Louie B.

Zapatos ISSUES:
JD 2 – ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Saint Columban Law School  Whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary
cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence.

 Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so like a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency has
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991 jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and
determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education,
Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City
Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN,
ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA
REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.
HELD:
 These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to
him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil
Service Commission.

 The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It
has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education
FACTS: Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same
ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions
involved.
 On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school
teachers, among them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association
(MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described
as "mass concerted actions”.

 The teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a
memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal
proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements.
G.R. No. 164790             August 29, 2008 ISSUES:

 WHETHER OR NOT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and LORELIE B. SOLIDUM, Branch Manager, Cubao RESPONDENT IS STILL QUALIFIED AS A PRIMARY BENEFICIARY OF
Branch, petitioner, DECEASED SSS MEMBER ANTONIO, UNDER SECTION 12-B IN RELATION TO
vs. SECTION 8 (e) and (k) OF THE SS LAW.
GLORIA DE LOS SANTOS, respondent.

HELD:

FACTS:  Divorce obtained by respondent against the deceased Antonio was not binding in this
jurisdiction. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.

 Antonio de los Santos and respondent Gloria de los Santos, both Filipinos, were
married on April 29, 1964 in Manila.
 Gloria left Antonio and contracted two marriages, one of the said marriages
subsequently caused her to file for divorce abroad.
 On May 23, 1987, Antonio married Cirila de los Santos in Camalig, Albay.
 Although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, we find that she is
still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the
requirement of dependency upon her deceased husband Antonio.
 The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her
husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any
showing to the contrary. In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from
qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her deceased husband.

 On May 15, 1989, Antonio amended his records at the Social Security System (SSS).

 Antonio retired from his employment on March 1, 1996, and from then on began
receiving monthly pension. He died of respiratory failure. Upon his death, Cirila
applied for and began receiving his SSS pension benefit, beginning December 1999.

 On December 21, 1999, Gloria filed a claim for Antonio’s death benefits with the SSS
Cubao Branch. Her claim was denied because she was not a qualified beneficiary of
Antonio.
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988  Professional Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for
general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that
even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the Court of First
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA, ALEXANDER R. Instance (now the Regional Trial Court).
REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA,
ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R.  The legality of his acts is under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior
RIMANDO, petitioner, to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the
vs. courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law).
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.  SC find no cogent reason why Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent
The Solicitor General for respondents. Professional Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

 It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act

FACTS: arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such
rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view.
 Herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution
No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for  Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Resolution No. 105 null and void and of no
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. force and effect for being unconstitutional. This decision is immediately executory.
 Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy filed on their own behalf with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary
injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-
mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not Resolution No. 105, issued by the respondent Professional

Regulation Commission, should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court as co-equal bodies and co-equal bodies have no power to
control each other or interfere with each other's acts.

HELD:

 There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to
question a ruling or order of the Professional Regulation Commission.
G.R. No. 209330
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A.
MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO and
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO JOEL T. REYES, Respondent.
HELD:
FACTS:
 This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision dated March 19, 2013 and
Resolution dated September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which rendered null
and void Department of Justice Order No. 710 issued by the Secretary of Justice.
 Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and
anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. He was shot dead in San Pedro, Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan.
 Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial
confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O.
Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.
 On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-
Terrorism Division of the National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it
was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who
ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.
 On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department
Order No: 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct
preliminary investigation.
 On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710
creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of
the case.
 On October 3, 2011, former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when
she issued Department Order No. 710 and created the Second Panel.
 Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function
beyond the scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition.
 The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable
cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of
Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to
judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
 A writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions. A quasi-judicial function is "the action,
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of
a judicial nature.
 An administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders awards,
determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect
as the judgment of a court.
 The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative or executive
function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform
functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency. Its
preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding.
 The Department of Justice is not a court of law and its officers do not perform quasi-
judicial functions. The Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions of prosecutors
is also not a ministerial function.
 An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a
given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or
its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done."
 When an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when
there is an allegation of grave abuse of discretion.
 Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of Justice
is authorized to issue Department Order No. 710.
 Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice
may motu proprio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or
the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for review.
 The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is
within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her
prosecutors.
 There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus
should be held for trial.
 A preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial. It is not a trial on the
merits.
 Petition is DISMISSED for being moot. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan is DIRECTED to proceed with prosecution of Criminal Case No. 26839.

