In the London Employment Appeal Tribunal UKEATPA/0770/19/RN

Adrian Arvunescu v Quick Release (Automotive) Ltd

Bundle for Rule 3(10) Application

1. ET Judgement and written reasons appealed from

2. Notice of Appeal
3. ET3 Response
4. ET1 Claim
5. Relevant orders of the ET (PH of 14dec2018 by EJ George )
6. Employment Appeal Tribunal letter dated 5 March 2020
7. Rule 3(10) application of 10 March 2020
8. E-mail between A and R of 1 May and 2 July 2019
9. ACAS of 27 February 2018
10. R’s e-mail of 12 February 2018 proposing conciliation
11. A’s submissions in a hurry before the Watford PH

Brief chronology:

2014 employment+dismissal+first Tribunal case

January 2018 application for role in Koln with R’s subsidiary
R refuses A a reference for the application
12 February 2018 R proposes conciliation
19 February 2018 alleged email rejecting application
27 February 2018 agreement
10 May 2018 ET1 (second case)
December PH Reading EJ George
1 May 2019 A reminds R about submissions
1 July 2019 deadline for R’s submissions
2 July 2019 A reminds R again about submissions
12 July 2019 R’s submissions at 3PM
15 July 2019 PH Watford
 Further grounds of appeal

The decision of 16.7.2019 by EJ Wyeth following the Open Preliminary Hearing in

Employment Tribunal in Watford, Case 3307014/2018 striking out everything for want of
jurisdiction is in error of law for the following reasons:
General:

1. The judge appeared biased, obviousness also shared by the respondent.

Procedural:
2. Erred in law refusing to strike out R’s skeleton, as well as disclosing the COT3, and
relying on arguments not submitted to A’s scrutiny.
Substantive: Erred in law striking the claims as compromised by COT3:
3. Perversely accepted evidence of the 19 February message, ignoring it was disputed
4. Erred in law disapplying s203 from the COT3 relating to particular proceedings
5. The conciliation officer had obviously not taken action towards settling the alleged
compromised claims, but only pending proceedings.
6. The claims were not related to (past) employment.
7. BCCI everything is never everything. EJ erred in law finding no ambiguity and thus
ignored the interpretation matrix.
8. It would have been unconscionable to settle all precious claims, and in the alternative,
there was no consideration because the award was already consumed by the pending
remedy sought.
Erred in law finding in the alternative that R was not liable for the German joint-venturer.
9. No reasons as to the strike out for no merits as well as joint-venture issue.
10. Perversely relied only on R’s statement that Emma Lloyd was not in charge of
German recruitment, which was not even held by C. In any case, joint liability
In fact, EJ was wrong about everything, save that he had no jurisdiction to hear the breach of
contract claims.
EJ also erred in law, in the alternative of the alternative finding no substantive merit on the
claims. However he gave absolutely no reasons. Therefore criticising this former issue
would imply reiterating the merits anew, which appears excessive for an appeal against a PH
order.
 1. Bias is already obvious from the incredible 3 months delay, given that all the reasons
were already integrally presented verbally at the end of the PH in July, and therefore
there appears absolutely no reason why typing them would have taken so long.
This delay makes EJ’s intention obvious in rendering A’s right to a fair trial illusory.
Furthermore, it is presumed from the socio-political context, that nearly anyone in England
is suspect of discriminating against Eastern-European nationals.
While this argument is most convincing rather in the marketplace than the courtroom, and A
was cautious even using it against R (after all, it cannot be reasonably presumed that 52% of
England are uninformed peasants… and while among the ‘elites’ the business people are
usually largely perceived as anti-Brexit… it stands therefore to reason that many of the
intellectuals are statistically in favour), following elements of EJ’s behaviour further
corroborate the conclusion of bias:
EJ started his reasons right in para. 2 with reference to C’s nationality, which arose out of
absolutely nowhere and had nothing to do with proceedings.
While normally a benign introductory paragraph, such a remark must be seen in the said
context as it clearly gives an insight into his priorities.
Moreover he stated that C describes himself as such (with regard to nationality), which was
absolutely never the case. Actually, EJ was aware of the quite the contrary, that A actually
had bought a British car, while living in France, for the purpose of pretending to pass as
an Englishman.
While this appears rather humoristic, hatred against East-European nationals is obviously
unfortunately not confined to England. Indeed in France and anywhere else I introduce
myself privately as English.
As a side remark, it is incredibly offensive to be called Romanian… even in Romania
Even if not motivated by personal hatred, EJ at least reveals his bias by showing his interest
to subversively make case that C abuses process to start new proceedings after a previous
settlement… after only 1 month of employment. Although new proceedings related to a
completely distinct job application.
EJ’s inappropriate irony towards C in para. 67 makes further proof of bias.
EJ cunningly tries to cover any appearance of bias with considerate words on C’s account…
but only as to actually turn the argument around against C.
EJ refers to C’s diligence to study the subject matter of COT3 agreements in July 2019… as
an argument that C should have been aware of all that already by March 2018!
Mere intelligence, in any case, is no substitute for background knowledge. However
intelligent C might be, he cannot be assumed to be aware of the case law on such a particular
subject matter. Nor does intelligence presume advanced knowledge of the law of one
country where I was only employed for 1 month.
C had no experience whatsoever about compromise agreements, a practice most common in
the UK only.
Lastly, merely producing complex arguments that eventually fail… makes for not such a
convincing proof of intelligence
Para. 3.10 Guide to judicial conduct Sufficient reasons for not sitting on a case
include...personal animosity towards a party
The right to a fair trial is enshrined in both Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and in common law. In turn, this includes the right to a trial conducted and made by a
decision-maker free not only from actual bias but also from the appearance of bias.
Apparent bias may be alleged where the Judge's conduct or behaviour is such that it gives
rise to a suspicion that he or she is not acting impartially.
Whether a trial is conducted fairly is assessed subjectively and necessarily with the benefit
of hindsight, but of course without the benefit of any input from the relevant Judge. there is a
separate question as to whether the trial Judge has acted with apparent bias. These matters
are distinct and should not be conflated. While the question of fairness is considered
subjectively, the apparent bias test is based on whether a "fair-minded, informed observer"
would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. This is therefore an objective test.
The test adopted by the House of Lords in Porter v McGill is “whether a fair minded and
informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real
possibility that the tribunal was biased”.
Addressing the role of British judges, Lord Neuberger said most were “normally rightly”
perceived as being wealthier and better educated than many of the people whose cases they
hear – an imbalance which carries dangers. “A white male public school judge presiding in a
trial of an unemployed traveller from Eastern Europe accused of assaulting or robbing a
white female public school woman will, I hope, always be unbiased,” he said. “However, he
should always think to himself what his subconscious may be thinking or how it may be
causing him to act.”
While the judge has not expressed views in the course of a hearing, in any extreme and
unbalanced terms as to throw doubt on their ability to try the issue with an objective judicial
mind, there are real grounds (in the reasons he gave at the conclusion of the hearing) for
doubting the ability of the Judge to ignore extraneous considerations, prejudice and
predilections and bring an objective judgment to bear on the issues. Justice must be seen to
be done. In any case where there is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in
favour of recusal.
 2. Refusing to strike out R’s skeleton is equally an error in law and proof of bias
(para 29)
The EJ first said R were under no obligation to produce a skeleton.
I reminded him of EJ George’s order … then he argued that C’s skeleton was also late. I was
further shocked when I read in para 29 that ‘C… acknowledges subsequently that most of
the content [in the skeleton] is not relied upon by R’.
I actually stated that during his oral submissions R relied upon other arguments which were
not included even in the late skeleton!
Which is actually the very opposite of what EJ noted.
R’s skeleton including authorities amounts to 62 pages to study within 2 days.
EJ’s para 48-51 make ample reference to authorities in the list.
Although I had done my best to prepare something in a hurry (which R had the first day of
the hearing to study – as they were not concerned with the second respondent’s case), I did
not agree that I had properly responded to their arguments.
I clearly explained that I had not effectively replied, but merely gathered the issues already
raised in previous correspondence: ending 2 pages of ET1, as well as submissions of
Monday, 17 December 2018 9:44 and Tuesday, 29 January 2019 13:28.
Which were well on time, therefore I had properly already notified R of all my arguments
although never gathered them in a proper skeleton but right before the hearing.
Therefore the wanger could not have found that my skeleton was late and that therefore there
is no harm that R’s skeleton was late too.
EJ could have allowed R’s skeleton only had a proper reason for the delay was presented,
which was never the case. Not having read the order transcript doesn’t hold water even in
primary school. They have counsel and in 5 years of litigation they should not be surprised
to have to compile submissions before hearings. Furthermore, 1 or 2 months ahead of
deadline I reminded them explicitly!!!!!!!! It’s already N’th time they miss a deadline. Ever
since the first PH in 2014, when they served the skeleton just before the hearing. When, at
one time, C asked for an extension of time (which was not even necessary, as the appeal was
lodged in time, but I only missed the confirmation. And I had resubmitted it asking for an
extension of time in the case the previous appeal was not registered correctly. EAT found no
need for an extension of time, while R was insisting the appeal was out of time). Which only
shows their wickedness.
EJ should therefore have struck out R’s skeleton, which would not have essentially
prejudiced R, still able to present the arguments during the FH.
EJ erred in law relying on arguments unsubmitted to debate
EJ also bizarrely added that he was in no way bound by the skeletons.
Which was not the issue. EJ was bound to the principle of contradictoriality, that both parties
should have advanced notice and opportunity to express a point of view regarding all points
of law and fact EJ relies upon in his decision.
Indeed, R’s skeleton relied on Allma, that there was no particular condition of form for
compromise agreements. Notably, the said authority concerned a contestation of consent due
to lack of signature. And there was no criticism of not fulfilling the s203 condition of
referring to particular proceedings. Indeed that case concerned one single common law claim,
and not a statutory claim.
Indeed the EJ did not rely on R’s argument but concocted one of its own making (that s203
simply does not apply)… which it is questionable whether he was indeed entitled to. In any
case, he should have given advance notice to the parties to prepare their response in this
respect, which he did not.
He actually did not raise the point at all before the parties and thus violated A’s right to a
fair trial. This is further evidence of bias.

Allowing the COT3 as evidence is equally an error in law and proof of bias
A should not argue as to this error of law as not fatal to the outcome.
The document was confidential, and I was therefore in the position to oppose of resist
disclosing the COT3 in its entirety.
EJ George had instructed that evidence should be heard about the COT3, not the document
itself. The parties agreed about over the content the relevant content of the term in the
COT3 (the waiver).
There was therefore absolutely no need to disclose the entire document (e.g. and thus
revealing to the EJ the amount of the settlement).
The EJ purposefully conflates my opposition towards disclosing the document itself with
opposing to consider its content (in as much as it was agreed by the parties).
I was not opposing him to consider parties submissions as to the content, which obviously in
agreement precluded the need for further evidence.
Of course, he would have arrived at the same conclusion, save from him being informed
about the other settlement terms, which it is reasonably assumed to have fuelled his bias.
EJ furthermore had no issue publishing the confidential content on the website.
Simply debilitating statements – para 44 the EJ refers, within the COT3 section of the
judgement, to A’s argument (pertinent to the age discrimination claim and nothing to do
with COT3), that R’s joint venturer KGIG advertised various ‘graduate jobs’ at the time of
C’s application in Koln. And the idea was to compare with the recruits list, to show that
‘graduate’ roles were offered to younger candidates rather than to R, which would amount to
age discrimination.
Both documents were provided by R and R’s admission as to what they represented was
clearly indicated in the bundle and their submissions.
However, the EJ shockingly concluded… what he concluded, that he had no idea what those
tables were.
While this is not per se direct proof of bias… it clearly indicates the EJ had absolutely no
intention to clearly sort out the facts and firmly apply the law, and therefore indirect hint of
bias.

3. Striking out the claims as compromised is an error of law

Perversity: no sane ET would evidence R’s uncertified e-mail of 19 February, and ignoring
C’s submissions that no such e-mail was received
In establishing his facts, the EJ relied in para 39 on a contested document provided by R,
which is an alleged message from a third party towards A.
He made however no remark of C’s position that the document was contested and absolutely
ignored C’s argument in para 3-4 of my ‘skeleton’.
Paragraph 2(5) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Practice Direction - Procedure (29
March 1996) provides "It is not acceptable for an appellant to state as a ground of appeal
simply that "the decision was contrary to the evidence" or that " there was no evidence to
support the decision "or that "the decision was one that no reasonable tribunal could have
reached and was perverse "or similar general grounds, unless the notice of appeal also sets
out full and insufficient particulars of the matters relied on in support of those general
grounds".
The principle that EAT does not revisit the facts only on exceptional circumstances rather
applies to a full decision on the merits. For policy purposes EAT could not rehear witnesses
and asses vast documentation. Similarly, in France and continental legal system, after the
Court of Appeal (2nd jurisdiction) revisits the facts, the Court of Cassation restricts its
examination to the law only, allowing only the production of new written documents (which
could not have already been presented before previous jurisdictions).
In this case, the EJ completely ignored C’s submission of not having received R’s message
and decided the issue on a single piece of evidence, contrary to CPR, a writing of the party
wishing to rely upon it, which is obviously not binding for the other party and cannot prove
anything.
R’s COT3 defence relates to the claims as being contemporary with the COT3. And thus,
relying on the allegation that C should have been aware of the course of action as at 19
February 2019. According to R, the claims are presumed as compromised by virtue of temporal
coincidence.
However, C had submitted not having received any such message. R’s piece of evidence is
merely a document of their own making with no proof of delivery.
Noteworthy, the said email message is alleged to be issued from their own server. (KCIG.DE)
It is not surprising that, being in control of their own email server, they could make it seem
they had sent messages without absolutely no possibility to certify their reality (unlike the
case of a public email server)
Writings emanating from a party are binding on that party only. Therefore, R cannot thus prove
C should have been aware of the course of action prior to COT3.
Misunderstanding or misapplying the facts may, in my view, amount to an error of law
where the Tribunal has got a relevant undisputed or indisputable fact wrong and has then
proceeded to consider the evidence and reach further conclusions of fact based upon that
demonstrable initial error. Such may be an error of law because the Tribunal is required by
law to consider the case in accordance with agreed or undisputed facts The Employment
Appeal Tribunal can indeed interfere if it is satisfied that the Tribunal has misdirected itself
as to the applicable law, or if there is no evidence to support a particular finding of fact,
since the absence of evidence to support a finding of fact has always been regarded as a pure
question of law Sheridan v British Telecommunications Plc [1989] EWCA Civ 14 (14
November 1989)

In the utmost alternative, the EJ erroneously had found, in para 70, that nothing had changed
between 19 February and the lodging of the claim.
Indeed, the tables referred to in ‘debilitating statements’ clearly show on 10 April 2018 R
advertised loads of new openings posterior to 19 February. And therefore even in the worst of
cases, taking R’s defence at its best, C’s claim would not have been bothered by the COT3:
Even saying that the openings available on 19 February would not have been suitable for C…
R cannot reasonably defend that a rejection on 19 February precluded offering employment to
C two months later.
And therefore relevant circumstances had changed, and the claim was resting on later facts in
April, which could not have been covered by the COT3 in March.
Interestingly enough, the claims for breach of contract or victimisation for not
providing references were not even contemplated by R, as they later submitted they
were not under an obligation to provide a reference anyway, such an obligation
appearing to encumber the execution of employment contract according to their
skeleton. And therefore at the time of the COT3, they could not have envisaged such a
course of action, and therefore could not have been compromised as outside the
contemplation of parties.

4. ET erred in law misapplying s203 from the COT3. There was no authority cited
and no proper reasoning.
In para 48 the EJ simply states that COT3 agreements do not need to relate to particular
proceedings, unlike settlement agreements.
However, there is no explanation to set aside A’s argument to the contrary. He cited no
authority, he didn’t even attempt at a mere construction of the law.

