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THE IMPOSSIBLE
JOSEPH SUGLIA
Desire, pure impure desire, is the call to bridge the distance, to die in
common through separation.
—Maurice Blanchot, L’écriture du désastre
Of the many challenges to the Heideggerian analytic of mortality that emerged through-
out the twentieth century, none has been more groundbreaking than that of Maurice
Blanchot.1 The originality and singularity of this confrontation consists in its accent on
the social character of mortality: the “experience” of death appears, in this body of
discourse, as a relation to the autrui.
Death is, for Heidegger, an individual engagement.2 Heidegger absolutely excludes
from his existential analytic of mortality any consideration of the Other’s dying as a
possible object of experience.3 Although Sein und Zeit (1927) posits cobeing (Mitsein)
as a structure essential to the constitution of selfhood,4 death belongs exclusively to the
solitary Dasein.5 The problematic of sacrifice is irrelevant to the existential analytic,
since the representative function of sacrifice does not correspond to the unrepresentable
1. Derrida’s better-known argument in Donner la mort (1992), for instance, concerning the
irreplaceability of the responsible self vis-à-vis the death of the Other, would not have been pos-
sible without Blanchot’s intervention into the problematic of dual mortality.
2. The theme of the Other’s death in Heidegger is discussed extensively in Christopher Fynsk,
“The Self and Its Witness.”
3. “Je angemessener das Nichtmehrdasein des Verstorbenen phänomenal gefasst wird, um
so deutlicher zeigt sich dass solches Mitsein mit dem Toten gerade nicht das eigentliche
Zuendegekommensein des Verstorbenen erfährt” [SZ 239].
4. “Auf dem Grunde dieses mithaften In-der-Welt-seins ist die Welt je schon immer die, die
ich mit den Anderen teile. Die Welt des Daseins ist Mitwelt. Das In-Sein ist Mitsein mit Anderen.
Das innerweltliche Ansichsein dieser ist Mitdasein” [SZ 118].
5. “Keiner kann dem Anderen sein Sterben abnehmen. [. . .] Am Sterben zeigt sich, dass der
Tod ontologisch durch Jemeinigkeit und Existenz konstuiert wird” [SZ 240].
50
experiencing the death of the Other as that of the Other. Whoever takes the Other’s
dying as a point of departure for an ontology of death, Heidegger suggests, misses the
phenomenon of death altogether. For Blanchot, however, the exact opposite is the case.
Anyone who fails to take the death of the Other as constitutive of the death of the self
misses the phenomenon of death “as such.” Throughout his entire oeuvre, Blanchot
suggests—in a manner that is at times oblique and yet nonetheless forceful—that only
the “experience” of the Other’s death may grant me a relation to the impossible.
La communauté inavouable
What calls me into question most radically, Blanchot writes in La communauté inavouable
(1983), is my presence for an Other who absents itself by dying.9 Every human being
calls itself into question, Blanchot suggests, by exposing itself to the Other as Other—
an exposure that grants the self a relation to the outside. By contesting itself, the self
opens itself up to the community, which is “grounded” precisely by the self’s relation to
the “death” of the other person. Blanchot writes, “To hold oneself present in the proxim-
ity of another who by dying removes himself definitively, to take upon myself another’s
death as the only death that concerns me, this is what puts me outside of myself,10 this is
the only separation that can open me, in its very impossibility, to the Open of a commu-
nity” [CI 21/UC 9].
When Blanchot writes that the self places itself beside the Other in its dying, he
means that the self is brought outside of itself and into the community by way of its
relation to the Other’s finite existence. I can only “experience” death by exposing my-
self to the Other in its finitude, and this exposure grants me a relation to mortality.
Although I cannot know my own death, I can experience mortality via the other person
in its finite existence—an existence that contests the self by exposing it to an infinite
alterity. Knowledge of the Other as a finite, existing being is at the same time an expe-
rience of mourning, and the exposure to the “death” of the Other is an exposure to an
absolute transcendence.11
9. Blanchot’s text takes as its point of departure Jean-Luc Nancy’s discussion of the commu-
nity. On the relation between Nancy and Blanchot, see Bernasconi.
10. Blanchot borrows this term from Georges Bataille: “A man alive, who sees his fellow
man die, can survive only outside of himself [hors de soi]” [CI 21/UC 9]. This is translated as
“beside himself” in the English translation.
