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CASE ANALYSIS OF

RAJESH KUMAR GUPTA AND ORS. VS STATE OF U.P. AND ORS

(C.A.NO. 3065-3066, 3067-3071, 3072 and 3073 OF 2005)

By:-

YASH PATIL

2nd Yr., LLB.

BHARATI VIDYAPEETH NEW LAW COLLEGE, PUNE

Mob.: -xyz

www.probono-india.in

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ABSTRACT:

The following is a brief Case Analysis of the case titled Rajesh Kumar Gupta V/S. State of U.P.
[C.A.NO. 3065-3066, 3067-3071, 3072 and 3073 OF 2005]. This case revolves around whether
the reservation policy of the State Government violates the article 14, 15, 16 &21 of the
Constitution of India and also whether the selection of candidates for special BTC training is
contrary to the provisions of the basic Education Act, 1972 and U.P. Basic Education (Teachers)
Services Rules, 1981. This particular case focuses on the legal provisions embedded in the
Articles 14, 15, 16, 21, & 350-A of the Constitution of India as well as Section 3, 5 and 16 of the
National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993.

INTRODUCTION:

The case is a Civil Appeal No. 3048-3064 of 2005.

In this case, is the validity of the State Government to prepare a merit list at the District level
instead of State level is violative of Article 15 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India1. And
whether the provisions of Article 350-A of the Constitution of India are attracted in the present
case.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:

1. The State Government runs a training college in each district, where the candidates are
given training in the teaching and on successful completion of the training are awarded a
`Basic Teacher's Certificate' (hereinafter referred to as BTC).

2. A decision was implemented by a Government Order dated 03.08.2001 that applications


were called for from B.Ed/L.T. qualified candidates for selection to undergo the special
BTC training after which suitable candidates would be selected and appointed as
Assistant Teachers.

3. There was a restrictive condition in the Government Order dated 03.08.2001 that
candidates were eligible to make applications only against the vacancies available in their

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State Of U.P.And Ors.vsAnant Kumar Tiwari And Ors. 2003 (3) AWC 2060

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home district and that, if a candidate applied for two or more districts, such applications
were liable to be rejected.

4. Being aggrieved, they moved to High Court for filing writ petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India and challenged the action of the Government as arbitrary and in
contravention of Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

1. Whether in the absence of the selected candidates having been impleaded by the writ
petitioners, the writ petitions are maintainable?

2. Whether the writ petitioners having applied for Special BTC training course and having
failed to get their name in the merit list are estopped from challenging the advertisement
and selection made pursuant thereto?

3. Whether the plea of promissory estoppel is available to the writ petitioners?

4. Whether the reservation of 50% females and 50% males and 50% for Arts group and
50% for science group in addition to the reservation policy of the State Government
already in force is contrary to the provisions of Articles 14, 15, 16, & 21 of the
Constitution of India?

5. Whether the State Government can prepare merit list at the District level instead of State
level and the same is violative of Article 15 and Article 16of the Constitution of India?

6. Whether the provisions of Article 350-A of the Constitution of India are attracted in the
present case?

7. Whether the selection of candidates for special BTC training is contrary to the provisions
of the basic Eduction Act, 1972 and U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Services Rules,
1981?

TheDivision Bench2 examined the aforesaid questions in the light of rival contentions.

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B. G. Balkrishnan J. and B. N. Shrikrishna J.

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ARGUMENTS FROM THE APELLANT SIDE:

 The advocate for the petitioner raised following grounds for challenge

a) the preparation of merit list district wise was arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 15 and
16 and 21 of the Constitution of India;

b) it was also contrary to the provisions of U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972 (hereinafter
referred to as the Act) and U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rule, 1981
(hereinafter referred to as the Rules); and

c) the reservation to the extent of making selection of 50% males and 50% females against
the 3 prescribed number of 50% candidates from the Science group and 50% from the
Arts group is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 15, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of
India.

