflict is the exploitation stemming from ownership of means of production.18
Although in Marx’s theory, a class is essentially born out of a conflict of interest, it does not mean
that members of a class are aware of this conflict and that they have developed class consciousness.
Becoming conscious of the distinctiveness (from another class) and the community of interests
(with similar individuals) implies – to say it with the words of Marx – the transition from ‘class in
itself’ to ‘class for itself’:
Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. The domina
tion of capital has created for this mass a common situation, common interests. This mass is thus already
a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In the struggle . . . this mass becomes united and constitutes itself
as a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests.19
What explains the lack of direct relation between the emergence of antagonistic interests and the
arousal of class consciousness are mechanisms of a dominant ideology functioning to legitimatize
a given social order. Such a prevailing ideology justifies beliefs on the society, legitimatizes interests
and norms of the ‘ruling class’, as well as their cultural expression.20 The ideology is indispensable,
since the rule of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat is the rule of the minority over the majority, and
it is the ruling class intention to ensure that other classes live in illusion, that their class conscious
ness remains amorphous.21 Consequently, a class in itself constitutes an aggregate of individuals
deficient in class consciousness.22 A class for itself, on the other hand, does require class-
consciousness arousal related to consciousness of common interests and identification of groups
of common and antagonistic interests.
4 M. GRODECKI AND R. KOSSAKOWSKI
In this analysis, a classical theory of Marx is reinterpreted. First of all, we move away from the
analysis of class antagonism at the macro-level (society as a whole). Thereby, we do not consider the
devoted supporters’ community as a mirror of broader social processes, nor as a case representing
particular characteristics of the process of class conflict. Our conceptualization assumes, on the
other hand, that in the devoted supporters’ community we can observe the emergence of two
‘classes’ of antagonistic economic interests: hooligans and rest of the devoted supporters. The main
axis of the conflict is the exploitation (stemming from control over means of production). Certainly,
the said system is not hermetic – it is subject to influences by broader social processes and by other
actors. Nonetheless, the origin of the conflict lies in the exploitation of resources (uneven access to
resources) and devoted supporters’ world is characterized by such distinctive internal dynamics that
it can be treated as a separate area of analysis.
Second of all, we broaden the concept of means of production. In this paper, it does not only
refer to economic relations. The notion is expanded to encompass cultural and social capital, being
products of supporter’s rivalry as part of the ‘stands culture’. Still, in a capitalist system, the cultural
and social capitals translate into economic capital.23 Therefore, in this context, we can still speak of
means of production, since the control over those resources can contribute to the multiplication of
economic capital.
Such reconceptualization, however, does not respond to all criticism against Marx’s concept and
comes up against some of its main postulates. Firstly, although in his theory Marx took into account
the existence of other classes, he emphasized that in every structure two main classes can be
distinguished. Their dialectical relation determines the dynamics of the structure. Over time,
through involvement in a conflict, the structure will reduce to two main classes. Such
a dichotomous character of social structures has become one of the main criticisms of Marxism.
As pointed out by some researchers of the theory,24 the historical description of class conflict
requires a broader analytical approach that, at the macro level, has to take into account the internal
diversification of each class. This study, however, is not based on the concept of class itself but
rather on the usefulness of ‘class in itself’ and ‘class for itself’ dichotomy for creating an analytical
model to explore the process of breaking within the strongly-bond community. It needs to be
emphasized, however, that a community of football supporters of one club can vary internally in
terms of class and gender (although in general it is strongly masculinized community). The
introduced analytical frame does not focus on these issues. It is used here only to analyse the
emerging awareness of the distinction between exploiters and exploited which stems from control
over ‘means of production’ of devoted supporters’ community. This analytical usefulness in
exploring this issue is also the strongest argument to use Marx’s concept as a theoretical frame
for this study.