11. See Fynsk’s foreword to Jean-Luc Nancy’s Inoperative Community [xvii]. The relation
between the self and the Other described in La communauté inavouable is not, despite appear-
ances, a struggle that would lead to a Hegelian Anerkennung in which the fragile mastery of the
self (“fragile” because, in its satiety and loss of possibility, it is liable to be overturned) would be
posited vis-à-vis the slave. Certainly, there is a structural parallelism between the Knecht-Herr
relation and that delineated by Blanchot: the Other is what radically calls the self-subsistence of
the subject into question by drawing that subject “outside of itself.” Hegel writes: “For self-
consciousness is another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself [ausser sich].” This is the
same movement described in the Bataille citation [see note 10]: when it encounters the Other, the
self is pulled into an ecstatic movement. Hegel continues: “This has a two-fold significance: first,
it has lost itself, for it finds itself as another being [. . .] .” At this point, Blanchot/Bataille and
Hegel seem to be in agreement. Yet Blanchot interrupts the Hegelian dialectic, insofar as he
refuses to follow him beyond this point. Hegel continues: “[S]econdly, in doing so [in finding
itself as another being] it has sublated the other [das Andere aufgehoben]” [146]. The Other is
never, strictly speaking, sublated in Blanchot: it retains its transcendence and its impulse toward
exteriorization. Again, neither does this struggle lead to recognition in Blanchot, but rather to the
sheer negation of a formally posited individuality. The dialectic, it would seem, has been stalled
at its negative moment. The self experiences itself as an exteriority through its engagement with
Alone, dying, you do not distance yourself alone, you are still present, for here
you grant me this dying as the harmony that surpasses all pain, all solicitude,
and in which I tremble softly even in that which rends, at a loss for words with
you, dying with you without you, letting me die in your place, in receiving the
gift beyond you and me. [CI 21/UC 9]
In this colloquy, it is not clear who is speaking, nor where this speaking occurs: the
names of the characters have been effaced. One who dies faces one who bears witness
to this dying: dying is granted the survivor as a gift. An impossible dying-with: one is
beside the Other, bearing witness to its dying, but can never engage in this dying. “Death”
the other person in its (non)engagement with mortality: the solus ipsus is also a socius. Blanchot’s
“theory of sacrifice” (insofar as it could be called a “theory” at all) could also be placed in
relation to Hegelian Rechtsphilosophie, which places the negation of individuality at the source
of civil society. The relation between Blanchot and Hegel, while of great interest to me, will not be
discussed directly in this essay, because it exceeds its limited focus.
12. A corollary to this argument is that no a priori substantialized subject would exist self-
subsistently and before others: there is a fundamental “insufficiency” of the self (as suggested by
Blanchot’s citations of L’expérience interieur throughout La communauté inavouable), inasmuch
as mortality is an unknown variable except by way of the Other. No sociality, no community can
precede this relation to impossibility. Insubjectivity itself is founded upon the relation of the self
to the Other’s finitude.
13. The original passage reads: “Mourant, tu ne meurs pas, tu m’accordes ce mourir comme
l’accord qui passe toute peine, toute sollicitude et ou je frémis doucement jusque dans ce qui
déchire, perdant la parole avec toi, mourant avec toi sans toi, me laissant mourir à ta place, en
recevant le don au-delà de toi et de moi” [PD 169].
14. Blanchot remarks in L’écriture du désastre: “once declared responsible for dying (for all
dying), I can no longer appeal to any ethics, any experience, any practice whatever—save that of
some counter-living, which is to say an un-practice, or (perhaps) a word of writing” [ED 47/WD
26]. The following passage from Emmanuel Levinas (Dieu, la mort et le temps) is also relevant to
this context: “The death of the Other affects me in my very identity as a responsible I [. . .] made
up of unspeakable responsibility. This is how I am affected by the death of the Other, this is my
relation to his death. It is, in my relation, my deference toward someone who no longer responds,
already a guilt of the survivor” [qtd. in Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas 7].
15. Compare this passage from Levinas, Alterity and Transcendence: “In that relation with
the face, in a direct relation with the death of the other [sic], you probably discover that the death
of the other has priority over yours, and over your life” [164].
54
munity is a community of death, and the community of death is the death of all commu-
nity. That is to say: there is no community without the exposure to death, and this expo-
sure to death makes it difficult to conceive of a community as a relation between com-
mon terms. Mortality founds as well as founders all community. To the extent that it is
grounded upon an impossible relation (a relation to the impossible), one could say, with
Blanchot, that every community is an “impossible community” (“l’impossible
communauté”) [CI 46/UC 25].
The community says its ground, bearing witness to the exposure to finitude, by folding
back upon its origin in the other person, who is substitutive of an impossible relation to
dying. Inasmuch as the community articulates its ground as an impossible relation, it
announces that communion between individuals is suspended. If “community” (under-
stood as a common measure between individuals) is suppressed, what makes communi-
cation between individuals possible? Blanchot touches upon the motif of communica-
tion in the passage that follows:
We cannot be alone to experience the solitude of our “own” dying. Blanchot asserts
here, in opposition to Heidegger, the sociality of mortality.16 For Blanchot, my relation
to my own death—a relation without relation insasmuch as death is the impossible—is
also a relation to the death of the other person. The other person is, for him, the presence
of an absence that permits the self to enter into an incommensurable relation (a relation
to dying), which is also a self-relation. Against the tendency in Heideggerian thought to
regard death as an individual engagement, Blanchot vigorously affirms that exposure to
the death of the Other is the only “experience” that could grant me a relation to that
which cannot be experienced. This “experience” of a nonexperience is communicated
through a self-offering—a relation to dying that Blanchot determines as friendship.
