Lesson Summary

(Article 249 - 254)

Article 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. - It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or
representatives:

(a) To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization. However, a labor organization shall have
the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership;
(b) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with
respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms
and conditions under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members;
(c) To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the representative of the employees;
(d) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature
of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed, including the demand for fee for union negotiations;
(e) To ask for or accept negotiation or attorney’s fees from employers as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any
other dispute;
(f) To violate a collective bargaining agreement. The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members
of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or organizations who have actually participated in,
authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable.

Interference by union is not ULP

When a labor union restricts or coerces workers in exercising their right to self-organization, it is committing ULP. Art. 249(a) has a
similar clause to Art. 248. (a). However, the word "interference" is absent. This intentional omission is "the equivalent of a labor
organization's license to participate in such activities that, if perpetrated by an employer, would be actionable unfair labor practices.by
way of “interference.” To put it another way, a labor union can interfere with an employee's right to self-organization as long as the
interference is not restriction or coercion. Interference by a labor union is not considered ULP since interfering with the right to organize
is a feature of self-organization.
Coercing Participation in Strike

Restraining or coercing an employee in the exercise of his right to refuse to engage in or consider a strike is a violation of the clause. If a
union threatens workers with bodily harm in order to cause them to strike, this is also a breach.
Union induced Discrimination

The legislation prohibits a ULP union from attempting to persuade an employer to provide benefits to union members over non-members,
union members in good standing over suspended or expelled members, union members over permit holders, union members over more
senior workers, members of one union over members of another union, or members of one local above members of another local.

Arbitrary Use of Union Security Clause

The general rule is that the union has the power to decide its membership and to recommend the terms for the acquisition and preservation
thereof. Consequently, access to membership will not be compelled. This law is qualified, however, in the case of trade unions that have a
monopoly in the procurement of labor, either in a specific location or in relation to a specific employer due to closed-shop or related
agreements. In this situation, eligible candidates must not be denied membership based on arbitrary criteria, and their entry may not be
limited by unreasonable laws. It is well established that trade unions do not have the right to unilaterally exclude eligible candidates for
membership, and a closed-shop agreement isn't one of them. The employer or a union will not be justified in firing, or in calling on the
firing of, an employee that the union refuses to admit to membership on the basis of this clause. Needless to add, since unions would be
forced to admit new entrants with the necessary credentials, the law and the courts have far more justification to use coercion because the
employee in question is a long-time union member who was forced to tender his resignation, which he promptly retracted or reversed, due
to the actions of union officers. In the very least, he should be able to evoke the rights of those who have been wronged.
seek admission for the first time, and cannot arbitrarily he denied readmission.However, the Court emphasizes that union protection
provisions are bound by statute as well as standards of right, fairness, and legality. Union negotiators cannot use confidentiality clauses
against an employer, let alone their own representatives, unless they have a strong sense of duty, justice, prudence, and judiciousness. A
union delegate can not be expelled from her union, and therefore her employment, for personal or rash motives, or for reasons unrelated
to the closed shop agreement and in a manner characterized by arbitrariness and whimsicality.

ULP under Art. 249(c) is intended to insure that unions approach the bargaining table with the same attitude of willingness to agree as the
Act requires of management. A union violates its duty to bargain collectively by entering negotiations with a fixed purpose of not
reaching an agreement or signing a contract.

Art. 249 refers to featherbedding. “Featherbedding” is the name given to employee practices which create or spread employment by
“unnecessarily” maintaining or increasing the number of employees used, or the amount of time consumed, to work on a particular job. In
spite of employee assertions that these so-called featherbedding practices are directly related to job security, health and safety, most
courts at common law found these practices to be economically
wasteful and without any legitimate employee justification

Article 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:

(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals.
The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice;
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may request for a conference which shall begin not later
than ten (10) calendar days from the date of request.
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or both parties or at its own initiative and immediately call
the parties to conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of the parties to such
meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call;
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early
settlement of the disputes; and
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator. (As
amended by Section 20, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
Article 251. Duty to bargain collectively in the absence of collective bargaining agreements. – In the absence of an agreement or other
voluntary arrangement providing for a more expeditious manner of collective bargaining, it shall be the duty of employer and the
representatives of the employees to bargain collectively in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

Collective bargaining or negotiations towards a collective agreement is a democratic framework to stabilize the relation between labor
and management and to create a climate of sound and stable industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union
and is characterized as a legal obligation.

Collective bargaining includes four related but distinguishable processes:

(1) negotiation between representatives of the management and the union over “wages, hours, and other terms of employment;”
(2) the execution of a written contract embodying the terms agreed upon;
(3) negotiation of any question arising as to the interpretation or application of the contract; and
(4) negotiation over the terms of a new contract or proposed modifications, when an existing agreement is validly opened for
negotiations. Collective bargaining is a system made up of a set of continuous processes; it is customary and helpful to distinguish
negotiation of contracts (the “legislative” phase of the union-employer relationship),

Contract management (the "executive" phase) and contract interpretation or execution (the "legal" phase).
Collective bargaining refers to agreements that lead to a collective deal, both in general use and in legal terms. It does not, though,
conclude with the signing of a contract. It's a never-ending operation. It needs all sides, the employer and properly approved employee
members, to deal with each other with a free and equal mind and to genuinely try to overcome challenges in the course of stabilizing the
employer-employee relationship.

