Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional

Hegemony
Author(s): Colin Elman
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 4 (Nov., 2004), pp. 563-576
Published by: American Political Science Association
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American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4 November 2004

Extending Offensive Realism: The Louisi

and America's Rise to Regional Hegemony
COLIN ELMAN Arizona State University
ohn Mearsheimer suggests that, whenever possible, great pow
hegemony, the safest feasible situation for a state. This object
great powers want to block the attempt, but it is doable beca
make balancing inefficient. Contra Mearsheimer, I argue that it is th
inefficiencies, that best explains when states can hope to domina
mony is only achievable when it is easy. I use property space tech
of offensive realism that clarifies why states will sometimes pre
particular, I argue that local considerations will often prevent a cont
to a rising state in another region. I test my argument by process t
and show that France's decision to sell is best explained by its pu
My extended version of offensive realism suggests that its single su
dominance of North America, provides no encouragement to con
for regional hegemony.

o rising states act badly abroad?I argue

Arethat they
Mearsheimer
con- overstates the United
States' accomplishment
strained by the anarchic international systemin dominating the Western
to dominate their region? Offensive Hemisphere. I use property space to develop a more
structural
realists (e.g., Labs 1997, Layne 2005, and version
fully specified Mearsheimer
of offensive realism, which sug-
2001) say yes, suggesting that security gests that local considerations
requires strongly influence great
acquir-
ing as much power relative to other powers' extraregional
states as activity.
possible. Continental great pow-
In particular, John Mearsheimer ers (2001) argues
will be lukewarm that
in their re- to contain a rising
efforts
gional hegemony is a feasible objective. state in another
Whileregion,
it is andhardan island state may ac-
because other great powers want tually
to support
block suchtheanattempt,
extraregional hegemonic bid.
it is nevertheless attainable because Consequently,
buck-passing
I provide a different
and explanation for
other hurdles make balancing inefficient U.S. regional hegemony.
(156). A The United States did not
so-
phisticated power maximizer, which make it to knows
the top by "when
exploitingtothe failures of states
raise and when to fold," can achieve that tried to stop hegemony
regional it. It became a regional hegemon be-
even though other states prefer cause
thatthere
itwere
does no indigenous
not (40). balancers, and because
The United States has been the theonly
anarchic international
regional system provided only weak
hege-
mon in the last 200 years, andcues consequently
for European great thepowers
caseto block its bid. The
plays a central role in supporting United Mearsheimer's
States could rationally ver-
seek regional hegemony
sion of offensive realism. Mearsheimer because it faced(2001)
virtually argues
no opposition.
that the United States "seems well-suited to be the My claim that continental great powers make indif-
poster child of offensive realism" (238). During the extraregional balancers is tested in this article
ferent
nineteenth century it "was bent on establishing with an account of France's sale of Louisiana to the
re-
gional hegemony, and it was an expansionist power Unitedof States in 1803. When Napoleon Bonaparte
the first order in the Americas" (238). Mearsheimer resolved
at- to sell the territory he was fully aware that
he was creating a regional power, openly consider-
tributes the United States' success to an understanding
that "the more powerful their country was, theing more
whether it might be "too powerful for Europe in
secure it would be in the dangerous world of inter- two or three centuries... " (Barb6-Marbois 1830/1977,
276). I investigate the reasons for the sale and sug-
national politics" (250). He suggests that the United
States achieved regional dominance in the face of gest that they can be more comfortably accommo-
great
powers that wanted it to fail (251; see also 249).dated by my extended version of offensive realism
than by Mearsheimer's original formulation. France's
decision to sell Louisiana was dictated by its un-
willingness
Colin Elman is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Sci- to modify its own territorial ambitions in
ence, Arizona State University, Box 873902, Tempe, AZ 85287-3902
Europe.
(colin.elman@asu.edu).
The author thanks Miriam Fendius Elman, John Mearsheimer,
America's rise to regional hegemony does not sup-
Stephen G. Walker, Deborah A. Boucoyannis, and the editor port the general proposition that great powers can hope
of the
to become regional hegemons even though others pre-
American Political Science Review and three anonymous reviewers
for comments on earlier drafts. The author is also grateful tofer that they do not. My account of offensive realism
partici-
pants at a panel at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American suggests
Political that the United States' success in the nine-
Science Association in Philadelphia, and at the January 2004 Institute
teenth
on Qualitative Research Methods at Arizona State University, for century depended on an improbable absence of
either local or extraregional balancers. That achieve-
helpful feedback. The author thanks Eric Strachan, Risto Karinen,
Ryan Davis, and Matt D'Anna for their research assistance.ment is not likely to be repeated by modern states, since

563

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 Extending Offensive Realism November 2004

TABLE 1. Mearsheimer's (2001) Six Questions

Why do great powers want power? To ensure their survival in an anarchic international system
How much power do states want? All they can get. States maximize relative power,
with hegemony as their ultimate goal
What is power? Military capabilities, meaning the material wherewithal
of land power. This in turn is based on latent
power, operationalized as wealth
How do states improve their relative War; blackmail; bait and bleed; bloodletting
capabilities...
and stop other states from improving theirs? Balancing and buck-passing
When do threatened states balance rather States balance when threat increases due to the proximity
than buck-pass? of a threatening state and the magnitude of its
relative capabilities
What are the causes of great power war? Significant gaps in power between the first and second
great powers in the international system or region

