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50 Important Judgments for CLAT PG 2022 by RostrumLegal
Table of Contents
ABHILASHA V. PARKASH AND ORS............................................................................................ 4
ANURADHA BHASIN V. UNION OF INDIA ................................................................................. 7
ANUSHREE GOYAL V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. .......................................... 10
APARNA BHAT V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ............................................................... 12
ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ....................................... 15
B.K. PAVITRA V. UNION OF INDIA ............................................................................................ 19
BAGLEKAR AKASH KUMAR V. GOOGLE LLC .......................................................................... 23
COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS OF ESSAR STEEL INDIA LIMITED V. SATISH KUMAR

GUPTA AND OTHERS .................................................................................................................... 26
DANAMMA @ SUMAN SURPUR & ANR. V. AMAR & ORS.................................................... 29
DEVILAL V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ........................................................................... 33
GANESH PATEL V. UMAKANT RAJORIA .................................................................................. 37
GAUTAM NAVLAKHA V. NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY....................................... 39
IN RE: PRASHANT BHUSHAN AND ANR. ALLEGED CONTEMNOR(S) ............................ 42
INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF KERALA .................................... 47
INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA V. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ...... 50
JARNAIL SINGH V. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA ...................................................................... 52
JOSEPH SHINE V. UNION OF INDIA ........................................................................................... 56
KERALA UNION OF WORKING JOURNALISTS V. UNION OF INDIA ................................ 59
LALIT KUMAR JAIN V. UNION OF INDIA ................................................................................. 61
Page 1 of 170
MANISH KUMAR V. UNION OF INDIA....................................................................................... 64
MOHD UMAIR @ UMER V. STATE (GOVT NCT OF DELHI) AND ORS ............................. 69
M/S. IMPERIA STRUCTURES LTD. V. ANIL PATNI ............................................................... 72
MUKESH KUMAR V. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND ........................................................ 75
MUKIS V. STATE OF U.P. .............................................................................................................. 78
NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR V. UNION OF INDIA ............................................................................ 80
PARAMVIR SINGH V. BALJIT SINGH ......................................................................................... 84
PRATHVI RAJ CHAUHAN V. UNION OF INDIA ....................................................................... 86
PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA V. STATE(GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) ........................................ 89
RAJEEV SURI V. UNION OF INDIA, 2021 ................................................................................. 92
RAMANAND AND ORS V. DR. GIRISH SONI AND ANR ......................................................... 96
RAMBABU SINGH THAKUR V. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. ...................................................... 100
S. KASI V. STATE THROUGH THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE ............................................. 105
SATISH CHANDER AHUJA V. SNEHA AHUJA ....................................................................... 107
SATISH RAGDE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA .................................................................. 111
SAURABH SHARMA V. SUB DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE .................................................. 115
SHAFIN JAHAN V. ASOKAN KM ............................................................................................... 118
SHAFIN JAHAN V. K. M. ASHOKAN ......................................................................................... 122
SHAFIYA KHAN AND SHAKUNTALA PRAJAPATI V. STATE OF UP .............................. 126
SHAKTI VAHINI V. UNION OF INDIA ..................................................................................... 129
SHAYARA BANO V. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ................................................................ 133

Page 2 of 170
SHILPA MITTAL V. STATE OF NCT DELHI AND ORS ........................................................ 137
SHREYA SINGHAL V. UNION OF INDIA ................................................................................. 139
SUSHILA AGGARWAL AND OTHERS V. STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER ... 142
SWAPNIL TRIPATHI V. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ....................................................... 146
THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE V. BABITA PUNIYA & ORS. ..................... 148
TOFAN SINGH V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU ........................................................................... 152
UNION OF INDIA V. KA NAJEEB .............................................................................................. 156
VIDYA DEVI V. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS ................................................. 161
VIKAS KUMAR V. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION .............................................. 165
VINEETA SHARMA V. RAKESH SHARMA & OTHERS........................................................ 167
Page 3 of 170
Abhilasha v. Parkash and Ors

Citation - Cri. Appeal No. 615 of 2020
Bench - Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah
Date - 15 September, 2020
Facts of the Case
The purpose of this appeal is to challenge the High Court's decision. A woman filed
an application under section 125 of the CrPC against her husband, claiming
maintenance for herself and her three children. The application of the petitioner and
two of her children was denied by the Judicial Magistrate. When the daughter filed
an application for maintenance under section 125 of the CrPC when she was a
juvenile, the magistrate dismissed the case, limiting the daughter's ability to claim
maintenance until she reaches the age of majority. The High Court dismissed the
claim under section 482 of the CrPC, holding that the appellant is not entitled to
maintenance because she has reached majority and is not suffering from any mental
or physical abnormality. The appellant argued that, despite having reached majority
in 2005 and being free of any medical or mental illness, she is entitled to
maintenance from her father under section 20 of the Act of 1956 until she marries.
Issues
1. Whether the appellant is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under
section 125 of CrPC, when she already attained majority and she is not suffering
from any mental or physical disorder but still she is unmarried?
2. Whether the order passed by Judicial Magistrate and the Revisional Court
limiting the appellant’s claim until she attains majority deserves to be set aside
with a direction to the respondent to continue to give maintenance until she is
married?
Laws
1. S. 125, CrPC
2. S. 20(3), Hindu Adoptions and Maintainence Act, 1956
Page 4 of 170
3. S. 482, CrPC
Arguments
The daughter can claim maintenance until she marries, according to the appellant's
lawyer, but this argument was dismissed only on the grounds that she is not suffering
from any mental or physical abnormalities or fatal harm. The child's claim is limited
under Section 125 of the CrPC until they reach the age of majority. By virtue of
section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a daughter who has
reached majority and is not suffering from any mental or physical disease or fatal
damage can claim maintenance from her father until she marries.
The court held in Lnanak Chand vs. Shri Chandra Kishore Agarwala and Others that
section 488 CrPC. allows a prompt remedy and simple procedure before the
magistrate court against starving of the deserted wife or kid. It is applicable to all
people of all religions. The Family Court also has the authority to issue orders
relating to the support of the wife, children, and elderly parents, which can be
exercised by a Magistrate of First-class under Chapter IX of the CrPC. Where a family
court has not been formed, cases involving the maintenance of the wife, children, and
elderly parents must be brought before the District Court or a subordinate court.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, an unmarried Hindu woman can
claim maintenance from her father if she argues and establishes that she is unable to
support herself, and that the application for enforcement of such entitlement must be
made under section 20(3) of the Act of 1956.
Judgement
The court while giving its judgement said that under section 125 of the CrPC,
maintenance to a daughter who has reached majority can only be granted if she is
suffering from a mental or physical abnormality or a fatal disability that renders her
incapable of supporting herself. In this case, the petitioner does not appear to be
suffering from any of the injuries listed in section 125, but the question is whether
the daughter is entitled to support until she marries according to section 20 of Hindu
Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
Page 5 of 170
In Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum 1985 AIR 945 it was held that the term
'wife' encompasses not only wedded wives but also women who have married by
following the necessary ceremonies prescribed by personal law.
In Jagdish Jugtawat v. Manju Lata and Others I (2001) DMC 605, the court held that
Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 recognises the
wife's entitlement to support under Section 125 and the minor daughter's right to
maintenance from her parents after achieving majority till marriage. Section 20(3)
deals with the Hindu's legal obligation to support his or her elderly parents and
children, especially unmarried daughters who are unable to support themselves on
their own income.
The court reached its decision based on a combined reading of section 125 of the
CrPC, which is a narrow concept that provides relief to the applicant, and section
20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which is a broader
concept that relates to ordering for the wife's, children's, and parents' maintenance.
As a result, it recognised the appellant's claim as an unmarried daughter seeking

maintenance from her father under section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act, 1956.
Page 6 of 170
Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India

Citation - (2020) 3 SCC 637
Court - Supreme Court of India
Bench - N.V. Ramana and V. Ramasubramanian
Date of Judgement - 10/01/2020
Facts of the Case
The President of India issued Constitutional Order 272 on 05/08/2019 applying all
provisions of the constitution of India in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.The DMs
of various districts invoked powers vested unto them under Section 144 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure which restricted movement and public gatherings on the
apprehension of breach of peace and tranquillity. The petitioner (Executive editor
of Kashmir Times) was aggrieved by restrictions imposed on movement and
communication of journalists, which was hindering the media professionals to
practice their profession and sought an issuance of an appropriate writ to quash all
orders by the respondent which put a bar on any mode of communication and
therefore enable the media to practice its profession while asking the respondent to
create a safe environment for media to work in and also pleaded for the framing of
guidelines to ensure that the rights and means of media personnel to report and
publish news is not unreasonably curtailed.
Issues
1. Whether the Government can claim exemption from producing all the orders
passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C and other orders under the Suspension Rules?
2. Whether the freedom of speech and expression and freedom to practice any
profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business over the internet is a
part of the fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution?
3. Whether the Government’s action of prohibiting internet access is valid?
4. Whether the imposition of restrictions under Section 144 CrPC was valid?
5. Whether the freedom of press of the petitioner in WP (C) No. 1031 of 2019 was
violated due to the restrictions?
Page 7 of 170
Laws
1. The Information Technology Act,2000

2. Section 144 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
3. The Suspension Rules under Section 7 of the Telegraph Act
4. Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act
Contentions made by the Petitioners
It was contended that print media had stopped functioning which is a very important
aspect of modern press due to non-availability of internet and also the petitioner had
not been able to work post 05/08/2019 due to the various restrictions imposed.
The petitioner requested for a test of “reasonableness and proportionality” since it is

necessary for any law curbing the rights of speech and expression to pass the
aforementioned test.
The indefinite restriction on telecom services was arbitrary and contrary to

Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services (Public Emergency or Public Safety)
Rules, 2017 where it was contemplated that the restrictions imposed on telecom
services would be of temporary nature and therefore asserted that there was non-
application of mind and also no reasoning justifying the restrictions was given as is
required under the suspension rules.
The situation at the time when the orders were passed did not warrant the passing of
the orders resulting in restrictions.
Contentions made by the Respondents
It was contended that the measures taken were taken in consideration of the high
frequency of internal militancy and cross-border terrorism in the state of Jammu and
Kashmir.
The restrictions imposed are for ensuring safety of citizens based on ground reports
and the facts of petitioners were incorrect.
Page 8 of 170
Internet is very fast and useful for communication from both the sides unlike
newspaper and can be used to spread fake messages and incite violence and has been
used for such purposes many times already even before the abrogation of article 370.
Restrictions were being put on the basis of threat perception and were being relaxed
where they were not required such as in Ladakh and other regions of Jammu where
restrictions were not imposed, proving that the suspension rules were not imposed
without application of mind.
Judgement
The court ordered the respondent to publish all the orders of restrictions being
passed, so that unlike the petitioners, now people can file a case against any order
which they feel violates their rights.
The freedom of speech and expression and to practice any profession, or to carry on
any occupation, trade or business over the internet is a fundamental right protected
under article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the constitution.
The government has the right to impose restrictions on the aforementioned rights
under article 19(2) and 19(6).
The power under section 144 of CrPC can be invoked not only when there exists
present danger but also when there is an apprehension of danger but not for
suppressing any legitimate expression of opinion or grievance or exercise of any
democratic rights.
The orders not in accordance with the rule of law laid must be revoked and if need
arises in future for fresh orders, then the law laid down herein must be followed.
Page 9 of 170
Anushree Goyal v. State of Madhya Pradesh &

Ors.
Citation - WP No. 7739/2020
Bench - S.C. Sharma
Date - 8th June 2020
Facts of the Case
The Petitioner sought custody of her two-year-old child through a habeas corpus writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution. In 2013, the Petitioner
married her husband and moved to the United States (State of Columbus), where
they had a kid in 2018. The Petitioner alleged that her husband and in-laws were
nasty to her and that she had been abused multiple times. The Husband secured an
ex-parte judgement from an American court prohibiting the Petitioner from residing
in her husband's matrimonial residence. She then flew back to India and filed a
police report. She later discovered that her husband and child had returned to India,
and that her daughter was living with her in-laws. She was denied access to her child
despite repeated requests. As a result, the mother filed a writ petition to gain custody
of her child. The Respondents (in-laws) claimed that the Petitioner had abandoned
the kid and that the grandparents were the lawful guardians of the child because the
father had signed a Power of Attorney and Authorization in their behalf. During the
case, an order was issued requiring the grandparents to present the child in court for
the hearings.
Issues
Whether a habeas corpus writ petition can be used for gaining custody of child?
Whether the Petitioner should get the custody of her child?
Laws
Article 226, Constitution of India
Page 10 of 170
Contentions
The Respondents, the Petitioner's in-laws, had argued that a habeas corpus petition
in the case of child guardianship could not be maintained. Regardless, the Court
refused to "throw away" the Petitioner on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or the
availability of an alternative remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890.
Judgement
The Respondent had relied on Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 to
raise the question of the High Court's jurisdiction to hear a case involving a child
with U.S. citizenship. The Respondents also stated that the grandparents were the
child's guardians, according to an injunction order issued by the Franklin County
Common Pleas Court, Division of Domestic Relations, Columbus, Ohio. The High
Court dismissed the contention that the injunction order was invalid since it was
silent on the child's case and was issued ex parte. The Court ruled that a writ under
Article 226 can be used to obtain custody of a child under unusual circumstances,
citing Capt. Dushyant Somal v. Sushma Somal ((1981) 2 SCC 277). Despite the fact
that there may be alternative options, habeas corpus would be the best option.
During the court procedures, the Court saw that the child was much happier with his
mother than with his grandparents. And, because he was under the age of 5, the
Court determined that it was in the best interests of the kid for him to be with his
mother, citing the "tender years" criterion and Section 6 of the Guardians and Wards
Act.
Thus, the child's custody was granted to his mother, the Petitioner, but the Court also
stated that the parties may seek custody in the future through a Civil Court under the
Guardians and Wards Act, and that this case would not alter the deliberations and
conclusions of that court.
Page 11 of 170
Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Citation - 2021 SCC OnLine SC 230
Bench - AM Khanwilkar and S. Ravindra Bhat
Date of Judgement - 18.03.2021
Facts of the Case
Advocate Aparna Bhat and eight other lawyers filed the appeal against the impugned
decision issued by the Madhya Pradesh High Court on July 30, in which the accused
of sexual assault was ordered to visit the victim’s home on Raksha Bandhan with
Rakhi and be tied by her as a condition of release.On 20.04.2020, the accused, who
is a neighbour of the complainant Sarda Bai, entered her house and attempted to
sexually harass her, prompting the police to file a FIR for offences punishable under
sections 452, 354A, 323 AND 506 of the Indian Penal Code (hereafter referred to as
IPC). A charge sheet was submitted once the case was investigated.
Under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused filed an
application for anticipatory bail (hereafter referred to as Cr. P.C.). The accused was
granted bail with the condition that he and his wife visit Sarda Bai’s house on the 3rd
of August, 2020, on the festival of Raksha Bandhan, with a box of sweets, and ask her
to tie the Rakhi to him with the promise that he will protect her in the future to the
best of his ability.
The accused was also required to hand over Rs. 11,000 as a gesture of a present given
by brothers to their sisters as part of the customary Raksha Bandhan rites, which the
petitioner has challenged in the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Issues
Whether such bail conditions imposed by the courts are acceptable or not and how
they can impact society?
Page 12 of 170
Laws
Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code
Judgement
The Supreme Court thanked the petitioner for the valuable suggestions and quashed
the bail conditions imposed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The court also laid
certain guidelines for the same. It also accepted the suggestions regarding the
inclusion of a gender sensitisation curriculum in law schools, for the bar exam and
also for induction training of newly appointed judges.
Guidelines for judges granting bail in sexual assault cases
Even though the law states that there must be a nexus between the object and
purpose of the bail order and that the order should not harass the individual or
infringe any of their constitutional rights, judges have often crossed this limit while
exercising their judicial discretion. In this case, again, the Supreme court has issued
a slew of directions to be followed by judges while granting bail in cases of sexual
assault. They are:
The bail conditions should not either mandate or require contact between the
accused and the complainant or her family members.
If the court suspects that there might be a threat to the victim, then necessary
protection may be provided.
Whenever bail is granted to the accused, the same should be intimated to the
complainant immediately. A copy of the bail order should also be provided.
The verdict granting bail should limit itself to the CrPc and should not reflect any
stereotype or biasness of the judge and no comments on the conduct, dressing
choice, morals or behaviour of the complainant should be made.
The court should not encourage any kind of relationship between the accused and the
complainant such as granting bail because they are getting married. It should also
not mandate or suggest mediation in cases of rape and sexual assault as this goes
beyond the court’s jurisdiction.
Page 13 of 170
The judge should be sensitive to the prosecutrix and should save her from trauma
during the proceedings.
Such words that threaten to shake the confidence of the victim in the fairness of the
justice system should not be uttered by the judge.
Page 14 of 170
Arnab Ranjan Goswami v. Union of India and

others
Citation - Writ Petition (Crl) No. 130 of 2020
Bench - D.Y. Chandrachud and M.R. Shah
Date - May 19, 2020
Facts of the Case
The petition was brought by Arnab Goswami, the Editor-in-Chief of Republic TV, an
English television news channel. He also serves as the Managing Director of ARG
Outlier Media Asianet News Private Limited, which owns and manages R Bharat, a
Hindi television news channel, and anchors new programming on both networks.
Multiple FIRs and criminal charges were filed against Mr. Goswami in the states of
Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Telangana, Jharkhand, and
the UT of Jammu & Kashmir following two programmes on Republic TV on April
16th and 21st, 2020.
Both broadcasts were about an incident that occurred on April 16, 2020 in
Gadchinchle village, Palghar district, Maharashtra, in which three people, including
two sadhus, were brutally murdered by a mob in the presence of police and forest
guard officials. He alleged that Sonia Gandhi, the head of the Indian National
Congress, engineered the Palghar massacre in Maharashtra, in which three of them
were lynched by locals on suspicion of being thieves while on their way to Silvassa.
He questioned Sonia Gandhi's silence in the aftermath of the incident, asking if she
would have remained silent if Muslim or Christian religious leaders had been
lynched instead of Hindus.
Concerning the incident's delayed investigation, the petitioner cited a number of

objections. Following that, the petitioner claims, a well-coordinated, vengeful, and
nasty campaign was undertaken. Several members of the Indian National Congress
(INC) submitted charges for offences allegedly committed under Sections 153, 153A,
153B, 295A, 298, 500, 504, 506, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and a
Page 15 of 170
social media campaign was purportedly launched using the hashtag

#ArrestAntiIndiaArnab.
The petitioner claimed that all of the complaints and FIRs were filed by accident in
states where the governments owed allegiance to the INC, and that the motion was
brought with an ulterior motive. He also referred to an incident on April 23, 2020,
between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m., when he was returning home by car with his wife and
was confronted by two individuals on a motorcycle and assaulted. Both of them are
said to have revealed their INC membership. The petitioner thus denied the
propagation of any views of communal nature and asserting his fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution
moved the court under Article 32 for the protection of those rights.
Issues
1. Whether Arnab Goswami, who stands accused, can get the case investigated by an
authority of his choice?
2. Whether the Courts can consolidate the various similar FIRs under Article 32?
3. Whether the statements made by Arnab Goswami on live TV fall under the
protective ambit of Article 19 (1) (a) or can be restricted as per the provisions
under Article 19 (2)?
Laws
1. Constitution of India - Articles 14, 19,21, 32 and 226

2. Indian penal Code, 1961 - Sections 34, 153, 153A, 153B, 500, 504, 505, 506, 188,
290, 499
3. Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 - Sections 41 (a), 91, 160, 482, 199, 173 (2), 154,
162
Contentions bade by the Petitioners
According to the petition filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, he

debated on live television only to question the inadequate investigation of the
Palghar event, as well as the contradicting stories of the authorities and the State
government's silence. The fact that the horrible incident took place in front of police
officials sparked a number of concerns regarding the coalition government's
Page 16 of 170
authority in Maharashtra. The petitioner refuted the claim that he was spreading
communal ideas. Under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Indian constitution, he requested the
court to declare his unambiguous freedom of expression. The principal reliefs sought
were the dismissal of all complaints and FIRs filed against Mr. Goswami in various
states, as well as a request from the Union Government for safety for his family.
The petitioner claimed that the inquiry into his case was biased and unjust.
According to him, the inquiry approach invites anyone to believe that the authorities
operated in ill faith against the petitioner. Mr. Goswami went on to say that the probe
is politically motivated and that it was launched solely to harass the petitioner. Using
this as a foundation, he said that the news station was challenging the Maharashtra
police's delay in the Palghar event, and that this institution is controlled by the state
government, resulting in a blatant conflict of interest.
Contentions made by the Repondents
The petitioner's actions, according to the Mumbai police, were hindering the inquiry.
It stemmed from the fact that Mr. Goswami was accompanied by a swarm of media
when he went to the NM Joshi Marg Police Station. Some remarks were delivered
here and broadcast live on television. After four hours of questioning, Republic
Bharat's twitter account released a message saying, "Truth shall triumph." Further
messages were sent on Republic Bharat's Twitter account, giving the appearance that
the Mumbai police are biased. The accusation was that the investigating agency was
being subjected to constant pressure, which was causing the probe to come to a
standstill.
Judgement
The division bench of Justices D Y Chandrachud and M R Shah handed down the
decision.
Except for the one filed in Nagpur, which has now been relocated to Mumbai, the
court invalidated all other identical FIRs filed against Arnab Goswami in different
states.
Page 17 of 170
Arnab's request for the inquiry to be transferred to the Central Bureau of

Investigation was denied by the court. It did, however, give him the freedom to
pursue any legal remedies available under the CrPC before the competent venue.
The court cited the decision in Romila Thapar v. Union of India ((2018) 10 SCC 753),
which stated that "accused does not have a say in the question of appointment of
investigative agency," and thus Arnab Goswami's request to transfer the application
was denied. It can be deduced that Arnab Goswami has no say in the designation of
the investigating agency and has no influence in how the inquiry should be
conducted; the investigating agency is free to determine the form of the questions
and the time of questioning in this case.
The court also cited the case of TT Antony v. the State of Kerala ((2001) 6 SCC 181),
in which the court stated that subjecting an individual to many proceedings for the
same offence is contrary to the state's goal of criminal prosecution.
When a counter-case is brought, the Court decided that conducting a new

investigation based on a related cognizable offence would be an "abuse of the
statutory power of investigation" and could be a suitable cause for exercising power
under Section 482 of the CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
The court declined to dismiss the FIR filed against Goswami for allegedly injuring
religious sentiments by making insulting statements about a religious community on
his channel Republic TV during a show on migrants congregated in Bandra.
The court also dismissed Maharashtra police's interim appeal, which sought a
directive to 'protect' the investigative agency from any 'pressure, intimidation, or
coercion' from Arnab Goswami. It left the door open for the police to present their
case to the Competent court.
The court asked Commissioner of Police, Mumbai to provide police protection to

Arnab Goswami, if it is considered appropriate, for the period during which the
threat perception is there..
Page 18 of 170
B.K. Pavitra v. Union of India

Citation - (2019) 16 SCC 129
Bench - Uday U. Lalit and D.Y. Chandrachud
Date - 10/05/2019
Facts of the Case
The Karnataka Determination of Seniority of Government Personnel Promoted on

the Basis of Reservation (to Posts in the Civil Services of the State) Act, 2002 gave
government servants from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes promoted under
reservation policy consequential seniority. The petitioners filed a lawsuit challenging
the law's constitutionality.
The case was heard by a two-judge bench consisting of justices Uday U. Lalit and
A.K. Goel in the Supreme Court.
The court decided in favour of the petitioners, citing a lack of measurable data to
support the state's claim of the need for reservation in public service promotions with
consequential seniority, while the creamy layer concept was applied.
On the basis of the Ratna Prabha Committee's recommendations, the state of

Karnataka established a new law, the Reservation Act, 2018. The petitioner filed a
second petition, this time challenging the new statute's legitimacy.
Issues
1. Is the 2018 Reservation Act still in effect?

