Introduction

The discipline, Philosophy is characterized into four core branches namely: Epistemology,

Metaphysics, Ethics and Logic. These core branches, down the ages, have further given rise to

different schools of thoughts. Here we are laying emphasis on the theory of Empiricism as a

school of thought. In other words, it is an epistemological school of thought that uses the sense

organs of sight, feeling, taste, smell, and hearing to capture that which is seen as the object of

knowledge?

This must have being the very reason why John Locke in his work, “An Essay Concerning

Human Understanding” which he gave as one of the sources of all human ideas, sensation.

Locke says: “All ideas come from sensation or reflection.” 1 Sensation as a source of ideas is seen

as a great one. To buttress this, he holds that even “the soul begins to have ideas when it begins

to perceive.”2 This implies that no idea is found in the soul outside perception, which of course,

is the business of the senses. However, down the ages, many scholars have saddled themselves

with the task of building upon the provinces of knowledge in the territory of the school,

empiricism; one of which was Willard Van Orman Quine, who in his contribution, brought about

the postulation of the “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” which is the focus of this work. Though,

these work, do not claiming to be exhaustive, but tries to evaluate the views and contributions of

Quine to the understanding and use of words and concepts in the field of Empiricism and other

scientific fields.

 WHAT IS EMPIRICISM?

1
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University,
1999), 87.
2
Locke, an Essay, 90.

1
Empiricism has a long, distinguished and complex history and as is usual with any live

philosophical tradition, it is continuously recreated and re-invited as it evolves over.

Traditionally presented as a doctrine, empiricism is often formulated as the claim that experience

is the only source of information about the world. Understood in this way, empiricism seems to

involve a particular belief: in the truth of the claim that characterizes this doctrines, and it

becomes an issue whether acquiring that belief outstrips the boundaries of experience and thus of

empiricism itself.3

 A BRIEF LIFE HISTORY OF WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE

Willard Van Orman Quine was born of his father, Cloyd Robert Quine, an engineer and Harriet

Van Orman, a teacher in Akron, Ohio in USA on June 25 th, 1908. From 1926 to 1930, he studied

Mathematical Philosophy in Oberlin College, where he obtained his First degree, B.A, major in

Mathematics with honors in his course. Between 1930 and 1932, he attended Harvard University

and got his Ph.D in philosophy, writing his dissertation on Alfred Whitehead and Bertrand

Rusell’s Principia Mathematica, after which he travelled to Vienna where he met Rudolf

Carnap, who later became his teacher and friend. However, one of the most influential

philosophers leading the charge against traditional empiricism has been Willard Van Quine. His

classic essay “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1953) shook the foundations of empiricism. This

assumption lies at the foundation of analytic philosophy, for only if it is possible to consider our

beliefs one by one can we subject them to piecemeal analysis 4 In 1934, Quine published his

work, “A System of Logistic,” a revised version of his dissertation. Six years afterwards, he

published his Mathematica Logic in 1940. Aside these works, he had authored many works such

3
Van Fraassen B.C, “The Empirical Stance”, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.
4
William F. Lawhead The Voyage Of Discovery, A Historical Introduction to philosophy fourth edition (U.S.A.
Cengage learning Stamford 2015) 570, 571

2
as, “Word and Object” (1960), “Theory and its Logic” (1963), “Ways of Paradox” (1966),

“Ontological Relativity and Other Essays” (1969), and many others. He was married to Naomi

Clayton. He died on December 25th, 2000 in Boston, Massachusetts in USA.

 W.V.O. QUINE’S “TWO DOGMAS OF EMPIRICISM”

The various criteria of meaningfulness in statements formulated by Hume, Kant and the

verificationists form the background from which Quine raised the issues of two dogmas of

modern empiricism. First, Quine suggested that the distinction between analytic and synthetic

statements cannot be sharply drawn as imagined but earlier criteria, and second, he frowned

against the notion of all meaningfulness statement being reduced to immediate sense experience.

