TOPIC OF THE PROJECT

THE DOCTRINAL AND DYNAMIC CONCEPT OF RIGHT TO

EQUALITY

SUBMITTED BY:

RINKU DAGA

of

SARSUNA LAW COLLEGE

SLC/20/036

LLB

Semestar-1

Subject- The Indian Constitutional Law-I

1
Introduction

Liberty and equality are words of passion and power. They were the watchwords of French
revolution, they inspired the unforgettable words of Abraham Lincoln and US congress gave
them practical effect in 13th amendment which abolished slavery and 14th amendment
which provided that- the state shall not deny to any person within its jurisdiction, the equal
protection of laws.

The right to equality provides for the equal treatment of everyone before the law, prevents
discrimination on various grounds, treats everybody as equals in matters of public
employment, and abolishes untouchability, and titles (such as Sir, Rai Bahadur, etc.).

The types of equality are:

Natural
Social
Civil
Political
Economic
Legal

Article  Brief description 

Article The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of
14 the laws within the territory of India, on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of
birth

Article The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race,
15 caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.

2
 Article There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment
16 or appointment to any office under the State.

Article Abolition of untouchability

17

Article Abolition of all titles except military and academic

18

Our founding fathers knowing of this history, not only put liberty & equality in preamble but
gave them practical effect in article 17 which abolished untouchability & article 14 which
provides state shall not deny equality before law and equal protection of laws.

Article 7 of Universal declaration of human rights, 1948 declares that all are equal before
law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of laws. By & large, the
same concept of equality inhered in article 14 of Indian constitution.

The Constitution of India guarantees the Right to equality through article 14 to 18. Equality
is one of magnificent corners of Indian democracy. The Doctrine of equality before law is a
corollary of rule of law which pervades the Indian constitution.

Article 14 restrict discrimination in a general way whereas subsequent articles such as article
15,16,17 &18 covers specific discrimination. Article 14 is a genus while Article 15&16 are
species. Article 14,15 &16 are single thread of constitutional guarantee which supplement
each other. If a situation is not covered by Article 15 to 18, the general principle of equality
embodied in Article 14 would be attracted whenever there is an allegation of discrimination.

Article 14 raised many problems but principles well settled by 1960. Article 17 has vital
impact on doctrine of equality. Article 18 is application of theory of equality in another
direction. Article 18 appears to have been framed under mistaken belief that US Precedent
was being followed. The Difference between US (Article 1) and Article 18 of Indian
constitution is that whereas US Constitution forbids the grant of title of nobility , article 18

3
forbids the grant of any title except military or academic. It is important to note that a title
of nobility is hereditary and has no necessary connection to merit whereas article 18
recognizes title of merit.

Equal Protection of Law

“Equal protection of law” has been given in article 14 of our Indian constitution which has
been taken from section 1 of the 14th amendment act of the constitution of the United
State.

Meaning of equal protection of law: here, it means that each person within the territory of
India will get equal Protection of laws.

In Stephen’s college v. university of Delhi under The court held that the expression “Equal
protection of the laws is now being read as a positive Obligation on the state to ensure
equal protection of laws by bringing in necessary social and economic changes so that
everyone may enjoy equal protection of the laws and nobody is denied such protection. If
the state leaves the existing inequalities untouched laws d by its laws, it fails in its duty of
providing equal protection of its laws to all persons. State will provide equal protection to all
the people of India who are citizen of India and as well as non citizen of India.
Exceptions To Rule Of Law

In the case of Indra Sawhney the right to equality is also recognized as one of basic features
of Indian constitution. Article 14 applies to all person and is not limited to citizens. A
corporation, which is a juristic person, is also entailed to the benefit of this article. This
concept implied equality for equals and aims at striking down hostile discrimination or
oppression of inequality. In the case of Ramesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1978 SC 327 It is
to be noted that aim of both the concept, ‘ Equality before law’ and ‘ Equal protection of the
law’ is the equal Justice.