2. Doesn't it overturn this Court's judgement in B.K. Pavitra Vs Union of India,
(2017) 4 SCC 620: (2017) 2 SCC (L&S) 128 without changing the decision's
foundation?
3. Is it in violation of the law on seniority established by this Court in M.G.
Badappanavar Vs State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 666: 2001 SCC (L&S) 489?
4. Is there a clear desire to override the decision in B.K. Pavitra Vs Union of India,
(2017) 4 SCC 620: (2017) 2 SCC (L&S) 128 in the context of the enactment of the
Reservation Act, 2018?
Page 19 of 170
5. Was the Governor of Karnataka's referral of the Bill to the President under Article
200 of the Constitution, as well as the ensuing events, constitutionally valid?
Could the Bill have gone into effect without the Governor's approval in this case?
6. Is the Reservation Act, 2018 in compliance with the principles enunciated in the
Constitution Bench decisions in M. Nagaraj vs Union of India, and Jarnail Singh
vs LachhmiNarain Gupta? Is the Ratna Prabha Committee's Report, dated 5-5-
2017, sufficient and relevant evidence to support the Act's legality and
implementation?
7. Is the Reservation Act, 2018 applicable in the current writ petitions (filed by B.K.
Pavitra and Shivakumar) to those departments or public corporations not covered
by the Ratna Prabha Report or the law where there is over-representation?
Laws
1. Section 3, 4, 5, 9, 1(2) of the Karnataka Determination of Seniority of the

Government Servants Promoted on the Basis of Reservation (to the Posts in the
Civil Services of the State) Act, 2002
2. Section 3,4 of the Reservation Act, 2018
3. Articles 14, 15, 16, 335,141 of the Constitution of India
Contentions by the Petitioners
The petitioners' counsel argued that the Reservation Act, 2018 was enacted by the
state of Karnataka to overturn the court's judgement in B.K. Pavitra.
The new legislation was believed to be identical to the prior legislation.
The enactment of the statute disobeyed the bench's decision by failing to make the
necessary changes to the parts of the legislation that rendered it ultra vires,
indicating an overruling of the law and a violation of the separation of powers
because the legislature has no authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision.
The Ratna Prabha Committee report was criticised for not taking into account data
from public sector undertakings, boards, and municipal bodies, among other things.
The report misidentified grades A, B, C, and D for cadres, demonstrating that the
information is incorrect.
Page 20 of 170
In this example, the concept of a creamy layer was not adequately implemented.
It was mentioned that there were no compelling reasons for consequential seniority,
and that a state must offer reasons for exercising its powers under 16(4)(A) to confer
consequential seniority.
Contentions by the Respondents
The enactment, it was argued, did not intend to overturn the B.K.Pavitra verdict.
The State Legislature has the authority to pass legislation that has retrospective or
retroactive effect.
The reasons for a legislature's enactment are not subject to judicial review.
Because seniority is not a vested or accruing right, the legislature has the authority to
adopt legislation to address it.
The Ratna Prabha Committee study gathered quantitative data on all three elements
(backwardness, inadequacy of representation, and overall efficiency) that are needed
to determine whether reservations are necessary or not, and the evidence proved that
the enactment is warranted.
The creamy layer notion only applies to OBCs, not SCs or STs, and it can only be used
at the entry level, not in promotions.
Judgement
The court upheld the Reservations Act 2018's constitutional legality and rejected the
petition.
The Honorable Supreme Court ruled that the state did not change the foundation of
B.K. Pavitra's ruling.
The court determined that the enactment complied with the principles set forth in
the Nagaraj judgements of the Constitution Bench.
The court decided that the enactment followed the principles laid out in the
Constitution Bench decisions in Jarnail, which established that the creamy layer
Page 21 of 170
notion was applicable to OBCs but not to SCs and STs, and that the reservations in
the current case were for SCs and STs but not for OBCs.
The court held that the reservation in promotion for SCs and STs has been provided
until their representation in these categories reaches 15% and 3%, respectively, and
that the above Government Order applies to departments with over-representation of
SCs and STs, as well as departments not covered by the RPC report, because the
departments not covered fall under the administrative control of one or the other.
Page 22 of 170
Baglekar Akash Kumar v. Google LLC

Citation - Case No. 39 of 2020
Court - Competition Commission of India
Bench - Ashok Kumar Gupta Chairperson Ms Sangeeta Verma Member Mr Bhagwant

Singh Bishnoi Member
Date of Judgment - 29/01/2021
Facts of the Case
Google provides its users with a variety of online products and services. Gmail and
Google's Meet App were the subject of the current case. It lets users to send and
receive emails, direct messages, and other types of messages through Gmail, as well
as hold video conferences and meetings using the Meet App.
Gmail and Meet App were connected by Google. The Informant challenged this
integration as an abuse of dominant position under the Competition Act of 2002.
Because Gmail possessed a dominant position in the relevant market, the Informant,
a university student, claimed that Google utilised its dominant position in one
relevant market to join another relevant market in violation of section 4(2)(e) of the
Act.
Issues
1. What were the relevant markets in the instant case, viz., the relevant market in
which Google was alleged to hold a dominant position, i.e., the primary relevant
market and the relevant market which it sought to enter?
2. Whether Gmail was in a dominant position in the former relevant market?
3. Whether the act of integration of Gmail and Meet App by Google amounted to an
abuse of dominant position?
Laws
1. Section 4 of the Competition Act,

2. Section 26(2) of the Competition Act
Page 23 of 170
3. Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act,

4. Section 4(2)(e) of the Competition Act
Contentions made by the Informant
In the market for "internet connected service and products," Google held a
commanding dominance.
It was taking use of its dominant position in the aforementioned area to expand into
a new market through Meet App.
Google claimed that the information provided by the informant was unfounded and
based solely on conjectures, speculation, and fear.
Furthermore, the Informant had to show that there was a prima facie case that
warranted the Director-investigation. General's The informer's locus standi was
contested by the opposing party.
It stated the following arguments in response to the charge of misuse of a dominating

position levelled against it:
Google did not have a dominant position in the market for "internet related services
and products," because there is no such sector. It could hardly be claimed to be in a
dominant position in such a market if one exists.
It was not dominating in India's "emailing and direct messaging" industry due to the
presence of competitors with similar or higher market positions.
The integration was made to help Gmail users. The restriction of such functionality
additions, such as Meet App, would be harmful to customers.
The integration was established in response to the competition provided by

competitors like Facebook and Microsoft.
Decision of the Competition Commission of India
Page 24 of 170
CCI stated that, In the argument, Google stated that Gmail does not have a dominant
position in emailing and direct messaging in India, and that it is up against a slew of
messaging services, many of which are on par with or better than Gmail. The CCI was
of the opinion that, regardless of whether Gmail is a dominant app in the relevant
market of providing email services in India or not, Google's conduct did not violate
the provisions of Section 4(2) (e) of the Act because the Informant did not place any
substantive material on record in support of the assertions made.
The argument stated by CCI was that Gmail users were not obligated to use Google
Meet, and there were no negative consequences for refusing to use Google Meet, such
as the removal of Gmail or any of its functions or other Google services currently
available. Any of the competing video conferencing apps can be used by a Gmail user
at their 'free will.'
It was also mentioned that anyone with a Google Account (but not necessarily a
Gmail user) can use Google Meet to create an online meeting. Furthermore, the user
does not need to be a Gmail user to create a Google account. He or she can create a
Google account with an email address created on any other platform. As a result,
Google Meet is also available as a standalone app outside of the Gmail ecosystem.
Consumers can pick from a variety of video-conferencing apps such as Zoom, Skype,
Cisco Webex, We Conference, Microsoft Teams, and Google Meet, which are all
competing for the same services.
The CCI also looked at the Meet tab's connection with Gmail from the standpoint of
imposing supplemental duties under Section 4(2)(d) of the Act. The CCI believes that
customers should have the option of using either of the Apps with all of its features
without having to use the other. Despite the fact that the Meet tab has been
integrated into the Gmail app, Gmail does not force users to use Meet solely as
Google has requested, and consumers are free to use Meet or any other Video
Conferencing software. Finally, the CCI decided that the complaint against Google
was not viable since their actions did not violate Section 4 of the Act.
Page 25 of 170
Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India

Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others
Bench - R.F. Nariman, J.
Date - November 15, 2019
Facts of the Case
Reserve Bank of India identified 12 accounts for resolution under IBC. 1 Essar Steel
was one of them with outstanding dues of Rs. 55,000 crores. 2 Hence, this matter was
brought before NCLAT by Standard Charter Bank and SBI and resolution
professional was appointed.
Resolution plan for Essar Steels was submitted by ArcelorMittal and Numetal. But
the resolution professional declared them ineligible as per section 29A of IBC.
ArcelorMittal and Numetal challenges disqualification in NCLT. During this period
fresh bids were invited and Vedanta ltd also submitted its resolution plan. However,
the resolution professional was instructed by NCLT to re-examine the first bid since
the provisions of IBC were not clearly followed. But the ArcelorMittal and Numetal
challenged their disqualification in first bid by appealing in NCLAT. NCLAT held that
the Numetal Second Bid is qualified but still gave two days’ time to ArcelorMittal to
clear dues to become qualified. But ArcelorMittal appealed to Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court held that both are ineligible, but the court by using its powers under
Article 142 gave 2 weeks’ time to pay dues to become eligible. CoC was also given 6
weeks’ time to reconsider resolution plan. ArcelorMittal filed the resolution plan
again but Numetal didn’t.3
1
RBI Press Release, “RBI identifies Accounts for Reference by Banks under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code (IBC)”,2017, https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=40743
Satish Kumar Gupta, “The journey of Resolution of Essar Steel India Limited (ESIL) under IBC”, IIIPI,
2
www.iiipicai.in
3
Nandani Anand, “Essar Steel Case: How Supreme Court Revised the Revolutionary IBC Regime”, SSRN,
2020 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3643327
Page 26 of 170
ArcelorMittal’s plan was approved CoC and by NCLT. But NCLT said that “…we are
of the view that the dues of the operational creditors must get at least similar
treatment as compared to the dues of the financial creditors on the principle of
equity and fair play as well as the Wednesbury Principle of Unreasonableness and the
Doctrine of Proportionality, so as to avoid disparity in making payments to the
operational creditors having debt value of Rs.1 crore and above (a token of Re.1) and
the allegation of discriminatory practice could be ruled out…”. ArcelorMittal plan
was challenged and appeals were filed in NCLAT. The final judgement of NCLAT
admitted ArcelorMittal plan but also stated that “In a resolution plan there can be no
difference between a financial creditor and an operational creditor in the matter of
payment of dues, and that therefore, financial creditors and operational creditors
deserve equal treatment under a resolution plan”.4
Challenging the order of NCLAT, several appeals and writ petitions were filed in
Supreme Court which were clubbed together by the court. Along with several issues,
the issue of equal treatment of financial and operational creditors was also raised.
But during the pendency of this case, the IBC amendment act was instituted. The
amendment included various changes which also included amendment to section 30,
mandatory completion of corporate insolvency resolution process in 330 days,
distribution of funds to operational creditor etc. This amendment act was also
challenged before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court clarified all issues in its
judgement dated 15th November, 2019.
Issues
The main question in the case was whether both Resolution Applicants should be
barred from submitting resolution plans because they violated Section 29A of the
Code.
Laws
1. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

2. Section 4, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
3. Section 6, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
4
Committee Of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd vs Satish Kumar Gupta and others, 2019 SCC OnLine SC
1478
Page 27 of 170
4. Section 29A, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019

5. Section 30(2)(b), Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
6. Section 53,Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2019
Judgement
The Supreme Court in its judgement5 held that:
The Supreme Court ruled that negotiating and approving a resolution plan, which
may include discriminatory payments to different classes of creditors, is the business
wisdom of the majority (66 percent) of the Committee of Creditors under the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC).
The Supreme Court overturned the required 330-day timeframe for resolving
insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings. When the resolution plan was about to be
finalised, the bench provided for flexibility by accepting exceptions. The Supreme
Court has granted the adjudicating authority the right to determine whether it
requires additional time to decide on a specific resolution method.
Tribunals do not have any "residual equity jurisdiction" to interfere in the merits of a
Committee of Creditors judgement. This means that the tribunals cannot interfere
with the Committee of Creditors' commercial judgments.
The Supreme Court ruled that the equality principle cannot be used in the context of
treating unequals alike since it would defeat the IBC's goal of resolving burdened
assets. Each creditor can receive equitable treatment based on the class to which it
belongs: financial or operational, secured or unsecured.
In the disbursement of funds received under the insolvency process, the Court
affirmed the precedence of financial creditors over operational creditors.
5
Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8766-67 OF
2019.
Page 28 of 170
Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Anr. v. Amar &

Ors.
Citation - Civil appeal nos. 188-189 of 2018
Bench - A. Bhushan and A.K Sikri
Date - 1st February 2018
Facts of the Case
The issue at hand is an appeal from a decision by the high court, which supported the
trial court's ruling and refused to grant the appellants coparcenary rights because
they were born before the act's introduction.
Mr. Gurulingappa Savadi, the propositus of a hindu undivided family, died in 2001,
leaving behind his widow and four children, according to the circumstances of the
case. Vijay and Arunkumar are two sons, and Danamma and Mahananda are two
daughters. Amar, Arun Kumar's son, applied for a partition deed and separate
ownership of the joint family property in 2002. However, he refused to give the
daughters any share because they were born before the act was passed, and they had
received dowry at the time of their marriages, thus they had surrendered any claim to
the property.
Daughters are not coparceners in this case because they were born before the Hindu
succession legislation was enacted, and the trial court also rejected the notion that
they received their part as dowry at the time of marriage because they had no share
in the property. The same was upheld by the high court. The trial court issued its
decision in 2007, and during the course of the case, a 2005 amendment to Section 6
of the HS Act was implemented, establishing the right of daughters as coparceners.
However, neither the trial court nor the high court, which issued its decision in 2012,
took into account the appellants' argument.
Page 29 of 170
Issues
1. Whether, the appellants, daughters of Gurulingappa Savadi, could be denied their

share on the ground that they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and,
therefore, cannot be treated as coparceners?
2. Whether, with the passing of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the
appellants’ become coparcener like sons, therefore entitled to equal share as that
of a son?
Arguments For The Appellants
The appellant maintained that they had a right to their part of the land as well. The
trial court, in its judgement and decree of August 09, 2007, found that the suit
schedule properties, with the exception of CTS No. 774, were joint family properties
after formulating the issues and recording the evidence (one of the house properties
in plaint C schedule).
Arguments For The Respondents
The respondent claimed that the joint family's residential properties were included in
the plaint schedule C. The joint family's retail properties were included in the plaint
schedule D. The joint family's machineries and movables were included in the plaint
schedule E. The respondent claimed that the suit schedule properties belonged to the
joint family and that defendant no. 1, the respondent's father, was ignoring the
respondent and his siblings, so he sought division of the suit schedule properties.
The respondent claimed that all of the properties listed on the suit schedule belonged
to the plaintiff's family.
In paragraph 5 of the plaint, the respondent claimed that the propositus,

Guralingappa, died one year before the complaint was filed. The plaintiff claimed in
paragraph 7 of the plaint that defendant no. 1 owned 1/3rd of the suit schedule
properties, while defendants 5 and 8 each owned 1/3rd. The respondent further
claimed that defendants 6 and 7 had no interest in the properties listed in the suit
schedule.
Page 30 of 170
Judgement
With respect to issue 1 in its decision, the Hon'ble court construed section 6 by
considering the purpose of the statute's alteration and the legislature's objective,
which was to make the act more fair and equal, as required by the Indian
constitution's article. As a result, it was declared that this amendment act will apply
to all daughters, whether born before or after the Act's enactment, as long as they are
alive on the day the modified act 2005 is enacted. This decision clarified the
interpretation of Section 6 of the HS Act, preventing an entire generation of women
from losing their coparcenary rights.
The Hon'ble court applied a literal interpretation, stating that both the father and the
daughter must have been alive on the day of the amendment act's implementation in
2005. This case, on the other hand, shed some light on the statute's implications.
However, when interpreting the law, it did not inquire into the legislature's intent.
The amendment act's legislative intent was to preserve female heirs' coparcenary
rights, and this ruling does not help them. The amendment legislation of 2005 was
enacted during the pendency of the current action. The Ganduri Koteshwaramma v.
Chakiri Yanadi ratio was applied, and the right of daughters did not lapse just
because the court issued a preliminary decree. As a result, since the finality of the
partition deed is determined by the court's final order, the amendment legislation of
2005 applies. In 2007, it was granted.
Finally, upholding the Supreme Court's authoritative precedent set in the Prakash v.
Phulavati case, the court ruled that daughters will be allocated their portion of
property if they were living when the amendment act of 2005 was enacted.
The second question raised by this decision was resolved by applying literal
interpretation to the plain meaning of the clause. Which stipulates that a
coparcener's daughter becomes a coparcener in her own right upon birth, just as sons
do. In the Hindu mitakshara law, this revised rule attempted to provide female heirs
the same rights as sons.
As can be seen, Hindu mitakshara law is patriarchal and patrilineal. As a result,

India's 174th law commission addressed the issue and made recommendations. The
Page 31 of 170
Hindu Succession Act has several problematic aspects, according to the law
commission's assessment.
The report's major goal was to eradicate girls' current unequal status under Hindu
Mitakshara law and promote the right to equality guaranteed by Article 14 of the
constitution. As a result, it was suggested that the daughter be given coparcenary
status at birth. Thus, the Hon'ble court made it very apparent that coparcenary is by
birth by citing incidences of coparceneryship from SBI v. Ghamandi Ram. As a result,
since the daughters have attained the status of coparcener, they are coparcener by
birth in the same way as sons are.
Page 32 of 170
Devilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Citation - Criminal Appeal No: 989 of 2007
Bench - Uday Umesh Lalit and K.M. Joseph
Date of Judgement - 25th of February, 2021
“In this case, the Court considered to what extent could the benefit under the
Juvenile Justice Act be extended where the offender was above 16 years and less
than 18 years of age on the day the offence was committed.
The Court held that in such a case, even if the accused were guilty, the matter must
be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board.”
Facts of the Case:
In F.I.R. no: 212 of 1998, filed at 11:10 p.m. on July 19, 1998, Ganeshram stated that
on July 14, 1998, while walking to his house, he saw Devilal armed with a Kulhari, his
son armed with a talvar, and Amritlal armed with a lathi in front of Devilal's
residence. Ganeshram was abused by Devilal, who referred to him as a Chamar and
claimed that Chamars had advanced too far. Then Devilal and his son, Amritlal, beat
Ganeshram with their Kulahri, Talvar, and lathis, fractured his right hand, cut his
right calve, kicked him in the face below both eyes, and the swelling was visible at the
time of the report, Ganeshram screamed for help, and his mother Gattubai, wife
Sajan Bai, and sister-in-law Saman Bai came out to protect him. While guarding
Ganeshram, Saman Bai was struck in the elbow by Devilal's lathi. Ganeshram's
sister-in-law and Satyanarain then loaded him into a tractor and drove him to the
police station to fill out an F.I.R.
Ganeshram died at 1.00 a.m. while being treated at Mandasaur District Hospital
while Kothari was completing the legalities.
By its judgement and order dated 01.05.1998, the Trial Court found that the FIR
recorded at the instance of the deceased could be relied upon as a dying declaration,
Sajjan Bai, Saman Bai, and Laxminarayan, as well as the recoveries at the instances
Page 33 of 170
of accused Devilal, Gokul, and AmratRam, proved the prosecution's case. The
prosecution had proved the offence under section 302 read with section 34 IPC,
according to the trial court.
The case against Gattubai, on the other hand, was deemed to be unproven, and it was
also determined that none of the defendants could be charged with crimes
punishable under the SC-ST Act.
The Juvenile Justice Act of 1986 was in effect when the offence was committed in
1998, and it stated that anyone under the age of 16 was deemed a juvenile. Amrat
Ram, Devilal's second son, was 16 years, 11 months, and 26 days old at the time the
crime was committed. As a result, he was plainly not a minor under the Juvenile
Justice Act of 1986. However, under the requirements of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act of 2000, this age was raised to 18. The Supreme
Court had ordered the sessions court to investigate and report on the matter of
juvenility.
Issue
At the commission of crime in 1998, the Juvenile Justice Act 1986 was in force,
which stated that any person below the age of 16 was considered a juvenile. The age
of Amrat Ram, the second son of Devilal, was 16 years, 11 months and 26 days at the
time of commission of the offence. Therefore, he clearly wasn’t a juvenile within the
meaning of Juvenile Justice Act 1986. But this age was raised to 18 in terms of
provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The
Supreme Court had directed the sessions court to investigate this issue of juvenility
and submit the report.
Laws
1. Section 34 of Indian Penal Code

4. Section 20 of Juvenile Justice Act 2000
Page 34 of 170
Arguments and Decision of the Court:
The prosecution showed that Devilal and his two sons were guilty under Sections 302
and 34 of the Indian Penal Code by the decision and order of the trial court
(05.01.1999). It's also worth noting that, despite the alleged caste-based altercation,
the court did not find them guilty of crimes punishable under the SC/ST Act. A
separate judgement found the appellants guilty of violating Sections 342 and 34 of
the IPC and sentenced them to life in prison and a punishment of Rs. 5000/- each.
Later, the appellants filed a Criminal Appeal 700 of 1999 at the High Court,
requesting that Dr. Kothari's medical evidence be considered. They argued that it was
exceedingly unlikely that the deceased, Ganeshram, would have given any statements
to the police prior to succumbing to the injuries that led to the filing of the FIR in this
case. The High Court rejected the appellants contentions and thus upheld Devilal's
conviction and sentence, as well as that of his sons Gokul and Amrat Ram, and
dismissed the accused's Criminal Appeal No. 700 of 1999. This decision was handed
out on September 14, 2006.
Furthermore, it was claimed that Amrat Ram, Devilal's second son, was a minor at
the time the crime was committed. The statement of the accused's juvenility could be
presented for the first time before the Court in light of the Hari Ram vs. State of
Rajasthan ruling. The Sessions Judge, Neemach, was directed by this Court to
conduct an inquiry into this issue of juvenility by order dated 3.10.2018, and it was
discovered that the accused, Amrat Ram, was 16 years, 11 months and 26 days old in
1998, and he was found to be a juvenile for the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act
2000 on the date of the offence.
Because the age of juvenility was raised to 18 years by the Juvenile Justice Act 2000,
it was now up for discussion what should be done with the accused's juvenility. It was
noted that, notwithstanding anything in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a
juvenile pending in any court on the date on which this Act comes into force, if the
court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding
and, rather than passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile
to the Board, which shall deal with the juvenile in accordance with the Juvenile
Justice Act 2020.
Page 35 of 170
Thus, Amrat must be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for
determining appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied up on him.
Page 36 of 170
Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria

Citation - S.L.P. (CRL.) NO. 9313 OF 2021
Bench - Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi
Facts of the Case
In this case, the accused filed a plea with the High Court under section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, claiming that he and the defacto complainant had
reached an agreement. The High Court ruled in favour of the petition. Following that,
the de-facto complainant filed an application for the order to be recalled, claiming
that it was made in his absence and based on incorrect information. The High Court
granted the application and overturned the previous order. The appellant challenged
the order of recall before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
Issue
Whether the application for recall of the order was maintainable?
Laws
1. S. 482, CrPc
2. S. 362 CrPc
Arguments By The Appellants
The appellant relied on Section 362 CrPC in his appeal to the Apex Court, which
states that "except as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other for the time
being in force, no Court shall alter or review a judgement or final order disposing of a
case after it has been signed, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error."
Judgement
"This appeal for recall of the order was maintainable because it was an application
seeking a procedural review, not a substantive review under Section 362 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973," the Apex Court bench stated while dismissing the
accused's Special Leave Petition. Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government
Page 37 of 170
Industrial Tribunal & Ors. 1980 (supp) SCC 420 was cited by the court in this regard.
The expression'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review
which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably
erroneous order passed under its misapprehension, and (2) a review on merits when
the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the
record, as stated by the court in Grindlays Bank. In the latter meaning, the Court in
Narshi Thakershi's case decided that no review lies on merits unless the status
expressly allows such. Obviously, when a review is sought because of a procedural
flaw, the Tribunal's unintended error must be addressed ex debito justitiae to
prevent misuse of its procedure, and every court or Tribunal has this ability.
The court also cited a decision in Budhia Swain and Others v. Gopinath Deb (1999),
which explains the difference between recall and review and when a recall order
might be issued. The High Court was correct in recalling the order and scheduling a
hearing and determination on the merits, according to the court.
Page 38 of 170
Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation

Agency
Citation - SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1796/2021
Bench - K.M. Joseph and U.U. Lalit
Date of Judgement: May 12, 2021
Introduction:
Gautam Navlakha is charged in the Bhima-Koregaon case and is suspected of being

one of the perpetrators of the violence. His bail application was initially denied due
to his ties to the maoists and Elgar-Parishad under the UAPA. Following that, the
accused was asked to surrender to the National Investigation Agency, where it was
discovered that the accused met with Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai (the Maoist group's
commander) to combine and fight against government forces in order to beat them
physically and mentally. Navlakha is another person who has been vocal in writing
against the administration, and he gained notoriety after being denied access to
Kashmir and labelled a threat.
Facts of the case:
Navlakha was detained at his home in Delhi on charges related to the Bhima-
koregaon case. The accused was placed under house arrest by the Delhi High Court
for 34 days, from August 28 to October 1, 2018. The arrest was declared illegal by the
Delhi High Court on the 34th day. Following that, the accused was placed in 11 days
of police custody and 46 days of judicial custody; at this point, he had served 90 days
of his sentence and applied for bail at the Bombay High Court; however, the court
denied the bail application, stating that house arrest had protected the accused's
liberty. The accused was ordered by the Supreme Court to surrender to the NIA
within three weeks on March 16, 2020, and he did so on April 4, 2020.
The accused's counsel submitted a habeas corpus writ to the Supreme Court, which
was granted.
Page 39 of 170
Issues
1. Whether a period of 34 days when Navlakha was in custody by way of house

arrest would count as custody for the purpose of default bail?
2. Whether the apex court would entertain Writ of habeas corpus in a case where
remand order has already been issued?
Laws
1. Article 32, constitution of India

2. Section 153A, 505(1B) and 34 and Section 120(B) IPC
3. Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38 and 40, Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
Contentions made by petitioner
Navlakha had already served 90 days in detention, according to the accused's lawyer,
and thus is eligible for default bail.
The counsel further claimed that the Delhi High Court had already overturned the
arrest and declared it illegal, citing the case of Romila Thapar v. Union of India as an
example.
The counsel also argued that because the accused was constantly interrogated by
police officers while under house arrest, it should not be included in the period of
default bail because he was completely cut off from the outside world – he couldn't
leave his house, he couldn't meet anyone except police officers, lawyers, and ordinary
house residents.
Contentions made by Respondent
Even though he was charged with serious crimes, the National Investigation Agency
offered him a residence and did not treat him like a regular criminal, according to the
attorney.
The counsel contended that because the magistrate's authorization was found to be
invalid by the Delhi High Court, the entire detention was illegitimate, and so the
incarceration under Section 167 of the CrPC is utterly undesirable, rendering the
default bail scenario unclaimable.
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The counsel also stated that the Delhi high court had suspended the transit remand
and set it aside, ruling that detention was unconstitutional and that there had been
no allowed custody by a magistrate's order.
Judgement
The hon'ble supreme court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the
accused's bail plea, plainly stating that "home arrest" is not included in the time
period required for default bail.
In its decision, the Supreme Court said unequivocally that a Writ of Habeas Corpus
will only be considered against a remand order if the remand is wholly
unconstitutional or was acquired by orders of a court with no power to do so.
The petition of the accused was dismissed by the Supreme Court because it had not
been passed by a court with erroneous jurisdiction and was not fully illegitimate.
Page 41 of 170
In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. Alleged

Contemnor(S)
Case Number - Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No.1 OF 2020
Bench - Arun Mishra, B. R. Gavai and Krishna Murari
Date - August 14, 2020
Facts of the Case
Prashant Bhushan, the contemnor, is a senior counsel who has spent more than three
decades pursuing public interest litigation in a number of high-profile cases. On July
22, 2020, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court of India against him and Twitter
Inc., calling to the Court's attention two tweets issued by Prashant Bhushan. The
purported tweets, which were directed against the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and
the Supreme Court, revealed a deterioration in the judiciary's independence and the
Supreme Court's role in safeguarding Indian democracy. Twitter finally took down
the tweets. The Court filed suo moto contempt proceedings against Prashant
Bhushan on July 22, 2020, claiming that his tweets were defamatory.
Issues
1. Whether the tweets published by Mr. Prashant Bhushan are healthy criticism of
the Indian judiciary or has dashed the public confidence in the institution of the
supreme court?
2. Whether these tweets were against the CJI's as Individuals or CJI's as the CJI of
the Supreme Court?
3. Whether the acts of Twitter Inc. have also tampered the reputation of the Indian
judicial system?
Laws
1. Article 19(1), Constitution of India

