“CONTEMPT OF COURT BY ADVOCATES AND ITS REMEDIES, JUDGMENTS OF

2015-2020”

FINAL DRAFT SUBMITTED IN THE COMPLETE FULFILLMENT FOR THE COURSE-PROFESSIONAL

ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM FOR THE ATTAINING DEGREE OF B.B.A.,
LL.B. (HONS.)

SUBMITTED By- SUBMITTED TO:

ADITI CHANDRA (1806) DR. ANSHUMAN

B.B.A., LL.B. (HONS.) FACULTY OF

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING SYSTEM

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NYAYANAGAR-MITHAPUR, PATNA

800001

September, 2021
 INDEX

DECLARATION.......................................................................................................1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.........................................................................................2
INTRODUCTION: MEANING OF CONTEMPT.................................................................3
IMPORTANCE AND CLASSIFICATION OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.................................6
DUTIES OF ADVOCATE TOWARDS THE COURT, HIS CLIENT AND HIS OPPONENT.10
CONTEMPT OF COURT BY ADVOCATES...................................................................12
PUNISHMENTS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT...............................................................15
REMEDIES AVAILABLE AGAINST THE ORDER OF PUNISHMENT..............................17
RECENT JUDGMENTS IN CONTEMPT CASES (2015-2020)........................................19
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................28
BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................................................................................29

1
 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work reported in the B.B.A., LL. B (Hons.) Project Report entitled
“Professional Ethics and Professional Accounting System” submitted at Chanakya National Law
University is an authentic record of my work carried out under the supervision of Dr. Anshuman.
I have not submitted this work elsewhere for any other degree or diploma. I am fully responsible
for the contents of my Project Report.

NAME OF CANDIDATE:

ADITI CHANDRA

CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, PATNA.

2
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I have taken efforts in this project. However, it wouldn’t have been possible without the kind
support of many individuals and institutions. I would like to extend my thanks to all of them.

I thank my God for providing me with everything I required in completion of this project. 

I am highly indebted to my faculty Dr. Anshuman for his guidance and constant supervision as
well as providing necessary information regarding the project and also for his support in the
completion of this project.

I would like to express my gratitude towards my parents for their kind cooperation,
encouragement and guidance regarding this project.

Also, I would like to thank my friends and batch mates who willingly helped me out in the
development of this project.

THANK YOU

NAME: ADITI CHANDRA

COURSE: B.B.A., LL.B.(HONS)

ROLL NO: 1806

SEMESTER: IX

3
 INTRODUCTION: MEANING OF CONTEMPT

The legal profession is a solemn and serious occupation. It is a noble calling and all those who
belong to are its honorable members. Although the entry to the profession can be had acquiring
merely the qualification of technical competence, the honor as a professional has to be
maintained by its members, by their exemplary conduct both in and outside the court.

The object and need of the contempt jurisdiction or contempt of Court the Court has held that the
object of the contempt power is not to vindicate the dignity and honor of the individual Judge
who is personally attacked or scandalized, but to uphold the majesty of law and administration of
justice. The foundation of the Judiciary is the trust and confidence of the people in its ability to
deliver fearless and impartial justice.

The judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. Hence judiciary is not the third pillar but the
central pillar of the democratic state and any misconduct that taints its dignity should not go
unpunished. Misconduct is a sufficiently wide expression. It is not necessary that it should
involve moral turpitude. Any conduct which in any way renders a man unfit for the exercise of
his profession or is likely to hamper or embarrass the administration of justice maybe considered
to be misconduct calling for disciplinary action. It cannot be said that an advocate can never be
punished for professional misconduct committed by him in his personal capacity.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions for Contempt

 Amongst all the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of Indian Constitution, Article 19(1)
(a), i.e., freedom of speech and expression is the most sensitive one and is prone to controversy.
If exercised negligently, without abiding by the limitations prescribed under Article 19(2), a
person, on one hand can be booked for defamation and on the other, hangs the probability of
prosecution for “Criminal Contempt”.

Article 129 of the Constitution, makes the Supreme Court “a court of record” and confers power
to punish for contempt of itself. Whereas, Article 142 empowers the Court to provide
punishment for contempt, subject to any other law made in this behalf by the Parliament. Similar
powers have been vested in the High Court by the virtue of Article 215 which makes the High

4
Court “a court of record”, implying that only Supreme Court and High Courts are empowered to
adjudicate criminal contempt proceedings.

Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 specifically empowers the High Courts to punish
contempt of subordinate courts. Similarly, Section 15(2) says even in the case of criminal
contempt of subordinate court, proceedings for contempt are to be initiated by the High Court on
a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-
General* (or Law officer in cases of Union Territory). It is pertinent to mention here, High
Court, for the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would include the Court of Judicial
Commissioner1.

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Objective

In India, contempt proceedings are governed by Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Contrary to the
obvious conception, the objective of the Act as mentioned in the Act is:

“…to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempts of courts and to
regulate their procedure in relation thereto.”

The rationale behind this enactment can be best described by pronouncement of Justice Wilmot
in Rex v.  Almon2: 

“And whenever men’s allegiance to the law is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and
most dangerous obstruction of justice and…calls out for a more rapid and immediate redress
than any obstruction whatsoever, not for the sake of the Judges as private individuals but
because they are the channels by which the King’s justice is conveyed to the people …”3.

1
Section 2(d), Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
2
 (1965) Wilm 243
3
Law Commission of India, 274th  Report, Review of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, April 2018

5
Aims and Objectives:

The aim of this project is to understand what constitutes contempt of court and consequences of
contempt of court by advocates and legal professionals.

Scope and Limitations:

This paper is limited to examining Indian law in detail.

Style of Writing:

The researcher has used bluebook method of citation through this paper

Research Questions:

1. What constitutes contempt of court?

2. What is the importance and classification of Contempt of Court?
3. What are the duties of an advocate towards the court, his client and his opponent?
4. What kind of behaviour by an advocate amount to contempt of court?
5. What are the punishments available for contempt of court? What are the actions taken by
Bar Council of India in this case?
6. What are the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Court in the event of Contempt
by Advocate?
7. What are the remedies available against the punishment for contempt of court?

The researcher has attempted to answer all these in this paper.