The later analyses of Marx’s theory have also pointed to some difficulties related to the self-
development of class consciousness among the exploited part of the population. Andrew indicated
that ‘it is perhaps questionable whether a class, without a sustained period of social hegemony,
could exist for itself, that is, articulate its understanding of the world, legitimate its interests and
aspirations as norms of conduct and forms of cultural expression’.25 In turn, Lukacs26 highlighted
that the emergence of class consciousness among proletarians should be seen as a result of the
intended actions of the Marxist intelligentsia. In this context, the growth of class consciousness of
non-hooligan supporters should result from activities of external actors, or, in a broader take, of
external processes. This paper, however, focuses only on the internal processes of the raising of
‘class consciousness’. Therefore, the examination of the potential influence of external factors (like
policy towards football-related violence or changing norms or discourses) is beyond this paper.
football-related violence in England.28 Ian Taylor29 argued that violence expresses contestation of
the working class youth, who have become increasingly isolated because of market rules entering
the football world and a redefinition of the traditional relationship of clubs and working class. In
turn, researchers from ‘the Leicester School’30 discussed the formation of a ‘rough working class’,
originating from profound economic changes in the middle of the 20th century and the petrification
of social inequalities that followed. The rough working class was supposed to be associated with
‘uncivilized’ behaviour patterns – as opposed to dominant ones – and football matches were
supposed to become an opportunity for its representatives to publicly contest the authorities.
This opposition was expressed with violence addressed at groups of supporters of other clubs, as
well as at the police.
However, attempts to explain football-related violence based on the class theories have been
subject to massive criticism on the grounds of evidence-based studies.31 A comprehensive ethno
graphy of hooligan groups showed that their internal structure is not made up solely of representa
tives of the working class and the problem of violence taking place in and around football stadiums
can not be reduced to economic factors and the frustration resulting therefrom. Although the class
theories as the main theoretical framework failed to explain the causes of football violence (they
proved to be insufficient), this does not indicate that they are of no use in the analysis of the
phenomenon of football fandom.
The Marxist and neo-Marxist perspective has been used in a few studies exploring the commo
dification of the contemporary fandom culture. The oldest approaches analysing the fans’ behaviour
based on Marx’s theory32 may have suggested that fans were ‘alienated’ groups with no access to
resources growing in the field of football. This statement could have been reasonable to some extent
in 1970s when it was published, at the time when football was not commercialized in such a manner
that it is today. More recently, David M. Webber has implemented Karl Polanyi’s concept of ‘double
movement’ to research on the Against Modern Football movement.33 Double movement refers to
two interplaying processes: the first one concerns the determination of economical system to
establish the self-regulating market, while the second refers to the social ‘counter-attack’ and
attempts to keep market forces subordinated to social values. The commercial transformation of
English and European football from the ‘90s is the first “movement”. The changing nature of the
game due to new TV deals, the growing significance of security measures, high tickets prices, and
opening for new global markets – entailed the incorporation of economic thinking in the structure
of football. The transformations went along with strategies of changing the “old” fans for the “new”
ones. But, just as there is no possibility to imagine the economy operating in separation from the
political and social system, there is also no possibility to separate the commercialized football from
its cultural and moral basis – founded and maintained by “proletarian” actors. The commodifica
tion of football has not been able to commodify the “class” of traditional fans entirely. In fact, some
new generations of football consumers have been socialized but the proletarian rest either has
attempted to keep the old traditions (usually limited in scope) or undertook the efforts to bring back
the “beautiful game”. As a result, fans’ protests, the Against Modern Football movement, and other
actions have created a multidimensional image of ‘double movement’ in the contemporary history
of football.