G.R. No. 204819               April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of
their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG
and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
FACTS:
are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it
is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are
proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
 As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section
17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties
and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities.
 The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that,
unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no
power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution,
Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate
on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.
 The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and
Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers
and on behalf of their minor children. This is to challenge the constitutionality of
the Reproductive Health Law.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the RH Law violates the delegation of authority of FDA and autonomy
of local governments.

HELD:

 The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the
power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and
methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and
highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods
fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as "health products."
 Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the
FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that
 HELD:
G.R. No. 195390               December 10, 2014
GOV. LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., and the PROVINCE OF CAMARINES
SUR, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JESSE M. ROBREDO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government, Respondent.
FACTS:
 On August 31, 2010, the respondent, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the
assailed MC No. 2010-83,9 entitled "Full Disclosure of Local Budget and Finances,
and Bids and Public Offerings," which aims to promote good governance through
enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs.
 All Provincial Governors, City Mayors and Municipal Mayors, are directed to faithfully
comply with the above cited [sic] provisions of laws, and existing national policy, by
posting in conspicuous places within public buildings in the locality, or imprint media
of community or general circulation, and in their websites.
ISSUES:
 THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HEISSUED THE ASSAILED MEMORANDUM
CIRCULARS IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL AUTONOMY AND
FISCAL AUTONOMY ENSHRINED IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.
 THE HON. SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN HEINVALIDLY ASSUMED LEGISLATIVE
POWERS IN PROMULGATING THE ASSAILED MEMORANDUM CIRCULARS
WHICH WENT BEYOND THE CLEAR AND MANIFEST INTENT OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991.
 This pertains to "the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute." Not to be confused with
the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and
determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law.
 In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.
 There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive
and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress."
 The President’s power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer
to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is
distinguished from the President’s power of control which is the power to alter or
modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate
officer. The power of control gives the President the power to revise or reverse the
acts or decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of discretion.
 A reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing
provision in the LGC. It was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the
directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for
development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine themselves if
they have been complying with the law.
 Section 287 of the Local Government Code mandates every local government to
appropriate in its annual budget no less than 20% of its annual revenue allotment for
development projects. In common understanding, development means the realization
of desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes essential in the
attainment of the constitutional objective of a desired quality of life for all.
 "Independently of any statutory provision authorizing the President to conduct an
investigation of the nature involved in this proceeding, and in view of the nature and
character of the executive authority with which the President of the Philippines is
invested, the constitutional grant to him of power to exercise general supervision over
all local governments and to take care that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize him to order an investigation of the act or conduct of the
petitioner herein. Supervision is not a meaningless thing. It is an active power. It is
certainly not without limitation, but it at least implies authority to inquire into facts and
conditions in order to render the power real and effective.
 the Court finds nothing in two other questioned issuances of the respondent, i.e., MC
Nos. 2010-83 and 2011-08, that can be construed as infringing on the fiscal
autonomy of LGUs. The assailed issuances of the respondent, MC Nos. 2010-83 and
2011-08, are but implementation of this avowed policy of the State to make public
officials accountable to the people.
 The Court believes that the supervisory powers of the President are broad enough to
embrace the power to require the publication of certain documents as a mechanism
of transparency.
 The President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning
agency of the government, primarily responsible for formulating and implementing
continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and
programs for the entire country.
 In the instant case, the assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of
promoting good governance through transparency, accountability and participation.
The action of the respondent is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his power
as alter ego of the President.

G.R. No. 98045 June 26, 1996
DESAMPARADO VDA. DE NAZARENO and LETICIA NAZARENO TAPIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MR. & MRS. JOSE SALASALAN, MR. & MRS. LEO RABAYA,
AVELINO LABIS, HON. ROBERTO G. HILARIO, ROLLEO I. IGNACIO, ALBERTO M.
GILLERA and HON. ABELARDO G. PALAD, JR., in their official and/or private
capacities, respondents.
 Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands,
as well as the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have
jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land Law.
 As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land,
being an artificial accretion of sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has
jurisdiction, authority and control over the same, as mandated under Sections 3 and
4 of the Public Land Law.
 This Court held that where, in the disposition of public lands, the Director of Lands
bases his decision on the evidence thus presented, he clearly acts within his
jurisdiction, and if he errs in appraising the evidence, the error is one of judgment, but
not an act of grave abuse of discretion annullable by certiorari.

