Beyond Descartes Panpsychism Revisited

Axiomathes (2006) 16:387–423 Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10516-005-8708-3
DAVID SKRBINA
BEYOND DESCARTES: PANPSYCHISM REVISITED
ABSTRACT. For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly

viewed mind and consciousness as the private domain of the human species. Some
have been willing to extend these qualities to certain animals. And there has been a
small but very significant minority of philosophers who have argued that the pro-
cesses of mind are universal in extent, and resident in all material things – the concept
of panpsychism. The traditional ‘man-alone’, or ‘man-and-higher-animals’, views of
mind have come under increasing criticism of late, and their philosophical weak-
nesses seem increasingly insurmountable. This has caused some thinkers to reex-
amine the ancient and venerable concept of panpsychism, and to apply it anew in
contemporary theories of mind. The present essay reintroduces panpsychism, and
demonstrates something of its legacy in Western thought.
1. INTRODUCTION
Rene Descartes held a very peculiar view of mind. Not only did he
accept an ontological dualism, of the world of mind (res cogitans)
and the world of matter (res extensa), but there was also his cate-
gorical dualism: man alone possessed mind, and all non-human
things did not. Homo sapiens was seen by Descartes as an utterly
unique entity, alone among the things of the physical realm,
endowed by God with spirit and mind. Descartes was thus a
‘double dualist’ – a fact that has had lasting repercussions on
Western thought.
Of course, Descartes was not entirely original on this point.
He was, in a sense, only codifying in philosophical form the
long-standing Christian view on mind and humanity. At least since
Augustine, the dominant religious view held that mind was
connected to the immortal soul, restricted to mankind, and was
virtually a supernatural entity. If mind is separable, immortal, and
divine, then the rest of the physical world must consist of mere
objects – things perishable, mundane, ‘sinful’, and utterly devoid of
life, consciousness, or even the smallest glimmer of spontaneity.
388 DAVID SKRBINA
The Renaissance changed our view of mind and soul. Philoso-

