SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 232624, July 09, 2018 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.
RENATO CARIÑO Y GOCONG AND ALVIN AQUINO Y RAGAM*,
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION
REYES, JR., J:
This treats of the Notice of Appeal [1] under Rule 124 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure filed by Renato Cariño y Gocong (Cariño), and
Alvin Aquino y  Ragam (Aquino) (collectively referred as accused-
appellants), seeking the reversal of the Decision[2] dated September
14, 2016, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06217, convicting them of Robbery with Homicide under Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and Carnapping under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539,[3] as amended.

The Antecedents

An Information was filed against the accused-appellants, charging

them with Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the RPC,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of August, 2002, in Quezon City,

Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent of
gain, by means of force, violence and/or intimidation against person,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one
MIRKO MOELLER of the following personal items:

One (1) cellphone, wallet, small camera, video camera and VCD
player, and by reason and on the occasion of the said robbery, said
accused pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill, attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of MIRKO
MOELLER by then and there mauling him with the use of a
dumbbell, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

Another Information was also filed against the accused-appellants for

the crime of Carnapping as defined and penalized under R.A. No.
6539, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2002, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, with intent to
gain and without knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away one (1) Unit of Nissan Sentra with Plate No. PN-USD-666
colored silver/pink, of undetermined amount belonging to MIRKO
MOELLER, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner thereof.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

The accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges. Trial

ensued thereafter.[6]

Evidence of the Prosecution

On August 28, 2002, Leonardo Advincula (Advincula) was driving an

R&E Taxi with plate number TVH 298, and traversing through East
Avenue, Quezon City, when he was flagged down by Cariño in front
of the Social Security System building. Cariño asked Advincula to
take him to Ortigas. Upon arriving at Ortigas, Cariño asked
Advincula to stop along the comer of Julia Vargas and Meralco
Avenue. While parked thereat, a silver Nissan Sentra with plate
number USD 666 arrived. Cariño alighted and approached the
Nissan Sentra. Upon returning to the taxi, Cariño asked Advincula to
follow the Nissan Sentra. After driving for a short distance, the
Nissan Sentra entered Gate 1 of the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision
in Quezon City.[7]

At around 10:39 p.m. of August 28, 2002, Jimmy Caporado

(Caporado), a security guard at the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision
was manning Gate 1 of the said subdivision. Caporado noticed a
Nissan Sentra with plate number USD 666, pass through Gate 1.
Trailing behind the Nissan Sentra was an R&E taxi with plate
number TVH 298. Upon passing through the gate, the driver of the
Nissan Sentra, who Caporado recognized as Mirko Moeller (Moeller),
a resident of the said subdivision, opened the car window to inform
the former that the passenger inside the taxi was his visitor. During
this time, Caporado noticed that Moeller was with Aquino. Obeying
Moeller's instructions, Caporado flagged down the taxi cab to take
the driver's license, and then let the taxi pass. [8] Caporado identified
the passenger of the taxi as Cariño, who he pointed to in open court. [9]

Meanwhile, Advincula dropped off Cariño at No. 11 Young Street,

Corinthian Gardens Subdivision. Cariño alighted from the taxi and
asked Advincula to wait for his payment. Moeller, the victim,
alighted from the Nissan Sentra and approached the taxi to pay for
Cariño's fare.[10] Advincula drove away without a passenger.

Subsequently, at around 7:30 a.m. of August 29, 2002, Nena Taro

(Taro), the housemaid of Moeller arrived at the latter's home. Taro
noticed that the main gate and the door of the house were unlocked.
Upon entering the house, she was surprised to see dried blood on the
wall beside the light switch. She walked to the backdoor leading to
the swimming pool to look for Moeller. There, she was horrified to
see him lying face down in front of the swimming pool. Shocked by
what she had seen, she rushed out of the house to ask for help.
Moments later, the security guards and the police arrived. [11]

Months after the incident, on September 4, 2002, Senior Police Officer

4 Celso Jeresano (SPO4 Jeresano), together with other police officers,
arrested the accused-appellants in Bagaquin, Baguio City. They were
tipped off by an informant about the whereabouts of the said
accused-appellants. During the arrest, the police recovered a camera,
video camera, and charger from the accused-appellants. The police
also tracked down the stolen Nissan Sentra in Isabela, after Cariño
pointed to its location.[12] Cariño also surrendered the keys of the
Nissan Sentra.

During the trial, Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez (Dr. Marquez), Medico-
Legal Officer, testified that the victim's cause of death was
intracranial hemorrhage, as a result of traumatic injuries in the head.
[13]

Version of the Defense

The accused-appellants vehemently denied the charges leveled

against them.

Aquino claimed that on September 4, 2002, while he was waiting for

a jeepney bound for Manila, a tinted Tamaraw FX suddenly stopped
in front of him. He was forced to board the said vehicle. While inside,
he was handcuffed and shown a cartographic sketch, and was asked
if the image was familiar. He said that he did know who the person
in the sketch was. Suddenly, he was hit on his right temple and on
the back of his head. This caused him to pass out. When he regained
consciousness, he found himself inside an unfamiliar small house,
with his t-shirt bearing blood stains. Thereafter, he was placed inside
a van, where he was subjected to physical abuse. Later on, he was
brought to Camp Karingal, where he was again physically abused by
the police officers. He was later on brought for inquest proceedings,
where he learned that he was being charged with Robbery with
Homicide.[14]

In the same vein, Cariño claimed that on September 19, 2002, between
6:00 and 7:00 a.m., a group of police officers suddenly barged inside
the house where he and his girlfriend were staying. He was arrested
and brought to Isabela. He was photographed while seated in a car,
and was told that he stole the same. Then, he was brought to Camp
Karingal where he was accused of killing a German national. Cariño
denied knowing Aquino.[15]

Ruling of the Trial Court

On April 29, 2013, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a

Decision[16] convicting the accused-appellants for the crimes of
Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping. The RTC concluded that
there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict them. In
particular, the RTC noted that the prosecution witnesses confirmed
that the accused-appellants were the last persons to be seen with the
victim.[17] Added to this, the RTC observed that the victim's stolen
properties were recovered from the accused-appellants.[18] Also, when
the police officer asked them about the stolen car, they were able to
pinpoint its exact location.[19] Finding these as sufficient proof of their
guilt, the RTC sentenced them to a penalty of reclusion perpetua for
the crime of robbery with homicide; and the maximum sentence of
life imprisonment for the carnapping, considering that Moeller, the
owner of the vehicle, was killed on the occasion of the carnapping. [20]

The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-02-111947, judgment is

hereby rendered finding [the accused-appellants] guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, and imposing on said
accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Court likewise adjudges [the accused-appellants] jointly and

severally liable to pay the heirs of the victim Mirko Moller,
[21]
 represented by Anthony Q. Paguio, the following amounts:

1. P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.

2. P75,000.00 as moral damages.
3. P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
4. 75,000.00 as temperate damages.
5. The costs of suit.

In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111948, judgment is also rendered finding

[the accused-appellants] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
carnapping, in violation of [R.A.] No. 6539, and imposing on said
accused the penalty of life imprisonment.

The accused shall be fully credited with their respective periods of

preventive detention, pursuant to Article 29 of the [RPC]. They shall
henceforth be committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
City to commence the service of their sentence.

SO ORDERED.[22]

Dissatisfied with the ruling, the accused-appellants filed an appeal

with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

On September 14, 2016, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,

[23]
 affirming the RTC's conviction against the accused-appellants for
Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping. Echoing the trial court's
findings, the CA affirmed that all the facts proven, and taken
together, created an unbroken chain of circumstances proving their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[24] The CA held that their defense of
alibi was unavailing, and faltered against the positive identification
of the prosecution witnesses.[25] Likewise, the CA found that the
results of the police investigation revealed that violence was
employed against the victim, which resulted to the latter's death.
Also, the camera, video camera and charger, which all belonged to
the victim, were found in the possession of the accused-appellants
when they were arrested in Baguio City.[26] They were not able to
explain the reason why they possessed the said items. [27] Added to
this, they knew the location of the stolen vehicle. [28] Consequently, the
CA concluded that all these established circumstances show that the
accused-appellants conspired with each other to commit the crimes
charged.[29]

As for the penalties, the CA affirmed the sentence of reclusion

perpetua  for the charge of Robbery with Homicide, but modified the
amount of damages awarded by the RTC. Specifically, the CA
deleted the award of exemplary damages finding that there were no
aggravating circumstances that attended the commission of the
crime. Also, the CA reduced the amount of temperate damages to
Php 50,000.00, to conform with recent jurisprudence.[30]

As for the crime of Carnapping, the CA found that the RTC erred in
imposing the maximum penalty for the said crime. The CA pointed
out that the Information charging the accused-appellants of
carnapping, failed to indicate that the victim was killed in the course
of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
Neither was there an allegation that the carnapping was committed
with violence or intimidation of persons. The CA surmised that based
on the attendant circumstances, the victim was presumably dead
when the accused-appellants unlawfully took the vehicle as a means
to escape the crime scene. Thus, there being no causal connection
between the carnapping and the killing, the accused-appellants
should be meted with the lesser sentence of fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months and not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, for the crime of carnapping. [31]

The decretal portion of the assailed CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The

Decision dated April 29, 2013 of the Quezon City [RTC], Branch 219,
in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-111947 and Q-02-111948 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION, in that:

1.) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111947, the award of exemplary

damages is DELETED and the award of temperate damages is
hereby REDUCED to Php 50,000.00.

In addition, accused-appellants are jointly and

severally ORDERED to PAY interest on all the damages imposed at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
decision until fully paid.

2.) In Criminal Case No. Q-02-111948, the accused-appellants are

sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) years
and Eight (8) months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four
(4) months, as maximum.

All other aspects of the fallo  of the assailed Decision STAND.

SO ORDERED.[32]

Aggrieved, the accused-appellants filed the instant Notice of Appeal

under Rule 124 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The Issue

The main issue raised for the Court's resolution is whether or not the
prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crimes
of Robbery with Homicide, and Carnapping.
In a Manifestation[33] dated January 25, 2018, the accused-appellants
dispensed with the filing of their Supplemental Brief, and prayed that
their respective Appellant's Brief filed before the CA, be considered
in lieu of their Supplemental Brief.

In support of their plea for exoneration, the accused-appellants assert

that the trial court erroneously convicted them on the basis of
insufficient circumstantial evidence. They point out that none of the
prosecution witnesses specifically identified them as the ones who
actually robbed and killed the victim, and carnapped the latter's
vehicle.[34] In fact, they stress that no less than the trial court stated
that no one witnessed the killing of the victim or the taking of the
latter's properties.[35] They harp on the fact that the absence of any
eyewitness engenders doubt on their culpability.[36]

Second, the accused-appellants claim that the trial court erred in

concluding that they took the stolen articles, simply because they
were found in possession thereof. Added to this, they point out that
the ownership of the personal items was not even definitely
determined.[37]

Third, anent their conviction for carnapping, they aver that the
prosecution failed to prove the presence of all the elements of the said
crime. The trial court erred in concluding that the act of changing the
vehicle's plate number constitutes proof of intent to gain. [38] They
posit that at most, the vehicle was merely used as a means to escape.
[39]
 Also, they question how they could be convicted of carnapping
with homicide, when the victim was already dead when the car was
taken.[40]

Finally, the accused-appellants bewail that there was no evidence

proving that they conspired to commit the crimes. There was no
showing that they were in fact motivated by a common purpose to
perpetrate the crimes.[41]

On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, (OSG) counters that the prosecution sufficiently proved the
guilt of the accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The OSG
avers that the trial court correctly found the nexus between the
robbery and the killing of the victim. There is no doubt that Moeller
was killed. The fact of death was established through the Medico-
Legal Report, and the testimony of Dr. Marquez, who described the
killing of Moeller as brutal and intentional. Likewise, the OSG points
out that Aquino admitted to SPO4 Jeresano that he killed Moeller. [42]
In the same vein, the OSG maintains that the trial court also correctly
found Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping.
Records show that all the elements of carnapping were present in the
instant case. Aquino, in conspiracy with Cariño, without the consent
of Moeller, and with intent to gain, and by means of violence against
the person of the victim, took the latter's Nissan Sentra. The OSG
posits that intent to gain is evident when one takes property
belonging to another against the latter's will.[43]

Ruling of the Court

The instant appeal is bereft of merit.

The Prosecution Established

Beyond Reasonable Doubt the Guilt
of the accused-appellants for the
Crime of Robbery with Homicide

The RPC defines and penalizes the crime of robbery as follows:

Article 293. Who are guilty of robbery. - Any person who, with intent to
gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by
means of violence or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything shall be guilty of robbery.

Article 295. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons;

Penalties.  - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua  to death, when by reason or on

occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed.

Parenthetically, to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide

under Article 294 of the RPC, the prosecution must prove the
existence of the following elements, namely, (i) "the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (ii) the property taken belongs to another; (iii) the taking is
[with] animo lucrandi;  and (iv) by reason of the robbery or on the
occasion thereof, homicide is committed."[44]

Notably, the phrase "by reason of the robbery," covers a situation

where the killing of the person is committed either before or after the
taking of personal property.[45] It is imperative to establish that "the
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing
may occur before, during or after the robbery."[46] Remarkably,
homicide is said to be committed: (i) "to facilitate the robbery or the
escape of the culprit; (ii) to preserve the possession by the culprit of
the loot; (iii) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or (iv) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the
crime."[47] Thus, a conviction for robbery with homicide requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery.
[48]
 Consequently, once it has been established with certainty that a
person was killed on the occasion of the robbery, the accused may be
convicted of robbery with homicide.

It is equally important to note that a conviction for robbery with

homicide need not be proven solely through direct evidence of the
malefactor's culpability. Rather, the offender's guilt may likewise be
proven through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following
requisites are present: (i) there must be more than one circumstance;
(ii) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (iii) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
doubt of the guilt of the accused.[49] Imperatively, all the
circumstances taken together must form an unbroken chain of events
leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to
the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime.[50] To rule
otherwise, would lead to the pernicious situation wherein felons
would be set free to the detriment of the judicial system, and thereby
cause danger to the community.[51]

In the case at bar, the circumstances surrounding the fateful day of

August 28, 2002, when the victim was robbed and killed, lead to an
unbroken chain of facts, which establish beyond reasonable doubt the
accused-appellants' culpability, to wit:

i. At 10:39 p.m. of August 28, 2002, security guard Caporado saw

Moeller pass through Gate 1 of Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision in his Nissan Sentra. Moeller was accompanied
by Aquino, who Caporado recognized and identified in open
court.
ii. The Nissan Sentra was trailed by the R&E taxi driven by
Advincula.
iii. Caporado recognized Cariño as the passenger of the taxi.
iv. Advincula, the driver of the taxi, confirmed that Cariño was his
passenger. He testified that he dropped off Cariño at the
house of a foreigner in Corinthian Gardens Subdivision.
v. Moeller's Nissan Sentra was seen to have exited Gate 4 of
Corinthian Gardens Subdivision at around 12:00 midnight on
August 29, 2002.
 vi. In the morning of August 29, 2002, Taro, the victim's
housemaid, found the latter at the backyard of his home,
lifeless.
vii. A dumbbell was found near the body of the victim.
viii. The Medico-Legal Report showed that Moeller died due to
intra-cranial hemorrhage, which was caused by a blow
inflicted using a hard and blunt object.
ix. During their arrest, Cariño and Aquino were caught in
possession of a camera, video camera and charger.
x. Taro confirmed that the said items belonged to Moeller.
xi. Cariño admitted to the police officers that the Nissan Sentra
was in Isabela. True enough, the said vehicle was recovered
in the said location.
xii. SPO4 Jeresano testified that the accused-appellants admitted
that the Nissan Sentra belonged to Moeller.
xiii. Aquino even surrendered the keys of the Nissan Sentra to the
police.

