Mobilisation and Militarisation

in the Neo-Babylonian Empire

John MacGinnis

For a phenomenon which, of however short duration, was to live on in memory with
a reputation writ large, it is extraordinary how little we know in detail about the Neo-
Babylonian empire.1 The explanations for this are various―relevant archives may
not have been found, they may have been cleared out by the Persians, they may to a
substantial extent have been written on perishable materials―but in any case this
scarcity of information extends to most aspects of both the internal government of
Babylonia as well as provincial administration. Inevitably this impacts on our under-
standing of the military.
In these circumstances we need to find other ways in which to approach the is-
sue. A good starting point is to take a look at the structure of the Neo-Babylonian
empire. This is important as it is leads into an understanding of the sources of re-
cruitment. Looked at from a historical standpoint the fundamental issue is to what
extent did the Babylonians inherit the empire of Assyria and how did they administer
those lands which they did retain? Following the collapse of Assyrian government in
612 BC the empire was carved up between the Medes and Babylonians, the Medes
taking the northern Zagros while Transpotamia and the Levant fell to the Babyloni-
ans.2 But much uncertainty exists over the line of demarcation and indeed the status
of Assyria itself. Was the Assyrian heartland itself carved in two?
The next question is the nature of Babylonian rule. Babylonia itself was admin-
istered as a network of provinces and tribal areas (with varying degrees of auton-
omy), but what was the situation in the territories outside of Babylonia? Did the
Neo-Assyrian empire smoothly transition into the Neo-Babylonian empire with the
Babylonians neatly take over the provincial administration set in place by the As-
syrians? Did the western part of the empire fall apart in revolt or even simply as a
consequence of the disappearance of central authority? Was the provincial network

1
For earlier remarks on the Neo-Babylonian army see Brinkman 1984, 36–37; Beaulieu 1989,
190–191; Frame 1992, 241–244. Some of the issues touched upon in this paper are also dealt
with in further detail in the author’s monograph Arrows of the Sun: Armed Forces in Sippar in
the First Millennium BC (in press). See also remarks in Kozuh 2006.
2
It is not clear what, if anything, the Cimmerians came away with in terms of territorial conces-
sions. It may be that they were, on paper, assigned the northeastern corner of the Assyrian em-
pire though there seems no likelihood that they would have been in a position to govern it or
even exercise lordship. Alternatively it may be proposed that the Cimmerians were mercenaries
and their reward came in the form of pay and loot.
154 John MacGinnis

replaced with a bank of client kings?

We can address these questions through a number of sources. Key among these
are two building inscriptions from the time of Nebuchadnezzar, the Etemenanki
inscription and the Istanbul fragment. The Etemenanki inscription (which is undated)
commemorates Nebuchadnezzar’s renovation of the ziggurrat in Babylon. Important
to our present purposes is that the text lists the place of origin of the labourers who
worked on the project. After mentioning the troops/workmen (sābē) of Šamaš and
Marduk―certainly meaning Sippar and Babylon―the text documents the participa-
tion of gangs from Ur, Uruk, Larsa, Eridu, Kullab, Nēmed-Laguda and the “land of
Ugar-[x]”3 and then (after a break) Larak, the territories of the Puqūdu, Bīt-Dakkūri,
Bīt-Amukāni and Birātu, and finally Dēr, Agade, Arrapha and Lahīru. This is all
summed up as “the whole of the land of Akkad and the land of Assyria, the kings of
Eber-Nāri, the governors of Hatti, from the Upper Sea to the Lower Sea”. As noted
by Vanderhooft in his analysis of this list, Puqūdu, Bīt-Dakkūri, Bīt-Amukāni and
Birātu are cities or tribal regions in central Babylonia while Dēr, Arrapha and Lahīru
are all east of the Tigris and south of the Lower Zab, in territory which had been
controlled by the Assyrians in the Sargonid period.4 The kings of Eber-Nāri evi-
dently refer to the kings of the Phoenician coastal states (see below), while the gov-
ernors of Hatti must refer to governors of the provinces of inland Syria. The termi-
nology is not standardised―the Babylonian Chronicle also refers to the kings of
Hattu5―but some confirmation of direct rule in Syria is provided by the attestation
of a governor of Arpad in Nebuchadnezzar year 19.6 As regards Assyria, the Ete-
menanki inscription gives no indication what pro-portion of the country was under
Babylonian control. In this respect an important addition to the data is a recently
published text from the archives of the Ebabbara temple in Sippar which documents
the receipt of tithes from the governor of Assur.7 This probably dates to the reign of
Neriglissar. Andrae had indeed postulated that the two Neo-Babylonian temples at
Assur had been built by the governor of the city.8 It would therefore appear that
Assur at any rate fell within the sphere of the Babylonians. There is as yet no infor-
mation on Nineveh.9 Finally, the Etemenanki inscription goes on to mention “the
kings of distant islands in the upper sea and the kings of distant islands in the lower
sea” though without specifying names.10