phers began to think in naturalistic rather than theological terms.
Into the Enlightenment, science and the modern worldview encour-
aged a movement away from the study of mind and soul, and ten-
ded to focus on the concept of a mechanistic, mindless physical
world. This reinforced the view that only humans and perhaps a
few animal species were possessors of mind.
Thus we arrive at the present view, almost universally held, in
which humans and certain (unspecified) ‘higher animals’ alone pos-
sess mind and consciousness. These rare sentient beings move with-
in a physical universe consisting of living but subjectless automata
(‘lower animals’, plants, microbes) and a vast array of inert, lifeless
material objects. Some individuals, however, still cling to the
Cartesian view in which true mind is that process which goes on in
the skull of homo sapiens, and nowhere else in this vast universe.
Now that we have largely abandoned conventional theology and
embraced evolution, neither of these two situations are philosophi-
cally defensible.
The profound difficulties of the man-only or man-and-higher-
animal notions of mind call for a deep reexamination of the
processes of mind. It should prompt philosophers, researchers and
other thinking people to reconsider these common assumptions that
Western civilization has held for some two millennia. It should
encourage us to consider new alternatives, or rather, new articula-
tions of ancient and venerable notions of mind and consciousness.
It is such thinking that I offer here.
I take it as evident that there is something amiss in the
Cartesian view of mind. As a step forward, we may begin then by
reconsidering one or the other of Descartes’ two dualisms. An
argument can be made for overturning both dualisms; but here I
will only elaborate on the latter – the categorical distinction
between enminded man and mindless objects. The other dualism,
that of mind and matter, is not unconnected to the categorical, but
requires additional discussion that I cannot offer here; in passing,
let me just suggest that the apparent distinction between mind and
matter is perhaps better seen as a form of dual-aspect monism, a la
Spinoza.
If one were to reject the Cartesian presumption that mankind
alone is enminded, one is thereby committed to the view that at
least some non-human things possess mind – or at least, some
mind-like quality. (Let us temporarily put aside a detailed inquiry
BEYOND DESCARTES 389
into complex notions of consciousness, rationality, beliefs, and the
like; by ‘mind’ I mean to suggest only a kind of base mentality,
perhaps associated with experience, subjectivity, or even qualia. To
this end, I will use the term ‘consciousness’ as more or less synony-
mous with ‘mind’). To the extent that other contemporary thinkers
have been willing to extend the notion of mind, the most common
extension has been to the so-called higher animals – meaning, pre-
sumably, the more-complex mammals like chimps, apes, dolphins,
and perhaps, dogs and cats. Unfortunately a viable definition of
‘higher animal’ is rarely offered, nor is any real argument why
those organisms – and only those organisms – are to be included in
the circle of enminded beings.
There is a fundamental choice here: Either we allow mentality to
only a portion of existence, in which case we introduce a line divid-
ing those ‘with’ from those ‘without’, or, we extend it in some form
to all things. The first alternative is commonly presumed, but rarely
argued for. And for good reason: It is mired in severe philosophi-
cal difficulties. The drawing of a line, and the philosophical
defense of that line, are tasks that few are willing to accept (Tye
2000: 171–183, is an exception).
Implicit in the line-drawing stance is the notion of emergentism
– the idea that mind or consciousness emerges only at a sufficiently
high degree of organic or structural complexity. On this view, mind
did not exist on the Earth for billions of years, until (say) Austra-
lopithecus afarensis, or some such creature, appeared with the req-
uisite neurophysiology to ‘express’ or ‘manifest’ consciousness. As
well, presumably, it appeared in other prehistoric animals – the
predecessors of dolphins, dogs, cats, or the like. Furthermore,
the issue of emergentism recurs every day, in the development of
the human embryo; a single fertilized cell, which presumably does
not possess mind, comes to acquire it at some undetermined point
in its 9-month progression to a fully-functioning human being at
birth. Emergence has strong intuitive appeal, and yet it retains
many unresolved riddles. As much as they would like to adopt and
defend this view, most contemporary philosophers of mind are
unable to explain how such a situation could come about.
Another alternative is that of panpsychism – the view that all
things have a mind-like quality. Mind did not emerge, but rather it
was always present, to a lesser or greater degree, in all physical
things. (Of course, the panpsychist still has a kind of emergence
problem: explaining how higher-level mind appears out of systems
390 DAVID SKRBINA
with lower-level mind. But this is a more tractable issue, and can
be addressed by the specific theory of mind that the panpsychist
chooses to articulate.) For some people panpsychism may seem
dubious and far-fetched, a theory held by few serious philosophers.
In fact, just the contrary. Panpsychism has a long and noble history
within Western philosophy, and an equal or greater standing in
most Eastern and indigenous cultures. It was present at the birth of
Western philosophy, and, in spite of what many presume, never
departed from the thinking of many of the greatest minds in our
history.
Let me add one last comment at the outset. Panpsychism is
often seen as a form of metaphysical idealism. This, I believe, is a
mistaken notion. Idealism is defined as a form of monism in which
all things either are, or are ultimately reducible to, mind. Panpsy-
chism – the thesis that all things have a mind – does not entail that
they are mind, or are reducible to mind. One could be a ‘dualist
panpsychist’, in which all material/physical objects possess a kind
of psyche. Or one could be an ‘identity-theory panpsychist’, in
which all physical structure is viewed as ‘identical’ to a certain
order of mind. There are many such possibilities. To be sure, some
panpsychists were idealists – Plato, Schopenhauer, Mach, Royce,
and Pierce, for example, come to mind. But their idealism does not
entail their panpsychism, nor vice versa.
The present essay will briefly outline the history of panpsychism
in the West, with an emphasis on those leading individuals in the
mainstream of philosophy. For space reasons I can only offer a few
passages from each thinker, but in most cases there is an elaborate
theory of mind that supports the panpsychist outlook. Where
possible, I have tried to present something of the rationale that the
individual had for holding such a view. For an elaboration on the
following ideas, see Skrbina 2003 and, especially, 2005.
2. PRE-MODERN IDEAS OF PANPSYCHISM
Pre-historical Europe was clearly an animated and panpsychic

world. Gods and spirits were present throughout the natural world,
guiding people and influencing events. This worldview formed the
basis for the emergence of pre-Socratic philosophy in the 7th-cen-
tury BCE. The Greeks, as we know, made a break from the mytho-
logical tradition by introducing a rational and reason-based
worldview. But by and large they did not break from the deeply-roo-
ted view that mind, spirit, or life was somehow inherent in all things.
We see evidence of this at the very beginning of philosophy, in
the few remaining fragments of Thales. Two are of interest. First,
the famous passage on the loadstone (magnet):
And Thales, according to what is related of him, seems to have regarded the soul
as something endowed with the power of motion, if indeed he said that the load-
stone has a soul because it moves iron. (De Anima, 405a19).
For the Greeks, psyche is that which causes or generates mo-

