Accepted Manuscript

Failure Mapping For Occupational Safety Management In The Film And Television
Industry

Rachel Barbosa Santos, Ualison Rébula de Oliveira, Henrique Martins Rocha

PII: S0925-5273(18)30226-3

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.05.024

Reference: PROECO 7053

To appear in: International Journal of Production Economics

Received Date: 17 June 2017

Accepted Date: 20 May 2018

Please cite this article as: Rachel Barbosa Santos, Ualison Rébula de Oliveira, Henrique Martins
Rocha, Failure Mapping For Occupational Safety Management In The Film And Television Industry,
International Journal of Production Economics (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.05.024

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 ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

FAILURE MAPPING FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN THE FILM

AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY

Rachel Barbosa Santos a

a
Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)
Address: 156 Passo da Pátria, St Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 24210-240.
Telephone: + 55 24 30768785.
E-mail: rachelbarbosa30@hotmail.com

Ualison Rébula de Oliveira b1

b
Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF)
Address: 783 Desembargador Ellis Hermydio Figueira St Volta Redonda, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
27213-145.
Telephone: + 55 24 30768785.
E-mail: ualison.oliveira@gmail.com

Henrique Martins Rocha e

e Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (UERJ)

Address: Rodovia Presidente Dutra Km 298 - Polo Industrial, Resende, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, 27537-000
Telephone: + 55 24 33813889
E-mail: prof.henrique_rocha@yahoo.com.br

1 Corresponding author: Ualison Rébula de Oliveira. Adress: 783 Desembargador Ellis Hermydio Figueira Street, Volta

Redonda – Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 27213-145. Telephone: +55 24 30768785. E-mail: ualison.oliveira@gmail.com
 ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

FAILURE MAPPING FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN THE

FILM AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY

ABSTRACT

In the film and television industry, a wide range of risks in processes of launching new

products (series, soap operas or films) can cause accidents and affect the health and safety of

crews. Besides potential personal injuries, as a business, the whole production process in

under risk, since if a key player (e.g.: the main actor/actress) gets severely injured or dies,

he/she cannot be replaced and the project can be paralyzed, causing difficulties to the

company. This article purposes to identify the most critical process in relation to the

occurrence of accidents, evaluating the failures of the activities of this critical process, and

understanding their causes, to enable formulating treatment plans. We performed a case

study of a large film and television producer in Brazil: A committee of experts identified

filming as the most critical process. We mapped the activities of this process, the potential

failures and their causes through a FMEA, identifying 15 modes of failure in the process and

32 potential elements that cause these failures. Combining and ranking those elements, 12

causes were considered critical and FTA was applied to identify their root causes. The result

was a procedure to analyze process failures tailored to the film and television industry, as

well as complete and objective visualization of the possible faults in this process, enabling

the company to correct them and providing elements for other researchers to investigate this

rich but as yet little explored theme.

Keywords: Occupational Safety and Health Risk Management; Risk Analysis; Film and

Television Industry; FMEA; FTA; Process Mapping.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Despite the increasing attention paid to work safety, accidents causing fatalities and

severe injuries to workers, as well as negative effects on communities, the environment and

firms’ public image, are still all too common in many industries, with possibly devastating

bottom-line impacts, as reported by, among others, Aminbakhsh et al. (2013), Wu et al.

(2013), Zhao et al. (2014) and Khan, Rathnayaka & Ahmed (2015). According to these

authors, the implementation of more effective safety measures through good risk

management is crucial to keep risks within acceptable levels.

This situation is worrying, since in spite of efforts to improve workplace safety,

grave accidents continue occurring in organizations, be it due to process failures or design

flaws. In response, many methods, procedures and approaches for risk management have

been developed to minimize or manage failures (Knegtering & Pasman, 2013; Mohsen &

Fereshteh, 2017).

The literature review revealed shortage of studies about risk management in the film

and television industry, and a corresponding lack of data. A search on Web of Science

database, performed on Dec 19th, 2017, using “risk management” as search argument,

presented a total of 4,176 articles. Funnelling the search with the additional argument

“analysis” showed 188 articles about risk management in different areas such as industrial &

energy plants, supply chain & logistics, construction, health & occupational, financial &

regulatory, project & business management, flood/droughts, residential, seismic, terrorism,

environmental, agriculture & farming, information technology, public service/offices,

aeronautics/astronautics, etc. However, no articles about film and television industry were

found.

According to Campbell & Mann (1987), McCann (1991), Caldwell (2008) and

Sullivan & Mckee (2015), the process of the film and television industry presents various

risks to health and safety of crews. Their processes have well-defined steps where the
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production methods or technologies pose a variety of physical risks and possible accidents,

among them excessive noise, slippery floors that can cause serious falls, and electrical

shocks, to name a few. All film crew members are exposed to risks to health and safety

(including mental), variously due to physical working conditions and high stress and

anxiety, possibly leading to accidents and occupational diseases/syndromes (Caldwell,

2008).

Among the accidents that occurred in the last years, one may cite the death of the

stuntman who fell during a TV series filming (Wattles, 2017); the actor who jumped

between two buildings and hit the wall (FILM, 2017); and a camera assistant died after

being hit by a train during a movie set recording (Pulver, 2014). As a matter of fact, if a key

actor/actress gets severely injured or dies (as happened with Brandon Lee while filming The

Crow), the impacts to the whole production process can be awful, even making the project

unfeasible.

Therefore, occupational safety management in this industry must be a pillar on

overall risk management process in this industry. Campbell & Mann (1987) mentioned as an

example the musical Starlight Express: unsafe conditions were described as constant both

onstage and offstage, categorized in four potential causes of accidents: moving vehicles,

falls, electrical shocks and fires. Additional risks have also been identified as negatively

affecting the health and safety of cast, crew and any other individuals at the working

location, such as physical exhaustion, eye infections, dermatitis, contraction of sexually

transmitted diseases/HIV (in the adult film segment), vibration, conditions of structures,

lighting and other equipment, use of flammable and other potentially hazardous substances,

as well as natural disasters, among others (Film Victoria Australia, 2013).

Risk elements are present in any production, be it on a theatre stage or before the

cameras at a film set or outside location. Fire in a film and television company in Brazil
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caused a delay on a TV series launch and negative impact in terms of costs and company

image (Rio, 2017).