Thomas l’Obscur
We come to approach just such a problematic, I think, in those pages of Thomas l’Obscur
(1941/1950) devoted to Anne’s death.17 Anne expresses “the greatest passion ever expe-
16. Blanchot affirmed that every death is a communal death (a “multiple doubling”) at least
as early as 1973 (in Le pas au-delà).
17. See chapter 13 of the 1941 version and chapter 10 of the 1950 version. A brief summary
of the “novel” (if it is one) might be in order here. It would be tempting to say that Thomas
l’Obscur (both versions) is the record of a metamorphosis. The title of the “novel” invokes not so
much an accidental trait of its “main character” as his incessant engagement with the obscure,
an engagement that often takes the form of a self-duplication or self-exteriorization. Thomas may
not even be said to metamorphose into something other, since the term “metamorphosis” sug-
gests a position of purity and stability against which a change could be measured. Thomas is the
“meta-” of all form. Since he cannot be contained in any particular form, Thomas is the pure
movement of turning-into-something-other-than-what-he-is: absolute change without stabiliza-
tion. In a word, Thomas is nothing other than his metamorphoses into an other. No formal or
stable subject remains intact outside of the changes that he undergoes. The metamorphosis that
Thomas endures in the penultimate chapter (in which he becomes a representation of death “it-
self”) is a repetition of the ecstatic moment in chapter 1 in which Thomas is immersed in the
waves, and becomes indistinguishable from the water in which he was tossed. The appearance of
the night repeats the opening movement of Thomas l’Obscur, in which the disappearance of the
self into the world occurs through the idealization of both. In the first version of the second
chapter (a passage completely omitted in the second), thought becomes body and world through
a process of realization: Thomas walked upon a path “with a body made up of his most intimate
thoughts and desires” (“avec un corps fait des pensées et des désirs les plus intimes”) [1: 13–
14]. His very thought later becomes a “nocturnal mass” that he is able to touch. Objects enter
into him (the representations of his consciousness take on bodily form): self-affection is here an
extreme experience of exteriority (the outside). In the fourth chapter, Thomas assumes a position
of extreme passivity, as, a “profound reader,” he is read by the (feminine) text that he attempts to
read. For a detailed reading of this passage, see Schestag. A brief discussion of this passage also
occurs in Mesnard 182–83. Thomas is subjected to an ecstatic movement in which he exteriorizes
himself by doubling himself in the fifth chapter (I touch upon this passage briefly below). One
might say that, in the first chapter and throughout this text (although this is not an argument that
I will pursue here), Thomas is at grips with his becoming-other. This is an interpretation that
Fynsk hints at in his foreword to The Station Hill Blanchot Reader. For a brief discussion of
metamorphosis in Thomas l’Obscur, see Fries 276-77.
Interpretations of Thomas l’Obscur are sparse. For some useful discussions of the text, see
Londyn; Stillers; Tsuquiashi-Daddesio, Plasticité graphique; and Hill. For an account of the his-
tory of the text’s publication and reception (in both versions), see Bident 200–02, 287–90.
18. In the 1941 version, the text reads: “Dans son immobilité absolue, dans son insensibilité
parfaite, elle ressenti comme un vide immense l’absence en elle de tout sentiment pour ceux qui
vivaient” [1: 201–02].
56
embody the absence of all sentiment in anticipation of the possibility of no-longer-
being-there.
Anne offers herself in her dying to those who mourn over her, proleptically mourn-
ing her own death as the death of an Other (she is at once the one who mourns and the
one over who is mourned): “To those who cried over her, cold and oblivious, she re-
turned hundred-fold what they had given her, devoting to them the anticipation of her
death, her death, the pure feeling, never purer, of her existence in the tortured anticipa-
tion of her non-existence” [1: 202/2: 116–17/TO 82].19 Anne’s gift of her dying exceeds
the possibility of compensation: it is an expenditure that could never be repaid. If the
concept of sacrifice, as Jacques Derrida suggests, implies the reciprocity of interest
(and surely it does), then Anne’s self-sacrifice is an offering that transcends the economy
of sacrifice: the offering of her work of (self-)mourning exceeds “hundred-fold” the
mourning that had been granted to her. Anne’s sacrifice is a nonreciprocal and
dissymmetrical sacrifice: it is a (non)act of unconstrained generosity.20
Through her self-sacrifice, her existence unites with her nonexistence (alive, she is
“already dead” [1: 202/2: 116/TO 82]—an absolute contradiction):
For the first time, she raised the words “give oneself” to their true meaning:
she gave Anne, she gave much more than the life of Anne, she gave the ultimate
gift, the death of Anne; she separated herself from her terribly strong feeling of
being Anne, from the terribly anguished feeling of being Anne threatened with
dying, and changed it into the yet more anguished feeling of being no longer
Anne, but her mother, her mother threatened by death, the entire world on the
point of annihilation. [1: 202/2: 117/TO 82]
What benefit is gained from this self-sacrifice? Who benefits? Giving the gift of an
impossible relation to her “own” death, Anne accedes to another order: that of social-
ity.21 We have already seen how, for Blanchot, the possibility of community is not con-
ceivable apart from a relation to human mortality. For Blanchot, the gift of an impos-
sible relation to one’s own death is the sacrificial gesture that founds all community. It
should be no surprise, then, that, offering herself in her dying, Anne is “forced to die not
personally but by the intermediary of all the others” (“contraint de mourir non pas
personellement, mais par l’intermédiare de tous les autres”) [1: 202/2: 118/TO 82]. Sur-
rendering her death to those who mourn her, Anne’s death becomes mediated by the
Other and is devoted to the Other. Her death becomes that of the Other. In the extraordi-
nary gesture by which Anne gives of her death, she offers to those who are witnesses to
her death the impossibility of assuming death as a possibility.