Therefore he should have retained the default position that s203 applies.
EJ could not have found the claims compromised, as the COT3 was not in compliance with
Section 203(3)(b) of Employment Rights Act 1996, because it does not clearly indicate the
particular claims contracted out. And therefore the claims could not have been compromised.
Any provision in an agreement (whether a contract of employment or not) is void in so far as it
purports to preclude a person from bringing any proceedings under this Act before an
employment tribunal. For the purposes of subsection (2)(f) the conditions regulating settlement
agreements under this Act are that the agreement must relate to the particular proceedings.
Hinton v University of East London (2005, EWCA Civ 532) found that Section 203(3)(b)
provides that the compromise agreement must relate to "particular proceedings". The particular
statutory claims to which a compromise agreement relates must be clearly identified. This can
be satisfied: (i) through a generic description of the claim (eg, 'unfair dismissal'); or (ii) by
reference to the particular section of the relevant statute (eg, 'Section 98 of the Employment
Rights Act'). Using general expressions to sweep up an employee's rights (eg, 'all statutory
rights') or simply naming the statute without identifying the relevant part is not sufficient and
will not compromise an employee's claims.
The Court of Appeal further observed that employers should not use standard form agreements
which list every form of employment right known to the law. Instead, compromise agreements
should be tailored to the individual circumstances of each case.
Section 203(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, consistent with electorative policy of
protecting employees from signing away the right to bring employment tribunal
proceedings under the Act except where closely defined conditions were satisfied and with the
language of the section, requiring that 'particular proceedings' be identified and particularised.
…that the key question was how the compromise agreement related to the applicant's particular
complaint, and did not 'relate to' the applicant's complaint of detrimental treatment under the
Act, since it failed to state expressly the particular statutory provision or to supply a description
of the legal nature or the factual basis of any proceedings 'arising under statue' or to mention
public interest disclosures or any detriment suffered by the applicant; and, that, therefore the
employment tribunal's conclusion was correct and the matter should proceed to a full merits
hearing."
The purpose of section 203 is clear. It is to protect claimants from the danger of signing
away their rights without a proper understanding of what they are doing. In order to
achieve that purpose, I consider that section 203(3)(b) must be construed as requiring the
particular proceedings to which the agreement relates to be clearly identified. It is not
sufficient to use a rolled-up expression such as 'all statutory rights'. In my view, Mr Hare went
too far when he conceded that it might be sufficient to identify the proceedings only by
reference to the statute under which they arise. In my judgment, it is not sufficient. Many
employment rights arise, for example, under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and, to comply
with section 203(3)(b), the particular proceedings to which the agreement relates must be more
clearly identified. In my judgment, in order to comply with section 203, the particular claims
or potential claims to be covered by the agreement must be identified, as Mr Hare suggested,
either by a generic description such as 'unfair dismissal' or by reference to the section of the
statute giving rise to the claim.
That is all that can be required for compliance with section 203(3)(b). However, I agree with
Mummery LJ that the requirements of good practice should dictate that the particular
proceedings covered by the agreement should be spelled out by means of a brief factual and
legal description. I agree with him that this should not cause practical difficulty and will not be
unduly onerous. I would add that I would not regard it as good practice for lawyers to draft a
standard form of compromise agreement which lists every form of employment right known to
the law. Compromise agreements should be tailored to the individual circumstances of the
instant case. Only in that way can the purpose behind this provision be fully satisfied.
Lunt v Merseyside TEC Ltd [1998] UKEAT 951_97_1305 (13 May 1998) … where a number
of different tribunal claims (such as unfair dismissal, race/sex discrimination, claims for
unlawful deduction of wages, and so on) have been raised by the employee, whether in an
originating application or in correspondence prior to the issue of proceedings, there does not
seem to be any good reason why these should not all be disposed of in the one compromise
agreement. Each matter would be a 'particular complaint' under the relevant statute.
The Court of Appeal decision in the case of Hinton v. University of East London [2005] IRLR
552 firmly stated that the purpose of settlement agreements is to settle specific, identifiable
claims. The Court of Appeal considered that an employee is entitled to know exactly what
he/she is settling and settlement agreements should be tailored to the particular circumstances
of the case.
EJ should have at least made an argument why the legislator would have excepted COT3
agreements from its policy. And again, this is an argument that the EJ surprised everyone
without submitting it to debate and was not relied upon by R’s skeleton.
5. The conciliation officer had obviously not taken action towards settling the victimisation
claim, but only pending proceedings.
The ACAS conciliator clearly excluded all discussions concerning a new role in Germany.
R first made conciliation contact with C on 12 February, one week prior to the alleged rejection.
Emma said The preparation and attendance at the final hearing in July is likely to incur
significant costs not to mention resource therefore I would like to suggest we engage in some
settlement discussions.
As R themselves introduced settlement as relating to the preparation and attendance at the
final hearing in July, thus obviously victimisation could not have been in contemplation as not
concerned by July FH.
ACAS services include the duty to “endeavour to promote a settlement”. Settlement can be
achieved in a number of ways but if it is to satisfy the parties’ wish that there be finality so that
the agreement is tribunal-proof, the settlement must be reduced into an agreement which takes
the form of a contract. Where the parties make a contract which follows any attempt by an
ACAS officer to promote the settlement, it is made with that officer’s assistance. Not every
attempt to promote a settlement, or every actual settlement, results in a conciliation contract but
if it does, it is appropriate to describe it as having been made by the parties with the assistance
of an ACAS officer. It follows that in order to decide whether a contract meeting the
conditions in section 18 has been concluded, attention is then drawn to what the ACAS officer
has done, and whether this corresponds to the functions which a conciliation officer is under a
duty, alternatively has a power, to discharge.
Livingstone v Hepworth Refractories Plc [1991] We cannot say, as Mr Cavanagh would have
us say, that a conciliation officer when acting under the 1978 Act is wearing "any number of
hats" and dealing with all other matters which could possibly arise. It is of course helpful for
parties to be able to "wipe the slate clean", but the agreement must relate to those matters
which are within their presumed contemplation at the time.
And it is obvious from all relevant circumstances that neither A nor the ACAS officer were
considering any other possible claims than relevant to the FH Hearing in July 2018.
Although this is evidence from messages labelled ‘without prejudice’, it is not actually
privileged communication, as it did not refer directly to negotiation, but mere ancillary issues.
Nor is this proof from prior negotiations contrary to four corners rule. C does not hold to bring
external evidence contrary to the contract, but once the term is deemed ambiguous, evidence
from prior negotiations is allowed towards its construction.
Therefore, in any case, even if there was no need to set out all particular proceedings, there was
still no evidence the ACAS officer had taken steps to conciliate other claims than relevant to
the PH in July 2018.
S203(2) Section 1 [a provision is void…] does not apply to any agreement to refrain from
instituting or continuing proceedings where a conciliation officer has taken action under any of
sections 18A to 18C of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.
Section 18C(3) - Conciliation after institution of proceedings - Employment Tribunals Act
1996, “settlement” means a settlement that brings proceedings to an end without their being
determined by an employment tribunal.
Section 18B(5) as well as Section 18A(6) - Conciliation before institution of proceedings - In
subsections (3) and (4) “settlement” means a settlement that avoids proceedings being
instituted.
Therefore the distinction in the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 makes it once again obvious
that the ACAS officer is only presumed to have taken steps towards a settlement that brings
proceedings to an end, and not towards a settlement that avoids proceedings being instituted.

6. The claims were not related to (past) employment.

COT3 clearly started to prohibit any claim arising out of employment or termination. It is
plainly intended to be a finalisation of existing matters between the parties arising only out of
the 2014 employment.
As far as the ‘or otherwise’, Ejusdem generis (when a general word or phrase follows a list of
specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type
as those listed)
Where “‘[a] release ... contain[s] specific recitals as to the claims being released, and yet
conclude[s] with an omnibus clause to the effect that the releasor releases and discharges all
claims and demands whatsoever which he [or she] ... may have against the releasee ..., the
courts have often applied the rule of ejusdem generis, and held that the general words of a
release are limited by the recital of a particular claim’ Camperlino v. Bargabos 96 A.D.3d
1582, 946 N.Y.S.2d 814, 2012 WL 2164461 N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2012. June 15, 2012
According to the contractual interpretation principal of ejusdem generis, "the meaning of a
word in a series of words is determined 'by the company it keeps,'" 242-44 E. 77th St., LLC v.
Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 31 A.D.3d 100, 103-104, 815 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1st Dep't 2006), when
a general provision follows a series of specific provisions, the general provision is interpreted
as being of the same type or class as the specific provisions that preceded it. See Innophos, Inc.
v. Rhodia, S.A., 38 A.D.3d 368, 372, 832 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't 2007).
In this case, the general provision … is preceded by a series of specific provisions relating to
the promises that plaintiffs made regarding the business relationship contemplated by the LOI.
Plaintiffs cannot rely on the specific provision to bring in an entirely new class of data.
“ Edgewater Growth Capital Partners, L.P. v Greenstar N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 2013 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 351, 2013 NY Slip Op 30183(U) N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2013 Jan. 2, 2013
Delaware recognizes the principle of ejusdem generis, which stands for the proposition that
"where general language follows an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in the widest extent, but are
to be held as applying only to persons or things of the game general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned." Aspen Advisors v. United Artists Theater Co., 861 A.2d 1251, 1265
(Del. 2004).Exec. Risk Specialty Ins. Co. v. First Health Group Corp. 2013 Del. Super.
LEXIS 170, 2013 WL 1908664 Del. Super. Ct., 2013. May 7, 2013
Nevermind the American stuff, the 2018 claims concerning an application for a role in
Germany with R’s joint-venturer clearly do not relate to 2014 employment with R and
therefore could not have been compromised.

7. BCCI stated the principle that everything is never everything

As shown in para. 6, COT3 is only absolutely clear to compromise claims relating to 2014
employment. Per a contrario, it does not compromise claims not related to 2014 employment.
Contrary to para. 65, the wording is not unequivocal, failing the ultimately high standard of
‘absolutely clear and leaving no room for doubt’ with respect to:
- Whether the alleged compromised claims related to 2014 employment,
- Whether COT3 covered only 2018 pending proceedings or related claims yet unraised.
C agrees the COT3 covers ‘future claims’ in the sense of claims arising out of 2014
employment not subject to 2018 pending proceedings.
But C does not agree that COT3 also covers ‘future claims’ not related to 2014 employment
and the victimisation claim concerning the 2018 application in Germany with R’s joint-
venturer clearly does not relate to 2014 employment.
To submit otherwise would imply that everything in the Universe is related to the 2014
employment by mere succession in time.
EJ therefore had incorrectly construed the COT3 as being clear about compromising the
claims, while in reality it could have only been clear about not compromising them.
However, the wording is ambiguously giving rise to multiple possible interpretations.
BCCI: The language of the clause "all or any claims whether under statute, Common Law
or in Equity of whatsoever nature that exist or may exist" is subject to some implied
limitations: where ex-employees have had deposits with the bank, the liquidators have not
sought to resist claims for repayment in reliance on the general release. Such claims, they say,
fall outside the clause because they do not relate to the employer-employee relationship [28.
that would be regarded as outside the 'contemplation' of the parties at the time the release was
entered into, not because it was an unknown claim, but because it related to a subject matter
which was not 'under consideration']. But acceptance of these claims involves acceptance
that the clause does not mean all it might be thought to say. What of a latent claim for
industrial disease or personal injury caused to the employee by the negligence of the employer
but unknown to both parties? Mr Jeans QC for the liquidators, in the course of an admirable
argument, recognised the difficulty of submitting that such a claim would be precluded by the
provision, even though it would relate to the employer-employee relationship. I would not
myself infer that the parties intended to provide for the release of such a claim. The same
would in my view be true if, unknown to the employee, the bank had libelled him as an
employee. The clause cannot be read literally. [29. The scope of general words of a release
depends upon the context furnished by the surrounding circumstances in which the
release was given. The generality of the wording has no greater reach than this context
indicates.]
Allma also agrees: It could not be accepted that the words “has or may have” were
designed to preclude future claims which the applicant might seek to assert. The
expression “has or may have” is apt to cover existing claims, whether known to the potential
claimant or not. Nor could it be accepted that the express exclusion of personal injury and
occupational pension rights claims from the ambit of the agreement indicated that the
compromise included all other future claims. That exclusion, which occurs regularly in
compromise agreements, related only to existing rights and did not deal with future claims.

EJ could therefore not have found the term unequivocal and resolving the ambiguity in
contractual terms requires background.

While indeed the wording of the COT3 appears impressively comprehensive, that does not
amount to unequivocal.
The condition to relate to particular claims stands to reason from this standpoint.
Only had the COT3 related to particular claims (or whether there was evidence that the
ACAS officer had taken such steps), it would have been unequivocal in respect to those
particular claims it related to.
ET should not shy away from the fact that it might just be impossible to express some ideas in
unequivocal words
R holds that if they multiply the verbiage … that complexity automatically renders the wording
unequivocal.
But other than relating explicitly to particular terms, there is no scientific basis to hold that
there must exist an abstract wording capable of being unequivocal.
Furthermore, authorities also agree the employee must not be asked to sign a blanket waiver of
all possible claims he or she may have.
Or, that is actually what R is proposing… and therefore their construction cannot be allowed.
Unequivocal wording is not a failure of the process.
The complexity of real life simply exceeds clear language’s capacity of unambiguous
expression.
Therefore the term cannot be presumed as unequivocal unless proved equivocal, nor should the
ET be biased, in the sense that unambiguous expression be the rule and unambiguity the
exception, towards a finding of no equivoque.
This is the only spot where C relies on the non-native language argument. It is not a
matter of linguistic proficiency, but of actual day to day life dealings, cultural proficiency
that C cannot be presumed to have acquired during a month in the UK.

Once the term deemed ambiguous and the background taken into consideration, there is
nothing in the ‘matrix of facts’ as to why the general wording should be interpreted extensively,
and therefore clearly beyond the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable
person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to
the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.

Odu-Obi v Interserve FM Ltd & Anor UKEAT 2013 p35: An agreement which prevents a
party from litigating matters which otherwise could be taken to Court must be construed
narrowly. It should not be assumed that any party will willingly give away a fundamental right.

Lord Westbury in Directors of the London and South Western Railway Co v Blackmore (1870)
LR 4 HL 610 at 623-624: The general words in a release are limited always to that thing or
those things which were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the
release was given. But a dispute that had not emerged cannot be considered as bound and
concluded by the anticipatory words of a general release.

There is perhaps little force in the following argument as well: Authorities allow settlement
agreements to wipe the slate clean only in the factual matrix of end of employment, before any
litigation taking place or ever being even contemplated. This is presumed as the employee must
receive legal advice before signing (and therefore fully understand the implications).Only when
the employer offers such a goodbye package, the employee accepting is presumed that the
parties never want to hear of each other ever again, and thus a wider interpretation is
permissible.

As opposed, COT3 occurs in the wholly different situation on an already ongoing dispute. This
agreement settling proceedings already started, 4 years after dismissal. Therefore, only a
restrictive construction is allowed to cover only the purpose of proceedings already started (or
which could further expand from that factual matrix, by the same template).
Where parties settle at the end of employment, they have no specific contemplation of any
claims in particular, and therefore, if there is nothing specific in their minds, they are to be
presumed to compromise everything.

8. It would be unconscionable to expand over unrelated claims such as the

victimisation claim, in the situation where R was contemplating victimising C at
the signing of the COT3.

C could not have been presumed to settle a promising claim for next to nothing.

BCCI continues in [65] If both parties knew that Mr Naeem had a personal injury claim which
was potentially worth, say, £30,000, the court would be reluctant to interpret the agreement as
amounting to its release in consideration of less than £3,000.

C’s largest head of claims was £27800 according to the Schedule of loss as 24 November 2017.
However, really the most reasonable expectation was for £12150 for the contract claim… and
it’s further very ambiguous because, while the ID claim was more promising on the merits, it
was less promising on the amendment/extension of time issue…

Last years’ statistics provided RD median award £13.000. However, before the present ET C’s
largest head of claim is £720.000 for the Chagger claim.

Any amount possibly settled for within ET’s inference… cannot amount to within less than 1
order of magnitude of the sought amount in the new proceedings. As we seen, HL would be
reluctant to interpret the agreement as amounting to the release of a claim (known by both
parties) which was potentially worth, say, £30,000, in consideration of less than £3,000.
WHICH IS THE VERY DEFINITION OF AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE.

Needless to add that all combined claims settled amount of 10-20K£, as indicated above…
leaves very little for victimisation et ali., and in any case falls between 30-70 times less than the
head of claim on the Chagger claim, therefore equally towards 2 orders of magnitude.

It is therefore mathematically obvious C cannot be presumed to have settled a claim for, say
2% its worth. That is in the situation C would be assumed to have known about it!

R’s advised interpretation would reward dishonesty at the expense of the innocent, as they
would have known their evil schemes to victimise C… and thus further hide behind the CO3. It
would be contrary to basic principles of construction for the meaning of a document to be
affected by facts which were known to one party but not reasonably available to the other.

Sir Richard Scott V-C [2000] ICR 1410, 1421… and with Chadwick LJ: a person cannot be
allowed to rely upon a release in general terms if he knew that the other party had a claim and
knew that the other party was not aware that he had a claim. No release of unknown claims
should be construed to extend to claims which were known to the party obtaining the benefit of
the release but not to the other party.

BCCI knew that Mr Naeem had or might have a stigma claim against the bank of which he
himself was unaware. In march 2018 C had no knowledge of being victimised by R.