6
 IMPORTANCE AND CLASSIFICATION OF CONTEMPT OF COURT

Contempt in law means being disobedient to a court of law or towards it ruling. The recognition
of contempt of court and to punish for contempt is essential for a nation such as India which is
based on the concept of rule of law, which requires supremacy of law, since the judiciary is
considered, as the last bastion of hope and justice for the citizens of any nation.

According to the Supreme court bar association v. Union of India (1995), The object of

punishment is both curative and corrective and these coercions are meant to assist an individual
complainant to enforce his remedy and there is also an element of public policy for punishing
civil contempt since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court
of law is to be disregarded with impunity.

Depending on the nature of the case in India, Contempt of Court is of two types.

1. Civil Contempt

2. Criminal Contempt

 CIVIL CONTEMPT
Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 states Civil Contempt as wilful
disobedience to the order, decree, direction, any judgment or writ of the Court by any person
or willfully breach of undertakings by a person given to a Court.  Since Civil Contempt
deprives a party of the benefit for which the order was made so these are the offences
essential of private nature. In other words, a person who is entitled to get the benefit of the
court order, this wrong is generally done to this person4.
O Defenses to Civil Contempt
A person who is accused of Civil Contempt of case can take the following defences:
 Lack of Knowledge of the order: A person cannot be held liable for Contempt of
Court if he does not know the order given by the court or he claims to be unaware of
the order. There is a duty binding on the successful party by the courts that the order
that has passed should be served to the Individual by the post or personally or through

4
Contempt of Court; https://blog.ipleaders.in/contempt-of-court-2/#Civil_Contempt

7
 the certified copy. It can be successfully pleaded by the contemner that the certified
copy of the order was not formally served to him.
 The disobedience or the breach done should not be: If someone is pleading under
this defence then he can say that the act done by him was not done willfully, it was just
a mere accident or he/she can say that it is beyond their control. But this plead can only
be successful if it found to be reasonable otherwise your plead can be discarded.
 The order that has disobeyed should be vague or ambiguous: If the order passed by
the court is vague or ambiguous or this order is not specific or complete in itself then a
person can get the defence of contempt if he says something against that order. In R.N.
Ramaul v. State of Himachal Pradesh 5, this defence has been taken by the respondent.
In this case, the Supreme Court has directed the corporation of the respondent to restore
the promotion of the petitioner from a particular date in the service. But the respondent
has not produced the monetary benefit for the given period and a complaint was filed
against him for Contempt of Court. He pleads for the defence on the given evidence
that it has not mentioned by the court in order to pay the monetary benefit. Finally, he
gets the defence.
 Orders involve more than one reasonable interpretation: If the contempt of any
order declared by the court and the order seems to be given more than one reasonable
and rational interpretation and the respondent adopts one of those interpretations and
works in accordance with that then he will not be liable for Contempt of Court. 
 Command of the order is impossible: If compliance of the order is impossible or it
cannot be done easily then it would be taken as a defence in the case of Contempt of
Court. However, one should differentiate the case of impossibility with the case of mere
difficulties. Because this defence can be given only in the case of the impossibility of
doing an order.
 CRIMINAL CONTEMPT
According to Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, Criminal Contempt is
Defined as (i) the publication of any matter by words, spoken or written, or by gesture, or by
signs, or by visible representation or (ii) doing of any act which includes:
a) Scandalize or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court, or

5
R.N. Ramaul v. State of Himachal Pradesh ; AIR 1991 SC 1171

8
 b) Biasness, interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any type of Judicial
proceedings, or
c) obstructs or tends to obstruct, interfere or tend to interfere with the administration of
justice in any manner.
The offence of contempt is not absolute and act of contempt per se does not entail
punishment (Exceptions—Sections 3 to 8). Exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts
Act shall have to be rather cautious and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the
true effect of the contemptuous conduct6.
o Defences Available
 Innocent Publication – SECTION 3 shows that immunity attaches to certain statements
or certain matter which may interfere or tend to interfere or obstruct or tend to obstruct
the course of justice in connection with any civil or criminal proceedings pending at the
time of the publication. However, if the persons so publishing had at the time of its
publication no reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding was pending, the
publication is described by this section as “innocent”7.
 Fair and Accurate Report of Judicial Proceeding – SECTION 4. Subject to the
provisions contained in SECTION 7, a person shall not be guilty of contempt of court for
publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial proceeding or any stage thereof.
Section 7 refers to leakage of information whereas Section 4 refers to reporting of court
proceedings. Leakage defeats very purpose of hearing in chambers or in camera8.
 Fair Criticism – SECTION 5. Fair criticism is another defense to criminal contempt of
court. It is the privileged right of the Indian citizen to believe what he considers to be
true and to speak out his mind, though not, perhaps, always with the best of tastes; and
speak, perhaps, with greatest courage than care for exactitude. Judiciary is not exempt
from such criticism. But there is no justification to resort to this freedom and privilege

6
Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman, (2001) 3 SCC 739
7
Prabhakar Laxman Mokashi v. Sadanand Trimbak Yardi, 1973 SCC OnLine Bom 79
8
Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603

9
 to criticize the proceedings during their pendency by persons who are parities and
participants9. 
 Complaint against Presiding Officer – SECTION 6. A person shall not be guilty of
contempt of court in respect of any statement made by him in good faith concerning the
presiding officer of any subordinate court to—
(a) any other subordinate court, or
(b) the High Court, to which it is subordinate.

In addition to above mentioned defences, an accused can also seek defence of truth, apology
and ignorance can serve as mitigating factors in some cases.

 Truth as a Defence –Section 13 of the Act enables the Court to permit justification by
truth as a valid defence in any contempt proceedings if it satisfied that such a defence
is in the public interest and the request for invoking the defence is bona fide. Truth
should ordinarily be allowed as a defence unless the Court finds, that it is only a
camouflage to escape the consequences of the deliberate attempt of scandalizing the
Court. However, for considering the truth as valid defence there is a twin
requirement----a) defence is in public interest, and b) request for invoking the defence
is bona fide10. 
 Apology – Proviso to Section 12(1) of the Act says that the accused may be
discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the Court. The apology tendered should impress the court to be
genuine and sincere. If the court, on being impressed of his genuineness, accepts the
apology then it could be said that the contemnor has purged himself of the guilt11.