2. Article 129, Constitution of India
3. Article 142 (2) (5), Constitution of India
Page 42 of 170
Arguments
During the hearing, Prashant Bhushan clarified that the initial tweet was intended to
express his outrage at the inconsistency between the CJI's reckless attitude in riding
a motorcycle without a mask while also preventing the SC from physically
functioning and hearing cases during the COVID-19 lockdown. He further claimed
that the contempt proceedings were an attempt to restrict free speech and a violation
of the Indian Constitution's Article 19(1)(a). Prashant Bhushan argued that the
second tweet was a genuine expression of his views on the Court's (and previous four
CJIs) role in undermining democratic ideals in the last six years (since the ruling BJP
party came to power), and that it could not be considered contempt because it was
protected under the Indian Constitution.
According to established Supreme Court of India conventions, the CJI is the 'Master
of the Roster,' with the authority to assign cases to judges. The use of this authority
by CJIs to facilitate the rise of authoritarianism, majoritarianism, and the suffocation
of dissent in the country has been brought into question in the past. In that context,
Prashant Bhushan contended that raising issues about the way CJIs behave
themselves in their individual roles does not constitute scandalising the Court. As a
result, the tweets cannot be claimed to be interfering with the administration of
justice or the due course of justice by the Court.
Judgement
The Court began by asserting that there is a strong link between comments
influencing judges' strict performance of their duties and their ability to obstruct the
administration of justice. It stated that such insinuations (as in the present case)
implicitly degraded the Court's dignity and amounted to eroding public faith in
judges' integrity by looking back at precedents. By doing so, the Court necessarily
associated criticism of judges with criticism of the Court, dismissing Prashant
Bhushan's contention that comments about judges' individual conduct had no
bearing on the administration of justice.
The Court, on the other hand, tried to make a key distinction. It was noted that while
vilifying a judge as a judge merits contempt, vilifying a judge as an individual does
not; in such circumstances, judges are left to seek private remedies. To adjudicate
Page 43 of 170
contempt cases, it primarily relied on six elements proposed by Justice V.R. Krishna
Iyer in Re: S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339: I prudent use of the Court's contempt
power, (ii) balancing constitutional values of free speech and the need for fearless
curial process, (iii) separating personal protection of libelled judges from community
confidence in the prevention of obstruction of justice, (iv) discretionary exercise of
authority, (v) not being hypersensitive even when criticisms exceed limits, and (vi)
declaring contempt in cases of malicious, scurrilous, intimidatory, or threatening
conduct beyond acceptable limit.
The Court then went into a study of the tweets, using Justice V.R. Iyer's multifold
tests as a guide. It split them into multiple pieces, noticing that the initial section of
the first tweet ('CJI rides a 50 lakh motorcycle belonging to a BJP leader without a
mask or helmet at Raj Bhavan, Nagpur without a mask or helmet') was a personal
attack on the CJI as an individual. The second half of the initial tweet, however, was a
'undisputed' attack on CJI in his function as administrative head of the judiciary ('at
a time when he puts the SC in lockdown mode, depriving citizens their fundamental
rights to access justice').
It's worth noting that the Court found various problems in the initial tweet's factual
correctness. Despite being physically unable to function, the Court was able to carry
out its duties via video conferencing facilities during the period of the disputed
tweets. According to the Court, a "patently false" and "wild charge" about the CJI has
the potential to shatter public trust in the judiciary as well as undermine the
authority and administration of justice in that setting. As a result, the Court
dismissed Prashant Bhushan's claim of genuine criticism based on his distress about
the courts' physical non-functioning.
The Court issued three observations in response to the second tweet. First, Prashant
Bhushan's statement that the Supreme Court had played a significant role in allowing
the breakdown of democracy, as well as the role of the previous four CJIs in
sustaining it, was a direct attack on the Supreme Court and the CJI. Second, the
Court determined that Prashant Bhushan acted irresponsibly, and that the tweets
were not qualified for good faith protection, based on the vast reach of the tweet and
the character of the contemnor (who is a lawyer).
Page 44 of 170
The tweets had the impact of dissuading an ordinary applicant and risked losing faith
in the Supreme Court and the CJI when taken together. The Court also concluded
that if it failed to protect itself from vicious insinuations like the one in this instance,
it would open the floodgates to other judges facing similar attacks. Preventing
malicious attacks was, in effect, a matter of national honour and reputation in the
community of countries, and it had to be handled with determination. Prashant
Bhushan was found guilty of contempt of the court by the Supreme Court.
Regarding Twitter's role in the contempt proceedings, the Court discharged the social
media site as an intermediary, taking cognizance of its action in suspending tweets in
July after receiving notice from the Court. According to a number of campaigners,
the company created a hazardous precedent that could apply to future defamation
claims. Twitter stated in a statement that it was committed to defending free speech
in India and around the world.
Prashant Bhushan asked the Court to have the proceedings invalidated on procedural
grounds following an adjudication by the Court on August 14, 2020, in which the
Court found Prashant Bhushan guilty of contempt claiming that a copy of the
complaint on the basis of which the suo motu notice was issued was not served on
him. He also challenged the decision on other grounds, including vagueness (due to
inconsistency with other Court decisions on the subject), free speech, truth (as a
defence), the principle of proportionality (tilting the balance in favour of rights over
restrictions), and an attempt to compel him to apologise.
Given the widespread public debate that followed the Supreme Court's decision, the
Court decided on some of the aforementioned points in its sentencing order of
August 31, 2020. It determined that shaming the Supreme Court constituted a
violation of the right to free speech. While fair criticism was a legal defence, it was
subject to reasonable limitations under Article 19(2) due to public interest concerns.
The Court noted, among other things, that judicial criticism was not protected under
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and amounted to contempt. When there was a
contradiction between freedom of expression and maintaining judicial
independence, one could not win.
"While it was not possible to control the thinking process and words functioning in
one individual's mind, when it came to expression, it had to be within the
Page 45 of 170
constitutional bounds," the Court concluded. Without a doubt, legitimate criticism of

the system is desirable while exercising one's right to free expression, and judges
cannot be overly sensitive, even when distortions and criticism go too far. The same
cannot, however, be expanded to allow nasty and scandalous statements. The
contemnor's other arguments were similarly dismissed for similar reasons."
As a result, instead of a harsh punishment, Prashant Bhushan was convicted to a

modest fine of INR 1.
Page 46 of 170
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of

Kerala
Citation - Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006, 2018 (8) SCJ 609
Bench - Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu
Malhotra
Facts of the Case
Women of menstrual age were denied entry to the Sabarimala sanctuary, one of
Kerala's most important temples. Bindu and Kanaka Durga, both in their early 40s,
attempted to access the hilltop shrine around 3.45 a.m. but were denied owing to
threats of physical harm.
In the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, a group of five women from the Indian Young
Lawyers Association filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) contesting the temple
officials' century-old restrictive practise. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of
Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, states that "Women who are not
permitted to join a site of public worship by tradition and use shall not be entitled to
enter or offer worship in any place of public worship," was argued to be a violation of
the Indian Constitution's basic fundamental rights.
Issues
1. Whether this restriction imposed by the temple authorities violates Articles 15, 25
and 26 of the Indian Constitution?
2. Whether this restriction violate the provisions of the Kerala Hindu Place of Public
Worship Act, 1965?
3. Whether the Sabarimala Temple has a denominational character?
Page 47 of 170
Laws
1. Articles 15(3) of the Constitution of India

2. Articles 14 of the Constitution of India
3. Article 17 of the Constitution of India
4. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act,
1965
Arguments made by the petitioners
Senior Counsel Indira Jaising argued that the widespread social stigmas that label
menstruation women as "impure" and "polluting" are both provocative and
damaging. Due to the dogmas surrounding menstruation in general, preventing
women from attending the temple is a type of untouchability. According to the
lawyer, there is a violation of Article 17 of the Indian Constitution, which condemns
and outlaws all forms of untouchability. On the question of whether the Sabarimala
temple has a denominational character, the counsel argued that the religious rituals
performed in the temple during 'pujas' and other religious rites are comparable to
those performed in any other Hindu temple.
Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran, who was nominated as an amicus curiae in the
case, claimed that Article 25(2) (b) is a substantive right, not only an enabling
provision. The above-mentioned Article grants women the right to enter the temple
and give worship.
The Nair Service Society's senior counsel, K. Parasaran, stated right away that the
limits put on women were not the result of patriarchal beliefs. Instead, the practise
was founded on the god Lord Ayyappan's celibacy. Kerala has a matrilineal structure,
according to the lawyer. The state's women are noted for being well-educated and
self-sufficient in their decision-making responsibilities. As a result, he maintained
that the prohibition enforced on young women was the outcome of Sabarimala
temple norms and usages, not misogyny. Furthermore, the defendant's lawyer
pointed out that temples are not specifically mentioned in Article 15(2) of the Indian
Constitution, which grants individuals the right to access public areas.
Page 48 of 170
J. Sai Deepak, who represents "People for Dharma," a group dedicated to keeping the
government and temple management apart, chastised the opposing counsel for
failing to distinguish between religious diversity and prejudice. The petitioner, he
argued, twisted a conversation about the deity's celibacy into purported concepts of
impurity related to menstruation.
The decision of the Court
On September 28, 2018, the Supreme Court removed the prohibition, allowing
women of all ages to visit the Sabarimala shrine in Kerala. The tribunal ruled with a
4:1 majority that the temple practise violates Hindu women's rights and that
prohibiting women from entering the shrine is gender discrimination.
The majority verdict reveals that the Indian Constitution's essential principles are
superior. Even in questions of religious beliefs, the Hon'ble Chief Justice and his
companion judges unambiguously said that governments, religious communities,
and citizens are obliged and must comply with the country's Constitution. All other
laws of the land, as well as customary customs, beliefs, and traditions of other
religions, are superseded by this historic judgement.
Dissenting opinion
Justice Indu Malhotra wrote the dissenting opinion. The Justice dismissed the
petition as frivolous and unworthy of consideration, arguing that courts lack
jurisdiction to decide whether religious activities should be abolished unless there
are issues of social ills, such as 'Sati.' According to Justice Malhotra, constitutional
morality would allow everyone to practise their views, and the religious community
would decide what constituted vital religious practise.
Indu Malhotra carefully says in her dissenting view that the decision to eliminate the
prohibitions on women would have significant repercussions, amounting to undue
meddling in religious emotions of many communities.
Article 25 of India's Constitution protects both the temple and the deity, according to
her claim. She believes that religious practises should not be judged exclusively on
the basis of Article 14.
Page 49 of 170
Internet And Mobile Association of India v.

Reserve Bank Of India
Citation - MANU/SC/0264/2020
Bench - Rohinton Fali Nariman, S. Ravindra Bhat and V. Ramasubramanian
Facts of the Case
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) issued a circular on April 6, 2018, prohibiting banks
and other entities from trading in virtual currencies. The banks were also prohibited
from providing services to the organisation or any individual dealing with or settling
virtual currency, according to the circular. This circular was published with the belief
that virtual currency trade is vulnerable to hacking, which could lead to terrorist acts,
money laundering, and other problems. The RBI has instructed the bank to refrain
from providing the following services: clearing, lending against virtual currencies,
account maintenance, registration, trading, settling, accepting virtual currency as
collateral, opening exchange accounts, and the sale/purchase or transfer of such
virtual currencies. The Internet and Mobile Association of India filed a case with the
Supreme Court challenging the circular. On the basis of proportionality, the court
authorised the same. Earlier in 2013, merchants and holders of the virtue money
were advised to be wary of the security and legal risks linked with it.
Issues
Whether the RBI lacks jurisdiction to disallow the trade of virtual currency and it
based such ban imposed on the misunderstanding.?
Laws
1. Section 35A read with Section 36(1)(a) Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and
2. Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and
3. Section 45JA and 45L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934
Page 50 of 170
4. Section 10(2) read with Section 18 of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
2007
Contentions made by the Petitioner
The petitioner contended that the RBI lacked the authority to prohibit crypto-
currency trading, and that the restriction was also the result of a misunderstanding.
It went on to say that cryptocurrency, or virtual money, is a store of value or medium
of exchange rather than a currency note or coin. The Petitioner further argued that
virtual currency or cryptocurrencies are a medium of trade or a store of value rather
than a monetary note or coin.
The respondent disputed with the first argument, claiming that the RBI lacks
jurisdiction and that it is a form of digital payment over which the RBI has control.
In response to the claim that cryptocurrency or virtual currency is a store of value or
medium of exchange rather than a type of currency note or coin, the respondent
stated that such virtual currency is a stainless digital currency that is used for
trading, and that cryptocurrency operates independently and without government
interference.
The decision of the Court
In this case, the Honourable Supreme Court found that, while the Reserve Bank of
India has broad powers and plays an important role in the development of the Indian
economy, it is unable to establish any harm to its regulated firms. As a result, the
Reserve Bank of India's directives urging banks to stop engaging with or providing
services to commodities traders using virtual currency are illegal and so
unenforceable.
Page 51 of 170
Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta

Citation - Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.30621 of 2011
Bench - R.F. Nariman
Facts of the Case
In the matter of M. Nagraj and Others vs. Union of India and Others, a decision was
reached in 2006 that was challenged by numerous states and the Centre. According
to the petitioner, the Nagraj decision had made it unjustly difficult to award
reservations in government posts and public sector promotions. With this in mind, it
was deemed appropriate to examine the circumstances in the Nagraj case and submit
it to a seven-judge panel. In India, reservation is regarded as a severe issue. Article 16
of the constitution provides for equality of opportunity in terms of public
employment, but until the Indra Sawhney case in 1992, this clause did not contain
anything linked to the reservation. In this situation, a few observations were made,
beginning with Article 16 (4), which authorises the state to create measures for the
reserve of any backward class of persons in appointments or offices, but not in
promotions. This had a significant impact on the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and in
order to keep the promotions going, Clause 4A was added, which said that nothing in
the mentioned article prevents the State from making any reservation in matters
pertaining to the promotion. Articles 16(4A) and 16(4B) were added by the 81st
Amendment.
The constitutional validity of these provisions was challenged in the Nagraj Case,
with a five-judge bench ruling that if the State wanted to make a provision for
reservation in promotions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, it would have
to collect "quantifiable data" sufficient to show the class's backwardness and
inadequacy of representation in public employment. The state must also ensure that
the reserve provision does not, in any case, exceed the 50 percent ceiling limit or
wipe away the creamy layer. The requirement to acquire quantitative data to
demonstrate backwardness was deemed illegal since it contradicted the Indira
Sawhney decision. Even the application of the creamy layer to Scheduled castes and
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tribes seemed odd, given that it was only applied to the other backward classes. The
introduction of the creamy layer idea to promotions also generated issues of equality.
Finally, a petition to review the Nagraj decision was filed.
Issues
Whether the Nagraj Judgement needed reconsideration by a seven-judge bench.
The second issue questioned whether the States had to collect quantifiable data to
prove the backwardness and inadequacy of the class while being promoted.
The third issue was whether the creamy layer among the scheduled castes and the
scheduled tribes should be barred from obtaining promotions through the
reservation.
Arguments
In the current case of Jarnail Singh, the Supreme Court refused to have the Nagraj
ruling reconsidered by a seven-judge bench and instead had the verdict reviewed by a
five-judge court. It did not believe that the terms of the Nagraj case needed to be
reviewed by a bigger court.
According to the Nagraj Verdict, in order to make a provision for the promotion of
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in employment and posts through reservation,
the states required to collect measurable data to show that they were
underrepresented in the public sector. The Attorney General of India, KK Venugopal,
contended that the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes were 'backwards' in
character, socially and economically excluded, as stated in the Indian constitution.
This means that there are no more examinations that may be used to prove their
class's backwardness and inadequacy. Those in favour of gathering measurable data
pointed out that when it comes to gaining a promotion, people will go to great
lengths, therefore keeping an eye on a person's backwardness was only the correct
thing to do. Furthermore, it did not jeopardise anyone's integrity or cause any loss;
rather, it served as a double-check. They also considered data gathering as a
government responsibility, which being removed would show that the government
was just interested in reducing its own burdens.
Page 53 of 170
The Indra Sawhney case, according to Justice Nariman, does not allow for the
collection of quantifiable data as a requirement for giving promotions under
reservation, and the Nagraj decision contradicts a nine-judge bench's ruling.
In the case of Jarnail Singh, the court interpreted Article 14, 15 and 16 to include the
concept of the creamy layer as part of the equality principle. Some arguments were
given in support of this equality, the first of which being that the fundamental
essence of a backward class was to exclude the socially and economically advanced
persons. Second, it was determined that the creamy layer must be excluded in order
to ensure that the truly backward members of the class have access to reservations
and that the creamy layer does not have exclusive access to all reservation benefits.
Third, if the creamy layer is not excluded, it will violate the equality principles by
treating equals differently, such as the general classes and those who are forward
among the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, while treating unequals in the
same way, such as the backward classes and those who are forward among the
backward classes.
The entire aim of reservation, according to Justice Nariman, is to provide the

backward classes a chance to advance so that they might be on an equal footing with
the rest of India's residents. If the creamy layer folks are included in this reservation,
the backward classes will likely remain backward since they will have little
opportunities in front of the advanced backward layer of people. He further pointed
out that individuals who are classified as creamy layer are not eligible for reservation
benefits because they do not belong to the backward classes.
Another argument was made based on the idea that applying the creamy layer
principle to Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes is a significant risk that the court
is ready to take. It's critical to grasp the distinctions between the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes and the other backward classes. A constitutional court cannot
overlook these factors, and it must remember that equality is a fundamental
principle that must be protected at all costs.
Those in favour of the inclusion of the creamy layer argue that the truly backward
will still be able to benefit from reservation in promotions after the creamy layer is
included because, in terms of promotions, all Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes
fall into the same economic bracket at a certain level of employment. As a result, the
Page 54 of 170
violation of equality argument only works at the entry level, not at further levels. It's
possible that excluding the creamy layer will only benefit the general classes. Because
India has a history of workplace discrimination, where Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes are not considered worthy, all backward groups, especially those
from the creamy layer, can be given a chance to prove their merit in front of the
general classes.
Judgement
The court decided that the Nagraj case's decision did not need to be forwarded to a
seven-judge panel. Furthermore, the requirement that the State collect quantifiable
data demonstrating the backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
is in conflict with the nine-judge Bench's decision in the Indra Sawhney case,
rendering this clause null and void. In the Indra Sawhney case, it was also
demonstrated that any discussion of the "creamy layer" has no bearing on Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In addition, the Supreme Court upheld the Nagraj
Judgement's application of the creamy layer to promotions for Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. Thousands of employees had been denied their due promotions as
a result of it.
Page 55 of 170
Joseph Shine v. Union of India

Citation - 2018 SC 1676
Bench - Dipak Mishra, A. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu
Malhotra
Date - 27th September, 2018
Introduction
In India, adultery was sanctioned by patriarchy and male chauvinism. A guy who has
sexual intercourse with a woman who is the wife of another man is guilty of this
crime. And if the spouse agrees or colludes in the conduct, it is no longer considered
adultery. In the event that her husband commits adultery, she has no rights. Adultery
was once thought to be a bad conduct committed by either a married man or a
married woman. In India, a woman who commits adultery is treated as a victim who
has been persuaded by a man into doing so.
Facts of the Case
Joseph Shine filed a writ case under Article 32 contesting the legality of Section 497
of the IPC read with Section 198 of the Cr. P.C., for violating Articles 14, 15, and 21 of
the Constitution. This started out as a PIL against adultery. The rule for adultery,
according to the petitioner, is arbitrary and discriminatory on the basis of gender.
The petitioner stated that such a law degrades a woman's dignity. The petition was
heard by a constitutional bench of five judges.
Issues
1. Whether the provision for adultery is arbitrary and discriminatory under Article
14?
2. Whether the provision for adultery encourages the stereotype of women being the
property of men and discriminates on gender basis under Article15?
3. Whether the dignity of a woman is compromised by denial of her sexual
autonomy and right to self-determination?
Page 56 of 170
4. Whether criminalizing adultery is intrusion by law in the private realm of an

individual?
Contentions by the Petitioner
The petitioner's counsel argued that the section criminalises adultery only on the
basis of sex classification, which has no rational nexus to be reached. The wife's
consent is irrelevant. As a result, it is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
The petitioner argued that the rule is founded on the idea that a woman is the
husband's property. Adultery is not committed if the husband consents or connives,
according to the clause.
The provision for adultery is gender discriminatory because it exclusively gives men
the authority to prosecute for adultery, which is a violation of Article 15.
The provision is unlawful, according to the petitioner, because it degrades a woman's

dignity by failing to respect her sexual autonomy and self-determination. It is
violative of Article 21.
Section 497 of IPC read with Section 198 of CrPC must be struck down.
Adultery is an offence that destroys family relationships, according to the

respondents, and deterrence should be in place to defend the institution of marriage.
Adultery, according to the respondents, has an impact on the husband, children, and
society as a whole. It is a crime perpetrated by an outsider with full understanding of
the marriage's sacredness.
Article 15(3), which grants the state the ability to enact special legislation for women
and children, protects the provision's discrimination.
They asked the court to strike out the part that was found to be unconstitutional but
keep the rest of the clause.
Page 57 of 170
Judgement
In its decision in this case, the court deemed Section 497 of the IPC unconstitutional,
ruling that it violates Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. Section 198(2) of the
CrPC is likewise invalid to the degree that it applies to Section 497 of the IPC,
according to the court. As a result, the court here overturned all earlier rulings in this
case.
In a statement, the court stated that each individual has complete sovereignty over
their sexual lives.
If a crime has criminal consequences, it should be regarded a public wrong;

nevertheless, in adultery situations, the wrongs are considered private. Punishments
should only be given when absolutely required, according to the right to dignity, and
only after a thorough investigation.
Also, no one can treat a woman as if she were a piece of property or a chattel.
This rule is nearly a century old and was enacted during a time when there was no
constitution, thus its validity was not even a consideration. However, patriarchal
laws no longer hold any weight in modern society.
Although sexual infidelity is ethically terrible, it does not meet the necessary criteria
to make it a crime. There are three components to the harm principle. 1) Detriment
2) an act of wrongdoing 3) There is a public element. To designate an unlawful
conduct as a criminal offence, all of these factors must be proven.
Thus, the Apex Court concluded in its judgement that the law is discriminatory and
out of date, and thus declared it void. As a result, adultery as a crime has vanished,
and it may now only be used as a justification for divorce, but its perpetrators are
immune from punishment.
Page 58 of 170
Kerala Union of Working Journalists v. Union of

India
Citation - Writ Petition (Crl.) No(S). 307 of 2020
Bench - A.S. Bopanna and V. Ramasubramania
“The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this case, held that the fundamental right to life is
available to undertrial prisoners as well.”
Facts of the Case
The writ petition was filled by the Kerala Union of Working Journalists association
as habeus corpus under article 32 of the constitution of India. SidhiqueKappan, a
journalist and a member of the Petitioner Association Kerala Union of Working
Journalist, was detained illegally on 5.10.2020 without serving any notice or order as
envisaged under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.).
SidhiqueKappan, along with his associates, were going to Hathras (U.P.) to report a
gruesome case of rape and murder of a young girl at the time of detention.
Issues
Is the Court limited to providing adequate health care to the accused, in line with the
limited relief?
Laws Applied
1. Article 32, the constitution of India

3. Section 482 CRPC
4. Section 107 CRPC
Page 59 of 170
Judgement of the Court
After hearing both sides, the Supreme Court decided that it is necessary to provide
adequate and effective medical assistance to him, and that it would be in the best
interests of justice to transfer SidhiqueKappan – the arrestee – to Ram Manohar
Lohia Hospital, All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), or any other
Government Hospital in Delhi for proper medical treatment.
The Court stated in giving the judgment that the most important fundamental 'right
to life' unreservedly embraces even an undertrial, and that SidhiqueKappan would be
returned to Mathura Jail as soon as he recovers and the doctors declare him fit to be
released. In the meantime, Sidhique Kappan is free to seek suitable legal relief from
the respective courts, such as the grant of bail, the challenge of the proceedings, or
the quashing of the charge sheet.
Page 60 of 170
Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India

Citation - Transferred Case (Civil) No. 245/2020
Bench - S. Ravindra Bhat
Date - 21 May, 2021
Facts of the Case
The case revolves around the Government of India's announcement dated September
15, 2019. Part III of the Code, which broadly states the execution of various rules
relating to the Personal Guarantor, is the subject of the notification. In their roles as
directors, promoters, chairman, and managing directors of the firms, the petitioners
entrusted bank and financial institutions with guarantees, which have been invoked
and procedures against the companies with which they are linked are pending. Cases
that are still open at various stages, such as insolvency filing, settlement plan, and so
on. After the notification was issued, many demand notifications were given to
petitioners, implying insolvency proceedings under the Code, and recovery
operations began after the invocation of guarantees under Part-III of the Code. The
Petitioners argued that the Government's authority under Section 1(3) of the Code
could not be used to limit the Code's provisions to personal guarantors of corporate
debtors.
Sections 2(e), 78 (except for the fresh start process), and 79, 94-187 (both inclusive)
were challenged, as were Sections 239(2)(g), (h), & (i) Section 239(2)(m) to (zc);
Section 239(2)(zn) to (zs); and Section 249.
On November 15, 2019, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) published a

notification about the implementation of certain provisions of the International
Business Code (IBC) addressing personal guarantors' liabilities. The Insolvency and
Bankruptcy Board of India then contested the decision (IBBI). Several petitions were
filed with the Supreme Courts, with the exception of Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of
India, which took the lead and was directed back to the various High Courts.
Various instances of promoters and directors of firms acting as a guarantor to banks

for the companies were widespread. Following the publication of the notification,
Page 61 of 170
demand notices were sent on the petitioners, who then went to the Supreme Court to
challenge the notification's legitimacy.
Issues
1. What is the liability of personal guarantors post-approval of a resolution plan?

2. Validity of the notification dated 15.11.2019 issued by the Government
3. What is the extent of liability of personal guarantors to the corporate debtors?
Laws
1. Section 1(3) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

2. Section 60(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
3. Section 243 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
4. Section 128 of the Indian Contracts Act, 1872
Arguments from the Petitioners
1. The powers exercised by the central government are unconstitutional.

2. There is no distinction made between financial and operational creditors in the
notification.
3. Section 243 should be implemented by the government.
4. The personal guarantor's liability is co-extensive with the corporate debtor's.
Arguments From The Respondents
1. Personal guarantors were to be treated differently under the law.