9. Joint-venture

There is no need to dispute whether the German QR/Bomcom is a wholly owned subsidiary or
a 50% joint venture with KCIG. In either case R holds joint liability.

Nor was it held that Emma Lloyd herself was the agent of decision to victimise. EJ based his
decision of completely irrelevant findings.

On the contrary, ET1 explained in great detail the 2014 recruitment process, whereby Rojda of
the German QR is but a clerk: she advertises roles, collects applications, processes candidate
data into an ERM software, conducts additional information requests by telephone, screens
potential candidates to refer to directors/HR of UK QR (Rob Ferrone, Emma etc) and schedules
such interviews. Of course she might be doing plenty of other things, but these only seem
relevant to victimisation during recruitment.

German companies observe very elaborate employment procedures, lasting even for 8 weeks.
Noteworthy, the said selection process is quite complex, involving phone interviews with
multiple people, online data tests, filling-in questionnaires, submission of formal documents
(university diploma, references etc.)

However such data administration is immaterial to actual decision making in regards to

victimisation. C was not claiming to have been victimised by an improper data handling
by a German employee, but by a deliberate act of rejection by QR UK management.

There could also be the secondary issue of vicarious liability, but I have absolutely no means to
acquire any further knowledge over the intricacies of the QR/Bomcom joint venture, relevant to
the jurisdiction issue. At this point the distinction appears as a mere technicality.

Yeboa71 On Mr Crofton's point that he could not be held to be personally liable for race
discrimination alleged by a fellow employee, the legal position is that Mr Crofton can be held
personally liable for race discrimination against Mr Yeboah, as a fellow employee, even though
he was not Mr Yeboah's employer and even though the Council, as Mr Crofton's employer, was
held not to be vicariously liable for his conduct.
To C it appears the common law principle that joint venturers are reciprocally liable for injury
caused to third parties in the course of their business. UK QR should respond irrespective of
BoMCOM being QR’s German subsidiary, or with JV.

Emma of R coordinates German QR HR. Disclosed correspondence proves that Mr. Ferrone
does play an essential part in the recruitment process for the roles in Köln. While Rojda
expresses a first hand impression over the candidates, decisions are always made by Rob

Quick Release GmbH, registered in 21.11.2012 on Bismarckstraße 51, 50672, Cologne,

Managing Director Ferrone, Robert, Cologne, entitled to sole representation with the authority
to conclude legal transactions in the name of the company with himself or as a representative of
a third party. Later changed names and address to BoMCOM GmbH, on 9.10.2013.

If joint venture be the appropriate legal status, or whether BoMCOM is a QR subsidiary, is

clearly outside C’s expertise. What is certain, as provided by literature, is that that a joint
venture (JV) is a business entity created by two or more parties, generally characterised
by shared ownership, shared returns and risks, and shared governance.

Each member of a joint venture is deemed to be the agent of the other when acting in
furtherance of the common objective. Shared risks implies shared liability. If a third party is
injured by the activities of a joint venture, all the parties involved may be held equally liable.

It is to be noted that when third parties deal with a co-venturer in good faith and without
knowledge of any limitation upon his/her authority, the law presumes him/her to have the
power to bind his/her associates by such contracts that is reasonably necessary to carry on the
business in which the joint venturers are engaged [Martin v. Chapel, Wilkinson, Riggs, &
Abney, 1981 OK 134].

Under common law (the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978) all parties can be
jointly and severally liable for the loss or damage that flows from the breach. .Section
1(1) of the Act provides that “any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by
another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the
same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise)”.
In whose favour should ambiguities be decided? Usually the court will resolve any
uncertainty or doubt surrounding a provision against the party who would benefit from the
suggested interpretation. This is the so-called "contra proferentem" rule whereby the clause
is construed against the party seeking to rely on it. It applies in particular to the party
seeking to take the benefit of an exclusion or limitation of liability. However, recent cases
indicate that the rule has a very limited role in relation to commercial contracts negotiated
between sophisticated parties of equal bargaining strength
https://www.trans-lex.org/912000/_/agent-acting-on-behalf-of-group-of-companies/
A corporate entity acting on behalf of a group of corporate entities binds all entities that
belong to the group. This Principle has been developed by international arbitral tribunals as
the so-called "group of companies doctrine" for cases in which a member of a corporate
group, even though not a signature to an arbitration agreement concluded by another
member of the corporate group, appeared in economic reality as the real party to the
arbitration agreement and was therefore treated as such by these tribunals. While the
Principle is disputed in the arbitration context because of the form requirement for
arbitration agreements, e.g. under Art. 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, it can be extended to contracts in general for which no such form
requirement exists. However, its application must be limited to clear cases in which the
involvement of the non-signatory in the performance of the contractual obligations is so
evident and strong that the case comes close to one of app
No. IV.6.11 Trans-Lex Principle
Plurality of debtors
Two or more parties who are liable for one and the same performance are (a) joint, or (b)
partial debtors. Parties are liable as joint or partial debtors when they unite in making one
and the same promise under the same contract or when they are liablefor the same damage
unless the contract or the law provides otherwise.(a) Joint debtors(aa) The creditor may
claim performance from any one ofthe joint debtors until full performance has been reached.
(a) Joint debtors
(aa) The creditor may claim performance from any one of the joint debtors until full
performance has been reached.
(bb) If one joint debtor has performed, in kind or by way of set off, the liability to the creditor
of the other joint debtor(s) is discharged to the extent of such performance or set-off. The
same applies if one joint debtor concludes a settlement with the creditor.
(cc) As between themselves, joint debtors are liable in equal shares unless the contract or
the law provides otherwise. If a joint debtor has performed more than his share, he may
claim the excess from any of the other joint debtors to the extent of each debtor's
unperformed share.
(dd) A joint debtor may invoke against the creditor any defense which another joint debtor
can invoke, other than a defense personal to that other debtor. Invoking the defense has no
effect with regard to the other joint debtors.
1The Principle deals with two types of plural obligations, those incurred by joint debtors and
those incurred by partial debtors. Whether a case of joint or partial debtorship is present
depends on the terms regulating the obligation. Absent such terms, the obligation of two or
more debtors to perform the same obligation or to pay the same damage is a joint obligation.

2Subsection (a) stipulates that in case of joint debtors, which are frequently encountered in
practice, the creditor may claim whole performance from any of the debtors without having
to involve all the debtors. The joint debtor that is approached by the creditor may invoke any
defense which another joint debtor can invoke, unless such defense is linked to the person of
that other debtor and may therefore not be invoked by another debtor. Performance by one
debtor, either in kind or by way of set-off, discharges the other debtors to the extent of such
performance or set-off. As to the internal liability among themselves, Subsection (a) (cc)
provides a default rule of equal sharing, unless the parties, expressly or by implication, have
provided otherwise. A rule of unequal sharing may also be provided for by the law, for
example in cases of damage claims in which one debtor carries a greater degree of fault or
responsibility as compared to the other debtors. If one debtor has performed more than its
internal share, he may recover the excess portion of this performance from any of the other
joint debtors, but only to the extent of each debtor's unperformed share.

3Subsection (b) stipulates that in case of partial debtors, the creditor may claim from each
partial debtor only that part of the performance for which the debtor is liable. This means
that the partial debtors carry separate liabilities vis-à-vis the creditor for their own shares.
Non-performance by one debtor does not affect the obligations of the other partial debtors.
The partial debtor may not invoke defenses which are available only to other partial debtors.
Absent a contrary indication in the contract or in the law, partial debtors are liable vis-à-
vis the creditor in equal shares. https://www.trans-lex.org/936600"

Chapter 10: Principles of European Contract Law

Plurality of Parties
Section 1: Plurality of Debtors
Article 10:101: Solidary, Separate and Communal Obligations
936600(1) Obligations are solidary when all the debtors are bound to render one and the same
performance and the creditor may require it from any one of them until full performance has
been received.
936600(2) Obligations are separate when each debtor is bound to render only part of the
performance and the creditor may require from each debtor only that debtor's part.
(3) An obligation is communal when all the debtors are bound to render the performance
together and the creditor may require it only from all of them.
Article 10:102: When Solidary Obligations Arise
936600(1) If several debtors are bound to render one and the same performance to a creditor
under the same contract, they are solidarily liable, unless the contract or the law provides
otherwise.
936600(2) Solidary obligations also arise where several persons are liable for the same damage.
936600(3) The fact that the debtors are not liable on the same terms does not prevent their
obligations from being solidary.
Article 10:103: Liability under Separate Obligations
936600Debtors bound by separate obligations are liable in equal shares unless the contract or
the law provides otherwise.
Article 10:104: Communal Obligations: Special Rule when Money Claimed for Non-
performance
Notwithstanding Article 10:101(3), when money is claimed for non-performance of a
communal obligation, the debtors are solidarily liable for payment to the creditor.
Article 10:105: Apportionment Between Solidary Debtors
936600(1) As between themselves, solidary debtors are liable in equal shares unless the
contract or the law provides otherwise.
(2) If two or more debtors are liable for the same damage under Article 10:102(2), their share
of liability as between themselves is determined according to the law governing the event
which gave rise to the liability.
Article 10:106: Recourse Between Solidary Debtors
936600(1) A solidary debtor who has performed more than that debtor's share may claim the
excess from any of the other debtors to the extent of each debtor's unperformed share, together
with a share of any costs reasonably incurred.
(2) A solidary debtor to whom paragraph (1) applies may also, subject to any prior right and
interest of the creditor, exercise the rights and actions of the creditor, including accessory
securities, to recover the excess from any of the other debtors to the extent of each debtor's
unperformed share.
(3) If a solidary debtor who has performed more than that debtor's share is unable, despite all
reasonable efforts, to recover contribution from another solidary debtor, the share of the others,
including the one who has performed, is increased proportionally.
Article 10:107: Performance, Set-off and Merger in Solidary Obligations
936600(1) Performance or set-off by a solidary debtor or set-off by the creditor against one
solidary debtor discharges the other debtors in relation to the creditor to the extent of the
performance or set-off.
(2) Merger of debts between a solidary debtor and the creditor discharges the other debtors only
for the share of the debtor concerned.
Article 10:108: Release or Settlement in Solidary Obligations
936600(1) When the creditor releases, or reaches a settlement with, one solidary debtor, the
other debtors are discharged of liability for the share of that debtor.
(2) The debtors are totally discharged by the release or settlement if it so provides.
(3) As between solidary debtors, the debtor who is discharged from that debtor's share is
discharged only to the extent of the share at the time of the discharge and not from any
supplementary share for which that debtor may subsequently become liable under Article
10:106(3).
Article 10:109: Effect of Judgment in Solidary Obligations
A decision by a court as to the liability to the creditor of one solidary debtor does not affect:
(a)the liability to the creditor of the other solidary debtors; or
(b)the rights of recourse between the solidary debtors under Article 10:106.
Article 10:110: Prescription in Solidary Obligations
Prescription of the creditor's right to performance ("claim") against one solidary debtor does
not affect:
(a)the liability to the creditor of the other solidary debtors; or
(b)the rights of recourse between the solidary debtors under Article 10:106.
Article 10:111: Opposability of Other Defences in Solidary Obligations
936600(1) A solidary debtor may invoke against the creditor any defence which another
solidary debtor can invoke, other than a defence personal to that other debtor. Invoking the
defence has no effect with regard to the other solidary debtors.
936600(2) A debtor from whom contribution is claimed may invoke against the claimant any
personal defence that that debtor could have invoked against the creditor.
Section 2: Plurality of Creditors
Article 10:201: Solidary, Separate and Communal Claims
(1) Claims are solidary when any of the creditors may require full performance from the debtor
and when the debtor may render performance to any of the creditors.
(2) Claims are separate when the debtor owes each creditor only that creditor's share of the
claim and each creditor may require performance only of that creditor's share.
(3) A claim is communal when the debtor must perform to all the creditors and any creditor
may require performance only for the benefit of all.
Article 10:202: Apportionment of Separate Claims
Separate creditors are entitled to equal shares unless the contract or the law provides otherwise.
Article 10:203: Difficulties of Executing a Communal Claim
If one of the creditors in a communal claim refuses, or is unable to receive, the performance,
the debtor may discharge the obligation to perform by depositing the property or money with a
third party according to Articles 7:110 or 7:111 of the Principles.
Article 10:204: Apportionment of Solidary Claims
(1) Solidary creditors are entitled to equal shares unless the contract or the law provides
otherwise.
(2) A creditor who has received more than that creditor's share must transfer the excess to the
other creditors to the extent of their respective shares.
Article 10:205: Regime of Solidary Claims
(1) A release granted to the debtor by one of the solidary creditors has no effect on the other
solidary creditors
(2) The rules of Articles 10:107, 10:109, 10:110 and 10:111(1) apply, with appropriate
adaptations, to solidary claims.
Art. 1313 code civile français–The joint and several nature of an obligation amongst debtors
imposes on each of them an obligation for the whole of the debt. Satisfaction by one of them
discharges them all as regardsthe creditor.36The creditor may require satisfaction from any
jointand several debtor he may choose. An action brought against one of the joint and several
debtors does notprevent the creditor from bringing similaractions against the others.Art.
1314. –A claim for interest made against a single joint and several debtor causes interest to run
against all.Art. 1315. –A joint and several debtor who is sued by the creditor may setup
defences which are common to all the co-debtors, such as nullity or termination, and those
which are available to him personally. He may not setup defences which are personal to the
other debtors, such as the grant ofa deferral. However, where a defence which is personal to
another debtor, such as set-off or release of the debt, extinguishes a separate part.
For all these reasons, bla bla…
 ET1 Particulars of the claim

I am seeking to lodge a victimisation claim against Quick Release for their failure to consider my
application for a role in the company, as well as a breach of contract claim (and in the alternative
for breach of duty of care) against them for the failure to provide a reference in this context.

The said failure to provide a reference is a triple course of action for breach of contract, but also
part of the victimisation claim, as well as a distinct victimisation claim.

We already had an ET discrimination case which we agreed to settle via ACAS. At that time I
claimed race discrimination in regards to dismissal in 2014.

The quick and relevant to this case facts were: In 2014 I was living in Germany and had applied
for a Data Analyst/Engineering Release Coordinator role in Köln with R’s subsidiary/JV
KCIG/QR Germany. Noteworthy, they invited C for an interview the very same day.

They offered a preliminary role in the UK, at the McLaren Technology Centre, with continuation
in Köln.

Once in the UK, R dismissed C one month into the employment and offered no continuation in
Köln. C lodged a discrimination claim in the ET against R. Early 2018 we agreed to settle the
claim.

Between 17 and 23 January 2018 C and R also discussed about applying for the same role in Köln,
which R continued to advertise.

C had recently left employment in France for Germany and applied once more for the very same
role as in 2014, as well as for other similar opportunities within QR’s other projects (ex. UK). C
asked Emma Lloyd whether she would agree to provide a favourable reference for the said
application.

She only advised that C should pursue the entire procedure anew. Although not always in best
terms, we knew each other for 4 years already and it didn’t appear unreasonable to ask for such a
favour.

I found almost shocking that Emma declined to volunteer a reference, as it’s a normal part of
employment to offer references. She even explicitly promised, upon dismissal in 2014, that she
would provide a reference.

I don’t now whether I’m really turning paranoiac about this issue, but also back in 2014 I was
under the conviction that R (deliberately) failed to provide a reference to a prospective employer,
thus loosing C any employment opportunity. I didn’t pursue that claim back then, but I tend to see
patterns re-emerging.

Emma only advised I contact Rojda Kaglayan, with the German HR. I had extensive contact with
her in 2014 during the first application process. Noteworthy, the said selection process is quite
complex, involving phone interviews with multiple people, online data tests, filling-in
questionnaires, submission of formal documents (university diploma, references etc.)

At first, C was not doubtful, as Rojda appeared extremely nice in 2014, as it was obvious from
direct contact with her, the (successful) outcome of the 2014 application, as well as 2014
contemporaneous conversation between Emma/Rob Ferrone and Rojda, whereupon she made very
positive comments about C such as ‘nice, likeable individual’ (orig. germ. sympathischer typ),
‘being a very good option’ (which is a comment she made about no other candidate – slightly not
my business here, but it’s nice pointing out).

Even Rob Ferrone agreed, in his particular style: He would come in as an experience hire… this
guy could be good BOMCOM material for the stuff outside of Ford as well. We could even use
him till Christmas and then bring him back.

Eventually C contacted Rojda anew and I have also used the official application procedure on
their website, as in 2014. However, at this time not just that I have not received any invitation the
very day… but no reply what so ever to any of my applications or messages!

It is therefore obvious that R, by means of their German subsidiary/JV, decided not to consider
C’s application for any of their roles in Köln or elsewhere.

I turned to consider the possible causes of R’s attitude and seriously analysed all facts and relevant
circumstances. C further delved into the disclosed correspondence, and my attention was drawn
also to some disclosed conversation between Emma, Rob Ferrone and Rojda which post-dated
2014, and actually 2017.