The occurrence of accidents or harm to health of actors and crewmembers is not

improbable, because a tradition exists of putting the production above health and safety, as

reflected in the sayings “getting the shot is what counts” and “the show must go on”. The

cast and crew are so involved in the illusion that they tend to forget reality (Campbell &

Mann, 1987).

Risk analysis in this industry is therefore considered a good practice, but this is not

always done, especially for low-budget productions (McCann, 1998; Taylor et al., 2007;

Sullivan & McKee, 2015). Accurate statistics on the number of accidents and illnesses

occurring during the production of films and television programs are difficult to obtain,

however, the Center for Safety in the Arts compiled a list of 40 fatalities from 1980 to 1989

during the production of films and television programs in US and produced by American

companies or their subsidiaries (McCann, 1991). Nowadays, serious accidents continue to

occur in this industry, and the disclosure of these facts usually occurs through social media

(magazines, newspapers, television programs, etc.).

In light of this situation, this study presents the following question: What are the

main failures in the process of the film and television industry and how can they be

identified, evaluated and mitigated? The relevance of this study is to offer researchers and

professionals of this business segment a perspective of the data about the film and television

industry, its risks, especially in the field of health and safety, and how to manage them.

In the present research, a case study of a film and television producer in Brazil that

combines different risk identification and management techniques is presented. Upon

mapping its macro process, the critical process was identified and the failure modes were

described and analyzed. Risks were, then, prioritized and the root and intermediate causes of
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the occurrence of failures were scrutinized, so that an action plan would be developed to

prevent/mitigate risks.

Entertainment and arts can be thought as a microcosm of all industries and their

occupational risks are in most cases similar to those found in more conventional industries

and the same types of precautions can be applied (McCann, 1998). Therefore, applied

method and findings in the present research can be useful in other sectors, to reduce their

risks of workplace accidents.

This paper is organized into five sections: Section 1 presents the introduction,

justification and research objectives; Section 2, the literature review; Section 3, the research

methodology; Section 4, results and discussion, and Section 5, the conclusions of this study,

followed by References.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Risk management is based on coordinated activities to guide and control an

organization regarding risks (De Oliveira et al., 2017). It involves a careful and recursive

process of documentation, evaluation and decision making during all phases of the life cycle

of the organization and can be applied in its various areas and levels, at any moment, as well

as in function of specific activities and projects (ISO/IEC 31000, 2009).

The ISO 31000 (2009) standard defines the risk management process by means of

seven main elements: communication and consultation; establishment of the context; risk

identification; risk analysis; risk evaluation; risk treatment; and monitoring and critical

review. This standard has been employed by many researchers as a base for developing risk

management of industrial processes (Paltrineri et al., 2013; Chemweno et al., 2015;

Teimourikia & Fugini, 2017). Nowadays, industrial processes are more complex, requiring

greater mental effort by workers. This high mental demand placed on workers tends to

increase the rate of errors. The result is a need to carefully consider the risks associated with
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the psychosocial and psychodynamic aspects of work (Oughton, 2013; Naderpour et al.,

2015).

Occupational Safety and Health Risk Management aims to maintain the risks under

acceptable levels, which, according to Naderpour, Nazir & Lu (2015), is a challenging task,

due to the dynamic nature of the risk factors. Therefore, risk analysis must be dynamic,

considering human and organizational factors, potential social, economic and environmental

impact on society, and the knowledge of specialists (Khan, Rathnayaka & Ahmed, 2015;

Villa et al., 2016; Iibahar et al., 2018), while keeping workers aware of risk assessment

results, i.e., level of risk of hazardous situations, and providing the basis for reducing risks

(Khanzode, Maiti & Ray, 2012; Shirali, Mohammadfam & Ebrahimipour, 2013; Jorgensen,

2015). Also, as highlighted by Lanoie (1992), the implementation of the occupational health

and safety risk management system can face obstacles such as the lack of resources and

trained personnel in occupational health and safety within companies and the lack of

applicability of existing regulations.

Health and Safety regulations have been growing steadily over the past 50-60 years,

making employers primarily responsible for the safety of their employees (Jorgensen, 2015)

and promoting the implementation of occupational health risk management systems toward

a safer and healthier work environment (Lanoie, 1992; Okunn et al., 2001; Niskanen,

Naumanen & Hirvonen, 2012; Isik & Atasoylu, 2017).

Although, even with the growth of health and safety regulations, current data show

that the occurrence of avoidable workplace accidents still persists (Aminbakhsh et al., 2013;

Isik & Atasoylu, 2017). These accidents result in injuries and / or illness or even death for

those involved. In addition, they generate negative impacts for companies, such as loss of

productivity, higher costs for treatment of employee health, higher costs due to tax payments

and so on (Lanoie, 1992; Jorgensen, 2015).

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Dangerous situations can be hard to perceive and exist for many years until

triggering an accident due to a process failure. In this context, it is essential to define

indicators and use systematic “tools” to map faults and thus avoid accidents (Jorgensen,

2015; Koivupaloa et al. 2015). Process mapping is only a way to visualize and control an

organization’s activities. Collectively, the various mapping approaches are meant to increase

the transparency or visibility of a process, enabling improvement of productive processes by

delineating the flow to reduce failures (Bolsson et al., 2013). In many business

organizations, the development of process maps is an intermediate step in making

improvements in a process of interest (Klotz et al., 2008).

Monforte et al. (2015) observed that process mapping allows better comprehension

of the welding process in the construction of offshore oil platform supply vessels,

identifying the critical points in relation to occupational health and safety failures. White &

Svetlana (2015) applied process mapping in three organizations and identified that the tool is

able to uncover and capture the knowledge within people and processes and can be widely

used to support organizational development and improvement. They applied the technique

by means of meetings with department heads and specialists in the areas.

According to Khanzode, Maiti & Ray (2012) and Tulashiea, Addai & Annan (2016),

occupational risk encompasses the probability of reverberations on life, health and/or

environment caused by hazards. Those risks are mainly related to processes, technologies,

materials and people (Jorgensen, 2015; Khan, Rathnayaka & Ahmed, 2015; Villa et al.,

2016) and their occurrence frequency, as well as expected severity are used to measure and

rank risks. The reliability and accuracy of this process depends on the quantity and quality

of the collected information (Tulashiea, Addai & Annan, 2016).

