We can make four general observations about the occurrence of these side effects. First, as Table 5.

1
summarizes, the harmful side effects are not unique to one form of control. However, the risk of side
effects seems to be smaller with personnel controls. Second, some of the control types have negative
side effects that are largely unavoidable. It is difficult, or even impossible, for people to enjoy following a
strict set of procedures (action accountability) for a long period of time, although the negative attitudes
can probably be minimized if the reasons for them are well communicated and if the list is kept to a
minimum. Third, the likelihood of severe harmful side effects is greatest when there is either a failure to
satisfy one or more of the desirable design criteria or a misfit between the choice of type(s) of control
and the situation. Fourth, when controls have design imperfections or when they are inappropriately
used, the tighter the controls are applied, the greater are both the likelihood and the severity of harmful
side effects.

What makes dealing with these potential side effects difficult is that there is not always a simple one-to-
one relationship between the control type and the effect. The need to adapt MCSs to different situations
across various business units, with different strategies or operating in different regions of the world,
adds to the complexity. Moreover, the existence of the side effects is often difficult to detect. For
example, a failure to make the measurement processes more robust in a results- or action-
accountability control system only offers the opportunity for data manipulation. Actual manipulation
may not occur until an employee has a personal need for more money; poor performance creates
additional pressure to perform; there is a lower chance of being detected or caught; and/or leadership
creates a motivation to manipulate.41 That said, the better organizations can alleviate both the
opportunity and motivation for undesired behaviors, the more likely their control systems will have
predominantly desired effects and, hence, lower costs.

Even costs can have hidden or indirect benefits. For example, managers in diversified or multinational
corporations are able to learn from potentially desirable practices used in their various businesses or
foreign countries. Those practices are known by employees in their entities, and some of those practices
can be readily adapted across other entities. Firms that grow by acquisition learn from the management
systems, including MCSs, being used in the organizations they acquire. When firms grow by acquisition,
they are likely to have to use, at least for a period of time, several variations of MCSs. The MCS
variations may persist if they are superior for controlling the acquired businesses, even though it can be
costly to maintain multiple sets of MCSs.