the United States is now a regional hegemon that Mearsheimer

will (2001) argues that ultimate safety
comes only from being the most powerful state in
vigorously countervail their bids for local dominance.
Since this renders such attempts futile, contemporary
the system. However, the "stopping power of water"
makes
great powers have no security-driven incentives to such
be- global hegemony all but impossible, except
have as revisionists. through attaining an implausible nuclear superiority
(145-47). The second-best, and much more likely, ob-
jective is to achieve regional hegemony, i.e., the dom-
MEARSHEIMER'S OFFENSIVE REALISM inance of the area in which the great power is located
(140-43). Finally, even in the absence of either type
of hegemony, states try to maximize both their wealth
The flagship delineation of offensive structural realism
is John Mearsheimer's (2001) The Tragedy ofand their military capabilities for fighting land battles
Great
Power Politics. The volume is organized around(143-45).
the In order to gain resources, states resort to
war, blackmail, baiting states into making war on each
six questions set out in Table 1 (12-14). Mearsheimer
derives his answers to these questions from other while standing aside, and engaging competitors
five as-
in long
sumptions: The international system is anarchic; greatand costly conflicts (147-55). When acting to
forestall
powers inherently possess some offensive military ca-other states' expansion, a great power can ei-
pability and, accordingly, can damage each other;ther try to inveigle a third party into coping with the
states
threat
can never be certain about other states' intentions; sur-(buck-pass) or balance against the threat itself
vival is the primary goal of great powers; and (156-62).
greatWhile buck-passing is often preferred as the
powers are rational actors (30-31). From these lower-cost assump- strategy, balancing becomes more likely, ce-
tions, Mearsheimer deduces that great powers teris paribus, the more proximate the menacing state
fear
each other, that they can rely only on themselves and the greater its relative capabilities.
for
their security, and that the best strategy for states In addition
to to moving Mearsheimer's (2001) focus
ensure their survival is maximization of relative power
to the regional level, the introduction of the "stopping
(32-36). power of water" leads to an informal employment of
In contrast to defensive structural realists, who sug- types. The theory laid out in The Tragedy of Great
gest that states look for only an "appropriate" amount Power Politics applies to great powers in general
of power (e.g., Glaser 1994/1995, 1997; Snyder 1991; (5, 403, note 5), but Mearsheimer also distinguishes
and Van Evera 1999), Mearsheimer argues that secu- among different kinds: continental great powers, is-
rity requires acquiring as much power relative to other land great powers, and regional hegemons. These types,
states as possible. Although states will take any incre- and Mearsheimer's predictions of their in-regional and
ment of power they can get away with, Mearsheimer extraregional behavior, are presented in Table 2. A
(2001) does not predict that states are "mindless ag- state may be one of several continental great powers,
gressors so bent on gaining power that they charge such as Germany from 1862 to 1945 and Italy from 1861
headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories" to 1943 (181-209). When operating in its own region,
(37). States are sophisticated relative power maximiz- if the distribution of capabilities makes such ambitions
ers that try "to figure out when to raise and when feasible, a continental great power will seek regional
to fold" (40). Expanding against weakness or indeci- hegemony. When it is unable to achieve this dominance,
sion, pulling back when faced by strength and deter- such a state will still maximize its relative power to the
mination, a sophisticated power maximizer reaches re- extent possible. The second type of great power is an
gional hegemony by using a combination of brains and insular state, "the only great power on a large body of
brawn. land that is surrounded on all sides by water" (126).

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4

TABLE 2. Typology Implicit in Mearsheime

Type of Great Power Exemplar In-Regional Behavior Extraregional Behavior
Continental great Germany Attempt regional hegemony Unclear. Case studies suggest
powers while balancing against balance against any would-be
other states regional hegemons
Island great powers Great Britain Balance against any Unclear. Case studies suggest
would-be regional balance against any would-be
hegemons regional hegemons
Regional hegemons United States Balance against other Balance against any would-be
states to maintain regional hegemons
regional hegemony

Where located in a region containing other greatDeriving

pow- the Extended Typology
ers that are vying for regional dominance, an insular
Mearsheimer's account of offensive realism distin-
state will balance against the rising states rather than
guishes
try to be a regional hegemon itself. Accordingly, states among continental great powers, island great
powers,
such as the United Kingdom act as offshore balancers, and regional hegemons. This classification is
missing
intervening only when a continental power is close to a fourth, important category: where a great
achieving primacy (126-28, 261-64). The thirdpower
kindisof
the only local state with significant resources.
Under these circumstances, such a state will try to ex-
great power in Mearsheimer's theory is a regional hege-
pand to dominate
mon such as the United States. A regional hegemon is its region, even if it is an island state.
While
a status quo state that will seek to defend the currentthis category is not named by Mearsheimer, he
favorable distribution of capabilities (42). does describe at least one example in his case study
As noted in Table 2, Mearsheimer providesnarrative,
an in- that of Japan in Northeast Asia between 1900
and
complete discussion of how the different state types 1945.1 Two other examples that can be coded as
fitting in this category are the Soviet Union in Europe
operate outside of their own regions. The one straight-
after the Second World War and America in the mid-
forward prediction is that regional hegemons will be
robust offshore balancers. Mearsheimer is much less nineteenth century. Both were the only states of any
clear, however, on whether the same holds true for consequence in their respective regions, but neither
had yet sequestered and extracted resources that dwar-
continental and island great powers. For example, while
Mearsheimer (2001, 141) suggests that great powers fed those held by continental powers in other regions.
"strive to prevent rivals in other regions from gainingBesides adding a fourth category of sole great power,
hegemony," the discussion on pages 141 and 142 my fo- expanded offensive realist typology also considers
different strategic circumstances that a state might face
cuses almost exclusively on the behavior of regional
when it operates outside of its own region. The ex-
hegemons. Elsewhere the volume suggests that great
tended
powers at least try to be offshore balancers, as, for typology takes the different state types, extracts
the elements attributed to them, and recasts the four
example, when Mearsheimer suggests that "the Euro-
peans, especially the British, were determined tonominal
do categories as extraregional contexts (Elman
what they could to contain the United States from2005; see also K. Bailey 1972, 1973; Barton 1955; and
Lazarsfeld
further expanding its borders" (251). The confusion 1965). For example, a state that is one of
several
over the question of extraregional activity by island continental powers in its own region might be
operating in another region that has several continental
and continental great powers is especially problem-
atic for Mearsheimer, because the United States powers
is with or without an island state, a single great
power,
offensive realism's single success story. If it faced or a regional hegemon. This expansion adds
four
no serious challenges on its path to dominance, the columns for "other regions," resulting in an addi-
tional 16 cells.
case is much less compelling evidence for the general
proposition that sophisticated power maximization The new typology is shown in Figure 1. Although
pays.
there are initially 20 cells in the 4 x 5 matrix, those
that are shaded gray can be deleted using empirical
functional reduction. In the modern era there have
EXTENDING OFFENSIVE REALISM been no cases of multipolar regions without an insular
offshore power. Accordingly the second column [cells
I argue that Mearsheimer's implicit typology can be
usefully expanded into a more fully specified version of
offensive realism by adding a fourth category of 1state,
Japan belongs in this category, even though it is also an island
(and therefore potentially an insular) state. If there are no powerful
by taking into account different strategic circumstances
states on the continent, there is no defensive force to multiply, and
that a state might face when it operates outside of its
hence water has no "stopping power." Accordingly, an island state
own region, and by paying more explicit attention
that is to
the only great power in the region will eschew the modesty
the theory's predictions about how state typesofbehave
offshore balancing, and seek regional dominance for itself. See
toward rising great powers in other regions. Mearsheimer 2001, 264-65.