Peter and David Kennedy study on football commodification draws on Marxist political econ
omy approach. They argued that: ‘a Marxist political economy of the football business has the
potential to provide a dialectic account of football more aware that its relations of production and
consumption have never fully developed to the point at which they are commodified’.34 It seems
that features that create a strong fan’s identity – a sense of belonging, feeling of unity, friendship,
togetherness – are the most important ‘obstacles’ preventing the commodification of football to be
fully developed. In other words, the ‘labour’ of the fans can not be reduced to purchasing tickets or
club’s jerseys. Their ‘labour’ is more embedded in the emotional-social space of identity. However,
as P.D. Kennedy argues, the nature of contemporary football is fictitious in a double sense, as it
offers ‘unrealisable commodification’ and ‘mythical tradition’. On the one hand, many fans use
6 M. GRODECKI AND R. KOSSAKOWSKI
‘tradition’ (even if it has an ‘invented’ nature and is more mythical than real) to defend football
against commodification, on the other hand, these same fans express a ‘market realism’ in the
conviction that without necessary financial assets, sporting success (e.g. playing in English Premier
League) is not possible. Such motivation guided Portsmouth FC fans to sell their club (rescued by
fans from financial damage and managed by supporters trust) to new American owner.35
As can be seen, the Marxist theory has been used in first football fandom studies to explain
football-related violence (where it proved to be insufficient to explain the causes of violence) and
later some neo-Marxist concepts have been adopted to depict the dialectic relations within the
process of football commodification. This paper, however, aims to revisit the classic class theory in
football fandom studies to explain the inner split within the supporter community.
method in the original study, one of the ‘classes’ distinguished in the paper – hooligans and the
other supporters (non-hooligans) – of interviewee’s belonging.
be grasped in the below statement of a supporter of a Polish club Jagiellonia Bialystok, founder of
the first football hooligan firm in the city:
In 2001 it was like all those first prearranged fights, such as Arka-Lechia – big guys showing off fighting,
training, exercising. (. . .) And so, practically all the firms already had their gangs, except for us – so we were
like let’s form one. (. . .) You know, fifteen men gathered, each one was supposed to bring a guy, whoever the
fuck wanted to join, and we would separate, and we would fight. (Jagiellonia A; hooligan)
Two processes contributed to the separation of hooligan groups from the rest of devoted
supporters and to their focus being merely on physical confrontations. First of all, it was
penalization of football-related violence that followed the adoption of the Polish Mass Event
Security Act in 1997. The new regulation distinguished stadium space as requiring separate legal
regulations.42 It also provided some appropriate legislative tools to combat football-related
violence and thus increased the activity of security services in this sector. Consequently,
hooligan formations had to become more hermetic, also to other devoted supporters of their
own club, and better organized. Second of all, violence in and around stands had to professio
nalize (which was highly influenced by football-related violence penalization). Therefore, in the
first decade of the 21st century, fights between hooligan firms began to move away from the
stadiums and took on a more planned character. Already in the period referred to by the
interviewee – 2001 – hooligans started to develop an interest in martial arts, designate places
intended for training, and, over time, to organize and take part in legal MMA tournaments. It
means that the nature of football-related violence evolved from confrontations of beery hooli
gans with bellies somewhere in and around stadiums into organized gang fights involving
martial arts fighters. Sports discipline together with martial arts skills, right after tough
character, became the most important requirement of admission to hooligan firms, which
made them even more exclusive. Both processes intensified hooligans’ sense of being ‘the elite
of the stands’, described by Spaaij, as well as a sense of separateness from the remainder of
supporters.
After the separation, hooligan groups became the centres of power in the devoted supporters’
community – informal, but recognizable and universal (present in the community of devoted
supporters of almost every club). The structure of such hooligan centre of power is described by one
of the devoted supporters of GKS Belchatow:
Most of the leaders obviously come from hooligan circles. I’m stronger. I’m in charge. But it would not hurt if
they had any brains. Luckily, usually the power does not only belong to those who are the strongest – it also
takes charisma and brains. But those are very narrow circles. (GKS Bełchatów A; supporter)
This power has been ‘given’ and legitimized in relation to a certain ‘tradition of violence’.43 What
it means is that hooligan groups and their physical confrontations emerged as the first forms of
devoted football supporters rivalry in Poland. As a result, physical violence has been institutiona
lized as the most ‘elite’ activity. Initially, the hooligan power was used primarily for strategic
decisions, for example – decisions on what club’s supporters to establish an agreement with
(friendly relations, Pol. zgoda), who is considered as an enemy (identification of an enemy group,
Pol. kosa), as well as on choreographies content. Such hooligan power is perfectly reflected in the
statements of supporters of Lech Poznan (regarding relations) and Legia Warszawa (regarding
choreographies), respectively:
It goes without saying that in most Polish clubs these are the hooligans that take decisions (. . .). At least in
Lech, what’s been always the most important was what came out from hooligans. Ultras have had to adapt.
