49.tan vs. Jam Transit

3/12/22, 10:06 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 605
G.R. No. 183198. November 25, 2009.*

LUZ PALANCA TAN, petitioner, vs. JAM TRANSIT, INC.,
respondent.
Civil Law; Negligence; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Res Ipsa Loquitur is

a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury
taken with the surrounding circumstances may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence or make out a
plaintiff’s prima facie case and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation.—Res ipsa loquitur is a
Latin phrase that literally means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present
a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
Where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to
be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and
the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if
those who had management or control used proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence—in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable
and logical explanation by defendant—that the accident arose
from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. This rule is
grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human experience, and
it is on the basis of such experience or common knowledge that
negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the
accident itself. Hence, the rule is applied in conjunction with the
doctrine of common knowledge.
Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of
substantive law and does not constitute an independent or
separate ground for liability; Mere invocation and application of
the doctrine do not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence; Requisites Before the Doctrine may be Allowed.—Res
ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not
constitute an independent or separate ground for liability.
Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or
a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for,
and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
660
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017f7be1ebd826fbe253000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/16
specific proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation and

application of the doctrine do not dispense with the requirement
of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such
proof, permitting plaintiff to present, along with the proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and
thereby placing on defendant the burden of going forward with
the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the
following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The accident
is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within
the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The
possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.
Same; Same; Quasi-Delicts; To avoid liability for a quasi-delict
committed by its employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee.—Whenever an employee’s negligence
causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the section (culpa in eligiendo) or
supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability
for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eudivigio G. Roxas for petitioner.
Aris J. Talens for respondent.
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NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision2
dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 89046 and the reinstatement of the Decision3 dated
December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 27, Santa Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3838.
The antecedents are as follows—
In her Complaint, petitioner Luz Palanca Tan (Tan)
alleged that she was the owner of a passenger-type jitney
with plate number DKF-168. On March 14, 1997, at around
5:00 a.m., the said jitney figured in an accident at an
intersection along Maharlika Highway, Barangay Bangyas,
Calauan, Laguna, as it collided with a JAM Transit
passenger bus bound for Manila, bearing plate number
DVG-557 and body number 8030. The bus was driven by

Eddie Dimayuga (Dimayuga).
At the time of the collision, Tan’s jitney was loaded with
quail eggs and duck eggs (balot and salted eggs). It was
driven by Alexander M. Ramirez (Ramirez). Tan alleged
that Dimayuga was reckless, negligent, imprudent, and not
observing traffic rules and regulations, causing the bus to
collide with the jitney which was then, with care and
proper light direction signals, about to negotiate a left turn
towards the feeder or barangay road of Barangay Bangyas,
Calauan, Laguna going to the Poblacion. The jitney turned
turtle along the shoulder of the road and the cargo of eggs
was destroyed. Ramirez and his helper were injured and
hospitalized, incurring expenses for medical treatment at
the Pagamutang Pangmasa in Bay, Laguna. Tan prayed
for damages in the
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 8-14.

2 Penned by Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, with Associate
Justices Regalado E. Maambong and Agustin S. Dizon, concurring.
3 Rollo, pp. 17-24.
662
amount of P400,000.00 for the damaged jitney, P142,210.00

for the destroyed shipment, P20,000.00 for moral damages,
attorney’s fees of P20,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court
appearance of counsel, and other reliefs warranted under
the premises.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent JAM
Transit, Inc. (JAM) admitted ownership of the subject
passenger bus and that Dimayuga was under its employ.
However, it denied the allegations in the Complaint, and
claimed that the accident occurred due to the gross
negligence of Ramirez. As counterclaim, JAM sought
payment of P100,000.00 for the damages sustained by the
bus, P100,000.00 for loss of income, and P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees plus P3,000.00 per court appearance of
counsel.
After pretrial, trial on the merits ensued.
Tan proffered testimonial evidence, summarized by the
RTC, and quoted by the CA, as follows:
“LUZ PALANCA TAN, 47 years old, married, a resident of Sta.

