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W20134

AUDI A8: THE WORLD’S FIRST LEVEL 3 AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE1

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Maya Kumar and Berend van der Kolk wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to
illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other
identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca; www.iveycases.com. Our goal is to publish

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materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to publishcases@ivey.ca. i1v2e5y5pubs

Copyright © 2020, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2020-03-04

Once considered a futuristic dream,2 higher-level automated vehicles in which “drivers” could sit back and
relax no longer represented the future. By May 2019, the German automobile company AUDI AG (Audi)
had launched its 2019 luxury A8 sedan in Europe as the first automobile with “Level 3” Society of
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Automotive Engineers (SAE) conditional automation on the market (see Exhibit 1). A Level 3 autonomous
car used programming to control itself under specific situations (e.g., when operating at a certain speed with
clear and well-marked lanes and clear weather conditions). Under these conditions, human drivers could
take their eyes off the road and their hands off the steering wheel. If conditions changed, several alerts
indicated that the driver might need to take over. Rupert Stadler, Audi’s chief executive officer, envisioned
that this technology would allow customers to gain a “25th hour”—that is, free time while a self-driving
car transported the driver and passengers from point A to point B.3
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The autonomous vehicle industry had the economic potential to generate €148 billion,4 and the race was on
to come up with the car with the best technology. Almost every traditional car manufacturer, some technology
companies, and a handful of newer autonomous car companies attempted to develop a self-driving car.
However, the rapid rate of technology development and misconceptions about how the technology worked
quickly led to a widespread discussion about the safety of autonomous vehicles. According to the Financial
Times, the industry had voiced concerns that “a system that allows owners to take their eyes off the road for
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prolonged periods of time is fundamentally unsafe.”5 Alexandre Haag, the chief technology officer of Audi’s
Autonomous Intelligent Driving (AID) division, also admitted there were technical challenges to developing
a car’s perception, or what makes it “see.”6 While driverless cars had the potential to offer several societal and
environmental benefits, such as reducing up to 90 per cent of traffic accidents, saving 11,000–13,000 lives in
the US annually, and reducing traffic congestion,7 the crash history of Level 2 autonomous vehicles suggested
that human drivers of these vehicles often abused the technology and treated the cars as if they were more
“skilled” than they actually were.8 Serious consumer and regulatory concerns were also being raised about the
way in which delicate driving decisions should be programmed into the cars’ software and the reliability of
the technology used.9 Considering these growing technological, ethical, and regulatory factors, how Audi
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decided to proceed with developing the strategy for its autonomous vehicle division would have substantial
implications for the future of the company.

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AUDI TECHNOLOGY

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AID GmbH was Audi’s wholly owned subsidiary that handled autonomous vehicle development for all of
the Volkswagen Group’s cars, including Audi, Volkswagen, and Porsche vehicles. Founded in mid-2016,
the self-driving team was built from scratch. At the time, it had 12 autonomous test vehicles, predominantly
VW Golf hatchbacks, out on public roads in Munich, and tests were also scheduled to take place on public
roads in China in the near future.10

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Eight AID teams focused on perception and prediction, safe driving functions, software development,
engineering, hardware, cloud infrastructure (to handle the data generated by the cars), and maps and localization
features.11 Audi planned to spend almost €14 billion on electric mobility and self-driving technology by 2023,
with much of this work taking place in AID.12 The goal was to achieve Level 4 high automation by 2020.13

From the outside, the A8 still looked like a typical luxury car, and the autonomous technology itself was

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optional. As with other self-driving cars in development, Audi’s technology included a range of radars,
cameras, ultrasonic sensors, and laser scanners (see Exhibit 2), as well as software and machine learning to
improve perceptions of the vehicle’s environment and to distinguish between pedestrians, other vehicles,
and other obstacles. Development of this technology was ongoing and often involved external partnerships.
For example, much of Audi’s graphics-related technology was developed with NVIDIA Technologies, a
company that developed computer graphics processing units (GPUs), and had advanced to incorporate
artificial intelligence (AI) into its technologies. Another partnership was announced in December 2018,
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when AID started working with a start-up called Luminar that made light detection and ranging (LIDAR)
sensors and perception software for self-driving cars.14

