Evidence - Weekly Case Doctrines

EVIDENCE WEEKLY CASE DOCTRINES
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Week 1 Cases
People v. Turco (2000) There is a difference between admissibility of evidence and the
G.R. No. 137757 probative value. The admissibility of evidence is determined by
J. Melo its relevance and competence; an affair of logic and law. The
weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on
judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in Rule 133
and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Although the
medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to
an absence of the examining physician.
However, it cannot be said that the case relied solely on the

medical certificate. In fact, the case heavily relied on the
complainant’s testimony. A medical examination is not
indispensable in the prosecution of rape.
Expertravel & Tours v. CA Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the
(2005) matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it
G.R. No. 152392 must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
J. Callejo, Sr. uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of
the jurisdiction of the court.
A judicially noticed facts is one not subject to a reasonable

dispute: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned (universal notoriety). In this case, the
court can take judicial notice of teleconferencing; however, the
Court is not convinced that one has been conducted or a Board
Resolution has been passed allowing Atty. Aguinaldo to sign the
certification against non-forum shopping.
Prieto v. Arroyo (1965) As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial
G.R. No. L-17885 notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
J. Makalintal contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried
or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact
that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending
before the same judge.
Tabuena v. CA (1991) The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an
G.R. No. 85423 exhibit does not mean it has thereby already been offered as
J. Cruz part of the evidence of a party. The markings made during the
pre-trial was only made for purposes of identification. Formal
offer is not required when: (1) it has been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded; and (2) it has been incorporated in the
records of the case.
In the absence of objection, and as matter of convenience to all

parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case
pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it for that purpose; or the original or
part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the
archives and admitted as part of the record of the case then
pending.
BPI Savings v. CTA (2000) The law creating the CTA, however, specifically provides that
G.R. No. 122480 proceedings before it “shall not be governed strictly by the
J. Panganiban technical rules of evidence.”
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While it is true that judicial notice cannot be claimed for a

previous case filed in the same court or even heard by the same
judge, the Court held that the attached CTA Decision providing
that BPI suffered losses can be used as a corroborative evidence
(not the sole basis of the claim of BPI) as it is a matter the judge
is ought to know by virtue of his judicial function.
City of Manila v. Garcia (1967) Even if the certification of the Chairman, Committee on
G.R. No. L-26053 Appropriations of the Municipal Board be set aside, the trial
J. Sanchez judge is still duty bound to take judicial notice of Ordinance
4566 as provided by the city charter of Manila.
Social Justice Society v. Atienza While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws
(2013) enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is
G.R. No. 156052 different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of
J. Corona matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under the Rules of
Court. Unlike in City of Manila v. Garcia, the SC is not covered by
the city charter.
Even when there is a statute that requires a court to take

judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not required
to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to
which it does not have access. The party asking the court to take
judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text
of the rules the party desires it to have notice of.
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales (1988) The law requires that a custom must be proved as a fact
G.R. No. 55960 according to the rules of evidence. To establish a valid foreign
J. Cortes marriage: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of
fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence. The Court has interpreted Section 25 to include
competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to prove the
existence of a written foreign law. Philippine courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved
as any other fact. If not proven, presumed to be same as ours.
Torres v. CA (1984) The amended complaint takes the place of the original. The
G.R. No. L-37420 latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any
J. Melencio-Herrera further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer
forms part of the record. If petitioner had desired to utilize the
original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. There
can be no estoppel by extrajudicial admission made in the
original complaint for failure to offer it in evidence.
Separate Opinion of J. Teehankee: The Justice does not agree

that Macaria can no longer invoke the admission in the original
complaint. The original complaint did not cease to be a judicial
admission and remains part of the judicial record, not having
expunged therefrom. For him, the question remains open for
determination of the appellate court where the case was
remanded for a new trial.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan When material averments in the complaint are not specifically
(2013) denied, they are deemed admitted. The allegations in the
G.R. No. 152154 petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank
J. Corona deposits in the sum of about $365 million, not having
specifically denied are deemed admitted (qualified as lawfully
acquired).
If the defendants denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent

to an admission. A negative pregnant is a form of negative
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expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an

implication of some king favorable to the adverse party. A
profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and
necessarily within the pleader’s knowledge or means of
knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all.
Judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by

the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or
written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of
judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case. Admissions
of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a party,
as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has
the force of judicial admission. The rules is that the testimony
on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial
admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a
fact which is peculiarly within his own knowledge.
An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by

the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on
him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection
is interposed by the adverse party or not.
People v. Hernandez (1996) The rule on prohibiting stipulation of facts in criminal cases is
G.R. No. 108028 grounded on the fundamental right of the accused to be
J. Francisco presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the corollary duty of
the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. In light of recent changes in our rules on
criminal procedure, particularly the pre-trial provisions found
in Rule 118, the prohibition against a stipulation of facts in
criminal cases no longer holds true.
A stipulation of facts should be allowed not only during pre-trial

but also and with more reason, during trial proper itself.
Stipulations made during the course of the trial need not be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and his counsel
since the same is automatically reduced in writing and
contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in
court. The admission is a waiver of the right to cross-examine
the witnesses and to present evidence on his behalf. This right
may be waived expressly or impliedly.
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Week 2 Cases
Villaflor v. Summers (1920) No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, is
G.R. No. 16444 limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-
J. Malcolm incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, on a
proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular
inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso
is that torture or force shall be avoided and not to embarrass the
patient any more than is absolutely necessary. No objection can
be made when the physical examination is made by the family
doctor of the accused or by the doctor of the same sex can be
seen.
U.S. v. Orera (1907) Since the document in question, the theatre ticket is a proof of an
G.R. No. 3810 agreement for the rent of a place in a theater to watch a
C.J. Arellano performance, the same is a private document.
PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines When the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are
(1992) deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make
G.R. No. 87434 a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be
J. Regalado presented formally in evidence for it may be considered an
admitted fact.
Heirs of Doronio v. Heirs of The requirement that documents written in an unofficial
Doronio (2007) language must be accompanied with a translation in English or
G.R. No. 169454 Filipino as a prerequisite for its admission in evidence must be
J. Reyes, R.T. insisted upon by the parties at the trial to enable the court,
where a translation has been impugned as incorrect, to decide
the issue; otherwise, it is presumed that the language in which
the document is written is understood by all, and the document
is admissible in evidence.
Evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may be

validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgement even
if by its nature, it is inadmissible.
Deutsche Bank v. See (2006) In the present case, there is likewise no dispute that the trial
G.R. No. 165606 court had jurisdiction over the case. As such, it had jurisdiction to
J. Callejo, Sr. rule on the admissibility of the documents offered in evidence.
The proper remedy of the petitioner was to appeal in due course
from the judgment or decision of the trial court on the merits of
the case to the CA and not certiorari. In a petition for certiorari
from an interlocutory order, the petitioner is burdened to prove
that the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief.
Catuira v. CA (1994) When private respondent was called on the witness stand,
G.R. No. 105813 petitioner waived this procedural error by failing to object at the
J. Bellosillo appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became
reasonably apparent the moment private respondent was called
to testify without any prior offer having been made by the
respondent. Query: How do you reconcile this with pre-trial? In
pre-trial you already have the witnesses and pieces of evidence
lined up.
People v. Yatco (1955) The Court overlooked that the right to object is a mere privilege
G.R. No. L-9181 which the parties may waive; and if the ground for objection is
J. Reyes, J.B.L. known and not reasonably made, the objection is deemed waived
and the Court has no power, on its own motion, to disregard the
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evidence.
Interpacific v. Aviles (1990) Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it
G.R. No. 86062 is formally offered as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior
J. Cruz to that time is premature.
A continuing objection is a single objection made to a class of

evidence (testimonial or documentary) which when first offered
is considered to encompass the rest of the evidence.
It is instructive at this point to make a distinction between

identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an
exhibit. The first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit. The
second is done only when the party rests its case and not before.
The mere fact that a particular document is identified and
marked as an exhibit does not mean it will be or has been offered
as part of the evidence of the party.
Dizon v. CTA (2008) As a qualification in the G.R. that offer must be made before it can
G.R. No. 140944 be considered by the court, the following requisites should be
J. Nachura present: (1) the evidence not formally offered to be admitted and
considered by the trial court must have been duly identified by
testimony and duly recorded; and (2) the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case (can be done when
exhibits are marked during pre-trial).
Heirs of Saves v. Heirs of Saves Even if the document was not formally offered in evidence before
(2010) the trial court, the CA did not err in considering the same
G.R. No. 152866 because it satisfied the requisites for the exception to apply
J. Leonardo-De Castro (identified by the witness + TSN during the trial).
Lamagan v. Dela Cruz (1971) The ruling of the court in the inadmissibility of evidence should
G.R. No. L-27950 be assigned as one of the errors when the case is taken into
J. Teehankee appeal.
Even if the Court rejected the pieces of evidence, the plaintiff

could tender them. This will enable the higher court to examine
the exhibits and to judge whether their rejection was erroneous.
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Week 3
Philippine Movie Pictures v. While the CIR was empowered to adopt its own rules of
Premiere Productions (1953) procedure and may act according to justice and equity without
G.R. No. L-5621 regard to technicalities, this broad power should not be
J. Bautista Angelo interpreted to mean that it can ignore or disregard the
fundamental requirements of due process in the trials and
investigations of cases brought before it for determination.
Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC The POEA has no jurisdiction to hear and decide a claim for
(1988) enforcement of a foreign judgment. Such a claim must be brought
G.R. No. 76595 before the regular courts.
J. Feliciano
The Dubai decision purports to be the written act or record of an
act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country, and
therefore, a public writing. Rances failed to submit any
attestation issued by the proper Dubai official having legal
custody of the original of the decision of the Dubai Court that the
copy presented is a faithful copy of the original decision. The
attestation must also be authenticated by a Philippine Consular
Office having jurisdiction in Dubai. The transmittal letter will not
suffice.
The translation is also legally defective. There is no showing of

who effected the English translation. The English translation was
not shown to be made by an official court interpreted of the
Philippine Government nor of the Dubai Government. Neither
was his identity nor competence in both languages shown. The
English translation was also not sworn to be accurate and
neither did the parties agree that the translation is true and
faithful.
E. Michael & Co. v. Enriquez The writing itself must be produced unless it has been lost or
(1915) destroyed, in which case, before its contents may be proved by
G.R. No. 10824 other evidence, it must be shown by the person offering the
J. Moreland secondary evidence: (1) that the document was duly executed
and delivered, where delivery is necessary; and (2) that it has
been lost or destroyed.
Bartolome v. IAC (1990) While the deed of sale is more than 30 years old since it was
G.R. No. 76792 executed in 1917 and that it was presented in court by the
C.J. Fernan proper custodian who is the heir of the person who would
naturally keep it (son), alterations or circumstances of suspicion
are present. The missing page has affected its authenticity.
Without the signature, the document is insufficient to show that
there was voluntary transmission of rights over the subject of the
sale.
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA (1991) The lack of signatures on the first pages, therefore, absent any
G.R. No. 79597-98 alterations or circumstances of suspicion cannot be held to
J. Padilla detract from the fact that the documents in question, which were
certified as copied of the originals on file with the Register of
Deeds of Pampanga, are genuine and free from any blemish or
circumstances of suspicion. Unlike in the previous case, the
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signature was vital (as it conveys the property voluntarily). The

document was also kept by one of the heirs of the parties in the
instrument. Finally, other circumstances raises doubt as to the
authenticity – only raised this issue when the other heirs claimed
the property.
Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule"

that a document must be unblemished by any alteration or
circumstances of suspicion refers to the extrinsic quality of the
document itself.
Antillon v. Barcelon (1917) To the foregoing rules with reference to the method of proving
G.R. No. L-12483 private documents an exception is made with reference to the
J. Johnson method of proving public documents executed before and
certified to, under the hand and seal of certain public officials.
All documents acknowledged by a notary public and certified to

by him are considered public documents in this jurisdiction. The
principal function of a notary is to authenticate documents.
When a notary public certifies the due execution and delivery of
a document under his hand and seal he thereby gives such a
document the force of evidence.
A document duly acknowledged before a notary public under his

hand and seal, with his certificate thereto attached, is admissible
in evidence without further proof of its due execution and
delivery, unless and until some question is raised as to verity of
said acknowledgment and certificate.
Lopez v. CA (1978) It is true that public documents are presumed genuine and
G.R. No. L-31494 regular under the provisions of the Rules of Court but this
J. Guerrero presumption is a rebuttable presumption which may be
overcome by clear, strong, and convincing evidence, not
conclusive evidence. While this case also involves a notarized
document, there are circumstances present in this case which
causes doubt as to the due execution and authenticity of the
document.
The Court, in this case, did not merely rely on the expertise of the
NBI handwriting expert. On their own, they have noticed the
discrepancies in the signatures of the purported vendor.
The modes enumerated in the ROC to prove the genuineness of

the handwriting in the document makes no preference, much
less distinction among and between the different means stated.
Thus, the Court may also make a comparison between the
questioned and standard signatures before it.
Lopez v. CA (1987) A special power of attorney executed before a city-judge public
G.R. No. 77008 notary in a foreign country, without the certification or
J. Gancayco authentication required under the ROC, is not admissible in
evidence in Philippine Courts.
ATCI v. Echin (2010) The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws;
G.R. No. 178551 hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To
J. Carpio Morales prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of the ROC. They
should submit a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly
authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat;
otherwise, apply the doctrine processual presumption.
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People v. Gaddi (1989) Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can
G.R. No. 74065 be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule
J. Cortes which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts
which he “knows of his own knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception.” It is not hearsay if the purpose
of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the
fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
In this case, Guzman was only testifying to the fact that Gaddi
told him that he stabbed Esguerra and not the truth of Gaddi’s
statement.
People v. Estenzo (1976) The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear
G.R. No. L-41166 and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the
J. Antonio opportunity of cross-examination. It enables the judge as the
trier of facts “to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence
of a witness’ deportment while testifying, and a certain
subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness.” This also
allows the court to reach a correct result and avoids subversion
of the rules governing the examination of witnesses, i.e., leading
question on direct examination.
People v. Brioso (1971) The affidavit of the Antonio Daria was not taken into
G.R. No. L-28482 consideration because it did not have the seal of the Fiscal’s
J. Reyes, J.B.L. Office. It was also never identified by the supposed affiant and
there was no opportunity for the prosecution to cross-examine
him.
Affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves

but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s
statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood
by the one writing them. Generally, affidavits were prohibited
because it does not give the opponent the opportunity to cross-
examine (blindsided). It should only be admitted if the affiants
themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
Bachrach v. CIR (1978) Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to
G.R. No. L-26136 cross-examine Kaplin, the association was entitled to have the
J. Muñ oz-Palma direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record.
Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is

complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined
by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost or in
part thru the fault of the adverse party. But when cross-
examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to
causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the
uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent.
Fulgado v. CA (1990) The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by
G.R. No. 61570 cross-examination has always been understood as requiring, not
C.J. Fernan necessarily an actual cross-examination, but merely an
opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired.
Where the failure to cross-examine was imputable to the cross-

examiner’s fault, the lack of cross-examination is no longer a
ground for exclusion according to the general principle that an
opportunity, though waived, will suffice.
People v. Abatayo (2004) As cited: The task of recalling a witness for cross-examination is
G.R. No. 139456 imposed on the party who wishes to exercise said right, and
J. Callejo, Sr. stressed that it should be the opposing counsel who should move
to cross-examine the plaintiff’s witness.
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The appellant waived his right to conduct further examination

when he failed to call the attention of the Court throughout the
proceedings.
People v. Relucio (1978) Every effort to reconcile the conflicting points should first be
G.R. No. L-38790 exerted before any adverse conclusion can be made therefrom.
J. Barredo
It is the duty of the party trying to impugn the testimony of a
witness by means of prior or, for that matter, subsequent
inconsistent statements, whether oral or in writing, to give the
witness a chance to reconcile his conflicting declarations, such
that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by him
that he should be deemed impeached.
Laying the predicate: it is incumbent upon the attorney when

cross-examining said witness to direct his attention to the
discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and such
statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a
statement different from that delivered in court.
The prosecution could have objected on the failure of the cross-