tion; since the loadstone clearly has this power, it must be enso-
uled. Furthermore the loadstone was, of course, a mere rock and
not a unique ontological category; thus Thales reasoned that it pos-
sessed something, a divine animate quality, shared by all things.
We know this by the second important fragment:
Certain thinkers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe, and it is per-
haps for that reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of
gods. (De Anima, 411a7).
Other pre-Socratics held similar views. Anaximenes put forth the

pneuma (air) as the underlying arche of the cosmos. Pneuma has a
number of related meanings, many of which correspond closely
with that of psyche; in addition to ‘air’ it can mean ‘breath’, ‘soul’,
‘spirit’, or ‘mind’. The pneuma penetrates and underlies all things,
and so a logical extension of Anaximenes’ system would entail that
all things are also endowed with a spirit or soul. Heraclitus’ arche
was fire. Fire, like the pneuma, was associated with life-energy;
thus Heraclitus referred to this fire not merely as pyr, but as pyr
aeizoon – an ‘‘ever-living fire’’. Consequently, this life-energy was
seen as residing in all things: ‘‘All things are full of souls and of
divine spirits’’. (Smith, 1934: 13). In another fragment he pro-
claimed: ‘‘The thinking faculty is common to all’’. (Freeman, 1948:
32). Anaxagoras envisioned the world as composed of a myriad of
substances, but these were ordered and regulated by the single
over-arching principle of nous (mind). Nous was a unifying, cosmic
mental force that was interwoven with the movement and actions
of disparate elements. The mind that is ubiquitous is not just some
amorphous, abstract mind, but essentially like that of animals, i.e.
an animated soul or spirit: ‘‘[J]ust as in animals, so in nature, mind
is present and responsible for the world...’’ (Metaphysics, 984b15).
392 DAVID SKRBINA
Of special note is the thinking of the great Sicilian-Greek phi-

losopher, Empedocles. He invented the four-element view of the
cosmos (fire, air, water, and earth) that held for nearly two mil-
lennia. All things, including psyche, were composed of these four
substances. Even the elements themselves were seen as ensouled:
‘‘Empedocles [says that the soul] is composed of all the elements
and that each of them actually is a soul’’. (De Anima, 404b11).
These elements were presided over by two animate forces, Love
(attraction) and Strife (repulsion). Hence panpsychism was
central to his worldview. Guthrie stated that ‘‘it was in fact fun-
damental to Empedocles’ whole system that there is no distinc-
tion between animate and inanimate, and everything has some
degree of awareness and power of discrimination’’. (1962–81, vol.
2. p. 233). Perhaps the clearest indication comes in fragment
103: ‘‘[A]ll things have the power of thought’’. (Smith, 1934: 31).
Moving to the heart of Greek philosophy: The common view of
Plato and Aristotle is that they made a break from the quasi-mysti-
cal hylozoism of their predecessors, and set philosophy forth on a
new path of rationalism and logic. Certainly they did break new
ground, but there was less divergence from panpsychism than is
acknowledged or understood.
Though not explicit, Plato made a number of intriguing com-
ments in support of panpsychism. Notably, passages suggesting
such a view occur in four of his last works – Sophist, Philebus,
Timaeus, and Laws. This implies that they represent his mature
thinking on the matter, and thus have some strong degree of signif-
icance in his overall metaphysical system.
Sophist discusses Plato’s ideas about the Form of Being. The rel-
evant passage begins with Plato explaining that ‘‘the definition of
being is simply power (dynamis)’’ (247e); that is, the power to act
upon, or to be acted upon. Such a power implies motion and
change in ‘being’, and this relates to Plato’s notion that self-origi-
nating motion is indicative of the presence of psyche. If being has
the power of self-generating motion, then being – i.e. the Form of
Being – must have an inherent psyche:
O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion (kinesi) and life (zoe) and
soul (psyche) and mind (phronesi) are not present with perfect being? Can we
imagine that, being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness
an everlasting fixture? – That would be a dreadful thing to admit. (249a)
The Form of Being thus possesses all three: life, mind and soul.
Furthermore we know that all real things participate in the Form
of Being, as this is how they acquire their actual existence. Thus,
everything may be said to participate in life, mind, and soul.
In the Philebus Plato introduced the concept of the anima mundi
– the world-soul (cf. 30a). He argued that the universe, like the
human body, is composed of the four Empedoclean elements (fire,
air, water, earth). Both the human and cosmos are well-ordered
and exhibit clear signs of logos, of rationality. The body, though
nothing more than a well-ordered combination of the elements,
possesses a soul; therefore a reasonable implication is that the
universe too is ensouled. He thus implied that the property of
ensoulment is associated with well-ordered objects that are
composed of the four elements. Since this applies to all things, one
can reasonably infer that the quality of psyche corresponds to all
material objects, or systems of objects. If this were not the case,
then there must be something fundamentally unique about the
structure of mankind and the cosmos that they alone are ensouled.
Plato gave no indication that this is true, and in fact argued later
to the contrary. Thus one is left with the panpsychist implication.
Timaeus contains an account of how the creator of the universe
– the Demiurge – brought the cosmos into existence, and endowed
it with a world-soul. One learns that not only is the cosmos as
a whole ensouled, but so too are the stars, individually; they are
‘‘divine living things’’ (40b), for which ‘‘[the Demiurge] assigned
each soul to a star’’ (41e). As well the Earth, described as a ‘‘god’’
(40c), ‘‘foremost’’ in the cosmos. Later (77b) Plato explained that
even plants possess the third kind of soul (appetitive), and are thus
animate. Still, our picture is incomplete. Plato informed us that hu-
mans (and implicitly other animals), plants, the cosmos, the stars,
and the Earth are ensouled individuals. Is this all? Either there
must be something ontologically unique about this set of objects,
or else ensoulment must be a general characteristic of the universe.
Finally, in Laws Plato offered a key passage, arguably decisive,
that states his final view on the matter:
Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and the months and all the
seasons: what can we do except repeat the same story? A soul or souls...have been
shown to be the cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by their living
presence in matter...or by some other means, we shall insist that these souls are
gods. Can anybody admit all this and still put up with people who deny that
‘everything is full of gods’? (899b)
394 DAVID SKRBINA
In a nod to the famous line by Thales, Plato seems to resolve