Underlying priniciple:-

4
The Principle of equality is not the uniformity of treatment to all in all respects. it only
means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in the privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed by the laws. Equal law should be applied to all in the same
situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another.
Rule Of Law
The rule of law embodied in Article 14 is the “ Basic feature” of the Indian constitution.
Hence it cannot be destroyed even by an amendment of the constitution under article 368
of the constitution.

Meaning of rule of Law

The Rule of law has been given by prof. Dicey the expression the guarantee of equality
before the law. It means that no man is above the law, all are equal in eye of law. The
concept of rule of law come from magnacarta.its means that law is equal for all in same line.
Because state have no religion all are equal in same line. And uniformity will be applied for
all. Every organ of the state under the constitution of India is regulated and controlled by
the rule of law. Absence of arbitrary power has been held to be the first essential of rule of
law. The rule of law requires that the discretion conferred upon executive authorities must
be contained within clearly define limits. The rule of law permeates the entire fabrics of the
constitution of India and it forms one of its basic features.

Principle laid down by various courts with regard to article 14

In ER Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974), where for the very first time court added a
new dimension of article 14 and pointed out that article 14 has highly activist magnitude
and it embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness. Thus, we cannot countenance any
attempt to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning, as for doing that would be a
violation of its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and
dimensions and it cannot be cribbed, cabined & confined within traditional doctrine limits.

5
From a positivistic point of view, Equality if antithetic to arbitrariness. Equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies . One belong to rule of law and other to whims & caprice of
an absolute monarch.

In Ajay Hasia case(1981), It is sufficient to state that article 14 must not be confused with
doctrine of classification. In earlier cases, article 14 came to be identified with doctrine of
classification because view taken was that article 14 forbids discrimination where
classification making differentia fulfilling 2 conditions:

1. Classification is found on an intelligible differentia

2. The Differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
impugned legislative or executive action.

Law violating Article 14 and Arbitrariness

When a law is based on impressible classification is struck down for violating equal
protection of laws that does not mean that law is per se arbitrary. There is difference
between arbitrariness and discretion. It is been said that a discretion unguided by any rule
or guidelines behind is essence of arbitrariness. However, this ingredient to covert
discretion as arbitrariness cannot be an absolute principle.

E.g. Indian Penal code lays down the maximum punishment by way of fine and/or
imprisonment which can be inflicted upon persons found guilty of committing specified
offences. A Discretion conferred on judges and magistrates which ranges from a small fine
to a substantial fine together with maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by law can
only be described as arbitrary , for no rules and guidelines can be given for exercise of
discretionary power and important factor is that circumstances on which crimes are
committed , matter of extenuation are to be taken into account for deciding the
punishment. Such power is arbitrary in essence but same must be conferred on judges if
justice are to be done.

6
There as many cases where discretionary power have been upheld by court because they
were not capable of being governed by further rules.

Article 14 in The Constitution Of India

The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the
laws within the territory of India

Article 14 interpreted by judiciary

The state shall not deny to any person equality before law or equal protection of laws within
the territory of India provided that nothing contained herein shall prevent the state from
making a law based on a classification founded on intelligible differentia having a rational
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law

The Prohibition contained in article 14 is directed against state (as widely defined by article
12).

Equality before law & Equal protection of laws

The Equality before the law is a negative concept which ensures that there is no special
privilege in favor of anyone that all are equally subject to ordinary law of land and that no
person, whatever be his rank is above the law. Article 14 confers a right by enacting a
prohibition.

Thus, is an absolute. In this respect, Article 14 is different from Article 19 where reasonable
restrictions are given. But though on face of it, it appears an absolute right but since the
doctrine of classification has been incorporated by judicial decisions. The Equal protection of
laws is a positive concept .

It states that like should be treated alike without distinction. The Principle of Equality does

7
not mean that same law should be apply to everyone but that a law should deal alike with
all in one class and unlikes should not be treated alike. Likes should be treated alike.

Article 14 forbids class legislation but it does not forbids reasonable classification of persons.
Classification is reasonable when:

 It is not arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It is based on intelligible differentia, some real

and substantial distinction which distinguishes the persons or things grouped
together in one class from other who left out of it.
 The Differentia adopted on basis of classification has a rational or reasonable nexus
with object sought to be achieved by statute in question.