examiner to lay the predicate; failure to do so is a waiver and the
court has no other option but to determine, if they can, possible
reconciliation on the basis alone of logic and common
experience.
People v. De Guzman (1998) A witness cannot be impeached by evidence of contradictory or
G.R. No. 122740 prior inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or
J. Regalado predicate has been duly laid by the party against whom said
witness was called. Here, the inconsistent statement was not
brought to the attention of the witness. Note that in the previous
case, it was also not brought to the witness’ attention BUT the
court, in itself, saw the jarring inconsistencies in the affidavit and
testimony before the court; plus, no objection was made when
the affidavit was introduced (here, it was not even introduced in
evidence). Also, in this case, it was the victim who was being
impeached.
If appellant was really prepared to attack complainant’s

credibility based on statements in her complaint, he should
necessarily have asked complainant about them during the trial,
offered the complaint as his evidence, and specified the purpose
of its admission.
Borromeo v. CA (1976) Memorandum is only needed when it is shown that there is a
G.R. No. L-31342 & L-31740 need to refresh the memory of the witness, which is not the case
J. Barredo here. The memorandum, however, is not admissible as
corroborative evidence.
People v. Sandal (1930) When the witness refused to leave the court when ordered, the
G.R. No. 32394-95 court has the discretion whether to admit or reject the testimony
C.J. Avanceñ a of the witness. However, in this case, the Court held that even if
the rejected testimony is admitted, there is nothing to show that
this would materially affect the outcome of the case.
Design Sources International v. Without any motion from the other party to exclude, there is
Eristingcol (2014) nothing in the rules that prohibits a witness from hearing the
G.R. No. 193966 testimonies of other witnesses. In comparison to Sandal, here
C.J. Sereno there was no order to exclude at all. The determination of
materiality of Stephen’s testimony was uncalled for.
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Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from

any of the parties, a court cannot simply allow or disallow the
presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter
heard the testimony of another witness.
Bagadiong v. Gonzales (1979) There is no legal impediment for a party to call any of the
G.R. No. L-25966 adverse parties to be his witness. It does not run afoul with the
J. De Castro provisions on self-incrimination (this is a civil case).
While the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination

protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil, or
administrative, said privilege, in proceedings other than a
criminal case against him who invokes it, is considered an option
to refuse to answer incriminating question, and not a prohibition
of inquiry. Furthermore, the provisions can only be invoked
when a question calling for an incriminating answer is
propounded.
Bermudez v. Castillo (1937) The provision in the Bill of Rights as to right against self-
Per. Rec. No. 714-A incrimination was written to extend to all cases, be they criminal,
J. Diaz civil, or administrative. In this case, Bermudez immediately
raised her privilege against self-incrimination when she was
asked to write the letters.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or

the fingers, writing is not purely a mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention.; here, she
was asked to write which would create evidence against you
from nothing.
What are not included?

• Physical examination
• Required to put clothings or shoes for size or for measuring or
photographing.
• Obtaining DNA samples
• Paraffin casting
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Week 4
People v. Yatco (1955) The lower court should have allowed such confessions to be given
G.R. No. L-9181 in evidence at least as against the parties who made them, and
J. Reyes, J.B.L. admit the same conditionally to establish conspiracy, in order to
give the prosecution a chance to get into the record all the relevant
evidence at its disposal to prove the charges.
Philippine Movie Pictures v. The mere inspection of the place of labor was not enough to
Premiere (1953) establish the allegations of the parties.
G.R. No. L-5621
J. Bautista Angelo
People v. Bardaje (1980) Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more
G.R. No. L-29271 eloquently that all witnesses put together.
J. Melencio-Herrera
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be
sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence
of corpus delicti.
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
Diaz (2007) application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate
G.R. No. 171713 biological samples of his DNA. Any physical residue of the dead
J. Chico-Nazario parent can be resorted to.
People v. Umanito (2007) If it can be conclusively determined that the accused did not sire
G.R. No. 172607 the alleged victim’s child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable
J. Tinga doubt and allow his acquittal on this basis.
After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the

parties who wish to avail the same to offer the results in
accordance with the rules of evidence.
This is applicable because the victim herself stated that the child
was the product of the rape.
Herrera v. Alba (2005) Advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity
G.R. No. 148220 and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts.
J. Carpio
If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable
presumption of paternity which should be subjected to the Vallejo
standards ((1) how the samples were collected; (2) how they were
handled; (3) the possibility of contamination; (4) the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples; (5) whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed; and (6) the qualification
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of the analyst who conducted the tests.).

In Re: The Writ of Habeas A review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for
Corpus of Reynaldo De Villa the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus only in very specific
(2004) instances: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
G.R. No. 158802 resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court has no
J. Ynares-Santiago jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has
been imposed, as such sentence void as to such excess.
The petitioner cannot invoke the remedy of habeas corpus in

order to seek the review of fact long passed with finality. This
relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. The
petition for writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the
record of the case.
The motion for new trial was also denied. The issue of Leahlyn’s
paternity is not central to the issue petitioner’s guilt or innocence.
The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different
question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of
the child. Pregnancy is not an element of the crime of rape.
DNA evidence does not fall within the statutory or jurisprudential

definition of “newly-discovered evidence.” Such evidence
disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced
during at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Query:
What is the proper remedy for post-conviction?
Lee v. People (2004) The best evidence rule was designed to guard against incompetent
G.R. No. 159288 or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the
J. Callejo, Sr. withholding of the originals. The rule does not apply to proof of
facts collateral to the issues or those which do not come from the
foundation of the cause of action or defense.
The offeror of secondary evidence has the burden to prove the

following: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad
faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance
of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or
destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a
diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for
the document in the proper place or places.
DECS v. Del Rosario (2005) When a party wants to prove the contents of the document, the
G.R. No. 146586 best evidence is the original writing itself. A party must first
J. Carpio satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence
before he can resort to secondary evidence.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,

contents, although the court in its discretion may change this
order if necessary.
Citibank v. Teodoro (2003) Citibank failed to prove that Teodoro had an obligation in the
G.R. No. 150905 principal amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the
J. Panganiban original sales invoices it had presented in court were inadmissible
in evidence.
Citibank failed to prove the following: (1) the existence or due

execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on
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the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the
unavailability of the original can be attributed. While the existence
of the original sales invoices were established by the photocopies
and the testimony of Hernandez, Citibank failed to prove that the
originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after
reasonable diligence and good faith in searching them.
Furthermore, a photocopy may not be used without accounting for

the other originals. Citibank failed to show that all three original
copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had been
exercised in the search of them.
People v. Tandoy (1990) The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
G.R. No. 80505 document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to
J. Cruz whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or
in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the
best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible. The marked money was presented by the prosecution
for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents.
Fiscal of Pampanga v. Reyes The copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published,
(1931) and its translation, constitute the best evidence of the libel
G.R. No. 35366 charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article
J. Villamor published in it.
Air France v. Carrascoso The testimony in relation to the contents of the notebook as to the
(1966) event is admissible. The subject of the inquiry is not the entry, but
G.R. No. L-21438 the ouster incident. Testimony of the entry does not come within
J. Sanchez the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is
admissible.
The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook

was spontaneous and related to the circumstances of the ouster
incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. It thus escapes
the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of res gestae.
Compañia Maritima v. Allied The best evidence on the cost of the said equipment would have
Free Workers Union (1977) been the sales invoices instead of the oral testimony of Teves. He
G.R. No. L-28999 did not produce the sales invoices.
J. Aquino
The rule on voluminous accounts and other documents does not
apply to this case because the voluminous character of the
records, on which the accountant’s reports were based, was not
duly established. The records and accounts should also be made
accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the
summary may be tested on cross-examination.
The general rule applies to this case. An audit made by, or the
testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as
proof of the original records, books, or accounts, reports or the
like. This is a processed information. Dapat yung original source
document (THE OR).
De Vera v. Aguilar (1993) The correct order of proof to be able to present secondary
G.R. No. 83377 evidence are as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. In
this case, the trial court merely ruled on the existence and due
execution of the alleged deed of sale and failed to look into the
facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the
original copies of the alleged deed of sale.
Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc What is to be proven in this case was the contents of the
(2012) documents; thus, the originals should have been presented. The
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G.R. No. 171701 fact that these documents were collected by PCGG in the course of
J. Sereno their investigation does not make the documents public
documents which would be exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Rodelas v. Aranza (1982) If the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other
G.R. No. L-580509 copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and
J. Relova only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. A
photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be
allowed because comparison can be made with the standards
writings of the testator.
MCC Industrial Sales The terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as
Corporation v. Ssangyong defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not
Corporation (2007) include a facsimile transaction. Accordingly, a facsimile
G.R. No. 170633 transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not
J. Nachura the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence
Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. As this is the
case, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission
not electronic evidence.
NPC v. Codilla (2007) A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
G.R. No. 170491 submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents
J. Chico-Nazario therein, such as the signatures of the person who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or produced
electronically. The offered photocopies are not tantamount to
electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be
considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed
in the law.
Aznar v. Citibank (2007) Aznar’s testimony that the person from Ingtan merely handed him
G.R. No. 164273 the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to
J. Austria-Martinez sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said
print-out’s integrity and reliability. Aznar failed to demonstrate
how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and
how the said information could be relied upon as true. He failed to
show who the real entrant was and whether the persons stated in
the letter made the entries in the ordinary course of business.
Duvaz Corp v. Export Industry The parole evidence rule provides that when the terms of an
Bank (2007) agreement have been reduced in writing, it is considered as
G.R. No. 163011 containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, as between
J. Garcia the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
Only when Duvaz is able to prove that the restructuring

agreement should have contained the dacion en pago agreement
can there be an actual and existing right in favor of Duvaz that
demands protection by a writ of preliminary injunction.
Enriquez v. Ramos (1962) If there is an allegation that the agreement does not express the
G.R. No. L-18077 true intent of the parties and this claim is put in issue in the
J. Bautista Angelo pleadings, the same may be subject of parole evidence. In this case,
the defendant in her answer specifically pleaded that the contract
of sale in question does not express the true intent of the parties
with regard to the construction of the roads (a condition
precedent to the sale; thus, cannot institute foreclosure
proceedings). Note that the contract + explanation was executed
on the same day.
Land Settlement and The lower court should have admitted the parole evidence sought
Development Corporation v. to be introduced to prove the failure of the document in question
Garcia Plantation (1963) to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. The
G.R. No. L-17820 plaintiff, in this case, would have been able to show that because
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J. Paredes the defendants had failed to pay a substantial down payment, the
agreement was breached and the contract contained in “Exhibit L,”
never became effective and the extension should be considered as
not having been given at all.
PNR v. CFI of Albay Branch 1 In order that parole or extrinsic evidence may be admitted to vary
(1978) the terms of the writing, the mistake or imperfection thereof must
G.R. No. L-46943 be or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
J. Aquino parties should be put in issue by the pleadings. Their parole
evidence (question by the counsel; testimonial) is inadmissible
upon seasonable objection interposed during the trial by the
donee’s counsel.
No allegation in the complaint that there was any mistake or

imperfection in the written agreement or that it failed to express
the true intent of the parties, parole evidence is inadmissible to
vary the terms of the agreement.
Maulini et al. v. Serrano The case at bare is not one where the evidence offered varies,
(1914) alters, modifies or contradicts the terms of the contract of
G.R. No. 884 indorsement admittedly existing. The evidence was not offered for
J. Moreland that purpose. The purpose was to deny that there ever existed any
agreement; to wipe out all apparent relations between the parties,
and not to vary, alter or contradict the terms of a relation
admittedly existing.
Canuto v. Mariano (1918) The plaintiff should have been allowed to introduce parole
G.R. No. L-11346 evidence since the case is an exception to the parole evidence rule.
J. Carson This case involves the establishment by parole of an agreement
between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the
time when the written instrument was executed.
For the parole evidence does not in any way deny that the original
agreement of the parties was but merely goes to show that the
parties have exercised their right to change or abrogate the same,
or to make a new and independent contract. It is a contract
nonetheless.
Marquez v. Espejo (2010) There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule in
G.R. No. 168387 this case because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the
J. Del Castillo documents for it is admitted by the parties that the Deed of Sale
referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject.
The instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence
Rule because there were issues on the intrinsic ambiguity, mistake
or imperfection in the written agreement; and the failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130,
Section 9. It was squarely put in issue that the written agreement
failed to express the true intent of the parties which necessitates
an examination of the parties’ respective parol evidence, in order
to determine the true intent of the parties.
It is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap
property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to
convey the Murong property to the petitioners. Furthermore,
respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI
and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. In
determining the intent of the parties, use the overt acts of the
parties. Insofar as they treated the property, it shows that they are
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not comfortable to perform acts of ownership in the Murong

property.
Lechugas v. CA (1986) The rule only applies as between parties to a written agreement,
G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 or their privies, parol evidence cannot be received to contradict or
J. Gutierrez, Jr. vary its terms. Victoria’s reliance on the parol evidence rule is
misplaced. Here, the deed of sale was between Leoncia and
Victoria. The dispute over what was actually sold is between
Victoria and private respondents. It is not applicable where the
controversy is between one of the parties to the document and
third persons.
Abrenica v. Gonda (1916) The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the
G.R. No. 10100 question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or
J. Araullo from the presentation of the proof the inadmissibility of the
evidence is, or may be, inferred. The only time that the objection
was raised was after the direct examination. This was done
through a motion to strike. To the court, these are complete and
conclusive evidence of the defendant’s waiver in objecting the
presentation of parol evidence.
Ortanez v. CA (1997) Under the general rule in Rule 130, Section 9, when the terms of
G.R. No. 107372 an agreement were reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all
J. Francisco the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be
admitted other than the contents thereof. The deeds of sale in this
case made no reference to any pre-conditions or other agreement.
The sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms. The deeds of
sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection,
much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof. The Inocentes
did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol
evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the
contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms of the
agreement.
Lambert v. Fox (1914) The intention of the parties to a contract must be determined, in
G.R. No. 7991 the first instance, from the words of the contract itself.
J. Moreland Interpretation and construction should be instruments last
resorted to by a court in determining what the parties agreed to.
In the case at bar, the parties expressly stipulated that the contract
should last 1 year. No reason is shown for saying that it shall last
only 9 months.
Capital Insurance v. Sadang If the mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to be vague or
(1967) ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against appellant, whose
G.R. No. L-18857 lawyer prepared the document, and in accordance with the real
J. Makalintal intention of the parties as explained by defendants-appellees. The
foregoing testimony is clear enough (refer to notes). Esteban
Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on condition that he
would answer for the "first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00
bond," and that "the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the
bonding company automatically releases my responsibility to
them."
People v. Mendoza (1996) Any child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
G.R. No. 113791 perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others
J. Davide, Jr. and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he is examined.
The requirements then of a child’s competency as a witness are

the: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and
(c) capacity of communication. The trial court is called upon to
make such determination.
People v. Baid (2000) Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she
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G.R. No. 129667 was qualified to be a witness, i.e., she could perceive and was
J. Mendoza capable of making known her perceptions to others. She was able
to understand the question and give responsive answers to them.
Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of

a rape victim during her testimony, such as by smiling when
answering questions, her behavior was such as could be expected
from a person suffering from schizophrenia.
People v. Hayag (1980) Deaf-mutes are now generally accepted as competent witness. In
G.R. No. L-38635 any given case, a showing must be made that the witness has a
J. Aquino system of communication, and if he has and he is otherwise
competent, his testimony will be received. The method of
examination depends largely in the trial court (can be written or
through an interpreter).
In this case, the trustworthiness of the interpretation is doubtful.