2. Section 60(2) was amended in 2018 to allow insolvency procedures against
personal guarantors.
3. The IBC can be implemented in stages.
4. Personal guarantors' liability is coextensive, joint, and multiple.
Judgement
The notification was found to be valid by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
stated that the notification is not superfluous legislation because the IBC does not
Page 62 of 170
have a mandatory effect for its application. The relationship between corporate
debtors and personal guarantees is inextricably linked. As a result, power exerted
under IBC Section 1(3) is not ultra vires.
If a corporate debtor's security is lost owing to an involuntary act, the personal

guarantor is not released from liability. Because discharge under Section 134 of the
Contract Act has not happened, the assurance can be realised under Section 128 of
the Contract Act.
The Supreme Court of India has ruled that the passage of a resolution plan does not
ipso facto discharge the personal guarantee. The borrower's liability has been
discharged by operation of law, which is an involuntary process, and thus personal
guarantee will not be absolved of its liability if it emerged from an independent
contractor. The extent of a personal guarantee's liability is determined by the terms
of the agreement between the borrower and the guarantor.
The notification in question is correct. Furthermore, the adoption of the resolution

plan is specific to the corporate debtor and will not relieve the personal guarantor of
his or her obligations to the corporate debtor.
The Supreme Court outlined several reasons why a common forum for insolvency-
related proceedings should be used. The adjudicating authority, the NCLT, would be
able to recognise the entire issue as a whole. NCLT would be aware of the corporate
debtor's assets, which would aid in the formulation of appropriate resolution
strategies and the use of personal guarantees to recover the debt.
Page 63 of 170
Manish Kumar v. Union of India

Citation - Writ Petition(C) No.26 of 2020
Bench - Rohinton Fali Nariman, K.M. Joseph and Ajay Rastogi
Facts of the Case
The petitioners filed their case in the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the
Indian Constitution. Sections 3, 4, and 10 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code
(Amendment) Act 2020 are being challenged. Section 3 of the challenged
modification modifies Section 7(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Code of 2016.
Section 4 of the challenged modification adds to the Code's Section 11 an additional
Explanation. The challenged change adds Section 32A to the Code under Section 10.
The second proviso, pursuant to which a new threshold has been proclaimed for an
allottee to move an application under Section 7 for commencing the insolvency
resolution process under the Code, has been challenged by the petitioners. The
threshold is the requirement that the application be supported by at least 100
allottees or 10% of the total allottees, whichever is lower. They should also be part of
the same project.
"A vested privilege under a legislation can be taken away by a retrospective law," the
Supreme Court has said. A right granted by one statute can be revoked by another.
The Supreme Court cannot overlook the fact that such a statute sparked a lot of
public interest. The sheer number of applications that grew, together with the
potential outcomes, cannot be dismissed as an unreasonable or arbitrary factor that
influenced the law-making process.
We have the following position on the compelled withdrawal under the third proviso
of the current applications: Once the Legislature decided that the pending
applications had to meet the threshold criteria, the repercussions for failing to do so
had to be established. Otherwise, utter doubt would have resulted, and the
application would have been treated in an obviously arbitrary manner.
Page 64 of 170
The Supreme Court stated that because the Act is an economic policy, the Legislature
must be given wide rein in the joints. The amendment in question is sensible,
limited, and appropriate. According to the respondent's records, there were 253
cases filed by allottees in the N.C.L.T. between June 2016 and June 2018. The
allottees, on the other hand, filed 2201 cases between June 6, 2018 and December
28, 2019.
Following that, between December 29th, 2019 and August 26th, 2020, there is a
dramatic drop, with only 130 complaints submitted in over eight months, according
to the Ordinance. It is pointed out that the argument against the Legislature based on
estoppel and malice is absurd. There can be no estoppel against the Legislature,
according to this Court's ruling in Union of India and others v. Godfrey Philips India
Ltd. 23, which is cited. In the sphere of law, the concept of transferred malice is
foreign. The right to make a Section 7 application is a legislative privilege that might
be limited.
Issues
Whether the sections 3, 4, 10 of Insolvency Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act 2020

are Constitutionally Valid?
Laws
1. Article 32 Constitution of India

2. Section 7(1) of the IBC
3. Section 11 IBC
4. Section 32A IBC
Contentions made by the petitioners
The Petitioners argued that the second proviso to Section 7(1) of the Code was
unreasonable, arbitrary, and irrational, that it went against the Indian Constitution,
and that it infringed on fundamental human rights. The modifications, it was argued,
resulted in hostile discrimination between the Petitioners and other financial
creditors, with no discernible distinction. The Petitioners claimed that the 1st
Amendment was unworkable due to an information asymmetry. There was also a
claim that there was no method for exchanging and making information on allottee
Page 65 of 170
data available. If the aforementioned proviso is upheld, the Petitioners say, they will
effectively fall outside the scope of a financial creditor and will have a worse status
than an operational creditor.
The Respondents, on the other hand, countered that the Amendment Act was
completely lawful and that it was part of an economic measure. The Respondents
also claimed that the Amendment Act was enacted to avoid the filing of multiple
procedures and to relieve the load of outstanding cases before already overcrowded
adjudicating agencies.
Preventing many individual petitions from being filed, which has the effect of
overloading the Adjudicating Authority's docket and further delaying a time-sensitive
process;
Protecting the interests of hundreds, if not thousands, of allottees who may object to
a single home-application; buyer'
Protecting the interests of hundreds, if not thousands, of allottees who may object to
a single home-application; buyer's In the case of allottees, the availability of remedies
under RERA to members of the sub-class;
Finally, the procedure becomes smoother and more cost-effective. Unnecessary

financial bleeding of the already-struggling business debtor is avoided.
Judgement of the court
1st Amendment
The Bench, which included Justices R.F. Nariman, N. Sinha, and K.M. Joseph, stated
that if there is a default against one application and the corporate insolvency
resolution process of the corporate debtor fails, liquidation would begin, which is not
the Code's goal. If a single allottee,, is permitted to file a Section 7 application, the
interests of all other allottees could be jeopardised, putting the entire project at risk.
The Court held that the rationale behind the 1st Amendment is to promote the object
of the Code and streamline the working of the Code, and that the minimum threshold
Page 66 of 170
of allottees suffering the same fate under the same real estate project coming
together to jointly file a Section 7 application is arbitrary and practical.
One of the Petitioners stated that the Amendment Act's minimal criterion should not
be restricted to a single real estate project, but should apply to all projects carried out
or developed by a Promoter. The applicant's work would be made more difficult,
according to the SC. Individual allottees were always free to pursue other remedies
available to them, such as those available under the Real Estate (Regulation and
Development) Act, 2016, the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, or by filing a civil suit,
and the Amendment Act would not exhaust the Petitioners' other options.
The Supreme Court further emphasised that whether a person holds one or more
allotments in his or her family's name, all independent allotments would qualify as
separate allottees and would be included in the computation of hundred
allottees/one-tenth of allottees. It was therefore emphasised that if more than one
person receives a shared allotment, the allotment must be handled as a single
allotment. This statement was made to clarify the purpose of the Amendment Act,
which is to ensure that a critical mass of people "agree that the timing is right" to
invoke the Code.
In response to the contention that each allottee's default date was different, the
Supreme Court held that any number of applicants could file a Section 7 application
even if no money was owed to them, as long as they were financial creditors and the
default was in the amount of one crore, even if the one crore amount was owed to
none of the applicants but to another financial creditor.
It is not essential for any of the candidates to have a default.
The Supreme Court stated that if the Legislature determines that the provisos in
question, which would affect a large number of creditors, are within the scope of
intelligible differentia, distinguishing the allottees from other financial creditors, the
SC will not be inclined to pass judgement on the wisdom of such a measure.
The doctrine of separation of powers was used, claiming that the presumption would
be that the democratically elected representatives of the people drafting our
legislation would be aware of all facts relevant to the law's validity.
Page 67 of 170
The SC stated that the developer is the debtor, since an allottee funds his own
apartment by paying amounts in advance, addressing the problem of whether the
status of allottees was not rendered comparable to or even worse than that of an
operational creditor. An operational creditor is unconcerned about the business
debtor's financial health. The allottee of a real estate project, on the other hand, is
quite concerned about the corporate debtor's financial condition.
2nd Amendment
The Supreme Court affirmed the amendment and dismissed the Petitioners'
arguments. While the SC acknowledged that the thirty-day term to comply with the
minimum threshold criterion may have been fairer and lengthier, it was unable to
conclude that the thirty-day time limit was impossible to meet. The imposition of a
time restriction on pending applications cannot be characterised as arbitrary,
because otherwise, the process would be unending and unknown. Furthermore, the
proposed applicant's withdrawal, as required by the Code, will not prevent the
invocation of the same default and re-filing of the application.
In conclusion, the SC maintained the provisos on the grounds that they met the
litmus test for being justified as reasonable classification established in furtherance
of the Code's goals, and that the case was not one of incomprehensible
differentiation.
Page 68 of 170
Mohd Umair @ Umer v. State (Govt Nct Of

Delhi) And Ors
Citation - CRL.M.C. 674/2021
Bench - Subramonium Prasad
Date - 12 March, 2021.
Facts of the Case
The complainant advised the accused not to dispute with his mother when he was
having a disagreement with her; however, the accused began abusing and attacking
the complainant and fighting with him. The accused allegedly slapped the
complainant, then threatened the complainant and went to his home when the mob
gathered around them. The accused allegedly stabbed the complainant in the
stomach. The latest instance, according to the MLC doctor, is one of a physical
assault with a reported knife wound in the belly. The incident occurred close to the
residence's address. The complainant has been charged with causing serious injury,
according to the charge sheet. Bail was later granted to the accused/petitioner. The
parties had decided to reconcile their differences after the engagement of their
parents and well-wishers, according to the petition. A deed of settlement was also
submitted.
Laws
Section 482 Cr. P.C
Issues
The question before the court was whether the High Court of Delhi may use its power
under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the FIR on the grounds that the parties had
reached an agreement.
Judgement
The High Court cited the case of State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat (2013), in
which it was noted that the scope of Sections 320 and 482 Cr. P.C. are both
Page 69 of 170
comparable and dissimilar. Compounding and quashing of proceedings on the basis

of compromise have parallels and distinctions, and the High Court has the sound
discretionary power to quash the criminal process in light of a compromise. Section
320's power is restricted, constrained, and limited, but Section 482's power is
immense, unrivalled, and supreme.
Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure Code limits and guides the criminal court's
ability to compound an offence, while the material on record guides the High Court's
inherent power to issue an opinion on whether or not to quash a criminal complaint.
Even if the eventual outcome is an acquittal or dismissal of an indictment, the
exercise of this power is to serve the goals of justice.
Similarly, in Narinder Singh v. the State of Punjab (2014), the Supreme Court
decided that the High Court, in exercising its inherent competence under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C., might cancel criminal proceedings in cases of non-compoundable
offences. The Gian Singh case was taken into account. It went on to say, however,
that the inherent power should be handled with caution. Even if the Section 307
offence is serious, the court checks to see if the incorporation of Section 307 is for the
purpose of the name or if there is sufficient evidence to establish it.
Using the case of Gian Singh v. the State of Punjab (2012), the High Court was found
to have the ability to quash a FIR/complaint based on a compromise struck between
the parties under Section 482 Cr. P.C. "Inherent power has no statutory limitations,"
it said, "but it must be utilised in accordance with the guideline engrafted in such
power, namely:
(i) To protect the interests of justice, or
(ii) To prevent any court's process from being abused.
When the offender and the victim have settled their dispute, the power to quash the
criminal procedure, complaint, or FIR may be exercised depends on the facts and
circumstances of each instance, and no category can be defined."
The court took into account that the accused was a 21-year-old adult with a whole life
ahead of him, had no criminal history, and had not absconded. It was discovered
after reviewing the charge sheet that the complainant slapped the petitioner. As a
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result, the petitioner was offended, and he grabbed a knife from a vegetable vendor
and stabbed the complaint in self-defense. Both parties live in the same
neighbourhood. The suspects have already been in detention for a month.
As a result, the court decided to quash the FIR under Section 482 because the 21-
year-old adult has his whole life ahead of him and the parties had reached an
agreement.
Page 71 of 170
M/s. Imperia Structures Ltd. v. Anil Patni

Citation - Civil Appeal No. 3581-3590 of 2020
Bench - Uday Umesh Lalit, Vineet Saran
Date - 2nd November 2020
Facts of the Case
M/s Imperia Structures Ltd. had launched THE ESPERA, a housing plan.
Many allottees paid the booking fee and signed the builder-buyer agreement with the
appellant after receiving their flats.
The Respondent paid Rs.36530.2 per square metre (Rs.3395/- per square foot) for
Apartment No.1803 on the 18th Floor of Tower No. "C," which has a super built-up
area of 153.34 square metres (1650 square feet approx.). Thus, the basic price was
Rs.56,01,750/-, plus additional charges, for a total price of Rs.76,43,000/-.
The enterprise had failed to give possession as per the builder–buyer agreement,
thus the respondent had turned to the National Consumer Dispute Redress
Commission for compensation.
The commission granted the respondents the remedy of refunding the amounts
deposited by each of the Complainants with simple interest @ 9% p.a. from the
respective dates of deposits, plus Rs.50,000/- in costs, and the amounts were to be
deposited within four weeks, failing which the amounts would carry interest @ 12
percent p.a.
The appellant, who was aggrieved by the commission's order, filed the instant
appeals on March 14, 2019, challenging the commission's jurisdiction.
Issues
1. Whether all the Complainants were ‘Consumers’ within the meaning of the Act?
2. Whether there is a need for interference by the court in the conclusions drawn by
the national law commission.
Page 72 of 170
Laws
1. S. 2(d) of the Consumer Protection Act:

2. S. 18 of the RERA Act:
Arguments by the Petitioner
Phase I of the project was finished on time, and Phase II of the project involved 437
allottees, with just 59 of these 437 allottees filing complaints under the Consumer
Protection Act.
Alternative accommodations were given to all allottees, but they were all declined,
indicating that the apartments were booked for investment purposes.
Because the units were booked as an investment for profit, the Complainants were
not "consumers" under the Consumer Protection Act.
Following the implementation of the RERA Act in 2016, all matters connected to the
Project, including those relating to construction and completion, would be under the
sole control of the RERA Act's authorities, and only they would have jurisdiction in
those cases.
Mr. Himanshu Giri filed a complaint under the RERA Act. As a result, the bulk of the
allottees put their trust in the Appellant.
In the case of Himanshu Giri, the court ordered that interest be paid at a rate of 10.75
percent per annum, but no money be refunded. The approach taken would be
beneficial to the completion of building while also balancing the interests of allottees.
According to the provisions of the RERA Act, the Commission's orders should be set
aside, and instead, as in the Himanshu Giri case, the Complainants should be
granted interest at a rate of 10.75 percent per annum on the amount they deposited,
allowing the Project to be completed without putting the Appellant under financial
strain, while also providing relief in the form of investment interest to the allottees.
Page 73 of 170
Arguments by the Respondents
The complainants acquired the units for their personal use. As a result, the question
of the Complainants not being "consumers" as defined by the Consumer Protection
Act was correctly decided in their favour.
The delay due to force majeure was not explained in any way that made sense.
There was no objection to the Project being registered under the RERA Act before the
Commission. As a result, the Appellant would be unable to make any arguments
about the RERA Act's applicability.
According to the Court, the CP Act's remedy would be an extra remedy available to a
consumer.
Judgement
The court ruled in favour of the Homebuyers, upholding the National Consumer
Dispute Redressal Commission's verdict. It was also held that RERA and the
Consumer Protection Act are two separate statutes, and that, despite continuing
litigation at RERA, the consumer forum will always have the right to hear cases when
homebuyers meet the description of "consumer" as defined by the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986.
This appeal was dismissed, and many explanations were given regarding the statutes
involved, such as S. 79 of the RERA Act, which only refers to the jurisdictional
limitations of Civil Courts, but Consumer forums are not Civil Courts.
Page 74 of 170
Mukesh Kumar v. The State of Uttarakhand

Bench - L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta
Facts of the Case
On September 5, 2012, the state government of Uttarakhand decided that all public
service positions in the state would be filled without any reservations for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotions for the positions of Assistant Engineer
(Civil) in the Public Works Department of the Government of Uttarakhand.
The state government's actions were overturned when a petition was filed with the
High Court. The High Court, however, recognised errors in its review ruling and
changed it to require the state to collect quantifiable data on the inadequacy of
representation of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in public services and to
instruct the state government to make decisions based on the data.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court included a group of appeals with the same subject
matter and decided to dispose of them altogether.
Issues
1. Whether the state government is bound to give reservations to the Scheduled

Caste and Scheduled tribes?
2. Is it applicable to reservation for those classes in promotion also?
3. Whether the right to claim reservation is a fundamental right?
4. Whether the decision by the State Government not to provide reservations can be
only on the basis of quantifiable data relating to the adequacy of representation?
Laws
1. Article 16(1) of The Constitution Of India 1949
Page 75 of 170
2. Article 16(4) of The Constitution Of India 1949

3. Article 16(4A) of The Constitution Of India 1949
4. Section 3(1) of The National Commission for Backward Classes Act, 1993
The petitioners asserted reservation as a fundamental right under Articles 16(4) and
16(4-A) of the Indian Constitution, and argued in favour of it by advocating for the
upliftment of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe members. They argued that if the
reservation is not made, each resident's right to uniformity is violated. The guideline
further argued that the State cannot refuse to provide a reservation until it fulfils its
commitment to collect measurable data on the sufficiency or inadequacy of portrayal
in public positions. The state failed to follow the cycle along these lines, which is a
violation of Article 16 of the Constitution. According to information acquired by the
council following the Supreme Court's verdict in M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Association
of India and Ors (2006) 8 SCC 212, there was inadequacy in the portrayals of
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes in taxpayer-funded organisations. The public
authority is constrained by the report's judgement; it must make the booking.
The respondents' counsel argued that the State is under no obligation to offer
reservation because Articles 16(4) and 16(4-A) of the Constitution are merely
enabling provisions, and the decision not to grant reservation was made after careful
study. They argued that, in light of the M. Nagaraj case, there was no need to offer
the reservation if the state refused to do so. If the State has to grant reservation, the
amount of the equivalent could be chosen by establishing a board, and the State
might choose the match based on that report, and similarly stated, the Court cannot
guide the State to give reservation.
Judgement
The Court brought up the main matter of disagreement. It was limited to the
question of whether the State Government will surely reserve a slot for a publicly
posted position and whether the State Government's decision not to provide
reservations may be solely based on quantitative evidence. The Court clarified its
Page 76 of 170
position on the fundamental right to reservation over promotion under Article 16 (4)
and 16 (4-A) by relying on the judgement in Ajit Singh (II) v. the State of Punjab,
(1999) 7 SCC 209, and added that the previously mentioned arrangements are
empowering and optional in relation to the State. The Court added by alluding to the
M. Nagaraj judgment that the prudence has the State to give reservation openly posts
and couldn't be guided by the Court to provide reservation in this perspective anyway
the choice of giving the booking out in the open positions and advancements can be
tested over the quantum of seats saved and must be defended on the premise of the
quantifiable information of portrayal of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
The data collected by the State government is only to justify providing reservation to
those classes of people and not otherwise. Not being bound to give reservations in
promotions, the State is not required to justify its decision based on quantifiable
data, showing an adequate representation of members of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes in State services. It additionally put aside the course given by the
High Court on 15.07.2019 that all future openings that are to be topped off by
advancement in the posts of Assistant Engineer should be from the individuals from
Scheduled Casts and tribes is entirely unjustified.
The Court also held that the High Court's most recent decision, which struck down
the 2012 notification based on the Indra Sawhney and Jarnail Singh judgments, was
flawed because the notification was only for promotions and based on the
recommendations of the committee that represented Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. The bench went on to say that the cases of Indra Sawhney, Ajit
Singh (II), M. Nagaraj, and Jarnail Singh only dealt with the need to show
quantifiable data to justify the quantum of reservation provided by the state, not with
the need to show quantifiable data in cases where the state denies the reservation,
because reservation is not a fundamental right when it comes to promotions.
Page 77 of 170
Mukis v. State of U.P.

Citation - Criminal Revision No. - 452 of 2022
Bench - Shekhar Kumar Yadav
Facts of the Case
The revisionist has filed this application in revision against an order dated 16.11.2021
issued by the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, Court No. 01, Aligarh in
Case No. 707 of 2017 (Smt Hasin Bano and others Vs Mukis), under Section 125
Cr.P.C., P.S. Akrabad, District Aligarh, ordering the revisionist to pay Rs. 3,000 to
opposite party no. 2 and Rs. 2000 to her son from the date of application.
Issue
Whether section 125 of the Crpc is within the ambit of Article 15(3) reinforced by
Article 39 of the Constitution?
The revisionists argued that the court below granted the opposite party no. 2's plea
for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. by granting total maintenance of Rs.
5000/- per month from the date of application, which the revisionist could not pay
due to financial issues. At this point, learned counsel for the revisionist argued that,
due to his bad financial situation, the revisionist is unable to pay the total amount
sought to be recovered from him, and that some time be provided to him to deposit
the stated amount. The learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that opposite
party no.2 is dwelling away from her matrimonial home of her own volition, along
with her parents, for no apparent reason. It was asserted that because the revisionist
has no permanent source of income, he is unable to provide such a large sum of
maintenance to the opposing party no. 2 and his son, and that the court below
incorrectly assessed the revisionist's income when issuing the impugned order. It was
also contended that the trial court had granted maintenance allowance to the
opposing party no. 2 without citing any specific cause from the date of application.
Contentions by Respondents
Page 78 of 170
The AGA has backed the impugned ruling, arguing that it is just and legal, that there
is no illegality or infirmity, and that the current criminal revision is without merit
and is likely to be dismissed.
Judgement
Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav pointed out, this provision gives effect to a man's
natural and fundamental duty to provide for his wife, children, and parents while
they are unable to provide for themselves. The bench made this observation while
dismissing a criminal revision petition filed by one Mukis challenging an order
issued by Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court, Aligarh in November 2021 under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. ordering him to pay Rs. 3,000 to his wife and Rs. 2000 to her son
as maintenance from the date of filing the application for maintenance. The Court
noted, based on the facts and arguments presented in the case, that the wife is unable
to support herself and that the revisionist had turned her wife against her will due to
non-payment of dowry demands. The Court went on to say that there is enough
evidence on the record to show that the revisionist's wife has no independent income,
so the revisionist is obligated to help the respondent no. 2 financially (wife).
In terms of the sum, the Court stated that the family court had awarded the wife a
minimal, and that if the wife had been living with the revisionist, he would have had
to pay at least as much on her. As a result, the Court concluded that the concerned
court could not be deemed to have granted an excessive amount. The Court, however,
ordered the revisionist to deposit the total sum due against him in three equal
monthly instalments within three months, as well as pay regular monthly
maintenance of Rs. 5000/-.
Page 79 of 170
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India

Citation - AIR 2018 SC 4321; W.P. (Crl.) No. 76 of 2018 D. No. 14961/2016
Bench - Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, Rohinton Fali Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud
and Indu Malhotra
Date - 6 September 2018
Facts of the Case
Consensual sex between homosexuals was classified as a "unnatural offence" under

Section 377 of the IPC, and thus was made illegal. It discriminates against a minority
primarily on the basis of their sexual orientation, which is similar to sex
discrimination. In Suresh Kaushal and Anr Vs. NAZ Foundation and Ors, the section
was challenged. It is claimed that it is in violation of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the
Constitution. In response, the Supreme Court issued an ambiguous ruling, indicating
that the decision to decriminalise homosexuality should have been decided by
Parliament rather than the courts. The courts can only do so if the statute is proven
to be in violation of constitutional provisions beyond a reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, the court stated that because fewer than 200 cases have emerged in
150 years, there is insufficient evidence to declare that section 377 IPC is ultra vires
the provisions of Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution. Finally, the Supreme
Court stated that Section 377 does not suffer from the vice of unconstitutionality,
without going into greater detail. The same judgement was challenged in the Navtej
Singh case by five members of the LGBTQ community who petitioned for the repeal
of Section 377 IPC, which criminalised consensual sex between homosexuals.
Issue
The constitutional validity of Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Section
377) in as much as it extended to consenting sexual conduct of adults of similar sex in
private was at dispute in the case. 'Any individual who willfully has fleshly
intercourse with any man, lady, or creature against the request for nature shall be
rebuked with life detention or detainment of one or the other portrayal for a time of
up to ten years, and will also be obligated to a fine,' according to segment 377.
Page 80 of 170
Laws

3. Article 19 (1)(a), Constitution of India
5. Section 377, Indian Penal Code
Arguments from the Petitioners
Homosexuality, bisexuality, and other sexual orientations are all natural and should
not be regarded as illnesses. Criminalizing it degrades a person's dignity, causes
confusion about gender identification, and infringes on the right to privacy provided
by the constitution's Art 21. It also has an impact on personality development,
relationship building, forcible affiliation, and other fundamental aspirations
protected by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The LGBT community makes up 7-8 percent of the Indian population and is
discriminated against and abused because of their sexual orientation. As a result,
they require more protection than other populations in order to reach their full
potential and live without fear, apprehension, or dread.
Although transgender people have been recognised as a third gender and have been
granted certain rights as a result of the NALSA case, their consensual acts are still
considered illegal.
The petitioners want Section 377 of the IPC repealed in as much as it criminalises
homosexuals having consensual sex. They believe that section 377 should be
restricted to bestiality and non-consensual actions.
Sec 377, according to the petitioner, infringes multiple fundamental rights, including
the right to dignity, equality, privacy, liberty, and freedom of expression.
The section violates Art 14 of the constitution since there is no discernible difference
or fair classification between natural and unnatural sex. The said phrases are not
specified in the Article or the statute, leaving it up to interpretation.
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The section also violates the Constitution's Article 15 since it discriminates against
people based on the sex of their sexual partners.
Arguments from the Respondents
Sec 377, according to the respondent on behalf of Intervener, comprises organ abuse,
and such acts are undignified and disparaging, amounting to constitutional wrong
and constitutional immorality.
This court has given the community with sufficient rights in NALSA, and the further
reliefs sought by petitioners are only an affront to privacy and personal liberty,
violating the concept of public morality.
Sec 377 criminalization is more significant now since homosexuals who engage in
those acts are more likely to contract HIV than heterosexuals, and so the right to
privacy should not be granted to them.
Apart from utterly destroying the family structure, marital institution, and social
culture, declaring Sec 377 unlawful will also destroy the country's political, economic,
and cultural history.
Sec 377 does not infringe on a person's constitutional rights because it is the state's
responsibility to impose reasonable restrictions on some activities, such as carnal
intercourse, in order to protect citizens from anything objectionable and harmful.
It does not infringe Art 14 because the state has the authority to determine who
should be considered a class for the purposes of enacting legislation based on
reasonable classification. Furthermore, the Section simply describes an offence and
the punishment associated with it.
It does not infringe Art 15 because the provision only prohibits discrimination based
on sex, not sexual orientation, which is not mentioned anywhere.
The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, the Special Marriage Act, the Indian Divorce
Act, and the Hindu Marriage Act would all be affected.
Page 82 of 170
Judgement
The current case, which was heard by a five-judge bench, resulted in a significant
decision on Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, which decriminalised
homosexuality. The Supreme Court argued that the current arrangement u/s 377 of
the Indian Penal Code, which prohibits sexual conduct by adults in private, such as
gay intercourse, is in violation of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Indian Constitution.
The Hon'ble court stated that because basic rights are the foundation, any
arrangement that violates the provisions of Part III will be deemed ultra-vires, and as
a result, Section 377 was given constitutional ethical status and homosexuality was
decriminalised as necessary.
Furthermore, in its Suresh Koushal ruling from 2013, the Supreme Court overturned
a Delhi High Court judgement, holding that the decision to decriminalise
homosexuality must be made by Parliament, not the Court. It further decided that
Section 377 prohibits only certain activities and does not apply to any particular
group of people. It also implied the tiny number of persons who belonged to the
LGBTI community and the fact that just a small percentage of them had been
charged under Section 377. As a result, on September 6, 2018, a five-judge bench
partially threw down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, making same-sex
relationships between consenting adults legal. It is currently legal for LGBT
individuals to engage in consensual intercourse. The Court has kept Section 377 in
place, which makes it illegal to perform non-consensual actions or sexual acts on
animals.
Page 83 of 170
Paramvir Singh v. Baljit Singh

Citation - Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 3543 of 2020
Bench - R.F. Nariman, K.M. Joseph, and Aniruddh Bose.
Date of Judgement - December 2, 2020
Facts of the Case
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal
Pradesh [(2018) 5 SCC 311], directed that the Ministry of Home Affairs establish a
Central Oversight Body ("COB") to carry out the plan of action regarding the use of
videography at the crime scene during the investigation. Furthermore, the Court held
that, in light of the directions issued in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal & Others
[(2015) 8 SCC 744], there was a need for further directions. An oversight mechanism
is established in every state whereby an independent committee can study CCTV
camera footages and publish a report of its findings regularly. The COB was also
asked to issue suitable instructions as soon as possible in this regard. In addition, the
Court ruled that the COB may issue necessary orders from time to time to ensure that
the use of videography becomes a reality in phases, with the first phase being
implemented by July 15, 2018. The Supreme Court has directed the various
governments to file compliance reports on the activities done through multiple
orders. The orders further questioned the status of audio-video recordings of the
witnesses' testimony made under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 ("CrPC").
Issues
Only 14 states had submitted their Action Taken Reports and Compliance Affidavits.
Furthermore, the vast majority of them failed to reveal the precise location of CCTV
cameras in each Police Station. Again, the total number of CCTV cameras installed
and their functioning condition and placement were not stated in the reports. There
was apparently no information on the status of oversight committees in any state and
Page 84 of 170
union territory. Since the Hon'ble SC's directives, nothing significant has been
observed in this regard for over two and half years.
Laws
1. Article 21 of the Constitution of India,

2. Sections 17 and 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act,
Judgment
The Court, in this case, has directed all the States and Union Territories to install
CCTV cameras in their jurisdictional police stations and file an affidavit regarding
the same within six weeks from the date of delivery of the judgment.
The Apex court also directed the Central government to install CCTV cameras which
shall be equipped with night vision and consist of audio and video footage at
the Central Bureau Investigation (CBI) offices, National Investigation
Agency (NIA), Enforcement Directorate (E.D.), Narcotics Control
Bureau (NCB), Department of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Serious Fraud
Investigation Office (SFIO) offices, and other similar central agencies at the places
where interrogation of people takes place.
Page 85 of 170
Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India