The tone this time had drastically changed, featuring derogatory and upsetting comments, such as
Adrian being weird, lying, he was crazy, and such a shame.

Considering previous correspondence with Rojda (start of 2014), it appears obvious that German
QR’s recent attitude towards C and my application in particular was considerably different to the
very same application earlier in 2014, in a way which can only be explained by animosity in
respect of the earlier Tribunal case.

C duly asked Emma to comment on the imminent allegations, however she declined to do so.

Worse still, her refusal to comment is furthermore evidence in support of victimisation.

As there appears no alternative explanation, I think therefore I have suffered victimisation with
regard to applying for a role in Köln earlier 2018, and respondent’s subsequent attitude/lack of
towards my application.

Emma’s lack to provide a reference appears now but the tip of the iceberg. Of course she would
not bother to write a reference, as she was already poised against C’s application!
Authorities agree that employment contracts include an implied term to the effect that they should
'provide a reference which was full, frank and truthful and… prepared using reasonable care.'
Spring v Guardian Assurance [1994] UKHL 7 (07 July 1994) and the like…

Romanian Labour Code provides in Section 34(5) At the request of the employee, the employer
shall issue a document certifying the activity performed by him/her, and the length of service - in
profession and specialisation. Obligation also stated in Section 40(2)(h) to issue, upon request, all
documents stating the employee quality of the applicant.

This ET is best unaware of the elaborate arguments issued before the previous Tribunal, as to why
C is referring to Romanian legislation as applicable before the UK ET!

Let R not even contemplate contemplating having no obligation to provide a reference! Rather say
hello to our old friend, the EC Regulation No 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual
obligations (Rome I)!!!

The incidence of its Sect 3(1) and Sect 8(2) is drawn by role advertised in Köln, as well as C’s
place of engagement. For a quick introduction, please find a brief article on the topic of references
in Germany! https://www.employmentlawworldview.com/the-german-arbeitszeugnis-reference-a-
sometimes-dangerous-mystery-for-non-german-employers/

Note also ECJ Judgment (Fourth Chamber) of 15 December 2011 in C-384/10 Voogsgeerd.

Bearing in mind that a reference was mandatory according to both German (the contract shall be
governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually
carries out his work in performance of the contract = Sect 3(1)) and Romanian substantial laws
(the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect the
characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence = Sect 4(2)), C could not have
forfeited minimum protection under any of the two, as provided by Sect 8(1) of the Regulation.

Basically, R’s nightmare is back: just as C was arguing in the other case that they were not
allowed to summarily terminate C at will (illegal in Germany or Romania)… the very same way C
argues now that they could not decline a reference.

This is some sort of a nutshell. C understands this is meant as a statement of fact, not legal
argument. However, C cannot be too precautious, as in the previous case we lost 3 years in the
EAT, because R forged the bundled ET1 by ‘accidentally omitting’ two pages… and then
claiming that I didn’t make the case.

R is therefore in breach of statute, as well as two distinct implied terms (into the defunct
employment contract): a term providing the obligation to provide a reference, as well as a breach
of the duty of trust and confidence. It survives the end of employment and falls outside the
Johnson exclusion area.
But not just implied terms in the 2014 employment contract were breached by refusing to provide
a reference, but also as an explicit term, that is the verbal promise of 2014 to provide a reference.
Therefore 2 distinct contracts, each breached in distinct ways.

Absolutely surprisingly, there is a third ground as well!! C is extraordinarily amazed myself – it’s
the COT3 agreement itself! It’s true that it didn’t feature an explicit clause about a reference…
however it needn’t!

The COT3 includes an implicit clause to provide a reference! Check this out! It’s breathtaking!!

The COT3 agreement included several transactions: 1. C agrees to advantages for withdrawing his
claims 2. Both parties agree to confidentiality.

However, there’s one more little ending clause: The Claimant agrees that he has not and will not
make or publish any derogatory or defamatory remarks about the Respondent. [Disclaimer, that C
engages not in breach of COT3 confidentiality by such remarks as to its content] This is very
important for R to include however not in direct connection with the settlement of the claims.

The point is that R didn’t explicitly volunteer any advantage for C over this term. In civil law,
parties cannot contract so that only one party takes an obligation, while the other does not
reciprocate in any way. That would be akin to a donation.

The interested party might the claim nullity (or unenforceability, whatever) of such a said clause.
However, in this case, the interested C asks instead the ET to construe the COT3 so as to include a
term instituting a reciprocal obligation upon R to provide a reasonable reference for C. This
interpretation gives maximum operation to the contract (there was a specific phrase, which C
cannot recall) and not far fetched, as both commensurate obligations share the same nature, and
are therefore naturally reciprocal (you’re good to me, I’m good to you’).

This is the point on lack of consideration, which I cannot precisely match with continental civil
code concepts. C lacked the physical time to research this topic any deeper…

Moreover, it is customary in the industry to provide a reference with a settlement (notoriety of

which we should prove during the proceedings). It is also customary in the industry to provide a
reference without a settlement 

I acquired this fabulous insight thanks to Byrnell v British Telecommunications & Anor [2009]
EWHC 727 (QB) (20 February 2009)

Such authorities also provide that even an unsubstantial reference is equivalent to no reference,
which is taken as a negative reference and always prejudicial.

No reference is a negative reference!

As to negligence, C alleges that R owed him a duty of care in providing a reference in the
knowledge that the lack thereof would prevent or substantially damage C’s prospects of
employment (C is upset by mixing tort and contract law, prohibited in continental civil codes).
Society has evolved since 1994, and nowadays it’s common norm, especially in the industry, that
giving of a reference, good or bad, is not a matter of discretion. (eg. Cox v Sun Alliance Life Ltd
[2001] EWCA Civ 649 (9 May 2001)

More so as it involved R’s subsidiary!! This is an interesting point! Applying with R’s subsidiary
for a role, while ascertaining previous experience with R in a similar role, IMPLIES that lacking
reference automatically forfeits any employment opportunity. And therefore it was obvious to R
that not providing one ruined C, and therefore they were obliged to provide one.

As further proof in this sense, be noted R’s scrupulous investigation into C’s past employment.

The consequences of a negligent attitude, such as failing to provide a reference, were known to the
potential author, namely that it might well blight a man's entire career, not to say that it was only
fair, just and reasonable that the author of the reference should take all reasonable care to ensure
that his attitude would not lead to that effect.

Back to victimisation. The relevant circumstances of 2018 and 2014 applications were remarkably
similar, making C of 2014 the best possible comparator in the world! (Authorities have agreed that
comparator exercises are not required to prove victimisation, but for direct discrimination,
however, the success of such an exercise guarantees an inference of victimisation).

C fulfilled all job requirements, exactly as 4 years back.

Just as in 2014, C was in Köln, proposing to make a personal visit.

Just as in 2014, having recently concluded my French employment (in 2014 conclusion was in
respect of Dutch employment), C was ready to start immediately.

Just as in 2014, C had done data test. Although not exactly as trim as in 2014, C was still in
perfect fit and charms.

There’s an additional catch to that as well! A very important one, that C realised much too late –
that R duped C greatly. And that C resents not having thought any earlier, when agreed to settle
away monetary sums owed during employment.

There’s a tiny sentence in the correspondence, which stroke a chord with R: Rojda said on 8 April
2014: I presume you’d cover and organise accommodation for the period in the UK Rob replied:
Yes On 22 April 2014, Rob directed Emma, can we get this guy on board for McLaren? We
wouldn’t have to pay any accommodation. Emma replied: We would obviously want to make the
offer attractive (which I think free accommodation is a pretty attractive offer)To which Rob
stressed: I would expect him to pay his own accommodation. (emphasis his)

C was stupid not to consider my entitlements as a foreign worker, that is accommodation and the
like. And R ruthlessly exploited C. Bloody £500/month!!!!!!! Perhaps more, there’s no point
going into details now. The point is R realised C was not just much better, but also much cheaper
than other candidates!!
The Stockholm syndrome part of C forgives R: just as communism is deeply ingrained in East
European mind… just the same way treating foreigners as chattel impacts British mind…

C congratulates himself for duly refraining from any reference to Adolf Hitler so far.

Disclosed correspondence between Emma and Rojda moreover show the perfect identity between
the roles, as the former provided the latter with a JD of the current roles, to replace the missing JD
for the 2014 role, which apparently Emma could not find for the FH Bundle.

It also appears, from the said correspondence, that Rojda had a more nuanced opinion in 2018
about C than back in 2014. Noteworthy, C had no contact with Rojda following the interviews in
Köln 2014.

As R states there was no other conversation about C (otherwise they would have disclosed it for
the ET case), it doesn’t appear from the said correspondence with Rojda that KCIG had any
knowledge about C other than they had back in 2014 + the fact of dismissal + the ET case.

There is also no evidence Rojda would have been persuaded that the fact itself of C’s dismissal in
2014 would render C inapt for a 2018 role in Köln.

This makes for other deeply disturbing facts: In the November 2017 e-mail, Rojda refers to Rob
telling her about firing him because he was crazy in mid-July 2014.

C vainly asked Emma to comment upon this most disturbing allegation…

But, most shockingly, the said conversation between Rob and Rojda was never included in the
documents R disclosed. Which is a second instance of R perjuring!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Certainty fails C on the use of the proper legal jargon, however, I’m referring to R’s self
admission of the first instance of perjury, when they forged the bundled ET1.

Perhaps C should also seek compensation for the mental harm occasioned by the stress of not
being able to catharsise the profoundly deeply negative feelings R’s criminal behaviour evokes
upon C (…abstaining from derogatory or defamatory remarks about R).

R’s practice of hiding evidence is also obvious from Nick Solly’s message of 23 jan 2015, when
he was contemplating deleting C’s message of 3 june 2014.

Closed parenthesis, back to comparing C to himself. What could have driven R to change their
view on C from:

an experience hire… this guy could be good BOMCOM material for the stuff outside of Ford as
well. We could even use him till Christmas and then bring him back.

to

weird and lying, he was crazy, and such a shame?

What could C imaginably have done during his short month of employment to warrant such a 180
degrees turn?

It was not even actually a short month, given that the decision to dismiss C was taken on 20 May.
This is a mere 2 weeks after C was employed on 6 May.

Unlikely that Nick Solly’s open hatred for C (for asking one day to leave 30 minutes earlier to
open a bank account – as directed by Emma, in the circumstance where C was working 10 hours
every day) is apt explaining the entire drama.

C carefully analysed every piece of information before reaching the conclusion that the ET case
was the only remaining cause. The otherwise inexplicable change in Rojda’s attitude appears to
render victimisation as the most likely explanation for R’s decision to not pursue C’s application
(as well as not providing a reference).

It is certainly very likely to be a contributing factor. Even in R’s view, it’s 50% likely, which is
abhorrently high. Authorities have systematically held that all the Claimant needs to do is plant in
the Employment Tribunal’s mind that the protected characteristic is a factor in the treatment. It
does not need to be the main reason, it just needs to have a “significant influence” on the outcome.

The UK House of Lords made it clear, in the 15th July 1999 decision in Swiggs and Others v.
Nagarajan [1999] UKHL 36 or Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2000] 1 AC 501 I don’t
know why they come with 2 different names.

"Decisions are frequently reached for more than one reason. Discrimination may be on racial grounds even
though it is not the sole ground for the decision. A variety of phrases, with different shades of meaning,
have been used to explain how the legislation applies in such cases: discrimination requires that racial
grounds were a cause, the activating cause, a substantial and effective cause, a substantial reason, an
important factor. No one phrase is obviously preferable to all others, although in the application of this
legislation legalistic phrases, as well as subtle distinctions, are better avoided so far as possible. If racial
grounds or protected acts had a significant influence on the outcome, discrimination is made out."
[emphasis added] (see also: Metropolitan Police v Keohane [2014] UKEAT 0463_12_0403).

This point is also made in Law Society v Bahl [2003] IRLR 640, at paragraph 83: "… the discriminatory
reason for the conduct need not be the sole or even the principal reason of the discrimination; it is enough
that it is a contributing cause in the sense of a 'significant influence'."

Not just that R failed to consider my application, but before addressing ACAS, I asked Emma
several times to express a view on the events, as to dispel victimisation, yet she has failed to do so.

I can imagine her to be furious, but, however, it’s not really anything but their own fault…

R’s further uncooperative attitude thus also offers solid grounds for an inference of victimisation.
Just as in the case of refusing to answer the questionnaire.

R appears resolute to make C’s life most difficult possible, not just by refusing to consider the
highly skilful C for the roles they advertised. But by also cutting all contact. Just like in the times
of not too old, when English people looked upon foreigners as less than people, not even worthy
addressing to.

Clearly Emma, R’s HR manager, was in a position to enquire into the German recruitment process,
as Mr. Ferrone was overseeing it. Providing feedback even for unsuccessful applications is a norm
in the field, and in any case a normal expectation given the former employment relationship. In
this respect, C is particularly relying on ECJ’s ruling in Coote. Just as victimisation was found
then in respect to refusal to provide reference, said reasoning is extendable to refusal to provide
explanation for declining to pursue such a reengagement application.

In 2014 they also declined to provide any explanation in regards to both dismissal and refusal to
relocate to Germany. Then, R deprived C of reference. Then R declined to comment on the
victimisation allegation.

Such attitude brings back very sad memories from 2014, when R also banished C 1 month into a
foreign country, cutting C’s contact completely (could anyone actually imagine C’s predicament
in respect of his colleagues noticing C’s sudden disappearance from among them and was never
able to be heard from again). C had absolutely no friends left, no contacts, no nothing… but a
4000 GBP debt for the leased studio (for the duration of the originating fixed-term).

What a turn around!!

R had then easy means at least to alleviate just a little bit of C’s torment, as upon dismissal they
promised an attempt to mitigate towards the landlord. At the time when C raised a grievance, R
nevertheless resolved on an exhibition of might and went back on their word, leaving C to his
demise.

At that time I also failed to pursue a course of victimisation in this respect, but R’s patterns of
attitude now turned obvious and there is no doubt in my mind of their evil schemes.

R’s entire attitude is cunningly calculated to discredit and demean, humiliate and degrade C.
When C superhumanly strove to best perform in work, they deliberately left C with the
falsely induced image that it’s all C’s fault for not being able to fit in. C cannot imagine
someone with more suicidal tendencies in his place…

This of course firstly and greatly benefits R as shielding them from justice, pursuing complex and
exhausting litigation being last thing’s on demoralised C’s agenda to actually survive.

I briefly mention this just to dispel ET’s doubts as to what sort of drama might be constituted out
of being banished in the UK – which is actually impossible for ET to picture, as their home
country, but whatever… Just picture yourself waking up in Afghanistan or North Korea. It’s
actually much worse than that, as those people would be more likely to help and feel sympathetic,
and not discriminate you for being a gypsy.

It is true some of these latter issues were originally touched upon in the 2014 originating ET1, and
to such extent cannot be reused as per the CO3 to give rise to the same claim. However, before the
2018 ET any reference towards them was already renounced on C’s own motion, therefore they
didn’t form part of the claim that was settled.

It is also true that they might still be covered by the CO3 in the sense that no new claim might be
asserted with respect to those facts, even as they didn’t take part in the settled claim.

But this is not the point raised here. C relies on those 2014 facts as evidentiary to the 2018
allegations of victimisation and breach of contract (not covered by the CO3), and not as giving
rise to a resurrected claim of the same facts.

C refers to those facts as evidence of R’s continuous campaign against C. That attitude bitterly
reverberates into their current 2018 acts. C could not properly prove my victimisation claim
without referring to those facts.

Needless to say, R’s systematic attitude further impacts upon C’s chances to ever find
employment in his field of expertise.

In extremely competitive market conditions today, who would hire an individual without a
reference from his former employer. And without any reasonable prospect to account or mitigate
for the lack thereof (being dismissed after one only month of employment automatically breeds
the assumption of gross incompetence or gross misconduct or criminal offence or worse).

It could also be argued that this portion of the claim might slightly touch upon the CO3 in the
sense that, even if they provided a reference, it would rather do more harm than good. But this
portion is not essential to the reference issue. But the fact that reengagement would have definitely
been C’s only possible chance to redeem its career. This paragraph makes little sense.

An individual’s right to private life under Article 8 also incorporates a right to protection of his or
her reputation and career. The Employment Rights Act 1996 recognised that a person's
employment is usually one of the most important things in his or her life. It gives not only a
livelihood but an occupation, an identity and a sense of self-esteem. C had spent 5 years for
University study, another 6 in Dutch and English employment, amounting to a somewhat
impressive career before the age of 30.

C’s career spanned over more than a third of C’s most recent, proficient and defining lifespan.