In this way, Blanchot’s first literary text forecasts what will be rearticulated in his
more theoretical statements of 1983 in La communauté inavouable. For Blanchot, the
19. The expression “froide et inconsciente” (“cold and oblivious”) in this passage is puz-
zling, insofar as it problematizes or at least complicates Blanchot’s own thesis that death may be
known only through the death of the Other.
20. See Derrida’s Donner la mort for a discussion of restricted and general economic con-
figurations of sacrifice: according to this dualistic typology, sacrifice is either a symmetrical
economy of exchange or an economy that incorporates loss. Derrida’s discussion—although he
does not expressly acknowledge it—is heavily indebted to Blanchot’s L’écriture du désastre.
21. For reasons of economy, I am not able to discuss the motif of motherhood in this pas-
sage. Because of the narrowly restricted focus of this essay (the relationship of the self to the
Other as determined by the problematic of mortality), an exposition of the figure of maternity in
Blanchot would require a separate study altogether. For a consideration of this topic, see Huffer.
Then, in the form of this primordial passion, having now only a silent and
dreary soul, a heart empty and dead, she offered her absence of friendship as
the truest and purest friendship; she resigned herself, in this dark region where
no one touched her, to responding to the ordinary affection of those around her
by this supreme doubt concerning her being, by the desperate consciousness
of being nothing any longer, by her anguish. [1: 202/2: 116/TO 81]
“L’angoisse” again names an affect that discloses the relation of a nonrelation (the ab-
sence of all relation, “the absence of friendship”).23 Anne’s anguished anticipation of
that which permits no relation forms is, paradoxically, the condition of “the truest and
purest friendship.” We have already encountered the motif of friendship in Blanchot’s
remarks on the basis of communication. There, friendship was determined as a work of
mourning that allows the self to experience what the self cannot experience individu-
ally. Here, “the truest and purest friendship” is mediated (sacrificial) dying—the offer-
ing of the Other’s death which is the condition of all community (“the absence of friend-
ship”—the disconnection of every relation). The anticipated loss of relation constitutes
the basis of a (paradoxical) relation: such is the “friendliness” of Anne’s self-immola-
tion.24
58
The relation to the autrui is one of friendship, and friendship is based upon death—
upon the exposure of the self to its “own” mortality. In a fragment from L’écriture du
désastre, Blanchot writes: “Friendship is not a gift, or a promise; it is not a form of
generosity. Rather, this incommensurable relation of the one to the other is the outside
drawing near in its rupture and inaccessibility” [ED 50/WD 29]. Friendship is not a gift,
but a sacrifice. The concept of a gift implies a pregiven plenitude that could be ex-
pended without diminishing one’s supply; a sacrifice, on the contrary, is meaningful
only when one cannot dispense with that with which one dispenses. Friendship implies
the absolute dispossession of the self, the anguished anticipation of one’s mortality. The
outside approaches via the sacrifice of the other person—the sacrifice by which the
other person exposes itself as finite and hence delivers the self over to its mortality. The
approach of the autre (the impossible) comes by way of the approach of the autrui (the
other human being). To that extent, the autrui mediates the infinite alterity of mortality.
The sacrifice of friendship (subjective and objective genitive) opens onto the abyss of
the impossible and grants a (non)relation to the impossible. It is a friendship, as Blanchot
demonstrates in Le pas au-delà, that is determined as the sharing of what cannot be
possessed, as the impossible sharing of mortality.
Anne’s death reflects upon the death at the heart of community. The ultimate sacri-
ficial figure, Anne offers her death to the Other as a death that is entirely other. De-
prived of its singularity, Anne’s death is “characterized” only by and as an indetermi-
nate dying that is rid of all of its historical characteristics. Her death is generalized to the
point at which it obtains the indifference of man stirbt. Sacrifice here requires a certain
“dedifferentiation.” The particularity of Anne’s existence is reduced until she becomes
of the order of anonymous and impersonal entities; human being becomes thinglike:
“[She is] like something which could not be represented, no longer a human being, but
simply a being, marvelously a being” [1: 203/2: 119/TO 83]. Delivered over to the
mediated impersonality of death (in which she is “forced to die by the intermediary of
all the others”), the solitude of Anne’s dying is infringed upon. The passionate/passion-
less anticipation of death gives way to the sacrifice of the person to the neutral: “Al-
ready [Anne] had no more importance.” Those who mourn over this nameless sacrifi-
cial victim are likewise deprived of their personal traits: “her mother was no longer
anything more than an insignificant being”; “Thomas is insignificant” [1: 206/2: 125/
TO 86]. The characters are effaced and surrendered to the neutrality of a faceless dying.