Cruz, Laguna and a businesswoman, testified to the facts stated in the
complaint that: She is engaged in the business of nets and ropes, and egg
dealership based [in] Santa Cruz, Laguna. She supplies her products to
her customers [in] San Pablo and Lucena. On March 14, 1997, while at
home, she was informed by her husband that one of their jeepneys, which
was loaded with eggs, was bumped by a JAM Transit bus when the latter
overtook the jeepney. The vehicle was driven by one Alexander Ramirez,
who has one “Monching” as a companion. As a result of the accident, she
incurred damages in the amount of P650,000.00 based on the following
computation: P400,000.00 as actual damage sustained by the jeepney,
from an estimate (Exhibit “D”) furnished by Plantilla Motors;
P142,000.00 for the lost value of the egg shipment, based on a
certification issued by the Calauan Police Station; and P15,000.00, for
the hospitalization and treatment of the driver and his companion. The
jeepney is duly registered as evidenced by its registration receipt (Exhibit
“G”). On cross examination, she testified that Ramirez, the jeepney driver
when the accident occurred, was under her employ since 1993 and is still
working for her.
663
On redirect, the plaintiff testified that prior to March 13, 1997, the
day the accident happened, Ramirez has not met any vehicular accident
and that it was only in the aforestated date when he figured in one. On
re-cross, she testified that she has no knowledge of Ramirez’ prior
experience as a driver. She did not ask Ramirez for his NBI or police
clearance prior to her hiring the said driver. On additional redirect, the
plaintiff testified that she is satisfied with the performance of Ramirez as
a driver as he is kind.
ALEXANDER RAMIREZ, 35 years old, married, resident of Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, and a driver testified that: He knows the plaintiff Luz
Palanca Tan because she is his manager. He worked for her as a driver
sometime in 1993. He sometimes drove a jeepney or a truck.
On March 13, 1997, at around 4:00 o’clock in the morning, he
reported for work at his employer’s warehouse located [in] Pagsawitan,
Sta. Cruz. He got the passenger jeep loaded with salted eggs, “balot” and
quail eggs for delivery to Lucena City upon instruction of Tan. In going to
Lucena City, he chose to drive on the Maharlika Road at San Isidro,
Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna because it is better than the road along
Brgy. Dayap of the same municipality. However, while at the Maharlika
Road, he met an accident at around 5:00 a.m. The jitney turned turtle.
PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES, 37 years old, married, resident of
Calauan, Laguna, and a member of PNP-Calauan, Laguna, testified that:
He was on police duty as of March 14, 1997. On that day, he issued a
certification (Exhibit “B”) pertaining to a vehicular accident which
occurred earlier. He came to know of the accident as relayed to their
office by a concerned citizen. He proceeded to the place of the accident,
which was at Maharlika Highway, in an intersection at Brgy. Bangyas,
Calauan, Laguna for an investigation. Upon reaching the place, as a rule
followed by police officers, he inquired from some of the residents about
the incident. As relayed to him, the jeepney with Plate No. 168 was going
towards the direction of San Isidro, followed by another jeepney, a truck
and then by a JAM Transit bus. The bus overtook the jeepney it was
following then side swept the jeepney (which figured in the accident)
dragging it along (“nakaladkad”) towards the sampaguita gardens.
[NOTE: The testimony of the witness regarding the information
gathered was ordered by the Court to be deleted.] Then, he went
personally to the place where the incident happened.
664
He stated it was cloudy that day. He described the highway where the
incident happened as having a double straight yellow line which
prohibits overtaking on both sides of the road. The said place is near the
intersection of Maharlika Highway and the barangay road leading to
Brgy. San Isidro.
On cross examination, he stated he cannot remember if he was with
other police officers during the investigation of the incident but he can
recall having interviewed a certain Mercy Ponteiros and one Rodel, who
are both residents of the place.
On redirect, he stated that the witness Mercy Ponteiros is still
residing at Brgy. Bangyas[.]
On additional direct examination, he stated that the accident site is
still fresh in his mind and he drew a sketch (Exhibit “F” to “F-7”) of the
said place. He identified in the sketch the direction of the highway which
leads to Manila and to Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The road, per his
approximation, was about 10 meters wide, with the shoulder about 5
meters except that it was diminished to about 2 meters on account of
some encroachment. The highway has a painted crosswalk. It also has a
yellow line without any cut which means no vehicle could overtake from
both sides of the road. He showed in the sketch the spot where the jitney
and the bus were at the time of the incident. Shown the photographs
(Exhibits “E” to “E-6”), he stated that they are truly reflective of the
scene of the incident, the damages in both the jeepney and the bus, as of
March 13, 1997.
On cross, he stated that what he saw was the situation after the
incident. He came to learn of the accident at around 5:10 in the morning
from a report received by their office, as relayed by a concerned citizen.
He remembers that SPO4 Rogelio Medina, now retired, as one of his
companions at the accident site. The site is about a kilometer away from
their police station. He can recall the scene of the incident because of the
photographs. The persons he investigated were the jitney driver, his
“pahinante” (helper) and some people in the vicinity. He could not
remember the names of those persons but they were listed in the police
blotter.
RODRIGO CONDINO, 38 years old, married, resident of Victoria,
Laguna and a mechanic, testified that: He is a mechanic of Plantilla
Motors at Bubucal, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. He knows the plaintiff Luz Tan as
he and his chief (mechanic) repaired the jeepney owned by the latter after
it figured in an accident on March 13, 1997. He came to know of the
accident when the said vehicle was brought
665
to their motor shop. They made an estimate (Exhibit “D”) of the damage
sustained by the said vehicle, which amounted to P450,000.00.”4
Tan also formally offered as exhibits the following documents:
Exhibit “A” — Articles of Incorporation of JAM Transit, Inc.;
Exhibit “B” — Certification issued by the Calauan Municipal