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ON
ON
FIGURE 1.
STATE IS ACTING IN

its own region another region which has

more than one more than one only one great

continental power great power (including an
(no insular state) insular state)
one of (1) Maximize relative (5) (9) (13) Indeterminate. Possibly (17)
multiple power (achieve regional balance against inevitable Poss
great powers hegemony if possible) hegemonic bid underm
in region while blocking other
continental states' France toward US in 19th Franc
similar ambitions century 201h c

France, Germany, Italy

insular state (2) Offshore balance (6) (10) (14) Acquiesce to inevitable (
(and one of against any rising hegemonic bid buckpas
multiple hegemon hegem
great powers in t
renUK
STATE region) U in in Europe UK toward US in 19th UK towa
Europe
IS century

(3) Seek regional (7) (11) Focus on achieving (15) (19)

only great hegemony hegemony at home, so attempt
power in minimal efforts in other hegemon in
region US in North America regions its ant
1800-1900; Japan in balan
Asia 1900-1945; Soviet US toward France, Germany
Union 1946-1988 and Russia in mid-19th century Japa

(4) Maintain hegemony (8) (12) Buckpass to the region's (16) Balance against
regional insular state; offshore balance inevitable hegemonic b
hegemon US in North America against rising hegemon as l
after 1900 resort US toward Japan in As
1940-194
US in Europe 1917 and

= cells amenable to empirical functional reduc

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4

(5)-(8)] can be deleted in inits their entirety. Similarly,

region is entirely consistent ther
with the thrust of
have been no examples of Mearsheimer's
multiple other predictions
multipolar regarding in-regional
regions
and hence cells (9) and (10) state behavior.
in the third column can
also be deleted. There have also been no cases of two However, my extended version of offensive realism
isolated great powers, and so cell (15) is empty.2suggests One that, because they will give precedence to local
cell in the property space, cell (20), can be reduced power
us- considerations, both island and continental great
ing logical functional reduction. The extended version powers make very doubtful extraregional balancers.
of offensive realism predicts that a regional hegemon In responding to the security demands posed by an
will intervene to prevent other states from achieving anarchic international system, an insular great power
regional dominance. If that prediction is accurate, should
we support an extraregional attempt at hegemony
will never encounter a situation in which there are two [cell (14)], and a continental great power should only
regional hegemons. Hence, cell (20) can be deleted.3intervene when its local situation permits [cell (13)].
We are left with eight extraregional cells: (11)-(14)As I suggest in cell (14), a regionally focused version
and (16)-(19). The remaining property space exhaus- of offensive realism predicts that insular great pow-
tively presents the offensive realist combinations that ers will prefer to support, not block, the emergence
are likely to be populated by cases in the modern era. of a regional hegemon in another neighborhood. Tak-
It should be stressed that this "stretched" version of ing Anglo-American relations as an example, Britain's
offensive realism is already nascent in The Tragedy main of concern should have been of a continental hege-
Great Power Politics. At least one "sole great power" mon is emerging in its own region. Since an American
discussed in the case studies (Mearsheimer 2001, 264- regional hegemon would share Britain's fear of a
65), and allowing for different extraregional contexts isEuropean hegemon, the British could rely on it to
implicit in Mearsheimer's use of different in-regionalserve as balancer-of-last-resort. Hence, conducting an
state types. However, explicitly adding these elementsextraregional campaign against the Americans made
to the extended typology enhances the descriptive con-no sense, since it would misdirect British resources
tent of both axes of the property space. Comparedaway from local balancing, as well as rob the island
to Mearsheimer's original formulation, my extended state of an inevitable future ally. This suggests that the
version allows for more nuanced hypotheses that col- British should have acquiesced in America's rise to
lectively can explain a wider range of state behavior.hegemony and quietly ceded control of the Western
Hemisphere. Since the two states both feared rising
European continental great powers, however, we
The Extended Typology's Predictions4 would expect the two states to engage in mutual buck-
Mearsheimer argues that the stopping power of water passing. Because Britain was much closer to Europe,
makes global hegemony impossible, with the corollary comes as no surprise that it would catch the buck in
it
1914 and 1939. But if Britain proved unequal to the
hypothesis that the best a state can hope for is to be the
world's sole regional hegemon. But a second corollary task, the United States was required to step in, as it did
in 1945.
of a regionally focused offensive realism is that local
power considerations will dominate a state's strategic Although I do not provide a direct test of cell (14)'s
calculations. This second corollary makes little differ-hypothesis in this article, Britain's behavior in 1803 is
ence when it comes to in-regional behavior, and hence consistent with the expectation that it would acquiesce
here Mearsheimer's and my version of the theory over-in America's rise. If France had not sold the territory,
it is very likely that an Anglo-American alliance would
lap in their predictions. Accordingly, cells (1), (2), and
have followed. In addition, in the event that Britain had
(4) of my typology (Figure 1) agree with Mearsheimer's
predictions for the local behavior of continental and in-conquered Louisiana from the French, it is probable
sular great powers and regional hegemons. While the that they would then have transferred all or part of the
extended version adds the in-regional behavior of a territory to the United States, in order to maintain that
alliance (Perkins 1955, 290-94; Skolnik 1969, 124-25).
sole great power, the prediction in cell (3) that states
like the United States will expand to fill the vacuum Britain's willingness to see the United States take New
Orleans is further demonstrated by its permitting the
British merchant bank Baring Brothers to participate
in the transaction's financing.
2 It would be possible to make a weak argument that U.S.-Japanese
relations between 1880 and 1900 might populate this cell, since Japan In contrast to the likely extraregional intervention
could be coded as having reached great power status, and the United by a regional hegemon to prevent the rise of a peer
States as not yet achieving regional hegemony. This is the only mod- competitor, and to the expected acquiescence in that
ern dyad that might remotely fit in cell (15). See Ragin 2000, 80, on
rise by an insular great power, a continental great
setting criteria for determining whether a cell is empirically empty.
3 If Mearsheimer is correct that balancing is inefficient, and regional
power may intervene in another region, but only when
hegemons suffer from the same inefficiencies as other great powers, that action will not undermine its relative position
then cell (20) is not logically empty. It should, instead, be deleted in its own neighborhood. As I note in cell (13), the
using empirical functional reduction. anarchic international system provides cross-cutting
4 This section looks only at the cells in the typology which are directly incentives for and against extraregional balancing by
relevant to the case discussed in this article, namely, how the United
States achieved regional hegemony. See Elman 2005 for a fuller
continental great powers. Perhaps the best reason
discussion of the methodology used to derive the extended typology, for intervention is that a continental great power
as well as of other cells in the matrix. anticipating its own bid for supremacy will want to

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 Extending Offensive Realism November 2004