Researchers often rely on input from specialists to analyze many themes, such as

identification of risk evaluation tools, potential critical risk factors and analysis of the

complexity of process failures, among others (Pinto, 2013; Ayra et al., 2015).
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Specialists can contribute to the application of risk analysis tools through the use of

brainstorming on possible existing flaws, suggestion of improvement ideas for the

adaptation of what has been identified in the literature for the process, these applications

being tools of risk analysis or risk-mitigating actions and judgments of results, depending on

the experience and mastery of the subject (Cicek & Celik, 2013; Ayra et al., 2015; Tremblay

& Badri, 2018).

For the quantitative analysis to be reliable, it must be based on historical data.

Aminbakhsh, Saman & Murat (2013), Pinto (2014) and Ayra et al. (2015) identified that the

lack of data leads to a high degree of uncertainty in the application of quantitative methods.

According to Guo & Kang (2015) and Iibahar et al. (2018), in the absence of this

information, specialists should be consulted for the collection of data.

In order to assess the risk of accidents, Tremblay & Badri (2018) pointed problems

related to lack of availability of prevention specialists. These experts work long hours

through field observations, however they suggest repetitive interventions rather than

business-adapted interventions, which in the case of the film and television industry is a

problem, since mitigating actions should be specific to the business (McCann, 1998).

Many studies suggest multidisciplinary professionals to compose the team of experts

in assessing the risks of accidents that may occur due to process failures. Knowledgeable

experts are usually selected who will be evaluated, who will be familiar with the tool that

will be applied for evaluation and knowledgeable about the risks of accidents, including the

health and safety professional (Chemweno et al., 2015; Koivupaloa et al., 2015).

Among the researchers who suggest this committee formation are: Aminbakhsh,

Saman, & Murat (2013), who used specialists in civil construction projects and in risk

analysis; Cicek & Celik (2013) used two specialists from the sector under study and a

specialist in the risk analysis tool used; Koivupaloa et al. (2015), who used specialists in

occupational health and safety, however who worked in the company in question and
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therefore were knowledgeable about the processes; Oliva (2016), analyzing the enterprise

risk management in the supply chain of Brazilian companies and Tremblay & Badri (2018),

which formed a team of 10 experts, being selected a group knowledgeable in the process and

another group of experts in prevention.

The origin of the expression “process safety” and its international evolution are

associated with severe accidents in processes that occurred in the period between 1960 and

1990, as the result of rapid industrialization and technological advance. The activities of

process risk management were also commenced in the 1970s. The most popular risk analysis

methods and processes developed and implemented in this period are the Hazard and

Operability Study (HAZOP), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree

Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) (Khanzode, Maiti & Ray 2012; Chemweno

et al., 2015; Guo & Kang, 2015; Khan Rathnayaka & Ahmed, 2015; Iibahar et al., 2018).

FMEA is a preventive method that can effectively manage risks by eliminating

potential failures associated with each phase of a process (Kurt & Ozilgen, 2013). It is a

useful technique to gather the data necessary to make decisions for elimination or control of

risks, by identifying the failure modes and their effects, specifying the corrective actions to

eliminate or reduce the probability of failure and developing an efficient system to reduce

the occurrences of potential risk scenarios (Damanab et al., 2015; Tremblay & Badri, 2018).

In recent studies, FMEA has been used successfully to analyze risks in many processes, such

as in the shipbuilding industry, metallurgical industry and food industry, sometimes

integrated with other methods (Cicek & Celik, 2013; Kurt & Ozilgen, 2013; Nowakowska &

Mazur, 2015; Chemweno et al., 2015).

The main advantage of the FMEA method over other risk analysis methods is

quantitative evaluation. In FMEA, the potential risks of processes are detected and evaluated

in each step, by attributing values to the frequency or probability of failure occurrence (O);

severity of the failure (S), which measures the impact of the failure on the process or on the
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types of injuries involved, as suggested by Khanzode, Maiti, & Ray (2012); and possibility

of detection (D), depending on which mechanisms or means exist to detect this failure.

The scale of the three variables has a range from 1 to 10, and a risk priority number

(RPN) is calculated for each failure mode by multiplying the three values determined (O x S

x D) (Garland, 2011; Kurt & Ozilgen, 2013; Cicek & Celik, 2013; Iibahar et al., 2018,).

According to Aminbakhsh, Saman & Murat (2013), the proper prioritization of these

risks is crucial for their management. After identification, analysis and evaluation of the

risks, some of them must be treated while others are assumed and still others transferred.

Hallegatte & Rentschler (2015) mention that if the risk evaluation is prepared with

indication of the potential costs, benefits of mitigation and consequences, and the

organization is capable of dealing with these consequences, the option of their acceptance is

justified. On the other hand, a risk treatment action is necessary if these consequences

cannot be managed.

The result of this process enables identifying actions to mitigate the risk of injuries,

occupational diseases and impacts on the work environment and assists the organization in

the effective development of risk-based health and safety risk management to ensure

compliance with the requirements operational and prevention of occupational diseases and

injuries (Khanzode, Maiti & Ray, 2012).

FTA is a method that graphically describes the propagation of failures by means of

logical paths that correlate the root cause with atop event (Coles et al., 2010). Besides this, it

can be used for quantitative analysis using reliability theory, Boolean algebra and

probability theory to obtain the probability of occurrence of the top event (Khan et al.,

2015).

Those risk assessment tools can complement each other. For example, FTA can

underline the fault propagation from the root cause up to the top event (effect) (Coles et al.,

2010; Jorgensen, 2015; Khan et al., 2015), helping in the FMEA development, i.e., listing
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potential problems, as well as their qualitative and quantitative analysis (Kurt & Ozilgen,

2013). Cicek & Celik (2013) used an expert committee for the application of the FMEA and

started by brainstorming potential flaws in the risk of explosion in a marine industry and

found that the appropriate risk tool offers flexibility in simple and complex situations.

Recent studies have combined some other techniques with application of FTA, such as

FMEA and HAZOP. Generally, the technique used along with FTA identifies the failure and

FTA indicates the causes of the failure and their probabilities of occurrence, with the

combined information serving as the base for making decisions (Han & Zhang, 2013;

Chemweno et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2015).