FACTS:

 The complaint was for annulment of the verification, report and recommendation,
decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding a parcel of public land.
 The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod,
Cagayan de Oro City. Said land was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the
dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan River.
 A decision was rendered against private respondents, which decision was affirmed
by the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 20.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over lands
acquired through accretion.

HELD:

 Subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley
Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.

G.R. No. 176707               February 17, 2010
ARLIN B. OBIASCA, Petitioner,
vs.
JEANE O. BASALLOTE, Respondent.
FACTS:
 On May 26, 2003, City Schools Division Superintendent Nelly B. Beloso appointed
respondent Jeane O. Basallote to the position of Administrative Officer II.
 Meanwhile, on August 25, 2003, Oyardo appointed petitioner Arlin B. Obiasca to the
same position of Administrative Officer II.
 Respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
against Oyardo, Gonzales and Diaz.
 Respondent elevated the matter to the CSC. In its November 29, 2005 resolution, the
CSC granted the appeal, approved respondent’s appointment and recalled the
approval of petitioner’s appointment.
 Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari  in the Court of Appeals (CA) claiming that the
CSC acted without factual and legal bases in recalling his appointment. He also
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction.
ISSUES:
 Whether the deliberate failure of the appointing authority (or other responsible
officials) to submit respondent’s appointment paper to the CSC within 30 days from
its issuance made her appointment ineffective and incomplete.
HELD:
 The decision of the [CSC] is final and executory if no petition for reconsideration is
filed within fifteen days from receipt thereof. Petitioner did not file a petition for
reconsideration of the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 before filing a
petition for review in the CA. Such fatal procedural lapse on petitioner’s part allowed
the CSC resolution dated November 29, 2005 to become final and executory.
 A final and definitive judgment can no longer be changed, revised, amended or
reversed.
 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of
law, comity and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for
administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have
been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum.
 Taken in its entirety, this case shows that the lack of CSC approval was not due to
any negligence on respondent’s part. Neither was it due to the "tolerance,
acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials." Rather, the underhanded
machinations of Gonzales and Oyardo, as well as the gullibility of Diaz, where the
major reasons why respondent’s appointment was not even forwarded to the CSC.
 It not only disregarded the doctrine of immutability of final judgments but also unduly
concentrated on a narrow portion of the provision of law, overlooking the greater part
of the provision and other related rules and using a legal doctrine rigidly and out of
context. Its effect was to perpetuate an injustice.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

G.R. No. 214241
HELD:
SPOUSES RAMON and LIGAYA GONZALES, Petitioners,
vs.
MARMAINE REALTY CORPORATION, represented by MARIANO MANALO, Respondent.
FACTS:
 The instant case arose from a Complaint dated October 30, 1997 for Recognition as
Tenant with Damages and Temporary Restraining Order filed by Sps. Gonzales
against herein respondent Marmaine Realty Corporation (Marmaine) before the
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), Region IV (Tenancy Case).
 the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued a Resolution ordering
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in Sps. Gonzales' favor.
 After due proceedings, the PARAD issued a Decision dated June 27, 2002 in the
Tenancy Case, dismissing Sps. Gonzales' complaint for lack of merit. Sps. Gonzales
moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an Order dated August 7,
2002. Aggrieved, they appealed to the DARAB, but the latter affirmed the PARAD
ruling in a Decision dated October 17, 2008. Dissatisfied, Sps. Gonzales moved for
reconsideration of the DARAB 's October 17, 2008 Decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution dated March 23, 2009. Due to the failure on the part of Sps.
Gonzales to further appeal, the DARAB Decision became final and executory on May
7, 2009, and an Entry of Judgment was issued on January 19, 2012.
 In view of the finality of the ruling in the Tenancy Case, Marmaine filed a Motion for
Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens dated January 31, 2012.
ISSUES:
 The issues raised for the Court's resolution are as follows: (a) whether or not the CA
erred in dismissing the petition for review before it due to petitioners' failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial
system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to
carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized
areas of their respective competence.
 In view of this doctrine, jurisprudence instructs that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be
exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought.
 Said question at best could be resolved tentatively by the administrative authorities.
The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply, because nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical
knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and
application of law.
 In sum, the PARAD properly ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens that
Sps. Gonzales caused to be annotated on Marmaine's certificates of title in view of
the finality of the decision in the Tenancy Case.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
 the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the
execution of the contract.
 Whether or not respondent exhaust administrative remedies.