Citation - WP(C) 1015/2018
Judge - Arun Mishra, Vineet Saran and S. Ravindra Bhat
Date of Decision - 10 February 2020
Facts of the Case
In this case, the constitutional validity of section 18-A of the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act,2018, was challenged by
the petitioners.
The petition was filed on the ground that section 18-A of the said Act nullifies the
decision of Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra &anr
where the court held that the provisions of the Prevention of Atrocities Act were
misused.
The court had introduced several safeguards in the Kashinath Mahajan case, but the
parliament overturned these safeguards by the amendment in the Act. The
safeguards are given in this case were-
Conduct of preliminary inquiry before registration of First Information Report
Investigating officers should receive approval before arrest.
Anticipatory bail to the accused, notwithstanding any judgment or order, or direction

of any court.
This amendment has diluted the effect of Kashinath Mahajan. The Kashinath
Mahajan Judgement intended to prevent the people from abusing the Act.
After the passing of Kashinath Mahajan, the parliament took a step to undo the
judgment as it caused so much violence and protest by the Dalits and Adivasis group
and placed the amendment bill in the parliament.
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A review petition challenging the Kashinath Mahajan judgment was filed before the
Supreme Court of India.
The legislature even has not waited for the court to hear the review petition filed,
which challenges the judgment.
The Supreme court issued a notice on 7 September 2018 to the central government to
respond to the petition.
In response to the notice, the central government filed an affidavit and stated that-
The legislature is competent to make changes through the process of
Many acquittal cases under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities Act) do not indicate the cases to be fake.
Several petitions were filed challenging the 2018 Amendment. On 13 September

2019, the review petition was referred by the division bench comprising Arun Mishra
and UU Lalit to the three-judge bench. After hearing before the three-judge bench,
the court upheld the constitutional validity of the 2018 Amendment.
Issues
1. Whether section 18–A of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2018 is constitutionally valid?
2. Whether bar on granting anticipatory bail is valid and whether it infringes the
personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution?
The contention made by the Petitioners
The counsel for the petitioner contended that the safeguards introduced in Dr.
Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. The State of Maharashtra &Anr. were necessary as
the Act was misused a lot.
It is further contended that the absolute bar on granting anticipatory bail will violate
fundamental rights granted under article 21 of the Constitution relating to the
personal liberty of a person.
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The contention made by the Respondents
On behalf of the Central Government, Attorney General KK Venugopal contends that

the amendment was made due to a large number of acquittal cases and police failed
to implement the Act properly, and prosecution of the accused was also not effective.
The petitioner's counsel further argued that the amendment conforms with the aim
of the Act, which states for the protection of the SC/ST section of the society.
Judgment
In this case, the three-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India has upheld the
Constitutional validity of section 18-A of "The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act,2018" and had nullified the effect of the
Kashinath Mahajan case. The court held that the directions given in the Kashinath
Mahajan case had placed an unnecessary burden upon people of Scheduled Caste
and Schedule Tribes.
While dealing with section 18-A of the Act, the court said that while looking into
section 18 concerning the preliminary inquiry before registration of FIR, the inquiry
is permissible only in conditions laid down in Lalita Kumari v. Government U.P.
Court further held that no anticipatory bail was given for offenses under SC/ST
Amendment Act. In the concurring opinion, Justice Ravindra Bhat observed that
anticipatory bail could only be given in exceptional cases and not in every case. The
court had earlier observed that the anticipatory bail could only be granted with no
prima facie case under SC/SCT Act. Justice Ravindra Bhat, while delivering
judgment, also states about equal treatment of all citizens and fostering the idea of
fraternity because the concept of fraternity is as important as the personal liberty of a
person. Court further held that if an accused is a public servant, the arrest can only
be made after appointing authority. If the accused is a non-public servant, the arrest
can be made after the permission of the Senior Superintended of Police.
Page 88 of 170
Purshottam Chopra v. State(Govt. Of Nct Of

Delhi)
Citation - Criminal Appeal Nos. 194-195 of 2012
Bench - A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari
Date - 7 January, 2020
Facts of the Case
A man (Sher Singh) was on fire, his entire body engulfed in flames, and the people
assembled at the scene attempted to extinguish the flames by pouring water on him.
According to reports, the information regarding the occurrence was passed on to the
police via a phone call from an unknown person. Around 120 unofficial witnesses
observed the incident and attempted to extinguish the flames. He was quickly
transferred to Safdarjung hospital, where the doctor prepared the Medicolegal,
during which the injured person identified himself as Sher Singh, gave his address,
and described the incident that led to his current condition, accusing two people with
the same name, Purshottam and Suresh, and giving their addresses to the doctor and
police officer. They were accused of setting Sher Singh on fire and creating burn
injuries that covered the entire body surface area, resulting in 100% severe burns.
Issues
1. Can a person who has received 92 percent burn damage be in a situation to

deliver a dying declaration? This was a major res Integra in this case that lingered
for a long time.
2. The admissibility of Sher Singh's claims, as he was not thought to be in a fit and
conscious state of mind to give credible remarks, as confirmed by eyewitnesses.
3. The absence of the magistrate during the recording of the dying declaration raised
the issue of admissibility of the deceased's comments.
Laws
1. Indian Penal Code S. 302

Page 89 of 170
Contentions of the Parties and Judgement
The Trial Court determined that there was no direct proof of the offence's
commission and that the prosecution's entire case rested on two dying declarations
allegedly made by the deceased Sher Singh. The court accepted the doctor's
testimony that the victim, Sher Singh, had informed her of the reason and cause of
his injuries, and that she had discovered the victim to be cognizant and oriented
despite his grave state. The veracity of the case prepared by her could not be
questioned, and the court also rejected the accused-other appellant's arguments,
holding that even if the victim had suffered 100 percent burn injuries, the dying
declaration made by him could not be disregarded because there was no evidence
that the injured Sher Singh's mental condition was such that he was unable to speak.
The High Court reexamined the evidence and agreed with the Trial Court's ruling,
saying that the deceased Sher Singh's statement to the doctor, as well as his
statement to the police, which were regarded his dying statements, clearly
established the crime alleged against the appellants.
Although the presence of a Magistrate is not required for the recording of a dying
declaration, it is expected that a Magistrate will be requested to record such dying
declaration and/or attestation will be obtained from other persons present at the
time of recording the dying declaration, where the dying declaration is suspicious or
suffers from any infirmity such as the declarant's lack of fitness of mind, it should
not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. When a statement is offered as a
dying declaration and meets all judicial scrutiny standards, it cannot be thrown out
simply because it was not recorded by a Magistrate or because the police officer did
not seek attestation from anybody present at the time of the statement.
The Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states that a statement made by a person who has
died, whether written or verbal, must be recognised as significant fact in the
investigation if the statement is made as to the cause of his death or any of the
circumstances of the transaction that resulted in his death. Another argument
advanced on behalf of the appellants, that the present case should be considered
under Section 304 Part II for the crime of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder, has been flatly rejected. The act of pouring kerosene on Sher Singh and then
lighting him on fire with a match contains all the ingredients of causing a person's
Page 90 of 170
death in a terrible manner, as mentioned in his dying declaration. The appellants'

convictions for murder appear to have been justified.
On behalf of the appellants, it was also argued that the victim made the remark
regarding self-immolation since he had been dropped from pace. It was argued that
the victim's speech should be considered his first dying declaration. However, the
Trial Court and the High Court correctly dismissed the witness' testimony after a
thorough examination.
The Court determined that the statement used as a dying declaration was voluntary,
intelligible, and consistent, and that recording a conviction based on it, even without
verification, is permissible.
All of the courts found the prosecution case to be beyond a reasonable doubt and
sentenced the accused-appellants to life in prison under Section 302/34 of the Indian
Penal Code. As a result, and in light of the foregoing, these appeals were denied and
dismissed.
Page 91 of 170
Rajeev Suri v. Union of India, 2021

Bench - A.M. Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari, Sanjiv Khanna
Citation - Tranferred Case (CIVIL) No. 229 of 2020
Introduction
The Central Vista case, also known as Rajeev Suri vs. Delhi Development Authority
and Ors. (2021), was a comprehensive judicial evaluation of the validity of the
Government of India's Central Vista Project. On January 5, 2021, a bench consisting
of Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, Sanjiv Khanna, and Dinesh Maheshwari issued the
decision. The Supreme Court upheld the Central Vista Committee's (CVC) decision of
"no protest" and "endorsement" by the Delhi Urban Art Commission (DUAC) and
"earlier endorsement" by the Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC) of the Central
Vista Project, for which Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid the foundation stone on
December 10.
Facts of the Case
The conflict emerged as a result of the redevelopment and modification of the

Central Vista, which is Delhi's crown jewel and living legacy. The Central Public
Works Department issued a notice on September 2nd, 2019, inviting offers for
construction work at the Common Central Secretariat, Parliament Building, and
Central Vista in New Delhi. Following the completion of the tender process and the
creation of the draught master plan on December 21, 2019, a public notice was
published in accordance with sub-section 3 of Section 11-A of the Delhi Development
Act, 1957 (hereinafter "Development Act") and Rule 16 of the Delhi Development
(Master Plan and Zonal Development Plan) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter "Development
Rules") to invite public objections and suggestions.
The Board of Enquiry and Hearing was provided an overview of the concerns and
proposals (hereinafter BoEH). Hearings before the BoEH were held on February 6th
and 7th, 2020, and after hearing from the public, the BoEH found merit in the
Page 92 of 170
objection that there is a lack of data in the public domain and advised that additional
data be revealed in the public domain.
Laws
1. Development Act – Section 7 to 11 which deals with master and zonal planning
regarding any development project in Delhi.
2. Development Rules – Rule 5 which relates to public notice regarding the making
of a Master Plan and invites suggestions and objections in writing in respect of
the master plan. Rule 6 which prescribes the mode in which notice shall be
published as given in Section 44 of the Development Act and likewise should also
be published in the official gazette. Rules 8, 9, 10 and 11 which prescribe the mode
in which objections and suggestions are to be considered and also deals with the
making of the final draft Master Plan.
Issues
The issue relates to the government’s obligation to consult and the scope and ambit
of the citizen’s right to participate in the administrative exercise.
Arguments of the Petitioners
The right to public participation and consultation is a pre-requisite for consequential

state activity, and it is derived from Section 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The
necessity is based on reasonableness, and the state has a constitutional obligation to
take all reasonable steps to ensure maximum participation.
There is insufficient public disclosure of information concerning the government's

actions surrounding the Central Vista project.
Court adjudication based on legal principles of procedural fairness and judicial

review authority cannot be a substitute for public participation prior to and during
the decision-making stage.
Arguments of the Respondents
Because India has adopted the representative model of governance, the mode of
public engagement in India is through the representative mode. The people elect
Page 93 of 170
their representatives, and the Council of Ministers is accountable to the Parliament

as a whole.
The lack of required public participation would not be considered outrageous enough
to invalidate the entire procedure.
The lack of information in the public domain would not invalidate the government's
decision.
Judgement
After hearing the parties, the Court held:
A) Within 7 days, the Central Government/Authority would make understandable

and adequate material, including drawings, layout plans, and explanatory
memorandum, available in the public domain on the web.
B) Within 7 days, the Authority and the Central Government will publish a public
notice on their websites, as well as appropriate print media coverage.
C) Anyone wishing to submit suggestions or concerns has four weeks from the date of
publication to do so. Objections/ recommendations can be addressed through email
or by postal mail to the address specified in the public notice.
D) The public notice would also include the date, time, and location of the Heritage
Conservation Committee's public hearing, which would be given to anybody
interested in testifying before the Committee. No adjournment or postponement
requests will be considered. The Heritage Conservation Committee, on the other
hand, has the authority to set extra hearing dates if necessary.
E) The Heritage Conservation Committee would receive the Authority's

objections/suggestions, as well as the BoEH and other records. These complaints,
among others, would be taken into account while considering whether or not to grant
approval/permission.
F) The Heritage Conservation Committee would adjudicate all disputes in line with
the Delhi Master Plan and the Unified Building Bye-Laws.
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G) The Heritage Conservation Committee would be free to conduct the public

participation exercise if it deems it acceptable and essential in accordance with
paragraph 1.3 or other sections of the Unified Building Bye-Laws for consultation,
hearing, and other purposes. It would also look at the controversy over the Central
Vista Precincts' Rajpath borders.
H) The Heritage Conservation Committee's report and records would be forwarded

to the Central Government, which would issue an order in line with the legislation
and in accordance with Section 11A of the Development Act and related Development
Rules, as well as the Unified Building Bye-laws.
I) The Heritage Conservation Committee would also look into the matter of granting
previous permission/approval for the new parliament's building/permit on Plot No.
118. However, after and only if the master plan revisions are announced, the final
decision or outcome will be communicated to the local body, NDMC.
J) The Heritage Conservation Committee would issue a spoken order outlining the
rationale for the judgments reached.
The Court set aside the order of the EAC dated 22nd April 2020 and the
environment clearance by the Ministry of Environment and Forest dated 17th
June 2020, and passed an order of remit to the EAC with a request that they may
decide the question on environment clearance within a period of 30 days from the
date copy of this order received, without awaiting the decision on the question of
change/modification of land use.
Page 95 of 170
Ramanand and Ors v. Dr. Girish Soni and Anr

Citation - RC. REV. 447/2017
Court - Delhi High Court
Bench - Prathiba M Singh
Date - 21/05/2020
Facts of the Case
The Appellants were tenants of a shop in Khan Market, New Delhi. An eviction suit
was filed against the Appellants by the Landlord and a decree of eviction was passed
against the Appellants. An appeal was filed against the decree which was dismissed
by the Ld. Rent Control Tribunal.
The Appellants thereafter filed a petition in Delhi High Court challenging the eviction
order. In the interim, the Delhi High Court stayed the eviction order subject the
Appellants paying the Landlord a rent of INR 3,50,000/- per month. The court in the
order further recorded that in case of any default in rent, the stay of execution of
eviction order shall stand vacated.
Thereafter, following the outbreak of COVID-19, the Appellants filed an application

for suspension of rent during the lockdown period, as the Appellants business
activities had completely been disrupted. The Appellants claimed that such a
situation is force majeure and they are entitled to waiver of monthly rent, directed to
be paid vide the previous order passed by the court.
Issues
Whether the lockdown would entitle tenants to claim waiver or exemption from
payment of rent or suspension of rent, is bound to arise in thousands of cases across
the country.?
Laws
1. Section 32 of Indian Contract Act, 1872
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2. Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882

3. Section 56 of Indian Contract Act, 1872
Judgement and Analysis of the Court
The Delhi High Court held that a relationship between a tenant and a landlord is
primarily governed either by contract or by law and therefore, the rights and
obligations, in relation to Force Majeure can only be determined by the terms and
conditions, whether express or implied, under the contract.
The Court relied on Energy Watchdog v. CERC & Ors., (2017) 14 SCC 80 and
other judgments on Section 32 of the ICA and held that “the fundamental principle
would be that if the contract contains a clause providing for some sort of waiver or
suspension of rent, only then the tenant could claim the same. The force majeure
clause in the contract could also be a contingency under Section 32 which may
allow the tenant to claim that the contract has become void and surrender the
premises. However, if the tenant wishes to retain the premises and there is no
clause giving any respite to the tenant, the rent or the monthly charges would be
payable.”
Therefore, it was concluded that without an express or implied term or agreement

(between the parties) which provides respite to the tenant, the rent or monthly
charges would be payable.
In relation to Section 56 of the ICA, the Court held that “in the absence of a contract
or a contractual term which is a force majeure clause or a remission clause, the
tenant may attempt to invoke the Doctrine of Frustration of contract or
`impossibility of performance’, which however would not be applicable in view of
the settled legal position…..”
The Court also referred to the decision in Raja Dhruv Dev Chand v. Raja
Harmohinder Singh & Anr., AIR 1968 SC 1024 where the Supreme Court had
examined Section 56 of the ICA in the context of the obligations of tenants. In Raja
Dhruv Dev Chand, the tenant had rented agricultural lands in Punjab which he could
not use because of the partition in 1947. Consequently, the tenant demanded refund
of the rent for the Kharif season in 1947 and Rabi season of 1948. The Supreme Court
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held that in the Indian context, Section 56 of the ICA“lays down a positive rule
relating to frustration of contracts and the Courts cannot travel outside the terms of
that section”. Importantly, it was also held that Section 56 does not apply to lease
agreements. The Court drew a distinction between a “completed conveyance” and an
“executory contract”.
Given the law on this subject, the Court concluded that “a lease is a completed
conveyance though it involves monthly payment and hence, Section 56 cannot be
invoked to claim waiver, suspension or exemption from payment of rent” and
therefore, a lease has to be understood as “executed contracts” and not “executory
contracts”.
Thereafter, in the absence of any express/implied contract between the tenant and
landlord, the Court explored the applicability of Section 108(B)(e) of the TPA which
recognises the doctrine of force majeure.
The Court observed that Section 108 (B)(e) of the TPA would only be applicable in
the absence of any contractual stipulation between the parties and that the lease
would be void if, due to fire, tempest or flood, or violence of an army or of a mob, or
other irresistible force, “any material part of the property [of the property] be
wholly destroyed or rendered substantially and permanently unfit for the purposes
for which it was let”. (emphasis supplied).
Significantly, the Court went on to hold that the temporary non-use of the property
would not render it substantially and permanently unfit.
However, the Court concluded by holding that for a lessee to seek protection under
Section 108(B)(e), there has to be complete destruction of property of a permanent
nature destruction due to the force majeure event.
Having examined the TPA, the Court held that “in view of the above settled legal
position, temporary non-use of premises due to the lockdown which was announced
due to the COVID-19 outbreak cannot be construed as rendering the lease void
under Section 108(B)(e) of the TPA.” And further that the tenant cannot avoid
payment of rent
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Finally, the Court held that with regard to suspension of the rent, a tenant may
approach the Court by invoking the equitable jurisdiction of the Court. The Court
rightly held that such a question would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case.
The Court ultimately rejected the Urgent Application but allowed a postponement of
rent in view of the lockdown.
Page 99 of 170
Rambabu Singh Thakur v. Sunil Arora & Ors.

Citation - Contempt Pet. (C) No. 428 of 2019 in W.P(C) No. 536 of 2011 & Contempt
Pet. (C) No. 464 of 2019 in W.P(C) No. 536 of 2011
Bench - Rohinton Fali Nariman, S. Ravindra Bhat, V. Ramasubramanian
Date of Judgement: 13/02/2020
Facts of the Case
This is a contempt petition that raises serious concerns about India's criminalization
of politics. This also draws attention to the Supreme Court's disregard for the
directions given by a constitutional bench in Public interest foundation & Ors v.
Union of India & Anr.1. In Public interest foundation & Ors v. Union of India &
Anr.1, a BJP leader Ashwini Upadhyay and an NGO called "Public interest
foundation" filed a petition seeking directions from the Supreme Court of India on
the criminalization of politics and the barring of criminals from contesting elections.
The petitioner's major argument was that those who have been charged in a court of
law should be barred from running for office, and that this is for the good of the
general public. They were of the opinion that lawbreakers should be prevented from
becoming legislators because they had reduced India's political principles and ethics.
The right to vote in elections is a statutory right that must be exercised in accordance
with constitutional principles in order to ensure proper government and fair politics.
In light of the foregoing, the SC established a number of guidelines that must be
followed in order to maintain a healthy political society.
Issues
Whether the court can exert the disqualification of members of parliament by

making new laws on it which would be beyond Article 102(a) to (e).
Page 100 of 170

Laws
1. Separation of power – Separation of power is one of the basic features of the

Indian Constitution and making laws regarding such disqualification by the court
would be a violation of the above principle. The provision for disqualification of
members of parliament has already been provided under Representation of the
People Act, 1951.
2. Principle of presumption of innocence- This principle states that a person is
considered innocent until and unless he is proven guilty. So, disqualifying a
candidate on the ground that there are pending criminal cases against him would
be unjust.
3. The doctrine of Colourable legislation- This principle states that what cannot be
done directly can’t also be done indirectly.
4. Article 129- This article states that SC is the court of record and has the power to
punish for the contempt of itself.
5. Article 142- This article states that the SC in the exercise of its jurisdiction can
pass decrees and orders which are necessary for ensuring complete justice and
such orders and decrees are enforceable throughout the territory of India
Contentions made by the Petitioner
The petitioner argued that the right to run for office is a statutory right, not a
fundamental one, and that it must be exercised in accordance with constitutional
principles in order to maintain complete governance and unprejudiced politics. As a
result, a lawbreaker should be barred from becoming a lawmaker because such
people can degrade the ethics and values of politics.
Furthermore, it was suggested that a candidate with a criminal record should be

barred from running for office in the interest of the general public. Furthermore, the
petitioner argued that the Election Commissioner, acting on the court's direction,
should prohibit political parties from giving tickets to candidates with criminal
records.
Page 101 of 170

Contentions made by the Respondent
The respondent's argument was that the principle of separation of powers, which is
contained in the Indian Constitution, is properly implemented in India, and that the
legislature has the ability to make laws, while the courts' power to make laws is
confined to issuing guidelines or directives only. Furthermore, it was argued that
under Article 142, courts have no authority to add terms to already existing
legislation.
Judgement
After considering the doctrine of Colorable Legislation, the principle of Separation of

Powers, and the court's inability to issue a writ of Mandamus to the Election
Commissioner regarding the extension of the law of disqualification for a candidate
with a criminal background, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the
judiciary does not have the power to make laws. However, as established by Articles
129 and 142 of the Constitution, the court has the authority to offer directions or
guidance.
Taking into consideration the escalating criminalization in politics and insufficient

information about the increasing criminalization amongst the public, the Supreme
Court in order to cure such information lacunae has issued following 5 directions:-
Each candidate contesting the election must complete a form given by the Election
Commission, which must include all relevant information.
Any pending criminal cases against the candidate must be noted in bold characters in
the application.
It is the candidate's responsibility to inform the political party from which he is

running for election of any pending criminal charges against him.
It is the responsibility of the political party to post any information about candidates
with criminal records on its official website.
It shall be the responsibility of the candidate and the political party for which he is
running for election to make a statement about the candidate's criminal past in the
most widely circulated publication in the area. They are also required to widely
Page 102 of 170

market it in the electronic media, which implies that it must be publicised at least
three times after the nomination papers are filed.
After reviewing the papers on file and the arguments made by the petitioner's and
respondent's counsels, it was discovered that over the last four general elections,
there has been an alarming increase in the criminalization of politics. When political
parties were questioned about why a candidate with criminal history was chosen over
a qualified candidate with no criminal antecedents, they were unable to provide an
explanation.
The Bench, consisting of Justice R. F. Nariman & Justice S. Ravindra Bhatt after
perusal of above reasons issued 6 new directions under Article 129 and Article 142 of
the Constitution of India:-
It will be the responsibility of the national and state political parties to provide full
information regarding the criminal backgrounds of the candidates. Furthermore,
information about criminal antecedents must include the type of the offence, the
charges levelled against them, the case number, the court in which the case was filed,
and so on. In addition, the political party must explain why the candidate with
criminal history was chosen over a suitable candidate without criminal antecedents.
The justification for such selection shall be based on the candidate's merits,
qualifications, and accomplishments, rather than mere "winnability" at the polls.
Detailed information on the candidates' criminal histories will be publicly publicised

in local and national newspapers, as well as on social media platforms such as
Twitter and Facebook.
The foregoing information must be published within 48 hours of the candidate's

selection or no later than 2 weeks before the first day of filing the nomination,
whichever comes first.
It is the responsibility of the concerned political party to file a compliance report to

the Election Commission within 72 hours of the candidate's selection, following all of
the above-mentioned court directives.
Page 103 of 170

If the relevant political party fails to submit the compliance report, the Election
Commissioner has the authority to take the non-compliance of the report to the
Supreme Court of India as a case of contempt of the court's directions/orders.
Page 104 of 170

S. Kasi v. State through The Inspector of Police

Citation - Criminal Appeal No. 452 of 2020
Bench - Ashok Bhushan, M.R. Shah, V. Ramasubramanian
Date - 19 June, 2020
Facts of the Case
The appellant in this case is charged under Sections 457, 380, 457(2), 380(2), 411(2),
and 414(2) of the Indian Penal Code.
At the foregoing case, he was arrested on February 21, 2020, and held in Trichy's
Central Prison. On April 30, 2020, the trial court denied the appellant's bail
application under Section 439. After spending more than 73 days in judicial
detention, the appellant filed an application with the High Court of Judicature of
Madras at Madurai Bench, requesting that he be granted bail due to the passage of
time and the failure to file a charge sheet.The appellant argued before the High Court
that because the charge sheet had not been filed, the appellant was entitled to bail by
default under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
"...The Supreme Court order eclipses all provisions dictating term of limitation until
further orders," the High Court said, pointing to an order of this Court dated
23.03.2020 passed in Suo Moto W.P.(C) No.3 of 2020. Without a doubt, it exceeds
the time limit set forth in Section 17(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure." Thereby,
dismissing the bail application.
This appeal was filed after being aggrieved by the Madras High Court's ruling dated
11.05.2020.
Issues
Whether the appellant was entitled to bail under section 167(2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure since the prosecution failed to submit a charge sheet within the
statutory time frame.
Page 105 of 170

Laws

3. Indian Penal Code S. 411(2)
4. Indian Penal Code S. 414(2)
Contentions by the Appellant
The appellant's counsel argued that the High Court erred in concluding that this
Court's ruling dated 23.03.2020 extended the deadline for filing a charge sheet as
required by Section 167(2) Cr.P.C. He argued that the requirements of Section 167(2)
Cr.P.C. are for the protection of personal liberty, and that if the police do not file a
charge sheet within the specified time, the appellant is entitled to default bail.
Contentions by the Respondent
The State's learned counsel defended the impugned judgement, arguing that a charge
sheet could not be filed in the current case due to enormous difficulties in conducting
the investigation, and that the appellant is not entitled to use Section 167(2) in the
precarious situation that has arisen as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic.
Judgement
After hearing both sides, the Court held that the Learned Single Judge violated
judicial discipline by taking a position that was directly opposed to that taken by
another learned Single Judge in Settu versus The State. The alternative opinion
expressed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgement is not only
incorrect, but it also sends the wrong signals to the State and the prosecution,
encouraging them to act in violation of a person's liberty. The idea of comity of courts
must be followed by all courts, including the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
Even if a verdict is made by a Bench of a lesser coram, a Bench, whether coordinate
or larger, must refrain from expressing any uncharitable observations about it.
Following the aforesaid arguments, the Court reversed the learned Single Judge's
decision and ordered that appellant be freed on default bail with a personal bond of
Rs.10,000/- and two sureties to the satisfaction of the trial court.
Page 106 of 170

Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja

Citation - AIR 2020 SC 2483
Bench - Ashok Bhushan, Shubhash Reddy & M R Shah
Date – 15/10/2020
Introduction
The expression "shared family" was interpreted differently in this case under Section
2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. In Satish
Chander Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja, the court ruled that a wife had the right to live in a
shared house with her husband's relatives. This means that if the wife resides in the
house with her husband after their marriage, she has the right to acquire a residence
order in respect of the property that belongs to her in-laws. The Supreme Court's full
bench, which included Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice Shubhash Reddy, and Justice
Mr Shah, reached the decision.
In the infamous case of S.R. Batra vs. Taruna Batra, the Supreme Court knocked
down the more than a decade old jurisprudence adopted in India with respect
to'shared family' under the Domestic Violence Act.
Facts of the Case
Respondent Sneha Ahuja's father-in-law was appellant Satish Chandra Ahuja.