Recent years have been marked by profound changes in the nature of work. The

previous risk analysis models were designed for a type of industrial arrangement where

workers were treated a human cogs in the production system. In well-conceived work

environments, planning was focused on adequate ergonomics, with less attention paid to the

cognitive aspects of the process. Concern was often more focused on preservation of the

means of production than protection of workers.

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS

The lack of studies related to risk identification and/or procedures for risk

management in the Film and Television Industry drove us toward the quest for identifying

the main failures in the process of such industry and how risks can be identified, evaluated

and mitigated.

In order to accomplish with this task, a case study of a film and television producer

in Brazil was carried out in eight steps, as illustrated in Figure 1. The steps are described in

the next subsections.

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Identification of the
Identifiying the steps Identifying the critical
activities of the
of the macro-process process
critical process
Process Knowledge of Process
mapping specialists mapping

Understanding the
intermediate causes Identifying the failure
Ranking the causes of
and roots of high-risk modes of the critical
the high-risk failure
causes process and the risk
modes
level of the causes
FTA Calculate
RPN FMEA

Developing and
applying the action Analyzing the results
plan to mitigate high- of the failure mapping
risk causes process
Re-application
FMEA (actions of the FMEA
recommended)

Legend: Step Method

Figure 1: Method to identify and study the critical process in the film and television industry
Source: Authors.

3.1. Identifying the steps of the macro-process

The studies in health and safety risk analysis are usually developed in a sector

(Koivupaloa et al., 2015), in which activity, task or accidents that occur systematically

(Cicek & Celik, 2013; Ayra et al., 2015). Since no critical focus was identified in the

literature regarding to the film and television industry and the company does not have an

Occupational Health and Safety indicator, and thus, the lack of historical data was identified,

we identified the need to pinpoint the critical process in the occurrence of accidents in the

target company.

As previously discussed, in the absence of historical data, experts can contribute a lot

due to the knowledge about the process of the target company, and to begin the evaluation of
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the critical process, the first step was the mapping of the macro-process through the

knowledge of the specialists.

In order to identify the main sequential steps that precede the macro-process of

launching a new product (series, soap opera or movie), we held a meeting with a committee

of specialists in the areas of occupational health and safety, special effects, and fire

prevention and fighting, and applied the process mapping tool. The committee was

composed of one safety engineer (with 17 years of experience in the entertainment areas),

two work safety technicians (respectively with six and three years of experience in the

entertainment area), one fire brigade supervisor (with 11 years of experience in the

entertainment area), and one special effects producer (with 35 years of experience in the

entertainment area).

3.2. Identifying the critical process

The same committee of experts also took part in this step, involving establishment of

the “critical process analysis by specialists” (CPAS) to identify the most critical process in

the macro-process mapped. For this purpose, we prepared a questionnaire for ranking the

probability of the occurrence of accidents in each process, on a Likert scale from 1 to 5,

where 1 corresponds to very low probability and 5 to very high likelihood, as shown down

below.

1 2 3 4 5
Very Low Low Medium High Very High

The Likert scale is a research tool that converts qualitative into quantitative values, to

enable better statistical analysis of data. It is widely used by researchers in the field of

process analysis (e.g., Shirali et al., 2013; Gao el al., 2015; Iqbal & Babar, 2016).

For the purpose of identifying the essential steps of a business and focusing on the

critical aspects that can increase the rate of failures, CPAS will save time and resources by

avoiding unnecessary digressions to examine processes that are not critical, since only the
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failures of critical processes that can compromise the functioning of the system will be

completely mapped.

The committee evaluated each process of the macro-process mapped in the previous

step, allowing the identification of the most critical process (results are detailed in section

4.2), which was the base for the analysis in the next step.

3.3. Identifying the activities of the critical process

After defining the most critical process, we held a second meeting with the

specialists to identify the logical sequence of the activities of the critical process. This

culminated in the map of the filming process, which was subsequently validated by us

through direct observation of the activities carried out in the mapped process. Through these

actions, we obtained information to help comprehend all the activities making up the

mapped process, in line with the purpose and objective of applying that tool (Garland,

2011).

3.4. Identifying the failure modes of the critical process and the risk level of the causes

After identifying the steps of the critical process (previous step), we carried out a

FMEA of the process to identify the existing failures and to calculate the risk priority degree

for each cause identified in these failures, for the purpose of distinguishing the causes with

high priority.

3.5. Ranking the causes of the high-risk failure modes

According to McElroy et al. (2015), the cause of a failure mode that presents

RPN≥300 is classified as a high-risk cause, so its treatment should be prioritized. Besides

these authors, the United States Army and the Automotive Industry Action Group also work

with this parameter (RPN≥300). Based on these citations, we adopted such limit to classify

the causes with high risk of the failure modes identified. Therefore, at this step of the study

we prioritized all the causes with RPN≥300.

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3.6. Understanding the intermediate causes and roots of high-risk causes

We applied FTA to the high-risk causes identified in the previous step, with the

objective of understanding top events, by identifying the intermediate causes and the root

causes, in turn to develop an action plan to mitigate these failures (Chemweno et al., 2015).

3.7. Developing and applying the action plan to mitigate high-risk causes

As the stages of identifying risks, analyzing risks and evaluating risks were concluded, a

risk management plan was developed, as part of the risk treatment step described in the ISO

31000 (2009). As a matter of fact, the FMEA itself establishes a step for developing

recommendations referring to each failure mode.

The development of this action plan occurred with the experts’ involvement, taking into

account the following issues raised during the literature review:

i) For the development of mitigating actions, local laws should be considered and when

local actions are not identified the search should be extended to international legislation (Isik

& Atasoylu, 2017);

ii) Mitigating actions cannot be generalist but specific to the target company (Lanoie,

1992; McCann, 1998; Okun et al., 2001; Niskanen, 2012; Oughton, 2013; Tremblay &

Badri, 2018);

iii) The risks considered as medium and low that can generate accidents with simple

consequences cannot be ignored (Khanzode, Maiti & Ray, 2012; Jorgensen, 2015);

iv) Risk and mitigation actions should be disseminated to all of the target company from

the senior management to the operational employees (Khanzode, Maiti & Ray, 2012; Shirali,

Mohammadfam & Ebrahimipour, 2013; Jorgensen, 2015).

