15

Fal lacies of Rel e v a n c e

T his chapter will consider a different kind of defect in arguments. ­F allacies

of ­relevance arise when a premise, true or not, is not adequately related to the
­conclusion. Such irrelevance comes in endless varieties, but we will focus on two
of the most common forms: arguments ad hominem and appeals to ­authority.
­Arguments of these kinds are not always fallacious, so we will discuss various
­factors that ­determine when such arguments are defective and when they are not.

RELEVANCE

In a good argument, we present statements that are true in order to offer

a reason for some conclusion. One way to depart from this ideal is to state
things that are true themselves, but have no bearing on the truth of the
conclusion.
We might wonder why irrelevant remarks can have any influence at all.
The answer is that we generally assume that a person’s remarks are relevant,
for this is one of the conditions for smooth and successful conversation (as
Grice pointed out in his rule of Relevance, discussed in Chapter 2). That it is
possible to exploit people by violating this natural assumption is shown in
the following passage from The Catcher in the Rye.
The new elevator boy was sort of on the stupid side. I told him, in this very
casual voice, to take me up the Dicksteins’. . . .
He had the elevator doors all shut and all, and was all set to take me up,
and then he turned around and said, “They ain’t in. They’re at a party on the
fourteenth floor.”
“That’s all right,” I said. “I’m supposed to wait for them. I’m their nephew.”
He gave me this sort of stupid, suspicious look. “You better wait in the lobby,
fella,” he said.
“I’d like to—I really would,” I said. “But I have a bad leg. I have to hold it in a
certain position. I think I’d better sit down in the chair outside their door.”
He didn’t know what the hell I was talking about, so all he said was “oh” and
took me up. Not bad, boy. It’s funny. All you have to do is say something nobody
understands and they’ll do practically anything you want them to.1

307

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 CHAPTER 15 ■ Fallacies of Relevance
308

It is clear what is going on here. When you offer something as a reason, it is

conversationally implied that there is some connection between it and the
thing you are arguing for. In most cases, the connection is obvious, and there
is no need to spell it out. In other cases, the connection is not obvious, but
in the spirit of cooperation others are willing to assume that the connection
exists. In the present case, there seems to be no connection between ­having
a bad leg and sitting in one particular chair. Why, then, does the elevator
operator not challenge this statement? Part of the reason is that it is not
easy to challenge what people say; among other things, it is not polite. But
­politeness does not seem to hold the elevator operator back; instead, he does
not want to appear stupid. The person who offers a reason conversationally
implies a connection, and we do not like to admit that we fail to see this
­connection. This combination of generosity and fear of looking stupid leads
us to accept all sorts of irrelevant statements as reasons.
Fallacies of relevance are surprisingly common in everyday life. People
often introduce irrelevant details or tangents in order to mislead by divert-
ing attention from the real issue. The irrelevant distraction is sometimes
­described as a red herring (reportedly after a man who dragged a red ­herring
across his trail in order to throw pursuing hounds off his scent). The best
strategy for dealing with such tricks is simply to cross out all irrelevant
claims and then see what is left. Sometimes nothing is left.
On the other hand, we should not be heavy-handed in making charges
of irrelevance. Sometimes the occurrence of irrelevance is innocent; good
­arguments often contain irrelevant asides (as we saw in Chapter 5). More
important, relevance is often secured by way of a conversational implica-
tion, so we really have to know what is going on in a given context to ­decide
whether a remark is relevant or not. We can illustrate this last point by
­examining two kinds of arguments that often involve fallacies of irrelevance:
arguments ad hominem and appeals to authority.

AD HOMINEM ARGUMENTS

Literally, an argument ad hominem is an argument directed against a ­person

who is making a claim rather than against that person’s claim or argument
for it. On the face of it, this move seems to involve irrelevance, for the charac-
ter, social position, or status of a person should have nothing to do with the
truth of what that person says or with the soundness or strength of that per-
son’s arguments. Even when protesters dress shabbily or fail to bathe, their
clothing and hygiene show nothing about the legitimacy of their protest.­
A speaker’s ethnicity, race, sex, or sexual orientation almost never give us
any good reason to challenge the truth of what that person says or the sound-
ness of his or her argument. And the fact that a judge was appointed by a
liberal (or by a conservative) does not show that the judge’s legal decisions