Raveen Ahuja, his son, married the respondent in 1995 and moved into the first floor
of a house purchased by the appellant in 1983.
Raveen moved out in July 2014 due to marital strife and began living with his
parents on the ground floor.
Raveen filed a divorce case against Sneha on the grounds of cruelty on November 28,
2014.
Sneha filed an application under section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act on

November 20, 2015, accusing Raveen, the appellant, and her mother-in-law
Premkant of domestic violence. She accused the defendants of serious emotional and
Page 107 of 170

mental abuse and asked the court for multiple reliefs under the Domestic Violence
Act of 2005.
The trial court issued an injunction prohibiting the defendants from separating her
from the rest of the family.
Sneha was sued separately by the appellant for a mandatory and permanent
injunction.
Issues
1. Is it correct to interpret the term of shared family in section 2(s) of the Protection
of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to mean that a shared family can
only be a joint family or one in which the husband serves as a victim?
2. Is it correct that the High Court found that the appellant's suit could not be
decreed under Order XII, Rule 6, CPC?
3. Whether or not the plaintiff in this case might be referred to as a respondent
under Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act of 2005?
4. Whether the aggrieved person's husband (the defendant) is a necessary party in
the plaintiff's lawsuit against the defendant or not?
5. Whether or whether the aggrieved party's husband (the defendant) is a necessary
party in the plaintiff's lawsuit against the defendant?
6. What effect do orders made under Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act of
2005 have?
7. Whether or not the interim or final proceedings initiated in the Civil Court had
competent jurisdiction?
Laws
1. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Section 2(f)

2. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Section 2(s)
3. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Section 2(q)
4. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Section 12(a)
5. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Section 12(b)
6. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Section 17
7. Domestic Violence Act, 2005 Section 19
Page 108 of 170

Arguments of the Petitioners
The petitioner argued that the defendant’s possession as daughter-in-law during the
duration of the marriage with the son was permitted in nature, and that the
defendant had no right to claim the right of residency against the petitioner. The
husband's in-laws are under no obligation to support him during his lifetime.
The petitioner also objected, claiming that the property he owns is not a shared
house, and hence the son has no claim to it.
It was also claimed that the son and daughter-in-law merely had free licences. As a
result, the defendant could only claim the right of residency in the joint family's
property and was not entitled to the husband's father's property.
The petitioner sought a decree of compulsory injunction against the defendant to

evict her from the first floor of the property, as well as a decree of permanent
injunction in favour of the petitioner and against the defendant, prohibiting the
defendant, her agents, and employees from interfering with or obstructing the
petitioner's right to the suit property in any way, and preventing him from interfering
in the petitioner's peaceful possession of the suit property.
It was argued that the broad interpretation of shared household would lead to
anarchy in society, posing a threat to the society's peace and harmony.
It was also argued that in order to balance the parties' rights, harmonised
construction should be used as interpretation in the case.
Arguments by the Defendants
The defendant referred to Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and stated
that she was in a domestic relationship with the appellant, and that the appellant was
the respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q), and that a charge of domestic
violence was levelled against him in the petition.
A complaint case was also filed by the defendant under Section 12 of the Domestic
Violence Act of 2005.
Page 109 of 170

The defendant filed an application under Rule 12 and Rule 14 of the CPC, Order XI,
for the production of documents.
According to the defendant, the suit property is a shared house under Section 2(s) of
the Act, 2005, and she has the right to remain there.
Judgement
It was decided that the word "shared family" should be read in accordance with the
law's general implication. As a result, the phrase "shared family" shall refer to any
household in which a victim of domestic abuse has resided for a set amount of time,
regardless of the holder's initial title and interest in the property and without
consideration to such forms of construction. The Supreme Court granted the
respondent relief and applied the literal rule of interpretation to determine what a
shared family is or can be, taking into account the basic laws of the Domestic
Violence Act of 2005. The Bench found that Section 2(s) of the Domestic Violence
Act, 2005, constituted an all-inclusive definition when read in conjunction with
Sections 17 and 19. It granted the aggrieved woman the right of residency
notwithstanding the fact that she had no stake or title in the property. It essentially
said that, even though the matrimonial home was registered in the name of the
husband or his relatives, the woman was able to lodge a legal claim on it under the
Domestic Violence Act of 2005.
Page 110 of 170

Satish Ragde v. State of Maharashtra

Court - Bombay High Court
Bench - Pushpa V. Ganediwala
Date of the Judgement - 19th January, 2021
“The case involves a 12-year-old girl who was sexually harassed. The circumstantial
evidence as well as the testimony of the witnesses were taken into consideration by
the Nagpur Joint Additional Sessions Judge. After recording his conviction under
Sections 342, 363, and 354 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as Section 8 of the
POCSO Act, the Special Court sentenced the accused to three years of solitary
confinement and a fine of Rs.1500/-“.
Facts of the Case
On the 14.12.2016, the prosecutrix, who was about 12 years old at the time, went to
bring guava but did not return for a long time, prompting her mother to go out and
look for her. Their next-door neighbour informed the mother that she had witnessed
the accused bringing the prosecutrix to his home and showed her around. When the
mother arrived at the house, she inquired about her daughter's location, which the
accused denied knowing. The mother became suspicious and searched the accused's
home. She discovered her daughter screaming in a room that was locked from the
outside while checking the first level. She was taken outside by her mother. The
prosecutrix was terrified, and she quickly told her mother about how the accused
lured her into his house on the guise of giving her guava, touched her breast, and she
screamed as he tried to remove her salwar. The mother immediately filed a police
report against the accused. The charge-sheet was filed before the Special POCSO
Court in Nagpur after the police conducted an inquiry.
The Special Court found the accused guilty of outraging a girl's modesty, kidnapping,
and unlawful confinement under Sections 354, 363, and 342 of the IPC, as well as
sexual assault under Section 8 of the POCSO Act, and sentenced him to three years in
prison and a fine of Rs500.
Page 111 of 170

Issues
1. Whether the Accused shall be held guilty for sexual harassment under section 7 &
8 of the POCSO Act?
2. Whether pressing prosecutrix breast without having a skin-to-skin contact be
considered under the definition of Sexual Assault provided in Section 7 of the
POCSO Act and punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act?
3. Whether ‘attempt to remove salwar’ of the prosecutrix would fall within the
definition of ‘sexual assault’ as defined under Section 7 and punishable under
Section 8 of the POCSO Act?
Laws
1. Section 7 of POCSO Act,

2. Section 8 of POCSO Act
3. Section 342 of Indian Penal CodeSection 354 of Indian Penal Code
4. Section 361 & 363 of Indian Penal Code,
5. Section 313 of Criminal Procedure Code
6. Section 428 of Criminal Procedure Code
7. Section 6 of Indian Evidence Act
The Appellant's (accused's) counsel aggressively opposed the underage girl's

mother's testimony. He said she was a hearsay witness who had not personally
witnessed the occurrence. As a result, her testimony may have some flaws that lead
to the conclusion that the crime was done in a cruel manner.
He also disputed the girl's mental competence, which the learned trial Court noticed
when recording her testimony. He claimed that the small girl's behaviour indicated
that she lacked mental competence.
The Appellant's Counsel argued that the prosecution-proven conduct of "pressing of

breast" does not fall within the ambit of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO
Act. The prosecution does not contend that the appellant took off her top and
touched her breast. As a result, there is no direct physical contact, i.e., skin-to-skin
contact with sexual intent that does not result in penetration.
Page 112 of 170

The testimony of the three witnesses, namely the Minor girl, her mother, and their
neighbour, was presented by the state's counsel.
When the minor and her mother testify about the incident, it is clear that both agree
that the appellant touched the prosecutrix's breast and attempted to remove her
salwar.
He also read from Section 7 of the POCSO Act, which defines "Sexual Assault."
Which makes it obvious that a 'physical touch with sexual intent without penetration'
is a required element of the crime.
Furthermore, on the basis of the idea of "ejusdem generic," the phrase "any other
act" encompasses the types of acts that are equivalent to the activities expressly listed
in the definition. The next act should be of a similar nature to the preceding one. As a
result, the accused's actions came within the scope of section 7 of the POCSO Act,
and he should be penalised for Sexual Assault under section 8 of the POCSO Act.
Decision of the Court
The honourable court state that the learned counsel was unable to prove from the
record that the minor girl's mother and the little girl's evidence could not be
considered or that they were not competent witnesses. The girl's responses to the
questions were not irrational. Furthermore, she informed her mother about the
incident as soon as it occurred, and the First Information Report was filed as a result.
Both mother and daughter's testimony are consistent and valid under section 6 of the
Evidence Act, implying that the Res gestate principle would apply.
The Court further reasoned that, according to the definition of'sexual assault,' a
'physical touch with sexual intent without penetration' is a crucial component of the
crime, and that more proof and more serious claims are required.
The Court further observed that it is uncertain whether the accused removed the top
of the prosecutrix or inserted his hand while grabbing her breasts, indicating that
there was no direct physical contact or "Skin-to-Skin" contact between the accused
and the victim as defined by section 7 of the POCSO Act. The act perpetrated by the
Page 113 of 170

accused appears to come under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code's definition of
"outraging the modesty of a woman."
The accused was found not guilty under section 8 of the POCSO Act and was
sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of Rs500 for outraging the prosecutrix's
modesty and illegally confining her under sections 354 and 342 of the IPC. In
addition, the accused was served with a non-bailable warrant.
Page 114 of 170

Saurabh Sharma v. Sub Divisional Magistrate

Citation - W.P. (C) 6595/2020
Bench - Prathiba M Singh
Date - 7th April 2021
Facts of the Case
In this case, the Delhi High Court has merged four separate petitions into a single
one. Despite having his mouth and nose covered with a scarf while driving in his car,
the petitioner claimed he was stopped. His counsel further informed the court that
the challan contains no information about the offense's date, time, or even the nature
of the offence. The sub-inspector issued the challan, the magistrate pre-stamped and
signed the challan booklet, and he received no acknowledgment for the cash he paid
for the challan.
Issues
Is it necessary to wear a mask even if the driver is alone in the car?
Laws
1. Sec.2 of Epidemic Diseases Act: Powers of Central Government.

2. Sec. 3(l) of the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Prohibition of
Advertisement and Regulation of Trade and Commerce, Production, Supply, and
Distribution) Act, 2003: Definition of the public place.
3. Sec. 188 of the Indian Penal Code: Disobedience to order duly promulgated by the
public servant.
4. Sec. 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code: Conditional order for removal of the
nuisance. Sec. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code: Prosecution for contempt of
lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice, and
offenses relating to documents given in evidence.
5. Sec. 22(2) of Disaster Management Act: Power to issue guidelines in various
forms to ensure non-spreading of disease and mitigation of disease.
Page 115 of 170

6. Sec. 24 of Disaster Management Act: Powers and functions of State Executive

Committee in the event of threatening disaster situation.
7. Sec. 35 of Disaster Management Act: Central Government to take measures.
Contentions by the Appellants
The appellants' counsel argued that the 2020 Regulations are in conflict with the
April Order. While the April Order clearly stated that face masks must be worn in
cars, the counsel argued that the Regulations of 2020 deal with the wearing of face
masks or covers in public places in general.
The appellants' counsel argued that because an automobile occupied by one person is
not a public venue, a mask is not required to be worn.
The GNCTD's counsel relied on Section 2 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, which
allowed the State Government to issue temporary regulations to be followed by the
public during times when a dangerous epidemic disease was on the verge of erupting,
if it was deemed necessary to prevent the outbreak or spread of the disease.
The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare's counsel argued that 'Public Health and
Sanitation' is listed in List 2 of the VII Schedule of the Indian Constitution and is
thus the sole duty of each state.
The lawyer also said that the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare had not released
any recommendations requiring people to wear masks while driving alone in a car.
The State Executive Committee implements the guidelines established in relation to
disaster management in the local context under the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
Judgement
After hearing the arguments of the appellants and respondents, the court decided
that a person travelling alone in a vehicle or car could be exposed to the virus in a
variety of ways. Before entering the car or vehicle, the defendant may have visited a
market, workplace, hospital, or busy street, according to the court. A person in this
situation could be required to keep windows open for ventilation. The court ruled
that, given the pandemic and the requirement to wear face masks, the authorities
Page 116 of 170

must take all necessary steps to ensure that the requirement is followed. The court
further found that, as advocates/lawyers, all four appellants in these circumstances
should acknowledge and assist in the execution of pandemic-prevention measures
rather than disputing them. Based on the foregoing viewpoints, the court determined
that the writ petitions lacked merit and dismissed them. According to the Court, the
mask functions as a "Suraksha kavach," protecting both the person wearing it and
those around them. The court further stated that "Wearing a mask has been
recommended by scientists and international governments. The pandemic posed a
significant problem, and whether or not a person is vaccinated, wearing face masks is
essential ".
Page 117 of 170

Shafin Jahan v. Asokan KM

Bench - D.Y. Chandrachud, A.M. Khanwilkar, Arun Mishra
Date - 8th March, 2018.
Facts of the Case
Hadiya Jahan, whose real name was Akhila Ashokan, was born a Hindu. When she
was studying Homeopathy (BHMS) at Shivraj Homeopathic Medical College, Salem
in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, she converted to Islam. She shared a residence with two
of her friends, Jaseena and Faseena. At the age of twenty-five, she married a Muslim
man named Shafin Jahan. Mr. Ashokan, Hadiya's father, discovered on January 6,
2016, that her daughter had been influenced by someone to change her religion from
Hindu to Muslim. Mr Ashokan filed a police case with the S.P. Malappuram District
after learning of his daughter's marriage. He then went to the High Court and filed a
habeas corpus case, claiming that the marriage was invalid since his daughter was
misled and forced to convert to Islam.
The petition was dismissed by a divisional bench of the High Court, which stated that
Hadiya had specifically affirmed her marriage to Shafin Jahan and her conversion to
Islam. Hadiya testified before the High Court that she had accepted Islam as her
religion of choice and had resided in Mallapuram at the Sathyasarani Education
Charitable Trust. As a result, the High Court found that Hadiya was not illegally
detained by Shafin Jahan and that she had the freedom to do so.
The Kerala High Court ruled that Hadiya and Shafin Jahan's marriage is a fake and
of no consequence." After seven months, Ashokan filed a new writ (habeas corpus)
case in the High Court, claiming that his daughter had been forcibly converted to
Islam and was about to be deported. The High Court found in Mr Ashokan's favour,
stating that it is the father's responsibility to preserve custody of his daughter until
she is able to understand her acts. The court exercised parens patriae jurisdiction,
stating that it was for the child's welfare at such a young age. The court further ruled
that a 24-year-old girl can be readily exploited since she is weak and fragile. As a
Page 118 of 170

result, the court declared the marriage null and unlawful and granted Hadiya's
parents custody, despite Hadiya's opposition.
Issues
1. Whether the High Court has the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India to annul and void the marriage of an adult?
2. Whether the petitioner had a right cause to file a writ petition of Habeas Corpus
before the High Court?
3. Whether a National Investigating Agency probe ordered by the Kerala High Court
was necessary?
4. Whether women or men have to take prior approval from their parents if they are
above the age of eighteen and twenty-one respectively?
Arguments And Judgement
The High Court has the authority conferred by the Indian Constitution under Article
226 to enforce the rights guaranteed in Part III of the Indian Constitution, as well as
for any other purpose. He has claimed that the High Court has broad authority to
declare a marriage null and void if the court determines that the marriage was
solemnised under dubious and suspicious circumstances. The power of the High
Court to grant the writ of Habeas Corpus, according to D.D. Basu's commentary on
Halsbury's Laws of England, is that "the writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum,
unlike any other writ, is a prerogative writ and used in extraordinary remedies where
the legal ordinary remedies are inadequate."
The writ of Habeas Corpus can only be given in certain cases and under certain
circumstances. In the case of Shafin Jahan v. K. M. Ashokan, the Kerala High Court
dismissed the initial petition on the grounds that her daughter Hadiya affirmed the
marriage and converted to Islam willingly and without force. The principle of Habeas
Corpus was developed to defend an individual's liberty and offer immense powers to
the courts to implement it in the most effective manner and to secure justice,
according to the case of Ummu Sabeena v. State of Kerala and Others.
Following this, Mr K.M. Ashokan filed a Habeas Corpus writ case in the Kerala High
Court to prevent her daughter Hadiya and her husband Shafin Jahan from leaving
Page 119 of 170

India and to seek custody of her daughter. The complaint was apparently filed under
the guise of 'love jihad.' He filed the petition to prevent her daughter from converting
illegally and fleeing the country as her father's 'locus standi.' The High Court agreed
with her father's claims and determined that the 24-year-old girl is weak and
vulnerable to being exploited by others. They are fragile, and significant parental
engagement is required while making crucial life decisions.
The court also applied the principle of Parens Patriae jurisdiction, noting that it was
worried about Hadiya's life and wellbeing at this age, and granted Hadiya's custody
to her parents for her welfare and benefit. The Kerala High Court further ruled that
solemnising a marriage is the most important decision a person can make, and that it
should be done with the active participation of both parents. Hadiya and Shafin
Jahan's marriage is a farce and has no legal standing. The marriage was declared null
and void by the High Court, and Hadiya was given to her parents for her benefit.
It is a well-established principle that courts can exercise Parens Patriae jurisdiction,

but this power comes with a caveat: this doctrine limits the decision-making
autonomy of living parents in relation to their children, which must be kept in mind,
and courts cannot apply this doctrine in every case.
Shafin Jahan, who was dissatisfied with the Kerala High Court's verdict, appealed to
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, in an interim ruling signed by Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, ruled
that the High Court's decision in the Hadiya marriage case was not justifiable in the
eyes of the law, and that the High Court bench had used its inherent powers in excess
of its judicial powers. The court went on to say that the High Court's jurisdiction to
annul the marriage in the writ petition of Habeas Corpus over the case ends when the
person for whom the writ of Habeas Corpus was filed appears in court with the
willingness to do as they please, indicating their free will, which is protected under
the Indian constitution.
As a result, it is the High Court's responsibility to preserve the fundamental rights

guaranteed by the Indian Constitution. As a result, the High Court's decision to annul
Hadiya and Shafin Jahan's marriage was contrary to Indian constitutional principles
and outside its authority.
Page 120 of 170

The Supreme Court's question aroused worries about the need for a federal probe
into the case. In 2017, the Supreme Court ordered the National Investigation Agency
to investigate the matter to determine whether it is part of a larger conspiracy or a
single incident.
The Supreme Court cited the case of Bharati Tamang v. Union of India, which lays
forth the principles for promoting and ensuring successful prosecution by the courts.
The courts have a broad variety of powers to prevent miscarriages of justice, and they
can direct that the case be investigated by the National Investigation Agency if
required. As a result, the Supreme Court stated that when a matter is complex and
involves a suspicious chain of events, High Courts have the authority to issue an
order for investigation.
The dispute over 'love jihad' is politically and socially motivated, with nefarious
intentions. In fact, Indian law encourages inter-caste marriages, sometimes known
as "Love Jihad." The Special Marriage Act of 1954 was enacted in India to regulate
inter-caste marriages. As a result, it's remarkable that the Kerala High Court was
persuaded in the first place by the girl and boy's statements. The Apex Court also
found the Kerala High Court's judgement that "marriage is a significant decision that
must be taken along with the parents" to be unclear and incorrect.
Because there was no undue influence on the girl, the High Court judgement to annul
the marriage and give custody to her parents was erroneous and in violation of the
Indian Constitution's core principles.
As a result, the Supreme Court ruled in Shafin Jahan's favour, saying that the
marriage was lawful and that she did not require her parents' consent because she
had reached the age of majority.
Page 121 of 170

Shafin Jahan v. K. M. Ashokan

Citation - Criminal Appeal No. 366 of 2018 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5777 of
2017)
Bench - Dipak Misra , A.M. Khanwilkar , DY Chandrachud
Date of Judgement - 8 March, 2018
“The case of Shafin Jahan v. K. M. Ashokan, popularly known as Hadiya's case,

concerns inter-caste marriage and the right of a woman to marry. The case directs
and leads an individual's independence and liberty. The case was dubbed the "Love
Jihad case" by the media. The case raised concerns about women's rights to marry
against their parents' wishes. The father of Hadiya submitted some points and claims
that complicated the case. He claimed that Shafin Jahan persuaded her to alter her
faith, and he also expressed fear that she was being moved out of India.
K.M Ashokan used the writ of Habeas Corpus to challenge the validity of the
marriage and her daughter's conversion to Islam before a divisional bench of the
Kerala High Court. The petition was dismissed by the High Court. Following that, a
new writ petition was filed, and the High Court ruled in the petitioner's favour. The
case was taken to the Supreme Court, which on April 9, 2018, overturned the Kerala
High Court's decision.”
Facts of the Case
Hadiya Jahan, whose real name was Akhila Ashokan, was born a Hindu. When she
was studying Homeopathy (BHMS) at Shivraj Homeopathic Medical College, Salem
in Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, she converted to Islam. She shared a residence with two
of her friends, Jaseena and Faseena. At the age of twenty-five, she married a Muslim
man named Shafin Jahan. Mr. Ashokan, Hadiya's father, discovered on January 6,
2016, that her daughter had been inspired by someone to change her religion from
Hindu to Muslim. After finding out about the marriage of her daughter, Mr Ashokan
filed a police complaint before S.P. Malappuram District. He then moved to High
Page 122 of 170

court and filed a habeas corpus petition challenging the validity of the marriage on
the ground of misleading and forcing his daughter to become a Muslim.
The petition was dismissed by a divisional bench of the High Court, which stated that
Hadiya had specifically declared her marriage to Sahfin Jahan and her conversion to
Islam. Hadiya testified before the High Court that she had accepted Islam as her
religion of choice and had resided in Mallapuram at the Sathyasarani Education
Charitable Trust. As a result, the High Court determined that Hadiya was not illegally
imprisoned by Sahfin Jahan and that she had the freedom to do so. The Kerala High
Court ruled that Hadiya and Sahfin Jahan's marriage is a fake and of no
consequence." After seven months, Ashokan filed a new writ (habeas corpus) case in
the High Court, claiming that his daughter had been forcibly converted to Islam and
was about to be deported. The High Court found in Mr Ashokan's favour, stating that
it is the father's responsibility to preserve custody of his daughter until she is able to
understand her acts. The court exercised parens patriae jurisdiction, stating that it
was for the child's welfare at such a young age. The court further ruled that a 24-
year-old girl can be readily exploited since she is weak and fragile. As a result, the
court declared the marriage null and unlawful and granted Hadiya's parents custody,
despite Hadiya's opposition.
Issues
1. Whether the High Court has the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India to annul and void the marriage of an adult?
2. Whether the petitioner had a right cause to file a writ petition of Habeas Corpus
before the High Court?
3. Whether a National Investigating Agency probe ordered by the Kerala High Court
was necessary?
4. Whether women or men have to take prior approval from their parents if they are
above the age of eighteen and twenty-one respectively?
Page 123 of 170

Contentions made by the Appellants
The High Court's decision, which annulled the marriage between two adults of sound
mind, breached Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, which contains the right to
marriage for all adults as well as the right to profess and practise any religion of one's
choosing. The counsel for Respondent No. 1 has attempted to portray the current
issue as a matter of jihad and to link it to communalism, which is not the case, and
such an attempt is being made to divert attention away from society's law and order.
In such instances, the courts can exercise their 'Parens Patrie jurisdiction.' It was not
the right time to use it in this situation. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted if a
person is detained against their will and must be brought before a court. Hadiya, who
was said to have been forcibly dentented, had appeared before the court as and when
the court requested. She had not been imprisoned against her will. The court's
decision to retain her in a required stay with her parents, on the other hand, was a
violation of her rights and a case of forcible imprisonment.
Because this is one of the most serious examples of love jihad, hearings will be held
in camera to ensure confidentiality and security.
The appellant attempted to take Hadiya to Syria and brainwashed her in the process
while she met him on an internet site called "ready for nikah" and was away from her
parents at the same time.
She is weak and defenceless, therefore marrying her without her parents' consent is
not the proper decision.
By exercising its 'Parens Patriae Jurisdiction,' the court will order Akhila to remain
with her parents, who are her only sincere and well-wishers.
The marriage should also be deemed null and void because it was formed under
duress.
Page 124 of 170

Judgement
In this case, the Supreme Court overturned a Kerala High Court decision declaring
Hadiya and Shafin Jahan's marriage null and void. The Supreme Court upheld the
marriage, ruling that the NIA's investigation into the marriage and any other
criminality should continue, but that there should be no interference with the
marriage. The ruling was delivered by a three-judge bench consisting of Chief Justice
Deepak Misra, Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, and Justice DY Chandrachud, and Hadiya
was removed from her parents' custody against her will. After she declared her desire
to continue her education, the judge ordered her to return to college.
Page 125 of 170

Shafiya Khan and Shakuntala Prajapati v. State

of UP
Bench - Ajay Rastogi, Abhay S. Oka
Date - February 10, 2022
Facts of the Case
At the age of 17, the appellant married Shiv Gobind Prajapati, with whom she never
stayed. In Gobind's divorce petition, it was admitted that the marriage was never
consummated and that the marriage was dissolved through Village Panchayat in
2014. He then married another woman, Suman Prajapati, and this marriage was
dissolved and annulled by the families of appellant and Shiv Gobind Prajapati
because it was voidable under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and Section
3 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006.
The appellant, who considered her marriage to be annulled for all practical reasons,
met Mohd. Shameem Khan while studying in Lucknow, and they married under
Sharia law in front of her late husband's entire family, including the second
respondent/complainant, despite her family's wishes. The appellant had a son as a
result of this marriage. Unfortunately, her husband died, and after obtaining a
succession certificate in her name and no protest from her mother-in-law to Mohd.
Shameem Khan's employer, she was hired as an Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (A.N.M.) at
King George Medical University in Lucknow on humanitarian grounds.
Her late husband's whole gratuity payment of Rs.4,60,000/- was sent to her mother-
in-bank law's account. She was later ejected from her matrimonial home, where she
had an eleven-month-old kid. An FIR was filed against the appellant for offences
under sections 494, 495, 416, 420, 504 & 506 IPC after more than a year, at the
request of the second respondent. The appellant was given anticipatory bail, and
when the charge-sheet was issued, the Trial Judge took notice of it and summoned
the appellant, who then petitioned the High Court u/s 482 CrPC for quashing of the
proceedings, which was denied. As a result, the current appeal.
Page 126 of 170

Issues
Whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant can be quashed under
Section 482 Cr.P.C.?
Laws

2. Section 482, Cr.P.C.
3. Section 494, IPC
4. Section 495, IPC
5. Section 416, IPC
6. Section 420, IPC
7. Section 506, IPC
8. Section 504, IPC
Arguments
It was submitted by the counsel of appellants that there is no evidence to support

what is alleged in the complaint by respondent no. 2 on the basis of which a FIR was
filed, and that even if what is stated in the FIR is taken at face value, none of the
charges levelled against the appellant in the charge-sheet are prima facie made out. If
the criminal proceedings against her are allowed to continue at this stage, it will be
nothing more than a clear abuse of the legal process and mental harassment to the
appellant, especially since she is not only trying to keep her job, but she is also trying
to care for her minor son as the sole breadwinner of her family, and further submits
that the High Court has not even looked into the prima facie allegations levelled in
the FIR on the basis of the facts.
Judgement
The Supreme Court after hearing the contentions of the parties held that the law on
the subject of exercising the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the
Constitution or the inherent power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure
Code is well settled, and to the best of their knowledge, this Court has defined
sufficiently channelled guidelines to provide an exhaustive list of the various types of
cases in which such power should be exercised.
Page 127 of 170