He made this point clear when he says: “Modern empiricism has been conditioned to large part

by two dogmas. One is belief in some fundamental cleavage between truths which are analytic,

or grounded in meanings independently of matters of fact, and truth which are synthetic or

grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism: the belief that each meaningful statement is

equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refers to immediate experience.” 5

Therefore, we shall be elucidating the two dogmas below.

 ANALYTICITY

The establishment of fundamental cleavage between analytic and synthetic statements was

attributed to Kant; however it has its roots in Hume’s distinction between “relation of ideas and

matters of fact”.6 This cleavage was however rejected by Quine as unsustainable, which forms

the basis of the background for analyticity.7 In doing this, Quine identifies two explicit

5
W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in from a logical point of view, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, the
Science Library, Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), 20.
6
Cf. Humean Criterion of Meaning, Chapter two, and section 2.1.
7
The analytic-synthetic distinction is known as analyticity.

3
definitions of analytic and synthetic statements, espoused in both Humean and Kantian criterion

of meaningfulness. More so, Hume conceives of an analytic statement as statement whose

denials of negations are self-contradictory. Quine contends this Humean definition of analytic

statements on the ground that analyticity, inasmuch as it presupposes contradiction does not in

any way means it has to do with self-contradictoriness. In the same vein, the definition of

analytic statements are given by Kant, who conceives analytic statement as one in which “the

concept of the subject term includes or contains the concept of the predicate term, whereas a

synthetic statement is not.”8 Hence, this definition was also brought into contention by Quine

that “it limits itself to statements of subject-predicate form, and it appeal to a notion of

containment which is left at a metaphysical level. 9 However, owing to the fact that the definitions

given to analytic and synthetic statements by Hume and Kant are not clear enough, Quine

therefore, attempts to give clarity to analytic-synthetic distinction by building on Kant’s intention

and restated analytic statement thus: “a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meaning

and independently of fact.” Furthermore, according to Quine, definition holds a presupposition

of meaning. Thus, he also offered criticism to this notion of analytic statements which

presuppose the concept of meaning. Thus, Quine strengthened his arguments by looking at both

singular terms and general terms. Though, the singular terms, Quine says we should not confuse

meaning with meaning of which using Frege’s idea of sense, reference and example of ‘evening

star’ and ‘morning star’, illustrate that terms can actually name or refer to the same thing but

differ in meaning or sense. While in general terms, Quine says we should not identify meaning

with extension, of which using the example of general terms ‘creature with a heart’ and ‘creature

with a kidneys’, which are alike in extension but differ in meaning. As a result, Quine asserts

8
J. A. Aigbodioh, “Philosophy of Language: Problems and Content” in Issues and Problems in Philosophy, K. A.
Owolabi (ed), (Ibadan: Grovacs Network, 2000), 172.
9
W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 21.

4
that: “When sort of thing are meanings? A felt need for meant entities may derive from an earlier

failure to appreciate that meaning and reference are distinct. 10 For him, the problem of analyticity

became anew and therefore considered two classes of analyticity, the class of the logically true

and the class of ‘replacing synonyms’. For Quine, the class of analytic statement that is logically

true is typified by “No married man is married” is “not merely true as it stands, but it remains

true under any and all reinterpretations of ‘man’ and ‘married’. Although, he noted that the

second class of analytic statements typified by “No bachelor is married” can be turned into

logical truth by interchanging synonyms, for instance, putting ‘unmarried man’ for its synonymy

‘bachelor.’11

 DEFINITION

The central focus of bringing clarity to the notion of synonymy was fastened on the concept of

definition. Here he noted the efforts of some scholars who have tried to reduce the second class

of analytic statements to the first class of analytic statements, the logically true statements, using

the notion of definition. For this is possible through substitution of definitions for the terms they

define. For example; the term ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried man’, as such this definition

‘unmarried man’ can be used as a substitute for the term ‘bachelor’. Hence, in the example “No

bachelor is married” can be turned or transformed to logical statements by definition as “No

unmarried man is married.” Quine was not satisfied even with the idea of definition as way of

clarifying the notion of synonymy. Hence, he argued: “But how do we find that ‘bachelor’ is

defined as ‘unmarried man’? Who defined it thus, and when? Are we to appeal to the nearest

dictionary, and accept the lexicographer’s formulation as law? Clearly this would be to put the

cart before the horse.”