preempt the creation ofTHEanLOUISIANA

offshorePURCHASE
balancer likely
interfere with its future plans. The strongest argumen
By turn Spanish, French,
against extraregional balancing Spanish,
is that aFrench, and Ame
continen
tal great power worriesican, the
far territory
more eventually
about transferred
its loca in t
competitors than about Louisiana whatPurchase of 1803 was the first,
is happening in and larges
other
regions. Hence, it is not surprising that France, step on the United States' path to regional hegemon
Prussia/Germany, and The sale comprised
Russia paid considerably
far more more thanatten
the con
tion to each other, and to Great Britain, than to temporary state of Louisiana, virtually doubling t
America. Some European states also worried, withsize of the republic. In addition, at a time when wat
good reason, that by blocking the United States' ex- transportation dominated communications and trad
pansion they risked pushing an increasingly power- the cession gave the United States control of th
ful state into the arms of their enemies. In addition, Mississippi River, the major north-south artery b
since the United States was the only powerful state intween the Appalachians and the Rockies, as well
North America, great powers interested in balancingof New Orleans, a choke-point that could dominat
the economies of the interior.
against it would have had to do all the heavy lifting
themselves, without the aid of local allies. Finally, by
allowing the United States to become more powerful, it
could serve as a useful counterweight in the European
balance.
The Background to the Purchase
The claim being made in cell (13) is not the neo- Several European great powers had an interest in the
classical realist argument that an otherwise determi-
region and, at various times, had exercised different
nate structural prediction is rendered inaccurate bydegrees of control. The first Spanish expeditions in
left-out domestic variables (see, e.g., Schweller 1993,
1528 and 1541 resulted in no permanent settlements
1994, 1996, 1997, and 1998). Rather, because local and
in Louisiana but helped to substantiate Spain's later
extraregional considerations compete, when it comes claims to the territory (DeConde 1976, 4-5; see also
Shepherd 1904, 443). A French mission down the
to extraregional balancing by continental great powers,
offensive structural realism is indeterminate on its own
Illinois and Mississippi rivers reached the Gulf in 1682.
terms. To be sure, a continental great power may not Its leader, Robert Cavelier, sieur de La Salle, claimed
be in favor of another state achieving regional hege- the territory for France, and named it in honor of Louis
mony elsewhere. But it will not care enough to deflectXIV (DeConde 1976, 6-7). France lost the east bank
resources that could otherwise be used in its own bid of the Mississippi (as well as New France) to England
for local dominance, or commit resources that should in 1763 following the Seven Years War. At the same
be used to block another local power from achieving time, England also received East and West Florida
regional hegemony, or so provoke the extraregional from Spain. France's exclusion from the continent
would-be hegemon that it throws its weight on the sidewas completed by its cession of the west bank of the
of the state's local enemies. That is, we cannot know Mississippi to Spain by the Treaty of Fontainebleau
in advance what a continental state will do about an (Aiton 1931, 718).
extraregional rising great power without much more Between 1762/63 and 1776 the only two colonial
information about local conditions. powers seriously vying for control of North America
Analyzing France's sale of Louisiana to the United were England, in the north and east, and Spain, in the
States provides an opportunity to test the argument south and west. Having withdrawn from the continent,
made in cell (13) that continental great powers France are was more interested in interfering with the En-
glish empire than in reestablishing its own (Fletcher
indifferent extraregional balancers, and that their own
local considerations dominate. The case is important 1930, 368, 375-76). England's position on the conti-
as the last occasion on which a powerful extraregionalnent was dealt a serious blow by its defeat in the
continental state had an indigenous presence on the War of Independence. The Floridas were restored to
North American continent.5 After 1803, the only two Spain, and the remaining Anglo-American territory
was divided between England and the United States.
states with such territory were Great Britain, an insular
Despite recovering Florida, however, Spain gained
island state, and a declining Spain. Hence process trac-
ing the Louisiana Purchase demonstrates how much of long-term advantage from these developments.
little
a price continental great powers are willing to payWhileto the amount of territory England controlled was
prevent regional hegemony elsewhere.6 much diminished, it was still easily capable of invad-
ing Louisiana from Canada. In addition, Spain now
had to cope with increasing westward migration of
Americans
5 Probably the next best opportunity for testing cell (13)'s prediction
into territory it claimed, as well as with
is the continental great powers' foreign policy toward the United large-scale smuggling that undercut its own economy.
States during the American Civil War, when the would-be regional For their part, the Americans considered themselves
hegemon looked especially vulnerable. As the best chance that Euro- heirs to the English colonies' original land grants that
pean great powers had to split the Union, it presents a "most likely"
gave competing titles to territory claimed by Spain. In
case for the argument that great powers do engage in extraregional
balancing (Eckstein 1975, 117-20; Levy 2003, 153, note 46).
addition, the Americans were determined to reduce
the
6 On process tracing see Bennett and George 2001 and George and vulnerability of their trade to Spanish control of
Bennett 2005. the Mississippi River.

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4

While not
Spanish-American friction an economic
was asset as a stand-alone
briefly eased by t
Treaty of San Lorenzo (Pinckney's
colony, Treaty)
a French-controlled ofnev
Louisiana would 1
Spain ceded claims toless land east
serve three of roles,
strategic theallMississip
operating to c
and north of the 31st parallel and guaranteed the United States: a barrier to westward expans
American vessels free navigation of the lower river. choke-point on the Mississippi, and a rival metr
The United States was also granted the right to trans- First, French Louisiana would provide a much str
ship goods at New Orleans free of tax for three obstacle to American expansion than Spain's rap
years, with Spain able to nominate an alternative declining empire (Fletcher 1930, 375; James 1914
site thereafter (DeConde 1976, 61-62; James 1914, 48; Lyon 1934/74, 149; Whitaker 1934, 456). Th
44). These generous Spanish concessions did not long rier rationale was a central theme in discussions of
solve their problems with either American expan- the comparative merits of French and Spanish own-
sion or American smuggling. Migration west of the ership, both in the 1790s and earlier (Kukla 2003, 205;
Mississippi and south of the 31st parallel continued see also DeConde 1976, 8, 26, 78, 80, 82-83, 86-87,
(DeConde 1976, 71). The American newcomers re- 93, and Lyon 1934/74, 14, 51, 81, 88). Second, New
fused to assimilate in language or custom and were Orleans "commanded the single most strategic point
correctly viewed by Spain as an inevitably irredentist between the Appalachians and the Rocky Mountains
diaspora. In addition, American smuggling of goods via of North America" (Kukla 2003, 31; see also 231). The
New Orleans to other Spanish colonies was a constant economies of the interior depended on the Mississippi
source of irritation to the authorities (Deconde 1976, River for transport, and New Orleans controlled the
72). waterway (Lyon 1934/74, 117). A state that could re-
In November 1799 France's interests in the West- strict egress from the Mississippi had powerful lever-
ern Hemisphere, renewed under the Directory,age were
over upstream territories (Robertson 1885, 254).
boosted by Napoleon Bonaparte's seizure of power Finally, French Louisiana could serve as a rival metro-
(Fletcher 1930, 374-75; Lokke 1925, 80; Sloane 1899; pole for parts of the United States to the west of the
1904, 508-9; Turner 1905, 268-69, 277). France sought Appalachian mountains. Given the long-standing ri-
to mold a new empire in the west, with Louisiana valry between northeastern and southern states, and
supplying food, timber, and other commodities the widespread acceptance of Montesquieu's argu-
to the
sugar island of St. Domingue (DeConde 1976, 77, 86; that large republics inevitably fragment, it was
ment
Lyon 1934/74, 109; see also Turner 1905, 257). While believed that America was ripe for division (Cerami
Louisiana would supply St. Domingue, it was the 2003,
is- 13-14; Kukla 2003, 59-66, 93, 97-98). France
land colony that would turn a profit by restoring what hoped that, in order to guarantee access to the lower
had previously been the source of 70% of France's
Mississippi, territories on the Eastern bank would
transfer their loyalty from the United States. Hence a
sugar, which in turn produced 20% of its exports (Kukla
2003, 213-14).7 Without St. Domingue, Louisiana contemporary
was British observer noted that "the state
a doubtful economic proposition. of Kentucky must unite with France as the Missis-
While ostensibly offered by France as compensation
sippi is the only communication that fine country has
for Spanish losses in the Seven Years War, the with orig-the Sea, and she is deprived of Commerce with
inal cession in 1763 was in large part made betweenthe United States by that Barrier the Apalachian [sic]
two states for which "Louisiana was not merely mountains..."
des- (quoted in H. Bailey and Weber 1960,
244, emphasis in the original). The French would be
titute of intrinsic value, it entailed a positive deficit"
(Shepherd 1904, 439). One French official observed,adopting a strategy previously advocated by the Span-
on September 20, 1762, that the colony "costs France
ish and feared by the United States, but doing so with a
eight hundred thousand livres a year, without yielding
government that was far more attractive to some Amer-
a sou in return" (447; see also Cerami 2003, 11).icans
The than the decaying Spanish monarchy (Kukla 2003,
Spanish in the intervening decades had done little 20,bet-
77-78; Riley 1897, 180-81). For these reasons, it
was hoped that territories to the east of the Missis-
ter (Fletcher 1930, 368-69). On June 22, 1800, Mariano
sippi could be persuaded to remove to Louisiana, and
Luis de Urquijo, Spain's secretary of state for foreign
affairs, observed to the Spanish ambassador in aParisFrench state could be constructed stretching from the
that the territory "costs us more than it is worth"Rockies
(cited to the Appalachians (DeConde 1976, 59, 83;
in Lyon 1934/74, 104; also cited in DeConde 1976,Lyon92;1934/74, 113-14).
Kukla 2003, 214, and Whitaker 1934, 469-70). Spain In October 1800, by the second Treaty of San
Ildefenso, the Spanish agreed to retrocede Louisiana
regarded Louisiana as a necessary part of its defense-
in-depth for its much more valuable holdings farther
to France in return for territory in northern Italy and
south and west. A twice-yearly grant from Mexico six ships
to (DeConde 1976, 95; Lyon 1934/74, 108). At
Louisiana was regarded as part of the cost of doing
the same time, France verbally agreed not to alienate
business (Kukla 2003, 18, 37-39, 74, 91-92; see thealso
territory to a third party. In July 1802 this assur-
DeConde 1976, 72). ance was repeated in a written promise by Gouvion
St. Cyr, French Ambassador to Spain, which included
the sentence, "I am authorized to declare to you in
the name of the First Consul that France will never
7 See Lyon 1934/74, 28-29 on how colonies were valued during the
alienate
eighteenth century and the high value placed on the sugar islands of [Louisiana]" (quoted in Lyon 1934/74, 124).
the West Indies compared to other colonies. Documents authorizing transfer of the territory were

