7. The Learning Child, Inc. v.

Ayala Alabang Village Association

SUMMARY:
• A parcel of land was sold to spouses Alfonso with an annotated Deed of Restrictions, which states that the
property shall be exclusively used for the establishment and maintenance thereon of a preparatory school.
• However, spouses Alfonso opened on the same lot The Learning Child Center Pre-school (TLC) which was later
expanded to include a grade school program.
• AAVA filed with the RTC an action for injunction against TLC and the spouses Alfonso, alleging breach of contract
for their alleged violation of the deed of restrictions plus:
o Manila ordinance wc classified the village as a low-density residential area and limits use of subject
property to a nursery and kinder school
o Baranggay ordinance wc prohibited parking on either side of the street measuring 8 meters in width).
• RTC rendered its Decision in favor of AAVA.
• TLC and the spouses Alfonso filed a MFR and while pending, the Municipality of Muntinlupa, through its
Sangguniang Bayan, passed Resolution No. 94-179 correcting an alleged typographical error in the description
of a parcel of land which reclassified it to “institutional” where operation of a grade school is allowed.
o According to the HLURB, it is not a case of a mere correction of an error but an actual rezoning of the
property into an institutional area.
o The Municipality of Muntinlupa, TLC and the spouses Alfonso appealed the HLURB Resolution to the
Office of the President which held that the resolution is a mere rectifying issuance and need not comply
with the mandatory requirements of notice and hearing.
• The RTC reversed its earlier decision and agreed with the spouses Alfonso (na pwede gradeschool).
• The CA agreed with the OP that the resolution was merely a rectifying issuance but that the OP exceeded its
authority when it ruled that the deed of restrictions lost its force in view of said ordinance.
• TLC and the spouses Alfonso's main argument against the enforcement of the Deed of Restrictions on their
property is that AAVA had allegedly repealed said restrictions by its own acts – acts made by Ayala Land Inc.
(ALI). AAVA invoked res inter alios acta rule that ALI is not a party to the case.
ISSUES:
WON the Muntinlupa Resolution is valid ----- YES
• The fact that there was indeed a typographical error was that BOTH the official zoning map of Muntinlupa and
Ayala Alabang Village show that the described property (Block 3) is classified as “institutional”. Neither showed
the typo (Block 1) to be such.
o The distance between Blocks 1 and 3 would make it difficult to commit an error on the map and it is
more plausible to mistype a single digit than mistake an area for another which is far from it.
• There also is no need to craft a new ordinance to effect such a change (thus no need for notice +hearing).
o While it would be a violation of the principle of separation of powers for the courts to interfere with
the wordings of a statute, there would be no violation of said principle for the court to merely affirm
the correction made by the same entity which committed the error.
o The resolution is entitled to a presumption of regularity. Muntinlupa is merely seeking to correct its
own error.
• The authority of the HLURB is also certainly subordinate to that of the Office of the President and the acts of
the former may be set aside by the latter.
o So the OP has the authority to reverse HLURB’s decision that the reso is not a mere rectification.