10
Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 22.
11
W.V.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 23.

5
However, Quine was very skeptical about the possibility of definition solving the problem of

synonymy as seen above, and in extension the problem of analytic-synthetic distinction. This is

why he argues that an appeal to the nearest dictionary would not even bring clarity to the

problem, since lexicographer is an empirical scientist that deals with facts and the

lexicographer’s definition of ‘bachelor’ as ‘unmarried man’ rest on his belief in the relation of

synonymy, which according to Quine “still needs to be clarified in terms relating to linguistic

behavior.”12 Although, Quine, employed Carnap’s notion of explication13 to explain definitions,

that in explication, the purpose is not merely to paraphrase the definiendum into an outright

synonymy, but actually to improve upon the definiendum by referring or supplementing its

meaning.

 INTERCHANGEABILITY

In the line of thoughts, another attempt to bring clarity to the notion of synonymy was carried out

by Quine using the idea of interchangeability, which is usually between two linguistic forms that

are interchangeable in all contexts without altering it meaning. However, Leibniz refers to the

interchangeability as “salva veritate.” On the other hand, Quine argues that no two linguistic

forms can be totally interchangeable in the sense of interchangeable salva veritate. This account

for why Quine categorically asserts that “it is not quite that the synonyms ‘bachelor’ and

‘unmarried man’ are everywhere interchangeable salva veritate.”14 More so, Quine explained the

possibility of truth which may become false when the term ‘unmarried man’ is substituted for

‘bachelor.’ Quine cited examples such as ‘bachelor of arts’, ‘bachelor’s buttons’ and ‘bachelor’

has less than ten letters. For him, the only way out will be to consider each of the above phrases

12
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 24
13
Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), 7.

14
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 25

6
as a single word, that are not indivisible, and interchangeable salva veritate which is the fulcrum

of synonymy which cannot be applied to such fragmentary occurrences inside of a word. At this

point, there seems to be a progressive move of reducing the problem of synonymy to a problem

of word-hood. Thus, using the already established example to drive this point further, Quine

affirmed that to say that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are cognitively synonymous is to say

that the statement: ‘ All and only bachelors are unmarried men’ is analytic. Here he says

analyticity is presupposed, but this according to him is not what is needed, but an account of

cognitive synonymy that is independent, which is “interchangeability salva veritate in all

contexts except within words.”15

However, the question whether interchangeability salva veritate is a sufficient condition for

cognitive synonymy became imperative for Quine. He noted that relying on the assurance of this

would imply that statement as “Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors” is true,

supposing that the adverb “necessarily” is only applicable to analytic statement. Then, if

‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable salva veritate, the former statement will be

“Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men.” Nevertheless, to assert that the

statement “Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men” is true, is to say that earlier

statement “All and only bachelors are unmarried men” is analytic, which implies that ‘bachelor’

and ‘unmarried man’ are cognitively synonymous. He argued further that “to suppose that the

adverb does make sense is to suppose that we have already made satisfactory sense of

analytic.”16 “But the fact remains that extensional agreement falls far short of cognitive

synonymy of the type required for explaining analyticity in the manner of background for

analyticity.”17
15
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 29.
16
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 30
17
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 31

7
  THE SEMANTICAL RULES

The task of finding grounds for analyticity, that is, analytic-synthetic distinction has been done,

by an appeal to meaning, synonymy and definition. But these ground have proven unsatisfactory

in solving the problem of analyticity. Quine therefore resorted to semantical rules, to see if it

could solve the problem of analyticity. Although, Quine opined that some people are of the

opinion that the true nature of analytic-synthetic distinction is made clear only when we have

precise artificial language that have explicit ‘semantical rules’, while they are of the view that

analyticity is difficult in ordinary language because of its vagueness. Furthermore, Quine made

reference to Carnap, concerning the issue in a bid to explain analyticity. He says Carnap’s

semantical rules have different forms. In achieving this, he observed that the notion of analyticity

has a supposed relation between statements and languages. Thus, in distinguishing Carnap’s

certain forms of semantical rules, with the first which began with an artificial language, whose

semantical rules have the form explicitly of a specification of all the analytic statements of the

artificial languages?18 This form of semantical rule seems plausible, since it does not face the

criticism posed on analytic and the clear nature of the notion of truth. From this, analyticity can

be derived: “that a statement is analytic if it is (not merely true but) true according to the

semantical rule.”19 Thus, Quine concludes that semantical rules of artificial language are only

important based on prior understanding of the notion of analyticity, but does not help in gaining

an understanding of analyticity.