Anne’s presentation of her finitude is at the same time the gift of her mortality—and yet
this testimony is that of the autre (the other as anonymous transcendence), not that of
the autrui (the other human being). The testimony is of an anonymous impersonality.
The uncanniness of the address consists in the fact that it is of the other: Anne’s sacrifice
affords a relation to an alterity.
Anne’s death is not “final” in that it incites discourse—the inner monologue of
Thomas, who will attempt to appropriate Anne’s death as speech. Provoked by Anne’s
death, Thomas is given to speak. Anne’s self-offering, however, does not pass entirely
into the speech of Thomas.25 Thomas is right to say to himself that Anne “gave herself
entirely over to death in an instant” (“elle s’est en un instant donné entièrement la mort”)
[1: 206/2: 127/TO 89]. Yet nowhere in his long and powerful reflection on Anne’s struggle
does Thomas articulate Anne’s gesture of “giving” her dying to him. To that extent,
Anne’s self-sacrifice bespeaks a lack in Thomas’s speech. Her sacrifice is measured by
25. This is suggested by Fynsk in his foreword to The Station Hill Blanchot Reader. Thomas’s
monologue constitutes almost the entirety of the fourteenth chapter in the 1941 version and the
eleventh chapter in the 1950 version.
But those who contemplated me felt that death could also associate with exist-
ence and form this decisive word: death exists. They have developed the habit
of saying about existence everything they could say of death for me and, rather
than murmur, “I am, I am not,” mix the terms together in a single happy com-
bination and say, “I am, while I am not,” and likewise, “I am not, while I am,”
without there being the slightest attempt to force contradictory words together,
rubbing them one against the other like stones. [1: 215/2: 140/TO 96]
26. Anne’s resistance to Thomas is “thematized” in the eighth chapter of the first version as
the “intrusion” of a physical force and an “inassimilable nothingness” [2: 89/TO 64] that thrusts
itself before his indifference. (In the twelfth chapter of the first version, this is written of Irène [1:
187]—a character who is completely elided in the 1950 edition.) Anne differs from the thought
that Thomas represents by offering herself as a body, an intractable, “triumphal presence” to his
thought, which can never appropriate her as a thought. In Thomas’s monologue in the penultimate
chapter of both versions of Thomas l’Obscur, her resistance consists in her misappropriation in
speech. Yet neither can Thomas be appropriated in the speech of Anne. In the eighth chapter of
the 1950 version, Anne wars against Thomas’s indifference by transforming herself into a body
“a thousand times more beautiful than her own” [2: 88/TO 63]. (Blanchot’s humor is evident in
this passage, despite his extraordinary seriousness.) Anne thereby revolts against the impossibil-
ity of placing Thomas into a narrative. Thomas is described as a being who could not be ques-
tioned, since his existence itself is a “terrible question posed” to Anne. It would be “extremely
presumptuous” for Anne, according to the narrator, to be “shocked” at her inability to “under-
stand” Thomas; her “rashness” would “go beyond all limits” if she attempted “to get informa-
tion about him” [1: 59/2: 65/TO 48]. Thomas is one whose nonknowability (the obscurity to
which the title of the text refers and which is his common noun qualifier) is determined as his most
essential determination, and who therefore suspends the distinction between comprehensibility
and incomprehensibility altogether. Thomas is not incomprehensible, for the category of incom-
prehensibility implies the possibility that something may be known. Jacques Derrida discusses
the common noun qualifier in the title Thomas l’Obscur in The Ear of the Other [160-61].
27. The first version reads: “Toute ma vie apparut confondue avec ma mort” [1: 211]. The
second version reads: “Tout mon être parut se confondre avec la mort” [2: 132].
60
diacritics / summer 2001 61
“Absent from Anne, absent from my love for Anne to the extent that I loved Anne” [1:
221/2: 154/TO 103]. To a certain extent, Thomas’s absence of desire is the absence of
alterity. But this absence of alterity is not solipsism. In a moment of extreme auto-
affection that surpasses any relation of self-identity, Thomas experiences himself as
absent from himself (“absent, doublement, de moi”) [2: 154/TO 103].28 Thomas is exte-
riorized as his own anonymous and impersonal double—a repetition of an earlier mo-
ment of the text (in the eighth chapter of the 1941 version and the fifth chapter of the
1950 version) in which Thomas attempts to coalesce with his death by interring himself
in the earth, where he encounters his own corpse. Here, the experience of auto-affection
is at the same time one of self-duplication: the experience of the self as an Other.29
Feeling himself as dead, Thomas presents himself not as a corpse, but in his living
existence, drawing himself beyond a purely metaphorical death (Thomas exposes him-
self as a “dead person” (“un mort”) “in order not to make of his death a metaphor”
(“pour ne pas faire de sa mort une metaphore”) [1: 211/2: 133/TO 92]). Thomas by-
passes the logic of metaphoricity—the transference (meta-pherein) from figure (that
which immediately represents) to concept (that which is mediately represented)—by
immediately presenting what he represents. As the figure of the impossible, Thomas
becomes the impossible. The exclusivity of life and death is eradicated when Thomas
poses himself as dead in his living, finite existence: “I feel myself dead—no; I feel
myself, living, infinitely more dead than dead” [1: 222/2: 156/TO 104].