Through these recommendations, we prepared an action plan, based on the

intermediate causes and base causes of the top event, for the causes classified as having high

risk (RPN≥300). This plan was presented to the people in charge of the areas for the purpose

of mitigating the failures and minimizing the risks.

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The action plan was applied in a period of two years (November 2013 to December

2015), in which we participated by direct observation of this entire step.

For the causes of the failure modes with RPN below 300 points, we did not

formulate the development of the top events in FTAs. Instead, we used the actions

recommended from the FMEA form to minimize these causes instead of action plans, since

this step was developed only for the failure modes with RPNs greater than or equal to 300.

3.8. Analyzing the results of the failure mapping process

As established in the ISO 31000 (2009), the last element of the risk management

process encompasses monitoring risks and critical review. To analyze the results of the

failure mapping process, at the end of the two years we re-applied the FMEA and

recalculated the RPNs of all the causes of the failure modes. To check the efficacy of

applying the methodology developed, we evaluated the actions plans of the high-risk causes

and compared the results of their RPNs.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The application of the tools resulted in a complete visualization of the process, its

failures and high-risk causes. These results are presented and analyzed in the same sequence

as the steps of the research method, as follows:

4.1. Identifying the steps of the macro-process

Application of the process mapping produced the logical sequence of the activities

of the company, as depicted in Figure 2:

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Start Development of a Pre-production Preparation of the

new product planning film set

No
Live
Post-production broadcast? Filming

Yes

End
Distribution Exhibition

Figure 2: Macro-process of the company for launch of a new product.

Source: Authors.

4.2. Critical process analysis by specialists

Chart 1 presents the level of criticality of the steps of the macro-process of the film

and television industry, evaluated by the committee of specialists, as described in section

3.2.

Chart 1: Analysis of the specialists in the step for defining the probability of accidents
work work
work special fire
safety safety
Steps of the macro-process safety effects brigade Average
technician technician
engineer producer supervisor
1 2
Development of the new
1 1 2 1 1 1.2
product
Pre-production planning 2 3 2 1 1 1.8
Preparation of the film set 3 2 3 3 3 2.8
Filming 5 5 4 5 4 4.6
Post-production 1 1 1 1 2 1.2
Distribution 1 2 1 1 1 1.2
Exhibition 1 1 1 1 1 1
Source: Authors

The specialists indicated that in the steps of new product development and pre-

production planning, the probability of failures is low, because in these steps the activities

are aimed at creation and planning, such as prospective budgeting, description of the

synopsis of the product, choice of the filming locations and types of sceneries, contact with
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government officials to obtain filming permits, choice of the cast and crew, and

storyboarding.

With respect to the preparation of the film set, the specialists considered the

occurrence of accidents to have medium probability of occurrence. According to the

committee, this phase involves preparation for the filming step, by visits to the filming

locations/stages to map and mitigate risks and to define the infrastructure for filming and the

crew, composed of qualified and trained professionals, and start of assembly of the scenery,

as planned in the pre-production step.

The post-production, distribution and exhibition steps also have low risk probability

according to the experts. When the show is exhibited live, these steps occur at the moment

of filming. In turn, the activities of the post-production step involve adjustment of the image

and soundtrack, graphic computation and addition of visual effects. Distribution can be by

optical fiber cable, microwave transmission, internet or on recorded tape or film stock, while

exhibition is to end consumers, with no risk to the team involved.

The filming step (see Chart 1) is considered to have the highest likelihood of

accidents. This step can involve high-risk activities depending on the scene, position of the

crew, filming environment and equipment used, among other elements. Besides this,

physical effort is necessary by the crew and actors, varying depending on the scene. The cast

and crew typically have a high level of anxiety and stress, which can be important factors

causing accidents. During the filming, other factors can heighten the risks, such as special

effects like explosions, car crashes, use of venomous or exotic animals and violent physical

acts of the actors. For this reason, the next section covers the flowchart of all the steps of

this process.

4.3. Preparing the flowchart for mapping the filming process

Figure 3 illustrates the filming process, prepared according to the comments of the

specialists interviewed for this purpose.

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Flowchart of the Filming Process

Direction/ Sound and image Cast, costumes
Special effects Scenery design
Production technology and stand-ins

Marking the Positioning of Positioning on

scene Positioning of support the set
materials and equipment and according to
equipment resources the scene
(camera, marking
lights,
microphones,
generator,
etc.) Rehearsal

Start of filming
Start and finish of the Filming

Sequence of
the filming
script

Disassembly of
End of filming
the set

Figure 3: Flowchart of the filming process

Source: Authors

The filming process flowchart revealed some close relationships between what was

mapped and descriptions in the literature on identification of risks, such as Campbell &

Mann (1987), who mentioned observation of risks during rehearsals, Sullivan & McKee

(2015), who mentioned risks during filming, and Caldwell (2008), who described risks in

the activities of repositioning of materials until the end of filming.

This flowchart was fundamental to understand all the steps and functions of the

filming process. The critical process map presented the involvement of five sectors with

nine main activities, in which the fault mapping tool was applied and the risks analyzed, as

described in the next section.

4.4. Applying the FMEA

The FMEA was developed and allowed identifying the gaps in the filming process

that can negatively affect the safety of the people involved. All told, 15 failure modes were
 ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

identified, with 32 potential occurrence elements (causes). Due to space and word-counting

limitations, not all FMEA details will be presented in this research.

In regards to Positioning of special effects material, the following failure modes

were identified: Inadequate, damaged or poorly prepared material; Change of positioning of

the material considered in the pre-production planning due to failure resulting from first

take; and Failure of equipment utilized, with 11 different causes.

On Director marks out the scene for camera framing, the failure mode Director

decides to change what was planned when visiting the location in the pre-production step

(two causes) was identified.

Positioning of the camera operator had Inappropriate positioning (two causes) as

failure mode, while Positioning of the actors, extras/stand-ins had Alteration of what was

decided in the tests carried out previously for special effects; and Inappropriate positioning

(three causes) as failure modes.

Positioning of the actors, extras/stand-ins presented two failure modes: Alteration

of what was decided in the tests carried out previously for special effects; and Inappropriate

positioning, and three causes.