The fact that the accused-appellants were the last persons seen with
Moeller prior to his demise was clearly confirmed through the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses Caporado and Advincula.

Moreover, the accused-appellants' unexplained possession of the

stolen articles gave rise to the presumption that they were the taker
and the doer of the robbery.[52] This presumption applies considering
that (i) the property was stolen; (ii) the crime was committed
recently; (iii) the stolen property was found in their possession; and
(iv) they were unable to explain their possession satisfactorily.[53] It
must be noted that during their arrest, the police officers found
Moeller's camera, video camera and charger in their hideout. They
were unable to offer any satisfactory and believable explanation
justifying their possession of the subject articles. All that they did to
rebut this presumption was to question the ownership of the said
articles. This defense fails considering that Taro identified the said
items and confirmed that they indeed belonged to Moeller. Her
familiarity with the said items cannot be doubted considering that
she was the personal maid of the victim for several years, and had
cleaned the said items on a regular basis.

The accused-appellants are also

Guilty Beyond Reasonable Doubt
for the Crime of Simple Carnapping

Carnapping is defined and penalized under Section 2 of R.A. No.

6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, as "the taking,
with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without
the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things."

Notably, the elements of carnapping are: (i) the taking of a motor

vehicle which belongs to another; (ii) the taking is without the
consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons or by using force upon things; and (iii) the taking is done
with intent to gain. Essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a
motorized vehicle.[54]

Significantly, the taking of the motor vehicle is deemed complete

from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if
he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.[55] The intent to gain or
the animus lucrandi, being an internal act, is presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.[56] Notably, " [a]ctual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to
gain."[57] Likewise, the term gain is not limited to a pecuniary benefit,
but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived
or expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of
the thing which was taken without the owner's consent already
constitutes gain.[58]

In the case at bar, the prosecution proved the existence of all the
elements of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt. The Nissan Sentra,
which was owned by Moeller, was stolen by the accused-appellants
from the victim's house, and brought to Isabela. To eradicate all
traces of its previous ownership, the accused-appellants even
changed the vehicle's plate number. However, despite their attempt
to conceal their crime, the police discovered that the retrieved vehicle
bore the same engine and chassis number as the victim's stolen
vehicle.

Likewise, the police found the stolen vehicle in Isabela, no less from
the information supplanted by Cariño himself. Certainly, Cariño's
knowledge about the vehicle's exact location shows his complicity in
its taking. Added to this, Cariño was in possession of the car keys,
which he surrendered to the police.

The accused-appellants Conspired

and Confederated with Each Other
to Commit the Said Crimes.

It becomes all too apparent that all the interwoven circumstances

form a chain of events that lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
accused-appellants robbed and killed Moeller, and took his Nissan
Sentra. It is evident that the accused-appellants conspired and
confederated with each other to commit the said horrid crimes.

It bears stressing that direct proof of a previous agreement to commit

a crime is not indispensable in conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was
perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves,
when such point to a joint purpose and design.[59] Undoubtedly, from
the moment the accused-appellants met in Ortigas, went to Moeller's
home, took his valuables and car, up to the time when they were both
arrested in possession of the said valuables, lead to no other
conclusion than that they hatched a criminal scheme, synchronized
their acts for unity in its execution, and aided each other for its
consummation. Consequently, once a conspiracy has been
established, the act of one malefactor, is the act of all.[60]

The Defenses of Denial and Alibi

are Weak and Easily Crumble
Against the Positive Identification
Made by Reliable and Credible
Witnesses

In seeking exoneration from the charges filed against them, the

accused-appellants interpose the defenses of denial and alibi.

The Court is not convinced.

Time and again, the Court has consistently ruled that a denial and
alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the assailants
made by a credible witness.[61] In fact, a denial is often viewed with
disfavor especially if it is uncorroborated.[62] Also, an alibi will only
prosper, if the accused can show that it was physically impossible for
him/her to be at the scene of the crime.[63] Thus, as between the
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on the one hand, and
a mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to
prevail.[64]

This said, the accused-appellants' defenses of denial and alibi falter in

light of the positive identifications made by Caporado and
Advincula, who saw them at the house of Moeller on the night that
the latter was killed. It bears noting that Caporado confirmed that he
saw Aquino riding with Moeller in his Nissan Sentra on the fateful
night of August 28, 2002. Similarly, Caporado confirmed that he saw
Cariño on board the taxi that trailed the Nissan Sentra. There was no
reason for Caporado, a disinterested witness, to falsely testify against
the accused-appellants.
Equally telling is the fact that Advincula corroborated Caporado's
testimony, by affirming that he dropped off Cariño at the victim's
home in Corinthian Gardens Subdivision. In fact, Advincula related
that the driver of the Nissan Sentra was a foreigner, which fit the
description of the victim.

Moreover, the Court finds that Cariño lied about not knowing the
victim. Taro affirmed on the witness stand that she saw Cariño one
month before the victim's death, at the latter's home.[65] This fact is
significant because it established the relationship between Cariño and
the victim, which the former denied. Clearly, Cariño's denial is
nothing but a vain attempt to exculpate himself from liability.

All told, there was no reason for the prosecution witnesses to lie and
falsely testify against the accused-appellants. Hence, absent any proof
of ill-motive on their part, there can be no doubt that their
testimonies certainly bear the earmarks of truth and candor.

The Penalty for Robbery with Homicide

The trial court correctly sentenced the accused-appellants with the

penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 294, paragraph 1 of
the RPC,[66] for their crime of robbery with homicide.

As for the amount of damages imposed, the Court affirms the awards
of civil indemnity of Php 75,000.00, and moral damages of Php
75,000.00.[67] The Court likewise agrees that the victim's heirs should
be awarded temperate damages of Php 50,000.00. Temperate
damages may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but definite proof of its amount was not presented in court.
[68]

However, the Court finds that the CA erred in deleting the award of
exemplary damages. Remarkably, exemplary damages should be
granted as a punishment for the reprehensible act committed against
the victim. This is in consonance with the Court's ruling in People v.
Jugueta,[69] where exemplary damages worth to Php 75,000.00 was
awarded to the victim's heirs.

The Penalty for Carnapping

R.A. No. 6539, as amended by Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, provides

the penalties for carnapping, as follows:

SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of

carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months
and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua  to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped
in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring Ours)

It must be noted that the Information charging the accused-

appellants with carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as amended, failed
to allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence
against, or intimidation of, any person, or force upon things. While
these circumstances were proven at the trial, they cannot be
appreciated because they were not alleged in the Information. Hence,
pursuant to the strict constitutional mandate that an accused must
always be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him,[70] the accused-appellants may only be convicted of
simple carnapping. Accordingly, the CA was correct in modifying the
maximum sentence of life imprisonment originally imposed by the
RTC, and reducing the same to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as
maximum. This term of imprisonment imposed by the CA is likewise
in consonance with Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which ordains that if the offense committed is punishable by a special
law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty
expressed at a range whose maximum term shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not be
less than the minimum prescribed.[71]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision
dated September 14, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06217, convicting accused-appellants Renato Cariño y Gocong
and Alvin Aquino y Ragam of the crimes of Robbery with Homicide,
and Carnapping, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In
Criminal Case No. Q-02-111947 for Robbery with Homicide, the
accused-appellants are ordered to pay exemplary damages worth
Php 75,000.00 to the heirs of victim Mirko Moeller. All the amounts
due shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this ruling until the full satisfaction thereof. The assailed
decision is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

*
 Also referred/spelled as "RAGMA" in some parts of the rollo.

[1]
 CA rollo, pp. 235-236.

 Penned by Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate

[2]

Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion and Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan,

concurring; id. at 200-222.

 AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZlNG CARNAPPING.

[3]

Approved on August 26,

1972.

[4]
 CA rollo,  p. 32-33.

[5]
 Id. at 33.

[6]
 Id.

[7]
 Id. at 36.

[8]
 Id.

[9]
 Id. at 208.

[10]
 Id. at 35-36.

[11]
 Id. at 35.

[12]
 Id. at 36.

[13]
 Id.

[14]
 Id. at 37.

[15]
 Id.

[16]
 Rendered by Hon. Maria Filomena D. Singh; id. at 49-67.

[17]
 Id. at 54; 60.
[18]
 Id. at 60.

[19]
 Id. at 63.

[20]
 Id. at 67.

[21]
 Spelled as Moller in the RTC decision.

[22]
 CA rollo, p. 67.

[23]
 Rollo, pp. 2-24.

[24]
 CA rollo, p. 209.

[25]
 Id. at 208-209.

[26]
 Id. at 216.

[27]
 Id.

[28]
 Id. at 216-217.

[29]
 Id. at 217-218.

[30]
 Id. at 220.

[31]
 Id. at 221.

[32]
 Id.

[33]
 Rollo, pp. 43-44.

[34]
 CA rollo, pp. 38-39; 145-147.

[35]
 Id. at 39; 146.

[36]
 Id. at 40.

[37]
 Id. at 42; 149-150.

[38]
 Id. at 44; 150-151

[39]
 Id. at 44; 151.

[40]
 Id. at 44.
[41]
 Id. at 44; 151.

[42]
 Id. at 83.

[43]
 Id. at 84-85.

 People v. Barra, 713 Phil. 698, 705 (2013), citing People v. Quemeggen,

[44]

et al., 611 Phil. 487, 497 (2009).

[45]
 People v. Diu, et al., 708 Phil. 218, 236 (2013).

 People v. Torres, 743 Phil. 553, 564 (2014), citing Crisostomo v.

[46]

People,  644 Phil. 53, 61 (2010).

 People v. Balute, 751 Phil. 980, 986 (2015), citing People v. Cachuela, et

[47]

al., 710 Phil. 728, 743-744 (2013).

 People v. Torres, et al., supra, at 561, citing Crisostomo v.

[48]

People,  supra.

[49]
 REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 133, Section 4.

 People of the Philippines v. Hermie Paris y Nicolas and Ronel Fernandez

[50]

y Dela Vega, G.R. No. 18130, February 14, 2018, citing Dungo v.

People, 762 Phil. 630, 679 (2015).

 People v. Quitola, 790 Phil. 75, 87-88 (2016), citing People v. Uy, 664

[51]

Phil. 483, 499-500 (2011).

 People of the Philippines v. Enrile Donia y Untalan,  G.R. No. 212815,

[52]

March 1, 2017; RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(j).

 People v. Lagat, et al., 673 Phil. 351, 367 (2011), citing Litton Mills,

[53]

Inc. v. Sales,  481 Phil. 73, 90 (2004).

[54]
 People v. Bustinera, 475 Phil. 190, 203 (2004).

 People of the Philippines v. Enrile Donio y Untalan, supra note 52,

[55]

citing People v. Lagat, et al., supra note 53.

 People v. Bustinera, supra, at 208 (2004), citing People v. Obillo,  411

[56]

Phil. 139, 150 (2001).

 People v. Bustinera, id., citing Venturina v. Sandiganbayan,  271 Phil.

[57]

33, 39 (1991).
[58]
 People v. Bustinera, id.

 People v. Napalit, 444 Phil. 793, 806 (2003), citing People v.

[59]

Pulusan, 352 Phil. 953, 974-975 (1998).

[60]
 People v. De Leon, 608 Phil. 701, 720 (2009).

[61]
 People v. Peteluna, et al.,  702 Phil. 128, 141 (2013).

[62]
 Id.

[63]
 People v. Ramos, et al., 715 Phil. 193, 203 (2013).

[64]
 People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527-528 (2013).

[65]
 CA rollo, p. 53.

[66]
 REVISED PENAL CODE.

Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons;

Penalties.  - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua  to death, when by reason or on

occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed.

xxxx

[67]
 People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 807, 839 (2016).

[68]
 Id. at 846-847.

[69]
 783 Phil. 807 (2016).

[70]
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article III, Section 14, paragraph 2.

[71]
 Act No. 4103, Section 1.

FIRST DIVISION

June 17, 2019

G.R. No. 230909

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
RYAN GONZALES Y VILLA, ANGELO GUEVARRA Y BUENO
ALIAS "ELO", ALVIN EUGENIO Y LACAY AND ROGELIO
TALENS ALIAS "MONG", Accused-Appellants

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

On appeal is the September 30, 2016 Decision 1 the Court of Appeals

(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07885, which affirmed with
modification the August 5, 2015 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 27, Cabanatuan City, convicting accused-appellants
Ryan Gonzales y Villa (Gonzales), Angelo Guevarra y Bueno alias
"Elo" (Guevarra), Alvin Eugenio y Lacay (Eugenio), and Rogelio
Talens alias "Mong" (Talens) of the crime of carnapping with
homicide, as defined and penalized by Republic Act (RA) No. 6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972), as amended by RA 7659.