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 Extending Offensive Realism November 2004

finally prepared on October

Barbd-Marbois
15, 1830/1977,
1802 274). (DeConde
Neither Livingstone
1976
105; Lyon 1934/74, 120).nor Monroe was instructed to ask for, or expected to be
The United States had offered,
caught wind
the whole colony of
(Lyon an impend-
1934/74, 240). Never-
ing agreement between theless,
Spain and instructions
even without France from earlier,
Jefferson, theyal
though it was unsure about both
readily agreed the proposal.
to France's timing-believin
By the first week
that the retrocession might have
of May 1803, been
10 months agreed
after France's writtenas ear
promise
as the 1795 Treaty of Basel-and
to Spain not to alienate
the its extent-believin
new possession, negotia-
that the deal included the
tions Floridas.
were completed forBy the May
territory's
1801,
purchase by
th
Americans were certain that some kind of deal had the United States.
taken place, although they were still unclear on what
The purchase met with overwhelmingly positive re-
territory had been transferred (DeConde 1976,actions
107- in the United States. To be sure, die-hard north-
108). If France's possession was allowed to operate as
easterners were very critical of westward expansion,
a barrier to westward expansion, as a chokehold and some were deeply angered by the acquisition.
on the
Mississippi, and as a magnet for disunion, it would
Knudson
do (1969, 184) relates the "hard-core Federalist"
response: "The price was not right. The territory was
so entirely at the expense of the United States. Ameri-
too large; the Union would be rended. Spain would
cans were acutely aware of these risks (see, e.g., Cerami
never agree to the transaction.... The cities of the
2003, 27, DeConde 1976, 69, 81-82, and Lyon 1934/74,
150). Not surprisingly, the United States mucheast would be depopulated... the center of political
pre-
power
ferred "pacific" and "feeble" Spain, which "might havewould drift southward and westward...
retained it quietly for years" (Skolnik 1969, 36-39).New
The England would be ruined" (see also Knudson
Spanish were viewed as "more safe, quiet, and 1969,
useful 198-202; Robertson 1885, 262-63). But previous
neighbors" (DeConde 1976, 84), and Rufus King, U.S.of the administration who were not so driven by
critics
sectional interests had to admit the obvious value of the
representative to Britain, observed that the Spanish,
like the Turks, "are the most proper to possess territory
a great to the United States and were largely reduced
Empire with great insignificance" (Kukla 2003, to
227).
claiming that Jefferson's administration deserved no
In December 1801, Robert Livingstone, America's
credit for a happy accident (Kukla 2003, 290-91).
ambassador to France, was directed to discover the
extent of the retrocession and whether the French in-
tended to send troops to its North American posses- France's Options in 1803
sions (Kukla 2003, 238). Livingstone was instructed toWhile America's readiness to buy Louisiana clearly
persuade the French not to reoccupy Louisiana and to fits both versions of offensive realism, France's sale
obtain the Floridas from them if they had title or from
poses a problem for the argument that continental
the Spanish if they did not (Kukla 2003, 239). U.S. con-
great powers prefer to contain would-be extraregional
cerns about Louisiana were considerably heightened hegemons. By contrast, the decision fits my predic-
on October 16, 1802, when Spain's Acting Intendant tion that extraregional foreign policies are subordinate
of Louisiana, Juan Ventura Morales, disregarded the to local power considerations. The possible options
Treaty of San Lorenzo by suspending America's right France had in April 1803 are shown in Table 3, to-
to deposit goods at New Orleans (Documents 1927, gether with two previous policies that were no longer
822-23; 1928, 331-32, 341; Lyon 1934/74, 167; Skolnikfeasible.
1969, 54-55). The move enraged Americans, especially Until the end of 1802, French policy was based on
those whose livelihoods depended on free egress from the hope that it could suppress the rebellion on St.
the lower Mississippi (Pelzer 1913, 122; Perkins 1955,
Domingue. By December, the prospect of a larger
285). The United States (as it turns out, wrongly) be-
Caribbean empire was much reduced, and with it
lieved that Spain had already transferred the territory
the economic raison d'etre of the Louisiana retro-
to France and that the suspension was the first act cession
of (Kukla 2003, 254). France's military force on
the new owners (Lyon 1932).8 U.S. President Thomas St. Domingue had been decimated by yellow fever,
Jefferson calmed the situation by appointing James with 29,000 troops killed or incapacitated (Stoddard
Monroe as Minister Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary 1914, 326-28, 338-40; see also Sloane 1904, 513). From
to France and Spain. Monroe was dispatched to Paris January to March 1803, France continued to pur-
to help Livingstone persuade the French to part with sue the retrocession, despite the very bad news from
New Orleans (Lyon 1934/74, 177-78). St. Domingue. In March 1803, however, with Britain
Monroe's arrival in Paris coincided with a remark-
preventing French troops from sailing for Louisiana,
able reversal by the French. Napoleon told his Napoleon
min- had four options: conciliate the British long
isters on April 11, 1803: "Irresolution and delibera-
enough to allow the military expedition to depart; sell
tion are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana.
its whole interest to the United States; sell only New
It is not only New Orleans that I will cede, it is the and navigation rights on the Mississippi River
Orleans
whole colony without any reservation" (quoted byUnited States; or live up to the nonalienation
to the
promise and transfer Louisiana back to Spain.
s The closure was a wholly Spanish adventure in which France played
no role and was likely a retaliation for American smuggling. Lyon
France Conciliates Britain to Allow Garrisoning
(1932, 282) suggests that the French did not know about the closure Louisiana in the Spring of 1803. If France retained
until they were told by their representative in Washington. control of New Orleans, a U.S. alliance with Britain and

