National Law University Odisha, Cuttack

SUBJECT: GENERAL PRINCIPALS OF CRIMINAL LAW

Topic: Principal of joint liability under the Indian penal

code

Under the guidance of:

Prof. (Dr.) Rashmi Rekha Baug

B.A. L.L.B Semester 4

Batch 2020-2025

By subham rathee (ba.llb) -102

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES...................................................................................................................3

RESEARCH METHEDOLOGY...............................................................................................4

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY:.................................................................4

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES:.................................................................................................4

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:...................................................................................................4

HYPOTHESIS:......................................................................................................................4

SOURCES OF THE STUDY:...............................................................................................5

METHOD OF RESEARCH:..................................................................................................5

MODE OF CITATION USED:.............................................................................................5

INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................6

JOINT LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 34 OF THE IPC........................................................7

THE SCOPE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF JOINT LIABILITY IN SECTION 34...................8

SCOPE OF COMMON INTENTION IN SECTION 149.....................................................9

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SECTION 34 AND 149..............................................................10

NATURE AND SCOPE OF SECTION 120A AND 120B.....................................................13

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................14

BIBLIOGRAPHY....................................................................................................................15

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 TABLE OF CASES

 Shri Ganesh v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 123.

 Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal AIR 2012 SC 3539
 Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 65
 Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 2012 SC 213
 Nand Kishore v. Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 178.

 Amar Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1973 Har. HC 300.

 Chhota Ahirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1977 1 SCC. 369.
 Nagendra v. State, AIR 1977 SC 412.
 Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, AIR 1964 SC 126

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 RESEARCH METHEDOLOGY

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY:

The scope of the research mainly focuses on the penal provisions of India This research paper
also focuses on the landmark judgements of the courts of India that shaped the interpretation
of “the principal of joint liability under the indian penal code”

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES:

• To examine the principal of joint liability under the indian penal code.

• To find out some shortcomings in the outdated provisions of the penal codes

• To critically study the elements of the principal of joint liability under the indian penal
code.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

1. Is mere presence of a person at the scene of the offence is the proof that he is a participant
to the crime.

2. How the is principal of joint liability interpreted by the courts of law in the country.

HYPOTHESIS:
1. A person's presence at the scene of an offence is not proof that he is a participant in the
offence.

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2. The interpretation of the principal of joint liability would be based on the facts and
circumstances of each case while keeping in the mind the penal provisions.

SOURCES OF THE STUDY:

Data used in this project is mostly secondary sources such as the penal codes of India, books,
Journal articles, case laws, publications, newspaper clippings.

METHOD OF RESEARCH:

This project is based on the doctrinal method of research. A fundamental, theoretical and
statutory analysis has been undertaken to make this project. The penal provisions of India
along with the landmark cases has been discussed. Mostly secondary sources of data has been
used.

MODE OF CITATION USED:

Mode of citation used is OSCOLA.

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 Introduction

Real criminals are typically called to account and punished for their misdeeds by the law. The
notion of criminal responsibility asserts that the person who commits an offence is
accountable and can be found guilty on their own. A rare exception exists in Indian penal
law. Sections 34, 149, and 120A hold the perpetrator and any accomplices who worked
together to carry out a crime with the same goal of committing a crime criminally liable. In
such a setting, everyone of them is held to the same standard of accountability. Several
clauses of the Indian Penal Code incorporate the notion of common purpose, which may be
found in criminal law systems all across the globe. Because it is based on the idea that the
accused and the other person had a common plan when the crime was done, this theory
allows the accused to be held criminally responsible for the other person's crime. As stated in
section 34, if criminal acts are committed by numerous people, each of them is accountable
for such acts in the same manner as if they were committed by one person alone. The purpose
of this provision is to establish a general principle that can be applied in cases where it is
difficult to prove the precise role of the parties to a joint criminal enterprise and to determine
their individual liability for acts performed in support of the common intention of all those
involved.

We know from criminal precedent that one may be held accountable only for his own actions,
and not those of others. To put it more succinctly, criminal culpability is a general idea that it
is the primary duty of the perpetrator of the crime to be held accountable and punished by the
law. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 34 specifies that if numerous people do a criminal act
together, each of them is accountable for the offence in the same manner as if it were
committed by one person alone. Exceptions to the fundamental canon of criminal
jurisprudence may be found in this section, which establishes a shared accountability concept
in the commission of a crime. The existence of a shared aim inspiring the accused and
leading to the commission of criminal acts in support of such an intention is the core of joint
responsibility.