Central to Audi’s technology was its AI Traffic Jam Pilot technology, a self-driving, Level 3 conditional
automation system that took control of the car on the highway at speeds of less than 60 kilometres per
hour.15 Traffic Jam Pilot used sensors, laser scanners, and cameras to scan the entire area in front of the car.
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The car’s Central Driver Assistance Control Unit (i.e., the central, comprehensive processing centre for the
sensor data, termed Zfas16) received and processed data from these sensors at a rate of 2.5 billion inputs per
second to understand the surrounding environment.17 To turn the system on and off, the human driver
simply pressed the Audi AI button on the centre console. The car used visual and auditory alerts to notify
the driver to take control of the car again.18

In contrast to Tesla’s Autopilot technology, Audi’s vehicles included more sensors and technology to help
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them “see” better. Audi’s autonomous vehicle approach included built-in redundancies so that if one system
failed to catch an obstruction or another issue, another system could act as a fail-safe. These extra
technologies allowed human drivers time to take their hands off the wheel and eyes off the road—a key
characteristic of Level 3 autonomous vehicles. Audi’s confidence in the technology was so high that it
included, for both the driver and passengers, the Virtual Cockpit and the Audi Connect—the
MIB+infotainment system, a modular infotainment platform that allowed for access to various car
functions, the radio, media, and surfing the Internet, and digital driving instruments such as speedometers,
tachometers, and navigation.19 Computer devices checked the road and weather conditions, and sensors
scanned the awareness of the drivers and alerted them if needed. If the driver did not respond after a certain
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period of time, the car could even pull over and stop on its own.20

Despite reaching the finish line first with a Level 3 autonomous vehicle, Audi was behind other automakers
in having an automated vehicle, even at lower SAE levels, on the market and tested on roads. As a result,
until the launch of the A8, the company had been unable to gather large amounts of data on how drivers

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used their technologies and how their technologies worked under various conditions. On the other hand,

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Audi was able to have new, advanced software that was unburdened by the inefficiencies of past versions.21

Quartz News estimated that creating a car with self-driving capabilities would cost from US$8,00022 to
approximately US$250,000.23 There was also the cost of the car itself, which could range in price
substantially, depending on the brand and features. With such hefty prices, consumers were not thrilled,

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and some said that they expected car companies to bear the costs of developing self-driving technology.24
The selling price of the 2019 A8 version started at €90,600 in Europe.25 While a version of the A8 sedan
launched in the United States, the self-driving system, Traffic Jam Pilot technology, was not available in
the US market. The US version of the car started at $83,800.26

COMPLEMENTARY TECHNOLOGIES AND SMART CITIES

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In addition to the technology relevant to an individual autonomous vehicle, complementary technologies
were emerging that would both affect the geographies in which autonomous cars could work and facilitate
interactions with other vehicles and infrastructure.27 These technologies contributed to creating a more
standardized transfer of information and to the infrastructure of smart cities.

For example, geofencing software helped define geographical boundaries using the Global Positioning
System (GPS) or radio frequency identification (RFID). The result was extremely detailed maps that took a
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long time to create and needed regular updating to account for changes in speed and the presence of obstacles.
This technology provided autonomous cars with information about a well-mapped geographic area, thereby
reducing reliance on the car’s sensors and even providing redundancies that improved monitoring.28

Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication technology used wireless networks that enabled cars to not only note
information about other cars’ speed, location, acceleration, direction of travel, and lane changes but also
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communicate with each other about roadside hazards, traffic signals, and approaching emergency vehicles that
they had passed. The goal of this technology was to make self-driving cars smarter,29 and requiring it in all new
cars would introduce standards for automotive communications.30 While in the United States, Audi had, by 2017,
already demonstrated its investment in V2V technology and related infrastructure,31 the costs still kept other
manufacturers from including it in their vehicles. V2V technology was estimated to cost $2,000 per vehicle,
although it could drop over time,32 and infrastructure devices would need to be placed at roadsides to improve
the safety and efficiency of intersection traffic movements, costing more than $38 million.33 According to
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General Motors, five years of V2V production would be needed before enough cars with V2V technology would
be on the road to improve traffic efficiency. Some cars without V2V technology would remain on the road,
though only for a certain number of years since passenger cars in the United States were typically scrapped after
11 years. V2V would be effective when 25 per cent of cars on the road had this technology.34

Another challenge was that V2V technology and other related intelligent transportation systems relied on
access to a 5.9 gigahertz (GHz) spectrum band used for short-range wireless communications or one- or two-
way wireless communication channels. The US Internet and Television Association had requested sharing the
5.9 GHz band to be used for additional wireless bandwidth, and the Federal Communications Commission
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approved this in October 2018.35 Some European car manufacturers also wanted to wait for the further
advancement of local 5G cellular technology before implementing V2V technology. While 5G would be
extremely fast, it would still be years before it could be fully developed.36

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ETHICS

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While self-driving vehicles were gaining some acceptance, consumers worldwide remained wary.37 Scientific
studies pointed out that choices needed to be made regarding the ethical decisions that self-driving cars would
face in the future. For instance, in dangerous situations, should self-driving cars always prioritize the lives of
their passengers over the lives of pedestrians? Or should self-driving cars be programmed so that they always
try to save as many lives as possible, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the car?38 Furthermore,

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should consumers be able to have a say in the ethical decisions that their self-driving cars made?

All of a sudden, the classic trolley problem by Philippa Foot39 was no longer hypothetical. Programmers
would need to make choices about what to program into the software, facing difficult and almost impossible
ethical dilemmas. AI and machine learning were increasingly being used to help cars “learn” to make
decisions; however, many people found it uncomfortable to think that their safety and that of others might
depend on machines being able to make complex, intelligent, and ethical decisions.

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To collect driving data, some cars could include black boxes, much like those in airplanes. These boxes created
implications regarding the personal data security of drivers in terms of where they (and their cars) travelled
and how they drove. The management at Nissan, Audi, and Mercedes-Benz believed that drivers should have
the option of retaking control of the car when driving conditions changed or emergencies arose, whereas Ford
and Jaguar Land Rover stipulated that autonomous vehicles would be road-ready only when they could drive
in all situations.40 Some raised additional concerns that drivers would not know how to handle different types
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of vehicles equipped with different autonomous vehicle standards.

REGULATION

Despite the potential benefits and the controversies surrounding autonomous vehicles,41 most governments
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were slow to develop safety regulations for them.42 Both the European Union and the United States had
discussed the need for regulations but had not come to any respective region-wide conclusions.43 This lack
was in part due to the complexity of understanding the emerging technologies, paired with different driving
and environmental conditions and existing regulatory gaps within the diverse geographies. Individual
European countries and American states had started creating their own laws, but they could be overruled
once regional regulations were established. Various government administrations also faced challenges in
passing related laws.
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Companies could use this opportunity to try to influence industry and regulatory standards, or they could
be hindered if the technology in which they had invested time and money to develop was found to be in
conflict with future regulations. Already, industry-led coalitions and lobby groups focused on autonomous
vehicle technology had formed to educate policy-makers and the public about the technology’s possibilities,
and Audi was a prime participant.44 In the United States, 54 per cent of consumers wanted the government
to implement regulations and standards for autonomous vehicles.45 However, while many people believed
it was better if autonomous vehicles minimized casualties when facing a potential accident, they were
reluctant for governments to require vehicles to make these decisions.46
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CONSUMER PERCEPTION

Audi had traditionally positioned itself as a company concerned with safety.47 Recent Audi advertisements
had suggested that Audi’s technology was so intelligent that both the Audi passengers and others (pedestrians,
cyclists, drivers, and passengers of non-Audi cars) would be safer with more Audi vehicles on the road.48

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Given Audi’s history of making safe cars, its foray into Level 3 autonomous vehicles was something of a

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gamble; it could be a success (a brilliant combination of innovation and safety) or a spectacular failure
(tarnishing Audi’s reputation as an automobile manufacturer known for its safe, stylish cars).

Over the past few years, a few high-profile crashes of semi-autonomous vehicles with Level 2 classification
had received bad press. In March 2018, the semi-autonomous Uber Volvo XC90 killed Elaine Herzberg in

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Arizona, USA. According to the official local police statement, the car’s perception module had failed to
recognize the presence of a bicycle on the road ahead, the emergency braking system had been disabled,
and the human driver had failed to apply the brakes in time.49 That same month, a Tesla Model X crashed
into a highway divider, though the last alert that the driver had received to take over had occurred 15 minutes
before the crash.50 In other incidents, a Tesla vehicle crashed into a parked fire truck, and another Tesla
vehicle collided with a tractor-trailer, peeling off the car’s roof and killing the driver.51

In all of these incidents, human drivers had used the Tesla Autopilot technology, classified as a Level 2