 The advocates for the petitioner stated that the impugned Government Orders were
contrary to the provisions of the Act as well as Rules. The counsel for the petitioner
further stated that the non impleadment of the successful candidate was not an
insurmountable difficult which could come in the way of entertaining the writ petitions.
The counsel further also stated that the reservation of 50% to Arts and 50% to Science
group and 50% for males and 50% for females was not warranted by the constitutional
provisions, being over and above the constitutional reservations in favor of backward
classes and that the change made in preparation of the merit list from State wise basis to
District wise basis was contrary to and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE:

 The advocate for the respondent with regard to the first question of the issue states that,
the impugned judgment of the Division Bench holds that full effect of the result would be
given only after verification of the testimonials, certificates and documents mentioned in
the application and mere publication of the selection list on 31.11.2001 did not result in
accrual of any right in favor of the candidates, whose names had found place in the select
list.

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 Relying on the judgment of this Court in Diwakar v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh3,and Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India 4, and the statement made by the
Chief Standing counsel on behalf of the State made at the Bar, the Division Bench held
that even though the candidates, whose names appeared in the select list, were not made
parties to the writ petitions, the writ petitions could not be summarily dismissed on the
said ground. The advocate for the respondent were inclined to agree with this finding of
the Division Bench, which is supported by the authority of the Constitution Bench
in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (supra) and several other judgments of this Court.
 The criterion for merit list was subsequently challenged only on 31.10.2001 i.e. after the
applications had been made by the candidates. Consequently, no candidate had any
occasion to protest, since the criterion was abruptly changed by the State Government.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE:

The case revolves around the interpretation of clauses of the three articles i.e., Article 15, Article
16 and Article 350A of the Constitution of India.

Article 15(1):

“The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste,
sex, place of birth or any of them”

Article 16(2):

“No citizens shall, on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth,
residence, or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any
employment or office under the State.”

Article 350-A:

“It shall be the endeavor of every State nd of every local authority within the State to provide
adequate facilities for instructions in the mother-tongue at the primary stage of education to
children belonging to linguistic minority groups; and the President of primary may issue such

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Diwakar v. Government of Andhra PradeshAIR (1982) SC 1555
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Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India AIR (1991) SC 1612

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directions to any State as he considers necessary or proper for securing the provion of such
facilities.”

VIEWS OF THE COURT:

 The Division Bench took the view that Articles 15(3) of the Constitution enables the
State Government to make special provision for woman and children notwithstanding the
prohibition contained in Article 15(1). Particularly viewed in the background of the fact
that a large number of young girls below the age of 10 years were taught in the primary
school and recognizing that it would be preferable that such young girls are taught by
women, the reservation of 50% of the posts in favor of the female candidates was held to
be justified. The classification made was justified and cannot be styled as arbitrary or
liable to be hit by the Article 14.
 The Division Bench of the High Court held that there was no violation of Articles 14, 15
and 16 of the Constitution.
 The Division Bench of the High Court came to the conclusion that the merit list could not
be prepared on district wise basis and that restricting the selection and preparation of
merit list at the district level was not justified and amounted to discrimination. It was also
found that though at one stage the State government had decided to prepare the merit list
on the State level, it was suddenly changed to the district level and the reasons advanced
for the sudden change were found to be wholly irrelevant and unjustified. The action of
the State Government was held arbitrary and violative of Articles 15(1) and 16(2) of the
Constitution of India.
 The counsel for the respondent stated that there was no material to indicate that dialects
vary from district to district. Consequently, there was no material to indicate that a
candidate from one district was not likely to be familiar with the dialect of another
district for which he applied for training. There was also no material placed on record to
indicate that training was to be in local dialect for the local school only. Finally, if the
emphasis is really on the regional dialect, nothing prevented the State government from
making the knowledge of a specified regional dialect as preferential criterion for
recruitment. For these reasons, the view taken by the Division Bench on this issue and