What is CBA or collective bargaining agreement

A collective bargaining agreement (CBA), as used in Article 252 of the Labor Code, Refers to a contract signed at the behest of either the
employer or the primary bargaining agent, incorporating the arrangement concluded during agreements on pay, hours of work, and any
other terms and conditions of employment, as well as arrangements for resolving any concerns or issues that might arise under such
agreement. While the terms and conditions of a CBA govern the relationship between the parties, it is not an ordinary contract under
which the rules of law that govern ordinary contracts apply. A CBA is not a labour contract within the meaning of Article 1700 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which regulates labor-capital relations and is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public
interest, thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the
courts must place a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
purpose which it is intended to serve. A CBA is more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the
draftsmen wholly anticipate. It covers the whole employment relationship and prescribes the rights and duties of the parties.

Collective bargaining may take place at the national, industry, or enterprise level. The Philippines so far has tried only enterprise-level, or
decentralized bargaining

Article 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. – The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to
meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of
work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to
agree to a proposal or to make any concession.

The Essence of the Duty to Bargain Collectively

The duty to bargain collectively does not impose upon the employer the obligation to initiate contract negotiation. Neither does it compel
the parties to agree to a proposal or to make any concession, much less to reach an agreement. All that is required is for the parties to
approach the negotiations with an open mind and exert reasonable effort to reach a common ground of agreement. Proposals, if
unacceptable, should be matched with Counter proposals. To offer the union a contract saying “Take it or leave it” is not in consonance
with good faith bargaining. Feigning negotiations through empty gestures is not bargaining in good faith.

Article 253. Duty to bargain collectively when there exists a collective bargaining agreement. – When there is a collective bargaining
agreement, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that neither party shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime. However, either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least sixty (60) days prior to its
expiration date. It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions
of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties.

The Hold-Over Principle

In the absence of a new CBA, the parties must maintain the status quo and must continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions
of the existing agreement until a new agreement is reached.

1.1 Four Forms of ULP in Bargaining

(1) failure to meet and convene;
(2) evading the mandatory subjects of bargaining;
(3) bad faith in bargaining, including failure or refusal to execute the collective agreement, if requested; and
(4) gross violation of the CBA.

The following are examples of matters considered as mandatory

subjects of bargaining:

(1) Wages and other types of compensation, including merit increases;

(2) Working hours and working days, including work shifts;
(3) Vacations and holidays;
(4) Bonuses;
(5) Pensions and retirement plans;
(6) Seniority;
(7) Transfer;
(8) Lay-offs;
(9) Employee workloads;
(10) Work rules and regulations;
(11) Rent of company houses;
(12) Union security arrangements.
3.1a Wage Agreement; “Solomonic” Approach

When Can Bargaining in Bad Faith Occur?

Bargaining in bad faith is considered ULP under Art, 248(g). But if one will be charged with bargaining in bad faith, the
charge should be raised while the bargaining is in progress. When the bargaining is finished and the CBA has been executed voluntarily
by the parties, a charge of bargaining in bad faith is too late and untenable. With the execution of the CBA, bad faith bargaining can no
longer be imputed upon any of the parties thereto. All provisions in the CBA are supposed to have been jointly and voluntarily
incorporated therein by the parties. This is not a case where private respondent exhibited an indifferent attitude towards collective
bargaining because the negotiations were not the unilateral activity of petitioner union. The CBA is proof enough that private respondent
exerted "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining."

Article 254 . announces the policy that labor disputes are generally not subject to injunction. If the rule were otherwise, it
would contradict the declared policy, under Article 211(a), “to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as modes of settling labor or
industrial disputes.” The policy, basically, is freedom at the workplace. The law, true to the tenets of free enterprise system, allows
management and labor to fashion the contents and incidents of their relationship. If there is dispute between
the parties, the responsibility to solve it devolves upon them primarily, not upon the government. Government intervention is the
exception rather than the rule. This anti-injunction policy applies even as regards wage-fixing by the wage commission or regional wage
boards. Moreover, any injunctive order in “non-national interest” disputes can be directed only against the illegal acts being committed in
connection with the labor dispute; it cannot be directed against the dispute itself.

Reason of the No-Injunction Policy

The labor injunction is an employer’s most effective remedy in labor dispute. However narrow its scope and form, the
issuance of an injunction for any purpose in a labor dispute will generally tip the scales of the controversy. The issuance of an injunction
in the early phases of a strike can critically sway the balance of the economic struggle against the union. Enforced by the court’s contempt
powers, even a preliminary injunction is an effectual strike-breaking weapon because
so much time ordinarily elapses between the issuance of a preliminary injunction and the time when a final decree can be
reviewed on appeal.

No-injunction Policy

 As a general rule Injunction not favoured in law considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective means of settling labor
disputes. Policy of the State: encourage the parties to use non-judicial process of:

1.) Negotiation
2.) Compromise
3.) Mediation &
4.) Arbitration

EXCEPTION: Injunctions may be issued only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds, after due considerations/hearing and
when all efforts at conciliation are exhausted.

Who May Issue Injunction in Labor Disputes

 Only by the ff. Can issue such:

NLRC :

1.) In ordinary disputes

2.) Cases arising from violation of Art. 264, of the Labor code

Sec. Of Labor and Employment – in labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the
national interest.

 Ordinary courts cannot issue injunction in cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute. Civil court cannot issue such
injunction to restrain execution of a final and executor judgement of the NLRC; Nor such civil court can enjoin striking EEs from
obstructing the free ingress/egress of an establishment