Police Station regarding the vehicular

accident;
Exhibit “C” — PNP-Calauan Police Report regarding the

jitney shipment;

Exhibit “D” — Estimate of damages sustained by the jitney,
from A. Plantilla Motors Repair Shop;
Exhibit “E” — Six (6) photographs depicting the site of the
vehicular accident;
Exhibit “F” — Four (4) pages of receipts representing hospital
and medical expenses paid by the plaintiff for
injuries sustained by her driver and helper
in the accident;
Exhibit “G” — Certificate of Registration of plaintiff’s jitney;
Exhibit “H” — Driver’s license of Eddie Dimayuga,
defendant’s bus driver;
Exhibit “I” — Sketch of the site where the vehicular accident
occurred.5
On the other hand, JAM offered the following

testimonial evidence—
“EDGARDO DIMAYUGA, 49 years old, married, resident of

Sta. Cruz, Laguna and bus driver of JAM Transit Inc., testified
that: He has been a passenger bus driver since 1983. He was
previously employed with the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company (BLTB). He was employed with JAM Transit since
1992. He has a professional driver’s license, D-12-78-008462562.
On March 14, 1997, he reported for work. He met an accident
while driving a bus. The other vehicle involved, a jitney, belongs
to
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 19-21.

5 Id., at pp. 18-19.
666
Luz Palanca Tan and driven by Alexander Ramirez. The accident

happened along the intersection of Maharlika Highway, Brgy.
Bangyas at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning. He was driving
the bus with a speed of 40 km/h when suddenly, a vehicle
overtook the bus from the right side going to Calauan. He was not
able to evade the vehicle as there was no way for him to do so. The
front portion of the bus and the mirror were destroyed.
On cross examination, he stated that his route as of March 14,
1997 was Sta. Cruz-Lawton. He cannot recall the bus conductor
who was on Bangyas, Calauan. He stated he was not able to evade
the jitney as there was no way for him to avoid the situation,
causing the jitney to be dragged to the side. Nothing else
happened after the bus hit the jeepney. He and other persons took
the driver from the jeepney and brought him to a hospital.
On redirect, he stated that bus conductors change duties every

two or three days.”6
JAM did not offer any documentary counter-evidence.

Applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC found
the JAM passenger bus driver at fault as he was then
violating a traffic regulation when the collision took place.
Thus, the RTC ruled in favor of Tan and disposed as
follows—
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the

defendants who are hereby adjudged to pay the plaintiff jointly
and solidarily, the following:
1. actual damages of P142,210.00 for the lost and damaged
cargoes; P400,000.00 for the destroyed jitney; P1,327.00 medical
expenses of the jitney driver and his companion, for a total
amount of [P543,537.00];
2. P10,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
4. Costs of suit[.]”
SO ORDERED.”7
_______________
6 Id., at p. 21.
7 Id., at p. 24.
667
Aggrieved, JAM appealed to the CA. The CA granted the