WON TLC and the spouses Alfonso should be enjoined from continuing the operation of a grade school in the subject
property YES
• The RTC cited the Ortigas case in holding that the earlier classification can no longer be enforced due to the
reclassification of the resolution of the subject property.
 o In Ortigas, properties containing restriction of exclusive use for residential purposes was sold and
annotated. The area was then reclassified to an industrial zone. The now-owner Bank started
construction of a building on the premises which Ortigas wanted to enjoin.
o The Court held the resolution to be an exercise of police power. The motives behind the reso were
reasonable and a legitimate response to a public need. Thus, the non-impairment clause cannot bar it.
• The Court rules that there is a way to harmonize the seemingly opposing provisions in the Deed of Restrictions
and the assailed zoning ordinance.
o The SC clarified the Ortigas case saying that when it upheld the exercise of police power, it took into
consideration the prevailing conditions in the area.
§ The subjected lot was in front of the highway
§ Industrial and commercial complexes have flourished, etc.
§ “Since it is now unprofitable to use the lots for strictly residential purposes...”
o ITCAB, the subject property, tho declared as an industrial lot, lies within a residential subdivision
surrounded by residential lots. The area did not undergo radical change like Ortigas. It is also located
along one of the smaller roads within the subdivision.
• The AAVA is also not estopped from enforcing the deed of restrictions.
o The Court agrees that there is a way to harmonize the opposing provisions in the Deed of Restrictions
and the assailed zoning ordinance.
§ The 2-classroom limit is actually imposed by the MMC Ordinance which classified Ayala Alabang
Village as a low density residential area.
§ In areas classified as institutional – the only limitation is nursery and kindergarten schools.
o By allowing the construction of 24 classrooms: it was not the deed that imposed the 2-classroom
restriction but rather a Muntinlupa ordinance.
o Applying Ortigas ITCAB, the Court investigated the surroundings of the lots. Unlike in the Ortigas case,
the area surrounding TLC remains residential to this day.
§ It is understandable why ALI, as the developer, restricted use of the subject lot to a smaller,
preparatory school that will generate less traffic than bigger schools.
§ The greater traffic generated by TLC's expanded operations will affect the adjacent property
owners enjoyment and use of their own properties.
§ The approval of the site development plan was also for the construction of a pre-school, not a
grade-school.
o On Ayala Land Inc. Requesting reclassification of the property and assenting to it:
§ res inter alios acta: a contract cannot adversely affect the rights of one who is not a party to
the contract.
§ Through the general Ayala deed of restrictions attached to the title, it appears that Ayala Corp.
Is jointly interested with AAVA to enforce the deed of restrictions and is therefore covered
under the exception to this rule.
• BUT Ayala’s assent came with conditions. Concurrence of the AAVA board and the
residents of the village.
• Considering the AAVA voted to ratify the resolution that the deed of restrictions should
be implemented, these conditions were not met.
• The AAVA consistently also insists upon compliance with the deed of restrictions.
• Clarification of doctrines
o Co
§ Agricultural tenant Roaring, facing a demolition order, filed a complaint for maintenance of
possession with the Court of Agrarian Relations of Quezon City.
§ The landowner challenged the court’s jurisdiction arguing that the classification of the subject
property therein from agricultural to a light industrial zone.
 § This Court denied the applicability of the reclassification, and clarified Ortigas: the zoning
ordinance in question, while valid as a police measure, was not intended to affect existing rights
protected by the impairment clause.
§ It is always a wise policy to reconcile apparently conflicting rights under the Constitution and
to preserve both instead of nullifying one against the other
o Ortigas
§ Upheld the exercise of police power in the reclassification of the property.
§ It took into considerations the prevailing conditions in the area.
§ The lots themselves not only front the highway; industrial and commercial complexes have
flourished about the place.
§ Since it is now unprofitable, nay a hazard to the health and comfort, to use the lots for strictly
residential purposes, defendants-appellees should be permitted, on the strength of the
resolution promulgated under the police power of the municipality, to use the same for
commercial purposes.
o Presley
§ The Deed of Restrictions of Bel-Air subdivision restricted its use for a residential purpose.
§ However, the area (Jupiter Street) where the lot was located was later reclassified into a high
density commercial (C-3) zone.
§ We allowed the operation of the Hot Pan de Sal Store despite the Deed of Restrictions, but not
without examining the surrounding area like what we did in Ortigas.
DISPOSITION OF THE COURT:
Defendants must cease and desist from the operation of TLC beyond nursery and kindergarten classes. But considering
there are students already enrolled in the elementary school who are innocent spectators, they are allowed to finish
school until Grade 7 but the school is no longer allowed to accept new students to the grade school.
5. Didipio v. Gozun

Case Summary:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 7942 (PH Mining Act of 1995) and its IRR for, among others, allowing the
unlawful taking of privately owned land without just compensation. Further, they allege that the issuances also sanction
an unconstitutional administrative process for determining just compensation. Anent these issues, the Court held that
just compensation was provided for and the administrative process for determining just compensation in voluntary
transactions does not encroach upon the trial court’s power to determine the same in eminent domain cases.

Facts:
• 3 March 1995 - Pres. Fidel Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
o DENR later issued the implementing guidelines for said law.
• Prior to these events, President Ramos already executed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement
(FTAA) with a foreign mining firm, Climax-Arimco Mining Corp. (CAMC), concerning a total land area of 37,000
hectares covering the provinces of Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino.
• 7 September, 2001 - petitioners sent a demand letter to DENR for the cancellation of the FTAA for the reason
that RA 7942 and its IRR are unconstitutional.
o This, and subsequent demand letters, were referred to the Panel of Arbitrators of the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau and were rejected in 2003.
• Petitioners filed the petition before the Supreme Court alleging that (eminent domain issues only):
o Section 76 of RA 7642 and Section 107 of the IRR allow the unlawful “taking” of private property for
private purpose in violation of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution.
o The same issuances encroach on the power of the trial courts to determine just compensation in
eminent domain cases.
• Respondents replied by stating that:
o Section 76 is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of police power.
o By entering the private lands for mining operation, the FTAA holders do not oust the owners of the land
but merely establish a legal easement upon the occupants.
Issue #1 W/N Section 76 of RA 7642 is an exercise of police power or eminent domain – HELD: EMINENT
DOMAIN
• Based on jurisprudence, the fundamental difference between the 2 powers when it involves private property
is that in police power, the state destroys property taken for the public welfare, while in eminent domain, the
state appropriates the property and applies it for some public purpose.
• Eminent Domain
• to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.
• a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is compensable taking
• If in the regulation of the use of the property, somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, such
restriction constitutes compensable taking.
• Police Power
• power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property.
• Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose; hence,
no compensation shall be paid
• property rights of private individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state
• property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public
welfare – no compensable taking
• property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest - no
compensable taking.
• the state restricts the use of private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rights
which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public
• While the power of eminent domain often results in the actual appropriation of the private property, this is not
always the case.
 • Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila: The imposition of burden over a private property through easement
was considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is required.
• NPC v. Gutierrez: Despite the NPC's protestation that the owners were not totally deprived of the use
of the land and could still plant the same crops as long as they did not come into contact with the wires,
the Court nevertheless held that the easement of right-of-way was a taking under the power of eminent
domain.
• Expansion to what constitutes eminent domain: a regulation which substantially deprives the owner of his
proprietary rights and restricts the beneficial use and enjoyment for public use amounts to compensable taking.