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hold that restriction of the selection and preparation of merit list at the district level was
arbitrary and violative of Article 15(1) and 16(2) of the Constitution.
 There was no material for the High Court to show that the case of any linguistic minority
was involved, hence, the High Court rightly held that Article 350-A was not violated.
 Relying on the judgment of Union of Indian Ors. v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers
College5, the High Court held that the National Council for Teacher Education
constituted under Section 36 of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 is
an expert body whose function is to maintain the standards of education in relation to
teacher's education. It was for this body to prepare norms for recognized courses for
teachers' education on different levels. The special BTC training course contemplated by
the State of U.P. had not been recognized by the National Council for Teacher Education
under the 1993 Act. It was, therefore, not a recognized teachers' training course. The
High Court, therefore, pointed out that the Government Order recognizing special BTC
course as equivalent qualification was contrary to the provisions of the UP Basic
Education Act and provisions of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993,
particularly so in view of Section 167 of the National Council for Teacher Education Act,
1993 which gives overriding effect to the provisions of the State Act.

OVERVIEW OF THE JUDGEMENT:

 The learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the change made in preparation of
the merit list from Statewise basis to districtwise basis was contrary to and violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

 The Division Bench overruled the objection to the maintainability of the writ petitions by
taking the view that there was no question of estoppel and the candidates, who had
applied and were not selected could not be said to be estopped from challenging the
process of selection.

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Union of Indian Ors. v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers College, JT (2002) 8 SC 269
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(Section 3) – “With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
appoint, there shall be established a Council to be called the National Council for Teacher Education.”
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(Section 16)Affiliating body to grant affiliation after recognition or permission by the Council.

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 The Division Bench of the High Court came to the conclusion that the merit list could not
be prepared on district wise basis and that restricting the selection and preparation of
merit list at district level was not justified and amounted to discrimination.

 The High Court pointed out that the government order recognising special BTC course as
equivalent qualification was contrary to the provisions of the U.P Basic Education Act
and provisions of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, particularly so
in view of Section 16 of the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 which
gives overriding effect to the provisions of the State Act.

CONCLUSION:

 The action of the State Government in restoring the preparation of merit list from State
level to district level was held arbitrary and violative of Articles 15(1) and 16(2) of the
Constitution of India. The High Court has referred and relied on a number of judgments
of this Court which have frowned upon recruitment on the basis of criteria restricted to
candidates from specified local areas8.
 The U.P. Basic Education (Teachers) Service Rules prescribe the qualifications requisite
for posts. Academic qualification required is a bachelor's degree from a University
established by law in India or a degree recognized by the Government together with
`training qualification' consisting of a Basic Teacher's Hindustani Teacher's Certificate,
Junior Teacher's Certificate, Certificate of teaching or any other training course
recognized by the government as equivalent thereto.
 In the face of these Rules, and particularly keeping in view the provisions of the National
Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993, no fault can be found with the impugned
judgment of the High Court that the special BTC training course formulated by the State
government was contrary to the provisions of the impugned Act and Rules and the
1993 Central Act.

REFERENCES:
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Kailash Chand Sharma vsState of Rajesthan(CA Nos.4440 & 4441-4442), JagdishLalvsState of Haryana (C.W.P.
No.8755/96.)

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1) State Of U.P. And Ors. vs Anant Kumar Tiwari And Ors. 2003 (3) AWC 2060
2) Diwakar v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR (1982) SC 1555
3) Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India AIR (1991) SC 1612
4) Union of Indian Ors. v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers College, JT (2002) 8 SC 269

BRIEF ABOUT AUTHOR:

YashPatil is a 2nd year LL.B student at BharatiVidyapeeth New Law College Pune. He has a
very keen interest in Corporate Law, Civil Litigation, and Alternative Dispute
Resolution ("ADR"). He is also associated with Adv. Sujay Joshi and Associates Law firm in
Pune.

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