appeal and dismissed the complaint on the ground that
there was nothing on record that supported the RTC’s
finding that the JAM passenger bus was overtaking Tan’s
jitney. The CA noted that Ramirez only testified that, on
March 14, 1997, he met an accident at around 5:00 a.m.,
while transporting eggs along Maharlika Road in San
Isidro, Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, causing the
jitney he was driving to turn turtle. The CA also observed
that the Certification (Exhibit “B”) made no mention that
the JAM passenger bus was overspeeding or that it was
overtaking the jitney; and, thus, there was no evidence as
to who between Ramirez and Dimayuga was negligent in
connection with the vehicular accident. The CA held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can only be invoked when
direct evidence is nonexistent or not accessible. It further
said that Tan had access to direct evidence as to the precise
cause of the mishap, such that the circumstances of the
vehicular accident or the specific act constituting the
supposed negligence of Dimayuga could have been testified
to by Ramirez or by the latter’s companion. The CA
concluded that res ipsa loquitur could not apply in this case
because the doctrine does not dispense with the

requirement of establishing proof of negligence.
Hence, this petition, with petitioner positing that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable given the
circumstances of the case.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means
“the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may
permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or
make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.
Where the thing that caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things,
would not happen if those who had management or control
used proper care, it affords reasonable
668
evidence—in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and

logical explanation by defendant—that the accident arose
from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. This
rule is grounded on the superior logic of ordinary human
experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or
common knowledge that negligence may be deduced from
the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the rule is
applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge.8
However, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive
law and does not constitute an independent or separate
ground for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely
evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves
a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of
negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application
of the doctrine do not dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such
proof, permitting plaintiff to present, along with the proof
of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to
invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption
of negligence, and thereby placing on defendant the burden
of going forward with the proof.9 Still, before resort to the
doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:
“1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of
the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the
plaintiff responsible is eliminated.10
_______________
8 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999, 321
SCRA 584.
9 Id.
10 Macalinao v. Ong, G.R. No. 146635, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA
740, 755.
669
Was petitioner able to establish the above requisites? We

answer in the affirmative. We do not subscribe to the
finding of the CA that petitioner had direct access to the
evidence surrounding the accident, but since she failed to
present it, the doctrine would not operate to apply. While
Ramirez took the witness stand, he was only able to testify
that he drove along Maharlika Highway in San Isidro,
Barangay Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, Tan’s passenger
jitney loaded with salted eggs, balot and quail eggs for
delivery at around 5:00 a.m. when he met an accident,
causing the vehicle to turn turtle. Obviously, Ramirez had
no vivid recollection of how the passenger jitney was
actually hit by the JAM passenger bus. Further, for some
unknown reasons, the other possible eyewitnesses to the
mishap were not available to testify. With the dearth of
testimonial or direct evidence, should petitioner now be left
without remedy? The answer is NO.
We cannot agree with the CA when it said that how the
incident happened could not be established, neither from
the photographs offered in evidence in favor of petitioner,
nor from the Certification11 that quoted an excerpt from
the records on the Police Blotter of the Calauan Municipal
Police Station. The CA, likewise, discounted the probative
value of the Police Blotter because, although prepared in
the regular performance of official duty, it was not
conclusive proof of the truth of its entries, since police
blotters are usually incomplete and inaccurate; and
sometimes based on partial suggestion, inaccurate
reporting and hearsay.12
It is worth noting, however, that photographs are in the
nature of physical evidence13—a mute but eloquent
manifestation of truth ranking high in the hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence.14 When duly verified and shown by
extrinsic evi-
_______________
11 Exhibit “B.”
12 CA Decision, pp. 15-16.
13 Jose v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 30; 322 SCRA 25 (2000).
14 See Aradillos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135619, January 15,
2004, 419 SCRA 514; People v. Bonifacio, 426 Phil. 511; 376
670
dence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the

time in question, they are, in the discretion of the trial
court, admissible in evidence as aids in arriving at an
understanding of the evidence, the situation or condition of
objects or premises, or the circumstances of an accident.15
The photographs16 proffered by petitioner indeed
depicted the relative positions of her jitney and of the JAM
passenger bus immediately after the accident took place.
An examination of the photographs would readily show
that the highway where the accident occurred was marked
by two yellow continuous parallel lines at the center,
separating the right lane from the left. Based on evidence,
the JAM passenger bus was moving along the highway
towards Manila, and the jitney was going along the same
route, until it was about to turn left to the barangay road
towards the Poblacion. After the incident, the photographs
would show that both vehicles were found on the opposite
lane of the highway. The front right portion of the bus was
shown to have collided with or hit the left portion of the
jitney with such an impact, causing the latter to turn turtle
with extensive damage, injuring its driver and his
companion, and completely destroying its cargo.17
Although the person who took the pictures was not able
to testify because he predeceased the trial, Senior Police
Officer II Daniel Escares (Escares) was recalled to the
witness stand to authenticate the said pictures. He
testified that the pic-
_______________
SCRA 134 (2002); People v. Marquina, 426 Phil. 46; 375 SCRA 378
(2002); Tangan v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 139; 373 SCRA 119 (2002);
People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677; 368 SCRA 586 (2001); People v.
Ubaldo, 419 Phil. 718; 367 SCRA 432 (2001); People v. Palijon, 397 Phil.
545; 343 SCRA 486 (2000); People v. Carillo, 388 Phil. 1010; 333 SCRA
338 (2000); People v. Roche, 386 Phil. 287; 330 SCRA 91 (2000); Id.
15 Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,
Vol. VII, citing Aldanese v. Salutillo, 47 Phil 548 (1925).
16 Exhibits “E,” and “E-1 to E-6.”
17 Exhibits “E-2,” “E-3,” “E-5,” and “E-6.”
671
tures were faithful representations of the circumstances