Though there is always a presumption in favor of constitutionality of enactment and burden

is on person who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of
constitutional principles. Whereas If the discrimination is large on face of legislation, the
onus may shift to the state.

Differential treatment per se is not violation of Article 14 and it violates Article 14 only when
there is no reasonable basis. Classification with regard to microscopic differences is not god.
To override classification is to undo equality. The Classification need not to be made with
mathematical precision but if there is little or no difference between persons or things
which have grouped together and those who left out of group, then classification cannot be
regard as reasonable.

At times, even administrative necessity or good corporate governance (Proviso section 167
of companies act, 2013) has been upheld as a basis of classification. This is especially in
matter of taxation, economic regulation, because of complexity involved in cases.

Interference with executive policy

The Supreme court has reiterated that courts cannot act as an appellate authority and
examine the correctness , sustainability and appropriateness of policy nor the courts are

8
advisors to executive on matter of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate.
Judicial review in this area is confined to examination as to whether any of fundamental
rights have been violated or is manifest arbitrary.

It is through manifest arbitrary door that challenges are likely to be made to formulation of
policies and in such a case court cannot examine provisions of policy to come up with
conclusion that if it is manifestly arbitrary and in this limited context, court can act as a
appellate authority. Arbitrariness on mere possibility that a power may be abused (despite
the guidelines) in provisions of act, cannot be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable.

In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, Principles framed with regard to scope of
permissible classification:

 A Law may be constitutional even though it relates to single Individual if on account

of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not to others, that
single individual may be treated as class by itself but such laws are seen with
suspicion, especially when they affect private rights of an individual.
 There is always a presumption of constitutionality and burden is on one who attacks
it.
 A Classification need not to be scientifically perfect or logically complete
 While considering the basis of classification, court must look into matter of common
knowledge, History of Bill, etc.
 The Court must look beyond the old doctrine and apply the test of palpable
arbitrariness in context.
 There is no right to equality in illegal acts.
 The Right to equality is available in grant of favor as well as imposition of burdens.

Single person laws:

Single person laws are prima facie violative of article 14 because they do not make a
classification on basis of some general or particular characteristics which is found in class of
individuals rather target one individual or person.

9
Single person laws can be justified as ones involving public rights rather than private rights.
Also, these laws can be justified in case of juristic persons but not in case of natural persons.

Special courts & Procedural Inequality:

The Constitutionality for creating the special courts to try persons holding high public offices
for offences committed by them during period of emergency (1975-77) came up before a 7
judge bench In Re: Special courts bill,1978.

The Supreme court under Article 143 gave its advisory opinion as to whether the bill violates
article 14.

Following principles laid down with regard to scope of article 14:

 If the legislative policy is clear and definite and is an effective method of carrying out
that policy, a discretion is vested by statute upon a body of administration to make
selective application of law to a certain class of persons, the statute itself cannot be
condemn as a piece of discriminatory legislation.
 The Discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power.
 Whether an enactment which cast for special procedure for trial of certain offences
is discriminatory or not , depends on each case and no general principle applicable to
all cases can be laid down.
 A Rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within purview of article 14 as
of any rule of substantive law.

Hence, court observed that classification is valid and offence committed during emergency
are class by itself. The Court observed that procedure to be fair and just within article 21
context.

Procedural fairness:
In Center for PIL v. UOI, the court invalidated allocation of 2G spectrum on first cum first
served basis on ground that allocation or disposal of natural resources to be done by

10
auction.

In Natural resource allocation, Re: Special reference No.1 of 2012, Though reasonableness
and rationality must be observed in distribution of natural resources but clarified that
auction is not the only mode of disposal.

In Maneka Gandhi, Article 14 requires the observance of principles of natural justice,

including requirement of reasoned decisions.

But it is not very clear that whether a law would violate article 14 if it expressly excludes the
application of principles of natural justice?

In charan lal singh v. UOI, The supreme court upheld the Bhopal gas disaster act, 1985 which
gave the exclusive right to Gov. of India to enforce the claims of victims of disaster and
under which a settlement was reached in supreme court between Union of India and
culprits of disaster without hearing or consulting the victims of disaster.