this issue for us – everything is full of gods. If this single statement
appears less than definitive, note that there is no argument at all to
explain why humans, plants, stars, etc alone are ensouled. So there
exists this one strong statement in favor of panpsychism, and none
that explicitly counter it. Considered as a whole, the case leads
toward the panpsychic conclusion.
Aristotle is perhaps the last ancient philosopher who would be
expected to put forth panpsychist views. His notion of mankind as
(alone among living beings) possessing a rational, separable, and
immortal soul align him with the traditional Cartesian view. His
emphasis on analytics and classification underpins contemporary
materialist science. And his denial of the Platonic Forms makes
him more of a conventional realist. Thus it is in his case that we
find perhaps the most startling evidence of panpsychist thinking.
We know that Aristotle viewed the psyche or soul as ‘the form
(or structure) of living things’. Accordingly, non-living things have
no soul – hence, technically, Aristotle was no panpsychist. But
the question remains whether non-living things have something
soul-like in them.
First, note that there is something of an evolutionary imperative
in Aristotle’s thinking. He envisioned all of nature as continually
striving toward ‘the better’ or ‘the good’:
There is something divine, good, and desirable...[that matter] desire[s] and yearn[s]
for... (Physics 1, 192a18)
For in all things...nature always strives after the better. (On Generation and
Corruption 2, 336b28)
All existing things...seek [their] own special good... (Eudemian Ethics, 1218a30)
By ‘better’ Aristotle had in mind certain specific qualities; he

commented that being is better than non-being, life better than
non-life, and soul better than matter. Thus, as Rist (1989: 123)
points out, there is a meaningful sense in which ‘‘the whole of the
cosmos is permeated by some kind of upward desire and aspira-
tion’’ – upward in the sense of toward form, life and soul.
This outlook is essential to Aristotle because he sought to
explain the puzzling phenomenon of the generation of living, enso-
uled beings like plants and animals. As he saw it, there are two
ways in which this can occur: sexual reproduction, or spontaneous
generation. The former is challenging enough to explain, but spon-
taneous generation is very problematic. Plant and animal life
appear out of inanimate matter. How is this possible?
The upward striving of matter is part of the explanation, but
not the whole story. At the beginning of Book 2 of Physics,
Aristotle distinguished between things that come about ‘by nature’
– animals, plants, the four elements, etc – and those manmade
things created ‘by cause’:
All the things mentioned [animals, plants, the four elements] present a feature in
which they differ from things which are not constituted by nature [e.g. artifacts].
Each of them [i.e. the natural things] has within itself a principle of motion and of
stationariness... (192b9ff)
This inherent ‘‘principle of motion’’ is an essential part of all