A feeling arises that discloses not his historical existence, but his existence as his-
torical. Thomas anticipates his nonbeing through the fundamental affect of l’angoisse—
a feeling that, as Blanchot writes, “molds” Thomas, making him and unmaking him,
“causing [him] to feel” “in a total absence of sentiment” his “reality in the shape of
nothingness” [1: 222–23/2: 156–57/TO 104]. We see that Thomas’s experience of mor-
tality is inextricably connected with that of Anne: “l’angoisse” (once more, the feeling
of the loss of all feeling) describes the joint that articulates their deaths.
Feeling nothing, feeling himself as nothing, Thomas opens himself up to a mori-
bund jouissance. “Ravaged by delights” (“ravage de délices”), Thomas posits himself
in relation to a “future void” (“vide futur”) as if to a “frightful enjoyment” (“jouissance
affreuse”) [1: 222/2: 155/TO 103]. It would seem that his ecstasis is the pleasure of
anticipating mortality. This rapture is so great that it can only be experienced in its
withdrawal as “torment”: “I am at grips with a sentiment that reveals to me that I cannot
experience it, and it is at that moment that I experience it with a force which makes it an
inexpressible torment” [1: 222/2: 155/TO 104]. His “delight” (“délice”) at no longer
existing is so great that it is beyond the ability of any subject to experience it; the subject
can at most experience its inability to undergo this experience. “Le tourment” names the
feeling that reveals the impossibility of feeling this feeling; it discloses an impossible
experience through which the subject would be nullified.
There is a transition from the absence of feeling, the absence of desire, and the
absence of alterity to the exposure to an alterity. It is as if an extraordinarily dense
experience of auto-affection forms the condition for an engagement with an infinite
transcendence. Along with the feeling that “everything is vanished” (“toutes les choses
se sont évanouies”), “the night” brings Thomas the feeling that “everything is immedi-
ate” (“toute chose m’est immediate”): “It is the supreme relationship that is sufficient
unto itself; it leads me eternally to itself, and an obscure race from the identical to the
28. There is a slight discrepancy between the first and the second versions at this point. The
1941 version reads: “Et absent, doublement absent de moi” [1: 221].
29. For a discussion of self-doubling in Thomas l’Obscur, see Hurault 72–74.
62
identical imparts to me the desire of a wonderful progress” [1: 223/2: 157/TO 105].30
“The supreme relationship that is sufficient unto itself” repeats itself eternally, but this
does not suggest (as is demonstrated by Klossowski’s interpretation of the Nietzschean
ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen) the static recurrence of the identical.31
Is the “supreme relationship” not similar in its structure to “poetry” in Blanchot’s
essay of 1949 devoted to Jean Paulhan (“La mystère dans les lettres”)? Poetry “de-
mands,” Blanchot writes, “absolute being” through the synthesis of meaning and sign.
Both aspects of language aspire to become interchangeable with each other. This is
possible because, Blanchot writes, in poetry the relationship preexists the terms; “the
terms exist only in their relationship” (“les termes n’existent que dans le rapport”) [PF
57/WF 51], and what we know of isolated terms, from other experiences, has the same
value only in the relationship that grounds them. Poetic language—understood here as
the pure signifying power of language—is an original difference that maintains both
opposing perspectives as identical; it is an interruptive opening that engenders both
poles. When read in the context of Blanchot’s later research, one may hypothesize that
the “supreme relationship” bears similar structural features to that of “poetry” in the
Paulhan essay: both are relations that precede and make their relata possible. “The su-
30. My interpretation of this passage was inspired by some of Fynsk’s remarks in his fore-
word to The Station Hill Blanchot Reader.
31. Blanchot alluded to this interpretation in Le pas au-delà. According to the Klossowskian
interpretation of the ewige Wiederkehr, consciousness is struck by a moment of delirious lucidity
when the inconceivable thought emerges that all things will have repeated themselves infinitely.
