CIV 2 CASES

VILLAROEL v. ESTRADA, G.R. No. 47362. Diciembre 19, 1940 (71 Phil 140)

FACTS:

- On May 9, 1912, Alejandro Callao, mother of Juan Villaroel, obtained a loan of P1,000 from spouses
Mariano Estrada and Severina payable after seven years.
- Alejandra died, leaving Juan Villaroel as sole heir, Spouses Mariano Estrada and Severina also died,
leaving Bernardino Estrada as sole heir.
- On August 9, 1930, Juan Villaroel signed a document in which he declared to pay the debt of his
deceased mother in the amount of P1,000 with legal interest of 12% per annum.
- The Court of First Instance of Laguna ordered Juan Villaroel to pay the amount of P1,000 with an
interest of 12% per annum since August 9, 1930 until full payment
- Villaroel appealed.

ISSUE:
- Whether or not the right to prescription may be waived or renounced.

HELD:
- Yes, right to prescription may be waived or renounced. As a general rule, when a debt has already
prescribed, it cannot be imposed by the creditor. However, a new contract which recognizes and
assumes the prescribed debt is an exception, for it would be valid and enforceable. Hence, a person
who acknowledges the correctness of the debt and promises to pay it despite knowing that the debt
has already prescribed, such as the case at bar, waived the benefit of the prescription.

G.R. No. L-13667    (107 Phil 997)         April 29, 1960

PRIMITIVO ANSAY, ETC., ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

- Ansay et al. filed against NDC a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and
1955.
- The trial court dismissed the complaint ratiocinating that a bonus is an act of liberality and the court
takes it that it is not within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal and
- that Ansay et al. admitted that NDC is not under legal duty to give such bonus and
- that the court has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New Civil
Code.).
- Ansay et al. appealed and argued that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because their
claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is defined by law as a natural obligation.

ISSUE:
- Is the grant of Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955 demandable based on natural or moral
obligation?
HELD:
- No
- Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural.
- “Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance.
- Natural obligations, not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a
right of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they
authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof”.
- It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor.
- Certainly retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance.
- But here there has been no voluntary performance.
- In fact, the court cannot order the performance.

G.R. No. L-48889 (161 SCRA 307) May 11, 1989

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP), petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE MIDPAINTAO L. ADIL, Judge of the Second Branch of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
and SPOUSES PATRICIO CONFESOR and JOVITA VILLAFUERTE, respondents.

FACTS:

- On February 10, 1940, spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained an agricultural loan
from Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now Development Bank of the Philippines, in the sum of
P2,000, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound themselves jointly and
severally to pay the amount in ten equal yearly amortizations.
- As the obligation remained unpaid even after the lapse if the 10-year period, Confesor, who was then
a member of the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11, 1961,
expressly acknowledging the said loan and promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961.
- The spouses still failed to pay the obligation on the specified date.
- As a result, the DBP filed a complaint on September 11, 1970 in the City Court of Iloilo City.
- The city court ordered payment from spouses.
- The CFI of Iloilo reversed the decision.
- Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

- WON a promissory which was executed in consideration of a previous promissory note which has
already been barred by prescription is valid
RULING:

- Yes, the second promissory note is valid because the said promissory note is not a mere
acknowledgement of the debt that has prescribed already.
- Rather, it is a new promise to pay the debt.
 - A new promise is a new cause of action.
- Although a debt barred by prescription is enforceable, a new contract recognizing and assuming the
prescribed debt would be valid and enforceable.

SOLID HOMES V. SPOUSES JURADO, G.R. No. 219673, September 2, 2019

FACTS:
- Solid Homes entered into a Contract to Sell with Spouses Calica, whose rights were transferred to
Spouses Jurado.
- The sale concerns the residential lot in Loyola Grand Villas in Marikina City.
- The spouses were later informed that Solid Homes mortgaged the property, and that the mortgage
had been foreclosed.
- Sps Jurado filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before the HLURB, and was
dismissed.
- There was no right created in favor of the spouses for lack of proof that Solid Homes gave prior
consent to the assignment and transfer of rights.
- HLURB Board reversed the HLURB arbiter, saying that Solid Homes consented to the said transfer of
rights.
- OP and CA affirmed the HLURB’s decision.
- Solid Home argues that that it did not give its consent to the transfer and assignment of rights under
the Contract to Sell,
- Solid Homes contends that the CA erred in a􏰜rming the OP's and the HLURB's similar orders to
replace the foreclosed lot and to convey title over the property, or in the alternative, to pay the
current value of the property.
- P Solid Homes contends that the CA erred in affirming the OP's and the HLURB's similar orders to
replace the foreclosed lot and to convey title over the property, or in the alternative, to pay the
current value of the property.

ISSUE:
- WON there was a valid transfer of rights under the Contract to Sell. YES
(focus on Prescription); reckoning point. Kelan nag accrue ang right of action ng sps? Nung
minortgage ng Solid Homes sa iba.
Feb 1983… but filed in 2005. So does it mean
Pres peropd suspends when jurado sends written extrajudicial demand. And may action din na finile,
which interrupted the running of prescriptive period
Kaya nung 005 finile, di pa ng prescribe ang case.
RULING:
- Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED
- the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of Rights between spouses Calica and spouses Jurado
effectively subrogated the latter in place of the former; consequently, spouses Jurado had the right to
enforce the Contract to Sell as spouses Calica could.
- A contract to sell is textually defined as a "bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the prospective
buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of
the condition agreed upon."
- The obligation of the prospective seller, which is in the nature of an obligation to do, is to sell the
property to the prospective buyer upon the happening of the positive suspensive condition, that is,
the full payment of the purchase price.
-
- RATIONALE: 2. A contract to sell is textually de􏰄ned as a "bilateral contract whereby the prospective
seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject property despite delivery thereof to the
prospective buyer, binds himself to sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon
ful􏰄llment of the condition agreed upon." a. The obligation of the prospective seller, which is in the
nature of an obligation to do, is to sell the property to the prospective buyer upon the happening of
the positive suspensive condition, that is, the full payment of the purchase price. b. In a contract to
sell, the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer, meaning,
the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer ownership of the property subject
of the contract to sell until the happening of an event, which for present purposes we shall take as the
full payment of the purchase price. c. What the seller agrees or obliges himself to do is to fulfill his
promise to sell the subject property when the entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to
him. In other words, the full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the
non-ful􏰄llment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and, thus, ownership is retained
by the prospective seller without further remedies by the prospective buyer.