3
Possibly Ugar-Sallu, Vanderhooft 1999, 37 n. 134.
4
Vanderhooft 1999, 39.
5
The Chronicle records how in his first year of Nebuchadnezzar “All the kings of Hattu came
into his presence and he received their vast tribute” (Grayson 1975, 100).
6
Joannès 1994; Vanderhooft 1999, 99.
7
MacGinnis 2000, 336 BM 63283.
8
Andrae 1938, 164–166.
9
Though there is evidence to suggest that Nineveh was neither abandoned nor completely
destroyed in 612 BC (Dalley 1993).
10
The former might allude to Arpad and Tyre while some confirmation of the latter comes from
the discovery of an inscription of Nebuchadnezzar on the island of Failaka (Ferrara 1975). The
empire may at times have also included Cilicia as far as the border of Piriddu and Lydia, cf.
Lambert 1965, 7 v. 21; Grayson 1975, 103 (Chronicle 6.1), 105 (Chronicle 7 i.7). Cilicia was an
important source of iron in this period. This analysis of the Neo-Babylonian empire is much
indebted to Sack (2004) and Vanderhooft (1999, 36f., 90f.).
 Mobilisation and Militarisation in the Neo-Babylonian Empire 155

The second major source is the Istanbul fragment. This dates to the 7th year of
Nebuchadnezzar and deals with work on the Ezida in Borsippa.11 This too gives a list
of the contributors, in this case starting with high court officials and going on to
detail the prefects (šaknu) of the Sealand and of Iadburu,12 the “legitimate prefect”
(šaknu kēnu) of Zamua;13 named individuals for major tribal groups (Tubliaš, Pu-
qūdu, Dakkuru, Gambulu, Amu-kānu);14 the šangû’s15 of numerous cities (many
broken off) including Dēr, Dūr-Iakin, Limētu, Matkallu, Nēmed-Lagūda, Kullabu,
Udannu, Larsa, Kissik, Bakuššu, together with the qīpu’s of these cities;16 the gover-
nors of the provinces (only Sumandar and Dūr are preserved); and the kings of
coastal cities of the Levant of which the names of Tyre, Gaza, Sidon, Arwad and
Ashdod are preserved.
The third document is BM 63570+, another archival text from the Ebabbara list-
ing allocations of bundles of reeds to the qīpu’s of the temples of numerous cities
along with the rab zammarē and a tupšar ēkalli by the name of Šamaš-šum-ukīn.17
The quantities involved are huge: the individual allocations are by the hundreds and
the summation of 10,000 in line 2 is denoted as part of a larger total. As preserved
the cities represented include Agade, Babylon, Borsippa, Cutha, Dēr, Dūr, Dūr-Enlil,
Sippar, Ur and Uruk as well as Amurru “The West”.18 The fact that the text was
written in Sippar indicates that this is where the allocations had been delivered.19
Clearly, therefore, they were for a project in Sippar or its environs. The obvious
candidate is the Median Wall. Although BM 63570+ does add some names to the list
of locations in the Etemenanki inscription and the Istanbul fragment, its importance
is not so much this as providing independent evi-dence in support of the claims of
Nebuchadnezzar that the cities of the whole of Babylonia participated in contributing
to his great projects.
Taking together these three sources list participations on the part of the high offi-
cials of the court; the cities of Babylonia; the tribal confederations of both Babylonia
and the west; the governors of the Sealand, of the provinces east of the Tigris (Ar-
rapha, Zamua, Lahīru, Dēr) and of the provinces in Syria (māt Hatti); the kings of