APPLIED IN THE CASE AT BAR

• Sections 75 and 76 of RA 7942 constitute deprivation of proprietary rights amounting to eminent domain, as
held in jurisprudence.
• The CAMC FTAA grants in favor of CAMC the right of possession of the Exploration Contract Area, the
full right of ingress and egress and the right to occupy the same.
• It also bestows CAMC the right not to be prevented from entry into private lands by surface owners or
occupants thereof when prospecting, exploring and exploiting minerals therein.
• It’s not just a simple right-of-way which is ordinarily allowed under the provisions of the Civil Code.
• Here, the holders of mining rights enter private lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such
as exploration, extraction and processing of minerals.
• All these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the beneficial ownership of
their lands. Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations commence.
• A study of the history of mining laws in the Philippines reveals that RA 7942 fell within the scope of PD No. 512
which expressly allowed the invocation of the power of eminent domain for entry, acquisition, and use of
private lands.
• Presidential Decree No. 512 provides for a new system of surface rights acquisition by mining
prospectors and claimants.
• Commonwealth Act No. 137 and Presidential Decree No. 463 - the power of eminent domain may now
be invoked by mining operators for the entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
• This grant of authority extant in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 is not expressly repealed by
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942.
• These two provisions can stand together even if Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 does not spell out the
grant of the privilege to exercise eminent domain which was present in the old law.
• Considering that Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 512 granted the qualified mining operators the
authority to exercise eminent domain and since this grant of authority is deemed incorporated in
Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942, the inescapable conclusion is that the provision is a taking provision.
• A requirement for the exercise of eminent domain is that it must be for public use
• Public Use - now synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public
convenience. It includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.
• Abandons traditional definition of public use - "actual use by the public"
• That the FTAA was granted to a private firm is immaterial since the development of the mining industry
in the country is one of the country’s goals for economic development – written in PD 463
• Petitioners argue: the government is reduced to a sub- contractor upon the request of the private respondent,
the contractor can compel the government to exercise its power of eminent domain derogating the govt’s
power to expropriate property
• The provision of the FTAA in question lays down the ways and means by which the foreign-owned
contractor, disqualified to own land, identifies to the government the specific surface areas within the
FTAA contract area to be acquired for the mine infrastructure.
• The government then acquires ownership of the surface land areas on behalf of the contractor, through
a voluntary transaction in order to enable the latter to proceed to fully implement the FTAA.
• Eminent domain is not yet called for at this stage since there are still various avenues by which surface
rights can be acquired other than expropriation.
• The FTAA provision under attack merely facilitates the implementation of the FTAA given to CAMC and
shields it from violating the Anti-Dummy Law.
 • There is no basis that the Mining Law does not provide for just compensation because Section 76 of Rep. Act
No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 provide for the payment of just compensation.
• Seeing as the said issuances are an exercise of the power of eminent domain, a reading by the Court of its
provisions show that they indeed provide for just compensation in expropriating private properties.
Issue # W/N RA 7942 and the IRR encroach upon the power of the trial courts to determine just compensation in
eminent domain cases – HELD: NO.
• Petitioners argue: Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 encroach on the power of the trial courts
to determine just compensation
• Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay: the court declared that the determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. Even as the executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations, the same cannot prevail over the court's findings.
• The same is undoubtedly a judicial function, but certain provisions of the issuances state that in case of
disagreement concerning the use of the private property, the matter shall be referred to a panel of arbitrators.
• SC: no indication that these provisions exclude the courts from taking cognizance of expropriation cases under
the mining law.
• Said provisions refer to disagreements in voluntary sale or transaction, not to involuntary sale (hence,
power of eminent domain not yet invoked).
• Preliminary determinations by an administrative agency or panel of arbitrators are not final and
conclusive, and the courts are still vested with the jurisdiction to determine just compensation in
appropriate cases.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. Section 76 of Republic Act No.
7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40; Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in
DAO 96-40 — insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements referred to in paragraph 4 of
Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.