However, R changed all that, as despite strenuous efforts, C could never resume his career for 4
years already. And future prospects appear even grimmer. C’s temporary employment in France is
utterly irrelevant to this issue, as it concerned unskilled labour.

For the purpose of victimisation, C made the point that 2014 and 2018 conditions were identical
with regard to the role R advertised.

There were however some changes in the context of 2018, as different from 2014. However, they
had the effect as to making C’s application even more appealing.

R had an unappeased hunger for more skilled employees, as R describe themselves:

It all began back in 2003. Rob, one of our founders, was working as an engineer at a leading
automotive company … So Rob and his colleague, Adam, created Quick Release. Now, 14 years
later, we’ve grown to 171 employees. (in 2017)

Noteworthy, in 2014 they had some 70 employees.

Founded in 2007, KCIG is a rapidly growing company that provides the mobility sector with top
quality, innovative and people-driven engineering solutions. In 2015 the magazine FOCUS listed
us as one of the fastest growing companies in Germany for the period 2011-2014.

In 2017 QR_ turned global, with expansions into the US and Asia Pacific. The business grew
rapidly, culminating in a nomination, and subsequent shortlisting for a British American Business
(BAB) Transatlantic Growth award.

From R’s very fortunate business context, rapidly expanding operations requiring more and more
highly skilled employees, it appears extremely bizarre to turn a skilled and experienced expert as
C down. While, in the very same conditions in 2014, they invited C for an interview the very next
day C applied!

Actually, they have much more hunger in 2018 than back in 2014, as Rob colourfully stressed: we
need someone two weeks ago.

In the alternative (although personally I find it extremely unlikely), I might have also suffered age
discrimination in the same circumstance. I am also considering here one of Emma’s former replies
mentioning that the opportunities are at ‘graduate level’.

I’m including this nonsense here in the event R’s solicitors pull out some sort of trick explanation.

ACAS’ guide for employers and employees Age and the workplace Putting the Equality Act 2010
and the removal of the default retirement age (DRA) 2011 into practice clearly instructs
employers, in page 11: If you ask for graduates, remember that the term can be interpreted as code
for someone in their early twenties. Graduates can be any age. Make it clear that you are
interested in the qualification and not the age of the applicant.

Age stereotypes can strongly affect people's choices about who to hire, reveals new research by
University of Kent, published Science Daily on March 24, 2016: If one of two equally well
qualified job candidates is described as having stereotypically 'young' characteristics, and the
other has stereotypically 'old' characteristics, the 'younger' candidate is more likely to be selected.

These findings show that people's unacknowledged assumptions about age and age-related
capability can affect the way they view someone's employability. If these assumptions affect
employers' judgements, it has serious implications for the fair chances of older workers to gain
employment in new roles or workplaces.

By far not lastly, while I might admit to some sort of cultural barrier in comprehending how was I
at ‘graduate level’ in 2014 (at 30) and no longer am in 2018. More so, how at ‘graduate level’
were, say, Ewan Shaw… and even Dan Baker and Fred Knowles exposed considerable previous
employment experience (7 years in Fred’s case).

In which case also race discrimination could be considered, given that QR really employed even
older people compared to the claimant, or clearly less likely to fit in the ‘graduates’ group (or, in
neutral terms being said, people sharing the same protected characteristic of age to an even larger
extent). In which case the differential treatment not being due to age, but to the other protected
characteristic, that C only shares besides age, race.

Ending these brief antipathetic remarks about age and race discrimination, slightly less unlikely is
disability discrimination. Should they decide to put the stupid crap about interaction skills.

Another disclaimer: R is so unimaginably evil that they even used some alembicated phrasing in
the ET1 (lodged august 2014) to ‘prove’ C’s deficiency in communication skills during
employment (may 2014). As they couldn’t bring any contemporaneous evidence during C’s
employment.

Which is not to say sometimes but outright idiotic – such as inventing words (e.g. percentualise)
and alternating C and ‘my’ in the same sentence. I’m disclaiming that C was employed in an
engineering context and not a judicial one. C lacks the physical time and resources to build a
perfect legal paper.

Finally, there is yet another point where unfortunately things appeared to have not changed much
since 2014: As C had already put R on hold with regard to discrimination, it appears R failed to
take any reasonably expected steps to prevent discrimination from reoccurring.

R was on notice that the danger that discrimination would occur was heightened, and that they
should reasonably have done something to prevent it over and above what had already been done
on a more general basis. (which was actually nothing) R utterly failed to take any reasonably
expected steps to prevent discrimination from reoccurring.

C is so surprised that someone as experienced as Emma, with so many years top HR experience,
would be so indifferent to discrimination. Which is suspect of lacking equal opportunity training,
in order to be objective and avoid stereotyping people because of their age. Making it mandatory
for R to prove strong interest in taking discrimination seriously, as provided per Para 18.3 – 18.34
of the Equality Act 2010 Employment Statutory Code of Practice – with respect to equality policy.

What steps had R taken reasonable to prevent discrimination??

Also from the ACAS code of practice thing…pre-existing policies that relate to discrimination,
harassment, equal opportunities and so on, and explore with the Respondent how those policies
were communicated to the employees. Other considerations would include whether training was
provided to staff and if so to what extent and at what level, whether they were regularly reviewed
and updated, whether there has been any monitoring of the effectiveness of these policies and
whether they have been utilised in an appropriate way when issues have occurred within the
workplace. Further, if the Respondent was put on notice that alleged discriminatory acts were
occurring, you would wish to explore what, above their normal policies and training, your client
did to avoid any further discrimination from occurring.

Here C should quote lengthy examples where R failed to observe ACAS code of practice.

Attempting to end, upon this entire calamity R incurred upon C: Short of contrary evidence by R,
C appears never to be able to resume his career, in which I invested the most significant part of
my life... This ongoing systematic genocide concentrated on a single individual gives rise,
similarly as in the Coote v. Granada case, to a claim of loss of earnings for the coming 30 years
until C’s retirement (what a daunting prospect!), in 30 years* £24k/year = £720.000. C fully
agrees to be exaggerating, and ET is invited to percentualise and subject to mitigation. This is the
only point where I succeed being brief.

C advised R that COT3 cannot prevent this claim. Emma only mentioned R would rely on the
COT3, however failing to particularise in any way as to how exactly. I therefore also omit here
ample arguments, but briefly point to the following:

Section 203(3)(b) ERA1996 provides For the purposes of subsection (2)(f) the conditions
regulating settlement agreements under this Act are that—the agreement must relate to the
particular proceedings.

Following Hinton v University of East London [2005] EWCA Civ 532 (06 May 2005), it is
submitted both that, contractually, the agreement was NOT sufficiently wide to cover the
applicant's complaint, and that section 203(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, consistent
with electorative policy of protecting employees from signing away the right to bring employment
tribunal proceedings under the Act except where closely defined conditions were satisfied and
with the language of the section, requiring that 'particular proceedings' be identified and
particularised.

…that the key question was how the compromise agreement related to the applicant's particular
complaint, and did not 'relate to' the applicant's complaint of detrimental treatment under the Act,
since it failed to state expressly the particular statutory provision or to supply a description of the
legal nature or the factual basis of any proceedings 'arising under statue' or to mention public
interest disclosures or any detriment suffered by the applicant; and, that, therefore the employment
tribunal's conclusion was correct and the matter should proceed to a full merits hearing."

The purpose of section 203 is clear. It is to protect claimants from the danger of signing away
their rights without a proper understanding of what they are doing. In order to achieve that
purpose, I consider that section 203(3)(b) must be construed as requiring the particular
proceedings to which the agreement relates to be clearly identified. It is not sufficient to use a
rolled-up expression such as 'all statutory rights'. In my view, Mr Hare went too far when he
conceded that it might be sufficient to identify the proceedings only by reference to the statute
under which they arise. In my judgment, it is not sufficient. Many employment rights arise, for
example, under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and, to comply with section 203(3)(b), the
particular proceedings to which the agreement relates must be more clearly identified. In my
judgment, in order to comply with section 203, the particular claims or potential claims to be
covered by the agreement must be identified, as Mr Hare suggested, either by a generic
description such as 'unfair dismissal' or by reference to the section of the statute giving rise to the
claim.

That is all that can be required for compliance with section 203(3)(b). However, I agree with
Mummery LJ that the requirements of good practice should dictate that the particular proceedings
covered by the agreement should be spelled out by means of a brief factual and legal
description. I agree with him that this should not cause practical difficulty and will not be unduly
onerous. I would add that I would not regard it as good practice for lawyers to draft a standard
form of compromise agreement which lists every form of employment right known to the
law. Compromise agreements should be tailored to the individual circumstances of the instant
case. Only in that way can the purpose behind this provision be fully satisfied.

Lunt v Merseyside TEC Ltd [1998] UKEAT 951_97_1305 (13 May 1998) A compromise
agreement cannot, therefore, seek to exclude potential complaints that have not yet arisen on the
off-chance that they might be raised; it cannot, in other words, be used to sign away all the
employee's tribunal rights, as can be done in the case of a negotiated settlement drawn up with the
assistance of a conciliation officer. However, where a number of different tribunal claims (such as
unfair dismissal, race/sex discrimination, claims for unlawful deduction of wages, and so on) have
been raised by the employee, whether in an originating application or in correspondence prior to
the issue of proceedings, there does not seem to be any good reason why these should not all be
disposed of in the one compromise agreement. Each matter would be a 'particular complaint'
under the relevant statute.

Byrnell further held in para 55 any claim that could have been made in relation to a reference and
failure to provide it after the execution of the Agreement would not, contrary to the Master's view,
have been caught up because if there were a right to demand a reference, the subsequent refusal of
a reference or provision of an inadequate reference would have been a new cause of action arising
after the date of the compromise agreement and not caught by it. It would not have been
something which arose out of the termination of the employment, but out of a separate breach of
obligation thereafter to provide a reference.

R’s proposition that C forfeited absolutely all possible future claims ascertains clearly beyond the
meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background
knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which
they were at the time of the contract. Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd. v West Bromwich
Building Society [1997] UKHL 28

All the above clearly prove victimisation, breach of contract, negligence, other discrimination, and
thus the ET is invited to allow the claim for compensation and loss of earnings.
In the London Employment Appeal Tribunal UKEATPA/0770/19/RN
Adrian Arvunescu v Quick Release (Automotive) Ltd

The Appellant is writing to the EAT to lodge a Rule 3(10) application, expressing
dissatisfaction with HHR Soole’s opinion of 5 March 2020 that the notice of appeal does not
disclose reasonable grounds of success, and ask that the matter be heard by a Judge and
order the appeal to proceed to a full hearing.
For the very reasons included in the Notice of appeal: The decision of 16.7.2019 by EJ
Wyeth following the Open Preliminary Hearing in Employment Tribunal in Watford, Case
3307014/2018 striking out everything for want of jurisdiction is in error of law:
General reasons:

1. The judge appeared biased, obviousness also shared by the respondent.

Procedural:
2. Erred in law refusing to strike out R’s skeleton and harmed A’s right to a fair trial
relying on arguments not submitted to A’s scrutiny.
Substantive: Erred in law striking the claims as compromised by COT3:
3. Perversely accepted evidence of the 19 February message, ignoring it was disputed
4. The conciliation officer had obviously not taken action towards settling the alleged
compromised claims, but only pending proceedings.
5. The claims were not related to (past) employment.
6. Erred in law disapplying s203 from the COT3 relating to particular proceedings
7. BCCI everything is never everything. A full slate compromise is always necessarily
ambiguous and thus EJ should not have ignored the interpretation matrix.
8. It would have been unconscionable to settle all precious claims, and in the alternative,
there was no consideration because the award was already consumed by the pending
remedy sought.
Erred in law finding in the alternative that R was not liable for the German joint-venturer.
9. No reasons as to the strike out for no merits as well as joint-venture issue.
10. Perversely relied only on R’s statement that Emma Lloyd was not in charge of
German recruitment, which was not even held by C. In any case, joint liability
In fact, EJ was wrong about everything, save that he had no jurisdiction to hear the breach of
contract claims. EJ also erred in law, in the alternative of the alternative finding no
substantive merit on the claims. However he gave absolutely no reasons.
 1. Bias is argued on several points:
1.1 The incredible 3 months delay from the hearing in July 2019 to the promulgation in
October, given that all the reasons were already integrally presented verbally at the end of
the PH, and therefore absolutely no reason why typing them would have taken so long.
1.2 EJ started his reasons right in para. 2 with reference to C’s nationality, which arose out
of absolutely nowhere and had nothing to do with proceedings.
While normally a benign introductory paragraph, such a remark must be seen in the said
socio-political context as it clearly gives an insight into his priorities.
Given Brexit, it is irrebuttably presumed from the socio-political context, that nearly anyone
in England is suspect of discriminating against Eastern-European nationals, judges included.
In the words of Lord Hewart CJ, justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and
undoubtedly be seen to be done… Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion
that there has been an improper interference with the course of justice. [R v Sussex
Justices, ex parte McCarthy, 1 KB 256, 1923]
The EJ should not have behaved in such a way to cast a doubt that he be considered a racist.
Moreover he stated that C describes himself as such (with regard to nationality), which was
absolutely never the case. Actually, EJ was aware of the quite the contrary, that A actually
had bought a British car, while living in France, for the purpose of pretending to pass as
an Englishman. While this appears rather humoristic, hatred against East-European
nationals is obviously unfortunately not confined to England. Indeed in France and anywhere
else I introduce myself privately as English.
1.3 EJ’s inappropriate irony towards C in para. 67 makes further proof of bias.
EJ cunningly tries to cover any appearance of bias with considerate words on C’s account…
but only as to actually turn the argument around against C. EJ refers to C’s diligence to
study the subject matter of COT3 agreements in July 2019… as an argument that C should
have been aware of all that already by March 2018!
Mere intelligence, in any case, is no substitute for background knowledge. However
intelligent C might be, he cannot be assumed to be aware of the case law on such a particular
subject matter. Nor does intelligence presume advanced knowledge of the law of one
country where I was only employed for 1 month. C had no experience whatsoever about
compromise agreements, a practice most common in the UK only.
Lastly, merely producing complex arguments that eventually fail… makes for not such a
convincing proof of intelligence
1.4 Refusing to strike out R’s skeleton is equally proof of bias (see pct. 2 below)
1.5 Relying on arguments unsubmitted to debate is further proof of bias (see pct. 2 below)
1.6 Allowing the COT3 as evidence is further proof of bias (see pct. 2 below)
1.7 Allowing R’s evidence of an uncertified e-mail of 19 February 2018, and ignoring C’s
submissions that no such e-mail was received is further proof of bias (see point 3 below)
Para. 3.10 Guide to judicial conduct Sufficient reasons for not sitting on a case
include...personal animosity towards a party
The right to a fair trial is enshrined in both Article 6 of the European Convention on Human
Rights and in common law. In turn, this includes the right to a trial conducted and made by a
decision-maker free not only from actual bias but also from the appearance of bias.
Apparent bias may be alleged where the Judge's conduct or behaviour is such that it gives
rise to a suspicion that he or she is not acting impartially.
Whether a trial is conducted fairly is assessed subjectively and necessarily with the benefit
of hindsight, but of course without the benefit of any input from the relevant Judge. there is a
separate question as to whether the trial Judge has acted with apparent bias. These matters
are distinct and should not be conflated. While the question of fairness is considered
subjectively, the apparent bias test is based on whether a "fair-minded, informed observer"
would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. This is therefore an objective test.
The test adopted by the House of Lords in Porter v McGill is “whether a fair minded and
informed observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real
possibility that the tribunal was biased”.
Addressing the role of judges, Lord Neuberger said most were “normally rightly” perceived
as being wealthier and better educated than many of the people whose cases they hear – an
imbalance which carries dangers. “A white male public school judge presiding in a trial of
an unemployed traveller from Eastern Europe accused of assaulting or robbing a white
female public school woman will, I hope, always be unbiased,” he said. “However, he
should always think to himself what his subconscious may be thinking or how it may be
causing him to act.”
While the judge has not expressed views in the course of a hearing, in any extreme and
unbalanced terms as to throw doubt on their ability to try the issue with an objective judicial
mind, there are real grounds (in the reasons he gave at the conclusion of the hearing) for
doubting the ability of the Judge to ignore extraneous considerations, prejudice and
predilections and bring an objective judgment to bear on the issues. In any case where there
is real ground for doubt, that doubt should be resolved in favour of recusal.