Antecedent Facts

Accused-appellants were charged with the crime of carnapping with

homicide in an Information3 which reads:

That on or about the 7th day of September 2007, in the City of

Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable [C]ourt, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding and abetting with one another,
with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation
against person, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away, a Suzuki Motorcycle with
side-car, described as Make: Suzuki, Series GS150TD; Engine No.
QS157FMJ-A0505185121; Chassis No. NG 46A-104784; Plate No.
2187CE, registered in the name of Nena Cardenas Carlos and driven
by her husband Benjamin Carlos Jr. y Banalagay, against the latter's
will and consent and to his damage and prejudice and, on the
occasion of such act of carnapping, the above-named accused, did
then and there unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal
violence upon the person of the said BENJAMIN CARLOS JR[.], that
is, by bashing the latter in the back of the head [with] a piece of rock
and thereafter by repeatedly stabbing the latter nineteen times on
various parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him multiple stab
wounds which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The accused-appellants pleaded not guilty when arraigned. During
pre-trial, the parties stipulated that the victim, Benjamin Carlos, Jr.
(Benjamin), was a driver of the tricycle registered under the name of
his wife, Nena Carlos (Nena), as evidenced by Certificate of
Registration No. 5181256-3 and Official Receipt No. 475663440. Pre-
trial was terminated on August 5, 2008 and trial on the merits ensued
thereafter.5

The prosecution presented the testimonies of (1) the victim's wife,

Nena, (2) Melquiades Verde (Verde), (3) Eugene De Ocampo (De
Ocampo), (4) PO3 Alejandro Santos (PO3 Santos), and (5) Dr. Jun B.
Concepcion (Dr. Concepcion).6

The facts of the case, as summarized by the trial court and adopted
by the CA, are as follows:

On September 7, 2007, around 11:30 P.M., 61-year old tricycle driver

Benjamin Carlos, Jr. was plying his route looking for passengers on
the streets of Cabanatuan City. He was found dead the following day
along Vergara Highway, Barangay Sta. Arcadia, Cabanatuan City
with nineteen (19) stab wounds and a bashed head. The result of his
autopsy showed that he was killed between 11:00 P.M. and 12:00
midnight of September 7, 2007.1âшphi1 Tricycle driver Melquiades
Verde saw accused-appellants Ryan Gonzales y Villa, Alvin Eugenio
y Lacay and Rogelio Talens x x x on board the victim's tricycle, while
x x x accused-appellant Angelo Guevarra x x x was on board another
tricycle, about 11:00 to 11:30 P.M. of September 7, 2007. On
September 10, 2007, the victim's tricycle was found at Cantarilla,
Barangay Valdefuente, Cabanatuan City x x x in the process of being
dismantled by accused-appellants Ryan Gonzales y Villa and Alvin
Eugenio y Lacay.

xxxx

Accused-appellant Rogelio Talens, however, claims that on the night

of September 7, 2007, he was having a drinking session with his
friends 'Ace' and 'Tarry' at the waiting shed of Brgy. Vijandre,
Cabanatuan City, and they all went home to their respective houses
after the drinking session around 11:30 P.M. Accused-appellant Alvin
Eugenio y Lacay claims that at the time of the incident, he was with
his parents in their house at Perigola, Valdefuente, Cabanatuan City.7

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its August 5, 2015 Decision, 8 the RTC convicted all accused-

appellants of carnapping with homicide, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Ryan
Gonzales y Villa, Angelo Guevarra y Bueno alias Elo, Alvin Eugenio
y Lacay, and Rogelio Talens alias Mong GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of carnapping as defined and penalized by
Republic Act [No.] 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) as amended
by R.A. 7659, with homicide. Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Said accused are further
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Benjamin Carlos, Jr., jointly and
severally, the sum of Php50,000.00 as death indemnity, Php50,000.00
as moral damages, and Php25,000.00 as temperate damages, with
interest on all these damages awarded at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.9

The RTC found the testimonies of PO3 Santos and Verde to be

straightforward, credible, and unrehearsed. It also ruled that the
defense failed to establish ill motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses.10

The RTC disregarded the accused-appellants' defense of alibi for

being inherently weak vis-a-vis the positive identification by the
prosecution witnesses, and considering that the victim's tricycle was
found in the possession of accused-appellant Gonzales and
Eugenio.11 It also held that accused-appellants had conspired with
one another in the execution of the felony as shown by their
concerted actions, community of design and unity of purpose.12

Aggrieved, accused-appellants elevated the case to the CA.13

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In the assailed Decision,14 the CA disposed of the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the trial court's Decision dated August 5, 2015 is

affirmed, subject to modification that accused-appellants are ordered
to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in
the increased amount of Php75,000.00, moral damages in the
increased amount of Php75,000.00 and exemplary damages of
Php75,000.00, in addition to the temperate damages of Php25,000.00
awarded by the trial court. The Decision dated August 5, 2015 is
affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.15

In affirming the conviction of accused-appellants for the crime of

carnapping with homicide, the CA similarly gave weight to the
testimony of Verde who positively identified the accused-appellants
as the persons last seen with Benjamin before the latter was found
dead the following morning. The CA also accorded credence to the
corroborating testimonies of Dr. Concepcion, who determined the
approximate time of death of the victim and the number of his
assailants; as well as the testimony of PO3 Santos, who caught
accused-appellants Gonzales and Eugenio in the act of repainting the
victim's dismantled tricycle.16

The appellate court noted that the defense failed to show that the
prosecution witnesses were prompted by any ill motive to falsely
testify against the accused-appellants. It also pointed out that
accused-appellants failed to dispute the fact that Benjamin's tricycle
was found in their possession by the police. The CA gave short shrift
to the accused-appellants' denial and alibi for being inherently weak
and unreliable, especially since the accused-appellants failed to show
that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the crime
scene when the crime was perpetrated.1âшphi1 Finally, the CA
affirmed the penalties imposed by the trial court, but increased the
awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages,17 in accordance with this Court's ruling in People v.
Jugueta.18

Hence, this appeal.

Issue

Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of carnapping with

homicide.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under RA 6539,

as amended, are as follows:

1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender

himself;

3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that
the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.19
For the crime to be considered a special complex crime of carnapping
with homicide, it must be proven that the victim was killed "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof."20 Thus, the prosecution must not only establish the essential
elements of carnapping, but it must also show that such act of
carnapping was the original criminal intent of the culprit and that the
killing was committed in the course of executing the act of
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.

In this case, the prosecution satisfactorily proved all the elements of

the crime. It sufficiently established that the vehicle did not belong to
the accused-appellants. Prosecution witnesses Nena and De Ocampo
testified that the tricycle subject of the carnapping was purchased
from Royce Motors on installment basis and registered in Nena's
name.21 Moreover, it was shown that the tricycle was forcibly taken
from Benjamin with the intent to gain from such taking.

Prosecution witness Verde testified that, sometime past 11:00 p.m. of

September 7, 2007, he saw the three accused-appellants alight from
Gueverra's tricycle and flag down a red Suzuki tricycle with
galvanized side car being driven by a man around the age of 60; 22 and
that, he later knew the identity of the 60-year old driver of the red
Suzuki tricycle when Benjamin's lifeless body was discovered the
following morning along Vergara Highway in Brgy. Sta. Arcadia.23

Corroborating Verde's testimony, PO3 Santos testified that, after

learning that a cadaver of a male person was found at the vicinity of
Brgy. Sta. Arcadia on September 8, 2007, his team went to the crime
scene and discovered the dead body of Benjamin. 24 He also confirmed
that Verde went to the police station and narrated what he saw the
previous night.25 PO3 Santos further stated that on September 10,
2007, a civilian informant arrived at the police station to report that a
tricycle, which fits the description of Benjamin's stolen tricycle, was
being dismantled at the vicinity of Brgy. Valdefuente. Upon receipt of
this information, the police conducted a follow-up operation. When
PO3 Santos and his companions reached Sitio Cantarilla, they
discovered that the tricycle had already been dismantled and its
motorcycle about to be repainted by accused-appellants Eugenio and
Gonzales, thereby prompting PO3 Santos and his team to
immediately arrest Eugenio and Gonzales.26

Dr. Concepcion, a medico-legal examiner, testified that he performed

the autopsy on the cadaver of Benjamin; that based on his autopsy,
the victim's time of death occurred on September 7, 2007, between
11:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight; that the cadaver sustained 19 stab
wounds of different sizes and depth, which were probably caused by
sharp, long, and pointed instruments; and that, as the stab wounds
were found on the chest and at the back, he deduced that there could
have been a commotion during the stabbing incident and the stab
wounds may have been committed by two or more persons. 27 Based
on the examination he conducted, Dr. Concepcion prepared an
illustrative sketch of the stab wounds, an Autopsy Report, and a
Death Certificate which he all submitted and identified before the
trial court.28

Taking into account all these circumstances, it is clear that the crime
of carnapping with homicide was committed. "Direct proof [of
conspiracy among the accused-appellants] is not essential as it may
be inferred from their conduct before, during, and after the
commission of the crime, that they acted with a common purpose
and design."29 Where the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution are consistent with one another, the only rational
proposition that can be drawn therefrom is that the accused-
appellants killed their victim for the purpose of taking the latter's
vehicle to be used for their own benefit.30

We agree with the following finding of the RTC:

The testimonies of both PO3 Alejandro Santos and Melquiades Verde

in open Court were straightforward, credible and have no sign of
being coached or rehearsed. Despite lengthy cross-examination, no
plausible reason was shown why they would testify falsely and
neither of the witnesses] has a grudge or axe to grind against any of
the accused. Hence, their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit
by the Court. The Supreme Court ruled in a number of cases that[,] in
the absence of any evidence indicating that the principal witness for
the prosecution was moved by any improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is thus
entitled to full faith and credit.31

Similarly, we subscribe to the following finding of the CA:

Equally important is the fact that accused-appellants Ryan Gonzales

y Villa and Alvin Eugenio y Lacay failed to dispute that the victim's
tricycle was found in their possession at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan
City. It has been held that '[i]n the absence of an explanation of how
one has come into the possession of stolen effects belonging to a
person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be
considered the author of the aggression and death of the said person
and of the robbery committed on him.' x x x32

All the accused-appellants invariably interposed alibi and denial as

their defense. Needless to say, both are inherently weak defenses as
they constitute self-serving negative evidence and may be easily
fabricated, and thus, cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight
than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.33 Before the Court may consider alibi as a valid defense, the
accused must first prove with clear and convincing evidence that (1)
he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time when the
crime was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime when the crime was committed.34 That
much is clear from the following teaching of this Court in the recent
case of People v. Bongos,35 to wit:

Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that
he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place
where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the
two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to be
present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.36

Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfactorily prove that

it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene when
the crime was perpetrated. Indeed, the eyewitness account of Verde
puts accused-appellants within the vicinity and with the victim
Benjamin himself, at or about the time the latter died. Moreover, the
accused-appellant's failure to justify their possession of the victim's
tricycle further casts serious doubts on the legitimacy of their
defenses. Hence, both the RTC and the CA were correct in finding
accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged.

Both the CA and the RTC correctly imposed upon accused-appellants

the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA also properly modified the
amounts of damages awarded, in consonance with this Court's ruling
in People v. Jugueta.37 However, the award of temperate damages in
the amount of ₱25,000.00 must be upgraded to ₱50,000.00 in light of
recent jurisprudence.38

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The September 30,

2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07885
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that accused-appellants are
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Benjamin Carlos, Jr. the amount of
₱50,000.00 instead of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, Jardeleza, Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

 Rollo, pp. 2-20; penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas

1

Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices Jane Aurora C.

Lantion and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela.

 Records (Vol. 1), pp. 264-278; penned by Presiding Judge

2

Angelo C. Perez.
3
 Id. at 1-2.
4
 Id. at 1.
5
 Rollo, pp. 5-6.
6
 Id. at 6.
7
 Id. at 3-4.
8
 Records (Vol. 1), pp. 264-278.
9
 Id. at 278. Emphasis in the original.
10
 Id. at 274.
11
 Id. at 274-275.
12
 Id. at 275-276.
13
 Id. at 285.
14
 Rollo, pp. 2-20.
15
 Id. at 19.
16
 Id. at 9-15.
17
 Id. at 15-19.
18
 783 Phil. 806, 848 (2016).

 People v. Donio, G.R. No. 212815, March 1, 2017, 819 SCRA 56,
19

67.
20
 Id. at 67-68.

 TSN, November 4, 2008, pp. 3-5; TSN, January 27, 2009, pp. 3-
21

4.
22
 TSN, September 13, 2011, pp. 5-12.
 23
 Id. at 6-8.
24
 TSN, October 5, 2010, pp. 3-5.
25
 Id. at 5-7.
26
 Id. at 7-9.
27
 TSN, May 7, 2012, pp. 4-7.
28
 Id. at 9-12.

 People v. Lagat, 673 Phil. 351, 369 (2011), citing People v. Sube,

29

449 Phil. 165, 176-177 (2003).

30
 People v. Lagat, id.
31
 Records (Vol. 1), p. 274.
32
 Rollo, p. 15.
33
 People v. Umapas, 807 Phil. 975, 989-990 (2017).
34
 People v. Badillos, G.R. No. 215732, June 6, 2018.
35
 People v. Bongos, G.R. No. 227698, January 31, 2018.
36
 Id.
37
 Supra note 18.
38
 People v. Macaranas, 811 Phil. 610, 625 (2017).

SECOND DIVISION

June 21, 2017

G.R. No. 226846

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JEFFREY MACARANAS y FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For consideration of this Court is the appeal of the Decision 1 dated

October 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing appellant
Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez's appeal and affirming with
modification the Judgment2 dated August 22, 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 79, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No.
38-M-2008, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.

The facts follow.

Frank Karim Langaman and his girlfriend Kathlyn Irish Mae

Cervantes were at Meyland Village, Meycauayan, Bulacan, in the
evening of February 18, 2007, aboard Frank's motorcycle, a green
Honda Wave 125 with Plate No. NQ 8724, registered under the name
of Jacqueline Corpuz Langaman. When they were about to leave the
place, two (2) men, both wearing jackets and bonnets suddenly
approached them, followed by a third man who was earlier standing
at a post. One of the three men held Frank by the neck and shot Frank
causing the latter to fall down. The same man pointed his gun at
Kathlyn and demanded that she give him her cellphone. After
Kathlyn gave her cellphone, the same man hit her on the back.
Thereafter, Kathlyn pretended to be unconscious and saw that the
men searched the body of Frank for any valuables. While the incident
was taking place, the second man took Frank's motorcycle, while the
third man, herein appellant, just stood to guard them and acted as
the look-out. Afterwards, the three men left together riding Frank's
motorcycle. It was then that Kathlyn was able to seek help and Frank
was taken to the hospital.

According to Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon, Frank sustained a gunshot

injury traversing the neck area which necessitated surgery.
Eventually, Frank died on the 27 th post-operative day or on March 30,
2007. The cause of Frank's death was "cardiopulmonary arrest
secondary to the spinal cord injury with retained metallic foreign
body secondary conjunction injury status post the surgery done
which is laminectomy infusion with rods and screws," as shown in
the Post-Mortem Certificate.

Thus, an Information was filed against appellant, Richard Lalata and

a certain John Doe charging them of violation of R.A. No. 6539, which
reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th day of February, 2007, in the City of

Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with gun, by means of violence and intimidation, with intent
of gain and without the consent of the owner, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away with
them one Honda Wave 125 motorcycle with Plate No. NQ 8724
valued at ₱59,000.00 belonging to Jacqueline Corpuz [Langaman], to
her damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount of ₱59,000.00, and
by reason or on the occasion of the commission of the said
carnapping act, the said accused in furtherance of their conspiracy
and with intent to kill did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot Frank Karim Langaman with the
gun they were then provided, hitting the latter on his neck which
caused his death.

Appellant pleaded "not guilty" during his arraignment and after the
pre-trial ended, the trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jacqueline Langaman,

Kathlyn Irish Mae Cervantes, Dr. Gene Patrick De Leon and SPO 1
Hernan Roble Berciles, Jr.

Appellant, on the other hand, testified in his defense and denied the
charges against him claiming that on February 18, 2007, he fetched
his cousin Richard Lalata before proceeding to his father Eming
Macaranas' house at Brgy. Lawa, where they usually eat and sleep.
According to him, they left early in the morning of the following day'
and just slept the whole day at their house in Brgy. Daungan.
Thereafter, sometime in June, 2007, barangay officials arrested him
and claimed that they beat and mauled him in order to admit that he
killed Frank, and under coercion, he pointed to his cousin Richard
Lalata as the perpetrator.

The RTC, in its decision, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the offense charged and disposed the case, as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused

Jeffrey Macaranas, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime
of Carnapping.

Accordingly, accused Jeffrey Macaranas is hereby SENTENCED:

(a) To suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

(b) To indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman

Corpuz the amount of Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death
of Frank Karim Corpuz Langaman;

(c) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount

of PhpS0,000.00 as temperate damages;
(d) To restore to the offended party, Jacqueline Langaman, the subject
motorcycle or in default thereof, to indemnify said offended party in
the sum of Php25,000.00; and

(e) To pay the costs of the suit.

The case against accused Richard Lalata who remained at large since
the filing of the Information is ordered ARCHIVED to be revived
upon his apprehension. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the arrest
of accused Lalata.