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 Joint Liability under Section 34 of the IPC

According to sections 33 and 34, "criminal act" comprises a series of acts performed in quick
succession and linked such that they cannot be separated from one another, with diverse
causes attributed to subsequent crimes. The parts are clearly intended to deal with
circumstances in which it is hard to distinguish between the illegal activity of individual
members of a group who all act in support of identical purpose when seen from this
perspective. This perspective. In the case of Shri Ganesh v. State of Mysore 1, the Supreme
Court of India noted that Section 34 codifies the common-sense principle that if two or more
individuals accomplish anything jointly, it is the same as if they did it alone. As a result,
Section 34 is composed of the following three components:

In order to commit a crime, it must be carried out by several people. Secondly, the unlawful
activity must contribute to strengthen everyone's common goal. It is imperative that everyone
participates in order to achieve the shared goal.

A court uses these three factors to determine whether or not a defendant is jointly liable with
others. Rather of focusing on what happened as a direct result of the accused's acts, the third
element considers the ramifications of those actions. Constructive responsibility, codified in
Indian Penal Code Section 34, takes effect after criminal behaviour and common purpose
have been shown in the case of Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal2. Prior to being held
accountable to others, it is necessary to establish that a person has engaged in conduct with
those other than one's own. Section 34 support requires that every member of the group take
part in the unlawful activity.

Lord Sumner of the Privy Council first considered the applicability of Section 34 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 in the case of Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor 3. As a result
of his conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the 1860 Code, the accused came
before the Privy Council. The Privy Council made the following comment in dismissing the
appeal.

1
Shri Ganesh v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 123.
2
Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal AIR 2012 SC 3539
3
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 65.

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For example, if a group of people does various actions that are similar or different, each
individual is accountable for the outcome of all because "the act" and "that act" in the latter
part of the section pertain to the full action covered by a criminal conduct "in the first part"
since they refer to it. An individual would be held liable for a criminal offence if all of the
crimes were committed by himself, hence the phrase "criminal act" is used to describe a
series of unlawful activities that result in a criminal offence. 

The scope of the principle of joint liability in Section 34

However, the provision does not address the issue of punishment, just the establishment of
shared culpability. A substantive crime is not committed by violating this clause, which is
(Shri Ganesh v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 123.)purely an evidentiary regulation. The
notion of joint  liability is established by this statute.

Because this provision does not constitute an offence in and of itself, it is usually interpreted
in conjunction with other sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In accordance with Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, joint culpability is only applicable in certain
circumstances.

A complaint and evidence presented in the case of Chhotu v State of Maharashtra established
that the victim was assaulted by three different individuals. The three individuals were found
responsible under the theories of joint culpability and assault. As a result, it may be
concluded that the clause cannot be read in isolation and must be read in conjunction with
another section of the Indian Constitution.

 Common Intention

According to a Supreme Court of India decision, it is common sense to assume that if many
persons are charged with criminal conduct, they are likely to have offered encouragement,
aid, protection, and support, as well as actively participated or otherwise engaged in the
illegal activity. It doesn't matter who committed the offence, as long as there was a shared
goal and everyone engaged in the effort to achieve it; everyone is held responsible for the
crime.

In the 1977 decision of Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab 4, the Supreme Court held that
Section 34's definition of joint responsibility required that numerous people commit a
criminal conduct together with the express goal of furthering a common objective. The most

4
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 2012 SC 213.

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important thing is that everyone engaging in the illegal activity has their attention on the
same thing at the same time in order to achieve a certain goal.

Supreme Court emphasised that the phrases "common intention" and "same or similar
intention" cannot be used interchangeably in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Rohan Singh (1994).
The nature of the conviction and penalty to be handed out will change based on the purpose
as well as culpability. Section 34 can only be utilised if the accused have a "shared purpose,"
not if they have a "similar intention."

For example, the Supreme Court's 2011 Nand Kishore v. Madhya Pradesh5 ruling made it
plain that mens rea is separate from common purpose. Mens rea is distinct from common
purpose, even if the latter is only a by product of the former.