9
Sheela Barse v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 226
10
Prashant Bhushan, In re, (2021) 3 SCC 160: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 698
11
Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650

10
 DUTIES OF ADVOCATE TOWARDS THE COURT, HIS CLIENT AND HIS
OPPONENT

An advocate owes certain duties towards different aspects of the society, community and the
country. He also owes some of these to the court, his clients, opponents and colleagues. Some of
the duties of a lawyer or an advocate are listed below:
 Duty towards the court
1) An advocate should be straightforward and his arguments should be pointed, clear, precise and
concise.
2) An advocate should have sense of humor and pleasing manners in his arguments.
3) An advocate must be tactful in presenting the matters.
4)An Advocate should not mislead the Court.
5) An advocate shall not influence the decision of the court by any illegal or improper Means.
6) An advocate shall appear in the court at all times only in the prescribed dress. He shall not
wear a band or gown in public places other than in Courts.
7) An advocate shall, when presenting his case and while otherwise acting before a court,
conduct himself with dignity and self-respect.
8) An Advocate shall not enter appearance, act, plead or practice in any way before a Court,
tribunal or authority on behalf of close kith and Kin.
9) An advocate shall not criticize the Judiciary with malice.
10) An advocate should not act or plead in any matter in which he himself pecuniarily interested.
11)An advocate shall not stand as a surety or certify the soundness of a surety for his client,
required for the purpose of any legal proceedings.
12) An advocate Shall assist court by presenting fully the pertinent law in his case.

Duty towards the client

1) An advocate shall fearlessly uphold the interests of his client by All fair and honorable means
without regard any unpleasant consequences to himself or any other.
2) An advocate shall fairly and reasonably submit the case on behalf of his client.
3)  An advocate shall pay attention which he is capable of giving to the case he is dealing.
4) An advocate shall not act on the instructions of any person either than his Client or authorized
agent.

11
5)An advocate shall not ordinarily withdraw from engagements ones accepted, without sufficient
cause and unless reasonable and sufficient notice is given to the client.
6) An advocate shall not do anything whereby be abuses or takes advantage. of the confidence
reposed in him by his client.
7) An advocate shall not accept a fee less than the fee taxable under the rules when the client is
able to pay the same.
8) An advocate shall not adjust fee payable to him by his client against his own personal liability
to the client which liability does not arise in the course of his employment as an advocate.
9) An advocate should keep accounts of the clients’ money entrusted to him.
10) An advocate shall not lend money to his client for the purpose of any action or legal
proceedings in which he is engaged by such client.
11) An advocate shall not disclose Communications made to them in course of their professional
engagement even after the case is over.
Duty towards opponent
1) An advocate shall not communicate or negotiate upon the subject matter of controversy with
any party represented by an advocate except through that advocate.
2) An advocate shall not mislead an opponent, or put him on the wrong scent regarding any point
in the case.
3) An Advocate shall do his best to carry out all legitimate promises made to the opposite party
even though not reduced to writing.

12
 CONTEMPT OF COURT BY ADVOCATES

The legal profession is a noble profession and advocates are considered as officers of the court
and the nobility of the legal profession is ensured by complying with the code of conduct laid
down by the Advocate’s Act.

Chapter 2 Part V of the Bar Council of India rules12 provides the code of ethics which is to be
followed by advocates. A part of the rules deals with the Advocate’s duty towards the court. For
the purpose of this article rules which are important include:

 Advocate has to keep in mind the dignity of the judge.

 It is the duty of the advocate to perform his function in such a manner that due to his acts
the honour and integrity of the court are not affected.

According to Chief Justice Marshall, the fundamental aim of Legal ethics is to maintain the
honour and dignity of the law profession.

However, what acts constitute to mar the dignity of courts and judges is not specified and this
has been criticized by many imminent lawyers. A fundamental question arises, whether
criticizing the judge in his personal capacity amounts to an act, which is against the ethics of the
legal profession and scandalizes the authority of the court. 

According to Dushyant Dave (President, Supreme Court Bar association) in response to

contempt proceeding against imminent Human rights lawyer Prashant Bhushan, scandalizing a
judge as a Judicial officer is different from scandalizing the judge as an individual”.

Criticism of judges according to eminent jurists around the globe ought not to be considered as a
violation of ethics towards the court. As the former Chief Justice Gajendragadkar said:

“We ought never to forget that power to punish for contempt, large as it is must always be
exercised cautiously, wisely and with circumspection. Frequent and indiscriminate use of this
power, in anger, would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the court, but may sometimes
affect it adversely”.

 Bar Council of India rules; chromeextension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/viewer.html?pdfurl=http%3A

12

%2F%2Fwww.barcouncilofindia.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads
%2F2010%2F05%2FBCIRulesPartVonwards.pdf&clen=3260032&chunk=true

13
It must be kept in mind that justice is not a cloistered (closed) virtue, and it must be allowed to
suffer scrutiny since this is the essence of democracy. 13Criticizing judges or even the court as an
institution is the essence of democracy and suppressing it under the garb of contempt casts a
chilling effect on the free speech of an advocate. Higher judiciary has unbridled power in
deciding what constitutes criminal contempt. The initiation of contempt proceeding against
Advocate Prashant Bhushan has been criticized not just by his fellow advocates but also retired
judges and free speech activists.

To criticize a judge is a necessary right. Justice Markendey Katju said in a 2007 lecture on Law
of contempt.

“If a person calls me a fool, whether inside the court or outside court, I for one would not take
action as it does not prevent me from functioning.”

According to Arun Shourie and Adv. Prashant Bhushan, Scandalizing the authority of the
Court under Criminal Contempt, violates freedom of Speech and is manifestly arbitrary.
According to them, the language is vague enough to encompass within its sweep legitimate
criticism as well, thus violating the Doctrine of Overbreadth. For them, it is rooted in colonial
assumption and objects and has no place in a democracy.

Further, if any comment is made against an individual judge, it must be ascertained whether it
interferes with the administration of justice or impairs a judge in the adjudication process. This is
because under section 13 of Contempt of Courts Act,1971 a person cannot be punished for
Contempt unless the act “substantially interferes with the due course of Justice”. In P.N. Duda
vs. V. P. Shiv Shankar & Ors. (1988), the court stated that criticism of the court that does not
hamper the administration of justice cannot be punished as contempt. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that when a court exercises the power of criminal contempt, it does not do so to
vindicate the dignity and honour of the individual judge who is personally attacked or
scandalized but to uphold the majesty of the law and the administration of justice.