immediately after the accident.18 Escares also made an
appropriately labeled sketch19 of the situation after the
collision, and testified as to the physical circumstances
thereof, including the width of the road and the road
shoulder, especially the double yellow lines at the center of

the highway.20
As regards police blotters, it should be remembered that
although they are of little probative value, they are
nevertheless admitted and considered in the absence of
competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein.
Entries in police records made by a police officer in the
performance of a duty especially enjoined by law are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and their
probative value may be either substantiated or nullified by
other competent evidence.21 In this case, the
Certification,22 whose entries were adopted from the police
blotter of the Calauan Municipal Police Station, the
sketch23 prepared by Escares, and the photographs, taken
together would prove that the jitney and the bus were
going along the same way; that the jitney was about to
negotiate the intersection going to the left towards the
feeder road in the direction of the Poblacion; and that the
bus hit the left-turning jitney causing the smaller vehicle to
turn turtle.
Indeed, no two motor vehicles traversing the same lane
of a highway with double yellow center lines will collide as
a matter of course, both ending up on the opposite lane,
unless someone is negligent. Dimayuga was driving the
JAM passenger bus which, from the evidence adduced,
appears to have precipitated the collision with petitioner’s
jitney. Driving the bus gave Dimayuga exclusive
management and control over it. Despite the claim of JAM
to the contrary, no contributory
_______________
18 TSN, April 2, 2004; Rollo, pp. 167-168.

19 Exhibit “F”; Id., at p. 53.
20 Id., at pp. 161-166.
21 Macalinao v. Ong, supra note 10.
22 Exhibit “B.”
23 Exhibit “F.”
672
negligence could be attributed to Ramirez relative to the

incident on the basis of the available evidence. Inevitably,
the requisites being present, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applies.
We, thus, quote with concurrence the findings of the
RTC—
“As both parties are asserting claim for the damages each has
respectively sustained from the subject collision, the negligence of
either driver of the bus or of the jitney must be shown, and the
burden to prove the negligence, by preponderance of evidence, lies
upon both who are alleging the other’s negligence. Preponderance

of evidence is “evidence as a whole which is superior to that of the
defendant {or the other}” [Pacific Banking Employees Organization
vs. CA, 286 SCRA 495].
To prove negligence of the bus driver, plaintiff relies heavily
upon the testimony of PO3 DANIEL C. ESCARES, who identified
the police report of the incident [Exhibit “B”] as well as the sketch
of the site [Exhibit “I”] and the pictures taken as reflective of the
scene of the incident [Exhibits “E” with sub-markings], invoking
[in plaintiff’s memorandum] the application of the doctrine of “res
ipsa loquitor.”
From the said exhibits, the plaintiff postulates that her jitney
then being driven by Alexander Ramirez, as well as the bus
driven by defendant Dimayuga were heading the same direction
towards Manila, but when the jitney was about to negotiate the
left side road intersection towards the feeder/Barangay road of
Brgy. Bangyas, Calauan, Laguna, it was bumped by the
oncoming/overtaking bus driven by Dimayuga, that caused the
jitney to turn turtle at the road shoulder causing damages on the
jitney, the cargoes and injuries to the jitney driver and his
companion. It was allegedly improper for the bus to overtake as
the road bears a double yellow line at the middle which prohibits
overtaking.
On the other hand, the bus driver who is the lone witness/
evidence for the defendant testified he was driving at the
Maharlika Highway at 40 km/hr when the jitney “overtook” from
the right and that there was no way for him to evade the latter so
it was dragged to the side [TSN, May 18, 2006, p. 13]. In its
memorandum, defendants postulate that it was the jitney driver
who was negligent as it overtook the bus from the right which is
not proper. Plaintiff allegedly could not claim damages for its
failure to prove the bus driver’s
673
negligence, and it was the jitney’s own negligence that is the