SO ORDERED.3

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with

modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal

is DENIED. Accordingly, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch79, Malolos, Bulacan, dated 22 August 2012 is
hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:

xxxx

Accordingly, accused Jeffrey Macaranas is hereby SENTENCED:

(a) To suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

(b) To indemnify the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman [y]

Corpuz the amount of seventy-five thousand (Php75,000.00)
pesos as civil indemnity forthe death of Frank Karim Corpuz
Langaman;

(c) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount

of fifty thousand (Php50,000.00)pesos as moral damages;

(d) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount

of thirty thousand (Php30,000.00)pesos as exemplary damages;

(e) To pay the private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount

of twenty-five thousand(Php25,000.00) pesos as temperate damages
in lieu of actual damages;

(f) To restore to the offended party, Jacqueline Langaman, the subject

motorcycle or in default thereof, to indemnify said offended party in
the sum of Php25,000.00; and

(g) To pay the costs of the suit.

The damages awarded shall earn interest at six percent (6%) per
annum from finality of judgment until fully satisfied.

The case against accused Richard Lalata who remained at large since
the filing of the Information is ordered ARCHIVED to be revived
upon his apprehension. Issue an alias warrant of arrest for the arrest
of accused Lalata.

SO ORDERED.

SO ORDERED.4

Hence, the present appeal.

Appellant insists that the trial court and the CA committed an error
in giving full credence to the testimony of the lone witness and in
rejecting his defense of denial and alibi.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended,

defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means
of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force
upon things. 5 By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659,
Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:

SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of

carnapping, as this term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua  to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof (Emphasis
supplied)

Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the

Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was
changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the
change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the
course of thecommissionof the carnapping or on the occasion thereof" This
thirdamendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a
special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4
of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of
the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the essential
requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim,
and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design
of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on theoccasion
thereof"  Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are
notproved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to
be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.6

"There is no arguing that the anti-camapping law is a special law,

different from the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised
Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent,
or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law
with the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common
features and characteristics, to wit: unlawful taking, intent to gain,
and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals
with the theft and robbery of motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle
is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with intent to
gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with
or without the use of force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping
law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within the
purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before
the enactment of said statute."7

So, essentially, carnapping is the robbery or theft of a motorized

vehicle and it becomes qualified or aggravated when, in the course of
the commission or on the occasion of the carnapping, the owner,
driver or occupant is killed or raped. 8 As we have ruled in People v.
Mejia: 9

The killing or the rape merely qualifies the crime of carnapping x x x

and no distinction must be made between homicide and murder.
Whether it is one or the other which is committed "in the course of
carnapping or on the occasion thereof' makes no difference insofar as
the penalty is concerned.

It is similar to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide

and in People v. Bariquit, 10 it was ruled that:

In the present case, the accused-appellants were charged with, tried,

and convicted for the crime of robbery with homicide. In our
jurisdiction, this special complex crime is primarily classified as a
crime against property and not against persons, homicide being a
mere incident of the robbery with the latter being the main purpose
and object of the criminal.

Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery is applicable

only to crimes against persons. Accordingly, inasmuch as robbery
with homicide is a crime against property and not against persons,
cannot treachery be validly considered in the present case.

Thus, the elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under

R.A. No. 6539, as amended are the following:

1) That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2) That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender

himself;

3) That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that
the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4) That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle. 11

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended,
the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping
and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly,
it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was
carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." 12 In other
words, to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the
culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. 13

In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution show that there were two (2)
men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together with the appellant
who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed
force and intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took the
victim's motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck causing his
death.

Appellant argues that the RTC, as well as the CA, erred in

appreciating the testimony of the lone witness of the prosecution
because of its inconsistencies and the improbability of her
imputations.
This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the
testimony of the witness[es], considering its unique position in
directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. 14 From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witness[es]. 15 The factual findings of the appellate
court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when
said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing
that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that
they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion. 16

The CA, therefore, did not err when it concurred with the RTC on the
following:

The testimony of Kathlyn satisfies the aforementioned test of

credibility. More importantly, during her time at the witness stand,
Kathlyn positively and categorically identified accused-appellant as
one of the three (3) men who committed the crime. We agree with the
court aquo's observation on this, thus -

xxx

The testimony of the Prosecution witness Kathlyn Irish Mae

Cervantes reveals that she came face to face with accused Jeffrey
Macaranas. Though the other two (2) accused wore bonnet at the
time of the shooting incident, she was able to identify accused Jeffrey
Macaranas and narrate to the court his specific participation in the
carnapping incident. She testified that before the two (2) male
persons approached her and Frank Karim, she saw accused Jeffrey
Macaranas who was then standing beside a post, staring at them
while they were moving slowly on board the motorcycle. Again, she
saw Jeffrey following the two male persons who approached her and
Frank Karim. Jeffrey Macaranas was just a meter away from her
because he was near the person holding the motorcycle. Jeffrey
Macaranas boarded the motorcycle together with his two (2) male
companions immediately after the incident.

xxx

There was indeed a positive and unequivocal identification of the

accused. It has long been settled that where the witnesses of the
prosecution were not actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they
were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit. Herein, no imputation of improper motive on the part of
Kathlyn was ever made by the accused-appellant, as the latter even
testified he was without knowledge of any grudge Kathlyn might
have against him. Further, relationship per se of Kathlyn with the
victim does not necessarily mean that her testimony is biased and/or
fabricated.

xxxx

Moreover, as correctly held by the People, through the OSG, any

inconsistency, if at all, was already superseded by Kathlyn's positive
identification of the accused-appellant in court. x x x

x x x17

Conspiracy was also proven in this case. Conspiracy exists when two
or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proved by
direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, 18 which are
indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. 19 In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy
is present when one concurs with the criminal design of another,
indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crime
committed. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated. 20 As the CA correctly ruled:

In the present case, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated

movements of the three accused. Accused-appellant was seen
standing by the post looking at Kathlyn and the victim aboard the
motorcycle. When his co-accused approached the former, accused-
appellant followed suit and was standing guard nearby, while his
companions committed their criminal acts. After the victim fell down,
and apparently thinking Kathlyn to be unconscious, the trio left
together taking with them the victim's motorcycle. Clearly, the
accused-appellant and company all acted in confabulation in
furtherance of their common design and purpose, i.e., to carnal the
motorcycle. As aptly held by the court a quo thus -

xxx

From the acts of accused Jeffrey Macaranas, there was unity in his
action with his co-accused and a concerted effort to commit the crime
charged. The simultaneous acts of Macaranas and his two (2)
companions indicate a joint purpose and concurrence of intentions on
their part. x x x

x x x21

Anent appellant's defense of denial and alibi, this Court has

consistently ruled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence, which
deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimonies of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters22 and that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the
time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime 23 during its
commission.24 In correctly ruling that the defense of denial and alibi
of appellant is inconsequential, the CA stated the following:

In the face of the serious accusation, accused-appellant merely

interposed the defense of denial and alibi to prove his
innocence.1âwphi1 Time and again, this Court held that denial is an
inherently weak defense and has always been viewed upon with
disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be concocted.
Inherently weak, denial as a defense crumbles in the in the light of
positive identification of the accused-appellant, as in this case. The
defense of denial assumes significance only when the prosecution's
evidence is such that it does not prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, which is not the case here. Verily, mere denial,
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative self-
serving evidence which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight
than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified on
affirmative matters. The Court finds inadequate the accused-
appellant's defense of alibi absent any credible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, to exculpate him of the crime charged. 25

As to the imposable penalty under Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as

amended, it is provided that:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of

carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.

Thus, the RTC did not commit an error in imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua  considering that there was no alleged and
provenaggravating circumstance. In line, however, with the recent
jurisprudence,26 in cases of special complex crimes like carnapping
with homicide, among others, where the imposable penalty
is reclusion perpetua, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages,
and exemplary damages are pegged at ₱75,000.00 each. The appellant
is also ordered to pay ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the
award of ₱25,000.00 as actual damages to the private
complainant.27 All the other dispositions of the CA stays.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of Jeffrey Macaranas y Fernandez

is DISMISSED. Consequently, the Decision dated October 29, 2015
of theCourt of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the appellant is ordered to indemnify the
private complainant Jacqueline Langaman the amount of ₱75,000.00
instead of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱75,000.00 instead of
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages and the amount of ₱50,000.00
instead of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes
*
 On wellness leave.

 Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2445 dated June

**

16, 2017.

 On leave. Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 12, Sec.
***

4. - Leaving a vote.  - A Member who goes on leave or is unable

to attend the voting on any decision, resolution, or matter may
leave his or her vote in writing, addressed to the Chief Justice
or the Division Chairperson, and the vote shall be counted,
provided that he or she took part in the deliberation.
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda with the
concurrence of Associate Justices Sesinando E. Villon and Myra
V. Garcia-Fernandez; rollo, pp. 2-11

 Penned by Presiding Judge Olivia V. Escubio-Samar;

2

CA rollo,  pp. 66-74.

3
 Id. at 74. (Emphasis in the original)
4
 Rollo,  pp. 14-15. (Emphasis in the original)
5
 Section 2, R.A. No. 6539.
6
 People v. Fabian Urzais y Lanurias, G.R. No. 207662, April 13,
2016, citing People v. Santos, 388 Ph;J. 993, 1005-1006 (2000).
7
 Tan v. People, 379 Phil. 999, 1009 (2000).
8
 People v. SPO/ Lobitania,  437 Phil. 213, 222 (2002).
9
 341 Phil. 118, 143 (1997).
10
 395 Phil. 823, 855-856 (2000).
11
 People v. Bernabe and Garcia, 448 Phil. 269, 280 (2003).
12
 People v. Fabian Urzais y Lanurias, supra note 6.
  People v. Enrile Donia, G.R. No. 212815, March 5, 2017,
13

citing People v, Aquino, 724 Phil. 739, 757 (2014).

14
 People v. Enrile Donia, supra.
15
 People v. A bat, 731 Phil. 304, 311 (2014).
16
 Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 391 (2014).
17
 Rollo, pp. 9-10.
18
 People v. Panida,  369 Phil. 311, 341 (1999).
19
 People v. Manes,  362 Phil. 569, 579 (1999).
20
 People v. Bato,  401 Phil. 415, 424 (2000).
21
 Rollo, p. 12.
22
 People v. Manalili, 608 Phil. 498, 516-517 (2009).
23
 People v. Mosquerra, 414 Phil. 740, 749 (2001).
24
 People v. Ramos, et al., 715 Phil. 193, 206 (2013).
25
 Rollo, pp. 12-13.
26
 People v. lreneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.
27
 People v. Enrile Donia, supra  note 13.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017

CELERINO CHUA ALIAS SUNTAY, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The violence against or intimidation of persons perpetrated by the

accused to commit a robbery under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code renders the accused also liable for carnapping committed by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons as defined and
punished by Section 14 of Republic Act 6539 involving the taking of a
vehicle to transport the stolen goods.

The Case
Celerino Chua alias Suntay (Chua) seeks to reverse the decision
promulgated on October 20, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed his convictions for carnapping in violation of Republic
Act 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) and for robbery as defined and
punished by Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code handed down by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in Malolos, Bulacan (RTC)
through its decision of September 25, 2002.2

Antecedents

On January 25, 1994, Chua, along with Leonardo Reyes alias Leo and

Arnold Lato y Baniel alias Arnold or Rodel, was charged in Criminal
Case No. 397-M-94 of the RTC with the crime of carnapping under
the information alleging as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1993, in the municipality of
Bocaue, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without
the consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away with
them one owner type jeep (stainless) bearing Plate No. CFC-327,
belonging to Sps. Reynaldo Ravago and Teresa Ravago, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owners in the amount of
P170,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On January 27, 1994, the same accused were charged with robbery
under the information filed in Criminal Case No. 428-M-94, to wit:
That on or about the 24th day of October, 1993 in the municipality of
Bocaue, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by
means of force and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with them
the following, to wit:
one (1) colored TV set (Sony)--------------- P 15,000.00  
one (1) TV set B & W (Hitachi/Union)--- P 5,000.00  
two (2) Betamax (Sony)---------------------- P 18,000.00  
one (1) VHS record (Toshiba)-------------- P 12,000.00  
one (1) Sansui compact disc---------------- P 25,000.00  
assorted jewelries (sic)------------------------- P 30,000.00  
six (6) pcs. of assorted wristwatches----- P 10,000.00  
 cash----------------------------------------------- P 7,000.00  
P122,000.0
TOTAL  
0
belonging to Sps. Reynaldo Ravago and Theresa Ravago, to the
damage and prejudice of the said spouses in the total amount of
P122,000.00; and by reason of and on the occasion of the commission
of the said robbery, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
bladed instrument, said Reynaldo E. Ravago thereby inflicting upon
him serious physical injuries which required medical attendance and
incapacitated him from his customary labor for a period of not more
than thirty (30) days.4
Reyes and Lato remained at large; hence, only Chua was arraigned
and tried for the crimes.

The CA synthesized the procedural and factual antecedents adduced

by the Prosecution and the Defense as follows:
The prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses, namely: Teresa
Legaspi-Ravago, Reynaldo Ravago, Valentina Legaspi, Juanito
Olivario, Gerry Ormesa, Moises Legaspi, Jessie Tugas and John
Laguidao.

The facts established by prosecution witness Teresa Ravago as

follows:

On October 24, 1993 at around 2:50 o'clock in the morning, Teresa

Legaspi-Ravago, accompanied by a helper, was about to leave for
work at the Maymart Market in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Upon opening
the door, she was immediately pushed inside the house by accused
Arnold Lato. Lato was followed by accused Leonardo Reyes. Arnold
tied the hands of Teresa and the helper with straw. Leonardo on the
other hand went to the master's bedroom where Reynaldo was
sleeping. Reynaldo was stabbed four times but was able to run to the
bathroom and lock himself in.

The accused demanded jewelry and cash that the Ravagos earned as
broker's commission from the sale of a fishpond. The two robbers
wore stockings on the head to conceal their identities. Teresa was
able to recognize the face of Arnold when the latter removed the
stocking off his face as he searched for jewelry.

Said two (2) accused carted off their television sets, Sony Betamax
sets, Karaoke, compact disc, assorted pieces of jewelry, VHS player
and cash. The said stolen items were loaded in a stainless owner type
jeep registered in the name of Teresa's mother, Valentina Legaspi, but
given to the private complainants in 1990.

The robbery was immediately reported to the Bocaue Police Station.

In the course of the investigation, Teresa was able to identify Arnold
through photographs shown to her.

The robbers were later on identified as Arnold Lato and Leonardo

Reyes. Arnold Lato was about her height, 5'2", dark and had earring
on his right ear. The other, Leonardo Reyes, was 5'7" or 5'8", fair
complexioned, thin and lanky. Both accused who were still at large
were workers of Gerry Ormesa. Appellant Chua referred both
accused to Gerry Ormesa. The straw ropes that were used to tie
Teresa and her helper were being used by Arnold and Leo in their
work. The built and height of the accused as described by Teresa fit
the description of aforenamed workers of Gerry Ormesa. The clothes
the robbers wore as described by Teresa were recognized by their
employer Gerry as among those few clothings his two workers
owned. Arnold and Leonardo stopped working after the October 24
incident. They left without waiting to receive the salaries due them.

Prior to the incident appellant Celerino Chua, together with his

legitimate family resided about twenty (20) meters away from
complainants' house. After the incident, they left. Before Chua went
into hiding he wrote the Ravagos to keep quiet about the incident,
otherwise, harm would befall their family.