The ability to quash criminal proceedings should be used sparingly and with caution,
and only in the most exceptional of circumstances, according to the Court, and such
inherent rights do not impose any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according
to its whims and fancies.
Justice Rastogi noted that the complainant had not provided any evidence to support
the bald claims made in the complaint, on the basis of which a FIR was filed.
The documentary evidence on record clearly shows that the Appellant's Nikah Nama
was properly registered and issued by a competent body, and the charge sheet
submitted against her does not prima facie reveal how the marriage certificate was
falsified, the Bench remarked.
As a result, the Supreme Court granted the appeal and quashed the criminal
proceedings against the appellant based on the FIR.
Page 128 of 170

Shakti Vahini v. Union of India

Citation - Writ Petition (Civil) No. 231 of 2010
Bench - Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud
Date - 27th March, 2018
In the case of Shakti Vahini v Union of India, the court established guidelines for the
government to follow in order to eradicate honour killing in India.
An honour killing is the homicide of a family member by other family members

because the attackers believe the victim has brought disgrace or dishonour to the
family by violating the principles of a community or religion.
Facts of the Case
An NGO named Shakti Vahini approached the Supreme Court, requesting that the
government take preventative measures to deal with honour killings. The writ
petition was filed under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, requesting that the
respondents—the state and central governments—take preventive measures to
combat honour crimes, submit a National and State Plan of Action to combat such
crimes, and further direct the state governments to establish special cells in each
district that couples can approach for their safety and well-being.
In addition, prayers have been offered for a writ of mandamus to be issued to the
state governments, ordering them to prosecute each case of honour killing and to
take appropriate measures to ensure that all such honour crimes and embedded evil
in the mindset of certain members of society are dealt with appropriately.
Issue
Whether the elders of the family can be allowed to kill the young for marrying against
their wishes and against the customary practices?
Page 129 of 170

Arguments of the Petitioner
The petitioners claimed that the IPC did not adequately deal with honour killings.
Khap panchayats have no remorse or qualms about performing such crimes.
It was also argued that crimes such as honour killings are in violation of Article 21.
It was argued that honour takes precedence over the wishes of two consenting adults,
and that they are treated inhumanely as a result of their decision.
Arguments of the Respondent
The Union government stated that it is collaborating with state governments to

either amend the IPC or develop new legislation to address honour crimes.
It is also stated that the 'Prohibition of Interference with the Freedom of Matrimonial
Alliance Bill' is being considered (Recommended by LC 242nd report).
Judgement
In this instance, the court stated that two consenting adults do not require the
agreement of their families or elders to marry. Any attempt by the Khap panchayat or
any other authority to prevent them from marrying each other is also illegal. "Class
honour, however conceived, cannot smother an individual's right to make a decision
that he or she is entitled to by our compassionate constitution," the court states.
The Supreme Court, citing the Law Commission's 242nd report, stated that the
destructive impact is not the only sort of crime imposed by Khap panchayat. It is a
type of crime motivated by honour. Any form of honor-based crime intended to stifle
a person's desire for a love marriage is prohibited.
Arumgam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu6 was also cited, which held that honour
killing in this sense violates individual liberty and freedom of choice.
6
Arumgam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu, Criminal Appeal No. 959 of 2011
Page 130 of 170

Directives Issued by the Court
Preventive Measures
The state government has been asked to identify regions where occurrences of
killings or Kaph panchayat assembly have been reported in the last five years.
Superintendents of police in certain areas must be more vigilant in the event of inter-
religious or inter-caste weddings in the area.
If a police officer learns of a Khap panchayat meeting in the area, he or she should
tell his or her superior officer as well as the Deputy/ Superintendent of Police.
DSP/SP must be present when such information is received, and he must notify the
members that they must not take any action that would endanger the couple or their
family. Each member will be held criminally accountable if such a decision is made.
If the DSP has grounds to believe that the meeting cannot be avoided or that the
couple would be harmed as a result of his interactions with members of the Khap, he
can report to the DM/SDM and request an order under sections 144 and 151 of the
CrPC.
To sensitise law enforcement authorities, the Home Department and state

governments must collaborate. They must include all statistics.
Stakeholders are people who are involved in the process. Institutional mechanisms
should be in place to coordinate with all parties.
Remedial Measures
If the Khap panchayat makes a decision against a couple despite the precautions, a
FIR should be filed.
Police have also been asked to conduct an effective investigation into the charge
made in the FIR, offer protection to the couple/family, and if necessary, arrange for
their marriage to be conducted under police protection.
The state government should establish 'safe residences' for such couples.
Page 131 of 170

The DM/S shall entrust an Addl. SP with the task of conducting a preliminary
investigation to determine the validity, nature, and intensity of the threat after
receiving a report from a couple/family that any hap panchayat is opposing their
marriage. He is supposed to send a report to the SP once he is satisfied with the
threat's veracity.
Failure by police or district authorities to follow the aforementioned instructions will

be regarded an intentional act of carelessness or misconduct, for which departmental
action must be taken and completed within six months.
Officials who were aware of the incident but did nothing to prevent it or who did not
respond immediately when one occurred will face disciplinary action (Arumugam
Servai v. State of TN).
It is necessary to establish special cells and 24-hour helplines.
Honor killings and domestic violence crimes should be prosecuted quickly. This
directive also applies to pending cases, which must be completed within six months.
Page 132 of 170

Shayara Bano v. Union of India and Ors.

Citation - AIR 2017 9 SCC 1 (SC)
Court - Supreme court of India
Bench – Jagdish Singh Khehar, S. Abdul Nazeer, Rohinton Fali Niraman, Uday U
Lalit, K.M. Joseph.
Date - 22nd August, 2017
Facts of the Case
Talaq e biddat is a procedure that allows a man to divorce his wife without her
consent by saying talaq three times in one sitting. Nikah halala is a procedure in
which a divorced woman who wants to remarry her spouse must marry a second
husband and get divorce from him before returning to her first husband. Polygamy,
on the other hand, is a practise that allows Muslim men to have many wives.
The Supreme Court of India asked Shayara Bano, the Union of India, several
women's rights organisations, and the all-India Muslim personal law body to submit
written submissions on the issues of talaq-e-biddat, nikah halala, and polygamy by
February 16, 2017. Ms Bano's claim that these practises are unlawful was endorsed
by the Union of India and women's rights organisations such as Bebaak Collective
and Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan. The AIMPLB has argued that uncodified
Muslim personal law is not susceptible to judicial examination under the
constitution, and that these are vital Islamic religious traditions protected under
Article 25 of the constitution.
On March 30, 2017, the Apex court convened a five-judge constitutional bench after
accepting Sahara Bano's appeal. The first hearing took place on May 11th, 2017. The
five-judge court issued its judgement in the triple talaq case on August 22, 2017,
calling the practise unlawful by a 3:2 majority.
Issues
1. Is Talaq-e-biddat a form of Islam?
Page 133 of 170

2. Whether the Muslim Personal Legislation (Shariat) Act, 1937 gives statutory
character on the subjects controlled by it, or is it still covered by Personal Law,
which is not law under Article 13 of the Constitution, as earlier Supreme Court
decisions have held?
3. Is it protected by the Constitution's Article 25?
Laws
1. Article 14:- equality before the law

2. Article 15(1):- prohibition of discrimination including on the ground of gender
3. Article 21:- right to life and 21(a) right to education
4. Article 25:- freedom of religion
5. Section 125 of CrPC: - Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.
Shayara Bano was represented by Mr. Amit Chadha in the matter of Shayara Bano v.
Union of India. According to Shayara Bano's senior lawyer, the Muslim personal law
(shariat) application legislation of 1937 does not recognise triple talaq as a sort of
divorce. He cites several high court and supreme court decisions that have reduced
Muslim men's unilateral power to divorce women, and he condemns the practise of
triple talaq, which he believes is not sanctioned by the Quran.
Furthermore, this judgement affirms that the Quran allows for divorce for good
reason if it is followed by a reconciliation attempt. He urged the court to declare
triple talaq unconstitutional, alleging that it breaches Articles 14 and 15 of the Indian
Constitution by granting Muslim men unrestricted divorce rights.
He concluded by adding that if triple talaq is repealed, the Muslim marital

dissolution act of 1939 will be the rule of divorce for Muslims, which will apply to all
Muslims, regardless of gender.
Mr. Kapil Sibal first states that the Shariat Act of 1937 does not specify substantive
Muslim personal law, but it does reiterate that the Sharia will apply as a rule of law to
Muslims, regardless of any tradition or practise to the contrary. The act's goal, he
Page 134 of 170

argued, was to abolish conventions that discriminated against women when it came
to inheritance. Furthermore, because marriage is a private transaction ruled by
Islamic law, no public regulation may change it.
Mr. Sibal claims that personal laws are not included in the idea of law under Article
13 based on arguments made in the Constituent Assembly. He pointed out that the
assembly had rejected an amendment that would have added "and anything else" to
the definition of the law under consideration, as well as the addition of such law
under Article 13. The concurrent list's unambiguous reference to personal law and its
removal from Article 13 reflect the constitution's authors' desire to exclude personal
law, he claims.
He argued that the constitution empowers Parliament to enact social reform laws
affecting secular activities involving religious practises. As a result, a court can only
rule on the law's legitimacy after it has been passed by Parliament. Mr. Sibal cited the
collection of money in a temple as an example of secular activity.
Mr. Sibal concluded his remarks by claiming that Muslim women are not
discriminated against as a result of the triple talaq practise, and that they may even
benefit from immediate relief from bad marriages. He suggested four ways for
Muslim women to protect themselves from the discriminatory usage of triple talaq:
She can use the Special Marriage Act of 1954 to register the marriage, and she can
insert conditions in the nikahnama to prohibit her husband from practising triple
talaq.
She can also entrust herself with the right to talaq and demand a high mehar sum to
deter triple talaq.
Judgment
On August 22, 2017, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court ruled in the triple talaq
case, declaring the practise illegal by a 3:2 majority. After six days of arguments from
both sides, it adjourned the case for a decision.
The court ordered that laws barring triple talaq be passed by Parliament. According
to Justices Rohinton Nariman and Uday Lalit, Muslim personal law (shariat)
Page 135 of 170

application 8, 1937, regulates talaq-e-biddat. They claimed that because the practise
is manifestly arbitrary, it is unconstitutional. Justice Kurian Joseph noted in his
concurring decision that triple talaq is prohibited by the Quran and hence has no
legal standing. "What is incorrect in the holy Quran cannot be good in Shariat," he
continued, "and what is wrong in theology is wrong in law."
In the constituent assembly debate on Articles 25 and 44, Chief Justice Khehar and
Justice Abdul Nazeer's dissenting minority judgement linked the elevation of
personal law to the status of basic rights. They contended that the 1937 Shariat Act
does not regulate triple talaq, but that it is a natural part of personal law. As a result,
it is protected under Article 25. Furthermore, legislation is the cure for the gender
discriminatory practise of talaq-e-biddat, not a challenge to the constitutionality of
the gender discriminatory practise of talaq-e-biddat.
Page 136 of 170

Shilpa Mittal v. State of NCT Delhi and ors

Citation - AIR 2020 SC 405
Bench - Deepak Gupta, Aniruddha Bose
Facts of the Case
A juvenile (aged 16 to 18) was accused of committing an offence punishable under

Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code, which has a maximum penalty of 10 years in
prison and a fine with no minimum term.
The appeal filed in the Delhi High Court against the Juvenile Justice Board's decision
that the juvenile should be tried as an adult for committing the heinous offence was
overturned, with the court ruling that the juvenile is not liable under the term
"heinous offence" because no minimum sentence was prescribed for the offence in
question, and thus did not fall within the scope of Section 2(33) of the Juvenile
Justice Act. Against this decision of the High Court, the appellant approached the
Hon’ble Supreme Court to decide this present matter.
Issue
Whether Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 extends to those offences
prescribing either no minimum punishment or a minimum punishment of less than 7
years but states clearly the maximum punishment of more than 7 years.
Laws
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children Act), 2015
1. Section 2(33)
2. Section 14
3. Section 15
4. Section 19
Page 137 of 170

Contentions of the Appellants
The appellant's lawyer argued that the legislature failed to recognise the "fourth
category" of offences addressed in the case as falling within the scope of "heinous
offences" as defined by Section 2 of the Criminal Code (33). As a result, the council
pointed out that the Juvenile Justice Act of 2015 does not officially acknowledge a
wide range of offences that fall under this 'fourth category.'
If the word "minimum" is eliminated from the definition of "heinous crimes"

provided under Section 2(33) by the effect of the doctrine of surplusage (non-
necessary), all offences except the small and serious would naturally fall under the
heading of "heinous offences," according to the counsel.
Contentions of the Respondents
In response to the Appellant's submission before the Court, the respondent's counsel
reminded the Court of the Court's limitation to rewrite a law only on the basis of an
existing lacuna in the Act, and that the statute could only be corrected by the
Legislature itself. Furthermore, the counsel argued that the Legislature's intent
cannot be determined solely by the absence of cognizance of a certain category of
offences under the Act in question.
Judgement
The Court concluded that the Legislature's aim behind the Act was to keep the statute
in the best interest of the child by designing a detailed procedure to be followed
before the kid was tried as an adult, based on Section 2(33) read in conjunction with
Sections 14, 15, and 19 of the Act.
Thus, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that offences with a minimum sentence of 7
years but a maximum sentence of more than 7 years cannot be considered 'heinous
offences,' but instead fall under the scope of 'serious offences,' as defined by the Act,
and will be deleted until Parliament takes action on the issue.
Page 138 of 170

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India

Citation - Writ Petition (Criminal) No.167 of 2012
Bench - Chelameswar, Rohinton Fali Nariman
Date - 24th March, 2015
Facts of the Case
The petitioner filed a public interest writ suit under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution, asking the Supreme Court to declare Sections 66A, 69A, and 79 of the
IT Act ultra-vires to the Indian Constitution. The petition claimed that the wording of
these laws is broad and vague. The petitioner also stated that the goal of these clauses
is to abuse it recklessly, and thus falls outside the scope of Articles 14, 19(1)(a), and
21 of the Indian Constitution. Menacing, offensive, annoyance, inconvenience,
obstruction, danger, and insult are all terms that are not defined in any act. As a
result, it is more vulnerable to undesired abuse. Aside from that, the distinction
drawn between citizens and netizens of the country was deemed arbitrary and in
violation of Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution, which guarantees freedom of
expression. It was claimed that the distinction allows police personnel the right to
detain netizens for remarks that can also be expressed by ordinary people of the
country. As a result, the fundamental right to equality enshrined in Article 14 of the
Indian Constitution is violated.
Issues
Whether Section 66A, 69A and 79 of the Information and Technology Act are
constitutionally valid?
Laws
1. Section 66A, Information and Technology Act

2. Section 69A, Information and Technology Act
3. Section 79, Information and Technology Act
5. Article 19(1)(a), Constitution of India
Page 139 of 170

Arguments of the Petitioner
The right to free speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian
Constitution is waived by Section 66A of the Information Technology Act of 2000,
and it is not covered by Article 19's reasonable categorization clause (2).
The petitioner further stated that acts of generating annoyance, impatience, or

vexation are not covered by Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution.
Section 66A was also argued to be unclear because it does not define a number of
concepts. The terms can be interpreted in a wide range of ways, making them
vulnerable to exploitation by executive agencies.
The classification of charging just netizens under Section 66A of the IT Act has no
discernible distinction. Hence, the entire provision is arbitrary, vague and
discriminatory in nature.
Arguments of the Respondent
The Respondent argued that it is the legislature's responsibility to satisfy people's

needs, and that the judiciary will only intervene if a statute is in violation of Part III
of the Indian Constitution. Furthermore, the respondent claimed that there is a
presumption that the statute in question is intra-vires to it.
The Court of Law has the power to interpret the law in a way that makes it justly
enforceable, while also reading down the complexities of the rules.
The executive's abuse of legislation cannot be the primary basis for declaring a law
ultra-vires to the Indian Constitution.
In the law, broad terms are employed to defend citizens' rights from those who
infringe on them using this medium.
The vagueness of the law is not a reason to declare a piece of legislation ultra-vires to
the Indian Constitution, especially when it is regarded qualified and just in other
ways.
Page 140 of 170

Judgement
The Court in its judgement held that:
Section 66 of the IT Act was repealed in its entirety because it violated Article
19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution and was not protected under Article 19(1)(a) of
the Indian Constitution.
The Constitution of India was held intra-vires to Section 69A and the Information
Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring, and Decryption
of Information) Rules, 2009.
The validity of Section 79 was upheld, subject to the reading down of Section
79(3)(b) of the IT Act.
The Apex Court of India also knocked down Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act.
Page 141 of 170

Sushila Aggarwal and others v. State (NCT of

Delhi) and Another
Citation - Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos.7281-7282 of 2017
Bench - Arun Mishra, Indira Banerjee, Vineet Saran, MR Shah and S. Ravindra Bhat
Date of Judgement - 29th January, 2020
Facts of the Case
In the light of the conflicting views of the different Benches of varying strength
regarding the scope of Section 438 of the CRPC, which provides for grant of
anticipatory bail and its limitations, a Special Leave Petition was filed before the
Supreme Court. The question that was put forth before the Supreme Court by way of
a Special Leave Petition was heard by a constitutional bench headed by Justice
Kurian Joseph as it noted contradictory views in earlier judgments as to whether an
anticipatory bail should be for a limited period of time or not.
Issues
1. Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438 CRP.C. should be
limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the Trial
Court and seek regular bail?
2. Whether the life of anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage when the
accused is summoned by the court
Laws
1. Section 438 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.

Page 142 of 170

Arguments presented before the Court
Relying upon the Judgement of this court in the case of Balchand Jian v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, the learned Senior Advocate Shri Harin P. Raval appeared as
Amicus Curiae, submitted that though no proper definition is provided for
“anticipatory bail” by the CrPC, as observed by the Apex Court anticipatory bail
means “bail in anticipation of arrest”.
He stated that according to the Law Commission of India, the need to

introduce‘anticipatory bail’ was to protect people from their rival influential people
who put false charges on them intending to get to put them behind the bars.
He further submitted that anticipatory bail can be given at different stages. Even if
no FIR is lodged and a person apprehends his arrest, in case the FIR is lodged, he can
apply for “anticipatory bail”. After giving notice to the Public Prosecutor, the court
can grant anticipatory bail.
He submitted that anticipatory bail can also be given in the pre-investigation stage.
Pre-investigation stage is one in which FIR is lodged but the investigation has not yet
begun. Further, he submitted that the “anticipatory bail” can also be given in post-
investigation stage.
It is after hearing from the Public Prosecutor, that the High Court or Sessions
Court can grant “anticipatory bail”. Thus, if once the anticipatory bail is granted
there is no reason to limit the said bail till the court issues summons or limit its
period.
Further, he submitted that the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has in the
above-mentioned case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia held that, the court has absolute
discretion to direct the duration’s trial. It can differ from weeks to the entire period
of trial. The consideration should be given to balancing the two competing interests
of protecting the accused’s liberty on one hand and the sovereign power of the police
to conduct a fair investigation on the other hand.
In the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre, the Supreme Court has held that once
an order of anticipatory arrest is granted, it will continue for the entire duration of
the trial.
Page 143 of 170

He further submitted that due to the conflicting opinion given in this said case from
the Gurbaksh Singh case, it is necessary to revisit it.
Judgement
The Constitutional Bench by pointing towards the difference in forms of arrest under
section 438 and 437, stated that the bail under section 438 is sought when there is an
apprehension of arrest and later is taken recourse at the stage when sufficient data is
available to the Court and thus, no special case needs to be made out in granting bail
under section 438.
The Courts have to very cautiously exercise the power granted to them under section
438 and cannot be invoked on vague allegations.
Hon’ble Justice Ravindra Bhatt interpreted Section 438 as an essential element of

Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. According to Justice Bhatt, unreasonable
restrictions cannot be imposed on the right to anticipatory bail. Further, the
provision of section 438 is a procedural legal path that concerns the personal liberty
of freedom.
Section 438(2) of CRPC read together with section 437(3) lay enough safeguards for
the authorities to prohibit the accused to escape from the authorities. Any kind of
violations of the conditions imposed on him will lead to his arrest under section
439(2). The accused who has been granted anticipatory bail will continue to be at
liberty even if a charge sheet is filed. But it is his duty to cooperate with the Police
and to carefully follow all the conditions.
With regards to the conflicting opinions of the Supreme Court in different cases, the
Court held the Judgement given in SiddharamMhetre v. State of Maharashtra and
the Judgements that followed to be bad in law and thus stands overruled. The
Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v.
State of Punjab is considered as the law and it needs reiteration.
The Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah stated that in order to balance the rights of the police
for investigation as well as that of the accused, in certain conditions the Apex Court
will impose a time limit for such bail till FIR is filed. But the normal rule will be not
to limit the operation of the order.
Page 144 of 170

Court unanimously concurred with the opinion that was kept before them.
Regarding the First Issue- The Court held that Anticipatory bail as a ‘general rule’
will not be limited to a fixed period of time. Usual or standard conditions can be
imposed under section 437(3) read with 438(2) of CrPC if the situation demands.
Regarding Second Issue-
The life span of Anticipatory bail does not end as soon as summons gets issued by the
Trial Court, or after the charges are framed, but can also be continued till the end of
the trial. The Court is open to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail if any special or
peculiar features necessitates the Court to do so.
Page 145 of 170

Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India

Citation - (2018) 10 SCC 628
Bench - Dipak Mishra, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud
Facts of the Case
Various people and organisations petitioned the Supreme Court of India under
Article 32 of the Constitution in 2017. "Supreme Court case procedures of
constitutional importance having an influence on the public at large or a significant
number of individuals should be live streamed in a manner that is easily accessible
for public viewing," the Petition stated. In addition, the Petition asked the Court for
guidelines to help determine which cases would be eligible for live broadcasting in
the future. The Petitioners cited the Supreme Court case Naresh Shridhar Mirjkar v.
State of Maharashtra [(1966) 3 S.C.R 744] ('Mirjkar'), which found that journalists
had the freedom to publish news of court proceedings under Article 19 of the
Constitution. The Court had stressed "the efficacy of open trials for sustaining the
legitimacy and effectiveness of the Courts, as well as for enhancing public confidence
and support" in that case.
Issues
1. Whether there should be live dissemination of proceedings before this Court with
the aid of information and communications technology (ICT).
2. Whether live streaming of court proceedings should be introduced in India, and if
so, under what conditions.
The State is obligated to raise public awareness of the law and its development. This
is due to the fact that no one can claim ignorance of the law. The petitioners cited a
Supreme Court case, Naresh Shridhar Mirjkar v. State of Maharashtra, in which the
judicial ruled that "Article 19 of the Constitution encompassed the right of journalists
to publish news of court proceedings."
Page 146 of 170

Judgement
The opportunity to watch live broadcasts of Supreme Court sessions stemmed from
the Constitution's right of access to justice, the Court held. According to the Court,
this privilege should not be absolute. It established a set of Model Guidelines to guide
courts in deciding when such broadcasts should be used.
The Court emphasised the importance of the rights at issue in this case, as well as the
necessity to strike a balance between the right to access justice and the privacy of
litigants and the dignity of the courts. It related to the Mirajkar case, which
concluded that article 19 of the Constitution should be construed to allow journalists
to continue working while attending court proceedings.
The Court stated that the Mirajkar decision had "expressed in no uncertain terms
that open trial is the norm," but that this would not rule out the possibility that
specific circumstances may necessitate trials in camera (in a closed session). As a
result, the Court determined that "a competent and balanced regulatory framework
may be needed before the concept of live streaming is put into action."
This decision summarised why live streaming of court proceedings would be

beneficial: it would allow immediate, virtual access to courtrooms, removing physical
barriers to attending court; it would facilitate the right to know about court
proceedings, reducing reliance on second-hand narratives and assisting in legal
education; it would "enhance the rule of law and promote better understanding of
legal governance as part of the functioning of democracy"; and it would "enhance the
rule of law and promote better understanding of legal governance as part of the
functioning of democracy.
Page 147 of 170

The Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita

Puniya & Ors.
Citation - MANU/SC/0194/2020
Bench – D Y Chandrachud, Ajay Rastogi,
Facts of the Case
In February 2003, a public interest litigation (PIL) filed under the watchful eye of the
Delhi High Court sought permanent commission for female military personnel
enlisted through the Short Service Commission (SSC) in comparison to their male
counterparts.
An update to the Strategy in 2006 allowed them to serve as an SSC official for a
maximum of 14 years.
In September 2008, the Center decided to grant permanent commissions to SSC

females in the Judge Advocate General's office and Army Education Corps, as well as
their contrasting branches in the Air Force and Navy.
In March 2010, a Delhi High Court bench upheld the appeals of such petitions,
directing the Defense Ministry to extend permanent commission benefits to SSC
women officials in the Air Force and Army who had chosen permanent commission
but had not yet been granted the equivalent. The Army put the request to the test in
July. The case was filed in advance with the Apex Court on September 2, 2011. The
Supreme Court ruled that the contested judgment's activities had not continued in
any way.
In May 2018, the Center informed the Supreme Court that it is considering providing
permanent commissions to women officials enrolled in the Army through the SSC.
Page 148 of 170

PM Modi made a key shift in August when he announced that women officials will be
able to choose between changeless commission in sectors of the military that are
independent from existing ones, such as law and instruction.
The legislature introduced a notice reporting permanent commission of women

officials in February 2019, although it was tentatively limited to those women
officials deployed following this request. This notification was kept out of the hands
of serving officials. In the same month, the Center requested that incoming SSC
officials in eight combat bolster arms/administrations be awarded perpetual
commissions.
Issues
1. Whether women should be granted Permanent Commission in the Indian Army?