The court and the accused have no means of checking the accuracy
of the verbalization made by the interpreter who is herself
interested in sending the accused to prison.
People v. Castañeda (1979) When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs,
G.R. No. L-46306 the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception. In thus case,
J. Santos the victim of the crime and the person who stands to be directly
prejudiced by the falsification is not a third person but the wife.
There was a breach of her trust when the husband signed the Deed
of Sale making it appear that she consented to the sale of their
conjugal property.
People v. Francisco (1947) The reasons given by law text-writers and courts why neither a
G.R. No. L-568 husband nor wife shall in any case be a witness against the other
J. Hilado except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed by one
against the other have been stated thus: First, identity of interests;
second, the consequent danger of perjury; third, the policy of the
law which deems it necessary to guard the security and
confidences of private life even at the risk of an occasional failure
of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission
would lead to domestic disunion and unhappiness; and, fourth,
because, where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is
danger of punishing one spouse through the hostile testimony of
the other.
Lezama v. Rodriguez (1968) The wife, a co-defendant of her husband in an action, may not be
G.R. No. L-25643 examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party.
J. Castro
People v. Carlos (1925) The rule is that once the privileged communication between the
G.R. No. 22948 spouses has come into the possession of a third party, it is no
J. Ostrand longer privileged and may be admitted. However, the letter was
still inadmissible because the wife was not put on the witness-
stand and the letter was therefore not offered for the purpose.
U.S. v. Antipolo (1918) The widow of the deceased is a competent witness, in a
G.R. No. L-13109 prosecution regarding dying declaration to her by the deceased
J. Fisher concerning the cause of his death. The very nature of these
declarations is for them to be communicated after the death of the
declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause
of his death.
Uy Chico v. Union Life (1915) A communication made by a client to his attorney for the express
G.R. No. 9231 purpose of its being communicated to a third person is essentially
J. Trent inconsistent with the confidential relation. The lawyer is merely
an agent in that case.
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Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by
Mineral Oil. Co. (1924) him to his attorney in the confidence of legal relation, but when
G.R. No. 21237 such document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the
J. Street hand of a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in
evidence.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan G.R. A lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
(1996) the name or identity of his client.
G.R. No. 105938
J. Kapunan EXC: (1) client identity is privileged where a strong probability
exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate that client
in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice; (2)
where disclosure would open the client to a civil liability, his
identity is privileged; and (3) where the government’s lawyers
have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the
client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that
would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an
individual of a crime, the client’s name is privileged.
Orient v. MLA (1930) Contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal
G.R. No. 34098 and considered as private matters, but they are a constant subject
J. Street of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of
privileged nature (the fees are irrelevant in this case – they cannot
be privileged in nature; generally, even if “irrelevant,” still
privilege since “privilege” is as to admissibility).
People v. Sandiganbayan The privilege applies only if the information was relayed by the
(1997) client to the lawyer respecting a past crime. The reckoning point is
G.R. Nos. 115439-41 when the communication was given, not when the lawyer was
J. Regalado made to testify. In this case, the communication was made in
relation to a crime yet to be committed – falsification of the public
document.
Lim v. CA (1992) Requisites to claim the physician – patient privilege:
G.R. No. 91114 1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
J. Davide, Jr. 2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly
authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to
the patient in his professional capacity;
 Meaning of “acting in professional capacity” : when the dr
attends to the patient's curative, preventive, or palliative
treatment.
 ONLY THOSE for the curative, preventive or palliative
treatment are protected.
 Thus, not covered are:
o The fact of making a communication
o Date of communication
o Number of consultations.
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would
blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
When the information elicited during consultation is in the

presence of 3rd persons it is no longer privileged.
If the information elicited does not blacken the reputation (or

character) of the patient then it is not privileged communication
Objection if not raised, is deemed waived.

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Krohn v. CA (1994) Here, it was the husband who testified on the matter. In the instant
G.R. No. 108854 case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one
J. Bellosillo duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is
simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners.
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Rule 130 (e) or privileged communications of a public officer. But
Board (1986) this is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the
G.R. No. 70054 protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that
Resolution would be prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable.
Keller v. COB (1986) These pieces of documentary evidence are sufficient to prove the
G.R. No. L-68097 liability of COB Group Marketing and to justify the foreclosure of
J. Aquino the two mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo. The
admissions of Bax are supported by the documentary evidence.
The fact na you are mortgaging your property – so far contrary to

your interest. As if you admitted na you have outstanding loan
obligations – admission under section 27.
People v. Paragasa (1978) The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied
G.R. No. L-44060 admission of the truth of the statements uttered in his presence is
J. Makasiar applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a party can
be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: (1) that
he heard and understood the statement; (2) that he was at liberty
to interpose a denial; (3) that the statement was in respect to
some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then
interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; (4) that the facts
were within his knowledge; and (5) that the fact admitted or the
inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the
issue.
These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present

case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the
accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an
admission of the truth of such assertion. Here, it was the private
complainant who was silent.
People v. Alegre (1979) The silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny
G.R. No. L-30423 statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when
J. Antonio such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such
implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
confession of his participation in the commission of the crime.
Here, it was the accused who was silent – this is in relation to his
right to remain silent. This can be invoked from the precise
moment na you can invoke the right to remain silent.
People v. Tia Fong (1956) It has also been held that while an accused is under custody his
G.R. No. L-7615 silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right
J. Labrador to remain silent; his silence when in custody may not be used as
evidence against him, otherwise his right of silence would be
illusory. But the better rule is to consider the circumstances in
each case and decide the admissibility of the silence accordingly.
Here, the re-enactment is not really part of the formal
investigation. Therefore, you cannot invoke the right to remain
silent.
People v. Yparriguirre (1997) An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint
G.R. No. 117702 be first filed before the offer can be received in evidence against
J. Puno the offeror. Here, it was the wife who compromised.
People v. Godoy (1996) The prosecution insists then that the offer to compromise made by
G.R. No. 113891 appellant is an admission of guilt. It has long been held however,
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J. Davide, Jr. that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer
was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely avoid the
inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reasons which
would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise
was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid
the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.
The evidence at bar overwhelmingly proves Godoy’s innocence. In

fact, Godoy refused Naem’s (a Muslim Leader) offer to marry the
complainant. Neither did Godoy know until the trial proper that
Mia’s mother had paid 30,000 for the settlement of these cases.
The Court ruled that no implied admission can be drawn from the
efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the
accused did not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort
to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal
customs. Here, it was the mother who compromised.
People v. Yip Wai Ming (1996) Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of
G.R. No. 120959 the right to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by
J. Melo the accused is inadmissible in evidence.
People v. Wong Chuen Ming By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on
(1996) the plastic bags, the accused in effect made a tacit admission of the
G.R. No. 112801-11 crime charged for possession of "shabu.” These signatures of
J. Padilla accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial
confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights.
People v. Tuniaco (2010) The confession must be voluntary, made with the assistance of a
G.R. No. 185710 competent and independent counsel, express, and in writing.
J. Abad Napasobra yung connection which resulted to the findings that he
was there in the crime scene.
People v. Lorenzo (1995) Admission is something less than confession. It is the
G.R. No. 110107 acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which is
J. Davide, Jr. insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to
establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Confession, on the other hand,
is acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case,
of his guilt of the crime charged.
In order to justify conviction by extrajudicial conviction, the

following must be present:
1. Must be corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
- There should be some evidence that a crime has
committed. Evidence besides the confession (Rule 133,
Section 33).
- Confession is still the main tool to justify conviction.
The corpus delicti merely confirms that there was a
crime committed. No need to establish each element of
the crime (useless kasi main nga is the confession).
2. Formal requisites mentioned in People v. Tuniaco.
Whether it is confession or admission, both are still admissible

and the process of determining admissibility is the same. If
confession na siya, admitted the commission yung crime – just
corroborate with corpus delicti to justify conviction. If admission
lang – wala kang sinansandalan na confession. You will have to
establish each element of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. It
may be easier if certain facts have been admitted.
People v. Tampus (1980) That spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation,
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G.R. No. L-44690 was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary
J. Aquino confession of guilt. It is the event speaking through you, not you
talking. Since it is like a confession itself, wala pa siyang counsel,
but why is it allowed? They already waived their right to counsel
and to be assisted by counsel. Dapat immediately after the
startling event. Therefore, not really custodial investigation kasi
kakatapos lang nung pangyayari.
The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the

spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived
their right to remain silent and to have the right to counsel. That
admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of
guilty and testimony in court. No right to counsel and remain
silent yet because hindi pa custodial investigation. Kakatapos pa
lang ng crime tapos sabay confess sila.
People v. Raquel (1996) The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-
G.R. No. 119005 accused
J. Regalado may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in
open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-
examine his co- accused on the latter's extrajudicial statements, it
is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused.
While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be