proximate cause of his injury.
No direct evidence was presented with respect to the exact road
position of the bus and the jitney at the time of the collision such
that the same can only be inferred from the pictures of the
colliding vehicles taken immediately after the incident [Exhibits
“E”].
At this juncture, it was established from Exhibits “E-5” and “E-
6” that the jitney’s left side portion was directly hit by the front-
right portion of the bus. This is consistent with the plaintiff’s
theory that the jitney was then negotiating the left portion of the
road when it was hit by the oncoming bus causing the jitney to
have a 90-degree turn around. The bus and the jitney were almost
perpendicular to each other when the collision took place, with
the bus directly hitting the jitney head on.
The statement of the bus driver that the jitney “overtook” from
the right only presumes that at the point of collision, the bus was
at the left lane of the road overtaking the vehicle/s at the right.
This scenario, in fact, was affirmed by the police report of the
incident [Exhibit “B”]. It is not quite logical that the jitney, in
allegedly overtaking the bus from the right came from the right
shoulder of the road, a rough road merely 5 meters in width
[Exhibit “F”] and even diminished by two (2) meters because of
the encroachment at the sides [TSN, 11-6-02]. No evidence was
shown that the jitney came from the right shoulder. The jitney
then loaded with eggs for delivery, was about to negotiate the left
lane towards the feeder/barangay road intersection, and it would
be illogical in such a situation that the jitney driver would take
the right shoulder. The foregoing suggest the fact that the bus
overtook the passing vehicles at the right lane and in the course
thereof, the jitney in front that was about to negotiate the left
lane, was hit.”24
Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the

JAM passenger bus was overtaking the vehicles running
along the right lane of the highway from the left lane, the
available evidence readily points to such fact. There were
two continuous yellow lines at the center of the highway,
which meant that no vehicle in the said area should
overtake another on
_______________
24 Rollo, pp. 22-23.
674
either side of the road. The “double yellow center lines”

regulation, which this Court takes judicial notice of as an
internationally recognized pavement regulation, was
precisely intended to avoid accidents along highways, such
as what happened in this case. This prohibition finds
support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136 (Land
Transportation and Traffic Code), Section 41(e).25
Furthermore, it is observed that the area of collision was
an intersection. Section 41(c)26 of R.A. No. 4136, likewise,
prohibits overtaking or passing any other vehicle
proceeding in the same direction at any intersection of
highways, among others. Thus, by overtaking on the left
lane, Dimayuga was not only violating the “double yellow
center lines” regulation, but also the prohibition on
overtaking at highway intersections. Consequently,
negligence can be attributed only to him, which negligence
was the proximate cause of the injury sustained by
petitioner. This prima facie finding of negligence was not
sufficiently rebutted or contradicted by Dimayuga.
Therefore, a finding that he is liable for damages to
petitioner is warranted.
_______________
25 Section 41. Restriction on overtaking and passing.—

x x x x
(e) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass, or attempt to
overtake or pass, any other vehicle proceeding in the same direction in
any “no passing or overtaking zone.” x x x.
26 (c) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass any other
vehicle proceeding in the same direction, at any railway grade crossing,
not at any intersection of highways unless such intersection or
crossing is controlled by traffic signal, or unless permitted to do
so by a watchman or a peace officer, except on a highway having two
or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where the driver of a
vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right. Nothing in this
section shall be constrained to prohibit a driver overtaking or passing
upon the right another vehicle which is making or about to make a left
turn. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
675
The liability of Dimayuga is solidary with JAM,

pursuant to Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides—
“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage

to another, there being fault or negligence is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or

injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise
diligentissimi patris families in the section (culpa in
eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees.27 To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed
by its employee, an employer must overcome the
presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of his employee.28
_______________
27 Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. C & A Construction, Inc., G.R. No.