natural objects. At the end of Physics (Book 8) he determined that
such motion is ever-present and eternal, thus acting as a Ôlife-forceÕ
in all things. He posed the question: ‘‘Is [motion] in fact an immor-
tal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life as it were
to all naturally constituted things?’’ (250b12; italics added) – to
which the answer was clearly affirmative.
The ‘‘sort of life’’ in matter was no idle concept, but directly
connected to the process of spontaneous generation. As Aristotle
wrote in one of the last-written books of the Metaphysics: ‘‘Those
natural objects which are produced...spontaneously, are those
whose matter can also initiate for itself that motion which [in
sexual reproduction] the seed initiates’’ (1034b5). The life in matter
initiates the generative process, thus bringing into being true life
and soul.
Remaining to be explained are the precise nature of this life or
striving that all natural things possess, and just how this activates a
process such as spontaneous generation. Clearly this life-property is
not equivalent to psyche, as Aristotle consistently confined soul, in
its three forms, to plants, animals, and humans. But it leaves open
the possibility of some quasi-psychic principle.
Ultimately Aristotle postulated the concept of the Unmoved
Mover as the transcendent root-source of cosmic motion. Mind
was attributed to this Mover, but some substantial agent was
needed to communicate motion to the physical world. In the heav-
ens this was achieved by the ether. The ether moves endlessly in a
circle, accounting for the perceived circular motion of the stars and
396 DAVID SKRBINA
planets. Importantly, the ether exhibits self-movement; as such, it is

ensouled: ‘‘If it moves itself, it must be animate’’ (De Caelo,
275b25). The self-moving ether is ‘‘immortal’’ and ‘‘divine’’ (284a4).
As such, it ‘‘contains’’ all limited, finite, earthly motions within it.
The self-moving ether drives the motion of the celestial bodies, thus
endowing them with a kind of life: ‘‘We think of the stars as mere
bodies, and as units with a serial order indeed but entirely inani-
mate; but we should rather conceive them as enjoying life and
action’’. (292a19–21). Hence, ‘‘we must, then, think of the action of
the stars as similar to that of animals and plants’’ (292a32). The
motion of all things, from stars to elements, exhibit a degree of
rationality, and rationality is a hallmark of mind. Mind is in all
things to the extent that its action is manifest in them via a cosmic
source of rational movement.
Yet the ether did not seem to fully account for events here on
Earth. So Aristotle supplemented the notion of the ether with
another concept, that of the pneuma. It assumed a preeminent role
in Aristotle’s system of nature. And it appears prominently in the
last three of his biological works (Parts of Animals, Motion of
Animals, and Generation of Animals).
Just as the ether is the heavenly bearer of mind and motion
generated by the Prime Mover, so too the pneuma is the earthly
bearer; it is the ‘‘vehicle of soul’’ and its ‘‘immediate instrument’’
(Peck, 1942: lix), the ‘‘bearer of soul’’ (Rist, p. 131). Pneuma is not
mind (this was reserved for the transcendent Mover), nor is it soul,
as soul resides only in those animate beings. It is soul-like. As
Aristotle said in one of his last works, Generation of Animals, it is
the ‘‘faculty of all kinds of soul’’, the ‘‘vital heat’’ (thermoteta
psychiken), the ‘‘principle of soul’’ (736b29ff).
As such, pneuma shares much in common with ether; they are,
as Aristotle said, ‘‘analogous’’. Both are intermediaries to the Prime
Mover, and both convey its rationality and soul. Neither are explic-
itly mind nor soul, but only the carriers of such. Furthermore, both
share a vital power or generative capacity. They both impart soul to
natural objects, and thus in a sense account for the life in them.
This, finally, brings us back us to the problem of spontaneous
generation versus sexual reproduction. In sexual reproduction it is
the soul-heat of the pneuma in the semen that conveys life upon
the embryo. In the case of spontaneous reproduction – which, as
all know, works best in decomposing matter sitting out in the hot
sun – it is the heat of the solar ether (manifest on Earth as the
pneuma) that conveys life. Regarding this vital heat, Aristotle said:
This is not fire nor any such force, but it is the pneuma included in the semen and
the foam-like, and the natural principle in the pneuma, being analogous to the
element of the stars [i.e. ether]. (ibid)
The soul-like pneuma is ubiquitous in the natural world, pene-

trating and informing all things. It not only brings soul to the
embryo and to the spontaneously-generated creatures, but it
accounts for the general property of matter – its desire for form,
and for the good. Aristotle was explicit and unambiguous that all
things are inspirited by the pneuma. With rather stunning clarity he
informs us:
Animals and plants come into being in earth and in liquid because there is water
in earth, and air in water, and in all air is vital heat, so that in a sense all things
are full of soul. (Generation of Animals 762a18–20)
Echoing panpsychist thinking from Thales to Plato, Aristotle