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system. With Level 2 technology, a car could help human drivers to maintain speed, stay in a lane, and slow
down to avoid other cars. However, drivers of Level 2 vehicles were expected to pay attention at all times.
Most Level 2 cars had built-in monitoring to detect whether a driver’s hand was on the steering wheel,
while the GM Cruise had eye scanners to track the driver’s attention.52 While the technology’s name
(Autopilot) and the Tesla website (stating “Full Self-Driving Capability”) sent mixed messages about the
car’s capability,53 after these crashes, Tesla still publicly blamed drivers for not being fully attentive and
maintaining control of the vehicle.54
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Based on these and similar issues, society and the media continued to be skeptical about autonomous
technology (see Exhibit 3). Despite most countries’ already high rates of automobile accidents that were
associated with human error (see Exhibit 4), many questioned whether autonomous technology was ready
to sense and react appropriately under various environmental conditions, and furthermore, whether human
drivers really understood when they need to be vigilant about paying attention.55 If the technology failed,
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if the car made the wrong decision, or if the driver failed to use the car appropriately, a crash of the first
Level 3 autonomous vehicle could severely tarnish Audi’s stellar reputation.

While most Western consumers preferred traditional car manufacturers to bring an autonomous vehicle to
market rather than a technology company such as Google, views differed greatly across international
markets. For instance, in Japan, 76 per cent of consumers believed the traditional car industry could deliver
a safe autonomous vehicle. In the United States, however, 47 per cent of consumers surveyed trusted
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traditional car manufacturers, while 25 per cent preferred technology companies, and 28 per cent would
trust a new autonomous vehicle maker. In contrast, only 13 per cent of consumers in Southeast Asia and 28
per cent in China trusted traditional car manufacturers.56

Furthermore, studies have shown that despite the hype around autonomous vehicles, consumers have
suggested that it was the auto industry’s responsibility to pay for safety features.57 Around the world, many
customers were unwilling to pay any additional amount for vehicles with autonomous technologies, including
50 per cent of consumers in Germany, 38 per cent in the United States, and 31 per cent in Japan. These
statistics were similar to what the automotive industry had seen with electric vehicle adoption, making it
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worrisome as to whether automakers were making the right decision to invest in autonomous technologies—
particularly given that governments had been slow to develop regulations around the technologies.58 That said,
due to the exorbitant costs of developing a self-driving car, autonomous vehicles typically came with a higher
price tag. For example, in Tesla’s Model 3 (for 2017), the two main forms of Tesla’s autonomous driving
software, Enhanced Autopilot plus full self-driving capability, had a price tag of an extra $8,000.59

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LOOKING AHEAD: MAY 2019

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It was a huge accomplishment for a traditional car company to bring the first Level 3 autonomous vehicle
to market. Nevertheless, similar to when the unreachable dream of going to the moon became true in 1969,
the next question became, what was next for Audi’s autonomous vehicle unit?

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One of the company’s biggest challenges involved balancing the pressures of different stakeholders. While
Audi wanted to meet the demands of shareholders seeking financial progress, the company also wanted to
continue to be innovative for its customers and to maintain its reputation for safety.60 As the producer of
the first Level 3 autonomous vehicle on the market, Audi had the potential to influence technological
standards and regulations, but it needed to put substantial thought into what technology to include and how
the cars would be programmed to react under different driving conditions. Furthermore, tech media such as
Wired predicted that it would be decades before a fully autonomous Level 5 vehicle that could handle any
situation would be available to mass consumers.61 It was more likely that the industry would start with truck

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fleets and taxis that operated on specific routes and with predetermined pickup and drop-off points. Did it
even make sense to continue to focus on the mass-consumer autonomous vehicle market?
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No
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EXHIBIT 1: LEVELS OF VEHICLE AUTONOMY BY THE SOCIETY OF AUTOMOTIVE ENGINEERS

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Level of
Label Description
Autonomy
0 No automation No automated technologies. Standard cruise control is not considered
to be automated technology. This level includes traditional
automobiles.