2. Refusing to strike out R’s skeleton is an error in law and proof of bias (para 29)
The Respondent produced their Skeleton 2 weeks late of the deadline and only 2 days in
advance of the hearing, amounting to 62 pages, of which A had absolutely no notice, which
is why I had asked to have it stroke out. Notably, R presented no excuse for the delay.
The EJ first said R were under no obligation to produce a skeleton! I reminded him of EJ
George’s order … then he argued that C’s skeleton was also late. I was further shocked when
I read in para 29 that ‘C… acknowledges subsequently that most of the content [in the
skeleton] is not relied upon by R’.
I actually stated that during his oral submissions R relied upon other arguments which were
not included even in the late skeleton! Which is actually the very opposite of what EJ noted.
EJ’s para 48-51 make ample reference to authorities in the list.
Although I had done my best to prepare some attempt of a reply in a hurry (which R had the
first day of the hearing to study – as they were not concerned with the second respondent’s
case), I did not agree that I had properly responded to their arguments.
I clearly explained that I had not effectively replied, but merely gathered the issues already
raised in previous correspondence: ending 2 pages of ET1, as well as submissions of
Monday, 17 December 2018 9:44 and Tuesday, 29 January 2019 13:28.
Which were well on time, therefore I had properly already notified R of all my arguments
although never gathered them in a proper skeleton but right before the hearing.
Therefore R was well on notice of all my arguments, and EJ could not have found that my
skeleton was late and that therefore there is no harm that R’s skeleton was late too.
EJ could have allowed R’s skeleton only had a proper reason for the delay was presented,
which was never the case. Not having read the order transcript doesn’t hold water even in
primary school. They have counsel and in 5 years of litigation they should not be surprised
to have to compile submissions before hearings. Furthermore, 1 or 2 months ahead of
deadline I reminded them explicitly!!!!!!!! It’s already N’th time they miss a deadline. Ever
since the first PH in 2014, when they served the skeleton just before the hearing. When, at
one time, C asked for an extension of time (which was not even necessary, as the appeal was
lodged in time, but I only missed the confirmation. And I had resubmitted it asking for an
extension of time in the case the previous appeal was not registered correctly. EAT found no
need for an extension of time, while R was insisting the appeal was out of time). Which only
shows their wickedness.
EJ should therefore have struck out R’s skeleton, and thereby failing the COT3 argument.

EJ erred in law relying on arguments unsubmitted to debate

EJ also bizarrely added that he was in no way bound by the skeletons.
Which was not the issue. EJ was bound to the principle of contradictoriality, that both parties
should have advanced notice and opportunity to express a point of view regarding all points
of law and fact EJ relies upon in his decision.
Indeed, R’s skeleton relied on Allma, that there was no particular condition of form for
compromise agreements. Notably, the said authority concerned a contestation of consent due
to lack of signature. And there was no criticism of not fulfilling the s203 condition of
referring to particular proceedings. Indeed that case concerned one single common law claim,
and not a statutory claim.
Indeed the EJ did not rely on R’s argument but concocted one of its own making (that s203
simply does not apply)… which it is questionable whether he was indeed entitled to. In any
case, he should have given advance notice to the parties to prepare their response in this
respect, which he did not.
He actually did not raise the point at all before the parties and thus violated A’s right to a
fair trial. This is further evidence of bias.

Allowing the COT3 as evidence is equally an error in law and proof of bias
A should not argue as to this error of law as not fatal to the outcome.
The document was confidential, and I was therefore in the position to resist disclosing the
COT3 in its entirety.
EJ George had instructed that evidence should be heard about the COT3, not the document
itself. The parties agreed about over the content the relevant content of the term in the
COT3 (the waiver).
There was therefore absolutely no need to disclose the entire document (e.g. and thus
revealing to the EJ the amount of the settlement).
The EJ purposefully conflates my opposition towards disclosing the document itself with
opposing to consider its content (in as much as it was agreed by the parties).
A was not opposing him to consider parties submissions as to the content, which obviously
in agreement precluded the need for further evidence.
Of course, he would have arrived at the same conclusion, save from him being informed
about the other settlement terms, which it is reasonably assumed to have fuelled his bias.
EJ furthermore had no issue publishing the confidential content on the website.

1.8 Simply debilitating statements – para 44 the EJ refers, within the COT3 section of the
judgement, to A’s argument (pertinent to the age discrimination claim and nothing to do
with COT3), that R’s joint venturer KGIG advertised various ‘graduate jobs’ at the time of
C’s application in Koln. And the idea was to compare with the recruits list, to show that
‘graduate’ roles were offered to younger candidates rather than to R, which would amount to
age discrimination.
Both documents were provided by R and R’s admission as to what they represented was
clearly indicated in the bundle and their submissions.
However, the EJ shockingly concluded… what he concluded, that he had no idea what those
tables were. While this is not per se direct proof of bias… it clearly indicates the EJ had
absolutely no intention to clearly sort out the facts and firmly apply the law, and therefore
indirect hint of bias.
3. Striking out the claims as compromised is an error of law
Perversity - EJ skipped
No sane ET would allow evidence of R’s uncertified e-mail of 19 February 2018, and
ignoring C’s submissions that no such e-mail was received.
Other than this email, there is absolutely no evidence that A could or should have known
having a victimisation claim at the time of the COT3.
In establishing his facts, the EJ relied in para 39 on a contested document provided by R,
which is an alleged message from a third party towards A.
This is not an issue of rehearing evidence, the ET could not have allowed the evidence
in the first place. This error of law of the ET to have allowed inadmissible evidence is
fatal to the judgement.
In addition, the EJ made no remark of C’s position that the document was contested and
absolutely ignored C’s argument in para 3-4 of my ‘skeleton’.
EJ decided the compromise issue on a single piece of evidence provided by R, a writing of
the party wishing to rely upon it, of which there is no proof of sending to and receiving by A.
Paragraph 2(5) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal Practice Direction - Procedure (29
March 1996) provides "It is not acceptable for an appellant to state as a ground of appeal
simply that "the decision was contrary to the evidence" or that " there was no evidence to
support the decision "or that "the decision was one that no reasonable tribunal could have
reached and was perverse "or similar general grounds, unless the notice of appeal also sets
out full and insufficient particulars of the matters relied on in support of those general
grounds".
Moreover, the principle that EAT does not revisit the facts only on exceptional
circumstances rather applies to a full decision on the merits. For policy purposes EAT could
not rehear witnesses and asses vast documentation.
R’s COT3 defence relates to the claims as being contemporary with the COT3. And thus,
relying on the allegation that C should have been aware of the course of action as at 19
February 2019. According to R, the claims are presumed as compromised by virtue of temporal
coincidence.
However, C had submitted not having received any such message. R’s piece of evidence is
merely a document of their own making with no proof of delivery.
Noteworthy, the said email message is alleged to be issued from their own server. (KCIG.DE)
It is not surprising that, being in control of their own email server, they could make it seem
they had sent messages without absolutely no possibility to certify their reality (unlike the
case of a public email server)
Writings emanating from a party are binding on that party only (I shall here elaborate in
submissions on civil rules of evidence). Therefore, R cannot thus prove C should have been
aware of the course of action prior to COT3.
Misunderstanding or misapplying the facts may amount to an error of law where the
Tribunal has got a relevant undisputed or indisputable fact wrong and has then proceeded to
consider the evidence and reach further conclusions of fact based upon that demonstrable
initial error. Such may be an error of law because the Tribunal is required by law to consider
the case in accordance with agreed or undisputed facts The Employment Appeal Tribunal
can indeed interfere if it is satisfied that the Tribunal has misdirected itself as to the
applicable law, or if there is no evidence to support a particular finding of fact, since the
absence of evidence to support a finding of fact has always been regarded as a pure question
of law Sheridan v British Telecommunications Plc EWCA Civ 14 (14 November 1989)

In the utmost alternative, the EJ erroneously had found, in para 70, that nothing had changed
between 19 February and the lodging of the claim.
This appears rather like a question of fact, however it’s based on the error of law pointed out
in 1.8 ‘debilitating statements’, of not allowing R’s evidence because he said he didn’t
know what they were - the tables referred clearly showing that on 10 April 2018 R advertised
loads of new openings posterior to 19 February. And therefore even in the worst of cases,
taking R’s defence at its best, C’s claim would not have been bothered by the COT3: Even
saying that the openings available on 19 February would not have been suitable for C… R
cannot reasonably defend that a rejection on 19 February precluded offering employment to C
two months later. And therefore relevant circumstances had changed, and the claim was resting
on later facts in April, which could not have been covered by the COT3 in March.

More so, please see further on point 4 that ACAS relayed R’s
message that I am more than welcome to apply for a Role in
Koln. So, if they have said so on 27 February… this clearly
prevents A from assuming to have a claim based on an earlier
rejection of 19 February.
 4. The conciliation officer had obviously not taken action towards settling the victimisation
claim, but only pending proceedings - EJ skipped
The ACAS conciliator clearly excluded all discussions concerning a new role in Germany,
therefore COT3 cannot bar the victimisation claim, in respect of which no action had been
taken by the CO. If the COT3 is taken to concern the victimisation claim, it was not so with the
assistance of a CO.

R first made conciliation contact with C on 12 February, one week prior to the alleged rejection.
Emma said The preparation and attendance at the final hearing in July is likely to incur
significant costs not to mention resource therefore I would like to suggest we engage in some
settlement discussions.
As R themselves introduced settlement as relating to the preparation and attendance at the
final hearing in July, thus obviously victimisation could not have been in contemplation as not
concerned by July FH.
This message is actually contractual! It is not proof from prior negotiations contrary to
four corners rule. A does not hold to bring external evidence contrary to the contract. And the
ambiguity of the COT3 is to be interpreted in light of this element of the contextual
matrix (point 7).
Although labelled ‘without prejudice’, there is no actual privileged content in this very message,
as it did not refer directly to negotiation, but mere ancillary issues.
For the purpose of this point’s argument it serves as evidence that COT3 cannot bar the
victimisation claim, because the condition is not met, the conciliation officer not having
obviously taken any action towards settling the victimisation claim.
ACAS services include the duty to “endeavour to promote a settlement”. Settlement can be
achieved in a number of ways but if it is to satisfy the parties’ wish that there be finality so that
the agreement is tribunal-proof, the settlement must be reduced into an agreement which takes
the form of a contract. Where the parties make a contract which follows any attempt by an
ACAS officer to promote the settlement, it is made with that officer’s assistance. Not every
attempt to promote a settlement, or every actual settlement, results in a conciliation contract but
if it does, it is appropriate to describe it as having been made by the parties with the assistance
of an ACAS officer. It follows that in order to decide whether a contract meeting the
conditions in section 18 has been concluded, attention is then drawn to what the ACAS
officer has done, and whether this corresponds to the functions which a conciliation
officer is under a duty, alternatively has a power, to discharge.
Livingstone v Hepworth Refractories Plc [1991] We cannot say, as Mr Cavanagh would have
us say, that a conciliation officer when acting under the 1978 Act is wearing "any number of
hats" and dealing with all other matters which could possibly arise. It is of course helpful for
parties to be able to "wipe the slate clean", but the agreement must relate to those matters
which are within their presumed contemplation at the time.
And it is obvious from all relevant circumstances that neither A nor the ACAS officer were
considering any other possible claims than relevant to the FH Hearing in July 2018.
Therefore, in any case, even if there was no need to set out all particular proceedings, there was
still no evidence the ACAS officer had taken steps to conciliate other claims than relevant to
the PH in July 2018.
S203(2) Section 1 [a provision is void…] does not apply to any agreement to refrain from
instituting or continuing proceedings where a conciliation officer has taken action under any of
sections 18A to 18C of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996.
Section 18C(3) - Conciliation after institution of proceedings - Employment Tribunals Act
1996, “settlement” means a settlement that brings proceedings to an end without their being
determined by an employment tribunal.
Section 18B(5) as well as Section 18A(6) - Conciliation before institution of proceedings - In
subsections (3) and (4) “settlement” means a settlement that avoids proceedings being
instituted.
Therefore the distinction in the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 makes it once again obvious
that the ACAS officer is only presumed to have taken steps towards a settlement that brings
proceedings to an end, and not towards a settlement that avoids proceedings being instituted.

5. The claims were not related to (past) employment – EJ skipped

Even if COT3 covered claims that A would not have been aware, it could only have so covered
claims related to 2014 employment that A would not have been aware about, and not any other
claim unrelated to 2014 employment that A would not have been aware about.
COT3 clearly started to prohibit any claim arising out of employment or termination. It is
plainly intended to be a finalisation of existing matters between the parties arising only out of
the 2014 employment.
The 2018 victimisation claim (concerning a role in Germany) does not relate to 2014 UK
employment, therefore it cannot have been compromised even on words presumed
unequivocal and sufficiently clear to only compromise claims related to past employment
(even not known).
Per a contrario, the words are only clear to exclude claims not related to 2014 employment, and
therefore the COT3 does not compromise claims not related to 2014 employment.
As far as the ‘or otherwise’, Ejusdem generis (when a general word or phrase follows a list of
specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type
as those listed)
Where “‘[a] release ... contain[s] specific recitals as to the claims being released, and yet
conclude[s] with an omnibus clause to the effect that the releasor releases and discharges all
claims and demands whatsoever which he [or she] ... may have against the releasee ..., the
courts have often applied the rule of ejusdem generis, and held that the general words of a
release are limited by the recital of a particular claim’ Camperlino v. Bargabos 96 A.D.3d
1582, 946 N.Y.S.2d 814, 2012 WL 2164461 N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2012. June 15, 2012
According to the contractual interpretation principal of ejusdem generis, "the meaning of a
word in a series of words is determined 'by the company it keeps,'" 242-44 E. 77th St., LLC v.
Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 31 A.D.3d 100, 103-104, 815 N.Y.S.2d 507 (1st Dep't 2006), when
a general provision follows a series of specific provisions, the general provision is interpreted
as being of the same type or class as the specific provisions that preceded it. See Innophos, Inc.
v. Rhodia, S.A., 38 A.D.3d 368, 372, 832 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't 2007).
In this case, the general provision … is preceded by a series of specific provisions relating to
the promises that plaintiffs made regarding the business relationship contemplated by the LOI.
Plaintiffs cannot rely on the specific provision to bring in an entirely new class of data.
“ Edgewater Growth Capital Partners, L.P. v Greenstar N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 2013 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 351, 2013 NY Slip Op 30183(U) N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2013 Jan. 2, 2013
Delaware recognizes the principle of ejusdem generis, which stands for the proposition that
"where general language follows an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in the widest extent, but are
to be held as applying only to persons or things of the game general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned." Aspen Advisors v. United Artists Theater Co., 861 A.2d 1251, 1265
(Del. 2004).Exec. Risk Specialty Ins. Co. v. First Health Group Corp. 2013 Del. Super.
LEXIS 170, 2013 WL 1908664 Del. Super. Ct., 2013. May 7, 2013.

6. ET erred in law misapplying s203 from the COT3.

In para 48 the EJ simply states that COT3 agreements do not need to relate to particular
proceedings, unlike settlement agreements.
However, there is no explanation to set aside A’s argument to the contrary.
EAJ Soole explains rather that only agreements relating to ERA96 claims are subject to
the s203 requirement of relating to the claims.
And that discrimination/victimisation claims under the Equality Act 2010 are not subject
to such a requirement, which only refers to agreements compromising ERA96 claims.
This is an absurd interpretation of law! No irrational interpretation of law should be
allowed which leads to a conclusion clearly outside the logic of the legislator.
Parliament cannot be presumed to have arbitrarily put legislation in place out of whim.
Not only that it gives that only settlement agreements (with solicitors) be subjected to
the requirement, but it also draws a bizarre distinction between COT3 agreements under
the ERA96, which would be subject to the requirement, and EA2010 which would not
be subject to such a requirement.
It might be a literal interpretation of the law but there is no proof that a literal
interpretation the correct interpretation.
There is no reason to opt for a literal interpretation which yields absurd conclusions. The
correct interpretation must not allow for such arbitrary distinctions.
The Legislator cannot be presumed to assign rights randomly. Any interpretation
yielding such a conclusion must be rejected and another interpretation must be favoured.
The EAJ could still have favoured such a literal interpretation, but only by giving
reasons to explain away the arbitrariness… to propose a logic behind the distinction
between the 4 combinations of agreements.
In the worst case, a distinction could have been argued between settlement agreements
and COT3 agreements, but not between COT3s themselves depending on the type of
claims compromised.
These are clearly arguable matters, and in any case the matter must be allowed to
proceed to an appeal on this issue to put the matter before the Court of Appeals.
A proposes a logical interpretation: settlement agreements are a general type, as they
work in other fields of civil litigation as well. COT3 are a particular type of such
agreement relevant to employment litigation only. And therefore they share the same
requirements.
The whole purpose of Employment law is to provide workers with additional protection
to general civil contractual/common law rights.
It appears therefore unsurprising for the legislator to only refer in later legislation (2010
Act) to the title of conciliation officer assisted agreements (s144-4a) and settlement
agreements (s144-4b), already described in prior legislation (1996 Act), without
explicitly reminding of all requirements for their validity, included in previous
legislation.
It would appear shocking to remove such an important requirement (as the need to list
all the claims covered) solely in regard of the person of the conciliation officer/solicitor.
And therefore the ACAS individual actually helping the position of the employer,
as opposed to general civil litigation where the parties are on equal footing.