11
Vanderhooft 1999, 92.
12
Reading in iv. 33 [PN šá KUR Ia-a]d-[b]u-ri rather than [Ia-a]p-[t]i-ri. For the location of
this province on the Elamite border (perhaps between the Diyala and Dēr) see RlA Jad/tburu.
13
Perhaps the implication of the rather anomalous title šaknu kēnu is that he was the hereditary
ruler of Zamua.
14
These were either the chiefs of the tribes or the government agents in charge of liaising with
them.
15
Vanderhooft is surely wrong in following Oppenheim in rejecting the reading of lúKID.BAR
= šangû. Presumably this is on the basis of the view once held that the šangû was a religious
figure. This has now discounted. The šangû’s position at the head of the temple hierarchy was
as a secular administrator and indeed it is not certain that he had any religious function at all.
See MacGinnis 1995a, 114; MacGinnis 1995b; Bongenaar 1997, 11f.
16
Restoring lúqi-i-pi URUmeš [šu-a-ti] in column iv line 13.
17
The first fragment of this text was published by MacGinnis 1993, re-edited after the
discovery of a new piece of the tablet in MacGinnis 2006.
18
It may be plausibly suggested that the qīpu of Amurru was a political agent responsible for
dealing with the Aramean tribes in the west.
19
Hence the title of the original publication―“Qīpu’s receive”―is wrong: the qīpu’s were
evidently delivering the contributions imposed on their respective cities.
156 John MacGinnis

the Phoenician and Canaanite littoral; and the kings of islands in both the Mediterra-
nean and the Persian Gulf.
This, then, was the Neo-Babylonian empire, and the this picture does allow us to
address the question of what happened to the Assyrian empire in at least general
terms. The area east of the Tigris came into Babylonian control, as did Transpota-
mia. Very likely Assyria itself was divided in half with the Babylonians taking the
south and the north going to the Medes. The degree of continuity maintained in these
regions over the transition from Assyrian to Babylonian rule is difficult to judge and
must in any case have been variable. Some of the provinces of Syria may have
passed smoothly into Babylonian administration. The coastal states of the Levant
gained independence albeit under Babylonian suzerainty.20 As regards the level of
control exercised by the Neo-Babylonian monarchy over the empire, Vanderhooft
has argued that the Assyrian provincial system had collapsed and that the Neo-
Babylonian empire was not a network of directly governed provinces but rather a
zone of dominance from which the kings in Babylon exacted tribute.21 If correct it is
worth noting that this is exactly how the Assyrian empire started out. However this
view has been challenged by Sack who argues that there was no such decisive break
with the Assyrian past.22 It would probably be fair to say that at the moment the
evidence is just not sufficient for a definitive answer.
If the preceding seems somewhat lengthy, it is nevertheless a necessary prelude
to addressing the composition of the Neo-Babylonian army. And the texts discussed
hint at another point which is important: the administrative procedures which suc-
ceeded in marshalling these labour forces from across the empire for engagement in
state building projects were the very same which could be used for the raising of
armies. Indeed, the men were the same men. The mobilisation of the empire could be
used for aims of peace or war. In this respect the gearing for mobilisation was deeply
embedded in Babylonian society.
As regards the composition of the army this must mean that there were contin-
gents from all of the sources outlined above―high officials of the court, the cities of
the Babylonian core, tribal confederations, the provincial governments in Assyria,
Syria and the east, the client kings of the Levant. How these various categories went
about raising the necessary forces will have differed widely. The court officials will
have had obligations placed on them in association with their tenure of landed es-
tates―first and foremost chariot fiefs (which, if van Driel is proved right, entailed
not just providing a chariot and crew but also a unit of accompanying infantry:23 the
aim must certainly have been that this could have been called up as an integrated
fighting unit). The contributions from Babylonian cities present a complex picture
which we are only just beginning to understand. The temple administrations cer-
tainly had a part to play―more on this below―but in addition to this there may have
been obligations placed on citizens as a consequence of urban property ownership
and income. There may also have been bow fiefs independent of the great estates. In

20
This independence was subsequently lost once again to the Achaemenids, cf. for example the
governor of Byblos attested in the reign of Darius I (Dandamayev 1995).
21
Vanderhooft 1999, 98.
22
Sack 2004, 89f.
23
Van Driel 2001, 233.
 Mobilisation and Militarisation in the Neo-Babylonian Empire 157

the case of the tribal confederations, external provinces and the Levantine kingdoms
we have no information on what procedures they used for recruitment. A final cate-
gory which should be added to this list is that of mercenaries.