A couple from the place where the appellant resided gave

information that the jeep was brought by the appellant Chua to Bani,
Pangasinan. The jeep was recovered at Jessie Tugas' motor shop in
Pangasinan. Appellant Chua and his live-in partner then resided in a
nipa hut near the motor shop from November to December 1993. One
Betamax unit was recovered in the nipa hut where appellant Chua
and his girlfriend stayed.

Appellant Chua told Tugas that he is the owner of the jeep. Chua
approached John Alden Laguidao, a friend of Tugas, who agreed to
purchase the vehicle for Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
Laguidao made a partial payment of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) on the condition that the balance shall be paid upon the
presentation of the certificate of registration.

Teresa was shocked by the incident. She was unable to return to work
for sometime because of fear to step outside in the morning. She even
received threats. She left the amount of damages to the discretion of
the court.
Reynaldo Ravago corroborated Teresa's testimony. He added that he
was stabbed four (4) times by the taller malefactor. He (Reynaldo) ran
to the bathroom and locked himself in to avoid further harm. He
heard the two robbers asking for their jewelry and cash which they
earned as commission from the sale of a fishpond which they
brokered. Appellant Celerino Chua knew of said transaction.
Reynaldo stayed inside the bathroom for as long as the two (2)
robbers had not yet left. After Reynaldo's wife opened the bathroom
door, he was brought for treatment to Yanga Clinic. He was confined
for five (5) days. He incurred expenses of about P17,000.00.

They were able to recover the vehicle in Jessie Tugas' shop in Bani,
Pangasinan. It had already been sold to one John Aldrin Laguidao for
P40,000.00. He saw the terms of the sale on a yellow pad which
showed the seller to be Celerino Chua and one Meann (Chua's live-in
partner). Pictures of the vehicle already dismantled (Exhibits "J", "J-1"
to "J-19") and taken in Jessie's shop were presented. An inventory of
the jeep's parts (Exhibits "M", and "M-1") were offered. Picture
(Exhibit "J-13") of the nipa hut where Chua and MeAnn stayed was
taken. The Betamax, among those stolen from the Ravagos, was
recovered from the same nipa hut where Chua and his companion
stayed.

Valentina Legaspi, Teresa's mother, confirmed that the jeep, although

registered in her name, was given to the spouses Ravago in 1991.

Juanita Olivario, the husband of Reynaldo Ravago's sister,

accompanied Reynaldo to Bani, Pangasinan. They went first to the
police station and requested for an escort to the shop of Jessie Tugas.
Laguidao, the buyer of the jeep, was no longer in Bani. Reynaldo
requested for a copy of the deed of sale between Chua and Laguidao.
They were told it was missing.

Gerry Ormesa identified Celerino Chua in court. Chua is his sister's

compadre. He identified the straw ropes to belong to him but used by
the two accused, Arnold and Leo, in their work. He also admitted
that the clothes shown him belonged to the two (2) accused.

Moises Legaspi, Teresa's father, identified the pictures of the subject

vehicle (Exhibit "J", "J-1" to "J-16").

Jessie Tugas, a resident of Bani, Pangasinan, identified Chua in court.

He came to know him when introduced by a nephew. He had an auto
repair shop then. Chua was with MeAnn and two (2) men. He
admitted that the jeep in question was repaired in his shop. Chua
represented that he owned the jeep. He was offering it for sale. A "For
Sale" sign was even posted at the back of the jeep. Tugas identified
the pictures of the jeep (Exhibits "J", "J-1" to "J-16"). He also admitted
that the picture (Exhibit "J-13") showed the nipa hut where Chua,
MeAnn and his nephew stayed. Laguidao, his brother-in-law, bought
the jeep. Laguidao gave a down payment of P20,000.00. Before the
balance was paid, Reynaldo Ravago came to recover the vehicle.

John Laguidao identified Celerino Chua in court. He identified the

pictures of the jeep. It was sold to him. Before he could pay the
balance in full, the real owner came and showed him the certificate of
registration. Upon verification of the chassis and engine numbers, the
owner took the vehicle. Laguidao's receipt for the transaction could
not be located anymore.

The accused thereafter presented defense evidence.

Accused Celerino Chua testified that he has no knowledge about the

charges against him. He did not know personally the other accused,
Leonardo and Arnold. He drove part time for Reynaldo. In the early
morning of October 24, 1993, he agreed to drive for Reynaldo but the
vehicle he was supposed to drive was under repair. He went home
and drove a passenger jeep instead. He started at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning and went home at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. He proceeded
to Sapang Palay, San Jose del Monte where he had a live-in partner,
Mary-Ann Rodrigesa. He learned that the house of Reynaldo Ravago
was robbed when the policemen came to Sapang Palay to ask him
questions. He hid in Malolos because he was afraid that he might be
killed. He also denied knowing John Laguidao and Jessie Tugas. He
hid in his father's house in Malolos, Bulacan for three (3) years. He
had not been to Bani, Pangasinan.

A barriomate and childhood playmate, Manuel Calumpang, testified

in behalf of appellant Chua. Sometime in 1994, upon a chance
meeting with the appellant, he heard two (2) persons talking to the
former threatening him not to point to them otherwise he and his
family would be killed. He was also told by the appellant that he had
a case. Of the two who made the threats, one was short and the other
was tall.5
Ruling of the RTC

As stated, the RTC convicted Chua for the crimes charged, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, finding accused
CELERINO CHUA alias SUNTAY guilty under Criminal Case No.
397- M-94 for violation of Republic Act 6539 otherwise known as the
AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of fourteen years (14) and eight (8) months as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum.

Further, finding accused CELERINO CHUA alias SUNTAY guilty in

Criminal Case No. 428-M-94 for Robbery under Article 294 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor as
minimum to eight (8) years and twenty one (21) days of prision
mayor as maximum and to indemnify the complainants Spouses
Teresa Ravago and Reynaldo Ravago the amount of Php One
Hundred Thirteen Thousand (less the value of (1) recovered Betamax
Sony).

With accused preventive imprisonment credited in his favor.

Accused Celerino Chua is likewise directed to pay complainant

Teresa Ravago the amount of Php Two Hundred Thousand as and
for actual damages.

Costs against accused CELERINO CHUA.

Let the records of the case be sent to archive as against accused

LEONARDO REYES alias "LEO" and ARNOLD LATO y BANIEL @
Arnold or Rodel who are still at large.

SO ORDERED.6
Decision of the CA

On appeal, Chua contended that the RTC had erred:

I

xxx IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SOLELY ON THE

BASIS OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II

xxx IN RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE

FACT THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7
On October 20, 2005, the CA promulgated the assailed decision
affirming the findings and conclusions of the RTC, pertinently
observing:
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not only the matrix
from which a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
Circumstantial evidence is like a rope composed of many strands and
cords one strand might be insufficient, but five together may suffice
to give it strength.

The requisite of circumstantial evidence to be sufficient basis for

conviction are: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived have been established; and (c)
the combination of all the circumstance is such as to warrant a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

This Court is convinced that the three (3) accused conspired to

commit the crime. The circumstances before, during and after the
incident point to the appellant as the mastermind. Direct proof is not
essential to the establishment of conspiracy, as it may be inferred
from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission
of the crime.

The circumstances in this case that point to appellant Chua as the

mastermind are:

First, the day before the incident, Reynaldo Ravago told his
compadre about the broker's commission he received in the sale of a
fishpond. Appellant Chua eavesdropped and intently listened to the
conversation.

Second, on the day of the robbery, Leonardo and Arnold, the two (2)
other accused, asked for the said broker's commission. Only Celerino
Chua could have told Arnold and Leo About said commission.

Third, subsequent to the commission of the crime, Celerino Chua

disappeared. He left the place where he stayed. He hid in his father's
house in Malolos Bulacan. Flight in jurisprudence has always been a
strong indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade responsibility.

Fourth is the sale of the owner type jeep. The seller was Celerino
Chua. Both Jessie Tugas and John Laguidao categorically identified
him as the person who sold and received the partial payment for the
vehicle. During the recovery of the vehicle, another stolen item, the
Betamax, was found in the place where Chua and his live-in partner
had stayed. A disputable presumption exists that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act. Appellants offered no evidence
to overcome or contradict such presumption.

It is also noted by this Court that appellant denied any knowledge in

the commission of the crime as well as the fact that he knows the
other accused. However, it was testified that appellant Chua was the
one who referred Leonardo and Arnold to their employer. Being
evidence that is negative and self-serving in nature, disavowals
cannot secure more worthiness than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testified on clear and positive evidence.

Furthermore, the defense of the accused is alibi and denial. Alibi and
denial are intrinsically weak absent material evidence of non-
culpability.

The defense also failed to prove any reason for the filing of a case
against the appellant. Settled is the doctrine that when there is no
evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a
prosecution would testify falsely against the accused or implicate him
in a serious offense the testimony deserves full faith and credit.

A judgment of conviction by the lower court is upheld on the basis of

the circumstantial evidence that constitutes an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the defendant is
guilty.

This Court affirms the conviction of Celerino Chua in Criminal Case

No. 397-M-94 without modification of the penalty imposed by the
trial court.8
The CA modified the penalty meted on Chua for the robbery stating
thusly:
However, this Court finds the penalty in Criminal Case No. 428- M-
94 for Robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal
Code inaccurate. Though this Court agrees with the trial court that
there was no evidence that Celerino Chua was part of any plan to
inflict physical injury in the course of the robbery which justified
imposition of the penalty under paragraph 5, Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, yet, the penalty actually imposed was not
accurate.

Since there is no mitigating and aggravating circumstance, the

maximum penalty should have been prision mayor in its minimum
period and the minimum penalty should have been the penalty next
lower prescribed by the code. The minimum of the indeterminate
penalty is left to the sound discretion of the court, to fix from within
the range of the penalty next lower without reference to the periods
into which it may be subdivided.9
The CA then accordingly disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is
hereby DENIED. The decision of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 397-M-94
is AFFIRMED in toto.
Conviction in Criminal Case No. 428-M-94 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant Chua is hereby sentenced to
suffer a penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Eight (8) years of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

Preventive imprisonment is credit(ed) in favor of the accused.

Accused Celerino Chua is likewise directed to pay complainant
Teresa Ravago the amount of Php Two Hundred Thousand for actual
damages.

Costs against accused Celerino Chua.

SO ORDERED.10
Issue

In his petition, Chua submits that the CA committed reversible errors

in finding the existence of a conspiracy between him and the two
other accused despite the failure of the State to establish his actual
participation in the commission of the crimes charged; in finding him
guilty of the crimes charged despite the insufficiency of the
circumstantial evidence; and in holding him guilty as a principal in
the commission of the crimes charged even assuming that he had
sold the motor vehicle of the victims and that the betamax machine
had been found in his place.

Was Chua's guilt for robbery and carnapping established beyond

reasonable doubt?

Ruling of the Court

The Court UPHOLDS the decision of the CA.

1.
The State presented sufficient and reliable circumstantial evidence
to establish the guilt of Chua beyond reasonable doubt for robbery
and carnapping, as charged

Direct evidence was not the sole means of establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The lack or absence of direct
evidence putting the accused at or near the scene of robbery and
carnapping at the time of their commission did not necessarily mean
that his guilt could not be proved by evidence other than direct
evidence. Conviction could also rest purely on circumstantial
evidence, which is that evidence that proves a fact or series of facts
from which the fact in issue may be established by inference.
Circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, could supplant the lack or
absence of direct evidence. It may be resorted to when to insist on
direct testimony would ultimately lead to setting felons free. 11

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides when circumstantial

evidence is sufficient for conviction if the conditions enumerated
therein are shown to exist, to wit:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain
that leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person. 12

Circumstances that fully warranted the inference of Chua's having

been the mastermind in the commission of the carnapping and the
robbery incriminated him beyond reasonable doubt in the crimes for
which he was convicted. It is relevant to note that the CA listed the
several circumstances that, taken together, proved the complicity of
Chua in the robbery and carnapping, as follows:
First, the day before the incident, Reynaldo Ravago told his
compadre about the broker's commission he received in the sale of a
fishpond. Appellant Chua eavesdropped and intently listened to the
conversation.

Second, on the day of the robbery, Leonardo and Arnold, the two (2)
other accused, asked for the said broker's commission. Only Celerino
Chua could have told Arnold and Leo About said commission.

Third, subsequent to the commission of the crime, Celerino Chua

disappeared. He left the place where he stayed. He hid in his father's
house in Malolos Bulacan. Flight in jurisprudence has always been a
strong indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade responsibility.

Fourth is the sale of the owner type jeep. The seller was Celerino
Chua. Both Jessie Tugas and John Laguidao categorically identified
him as the person who sold and received the partial payment for the
vehicle.
During the recovery of the vehicle, another stolen item, the Betamax,
was found in the place where Chua and his live-in partner had
stayed. A disputable presumption exists that a person found in
possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act. Appellants offered no evidence
to overcome or contradict such presumption.

It is also noted by this Court that appellant denied any knowledge in

the commission of the crime as well as the fact that he knows the
other accused. However, it was testified that appellant Chua was the
one who referred Leonardo and Arnold to their employer. Being
evidence that is negative and self-serving in nature, disavowals
cannot secure more worthiness than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testified on clear and positive evidence.13
Chua's complicity in the commission of robbery and carnapping is
beyond dispute. It was he who had earlier referred his co-accused
Lato and Reyes to Gerry Ormesa for purposes of employing them.
But Lato and Reyes stopped working for Ormesa immediately after
the commission of the crimes on October 24, 1993, and left even
without receiving the salaries due to them. After the commission of
the crimes, Chua himself, along with his common-law spouse, left his
residence in the neighborhood where the house of complainant
Reynaldo Ravago was (being only about 20 meters away from the
latter's residence). Before he transferred, however, he warned Ravago
to keep quiet about the robbery, or else harm would befall him and
his family. Chua was also the person who later on sold the vehicle
subject of the carnapping for P40,000.00 to one John Alden Laguidao
who partially paid him P20,000.00 with the balance of P20,000.00 to
be given upon Chua's presentation of the certificate of registration. In
the meantime, Ravago learned from a couple who were residing in
the place where Chua had transferred that the latter had brought the
vehicle subject of the carnapping to Bani, Pangasinan. Thus, Ravago,
with the help from the local police station, successfully recovered the
vehicle, already dismantled, from the motor shop of one Jessie Tugas
located in that place. Laguidao, Chua's buyer, was the brother-in-law
of Tugas, who himself recalled that Chua, in the company of two
men, had brought the vehicle to his shop claiming to be the owner of
the vehicle. Chua and his common-law spouse then lived in a nipa
hut near the motor shop. It was hardly coincidental that at the time of
the recovery of the vehicle, Ravago's Betamax unit was recovered
from Chua's nipa hut.