Substantive equality:
In Navtej Johar v Union of India, Chandrachud J. noted that:
Article 14 has a substantive content on which, together with liberty and dignity, the edifice
of the Constitution is built. Simply put, in that avatar, it reflects the quest for ensuring fair
treatment of the individual in every aspect of human endeavor and in every facet of human
existence.

Malhotra J. observed: Where a legislation discriminates on the basis of an intrinsic and core
trait of an individual, it cannot form a reasonable classification based on an intelligible
differentia.

In Joseph Shine v Union of India, Chandrachud J. observed that:

Justness postulates equality. In consonance with constitutional morality, substantive
equality is directed at eliminating individual, institutional and systemic discrimination

11
against disadvantaged groups which effectively undermines their full and equal social,
economic, political and cultural participation in society.

To move away from a formalistic notion of equality which disregards social realities, the
Court must take into account the impact of the rule or provision in the lives of citizens. The
primary enquiry to be undertaken by the Court towards the realisation of substantive
equality is to determine whether the provision contributes to the subordination of a
disadvantaged group of individuals.

In State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar, [1952] SCR 284,

Justice Vivian Bose observed:
What I am concerned to see is not whether there is absolute equality in any academical
sense of the term but whether the collective conscience of a sovereign democratic republic
can regard the impugned law, contrasted with the ordinary law of the land, as the sort of
substantially equal treatment which men of resolute minds and unbiased views can regard
as right and proper in a democracy of the kind we have proclaimed ourselves to be.

Such views must take into consideration the practical necessities of government, the right to
alter the laws and many other facts, but in the forefront must remain the freedom of the
individual from unjust and unequal treatment, unequal in the broad sense in which a
democracy would view it.

In Deepak Sibal v Punjab University, Subramaniam Swamy v Union of India,

In addition to intelligible differentia and rational nexus, Article 14 also requires the
existence of a legitimate purpose

In Shayara Bano v Union of India, manifest arbitrariness is a ground for striking down
legislation under Article 14 of the Constitution (Manifest arbitrariness is defined as
something done capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle.

12
In Ahmedabad St Xaviers College v State of Gujarat, this Honorable Court explained the
concept of unconstitutional conditions as follows:

The doctrine of unconstitutional condition means any stipulation imposed upon the grant of
a governmental privilege which in effect requires the recipient of the privilege to relinquish
some constitutional right. This doctrine takes for granted that ‘the Petitioner has no right
to be a policeman’ but it emphasizes the right he is conceded to possess by reason of an
explicit provision of the Constitution, namely, his right to talk politics.

The major requirement of the doctrine is that the person complaining of the condition must
demonstrate that it is unreasonable in the special sense that it takes away or abridges the
exercise of a right protected by an explicit provision of the Constitution... though the state
may have privileges within its control which it may withhold, it cannot use a grant of those
privileges to secure a valid consent to acts which, if imposed upon the grantee in invitum
would be beyond its constitutional power.

Evolving of the New Doctrine

Article 14 mandates that the State shall not deny equality before law and equal protection
of laws to any person within the territory of India. By incorporating in Article 14 the British
doctrine of rule of law as propounded by Prof. Dicey and the "equal protection of law"
clause of 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the framers of our Constitution had in
their zeal infused extra vigour and vitality in the right to equality. However, Parliament has
repeatedly tried to curtail the scope and vigour of Article 14 in order to carry out the
welfare programmes.1 Apart from it, the Supreme Court had sapped some of the vigour of
Article 14 by showing "fanatical reverence" to the theory of classification or the nexus
tests". Finally in 1974 the Supreme Court evolved the new doctrine that Article 14 is a
guarantee against arbitrariness. Thus the Supreme Court has evolved two different and
distinct doctrines for tackling attack on State action on the ground of violation of Article 14.