 THE VERIFICATION THEORY AND REDUCTIONISM

In order to establish grounds for analytic-synthetic distinction, we have looked into the notion of

meaning, which formed the background for analyticity, the notion of cognitive synonymy and
18
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 33.
19
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 34.

8
the notion of analyticity itself. At this point we shall examine the verification theory and

reductionism. However, for the logical empiricists viewed the verification theory method of

confirming and infirming the meaning of a statement. Applying this to the notion of synonymy,

verification theory states; “statements are synonymous if and only if they are alike in point of

method of empirical confirmation or infirmation.”20 The verification theory is discussed in the

light of statement synonymy which appears to give the notion of analytic-synthetic dualism a

backing, since statement synonymy is concerned with sameness of methods of empirical

confirmation or information. Similarly, the idea of radical reductionism, which views the relation

between a statement and the experience as a direct one. Here, Quine opined that such a view

attributes all meaningful statements as a translation of direct immediate experience. And this is

the bedrock on which verification theory of meaning is built. The radical reductionism is a

resultant views that were held by Hume and Locke who likened all ideas as an off-shoot of direct

experience, and in the view of Tooke who proposed that significance rest on a name of sense

datum or a compound of such names or an abbreviation of such a compound. Therefore, radical

reductionism set the goal of translating any significant statement into sense-datum language.

This tasks was vividly embarked on by Carnap who was deeply involved in achieving the goal of

what Quine calls radical reductionism. Thus, Quine noted that “reductionism in its radical form

has long since ceased to figure in Carnap’s philosophy.”21 However, Quine is of the view that the

dogma of reductionism is not isolated from the dogma of analytic-synthetic cleavage, rather there

exist a kind of connection between both dogmas. According to Quine, “the two dogmas are,

indeed, root identical.”22 That it is the verification theory of meaning that actually brought the

link between the dogma of analyticity and the dogma of reductionism. For the essence, science

20
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 37
21
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 38
22
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 39-40.

9
has its double dependence' upon language and experience; but this duality is not significantly

traceable into the statements of science taken one by one.23

 EMPIRICISM WITHOUT THE DOGMAS

The whole of science is built on the unit of empirical significance. For the totality of our so-

called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the

profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric

which have a bearing on experience only along the edges. He is of the view that a conflict could

occur with experience at the periphery that brings about readjustment of the scientific field. Such

a situation for him, will result to re-evaluation of statements and others as well due to the logical

inter-relatedness of those statements. However, Quine continuous to emphasize that inasmuch as

revelation of one statement leads compulsorily to the revelation of other statements, then the

total field of science is underdetermined by experience. This is because, for him, there are no

popular experiences that are linked with particular statements at the interior of scientific field,

except through an indirect generalization affecting the whole of scientific field. He then

expressed the incoherence of setting boundary between analytic and synthetic statements, with

the former being contingent on experience and the latter necessary on experience. That, if such

boundary is held, then “any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic

enough adjustments elsewhere in the system”24 more so, there are some statements about

physical objects and not sense experience, seem peculiarly germane to sense experience, of

which Quine’s opinion are near the periphery. However, considering the fact that all statements

are prone to revision, the choice of accommodating one statement to a recalcitrant experience is a

vague one. Quine affirms the importance of science as a tool used in predicting the future

23
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”,41

24
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 42

10
through past experience. Such notion of physical object can be compare epistemologically to

spiritual or metaphysical entities. Although, Quine believes seriously on the physical objects, he

is of the view that physical objects and metaphysical or abstract entities differ only in degree, but

not in kind, when viewed epistemologically.25 Thus, the totality of science, that is, natural

science, human science and mathematical science have all been extremely underdetermined by

experience, rather than being squared with experience. At this, Quine is said to have brought

down an edifice that was erected and known to have govern empiricism in the modern era by

espousing a more pragmatic way of asserting meaningfulness of sentences, statements and

propositions, be it metaphysical or empirical entities, without any condition to either the dogma

of analyticity or dogma of reductionism, but through an empiricism that is devoid completely of

any dogmas.