Disassembly of scenery had one single failure mode: Lack of adequate equipment

for disassembly, and one cause. Arrangement of lighting had also one failure mode,

Inadequate transport of loads, and three causes.

Alteration of the crew linked directly to the scene presented three failures modes:

Special effects - operational failure of the special effects technician; Engineering -

replacement of a device or overheated equipment; Haste of the crew to end the activity, and

five causes.

Actions of actors involved the following failure modes: Improvisations in scenes

involving risk; Lack of knowledge of risks of the set; and Use of stand-ins who are

inappropriate for the dynamics of the set, with five causes.

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With failure modes found, their possible effects and causes, the existing controls

identified and the respective RPNs, risk mitigation recommendations were developed. Many

opportunities for improvement of the critical process were observed, such as:

- Better ergonomics of the equipment used on the sets, mainly for camera, audio

and lighting operators;

-Formulation of training programs for each type of activity;

- Risk analysis of the sets according to the dynamics;

-Development of qualified suppliers.

- Team rotation on long filming sets, in order to minimize fatigue and stress effects.

-Preventive and corrective maintenance plan implementation, in conjunction with

an equipment pre-use checklist.

-Identification of adequate costume for each situation (eg: no wigs and synthetic

fabrics in fire scenes).

4.5. Prioritizing high-risk causes (RPN≥300)

12 causes were found with RPN greater than 300. After a meeting with the

specialists, these causes were analyzed and stratified, producing four groups of basic and

principal causes, which after being addressed will solve the 12 causes. Chart 2 describes and

ranks the four causes:

Chart 2: Grouping of the causes found in the com RPN>300

Ranking of Failures
Causes of the activities found in the FMEA Total causes
RPN
found
Lack of quality control of the material used for filming special effects 1 480
Inexperience of the person in charge of special effects 2 540
Lack of holistic vision of risk by the director/producer 4 480
Lack of technical guidance and monitoring during filming 5 320
Source: Authors

4.6. Applying the FTA and understanding the intermediate and root causes with high

risk

The FTA was applied to each high-risk cause (see Chart 2) and allowed the

committee of specialists to understand the succession of causes that preceded the top event.
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As an example, Figure 4 depicts the development of the FTA for the cause “Lack of

quality control of the material used for filming special effects”.

Lack of quality control of the material

used for filming special effects

Lack of standardization Lack of specific

Lack of a special effects knowledge about special
market of special effects
effects materials

Lack of regular
suppliers, because they
vary according to the
Lack of a specific material necessary for
company to the special effect
prepare special
effects materials
Diversity of special
effects required

No specific
training exists
It’s part of the
for special
Lack of an business. The product
effects
operational has particular features
technicians
procedure for depending on the
contracting special effect
suppliers stipulated by the
director

Figure 4: FTA for the top event “lack of quality control of the material used for filming special effects”
Source: Authors

The results of the basic and root causes of each tree were analyzed and discussed by

the specialists, as described next.

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4.6.1. Trees 1 and 2 (Lack of quality control of the material used for filming

special effects & Inexperience of the person in charge of special effects):

It can be seen in Tree1 that the cause is due to the diversity of special effects requested

by the directors/producers. To prepare special effects involving fire, for example, a variety

of equipment and materials (inputs) is necessary. Due to this variation, there are no specific

suppliers for each sector. Because of this difficulty of obtaining specific inputs, equipment

and materials already available in the market must be adapted by those responsible for

producing the effect, and this adaptation is carried out based on the technical knowledge of

the person in charge. The film and television production company in question does not have

a standard operational procedure to acquire these inputs or to fabricate them in-house.

Trees 1 and 2 identify the root cause of the lack of specific training for special effects

technicians. The companies in this segment minimize the occurrences of this failure by

setting minimum training requirements for employees through courses existing in the

market, among them:

i. Technical courses in the areas of mechanics, electricity, electronic

technology, automation or electromechanics;

ii. Courses about Brazilian occupational health and safety legislation and

regulations;

iii. For pyrotechnical special effects, a course in blasting.

Moreover, these professionals intermittently undergo specific training at the company

in question, whereby it takes up to five years to become a fully qualified professional. In

these training sessions, the employees learn to use the material correctly, identify the type of

material for each effect and the correct use, and create mechanisms for the effects required

by the direction/production team.

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4.6.2. Tree 3 (Lack of holistic vision of risk by the director/producer):

In analyzing the intermediate and root causes of this tree, it can be highlighted that

the focus of the direction and production people is the creation of realism in the final

product, but they are not aware of the role of the occupational health and safety professional.

They think that health and safety actions can make filming certain types of scenes

impossible.

Another cause is that college degree programs in entertainment do not cover the

theme of evaluation of the risk of job-related accidents or diseases, a factor that contributes

to the lack of a holistic vision of risks by these people.

4.6.3. Tree 4 (Lack of technical guidance and monitoring during filming):

The main root cause here is the lack of professionals in the technical corps of the

company. Normally companies in this segment do not have an area specialized in

occupational health and safety risks. This is due to the applicable regulation, NR 4 (2016)

from the Ministry of Labour, which establishes rules for the creation of a “specialized

service in occupational health and safety engineering” (SESMT) by companies, with the

objective of promoting health and protecting the integrity of workers while on the job. It is a

general rule, applicable to all economic activity categories, and the composition of the

SESMT is determined basically by four steps:

1st step: Identify the main economic activity of the establishment.

2nd step: Identify the level of risk of that activity, according to Table I of NR-4.

3rd step: Identify the number of employees of the establishment.

4th step: Classify the information in Table II of NR-4.

Chart 3 shows the makeup of the SESMT that must be established by film and

television producers, according to the number of fixed employees. This is only required of

companies with 501 or more employees, at which threshold only one full-time employee

specialized in work health and safety must be hired. The number of SESMT people
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increases for larger companies. However, it is not common in Brazil for film and television

producers to have 501 or more fixed employees. Instead, they outsource workers when

demand increases due to new products.