(Lech Poznań A; supporter)
Hooligans rule over every Polish club, nah. A gang says not to do a choreo and they’re not doing it, no way.
There’s only one unity, there’s a hooligan firm, so it’s no surprise it holds the power. And ultras? They’re there,
they’re kind of free, but in some aspects, they need to follow a given direction. (. . .) if there’s any problem with
ultras, hooligans just kick them out, nah. (Legia Warszawa B; supporter)
SOCCER & SOCIETY 9
‘The tradition of violence’ is also related to ‘the monopoly on violence’ held by hooligans in
devoted supporters’ community. In this context, this is a two-dimensional concept. Firstly, it refers
to decisions about fights between hooligan firms – their time, place, the number of fighters and the
composition of groups. Secondly, it also means that physical force and violence are used as tools to
legitimatize the power, the social control and the position in the devoted supporters’ structure. The
below words of a non-hooligan supporter reflect it directly.
Nobody’s going to stand up against them and enter into discussions, cause they always have superiority of
argument – the power. (Śląsk Wrocław B; supporter)
Due to the fact that hooligan groups separated as centres of power in the devoted supporters’
community, their leaders started to interact more and more often, which, in turn, contributed to the
monopolization of social networks.44 Hooligan leaders ‘seized’ social capital in the form of net
works. This is especially apparent in decisions regarding the nature of contacts with supporters
groups of other clubs that are made and legitimized solely by designated persons from hooligan
groups, regardless of disapproval of other supporters. This is an important phenomenon to an
extent that it gave rise to the awareness of common interests among hooligan groups of different
clubs. These were foundations for the emergence of the ‘ruling class’ in the community of devoted
supporters – the hooligan bourgeoisie.
The formation of the group depicted above illustrates at least two processes. Firstly, it points to the
awareness of one’s organizational power, which started to be used for activities other than tradi
tional hooligans activities (in this case, gaining some control over nightclubs as bouncers).
Secondly, it shows the internalization of capitalist rules. The organizational power and the skills
acquired in the supporters’ world were used in activities aiming at making profits. From that
moment, being a part of a hooligan group entailed not only greater prestige in the devoted
supporters’ community and a sense of belonging to the group holding power, but also the possibility
of accumulating economic capital.
This stage of hooligan groups’ development is crucial for our analysis. From that moment on,
hooligans started a) to adapt their organization and b) to make use of their power over football
stands, both to serve their economic activity. Due to the lack of regular data, we are not able to
reproduce in detail the evolution of this process. However, the empirical material that we gathered
allows us to identify the key dimensions of the current economic activity of the hooligans (both legal
and illegal).
The evolution of the organization of hooligan firms to better serve their economic aims is the
most apparent in their symbiosis with the criminal world. The position in the vertical structure of
hooligan firms not only depends on seniority, esteem and fighting skills, but often also on the level
of involvement in criminal activities. In other words, belonging to a hooligan group also implies
being involved in ‘business’ aimed at serving the economic interests of the group. The process is well
depicted in the below statement made by a police officer:
It starts with a minor offence. Over time, the calibre of groups’ expectations grows bigger. You’re given
promises about a promotion, and, in return, you’re expected to do bigger and more serious jobs. Their nature
10 M. GRODECKI AND R. KOSSAKOWSKI
varies – from involvement in fights, robberies, and thefts, up to drug traffic. Gangs of hooligans invest in new
recruits. Young people attend martial arts classes, earn respect in their circles, also they can count on help
from older colleagues in case of any trouble.45
Using the power to achieve economic goals is perfectly illustrated in strategic decisions related to,
for example, a system of friendship and rivalry in the football fandom world. In the past, such
decisions were made based on some regional background and frequent matches, sometimes on
social relations (e.g. drinking bouts), as well as on the power of a given group and possibilities of
cooperation in confrontations with other groups. Currently, it is more and more often based on
business relations (also illegal), that decisions are made. For instance, the alliance between Wisła
Kraków, Śląsk Wrocław, and Lechia Gdańsk, which lasted over 20 years, broke off mainly because
a hooligan firm of Wisła Kraków (‘Sharks’) allied with hooligans of Ruch Chorzów (‘Psychofans’).