Temple Contributions
The above is limited to the field of generalities. But there is one sector where we are
able to say more, namely with regard to the manpower fielded by the temples of the
land. The evidence is essentially only from two institutions ―the Eanna of Uruk and
the Ebabbara of Sippar (and predominantly from the latter)―but there is no serious
reason to doubt that similar or identical regimes were in force in all the major temple
administrations of Babylonia. Nevertheless, this paper principally utilises the data
from the Ebabbara. It is now well established that the temple raised its militia from
the main body of temple dependents (širāku). Above all this meant those engaged in
agriculture―farmers (ikkaru), gardeners, shepherds―but it also included individuals
involved in most or all of the artisan professions. The fact that the ikkaru were tied to
the land, and that the land could be rented out could lead to problems. Following the
reforms of Nabonidus and the creation of the fermes générales, when huge swathes
of temple land were granted in concessions to rent farmers with the title rab sūti/ša
muhhi sūti, it was a duty of these rent farmers to supply the corresponding manpower
as required. A good illustration of this is the lease contract BRM 1 101, edited by
Jursa. In this text a certain Šamaš-kasir son of Nabû-mukīn-apli subcontracts from
the rab sūti Bultāya a concession to farm half of the temple’s land, and it is
noteworthy that one of the stipulations is that Šamaš-kasir will give the rab qašti half
of the farmers and gardeners whom Bultāya is required to provide for bow duty.24
Another interesting case occurs in a text from the very end of the Ebabbara archives
(Xerxes year 2) in which the well known rab sūti Birūqāya petitions the šangû
Nabû-balassu-iqbi for seven men to work on his land. The situation here is that the
qīpu Šamšāya had requisitioned seven ikkaru (in addition to an earlier requisition of
smiths and a carpenter) for service in the corvée gang and that Birūqāya had
subsequently found himself short of sufficient manpower to work his lands. Evi-
dently Nabû-balassu-iqbi granted this request, and it of no little interest that the re-
placement manpower appears to have come from prisoners.25
The bulk of the soldiery furnished by the temples was archers. They were
equipped with bows, bow-cases, arrows and daggers and might also be provided
with donkeys for their work. Bows were manufactured and repaired by bowmakers
in the employ of the temple, of which up to seven are attested. There were both Ak-
kadian bows and Cimmerian bows and different Akkadian and Cimmerian arrow-
heads accordingly; each archer was issued from 40 to 60 arrows. The arrows were
possibly made by leatherworkers while the arrowheads were manufactured by the
temple smiths, who also manufactured daggers and heads for lances. Weaponry
might also be purchased.
As concerns the total number of archers that the Ebabbara could field, we can
give no definitive answer though we can hazard some guesses. A number which

24
Jursa 1995, 103; MacGinnis 1998b.
25
MacGinnis 2007, 95–97. For more on the corvée gang see MacGinnis 2003.
158 John MacGinnis

recurs repeatedly in lists of issues is fifty. On the other hand, CT 56 481+, a list of
agricultural workers serving as archers, suggests a levy of about 14%.26 Applying
this to the proposed total of 1,300 for adult males dependent on the temple27 would
yield a force of approximately 180. It may be then that routinely the temple fielded a
force of 50 archers, and that in times of greater demand this could be increased three
or four fold. By comparison, texts from Uruk variously give figures of 50, 70 and
100 archers.28 The archers were organised into decuries composed according to
profession, i.e. there were separate decuries of shepherds, farmers and gardeners.
Each decury was led by a rab eširti and the corps as a whole was under the com-
mand of the rab qašti who in turn came under the qīpu.
As regards cavalry, there is not a great deal of information on temple commit-
ments, but it does appear that the Ebabbara was responsible for resourcing at least 12
horsemen. The quota for Uruk will certainly have been greater.
For chariotry, the evidence is also sparse but it is noteworthy that in Sippar all
three members of a chariot crew―mār damqa, mukīl appāti, tašlīšu―are mentioned
in the texts in one context or another. It may be that the temple itself furnished just
one chariot, which would then almost certainly have served as the command plat-
form of the qīpu.