Chart 3: Composition of the SESMT for film and television producers in Brazil
50 101 251 501 1001 2001 3501 More than 5000, for each
Risk
SESMT to to to to to to to group of 4000 or fraction
level
100 250 500 1000 2000 3500 5000 greater than 2000**
Work safety 1 1 2 5 1
technician
Work safety engineer 1* 1 1 1*
2
Labour nursing aide 1 1 1 1
Labour nurse 1
Labour physician 1 1 1 1
(*) Part-time (minimum of 3 hours per day)
(**) The total size is determined considering the size of the range from 3501 to 5000 plus the size of the
group(s) of 4000 or fraction thereof greater than 2000.
Source: Based on Table II of NR-4 (2016) from the Ministry of Labour

The parameters of Brazilian legislation contrast sharply with those adopted in the

Australian state of Victoria (Australia, 2013). While in Brazil the need for a safety specialist

depends on the number of employees and general risk level of the company’s activity, in

Victoria a safety supervisor must be present at the filming location anytime the risk of the

particular scene(s) is considered to be high.

The specialists interviewed during this study expressed the belief that resolution of

the failure “lack of holistic vision of risk by the directors and producers” (Tree 3) would

enable mitigating or even eliminating the failure “lack of technical guidance and monitoring

during filming”.

4.7. Application of the action plan

The recommendations of the action plan were applied by those in charge of the areas

and we accompanied the results of this application for two years. These recommendations

helped lead to the creation of procedures, alteration of standards and in some cases alteration

of suppliers. To illustrate the development of this phase, here we discuss the cause “lack of

quality control of the material used for filming special effects”, related to the failure mode

“inadequate, damaged or poorly prepared material”, referring to the activity “positioning of

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special effects material”, where the recommendation to reduce this failure is “require the

suppliers to provide quality certification and test all material”.

Minimization of the failure involved dividing the types of special effects and

identifying the corresponding equipment, materials and activities used, as shown in Chart 4.

Chart 4: Types of special effects and inputs used

Effect Equipment, Materials and Activities Utilized
Fires Torches, candles, stoves, fireplaces, campfires, spark generators, gas canisters, flares
Explosions Gas accumulator, air accumulator, mortars and physical bombs
Burning objects Vehicles, motorcycles, scenery, clothing, hair, body.
Smoke Fog machine, bee smoker, dry ice machine, smoke pump.
Body, scenery, vehicles, blank cartridges, paintball guns, spark generator, dust
Projection of material
generator, glass objects.
Ramps, tracks, pneumatic cannons, remote controls, precipices, rollover simulator,
Accidents(rollovers)
suspension parts.
Accidents(collisions) Large/medium/small vehicles, motorcycles, fixed/stopped objects.
Accidents (pedestrians
Large/medium/small vehicles, motorcycles, people.
hit by vehicles)
Dangerous driving Car chases, skidding (drifting), 180 skid, falling boulders.
Levitation of people, suspension of objects, anchorage/lifelines for people,
Work at Heights rappelling, rescue of people, rescue of objects, falls of people, positioning of cred to
capture images at heights.
Simulation of natural
Rain makers, snow makers, lightening producers, avalanche simulators, fans.
phenomena
Others Spider webs, foam, bubbles, confetti, dust, leaves/detritus, confetti Gerb, etc.
Source: Authors.

For each type of effect, eight actions were applied (Identify all the equipment,

products and materials (inputs) used for each effect; Identify the pertinent regulations for

each product regarding necessary certification; Identify minimum health and safety

requirements for contracting suppliers; Create a standardized procedure for contracting

suppliers of these materials, with inclusion of the requirements of regulations and minimum

demands of the company; Approve the procedure with the department in charge of

contracting suppliers; Procure three suppliers in the market that satisfy the scope defined in

the procedure; Inspect all materials upon receipt to attest that they satisfy the requirements;

and Train the team involved in the operational procedure adopted), where the areas in charge

defined the actions that would be implemented, the people responsible for these actions and

the time frames for execution.

Actually, actions involving proper information provided by Purchase and Sourcing

groups to suppliers is a key element on minimizing risks, as reported by Hallikas et al.

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(2004), Bandaly, Satir & Shanker (2016), Giannakis & Papadopoulos (2016), Hallikas &

Lintukangas (2016), Wiengarten et al. (2016), and Fan et al. (2017). The application of these

actions produced a reduction of the RPN of this cause from 480 to 40. This was due to

reduction of the variables of occurrence (O) and detection (D) in the calculation of the RPN.

With the inclusion of the requirements of regulations on occupational health and safety in

the standard procedure for purchasing special effects materials, the occurrence of the cause

“lack of quality control of the material used for filming special effects” was reduced from 6

to 2 points, and with disclosure of this procedure, the identification of this cause on the sets

was facilitated, reducing the detection variable from 8 to 2 points.

A special effects material receiving procedure was elaborated with all the normative

requirements and product quality guarantee and standardization requirements (eg: bombs

would be received in the exact size and quantity of gunpowder required to explosion effects,

eliminated the manipulation of this chemical during the recording and reduced the risk of

accident and the chance of errors in the preparation of the material). Purchasing sector

forwarded the procedure to all suppliers.

The implementation of this action directly influenced the Occurrence and Detection

indices for RPN recalculation, however, the Severity variable was retained, since the

occurrence of special effects accidents during the recording is considered with maximum

severity, due to the fact that the impacts can be very negative, among them: the occurrence

of injuries in actors, extras or onlookers; occurrence of injury to the main actor which

damages the entire recording process; disclosure in the media about the accident that directly

impacts the company's image; cancellation of the recording, which impacts on the cost of the

final product and the deadline for the product launch.

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4.8. Analysis of the results of the failure mapping process in the film and television

industry

For the purpose of understanding the influence of applying all the recommendations

in the failure mapping of this process, which occurred between 2013 and 2015, we re-

applied the FMEA and recalculated the RPNs of all the causes of the failure modes.

The actions were:

i) Implementation of Procedure to acquire special effect materials;

ii) Development of an 80-hour training one-year program for special effect

professionals of. Among the topics addressed, the most important were equipment risk

analysis and special effect project risk analysis. The implementation of this action also

directly reduced the Detection and Occurrence variables and reduced the RPN from 540 to

40.

iii) Development of a risk analysis procedure for recording sets, including holistic

risk analysis for all areas and recording tasks. Each elaborated risk analysis was presented to

the Directors and Producers, along with risk signalling and their mitigating actions. The

implementation of this action also directly reduced the variables of Detection and

Occurrence of accidents in the critical process.