EJ could not have found the claims compromised, as the COT3 was not in compliance with
Section 203(3)(b) of Employment Rights Act 1996, because it does not clearly indicate the
particular claims contracted out. And therefore the claims could not have been compromised.
Any provision in an agreement (whether a contract of employment or not) is void in so far as it
purports to preclude a person from bringing any proceedings under this Act before an
employment tribunal. For the purposes of subsection (2)(f) the conditions regulating settlement
agreements under this Act are that the agreement must relate to the particular proceedings.
Hinton v University of East London (2005, EWCA Civ 532) found that Section 203(3)(b)
provides that the compromise agreement must relate to "particular proceedings". The particular
statutory claims to which a compromise agreement relates must be clearly identified. This can
be satisfied: (i) through a generic description of the claim (eg, 'unfair dismissal'); or (ii) by
reference to the particular section of the relevant statute (eg, 'Section 98 of the Employment
Rights Act'). Using general expressions to sweep up an employee's rights (eg, 'all statutory
rights') or simply naming the statute without identifying the relevant part is not sufficient and
will not compromise an employee's claims.
The Court of Appeal further observed that employers should not use standard form agreements
which list every form of employment right known to the law. Instead, compromise agreements
should be tailored to the individual circumstances of each case.
Section 203(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996, consistent with electorative policy of
protecting employees from signing away the right to bring employment tribunal
proceedings under the Act except where closely defined conditions were satisfied and with the
language of the section, requiring that 'particular proceedings' be identified and particularised.
…that the key question was how the compromise agreement related to the applicant's particular
complaint, and did not 'relate to' the applicant's complaint of detrimental treatment under the
Act, since it failed to state expressly the particular statutory provision or to supply a description
of the legal nature or the factual basis of any proceedings 'arising under statue' or to mention
public interest disclosures or any detriment suffered by the applicant; and, that, therefore the
employment tribunal's conclusion was correct and the matter should proceed to a full merits
hearing."
The purpose of section 203 is clear. It is to protect claimants from the danger of signing
away their rights without a proper understanding of what they are doing. In order to
achieve that purpose, I consider that section 203(3)(b) must be construed as requiring the
particular proceedings to which the agreement relates to be clearly identified. It is not
sufficient to use a rolled-up expression such as 'all statutory rights'. In my view, Mr Hare went
too far when he conceded that it might be sufficient to identify the proceedings only by
reference to the statute under which they arise. In my judgment, it is not sufficient. Many
employment rights arise, for example, under the Employment Rights Act 1996 and, to comply
with section 203(3)(b), the particular proceedings to which the agreement relates must be more
clearly identified. In my judgment, in order to comply with section 203, the particular claims
or potential claims to be covered by the agreement must be identified, as Mr Hare suggested,
either by a generic description such as 'unfair dismissal' or by reference to the section of the
statute giving rise to the claim.
That is all that can be required for compliance with section 203(3)(b). However, I agree with
Mummery LJ that the requirements of good practice should dictate that the particular
proceedings covered by the agreement should be spelled out by means of a brief factual and
legal description. I agree with him that this should not cause practical difficulty and will not be
unduly onerous. I would add that I would not regard it as good practice for lawyers to draft a
standard form of compromise agreement which lists every form of employment right known to
the law. Compromise agreements should be tailored to the individual circumstances of the
instant case. Only in that way can the purpose behind this provision be fully satisfied.
Lunt v Merseyside TEC Ltd [1998] UKEAT 951_97_1305 (13 May 1998) … where a number
of different tribunal claims (such as unfair dismissal, race/sex discrimination, claims for
unlawful deduction of wages, and so on) have been raised by the employee, whether in an
originating application or in correspondence prior to the issue of proceedings, there does not
seem to be any good reason why these should not all be disposed of in the one compromise
agreement. Each matter would be a 'particular complaint' under the relevant statute.
The Court of Appeal decision in the case of Hinton v. University of East London [2005] IRLR
552 firmly stated that the purpose of settlement agreements is to settle specific, identifiable
claims. The Court of Appeal considered that an employee is entitled to know exactly what
he/she is settling and settlement agreements should be tailored to the particular circumstances
of the case.
EJ should have at least made an argument why the legislator would have excepted COT3
agreements from its policy. And again, this is an argument that the EJ surprised everyone
without submitting it to debate and was not relied upon by R’s skeleton.

7. BCCI stated that clean slate agreements are always inevitably ambiguous - EJ skipped
Contrary to para. 65, the wording is not unequivocal, failing the ultimately high standard of
‘absolutely clear and leaving no room for doubt’ with respect to:
- Whether the alleged compromised claims related to 2014 employment,
- Whether COT3 covered only 2018 pending proceedings or related claims yet unraised.
EAJ Soole is further wrong that said COT3 provide the missing clarity of Royal National
Orthopaedic Hospital Trust v. Howard, which provide: full and final settlement of these
proceedings and of all claims which the Applicant has or may have against the
Respondent (save for claims for personal injury and in respect of occupational pension
rights) whether arising under her contract of employment or out of the termination
thereof on 29 November 1998, or arising under the Employment Rights Act 1996, the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 or under European Community Law.
Instead the current COT3 provides:
What exactly is the difference? Wherefrom does it stem the difference in clarity? What are the
exact words that cast away all doubt which were present in this COT3 but missed in Howard’s?
The judgement is in obvious want of reasons concerning this.
As shown in point 5, the COT3 could only have been clear to exclude claims not relating to
2014 employment. Therefore it cannot be clear to compromise all claims unimagined.

EJ failed to correct for his inherent hindsight bias (provided he was not biased otherwise).
The science of psychology provides examples of hindsight bias in judicial systems as
individuals attribute responsibility on the basis of the supposed predictability…
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindsight_bias#cite_note-Blank_2-6 and following. Due to the hindsight
bias, defendants are judged as capable of preventing the bad outcome. In cases where there is
an assumption of risk, hindsight bias may contribute to the jurors perceiving the event as riskier
due to the poor outcome. This may lead the jury to feel that the plaintiff should have exercised
greater caution in the situation. Judges and juries are likely to mistakenly view negative events
as being more foreseeable than what it really was in the moment, when looking at the situation
after the fact in court.

Everything is never everything

BCCI: The language of the clause "all or any claims whether under statute, Common Law
or in Equity of whatsoever nature that exist or may exist" is subject to some implied
limitations: where ex-employees have had deposits with the bank, the liquidators have not
sought to resist claims for repayment in reliance on the general release. Such claims, they say,
fall outside the clause because they do not relate to the employer-employee relationship [28.
that would be regarded as outside the 'contemplation' of the parties at the time the release was
entered into, not because it was an unknown claim, but because it related to a subject matter
which was not 'under consideration']. But acceptance of these claims involves acceptance
that the clause does not mean all it might be thought to say. What of a latent claim for
industrial disease or personal injury caused to the employee by the negligence of the employer
but unknown to both parties? Mr Jeans QC for the liquidators, in the course of an admirable
argument, recognised the difficulty of submitting that such a claim would be precluded by the
provision, even though it would relate to the employer-employee relationship. I would not
myself infer that the parties intended to provide for the release of such a claim. The same
would in my view be true if, unknown to the employee, the bank had libelled him as an
employee. The clause cannot be read literally. [29. The scope of general words of a release
depends upon the context furnished by the surrounding circumstances in which the
release was given. The generality of the wording has no greater reach than this context
indicates.]
Allma also agrees: It could not be accepted that the words “has or may have” were
designed to preclude future claims which the applicant might seek to assert. The
expression “has or may have” is apt to cover existing claims, whether known to the potential
claimant or not. Nor could it be accepted that the express exclusion of personal injury and
occupational pension rights claims from the ambit of the agreement indicated that the
compromise included all other future claims. That exclusion, which occurs regularly in
compromise agreements, related only to existing rights and did not deal with future claims.

EJ could therefore not have found the term unequivocal and resolving the ambiguity in
contractual terms requires background.

While indeed the wording of the COT3 appears impressively comprehensive, that does not
amount to unequivocal.
The condition to relate to particular claims stands to reason from this standpoint.
Only had the COT3 related to particular claims (or whether there was evidence that the
ACAS officer had taken such steps), it would have been unequivocal in respect to those
particular claims it related to.
ET should not shy away from the fact that it might just be impossible to express some ideas in
unequivocal words
R holds that if they multiply the verbiage … that complexity automatically renders the wording
unequivocal.
But other than relating explicitly to particular terms, there is no scientific basis to hold that
there must exist an abstract wording capable of being unequivocal.
Furthermore, authorities also agree the employee must not be asked to sign a blanket waiver of
all possible claims he or she may have.
Or, that is actually what R is proposing… and therefore their construction cannot be allowed.
Unequivocal wording is not a failure of the process.
The complexity of real life simply exceeds clear language’s capacity of unambiguous
expression.
Therefore the term cannot be presumed as unequivocal unless proved equivocal, nor should the
ET be biased, in the sense that unambiguous expression be the rule and unambiguity the
exception, towards a finding of no equivoque.
This is the only spot where C relies on the non-native language argument. It is not a
matter of linguistic proficiency, but of actual day to day life dealings, cultural proficiency
that C cannot be presumed to have acquired during a month in the UK.

Once the term deemed ambiguous and the background taken into consideration, there is
nothing in the ‘matrix of facts’ as to why the general wording should be interpreted extensively,
and therefore clearly beyond the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable
person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to
the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.

Odu-Obi v Interserve FM Ltd & Anor UKEAT 2013 p35: An agreement which prevents a
party from litigating matters which otherwise could be taken to Court must be construed
narrowly. It should not be assumed that any party will willingly give away a fundamental right.

Lord Westbury in Directors of the London and South Western Railway Co v Blackmore (1870)
LR 4 HL 610 at 623-624: The general words in a release are limited always to that thing or
those things which were specially in the contemplation of the parties at the time when the
release was given. But a dispute that had not emerged cannot be considered as bound and
concluded by the anticipatory words of a general release.

There is perhaps little force in the following argument as well: Authorities allow settlement
agreements to wipe the slate clean only in the factual matrix of end of employment, before any
litigation taking place or ever being even contemplated. This is presumed as the employee must
receive legal advice before signing (and therefore fully understand the implications).Only when
the employer offers such a goodbye package, the employee accepting is presumed that the
parties never want to hear of each other ever again, and thus a wider interpretation is
permissible.

As opposed, COT3 occurs in the wholly different situation on an already ongoing dispute. This
agreement settling proceedings already started, 4 years after dismissal. Therefore, only a
restrictive construction is allowed to cover only the purpose of proceedings already started (or
which could further expand from that factual matrix, by the same template).

Where parties settle at the end of employment, they have no specific contemplation of any
claims in particular, and therefore, if there is nothing specific in their minds, they are to be
presumed to compromise everything.
 8. It would be unconscionable to expand over unrelated claims such as the
victimisation claim, in the situation where R was contemplating victimising C at
the signing of the COT3.

C could not have been presumed to settle a promising claim for next to nothing.

BCCI continues in [65] If both parties knew that Mr Naeem had a personal injury claim which
was potentially worth, say, £30,000, the court would be reluctant to interpret the agreement as
amounting to its release in consideration of less than £3,000.

C’s largest head of claims was £27800 according to the Schedule of loss as 24 November 2017.
However, really the most reasonable expectation was for £12150 for the contract claim… and
it’s further very ambiguous because, while the ID claim was more promising on the merits, it
was less promising on the amendment/extension of time issue…

Last years’ statistics provided RD median award £13.000. However, before the present ET C’s
largest head of claim is £720.000 for the Chagger claim.

Any amount possibly settled for within ET’s inference… cannot amount to within less than 1
order of magnitude of the sought amount in the new proceedings. As we seen, HL would be
reluctant to interpret the agreement as amounting to the release of a claim (known by both
parties) which was potentially worth, say, £30,000, in consideration of less than £3,000.
WHICH IS THE VERY DEFINITION OF AN ORDER OF MAGNITUDE.

Needless to add that all combined claims settled amount of 10-20K£, as indicated above…
leaves very little for victimisation et ali., and in any case falls between 30-70 times less than the
head of claim on the Chagger claim, therefore equally towards 2 orders of magnitude.

It is therefore mathematically obvious C cannot be presumed to have settled a claim for, say
2% its worth. That is in the situation C would be assumed to have known about it!

R’s advised interpretation would reward dishonesty at the expense of the innocent, as they
would have known their evil schemes to victimise C… and thus further hide behind the CO3. It
would be contrary to basic principles of construction for the meaning of a document to be
affected by facts which were known to one party but not reasonably available to the other.

Sir Richard Scott V-C [2000] ICR 1410, 1421… and with Chadwick LJ: a person cannot be
allowed to rely upon a release in general terms if he knew that the other party had a claim and
knew that the other party was not aware that he had a claim. No release of unknown claims
should be construed to extend to claims which were known to the party obtaining the benefit of
the release but not to the other party.

BCCI knew that Mr Naeem had or might have a stigma claim against the bank of which he
himself was unaware. In march 2018 C had no knowledge of being victimised by R.
 9. Joint-venture

There is no need to dispute whether the German QR/Bomcom is a wholly owned subsidiary or
a 50% joint venture with KCIG. In either case R holds joint liability.

Nor was it held that Emma Lloyd herself was the agent of decision to victimise. EJ based his
decision of completely irrelevant findings.

On the contrary, ET1 explained in great detail the 2014 recruitment process, whereby Rojda of
the German QR is but a clerk: she advertises roles, collects applications, processes candidate
data into an ERM software, conducts additional information requests by telephone, screens
potential candidates to refer to directors/HR of UK QR (Rob Ferrone, Emma etc) and schedules
such interviews. Of course she might be doing plenty of other things, but these only seem
relevant to victimisation during recruitment.

German companies observe very elaborate employment procedures, lasting even for 8 weeks.
Noteworthy, the said selection process is quite complex, involving phone interviews with
multiple people, online data tests, filling-in questionnaires, submission of formal documents
(university diploma, references etc.)

However such data administration is immaterial to actual decision making in regards to

victimisation. C was not claiming to have been victimised by an improper data handling
by a German employee, but by a deliberate act of rejection by QR UK management.

There could also be the secondary issue of vicarious liability, but I have absolutely no means to
acquire any further knowledge over the intricacies of the QR/Bomcom joint venture, relevant to
the jurisdiction issue. At this point the distinction appears as a mere technicality.

Yeboa71 On Mr Crofton's point that he could not be held to be personally liable for race
discrimination alleged by a fellow employee, the legal position is that Mr Crofton can be held
personally liable for race discrimination against Mr Yeboah, as a fellow employee, even though
he was not Mr Yeboah's employer and even though the Council, as Mr Crofton's employer, was
held not to be vicariously liable for his conduct.

To C it appears the common law principle that joint venturers are reciprocally liable for injury
caused to third parties in the course of their business. UK QR should respond irrespective of
BoMCOM being QR’s German subsidiary, or with JV.

Emma of R coordinates German QR HR. Disclosed correspondence proves that Mr. Ferrone
does play an essential part in the recruitment process for the roles in Köln. While Rojda
expresses a first hand impression over the candidates, decisions are always made by Rob
Quick Release GmbH, registered in 21.11.2012 on Bismarckstraße 51, 50672, Cologne,
Managing Director Ferrone, Robert, Cologne, entitled to sole representation with the authority
to conclude legal transactions in the name of the company with himself or as a representative of
a third party. Later changed names and address to BoMCOM GmbH, on 9.10.2013.

If joint venture be the appropriate legal status, or whether BoMCOM is a QR subsidiary, is

clearly outside C’s expertise. What is certain, as provided by literature, is that that a joint
venture (JV) is a business entity created by two or more parties, generally characterised
by shared ownership, shared returns and risks, and shared governance.

Each member of a joint venture is deemed to be the agent of the other when acting in
furtherance of the common objective. Shared risks implies shared liability. If a third party is
injured by the activities of a joint venture, all the parties involved may be held equally liable.

It is to be noted that when third parties deal with a co-venturer in good faith and without
knowledge of any limitation upon his/her authority, the law presumes him/her to have the
power to bind his/her associates by such contracts that is reasonably necessary to carry on the
business in which the joint venturers are engaged [Martin v. Chapel, Wilkinson, Riggs, &
Abney, 1981 OK 134].