G.R. No. 158253             March 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HELD:

WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, Petitioner,
vs.  IT IS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT WHICH HAS THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION
CARLITO LACAP, doing business under the name and style CARWIN CONSTRUCTION TO RESOLVE RESPONDENT’S MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.
AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY, Respondent.  COA has primary jurisdiction to resolve respondent’s money claim against the
government under Section 2(1),26 Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section
2627 of P.D. No. 1445; that non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and the principle of primary jurisdiction results in a lack of
FACTS: cause of action.
 Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of
 Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving
Rules of Court assailing the Decision1 dated April 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals. a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the
 The District Engineer of Pampanga issued and duly published an "Invitation To Bid" resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal.
dated January 27, 1992. Respondent, doing business under the name and style  WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Carwin Construction and Construction Supply (Carwin Construction), was pre-
qualified together with two other contractors. Since respondent submitted the lowest
bid, he was awarded the contract for the concreting of Sitio 5 Bahay Pare.
 On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San
Fernando, Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100%
completed in accordance with the approved plans and specifications.
 Respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project. The DPWH
prepared the Disbursement Voucher in favor of petitioner. However, the DPWH
withheld payment from respondent after the District Auditor of the Commission on
Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s
license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not COA erred in withholding payment from respondent after the District
Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on

G.R. No. 180388               January 18, 2011
GREGORIO R. VIGILAR, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS (DPWH), DPWH UNDERSECRETARIES TEODORO E. ENCARNACION AND
EDMUNDO E. ENCARNACION AND EDMUNDO V. MIR, DPWH ASSISTANT SECRETARY
JOEL L. ALTEA, DPWH REGIONAL DIRECTOR VICENTE B. LOPEZ, DPWH DISTRICT
ENGINEER ANGELITO M. TWAÑO, FELIX A. DESIERTO OF THE TECHNICAL WORKING
GROUP VALIDATION AND AUDITING TEAM, AND LEONARDO ALVARO, ROMEO N.
SUPAN, VICTORINO C. SANTOS OF THE DPWH PAMPANGA 2ND ENGINEERING
DISTRICT, Petitioners,
vs.
ARNULFO D. AQUINO, Respondent.
FACTS:
 On 19 June 1992, petitioner Angelito M. Twaño, then Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-District
Engineer of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) 2nd Engineering
District of Pampanga sent an Invitation to Bid to respondent Arnulfo D. Aquino, the
owner of A.D. Aquino Construction and Supplies.
 Project was awarded to respondent, and a "Contract of Agreement" was thereafter
executed between him and concerned petitioners for the amount of
PhP1,873,790.69, to cover the project cost.
 The certificate was signed by Romeo M. Yumul, the Project Engineer; as well as
petitioner Romeo N. Supan, Chief of the Construction Section, and by petitioner
Twaño.
 Respondent Aquino, however, claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but
petitioners refused to pay the amount.
ISSUES:
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE COA
TO ALLOW PAYMENT TO RESPONDENT ON A QUANTUM MERUIT BASIS
DESPITE THE LATTER’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1445.
HELD:
 In ordering the payment of the obligation due respondent on a quantum meruit basis,
the Court of Appeals correctly relied on Royal Trust Corporation v. COA, Eslao v.
COA, Melchor v. COA, EPG Construction Company v. Vigilar, and Department of
Health v. C.V. Canchela & Associates, Architects. All these cases involved
government projects undertaken in violation of the relevant laws, rules and
regulations covering public bidding, budget appropriations, and release of funds for
the projects. Consistently in these cases, this Court has held that the contracts were
void for failing to meet the requirements mandated by law; public interest and equity,
however, dictate that the contractor should be compensated for services rendered
and work done.
 Specifically, C.V. Canchela & Associates is similar to the case at bar, in that the
contracts involved in both cases failed to comply with the relevant provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1445 and the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Nevertheless, "(t)he illegality of the subject Agreements proceeds, it bears emphasis,
from an express declaration or prohibition by law, not from any intrinsic illegality. As
such, the Agreements are not illegal per se, and the party claiming thereunder may
recover what had been paid or delivered."
 Neither can petitioners escape the obligation to compensate respondent for services
rendered and work done by invoking the state’s immunity from suit. This Court has
long established in Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu, and recently reiterated in Heirs of
Pidacan v. ATO, that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen. As this Court enunciated in
EPG Construction.
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
  The prevailing doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases
vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a court of first instance from assuming
cognizance over such a matter."
 The petition therefore did not exaggerate matters when it emphasized that
respondent Judge, in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction sought to be nullified,
G.R. No. L-33146 May 31, 1977 acted in a manner contrary to and in violation of the law, assuming jurisdiction over a
matter beyond his competence.
 WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of respondent Judge of
January 4, 1971 nullified and set aside.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch II
(Pasig, Rizal), and JUANITO S. FLORES, doing business under the name and style of
JS. F. ENTERPRISES and ASIATIC INCORPORATED, represented by EUGENIO
VILLANUEVA, respondents