Klossowski stresses the non-narratable character of the eternal recurrence: its experience may
not be preserved or archivalized, since a forgetting is essential to this experience. This is because
the time in which the experience of the eternal recurrence is itself experienced must occur in time,
and so must be relegated to an amnesia no less vital than anamnesis. As Klossowski remarks, “it
is inscribed in the very essence of the circular movement that the movement itself be forgotten
from one state to the next” [110]. The “I” to whom recurrence discloses itself is destroyed, for the
time in which “he” or “she” will experience the infinitely recurring moment of disclosure is not
the time in which the “I” lives, subordinated to the everyday system of signs. For personal pro-
nouns are, for Klossowski, the fossilized signs of ordinary language and crystallize through their
repetition. Eternal recurrence casts the stagnant character of the “I” into dispersion and trans-
forms it into a pronoun in the third person (this is the very movement that Blanchot himself
describes in “La voix narrative” in L’entretien infini and “La solitude essentielle” in L’espace
littéraire). When I experience that all things will return, I am reconciled with myself only insofar
as I become integrated within an infinite series of permutations of the self. Auto-affection is at
this moment a form of hetero-affection. Klossowski’s ecstatic self is not a self-same subject com-
mitted to the infinite repetition of the same acts and the same thoughts; he rather emphasizes the
expropriation of the self from its own “self-identity.” All that the self has in common with itself,
according to this interpretation, is reduced to a mere moment of disjunctive instanteity, wherein
its own self-sameness is forgotten, insofar as it is temporalized, disappropriated only to be taken
up again, reappropriated not in the lucidity of self-consciousness, but in terms of a disjunctive
member of an infinite temporal series—what Klossowski terms “the successive realization of all
possible identities” [108]. When the meaning of the eternal recurrence is disclosed to me, “my
self” is obliterated in the face of something objectively necessary and absolute—its own othering.
The experience of eternal recurrence is the experience of a nonexperience, for it involves the
dissolution of the very self that would have experienced it. What Klossowski understands by “the
eternal recurrence of the same,” then, is not the constitution of a static identity, for the self that
experiences the eternal recurrence must actualize all other possible selves, revealing itself as
nothing more than one of a series of masks. The eternal recurrence demands a time without
identity, since no instant is determinable as identical to itself outside of the series of determina-
tions that recurrence imposes. But if it is the case that no instant is identical to itself, then sameness
is no longer conceivable as identity, since what is the same occurs only in terms of the diversity of
its repetition. See Deleuze, The Logic of Sense.
32. The notion of a “pure relation” can be found in the Heideggerian text “Das Wesen der
Sprache” (although the author does not use this term). In order to approach the essence of lan-
guage, Heidegger suggests, one must think the neighborhood (Nachbarschaft) between poetry-
making (Dichten) and thinking (Denken). Both terms belong to “the same element,” Heidegger
writes: that of saying (Sagen). One enters into “perplexity” (Verlegenheit) in engaging in thought
with the neighborhood that holds both relata together. Thinking this relation qua relation is the
precondition of thinking through the essence of language.
33. As Blanchot’s rhetoric suggests, a step (pas) into the beyond is here interdicted (pas) at
the same time as it comes to pass.
34. Thomas is figured as humankind in the opening of the penultimate chapter: “With me,
the species died each time completely. [. . .] I was the sole corpse of humanity” [1: 212–13/2:
135–36/TO 93].
64
very night. Any distance between us is suppressed, but suppressed in order that we may
not come closer one to the other. It is a friend to me, a friendship which divides us” [2:
159–60/TO 105–06].35 The infinite distance of “friendship” describes the articulation of
a relation between death and the human. In the intimate bond that is brought about
between the “supreme relationship” and Thomas, a separation is still maintained. There
is an infinite entre-tien, a comaintenance, a holding-between—a relation between them
subsists, which consists in the fact that there is no relation whatsoever.
If the “night” is absolute transcendence, in the later moments of Thomas’s mono-
logue, the absolute is relativized. If the self-sufficiency of the “supreme relationship”
makes of it a transcendence, it is a finite transcendence. The “supreme relationship” is
death, but “death” exists only in relation to the human. Absolutely self-identical, “death
itself” opens up to its finitude. By reflecting its self-identity, Thomas sets terms to the
infinite: “You give to the infinite the glorious sentiment of its limits. [. . .] You bloom
into new restrictions” [1: 226/2: 163–64/TO 109]. The absolute character of the night is
not renounced; rather, it is made relative while retaining (neither surrendering nor com-
promising) its absoluteness. It would seem that mimesis relativizes the absolute, while
preserving its absolute character. Thomas transmutes himself into a self-effacing me-
dium through which the night reflects upon itself (“Tu te contemples par mon
intermédiaire éternellement”) [1: 226/2: 164]. By presenting himself as the resemblance
of the infinite, Thomas transforms the infinite into an object. Thomas thus presents
himself as one who mediates the impossible. This victorious (self-) assertion of the
human against an infinite otherness is an irreconcilable aporia.36
To return to this essay’s starting point: for Blanchot, death cannot be known except by
way of the Other. As I have demonstrated, death in Thomas l’Obscur is at the furthest
remove from the pathos of a solitary being-toward-death. Anne’s gift of mortality exists
only in relation to the Other and is mediated by the Other. Can one not say that Thomas’
engagement with mortality was incited by Anne’s self-sacrifice? Her gift of dying leads
to a kind of linguistic metamorphosis in which Thomas becomes the figure of death.