Contempt by lawyers is the most pertinent problem before the Courts these days. There are
several instances of misconduct, which have been taken as contempt of Court. For example,
using insulting language against the judge, making scandalous allegations against a judge,
13
Contempt of court and professional ethics;
https://blog.ipleaders.in/contempt-court-professional-ethics/#Role_of_ethics_in_the_contempt_of_court_and_analys
is_of_criminal_contempt_of_the_courts

14
suppressing the facts to obtain favorable order, allegation of partiality and unfairness against the
judge, etc. An advocate who advises his clients to disobey the Court is. Also held liable for
contempt Courts. In Bar Council election, attacking judiciary is also taken as contempt of court if
a council or an advocate refuse to answer the question of the Court.
A lawyer who advises his clients to disobey the judgment or the order of the court is guilty of
contempt of court. Further, when a lawyer refuses or ignores to answer the question asked to him
by the court, he is liable for contempt of court. The lawyer in his pleadings or arguments cannot
use language which is intemperate or unparliamentary, which undermines the dignity of the
court.14
A lawyer who is disrespectful to the judge, questions his authority, shouts or yells at him, loses
his temper in the court, threatens the judge with impeachment or transfer, uses insulting or
abusive language, dictates the judge to pass a favorable judgment, or does any act that interferes
or obstructs the administration of justice amounts to contempt of court. In re Nandlal Balwani
case15, 1999, the advocate chanted slogans in court and even hurled his shoe towards the court.
This was taken as gross criminal contempt of court and was punished for the same. The
advocate’s apology was rejected by the court by saying that it was not genuine or bonafide and
was made only to escape punishment.
A lawyer imposing unfounded and false allegations of corruption on the judge, accusing the
judge to be unfair as a ground of appeal to the appellate court, convincing the client to make a
false affidavit, false documents, give false testimony amounts to contempt of court. Moreover, a
lawyer withholding the funds of the client and not giving back even after repeated requests by
the client, or acting as a lawyer without having necessary qualification also amounts to contempt
of court.

14
Contempt of Court by lawyers, judges, state and corporations; https://cometowardssuccess.com/contempt-of-
court-by-lawyers-judges-state-and-corporations/
15
In Re: Mr. Nand Lal Balwani; 1999 (1) SCR 937

15
 PUNISHMENTS FOR CONTEMPT OF COURT

Article 129 and 215 empower the Supreme court and the High courts to punish its contempt.
Accordingly, Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides for punishment for
contempt of court. It incorporates the type and extent of punishment which the courts can give
for contempt. According to section 12 contempt may be punished either by simple imprisonment
of 6 months or a fine of Rs. 2000 or both. The further section makes it clear that the punishment
for contempt cannot exceed the 6-month imprisonment and fine of Rs 2000. Thus, this is the
maximum punishment which the courts can give for contempt.

Further section 12 also states that imprisonment should only be imposed if it is necessary to do in
the interest of justice. In Smt. Pushpaben and another vs. Narandas V. Badiani and Anr. 16 the
supreme court said that the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 confers special power on the court to
impose imprisonment and the court must give a special reason with a proper application of mind
while giving a sentence of imprisonment. It further said that the Sentence of a fine is the rule
while imprisonment is an exception. In the Supreme Court bar association v. Union of
India17 said that for imposing imprisonment, the contempt has to be serious enough and that it
must consider the likelihood of interference with the administration of justice. Culpability of the
offender and that the intention for the act of contempt is a crucial factor while considering
imprisonment as punishment for contempt. Further according to section 10 of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971, the High courts have the jurisdiction and authority to punish for the contempt
of courts subordinate to it as well.

Supreme Court’s power to debar the advocates

The question of whether an advocate convicted of contempt of Court can be debarred by the
Courts from practicing the law was dealt with in the case of Supreme Court Bar Association v.
Union of India. In this case, the Constitution bench of the Court upheld the right of Bar Councils
to try advocates for alleged professional misconduct. It held that Courts cannot suspend or
revoke the licenses of advocates on their contempt and that the said power vests with the Bar
Council. But the observation, which read as follows, shows an important distinction between

16
Smt. Pushpaben and another vs. Narandas V. Badiani and Anr; 1979 AIR 1536
17
Supreme Court bar association v. Union of India;

16
preventing an advocate from appearing before the Court (debarring) and suspending or revoking
the Advocate’s license.

“In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the High Court, to prevent the contemner
advocate to appear before it, till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different
from suspending or revoking his license or debarring him to practice as an advocate.”

It said that although parliament or state legislature has the power to make law in contempt of
court, such legislation cannot denude, abrogate or nullify the power of the supreme court to
punish under article 129 or vest that power in some other court. This, it said because the
Supreme Court is a court of record and being a court of record, it has an inherent power to
punish and no law can take away this inherent jurisdiction (power) of a court of record. In
simple words, it means that the Supreme Court and the High Court being courts of record, they
have the power to punish for contempt of itself respectively as well as contempt of courts which
are subordinate to it and no law can take away the inherent jurisdiction.

It further differentiated between the power of the High court and that of the Supreme Court to
punish for contempt. It said that the Act of 1971 does not deal with the power of the Supreme
Court to punish for contempt of itself and only article 142(2) and 129 deals with it. This is
because in the definitions clause of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 there is no mention of the
Supreme Court and as the Supreme Court said that section 15 only deals with the procedure by
which the Supreme Court can take cognizance of an act of contempt. Thus, it said that the nature
of punishment under Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 may act as a guide for the supreme court but
the extent (quantum) of punishment under the act can apply only to the High courts. This is
because according to the court, the1971 act ipso facto does not deal with the contempt
jurisdiction of the supreme court.