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 TABLE 3. Options in April 1803
Previous Policies Existing Options
Garrison Louisiana (1) Conciliate Great
and Recover St. Britain and Garrison
Domingue Garrison Louisiana Louisiana (2) Sell to US (3) Sell part to

French policy? Until December 1802 January-March 1803 April 1803

Who gets New France France France US US Spai
Orleans? probably US
Who gets west bank France France France US France. Probably GB
of Mississippi? once war starts, probab
w
to US

Effect on North US contained US contained US contained US not contained US partly cont

American if British keep now,
distribution of west bank but not f
capabilities? if they give i
to US

Effect on France's Worsened (US-GB Worsened (US-GB Much worsened Improved Slightly impr
position in alliance) alliance)
European
distribution of
capabilities?
Compensation None None None 52 million francs 0 < ?? < 52 m
France receives
immediately?

Effect on France's Keeps France Keeps France Keeps France Allows France to Keeps Fra
economic return focused on focused on focused on focus on India focused on
from its colonies? Louisiana to Louisiana to Louisiana to and the East bank to detr
detriment of India detriment of India detriment of India of India an
and the East, but and the East and the East East (until l
St. Domingue west bank to U
compensates

,..

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 Extending Offensive Realism November 2004

war with France were both likely

could help create to
a great naval follow
power (Ceram
to counter Britain
2003, 155, 165; DeConde 1976, 85; Kukla 2003, 268; (Sloane 1904, 512, 514).
Lyon 1934/74, 182; Perkins 1955, 286-87, 295; Skolnik Partial Sale to the United States. France could have
1969, 126). Accordingly, the barrier, blockade, and rival
sold the United States the town of New Orleans,
metropole benefits all depended on France garrisoning
together with free navigation of the Mississippi River,
Louisiana before war commenced with enough troops
and kept the rest of the territory. As Jefferson
to deter or withstand an attack (DeConde 1976, 94-95).
Hence the instructions to General Victor, the leader of made clear in his April 18, 1802 letter to Robert
R. Livingstone (reproduced in Skolnik 1969, 36-39),
France's expedition to garrison Louisiana, suggested
this would have been enough to satisfy the Americans.
that "the intention of the First Consul is to give
Indeed, the instructions to Monroe and Livingstone
Louisiana a degree of strength which will permit him
were to make an offer for New Orleans, the Floridas,
to abandon it without fear in time of war, so that its
and some small islands in the Mississippi. Failing that
enemies may be forced to the greatest sacrifices merely
they were to ask for territory on which a new American
in attempting to attack it" (quoted in Lyon 1934/74,135;
town could be constructed, and if that was not forth-
see also Smith 1971, 30).
coming, they could be satisfied with a renewal of the
That there was not already a French military pres-
right of deposit in New Orleans (Lyon 1934/74, 213).
ence in early 1803 was largely due to Spanish delays.
The United States certainly never expected France to
The territory could have been retroceded as early as the
offer it the whole colony. Shorn of its control of the
Treaty of Basel in 1795 (DeConde 1976, 80; Whitaker
Mississippi River, France would have been welcome to
1936). Even the 1800 retrocession by the second Treaty
keep the west bank, at least for the time being (Kukla
of San Ildefenso would have been soon enough, if Spain
2003, 233-34, 244-45, 265, 275; Lyon 1934/74, 177-78,
had not then forced France to endure a two-year delay
224).
until signing the formal authorization for the transfer
There were several reasons why a partial sale was
in October 1802. Since yellow fever had killed most
unlikely. First, when the Peace of Amiens broke down,
of the troops already sent to reestablish the western
the British could easily take what the French retained.
empire, a garrison for Louisiana would have to come
Second, even if the British did not attack in the interim,
from France. By the time General Victor's expedition
the French would only be postponing an inevitable
to Louisiana was ready to depart in January 1803, it clash when the United States continued and intensi-
found itself trapped by ice that did not melt until mid-
fied its westward pressure (Lyon 1934/74, 205). Third,
March (Adams 1955, 174; Lyon 1934/74, 129-44). At if Louisiana without New Orleans could be made a
that point the expedition found itself blockaded by the
going concern, it would still have to export its pro-
British fleet (Smith 1971, 33). Unless and until France
duce down a river now controlled by the Americans.
conciliated Britain by modifying its territorial ambi-
tions, the garrison could not leave. The French would be in the same position vis-at-vis
New Orleans that the Americans had been in with the
Full Sale to the United States. By selling the ter- Spanish, and that they now contemplated with the
ritory France would receive a net sum of 52 million French. Finally, retaining the territory would keep
francs: The 80 million francs purchase price, less the French commercial classes focused on the Western
20 million francs to settle American claims on France Hemisphere, to the detriment of their interests in Asia
for seizure of vessels and 8 million francs in brokers fees and the eastern Mediterranean. The Americans "were
to discount the bonds issued by the U.S. government ready to buy an empire to get a city" (Lyon 1934/74,
for cash (Barb6-Marbois 1830/1977, 402-12; Colomb 224). The French, correctly concluding that without
1929; Winston 1929, 190). Since the colony was inde- the city there was no empire, were unwilling to divide
fensible without a garrison, the sale would represent Louisiana.
a 52 million franc gain on something that would oth-
Sale or Transfer to Spain. If the French could not
erwise be lost for nothing (Barbe-Marbois 1830/1977,
keep all or part of Louisiana, a final alternative would
264; Kukla 2003, 235, 268; Lyon 1934/74, 200). In
have been to abide by the promise not to alienate the
addition, the benefit of the territory would go to the
territory to a third party. A transfer to Spain would
United States and not to the British (Knudson 1969,
not have earned the French as much U.S. goodwill
192, 194; see also Sloane 1899, 447). At the same time,
as a partial or full transfer to America. But since the
Franco-American relations would be considerably im-
United States considered Spain much less of a threat, it
proved and an Anglo-American alliance would be pre-
would probably have forestalled an Anglo-American
vented. Another reason for selling the entire colony
alliance against France. There were, however, at least
was that, by removing itself from the continent, France
three reasons why such a transfer was unlikely. First,
would free up its commercial classes to concentrate
Napoleon was furious with Spain for the two-year
on developing its colonial interests elsewhere (Lyon
delay between agreeing retrocession and the trans-
1934/74, 205). Finally, by selling Louisiana, the French
fer, and was not minded to do it a good turn (Lyon
1934/74, 122, 125, 198-99, 231; Smith 1971, 22). Sec-
ond, while it is not clear what Spain might have offered
9 It is also possible that, by selling Louisiana with indistinct borders,
Napoleon hoped to draw the Spanish, British, and Americans into
of the purchase. See also Cerami 2003, 180; Lyon 1934/74, 225; and
a conflict in North America, drawing resources away from Europe.
Robertson 1885, 256-60.
See Barb6-Marbois 1830/1977, 283-89, for a discussion of the borders