2. Whether the guidelines issued by the Government of India dated 15th February
2019 should be implemented?
3. What are the conditions governing the Women Officers in the Indian Army?
Laws
1. Section 12 of the Army Act 1950

2. Article 33 of the Constitution
3. Article 14 of the Constitution
Contentions made by the petitioners
The Union of India contended that Section 12 of the Army Act gives power to
President to grant commission. Therefore, no mandamus can be issued from the
court.
Article 33 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to determine by law the extent to

which the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution shall be
restricted/abrogated in their application to the members of the Armed Forces so as
to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline
among them. Therefore provisions of the Army Act are protected under Article 33.
The Union Government has contended that the Army faces a huge management
challenge “to manage Women Officers in soft postings with required infrastructure,
Page 149 of 170

not involving hazardous duties with the regular posts with the other women in the
station”.
The Army has to cater to spouse postings, “long absence on account of maternity
leave, child careleave” as a result of which “the legitimate dues of male officers have
to be compromised”.
It was contended by the Union of India that the Scope of Judicial Review in the
matters of Army and its process was limited by this Court in Union of India v. P K
Chaudhary.
It was also contended that there is no discrimination between males and females in
recruitment in SSC.
It was argued that the border areas lack very basic and minimal facilities and thus the
deployment of women officers in such areas is not advisable because of habitat and
hygiene.
It is contented by the Respondents that the Army consider Women Officers as

effective as male counterparts until they complete 14 years.
It was contended that women officers of all the ages are still being posted to places
which are dangerous and where there is no sanitation like field areas, force
headquarters, sensitive area, and warfare zone.
It was contended that women officers undergo the same training as SSC male
officers. However, only male officers are entitled to Permanent Commissions.
It was argued that besides the discriminatory nature of the policy by the Union
Government with respect to the grant of PCs to SSC women officers, it also lowers
their status to that of a jawan.
It was contended that Article 33 enable Parliament to limit or abrogate the FRs for
the proper discharge of duties and maintenance of disciple.
Page 150 of 170

Judgement
Justice D.Y Chandrachud writing for himself and Justice Ajay Rastogi held that:
All serving female officers on the SSC will be considered for PCs.
In the 2019 circular, the expressions "in various staff appointments only" in para 5
and "on staff appointments only" in para 6 will not be implemented.
All consequential benefits, including promotion and financial incentives, will be

available to SSC women officers who are given PC in accordance with the
aforementioned orders.
According to the policy decision made by the Union Government on February 25,
2019, it would apply prospectively.
It is vital for this Court to clarify that the decision's prospective applicability does not
mean that it will apply only to women officers who were appointed as SSC officers
after the decision's date, but also to women who are presently serving as SSC officers.
The statement that women officers face a "greater challenge" in meeting the hazards
of service "due to their prolonged absence during pregnancy, motherhood, and
domestic obligations towards their children and families" is based on a strong
stereotype that domestic obligations are solely the responsibility of women.
A blanket ban on women seeking criterion or command positions would be

incompatible with Article 14's promise of equality. When the state, and in this case
the Army as a state instrument, makes a distinction between men and women, the
Army bears the burden of proving that the distinction is reasonable.
Following the decision of the Delhi High Court, the court ordered that the necessary
actions to comply with the judgement be taken within three months of the date of the
decision.
Page 151 of 170

Tofan Singh v. State Of Tamil Nadu

Citation - Criminal Appeal No. 152 Of 2013
Date of the case - 8 October 2013
Bench - A.K. Patnaik, A.K. Sikri
Facts of the Case
Mr. L.S. Aruldoss, NCB intelligence officer, received information on the 23rd of
October 2004 that a resident of Nanganallur, Chennai, namely Prem alias Kannan
alias Sudeshwaran, was procuring narcotics from Guddusingh, a Rajasthan resident,
with the assistance of Bapulal from Chennai, at about 9:00 p.m. Bapulal and Kannan
were supposed to leave in a white Ambassador automobile, and when they arrived in
Chennai, Kannan was supposed to transport the heroin to Sri Lanka.
Mr. L.S. Aruldoss discussed the intelligence with his superiors and proceeded with
the case after receiving a green signal. Mr. L.S. Aruldoss, together with other cops,
one sepoy, and a driver, left for the area of the incident on October 24, 2004, and
intercepted the aforementioned white Ambassador car. There were a total of 6
passengers, 2 drivers, and the appellant in the front, with Bapulal, Guddusingh, and
Kannan in the back.
Following a police investigation, people at the back handed out a green bag
containing 5 kg of heroin. The drivers were permitted to leave, but the remainder
were all arrested for violating the NDPS Act. Mr. Murugan took down the statements
of the apprehended accused, and the appellant admitted to the crime. The trial court,
after considering all the facts, issued a judgement on December 18, 2009, stating that
the contraband was apprehended by officers in the middle of the operation,
indicating that the trafficking was not successful and that the accused were acquitted
of charges under Section 28 of the NDPS Act.
However, after convicting the accused persons under Sections 8(c) and 29 of the
NDPS Act, the court sentenced them to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine
of Rs. 1 lakh, as well as another year of harsh imprisonment for the appellant, all of
which were to be served consecutively.
Page 152 of 170

The appellant, who was unhappy and offended by the trial court's decision, filed an
appeal in the Madras High Court, which was dismissed on June 18, 2012. As a result,
the appellant appealed the high court of Madras' decision to the Supreme Court.
Issues
Whether the officer investigating the matter under NDPS Act would qualify as a
police officer or not?
Whether the statement recorded by the investigating officer under S. 67 of the NDPS
Act can be treated as a confessional statement or not?
Laws
1. S. 42 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act

Arguments by the Appellants
There was no mention of the appellant in the intelligence Mr. Aruldoss received, and
his name was not revealed anywhere.
The appellant was located seated in front, not in the back, with the other defendants
on the day of the occurrence.
The narcotics were passed over to Mr. Aruldoss by people in the back, thus neither
the appellant nor the respondent had them.
The raiding party discovered Rs. 680/- in the custody of the appellant herein,
together with two second-class train tickets from Shamgarh to Chennai.
There was no evidence of a phone connection between the other accused and the
appellant.
The prosecution's case is based primarily on the appellant's confessional statement,

which was reportedly recorded by Mr. Murugan, who also served as the case's
investigating officer.
Page 153 of 170

The NDPS Act, Section 67, gives no authority to record confessions or significant
evidence that could lead to a conviction.
Arguments by the Respondents
The appellant made a voluntary confession admitting to his role in the crime's
commission. He admitted to transporting 5.25 kilogrammes of heroin from Maniki
Village, District Mandsaur, Rajasthan to Chennai by the Jaipur – Chennai Express
with co-accused Badrilal Sharma, who was dressed in an RPF uniform until they
arrived in Nelore, Andhra Pradesh. Following that, Guddusingh and Bapulal Jain
drove them to Chennai in a car. However, they were apprehended by officials along
the route.
The NDPS Act's Sections 42, 53, and 67 do not prevent an officer authorised by the
act from conducting a search, seizure, investigation, or enquiry into the matter.
Badrilal Sharma, who travelled with the accused/appellant, made a confessional

statement that was also recorded.
Badrilal Sharma's ID card and the appellant's and Badrilal Sharma's railway tickets
were both on record because they travelled together. All of data demonstrates that
the appellant had 5.250 kg of heroin in his hands and was transporting it from
Rajasthan to Chennai in order to smuggle it into Sri Lanka.
Judgement
The appellant had already served more than 9 years of his sentence under the NDPS
Act, despite the fact that he had been sentenced to 10 years by the Additional Special
Court. In these circumstances, the suspension of additional sentence was deemed
appropriate pending the outcome of this appeal by the bigger Bench.
The appellant was to be freed on bail after providing the trial court with security in
the amount of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) and two sureties in the same
amount.
Page 154 of 170

As per the October 2020 Judgment
As the appeal was directed to a larger bench it was concluded in October 2020 that,
S. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act would only apply to a police officer or an officer who
exercises all the powers of a police officer including the power of filing a police report
under S. 173 of the Cr. P.C. An officer under the NDPS Act does not have the power to
file a police report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C.
The NDPS Act, where the provisions of the Cr. P.C does not apply to any
inquiry/investigation, except as provided therein, it cannot be held that the officer
has all the powers of a police officer to file a report under S. 173 of the Cr.P.C.
In the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act, the statement recorded under S. 67
cannot be used as a confessional statement.
The officers empowered by S. 53 of the NDPS Act are "police officers" within the
meaning of S. 25 of the Evidence Act, any confessional statement made to them
would be forbidden by S. 25 of the Evidence Act and could not be used to convict an
accused under the NDPS Act.
Page 155 of 170

Union of India v. KA Najeeb

Citation - 2021 SCC OnLine SC 50
Bench - Surya Kant
Date of Judgment - 01/02/2020
Facts of The Case
K.A. Najeeb (hereinafter known as the respondent), an active member of an

extremist organization called the Popular Front of India (PFI) was arrested on the
charges of being one of the main conspirators of a pre-planned attack on Professor
T.J. Joseph of Newman College, Thodupuzha.
The victim while framing a question paper had included a question that was
considered objectionable against a certain religion. The respondent in association
with the other members of an extremist Islamic organization (Popular Front of
India) decided to avenge their religious sentiments by attacking the victim.
On July 4, 2010, at about 8 AM, a group of people with a common object, attacked
the victim while he was returning home with his mother and sister. Over the course
of the attack, members of the PFI forcefully intercepted the victim’s car, restrained
him and chopped off his right palm with choppers, knives, and a small axe. Country-
made bombs were also hurled at bystanders to create panic and terror in their minds
and to prevent them from coming to the aid of the victim. An FIR was consequently
lodged against the attackers by the victim’s wife.
After the due course of the investigation, it was found that the attack was part of a
larger conspiracy that allegedly involved meticulous preplanning, numerous failed
attempts and the use of dangerous weapons. Hence, the provisions under UAPA were
invoked against him.
Although most of the respondent’s co-conspirators have been tried and held guilty by
the NIA special court, the accused was declared an absconder. The co-accused were
Page 156 of 170

awarded a cumulative sentence ranging between two and eight years’ rigorous
imprisonment.
Najeeb was eventually found and arrested by the NIA and was put in judicial custody
for nearly five years without being tried or adjudicated by any court.
The respondent approached the court for bail as many as six times between 2015 and
2019, claiming parity with other co-accused who had been enlarged on bail or
acquitted. His pleas were rejected as the respondent prima facie knew about the
attack and had assisted and facilitated the attack.
This made him ineligible for bail under Section 43D (5) of the UAPA, as normal bail
rules do not apply to an accused under UAPA, it allowed courts to deny bail on the
basis of reasonable doubt. The respondent, again approached the High Court for the
third time, questioning the Special Court’s order denying bail.
The High Court through the impugned order, released the respondent on bail noting
that the undertrial respondent could not be kept in custody for too long. Especially
when the trial was not likely to commence in the near future and not doing so would
cause serious suffering to him.
The operation of the aforementioned bail order was, however, stayed by the court
and an appeal was filed by the NIA stating that the High Court had erred. Hence, the
present case.
Issues
1. Whether a violation of Article 21 can oust the statutory rigours under Section
43D(5) of UAPA?
2. Whether the court is duty-bound to deny bail where the suspect is prima
facie believed to be guilty?
3. Whether the court’s decision to grant bail can be challenged without any special
grounds?
Laws

2. Section 43D (5) of UAPA
Page 157 of 170

Contentions made in the court
Relying upon judgment in National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah

Watali, it was highlighted that bail proceedings under the special enactment were
distinct and the Courts are dutybound to refuse bail where the suspect is prima
facie guilty. It was further contended that the fact that the respondent had absconded
for years makes apprehension towards his bail even more legitimate.
Concerning the early conclusion of the trial, he contended that the NIA had filed an
additional affidavit to examine 276 witnesses. At the same time, the NIA was
expecting to conduct the trial on a day-to-day basis and complete it within a year.
On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent highlighted that
many of the co-accused had been acquitted and those who were held convicts had
also been awarded a sentence of not more than eight years.
Given how the respondent has already suffered incarceration of almost five-and-a-
half years without the trial, ‘violate his Constitutional liberty and rights to have him
serve most of his sentence without any adjudication of guilt by a judicial authority’.
He urged that once the High Court had exercised discretion to grant bail, the same
ought not to be interfered with except in rare circumstances. Relying upon Shaheen
Welfare Association v. Union he further contended,
“such protracted incarceration violates the respondent’s right to a speedy trial and
access to justice; in which case, Constitutional Courts could exercise their powers to
grant bail, regardless of limitations specified under special enactments.”
It was reiterated that at the time of deciding an application for bail, it would be
necessary to record reasons, albeit without evaluating the evidence on merits.
Counsel also stated that numerous judgments enshrine the liberty guaranteed by
Part III of the Constitution which within its protective ambit gives access to justice
and a speedy trial.
Page 158 of 170

Judgement
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court attempting to strike a
balance between the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the
charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously, the respondent’s rights guaranteed
under Part III of the Constitution.
Hence, the SLP filed by the appellant was found not maintainable.
It was held that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA
per se does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution. It was held,
It was further added that both the restriction from the statute and the powers
promised to the Supreme Court under constitutional jurisdiction can be well
harmonised.
Despite the accused being prima facie under the suspicion of being guilty, the judges
while acknowledging the nature of offences kept in mind the time the respondent had
spent in custody. But given the ‘unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime
soon’, the High Court’s decision of granting bail was justified. The court advanced,
“An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead
evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and
simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of our
Constitution have been well protected”
It was said obiter dictum(in passing) that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is
comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where
the competent court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty
and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such
precondition under the UAPA.
Instead, Section 43D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the
competent court to refuse bail. This served as an additional point for the court to
enlarge the respondent on bail and therefore did not challenge the High Court’s
decision.
Page 159 of 170

The Hon’ble bench imposed a few additional conditions on the respondent in the
best interest of society at large and to ensure that the respondent didn’t indulge in
any other communal attacks.
The respondent was ordered to mark his presence every week on Monday at 10 AM at
the local police station and inform in writing that he is not involved in any other new
crime.
Additionally, the respondent is refrained from participating in any activity which

might enrage communal sentiments. It was further held that any violation of the bail
conditions, tampering of evidence, or hampering the trial will lead to the direct
cancellation of the respondent’s bail.
Page 160 of 170

Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors

Citation - Civil Appeal Nos. 6061 of 2020
Bench - Indu Malhotra, Ajay Rastogi
Facts of the Case
An 80-year-old appellant filed this case in the Supreme Court, citing a dispute over
3.34 hectares of land in the region of Khata/Khatuni No. 105 min/127, Khasra No. 70
in Tika Jalari Bhaddirain, Mauja Jalari, Tehsil Nadaun, Dist. Hamirpur, Himachal
Pradesh. The respondent state, Himachal Pradesh, has taken over the land that is the
subject of this appeal in order to convert it for the construction of an important
district road that runs through it, the Nadaun-Sujanpur Road. The acquisition was
completed in accordance with the lawful acquisition procedures in place to acquire
the aforementioned lands for the road. It was also claimed that the proper legal
procedures were not followed in the acquisition of the lands in this case. The building
of the road was completed in the year 1975. The appellant was a widow who lived in a
rural area and whose land was taken in 1967-68. Because she was illiterate, she did
not file any proceedings to recover compensation for the land that was taken due to
the state's compulsion, because she was unaware of her rights and entitlement to the
property due to her inability to comprehend the concepts and challenges.
In the case of Anakh Singh &Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors., other
members of the same locality who had their land taken by the respondent state
appeared before the High Court in 2004 to seek compensation, and the court allowed
the case by issuing an order on April 23, 2007 directing the state to complete the
process as required under the Land Acquisitions Act, 1894, which the respondent-
state did for the petitioners. The respondent state, on the other hand, had only begun
land acquisition proceedings for the writ petitioners in accordance with the court's
directives, and the remaining landowners who had also provided their property for
the project were not included. This was brought to the appellant's attention by her
two daughters in 2010, prompting them to file a petition in the Himachal Pradesh
Page 161 of 170

High Court seeking compensation or the beginning of land acquisition procedures

under the Act.
The respondent state claimed that a period of forty-two years had passed since it had
acquired the land and completed the project, and that there had been a change of
ownership to the state based on the principle of "adverse occupation." The state also
claimed that the Notification under Section 4 of the act was started in 2008 in order
to provide relief to Anakh Singh, a neighbouring landowner whose land was close to
the appellant's land. The government also maintained that the writ petition was
precluded by the law of laches because the purchase occurred in 1967-68 and the
route was completed in 1975. The government also claims, through its lawyers, that
there was verbal permission for the land seizure.
The High Court ruled that the case before them was a question of fact and law for
determining the start of the limitation period, dismissing it as improper for a writ
petition and instructing the petitioner to initiate a civil suit. The petitioner filed a
Review Petition against the same judgement, which was likewise dismissed on the
13th of May 2014 by an order. The appellant subsequently filed an appeal with the
Supreme Court, citing his dissatisfaction with the High Court's decision.
Laws
Land Acquisition Act,1894.
Issues
1. Was the acquisition proceeding proper, and conducted under the due process of
the law?
2. Was there a fundamental property right, and now a human right?
3. Whether the appellant has the right to a just and reasonable compensation?
4. Adequacy and due process in the application of the Land Acquisitions Act, 1894.
5. Was the state entitled to the “adverse possession” of the land?
6. Does the Doctrine of Laches apply to the present appeal?
Page 162 of 170

Contentions of the Appellants
The appellant first became aware of the writ petitions in 2010, when she and her two
daughters filed a civil writ petition in the Himachal Pradesh High Court, asking the
court to compensate them or dismiss the acquisition proceedings under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894.
Contentions of the Respondents
The respondents' land was taken over in 1967-68, and it has been 42 years since
then. The title has now been changed to 'adverse possession,' and the appellants' sole
option is to file a civil suit.
The State also claimed that a notification dated in 2008 alerted the general public
about a nearby property that was similarly taken over from its owners.
Because there has been a considerable delay in filing a civil writ petition, the writ
petition is banned.
After acquiring the land from the appellants, the State has occupied it. The
appellants' forefathers have granted their consent for its use orally and without
reservation.
Judgement
The court upheld the appeals and overturned the high court's orders from September
11th and May 13th, 2013. The court emphasised that the land was taken by the state
while the appellant was protected by the constitution's right to private property
ownership and had been deprived of the land without due process or legal
authorization. The court rejects the state's "adverse possession" defence, stating that
the state's nature was that of a welfare state, and that adopting the "adverse
possession" defence provides the state a broad ambit to acquire land without due
process. The court disallowed the defence of "delay and laches" on the grounds of
erroneous application of the due process of law and the resulting harm from
admitting the defence against acquisition by unjust methods, as well as being
contrary to the appellant's fundamental rights. Furthermore, the court found that the
appellants had not received adequate compensation.
Page 163 of 170

The court, acting under Articles 136 and 142 of the Indian Constitution, ordered the
respondent state to pay compensation. The terms of the compensation were to be the
identical as those in Anakh Singh's case, and the court ordered that all other
statutory benefits, such as interest and solatium, be paid within eight weeks.
Page 164 of 170

Vikas Kumar v. Union Public Service

Commission
Citation - Civil Appeal No. 273 of 2021 Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1882 of 2021
Bench - Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud
Facts of the Case
The appellant was a student of disability he was deprived of his rights discussed in
Rights of Persons with Disability Act 2016 (herein referred as RPWD Act) where he
was bound to get an additional hour in NEET examination as he was diagnosed with
Dysgraphia and he falls under the definition of benchmark disability of 40%
permanent disability.
The respondent no.1, National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) has duty to
make sure PwD students gets their rights and relaxations given under guidelines of
Written Examinations and the same duty lies on the respondent no.2, an
examination centre who lack required training and forcibly took answer sheet where
the appellant is rightly entitled to additional hour.
The appellant filed writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution in High Court of
Judicature at Bombay which dismissed the plea of the appellant, dissatisfied by the
judgement she appealed the same in Supreme Court of India.
Issue
Whether rights and entitlements of a PwD can be restricted on the definition of

benchhmark disability as a condition of eligibility?
Laws
1. Section 2(s), 2(r) and Section 2(zc) of the RPwD Act, 2016
2. Article 14 and Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India
Page 165 of 170

Judgement
The High Court asked to provide a certificate to further proceed this case as
mentioned by the learned counsel of respondent, knowing that the said certificate
can only be given after the declaration of results. The appellant was unable to
produce the certificate and consequently the High Court dismissed the petition. The
appellant appealed the same in Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court said that the NEET clearly failed to perform its duties in case of a
PwDs and should rectify the injustice by compensating her with extra marks or
should adopt "no negative marks' scheme
The Court held that as discussed in this case observed that the concept of benchmark
disability is applicable in the context of the provisions contained in RPWD Act 2016,
which is titled Special Provisions for Persons with Benchmark Disabilities and that
these rights and entitlements which are conferred upon PwD cannot be constricted
by adopting the definition of benchmark disability as a condition precedent
Page 166 of 170

Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma & Others

Citation - (2020) AIR 3717 (SC)
Bench - Arun Mishra
Date - 11th August, 2020
Facts of the Case
Following the amendment Act of 2005, a Division bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India held in the case of Prakash & Others Vs. Phulavati & Others, (2016) 2
SCC 36, that the Act of 2005 is prospective in nature and that the rights conferred on
daughter, under Section 6 of the Act of 2005, are on the living daughter of a living
coparcener, requiring the coparcener to be alive as of 09.09.2005 in order for the
daughter to claim rights. The coparcener in this case died before the 2005
amendment, hence the daughter is not entitled to a share of the coparcenary
property because she is not the daughter of a living coparcener. Although the Court
did not specifically deal with the concept of a living daughter of a living coparcener in
the case of Danamma @ Suman Surpur & Others Vs. Amar & Others, (2018) 3 SCC
343, the Court took a contrary view from the decision in the Phulavati case and held
that daughters have equal rights in the coparcenary property as sons, even though
the coparcener had died before the amendment of 2005.
Similar questions were raised before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma
v. Rakesh Sharma & Others, and the issue was referred to a larger bench consisting of
three judges of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, based on the contradictory views
expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above mentioned two decisions, i.e.,
Phulavati case and Danamma case.
Issues
1. Whether the amended Section 6 of the Act of 2005 requires the coparcener to be
alive as on 09.09.2020, for the daughter to claim rights in the coparcenary
property?
2. Whether the amended Section 6 of the Act of 2005 is prospective, retrospective or
retroactive?
Page 167 of 170

Arguments advanced on behalf of the Union of India
The 2005 amending act is retroactive rather than retrospective.
The conferral of rights on the daughter had no effect on the rights that had been
crystallised by division prior to December 20, 2004.
The phrase "daughter of a living coparcener" in Section 6 does not necessarily mean
"daughter of a living coparcener." The coparcener does not have to be alive on the
day the Amended Act takes effect.
The section 6(5) explanation about the requirement of a recorded partition deed is
advisory rather than mandatory.
Arguments advanced by Learned Senior Counsel and Amicus Curiae
The verdicts of Phulavati and Danamma do not contradict one other, and the
provisions of Section 6 are deemed to be prospective in both cases.
When a coparcener dies, his interest merges with that of the surviving coparcenary,
hence when a coparcener father dies, there will be no surviving coparcener from
whom the daughter will inherit. As a result, the daughter can only succeed if she has
a living coparcener.
Although equality was established with effect from the 2005 Amendment, the birth
of a coparcener prior to 2005 has no bearing.
Sections 6(1) and 6(5) are not designed to reopen oral partition and family
settlement cases.
Arguments advanced by Counsel for Appellants
The Amended Act's substitution of Section 6 dates back to the Principal Act's
inception in 1956.
A notional partition on the death of a coparcener to determine his shares is not a real
partition, therefore the proviso in Section 6 does not apply.
The Phulavati decision cannot be regarded to have established the correct law.
Page 168 of 170

The notion of a live daughter of a living coparcener is being added to the wording of
Section 6's provisions.
Section 6 applies to all daughters, regardless of whether their father is alive on the
date of the act's revision.
Judgement
The Supreme Court's Larger Bench, in the above Appeals, referred to various
concepts of Hindu Law, both codified and customary, such as Coparcenary and Joint
Hindu Family, and unobstructed and obstructed heritage, as well as a catena of
Judgements, and came to the conclusion, that a coparcener father need not be alive
as of 09.09.2005 in order for a daughter to inherit rights over the coparc The Hon'ble
Supreme Court defined obstructed and unobstructed heritage as follows:
unobstructed heritage occurs via birth, but obstructed heritage occurs after the
owner's death.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to say that under Section 6, a right is conferred
by birth, making it an unobstructed inheritance, and that the coparcener's father had
to be alive on September 9, 2005 for the daughter to receive rights to the coparcenary
property. The Court also stated that the concept of uncodified Hindu Law of
unobstructed heritage has been given concrete shape under the provisions of Section
6(1)(a) and 6(1)(b), and that the coparcenary right is by birth, so it is not required
that the daughter's father be alive on the date of the amendment, because she had
not been conferred with coparcenary rights by obstructed heritage. As a result, the
Supreme Court did not consider the ruling in the Phulavati case to be a good
judgement in this regard.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court decided that the modified Section 6 is retroactive in
nature, regardless of whether it is applied retrospectively or prospectively. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the ideas of prospectively, retrospectivity, and
retroactivity, holding that the functioning of a retroactive statute is based on a
characteristic or event that occurred in the past or requisites that were inferred from
an antecedent event.
Page 169 of 170

The Court also stated that Section 6(1)(a) contains the concept of Mitakshara
coparcenary's unencumbered heritage, which is conferred by birth, and because the
right is conferred by birth, it is an antecedent event, and the provisions apply on and
from the date of the Amendment Act, making it retroactive. The Court further stated
that the provision in Section 6(4) makes it apparent that Section 6's requirements are
not retrospective.
Page 170 of 170


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ABHILASHA V. PARKASH AND ORS............................................................................................ 4

ANURADHA BHASIN V. UNION OF INDIA ................................................................................. 7

ANUSHREE GOYAL V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. .......................................... 10

APARNA BHAT V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ............................................................... 12

ARNAB RANJAN GOSWAMI V. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ....................................... 15

B.K. PAVITRA V. UNION OF INDIA ............................................................................................ 19

BAGLEKAR AKASH KUMAR V. GOOGLE LLC .......................................................................... 23

COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS OF ESSAR STEEL INDIA LIMITED V. SATISH KUMAR

DANAMMA @ SUMAN SURPUR & ANR. V. AMAR & ORS.................................................... 29

DEVILAL V. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ........................................................................... 33

GANESH PATEL V. UMAKANT RAJORIA .................................................................................. 37

GAUTAM NAVLAKHA V. NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY....................................... 39

IN RE: PRASHANT BHUSHAN AND ANR. ALLEGED CONTEMNOR(S) ............................ 42

INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION V. STATE OF KERALA .................................... 47

INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA V. RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ...... 50

JARNAIL SINGH V. LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA ...................................................................... 52

JOSEPH SHINE V. UNION OF INDIA ........................................................................................... 56

KERALA UNION OF WORKING JOURNALISTS V. UNION OF INDIA ................................ 59

LALIT KUMAR JAIN V. UNION OF INDIA ................................................................................. 61

MANISH KUMAR V. UNION OF INDIA....................................................................................... 64

M/S. IMPERIA STRUCTURES LTD. V. ANIL PATNI ............................................................... 72

MUKESH KUMAR V. THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND ........................................................ 75

MUKIS V. STATE OF U.P. .............................................................................................................. 78

NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR V. UNION OF INDIA ............................................................................ 80

PARAMVIR SINGH V. BALJIT SINGH ......................................................................................... 84

PRATHVI RAJ CHAUHAN V. UNION OF INDIA ....................................................................... 86

PURSHOTTAM CHOPRA V. STATE(GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) ........................................ 89

RAJEEV SURI V. UNION OF INDIA, 2021 ................................................................................. 92

RAMANAND AND ORS V. DR. GIRISH SONI AND ANR ......................................................... 96

RAMBABU SINGH THAKUR V. SUNIL ARORA & ORS. ...................................................... 100

S. KASI V. STATE THROUGH THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE ............................................. 105

SATISH CHANDER AHUJA V. SNEHA AHUJA ....................................................................... 107

SATISH RAGDE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA .................................................................. 111

SAURABH SHARMA V. SUB DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE .................................................. 115

SHAFIN JAHAN V. ASOKAN KM ............................................................................................... 118

SHAFIN JAHAN V. K. M. ASHOKAN ......................................................................................... 122

SHAFIYA KHAN AND SHAKUNTALA PRAJAPATI V. STATE OF UP .............................. 126

SHAKTI VAHINI V. UNION OF INDIA ..................................................................................... 129

SHAYARA BANO V. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ................................................................ 133

SHILPA MITTAL V. STATE OF NCT DELHI AND ORS ........................................................ 137

SHREYA SINGHAL V. UNION OF INDIA ................................................................................. 139

SWAPNIL TRIPATHI V. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ....................................................... 146

TOFAN SINGH V. STATE OF TAMIL NADU ........................................................................... 152

UNION OF INDIA V. KA NAJEEB .............................................................................................. 156

VIDYA DEVI V. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH & ORS ................................................. 161

VIKAS KUMAR V. UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION .............................................. 165

VINEETA SHARMA V. RAKESH SHARMA & OTHERS........................................................ 167

Abhilasha v. Parkash and Ors

Bench - Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy, M.R. Shah

Date - 15 September, 2020

Facts of the Case

As a result, it recognised the appellant's claim as an unmarried daughter seeking

Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India

Court - Supreme Court of India

Bench - N.V. Ramana and V. Ramasubramanian

Date of Judgement - 10/01/2020