17
 REMEDIES AVAILABLE AGAINST THE ORDER OF PUNISHMENT

Following remedies are available against the punishment order under Contempt of Court Act:
1. Apology: The contemner may under apology to the court and the court may remit the
punishment awarded for contempt, if the court is satisfied that the apology has been made with
real sense of repentance.
In case of A.K.Pandey, the Supreme Court made it clear that the court is not bound to accept the
apology unless there is a feeling of repentance in the contemner. In case of M.C.Mehta vs. Union
of India[13], the Supreme Court further clarified that apology should not be used as a weapon of
defense in case of contempt. The apology must be tendered at the earliest opportunity. An
apology will not be treated as an apology if tendered at a time when court is going to impose a
punishment. However, along with apology the defense taken by contemner can be pleaded.
Explanations to section 12(1) has enabled the contemner to put forward his defense while
pleading apology as this explanation has provided that apology should not be rejected on the
ground that its qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bonafide. Apology will help the
contemner if his explanation has been rejected.
In case of Haridas V. Smt. Usharani18  the apology tendered by contemner was not found to be
genuine as the contemner repeatedly tried to assert that whatever he said was correct and he
would prove it. And at the same time, he tender apology. His apology was not found to be
genuine and he was punished for contempt.
2. Appeal: Contempt of court Act, 1971 has provided for the statutory right of appeal against the
orders of High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for the contempt of the
court. Prior to this act there was no statutory right of appeal but even at that point of time the
person punished under the Contempt of Court Act was not remediless. The High Court itself
could grant the certificate under Article 134 of the Indian Constitution and where the High Court
refused to grant such certificate, the Supreme Court could entertain the appeal by granting
special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
So, the right of appeal prior to 1971 was dependent on the discretion of the court and it was not
by the way of right. Section 19(1) of the act provides right of only one appeal. It provides that an
appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to punish for contempt. If the order of punishment has been passed by single judge of
18
Haridas V. Smt. Usharani; Appeal (civil) 7948 of 2004

18
High Court, there is right of appeal to the division bench of not less than two judges of High
Court. If the order of punishment is passed by a division on bench, then appeal will lie in
Supreme Court.
However, in case of punishment order passed by single judge, the right of appeal gets exhausted
once the appeal is filed before the division bench and there is no further right of appeal under the
Contempt of Court Act.
However, the remedy under Article 136 of Constitution will still be available and the Supreme
Court may grant leave to appeal under Article 136. Section 19(4) provides for the period of
limitation for preferring an appeal.
It provides that an appeal under Article 19(1) shall be filed within thirty days to the division
bench of High Court and in case the order of punishment has been passed by division bench of
High Court then within sixty days to the Supreme Court from the date of the order appealed
against. Section 19(2) deals with the power of Appellate Court during the pendency of appeal. It
provides that during the pendency of the appeal the Appellate Court may pass the following
orders:
1. The execution of the punishment order shall remain suspended.
2. If appellant is under confinement imprisonment, he may be released on bail.
3. The appeal may be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not perched his contempt.

Section 19(3) provided that an appeal under section 19 will lie at the instance of the person
aggrieved. A proceeding for contempt is between the court and the contemner. A person who
moves the application for initiating contempt proceeding does not come within the category of
person aggrieved and therefore he has no locus to file an appeal, if his contention for initiating
the contempt proceeding is rejected. If a person is found guilty for contempt of court, an appeal
will lie under section 19 that the instance of person who is found guilty and is consequently
punished. But if a person is not found guilty of contempt proceedings and proceedings for
contempt is either dismissed or dropped against him then the informant or person who has
moved the application for initiating the contempt will have no right of appeal under section 19 of
the Act. In case of Varda Kant Mishra vs. State of Orissa, it was clarified by Supreme Court that
the order or the decision of High Court refusing to initiate contempt proceedings or dropping the
contempt proceedings or acquitting the contemner (even if initiated the contempt proceedings)

19
cannot be challenged by way of appeal under Section 19. It is only the order of punishment
which can be challenged by way of appeal under section 19 of the act.

RECENT JUDGMENTS IN CONTEMPT CASES (2015-2020)

There have been a number of contempt cases in the last few years which have gathered much
public attention. Some of these cases are discussed below:

 In re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr.

Recently, the Supreme Court has held the advocate Prashant Bhushan as guilty of contempt
of court for his two tweets criticizing the judiciary.
Bhushan's first tweet pertained to a picture of Chief Justice SA Bobde in which he is seen
sitting on a high-end motorcycle. In the second tweet, Bhushan gave an opinion on the role
of the last four chief justices of India in the context of the state of affairs in the country.
The provision of contempt of court is necessary to maintain the sanctity of the Judiciary in
the public eye. However, many constitutional experts and civil society have criticized the
invocation of contempt of court provisions, on the grounds of ambiguity in the legal
provisions and arbitrariness. The Court rejected the argument that the tweet has not really
interfered with administration of justice and relied on past judgements to initiate the
proceedings against the advocate. The court relied on the judgement given in Brahma
Prakash Sharma & Others vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh19in which it ruled that scandalizing
the court is when there is an attack on an individual judge or the court as a whole with or
without reference to particular cases, casting unwarranted and defamatory aspersions on the
character of the judges. This according to the court is necessary because it creates distrust in
the mind of the people and “impairs the confidence of people in the courts which is of prime
importance.
It further relied on the judgement given in C. K. Daphtary & Ors vs. O. P. Gupta & Ors 20
(1971) in which it ruled that any publication which was calculated to interfere with the due
course of justice or administration of the law would amount to Contempt of Court. It said that
a scurrilous attack on a judge, for a judgement or past conduct, has in our country the

19
Brahma Prakash Sharma & Others vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh; 1954 AIR 10
20
C. K. Daphtary & Ors vs. O. P. Gupta & Ors; 1971 AIR 1132

20
inevitable effect of undermining the confidence of the public in the judiciary and if
confidence in judiciary goes, administration of justice definitely suffers.
Court held the first part of the Tweet which stated that, “At a time when he (Chief Justice)
keeps the Supreme Court in lockdown mode, denying citizens the Fundamental Rights to
access to justice” to be contemptuous because according to the Court the tweet criticized the
Chief Justice of India in his capacity as the Chief Justice of India and not as an individual.
The court ruled that the tweet had the tendency to shake the confidence of the public in the
Judiciary and this according to the Court undermines the dignity and authority of the
administration of Justice.
It further said that an attack on the Supreme Court not only reduces the confidence of an
ordinary litigant but also of other judges in the country in its highest Court.
The Court for his 2nd tweet court said that the tweet gives the impression that the Supreme
Court has played a particular role in the destruction of democracy in the last 6 years and this
according to the Court is the criticism of Judiciary as an institution and shakes the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.
The court ruled that an attempt to shake the foundation of Constitutional democracy i.e., the
Judiciary has to be “dealt with an iron hand”. For the Court, the tweets have the effect of
destabilizing the Foundation of Indian Democracy. However there have been issues of
arbitrariness and interpretation of the phrase “scandalizing the court.”
o The expression “scandalizing the court” has not been defined.
o The court also held that fair criticism of judges, if made in good faith in public
interest, is not contempt. But how to ascertain good faith is the million-dollar question
as the Act has not defined it as well.
o When Arun Jaitley, the late minister had said that there are two kinds of judges, one who
knows Law and the other who knows Law minister, it was not taken as contempt. He had
also remarked that pre-retirement judgements are inspired by the post retirement jobs.
o When 4 judges in 2018 held a press conference and questioned the integrity of the CJI
and the court, it was not taken as contempt.
o In a case involving Bhushan himself in 2001, proceedings against him were dropped. The
Supreme Court had held that personal criticism of a judge does not amount to “fair
criticism”.