The interviewed supporters (interestingly – of various clubs, also of those not involved directly in
this situation) admitted that the new ‘agreement’ on the Polish map of supporters, was motivated by
a common business relation – drug trafficking and smuggling:
I’ve heard that high-profile people from hooligan groups of Wisła and Ruch met in prison while serving
a sentence and came to a ‘business’ agreement. (Lechia Gdansk A, supporter)
The circumstances of the agreement reached between ŁKS Lódź and Lech Poznań are very similar.
One day (. . .) someone got in touch with Lech, or it was Lech who reached out to us (. . .) yes, it is all about
business. It was supposed to be just a hooligan agreement, but for sure Lech intended to develop a certain
network in the centre of Poland, I don’t know, maybe drugs or other resources. (ŁKS Łódź A, supporter)
The hooligan power over the rest of devoted supporters also translates into control and uneven
distribution of resources and ‘income’ coming from devoted supporters’ activities. The statement
made by a former hooligan of Cracovia, who claimed that the ‘money was notoriously taken after
fund-raising’ (Cracovia Kraków A, hooligan) perfectly illustrates the fact of hooligans making
profits from finance raised for devoted supporters’ aims.
Hooligans were also able to control the demand for goods from their illegal economic activity, by
enforcing solidarity through physical violence. A former hooligan of Cracovia is straightforward
about the fact that drugs could only be purchased ‘inside’:
Wisla and Cracovia had their own dealers. As Cracovia supporter, you could only get drugs from selected
dealers. (Cracovia Kraków A, hooligan)
Those two processes, namely the process of adapting the organization, as well as the process of
using the power at the stands – both in order serve economic purposes, further intensify a sense of
common interests among hooligan groups of various clubs, this is among the devoted supporters’
bourgeoisie. This is demonstrated in criminal activities in which hooligans were able to put their
club animosities aside and cooperate. Such cooperation was to be present between some members
of hooligan groups of Ruch Chorzów and GKS Katowice (fierce rivals from Upper Silesia) who
joined efforts in drug trafficking and burglaries.46 Similarly, in Tricity (three neighbour coastal cities
in Poland – Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Sopot), members of two opposing hooligan firms – Lechia Gdańsk
and Arka Gdynia – did drug and pimping business together, as well as they co-managed security of
Tricity’s nightclubs.47 What follows from words of a ŁKS supporter below is that such cooperation
is more and more common and the high position in the hierarchy of these firms is always related to
economic interests:
In big clubs (. . .) like ŁKS, Legia, Wisła, the power, up there, is concentrated in the hands of those who do
business, for example here . . . it’s ŁKS with Widzew (fierce rivals from Łódź – authors) – they must be doing
business (. . .) I mean often it’s just about real big money. And you, being an ordinary soldier, you cannot be
friends with them, be around them, take pictures with them, party if you’re not a hoolie (. . .) these are criminal
organisations, this is serious now. The more money is involved, the less . . . the more the hostility faints at some
point. (ŁKS Łódź A, supporter)
SOCCER & SOCIETY 11
This confirms what was said earlier about the emergence of an ’elite’ among hooligan groups,
which began to establish ’business’ relations with each other, regardless of the existing norms and
traditions (cooperation with enemies). Economic interests played a vital role in the process of
arousal of solidarity among hooligans of various clubs and of awareness of having interests that are
separate from those of non-hooligan-devoted supporters. However, their overt contradiction to the
values of devoted supporters’ community (common interests with the enemy), and thus to the
ideology, which traditionally legitimatized the power of hooligans, at the same time requiring
conformism among non-hooligan-devoted supporters (‘you, as an ordinary soldier, cannot be
friends with him’), gave rise to a sense of the latter being exploited.