made with the assistance of counsel.
People v. Cabrera (1974) Since the statement was made after the existence of the conspiracy
G.R. No. L-37398 and when the witness was already in the hands of the authorities,
J. Baredo the rules on admission by conspirator.
The confession was made two days after the incident and was
already in custodial investigation. It is clearly outside the duration
of the conspiracy.
 You can use it against the confessor but not to anyone else.
Tamargo v. Awingan (2010) Requisites for the extrajudicial confession of the co-conspirator be
G.R. No. 177727 admissible against the others:
J. Corona a. The conspiracy must first be proved by evidence other
than the admission itself;
b. The admission relates to the common object; and
c. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy.
You corroborate the statement on conspiracy by independent

evidence of conspiracy.
People v. Serrano (1959) The rule on admission by conspirator applies only to extra-judicial
G.R. No. L-7973 acts or declaration, but not to testimony given on the stand at the
J. Padilla trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant.
If made during trial it is judicial admission, admittedly sa

confessor but as to third persons, depends sa court.
People v. Badilla (1926) The general rule is that extrajudicial declarations of a
G.R. No. 23792 coconspirator made before the formation of the conspiracy or
J. Ostrand after the accomplishment of its object, are inadmissible in
evidence as against the conspirators.
While an extrajudicial declaration of a coconspirator may not be

directly introduced in evidence against another coconspirator as
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proof of specific facts, it may nevertheless under certain

conditions be taken into consideration as a circumstance in
judging the credibility of the testimony of an accomplice.
At what point was the statement or confession made? It was made

during the preliminary investigation.
 In the previous case, during the custodial investigation,
after the conspiracy na.
 Here, if the statement was made before or after conspiracy,
generally, cannot be used against the co-conspirator. EXC:
if they are in all material points consistent and no chance
to talk – BUT only to judge the credibility of the testimony
of an accomplice. Not on the content of the confession but
only to establish the credibility of the stand-alone
confessions.
Alpuerto v. Pastor (1918) The word "privies," as used in article 1225 of the Civil Code,
G.R. No. 12794 denotes not only the idea of succession in right of heirship or
J. Street testamentary legacy, but also succession by virtue of acts inter
vivos, as by assignment, subrogation, or purchase — in fact any act
whereby the successor is substituted in the place of the
predecessor in interest. The purchaser at an execution sale is,
therefore, a privy of the execution debtor.
The rule does not require voluntary transfer. In this case, it was a
forced or execution sale.
Philippine Free Press v. CA Hearsay evidence, in general, is excluded because it does not give
(2005) an opportunity for the other party to cross-examine the witness.
G.R. No. 132864
J. Garcia
Dantis v. Maghinang (2013) Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence
G.R. No. 191696 where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The sworn
J. Mendoza statement by Ignacio narrating the alleged sale is of this kind.
Philippine Realty Holdings Well-entrenched is the rule that a private certification is hearsay
Corp. v. Firematic Philippines where the person who issued the same was never presented as a
(2007) witness. Same is true with letters.
G.R. No. 156251
J. Callejo, Sr. The lack of objection may make an incompetent evidence
admissible, but admissibility of evidence should not be equated
with weight of evidence. Indeed, hearsay evidence whether
objected to or not has no probative value.
Even if the one who wrote the letter was presented, the Court held
that it was still inadmissible because of lack of personal
knowledge.
People v. Macandog (2001) For a dying declaration to be valid and admissible in evidence,
G.R. No. 129534 the following requisites must concur:
J. Gonzaga-Reyes 1. That the declaration must concern the cause and
surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
2. That at the time the declaration was made, the declarant
was under a consciousness of an impending death;
3. That the declarant is competent as a witness; and
4. That the declaration is offered in a criminal case in
which the declarant is the victim.
Here, after 30 minutes namatay na yung victim. But in other case,

hindi necessarily bound by time. It is more on the consciousness of
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impending death.
People v. Latayada (2004) The law does not require that the declarant to state explicitly a
G.R. No. 146865 perception of the inevitability of death. The same can be taken
J. Panganiban from the surrounding circumstances of the case. Such as nature of
injury and further conducts of the victim.
People v. Cerilla (2007) As an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence, a dying
G.R. No. 1771147 declaration or ante mortem statement is evidence of the highest
J. Tinga order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of
his impending death would make a careless and false accusation.
The reasons for its admissibility are necessity and
trustworthiness.
People v. Sabio (1981) The fact that death did not ensue till 3 days after the declaration
G.R. No. L-26193 was made will not alter its probative force since it is not
J. Bengzon indispensable that a declarant expires immediately thereafter.
People v. Ola (1987) In disregarding the dying gesture, the court pointed out that the
G.R. No. L-47147 same is not like an oral or written statement. It is open to several
J. Cortes interpretations.
People v. Odencio (1979) The rule is that a dying declaration may be oral or written If oral,
G.R. No. L-31961 the witness, who heard it, may testify thereto without the
J. Aquino necessity, of course, of reproducing exactly the words of the
decedent, if he is able to give the substance thereof. An unsigned
dying declaration may be used as a memorandum by the witness
who took it down.
People v. Gueron (1983) The hearsay rule excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-
G.R. No. L-29365 examination. Exhibit A would normally be classified as hearsay
J. Abad Santos because the one who executed it could not be cross-examined on it
during the trial; he was dead. But there are exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
Bearing in mind the circumstances narrated above under which

Exhibit A was executed, there can be no doubt that it is admissible
in evidence as part of the res gestae.
People v. Lanza (1979) Notwithstanding the fact, however, that the victim's statement
G.R. No. L31782 may not be admitted as a dying declaration, it is nevertheless
J. Antonio admissible as part of the res gestae against herein appellant.
Briefly stated, the spontaneous declaration must have been made

while the nervous excitement caused by the startling occurrence
was still working on the declarant's mind. This may be a short
time after the incident or some hours later, as long as the influence
of the startling occurrence still persists. What is important is that
the declarant must have had no opportunity to devise or contrive
anything contrary to the real facts that occurred.
The element of time is, therefore, not controlling, but merely of

importance, on the question of spontancity.
People v. De Joya (1991) It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be
G.R. No. 75028 complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not mean that the
J. Feliciano declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of
the subject of his statement, but that his statement of any given
fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as
conveying his meaning in respect of such fact.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased

victim here was incomplete. In other words, the deceased was cut
off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible
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communication to Alvin.
Capila v. People (2006) For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following
G.R. No. 146161 requisites must be met: (1) that the principal act or the res gestae
J. Sandoval-Gutierrez be a startling occurrence; (2) the statement is spontaneous or was
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the
statement is made during the occurrence or immediately or
subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
People v. Cudal (2006) It cannot be concluded that in a very short span of time, taking
G.R. No. 167502 into consideration the ripe age of the victim, his relationship to
J. Carpio Morales appellant, and the cruelty and suffering which immediately
preceded the confession, the victim had the opportunity to concoct
the facts surrounding the incident and its authorship.
People v. Tolentino (1993) All the requisites for res gestae are present in this case since
G.R. No. 87085 Geraldine had named accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators
J. Nocon in the commission of the crime immediately after the occurrence
of the stabbing incident.
People v. Tulagan (1986) Not every statement made on the occasion of a startling
G.R. No. L-68620 occurrence is admissible as part of res gestae; only those that
J. Narvasa appear to have been involuntary and spontaneously wrung from
the observe by the shock or impact of the occurrence such that, as
has aptly been said, it is the event speaking through the witness,
not the witness speaking of the event.
People v. Berame (1976) Then, too, there was a statement made by one of the original co-
G.R. No. L-27606 accused, Anastacio Montinola, on his being captured after the
J. Fernando gunplay where he was wounded, it turned out, mortally. He
admitted his participation in the killing of Maningo and pointed to
appellant as one of his companions. While not amounting to a
dying declaration, the lower court considered it as part of the res
gestae, and rightly so. That was assigned as error by appellant's
counsel in view of the nine hours that had elapsed from the time of
the killing before its utterance. That is not enough to take it out of
the operation of the principle. All that is required for the
admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that
it be made under the influence of a startling event. witnessed by
the person who made the declaration before he had time to think
and make up a story.
DBP v. Radio Mindanao While it may concede that these statements were made by the
(2006) bystanders during a startling occurrence, it cannot be said
G.R. No. 147039 however, that these utterances were made spontaneously by the
J. Austria-Martinez bystanders and before they had the time to contrive or devise a
falsehood. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the
bystanders' statements while they were making their
investigations during and after the fire. It is reasonable to assume
that when these statements were noted down, the bystanders
already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to
one another and exchange information, not to mention theories
and speculations, as is the usual experience in disquieting
situations where hysteria is likely to take place.
Estrada v. Desierto (2001) Moreover, the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover
G.R. No. 146710-15 and 146738 independently relevant statements. These are statements which
J. Puno are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They
belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very
facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial
evidence of the facts in issue. As aforediscussed, the Angara Diary
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contains statements of the petitioner which reflect his state of

mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also
contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can
reasonably deduce petitioner's intent to resign. They are
admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay.
Admission distinguished from declaration against interest. — An

admission is distinguishable from a declaration against interest in
several respects. The admission is primary evidence and is
receivable, although the declarant is available as a witness; it is
competent only when the declarant, or someone identified in legal
interest with him, is a party to the action; and need not have been
considered by the declarant as opposed to his interest at the time
when it was made. The declaration against interest is in the nature
of secondary evidence, receivable only when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness; it is competent in any action to which it is
relevant, although the declarant is not a party to, or in privity with,
any party to the action; and it must have been, when made, to the
knowledge of the declarant, against his obvious and real interest.
When the contents of the diary have been cited, it became a

judicial statement. What they did was they made it as an exception
to res inter alios acta rule, as an agent or alter ego of the President.
As to adoptive admission, Jones explains that the "basis for
admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from
the ratification or adoption by the party of the statements which
the other person had made.” When Angara asked re: dignified exit
or resignation, Estrada did no object. Aamin si Estrada vicariously
through Estrada.
The statements in the diary are admissible as it reflects the state of

mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign
(independently relevant statements). Here, the factum probandum
is the fact of resignation but the statements were used to satisfy
the factum probandum re: intent to resign.
Heirs of Franco v. CA (2003) A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords
G.R. No. 123924 the
J. Tinga greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. In the same vein, a
judicial
admission binds the person who makes the same, and absent any
showing that this was made thru palpable mistake, no amount of
rationalization can offset it. In the case at bar, there is no showing
of palpable mistake on the part of Miguel when he made the
admission (when he listed the property as part of his brother’s
estate without stating his claim over it).
It is a judicial admission in the land registration case because that

court already ruled in finality that it belongs to Quintin (not even
the same case). As to declaration against interest, he said na “kay
Quintin” yung property when he listed the properties sa estate.
Is it really a judicial admission? Apply Section 27 – admissions in

general. Extrajudicial pa rin siya. If a party and able to testify,
apply Section 27.
People v. Toledo (1928) Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its maker at
G.R. No. 28655 his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible
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J. Malcolm to exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different ill
the first case than in the second. Exhibit 1 should have been
received not is conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence
to be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven
facts.
Fuentes v. CA (1996) There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a
G.R. No. 111692 declaration against interest: (a) the declarant must not be
J. Bellosillo available to testify; (b) the declaration must concern a fact
cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must
render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed. But more
importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against
penal interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the
declarant is not "unable to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo
is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent
which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence from the
jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this
rule.
Why is it untrustworthy? Consider this factual scenario: the

alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant,
verbally admitted to the latter, and later to their common uncle
Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo) killed the victim because of a
grudge, after which he disappeared. It seems self-serving. If one
was accused of a crime and one of her defenses is that another
stated, against the other’s interest, that he committed the crime
and the latter cannot be found anymore.
Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf The true test in reference to the reliability of the declaration is not
(1949) whether it was made ante litem motam, as is the case with
G.R. No. L-2016 reference to some classes of hearsay evidence, but whether the
J. Ozaeta declaration was uttered under circumstances justifying the
conclusion that there was no probable motive to falsify." Insofar,
at least, as the appellant was concerned, there was no probable
motive on the part of Fitzsimmons to falsify his inventory Exhibit
1 by not including therein appellant's present claim of P63,000
among his obligations or liabilities to be deducted from the assets
of the conjugal partnership between him and his divorced wife.
Unrelated cases: the case is about a claim against the estate and
the “admission against interest” is in relation to the divorce
proceedings. If it is a declaration “for” your interest, you cannot
have it as exempted from hearsay rule.
People v. Bernal (1997) A statement may be admissible when it complies with the
G.R. No. 113685 following
J. Romero requisites, to wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that it relates to a fact against the interest of the
declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the
declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid
interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and
believed such declaration to be true.
Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be

called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a
declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty
Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane
person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
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An instance unlike in Heirs of Franco. Yung declaration against

interest, dapat hindi siya yung “lis mota” nung case. Here, the
declaration pertains to something else and not the crime of
kidnapping.
Tison v. CA (1997) Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which
G.R. No. 121027 is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section
J. Regalado 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2)
that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the
subject of
inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other
than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante
litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks
recovery against a relative common to both claimant and
declarant, but not from the declarant himself or the declarant's
estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common relative
may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement
that there be other proof than the declarations of the declarant as
to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the
estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right
through his declarations to the property of some other member of
the family.
Yung declarant na mismo yung nagsabi na relative sila + the claim

is against the declarant’s estate – she probably knew the effect sa
estate niya eh.
Gravador v. Mamigo (1967) In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no
G.R. No. L-24989 personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his
J. Castro age as he had learned it from his parents and relatives and his
testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.
People v. Alegado (1991) (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any of
G.R. No. 93030-31 the members of a family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the
J. Gutierrez. Jr. pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the
controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation
or tradition regarding the pedigree of the person must be a
member of the family of said person.
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering

that the date of birth of the rape victim is being put in issue; that
the declaration of the victim's grandfather relating to tradition
(sending a child to school upon reaching the age of seven) existed
long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying
to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
City of Manila v. Del Rosario Such testimony, however, does not constitute the "common
(1905) reputation" referred to in the section mentioned. "common
G.R. No. 1284 reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent to universal
J. Mapa reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to
establish the presumption referred to.
In Re: Florencio Mallare Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth,
(1974) race, or race ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was
A.C. No. 533 born alive. Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation
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J. Fernandez of marriage may proceed from persons who are not members of
the family - the reason for the distinction is the public interest that
is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations.
Security Bank v. Gan (2006) The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books required
G.R. 150464 the satisfaction of the following conditions: (1) the person who
J. Corona made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify; (2) the entries
were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer; (3) the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in
the entries; (4) the entries were made in his professional capacity
or in the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral
or religious; and (5) the entries were made in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty (based on the old rule).
In this case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary reports

of the official concerned.
Jose v. Michaelmar (2009) Under legal rules of evidence, not all unsigned documents or
G.R. No. 169606 papers fail the test of admissibility. There are kinds of evidence
J. Carpio known as exceptions to the hearsay rule which need not be
invariably signed by the author if it is clear that it issues from him
because of necessity and under circumstances that safeguard the
trustworthiness of the paper. A number of evidence of this sort are
called entries in the course of business, which are transactions
made by persons in the regular course of their duty or business.
We agree with the labor arbiter that the drug test result
constitutes entries made in the ordinary or regular course of duty
of a responsible officer of the vessel. The tests administered to the
crew were routine measures of the vessel conducted to enforce its
stated policy, and it was a matter of course for medical reports to
be issued and released by the medical officer.
Present the custodian of the health records under the new rules –
the HR officer.
People v. San Gabriel (1996) Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
G.R. No. 107735 by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty
J. Bellosillo specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3)
requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police
officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b)
It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties
or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had
sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information.
People v. Cabuang (1993) Entries in the police blotter, though regularly done in the course of
G.R. No. 103292 performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth
J. Feliciano of such entries. Testimony given in open court during the trial is
commonly much lengthier and more detailed than the brief entries
made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its
findings on a police report merely, but must necessarily consider
all other evidence gathered in the course of the police
investigation and presented in court.
Blotter, even if done in the regular course, di conclusive truth.