apparently came to the conclusion that something soul-like, of
varying degrees, inhered in all objects of the natural world.
Peck (1942: 585) referred to this panpsychic conclusion as
Aristotle’s ‘‘startling admission’’. Peck argued that such a conclu-
sion was justified in part by the fact that animated beings arise out
of nature (physis), and that, ‘‘as we know, physis never acts idly
but always with a telos [end] in view’’ (ibid). He continued:
Regarded in this way, ‘matter’...might be looked upon as considerably more than

mere lifeless, inert material; and in Generation of Animals Aristotle does in fact
ascribe even the possession of psyche to it... (ibid)
Peck seems taken aback by this startling admission, and appears

unwilling or unable to place it in the larger context of Aristotle’s
conception of life and mind. Such is the deep-seated bias against
the panpsychic worldview.
Pneuma was thus, for Aristotle, the universal link amongst all
things, and provides a common ontological dimension. It made the
distinction between animate and inanimate relatively superficial:
Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that
it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side
thereof an intermediate form should lie. (History of Animals, 588b4-6).
398 DAVID SKRBINA
Through the pneuma Aristotle avoided an unacceptable and

unexplainable ontological dualism of things ensouled and those
utterly without. Thus, we can see a clear picture of a quasi-panpsy-
chist cosmos in Aristotle, a cosmos in which everything has either
soul or, at least, a soul-like presence, the pneuma, which confers an
evolutionary, life-like impulse upon all things.
3. HELLENISM AND THE LATER GREEKS
Post-Socratic (Hellenistic) Greek philosophy continued to incorpo-

rate panpsychist themes. The two dominant schools of that era
were those of Epicurus and Zeno the Stoic.
Epicurean physical theory relied heavily on the atomism of
Democritus, and followed his central thesis of material objects as
composed of atoms moving through the void. The early atomists
held to a strict determinism, but this was problematic for Epicurus,
as his ethical system required the existence of free will. He there-
fore discarded the determinism by introducing a new factor that he
called ‘‘swerve’’ (parenklisis; in Latin, declinare, a deflection or
turning-aside). The swerve was due to a tiny amount of ‘free will’
exhibited by all atoms. This allowed them to initiate contact
between one another, leading to a cascading of action that resulted
in the formation of the complex atomic structures constituting the
objects of the everyday world. As explained by Lucretius:
Though atoms fall straight downward through the void by their own weight, yet
at uncertain times and at uncertain points, they swerve a bit... And if they did not
swerve...no clashes would occur, no blows befall the atoms; nature would never
have made a thing. (Lucretius, 1977, 215–25)
The willful swerving of the atoms is the basis for our own free
will: ‘‘[Out of the swerve] rises, I say, that will torn free from fate,
through which we follow wherever pleasure leads, and likewise
swerve aside at times and places’’ (ibid, 255–60). Human free will
cannot arise ex nihilio (‘‘since nothing, we see, could be produced
from nothing’’; 287), and hence must be present in the atoms them-
selves: ‘‘Thus to the atoms we must allow...one more cause of
movement [namely, that of free will] – the one whence comes this
power we own’’. (ibid, 284–6).
The Stoic philosophers – Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus –
adopted many of their predecessors’ fundamental assumptions
about the nature of being and mind. They accepted Empedocles’
four elements and his concept of a material cosmos organized by
‘force principles’ (in this case, the ‘active’ and the ‘passive’); they
adopted the Platonic world-soul, and, most importantly, the
Aristotelian/Anaximean pneuma.
Composed of fire and air, the pneuma was put forth as the crea-
tive life energy of the universe. This was most evident in human
bodies, in which both warmth (fire) and breath (air) were seen as
the essential defining characteristics of life and soul. Pneuma was
the active principle made tangible, and as such it accounted for all
form that was seen in worldly objects. Pneuma was the ‘creative
fire’ of the cosmos, a pyr technikon. It had the status of divinity,
and was equated with both god and cosmic reason.
Cicero informs us that they followed Plato in his attribution of
life and mind to the stars: ‘‘[T]he cosmos is divine, [and] we should
assign the same sort of divinity to the stars... [T]hey too are also
said quite correctly to be animals and to perceive and to have intel-
ligence’’. (cited in Inwood and Gerson, 1997: 133). More generally,
Cicero stated, ‘‘the parts of the cosmos...contain the power of
sense-perception and reason’’. (ibid).
A. A. Long noted that in the Stoic system ‘‘mind and matter are
two constituents or attributes of one thing, body, and this analysis
applies to human beings as it does to everything else’’. (1974: 171).
All material objects are ‘bodies’, and they are in fact ‘‘compounds
of ‘matter’ and ‘mind’ (God or logos). Mind is not something other
than body but a necessary constituent of it, the ‘reason’ in matter’’.
(ibid, p. 174).
4. MODERN VIEWS – THE RENAISSANCE
The end of Hellenism and the Stoic philosophy coincided with the
beginnings of the monotheistic religious worldview. Monotheism
was fundamentally opposed to such notions as panpsychism, and
thus it is perhaps not surprising that we find relatively little articu-
lation of panpsychist ideas for several centuries.
The next major leap forward in panpsychist philosophy did not
occur until the Italian Renaissance. Five of the most important phi-
losophers of that era – Cardano, Telesio, Patrizi, Bruno, and Cam-
panella – were panpsychists. Girolamo Cardano was the first notable
philosopher in over a millennium to put forth an unambiguous
400 DAVID SKRBINA
panpsychist philosophy. His ontological system consisted of a nested