Evaluation

Before the advent of the scientific revolution, the general view was that scientific knowledge is

the most genuine knowledge. The scientific method is considered as the surest and most reliable

in attainment of rational certainty and epistemic justifications 26 of epistemic claims. One of the

virtues of logical positivism is that it is a view of scientific explanation. Historically, positivism

has been criticized for its reductionism, which is for contending that all processes are reducible

to physiological, physical or chemical events, social, moral, emotional and ethical processes are

reducible to what can be felt and that the biological organisms are reducible to physical entities.

This corresponds to pragmatism. Logical positivism and pragmatism are similar, in that they

each tie the meaning of a statement to empirical experience. A common criticism of logical

positivism is that it is self-refuting: its verification principle is itself neither a duplication nor

25
W.V.O Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, 43
26
W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 32-34.

11
empirically verifiable; thus, it fails on its own criteria and is meaningless. In other words, its

verification is itself not verifiable. Also, another challenge on the logical positivism is that it

eliminates important scientific concepts that do not pass the verification test, such as theoretical

entities like atoms, protons, electrons. This is nothing but a blow on its own self, for all of these,

the atoms, protons, electron, all belong to the domain of science. Nevertheless, it offers scientific

explanations to reality and so strengthens science in its domain. Thus, it is scientifically acclaims

and preaches careful analysis and criticism. All of the above, Quine has technically pointed out

in his notion of two dogmas of empiricism which is indeed a plausible one; in fact, his idea

gives more meaning to and brings about the development of different thesis in the field not just

of philosophy of language but approximately in all areas of philosophy. One may however point

out that, his notion is a critique to the logical positivists’ doctrine. No doubt, this is very much

welcomed in philosophy. The fact remains that in philosophy there is no perfect argument and

this was why the British philosophers of language, Paul Grice and P.F Strawson also challenged

Quine’s notion. They gave an argument as regards Quine’s idea in which they state that Quine

was skeptical about synonyms and his skepticism about synonyms leads to a skeptical position

on what meaning is.27 However, some philosophers, the positivists often claim that analytic

truths are true by definition or true in virtue of meaning alone. Quine’s position on this is that,

what these philosophers have in mind is the idea that a sentence is analytic if and only if it can be

turned into a logical truth by replacing synonyms with synonyms. This leads to a first attempt to

define analyticity ‘S’ is analytic, equals to ‘S’ can be turned into a logical truth by replacing

synonyms with synonyms.28 The term ‘bank’ is not always synonymous to the ‘store for money’.

27
Grice, H. P. and Strawson, P. F., In Defense of a Dogma, (Duke: Duke University Press, 1956), Vol. 65, No. 2.
28
Jeff Speaks, “Quine on the Analytic and Synthetic distinction”, https://www.3.ndedu>mcgil.quime accessed on
April 1th, 2022.

12
It may sometimes refer to the beginning of a river. Here, analyticity is more than mere synonyms

replacement. Quine’s proposition is very plausible in this regard.

Despite the plausibility in Quine’s idea, some academic stamina have pointed out some flaws in

his idea. Jerrold Katz raises an argument against Quine by noting that Quine's circularity

argument needs two of the logical positivists' central theses to be effective: (1) All necessary

truths (and all a priori truths) are analytic. (2) Analyticity is needed to explain and legitimate

necessity. It is only when these two theses are accepted that Quine's argument holds. It is not a

problem that the notion of necessity is presupposed by the notion of analyticity if necessity can

be explained without analyticity.29 So, the whole idea of analyticity is still evident because Quine

cannot just critic the idea of the philosopher of language there will be some loopholes in his

arguments and that is what Katz has pointed out.