Scope of common intention in section 149

The 'Common Intention' concept has a wide range of applications. According to Section 149
of the Indian Penal Code, there must be a common purpose in addition to the illegal conduct.
The participants involved in an illegal assembly are jointly accountable for the conduct done
with a common purpose, according to section hola. In the instance of Queen y Sabib Ali,
shared purpose was considered as a means of carrying out the illegal conduct. The court said
in Ganesh Singh v Ram Raja that the common goal must be reached by a shared desire to
complete the assignment. Prior encounters, meetings of minds, and pre-arranged
arrangements to conduct something illegal are often used to determine it. The court said in
Kripal Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh that the common aim should be determined from the
facts and circumstances of the case. The facts and circumstances of the case are also meant to
determine the breadth of shared purpose.

5
Nand Kishore v. Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 178.

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 Difference Between Section 34 and 149

Culpability is established by a shared purpose under Section 34, whereas liability is

established by a common object under Section 149. There is no restriction on what
constitutes a common object in Section 34, but Section 149 does, and it is limited to the five
prohibited items stated in Section 141. It is important to note that while Section 34 does not
constitute a particular offence on its own, Section 149 does. In section 34, active participation
is required, especially in crimes involving physical violence, but in section 149, no such
participation is required, and the liability arises solely from membership in an unlawful
assembly with a common object, even if no active participation is taken in the preparation or
commission of the crime. Correction of an error in charging an individual under the wrong
section of IPC and then replacing Section 34 does not have an adverse effect on the
prosecution's case unless the defendant is prejudiced by the substitution. Despite the fact that
the accused was charged under Section 302 read with Section 149, Amar Singh v. State of
Haryana6 held a conviction for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 was legal
because the facts and evidence adduced would have been the same if he had been charged
under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

 The Common Intention should be Prior or Antecedent to the Occurrence

According to the idea of common intention, an event must have an antecedent. A clear
contrast is established between the terms "shared purpose" and "common aim," with the
former indicating a pre-arranged plan and the latter not need proof of a prior meeting of the
minds, whereas the former does not. Section 34 and Section 149 have significant differences,
but they also have some overlap, and whether or not they do so depends on the specific facts
of each case.

 Common Intention may Develop during the Course of the Occurrence and could
Develop on the Spot

The investigators must determine a common purpose, although it is not required that this
occurs prior to the incident. In addition, it may occur at the time of the act. At every given
stage of the action, the intention is carefully crafted.

6
Amar Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1973 Har. HC 300.

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  Common Intention is Different from Same or Similar Intention

It is important to note that common intention refers to the fact that all participants had a
single goal, whereas similar intention refers to the change in goal throughout the act owing to
external conditions.

For example, four persons shared a common goal of abducting a little girl. However, if one of
them murders the person who was kidnapped without the approval of the other participants in
the process, the situation becomes dangerous. Everyone else is solely responsible for
kidnapping and not responsible for murder.7

 Key Judgments
1. Chhota Ahirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh8

During a discussion in Chhota Ahirwar v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (2011), a Supreme
Court bench led by Justice Indira Banerjee made the following observations:

According to established principles of criminal law, only the person who really commits the
crime may be held guilty and sentenced accordingly. To establish a shared accountability
concept, Section 34 is the only provision that establishes a common objective, encouraging
the principal accused to carry out the illegal act as a means of achieving that goal.

Each individual is responsible for the outcome of all the acts even if they are conducted by
two or more people working together toward a common purpose. As far as I know, Section
34 does not represent an actual offence, but rather an evidentiary rule that applies the concept
of shared criminal responsibility.

Common aim implies working together. In order to prove the existence of a conspiracy,
evidence of the accused's activities, the conditions in which they occurred, or any other
relevant information must be shown to the court. It's not enough to have the same goal in
mind without the help of others.

2. Nagendren v. State9

IPC Section 34 does not constitute a distinct or substantial offence. As a rule of evidence, it
sets the standard for illegal action perpetrated by groups of persons since it demonstrates
7
Supra, note 1.
8
Chhota Ahirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1977 1 SCC. 369.
9
Nagendra v. State, AIR 1977 SC 412.

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vicarious, constructive, and joint responsibility. An exception to the general norm is
established in this case by law. In the well-known case of Nagendran against State, the
Madras High Court made this observation.