hierarchy in which each individual thing was seen as (1) a part (of
the larger whole, or One), (2) a unity in itself, and (3) a composition
of sub-parts – a view that clearly anticipated the relatively recent
work of Koestler and Wilber. The fundamental principle maintain-
ing the unity of each part was anima (soul); and the particularly
human form of this principle he recognized as ‘mind’. As the unify-
ing principle, soul was present in all unities large and small.
Cardano’s panpsychism followed naturally from this view. In his
work De subtilitate (On Subtlety, 1550), he explained the central
role of anima: ‘‘[Material] bodies...are generated from matter and
form, and are controlled by the anima, which in the higher types of
beings is mind...’’ (1550/1934: 117). As with the Greeks, Cardano
saw soul as the causal source of all motion in the world: ‘‘[U]niver-
sally there must exist a certain anima...because a source of motion
seems to exist in every body whatsoever...’’ (ibid: 87). In a break
from the ancient view, he argued against the designation of ‘fire’ as
an element. To him, fire is heat, the active principle, which acts on
the ‘passive’ to produce form. This is a general ontological princi-
ple, and hence, ‘‘all permanent bodies, including stones, are always
slightly moist and warm and of necessity animate’’. (ibid: 66).
Bernardino Telesio developed a panpsychist philosophy that had
a lasting influence in Western philosophy, primarily through the
works of Bruno, Campanella, Bacon, and Hobbes. Like Empedo-
cles, Telesio saw two fundamental and opposing forces in the
universe, an expanding and motive principle that he called heat,
and a contracting principle, cold. These forces acted on and shaped
the so-called third principle, passive matter, which was associated
with the Earth. Every object was a composition of passive matter
and the heat/cold principles.
Heat and cold also had the notable property of perception. Heat
sought to ‘stay warm’ and cold sought to ‘stay cool’, and this
tendency Telesio interpreted as a kind of sensation or knowledge.
As he says, ‘‘It is quite evident that nature is propelled by self-
interest’’ (1586/1967: 304). And since heat and cold inhered in all
things, all things shared in this ability to sense. Thus his position is
sometimes referred to as pansensism, a particular form of panpsy-
chism.
Francesco Patrizi also sought to undermine the dominant
Aristotelian scholasticim, and place greater emphasis on Plato’s
philosophy. His chief work, Nova de universis philosophia (New
Philosophy of the Universe, 1591) laid out a complete cosmological
system, and introduced into the Western vocabulary the term
‘panpsychism’.
Following the model of Ficino, Patrizi created a 9-level hierarchi-
cal system of being with soul (anima) in the center. As such it
permeated all levels, existing simultaneously at the level of a world-
soul, a human soul, and soul of ‘inanimate’ things. Kristeller
informs us that ‘‘Patrizi does not treat the individual souls as [mere]
parts of the world soul, but believes, rather, that their relation to
their bodies is analogous to that of the world soul to the universe
as a whole’’. (1964: 122). In the words of Brickman, soul is
‘‘both [unity and plurality], with the many contained in the one’’.
(1941: 41).
Giordano Bruno’s panpsychism is developed primarily in his
two philosophical dialogues De la causa, principio, et uno (Cause,
Principle, and Unity, 1584a), and De l’infinito universo et mondi (On
the Infinite Universe and Worlds, 1584b). Like the other Renais-
sance naturalists, Bruno endorsed the idea of God as a world-soul,
and then elaborated a general concept of the soul as dwelling in all
things; this, he felt, was required to maintain a consistent ontology.
Bruno was very frank about his panpsychist views, and even
acknowledged his unconventionality. In De la causa the character
Dicsono says, ‘‘Common sense tells us that not everything is alive.
... [W]ho will agree with you?’’ Teofilo (speaking for Bruno) replies,
‘‘But who could reasonably refute it?’’ (1584a/1998: 42).
He then proceeds to offer a ‘proof’. One of Bruno’s central
metaphysical beliefs was that the same principles must apply
throughout the cosmos. The Earth held no privileged position in
the universe (such as being at the center), and humans held no
privilege with respect to possessing a soul. He took the world-soul
and the human soul as given, and concluded that all things, all
parts of the whole, must be animated: ‘‘[N]ot only the form of the
universe, but also all the forms of natural things are souls’’ (ibid).
Elaborating on this idea, he adds, ‘‘there is nothing that does not
possess a soul and that has no vital principle’’ (ibid: 43). A skepti-
cal Polinnio retorts: ‘‘Then a dead body has a soul? So, my clogs,
my slippers, my boots...are supposedly animated?’’ (ibid). Teofilo
(Bruno) clarifies his position by explaining that such ‘dead’ things
are not to be considered animate in themselves, but rather as
containing elements that either are themselves animate or have the
innate power of animation:
402 DAVID SKRBINA
I say, then, that the table is not animated as a table, nor are the clothes as
clothes...but that, as natural things and composites, they have within them matter
and form [i.e. soul]. All things, no matter how small and miniscule, have in them
part of that spiritual substance... [F]or in all things there is spirit, and there is not
the least corpuscle that does not contain within itself some portion that may
animate it. (ibid: 44).
This distinction is important because it anticipates the views