21
 o Another question is that can a mere tweet really obstruct the administration of justice, and
whether judicial dignity is so fragile that it would get lowered in mature Indian people’s
eyes because of an activist-lawyer’s opinion?
 In Shiv Shankar (1988), the Supreme Court held that a criticism of the court that does
not impair and hamper the administration of justice cannot be punished as
contempt.
Prashant Bhushan judgement gives an impression that the court treated Bhushan’s tweets as
the occasion for the Court to flex its muscle and make clear that it will not tolerate criticism.
It sends a chilling effect to the constitutional right of freedom of speech and expression. The
Court, whom we have always proclaimed to be the defender of the freedom of speech, has by
its judgment curtailed that very freedom by the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction, a
jurisdiction where the Court is judge, victim and prosecutor. The court also brought up an 11-
year-old contempt case against him. That Bhushan’s comments had not lowered the Court’s
esteem or brought it into disrepute for 11 years, that it did not merit disposal during a
pandemic when matters of far greater importance were pending.
 R. Muthukrishnan v The Registrar General Of The High Court Of Judicature At Madras 21
The latest, landmark and laudable judgment by a two-Judge Bench of Supreme, authored by
Justice Arun Mishra for himself and Justice Vineet Saran observed that the Advocates Act
never intended to confer the disciplinary powers upon the High Court or Supreme Court
except to the extent dealing with an appeal under Section 38 of the Act. There can be no
denying or disputing it. It very rightly quashed Rules 14-A to 14-D of the Rules of High
Court of Madras, 1970 holding most emphatically that they are ultra vires to Section 34 of
the Advocates Act and usurps the power of the Bar Council in Disciplinary matters.
The petitioner, an Advocate, filed the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India,
questioning the vires of amended Rules 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D of the Rules of High
Court of Madras, 1970 made by the High Court of Madras under section 34(1) of the
Advocates Act, 1961.
The High Court has inserted Rule 14A in the Rules of High Court of Madras, 1970
empowering the High Court to debar an Advocate from practicing. The High Court has been
empowered to take action under Rule 14B, where any misconduct referred to under Rule 14-
21
R. Muthukrishnan v The Registrar General of The High Court of Judicature at Madras; Writ Petition (C) No. 612
of 2016

22
 A is committed by an Advocate before the High Court then the High Court can debar him
from appearing before the High Court and all subordinate courts. Under Rule 14-B(v) the
Principal District Judge has been empowered to initiate action against the Advocate
concerned and debar him from appearing before any court within such District. In case
misconduct is committed before any subordinate court, the concerned court shall submit a
report to the Principal District Judge and in that case, the Principal District Judge shall have
the power to take appropriate action. The procedure to be followed has been provided in the
newly inserted Rule 14-C and pending inquiry, there is power conferred by way of Rule 14-D
to pass an interim order prohibiting the Advocate concerned from appearing before the High
Court or the subordinate courts.
Striking a note of caution, the Bench also observed in para 74 that, "Contempt of court is a
weapon which has to be used sparingly as more is power, same requires more responsibility
but it does not mean that the court has fear of taking action and its repercussions. The
hallmark of the court is to provide equal and even-handed justice and to give an opportunity
to each of the system to ensure that it improves upon.
Continuing in the same vein, Justice Arun Mishra who authored this judgment for himself
and Justice Vineet Saran, very rightly and commendably points out that, “…Bar and Bench
in order to protect independence have their own inbuilt machinery for redressal of
grievance if any and they are supposed to settle their grievances in accordance therewith
only…” he further clarified that “It is basically not for the Court to control the Bar. It is the
statutory duty of Bar to make it more noble and also to protect the Judges and the legal
system, not to destroy the Bar itself by inaction and the system which is important pillar of
democracy."
 Rakesh Tiwari, Advocate vs Alok Pandey22
The appellant here, who is a lawyer was accused of contempt of court. On 21 December
2012, the lawyer entered the room of the C.J.M along with 2-3 colleagues and started abusing
him during the lunch hour. Not only did the appellant entered the C.J.M’s room without
permission, but he also started abusing, threatening him of future consequence and also
raised his hands upon the C.J.M. The Allahabad High Court convicted him for simple
imprisonment of six months along with a fine of Rs. 2000. The Court further prohibited him

22
Rakesh Tiwari, Advocate vs Alok Pandey; Criminal Appeal No.1223 of 2015

23
to not enter the premises of the District Judgeship of Allahabad for the next six months. In
case of non- payment of fine, the appellant has to further undergo simple imprisonment of 15
days. The appellant was put under observation for a period of two years and in case of further
disturbance, the District Judge will report the matter to the High Court. The petition is filed
by the accused advocate who stated that he has seen the C.J.M. along the accused of his
client’s case and also denied the facts that he abused the judge. The High Court, on the other
hand, have found the advocate along with 2-3 junior advocates entered and misbehaved with
the CJM in his chamber.
The Apex Court was disappointed seeing the unapologetic nature of the advocate and thus
suspended the judgment of the sentence of imprisonment of 6 months to a further period of 3
years subject to his proper conduct. The Court also observed that-
“A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client and must place before the Court
all that can fairly and reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client. He may even submit
that a particular order is not correct and may ask for a review of that order. At the same time,
a member of the Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court in which he is
appearing. He must uphold the dignity and decorum of the Court and must not do anything to
bring the Court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly overstepped the limits of
propriety when he made imputations of partiality and unfairness against the Munsif in open
Court. In suggesting that the Munsif followed no principle in his orders, the appellant was
adding insult to injury, because the preliminary point of jurisdiction and Court fees, which
order had been upheld by the High Court in revision. Scandalizing the Court in such manner
is really polluting the very fount of justice; such conduct as the appellant indulged in was not
a matter between an individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial service; it
brought into disrepute the whole administration of justice. From that point of view, the
conduct of the appellant was highly reprehensible.
In the instant case the advocate has acted contrary to the obligations. He has set a bad
example before others while destroying the dignity of the court and the Judge. The action has
the effect of weakening of confidence of the people in courts. The judiciary is one of the
main pillars of democracy and is essential to peaceful and orderly development of society.
The Judge has to deliver justice in a fearless and impartial manner. He cannot be intimidated
in any manner or insulted by hurling abuses. Judges are not fearful saints. They have to be