Currently, however, divisions between hooligans and the rest of devoted supporters are more and
more visible. The romantic perception of hooligans as ‘defenders of club colours’, as well as the
solidarity between various supporters’ groups of one club transformed into critical attitudes and the
awareness of being exploited. The consciousness of being dominated can be grasped in anonymous
supporters’ forum posts:
This whole whoring shit that is still sometimes called supporting or hooliganism, has long nothing to do with
those two concepts, since it’s long just been gangs, wars of pseudo-mafia that does not have balls to act like real
mafia, they hide at the stadiums instead and take advantage of the few with fanaticism in the heart! (kibice.net
201749)
Don’t be surprised that you’re charged for everything like you were stupid, they encircle you with must-have
match gadgets, just for the sake of money, and you’ll go nowhere if you don’t buy an exorbitantly overpriced
ticked for a special bus to the away match. A generation of fucking clones, wearing the same thing, brainlessly
repeating everything after the present mafia that took over the stands and is rolling in money, not respecting
those who are really in ultras part and rip their throats out for the club, but using them to make 1. laugh 2.
cabbage. Go on like this and if you don’t think independently, they will fuck you every week, regardless of
what’s your club, cause now it’s all in the hands of the underworld and their business. (kibice.net 201750)
The consciousness of being exploited is based on the awareness of: 1) dominance of economic
interests of hooligans over the interests of the devoted supporters’ community of a club; 2) instru
mental use of devoted supporters’ values (sale of t-shirts, extorting money from contributions,
taking advantage of relationships with other supporter groups) with the aim to increase hooligan
profits; 3) legitimization of hooligan economic activities by ‘the tradition of violence’; 4) coopera
tion of hooligan groups with the criminal world.
The awareness of being exploited consequently transformed into a certain identity and definition
distance. The identity distance is particularly visible in referring to hooligan groups as to strangers.
Hooligans are ‘them’:
They have their spots. At matches they usually wear black or wear pieces with no relevance to the club, and this
is quite bad cause they seem to consider themselves as better than supporters, so they do not involve in all
12 M. GRODECKI AND R. KOSSAKOWSKI
those basic things that we claim are important during matches, both home and away. Simply, they just care to
be popular, recognizable among supporters, to be respected, sometimes to arise fear, and it’s probably that
they feel they are the most savvy in this environment, that’s why they claim rights to be, let’s say, better suited
to be at the stands, that they are more savvy, they know more. (Śląsk Wrocław B; supporter)
In this perception, ‘they’ do not identify with the other devoted supporters either. ‘They’ consider
themselves as the ‘elite’ of the stands, as mentioned by Spaaij. ‘They’ stand at sides of sectors, wear
distinctive clothes. Because ‘they’ fight for the club, ‘they’ no longer have to take part in other forms
of devoted supporters’ activities at the stands. In other words, non-hooligans perceive the attitude of
hooligans as patronizing. This is characteristic to how the inferior class perceives the ‘bourgeoisie’.
The definition distance, in turn, puts hooligans outside the definition scope. It is visible in two
dimensions. Firstly, non-hooligans accuse hooligans of abandoning the ethos of devoted
supporters:
I mean, I just keep myself at a distance from all those hooligan groups. I find they do not entirely represent
a model, a supporter role model that is right, in my view. (Śląsk Wrocław B; supporter)
Secondly, the definition distance towards hooligans is apparent in all the statements, when referring
to those groups one deliberately omits terms associated with football fandom (‘firms’ or ‘hooli
gans’). Non-hooligans are starting to realize that hooligan firms do instrumentalize the devoted
supporters’ ideology to use it to cover up and legitimatize their illegal operations. Therefore, they
rather refer to those groups as ‘mafia that took over the stands’, ‘underworld and their business’ or
‘gangs, wars of pseudo-mafia’. There is a boundary set between the world of criminal activities,
based on economic exploitation, and the world of devoted supporters. Qualifying hooligan groups
as criminal groups by other devoted supporters perfectly depicts non-hooligans’ awareness of being
economically exploited.
least in principle) have been interpreted as targeting the stands culture as a whole. With the
development of hooligan firms’ economic activities – including illegal – and so the more and
more frequent cooperation with hooligans of other clubs, the antagonistic nature of interests began
to break the basic rules and traditions of the stands culture.