More so, Hillary Putnam argues that Quine is attacking two different notions. Analytic truth

defined as a true statement derivable from a tautology by putting synonyms for synonyms is near

Kant's account of analytic truth as a truth whose negation is a contradiction. 30 Analytic truth

defined as a truth confirmed no matter what however, is closer to one of the traditional accounts

of a priori. However, for Kant he believes that analytic truth has its subject contain in the

predicate unlike Quine who believes that analytic truth does not exist but they involve in

empirical aspect. He holds that they are grounded in meaning while synthetic statements are

grounded in facts. Regardless of the objections raised against Quine, there is no doubt saying that

his contribution is of great importance to philosophy. From his views, we see how reductionism

poses a great danger to the working patterns of the human brain. The brain, though it sometimes

29
Katz J.J., the Philosophy of Language, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 240-282.
30
Putnam Hilary, “Two Dogmas Revisited,” In Contemporary Aspects of Philosophy (Stockfield: Oriel Press, 1976),
202-213.

13
forgets, it takes time to recall what it has forgotten. Reductionism however is against this

principle as it is dogmatic to immediate verification. The brain may not be able to immediately

recall what is to be verified. With this, that which really is, may become what is not because of

the delay in remembrance. Reductionism therefore, if not refuted as did Quine, may continue to

pose danger not just on the brain but also on knowledge in general. It suffices therefore that to

support Quine in his contribution to philosophy.

And so, when we talk about the attainment of knowledge, it is not all what that is, that can be

known. Of course, the human person in his quest for knowledge is not limited in knowing certain

things. What is really needed is what Quine really calls the metaphysical article of faith. This

implies that there are certain existing realities which cannot be known empirically, but by

metaphysical dogma of faith, which even if doubted, should be accepted as existing realities.

This, cannot but directs our minds to the principle which we shall call the comprehensibility

principle. By this principle, we mean the establishment of meanings of linguistic statements by

the way such statements are understood and conceived by those involved. In other words, a

statement is meaningful insofar that its components can be understood. The form of

understanding in this regards, is dependent first, on the concepts used. This is what we call

conceptual comprehension of a statement. For instance, in statement, ‘No bachelor is married’,

the concepts contained –bachelor and married must first be understood for one to be able to give

the statement adequate meaning. The second form of the directness principle is that which deals

with the contextual understanding of the statement. This is where really lies the task of assigning

meanings to statements. The contextual comprehension of a statement has to do with

understanding the context at which a statement is proclaimed. This is determined by the total

examination and consideration of each of the concepts used in a given statement. In other words,

14
though the contextual comprehension of a statement in determining the meaning of a statement is

superior to the conceptual comprehension, it is dependent on the latter for its exercise. This does

not need the substitution of synonyms for synonyms as held by the positivist, to make meanings

out statements. The statement ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ needs not the synonym ‘unmarried’

to replace ‘bachelor’ to make sense. The substitution of ‘unmarried’ for ‘bachelor’ presupposes

that there is meaning already inherent in it. But examining the conceptual components of the

statement –‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’, helps one to attain its contextual meaning. The concept

‘bachelor’ can also be referred to an academic degree, such as Bachelor of Science. When

adopted in this format, contextually can never attract the concept, ‘unmarried’. This will be a

semantic error.

Conclusion

The central focus of this work is based on the meaningfulness of statements. Having gone

through this work, we have come to the understanding of what the criteria of asserting statement

to be meaningful or meaningless. Here we are presented with Quine’s criticism of the modern

empiricism based upon their criteria of judging the meaningful statements from meaningless

ones.

Quine continuous to emphasize that inasmuch as revelation of one statement leads compulsorily

to the revelation of other statements, then the total field of science is underdetermined by

experience. This is because, there are no popular experiences that are linked with particular

statements at the interior of scientific field, except through an indirect generalization affecting

the whole of scientific field. Thus, his criticism of the modern empiricism brought more light

into the field of analytic philosophy and in the discourse of sentential meaning as well as to

15
philosophy in general, even though not all of his arguments against the modern empiricism can

be accepted by all.

16