Fiefs
Moving on from the temples, the category for which we have the next most abundant
information―though a far second―is fiefs. The documentation for the different
categories―bow fiefs, horse fiefs and chariot fiefs29―is however very uneven in
terms of both quantity and temporal distribution. Nevertheless, it seems highly prob-
able that fiefs were integral to the state system of raising troops in Babylonia.
Starting with bow fiefs, we do not know exactly when these were first insti-
tuted―or reinstituted―in Babylonia but the time of the earliest attestation has been
progressively pushed back from the time of Cambyses to Nabonidus to Nebuchad-
nezzar.30 It may be that they have their origins in the period of Assyrian rule. As
regards the numbers involved, there is no useful data from the Neo-Babylonian pe-
riod but a recent evaluation of the data in the Murašû archives estimates an absolute
maximum of 2,000 for the number of bow fiefs in the environs of Nippur.31 This
does at least give us an idea of the order of magnitude involved.

26
Jursa 1995, 8–9; cf. Stolper 2001, 126 n. 61.
27
MacGinnis 2004b.
28
During the Šamaš-šum-ukīn revolt Uruk raised 500 or 600 archers to go to the aid of Ur,
while on another occasion mention is made of 1,000 archers stationed in Ur (Frame 1992, 244).
There is however a problem with these figures (particularly the higher ones) in that we do not
whether they came from just the temple organisations of the named cities or from a wider range
of sources. Another text, probably from Borsippa, talks of 300 širku’s sent to Aššur as archers
(this probably dates to the twelfth year of Nabopolassar; Ungnad 1937, 250).
29
An erstwhile fourth category―bīt ritti―is now discounted, indeed the term itself may be a
misnomer: see the section on bīt ritti’s in the author’s Arrows of the Sun (in press).
30
Jursa 1998b; cf. MacGinnis 1998a, 214.
31
Van Driel 2002, 321.
 Mobilisation and Militarisation in the Neo-Babylonian Empire 159

Horse fiefs are not directly attested in the Neo-Babylonian material at all.32 It
may be guessed that high officials were required to supply cavalry in addition to
their chariot units, but we do not know this for sure. It may also be that there was a
tier of lower nobles/free men (mār banê) who held individual horse fiefs.
The evidence for chariot fiefs is also disparate, just a handful of attestations of an
administrative nature. The most important recent contribution is the proposal of van
Driel that the chariot fief comprised more than just the chariot and its equipment; it
also involved the support personnel and it also had a rab qašti.33 However, as van
Driel notes, what we do not know is “whether the chariot, horse and bow fiefs were
always linked in a fixed (command?) structure, through which the other fiefs were
grouped around the chariot fief”. And leading on from this, was the manpower raised
from fiefs integrated with that from the temples into a single command structure?
Was it organised into a completely different structure? Important as these questions
are, again we simply do not know.

Citizenry
The next sector from which troops could be raised was from the citizen body. As
Jursa has shown in his research on the archives of Bēl-rēmanni and Nidinti-Marduk,
free citizens were liable to perform bow service. We do not know the precise legal
basis of this service but Jursa suggests it may have arisen either as a result of urban
tax obligations or because it was a duty incumbent on all citizens.34 This citizen
militia was also divided into decuries, once again organised according to profes-
sion.35 The service could be commuted into payments in silver―apparently at a rate
of 1 mina per year―though this may not have exempted the individuals concerned
from the performance of occasional civic duties.

Deportees
The Neo-Babylonian kings transported tens of thousands of people from their con-
quered lands into Babylonia. These fell into two categories, prisoners of war led off
and given to the major temples, and communities deported en masse. In the case of
Sippar, we have plentiful evidence for Egyptians, evidently settled in the community
at Bīt Misirāya (attested from Nabonidus year 15) and less for other nationali-
ties―Assyrians, Cilicians, Gezerites and individuals from Byblos and Birītu.36

32
This refers to the Neo-Babylonian period―from the Persian period there is more, particularly
the text published by Ebeling 1952.
33
Van Driel 2002, 233.
34
Jursa 1999, 109; see also van Driel 2002, 294 for taxes on urban property.
35
For further information on decuries of bowmen see Abraham 2004, 42, 57f.
36
Jursa 1998a No. 7, cf. p. 25–27 (Gezer); CT 56 638 (3 Biritāyan individuals and one from
Byblos), CT 56 758 (7 Biritāya). For captives involved in the manufacture of a statue see
MacGinnis 1995b.
160 John MacGinnis

Tribal contributions
It is likely that the major tribal federations of Babylonia will have contributed men to
the central army, at least on occasions. As seen, both the Etemenanki Inscription and
the Istanbul Fragment indicate such contributions for the use of the state (albeit in
those instance for peaceful construction work). This must have been more or less at
the discretion of the tribal leaders; the king would certainly have been unable to
coerce them into compliance without a major application of force. It is not easy to
say exactly what benefit the tribes received in return, though perhaps the agreement
to furnish troops was part of the deal of recognising their autonomy. Simple em-
ployment may have been another issue.