On the basis of these tests, better known as nexus tests, innumerable cases have been
decided by the Supreme Court and various State High Courts. Supreme Court has from time

13
to time tried to summarise the principles enunciated by it in its previous decisions under
Article 14.5 These classic tests of permissible classification have been repeated so many
times that the Supreme Court in 1960 remarked that "they now sound platitudinous".6
Apart from staleness of repetition, it was feared that the fanatical reverence shown to these
tests might ultimately replace the doctrine of equality and rob Article 14 of its "glorious
content".7 Some academic literature regarding the right to equality also appeared pointing
out the shortcomings of the nexus tests. However, only two of such studies may be noted in
this brief paper. K.K. Mathew, J. highlighted the negative concept of the doctrine of
"equality before the law", as traditionally understood and posed the question whether the
command of Article 14 is merely to ban creation of equality or to eliminate inequalities ?
According to him "Formal equality before the law has been found to be a sham in many
areas".8 Thus, legal thinking in the country was slowly moving towards giving a positivistic
or activist twist to the right to equality. Prof. P.K. Tripathi in his Telang lectures on "Right to
Equality" attempted a more comprehensive study of the right to equality. After careful
analysis of several decisions of the Supreme Court applying nexus tests he concluded that
these tests were inappropriate in certain fields. He pointed out that the theory of
classification has three aspects which he chose to call " 'Why', 'What' and 'Whom' elements
respectively." He also observed that, the nexus tests notice only the object and criterion of
classification and their mutual relation but ignore the "what" element and the relationship
of this element with the other two, resulting in the "what" element being confused with the
other "why" or "whom" elements, specially when the "object" or "why" element is not
expressly and clearly indicated in the statute itself. He further concluded that nexus tests
are not suitable at all for tackling certain situations. These are: (i) where the statute
indicates the policy or purpose to be fulfilled and also the special treatment to be given to
selected persons or things but leaves it to the executive to make actual selection of the
persons or things in fulfillment of the legislative policy; (ii) to "one person"
statutes; (iii) where legislature gives broad indication of the kind of cases to be subjected to
differential treatment and (iv) to statutes which leave the executive free to pick and choose
individuals towards the fulfillment of statutory policy. In short it may be stated that nexus
tests were found inadequate to meet the situation where very wide or unbridled discretion
was given to the authorities to pick and choose persons for giving different treatment
through indicating clearly the legislative policy for achieving other objects of legislation in

14
the statute itself. No doubt in this sphere the Supreme Court has not shown consistency
even according to H.M. Seervai.9 Prof. Tripathi in the end expressed his hope that "the
Supreme Court will sooner rather than later free itself from the shackles of this dogma".10
As a result of the aforesaid, well informed criticism of the nexus tests, the Supreme Court
freed itself from the shackles of this dogma. However, at first in Maganlal Chaganlal v.
Municipal Corpn., Greater Bombay11, the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in
Northern India Caterers Ltd. v. State of Punjab12 without applying nexus tests. Finally the
Supreme Court adopted the positivistic or activist stance in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil
Nadu.13 Bhagwati, J. stated : "Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and it
cannot be 'cribbed, cabined and confined' within the traditional and doctrinaire limits.
From the positivistic point of view equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality
and arbitrariness are sworn enemies.... Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is
unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of
Article 14...." On the basis of this new activist theory of equality a few decisions14 were
made by the Supreme Court and ultimately it was unanimously approved by the Supreme
Court in Ajai Hasia v. Khalid Mujib.15 After reiterating that equality is a dynamic concept
with many aspects which could not be confined to traditional and doctrinaire limits,
Bhagwati, J. had in Maneka Gandhi proceeded to examine the 'content and reach' of the
'great equalising principle' enshrined in Article 14. He observed that: "It is indeed the pillar
on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And therefore, it must
not be subject to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be
made to truncate its all embracing scope and meaning, for,# to do so would be to violate
its activistic magnitude.... Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and
dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits.... Article
14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment.
The principle of reasonableness, which legally and philosophically, is an essential element of
equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence.'' This was
again reiterated by the Supreme Court in the International Airport Authority case.16 Thus
the new doctrine of equality that "Article 14 embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness"
has become established. However, this does not mean that the nexus tests have been
abandoned by the Supreme Court altogether.