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4

by way of compensation makefora choicereturning

between containing American power
Louisiana, i
unlikely that it would and
have pursuingmet
French ambitions
the inprice Europe. France
paid
was by
Americans. Finally, a transfer tounless
unable to hold Louisiana Spainit could getwas mere
troops to
delayed conveyance to the United
the colony, which was only States.
possible if BritainIt was wid
permitted
recognized that because the
of Helvoet-Sluys expedition to sail (Barbd-Marbois
the weakness of its defe
in Louisiana, "Spain's 1830/1977,
days 253). in Louisiana
Britain's control of the seawere
routes nu
bered" (DeConde 1976, 71;
to the see
Western also
Hemisphere Whitaker
had been readily demon- 19
456). This was due in part to
strated the
when France disparity in populati
sent earlier military expeditions to
growth. Between 1785 and St. Domingue.
1800 France'sthe
first attempt
population
in May 1800 was of
Ohio River Valley increased seven
only made possible times
by a storm faster
dispersing the British th
that of Louisiana (Kukla blockading
2003, squadron,
113). and the second by
The the Peace
relative w
ness of Spain is demonstrated of Amiens and byBritish
itssympathies
anemic with the reaction
aims of
France breaking its promise the expeditionnot
(Lokke 1925,
to 81, 85). By contrast, Louisia
alienate in
Spain acquiesced because earlyto
1803, do otherwise
as the Peace of Amiens unraveled,wasFrance to r
war with the United States and the loss of the Floridas found itself faced by an uncooperative and potentially
(Lyon 1934/74, 245). hostile Britain, in large part thanks to French pro-
vocation.
The Treaty of Amiens had restored all of France's
overseas colonies, but required France to evacuate
Analysis
Naples and the Roman States and surrender Egypt
The key argument made in my extended version ofto Turkey (Ward and Gooch 1922/70, 306). In return,
offensive realism is that the anarchic international sys-Britain was to vacate Elba and Malta (Mahan 1897,
tem provides dissimilar cues to different types of states81). In the summer of 1802, Franco-British relations
to engage in extraregional balancing. An analysis ofwere reasonably congenial, but they quickly deterio-
France's sale of Louisiana tests the hypothesis set outrated in September and October following evidence of
in cell (13) of Figure 1 that continental great powers France's renewed ambitions, most notably in Egypt and
make indifferent extraregional balancers, because lo-Switzerland (Schroeder 1994, 231-32). France com-
cal power considerations dominate their calculations. pounded its provocation by publishing a report by the
leader of its Egyptian expedition in the Moniteur
It investigates the central question of what local price
France was willing to pay to contain the United States on January 30, 1803, including the observation that
in another region. French policy evolved as the costs it could be conquered by 6,000 French troops. Britain
and benefits of containment changed. subsequently refused to surrender Malta (Gill 1909, 73;
Until December 1802, Napoleon was willing to risk Mahan 1897, 93-96; Sloane 1904, 509). On February 21,
an Anglo-American alliance by garrisoning Louisiana France published the official View of the State of the
as part of a larger western empire that included the Republic, which noted, inter alia, that France needed
sugar producing island of St. Domingue. The periodan army of 500,000 men to be safe from the threat from
from January through March 1803 partly disentan- Britain (Ward and Gooch 1922/70, 318). On March 8
gles the economic benefits of the Caribbean from the the British government sent a royal message to Parlia-
strategic benefits of the west bank of the Mississippi.ment announcing that in consequence of military pre-
By January, Napoleon knew that France's plans forparations going on in the ports of Holland and France,
St. Domingue were in serious trouble, and he had firm it was prudent to make additional provision for defense
indications that French control of Louisiana would (Ward and Gooch 1922/70, 319; Mahan 1892, 97).
provoke an alliance between the United States Lord and Whitworth, the British Ambassador to France,
Great Britain (Lyon 1934/74, 194-195; see also Lokke forwarded a March 12 memorandum from Napoleon
1925, 86). Yet neither the failure of the St. Domingue noting that the troops in Helvoet-Sluys were intended
expedition nor the strength of America's reaction for America
to but that, given the royal message, orders
the closure of New Orleans led Napoleon to can-
for their embarkation and departure had been counter-
manded
cel plans for garrisoning Louisiana. For example, in (quoted in Browning 1887, 114). Napoleon's
message was at best misleading, since he did not or-
February 1803, ignorant of the ice that prevented
it from leaving Holland, Napoleon ordered "thederen-the expedition to stand down until after the sale
ofdes-
tire Louisiana expedition to sail directly to its Louisiana had been completed in April (Smith
tination," countermanding his previous order to 1971,
di- 34-35). Indeed, French Foreign Minister Charles
Talleyrand complained to Lord Whitworth on
vert much of its military force to St. Domingue
(DeConde 1976, 152; Lyon 1934/74, 139-40). TheMarch
ex- 25 that English frigates cruising off of Helvoet-
Sluys were preventing the French vessels from leaving
pedition was repeatedly ordered to depart throughout
February and early March (Smith 1971, 33, note (Browning
36). 1887, 142). Lord Hawkesbury (147) replied
to Talleyrand,
This suggests that, with or without St. Domingue, had via Whitworth:
local (i.e., European) power considerations allowed,
Napoleon would have tried to contain the United With respect to the British vessels alleged to be cruising
States.
off the ports of the Batavian Republic, his Majesty has
French policy changed in March 1803 when dete- several ships of war in the seas adjacent to those ports;
riorating relations with Britain forced Napoleon to but if their commanders have made any movements or