It needs to be emphasized that this study is limited to giving visibility to the emerging process of
breakdown within community of devoted supporters and analysing its genesis and dynamics. It
does not assess how big the scale of the division is, how many hooligan groups are involved in their
economic interest-driven exploitation of other supporters, and to what extent this exploitation
reaches. Most probably this process differs depending on the local context. Nevertheless, this study
delivered evidence that it occurs among hooligan groups of different clubs and is recognized among
devoted supporters from various cities. This proves a breakdown in the devoted supporters’
solidarity and shows that ‘class consciousness’ of the exploited part of community is under
development.
Moreover, it needs to be stressed that our analysis focused only on internal processes that
contributed to a visible breakdown in the devoted supporters’ community. Taking into account the
criticism concerning the ‘self-raising’ of class-consciousness within the exploited part of the
community,52 further analysis should aim to show the potential influence of external processes
and actors. Some tracks lead to the changing public discourse of the stadium-related violence, which
could contribute to breaking the ideology forming the ‘false consciousness’ among non-hooligan
supporters. Until the time when Poland organized EURO 2012, the policy of the state towards
football-related violence attributed the responsibility to the community of devoted supporters as
a whole, even though the physical confrontations arose almost exclusively between the hooligans
groups. Currently, it seems that the discourse shifted and focuses on capturing and defining specific
groups responsible for violence in and around the stadiums, as well as on condemning such
behaviours.
Erosion of solidarity in the devoted supporters’ community and the potential inclusion of non-
hooligans in the camp against hooligans seems to constitute a possible turning point that would
make hooligan groups lose a lot of power. It is difficult to predict if the activity of football club
boards and the modernization in a broader context will result in the disappearance of the hooligan
‘class’. Probably, the violence and the desire of some groups to derive economic benefits are difficult
to eliminate. Perhaps, however, the transformation of the Polish society and of Polish football will
soon lead to a real ‘class’ revolution at the stadiums.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for their comments that have helped improve the article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
The research conducted by Radosław Kossakowski was funded by the National Science Center (Poland), research
Grant number [2013/09/D/HS6/00238].
ORCID
Mateusz Grodecki http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3156-2850
Radosław Kossakowski http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4150-9730
14 M. GRODECKI AND R. KOSSAKOWSKI
Notes
1. Giulianotti, ‘Supporters, followers, fans, and flaneurs: A taxonomy of spectator identities in football’, 35–36.
2. Grodecki, ‘Building social capital’, 8.
3. Kossakowski, ‘From Communist Fan Clubs to Professional Hooligans: A History of Polish Fandom as a Social
Process’.
4. Spaaij, ‘Understanding football hooliganism: A comparison of six Western European football clubs’, 6.
5. Grodecki, ‘Życie po meczu. Formy wykorzystania kapitału społecznego kibiców piłkarskich w Polsce’.
6. Kossakowski, Szlendak, Antonowicz, ‘Polish ultras in the post-socialist transformation’.
7. Antonowicz, Wrzesiński, ‘Kibice jako wspólnota niewidzialnej religii’.
8. Rookwood, Pearson, ‘The Hoolifan: Positive Fan Attitudes To Football “Hooliganism”’.
9. Perryman, ‘The good, the Bad and the Beautiful Game’; Chiweshe, ‘The People’s Game: Football Fandom in
Zimbabwe’.
10. Williams, ‘Who are you calling a hooligan?’.
11. Rookwood, Pearson, ‘The Hoolifan: Positive Fan Attitudes To Football “Hooliganism”’.
12. Testa, Armstrong, ‘Football Fascism and Fandom’, 65.
13. Trejo ‘Violence and Death in Argentinean Soccer in the New Millennium: Who is Involved and What is at
Stake?’, 844.
14. Kelly, ‘The Barra Bravas: The Violent Argentinian Gangs Controlling Football’.
15. Grabia, La Doce, La Verdadera, ‘Historia de la Barra Brava de Boca’.
16. Marx, Engels, ‘The communist manifesto’.
17. Lukacs, ‘Historia i świadomość klasowa: studia o marksistowskiej dialektyce’, 163.
18. Marx, Engels, ‘The Communist Manifesto’.
19. Marx, Engels, Lapides, 'Marx and Engels on Trade Unions', 34.
20. Andrew, ‘Class in Itself and Class against Capital: Karl Marx and His Classifiers, Canadian Journal of Political
Science’, 583.