Mercenaries
This is an aspect of the Neo-Babylonian army about which we are at present able to
say very little. The presence of Greek mercenaries in the army of Nebuchadnezzar is
known from a celebrated poem of Alcaeus37 and there is no reason to think that there
will not have been mercenaries of other origins as well.38

Mobilisation and Deployment

As already noted, the population of Babylonia appears to have been thoroughly or-
ganised into ešertu “decuries”. This system connected directly to the actual compo-
sition of society, with members of the same socio-economic class and of the same
profession being grouped together. Accordingly, we can expect the ešertu’s to have
been based on family relationships. In this way “the ešertu also had an inbuilt prop-
erty link, in which general obligations of the subject were linked to, or could evolve
into a primarily property based taxation system”.39
The existence of the ešertu’s provided an automatic mechanism for mobilising
the population―the basic procedure was for the dēkû “mobiliser” to simply direct
his orders via the rab eširti’s.40 As regards the brass tacks, once again the evidence
comes overwhelmingly from the domain of the temples. There is evidence for the
temples supplying their personnel with clothing and arms and with provisions for
undertaking service away from home (the latter designated by the term “rikis
qabli”).41 Rations are issued to men heading out on campaign in the form of dates,
barley and sheep, and silver was paid out both for these and for the water bottles,
cress, salt and oil required. Blankets, jerkins, tents, sacks, shoes, horses and donkeys
were also supplied. Rations were issued for men taking supplies to the levy camp
and boats might be hired for this purpose. As for the length of deployment, evidence
is both thin and equivocal―there are indications for both three months and a full
year.

37
Dandamayev / Lukonin 1989, 302.
38
A recent conjecture of Waerzeggers (2006), that Carians settled in Borsippa were retired mer-
cenaries seems highly plausible, though this case dates to the early Achaemenid period.
39
Van Driel 2002, 295.
40
Van Driel 2002, 295.
41
The texts detailing such issues have been most recently surveyed by MacGinnis 1998.
 Mobilisation and Militarisation in the Neo-Babylonian Empire 161

Conclusion
In summary, we are becoming increasingly aware that Babylonia was geared to the
raising of armed forces through multiple channels―temple domains, urban citizenry,
tribal structures and fiefs. The eširtu organisation of society provided for a ready
generation of soldiers from the available population. Together these elements formed
what might be fairly called the Babylonian military-agricultural complex. This is
particularly well documented with regard to the temples. In the case of Eanna this
has been very well put by Kozuh:
If nothing else, Eanna’s self-equipped and centralized forces, in addition to its
metal workers, stocked storehouses, arms depots and warehouses, ready-made
cavalry and urban location, made it both a productive asset in times of politi-
cal stability and a potentially dangerous source of opposition in times of po-
litical disintegration or fragmentation ...... Eanna was a force unto itself that
promoted its own interests and had to be co-opted by the royal administration
at Babylon through trade-offs and concessions.42
A similar situation will have held with all the other major temples of the land. In
addition to the contributions from temples, citizens, tribes and fiefs there will also
have been mercenaries, deportees, prisoners of war and perhaps units from subject
states subsumed into the Babylonian army en bloc. Exactly how, or even whether,
these elements were combined into a single army is at present beyond us. Beaulieu,
for example, interprets entries in the Babylonian Chronicle to mean that Nabonidus
went to Tema with the army of Babylonia (emūq Akkad), leaving Belshazzar at home
in charge of an army consisting of mercenaries and contingents levied from con-
quered lands (ummān mātitān).43 If that is correct, it must surely have been a proce-
dure that put the stability of the empire at risk. That, however, is another story.44

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42
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44
It is of no little interest that such a development would indeed be recreating, at least in part,
the very conditions which had contributed to the collapse of the Assyrian empire. These include
misjudgement of the threat, invasion from Iran, dilution of the native population by deportation
and immigration exacerbated by external deployment of native troops and members of the rul-
ing classes, and at least partial transmission of the provincial system to the successor empire.
These issues are surely worthy of further study.
162 John MacGinnis

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