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1 Driver Some basic driver-facilitating technologies, such as adaptive cruise
assistance control or lane-keeping technology.
2 Partial The car can at any time interfere with and control the car’s brakes,
automation acceleration, and/or steering. An example is Tesla Autopilot, an
advanced driver-assistance feature.
3 Conditional The car can take full control during specific parts of a journey,
automation provided certain conditions have been met, such as clear weather, dry
highways, and clear lanes. An example is Audi AI Traffic Jam pilot

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technology.
4 High This technology would be capable of completing full journeys without
automation human interference or supervision. No examples available yet, though
experts believe this level of autonomy is the goal of Waymo, Google’s
self-driving car.
5 Full automation This technology would allow the car to drive autonomously always and
anywhere. No examples are available yet.
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Source: Alex Davies, “Everyone Wants a Level 5 Self-Driving Car—Here’s What That Means,” Wired, August 26, 2016,
accessed January 15, 2019, www.wired.com/2016/08/self-driving-car-levels-sae-nhtsa/.

EXHIBIT 2: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY

Five main types of technology are being used and developed in autonomous vehicles today. This
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technology includes cameras, radar, light detection and ranging (LIDAR) laser technology, GPS, and a
central computer.

Cameras: Cameras are relatively affordable, costing around $6,000. One car may have a dozen cameras,
and together they can capture visual detail to see road signs and lanes and have excellent resolution in
conditions of daylight and good weather. Currently, Tesla relies only on camera technology; however, most
autonomous vehicle makers worry about the sensitivity of how different parts of images are distinguished
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when using a camera.

Radar: Radar in cars has been around since the early 2000s and has been used to broadly perceive the
environment. There is very little precision regarding distinguishing different obstructions, but radar can see
hundreds of metres ahead and can identify the speed of objects and the direction of movement. The radar
is placed under the metal bodywork of the car and is used in existing automotive technology such as
adaptive cruise control.

LIDAR: The technology that revolutionized how autonomous vehicles “see” is LIDAR laser sensors. This
technology is used to perceive and understand the surroundings by sitting on top of the car and sending out
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millions of laser points per second. Substantial information is conveyed back to the vehicles by the speed at
which the laser bounces back. For instance, the lasers can judge distance and detect shapes, helping to
distinguish between a person in a wheelchair and a shopping cart. The data conveyed back to the car then
need to be interpreted through programming, primarily machine learning. Machine learning exposes the
machine to real-world examples and feedback to train and improve software that interprets sensor data that
“see” for the car. AI is also used to transform 2-D images. This technology is developing rapidly.

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EXHIBIT 2 (CONTINUED)

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While the resolution is not the same as that of a camera, LIDAR works during the day and night. One large
sensor is typically needed on the top of the car, and four additional small sensors are used around the
vehicle. Cost is a large prohibition to including this technology in an autonomous vehicle.

For example, the originator of LIDAR technology, Velodyne, has a top-of-the-line LIDAR model for the top

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of the car that is priced at $85,000. That said, research is ongoing to create more affordable LIDAR
technology. For example, Google has created one for around $7,500, and Audi is looking to partner with a
start-up, Luminar, which has created powerful long-range sensors. The smaller LIDAR sensors cost
approximately $8,000 each, but more than 50 start-ups are currently focused on developing competing
technologies to reduce costs and address some of the doubts about their reliability. Tesla does not use
LIDAR technology. Instead, they use only cameras.

GPS: The GPS facilitates navigation, geolocation, and time. Such technology has become standard in

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vehicles but may fail in locations that include obstacles such as buildings or tunnels. Some automotive
companies are including devices called inertial measurement units ($4,000 each) in their cars to help GPS
receivers work when regular GPS signals cannot be accessed.

Central computer and related hardware: A central computer is needed to coordinate the autonomous
vehicle system, currently costing around $5,000. With increased innovation by various parts suppliers and
the autonomous vehicle manufacturers themselves, costs are likely to come down.
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Note: All currency amounts are in US$; LIDAR = light detecting and ranging; GPS = global positioning system.
Source: Steve LeVine, “What It Really Costs to Turn a Car into a Self-Driving Vehicle,” Quartz, March 5, 2017, accessed
January 15, 2019, https://qz.com/924212/what-it-really-costs-to-turn-a-car-into-a-self-driving-vehicle/; Alex Davies, “How Do
Self-Driving Cars See (and How Do They See Me?),” Wired, November 8, 2018, accessed January 15, 2019,
www.wired.com/story/the-know-it-alls-how-do-self-driving-cars-see/; Andrew J. Hawkins, “Audi Pulls the Curtain Back on Its
Self-Driving Car Program,” The Verge, December 18, 2018, accessed January 15, 2019,
www.theverge.com/2018/12/18/18144506/audi-self-driving-car-volkswagen-luminar-lidar.
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EXHIBIT 3: CONSUMER VIEWS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES (%)

Consumers Who Believe That Consumers Who Believe That

Country Autonomous Vehicles Will Autonomous Vehicles Will
Not Be Safe—2017 Not Be Safe—2018
South Korea 81 54
No

United States 74 47
Germany 72 45
France 65 37
China 62 26

Source: Deloitte, “Deloitte Study: Consumer Trust in Autonomous Vehicles on the Rise,” press release, January 8, 2018,
accessed January 15, 2019, www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/press-releases/2018-global-automotive-
consumer-survey-press-release.html.