2.
Despite his physical absence from the scene of the crime, Chua was
liable as a principal by inducement, and also for the violence
committed by Lato and Reyes during the execution of the crimes

The foregoing circumstances were sufficient and competent to prove

that Chua masterminded the robbery and carnapping. As the
mastermind, he directly induced Lato and Reyes to commit the
robbery and the carnapping. His inducement of them was not merely
casual but influential and controlling. Lato and Reyes could not have
committed the crimes without Chua's inducement and plotting. In
that capacity, Chua was a principal by inducement within the context
of Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals:

1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act;

2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it;

3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another

act without which it would not have been accomplished.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime, and decide to commit it. 14 For
an accused to be validly held to conspire with his co-accused in
committing the crimes, his overt acts must tend to execute the offense
agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator cannot be held to be
still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such
passive conspirator is the mastermind. In that respect, it is not always
required to establish that two or more persons met and explicitly
entered into the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the
details of how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried
out.15 Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred from the acts of
the several accused evincing their joint or common purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.16 Clearly, the
State successfully proved the existence of a conspiracy among the
three accused.

3.
Robbery committed was that under Article 294(5) of the Revised
Penal Code

Robbery is defined and punished under Article 294 of the Revised

Penal Code, to wit:
Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons;
Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence
against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed.17

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion

perpetua when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery,
any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263
shall have been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery
accompanied with rape is committed with a use of a deadly weapon
or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death (As amended by PD No. 767).

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of

the robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of
the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have
been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion

temporal in its medium period, if the violence or intimidation
employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to
a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or in
the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any
person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries
covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision

mayor in its medium period in other cases. (As amended by R. A. 18).
The CA properly convicted Chua of robbery as defmed and punished
under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code.

During the commission of robbery, Reyes, the taller between him and
Lato, stabbed Ravago four times. Ravago escaped further harm only
by running to the bathroom and locking himself in. In that time, the
robbers demanded to know from him the hiding place of the jewelry
and the commission earned from the sale of a fishpond that Ravago
had brokered. The latter ignored the demand and just stayed inside
the bathroom until after they had left, and his wife opened the
bathroom door. She rushed him to the Yanga Clinic for treatment. He
was confined in the Yanga Clinic for five days, and incurred expenses
of about P17,000.00.

Yet, the physical injuries inflicted by the stabbing in the course of the
execution of the robbery did not constitute any of the serious physical
injuries mentioned under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code as
required by Article 294(2)(3) and (4) of the Revised Penal Code.
Specifically, the physical injuries inflicted on him did not render him
insane, imbecile, impotent or blind; he did not also lose the use of
speech or the power to hear or to smell, or an eye, a hand, a foot, an
arm or a leg; or the use of any of such member; he did not also
become incapacitated for the work in which he was theretofore
habitually engaged; he did not become deformed; he did not lose any
other part of his body, or the use thereof; he did not become ill or
incapacitated for the performance of the work in which he was
habitually engaged for a period of more than 90 days; or he did not
become ill or incapacitated for labor for more than 30 days. The crime
is simple robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code.

The CA modified the penalty meted by the RTC after observing that
"there was no evidence that Celerino Chua was part of any plan to
inflict physical injury in the course of the robbery."18 Although both
lower courts agreed that there was no evidence showing that Chua
had been part of any plan to inflict physical injury in the course of the
robbery, the Court deems it necessary to issue a rectification lest such
observation be unduly taken as sanctioned with concurrence.

Being the mastermind, Chua was as responsible for the consequences

of the acts committed by Lato and Reyes, the principals by direct
participation. This is because of the conspiracy among the three of
them. The informations had properly charged them as co-
conspirators in robbery and carnapping. Once their conspiracy was
established, the act of each of the conspirators became the act of all.
Indeed, Chua could not escape responsibility for the acts done by his
co-conspirators. The very nature of the planned robbery as a crime
that entailed violence against persons warranted holding Chua fully
responsible for all the consequences of the criminal plot.

In People v. Pareja,19 the trial court had appreciated one of two

aggravating circumstances (price or reward) as the qualifying
circumstance but had refused to consider the other (treachery) as a
generic aggravating circumstance against the accused, who was the
mastermind, on the ground that he had not been present when the
crime was being actually committed, having left the means, modes or
methods of its commission to a great extent to the discretion of the
others. The trial court cited as its authority the ruling in People v. De
Otero (51 Phil. 201). The Court, on appeal, disagreed with the lower
court, and opined per curiam as follows:
The citation is not in point. It refers to a case where the accused was
convicted as principal by inducement per se under paragraph 2 of
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, without proof of conspiracy with
the other accused. In the case at bar, however, there was conspiracy
among the defendants, and the rule is that every conspirator is
responsible for the acts of the others in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Treachery - evident in the act of the gunman in suddenly firing his
revolver, preceded as it was by a false showing of courtesy to the
victim, thus insuring the execution of the crime without risk from any
defense or retaliation the victim might offer should be appreciated as
a generic aggravating circumstance against appellant.20
For the robbery, the RTC set the indeterminate sentence at four years,
two months and one day of arresto mayor, as the minimum, and eight
years and 21 days of prision mayor, as the maximum. The CA
modified the indeterminhte sentence by imposing four years and two
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years of prision
mayor, as maximum.

The imposable penalty for robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised

Penal Code is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period, which ranges from four years, two
months and one day to 10 years. In the absence of modifying
circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period, that is,
six years, one month and 11 days to eight years and 20 days. The
minimum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from the penalty
next lower, which is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period (that is, four months and one day to
four years and two months). The CA correctly fixed the minimum of
the indeterminate sentence. On the other hand, the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should be from the medium period of the
penalty as stated herein.

In its judgment, the CA applied the ceiling of the penalty but did not
tender any justification for doing so. Such justification was required
by the seventh rule enunciated in Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code on the application of penalties containing three periods. The
need for the justification is explained in Ladines v. People,21 to wit:
x x x although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the
rules "for the application of penalties which contain three periods,"
requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the penalty
prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly
demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall
deterff!ine the extent of the penalty according to the number and
nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the
greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not
specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of the period of
the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence
became arbitrary, or whim ical, or capricious. In the absence of the
specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the
petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion
temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal. (Bold under coring supplied for emphasis; italicized
portions are part of the original text)
Although the CA should not have fixed the ceiling of the penalty
without tendering the justification for doing so, we nonetheless note
that such ceiling of eight years as the maximum of the indeterminate
penalty was warranted. The appeal by Chua threw the records open
for review, such that the penalty meted on him could be reviewed as
a matter of course and rectified, if necessary, without infringing on
his right as an accused. Thus, the Court will itself now tender the
justification for imposing the ceiling of the penalty. Chua's
masterminding of the robbery and carnapping against his own
neighbor manifested the high degree of his criminality.

4.
Carnapping committed with violence or intimidation of persons
was established beyond reasonable doubt; hence, Chua's proper
penalty should be higher

Carnapping is defined as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor

vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon
things."22 Under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, the penalty for
carnapping committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things is imprisonment of not less than 14 years and
eight months and not more than 17 years and four months; if
committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or force upon things, the penalty is imprisonment of not less
than 17 years and four months and not more than 30 years.

The taking of the motor vehicle (owner-type jeep) belonging to the

Ravagos by Lato and Reyes constituted carnapping. But it was clear
error for the lower courts to punish Chua with the penalty for
carnapping committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things. Even ifthe robbers took the motor vehicle after
consummating the robbery in the course of the execution of which
one of them stabbed Ravago four times, the taking of the motor
vehicle in order to carry the stolen articles out was still attended by
the same violence and intimidation of the owner and his wife, as well
as of the rest of their household. As such, the correct imposable
penalty is imprisonment of not less than 17 years and four months
and not more than 30 years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence
is imprisonment for 18 years, as minimum, to 22 years, as maximum.

5.
Civil liability
We affirm the civil liability awarded to Ravago considering that Chua
did not assail the award. Yet, we have to direct the payment of legal
interest of 6% per annum on the P200,000.00 awarded as actual
damages reckoned frorri the finality of this decision until full
satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review

on certiorari; AFFIRMS in all respects the decision promulgated on
Octobe 20, 2005, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) Petitioner CELERINO CHUA ALIAS SUNTAY is punished in

Criminal Case No. 397-M-94, for carnapping, with the indeterminate
sentence of 18 years, as minimum, to 22 years, as maximum; and

(2) The actual damages of P200,000.00 shall earn legal interest of

6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full
satisfaction.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Leonen, Martires, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

Rollo, pp. 126-137; penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M.

1

Romilla-Lontok, and concurred in by Associate Justice Marina L.

Buzon and Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine.

2
 Id. at 52-68; penned by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba.

3
 Id. at 127.

4
 Id. at 128.

5
 Id. at 129-133.

6
 Id. at 104-105.

7
 Id. at 134.

8
 Id. at 134-136.
9
 Id. at 136-137.

10
 Id. at 137.

11
Gan v. People, G.R. No. 165884, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 550, 571.

 People v. Canlas, G.R. No. 141633, December 14, 2001, 372 SCRA
12

401, 411; People v. Malimit, G.R. No. 109775, November 14, 1996, 264
SCRA 167, 178.

13
Rollo, p. 135.

14
 Article 8, second paragraph, Revised Penal Code.

People v. Pansacala, G.R. No. 194255, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 549,
15

558-559.

People v. Fegidero, G.R. No. 113446, August 4, 2000, 337 SCRA 274,
16

284.

 This paragraph has since been amended by Republic Act No. 7659
17

(approved on December 13, 1993) to add: "or when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."

18
Rollo, p. 136.

19
 No. L-21937, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693.

20
 Id. at 715-716.

21
 G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016, 778 SCRA 83, 93.

22
 Section 2, Republic Act No. 6539.
Theft of a Motor Vehicle, which is deemed qualified under the
Revised Penal Code, and Anti-Carnapping Law
Both are criminal offenses but are punished by two different criminal
laws. As codified in the Revised Penal Code, Art. 310 punishes the
crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle.  Conversely, carnapping is
penalized under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended by Republic Act
No. 10883.
It is true, the Anti-Carnapping law is a special penal law which is
different from the crimes of Robbery and Theft under the Revised
Penal Code.  The distinction between the two crimes will be
extensively discussed in seriatim.
For purposes of discussion and to understand thoroughly what
carnapping is, the author would want to expound what vehicles are
subject to this law.
As provided under Section 2(e)[1] of Republic Act No. 10883, motor
vehicles are those:
“propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public
highways, except road rollers, trolley cars, street sweepers, sprinklers, lawn
mowers, bulldozers, graders, forklifts, amphibian trucks, and cranes if not
used on public highways; vehicles which run only on rails or tracks; and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used exclusively for
agricultural purposes. Trailers having any number of wheels, when
propelled or intended to be propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall
be classified as a separate motor vehicle with no power rating.”[2]
Take note that in Anti-Carnapping Law, what is punished is the
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle, and not all classes of vehicle.
As defined in Oxford Dictionary, a vehicle[3] is a thing that is used for
transporting people or goods from one place to another, such as a car
or lorry.  In this law, it is expressly stated that what is punished is the
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle only.
Let’s say that if Juan steals from Pedro his Bianchi Road Bicycle which he
uses as his mode of transportation, the crime would only be robbery or theft,
as the case may be, and not to carnapping as the road bike. Although
classified as a vehicle used to transport people, it is propelled by muscular
power and not by an engine.
Carnapping Law in the Philippines | Brief take
In 1972, the first Anti-Carnapping law was passed by the Philippine
Legislature or Republic Act [RA] No. 6539.
In the said law, carnapping was defined as the “taking, with intent to
gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons,
or by using force upon things.”[4]
Until in 2016, when a new anti carnapping law was passed or RA
10883 [5], which is way stricter, increased the length of penalty of
imprisonment as compared to the old law, RA 6539 has been the
effective Special Penal Law that criminalized and penalized
carnapping.
Senator Grace Poe, who is the principal author in the Senate has
expressed her high hopes in the passing of the said measure (RA
10883) to eradicate the crime and give vehicle owners peace of mind.
“It is our hope that this new and comprehensive anti-carnapping law
imposing much stiffer penalties, alongside strict implementation by
our law enforcers, will hinder the commission of this crime and give
vehicle owners peace of mind,” as she said in a separate statement.[6]
From imprisonment of “not less than fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months to not more than seventeen (17) years and four (4) months”,
[7]
 a person who will be found guilty of carnapping, irrespective of the
value of the motor vehicle taken if the taking is committed without
violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things, will suffer.
Under the new law, a penalty of “imprisonment for not less than
twenty (20) years and one (1) day but not more than thirty (30)
years.”[8] The penalty has been increased. Hence, this is more punitive
than its predecessor.
If the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things the guilty person is
bound to suffer the penalty of “imprisonment for not less than thirty
(30) years and one (1) day but not more than forty (40) years,” [9] as
compared with the old law which only imposed “imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years.”[10]
Further, in the new anti-carnapping law, life imprisonment is the
penalty when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the commission of the said crime. [11]  In
addition, take note that in the new law, raping the car-owner now
qualifies the crime of carnapping.[12]
Further, both in the old and new anti-carnapping laws, any public
official is penalized if he “directly commits the unlawful acts defined
in this Act or is guilty of gross negligence of duty or connives with or
permits the commission of any of the said unlawful acts shall, in
addition to the penalty prescribed in the preceding paragraph, be
dismissed from the service, and his/her benefits forfeited and shall
be permanently disqualified from holding public office.”[13]
Moreover, the sale of second hand spare parts which are taken from a
stolen or carnapped vehicle.[14]  The crime would have been a
violation of Anti-Fencing Law if it were not defined and penalized in
this Special Penal Law.
Difference between Carnapping and Theft of a Motor Vehicle
Carnapping and Qualified Theft of a Motor Vehicle can be deduced
to a similar definition – it is an act of stealing a vehicle. In this regard,
both crimes are often misapplied by laymen and law students as well.
After all, it involves almost the same elements, and it involves a
motor vehicle. Therefore, it is within the context of stealing, etc.
So, to clearly define the line between a Carnapping incident and
a Qualified Theft of a Motor Vehicle incident, we have to look into
the difference between the two crimes as to its nature and as to its
penalty.
As to Nature
In essence, both crimes really do not differ from each other. In fact, in
People of the Philippines vs. Bustinera, [15] the Supreme Court
declared that the law covering Carnapping offenses and Qualified
Theft of Motor Vehicle, are in pari material (“same subject matter”).
In City of Naga vs. Agna[16], the Supreme Court declared that:
“In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter
should be compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable
construction, both should be so construed that effect may be given to every
provision of each.”[17]
In People of the Philippines vs. Tan[18] and People vs. Lobitania[19] the
Supreme Court clarified that the unlawful taking of motor vehicles is
now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions
on qualified theft or robbery.
Although the law applied in the above-mentioned cases is different
from the currently effective law, which is R.A. 10883, the same
concepts and context still applies.
It must be noted that the special law did not include in its coverage
certain vehicles such as:

 roadrollers,
 trolleys,
 street-sweepers,
 sprinklers,
 lawn mowers,
 amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways,
 vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and
 tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used
exclusively for agricultural purposes.
Hence, in cases where there is unlawful taking of such vehicles, the
provisions under Qualified Theft of a Motor Vehicle shall be applied.
As to Penalty
R.A. 10883 stipulates different period of penalties for different kinds
of violation, as stated under the same law, which are:

1. Carnapping without violence against or intimidation of

persons – imprisonment for not less than twenty (20) years
and one (1) day but not more than thirty (30) years (Sec. 3,
R.A. 10883);
2. Carnapping with violence against or intimidation of persons
– imprisonment for not less than thirty (30) years and one (1)
day but not more than forty (40) years, when the carnapping
is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or force upon things (Sec. 3, R.A. 10883);
3. Carnapping resulting to death or that the owner, driver, or
occupant of motor vehicle is raped – life imprisonment (Sec.
3, R.A. 10883);
4. Concealment of Carnapping – imprisonment of six (6) years
up to twelve (12) years and a fine equal to the amount of the
acquisition cost of the motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine,
or any other part involved in the violation.
On the other hand, the penalty for Qualified Theft of Motor Vehicle
depends on the amount of the motor vehicle vis-à-vis Article 309 of
the Revised Penal Code. For Qualified Theft of Motor Vehicle, the
law specifically states that:
“Article 310. Qualified theft.– The crime of theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the
next preceding article . . .”[20] The next preceding article pertains to the
provision of Simple Theft.
Hence, both crimes have different set of penalties attached to each
specific kind of violation, albeit Anti-carnapping law is more specific
in classifying different kinds of violation.
Qualified Theft under the Revised Penal Code
As previously discussed, the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle may
be penalized by a Special Penal Law, which is RA 10883 or the Anti-
Carnapping Law of 2016, or under Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code
or Qualified Theft of a motor vehicle.
Jurisprudence provides the following elements of Qualified Theft, to
wit:
          1) That there is taking of personal property;
          2) That the said property belongs to another;
 3) That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
          4) That it be done without the owner’s consent;
          5) That it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
          6) That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.[21]
It can be gleaned from the above-mentioned elements that for a
person to be convicted of Qualified Theft of a Motor Vehicle under
Art. 310 the Revised Penal Code, the unlawful taking thereof must be
committed without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things and done with grave abuse of
confidence, unlike in the Anti-Carnapping Law of 2016, where certain
situations in the commission of carnapping may be attended with
violence or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
Further, in Qualified Theft of a Motor Vehicle under Art. 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, the abuse of confidence must be grave.
In the old case of People vs. Koc Song, [22] as cited in People vs.
Puig[23] the Supreme Court held that “there must be allegation in the
information and proof of a relation, by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused and the offended
party that has created a high degree of confidence between them,
which the accused abused.[24]
However, if the car is stolen without committing any act with grave
abuse of confidence, the crime falls within the purview of the Anti-
Carnapping Law and not only simple theft or robbery.
When is carnapping qualified?
Carnapping becomes qualified when, in the course of the commission
or on the occasion of the carnapping, the owner, driver or occupant is
killed or raped.
The court ruled in People vs. Mejia that the killing or the rape merely
qualifies the crime of carnapping and no distinction must be made
between homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other which
is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the occasion thereof’
makes no difference insofar as the penalty is concerned.
Is carnapping with homicide a special complex crime?
Based on the People vs. Arcenal y Aguilan [25], carnapping with
homicide is a special complex crime if the elements of carnapping are
present —where the elements of carnapping are:
1) There is an actual taking of vehicle;[26]
2) The vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;[27]
3)The taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons, or by using force upon things; and[28]
4) The offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.[29]
The most important thing in mind is that the original criminal design
of the perpetrator and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
It is similar to the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
and in People vs. Bariquit[30], it was ruled that:
In the present case, the accused-appellants were charged with, tried,
and convicted for the crime of robbery with homicide. In our
jurisdiction, this special complex crime is primarily classified as a
crime against property and not against persons, homicide being a
mere incident of the robbery with the latter being the main purpose
and object of the criminal. Under Article 14 of the Revised Penal
Code, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons.
Accordingly, inasmuch as robbery with homicide is a crime against
property and not against persons, cannot treachery be validly
considered in the present case.[31]
Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. No. 6539, as amended,
the prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping
and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly,
it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was
carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated “in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.”[32]
In other words, to prove the special complex crime of carnapping
with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements
of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the
culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[33]
The distinction between carnapping with homicide as special
complex crime and carnapping which resulted of the victim as
qualified is that there must be proof not only of the essential
elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal
design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.  This
relies to the strength prosecution and the weight of evidence and
witnesses.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Decisions which may have
characterized carnapping as a special complex crime when attendant
with killing or rape or both were promulgated when RA 6539 was
still effective. The latter law adopted the nomenclature of penalties
under the Revised Penal Code.
In RA 10883, the Revised Penal Code penalty nomenclature adopted
in RA 6539 was not incorporated. The new law imposes a straight
penalty. The highest being is life imprisonment.
Hence, it is of the author’s legal opinion that, when a carnapping
happens and, on the occasion thereof, homicide, murder, and/or
rape may have been committed, carnapping is considered
qualified. Is carnapping bailable?
When the owner, driver or occupant of the motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the commission of this offense, the penalty shall be life
imprisonment.
It is non-bailable if committed by criminal groups, or gangs or
syndicates or by means of violence or intimidation of any person or
persons or forced upon things; or when the owner, driver, passenger
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped in the course
of the carnapping when the evidence of guilt is strong.
Otherwise, short of the penalty of life imprisonment, the offense of
carnapping is bailable. Thus, in the 2018 New Bail Bond
Guide[34] promulgated by the Department of Justice [DOJ], it provides
that:
“NOW, THEREFORE, the following rules of computation shall be
used in arriving at a uniform rate of bail, viz:[35]
“1. Where the penalty is Reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail is not a matter of right; hence, “No Bail” shall be recommended;
[36]

“x x x x
“4. For violations of special laws, bail shall be computed based on the
maximum penalty imposable, the number of years in its maximum
period multiplied by P6,000.00 except for the following laws, bail
shall be computed based on the maximum penalty imposable, the
number of years in its maximum period multiplied by P10,000.00 to
wit:[37]
“x x x x . . . .
m. RA 10883 (New Anti Carnapping Act of 2016 (repealing RA 6539);
[38]

“x x x x . . . .
Conclusion 
Taking everything into account, Anti Carnapping law encapsulates
violative acts that may relate to carnapping per se and defacing, or
tampering with, repainting, and bodybuilding of certain vehicles
which are stolen.
On the other hand, theft of a motor vehicle, prior to the special penal
law on carnapping, was punishable under the Revised Penal Code as
Qualified Theft, and it covers all types of vehicles that are powered
by motor.
With the advent of Anti -Carnapping Law, as discussed, stealing
motor vehicles, which are defined and enumerated in the aforesaid
special law, shall now be punished as an act of carnapping and not
anymore as qualified theft.
This serious crime of carnapping may need the  assistance and
coordination primarily with the Land Transportation [Commission]
Office. This government agency is responsible for handling the
“untaxed importation or coming from an illegal source or
carnapped”.
This discussion also explains the elements of qualified theft which are
which are similar with that of the Anti Carnapping Law and
Qualified Theft of a motor vehicle, such as intent to gain and taking
away of the vehicle without the consent or against the will of its
owner.
Therefore, Theft of a Motor Vehicle under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code and the Anti-Carnapping Law are in pari materia as both
relate to the same subjects, specifically those covered vehicles under
the special law.
Carnapping can be done with or without violence, force, or
intimidation against others, and committed under the circumstances
mentioned in Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, yet, punishable
under the special law.
When carnapping is attendant with violence, such as physical
injuries, death, or rape, the same is considered qualified and will be
meted with higher penalty.
Thus, this Anti-Carnapping Law seeks to protect the vehicle owners
against individuals with sinister motives to rob the former of their
vehicles, with or without force or violence.
References
References

↑1 Section 2[e], RA 10883

↑2 Id.

↑3 Oxford Dictionary. Definition of “vehicle”

↑4 Section 2, RA 6539

↑5 The New Anti-Carnapping Law of the Philippines

↑6 Senator Grace Poe’s Expression of Hopes

↑7 Section 14, RA 6539

↑8 Section 3, RA 10883

↑9 Id.

↑10 Section 14, RA 6539

↑11 Section 3, RA 10883

↑12 Id.

↑13 Section 4, RA 10883

↑14 Section 17, Id.

↑15 G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 20404

↑16 G.R. No. L-36049 May 31, 1976. 71 SCRA 176 [1976]

↑17 Ibid.

↑18 G.R. No. 135904, January 21, 2000. 323 SCRA 30 [2000]

↑19 G.R. No. 142380. September 5, 2002. 388 SCRA 417 [2002]

↑20 Art. 310, Revised Penal Code

↑21 People vs. Puig, G.R. No. 173654-765, August 28, 2008

↑22 G.R. No. L-45043, August 28, 1936. 63 Phil. 369

↑23 Supra., G.R. No. 173654-765, August 28, 2008

↑24 Ibid.

↑25 G.R. No. 216015, March 27, 2017

↑26 Id.

↑27 Id.

↑28 Id.

↑29 Id.

↑30 G.R. No. 122733. October 2, 2000

↑31 Ibid.

↑32 People vs. Macaranas, G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017

↑33 Ibid.

↑34 DOJ 2018 Bail Bond Guide

↑35 Id.

↑36 Id.
↑37 Id.

↑38 Id.

SECOND DIVISION

March 1, 2017

G.R. No. 212815

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
ENRILE DONIO y UNTALAN, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the November 4, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05418, which affirmed the
Decision2 dated January 24, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 59, Angeles City in Criminal Case No. 04-594.

The facts are as follows:

Accused-appellant Enrile Donio y Untalan (Donia) was charged with

violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as
AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Co-
accused Val Paulino (Paulino)  and one @Ryan (Ryan),  both remains
at-large, were similarly charged. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about the 26th day of November 2003, in the Municipality

of Mabalacat, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent
of the owner, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away with them one (1) Honda TMX 155 tricycle,
colored black and with Body [No.] 817, valued at Ninety-Six
Thousand ([P.]96,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, and on the
occasion thereof, Raul L. Layug, being the driver and owner of the
said Honda TMX 155 tricycle, was killed with the use of a mini jungle
bolo.

Contrary to law.3
Pending Donio's arraignment, POI Emessito N. Bansagan and the
National Bureau of Investigation, Central Luzon Regional Office
submitted the returns on the Warrant of Arrest against Ryan and
Paulino, respectively, stating that the said persons could not be
located at the given addresses, and requested for alias warrants
against them. The trial court issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest
against accused Ryan on September 4, 2004 and against Paulino on
November 4, 2004.4

At his arraignment, Donio, assisted by his counsel de oficio,  pleaded

not guilty to the offense charged. During the pre-trial conference, it
was stipulated that Donio is the same person whose name appears in
the Information and was arraigned before that court.

Thereafter, the trial on the merits ensued.

On November 26, 2003, six police officers of the Concepcion Police

Station, Tarlac City, headed by SP04 Leodegario Taberdo (SP04
Taberdo  ), conducted a checkpoint along the junction of MacArthur
Highway in relation to the campaign of the Philippine National
Police against hijacking, camapping, and kidnapping, hailing cargo
trucks and closed vans, and issuing cards to southbound vehicles.5

At 2:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003, a speeding tricycle

abruptly stopped a few meters from the checkpoint and caught the
attention of the police officers. SP04 Taberdo and two others
approached the vehicle. The driver, later identified as Donio, was
noticeably agitated while repeatedly kicking the starter of the tricycle.
When asked for his identity, he introduced himself as Raul
Layug (Raul)  and then handed to SP04 Taberdo a temporary license
bearing the said name. The police officers asked the driver and his
companions, co-accused Paulino and Ryan, to bring the vehicle, a
Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817, to the checkpoint when
they failed to produce its certificate of registration and the official
receipt.6

Upon visual search of the vehicle, they discovered a bloodstained

mini jungle bolo inside. They seized the tricycle and the bolo, and
then brought the three to the police station. At 9 o'clock in the
morning, Donio asked permission to leave in order to get the
registration papers. The officers allowed him, however, he did not
return.7

Meanwhile, around 6:30 in morning of the same date, Rodrigo

Layug (Rodrigo)  was searching for his brother Raul, the victim, who
has not returned home since last night. Raul was the driver of
Rodrigo's Honda TMX 155 tricycle with Body No. 817. Rodrigo met
with his tricycle driver cousin from Mawaque to ask him if he saw
his brother. His cousin accompanied him to Barangay Madapdap
where they found the remains of Raul. Words spread about his death.
Thereafter, a tricycle driver informed them that he saw a vehicle
similar to Rodrigo's at the Concepcion Police Station. Rodolfo, Raul
and Rodrigo's other brother, went to the station where he learned
that Paulino and Ryan were released.8

Sometime in December 2003, the brothers returned to the station

upon learning that Donio was apprehended. On December 7, 2003,
the Chief of

Police summoned SP04 Taberdo to identify the driver who asked

permission to retrieve the registration papers but did not return at
the Concepcion Police Station. Upon seeing Donio, the disgruntled
SP04 Taberdo asked him, "Why did you do that?" He was referring to
the incident when Donio did not return. It was also that same day
that he learned Donio's real identity.9

Dr. Reynaldo C. Dizon (Dr. Dizon) conducted the post-mortem

examination of Raul's body and determined that he sustained stab
wounds caused by a sharp instrument.

Defense's sole witness, Donio, a 35-year-old grass cutter and a

resident of Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga, denied the
accusations. As a sugarcane plantation worker, he has a long palang
for harvesting and cutting. It was not similar to the sharp and
pointed mini jungle bolo. As a stay-in plantation worker, he does not
leave the workplace for six months. His wife visits him instead.

On November 24, 2003, he was harvesting sugarcane in Capas,

Tarlac. However, from the evening of November 25, 2003 until the
next day, he was at home after his wife fetched him to tend to their
sick child. He first learned of the carnapping charge when the police
officers came to his house looking for a certain Val Paulino. He was
taken to the municipal hall where he was investigated and detained
for five days. Three officers beat and electrocuted him for three hours
forcing him to admit the crime.10

The RTC convicted Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ENRILE U. DONIO guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Carnapping as defined in
Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with credit of his preventive
imprisonment.
Accused ENRILE U. DONIO is further ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim Raul L. Layug the following amounts: Fifty thousand pesos
([₱]50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Twenty-five thousand pesos
([₱]25,000.00) as actual damages.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

The trial court ruled that the prosecution established all the elements
of the crime. Donio failed to substantiate his presence at another
place at the time of the perpetration of the offense or the physical
impossibility of his presence at the locus criminis  or its immediate
vicinity at the time of the incident.12 Under the Rules, SP04 Taberdo's
action as police officer enjoys the presumption of regularity. In the
absence of evidence showing that he was motivated by bad faith or
ill-will to testify against Donio, SP04 Taberdo's categorical
identification of the accused stands.13

In a Decision dated November 4, 2013, the CA denied Donio's appeal

and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA found his averment
that he was taken from his house, tortured and made to sign a blank
sheet of paper as highly implausible. His sworn affidavit was replete
with details which were unlikely the product of creative imagination
of the police. There was no proof that the police singled him out, or
was impelled by an evil or ulterior motive. The said affidavit was
voluntarily and freely executed with the assistance of
counsel.14 The fallo  of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.15

Hence, the instant appeal was instituted.

In its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Supplemental Brief,16 the

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) informed this Court that it opted
not to file a supplemental brief for the same would only be a
repetition of the raised arguments considering that all relevant
matters regarding Donio' s guilt for the crime of carnapping with
homicide were extensively argued and discussed in the People's
Brief17 dated July 9, 2013.

Likewise, Donio, through the Public Attorney's Office, manifested his

intention not to file a supplemental brief and prayed that the case be
deemed submitted for decision.18
In essence, the issue to be resolved by this Court in this appeal is
whether the prosecution has successfully proven beyond reasonable
doubt that Donio is guilty of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

After a judicious review of the records and the submissions of the

parties, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse Donio' s
conviction. At the outset, the CA noted that the prosecution should
have filed an Information for the special complex crime of qualified
carnapping in aggravated form.19 while it is necessary that the
statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the
caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the
offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is
controlling but the facts alleged in the information which determines
the real nature of the crime.20 Recently, it was held that failure to
designate the offense by the statute or to mention the specific
provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law
violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein
clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.21 The recital of
the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information
determines the character of the crime and not the caption or
preamble of the information or the specification of the provision of
the law alleged to have been violated.22 In the case at bar, the acts
alleged to have been committed by Donio are averred in the
Information, and the same described the acts defined and penalized
under Sections 2 and 14 of R.A. 6539, as amended.

The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized under the R.A.

No. 6539, as amended are the following:

1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;

2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender

himself;

3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that
the taking was committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; and

4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.23

Under the last clause of Section 14 of the R.A. 6539, as amended, the
prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of
the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must
show that the original criminal design of the culprit was camapping
and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof "24 In other words, to prove the
special complex crime of camapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it
was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was
perpetrated in the course of the commission of the camapping or on
the occasion thereof.25

Records show that all the elements of camapping in the instant case
are present and proven during the trial.

The tricycle was definitely ascertained to belong to Rodrigo, as

evidenced by a Deed of Conditional Sale in his favor.26 Donio was
found driving the vehicle in the early morning of November 26, 2003,
the same day Rodrigo was looking for his missing brother Raul. Also,
SP04 Taberdo positively identified Donio as the driver he flagged
down at the checkpoint in his testimony, viz.:

xxxx

Q- On or about that time 2:45 early in the morning of November 26,

2003, could you recall if there was any unusual incident that required
your attention as Police Officers manning the check-point?

A- Yes, sir.

Q - What is that incident?

A - During that time, we are issuing pass card among vehicles going
to South when suddenly a speeding tricycle approaching our PCP its
engine suddenly stop.

Q- Who was driving the tricycle when the engine suddenly stop[s]?

A-The one who gave me the Driver's License was Raul Layug.

Q - If this person who gave his license as Raul Layug is here present
today, will you be able to identify him?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Will you please look around the premises of the Court and point
to him.

A - This one, sir. We came to know later on that his real name is
Enrile Donio.

INTERPRETER:

Witness pointed to accused Enrile Donio.

x x x27
"Unlawful taking" or apoderamiento is the taking of the motor vehicle
without the consent of the owner, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. It is deemed
complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.28 Section
3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides the presumption that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act.

The presumption that a person found in possession of the personal

effects belonging to the person robbed and killed is considered the
author of the aggression, the death of the person, as well as the
robbery committed, has been invariably limited to cases where such
possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is
rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent
thereto.29 The said principle may be applied in this case as the
concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and carnapping being
the same.30 Here, Donio failed to produce the vehicle's papers at the
checkpoint. He impersonated the victim before the police officers
when his identity was asked, and left under the guise of getting the
said documents. It was also established that he and the others were
strangers to Rodrigo. Donio's unexplained possession, coupled with
the circumstances proven in the trial, therefore, raises the
presumption that he was one of the perpetrators responsible for the
unlawful taking of the vehicle and Raul's death.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandi, which is an internal act, is presumed

from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. The
term "gain" is not merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also
includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or
expected from the act which is performed. Thus, the mere use of the
thing which was taken without the owner's consent constitutes
gain.31 Donio's intent to gain from the carnapped tricycle was proven
as he and his companions were using it as means of transportation
when they were confronted by the Concepcion police officers.

Having established that the elements of carnapping are present in the

instant case, We now discuss the argument that the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution are insufficient to convict
Donio of the crime of carnapping with homicide.

He alleges that while it is true that criminal conviction may be

predicated on a series of circumstantial evidence, the same must be
convincing, plausible and credible. It cannot be discounted that SP04
Taberdo testified only on the circumstances after the alleged
carnapping. He failed to establish his alleged participation prior to or
during the actual taking of the vehicle. The facts established by SP04
Taberdo' s testimony- the Concepcion police operatives caught him in
possession of the stolen tricycle on November 26, 2003; the tricycle
was registered under the name of Rodrigo; and he was in possession
of Raul's license - are insufficient bases and do not lead to an
inference exclusively consistent with his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

Such contention fails scrutiny. The lack or absence of direct evidence

does not necessarily mean that the guilt of the accused can no longer
be proved by any other evidence. Circumstantial, indirect or
presumptive evidence, if sufficient, can replace direct evidence as
provided by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, which, to
warrant the conviction of an accused, requires that: (a) there is more
than one (1) circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived have been proven; and (c) the combination of all these
circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, is the one who committed the crime.32 Hence,
to justify a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be interwoven in such a way as
to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.33

After a careful perusal of the records, this Court finds that the
confluence of the following pieces of circumstantial evidence,
consistent with one another, establishes Donio's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt:

First,  Donio was driving the tricycle when he, Paulino and Ryan were
accosted during a checkpoint at the junction of the MacArthur
Highway by elements of the Concepcion Police Station at around 2:30
in the morning on November 26, 2003;

Second,  his possession of the vehicle was not fully explained as he

failed to produce its registration papers;

Third,  he was in possession of the victim's temporary license. He even

presented it and introduced himself as Raul to the police;

Fourth,  a bloodstained mini jungle bolo was found inside the tricycle;

Fifth,  Rodrigo ascertained that Raul was the driver of his tricycle, and
that he was looking for him on the same day that Donio and the
others were flagged down;

Sixth,  Raul was last seen driving the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening
on November 25, 2003 when he passed by at the Mawaque Terminal
at the comer of MacArthur Highway and Mawaque Road.34
Seventh, the Bantay Bayan of Madapdap Resettlement found Raul's
body at around 6:30 in the morning on November 26, 2003 at a vacant
lot towards the road to Sta. Lucia Resettlement comer Barangay
Dapdap.

Eighth,  Raul sustained multiple stab wounds caused by a sharp

instrument as depicted in the post-mortem examination sketch by Dr.
Dizon and reflected in the Certificate of Death, which states:

17. CAUSES OF DEATH:

I. Immediate Cause: Cardio respiratory arrest

Antecedent Cause: Hemo-pneumothorax L

Underlying Cause: Penetrating Stab Wounds, Multiple.35

Ninth,  Donio was subsequently apprehended and SP04 Taberdo

positively identified him as the driver they flagged down at the
checkpoint.36

Likewise, the victim's lifeless body was found sprawled with

multiple stab wounds and was noted in a state of rigor mortis. Rigor
mortis,  which consists in the stiffening of the muscular tissues and
joints of the body setting in at a greater or less interval after death,
may be utilized to approximate the length of time the body has been
dead. In temperate countries, it usually appears three to six hours
after death but in warmer countries, it may develop earlier. In
tropical countries, the usual duration of rigor mortis is twenty-four to
forty-eight hours during cold weather and eighteen to thirty-six
hours during summer. When rigor mortis sets in early, it passes off
quickly and viceversa.37

From the foregoing, it was established that Raul was last seen driving
the tricycle at 10:00 in the evening on November 25, 2003, and that his
body was discovered at 6:30 in the morning the next day.
Considering the condition of the body upon discovery, he could have
been killed between 10:00 in the evening and 3:30 in the morning on
the next day. Donio and his companions were hailed at the
checkpoint at around 2:3038 in the morning on November 26, 2003
aboard the missing tricycle. Taking into account the distance of the
Mawaque Terminal area or of the vacant lot near Barangay Dapdap
from the junction of the MacArthur Highway in Concepcion, Tarlac
and the time they were hailed at the checkpoint, it can be logically
concluded that Donio and the others were in contact with Raul
during the approximate period of the latter's time of death. Also, it
was during that period that they gained possession of the vehicle.
Thus, the only rational conclusion that can be drawn from the totality
of the foregoing facts and circumstances is that Donio and his
companions, to the exclusion of others, are guilty of carnapping the
tricycle and of killing Raul in the course thereof.

Moreover, when Donio was brought to the police station, he asked

permission from the officers to get the registration papers but never
returned. Undoubtedly, Donio's flight is an indication of his guilt or
of a guilty mind. Indeed, the wicked man flees though no man
pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.39

This Court gives the highest respect to the RTC's evaluation of the
testimony of the witnesses, considering its unique position in directly
observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage
point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the
truthfulness of witnesses.40 The factual findings of the appellate court
generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said
court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that
the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they
are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.41 In the case at bar, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave
credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness. Records are
bereft of evidence which showed ill-will or malicious intent on the
part of SP04 Taberdo. In absence of evidence to the contrary, this
Court finds that the RTC and the CA did not err in the findings of
facts and the credibility of the witnesses.

As for Donio's defense of alibi, he argues that it must not be looked

with disfavor, as there are instances when the accused may really
have no other defense but denial and alibi which, if established to be
truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the
prosecution evidence is inherently weak. He insists that he was
tortured and subjected to harsh treatment during arrest.1âwphi1 He
insinuates that the police arrested the first person they suspected
without conducting any in-depth investigation.

Donio maintained that he first learned of the camapping charge when

the police came to his house in Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga on
December 6, 2003. However, he also alleged that as a stay-in
sugarcane plantation worker in Capas, Tarlac with a six-month work
period ending in January, he never left the workplace and that his
wife visited him instead. Donio testified during direct and cross
examination as follows:

xxxx

ATTY. LOPEZ
Q: Mr. Witness, prior to your incarceration at the Angeles District
Jail, where were you residing?

A: Madapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga, sir.

Q: On November 25, 2003 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening to

November 26, 2003, do you remember where [you were] on the said
dates?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where were you, Mr. Witness?

A: At home, sir.

Q: Who were your companions there?

A: My family, sir, my wife and child.

x x x x42

PROS. HABAN

Q: Where are you working again?

A: Capas

xxx

Q: How about on November 27, 2003, where were you then?

A: At work.

Q: How about on November 25 and 26?

A: At work.

Q: During the whole day?

A: Stay-in.

Q: So you never left work?

A: No, sir.

Q: Never, not even Saturday and Sunday?

A: No, sir.

Q: The whole year of 2003 you never left work?

A: We stayed there for six (6) months.

Q: When is the end of six months period?

A: January.

x x x 43

No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the

weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove, and for which reason, it is generally rejected. For the alibi
to prosper, the accused must establish the following: (1) he was not at
the locus delicti  at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
commission.44 It must be supported by credible corroboration from
disinterested witnesses, and if not, is fatal to the accused.45

When he was confronted with his inconsistency, Donio clarified that

he was in Capas, Tarlac and was fetched by his wife in the evening to
attend to his sick child. We note, however, the proximity of the area
of Donio’s residence with the Barangay Dapdap and Sta. Lucia
Resettlement area where the victim was found dead. To buttress his
defense of alibi, Donio could have presented the testimony of a
fellow plantation worker or any disinterested witness who could
have substantiated the same. Aside from his bare allegations, he
failed to present convincing evidence of the physical impossibility for
him to be at the scene at the time of carnapping. Similarly, this Court
is unconvinced of his insistence that he was tortured in view of lack
of any evidence to validate the same. Thus, the uncorroborated alibi
and denial of Donio must be brushed aside in light of the fact that the
prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained his identity. It
is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative
testimony.46

In sum, the prosecution established through sufficient circumstantial

evidence that the accused was indeed one of the perpetrators of the
crime of carnapping with homicide.

As to the imposable penalty, Section 14 of RA No. 6539, as amended,

provides that:

Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.  -Any person who is found guilty of

carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons,
or force upon things; and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years,
when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty
of reclusion perpetua  to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped
in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof.47

The RTC is correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion

perpetua  considering that there was no alleged and proven
aggravating circumstance.

However, in line with the recent jurisprudence,48 in cases of special

complex crimes like carnapping with homicide, among others, where
the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua,  the amounts of civil
indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are pegged at
₱75,000.00 each .. This Court orders Donio to pay ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages in lieu of the award of ₱25,000.00 as actual
damages. Also, Donio is ordered to pay the heirs of Raul interest on
all damages awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum  from the date of finality of the Decision.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 4, 2013 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05418, finding accused-appellant
Enrile Donio y Untalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Carnapping with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS: accused-appellant
Donio is ORDERED to PAY the heirs of Raul L. Layug the amount of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
date of finality of the Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

On official leave JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

MARIANO C. DEL Associate Justice
 CASTILLO**
Associate Justice

On official leave
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN**
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

 Designated Additional Member in lieu of Associate Justice

*

Francis H. Jardeleza, per Raffle dated September 1, 2014. (On

official leave)
**
 On official leave.
1
 Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, with Associate
Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Rodil V. Zalameda,
concurring, rollo,  pp. 2-12.

 Penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Angelica T. Paras-Quiambao,

2

CA rollo,  pp. 42-61.

3
 Id at 42.
4
 Id. at 43.
5
 Id at 46.
6
 Id
7
 Id
8
 Id at45.
9
 Supra note 5.
  Id.  at 49.
10

 Id at 61.
11

 Id. at 56.
12

 Id. at 57.
13

 Rollo p. 8.
14

 Id at 12. (Emphasis in the original)

15

 Id at 22-24.
16

 CA rollo  pp. 71-91.

17

 Rollo pp. 27-28.
18

 Supra note 16.
19

 People v. Bali-balita,  394 Phil. 790, 814 (2000).

20

 People v. Victor Padit, G .R. No. 202978, February 1, 2016.

21

 Id.
22

  People v. Bernabe and Garcia,  448 Phil. 269, 280 (2003).

23

 People v. Fabian Urzais y Lanurias, G.R. No. 207662, April 13,

24

2016.

 People v. Aquino, 724 Phil. 739, 757 (2014).

25

 CA rollo  p. 44.
26

 TSN, May 11, 2006, pp. 8-9.

27

 People v. Lagat, et al., 673 Phil. 351, 367 (2011).

28

 People v. Geron, 346 Phil. 14, 25 (1997). (Emphasis supplied).

29

 People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004, 431 SCRA

30

284.

 Id
31

  People v. Banez y Baylon, G.R. No. 198057, September 21, 2015.

32

 People v. Lagat, et al., supra note 28.

33
  Records, p. 11, Advance Information Report, Mabalacat
34

Municipal Police Station.

 CA rollo  p. 52.
35

 Id.  at 53-54.
36

 People v. Dulay,  G.R. No. 92600, January 18, 1993, 217 SCRA
37

103, 119, citing Solis, ,ega Medicine 127 [1987 ed.] (underscoring

supplied).

 2:45 in other parts of Records.

38

 People v. Dela Cruz, 4459 Phil. 130, 137 (2003).

39

 People v. Abat, G.R. No. 202704, April 2, 2014, 720 SCRA 557,
40

564.

 Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 391 (2014).

41

 TSN, September 24, 2009, p. 6.

42

 TSN, August 3, 2010, pp. 3 and 5.

43

 People v. Regaspi, G.R. No. 198309, September 7, 2015.

44

 People v. Mallari, 707 Phil. 267, 281 (2013).

45

 People v. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014,

46

735 SCRA 687, 704.

 Emphasis supplied.
47

 People v. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.

48