Under an accused to be eligible for Section 34, the Court stated that he or she must be
involved in the crime, and not just a single overt act. There are a variety of ways to describe
this sort of interaction. It is necessary that an accused be present in order to be charged under
Section 34 of the IPC for acts that cause bodily harm or violence. Even if there is no physical
exertion, just there is sufficient. Alternatively, a presence like this would need a level of
active participation. The degree of active or passive participation so depends on the situation.
The behaviour of the actors during the action or at the end of the final act might be utilised to
determine the prior performance. While it's possible to believe in the actuality of a
spontaneous convergence of thoughts, it needs be demonstrated. As a result, there is no need
for first-hand proof in order to meet Section 34 requirements.

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 Nature and Scope of Section 120A and 120B

Criminal Conspiracy is defined as two or more people conspiring to do an illegal act. No one
person or thing may be the cause of the wrongdoing in this case. Two or more people must
agree to do a certain action. In order to prevent any illegal acts from taking place prior to the
formation of a criminal act, the Sections were put in place The sections' focus is on
prevention. It serves as a deterrent to any crime. The act itself must now be performed as the
following phase. As a result, the reach of the law is confined to situations in which two or
more people are in agreement about committing a criminal conduct. As the court explained in
the case of Ram Narayan Popli v CBI10, there are several elements of criminal conspiracy: (a)
an objective to be achieved, (b) a plan or scheme containing means to achieve that objective,
(c) an agreement between two or more of the accused persons whereby they become
definitively committed to cooperating for achievement by means of agreement or by any
effective means, and (d) in the jurisdictional context.

 Threshold for proof of conspiracy

The act of committing the crime has its roots in the victim's mind. It's also hard to prove that
someone did something like that. The fact that any action was kept under wraps might serve
as evidence. However, this is not a crucial part of the plot. Through Direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence are the two options.

From their actions during the course of a premeditated plan, it was concluded by the court in
Quinn V. Leathern that inference is typically drawn from their actions. Because there hasn't
been a crime, there is no difference between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence.
Only a plan has been put into motion. It's also worth noting that in this case, the Doctrine of
Agency comes into play. The presence of a third party in the conspiracy might serve as
evidence that this individual was directly involved. In Bhagwan Swaroop Lai Bishan Lai v.
Maharashtra, a court ruled that this was the case.11

Section 120B of the Penal Code outlines the punishments meted out to those found guilty of
conspiracy. They might be put to death or put away for a long period of time. This part has a
punishing tone to it. This section's focus is only on imposing sanctions on those who have
been found guilty.

10
Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, AIR 1964 SC 126
11
Stanley Yeo, Common Intention in the Indian Penal Code: Insights from Singapore, 50(4) The Journal of
Inidan Law Institute 640 (2008).

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 Conclusion

Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code outlines the notion of shared culpability. In this clause,
the term "shared responsibility" is defined although no penalties are specified. Various other
parts of the IPC must be read in conjunction with this section, including sections 120A,
which defines criminal conspiracy, and 120 B, which imposes penalties for criminal
conspiracy. An crime committed in conjunction with this section 34 can only be punished if it
is used in conjunction with another part of the law.

The researcher's hypothesis assumes that a person's presence at the scene of an offence is not
proof that he is a participant in the offence. The researcher's theory is correct in that it is not
required for all of the people present at the crime scene have some connection to it. The
researcher's theory is supported by the data. A higher court acquitted all of the
aforementioned defendants, despite the fact that all of them were present when the crime was
committed and were initially charged with it. It is also not required that all of the people
involved in a crime have the same motive. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code relies on the
defence that the people involved were just there by coincidence and had no common intent
when they were arrested.

Finally, the researcher wishes to point out that at each crime scene, not only the accused and
the victim are there, but also a number of other people, such as witnesses, who are often
present. In other words, a person should not be held responsible for a crime merely because
he was there at the scene or was in close proximity to the victim.

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 Bibliography

Shri Ganesh v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 123.

Shyamal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal AIR 2012 SC 3539
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 65
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab, AIR 2012 SC 213
Nand Kishore v. Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 SC 178.
Amar Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1973 Har. HC 300.
Chhota Ahirwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1977 1 SCC. 369.
Nagendra v. State, AIR 1977 SC 412.
Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, AIR 1964 SC 126
Stanley Yeo, Common Intention in the Indian Penal Code: Insights from Singapore, 50(4)
The Journal of Inidan Law Institute 640 (2008).

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