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 Extending Offensive Realism November 2004

held any language which English

could be regarded
to become predominant in as being
America."'l The of
a hostile nature, their conduct has been
increase in American power wasin direct
clearly oppo
recognized
sition to the tenor of their instructions.
and dismissed as a reason not toHis Majesty
proceed with the sale. has
received assurances from the French government that it is
Napoleon observed,
not their intention that the expedition to Louisiana should
proceed to its destination under the present circumstances
Perhaps it will places
in which assurances his Majesty also be objected to me, most
the that the Americans
entire
confidence. may be found too powerful for Europe in two or three
centuries: but my foresight does not embrace such remote
March and April saw fruitless negotiations and mutual fears. Besides, we may hereafter expect rivalries among
recriminations, culminating in the delivery of a British the members of the Union. The confederations, that are
ultimatum that essentially required France to evacuate called perpetual, only last till one of the contracting parties
its troops from Holland and to permit Britain to keep finds it to its interest to break them.... (quoted in Barbe-
Malta (Christie 1982, 260; Ward and Gooch 1922/70, Marbois 1830/1977, 276)
326-27). The French refused, and on May 18 Britain
declared war. By selling, France received full compensation for the
Because France was unwilling to modify its terri- territory, forestalled an Anglo-American alliance, and
torial ambitions in Europe, it had no opportunity built
to the United States into a potential competitor to
garrison Louisiana, and hence a sale was mandated the British. The question of whether the resulting re-
(Perkins 1993, 116). The three sale options (all to the
gional hegemon would one day threaten France was left
United States, part to the United States, all to Spain)
to posterity, and the hopeful hypothesis that a larger
union would inevitably fragment.
had the same basic configuration of costs and benefits:
All would provide some immediate remuneration to In sum, so long as the cost of securing Louisiana
France and forestall an Anglo-American alliance, but could be borne largely by the colonies, and so long as
each would result in U.S. regional hegemony. Transferretaining it did not unduly interfere with its own strate-
of the whole colony to the United States was the best of
gic interests vis-a-vis the other European great powers,
the three sale options for France, because it provided
France was willing to prevent American regional hege-
the largest monetary return and gave France the bestmony. But by April 1803 that was no longer a plau-
chance of befriending the Americans. sible position. Thanks to Spanish delays, the constant
Since local power considerations dominated French drain of rebellion and disease in St. Domingue, and
calculations, it is entirely unsurprising that the sale
the failure of the Louisiana garrison to depart Holland
was directed to improving French power in Europe, because of ice and blockade, France did not have the
means to hold the territory once it took clear title. The
especially vis-a-vis Britain. For example, the 52 mil-
lion francs France received was used to build barges
only way to garrison Louisiana was to appease Britain
for an invasion of Britain (Barbd-Marbois 1830/1977,
and reign in French ambitions in Europe. Since France
313; Richmond 1941,53). In addition, Napoleon viewed
was unwilling to do this, at that point it reversed course
the sale as helping the United States become a morebecause going into war with an indefensible Louisiana
was worse than surrendering the colony before the con-
formidable competitor for Britain, observing that "this
accession of territory strengthens for ever the power flict
of with Britain resumed.
the United States; and I have just given to England a
maritime rival, that will sooner or later humble her
CONCLUSION
pride" (quoted in Barb6-Marbois 1830/1977, 312).1?
To build the United States into a major competitor The extended version of offensive realism does not
to the British, however, required helping it to become
predict consistent extraregional balancing by insular
more powerful. The main drawback to the sale wasand continental great powers, and an investigation of
that the United States was put firmly on the path the
to historical record does not find it. European con-
regional hegemony. Barbd-Marbois (1830/1977, 290),tainment
a of the United States in the nineteenth cen-
participant in the negotiations, captures the trade-off
tury ranged from the anemic to the nonexistent. The
France was willing to make in selling the colony: "The
United States' two wars with great powers between
cession of Louisiana was a certain guarantee of the
1783 and 1814 were caused by disputes over the trading
future greatness of the United States, and opposed rights
an of neutral states, not by European apprehen-
insurmountable obstacle to any design formed by thesions of American expansion. Between 1814 and 1898
the United States fought no wars at all with European
great powers, a period during which it obtained Florida,
"' Napoleon's reasoning on this benefit was uncharacteristically
Texas, California, and Oregon. This absence stands
weak. By removing all barriers to westward expansion, the Louisiana
in stark contrast to the vigorous responses to France,
Purchase shifted the United States' center of gravity a thousand
Germany,
miles inland (Sloane 1904, 518). For the next 100 years, most of the and the Soviet Union in their respective bids
republic's energies were spent acquiring and consolidating control
for regional hegemony.
over its continental empire. In addition, when the United States
did eventually turn its attention eastward, it was to act in concert
with Great Britain in two world wars and the cold war. In short, as
suggested in cells (2) and (12) of the extended typology, the United
1 Similarly Sloane 1899 (447) observes that to keep control of the
Gulf
States and Great Britain had the same interest in preventing the rise out of British hands, Napoleon was prepared to see it perma-
of a European regional hegemon. nently in America's hands.

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 98, No. 4

TABLE 4. The Likelihood of Achieving Re

Is the Expanding Great Is There a Reg
Power the Only Great
Power in the Region? No Yes

No Regional hegemony unlikely Regional hegemony very unlikely

(Napoleonic France) (Germany 1914-18 and 1939-
(cells 1 and 2)a 45) (cells 1, 2, and 12)
Yes Regional hegemony possible Regional hegemony very unlikely
(US) (cells 3, 13, and 14) (Japan 1940; Soviet Union
1945-85) (cells 3, 13, 14,
and 16)

a Cells in typology in Figure 1.

An analysis of the Louisiana Purchase supports suchthe a powerful offshore balancer waiting in the wings,
argument that the United States achieved regional would-be revisionists have no structural incentives to
hegemony because of the absence of credible indige- start a fight they cannot win. By contrast, as noted in
nous balancers in North America and the weak struc- Table 4, in the nineteenth century the United States
tural incentives for European great powers to inter- did not have to cope with a regional hegemon or other
vene. In April 1803 France offered Louisiana for sale local great powers. Its only barrier to dominating its
because European power considerations dominatedneighborhood
its was potential opposition from extrare-
calculations. Bellicose American rhetoric made France gional continental great powers and an insular island
realize that their retaining New Orleans riskedstate. an This opposition never materialized. The reason
Anglo-American alliance (Perkins 1955, 281-82). But for America's rise to local dominance is entirely in-
that was a price the French were willing to pay right tuitive: The absence of balancing is explained by the
up until March 1803 and the realization that a self- absence of balancers. Regional hegemony was only
sufficient garrison could not be implanted in North possible because it was easy.
America without compromising French ambitions. It
was the imminent war with Britain that made garrison-
ing Louisiana impossible, and it was the French refusal
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