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EXHIBIT 4: SELECTED AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT STATISTICS IN 2017 BY COUNTRY

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Deaths Due to Road Accidents
Countries
(per 1 million people)
Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland <30
Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, and Spain 30–40
France, Finland, Belgium, and Italy 40–60

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Japan 41
Australia 56
United States 120
China 182
Brazil 197
India 226
South Africa 259

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Source: For Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland; Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, and Spain; and France, Belgium, and Italy:
European Transport Safety Council, “Road Deaths in the European Union,” European Transport Safety Council, 2018,
accessed January 15, 2019, https://etsc.eu/euroadsafetydata/; for Japan, Australia, China, Brazil, India, and South Africa:
World Health Organization, “Road Traffic Industries,” World Health Organization, December 7, 2018, accessed January 15,
2019, www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/road-traffic-injuries; and for the United States: National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration, “2017 Fatal Motor Vehicle Crashes: Overview (DOT HS 812 603),” 2017.
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No
Do

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ENDNOTES

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1
This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in this case are not necessarily those of AUDI AG or any of its employees.
2
“GM – Key to the Future,” GM Corporate Newsroom, 9:07, accessed November 29, 2019, https://media.gm.com/media/us/en/gm/
bcportal.html/currentVideoId/3767696901001/pnId/12/typeId/c/currentChannelId/Most%20Recent.html.
3
Ralf Blasig, “The Gift of an Hour,” Volkswagen, accessed January 15, 2019,
www.volkswagenag.com/en/news/stories/2017/06/the-gift-of-an-hour.html.

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4
Tatjana Evas, A Common EU Approach to Liability Rules and Insurance for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles, 1,
European Parliamentary Research Service, European Added Value Unit, European Union, February 2018, accessed January
15, 2019, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/615635/EPRS_STU(2018)615635_EN.pdf; € = European
Union euro; €1 = US$1.2482 on February 15, 2018.
5
Patrick McGee and Peter Campbell, “Audi Launches Most Advanced Self-Driving Car,” Financial Times, July 11, 2017,
accessed January 15, 2019, www.ft.com/content/973f2f5c-6649-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614.
6
Andrew J. Hawkins, “Audi Pulls the Curtain Back on Its Self-Driving Car Program,” The Verge, December 18, 2018, accessed
January 15, 2019, www.theverge.com/2018/12/18/18144506/audi-self-driving-car-volkswagen-luminar-lidar.
7
Bill Howard, “V2V: What Are Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications and How Do They Work?,” ExtremeTech, February 6, 2014,

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accessed January 15, 2019, www.extremetech.com/extreme/176093-v2v-what-are-vehicle-to-vehicle-communications-and-
how-does-it-work/4.
8
Colm Gorey, “Tesla Risks Drivers Being Over-Reliant on Car Tech, Report Warns,” Silicon Republic, October 19, 2018,
accessed January 15, 2019, www.siliconrepublic.com/machines/autonomous-car-tech-tests-tesla.
9
Jean-François Bonnefon, Azim Shariff, and Iyad Rahwan, “The Social Dilemma of Autonomous Vehicles,” Science 352, no.
6293 (2016): 1573–1576.
10
Wang Xuechao and Tom Hancock, “German Carmakers Test Autonomous Vehicles in China,” Financial Times, September
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12
Hawkins, op. cit.
op
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tC

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18
Ibid.
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“CES 2017: AI Car Partners,” op. cit.
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Hawkins, op. cit.
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All dollar-denominated currency amounts are in US$.
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No

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McGee and Campbell, op. cit.
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Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860
 Page 11 9B20M027

t
os
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33
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McGee and Campbell, op. cit.

yo
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op
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tC

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This document is authorized for educator review use only by Rajesh Sharma, Symbiosis International University (SIU) until Jan 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.
Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860