Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge B
4. Until this ye1r, Cheers Inc. w1s org1nized 1s 1 p1rtnership. This ye1r,
ownership.
p1rtnership?
1ddition1l regul1tions.
limited li1bility.
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 3
stockholders should be to
1. Compens1ting m1n1gers with stock c1n reduce the 1gency problem between
stockholders.
hostile t1keovers.
11. Which of the following 1ctions 1re likely to reduce 1gency conflicts
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 4
1B. Which of the following 1ctions 1re likely to reduce the 1gency problem
1. Bond coven1nts.
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 5
li1bility.
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 6
return projects.
corpor1te t1xes, 1nd thereby elimin1te the double t1x1tion th1t you
Medium:
b. The 1ctions th1t m1ximize 1 firm’s stock price 1re inconsistent with
gener1l, this will not 1ffect the second group’s 1bility to 1ttr1ct
c1pit1l.
volunt1rily.
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 7
1. The corpor1te byl1ws 1re the set of rules dr1wn up by the st1te to
while the decl1r1tion of the 1ctivities th1t the firm will pursue 1nd
d. 1lthough most comp1nies design 1 ch1rter, only the byl1ws 1re leg1lly
interest in 1 corpor1tion.
extension of the leg1l st1tus of its owners 1nd m1n1gers, th1t is, the
c. Unlimited li1bility 1nd limited life 1re two key 1dv1nt1ges of the
leg1l li1bility, the leg1l st1tus of the corpor1tion does not protect
form1tion.
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 8
b. Most businesses (by number 1nd tot1l doll1r s1les) 1re org1nized 1s
corpor1tions.
1. The optim1l dividend policy is the one th1t s1tisfies the sh1reholders
b. The use of debt fin1ncing h1s no effect on c1sh flow or stock price.
c. The riskiness of projected c1sh flows depends upon how the firm is
fin1nced.
d. Stock price is dependent on the projected c1sh flows 1nd the use of
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 9
firm’s expected c1sh flow, bec1use this will 1dd the most we1lth to
b. One w1y to st1te the decision fr1mework most useful for c1rrying out
depends upon the firm’s 1ssets, but EPS does not depend on the m1nner
stockholders’ best interests, but they m1y 1lso oper1te in their own
in such situ1tions.
corpor1tion.
st1y within the l1w, there 1re no effective controls th1t stockholders
1. One of the w1ys in which firms c1n mitig1te or reduce 1gency problems
b. The thre1t of t1keover is one w1y in which the 1gency problem between
b. M1n1gers who f1ce the thre1t of hostile t1keovers 1re less likely to
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 11
corpor1te t1x. The other st1tements 1re f1lse. Corpor1tions 1re subject
to limited li1bility, but 1re subject to more regul1tions th1n the other
tr1nsferred.
li1bility; however, they f1ce more regul1tions th1n the other forms of
Except for st1tement 1, 1ll the other st1tements 1re ex1ctly opposite for
corpor1tions.
corpor1tions.
proprietorships.
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 1B
firm is underperforming. M1n1gers who fe1r losing their jobs will try to
will ex1cerb1te the 1gency conflict, while st1tement c reduces the 1gency
stock options, then the m1n1gers will be sh1reholders 1nd will sh1re the
1 l1rge 1mount of the firm’s stock, they will like to h1ve more s1y in
the m1n1gement of the comp1ny. (Some m1y even m1ke sure th1t they get
bo1rd se1ts.) Since they 1re sh1reholders 1nd h1ve more influence, they
st1tement c is true.
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 13
c1n profit by t1king it over 1nd doing 1 better job running it.
def1ult. Therefore, they would like the firm to st1y less risky so they
get their interest p1yments. If they owned 1 bond th1t promised to p1y
them 5 percent, 1nd then the firm bec1me risky, the def1ult risk premium
percent return th1t compens1ted them for the old level of def1ult risk.
the other h1nd, sh1reholders would prefer the comp1ny to t1ke 1 little
correct choice.
Ch1pter 1 - P1ge 14
f1lse. Even if m1n1gers st1y within the l1w, the thre1t of firing 1nd/or
l1rge firms. This m1kes it h1rder for sm1ll comp1nies to r1ise outside
c1pit1l