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Ad Hominem Arguments
309

are incorrect or unfounded. Ad hominem fallacies very often deal in such

irrelevant personal characteristics. They are often introduced just to distract
us from the real point at issue.
In rare and unusual cases, however, a speaker ’s character or position
is a reason to doubt the truth of what he says. Suppose that Lucy is sus-
pected of committing murder, but Louie testifies that he was with her
at the time of the murder. Then the prosecution shows that Louie pro-
vided a similar alibi for an accused murderer at ten trials in the past year,
and every time he was found to have lied in exchange for money. Louie
never testifies without being paid, he says whatever he is paid to say, and
people do not hire him if they have any better defense. This background
about Louie provides some reason to believe that what Louie said was
false—that he was not with Lucy at the time of the murder. Lucy still
might not have committed the murder, but we can’t take Louie’s word for
it. Ad hominem arguments like this can be called deniers, since they deny
the truth of what is said or the strength or soundness of an argument.­
Although most ad hominem deniers are fallacious, the case of Louie
shows that a few are not.
A different kind of ad hominem argument questions a person’s right to
make a claim or present an argument. Imagine that the legislature is debat-
ing tax rates. During one session, Tad stands up and argues for a reduc-
tion in taxes. Tad can be criticized if he is not a legislator, because then he
lacks the status that confers the right to speak in this setting. Even outside of
any formal institution, if a neighbor tells someone that she ought to take her
children to a certain church, the mother might respond, “Mind your own
business, you busybody.” Responses like this can be called silencers, because
they revoke the right to speak without necessarily denying the truth of what
is said.
A third variety of ad hominem argument is more subtle. Consider the
­following exchange:
Norm: The cold war is over, and bad relations between Cuba and the United
States hurt both countries, so it is time for the United States to develop normal
relations with Cuba.
Cliff: Yeah, so you can make a bundle importing cigars from those commies.

Cliff’s reply is not an attack on the truth of what Norm said. Nor is Cliff
denying that Norm has a right to speak. Yet Cliff’s remark is not without
some relevance—it is not off the wall. Cliff is questioning Norm’s motives.
He suggests that Norm says what he says not because Norm believes it but
only because Norm will make a lot of money if enough other people believe
it. In a conversational exchange, we rely on the integrity of the person who is
speaking, and when we have reasons to believe that the person’s integrity is
questionable, we sometimes say so. This is the significance of Cliff’s remark.
Cliff points to a fact that gives us some reason not to trust Norm’s integrity
in a discussion of U.S. relations with Cuba.

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 CHAPTER 15 ■ Fallacies of Relevance
310

Cliff’s attack might or might not be justified. If the only reason why Norm
favors normal relations between the United States and Cuba is that this
would enable Norm to make more money, then Cliff’s ad hominem attack
is well founded. But if Norm’s real reason for saying what he does is that
he honestly believes that normal relations would be beneficial both to the
United States and to Cuba, then Norm’s position does not depend on any
lack of integrity. In that case, Cliff’s attack is not well founded, even if it so
happens that Norm would profit from normal relations.
Whether justified or not, ad hominem arguments of this third variety can
be called dismissers, because they dismiss the speaker as untrustworthy and
unreliable. Their point is not to deny the truth of the claim or the speaker’s
right to say it. Instead, a dismisser is supposed to show why the fact that
this speaker supports a claim is not a good reason to believe that claim (or to
deny it, for that matter).
These three variations are all ad hominem arguments because they start
from premises about the person’s character or status. Where they differ is
in their conclusions: Deniers conclude that a claim is untrue or that an argu-
ment is unsound or weak. Silencers conclude that someone lacks the right to
speak in a certain context. Dismissers conclude that someone is untrustwor-
thy or unreliable. Each can be either justified or unjustified, so ad hominems
come in six kinds that can be diagrammed like this:

Ad Hominem Arguments Justified Not Justified

Deniers Louie, the hired perjurer Shabby protesters
Silencers Tad if he is not a legislator Tad if he is a legislator
Dismissers Cliff’s reply if Norm lacks Cliff’s reply if Norm
integrity does not lack integrity

What logicians usually call ad hominem fallacies are unjustified deniers.

Even when the premises of such an argument are true, they are irrelevant to
the conclusion. That makes them fallacies of relevance. Once you get used to
spotting ad hominem fallacies, they seem common and obvious.
When assessing an ad hominem argument, the first step is to determine
whether its conclusion is about someone’s right to speak, about someone’s
reliability, or about the truth, soundness, or strength of what is claimed. The
second step is to determine whether its premises provide adequate justifica-
tion for its conclusion. These steps will enable you to place the argument in
the above table, but they will often be neither easy nor obvious. Although
perjurers for hire almost always lie, most people exhibit some middling de-
gree of reliability. When people are known for passing on rumors without
checking their truth, this might be a reason to doubt what they say when
they pass on yet another rumor (even if it is not a reason to believe that what
they say is false). In assessing what they say, it would be best to look for ad-
ditional evidence. If none is available, then we need to ask how often their
testimony is true on matters of this kind. Only by careful inspection of indi-
vidual cases can we determine the strength of such ad hominem arguments.

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