21. Lukacs, ‘Historia i świadomość klasowa: studia o marksistowskiej dialektyce’, 172.
22. Andrew, ‘Class in Itself and Class against Capital: Karl Marx and His Classifiers, Canadian Journal of Political
Science’, 582.
23. Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’.
24. Hochfeld, ‘Studia o marksowskiej teorii społeczeństwa’.
25. Andrew, ‘Class in Itself and Class against Capital: Karl Marx and His Classifiers, Canadian Journal of Political
Science’, 583.
26. Lukacs, ‘Historia i świadomość klasowa: studia o marksistowskiej dialektyce’, 172.
27. Kennedy, Kennedy, ‘Football in Neo-Liberal Times: A Marxist Perspective on the European Football
Industry’.
28. Cleland, Cashmore 'Football Fans' Views of Violence in British Football.
29. Taylor, ‘Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology of Football Hooliganism’.
30. Dunning, Murphy, Williams, ‘The Roots of Football Hooliganism’.
31. Giulianotti, ‘Social Identity and Public Order: Political and Academic Discourses on Football Violence’;
Armstrong, Harris, ‘Football Hooligans: Theory and Evidence’.
32. Taylor, ‘Football Mad: A Speculative Sociology of Football Hooliganism’.
33. Webber, ‘Playing on the Break’: Karl Polanyi and the double-movement ‘Against Modern Football’.
34. Kennedy, Kennedy, ‘Towards a Marxist Political Economy of Football Supporters’, 184.
35. BBC, ‘Portsmouth FC: Michael Eisner Completes Takeover of League One Club’.
36. According to the definition of devoted supporter, the interviewees had to meet the two following criteria: (1)
declare an emotional attachment to a football club; (2) be a former or present member of formal or informal
group of football supporters.
37. As hooligans, we define supporters who were members of hooligans groups or admitted during the interview
that they took part in fights between football supporters. A small number of interviews with hooligans is
associated with their distrust of ‘outsiders’. Therefore, it results in reluctance to talk with the researchers.
38. Scriven, ‘Prose and Cons About Goal-free Evaluation’.
39. Kossakowski, ‘Where are the Hooligans? Dimensions of Football Fandom in Poland’.
40. Burski, ‘Od chuligana do prezesa – analiza przemian zachodzących w społecznym świecie polskich kibiców’;
Ruban, ‘Z pamiętnika Galernika. Magia lat 90-tych’, Vol. 1, Vol. 2.
41. Spaaij, ‘Understanding Football Hooliganism: A Comparison of Six Western European Football Clubs’, 316–7.
42. Antonowicz, Grodecki, ‘Missing the Goal. Policy Evolution Towards Football–related Violence in Poland
(1989–2012)’.
43. Grodecki, ‘Życie po meczu. Formy wykorzystania kapitału społecznego kibiców piłkarskich w Polsce’.
44. ibid.
SOCCER & SOCIETY 15
45. Kłos, Słomczyński, ‘Handel narkotykami w Gdańsku. Grupy przestępcze chcą przeniknąć do środowiska
kibiców Lechii’.
46. Pietraszewski, ‘Mafiosi i kibole Ruchu Chorzów’.
47. Kłos, Słomczyński, ‘Handel narkotykami w Gdańsku. Grupy przestępcze chcą przeniknąć do środowiska
kibiców Lechii’.
48. Similiar as in England, see Rookwood, Pearson, ‘The hoolifan: Positive fan attitudes to football “hooliganism”’.
49. https://www.kibice.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=33905&start=200 (accessed 28.9.2020).
50. https://www.kibice.net/forum/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=33730&start=160 (accessed 28.9.2020).
51. Marx, Engels, ‘The Communist Manifesto’.
52. Lukacs, ‘Historia i świadomość klasowa: studia o marksistowskiej dialektyce’, 172.
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