24
 fearless preachers so as to preserve the independence of the judiciary which is absolutely
necessary for survival of democracy. Additional three years of observation was levied on him
along with the previous judgment commencing from 1.7.2019- 30.6.2022
 In Re: Vijay Kurle23
After finding advocates Vijay Kurle, Nilesh Ojha and Rashid Khan Pathan guilty of levelling
scandalous allegations against Justice RF Nariman and Justice Vineet Saran, the bench of
Deepak Gupta and Aniruddha Bose, JJ has sentenced all 3 to undergo simple imprisonment
for a period of 3 months each with a fine of Rs. 2000/-. It further said that in default of
payment of fine, each of the defaulting contemnors shall undergo further simple
imprisonment for a period of 15 days.
However, keeping in view the COVID-19 pandemic and the lockdown conditions, the Court
directed that the sentence shall come into force after 16 weeks from the date of the order-
“when the contemnors should surrender before the Secretary General of this Court to
undergo the imprisonment. Otherwise, warrants for their arrest shall be issued.”
All 3 of the advocates were not willing to argue on sentence on the ground that according to
them the judgment was per incuriam and they had a right to challenge the same. The Court,
hence, noticed that there was not an iota of remorse or any semblance of apology on behalf
of the contemnors. The Court, hence, said, “Since they have not argued on sentence, we have
to decide the sentence without assistance of the contemnors. In view of the scurrilous and
scandalous allegations levelled against the judges of this Court and no remorse being shown
by any of the contemnors we are of the considered view that they cannot be let off leniently.”
The basis of the contempt proceedings was two letters dated 20.03.2019 and 19.03.2019
received by Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi and other judges of the Court, admittedly
signed by Vijay Kurle (State President of Maharashtra and Goa of the Indian Bar
Association) and Rashid Khan Pathan (National Secretary of the Human Right Security
Council), respectively. The Court had already discharged Mathews Nedumpara last year in
September, after he denied any role in sending those complaints.
It is pertinent to note that the bench of RF Nariman and Vineet Saran, JJ had barred
Nedumpara from practicing as an advocate in the Supreme Court for one year, after he had
argued before the Court during a proceeding:

23
In Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors.; 2020 SCC OnLine SC 407

25
 “Judges of the Court are wholly unfit to designate persons as Senior Advocates, as they
only designate Judges’ relatives as Senior Advocates.” He was referring to the judgment
where with the intent to make the exercise of senior designation more objective, fair and
transparent so as to give full effect to consideration of merit and ability, standing at the bar
and specialized knowledge or exposure in any field of law, the 3-judge bench of Ranjan
Gogoi, RF Nariman and Navin Sinha, JJ laid down elaborate guidelines for the system of
designation of Senior Advocates in the Supreme Court as well as all the High Courts of
India.
He also took the name of Senior Advocate Fali S. Nariman. When cautioned by the Court, he
took his name again. Thereafter, on being questioned by the Court as to what the relevance of
taking the name of Fali S. Nariman was, he promptly denied having done so.
On April 27, 2020, the Court found all 3 advocates guilty of contempt and said, “The
allegations are also scurrilous and scandalous and such allegations cannot be permitted to
be made against the Judges of highest Court of the country.”
Holding both the complaints as ex-facie contemptuous wherein highly scurrilous and
scandalous allegations have been levelled against the two judges of this Court, the Court said
that though the   alleged contemnors claim that they are not expressing any solidarity with
Mathews Nedumpara nor do they have anything personal against Justice R.F. Nariman, the
entire reading of the complaints shows a totally different picture— “When we read both the
complaints together it is obvious that the alleged contemnors are fighting a proxy battle for
Shri Nedumpara. They are raking up certain issues which could have been raised only by
Shri Nedumpara and not by the alleged contemnors.”
 Asok Kumar Pandey Case24
The Allahabad High Court at Lucknow has initiated criminal contempt of court proceedings
against a lawyer, Asok Pande for using abusive language against judges while arguing a case,
and calling them 'goondas'.
A Division Bench of Justices Ritu Raj Awasthi and Dinesh Kumar Singh, said that
Pande's conduct amounted to ex facie contempt of court and he had a history of such
behaviour.

24
In Re: Suo Moto- Asok Kumar Pande

26
"He created ruckus in the Court in the morning and atmosphere of the Court got completely
vitiated. He used abusive language against the judges and said that the Judges were
behaving like 'goondas'," the order passed by the High Court on August 18 recorded.
Besides initiating the contempt proceedings, the Court also directed the Bar Council of Uttar
Pradesh to take appropriate disciplinary proceedings against Pande.
"He used intemperate language, indulged in indecent behaviour amounting to gross
misconduct and he challenged the authority of the Court. His conduct was unbecoming a
member of the legal profession," the court said
The Court in its order also observed that it is the duty of judges and lawyers to uphold the
majesty of law and maintain purity in justice delivery system.
"The dignity of judges cannot be allowed to be polluted by these disgruntled and publicity
seeking persons. The past conduct of Sri Asok Pande and ex facie contempt committed by
him today in the Court room does not leave us with any scope other than charging him for
committing ex facie contempt of the court in order to protect the majesty and dignity of this
Court," the Court added.
The incident happened on August 18, when mentioning of cases was progressing before the
Bench.
Asok Pande then stepped into the courtroom in civil dress with an unbuttoned shirt.
When the Court asked him why he was not in lawyer's attire, he said that he had by way of a
public interest litigation petition, challenged the Bar Council Rules prescribing the lawyers
dress code and, therefore, would not wear lawyer's uniform.
He also added that he was appearing in-person and therefore, it was not required for him to
don lawyers’ uniform.
The Court told him that he should at least appear in ‘decent dress’ if he was appearing in
person. On this, he started questioning the Court on ‘what is decent dress’. The Court asked
him to button his shirt, which he did not do.
"He created ruckus in the Court in the morning and atmosphere of the Court got completely
vitiated. He used intemperate language, indulged in indecent behaviour amounting to gross
misconduct and he challenged the authority of the Court. His conduct was unbecoming a
member of the legal profession. When he was warned that if he would not behave properly,
the Court would have no option except to remove him from the Court, he challenged the