Such implementation had a direct impact on the cause of management and

production's lack of knowledge of risk, since these professionals participated in the risk

analysis process and began to understand that creation can go on, while equipment and

material substitution, and changes in the dynamics of the scene can mitigate the risks. In

addition they understood the negative impact to the company in case of occurrences of

accidents in the set.

A significant reduction was achieved in the RPNs for the 12 high-risk causes, with

the highest value, observed in 2013, of 540 falling to 40 in 2015. Graph 1 depicts the
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behaviour of the RPNs of the 12 high-risk causes in the two FMEAs applied (2013 and

2015).

RPN 2015
RPN 2013

Lack of technical guidance and monitoring during filming 10

320

Lack of technical guidance and monitoring during filming 10

320

Inexperience of the person in charge of special effects 20

540

Lack of holistic vision of risk by the director 10

480
Causes Identified

Lack of technical guidance and monitoring during filming 10

320
Lack of a holistic vision of risk by the people involved (cast, 10
crew, stand-ins, etc.). 480

Lack of technical guidance and monitoring during filming 10

320

Lack of holistic vision of risk by the producers 10

480

Lack of technical guidance and monitoring during filming 20

320

Lack of holistic vision of risk by the directors/producers 20

480

Inexperience of the person in charge of special effects 40

540
Lack of quality control of the material used for filming special 40
effects 480

0 100 200 300 400 500 600

RPN Value

Graph 1 – Representation of the RPNs of the 12 causes identified in the first FMEA (2013) and second FMEA
(2015).
Source: Authors.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The literature review revealed the shortage of studies about risk management in the

film and television industry. Therefore, this study contributes by describing a systematic

procedure using a variety of tools that, if properly combined, has good potential to reduce

the risks of work-related accidents in this business segment in a way not yet explored by

researchers and entrepreneurs.

With respect to the steps and objectives proposed, the results indicate that:

i – The process mapping of the film and television industry provided a vision of all

the steps of the macro process;

ii – The analysis of the specialists culminated in identification of the critical process

filming);
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iii – The application of the FMEA to the activities of the critical process enabled

mapping 15 failure modes with a total of 32 causes that can generate accidents and harm to

the health and safety of those involved;

iv – The RPNs calculated by applying the FMEA and knowledge of the specialists

allowed identifying 12 causes classified as having high risk and their prioritization, and

revealed their intermediate and root causes;

v – The result of applying the FTA enabled understanding the high-risk causes of

failures and enabled preparing an effective action plan to mitigate the failures;

vi – The application of the action plan for two years enabled analyzing the results of

the integrated failure mapping procedure; and

vii –Re-application of the FMEA in 2015 demonstrated that the development and

application of the integrated failure mapping procedure presented in this study attained its

objective, as revealed by the significant reduction of the RPNs between 2013 and 2015.

Such achievements allowed attaining the general objective and suggest that the

method used to evaluate risks and map failures is applicable to the processes of the film and

television industry and can help companies in this segment to mitigate or eliminated these

failures.

We identified the critical process in the film and television industry, its failure modes

and potential elements that caused these failures: risks were evaluated based on the opinions

of the experts.

In regards to the process critical risks, they resemble those of other industries,

however with different intensities. To illustrate, the activities of the Civil Construction

industry and the activities of construction of scenarios are somehow similar, however, the

impacts are differentiated, for example in the occurrence of a serious or fatal accident with

the main actor, the product in question can be impacted directly since the actor cannot be
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replaced, while in other industries, operators are replaced in the process more easily. In

addition, the negative impact on the media is high because the disclosure is immediate.

As a result of the analysis of the proposed method, the critical risks were identified

along with their root causes and they were treated effectively. After assessing the probability

of Occurrence, Detection and Severity of these causes, it was concluded that these risks need

to be managed. RPN was used as an indicator to verify the effectiveness in the

implementation of the mitigating actions and was considered a good parameter.

Then, actions were proposed to mitigate the failures, the action plan was applied and

the effectiveness of the implementation of the proposed actions was verified. The 12 high-

impact causes were minimized significantly after application of the action plan.

That action plan was only possible thanks to the initial failure mapping process,

which allowed complete visualization of the processes, identification of the critical process

(filming), mapping of the failures that can generate accidents and harm to the health and

safety of the cast and crew, the secondary and primary causes of these failure modes, and the

potential of an action plan based on all the knowledge obtained during the case study

conducted to reduce the risk priority number (RPN).

The mitigating actions were quite similar to the ones applied to other industries, i.e.,

procedure development and updating, as suggested by Ayra et al. (2015) and Koivupaloa et

al. (2015); Capability building training; preparation of risk analysis and dissemination for

the entire workforce including senior management (Jorgensen, 2015); ergonomic evaluation

and adaptation of equipment; assessment of the costume (which can be comparable to adapt

uniforms to the risks). By the other side, mitigating actions for recording risks were unique,

since the exposure time is very short and does not justify an investment in engineering

projects, as defended by McCann (1998).

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We also discussed the issues faced in implementing and communicating the proposed

measures, thus illustrating the process of risk analysis and the negative impact to the

company in case of occurrences of accidents in the set.

With respect to recommendations for future avenues of research, we can mention

many possibilities, such as:

 Study applying the FMEA by probabilistic analysis with identification of the

Independence of the variables;

 Analysis of the feasibility of including health and safety culture in the

training of the professionals responsible for creating entertainment content

(direction and production staff);

 Evolution of the approach, referring to Brazilian legislation and regulations,

to orient companies in this segment regarding the risks of work-related

accidents;

 Apply the method developed in this case in other companies/industries were

risk management potential is not fully explored.

In closing, we stress that the techniques and approaches presented in this study,

involving integrated and systematized mapping of failures in the productive processes of the

film and television industry, has huge potential to identify, analyze and evaluate failures,

thus minimizing the risks of accidents that can impair the health and safety of workers of the

company examined in this case study.

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FAILURE MAPPING FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT IN THE FILM

AND TELEVISION INDUSTRY

HIGHLIGHTS

 A procedure is proposed to analyze process failures in the film and television industry.

 The critical process of occupational health and safety is identified and analyzed.

 Visualization of the process enables identifying critical points.

 Visualization of the process enable formulating effective action plans to mitigate faults.

 Techniques presented in this study have huge potential to identify, analyze and evaluate failures.