156034, October 1, 2003, 412 SCRA 524.
28 Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, 445 Phil. 31; 397 SCRA 75
(2003); Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 129; 386
SCRA 126 (2002).
676
In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM

did not present any other evidence, whether documentary
or testimonial, in its favor. Inevitably, the presumption of
its negligence as Dimayuga’s employer stands and it is,
thus, solidarily liable for the damages sustained by
petitioner.
As regards the award for actual damages, we, however,
concur with respondent that the award of P400,000.00 for
the damage to the jitney is not warranted, considering that
the evidence submitted to support this claim was merely an
estimate made by A. Plantilla Motors. The same reason
holds true with respect to the amount of damages for the
destroyed cargo of eggs, considering that the document
submitted by petitioner to support the claim of P142,210.00
was merely a Certification,29 as the information found
thereon was supplied by petitioner herself per the number
of pieces of the different eggs and the corresponding price
per piece.
To warrant an award of actual or compensatory
damages for repair to damage sustained, the best evidence
should be the receipts or other documentary proofs of the
actual amount expended.30 However, considering that it
was duly proven that the jitney was damaged and had to be
repaired, as it was repaired, and that the cargo of eggs was
indeed destroyed, but the actual amounts expended or lost
were not proven, we deem it appropriate to award
P250,000.00 by way of temperate damages. Under Article
2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
recovered when pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot be proved with certainty.31 We, however,
sustain the trial court’s award of P1,327.00 as re-
_______________
29 Exhibit “C.”
30 G.Q. Garments, Inc. v. Miranda, G.R. No. 161722, July 20, 2006, 495
SCRA 741.
31 People of the Philippines v. Anselmo Berondo, Jr. y Pateres, G.R. No.
177827, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547; Republic v. Tuvera, G.R. No.
148246, February 16, 2007, 516 SCRA 113.
677
gards the medical expenses incurred by petitioner, the

same being duly supported by receipts.32
The award of P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00
as attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit are sustained, the
same being in order and authorized by law. Although the
basis for the award of attorney’s fees was not indicated in
the trial court’s Decision, we deem it justified as petitioner
was compelled to litigate before the courts and incur
expenses in order to vindicate her rights under the
premises.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated June 2, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 89046 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
dated December 20, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 27, Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Civil Case No. SC-3838 is
REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that the award
of actual damages is reduced to P1,327.00, and, in lieu of
actual damages with respect to the damage or loss
sustained with respect to the passenger jitney and the
cargo of eggs, the amount of P250,000.00 is awarded by
way of temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and

Peralta, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.
Note.—In an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of

the employer is direct and primary subject to the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee. (Aguila vs. Baldovizo, 517 SCRA 91 [2007])
——o0o——
_______________
32 Exhibit “F.”
33 Civil Code, Art. 2208(2).
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49.tan vs. Jam Transit

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49.tan vs. Jam Transit

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3/12/22, 10:06 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 605

G.R. No. 183198. November 25, 2009.*

Civil Law; Negligence; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Res Ipsa Loquitur is

specific proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation and

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

DVG-557 and body number 8030. The bus was driven by

1 Rollo, pp. 8-14.

amount of P400,000.00 for the damaged jitney, P142,210.00

“LUZ PALANCA TAN, 47 years old, married, a resident of Sta.

Police Station regarding the vehicular

Exhibit “C” — PNP-Calauan Police Report regarding the

jitney shipment;

On the other hand, JAM offered the following

“EDGARDO DIMAYUGA, 49 years old, married, resident of

4 Id., at pp. 19-21.

Luz Palanca Tan and driven by Alexander Ramirez. The accident

On redirect, he stated that bus conductors change duties every

JAM did not offer any documentary counter-evidence.

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered against the

Aggrieved, JAM appealed to the CA. The CA granted the

because the doctrine does not dispense with the

evidence—in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and

Was petitioner able to establish the above requisites? We

dence to be faithful representations of the subject as of the

tures were faithful representations of the circumstances

shoulder, especially the double yellow lines at the center of

18 TSN, April 2, 2004; Rollo, pp. 167-168.

negligence could be attributed to Ramirez relative to the

upon both who are alleging the other’s negligence. Preponderance

negligence, and it was the jitney’s own negligence that is the

Verily, although there was no direct evidence that the

24 Rollo, pp. 22-23.

either side of the road. The “double yellow center lines”

25 Section 41. Restriction on overtaking and passing.—

The liability of Dimayuga is solidary with JAM,

“Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage

Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or

27 Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. C & A Construction, Inc., G.R. No.

In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM

gards the medical expenses incurred by petitioner, the

Corona (Chairperson), Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr. and

Petition granted, judgment reversed and set aside.

Note.—In an action based on quasi-delict, the liability of

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