FACTS:

 This is a petition for certiorari, filed on February 11, 1971, was on the jurisdictional
issue. It sought to nullify and set aside order of respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro
dated January 4, 1971, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private
respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated the importers of 1,350
cartons of fresh fruits, restraining petitioners from proceeding with the auction sale of
such perishable goods.

ISSUES:

 Whether or not respondent judge has jurisdiction over in seizure and forfeiture cases.

HELD:

 The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the administrative in the first instance and
then the Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction controls.
 HELD:
G.R. No. 191705, March 07, 2016
BASIANA MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION, BASIANA MINERALS
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND RODNEY O. BASIANA, IN HIS OWN PERSONAL
CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF BASIANA
MINING EXPLORATION CORPORATION AND BASIANA MINING DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,
v. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, AND SR METALS INC. (SRMI), Respondents.
FACTS:
 the MGB-POA, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DENR Secretary
entered into MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII with SRMI for the development and
commercial utilization of nickel, cobalt, iron and other associated mineral deposits in
the 572.64-ha area in Tubay, Agusan del Norte.
 Hence, the herein petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the
issuance of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII on the grounds that (1) "there was clear
violation of due process and the entire proceedings was railroaded and suited for the
benefit of [SRMI]," and that (2) the approval of the application is a patent nullity
and/or absolutely without any factual and legal basis.
ISSUE:
 WHETHER OR NOT COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING
ITS OWN RESOLUTION DECLARING THAT THE MPSA ISSUED BY THE [DENR]
AS NULL AND VOID, BY GIVING THE FOLLOWING SPECIOUS AND BASELESS
LEGAL GROUNDS, WHICH ARE NOT IN ACCORD WITH EXISTING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
 First, the act of the DENR Secretary in approving SRMI's application and entering
into MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII is not an exercise of its quasi-judicial power; hence, it
cannot be reviewed by the CA, whether by a petition for review under Rule 43 or a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
 Administrative agencies possess distinct powers and functions - administrative,
quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. "Administrative power is concerned with the work
of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs."36 Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicator/ power, on the other hand, "is
the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law."
 "A government agency performs adjudicator/ functions when it renders decisions or
awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties, which decisions or awards
have the same effect as a judgment of the court.
 Given that it is the DENR Secretary that has the primary jurisdiction to approve and
cancel mining agreements and contract, it is with the DENR Secretary that the
petitioners should have sought the cancellation of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII, and not
with the courts. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction instructs that if a case is such that
its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an
administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the courts is had.
 The DENR Secretary, no doubt, is under the control of the President; thus, his
decision is subject to review of the latter. Consequently, the petitioners should have
appealed its case to the Office of the President under A.O. No. 18, series of 1987,
instead of directly seeking review by the court. WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED.
 proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is
within the proper jurisdiction of the court.
 As regards respondent’s invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that
"the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in
G.R. No. 187714               March 8, 2011 the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people."
 WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N.
PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, and ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, Respondents.

FACTS:

 Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate Committee of the Whole (respondent) from
conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo
A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to Senate
Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of ₱200
million for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act.

ISSUE:

 Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction or prior resort

HELD:

 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case.

 It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case,
which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the
case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and
knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
  This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is
constitutional when: (1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion.
 We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was
G.R. No. 205728               January 21, 2015 its duty in this case. However, it was misdirected.
 COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and
reduce spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to
regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE exercise.
M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,  This is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all
vs. deserve? It is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.  WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order
previously issued is hereby made permanent. The act of the COMELEC in issuing
the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is
declared unconstitutional.
FACTS:

 Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign Materials2 dated
February 22, 2013 and letter3 issued on February 27, 2013.

ISSUE:

 WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE

"POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR "ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING
THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE

 WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION (PROTECTED

SPEECH), OR ELECTION PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT.

HELD: