Judgment Summarisation On POCSO CASE LAWS

1. Hari Dev Acharya @ Pranavanand & Ors v.
State (2021)
Case Title Hari Dev Acharya @ Pranavanand & Ors v. State

Case Citation CRL.M.C. 6530/2018 and CRL.M.As. 50336/2018, 14161/2021
Court (SC/HC) IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Hon’ble Judge(s) HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR OHRI
Date of Judgment 12.11.2021
Link to the Judgment https://lawbeat.in/sites/default/files/2021-11/
MKO12112021CRLMM65302018_222940.pdf
Child Rights Concern whether two separate incidents can be combined in a single First
Information Report (FIR), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (CrPC) would apply, allowing joint trial if the offences were
committed during the same transaction.
Youngster studying at a Gurukul in Delhi was reportedly raped by a

superior as well as official personnel
Legal Issues involved  forced to enter into the compromise by official personnel
 child victim was physically beaten with kicks, fist and
punches
 offence of sodomy
 harassed for the last one and half month
Facts of the Case Briefly stated the facts involved in the present case are that on a
complaint lodged by the child victim/complainant on 04.09.2017, FIR
No. 304/2017 came to be registered under Section 377 IPC1 and Sec.
10 of the POCSO Act2 against one Nikhil Arya and others. The victim
was harassed for a period of one and a half month during the stay at
Gurukul by his superiors. It was further stated that on the
intervening night of 04/05.08.2017 at about 12:50 in the night, Nikhil
1
Unnatural offences
2
accused of touching the breast of the victim with sexual intent amounts to an aggravated form of sexual assault
Arya woke up the child and exploited him sexually in the teacher’s
room. The victim told about the entire matter to his friend and went
to Hauz Khas police station. His mother was called to the police
station at about 2:30 in the night and to avoid any insult, they
entered into a compromise under the pressure of Rampal, Subhash,
Pradeep, Bhupesh and Yogesh. It was stated that Raman, who had
supported the complainant, was rusticated from the Gurukul. It was
further stated that thereafter in presence of entire class, the child
victim was physically beaten with kicks, fist and punches. It was also
stated that on 02.09.2017 between 11 a.m.-12 p.m. when he visited
the washroom, Nikhil was already present there. After gagging the
complainant‟s mouth, Nikhil committed the offence of sodomy. The
complainant ran away from there and thereafter, Swami
Pranavanand levelled allegations against him of stealing dry fruits
and rusticated him from Gurukul. After going home, the child victim
narrated the entire incident to his mother and the present FIR came
be lodged.
Arguments (Both Side)  Victim: forced to enter into the compromise dated
05.08.2017 with the accused persons
 circumstances under which the compromise was forced upon
the child victim by accused persons, namely Rampal, Subhash
Kumar, Pradeep, Bhupesh and Yogesh, were elaborated.
 Child was publicly beaten in front of the class and later
rusticated from the Gurukul on false allegations.
 Prosecution: the petitioners could not have been summoned as

the complaint was filed by clubbing two incidents dated
04.08.2017 and 02.09.2017. The petitioners had no role in the
second incident dated 02.09.2017 which being distinct and
separated from the first incident by a period of one month
could not have been clubbed with it. Additionally, the
prosecution ought to have first established the main offence
stated to have been committed by Nikhil Arya before
proceeding against the present petitioners. In other words, it
was contended that there cannot be a joint trial.
 for the incident dated 04.08.2017, both the basic ingredients
required to be proved for establishing an offence punishable
under Section 21 of the POCSO Act, i.e., „commission of the
offence‟ and its „knowledge‟, are missing. The document
dated 05.08.2017, written by the child victim‟s sister, and
signed not only by the child victim but also by his sister and
his mother, mentioned that there was rather a
misunderstanding between the parties. As neither the child
victim nor his sister/mother had alleged commission of any
offence under the POCSO Act, the petitioners could not be
attributed with the requisite „knowledge‟. Further, while
transposing the petitioners‟ names from Column No. 12 to
Column No. 11 at the time of filing of the first supplementary
challan, the only material cited was the statement of ASI
Hakam Singh who was present in the concerned police station
on the night of 04.08.2017, but his statement does not
incriminate the petitioners in any manner.
 the petitioners could not have been summoned as the
allegations are prima facie false. The first incident dated
04.08.2017 was not reported till 04.09.2017 and it was also
not investigated. The second incident stands falsified by the
FSL Report on the footage seized from the CCTV cameras of
the Gurukul.
 the summoning order is cryptic and shows non-application of
mind. Further, it was passed prior to filing of the second and
third supplementary charge sheet; and at that time the Trial
Court did not have the benefit of the FSL report.
 the petitioner Hari Dev Acharya @ Pranavanand was not even
present in India at the time of first incident and he returned
only on 15.08.2017.
 the present FIR was filed with malafide intentions as the child
victim was caught stealing dry fruits and the same was
captured by the CCTV cameras of the Gurukul.
Other judgments  Neeraj Verma v. State, CRL.M.C. 3770/2005,

referred  Sr. Terry Jose and Others v. State of Kerala reported as (2018)
18 SCC 292,
 Kamal Prasad Patade v. State of Chhattisgarh reported as 2016
SCC OnLine Chh 719
Conclusion by Court  accused Nikhil Arya was held punishable under Section 6
POCSO Act and Section 377 IPC
 petitioners are accused of their failure to not inform the
Special Police Juvenile Unit or the local police after coming to
know of the offence committed by accused Nikhil Arya on
the child victim and have been charge-sheeted for
committing an offence punishable under Section 21 POCSO
Act. Section 223(d) Cr.P.C
 Court is of the opinion that the offences committed by Nikhil
Arya and the present petitioners have been committed in the
course of „same transaction‟ and a joint trial is permissible.
 reliance placed by learned Senior Counsel on the decision in
Neeraj Verma (Supra) is also misplaced as the fact situation
in that case was completely different.
 offence under the POCSO Act was committed on both the
dates by accused Nikhil Arya.
Judgment / Order 77.1 The persons in charge of the schools/educational institutions,

special homes, children homes, shelter homes, hostels, remand
homes, jails etc. or wherever children are housed, if they come across
instances of sexual abuse or assault on a minor child which they
believe to have been committed or come to know that they are being
sexually molested or assaulted are directed to report those facts
keeping upmost secrecy to the nearest Special Juvenile Police Unit
(SJPU) or local police, and they, depending upon the gravity of the
complaint and its genuineness, take appropriate follow-up action
casting no stigma to the child or to the family members.
77.2 Media personnel, persons in charge of hotels, lodges, hospitals,
clubs, studios and photograph facilities have to duly comply with the
provision of Section 20 of Act 32 of 2012 and provide information to
the SJPU, or local police. Media has to strictly comply with Section
23 of the Act as well.
77.3 Children with intellectual disability are more vulnerable to
physical, sexual and emotional abuse. Institutions which house them
or persons in care and protection, if come across any act of sexual
abuse, have a duty to bring to the notice of the Juvenile Justice
Board/SJPU or local police and they in turn be in touch with the
competent authority and take appropriate action.
77.4 Further, it is made clear that if the perpetrator of the crime is a
family member himself, then utmost care be taken and further action
be taken in consultation with the mother or other female members of
the family of the child, bearing in mind the fact that best interest of
the child is of paramount consideration.
77.5 If hospitals, whether government or privately-owned or medical
institutions where children are being treated come to know that
children admitted are subjected to sexual abuse, the same will
immediately be reported to the nearest Juvenile Justice Board/SJPU
and the Juvenile Justice Board, in consultation with SJPU, should
take appropriate steps in accordance with the law safeguarding the
interest of the child.
77.6 The non-reporting of the crime by anybody, after having come
to know that a minor child below the age of 18 years was subjected to
any sexual assault, is a serious crime and by not reporting they are
screening the offenders from legal punishment and hence be held
liable under the ordinary criminal law and prompt action be taken
against them, in accordance with law.
77.7 Complaints, if any, received by NCPCR, SCPCR Child Welfare
Committee (CWC) and Child Helpline, NGOs or women's
organisations, etc., they may take further follow-up action in
consultation with the nearest Juvenile Justice Board, SJPU or local
police in accordance with law.
77.8 The Central Government and the State Governments are directed
to constitute SJPUs in all the districts, if not already constituted and
they have to take prompt and effective action in consultation with the
Juvenile Justice Board to take care of the child and protect the child
and also take appropriate steps against the perpetrator of the crime.
77.9 The Central Government and every State Government should
take all measures as provided under Section 43 of Act 32 of 2012 to
give wide publicity of the provisions of the Act through media
including television, radio and print media, at regular intervals, to
make the general public, children as well as their parents and
guardians, aware of the provisions of the Act."
Key Takeaways  as per the CCTV footage, the child victim had entered the
washroom on 02.09.2017 at 11:30 a.m. and left the same at
11:46 p.m. It was also mentioned that Nikhil Arya could not
be seen going to the washroom at this time on 02.09.2017.
he was present in the verandah.
 It was further mentioned that he entered the office at

10:55:18 a.m. and left at about 11:47:37 a.m. It was also
mentioned that the presence of the accused Nikhil Arya could
not be established from 11:30 a.m. to 11:46 p.m. in the
washroom when the child victim is stated to have used it.
 supported the summoning order
 medical examination report of the child victim supports his

allegations
 child victim was medically examined at AIIMS on 04.09.2017,

and the concerned Doctor stated that after thorough medical
examination of the child victim, he was of the considered
opinion that "...insertion of penis or penis like object cannot
be ruled out."
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Etcetera Etc.
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Urf/Alias @
Section Sec
REFERENCE LINKS-
https://blog.ipleaders.in/landmark-judgments-under-pocso-act-2012/
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/158757170/
https://lawbeat.in/sites/default/files/2021-11/MKO12112021CRLMM65302018_222940.pdf
2. Pramod Yadav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh (2021)
Case Title Pramod Yadav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Case Citation Criminal Appeal No.5189/2020
Court (SC/HC) THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR MADHYA
PRADESH AT JABALPUR
Hon’ble Judge(s) Hon'ble Shri Justice Mohammad Rafiq, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Dwivedi, Judge
Date of Judgment 22/04/2021
Link to the Judgment https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166038266/
Child Rights Concern care, protection, maintenance, welfare, training, education and
rehabilitation of neglected or delinquent children and for the trial of
delinquent children in the Union territories.
Legal Issues involved  Sec 3633.
 Sec 366 4
 Section 376(2) of IPC5,
3
Punishment for kidnapping
4
Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.
 Sec 376(3) 6,
 Section 5(L)7 and 68 of Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012
Facts of the Case Abduction of the minor prosecutrix and took her to Nagpur where
he sexually exploited her on the pretext of marriage. appellant was
arrested on 22.10.2019. He filed an application under Section
439 Cr.P.C. for grant of bail which was rejected by the Special Judge.
Thereafter the trial Court recorded the statement of prosecutrix
wherein she did not support the prosecution story and deposed that
appellant did not commit rape with her. This paved the way for the
accused/appellant to file second appeal on the same subject matter.
Arguments (Both Side)  Victim: there was nothing objectionable even if the trial of
the case involving offences of both POSCO Act as well as
Atrocities Act was being conducted by the Special Court
notified for trial of the offences under the latter Act.
 Since the application filed by the accused under Section
439 of Cr.P.C. was dismissed by the Special Judge notified
under the Atrocities Act, an appeal against such order would
lie to this Court under Section 14 of the Atrocities Act.
 both the POCSO Act and Atrocities Act contain non-obstante
clauses regarding applicability of various provisions of Cr.P.C.
The Special Courts have been constituted under both the
enactments for the purpose of taking cognizance, conducting
trials etc.
5
offence by official
6
Punishment for rape
7
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than twenty years for aggravated penetrative sexual assault
8
Subs. by s. 5, ibid., for section 6 (w.e.f. 16-08-2019).br
 the POCSO Act has much wider scope and has a detailed
procedure which is evident from the provisions contained in
Sections 19 to 27 of the POCSO Act.
 challan in cases involving POCSO Act has to be filed before
the Special Court notified under that Act whereas for
offences under the Atrocities Act the trial of the case has to
be made over to the Special Court after committal by the
Chief Judicial Magistrate. It was noted that in that particular
case the challan was filed before the Sessions Court,
therefore, it would affect the right of the applicant.
 Prosecution: an objection was raised by the learned Public

Prosecutor that since the accused is also being tried for
offences punishable under Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act,
therefore, he should have filed an application under Section
439 of Cr.P.C. before this Court rather than filing appeal
 It was argued that when the [4] Criminal Appeal
No.5189/2020 accused is being tried for offences of POCSO
Act as well as for offences under the Atrocities Act, such trial
should be conducted by the Special Judge notified for trial of
the cases registered under POCSO Act, whereas, in the
present case, the trial is being conducted by the Special Judge
notified for trial of the cases registered under the Atrocities
Act.
 It was therefore argued that the trial against the accused
stood vitiated and a direction be issued to transfer this case
to the court of Special Judge notified for trial of the cases
under the POCSO Act.
 where there are two special enactments, which contain non-
obstante clauses, the latter statute must prevail.

Other judgments  Mohd. Juned vs. State of M.P.
referred  Smt. Sunita
 Gandharva vs. State of M.P. and another
 Sarwan Singh and another vs. Kasturi Lal
 Registrar (Judicial) High Court, Madras, 2017 Cri.L.J. 4519
 State of Andhra Pradesh v Mangali Yadagiri, 2016 Cri.L.J. 1415
 Guddu Kumar Yadav vs. The State of Bihar, Cr. Misc.
No.52792 of
 Rinku v State of UP Misc. Bail Application No.33075/2018
 Vikrambhai Amrabhai Malivad vs. State of Gujarat, R/Criminal
Misc. Application No.11014/2020.
 Suraj S. Paithankar v. The State of Maharashtra, Bail.
Application No.817/2020.
 Lokesh Kumar Jangid vs. State of Rajasthan, Criminal
Miscellaneous Second Bail Application No.9440/2020.
 Sharat Babu Digumarti v Govt.
Conclusion by Court the trial of a case instituted under the provisions of two special Acts
viz. Atrocities Act and POCSO Act, shall be conducted by the Special
Courts constituted under the POCSO Act.
in a case involving trial of the accused for the offences under both
the Atrocities Act and POCSO Act shall be conducted by the Special
Court constituted under Section 28 of the POCSO Act and remedy of
the accused against the order of rejection of bail under Section
439 of Cr.P.C. by the such Special Judge, would be by filing the bail
applications under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court.
Judgment / Order When the matter was listed before this Court on 11.12.2020, a
direction was issued to issue notice to the High Court Bar
Association, Jabalpur; High Court Advocates' Bar Association,
Jabalpur; High Court Bar Association, Indore; and High Court Bar
Association, Gwalior to address the Court on the issue. Shri Rakesh
Kumar Sharma, learned Senior Advocate was appointed as amicus to
assist the Court.
POCSO Act being the latter Act, its provisions would prevail over
those of the Atrocities Act.
relegated the trial of a case registered for offences under Sections
363, 366, 342, 506-B & 376-D of IPC and also under Section 5(g), 6
and 12 of the POSCO Act and Section 3(1)(xi) of Atrocities Act to the
Court of Special Judge notified under Atrocities Act.
Key Takeaways  accused is also being tried for offences punishable under
Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act, therefore, he should have
filed an application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. before this
Court rather than filing appeal.
 Since the application filed by the accused under Section
439 of Cr.P.C. was dismissed by the Special Judge notified
under the Atrocities Act, an appeal against such order would
lie to this Court under Section 14 of the Atrocities Act.
 learned Senior Criminal Appeal No.5189/2020 Counsel that
both the POCSO Act and Atrocities Act contain non-obstante
clauses regarding applicability of various provisions of Cr.P.C.
"17. Instant case is by way of an application for cancellation of bail at
the instance of complainant and the main objection to the said
application is maintainability itself. Beside that question of interplay
of Atrocities Act and POCSO Act and extent of bail conditions as
per Section 437(3) Cr.P.C. are involved. Therefore, according to this
Court Five Questions are involved in this case, viz.:-
(i) Whether, High Court can entertain an application under Section
439(2) of Cr.P.C. for cancelation of bail granted in exercise of powers
conferred under Section 14-A(2) of Atrocities Act?;
(ii) Whether, the Court granting bail in an appeal under Section 14-
A(2) of Atrocities Act can be recalled/cancelled as the order granting
bail does not attain finality?;
(iii) Whether, in an offence where the provisions of Atrocities Act
and POCSO Act are involved, the procedural law of POCSO Act will
apply or the provisions of Atrocities Act?;
(iv) Whether, in a composite offence involving of provisions of
POCSO Act and Atrocities Act, an order refusing bail under Section
439 Cr.P.C. will be appealable as per Section 14-A(2) of Atrocities Act
or an application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. simpliciter will lie before
the High Court?; and [14] Criminal Appeal No.5189/2020
(v) What is the scope and extent of bail conditions as referred
in Section 437(3) of Cr.P.C.?"

Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Government Govt.
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Section Sec
REFERAL LINKS-
3. Attorney General for India v. Satish and anr. (2021)
Case Title
Satish S/O Bandu Ragde v State Of Maharashtra

Case Citation CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 161 OF 2020
Court (SC/HC) HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH
Hon’ble Judge(s) Pushpa V. Ganediwala

Link to the Judgment https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pressing-a-childs-breast-without-skin-to-
skin-contact-does-not-amount-to-sexual-assault-under-pocso-act-bombay-high-
court-388064.pdf
Child Rights Concern Section 8 in The Children Act, 1960

8. Procedure to be followed by a magistrate not empowered under
the Act.
1) When any magistrate not empowered to exercise the powers of a
Board or a children' s court under this Act is of opinion that a person
brought before him under any of the provisions of this Act
(otherwise than for the purpose of giving evidence) is a child, he
shall record such opinion and forward the child and the record of the
proceeding to the competent authority having jurisdiction over the
proceeding.
2) The competent authority to which the proceeding is forwarded
under sub- section (1) shall hold the inquiry as if the child had
originally been brought before it.
Legal Issues involved Sec 354 Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage
her modesty
Sec 363 Punishment for kidnapping
Sec 342 Punishment for wrongful confinement
Sec 8 of POCSO
Facts of the Case The mother of the prosecutrix placed an FIR on 14.12.2016 against the
appellant for attracting her daughter who was of 12 years of age by
showing her a guava and taking to his house. She asked the appellant
about the whereabouts of her daughter. He denied the presence of
the prosecutrix in his house. The appellant thereafter tried to touch the
breast of the prosecutrix and undress her.
Arguments (Both Side) Respondent- The learned APP read out Section 7 of the POCSO Act,
which defines sexual assault and submitted that the act which has
been proved by the prosecution "pressing of breast" comes within
the definition of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act.
Appellant- It is not possible to accept this submission for the

aforesaid reasons. Admittedly, it is not the case of the prosecution
that the appellant removed her top and pressed her breast. As such,
there is no direct physical contact i.e. skin to skin with sexual intent
without penetration.
Other judgments Referred Sec 354 for sexual assault
referred
Conclusion by Court  For the offence punishable under Section 8 of the POCSO Act
read with Section 354 of the IPC, the appellant is sentenced
to suffer R.I. for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-, in
default of fine to suffer R.I. for one month
 For the offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC, the

appellant is sentenced to suffer R.I. for two years and to pay
fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of fine to suffer R.I. for one
month.
 For the offence punishable under Section 342 of the IPC, the
appellant is sentenced to suffer R.I. for six months and to pay
fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of fine, to suffer R.I. for one
month.
 All the substantive jail sentences were directed to run
concurrently. The appellant is given set off for the period of
sentence, he has already undergone.
Judgment / Order  The Special Court framed charge (Exh. 11) against the
appellant / accused under Sections 361, 354, 342 and 309 of
the IPC and under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. The said
charge was read over and explained to the appellant /
accused, to which he denied. His plea was recorded.
 the prosecution examined in all five witnesses (PW 1-5) and
also brought on record the relevant documents.
 The Special Court recorded the statement of the appellant /
accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
 The learned Special Court, however, acquitted the appellant /
accused of the offence punishable under Section 309 of the
IPC.
 learned Court found the appellant / accused guilty of the
crime registered against him and passed the judgment of
conviction.
 in the opinion of this Court, stricter proof and serious
allegations are required.
 would not fall in the definition of 'sexual assault'. It would
certainly fall within the definition of the offence
under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code.
Key Takeaways  informant - PW-1 and the prosecutrix - PW-2 are the star
witnesses.
 prosecutrix at the relevant time was 12 years and this fact is
not seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the
appellant.
 She asked the appellant about the whereabouts of her
daughter. He denied the presence of the prosecutrix in his
house.
 PW-3, the neighbour, is examined on the point that she had
heard the shouts of a girl and she informed PW-1 about it.
 in the opinion of this Court, stricter proof and serious
allegations are required.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Etcetera Etc.
And &
FIR First Information
Report
Son of S/o
Section Sec
PW-1 Informant and
mother of
prosecutrix
PW-2 Prosecutrix
PW-3 prosecution
witness
(neighbour)
PW-4 WPSI - Kinake
PW-5 PSI who
registered crime
against the
appellant
another Anr.
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pressing-a-childs-breast-without-skin-to-skin-contact-does-not-
amount-to-sexual-assault-under-pocso-act-bombay-high-court-388064.pdf
4. Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (2019)
Case Title Nipun Saxena v. Union of India

Case Citation WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 565 OF 2012
Court (SC/HC) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL/CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Hon’ble Judge(s)
Hon'ble Justice Deepak Gupta; Hon'ble Justice M. B. Lokur

Link to the http://www.delhihighcourt.nic.in/JJC/judgements/Judgment_Nupun%20Saxena.pdf
Judgment
Child Rights Section 23(1), section 24(5), section 33(7) Prevention of Children from Sexual
Concern Offences (POSCO) Act
Legal Issues Why the identity of rape victims should not be revealed?
involved
In what case, in what circumstances it can be revealed?
Whether non-disclosure of the identity of the victim covers the preview of the
POCSO Act?
Facts of the Case  A victim of sexual assault such as rape is dealt with like an
“untouchable” and shunned from society. Commonly, even her family
will not acknowledge her go into their overlay. The unforgiving the
truth is that multiple occasions instances of assault don’t get revealed
due to the bogus thoughts of supposed ‘respect’ which the group of
the unfortunate casualty needs to maintain. The issue doesn’t end
here. Much after a case is held up an FIR recorded, the police, as a
general rule, question the unfortunate victim like a denounced.
 The unfortunate victim’s first brush with justice is an undesirable one
where she is caused to feel that she is to blame; she is the reason for
the wrongdoing; she is the one at fault.
 Section 228 of IPC prohibits the disclosure of the identity of a rape
victim. But certain media houses don’t follow what legal proposition
suggests instead they publish the identity of victims. It was also laid
down in the case of Bhupinder Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh,
that, in order to maintain the spirit of Section 228, disclose the identity
of the rape victims ought not to be disclosed.
Arguments (Both  PETITONER- The Court alluded to Section 228A IPC (Disclosure of
Side) character of the casualty of specific offenses and so on.), Section 327
CrPC, 1973 (Courts ought to be open and regularly open ought to
approach the Courts), expressed that vide the Amendment Act of
1983, instances of rape, gang rape and so forth were rejected from the
class of cases to be attempted in open Court.
 Sub-Section (1) of Section 228A states that any individual who makes
known the name and identity of an individual who is a supposed victim
of an offense falling under Sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C,
376DA, 376DB or 376E carries out a criminal offense. Sub-Section (2)
of Section 228A is making known the identity of the unfortunate victim
by printing or distribution in specific situations depicted in that.
RESPONDENT- The respondents clarified that they would prefer not to in any
way diminish the privilege of the safeguard to interrogate the prosecutrix, yet
the equivalent ought to be finished with a specific degree of goodness and
regard on the loose. Endeavors have been made to sharpen the Courts;
however, experience has demonstrated that despite the most punctual
reprobation, the first as far in 1996, State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, the
Courts even today uncover the identity of the victim in question. The freedom
of speech and expression takes a backseat because of the said provision. The
disclosure of identity and names are impositions of truth only
Other judgments Bhupinder Sharma v State of Himachal Pradesh

referred State of Punjab v Gurmeet Singh
Conclusion by  Victim was suggested to be protected from mental and sociological

Court torment or mental misery that may follow the deplorable occurrence
of sexual viciousness.
 Society has an obligation to help the victims of sexual brutality and to
guarantee that they return to regularity and begin having a typical
existence. Victims of such viciousness are not stripped of their
essential right to security and are at risk to be protected against
pointless open remarks.
 The area is so clear, unambiguous and the result of it is inevitable and
the inquiry whether the exposure was expected, bonafide or without
information on the law has no significance. Subsequently, the
arrangement of section 228A IPC restricting the exposure of the name
by a denounced is total and can’t be weakened.
Judgment / Order  The issues which may make known the identity of the individual don’t
exclusively imply that lone the name of the unfortunate victim ought
not to be uncovered however it likewise implies that the identity of
the injured individual ought not to be recognizable from any issue
distributed in the media.
 The lucidity additionally prompts the seat expressing that no individual
can print or distribute the name of the person in question or uncover
any realities which can prompt the injured individual being
distinguished and which should make her character known to people
in general on the loose.
 Next pointer on which the Court tossed light was on the examination
taken by cops, they ought to likewise quite far either utilize a nom de
plume portray the unfortunate victim except if it is completely
important to record her identity.
 FIR relating the offense of rape against ladies or offenses against
children falling inside the domain of POCSO will not be placed in the
open space. Updates or Correspondence traded or gave with the name
of the unfortunate victim in it ought not to be revealed to media and
not be outfitted to any individual under the RTI Act, 2015.
 Another vexatious issue is concerning the “following kinfolk of the
person in question” giving power to the administrator or secretary of
perceived welfare establishments to pronounce the name of the
person in question—For the expressed issue, Court was of the feeling
that, it isn’t important to unveil the identity of the unfortunate victim
to stir general assessment and supposition, If a crusade must be begun
to ensure the privileges of the person in question, it very well may be
done as such without uncovering her personality. In this way, the
Court expressed of without authorization of the authority, the identity
ought not to be revealed.
 Section 24(5) and Section 33(7) of the POSCO Act, makes it sufficiently
evident that the name and identity of the child are not to be revealed
whenever throughout examination or preliminary and the identity of
the kid is shielded from people in general or media.
 Section 37 of POSCO Act, states that preliminary is to be led in the
camera which would imply that the media can’t be available; the
reason for POCSO is to guarantee that the identity of the child isn’t
uncovered except if the Special Court recorded as a hard copy allows
such divulgence and exposure must be made in the event that it is in
light of a legitimate concern for the child, for instance, the identity of
the child can’t be built up even by the researching group, at that point
the authorization of photo to be distributed can be given by the
Special Court of Investigative Team.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Etcetera Etc.
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Urf/Alias @
Number No.
Section Sec
REFERRAL LINKS-
5. Libnus S/O Fransis Kujur v. State of Maharashtra (2020)
Case Title Libnus v. State of Maharashtra

Court (SC/HC) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
Hon’ble Judge(s) PUSHPA V. GANEDIWALA, J.
Date of Judgment JANUARY 15, 2021
Link to the Judgment https://images.assettype.com/barandbench/2021-01/4a6c67df-3ff3-4026-8164-
24d331b8efd6/libnus_v_maharashtra.pdf
Child Rights Concern Sexual assault

Sexual harrasment
Legal Issues involved Sec 8 of POCSO ACT: Punishment for sexual assault
Sec 10 of POCSO ACT: act of accused of touching breast of the victim
with sexual intent amounts to an aggravated form of sexual assault
Sec 11 of POCSO ACT: Imprisonment for sexual harassment
IPC Sec 354A: Punishment for sexual harassment
Facts of the Case the mother of the victim (a 5 year old girl) had gone to work and when
she returned, she saw that a man was in his house and he was holding the
hands of her daughter and he ran away on seeing the mother. The victim
told her mother that the man had asked her to sleep with him and he had
also unzipped his pants and taken out his penis.
Arguments (Both Side) Prosecution- /accused entered into the house of the prosecutrix with the
intention to outraged her modesty or sexual harassment as defined u/s 11 of
the POCSO Act.
Therefore, the conviction of the appellant/accused for the offence punishable
under Sections 448 and 354-A(1)(i) of the IPC r/w Section 12 of the POCSO Act
is maintained.
Conclusion by Court Holding minor’s hands and opening the zip of pants will not come under
the definition of sexual assault under POCSO, 2012 and would rather
come under sexual harassment under Sec 534(i) of the IPC.
The court observed that according to the definition of sexual assault, ‘a
physical contact with sexual intent without penetration is essential
ingredient. As no actual touching of the private parts of the body
happened in the case, the Bombay High Court considered if the act will
come under the ambit of the third part of the definition any other act
with the sexual intent which involves physical contact without
penetration’.
The appellant was not convicted for the aggravated sexual assault under
Sec 10 of POCSO as well as Sec 12 of POCSO in addition to Sec 354A
& 448(House trespass) of IPC but was rather convicted under Sec 354A
of IPC. Sec 11 of POCSO defines and Sec 12 punishes the offence of
sexual harassment. The ingredients of Sec 354A, IPC Does not overlap
with Sec 11 of POCSO, but both the offences share same name. The
Judge chose to convicted under 354A(3) which carries maximum prison
term of three years with no statutory minimum sentence stipulated
thereof. While disposing of the appeal, the court also noted that the
appellant had already served five months imprisonment Which was
sufficient in view of the nature of his act and ordered his release.
Judgment / Order The object behind the POCSO Act was to safeguard children from sexual
offences which received a massive jolt when the Bombay High Court acquitted
the person accused of sexual assault against a 5 year old girl. However, the
judgement was stayed by the Supreme Court. In this judgement, the POCSO
Court of Mumbai was not consistent with that of the High Court and dealt
with the provisions of POCSO Act to answer whether the accused can be
granted bail or not. The main contention of the accused is that the victim used
to visit his house and it cannot be said that the touch was a ‘bad touch'. To
answer this question, the court stated that the victim being a small girl, it
cannot be presumed that she is not aware of good touch or bad touch. The
victim has expressly stated that the accused touched her and she felt the
touch was a bad touch. The court further opined that the accusations were of
a serious nature and the applicant is alleged to have committed aggravated
sexual assault. Thus, the bail plea is rejected.
Key Takeaways If the offence of ‘sexual assault’ is proved against the appellant/accused, the
prosecutrix, being of age below twelve years, the conviction has to be
recorded for the offence of ‘aggravated sexual assault’.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Indian Penal Code IPC
Section Sec
And &
Son of S/O
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-4835-two-judgements-disrobing-pocso-
act.html
https://images.assettype.com/barandbench/2021-01/4a6c67df-3ff3-4026-8164-
24d331b8efd6/libnus_v_maharashtra.pdf
https://devgan.in/ipc/section/354A/
https://www.lawyersclubindia.com/judiciary/libnus-v-state-of-maharashtra-2021-holding-
hand-and-unzipping-pant-not-sexual-assault-under-pocso-4992.asp
6. K. Prakash v. The State Of Karnataka (2021)
Case Title K. Prakash v. The State Of Karnataka

Case Citation CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.336 OF 2021
Court (SC/HC) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Hon’ble Judge(s) R. Subhash Reddy J.

Link to the Judgment https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/kprakash-vs-state-of-karnataka-ll-2021-sc-
169-390816.pdf
Child Rights Concern Sec 6 of POCSO ACT: Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual
assault
Legal Issues involved Sec 6 of POCSO ACT: Punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual
assault
Sec 344 of IPC: wrongful confinement for ten or more days
Sec 366 of IPC: abducting or kidnapping with an intent
Facts of the Case PW-2 had gone to bring chips and milk from a nearby shop but she
did not return home for about half an hour. According to the
complainant/PW-1, accused No.1, who was residing near the house
of the complainant, was having love affair with PW-2- victim girl and
he was insisting to perform her marriage with him. The complainant
explained to him that she is not of marriageable age and his request
will be considered after the victim attains the marriageable age.
Therefore, the complainant/PW-1, suspected the role of accused
No.1 and complaint was lodged before the police. Pursuant to
registration of crime, the investigation was taken up. After
investigation, it was revealed that accused No.1, with the help of
other accused Nos. 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9, conspired together and
kidnapped the minor girl PW-2, in a car provided by the
appellants/accused Nos. 4 and 5.
Arguments (Both Side) learned counsel appearing for the Appellants: High Court has
committed error in confirming the judgment of conviction and Order
of Sentence, though the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt.
It is submitted that the appellants/accused Nos.4 and 5 are the
tenants of accused Nos. 6 and 7 and are no way connected with the
crime but have been falsely implicated at the instance of PW-1 and
PW-2.
It is submitted that there are various inconsistencies and
contradictions in the prosecution evidence and in spite of the same,
the Trial Court has erroneously convicted the appellants and the
same is confirmed by the High Court.
Further, having regard to allegations made against the appellants,
the sentence imposed is excessive and illegal.
Further it is submitted that, as they are having minor child and aged
parents, there is no one to take care of them. With the aforesaid
pleas, learned counsel has made a request to modify the sentence.
learned counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka: appellants are

convicted for offence punishable under Sections 344, 366 read
with Section 34 of IPC and that PW-2-minor girl was kidnapped at
the instance of accused No.1, as such there is no illegality in the
conviction recorded and Sentence imposed on the appellants. It is
submitted that, there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned
judgment.
Conclusion by Court prosecution has proved the guilt of accused nos. 4 and 5 only for
offences punishable under Sec 344, Sec 366 read with Sec 34 of the
IPC. Accused No. 1 was, in addition, found guilty of offence
punishable under Section 6 of POCSO Act. All the accused were
convicted accordingly. The conviction recorded and Sentence
imposed on the above accused, is confirmed by the High Court, by
dismissing the criminal appeal filed by them, by impugned judgment
dated 06.06.2019.
Judgment / Order  Though learned counsel for the appellants has argued,
questioning the conviction itself but we are satisfied with the
reasoning assigned by the High Court for confirming the
conviction recorded, as such we need not elaborate further.
Further, this Court has issued notice, limited to the quantum
of sentence only. Learned counsel for the appellants made a
request to modify the sentence.
 Many factors which may not be relevant to determine the
guilt, must be seen with a human approach, at the stage of
sentencing. While imposing the sentence, all relevant factors
are to be considered, keeping in mind the facts and
circumstances of each case. In the present case, the main
accusation was against accused no.1, who is convicted for
offences punishable under Sections 344, 366, IPC and Section
6 of POCSO Act and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
a period of 10 years. Even in the complaint, it was mentioned
that accused no.1 was in love with the victim girl PW-2.
 The alleged incident is of the year 2014 and we are informed
that appellants have already served sentence of about three
months and paid fine amount. They specifically pleaded that
there is no one to take care of their minor son and old age
parents.
 In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,
while confirming the conviction recorded and fine imposed,
we modify the sentence on the appellants for the period
already undergone. The appellants be released forthwith
unless otherwise their custody is required in connection with
any other case.
Key Takeaways learned counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka, has submitted
that the appellants are convicted for offence punishable
under Sections 344, 366 read with Section 34 of IPC and that PW-2-
minor girl was kidnapped at the instance of accused No.1
they are having minor child and aged parents, there is no one to
take care of them. With the aforesaid pleas, learned counsel has
made a request to modify the sentence.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Mother PW-1
Prosecutrix PW-2
Section Sec
Number No.
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/announcement.php?WID=13642
https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/kprakash-vs-state-of-karnataka-ll-2021-sc-169-
390816.pdf
7. State of Bihar v Dilip Kumar Yadav (2021)
Case Title State of UP v. DILIP KUMAR YADAV S/o Surya Narayan Yadav
Case Citation CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.7117 of 2021
Court (SC/HC) THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Hon’ble Judge(s) HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD

Child Rights Concern Sec 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012: Punishment for aggravated
penetrative sexual assault
Section 3 of the POCSO Act: the accused removed her
panty, inserted and rubbed his penis in her vagina
Legal Issues involved  Dilip Yadav committed rape upon victim who is almost 8 years of
age
 accused committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon
victim
Facts of the Case On the evening of July 22nd, the aggrieved party went to wash the pots at
a nearby tap. When she returned home after cleaning the pans, the
accused, Dilip Yadav, took advantage of her isolation. The perpetrator
snatched the victim’s hand and dragged her inside the residence, where
she was raped forcibly. When the victim’s mother heard shouting, she
dashed into the courtyard. After that, she entered the home and saw her
daughter unconscious on the cot with her clothing drenched in blood. The
victim was taken to the local doctor for treatment with the aid of the
neighbouring people. The situation of the victim started worsening due to
the continuous flow of blood.
Dilip Yadav, the accused, also arrived at the Purnia Hospital, where the
victim was being treated. When the victim regained consciousness, the
name of Dilip Yadav, who had committed the rape with her, came up. The
accused departed the hospital after hearing the same. Furthermore, Dilip
Yadav’s cousin brother offered the victim’s mother Rs 150,000 in exchange
for the case being closed, which the victim’s father refused. The physicians
at the hospital were the ones who had called the Forbesganj Police and
told them about the occurrence.
Arguments (Both Side)  Learned counsel of accused: The accused, Dilip Yadav had
pleaded not guilty of the charges framed against him which
comprised of punishment for sexual assault under Section 376
AB of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and punishment for penetrative
sexual assault as provided under Section 4 of POCSO Act, 2012.
 The case of the defence was the general denial of the whole of the
prosecution case and the accused had taken the plea of innocence
at the time of recording his statement under Section 313 Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The defence did not adduce any
evidence as well.
 The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused submitted
that the medical report did not point to recent sexual intercourse
or assault and penetration. It was therefore contended that the
absence of the same neither can attract Section 375 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 nor the ingredient of Section 3 of the POCSO Act,
2012 to put in motion the penal provision of Section 376AB of IPC,
1860 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.
 Learned counsel of Prosecution: The Special PP found that the
prosecution’s case had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the victim was under the age of 12, and that the medical
evidence, as well as visual evidence, led to the accused’s guilt.
 In her Examination in Chief, the victim testified that the accused
Dilip Yadav raped her and went on to describe the circumstances in
which she was raped by the accused. The Court noted that she had
remained solid and consistent throughout the proceedings and
that nothing had been elicited to undermine her integrity and
veracity.
 Under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, her
evidence was determined to be compatible with her statement.
The Court also considered the evidence of the victim’s 9-year-old
brother, who stated that he saw the accused Dilip Yadav in the
room where the incident occurred. He also testified that the
accused smacked him and it is understandable that he fled the
scene of the incident out of fear.
Conclusion by Court  Special POCSO Court Judge Shashi Kant Rai ordered the accused to
pay a fine of Rs 50,000 and compensation of Rs 7 lakh for the
survivor’s rehabilitation.
 Along with the minor victim, her brother and parents were also
testified and both the parents had provided relevant answers and
repeatedly established the fact that the accused, Dilip Yadav had
raped their sister and daughter respectively.
Judgment / Order  The Court had observed that the victim while being testified for
her Examination-in-Chief was steadfast and consistent regarding
the accused and his actions with her throughout and nothing has
been elicited in order to demolish her trustworthiness and
credibility. Along with the minor victim, her brother and parents
were also testified and both the parents had provided relevant
answers and repeatedly established the fact that the accused, Dilip
Yadav had raped their sister and daughter respectively. The
victim’s testimonies in view of Sections 161 and 164 of the Cr.P.C.
were consistent in nature. Similarly, the statement of the mother
and father of the victim was also found consistent and no
inconsistencies had been brought by the defence in the cross-
examination.
 The Special Judge had observed that as the accused defence
pleaded that there were no concerns about any hostility between
the victim and the accused, the same could not be adopted at any
level of argument without confronting the witness about any
animosity. There was no logical explanation why the accused
would be involved in a fake case of such gravity. If there was
motivation, it could not be projected during the witnesses’ cross-
examination. Despite her tender age, the victim was educated
enough to recognize that the accused’s actions were terrible. The
victim’s mother’s testimony also shows that she went to the scene
of the crime after hearing the victim scream and witnessed
bleeding from the victim’s private parts.
 On a detailed examination of the victim’s testimony, it was clear
that the Investigating Officer had well proven the site of
occurrence, and the accused had pointed out no error in the
investigation, and the defect that had been brought out was not a
substantial one. The location of the sexual event and the area
where it occurred was not contested by the defence as well.
 The victim of the current case stated that after taking her into the
house, the accused removed her panty, inserted and rubbed his
penis in her vagina, which attracts the ingredients of Section 3 of
the POCSO Act, 2012. The Judge further held that there was
nothing to disbelieve her piece of testimony, which was reliable
and acceptable beyond all reasonable doubt. In this case, the
victim’s constant statement throughout the examination process,
together with corroboration, renders her story a trustworthy and
accepted piece of evidence.
 The victim said unequivocally that the perpetrator had put his
penis into her vagina in the matter at hand. As a result, the male
sex organ is implanted into the female sex organ, which meets the
requirements of Sections 375(a), (b), and (c) of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860, and the victim is under the age of 12, which meets the
requirements of Section 376(AB) of the aforementioned Code.
That the victim was originally a minor below the age of 12 years,
had been shown beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution
counsel and therefore clause (m) of Section 5 of the POCSO Act,
2012 and the components of Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012
were met with. Apart from that, the provision of the Cr.P.C.
specified in Section 221(2) Cr.P.C. also allows flexibility to enhance
the charge based on facts and evidence. Thus, on the reliance of
this provision Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 became relevant
and admissible.
 Dilip Kumar Yadav was held guilty of committing an offence
punishable under Section 376(AB) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO
Act, 2012. The Special POCSO Court’s Single Judge bench explained
that because the Court was exercising its authority under Section
221 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 the accused could be
found guilty under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, even if
charges were not filed under that provision.
 In addition to life in prison, Special POCSO Court Judge Shashi Kant
Rai ordered the accused to pay a fine of Rs 50,000 and
compensation of Rs 7 lakh for the survivor’s rehabilitation.
Key Takeaways  the statement of the mother and father of the victim was also
found consistent and no inconsistencies had been brought by the
defence in the cross-examination.
 There was no logical explanation why the accused would be
involved in a fake case of such gravity.
 The victim’s mother’s testimony also showed that she went to the
scene of the crime after hearing the victim scream and witnessed
bleeding from the victim’s private parts. Investigating Officer had
well proven the site of occurrence.
 In this case, the victim’s constant statement throughout the
examination process, together with corroboration, renders her
story a trustworthy and accepted piece of evidence.
 the male sex organ is implanted into the female sex organ. Thus,
on the reliance of this provision Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012
became relevant and admissible.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Uttar Pradesh UP
And &
Son of S/o
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.legitquest.com/case/dilip-kumar-yadav-and-3-others-v-state-of-up-and-
another/20B093
https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/special-pocso-judge-hears-convicts-
sentences-one-day-rape-of-8-year-old
https://www.news18.com/news/india/setting-an-example-bihar-pocso-court-convicts-and-
sentences-man-for-raping-8-year-old-all-in-one-day-4495607.html
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/patna/justice-not-delayed-bihar-pocso-court-
completes-trial-verdict-in-one-day-7644836/
https://www.femina.in/trending/in-the-news/bihar-courts-fastest-verdict-in-a-pocso-trial-
justice-delivered-in-a-day-212863.html
8. Ganesh Das & Anr v. State of West Bengal (2017)

Case Title
Ganesh Das & Anr v. State of West Bengal
Case Citation W. P. 19543 (W) of 2017
Court (SC/HC) Calcutta High Court

Hon’ble Judge(s) Justice Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan and Justice Aniruddha Roy
Child Rights Concern Sec 6 of POCSO ACT

Sec 8 of POCSO ACT
Legal Issues involved Sec 376: Punishment for Sexual assault
Sec 6/8 of POCSO ACT, 2012
Sec 374: Unlawful compulsory labour
Facts of the Case The petitioner challenges the notice dated July 11, 2017, issued by the
Secretary of State of the Government of West Bengal and the Food
Commission of the Food Supply Authority, which has established a good
distribution policy for kerosene by the Government of West Bengal. (SK oil
for short) to ration cardholders. Some petitioners are owners of ration
cards, while others are the West Bengal Kerosene Dealers Association and
the Kolkata Kerosene Dealers Association.
Arguments (Both Side) The appellant was found guilty and convicted of being punished under
Section 376 (3) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison and
fined, and also one year of imprisonment was imposed for crimes
punished under Section 376 (3) of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant
was found guilty and was convicted of a crime punished under Section 6 of
the POCSO Act, and sentenced to 10 years in prison and Rs 1 Lakh fine. The
Calcutta High Court has ordered victims to pay the fines under Section 357
of Cr.P.C. In this appeal, the appellant placed a person described by name
among the defendants and identified that person as a victim.
The learned amicus curiae referred to the provisions of Section 23, 24 (5),

and 33 (7) of the POCSO Act to point out that there is overwhelming
legislative momentum to ensure the protection of victims. Citing the
judgment of the Supreme court, Vishaka v. the State of Rajasthan,(1997)
the lawyer stated that the content of international conventions and norms
is significant for the interpretation of constitutional guarantees in the
absence of national law that occupies the field and that Article 51 of the
Constitution should be read together with Article 253 of the Constitution
and that in the absence of contrary legislation, Indian municipal courts
would respect the norms of international law. The appeal was rejected by
the State, stating that it is defective since the victim has not become a
party
Other judgments Vishaka & Ors vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors

referred
Ramanna Dayaram v. international airport authority of India
Premium ganite v. State of Tamil Nadu
Balco Employee Union v. Union of India
Srisitaram Sugar Company Ltd. V. Union of India
Jal Mahal Resorts Ltd. V. K.P. Sharma
Sanchit Bansal v. Joint Admission Board
Conclusion by Court The appellant was held guilty and convicted for offence punishable
under Section 376(3) of the Indian Penal Code; hereinafter referred to as
“I.P.C.”; and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012; for short, “POCSO Act”.
A division bench of the Calcutta High Court comprising Justice Thottathil B.
Radhakrishnan and Justice Aniruddha Roy has held that in case of an
appeal from a conviction in an offence committed against a child or a
woman, the victim is not a necessary party to the appeal.
Judgment / Order  The victim is not a necessary part of a criminal appeal for
conviction of crimes against women or children, punishable
under the provisions of the I.P.C. or POCSO Act or any other
criminal provision that is applied in relation to crimes that
affect the human body against any “woman” and/or “child”,
both expressions being understood in the context of the
respective legislation that deals with said crimes.
 No appeal of this type would be flawed in the absence of the
victim’s implementation.
 The procedure to be followed in all these resources would be to
attend to those resources without insisting on the victim’s
implementation. In cases where, in addition to the assistance of
the prosecutor representing the State, the appellate court
deems it necessary to provide additional assistance to ensure
the interest of the victim through legal assistance, the HCLSC or
DLSA in question may be required to provide assistance
through a splicer or other advocates as determined by the
HCLSC or DLSA. However, even in such cases, the Court will
insist that the principles relating to the protection of dignity
and privacy and the modality of safeguarding those values, set
forth above, are scrupulously respected.
 As a necessary corollary, the resources of the victims would be
governed by the provisions of Nipun Saxena; however, there
should be no question about how the victim would be
described. It would suffice for the title of the case of said
appeal to show that the appellant is the victim in the criminal
case identified by the number, the court below, and/or the
police station. This will protect the victim from being subject to
disclosure of that person’s identity.
Key Takeaways  In this case, the learned court held that the victim’s legal rights,
eligibility, and interests are met if the state plays its role diligently
and carefully in the criminal procedure and the performance of the
prosecutor’s duties and responsibility. Responsibility to respond to
the provisions of Cr.P.C. and other enforced laws. The order was
issued in a criminal appeal filed by Ganesh Das, convicted of a
crime punished by the Court of the first instance under Section
376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
 The district court has determined that victims of sex crimes subject
to IPC or POCSO law have the right to defend the cause in an
appeal derived from a conviction. However, it is the duty of the
State and the Ministry of Public Affairs to comprehensively address
all aspects of criminal appeals against convictions and protect the
interests of victims, even if the victim is not involved in all parties.
The court further combined the contents of Section 374 and
Section 385 of CrPC, which does not provide for the issuance of a
notice of appeal to the victim, but the notice to the plaintiff, if an
appeal is provided.
 Furthermore, the procedure to be followed in all these remedies
should be to deal with the remedies without insisting on the
victim’s implementation. In cases where, in addition to the
assistance of the Prosecutor representing the State, the appellate
court deems it necessary to provide additional assistance to ensure
the interest of the victim through legal assistance, the HCLSC (High
Court Legal Service Committee) or DLSA (District Legal Service
Association) as in the question may be required, to provide
assistance, through an impaled defender or another determined by
the HCLSC or DLSA. However, even in such cases, the Court will
insist that the principles related to the protection of dignity and
privacy and the modality of safeguarding those values, set forth
above, are scrupulously respected.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Limited Ltd.
Section Sec
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5ac5e3c84a93261a672ba374
https://www.legitquest.com/case/in-re-v-ganesh-das-and-ors/1E7390
9. Ravishankar @ Baba Vishwakarma v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019)
Case Title Ravishankar @ Baba Vishwakarma v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Case Citation CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1523-1524 OF 2019
Court (SC/HC) THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Hon’ble Judge(s)
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R. SUBHASH REDDY & THE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA KANT
Date of Judgment 3 October, 2019

Link to the Judgment https://www.lawyerservices.in/Ravishankar--Baba-Vishwakarma-Versus-The-
State-of-Madhya-Pradesh-2019-10-03
Child Rights Concern guilty of kidnapping a 13 year-old girl, committing rape on her, killing
her by throttling and thereafter destroying the evidence by throwing
her half naked body in a dry well.
Legal Issues involved Sec. 363, 366, 376(2)(i), 376(2)(n), 376(2)(j), 376(2)(m), 376-
A, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) and

alternatively under the corresponding provisions of the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short ‘POCSO Act’)
Facts of the Case P.W.3 filed a report at the Police Station at Gotitoria on 22 nd May,
2015 at about 4.00 p.m. giving information of the disappearance of his
13 year old granddaughter. The deceased and her 11 year old brother
Harinarayan were children of the informants younger son, Satyaprakash
and had been staying with their mother at the latters parental home in the
neighbouring village, Chargaon, for the last four months. The deceased
visited the informants home in village Baglai with her mother at around
10 a.m. the previous day. The deceased did a few household chores
while her mother cooked food for the family. Later, she went out to play
with her friend who lived in the neighbourhood. Upon returning back
she told her mother that she was not feeling good and requested that they
should return back to her maternal uncles home in Chargaon. Her
mother assured her that they would return later that afternoon and both
of them went to sleep. Upon waking up at 3.00 p.m., the mother
discovered that the deceased was not around. The mother made
unsuccessful enquiries in the neighbourhood and later asked the
deceaseds 11 year old brother to go and enquire whether she had gone to
Chargaon on her own. The brother came back in the evening without
any news of the victim. Thinking that their daughter might have gone to
her paternal aunts home in the nearby village of Aadegaon, both parents
slept. Next morning enquiries were made at Aadegaon but it was
informed that the deceased had not gone there either. Worried, the
mother herself left for her parental home at around 9-10 a.m. and
informed her brother Vishram that the victim was missing. Vishram and
the deceaseds mother set out on a wide search in the neighbourhoods of
Chargaon with little result. Whilst returning back to Baglai, the mother
identified the deceaseds salwar and one chappal on the embankment of
the water-channel which divided the villages of Baglai and Chargaon.
Upon reaching her matrimonial home in Baglai, the mother informed her
father- in-law about her daughters disappearance who then approached
the police. P.W.3 thereafter narrated facts of deceaseds disappearance
and gave description of his granddaughter who was studying in Class 6
at that time. The Police, accordingly, registered a crime case under Sec.
363, IPC.
the police took P.W.3 to the spot where the salwar and the chappal were
recovered. Upon a local search of the area with some villagers and
relatives, the semi-nude body of the deceased was discovered lying in a
supine position in a dry well. The dead body was taken out of the well and
it was duly identified by her grandfather, P.W.3.
Other judgments Bhupinder Sharma vs. State of Himachal Pradesh
referred
Pantangi Balarama Venkata Ganesh vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
Dharam Deo Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab
Mukesh & another v. State (NCT of Delhi) & ors.
Machhi Singh and others vs. State of Punjab
Vasanta Sampat Dupare vs. State of Maharashtra
Khushwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab
Manoharan vs. Inspector of Police
Rajindra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra
Rameshbhai Chandubhai Rathod vs. State of Gujarat
Conclusion by Court The Trial Court awarded death sentence after drawing a balance-sheet
weighing ‘mitigating’ circumstances against ‘aggravating’ circumstances. It
noted that lack of criminal antecedents and a large number of dependants
were outweighed by appellant’s mature (40-50) age, heinousness of
offence, adverse reaction of society, pre-planned manner of crime, injuries
on body of deceased and lack of regret during trial. The High Court noted
that there was bleeding due to sexual intercourse and that there was no
possibility of reform owing to the appellant’s denial of his crimes.
Accordingly, it held that awarding death penalty was justified.
Judgment / Order We do not propose to mention name of the victim. Sec. 228-A of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (in short the “IPC”) makes disclosure of identity of victim
of certain offences punishable. Printing or publishing name of any matter
which may make known the identity of any person against whom an
offence under Sec. 376, 376-A, 376-B, 376-C or 376-D is alleged or found
to have been committed can be punished.
The prosecution has effectively proved that deceased was last seen’ with
the appellant and on earlier occasions too was seen being enticed by the
appellant. DNA evidence using the established STR technique has proved
that appellant committed sexual intercourse with the deceased. Deceased
has been proven to be a minor using school records. Various injuries on
her body along with signs of struggle proved that such crime was
committed in a barbaric manner. Death has been established as being
homicidal and caused by throttling, and has been estimated during the time
when the deceased was seen with the appellant. A slipper have been
recovered through the appellant which has later been identified as
belonging to the deceased, giving finality to the circumstantial chain. The
appellant has been unable to offer any alibi and his defence merely rests
on deflecting guilt on to the family of the deceased, which is without a
shred of evidence. Further, no effective challenge has been made against
any medical or DNA reports. There can thus be no second opinion against
the guilt of the appellant and his consequential conviction.
41. “(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest
cases of extreme culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the ‘offender’
also require to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of
the ‘crime’.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In

other words death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment
appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the
relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the
option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be
conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of
the crime and all the relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be

drawn up and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to be
accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the
aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is
exercised.”
Key Takeaways PW-20 advised the policeon handling the body of the deceased and later
inspected the decomposing dead body at 9:45 p.m. at the Government
Hospital, Chichli. After noticing various injuries including ligature marks on
the neck, she gave a report that death of the deceased was homicidal.
She noted various injuries on the body including a ruptured hymen,
congested trachea and pale lungs.
After confirmation by the FSL stating that only the DNA extracted from the
appellant matched with that on the vaginal slide of the deceased.
PW-9 After the analysis of facts described in the documents which have
been examined was of the opinion that Sexual intercourse was performed
with the deceased before her death which amounted to rape on
considering the age. The deceased was dragged before her death and
injuries indicating the struggle were also present.
P.W.11 submitted the DNA test report which shows that the DNA extracted
from the appellant’s blood matched with DNA from the vaginal smear slide
and salwar of the deceased.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Urf/Alias @
And &
Others Ors.
Forensic Lab FSL
Purushottam PW-3
Kaurav grandfather
of the
deceased
(Dr. C.S. Jain) PW-9
posted as Forensic
Expert-Analysis at
Medico-Legal
Institute
(Dr. Pankaj P.W.11
Srivastava) was
posted as Scientific
Officer at the DNA
Unit of FSL
Harsha Singh, PW-20
Senior Scientific
Officer
Section Sec.
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.advocatekhoj.com/library/judgments/search.php?q=pocso%20judgements
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Ravishankar--Baba-Vishwakarma-Versus-The-State-of-
Madhya-Pradesh-2019-10-03
10. Aparna Bhat & Ors. V. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (2021)
Case Title Aparna Bhat & Ors. V State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Court (SC/HC) THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Hon’ble Judge(s) A.M. Khanwilkar, S. Ravindra Bhat
Date of Judgment 18 March, 2021
Link to the Judgment https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/aparna-bhat-v-state-of-mp-168-390769.pdf
Child Rights Concern Sexual Assault

Legal Issues involved Can a compromise be made between the accused and the victim in such
cases
Are such orders given by the quotes acceptable and if yes what will be
the effect of such judgements on society?
Do such orders amount to conduct of trial in an unfair manner?
Can the accused be permitted to meet the survival or any of the members
of her family?
Most importantly what should be the guidelines to be taken into
consideration by the court while granting bail and anticipatory bail?
Facts of the Case The plea was filed by advocate Aparna Bhat and eight other advocates
against the impugned order passed by Madhya Pradesh High Court on
30th July, where the accused of sexual assault was asked to visit the
victims home on the occasion of Rakshabandhan along with Rakhi and
get in tied by her as a condition of bail. The accused who is neighbour of
the complainant, entered her house and attempted to harass her sexually
followed by which an FII are was filed by the police for the offences
punishable under sections 452, 354A, 323 and 506 of the IPC. The case
was investigated and a chargesheet was filed. In the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh while granting the bail imposed the conditions on the
accused that he along with his wife shall visit their house on the
occasion of Rakshabandhan with a box of sweets and request her to tie
the rakhi to him with the promise that he will protect her in future with
all his best ability. The accused was also asked to tender an amount of
Rs.11,000 as a token of gift given by brothers to their sisters as a part of
the customary rituals of Raksha Bandhan which had been challenged by
the petitioners before the honourable Supreme Court.
Arguments (Both Side) Petitioners: they submitted that Sec 437(3)(c) and Sec 438(2)(iv) of the
CRPC empowers the codes to impose any condition as it may deem fit
in the interest of public but the conditions required in any case has to be
in accordance with other conditions of the provisions.
Petitioners took reference of state of Madhya Pradesh v. Madan Lal and
urged that in cases of sexual offences the idea of compromise, especially
in the form of marriage between the accused and the Prosecutrix is
abhorrent and should not be considered a judicial remedy, as it would be
anti-thetickle to the woman’s honour and dignity.
The petitioner also requested to the court that no such judgement or
order should be passed by the court which can affect the dignity of
women and conduct of trial in fair and unbiased manner and citied
various cases where the apex court has denied the idea of compromise
on the ground that it will be antithetical to the woman’sDignity and that
it disparages and downgrades and otherwise heinous crime Thereby
indicating that such offences are media bill by the way of compromises.
Counsel for interveners: The counsel for interveners had submitted that
the u/s 437 (2) and 438 the power of court to impose. Conditions have a
wide array under any manner and citied a number of judgements When
courts have put forward certain conditions for granting bail.
Other judgments
referred
Rakesh B v State of Karnataka
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal

Vikram v. State of Madhya Pradesh
State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh & ors.
Vikas Garg v. State of Haryana
Conclusion by Court The court was urged to issue directions for gender sensitisation for
the bar and the bench as well as for law students. The Supreme
Court thanked the petitioner for the valuable suggestions and
quashed the bail conditions imposed by the Madhya Pradesh High
Court. The court also laid certain guidelines for the same. It also
accepted the suggestions regarding the inclusion of a gender
sensitisation curriculum in law schools, for the bar exam and also
for induction training of newly appointed judges.
Judgment / Order  The order passed by Madhya Pradesh High Court was
quashed by honourable Supreme Court. Honourable Judges
emphasised the quotes to stay away from adopting soft
approach or any kind of liberal approach that would be in the
realm of a sanctuary of errors.
 Various guidelines had been framed and directions were given
by the court:
 Under no circumstances should The contact between accused and
complainant be permitted as a condition for bail and in case, bail
is granted, the complainant should immediately be regarding the
same along with proving a copy of the bail order to her within
two days
 Bail conditions must strictly follow the provisions of CRPC and
order should avoid reflecting patriarchal notions against the
women
 Any kind of suggestion for compromise to the accused and
victim suggest to get married or two men dead meditation should
not be entertained as this is outside the jurisdiction of the court
Key Takeaways appellants requested that no remarks or observations should be made by
a judge in the judgment, which might reflect their biases and affect the
woman’s dignity.
what will be the effect of such judgements on society?
conduct of trial in an unfair manner
Petitioners took reference of state of Madhya Pradesh v. Madan Lal and
urged that in cases of sexual offences the idea of compromise, especially
in the form of marriage between the accused and the Prosecutrix is
abhorrent and should not be considered a judicial remedy, as it would be
anti-thetickle to the woman’s honour and dignity.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Section Sec.
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2021/03/18/no-more-asking-sexual-offence-
survivor-to-tie-rakhi-or-get-married-to-the-accused-supreme-court-calls-for-gender-
sensitisation-of-judges-and-lawyers-read-directions/
https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/aparna-bhat-v-state-of-mp-168-390769.pdf
https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/indian-supreme-court-on-gender-sensitisation-of-judges-aparna-
bhat-ors-v-state-of-madhya-pradesh-anr/#:~:text=In%20Aparna%20Bhat
%20%26%20Ors.,%2C%20that%20%E2%80%9Cwomen%20consuming%20alcohol
%20%E2%80%A6
11. Labhuji Amratji Thakor & Ors v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2018)
Case Title Labhuji Amratji Thakor & Ors v. State of Gujarat & Anr.
Case Citation
Criminal Appeal No. 1349 of 2018
Court (SC/HC)
Supreme Court of India
Hon’ble Judge(s)
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
By, THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN & THE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY RASTOGI

Link to the Judgment https://www.lawyerservices.in/Labhuji-Amratji-Thakor-and-Others-Versus-
State-of-Gujarat-and-Another-2018-11-13
Child Rights Concern Sec. 3 & 4 of POCSO Act; commits penetrative sexual assault shall be
punished with imprisonment and unnatural intercourse with the minor victim
Legal Issues involved Sec. 363 9 & Sec. 366 10of IPC, Sec. 3 11& 412 of POCSO Act
Facts of the Case The complainant-respondent No.2 lodged a First Information Report on 27.05.2015
under Sections 363 and 366 of Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "I.P.C.")
and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012 (hereinafter referred to as "POCSO ACT") that her daughter Parvati aged 14 years
has been abducted by one Natuji Bachuji Thakor between the night of 26.05.2015 and
morning hour of 27.05.2015. It was further alleged that Natuji Bachuji Thakor used to
visit my daughter and has given a mobile phone to her, after coming to know of which
fact, complainant had warned Natuji. After receiving the First Information Report, Police
conducted investigation and submitted a Charge Sheet under Sections 363 and 366 of
I.P.C. and Sections 3 and 4 of POCSO ACT against Natuji Bachuji Thakor, the
accused. The statement of victim was also recorded by the Police, who, in her
statement, had taken the name of Natuji alone. Special POCSO Case No. 10/2016 was
registered and trial proceeded against the accused. The statement of PW3 & PW4 was
recorded.
Arguments (Both Side) Learned counsel of victim: he stated that the victim has taken the names
of Labhuji, shashikant and jituji also. It was prayed in the application
that appropriate legal proceedings be initiated against the trio.
9
10
Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.
11
commits penetrative sexual assault shall be punished with imprisonment
12
unnatural intercourse with the minor victim
Learned counsel of prosecution: The statement in which the victim took
the additional names was recorded one year after the incident.
Conclusion by Court High Court committed error in setting aside the order of the trial
court rejecting the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The
High Court has not given sufficient reasons for allowing the
application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. filed by prosecution. The
impugned judgment of the High Court is unsustainable and is
hereby set aside. The appeal is allowed.
The court stated that there is not even suggestion of any act done by the
appellant is that amount to an offence referred to in sections three and
four of the POCSO act, 2012 and permitted the appeal filed by the
appellant.
Judgment / Order The judge listening to the case dismissed their application by stating that
she did not mention their name anywhere in a long statements. However,
the constitutional bench held that the crucial test of evidence must be
rebooted and if it is not tribute it then it will lead to conviction.
Moreover the bench also said that mayor presence of appellants in the
place where the crime was committed doesn’t prima facie Prove that the
appellants was involved in the crime.
Other Judgements Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab & ors.
referred
Key Takeaways The statement in which the victim took the additional names was
recorded one year after the incident.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
And &
Another Anr.
section sec
Others Ors
mother PW-3
Prosecutrix PW-4
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/court-must-have-cogent-reasons-to-summon-person-u-s-
319-crpc-reckons-sc-read-judgment
https://www.lawyerservices.in/Labhuji-Amratji-Thakor-and-Others-Versus-State-of-
Gujarat-and-Another-2018-11-13
12. Bijay Chhetri V State of Sikkim (2021)
Case Title Bijay Chhetri V State of Sikkim

Case Citation Crl. A. No.04 of 2021
Court (SC/HC) The High Court of Sikkim

Hon’ble Judge(s) The Honourable chief justice Mrs Justice Meenakshi Madan Rai
Date of Judgment 24th September 2021

Link to the Judgment https://hcs.gov.in/hcs/hg_orders/202100000042021_4.pdf
Child Rights Concern Sec. 9(m) of the POCSO Act13

Sec. 6 of the POCSO Act14
Legal Issues involved Sec.. 36315, 34216, 376(2)(i) of the IPC 17and Sec.. 6 of the POCSO Act
Facts of the Case Prosecution case is that on 15.08.2018, at 18:30 Hrs, a written FIR
was filed. two boys came to the Police Station with the Appellant
and the minor Victim, reporting that the Appellant had sexually
assaulted the Victim behind the Melli Hospital Quarters at around
17:00 Hrs of the same day. The age of the victim was seven years.
13
aggravated sexual assault on a child below 12 years
14
15
16
Punishment for wrongful confinement
17
Punishment of Sexual Assault- punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than three
years but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
According to the Victim, on the relevant day, she had gone to
witness a football match at Melli Ground with her cousin. In the
midst of the football match, she went to purchase juice and in the
meantime, her slippers broke. The Appellant came to her and told
her that he would repair her slippers and would also buy her sweets.
He took her behind the Hospital, inserted his hand inside her frock,
touched her private part, kissed her and touched her chest area. He
then grabbed her neck and dashed her head on a nearby stone. In
the meantime, two boys arrived at the scene and took them to the
Police Station.
Arguments (Both Side) Learned counsel of appellant:
 The victim did not identify the appellant in the court room
 There were statements being at variance from the end of the
victim. The testimony of the victim was not of and the learned
trial court placed reliance on the statement of victim to convict
the appellant
 The learned counsel of appellant asked for the appellant an
acquittal
 In support of his argument he put forth seven cases before the
court to prove his area.
Learned counsel of victim:

 There was no question of not ecognizing the appellant by the
victim.
 There were evidences brought forward before the learned court
that consisted no leniency.
 He, therefore concluded by saying that there is no requirement
for interfere with the impugned judgement and order on sentence
Other judgments Milan Rai v. State of Sikkim
referred
Lal Bahadur Kami & anr. V. State of Sikkim
Binod Sanyasi v. State of Sikkim
State of Sikkim v. Karna Bahadur Rai
Visveswaran vs. State Rep. by S.D.M
In Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi vs. State of Gujarat
Prakash v. State of Karnataka
Visveswaran vs. State and Hemudan Nanbha Gadhvi
Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Krishna Gopal & anr.
Vijayee Singh & ors. V. State of Uttar Pradesh
Navin dhaniram v. The state of Maharashtra
Conclusion by Court
the offence having been committed on a child below twelve years,
the provisions of Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act would fall into
place. The Learned Trial Court therefore was not in error on this
count.
Section 164 Cr.P.C. Statement of the Victim disregarded
impugned Judgment and Order on Sentence warrants no
interference by this Court, save to the extent pertaining to the
Statement of the Victim under Section 164 Cr.P.C., as already
detailed supra. Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
Judgment / Order “12. ........................................Under Rule 12(3)(b), it is specifically
provided that only in the absence of alternative methods described
under Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii), the medical option can be sought for.
In the light of such a statutory rule prevailing for ascertainment of
the age of a juvenile, in our considered opinion, the same yardstick
can be rightly followed by the courts for the purpose of ascertaining
the age of a victim as well.”
In the aforementioned situation, this Court in a number of
judgments has held that the age determined by the doctors should
be given flexibility of two years on either side.
Learned Trial Court could only rely on the evidence given on oath in
the Court and not one under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. which can be
relied on only for the purposes of corroboration and contradiction.
Section 164 Cr.P.C. Statement of the Victim is to be disregarded for
the reason that it is not substantive evidence besides which, it was
not read out to the Victim in the Courtroom to refresh her memory
or to test the veracity of the Statement.
“14. Merely because the victim affixed her signature on Exhibit 3,
assumptions cannot be drawn of her knowledge of its contents. The
document cannot prove itself, the contents thereof are required to
be proved in terms of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(hereinafter “Evidence Act”) viz. Section 67 of the Act, unless the
contents of the documents are said to be admissible by reasoning of
a provision o“ a Statute, ”xample, Section 90 of the Evidence Act.
Identification of her signature on Exhibit 3 is not conclusive of
knowledge of the contents, when the contents were not put to her
to replenish her memory.”
Even without the strength of the Section 164 Cr.P.C. Statement, the
evidence of the Victim to the effect that the Appellant had indeed
touched her genital with his hand cannot be blind sighted as it has
weathered the test of cross-examination and remained
undemolished. Her evidence reveals that the offence had been
committed by the Appellant.
Key Takeaways considered the rival submissions of Learned Counsel, examined the
evidence and documents on record, as also 2016 CriLJ 4591 2017 SCC
OnLine Sikk 173 2017 SCC OnLine Sikk 28 2020 SCC OnLine Sikk
33 (1988) 4 SCC 190 (1990) 3 SCC 190 2018 CriLJ 3393
the doctor gave the final opinion that clinical and cytopathological
examination was not suggestive of forceful, sexual intercourse.
“9. While it is correct that the age determined on the basis of a
radiological examination may not be an accurate determination and
sufficient margin either way has to be (2008) 15 SCC 223 (2009) 6
SCC 681 (2018) 9 SCC 248 Bijay Chettri vs. State of Sikkim allowed,
yet the totality of the facts stated above read with the report of the
radiological examination leaves room for ample doubt with regard to
the correct age of the prosecutrix. The benefit of the aforesaid
doubt, naturally, must go in favour of the accused.”
By adding two years to the Victim‟s age, which as per the
Ossification Test was “8.6 years,” her age would be only “10.6 years”
thereby still making her below twelve years of age.
P.W.7 Pravez Khan had seen the Appellant in a state of undress
below his waist, this circumstance went unexplained by the
Appellant. What would be the reason for a grown man to be half
naked in front of a child?
The evidence given by the Victim in the Court regarding the offence
committed by the Appellant under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act
cannot be obliterated.
P.W.7 had identified the Appellant, both in the T.I. Parade and in the
Courtroom. Hence, the question of non-identification of the
Appellant by the Victim does not arise.
It is a well settled proposition of law that other things being equal,
the interpretation of any provision sought to be adopted by the
Court is one that goes in favour of the accused.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Number No.
Section Sec
Another Anr.
First Information FIR
Report
And &
Pravez Khan who P.W.7
saw the accused
half naked
Test Identification T.I.
13. Arjun Kumar @ Prince v. The State of Bihar (2018)
Case Title
Arjun Kumar @ Prince v. The State of Bihar
Case Citation CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.159 of 2018
Court (SC/HC) High Court of Patna
Hon’ble Judge(s) HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIRENDRA KUMAR
Link to the Judgment https://primelegal.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/2-2.pdf
Child Rights Concern Sec 4 of POCSO Act18