Prima facie evid of content. Wouldn’t that be saying that it is like
an exception under 46? Bakit sabi kanina di pwede?
ABI
 Ito bang blotter is compliant with Section 46? Dapat may

personal knowledge of the facts yung police officer.
 46 gives you a succession – prima facie evidence na siya –
not a step down sa conclusive presumption.
Franco-Cruz v. CA (2008) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the
G.R. No. 172238 facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
J. Carpio Morales personally or through official information. Here, Balajadia's
statement that the Franco Transit bus was registered under the
name of Marializa Franco-Cruz of Batac, Ilocos Norte" was not
shown to have been based on his personal knowledge or that he
had sufficient knowledge thereof acquired by him personally or
officially.
PNOC v. CA (1998) A document is a commercial list if: (1) it is a statement of matters
G.R. No. 107518 of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such
J. Romero statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other
published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the
use of persons engaged in that occupation, and (4) it is generally
used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.
Tan v. CA (1967) The Court ruled that the witnesses in question couldn’t be
G.R. No. L-22793 categorized as witnesses of the class who are unable to testify. The
J. Sanchez witnesses in question were available but refused to testify. Such
inability to testify should proceed from a grave cause, almost
amounting to death, as when the witness is old and has lost the
power of speech.
Still mere refusal will not make the witness unavailable or unable
to testify = should exert effort to have them in court.
Guevarra v. Almario (1932) In order to have facts in former cases be established as facts in
G.R. No. 35357 evidence the following are the requisites:
J. Malcolm 1. That the party against whom the evidence is offered, or his
privy, was a party on the former trial;
2. that the issue is substantially the same in the two cases;
3. that the witness who proposes to testify to the former
evidence is able to state it with satisfactory correctness;
and
4. that a sufficient reason is shown why the original witness
is not produced
Must show due diligence that you tried to have them presented in
court.
GR: a judgment of conviction in a criminal proceeding cannot be

admitted in evidence in a civil action.
Excp: But a record in a criminal case may be admitted by way of

inducement, or to show a collateral fact
Toledo, Jr. v. People (1978) It is only in case of actual impossibility of producing the witness at
G.R. No. L-36603 the trial that in order not to defeat the ends of substantial justice,
J. Barredo the law permits the admission of testimony in another proceeding.
Manliclic v. Calauanan (2007) Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in
G.R. No. 150157 said criminal case, the testimonies of the three witnesses are still
J. Chico-Nazario admissible on the ground that petitioner PRBLI failed to object
on their admissibility.
Dapat same party but not the same counsel. Even if in reality, it
would have been the counsel who would conduct the cross-
examination.
ABI
Though said section speaks only of testimony and deposition, it

does not mean that documents from a former case or proceeding
cannot be admitted. Said documents can be admitted they are
being part of the testimonies of witnesses that have been
admitted.
 If the testimony in the previous case introduced a
document, like a hospital bill, yung doc kasama siya sa
exception sa hearsay.
Quianay v. Mapile (2005) The opinion of an expert should be considered by the court in view
G.R. No. 154087 of all the facts and circumstances of the case. The problem of the
J. Tinga evaluation of expert testimony is left to the discretion of the trial
court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of
an abuse of that discretion.
Bacalso v. Padigos (2008) Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally
G.R. No. 173192 regarded as purely advisory in character. The courts may place
J. Carpio Morales whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they
find them inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise
unreasonable. When faced with conflicting expert opinions, courts
give more weight and credence to that which is more complete,
thorough, and scientific. No standard used and did not use any
standard specimen to decide on the genuineness of the
handwriting. The Courts can come up of their own assessment.
Domingo v. Domingo (2005) Handwriting: Courts not bound to give probative value or
G.R. No. 150897 evidentiary value to the opinions of handwriting experts, as resort
J. Quisumbing to handwriting experts is not mandatory. The law makes no
preference, much less distinction among and between the different
means stated above in proving the handwriting of a person.
In order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the

standards of comparison must be as close as possible in point of
time to the suspected signature. As correctly found by the
appellate court, the examination conducted by the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory did not conform to the foregoing standard. Recall that
in the case, the signatures analyzed by the police experts were on
documents executed several years apart – 1958 and 1962.
Jao v. CA (1987) Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood
G.R. No. L-49162 grouping tests in the instant case by impugning the qualifications
J. Padilla of the NBI personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of
the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be
without merit. The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the
tests is also a serologist and has had extensive practice in this area
for several years. The blood tests were conducted six (6) times
using two (2) scientifically recognized blood grouping systems, the
MN Test and the ABO System, under witness and supervision.
If you are saying na hindi siya expert, sa admissibility yan. Pero if

hindi siya kapanipaniwala or hindi siya qualified, credibility na
yan.
China Banking Corporation v. In this case, to prove the blindness of Avelina, it is not necessary to
CA (2007) submit a med cert. There was no need to have an expert witness
G.R. No. 155299 since the same can be determined through common knowledge
J. Austria-Martinez and by anyone with sufficient familiarity of such fact. Avelina also
categorically testified and attested to her own blindness.
People v. Adoviso (1999) The Supreme Court does not put credit and faith on the result of a
G.R. No. 116196 lie detector test inasmuch as it has not been accepted by the
ABI
J. Kapunan scientific community as an accurate means of ascertaining truth or

deception.
U.S. v. Mercado (1913) Generally speaking, a witness cannot be impeached by the party
G.R. No. 8332 against whom he has been called, except by showing (a) that he
J. Johnson has made contradictory statements: or (b) by showing that his
general reputation for the truth, honesty, or integrity is bad.
In the present case, the other offense to which the question above
related was not a high crime, as that term is generally used, and
we assume that the phrase "high crime," as used in section 342, is
used in its ordinary signification. High crimes are generally
defined as such immoral and unlawful acts as are nearly allied and
equal in guilt to felonies. We believe that the objection to the
above question was properly interposed and should have been
sustained.
If you are trying to impeach the persons credibility, make sure that
you can do so. If 11, appear as ordinary cross. If under Section 54,
check if civil or criminal case.

Evidence - Weekly Case Doctrines

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Evidence - Weekly Case Doctrines

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EVIDENCE WEEKLY CASE DOCTRINES

However, it cannot be said that the case relied solely on the

A judicially noticed facts is one not subject to a reasonable

In the absence of objection, and as matter of convenience to all

While it is true that judicial notice cannot be claimed for a

Even when there is a statute that requires a court to take

Separate Opinion of J. Teehankee: The Justice does not agree

If the defendants denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent

expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an

Judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by

An admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by

A stipulation of facts should be allowed not only during pre-trial

Evidence not objected may be deemed admitted and may be

A continuing objection is a single objection made to a class of

It is instructive at this point to make a distinction between

Even if the Court rejected the pieces of evidence, the plaintiff

The translation is also legally defective. There is no showing of

signature was vital (as it conveys the property voluntarily). The

Moreover, the last requirement of the "ancient document rule"

All documents acknowledged by a notary public and certified to

A document duly acknowledged before a notary public under his

The modes enumerated in the ROC to prove the genuineness of

Affidavits are generally not prepared by the affiants themselves

Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is

Where the failure to cross-examine was imputable to the cross-

The appellant waived his right to conduct further examination

Laying the predicate: it is incumbent upon the attorney when

The prosecution could have objected on the failure of the cross-

If appellant was really prepared to attack complainant’s

Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from

While the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or

What are not included?

After the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the

of the analyst who conducted the tests.).

The petitioner cannot invoke the remedy of habeas corpus in

DNA evidence does not fall within the statutory or jurisprudential

The offeror of secondary evidence has the burden to prove the

The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss,

Citibank failed to prove the following: (1) the existence or due

Furthermore, a photocopy may not be used without accounting for

The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the notebook

Only when Duvaz is able to prove that the restructuring

No allegation in the complaint that there was any mistake or

not comfortable to perform acts of ownership in the Murong

The requirements then of a child’s competency as a witness are

Though she may have exhibited emotions inconsistent with that of

In this case, the trustworthiness of the interpretation is doubtful.

When the information elicited during consultation is in the

If the information elicited does not blacken the reputation (or

Objection if not raised, is deemed waived.

The fact na you are mortgaging your property – so far contrary to

These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present

The evidence at bar overwhelmingly proves Godoy’s innocence. In

In order to justify conviction by extrajudicial conviction, the

Whether it is confession or admission, both are still admissible

The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the

While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be