Under common law (the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978) all parties can be
jointly and severally liable for the loss or damage that flows from the breach. .Section
1(1) of the Act provides that “any person liable in respect of any damage suffered by
another person may recover contribution from any other person liable in respect of the
same damage (whether jointly with him or otherwise)”.
In whose favour should ambiguities be decided? Usually the court will resolve any
uncertainty or doubt surrounding a provision against the party who would benefit from the
suggested interpretation. This is the so-called "contra proferentem" rule whereby the clause
is construed against the party seeking to rely on it. It applies in particular to the party
seeking to take the benefit of an exclusion or limitation of liability. However, recent cases
indicate that the rule has a very limited role in relation to commercial contracts negotiated
between sophisticated parties of equal bargaining strength
https://www.trans-lex.org/912000/_/agent-acting-on-behalf-of-group-of-companies/
A corporate entity acting on behalf of a group of corporate entities binds all entities that
belong to the group. This Principle has been developed by international arbitral tribunals as
the so-called "group of companies doctrine" for cases in which a member of a corporate
group, even though not a signature to an arbitration agreement concluded by another
member of the corporate group, appeared in economic reality as the real party to the
arbitration agreement and was therefore treated as such by these tribunals. While the
Principle is disputed in the arbitration context because of the form requirement for
arbitration agreements, e.g. under Art. 7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, it can be extended to contracts in general for which no such form
requirement exists. However, its application must be limited to clear cases in which the
involvement of the non-signatory in the performance of the contractual obligations is so
evident and strong that the case comes close to one of app
No. IV.6.11 Trans-Lex Principle
Plurality of debtors
Two or more parties who are liable for one and the same performance are (a) joint, or (b)
partial debtors. Parties are liable as joint or partial debtors when they unite in making one
and the same promise under the same contract or when they are liable for the same damage
unless the contract or the law provides otherwise.(a) Joint debtors(aa) The creditor may
claim performance from any one oft he joint debtors until full performance has been reached.
(a) Joint debtors
(aa) The creditor may claim performance from any one of the joint debtors until full
performance has been reached.
(bb) If one joint debtor has performed, in kind or by way of set off, the liability to the creditor
of the other joint debtor(s) is discharged to the extent of such performance or set-off. The
same applies if one joint debtor concludes a settlement with the creditor.
(cc) As between themselves, joint debtors are liable in equal shares unless the contract or
the law provides otherwise. If a joint debtor has performed more than his share, he may
claim the excess from any of the other joint debtors to the extent of each debtor's
unperformed share.
(dd) A joint debtor may invoke against the creditor any defense which another joint debtor
can invoke, other than a defense personal to that other debtor. Invoking the defense has no
effect with regard to the other joint debtors.
1The Principle deals with two types of plural obligations, those incurred by joint debtors and
those incurred by partial debtors. Whether a case of joint or partial debtorship is present
depends on the terms regulating the obligation. Absent such terms, the obligation of two or
more debtors to perform the same obligation or to pay the same damage is a joint obligation.

2Subsection (a) stipulates that in case of joint debtors, which are frequently encountered in
practice, the creditor may claim whole performance from any of the debtors without having
to involve all the debtors. The joint debtor that is approached by the creditor may invoke any
defense which another joint debtor can invoke, unless such defense is linked to the person of
that other debtor and may therefore not be invoked by another debtor. Performance by one
debtor, either in kind or by way of set-off, discharges the other debtors to the extent of such
performance or set-off. As to the internal liability among themselves, Subsection (a) (cc)
provides a default rule of equal sharing, unless the parties, expressly or by implication, have
provided otherwise. A rule of unequal sharing may also be provided for by the law, for
example in cases of damage claims in which one debtor carries a greater degree of fault or
responsibility as compared to the other debtors. If one debtor has performed more than its
internal share, he may recover the excess portion of this performance from any of the other
joint debtors, but only to the extent of each debtor's unperformed share.

3Subsection (b) stipulates that in case of partial debtors, the creditor may claim from each
partial debtor only that part of the performance for which the debtor is liable. This means
that the partial debtors carry separate liabilities vis-à-vis the creditor for their own shares.
Non-performance by one debtor does not affect the obligations of the other partial debtors.
The partial debtor may not invoke defenses which are available only to other partial debtors.
Absent a contrary indication in the contract or in the law, partial debtors are liable vis-à-
vis the creditor in equal shares. https://www.trans-lex.org/936600"

Chapter 10: Principles of European Contract Law

Plurality of Parties
Section 1: Plurality of Debtors
Article 10:101: Solidary, Separate and Communal Obligations
936600(1) Obligations are solidary when all the debtors are bound to render one and the same
performance and the creditor may require it from any one of them until full performance has
been received.
936600(2) Obligations are separate when each debtor is bound to render only part of the
performance and the creditor may require from each debtor only that debtor's part.
(3) An obligation is communal when all the debtors are bound to render the performance
together and the creditor may require it only from all of them.
Article 10:102: When Solidary Obligations Arise
936600(1) If several debtors are bound to render one and the same performance to a creditor
under the same contract, they are solidarily liable, unless the contract or the law provides
otherwise.
936600(2) Solidary obligations also arise where several persons are liable for the same damage.
936600(3) The fact that the debtors are not liable on the same terms does not prevent their
obligations from being solidary.
Article 10:103: Liability under Separate Obligations
936600Debtors bound by separate obligations are liable in equal shares unless the contract or
the law provides otherwise.
Article 10:104: Communal Obligations: Special Rule when Money Claimed for Non-
performance
Notwithstanding Article 10:101(3), when money is claimed for non-performance of a
communal obligation, the debtors are solidarily liable for payment to the creditor.
Article 10:105: Apportionment Between Solidary Debtors
936600(1) As between themselves, solidary debtors are liable in equal shares unless the
contract or the law provides otherwise.
(2) If two or more debtors are liable for the same damage under Article 10:102(2), their share
of liability as between themselves is determined according to the law governing the event
which gave rise to the liability.
Art. 1313 Code Civile Français –The joint and several nature of an obligation amongst
debtors imposes on each of them an obligation for the whole of the debt. Satisfaction by one of
them discharges them all as regards the creditor. The creditor may require satisfaction from any
joint and several debtor he may choose. An action brought against one of the joint and several
debtors does not prevent the creditor from bringing similar actions against the others. Art. 1314.
A claim for interest made against a single joint and several debtor causes interest to run against
all.

10. No reasons as to the strike out for no merits as well as joint reliability.

For all these reasons, the EAT should allow the appeal to proceed to quash the judgement:

- The judge appeared biased,

- Procedurally improperly, EJ refused to strike out R’s skeleton and harmed A’s right to
a fair trial relying on arguments not submitted to A’s scrutiny.
- Perversely accepted evidence of the 19 February message, ignoring it was disputed,
and could therefore not conclude that A should have been aware of the victimisation
claim at the time of the COT3.
- The conciliation officer had obviously not taken action towards settling the alleged
compromised claims, but only pending proceedings.
- The claims were not related to (past) employment.
- Erred in law disapplying s203 from the COT3 relating to particular proceedings
- Clean slates are always ambiguous. According to BCCI, everything is never
everything. EJ should not have ignored the interpretation matrix, providing that A did
not intend to compromise unknown claims.
- It would have been unconscionable to settle all precious claims, and in the alternative,
there was no consideration because the award was already consumed by the pending
remedy sought.
Erred in law finding in the alternative that R was not liable for the German joint-venturer.
No reasons as to the strike out for no merits as well as joint reliability.
12/24/2020 Yahoo Mail - Re 3307014/ 2018

Re 3307014/ 2018

From: Adrian Arvunescu (adi@adi.lc)

To: e.lloyd@quickrelease.co.uk

Date: Wednesday, 1 May 2019, 08:06 EEST

Emma, sorry, I got the dates wrong in my diary, for some month in advance.
Regarding witness statements... the idea I guess would be that there are no disputed facts, but only matters of law (and therefore no need of
such evidence), as opposed to ph2014, when statements were heard.
Regards,
Adrian

Le lun., avr. 29, 2019 à 9:26, Emma Lloyd

<e.lloyd@quickrelease.co.uk> a écrit :

Hi Adrian

Are you referring to the Witness Statements? If so I don’t believe there is anyone to call as a witness, the only person
who was involved in the recruitment process was Rojda who no longer works for KCIG.

Thanks

Emma

From: Adrian Arvunescu <adi@adi.lc>

Sent: 27 April 2019 05:11
To: Emma Lloyd <e.lloyd@quickrelease.co.uk>
Subject: 3307014/2018

Emma, the deadline for lists of authorities!! Could you please advise soon?! I actually care about this issue
greatly...

QR_ HEAD OFFICE: Suite 12 Churchill House, West Horndon Industrial Estate, West Horndon, CM13 3XD

QUICK RELEASE (AUTOMOTIVE) LTD. IS A LIMITED COMPANY REGISTERED IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
1386 LONDON ROAD, LEIGH ON SEA, ESSEX, ENGLAND, SS9 2UJ, Company No. 04717239

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12/24/2020 Yahoo Mail - RE: Emma, submissions????

RE: Emma, submissions????

From: Emma Lloyd (e.lloyd@quickrelease.co.uk)

To: adi@adi.lc

Date: Tuesday, 2 July 2019, 13:39 EEST

Apologies I missed this and was still referring to the old Orders.

I will get this to you by the end of the week.

-----Original Message-----
From: Adrian Arvunescu < adrianarvunescu@yahoo.com>
Sent: 02 July 2019 11:14
To: Emma Lloyd <e.lloyd@quickrelease.co.uk>
Subject: RE: Emma, submissions????

Emma, please see your 7 march message of the ET, reading in first attachment (which I was also trying to remind you 2 months ago!) 3. On
the claimant's application for a case management order in relation to lists of authorities, all parties are to provide skeleton arguments on the
preliminary issues by 1 July 2019. Such skeleton arguments should include citations of all authorities relied upon and should not include
extracts of documents but cross refer to them by page number from the joint bundle. No additional written submissions will be permitted
without leave of the employment judgment hearing the open preliminary hearing.

________________________________

QR_ HEAD OFFICE: Suite 12 Churchill House, West Horndon Industrial Estate, West Horndon, CM13 3XD

QUICK RELEASE (AUTOMOTIVE) LTD. IS A LIMITED COMPANY REGISTERED IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
1386 LONDON ROAD, LEIGH ON SEA, ESSEX, ENGLAND, SS9 2UJ, Company No. 04717239

1/1
12/24/2020 Yahoo Mail - Response from respondents rep: 2700958/14: Arvunescu vs Quick Release (Automotive)

Response from respondents rep: 2700958/14: Arvunescu vs Quick Release (Automotive)

From: ACAS - Bury St Edmunds (bseconciliators@acas.org.uk)

To: adi@adi.lc

Date: Tuesday, 27 February 2018, 12:13 EET

Dear Adrian

I have received a call from the respondent's rep today to say that the respondents have agreed to your counter offer of £20,000. They have
indicated that they will be drawing up terms for a COT3 agreement and when I am in receipt of these I will send them to you. Once the terms
have been agreed by both parties the agreement will become legally binding.

Regarding the re-engagement to a position in Germany, they have stated that you are free to apply for any position that comes up, however you
would need to go through the full application process. They have also indicated that all positions are at graduate level but you are more than
welcome to apply. However this does not form part of the agreement.

If you wish to discuss the above please contact me however as soon as I am in receipt of the terms I will send these through to you.

Regards

Jackie Maynard
Conciliator
Acas BSE
Tel: 0330 109 3491
E-mail: BSEconciliators@acas.org.uk

______________________________________________________________

Should this communication contain any discussion of legal matters,

this is not to be taken as an authoritative interpretation of the law.

This email and any attachments are confidential and intended for the
addressee only. If you are not the named recipient, you must not use,
disclose, reproduce, copy or distribute the contents of this communication.
If you have received this in error, please contact the sender and then
delete this email from your system.
______________________________________________________________

Acas - Help & advice for employers and employees.

For more information about any of our services, visit our website
at www.acas.org.uk

***********************************************************

1/1
12/24/2020 Yahoo Mail - Without Prejudice

Without Prejudice

From: Emma Lloyd (e.lloyd@quickrelease.co.uk)

To: adi@adi.lc

Date: Monday, 12 February 2018, 13:19 EET

Dear Adrian,

I am contacting you today (without prejudice - therefore this may not be referred to in any correspondence relating to the claim) to ask you to
consider a settlement ahead of the final hearing in July.

The preparation and attendance at the final hearing is likely to incur significant costs not to mention resource therefore I would like to suggest we
engage in some settlement discussions. If you are willing to consider this we can get ACAS involved to oversee the process.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Regards

Emma Lloyd
HR Business Leader

Quick Release_
e.lloyd@quickrelease.co.uk | +44 796 177 2088 | West Horndon

Follow Us: Website | Facebook | Twitter | LinkedIn

QR_ HEAD OFFICE: Suite 12 Churchill House, West Horndon Industrial Estate, West Horndon, CM13 3XD

QUICK RELEASE (AUTOMOTIVE) LTD. IS A LIMITED COMPANY REGISTERED IN ENGLAND AND WALES.
1386 LONDON ROAD, LEIGH ON SEA, ESSEX, ENGLAND, SS9 2UJ, Company No. 04717239

1/1
IN THE WATFORD EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNAL Claim 3307014/2018
BETWEEN Adrian Arvunescu Applicant -And
Quick Release (Automotive) Limited Respondent --- Something made up in a hurry

1. C continues to firmly oppose disclosing COT3.

2. C flies on Tuesday 18:35 from Heathrow Terminal 5, whereby I should be trying to hop
on a 16:00 724 bus.

3. C welcomes R having revived Jamie, as Eng. imperiously requires an influx Scots brains
owing to their utter lack thereof.

4. C claims as follows:

- Victimisation for not advancing the application in Germany, 13.14

C is no longer relying on age or disability discrimination.
C was not at all keen to be claiming race discrimination, owning confidence that R would not
rest so barbaric… after 5 years of doing business together I should have been expecting they
cultivate themselves out of all that, but instead they appear to be turning even worse still.
Actually, I envisaged relying on the deterioration of the social and political context only as proof
for victimisation, while in fact it is proof of direct discrimination. Legislator could not have
encompassed all social phenomena dynamics... and rightly so, the sheer scale of idiocy regarding
Brexit being unimaginable even in the whole history of totalitarianism, what to say of
democracy… And, however, that it is the logical consequence of the 2014 claim.
R themselves agree with this reasoning when they label as ‘racist’ any mention of Adolph Hitler,
even in an objective context of political debate. Implicitly they agree the very same about Brexit.
- Breach of contract for not providing references, ET has jurisdiction as it is outstanding on
the 2014 employment contract. 13.17.3 and 4
- Breach of promise to provide reference, as the unilateral contract was outstanding on the
termination of 2014 employment. 13.17.5
No more implied term in COT3 nor in the employment contract 13.17.1 and 2.
As to the claims in tort, C can only add ‘bla…’.
As to the 1(iv), C understands R’s skeleton to no longer rely that KCIG joint-venture made the
act complained about not one of R’s. Which C finds actually extremely disgusting of them, as
having spent loads of time researching the topic.
In any case, could we please just forget about the 2nd bogger for today and deal with them
tomorrow?
 7. Secondly, R’s COT3 defence relates to the claims as being contemporary with the COT3.
And thus, relying on the allegation that C should have been aware of the course of action as at
19 February 2019. According to R, the claims are presumed as compromised by virtue of
temporal coincidence.
However, R fails factuality wise, as C submits not having received any such message.
Therefore, R’s piece of evidence number 2 is merely a document of their own making with no
proof of delivery (by the way, it’s annoying they called it ‘response to informal application’ as
their 1st piece of evidence shows C actually had submitted a formal application)
Writings emanating from a party are binding on that party only. Therefore, R cannot thus prove
C should have been aware of the course of action prior to COT3. And their defence fails.

8. However, circumstances around this said email however prove R’s wickedness.
C should be straying a little from the COT3, as interestingly enough, R made a conciliation
proposition that very same day when the rejection email was supposed to have been sent.
Why would they have chosen to notice a rejection of the application at a date relevant to COT3
in the UK, which had objectively nothing to do with German vacancies.
The said rejection email is remarkably not assumed by anyone, being signed ‘career team (C)’.
Interestingly, it also reads to have been created on 1 February by Rojda (rc), but only actually
sent 18 days later.
Why would they have waited for 18 days to send the message… which also makes for 1 month
since the application date… if the reason for rejection was that R had no openings?
I should return to the openings issue later when discussing merits, however it is obvious that a
number of other similar positions were also available at the time, one of which was opened the
very previous day!

R conveniently submits Rojda no longer works with them and therefore no one would be able to
provide evidence concerning this message.
Emma herself cannot testify as she already stated having nothing to do with German recruitment,
in order to support the thesis that they cannot be sued for their joint-venturer.