Legal Issues involved Sec. 36319, 366A20 and 37621 of the IPC as well as 4 of the POCSO Act.
Facts of the Case PW-3 reported on 29.11.2015 at about 10 a.m that her daughter aged about
13 years left the house for getting tuition. The youngest son Niku Kumar aged
about 10 years reported that he had seen the victim girl going on an auto
rickshaw towards the railway station. Soon thereafter the appellant, from the
18
Punishment for penetrative sexual assault
19
20
Procuration of minor girl
21
Punishment for rape
referred mobile, called to the informant and said that he is along with the
victim girl and he is taking her to Patna for marrying with her. The informant
alleges that her minor daughter was induced by the appellant for the purpose
of marriage. Thereafter the appellant was in physical relation with her for
three days. On 03.12.2015, the victim girl was found at the railway station
Dumrao by the police vide evidence of PW-6. Medical examination of the
victim was done on 04.12.2015 vide report at Ext.-2 and her statement under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 04.12.2015
Arguments (Both Side) learned counsel for the appellant-
 submits that on bare perusal of the prosecution case and prosecution
evidences, there is no case at all that the appellant committed offence
under Section 366A IPC. Even if it is assumed for argument sake that a
minor girl was induced to go, there is no allegation that purpose was
of illicit intercourse with another person. Therefore, conviction under
Section 366A IPC is bad in law.
 in her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the victim stated that 3-4
months back, the appellant had phoned on the mobile of her mother
which the victim had received. The appellant disclosed his name and
the victim voluntarily left her house to meet the appellant at Dumrao
railway station. The conduct of the victim in voluntarily leaving the
house alone, meeting the appellant at the railway station and
accompanying the appellant for Patna on a train, and lack of evidence
that the appellant had persuaded the victim to go to Patna on the
pretext of some unreal purpose for taking her to Patna would make it
clear that the prosecutrix had gone along with the appellant
voluntarily. Moreover, when she was in physical relation with the
appellant for three days, she did not make any protest nor any
complain to anyone.
 The evidence of approximate age cannot take the place of proof of
exact age.
learned counsel for the Prosecution-
 since the victim was a minor and there is no cross-examination, to the
prosecution witnesses who had deposed that the victim was a minor
including to the victim girl, regarding correctness of her age.
Therefore, in absence of any other evidence, the available evidence
would show that the victim was a minor. Once she was a minor, her
consent or no consent is immaterial for the purpose of consideration
of charge against the appellant. The victim is consistent that she was
sexually exploited by the appellant. Therefore, conviction requires no
interference.
Other judgments  Sunil v. State of Haryana

referred  State of Madhya Pradesh v. Munna @ Shambhu Nath
 Jarail Singh v. State of Haryana
Conclusion by Court  prosecutrix was in consensual relationship with the appellant, the
prosecution has failed to prove that the victim was of the age
incapable of giving consent.
 the prosecution has failed to prove that the victim was induced to go
with the appellant for the purpose of illicit intercourse with another
person.
 In the result, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence are hereby set aside and this appeal is allowed.
Judgment / Order  It is not the prosecution case that the consent of the victim was
obtained by fraud, or by putting her or anyone in whom she was
interested in fear of death, or at the time of giving consent she was of
unsound mind or under influence of intoxication, consequently unable
to understand the nature and consequence of that for which she gave
consent. Rather prosecution case is that at the time of incident the
victim was under 18 years of her age. Hence, her consent was
immaterial.
 the age of the victim of rape should be determined in the manner
provided under Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007, there is no difference as regards minority
between the child in conflict with law and the child who is victim of
crime. Under Rule 12(3), preference is to be given to the school
documents in determination of age of the victim. Only in absence of
the school documents, the opinion of medical expert is permissible
 Allowing the appeal, the court also noted that there is no
prosecution case that the minor was induced to have a legal
sexual relations. Therefore, it is also illegal convicted the
defendant under section 366A of the IPC
 the victim was in consensual relationship with the appellant.
Therefore, charge under Section 376 IPC and 4 of the POCSO Act
fails.
Key Takeaways  there is no prosecution case that the minor was induced to have
a legal sexual relations.
 prosecution case is that at the time of incident the victim was under
18 years of her age. Hence, her consent was immaterial.
 victim was in consensual relationship with the appellant.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Urf/Alias @
Section Sec
PW-3 Mother of
Prosecutrix
PW-6 Investigating
officer
PW-8 Brother of victim
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://lawstreet.co/judiciary/evidence-exact-age-patna-hc-acquits-accused-pocso-case
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/129482499/#:~:text=JUDGMENT%20Date%20%3A
%2007%2D07%2D,trial%20in%20POCSO%20Case%20No.&text=2017%2C%20the
%20learned%20trial%20Judged,order%20of%20sentence%20dated%2017.11.
https://www.livelaw.in/news-updates/evidence-of-approximate-age-exact-age-patna-
high-court-acquits-pocso-177069
14. Deepak Mehto v. The State of Bihar (2019)
Case Title Deepak Mehto v. The State of Bihar

Case Citation CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.2932 of 2019
Court (SC/HC) HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Hon’ble Judge(s) HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BIRENDRA KUMAR C.A.V. JUDGMENT
Date of Judgment 12 April 2021

Child Rights Concern Section 622 of the POCSO Act

Legal Issues involved Sec 376 of IPC; PUNISHMENT FOR RAPE
1) Whoever, except in the cases provided for in sub-section (2),

commits rape, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment of either
description for a term which23[shall not be less than ten years, but
which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine].
(2) Whoever,—
(a) being a police officer, commits rape—
(i) within the limits of the police station to which such police officer is
appointed; or
(ii) in the premises of any station house; or
(iii) on a woman in such police officer's custody or in the custody of a

22
23
Subs. by Act 22 of 2018, s. 4, for "shall not be less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine" (w.e.f. 21-4-2018)
police officer subordinate to such police officer; or
(b) being a public servant, commits rape on a woman in such public

servant's custody or in the custody of a public servant subordinate to
such public servant; or
(c) being a member of the armed forces deployed in an area by the

Central or a State Government commits rape in such area; or
(d) being on the management or on the staff of a jail, remand home or

other place of custody established by or under any law for the time being
in force or of a women's or children's institution, commits rape on any
inmate of such jail, remand home, place or institution; or
(e) being on the management or on the staff of a hospital, commits rape

on a woman in that hospital; or
(f) being a relative, guardian or teacher of, or a person in a position of

trust or authority towards the woman, commits rape on such woman; or
(g) commits rape during communal or sectarian violence; or
(h) commits rape on a woman knowing her to be pregnant; or
(j) commits rape, on a woman incapable of giving consent; or
(k) being in a position of control or dominance over a woman, commits

rape on such woman; or
(l) commits rape on a woman suffering from mental or physical

disability; or
(m) while committing rape causes grievous bodily harm or maims or

disfigures or endangers the life of a woman; or
(n) commits rape repeatedly on the same woman,
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than ten years, but which may extend to imprisonment for life,
which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's
natural life, and shall also be liable to fine.24
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section,—
(a) "armed forces" means the naval, military and air forces and includes
any member of the Armed Forces constituted under any law for the time
being in force, including the paramilitary forces and any auxiliary forces
that are under the control of the Central Government or the State
Government;
(b) "hospital" means the precincts of the hospital and includes the
precincts of any institution for the reception and treatment of persons
during convalescence or of persons requiring medical attention or
rehabilitation;
(c) "police officer" shall have the same meaning as assigned to the
expression "police" under the Police Act, 1861 (5 of 1861);
(d) "women's or children's institution" means an institution, whether

called an orphanage or a home for neglected women or children or a
widow's home or an institution called by any other name, which is
established and maintained for the reception and care of women or
children.
25
[(3) Whoever, commits rape on a woman under sixteen years of age

shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than twenty years, but which may extend to imprisonment for
life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's
natural life, and shall also be liable to fine:
24
Clause (i) omitted by s. 4, ibid. (w.e.f. 21-4-2018).
25
Ins. by Act 22 of 2018, s. 4 (w.e.f. 21-4-2018).
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical
expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided further that any fine imposed under this sub-section shall be
paid to the victim.]
Sec 6 of the POCSO Act

Facts of the Case the prosecutrix aged about 13 years was in her house in village-
Khamhiya, P.S.- Inarwa, District-West Champaran. On 16.06.2018 at
about 12 night, the appellant entered into her house and forcefully
established sexual relationship. The informant tried to make alarm,
but the appellant pressed on her mouth. Further allegation is that
the appellant lifted her and was carrying her to commit her murder,
but the family members came and the appellant was apprehended
and was handed over to the police.
Arguments (Both Side) Learned counsel for the appellant contends that none of the
prosecution witnesses produced have supported any allegation
against the appellant, hence the case is of "no evidence", but the
learned trial Judge misunderstood the legal principles and relied
upon the statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. as well as
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. for coming to the conclusion that the
prosecution has proved the charge against the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
Learned counsel contends that Dr. K.M.P. Parwe who had performed
radiological examination of the prosecutrix was not produced in
Court nor Dr. Rubi Kumari who had examined the victim was
produced by Patna High Court
rather injury report has been proved by Dr. Keshwar Jamil (PW-7)
who was not present at the time of examination of the victim. Hence
his evidence was completely hearsay evidence and the accused
prejudiced in not getting opportunity to cross-examine the expert.
Learned counsel for the State contends that a victim of rape

hesitates in disclosing what has happened against her openly at each
and every opportunity faced by her and the statement of the
prosecutrix as PW-1 would reveal that she has supported her earlier
statement given before the police or before the Magistrate.
Therefore, she is wholly a reliable witness and corroboration is not
the requirement of law. Hence, the judgment of conviction requires
no interference.
Other judgments R. Shaji v. State of Kerala
referred Dharma Rama Bhagare v. State of Patna High Court
Utpal Das & Anr. v. State of West Bengal
Conclusion by Court The impugned judgment reveals that the trial Judge has accepted
the conflicting prosecution case as disclosed in the statement of the
prosecutrix under Section 154 Cr.P.C. and under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
for recording conviction without appreciating the fact that the
aforesaid are not substantive piece of evidences and the evidence
brought during trial does not disclose commission of any offence or
identity of the perpetrator of the offence. In the result, the
impugned judgment and sentence passed against the appellant are
hereby set aside and this appeal is allowed.
Judgment / Order Patna High Court CR. APP (SJ) No.2932 of 2019 dt. 12-04-
2021 sentenced the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
10 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2 lacs. In default of payment of fine,
two years further imprisonment was ordered. Out of the aforesaid
fine amount, Rs.1 lac was ordered to go to the victim. The judgment
of conviction dated 12.06.2019 and order of sentence dated
15.06.2019 are under challenge in this appeal.
Key Takeaways As the defence had no opportunity to cross-examine the witness
whose statement was recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. or
under Section 161 Cr.P.C., such statements cannot be treated as
substantive evidence.
Dr. Rubi Kumari or the doctor who had performed the radiological
examination would be fatal for the prosecution case as the accused
could not get opportunity to cross-examine them.
the fact remains that even the family members of the prosecutrix
have not supported the prosecution case.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Section Sec
another Anr.
and &
RERRAL LINKS-
https://www.shadesofknife.in/deepak-mahto-deepak-kumar-vs-state-of-bihar-on-12-apr-
2021/
15. State of Bihar v. Balwant Singh (2019)
Case Title
State of Bihar v. Balwant Singh
Case Citation DEATH REFERENCE No.4 of 2019
Court (SC/HC) Patna High Court

Hon’ble Judge(s) HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ARVIND SRIVASTAVA CAV JUDGMENT
(Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH)
Child Rights Concern Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act
Legal Issues involved Sections 366-A/34, 376-D/34, 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code
Facts of the Case the informant has stated that on 31.01.2018, at about 8:00 PM, his
minor daughter, aged about 16 years, had gone to ease herself
towards south of his house. Soon after, she went out of her house,
she raised alarm and cried for help as three boys were trying to
forcibly abduct her. Hearing his daughter's cry, he along with his
nephew went there and saw that Chhotu Kumar Singh son of
Rajendra Singh, Balwant Singh son of Bitan Singh, both residents of
village- Old Bindgawan and one unknown boy dragged his daughter,
forced her to sit on bike and tried to kidnap her. He further stated
that the accused Chhotu Kumar Singh was riding the bike and the
accused Balwant Singh was the pillion rider. They had sandwiched
his daughter in the middle on the bike. The unknown boy rode on
another bike. However, he himself and his nephew caught hold of
the bike being rode by the kidnappers from behind as a result of
which the rider and the pillion riders fell down. He himself also
sustained injuries on his hand and legs. Taking advantage of the
situation, Chhotu Kumar Singh and Balwant Singh along with his
daughter rode on the bike being driven by the unknown miscreants
and sped away. Thereafter, he went to the house of the accused
Chhotu Kumar Singh and Balwant Singh and apprised their family
members that they had kidnapped his daughter, but they said that
they do not know anything about kidnapping of his daughter.
Arguments (Both Side) learned senior advocate for the appellant:
submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish its case
beyond reasonable doubt. He contended that the FIR was instituted
after an inordinate and unexplained delay of six days. He contended
that the authenticity of the FIR itself is doubtful. According to him,
admittedly, the FIR based on the written report of the informant is a
subsequent version as the informant himself has stated that he had
gone to the police station along with his nephew on 01.02.2018 and
narrated the entire incident to the police. He contended that the
witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution have contradicted
each other during trial. He argued that from the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses it would be evident that neither the manner
of occurrence nor the place of occurrence has been proved. He
urged that from the evidence it would be evident that the
prosecution was interested in suppressing the facts more than
revealing it before the court. According to him, neither the injury
reports of the informant Sheo Raj Rai and Kamlesh Rai (P.W.2) were
brought on record nor the doctor who treated them was examined
during trial. He further contended that the prosecution has utterly
failed to prove the charges under Sections 366-A and 376-D of the
IPC.
He further contended that since confessional statement recorded on
18.02.2018 did not lead to discovery of any fact, the same could not
have been taken into evidence by the Trial Court even under Section
27 of the Indian Evidence Act and that too after the evidence on
behalf of the prosecution and the defence was closed. He contended
that the Trial Court has grossly erred in placing reliance on an
inadmissible confessional statement of the accused Balwant Singh.
He contended that no witness was examined to corroborate the
statement of the investigating officer regarding recovery of the dead
body from the mustard field. He further contended that except
P.W.2 and P.W.4, other two witnesses are hearsay witnesses and
there are major contradictions in the evidence of the witnesses with
regard to the number of accused persons and the bikes being
possessed by them. According to him, the story propounded by the
prosecution is highly improbable, unbelievable and contrary to the
normal act of a prudent person.
Further, in the FIR, the informant has named Balwant Singh, Chhotu
Kumar Singh and one unknown person only, who are said to have
kidnapped the deceased. He has stated in the FIR that on the first
bike Balwant Singh, Chhotu Kumar Singh and the deceased were
sitting and one unknown person was sitting on the second bike. But,
during trial, the informant has changed his version regarding the
manner of occurrence. He has stated that on the first bike Balwant
Singh, Chhotu Kumar Singh, one unknown person and the deceased
were sitting and, on the second bike, Anant Pandey, Ajay Rai, Om Rai
and Chhotu Mahto were sitting.
learned Additional Public Prosecutor:

submitted that from the evidence on record, it would be evident
that on 31.01.2018 at 8:00 PM the accused Balwant Singh, Chhotu
Kumar Singh and an unknown person kidnapped the minor daughter
of the informant when she went out near embankment of Patna
High Court D. REF. No. 4 of 2019 dt.23-07-2021 her village to ease.
He contended that Deo Sharan Rai (P.W.1) and Vijendra Rai (P.W.3)
have fully corroborated the prosecution case as narrated by the
informant. According to him, Kamlesh Rai (P.W.2) and Sheo Raj Rai
(P.W.4) have also withstood the test of cross examination. He
further contended that the confessional statement of the accused
Balwant Singh was first made on 06.02.2018 after he was arrested
pursuant to which the body of the deceased was recovered. He
urged that Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that if any
fact is discovered in consequence of any information received from a
person accused of an offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so
much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or
not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved against him. He contended that in the present case since the
body of the deceased was recovered by the police at the instance
and identification of accused Balwant Singh and he had taken name
of his accomplices, Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act would
directly come into play. He submitted that the Trial Court has
properly appreciated the facts and law involved in the case and has
rightly convicted and sentenced the accused appellants.
The FIR is an important document even though it is not a substantive
piece of evidence. A prompt FIR prevents possibility of coloured
version being put by the informant.
the fact that the FIR has been lodged belatedly has to be considered
in the light of other facts and circumstances of the case. It is to be
seen whether the delay in lodging the FIR has been sufficiently
explained or not. In this regard, first of all, it would appear from the
written report submitted by the informant pursuant to which the FIR
was instituted that since the prestige of his family was involved, he
first took measures to trace the victim himself. When he failed in his
effort, he approached the police. During trial, the informant Sheo Raj
Rai changed his version and stated in his evidence that though he
approached the police a day after the occurrence on 02.02.2018 and
gave his oral statement, the Daroga advised him to conduct his own
search. He assured that if he would not be able to trace the victim,
the FIR would be registered. He stated that he conducted his own
search for four days and when he failed in his effort, he approached
the police and submitted his written report. The said statement of
P.W.4 is not in alignment with the deposition of Umesh Kumar Das
(P.W.7), who was entrusted with the investigation of the case. The
informant has also not produced any document in support of his
contention that he had approached the police a day after the
occurrence had taken place.
It has been argued on behalf of the prosecution that the dead body
of the victim girl was recovered by the police at the instance and
identification of the appellant Balwant Singh, who also took the
name of his accomplices in the crime. In this regard, the evidence of
first investigating officer Umesh Kumar Das (P.W.7) is important. In
his examination-in-chief, he has stated that the accused Balwant
Singh was arrested at 9.50 PM on 05.02.2018 after institution of the
FIR and his defence statement was recorded by him for which he
was taken out of Hazat in which he disclosed that he had abducted
the deceased on 31.01.2018 in the night with his accomplices Anant
Kumar Pandey, Om Rai, Ajai Rai and Chhotu Mahto from Semra
embankment and kept her at Semra Marriage Hall where they gang-
raped her and, thereafter, strangulated her to death and threw her
body in the mustard field of Jugal Mahto. In cross-examination, he
admitted that he did not record the confessional statement of the
accused Balwant Singh in the night of 05.02.2018 after his arrest. He
further admitted that he recorded the confessional statement of
accused Balwant Singh on 18.02.2018 at 3:00 PM in the police
station after he was taken on police remand.
Other judgments Thulia Kali Vs. State of T.N.
referred
State of Punjab Vs. Ramdev Singh
Bullu Das Vs. State of Bihar
Pulukuri Kottaya Vs. Emperor
Geejaganda Somaiah v. State of Karnataka
Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan
Conclusion by Court The appellants, namely, Balwant Singh and Anant Pandey are
acquitted of the charges levelled against them. They shall be
released from the jail forthwith unless they are required in any other
case.
Judgment / Order mere delay in lodging the FIR is not fatal to the case of the
prosecution. The fact that the report has been lodged belatedly is a
relevant fact, which has to be kept in mind while appreciating the
evidence.
As per the aforesaid provision when an accused makes a confession
to a police officer or an accused makes confession while he is in
custody, such a confession cannot be proved in evidence against him
unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. This is
with a purpose to do away with the torture of the accused and use
of force against him by the police.
According to Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, when a
statement made by the accused leads to discovery of a fact in
relation to the offence then it may be proved.
together with the phrase "whether it amounts to a confession or
not" shows that the section is in the nature of an exception to the
preceding provisions particularly Sections 25 and 26. It is not
necessary in this case to consider if this section qualifies, to any
extent, Section 24, also. It will be seen that the first condition
necessary for bringing this section into operation is the discovery of
a fact, albeit a relevant fact, in consequence of the information
received from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the
discovery of such fact must be deposed to.
In the instant case, since no fact was actually discovered in
consequence of the information given by the accused Balwant Singh
while he was in police custody after being taken on police remand
from the court, partial lifting of ban against the confession and the
statement made to the police as provided under Section 27 of the
Indian Evidence Act was not at all available.
Coming back to the evidence of Kamlesh Rai (P.W.2) and Sheo Raj
Rai (P.W.4) they have stated that they sustained injury while trying
to stop the bike of the miscreants, neither any injury report has been
filed by them nor the compounder nor the doctor, who examined
them was made a prosecution witness.
As seen above, the Trial Court has convicted the appellants for the
offences punishable under Sections 366-A, 376- D and 302 of
the IPC. On scrutiny of the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.4, I find that
they have deposed that they heard that the victim girl was
screaming for help meaning thereby she was not induced as per the
prosecution case. Therefore, charge under Section 366- A of the IPC
does not stand.
In so far as the charge under Section 376-D is concerned, the case of
the prosecution is that the appellants gang raped the deceased.
Admittedly, there is no witness to the offence of gang rape. Dr.
Madhu Bala Sinha (P.W.5) and Dr. Absar Ahmad (P.W.6), who were
members of the medical team conducting the post-mortem
examination on the body of the deceased have not stated anything
in their evidence to corroborate the fact that prior to death the
victim was subjected to rape.
In absence of any witness to the incident of rape and in the absence
of any corroborative medical evidence, by no stretch of imagination
it can be said that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge
under Section 376-D of the IPC beyond shadow of reasonable doubt.
it is not a case of confession leading to recovery and possibly that is
the reason that the police never bothered to inspect the marriage
hall at Semra, which was the place where the occurrence of murder
and gang rape allegedly took place.
set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and the consequent
order of sentence passed by the Trial Court, the reference made by
the Trial Court for confirmation of death sentence vide Death
Reference No. 4 of 2019 is, hereby, rejected.
Key Takeaways  Deo Sharan Rai (P.W.1) stated in his deposition that on the
alleged date of occurrence, upon hearing the noise, he went
towards southern side of the embankment where he saw
Sheo Raj Rai and Kamlesh Rai fallen on the ground and trying
to recover themselves by holding the bike. He corroborated
the allegations made by the informant Sheo Raj Rai in the FIR.
He stated that he is neighbor of the informant. The height of
the embankment is 10-15 ft from the ground level. He further
stated that before he could reach the villagers had already
assembled there and they were carrying Sheo Raj Rai (P.W.4)
and also holding Kamlesh Rai (P.W.2). He has further stated
that he had told the police that he himself saw the accused
persons abducting the victim. Patna High Court D. REF. No. 4
of 2019 dt.23-07-2021. In cross-examination, he admitted
that neither the murder had taken place in his presence nor
the victim was raped before him. He further stated that he
has information that the informant had filed a case against
two persons, namely, Balwant Singh and Chhotu Kumar
Singh. He stated that the bike was in possession of the
Chowkidar from the date of occurrence.
 Kamlesh Rai (P.W.2) stated in his evidence that the deceased
was his cousin sister. He stated that he was present along
with P.W.4 at the time of occurrence. He also corroborated
the allegations made in the FIR in his examination-in-chief. He
stated that on hue and cry raised by them, the villagers,
namely, Sudama Rai, Tribeni Rai, Khalifa Rai, Vinod Rai, Deo
Sharan Rai and Manoj Rai assembled at the place of
occurrence. He stated that a search was made for the victim
since the time of occurrence itself. He further stated that on
5/6.02.2018 the dead body of the victim was recovered.
 Vijendra Rai (P.W.3) stated in his deposition that the
deceased was related as sister to him. Upon hearing the
noise, he also went to the embankment where he saw P.W.2
and P.W.4 in an injured condition. On query, the informant
narrated him the entire story. He stated that he along with
others took the informant Sheo Raj Rai and his nephew
Kamlesh Rai to their house and got them treated.
 Sheo Raj Rai (P.W.4) is the informant of the case. He tried to
give a different version. He stated that after hearing hue and
cry of his daughter when he reached near the embankment
along with his nephew Kamlesh Rai, he saw that on the first
bike Balwant Singh, Chhotu Singh, one unknown person and
the victim were sitting and on the second bike Anant Pandey,
Ajay Rai and Chhotu Mahto were sitting. He stated that when
he tried to stop the first bike, he was pushed aside. He
further stated that when his nephew caught hold of another
bike, he was also pushed aside and the accused persons ran
away from the place of occurrence after leaving the second
bike. He further stated that his co-villagers carried him to a
doctor and got him treated. He further stated that he started
searching for his daughter after two hours of her abduction.
He further stated that the next day he along with others went
to the police station and narrated the story to the Daroga,
but the Daroga advised them to search the victim and if she
would not be recovered, he would institute the FIR. He
further stated that he tried to trace his daughter for four days
and when he failed in his Patna High Court D. REF. No. 4 of
2019 dt.23-07-2021 efforts, he submitted a written report on
05.02.2018 to the police pursuant to which the FIR was
registered. He identified his signature on the written report,
which was marked as Exhibit-1. He stated that on 06.02.2018
at 02:00 A.M. the police apprehended the accused Balwant
Singh and on his disclosure the body of the victim was
recovered from the mustard field of Jugal Mahto by the
police. According to him, the police had found blood stains
near the private parts of his daughter. He identified the
accused Chhotu Kumar Singh and Anant Pandey in the dock.
 Dr. Madhu Bala Sinha (P.W.5) was posted as Medical Officer
in Sadar Hospital, Ara on 06.02.2018. She stated in her
deposition that on 06.02.2018 at 7:15 AM a medical team
headed by the Civil Surgeon was constituted for conducting
post- mortem examination on the body of the deceased
daughter of the informant. She stated that she took vaginal
swab and sent it for Patna High Court D. REF. No. 4 of 2019
dt.23-07-2021 pathological examination. She stated that the
post-mortem report was prepared in her presence and she
had put her signature over it. She identified her signature on
the post-mortem report, which was marked as Exhibit-2.
 Dr. Absar Ahmad (P.W.6) was posted as Medical Officer in
Sadar Hospital, Ara on 06.02.2018. He also stated that on
06.02.2018 at 07:15 AM a medical team under the leadership
of Civil Surgeon was constituted for conducting post-mortem
examination of the deceased. He stated that the post-
mortem report was prepared by him. According to him, the
medical board consisted of three doctors, namely, Dr. T. A.
Ansari, Dr. K. S. Chaubey and Dr. Madhubala Sinha. He
identified his signature on the post-mortem report, which
was marked as Exhibit-3. According to him, the cause of
death of the victim was fracture of neck bone leading to
asphyxia.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Etcetera Etc.
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Urf/Alias @
Son of S/o
Section Sec
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.legitquest.com/case/balwant-singh-v-the-state-of-bihar/1D69DC
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/56098b13e4b0149711384de1
https://www.livelaw.in/top-stories/patna-high-court-50-important-decisions-of-2021-
188623
16. Fathima v. State of Kerala (2020)
Case Title Fathima A.S v. Public Prosecutor

Case Citation CRIME NO.478/2020
Court (SC/HC) HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Hon’ble Judge(s) HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN
Date of Judgment 24th July, 2020

Child Rights Concern Sections 13, 14 26and 1527 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act,2012 ('POCSO Act')
Sec 13. Special Judicial Magistrates.
(1) The High Court may, if requested by the Central or State
Government so to do, confer upon any person who holds or has held
any post under the Government, all or any of the powers conferred
or conferrable by or under this Code on a Judicial Magistrate 28of the
first class or of the second class, in respect to particular cases or to
particular classes of cases, in any local area, not being a
26
Use of child for pornographic purposes.
27
An)' person. who stores. for commercial purposes any pornographic material in any form involving a child shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.
28
Subs. by Act 45 of 1978, s. 4, for certain words (w. e. f. 18- 12- 1978 ).
metropolitan area]: Provided that no such power shall be conferred
on a person unless he possesses such qualification or experience in
relation to legal affairs as the High Court may, by rules, specify.
(2) Such Magistrates shall be called Special Judicial Magistrates and
shall be appointed for such term, not exceeding one year at a time,
as the High Court may, by general or special order, direct. 29
[ (3) The High Court may empower a Special Judicial Magistrate to
exercise the powers of a Metropolitan Magistrate in relation to any
metropolitan area outside his local jurisdiction.]
Legal Issues involved Sec. 67B(d) of the Information Technology Act,2000 30(I.T.Act). Sec.
75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
Facts of the Case The petitioner, a mother asked her two minor children, aged 14
(boy) and 8 (girl) to paint on her naked body above the navel. The
children painted on her naked body. The petitioner recorded it as a
video. After that, the video is uploaded in social media with the
heading "Body Art and Politics." When this video was found by the
Cyber dome, Kochi City Police, they submitted a report before the
Inspector General of Police and the Commissioner of Police, Kochi
stating that this is a child pornography related crime in social media.
Arguments (Both Side) The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, even if the
entire allegations in the F.I.R. are accepted in toto, no offence under
Sections 13, 14, and 15 of the POSCO Act is made out. The learned
counsel also submitted that, the offence under Section 67B (d) of
the I.T. Act and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children)Act, 2015 is also not made out. The
petitioner's submission is that she is an Activist and has been fighting
her battle against body discrimination. The petitioner submitted
that, it is her firm belief that, there needs to be openness so far as
the discussion on body and body parts is concerned, and there is
29
Ins. by s. 4, ibid. (w. e. f. 18- 12- 1978 ).
30
facilitates abusing children online.
nothing to be hidden within and outside the family about the same.
According to the petitioner, the children should be given sex
education, and they also need to be made aware of the body and
body parts as well. In which event, they would mature themselves to
view the body and body parts as a different medium altogether
rather than seen it as a sexual tool alone. According to her, she
uploaded the above video with such an intention. The petitioner
contends that, morality of the society and public outcry cannot be a
reason and logic for instituting a crime and prosecuting a person.
Hence, the petitioner filed this Bail Application under Section
438 Cr.P.C apprehending arrest. According to the counsel, in the
light of the write up uploaded along with the video, the intention of
the petitioner is clear. The counsel argued that, even if the entire
contents of the video along with the write up is accepted in toto, no
offence is made out. to attract an offence under Section 13(c) of the
POCSO Act, the essential element is that, there needs to be
'indecent or the obscene representation of the child'. The counsel
submitted that, the words 'indecency and 'obscenity' have not been
defined under the POCSO Act or under the Indian Penal
Code. according to the counsel, there is no indecent or obscene
representation of the children.
The counsel for the petitioner submitted that, there are two other
cases registered against the petitioner as Crime No.2405 of 2018 by
the Pathanamthitta Police Station and Crime No.334 of 2020 by the
Ernakulam South Police Station. According to the counsel, these
cases including the present case have been preferred by Right Wing
Puritan Advocates either associated with the BJP or the Sangh
Parivar, who wanted to either gain publicity or wanted to make sure
that the petitioner is harassed for having taken a stand in favour of
the gender equality she has been pursuing throughout her life. The
counsel submitted that, the custody of the petitioner is not required
in the facts and circumstances of the case.
Other judgments Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra31
referred
Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal 32
Samaresh Bose & Anr. V. Amal Mitra33
P.P. Harris v. S.I. of Police34
Felix v. Gangadharan35
Samaresh Bose and Another v. Amal Mitra & anr.36
Chidambaram P. v. Directorate of Enforcement37
Conclusion by Court this is not a fit case in which the petitioner can be released on bail
under Sec.438 Cr.P.C. Hence Bail Application No.3861 of 2020 is
dismissed.
Judgment / Order 14. “ I am of the opinion that the petitioner uses the children for the
purpose of sexual gratification because the children are represented
in the video uploaded in an indecent and obscene manner because
they are painting on a naked body of their mother. The Public
Prosecutor made available the video to me with the consent of the
counsel for the petitioner.” “I am not in a position to say that, no
offence under Section 13, 14 and 15 of the POCSO Act is attracted in
this case.”
16. “The counsel for the petitioner also contended that Section 75 of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is
31
AIR 1965 SC 881.
32
(2014)4 SCC 257
33
(1985)4 SCC 289.
34
2017(2) KLT 437.
35
2018(3) KLT 404.
36
(1985)4 SCC 289.
37
AIR 2019 SC 4198.
also not attracted. On this point also, I am not making any
observations at this stage. This matter is also to be investigated by
the Investigating Officer. I cannot say at this stage that, the
prosecution has established the offence under Section 75 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 as
alleged. The Investigating Officer has to investigate the matter.
Investigating Officer submitted that, he wants the custodial
interrogation of the petitioner to complete the investigation. In such
situation, I am not in a position to say that, custodial interrogation of
the petitioner is not necessary in this case.”
17. “The petitioner, when shot and uploaded these videos in social
media, she also claims that she wants to teach sex education to the
children in the society. I cannot accept this stand of the petitioner.”
“I place myself in the position of the petitioner and from the view
point of the viewers of every age group in whose hands this video is
reached by uploading the same by the petitioner. After applying my
judicial mind, I am not in a position to say that, there is no obscenity
in the video when it is uploaded in the social media. I make this
observation only for the purpose of deciding this Bail Application.”
18. “The petitioner has got the freedom to teach her child according
to her philosophy. But, that should be within the four walls of her
house and should not be forbidden by law.“
21. “I am not in a position to agree with the petitioner that she
should teach sex education to her children in this manner.”
24. “The Anticipatory Bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule and
it has to be granted only when court is convinced that exceptional
circumstances exists to resort to the extraordinary jurisdiction.”
Key Takeaways Petitioner wanted teach sex education to her children. For that
purpose, she asked her children to paint on her naked body and then
uploading the same in social media. The Court did not agree it was
the right way to deal with this.
The role of mother is always important in the life of a child. The
mother will be a pillar of emotional support to the child. As a
mother, it is her duty and responsibility to be the emotional anchor
of their children so that they can face the storms of life. Be
responsible enough to teach and demonstrate the values that your
kids need in order to grow up as decent human beings. You are also
responsible for living your life according to the same moral values
that you preach, as that is the only way kids will learn.
There may be a difference of opinion about several verses of
Manusmrithi. But the description of mother in it is excellent for
which there may not be any controversy. In Manusmrithi, there is a
verse about mother and the English translation of the same
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Section Sec
REFERRAL LINKS-
https://www.lawyerservices.in/AS-Fathima-Versus-State-of-Kerala-Represented-by-The-
Public-Prosecutor-High-Court-of-Kerala-Ernakulam-and-Others-2020-07-24
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/tag/fathima/
https://www.barandbench.com/news/litigation/supreme-court-stays-ban-rehana-fathima-
publishing-sharing-material-electronic-media
17. State Government of NCT of Delhi v. Khursheed (2018)
Case Title State Government of NCT of Delhi v. Khursheed

Case Citation CRL.A. 510/2018
Court (SC/HC) THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Hon’ble Judge(s) HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIPIN SANGHI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S. TEJI

Child Rights Concern Sec 4, 28 & 29 of POCSO Act

Legal Issues involved Sec 376 IPC; Punishment for rape & Sec 4 of POCSO Act; punishment
for penetrative sexual assault
Facts of the Case The complainant stated that she lived with her 2 daughters and 3 sons in
a rented accommodation at H. No. 316, Ajju Colony, Badarpur, New
Delhi. On the said day, when the complainant returned home from her
job around 3:00 PM, her daughter- prosecutrix, who was a student of 4th
class in a government school was missing from their house. She started
searching for her daughter and upon suspicion, she went to the nearby
room of Khursheed and pushed open the door of his room. She found
that the accused Khursheed had put the prosecutrix on the floor and had
removed her lower clothes. She added that Khursheed had also removed
his own pant and was lying over the prosecutrix. The complainant
pushed him away, upon which he ran away from the spot after wearing
his pant. She further stated that she was informed by the prosecutrix
herself that the accused- Khursheed had taken her to his room on the
pretext of giving her a toffee, but instead, committed rape upon her and
when she started raising noise, the accused had put his hand on her
mouth.
Arguments (Both Side)  Learned counsel of Prosecution:
 He submitted that the prosecutrix was only 8 years and 8 months
old on the date of the incident and belonged to the lower strata of
the society. This aspect has been completely ignored by the Ld.
ASJ while scrutinizing the statements of the prosecutrix. He
submits that the statement of the prosecutrix recorded under
Section 164 Cr PC (Ex. PW-11/D), and the statement of the
prosecutrix recorded before the court are consistent. Minor
variations, which were inconsequential and did not shake the
core of the prosecution‟s case have been blown out of proportion
and cited as reasons to discredit the prosecutrix, whose statement
was duly corroborated by eye-witness account of her mother
PW8, and the medical evidence i.e. her MLC. The prosecutrix
was also not confronted with the minor and natural variations in
her statement. There was no reason to disbelieve the statement of
the prosecutrix. Mr. Mahajan submits that the said evidence, by
itself, was sufficient to find the accused guilty.
 Mr. Mahajan submits that scientific evidence is used as
corroborative evidence. If the victim is credible, reliable and
trustworthy, no corroboration is necessary. However, in the
present case, the statement of the victim is corroborated by her
mother PW-8, who is an eye witness as well as the MLC of the
prosecutrix.
 He submits that the allelic data in the 2 reports with respect to
the samples of semen taken from the underwear of the
prosecutrix is the same, but it is completely different in respect
of the blood samples of the accused. the first report Ex. CW-1/A
is liable to be rejected as the same was founded upon a
compromised sample of the blood drawn from the accused.
 He argued that the second FSL report dated 24.05.2018, must be
preferred over the first FSL report, as the former is founded upon
a blood sample which does not appear to belong to the accused.
Thus, it is not a case of two interpretations, or even two different
expert reports on the same samples, but a case of two reports- the
first being founded upon a partially incorrect data/ sample viz.
the blood sample which- as it now transpires, was not of the
accused.
 where multiple contradictory reports have been produced before
the court by two or more equally competent medical experts,
then the court must consider the report which supports the direct
evidence in the case.
 He submits that the accused failed to rebut the statutory
presumption by leading any evidence, or by probablising a
defence.
 He submitted that the accused could not have objected to his
blood samples being drawn and, as a matter of fact, he has not
objected to the same on any occasion.
 learned counsel for the respondent:

 Khursheed was arrested at 7:30PM from his own house No. 316,
Ajju colony, Badarpur, New Delhi. She argued that if the
respondent had, in fact, committed the offence, he would have
absconded, instead of waiting for the police to arrest him from
his own house. This reflects on the clear conscience of the
accused.
 there are many inconsistencies in the case of the prosecution. She
submits that in her complaint/ rukka forming basis of the FIR Ex.
PW-5/A, the mother of the prosecutrix PW-8 stated that when
she returned to her room at about 3:00 p.m. and did not find the
prosecutrix, she searched for her in the nearby areas and she
noticed that the room of the accused was closed. She stated that
she had some doubt, so she pushed the door of the room of the
accused and she saw that the accused had laid prosecutrix on the
floor and he had removed the lower clothes worn by the
prosecutrix. He had also lowered his own pant and he was lying
on top of the prosecutrix. He had covered the mouth of the
prosecutrix with one hand. However, in her testimony, PW-8
stated that on the date of occurrence when she was searching for
her daughter- the prosecutrix, she noticed that on one room, on
which, usually there was a lock in the day time, on that day there
was no lock outside the door of the room and therefore she got
suspicious. She pushed the door. However, it was found to be
locked from inside. Thereafter, she pushed the window of the
room and due to force, the window got opened and she saw the
accused lying over the prosecutrix. After seeing PW-8, the
accused opened the door of the room and ran away from the spot.
Ms. Parmar submits that the sequence and version narrated by
PW-8 while recording her testimony was at variance with that in
her statement recorded by the police in the rukka Ex. PW-8/A.
PW-8 had claimed that a piece of the glass window had broken
and she had also got injured in her finger, but no broken glass
piece was recovered, and there is no evidence of any injury
suffered by PW-8.
 prosecutrix gave a different version of the incident when her
statement was recorded before the court as PW-1. She stated that
her mouth was closed by the accused with his hand when he took
her forcibly into his room. He removed his hand after entering
the room. She voluntarily stated that the accused slapped her and
closed her mouth with a cloth which is worn on head. He tied her
hands at the back and also tied her legs. He used his 3-4 gamchas
for this. The prosecutrix stated that she opened the door after
releasing herself and opening her hands using the teeth while the
accused hid himself behind the chowki. the version given by the
prosecutrix with regard to gamchas being used to tie her up was
introduced for the first time by the prosecutrix when her
statement was recorded before the court. No such statement was
made by the prosecutrix either under Section 164 Cr PC, or by
the complainant while recording the rukka Ex. PW-8/A. No
gamcha was found by PW-11/I.O. as narrated by her in her cross
examination recorded on 02.09.2016.
 the recovery of the undergarment of the prosecutrix is doubtful.
Ms. Parmar further submits that when the statement of the
prosecutrix was recorded before the court on 21.01.2016, she
stated that her mother had thrown away the frock and ghagri that
she was wearing at the time of the incident, as all the buttons of
the same were broken and the clothes were torn. However, the
I.O. stated that the clothes worn by the prosecutrix at the time of
the offence were taken by the complainant and handed over to
the doctor. She improved her statement by stating that only the
underwear of the prosecutrix was handed over by the
complainant to the doctor. No blood stain was found on the
underwear of the prosecutrix when it was handed over to the
doctor. She submits that had penetrative sexual assault been
perpetrated on the prosecutrix, there would have been blood
stains on the underwear of the prosecutrix, which was not the
case.
 At one place, the prosecutrix described her dress as frock as
ghagri, while at a later stage (when her cross examination was
conducted on 19.02.2016), she stated that the frock and ghagri-
which she had described in her previous deposition, were her
school uniform. The shirt was of sky blue colour and ghagri
(skirt) was of blue colour. Thus, there were variations and
contradictions in the statements of the prosecutrix, on material
aspects.
 since there are two reports prepared by the FSL- one which
points to his innocence, and the other to his guilt, the one in his
favour ought to be relied upon, as the accused is entitled to the
benefit of the doubt.
 the prosecutrix in her statement recorded before the court had
stated that her mother tutored her to depose the facts as she was
not remembering the same completely. She stated "My mother
told me to depose the facts as I was not remembering the same
completely. Thus, the prosecutrix PW-1 was a tutored witness
who did not depose the facts on her own recollection. She cannot
be relied upon as she is not credible.
 Ms. Parmar has further argued that a presumption under Sections
29 and 30 of POCSO Act cannot be raised against the
respondent/ accused, because the prosecution is bound to
establish its own case first, before the onus is shifted upon the
accused. In this regard, she places reliance on Sahid Hossain
Biswas v. State of West Bengal, (2017) 3 CALLT 243 (HC),
wherein it was held that ".....It is, therefore, an essential
prerequisite that the foundational facts of the prosecution case
must be established by leading evidence before the aforesaid
statutory presumption (u/s 29, 30) is triggered in to shift the onus
on the accused to prove the contrary".
Other judgments Sheo Swarup & ors. V. The king Emperor38
referred Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. 39
State of H.P. V. Jai Lal & ors.40
State of Haryana v. Bhagirath41
Vishnu @ Undrya v. State of Maharashtra42
38
AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)
39
(2008) 10 SCC 450
40
(1999) 7 SCC 280
41
(1999) 5 SCC 96
Dayal Singh and ors. v. State of Uttarancha43l
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar44
Punjab Singh v. State of Haryana45
Piara Singh and ors. v. State of Punjab46
M. Narsinga Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh 47
Shamnsahib M. Multani v. State of Karnataka48
Dhanvantrai B. Desai v. State of Maharashtra49
M/s Sodhi transport Company v. State of UP50
Hari Om v. State (NCT)51
Brijlal v. State (NCT)52
Prakash & anr. V. State of Madhya Pradesh53
Ratansingh Nayak v. State of Gujarat 54
Panchhi & Ors. v. State of U.P.55
State of U.P. v. Krishna Master & Ors.56
Conclusion by Court  To claim that the complainant PW-8 would falsely implicate the
accused to extract money from him by making such a serious
allegations against him - which also involve her own 8 year old
daughter is outrageous. This bald submission- which is not
probablised, much less established with cogent evidence, has
repeatedly been rejected by Courts.
 The accused was charged of having committed penetrative
42
(2006) 1 SCC 283
43
(2012) 2 SCC 583
44
(2001) SCC (Cri) 1009
45
AIR 1984 SC 1233
46
AIR 1977 SC 2274
47
AIR 2001 SC 318
48
AIR 2001 SC 921
49
AIR 1964 SC 575
50
AIR 1986 SC 1009
51
2010 Cri LJ 1281
52
2017 (1) JCC 583
53
(1992) 4 SCC 225
54
(2004) 1 SCC 64
55
AIR 1998 SC 2726
56
AIR 2010 SC 3071
sexual assault on the prosecutrix, by inserting his penis into her
vagina.
 where the conditions prescribed in the said section are fulfilled,
the earlier statement of the prosecutrix/ victim would be legally
admissible as corroboration.
 in the face of the evidence led by the prosecution, the charge
against the accused was established beyond all reasonable doubt.
Judgment / Order  The envelope in which the sample of semen was supposed to
come was notice by the Court to be opened in a casual manner.
Hence, With a view to give yet another opportunity to FSL,
Delhi, to demonstrate their competence and to come clean in the
matter, the Court inclined to give one more opportunity to the
FSL, Delhi to undertake fresh and detailed examination of the
preserved sample and to generate a fresh DNA analysis report on
that basis. At the same time, the Court have made it clear to
Director, FSL, Delhi that the entire sample which is preserved
should not be utilised and destroyed, since the same should be
available, in case, further testing is required to be undertaken at
some other laboratory within or outside the country.
 the blood samples of the prosecutrix and the accused were
collected at the appropriate Government hospital. The same
transmitted to FSL in a sealed condition in compliance of the due
procedure. This exercise was undertaken by the next morning
itself. a fresh DNA report from the FSL, after drawing a sample
from the residue of the semen stained underwear of the
prosecutrix, and after obtaining a fresh blood sample from the
prosecutrix and the accused. This exercise was directed to be
undertaken while making it clear that the hearing in the appeal
shall proceed, since the FSL Report found on record dated
15.05.2014 had not been led in evidence. Since Ms. Babyto Devi
had been examined as CW-1, and she exhibited her report
Ex.CW-1/A, Crl.M.A. No.9662/2018 was disposed of as
infructuous and revised report of CW-2 was taken into
consideration.
 Mere absence of this part of the statement- either in the rukka, or
in the earlier statement of PW-1 recorded under Section 164 Cr
PC, does not render her statement unbelievable.
 The submissions of Ms. Parmar aimed at creating a doubt about
the recovery of the undergarment of the prosecutrix, and about
the other clothes of the prosecutrix not being seized or exhibited,
have no merit.
 the fact that the accused did not flee from his room and was
arrested from his room does not absolve him of the crime.
 To claim that the complainant PW-8 would falsely implicate the
accused to extract money from him by making such a serious
allegations against him - which also involve her own 8 year old
daughter is outrageous. This bald submission- which is not
probablised, much less established with cogent evidence, has
repeatedly been rejected by Courts.
 The court found merit in the submission of Mr. Mahajan that the
Trial Court failed to raise the statutory presumption under
Section 29 and 30 of POCSO Act, which the Trial Court was
bound to raise in view of the mandatory nature of the language
used in the said provisions. The offence with which the accused
is charged falls under Section 6 of POCSO Act which prescribes
the punishment for aggravated penetrative sexual assault.
Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault is defined in section 5 of
POCSO Act. A person is said to have committed aggravated
penetrative sexual assault, inter alia, when the assault is
committed on a child below 12 years of age - which the
prosecutrix was at the relevant time. Penetrative Sexual Assault
is defined in section 3 to mean, inter alia, where the accused
penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth,
urethra or anus of a child or makes the child to do so with him or
any other person.
 It was ordered that none of the so-called variations,
improvements, contradictions and inconsistencies go to the root
of the matter. They are natural, particularly when one considers
the small age of the prosecutrix at which the said incident took
place, and the time lag between her initial statement and her
cross examination. The fact that she was reminded of the
incident by the mother does not lead to the inference that she was
tutored by the mother. It only shows that her fading memory was
refreshed by the mother, and when she made her statement
before the court, she remembered the incident in substantial
detail.
 it is based on erroneous view of the law- as the presumptions
under Sections 29 and 30 POCSO Act were not raised against the
accused; the impugned judgment- if not set aside would lead to
grave miscarriage of justice to the victim; the approach of the ld.
ASJ in dealing with the evidence is patently illegal, and; the Trial
Court has ignored the medical evidence Ex.PW-4/A and misread
and misappreciated the evidence led by the prosecution.
 no doubt or hesitation in our mind that the report Ex. CW-2/A
should be accepted in preference to the report Ex. CW-1/A, for
the reason that Ex. CW-2/A is consistent with the other evidence
in the case which we have already taken note of herein above. In
fact, Ex. CW-2/A is the last nail in the coffin so far as the
respondent is concerned.
 the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. We, accordingly,
set aside the impugned judgment, and convict the respondent/
accused of the offence under Section 6 of the POCSO Act i.e. of
having committed aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon the
prosecutrix.
 the irregularities which has come to light- particularly in respect
of reports prepared by Ms. L. Babito Devi, need to be thoroughly
investigated by a competent investigating agency like the Central
Bureau of Investigation (CBI).
Key Takeaways  the DNA profile generated from the semen found on the
underwear of the prosecutrix did not match the DNA profile
generated from the blood sample of the accused. But as per the
revised report, the male DNA profile generated by using
minifiler and identifilerplus amplification kit from the source of
exhibit-2 i.e. the underwear of prosecutrix was found to be
matching with DNA profile generated from the source of exhibit-
4 i.e. blood sample of the accused. Y-STR DNA profile
generated from the source of exhibit-2 i.e. underwear of
prosecutrix was found to be matching with the DNA profile
generated from the source of exhibit-4 i.e. blood sample of
accused. The female DNA profile generated from the source of
exhibit- 1 i.e. microslide of prosecutrix was found to be matching
with the DNA profile generated from the source of exhibit-3 i.e.
blood sample of victim.
 PW-1, throughout describes the accused as "uncle". This itself is
reflective of her innocence, and lends credibility to her
statements. If she had been tutored, she would most likely, not be
tutored to call the accused- who is her alleged exploitor, "uncle".
 In response to the question "Do you understand the importance
of telling the truth in the proceedings before the court?". She
very innocently states "Haan, jhoot bolte hai tho kaua kaatha hai,
isliye sach bolo". This statement is also reflective of the
innocence, spontaneity and truthfulness of the prosecutrix. A
tutored witness would lack such spontaneity, and would answer
such questions very formally, as tutored.
 she graphically describes the process of ejaculation of the semen
by the accused by stating "nunu me se lachak lachak nikla, meri
shirt par, tang par gira diya tha". A child under 9 years would not
know, and would not describe this phenomenon. She even asked
the accused "uncle what are you doing?", since she did not
understand the said act of the accused. It would be completely
outrageous to imagine that the parents of a girl child only 8 years
and 8 months old would tutor her about sexual intercourse in
such graphic detail.
 some amount of fading of her memory was only to be expected.
In fact, in her cross examination, she herself stated that her
mother had reminded her of the incident, since she could not
completely remember the same. However, she was categorical in
her denial that she had made false allegations against the accused
in order to take money from him.
 The initial statement of the mother found in the rukka Ex. PW-
8/A- that she pushed the door of the accused and it opened,
cannot be said to be contradictory with the statement of the
prosecutrix recorded under Section 164 Cr PC, or with her
statement recorded before the court. The statement of PW-1
before the Magistrate Ex. PW-1/A is a summary statement. Her
statement recorded before the court is a more elaborate one.
 The prosecutrix was consistent with regard to the incident which
happened. Pertinently, both in her statement recorded under
Section 164 Cr PC Ex. PW-1/A and before the court, she
narrated in her own innocent words that the accused ejaculated
on her clothes and her legs. What emerges from the statements of
PW-1, both recorded under Section 164 Cr PC, as well as before
the court is that the prosecutrix was a completely innocent child.
 The accused was found to be in an inebriated condition upon his
medical examination. That could explain his conduct in not
fleeing from his room.
 She had fresh bruises mark on her thigh. These injuries clearly
corroborate the otherwise natural and credible statement of the
prosecutrix. medico- legal literature supports the case of the
prosecution that the bruises suffered by the prosecutrix on her
thighs were as a result of sexual assault upon her by the accused.
 victim was a child of barely 8 years and 8 months, and for the
hymen of such a small child to be torn, itself was abnormal.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Urf/Alias @
Section Sec
18. Tulachha Ram S/o Deepa Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2018)
Case Title Tulachha Ram S/o Deepa Ram v. State of Rajasthan

Case Citation D.B.CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.219/2018
Court (SC/HC) HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
Hon’ble Judge(s) Sandeep Mehta, Vinit Kumar Mathur
Date of Judgment
21 December, 2018
Link to the Judgment
Child Rights Concern Sections 5 (j) (ii)/6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act,
2012
Legal Issues involved Rape on minor aged 16 years
Threatening of obscene photographs of the victim
Facts of the Case The informant while narrating his FIR told he was engaged in
agricultural job at 53 Sada Minor District Jaisalmer. His mother-in-law,
father-in-law along with two sisters-in-law used to reside and did
farming jobs in the Dhani constructed in the field of Balveer Punia
located at Chak 30 SLD. Mamraj and his Munim Tulchha Ram used to
regularly visit their place. 3-4 months back, Tulchha Ram committed
rape on his sister-in-law, aged 16 years. Tulchha Ram under the guise of
marrying her, he used to repeatedly commit rape upon her. Thereafter,
Tulchha Ram regularly used to visit their Dhani and threatened her that
he was in possession of some obscene photographs of the victim. The
accused-appellant used to blackmail her on the strength of these
photographs and commit rape upon her. Mamraj Jat threatened his
sister-in-law of dire consequences, if she did not fulfill the demands of
accused Tulchha Ram. His sister in law became pregnant and entire
family was aware of this fact. Balveer Punia was informed about this
incident who also threatened them not to disclose this fact and instructed
to get abortion done of the victim, failing which entire family was
threatened to be killed.
Arguments (Both Side) Learned counsel for the appellant:
Submitted that in view of the sworn statement of the victim (PW1), it is
a case of consensual relationship as the victim was staying with her
mother, father in the Dhani constructed at Chak 30 SLD and while they
were engaged in farming, their family was regularly visited by the
appellant and during these meetings, friendship developed between
them. Since, the victim wanted to marry the appellant but there was a
stiff resistance from the mother and father of the victim to the same on
the ground that they belonged to Rajput community and the appellant
was a Jat. For this reason, the present complaint was got filed and the
appellant was prosecuted.
He further submits that as far as age of the victim is concerned, she is
well above the age of 18 years as she herself in her statement gave out
her date of birth as 20.04.1998 & therefore, on the date of incident i.e. in
the year 2016, she was well above the age of 18 years. He further
submits that as per statement of PW-2 Mal Singh (father of the victim),
also admitted that his daughter is about 20 years of age. When she was
admitted in the school, she was 6-7 years of age and her teacher had
written lesser age in the school record. Therefore, as per Shri
Choudhary, Ex.P-14 i.e. certificate of the Principal showing age of the
victim is of no consequence.
He further submits that even on earlier occasions, the victim had gone
with the appellant of her own free will and volition. Even the victim in
her statement stated that the relations were established with her own
consent and since she is a major person, her consent is the concluding
factor.
He further submits that as per Ravi Kumar (PW-5) and Jasnath (PW-6),
the victim wanted to marry the appellant and, therefore, on earlier
occasion, she had gone away with him.
Learned counsel of prosecutor:

submitted that it has come on record in the statements of the victim
recorded under Section 161 & 164 of Cr.P.C. that she was 16 years of
age and the appellant committed rape on her against her wishes and free
will.
He further submits that during investigation, the police obtained a
certificate from the Principal, Government Secondary School, Bhojasar
Chhota (Churu) wherein the date of birth of the victim is recorded as
20.09.2000. There is no reason to discard the material piece of
documentary evidence available on record and, therefore, he submits
that since the victim is below the age of 18 years, her consent in the
matter is irrelevant. He, therefore, submits that the learned trial Court
was justified in convicting the appellant for the offences under Section 5
(j) (ii)/6 of POCSO Act.
Other judgments Birad Mal Singhvi V/s Anand Purohit57
referred
Conclusion by Court it is a clear case of consensual relations and since the victim was above
the age of 18 years on the date of the incident, the provisions of
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act were wrongly applied.
The judgment dated 29.09.2018 passed by Special Judge, POCSO Act,
Jaisalmer is quashed and set aside.
Judgment / Order statements of the victim (PW1), her father Mal Singh (PW2) and mother
Santosh Kanwar (PW6) depicts the entire story. The victim was having
proximity and affinity with the accused-appellant who used to regularly
visit their Dhani and since both of them were aged 18 years and 25 years
respectively, the relationship between them blossomed physically also
leading to the prosecutrix conceiving.
When the fact of the victim being pregnant was noticed by her mother
and father, they counselled their daughter but the victim was adamant to
marry the accused- appellant. Her father resorted to lodging the
complaint against the appellant in order to dissuade his daughter from
continuing her relationship with the appellant because the families
hailed from different castes.
it is a case of voluntary and spontaneous physical relationship between
two consenting adults i.e. victim and the appellant.
As far as age of the victim is concerned, although the school certificate
(Ex.P-14) shows her date of birth to be 20.09.2000 but in the statements
of the victim (PW1), her father Mal Singh (PW2) and mother Santosh
Kanwar (PW4), it has come on record that the victim was 20 years of
age in the year 2017, therefore, on the date of the incident, she was well
above the age of 18 years.
The appellant was acquitted from the charges leveled against him and it
was ordered that the appellant shall be released from judicial custody
57
AIR 1988 Supreme Court, 1796
forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.
Key Takeaways  PW5 Ravi Kumar and PW6 Jasnath stated in their statements that
they knew the accused-appellant. The victim had gone with the
accused Tulchha Ram on earlier occasion out of her own free
will and volition.
 As stated in the statement of PW2 Mal Singh just to separate his
daughter from the appellant, he had filed the present complaint
against him. Even the testimony of PW2 Mal Singh and PW4
Santosh Kanwar (father and mother of the victim) is clear that
their daughter was more than 18 years of age as on the date of
the incident. It has also come on record that the victim
pressurized her parents to solemnize her marriage with the
accused-appellant but the parents were not ready for the same.
 Prior to the lodging of this complaint also, she left her home out.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Section Sec
REFERRAL LINKS-
http://rajasthanjudicialacademy.nic.in/docs/report10022021.pdf
https://mynation.net/judgments/tag/section-376-in-the-indian-penal-code/page/55/
19. M. Veeresh vs State Of Karnataka (2021)
Case Title M. Veeresh vs State Of Karnataka

Case Citation CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.200141/2018
Court (SC/HC) THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
Hon’ble Judge(s) THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT
AND
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE M.G.S.KAMAL
Child Rights Concern Section 4 of POCSO Act.

Legal Issues involved offences punishable under Section 369, 377, 302, 394 and
201 of IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act.
Facts of the Case P.W.1- Tayappa and P.W.2- Tayyamma are the parents of deceased
Mariswamy aged about 5 years. That on 09.02.2016 at about 2.00 p.m.
accused-Veeresh came to their house situated at Shankarwadi village,
Raichur Taluk and had asked P.W.2- Tayamma to give him food as he
was hungry. She served him food making him to sit outside house. At
that time, P.W.10-Sujatha their neighbour had asked the accused as to
which village was he from, to which he replied that he was from Chatla
Mallapur. That the accused stayed near the house for some time.
Deceased Mariswamy aged about 5 years was also present outside the
house. That the accused offered deceased Mariswamy Mandalu (puffed
rice) and jaggery to eat and had asked him to show him the house of his
uncle in Telugu. he had kidnapped the said Mariswamy and taken him to
Raichur City from Katlatkur border crossing through Poornima Talkies
and Chandramouleshwara Circle. That he had purchased a blade from
the shop of P.W.17-Veeranjeneya situated opposite to Sow Number
Ganesh Beedi Company and had thereafter taken the Mariswamy near
the Ishwar Temple situated behind KSRTC Staff Quarters into thorny
bushes and at 9.30 p.m. he had unnatural sexual intercourse with the said
Mariswamy and assaulted him over his head with a stone, strangulated
his neck by his hands and killed him. Accused thereafter had taken the
golden ear rings (Muruvu) from the ears of the deceased by cutting them
with blade and had thrown dead body of the deceased in the said thorny
bushes for disappearance of the evidence.
That on 10.02.2016 at about 2.00 p.m. accused had gone to Shri Balaji
Jewelry shop of P.W.9-K. Pranesh situated at Gillesugur Camp and had
pledged the golden ear rings weighing 2 grams 780 mili worth
Rs.7,000/- stating that same belong to him and taken Rs.4,700/- from
him.
Arguments (Both Side) learned counsel for the accused:
a) That the trial court erred in not appreciating that the prosecution had
not conducted the test identification parade.
b) That P.W.1-Tayyappa, the complainant and father of the deceased,
P.W.2, the mother of the deceased and P.W.10 - Mrs. Sujatha, the
neighbour of the complainant and P.W.6-Mr.
Narashimha had not identified the accused to justify the allegation of he
taking away the deceased Mariswamy from their house.
c) That all these witnesses were untrustworthy with regard to the
accused having taken the deceased and committing the offences alleged.
d) That P.W.17 - Mr. Veeranjeneya, the owner of Kirana shop did not
support the case of the prosecution and that the evidence of P.W.18-
Chandrashekhar, the Manager of the Wine shop was not corroborated
with evidence of other witnesses.
e) That seizure of material objects are not proved against the accused.
f) The postmortem report and FSL report are contrary to the evidence of
the witnesses deposing to that effect.
g) That the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed in
respect of the alleged offence against the accused have not been proved
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. As such, the accused
deserves to be acquitted of the offences alleged by allowing the appeal.
Learned counsel of the prosecution:

a) That the prosecution having examined P.Ws.
1 to 27 and having marked Exs.P.1 to 36 and M.Os.1 to 4 has proved the
guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt.
b) That the statements and evidences and the chain of event from the
time the accused appearing near the house of the deceased till
commission of unfortunate incident and the subsequent conduct of the
accused have been established beyond all reasonable doubt.
c) In view of the facts and circumstances of this case non-conducting of
identification parade would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution
and the accused has not made out any special or exceptional case
requiring identification parade
Other judgments Amar Nath Jha Vs. Nand Kishore Singh & Ors.58
referred Sheo Shankar Singh v. State of Jharkhand & anr.59
Mehaboob Vs. State through Yadgiri P.S.60
Murugan v. State of Tamil Nadu61
Mohd. Faizan Ahmad v. State of Bihar62
Rajasthan Vs. Bhup Singh63
Pulukuri Kottaya vs. Emperor64
Jaffer Husain Dastagir vs. The State of Maharashtra65
K. Chinnaswamy Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & anr.66
State of Karnataka Vs. David Rozario and Anr.67
Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan68
Conclusion by Court it was the accused who has committed the crime.
accused used the blade to cut the ears of the deceased to take the ear
rings which he had pledged with P.W.18-Mr. Chandrashekhar for
58
(2018) 9 SCC 137.
59
(2011) 3 SCC 654
60
Crl.A.No.3552/2013
61
2018 ACR 564
62
(2013) 2 SCC 131.
63
(1997) 10 SCC 675.
64
(AIR 1947 PC 67).
65
AIR 1970 SC 1934.
66
AIR 1962 SC 1788.
67
(2002) 7 SCC 728.
68
(2004) 10 SCC 657.
Rs.4,200/- which amount was recovered and seized from the possession
of the accused in the presence of the panch witnesses.
Judgment / Order the death being homicidal is not in dispute. The case of the prosecution
being based on the "theory of last seen" and "circumstantial evidence" is
also not in dispute.
10. "Suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. If a
criminal court allows its mind to be swayed by the gravity of the offence
and proceeds to hand out punishment on that basis in the absence of any
credible evidence, it would be doing great violence to the basic tenets of
criminal jurisprudence"
The postmortem report reveals that the death of Mariswamy aged 5
years is due to the head injury sustained. The death has occurred due to
the forcible assault on the head. The other injuries on the neck and cut
injury on the ears and the other parts present on the dead body adds up
to the ingredients of Section 302 of IPC.
The injuries at the anus area of the deceased, which according to the
opinion of the doctor are suggestive of forcible unnatural sexual
intercourse falling within Section 5 of POCSO Act.
Corroborating the evidence of these witnesses with that of recording of
CCTV footage in C.D - Ex.P.24 categorically establishes the fact that
the accused has taken the child from the house of P.Ws.1 and 2 and had
taken towards Katlatkur through Chandramouleshwar Circle. There is no
missing link in the last seen theory established by the prosecution.
Recovery of dead body, recovery of stone used to assault the minor
child, recovery of blood stained blade and half burnt beedi read in the
light of postmortem report and FSL report establish the fact of accused
having unnatural sexual intercourse, causing injuries with the stone and
blade.
The line of defence on behalf of the accused is only of bald denial. Even
at the stage of recording statement of accused under Section 313 of
Cr.P.C. except denial, accused has not chosen to rebut or lead any
evidence which are incriminating in nature. No, other theory or defence
line has been set up by the defence. There was no any element of
animosity or ill-will from P.Ws.1 and 2 or from others witnesses to
implicate the accused into the matter. All of them have encountered the
accused for the first time and just on the circumstances narrated by
them. Under any stretch of imagination cannot be construed to be ill-
intended or the case of false implication of the accused into the crime.
Therefore, this feeble admitted to be set up cannot be countenanced.
The prosecution having established through medical evidence of the
injuries on the anal area of the deceased having been caused by acts in
the nature of penetrative sexual assault, the guilt of the accused
punishable under Section 4 of POCSO Act is established.
Key Takeaways a) The accused appearing at 2.00 p.m. at the house of P.W.1 on the
pretext of having food and thereafter disappearing with the minor child.
b) Accused going to the wine shop and carrying the child through
Chandramouleshwar Circle.
c) The recording of the movements of the accused with the minor boy in
the CCTV installed at Chandramouleshwara Circle.
d) Accused furnishing the information of he taking the minor child
behind the Staff quarters of KSRTC and committing the crime of
unnatural sexual intercourse and assaulting the minor child with the
stone, cutting the ears with blade and burning the hip and private parts of
the minor child with half burnt beedi.
e) Discovery of dead body of the minor child with injuries as detailed in
the postmortem report, material objects such as, stone, blade and half
burnt beedi used by the accused to commit the offence recovered at the
instance and information given by the accused.
f) The accused pledging the golden ear rings with P.W.9 for Rs.4,700/-
which was recovered at the instance and information given by the
accused.
Abbreviation Log
Versus v
Etcetera Etc.
And &
Another Anr.
Others Ors
Urf/Alias @
Son of S/o
Section Sec

Judgment Summarisation On POCSO CASE LAWS

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Judgment Summarisation On POCSO CASE LAWS

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1. Hari Dev Acharya @ Pranavanand & Ors v.

Case Title Hari Dev Acharya @ Pranavanand & Ors v. State

Youngster studying at a Gurukul in Delhi was reportedly raped by a

 Prosecution: the petitioners could not have been summoned as

Other judgments  Neeraj Verma v. State, CRL.M.C. 3770/2005,

Judgment / Order 77.1 The persons in charge of the schools/educational institutions,

 It was further mentioned that he entered the office at

 supported the summoning order

 medical examination report of the child victim supports his

 child victim was medically examined at AIIMS on 04.09.2017,

2. Pramod Yadav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh (2021)

Case Title Pramod Yadav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Hon’ble Judge(s) Hon'ble Shri Justice Mohammad Rafiq, Chief Justice

 Prosecution: an objection was raised by the learned Public

3. Attorney General for India v. Satish and anr. (2021)

Satish S/O Bandu Ragde v State Of Maharashtra

Court (SC/HC) HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

Hon’ble Judge(s) Pushpa V. Ganediwala

Child Rights Concern Section 8 in The Children Act, 1960

Appellant- It is not possible to accept this submission for the

 For the offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC, the

Case Title Nipun Saxena v. Union of India

Court (SC/HC) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Date of Judgment 11.12.18

Other judgments Bhupinder Sharma v State of Himachal Pradesh

Conclusion by  Victim was suggested to be protected from mental and sociological

5. Libnus S/O Fransis Kujur v. State of Maharashtra (2020)

Case Title Libnus v. State of Maharashtra

Case Citation CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 445 OF 2020

Child Rights Concern Sexual assault

6. K. Prakash v. The State Of Karnataka (2021)

Case Title K. Prakash v. The State Of Karnataka

Hon’ble Judge(s) R. Subhash Reddy J.

learned counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka: appellants are

7. State of Bihar v Dilip Kumar Yadav (2021)

Case Citation CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS No.7117 of 2021

Court (SC/HC) THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

Hon’ble Judge(s) HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJEEV RANJAN PRASAD

Date of Judgment 24.07.2021

8. Ganesh Das & Anr v. State of West Bengal (2017)

Ganesh Das & Anr v. State of West Bengal

Case Citation W. P. 19543 (W) of 2017

Court (SC/HC) Calcutta High Court

Child Rights Concern Sec 6 of POCSO ACT

The learned amicus curiae referred to the provisions of Section 23, 24 (5),

Other judgments Vishaka & Ors vs State Of Rajasthan & Ors

9. Ravishankar @ Baba Vishwakarma v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019)

Case Title Ravishankar @ Baba Vishwakarma v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Case Citation CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1523-1524 OF 2019

Court (SC/HC) THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Date of Judgment 3 October, 2019

A, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) and

(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. In

(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be

Court (SC/HC) THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Child Rights Concern Sexual Assault

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Madanlal

Date of Judgment 13.11.2018

12. Bijay Chhetri V State of Sikkim (2021)

Case Title Bijay Chhetri V State of Sikkim

Court (SC/HC) The High Court of Sikkim

Date of Judgment 24th September 2021

Child Rights Concern Sec. 9(m) of the POCSO Act13