27
Court and said that if the Court had power, it could remove him from the Court," the order
passed by the Court said, narrating the events of the day.
The Court also noted that two days prior to that, on August 16, Pande had indulged in similar
unruly behaviour when the hearing in the case relating to Awadh Bar Association elections
was in progress.
"Mr Asok Pande barged in the Court and came to podium without uniform and started
shouting on top of his voice. When the Court asked him that in what capacity, he was
addressing the Court, he said that he was a Member of the Avadh Bar Association and had
every right to address the Court. When the Court asked that why he was not in uniform, he
said that would not don the advocate’s uniform as he had challenged the Bar Council Rules
prescribing the Dress Code for Lawyers," the order said.
In view of these, the Court on August 18 directed police officials to take Pande into custody
till 3 PM.
"We ordered to keep him in custody till 3 PM so that he could come to Court and express his
remorse and tender unconditional apology to the court for his outrageous behaviour in the
Court."
Later that day, a senior member of the Bar Senior Advocate Mohd. Arif Khan mentioned the
matter and requested that the issue be given a quietus.
The Court then asked whether any respected member of the Bar would be willing to take
responsibility for Pande’s future behaviour in court but nobody came forward, the Court
noted.
Accordingly, contempt proceedings were initiated against Pande by the court.
"We hold that Asok Pande has prima facie committed ex facie contempt of Court during the
court proceedings today, i.e, 18-08-2021 which amounts to scandalizing and lowering the
authority of this Court and interference with due course of judicial proceedings and, it also
has tendency to interfere or obstruct the administration of justice," the Court said.

28
 CONCLUSION

Anything that curtails or impairs the freedom of limits of the judicial proceedings or any conduct
that tends to bring the authority and administration of Law into disrespect or disregard or to
interfere with or prejudice parties or their witnesses during litigation, consisting of words spoken
or written which obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice or publishing words
which tend to bring the administration of Justice into contempt, to prejudice the fair trial of any
cause or matter which is the subject of Civil or Criminal proceeding or in any way to obstruct the
cause of Justice, is seen as Contempt of Court The High Court and the Supreme Court being the
Court on record can punish for their contempt, the Supreme Court may also punish for the
contempt of courts subordinate to it.
 In short contempt can be said to be an act or omission which interferes or tends to interfere in
the administration of justice. To constitute contempt, it’s not necessary that there has been actual
interference in the administration of justice. If the act complained of, tends to interfere or
attempts to interfere in the administration of justice, may be taken as contempt. The expression
'administration of justice' is to be used in a very wide sense. It is not confined to the judicial
function of the judge but includes all functions of judges- administrative, adjudicatory and any
other function necessary for the administration of justice.
However, it must be significantly pointed out that the right to speech and expression is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution itself. There must be a balance between the
right to speech and the court's power to punish its criticism.

In a free market place every wing of the State must be open to public criticism. The Judiciary
can’t carve a special status for itself because in India every wing of the state is separate and
equal. The law is a colonial legacy and even England and the USA have upheld freedom to
speech over the Judicial criticism.

29
Many of the developed countries have abolished the scandalizing of court as contempt and so
Indian courts too must consider this proposition. In the words of Lord Atkin, “justice is not a
cloistered virtue”. Lord Denning had said that he would never use the contempt jurisdiction to
uphold his own dignity for “that must rest on surer foundations”. In words that bear repetition, he
said: “We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at
stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself.”

BIBLIOGRAPHY

CASES

 Rex  v. Almon; (1965) Wilm 243

 R.N. Ramaul v. State of Himachal Pradesh ; AIR 1991 SC 1171
 Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman, (2001) 3 SCC 739
 Prabhakar Laxman Mokashi v. Sadanand Trimbak Yardi, 1973 SCC OnLine Bom 79
 Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603
 Sheela Barse v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 226
 Prashant Bhushan, In re, (2021) 3 SCC 160: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 698
 Pravin C. Shah v. K.A. Mohd. Ali, (2001) 8 SCC 650
 In Re: Mr. Nand Lal Balwani; 1999 (1) SCR 937
 Smt. Pushpaben and another vs. Narandas V. Badiani and Anr; 1979 AIR 1536
 Supreme Court bar association v. Union of India;
 Haridas V. Smt. Usharani; Appeal (civil) 7948 of 2004
 Brahma Prakash Sharma & Others vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh; 1954 AIR 10
 C. K. Daphtary & Ors vs. O. P. Gupta & Ors; 1971 AIR 1132
 R. Muthukrishnan v The Registrar General of The High Court of Judicature at Madras; Writ
Petition (C) No. 612 of 2016
 Rakesh Tiwari, Advocate vs Alok Pandey; Criminal Appeal No.1223 of 2015
 In Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors.; 2020 SCC OnLine SC 407
 In Re: Suo Moto- Asok Kumar Pande

ACTS, RULES AND REPORTS

 Constitution of India

30
 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
 Law Commission of India, 274th Report, Review of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, April
2018
 Bar Council of India Rules

ARTICLES

 Contempt of Court; https://blog.ipleaders.in/contempt-of-court-2/#Civil_Contempt

 Contempt of court and professional ethics; https://blog.ipleaders.in/contempt-court-
professional-ethics/#Role_of_ethics_in_the_contempt_of_court_and_analysis_of_criminal_c
ontempt_of_the_courts
 Contempt of Court by lawyers, judges, state and corporations;
https://cometowardssuccess.com/contempt-of-court-by-lawyers-judges-state-and-
corporations/

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