15
Criticism

However, the new doctrine of equality has its own critics. Seervai has taken exception to
Bhagwati, J.'s description of the classification theory as "doctrinaire" because according to
him "there is nothing unpractical about a doctrine which effectively secures equal
protection of law to persons by declaring the law based on impermissible classification to
be void while leaving to the State a wide field for making laws based on permissible
classification". He does not stop here but goes on to challenge the very validity of the new
doctrine in the following terms: "The new doctrine hangs in that air because it propounds a
theory of equality without reference to the terms in which Article 14 confers rights to
equality." After pointing out that Article 14 has two limbs, he observes that: "Equality before
law, broadly speaking, means that except in a very limited class of cases a court
administering justice is not concerned with the status or position of the parties appearing
before it. The law is no respecter of persons." As regards the second limb he observes that
"the U.S. Supreme Court had evolved the doctrine of classification to explain and give a
content to equal protection of laws."
He has further stated that the new doctrine suffers from "fallacy of undistributed
middle".Jagdish Swaroop has also found "it difficult to agree" with the observations of
Bhagwati, J. in the Ajay Hasia case that it was for the first time in Royappa case that the
Supreme Court laid bare a new dimension to Article 14 and that it was a guarantee against
arbitrariness. He has pointed out that: "From the very beginning the Supreme Court held
that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification." If
any statute is found not to comply with the two important requirements of Article 14, it will
be struck down as void and no act of the legislature could be termed "arbitrary". He further
points out that: "Any order passed independent of a rule or without adequate determining
principle would be arbitrary. Here the valid determining principle is valid classification.
Article 14 is not really a guarantee against arbitrariness... classification would be arbitrary if
it does not follow and is contrary to the norms laid down by the Supreme Court in regard to
classification."20 Thus in substance the objection of Jagdish Swaroop to the new doctrine is
that it fails to lay down any "determining principle for finding out whether or not a

16
particular state action is arbitrary". In substance he agrees with H.M. Seervai that "the new
doctrine hangs in the air".

It is humbly submitted that, by and large the old doctrine of classification or nexus tests is
more satisfactory and must be retained because, on the basis of the old doctrine challenge
to State action as being violative of Article 14 can be successfully tackled by the courts in a
large majority of cases. It is only in the limited sphere of conferment of unbridled or too
wide a discretion on executive authorities to pick and choose persons or things for giving
different treatment that, the doctrine of classification has not yielded satisfactory results
and resulted in inconsistency in Supreme Court decisions. The new doctrine of equality,
therefore, can be usefully employed in plugging this loophole.

On the contrary, if the theory of classification is replaced by the new doctrine of equality viz.
non arbitrariness, it would lead to highly unsatisfactory results because shorn of its rhetoric
the new doctrine is vague and uncertain. Patanjali Sastri, C.J.'s warning may be usefully
recalled here, that "dangerously wide and vague language of equality clause to the concrete
facts of life, a doctrinaire approach should be avoided".

The chief merit of the new doctrine is, that it has freed the Supreme Court of the
"shackles of the dogma of classification" in the limited sense that the Judges should not
make sustained efforts to find some basis of classification where none is perceptible from
the language of the Act. However, the new doctrine or test of non-arbitrariness does not
evolve a more satisfactory test than the nexus tests.

Even Prof. P.K. Tripathi, a critic of nexus tests has expressed his concern regarding the new
development. He has observed that "arbitrariness by Article 14 is the arbitrariness or
unreasonableness in discriminating between one person and another and if there is no
discrimination, there is no arbitrariness in the sense of Article 14". To sum up, it is submitted
that the approach of the courts should not be doctrinaire towards either of the doctrines of
equality. Where a State action appears ex facie arbitrary as found in a recent case, it should
be decided on the basis of the new doctrine. Again cases pertaining to conferment of
unbridled or too wide discretion on executive authorities should also be tackled on the basis

17
of the doctrine of non-arbitrariness but other challenges to State action should still be
tackled by applying the old nexus tests. It is heartening to note that Supreme Court has not
totally abandoned the nexus tests25 though the new theory of non-arbitrariness has also
been applied where state action has been found to be "patently" arbitrary.

18