Here it is a matter of the union between existence and death through the “meta-meta-
phorical” representation of that union. Because Anne gives her death to Thomas, he
finds himself able, as an existing being, to become the figural representation not of her
death, but of death as such. His transmutation of Anne’s gift of dying is such that he
joins with the “night” only as its figural representation. There is a sacrifice of human-
ness insofar as the human responds to a figural exigency.37 It is necessary to read Tho-
mas’s final, victorious affirmation—“It makes me, nothingness that I am, like unto noth-
35. In the first version, this passage reads: “Notre intimité est cette nuit meme. Mais si toute
distance est supprimée entre nous, c’est pour que nous ne puissons pas nous rapprocher. Plus je
lui suis proche, plus il m’est étranger. Tous les rapports par lesquels il s’unit à moi servent à
empecher mon union avec lui. Chaque relation nouvelle est une relation qui me manque. Il m’est
ami, amitié qui ne me pénétre pas” [1: 224].
36. The infinite, of course, can neither become an object nor have a cause. Nevertheless,
Thomas paradoxically affirms himself as “the origin of that which has no origin”: “I create that
which cannot be created” [1: 226/2: 164/TO 108].
37. This figural-sacrificial exigency is also discussed in “La littérature et le droit à la mort,”
wherein literary negation is likened to the ideality of death in the Reign of Terror. Human particu-
larity is sacrificed in order to obtain its representative function. See Fynsk’s interpretation of this
text, “Crossing the Threshold.”
38. For a discussion of the relation between Blanchot and Levinas, see Libertson; and Davies.
66
Can one not also say of Blanchot what he himself says of Mallarmé in “L’expérience
d’Igitur”? Does Blanchot here shrink back from what Mallarmé calls, in the preface to
Un coup de dès, “the identical neutrality of the abyss”? One could assert that it is no
longer the “night” (absence) that speaks, but the night in the name of the human. Ab-
sence is posited as consciousness in order to appear as absence. The night becomes
being, becomes life itself, in order that death be mastered—it thus abjures its status as
nothingness. Does Blanchot—despite every statement to the contrary—make death
present? By humanizing absence, does Blanchot move back from what is most terrible
in this experience?
I do not pretend to have answers to these questions. Perhaps the experience should
be left in its fundamental ambiguity. This much, at least, is clear: throughout the corpus
of Blanchot, the question of mortality (or the neutral) is inextricably interlaced with the
question of the autrui, as the question of the autrui implicates that of mortality. An
aphorism from L’écriture du désastre, however, complicates this assertion by its sug-
gestion that the phrase “the death of the Other” is a pleonasm: “The death of the Other:
a double death, for the Other is death already, and weighs upon me like an obsession
with death” [ED 36/WD 19]. In the relation of the self to the autrui, passivity and dis-
possession reign: perhaps this is the “death” to which the fragment refers. And yet
Blanchot seems to be saying something more here. The other person opens up a wound,
granting receptivity to the other as the Other. The self is exposed to transcendence via
the Other. The other person appears once more as a substitute for the impossible, and—
as the fragment of L’écriture du désastre implies—is at the same time the impossible.
Perhaps this is what Blanchot is implying in a “parenthesis” of L’entretien infini (or
rather “Blanchot,” one of the interlocutors of the infinite conversation that runs throughout
and beyond that volume) that reads, “The Other is in the neutral, even when it speaks to
us as Autrui” [EI 456/IC 311]. An interlocutor in the same parenthesis suggests that
death “plays the role” of a “challenge to Being”39 grasped as the One in a manner analo-
gous to that of the Autrui: “Coming as Other, having the false appearance of the neutral,
not allowing itself to be seized as unified; attaining only inasmuch as it remains inac-
cessible (and thereby rendering inaccessible what it reaches), nevertheless touching
only what it has always already touched; having no actuality and only allowing itself to
be encountered by the ‘Self’ that it haunts when the Self, stand-in for the Other, is no
more than the already broken fictive partner that the Other offers itself and receives as a
gift” [EI 457/IC 311]. The self encounters death only inasmuch as the Other offers death
to it as the Other. Neither the self nor the Other can engage in dying except by way of
the other, who is substitutive of the experience of mortality. Mortality comes through
and as the other person in its human finitude.
In order for the community to know the finitude that serves as its elusive founda-
tion, there must be a sacrifice. In its self-sacrifice, the other person answers to a figural
exigency. The impossible must be communicated in order to institute the community of
the impossible. The autrui is figurative of mortality, making death mediate, answering
to the demand that there be a sacrifice in order to make of death something other than a
metaphor.
39. Neither death nor the autrui are conceivable on the basis of being. Both are forms of
nondialectical transcendence or “excedence.” Neither can be reduced to the one and the same;
both are beyond the grips of ontology. This is a Levinasian argument that I am not able to pursue
here because of the restricted scope of my essay.
68
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