of both Leibniz and the 20th century process philosophers
(Whitehead, Hartshorne, Griffin, et al.), who also deny mind to
certain (aggregate) objects but grant it to atoms, molecules, cells,
and other ‘‘true individuals’’.
Tommaso Campanella’s system centered on his doctrine of the
‘‘three primalities’’: power, wisdom (or ‘knowledge’, or ‘sense’), and
love (or ‘will’). These are three qualities that Campanella saw as
residing in all things, from the lowliest rock to the human being to
God himself.
The second and third primalities, wisdom and love, relate explic-
itly to Campanella’s panpsychism. Regarding the former, he argued
that all things possess wisdom and sensation, and therefore can be
said to ‘know’. First and foremost, things know themselves. Each
thing knows of its own existence, and its own persistence over time:
‘‘All things have the sensation of their own being and of their
conservation. They exist, are conserved, operate, and act because
they know’’. (1638/1969: 156).
Hoeffding elaborated on this point: ‘‘[According to Campanel-
la,] every individual being has an ‘original hidden thought’ of
itself, which is one with its nature’’. (1908: 153). We see the
same idea, very explicitly, in the subtitle of Campanella’s work De
sensu rerum:
A remarkable tract of occult philosophy in which the world is shown to be a living

and truly conscious image of God, and all it’s parts and particles thereof to be
endowed with sense perception, some more clearly, some more obscurely, to the
extent required for the preservation of themselves and of the whole in which they
share sensation. (1620/1969: 156).
Quite a ‘remarkable’ subtitle, one that captures many aspects of

his philosophy in a single sentence.
Campanella offered a number of arguments in support of his
panpsychism. For example, following Epicurus and Telesio he
argued that ‘like comes from like’, i.e. that emergence is impossible:
Now, if the animals are sentient...and sense does not come from nothing, the
elements whereby they and everything else are brought into being must be said to
be sentient, because what the result has the cause must have. Therefore the heav-
ens are sentient, and so [too] the earth... (1620, cited in Dooley, 1995: 39)
Finally, an observation by Cassirer, who noted that Campanella’s

epistemology – based on the unity of knower and known – serves as
a further basis for the panpsychist view:
[T]his unity is only possible if the subject and object, the knower and known, are
of the same nature... Every sensory perception is an act of fusion and reunifica-
tion. We perceive the object, we grasp it in its proper, genuine being only when we
feel in it the same life, the same kind of movement and animation that is immedi-
ately given and present to us in the experiencing of our own Ego. From this,
Panpsychism emerges as a simple corollary to [Campanella’s] theory of knowl-
edge... (1927/1963: 148)
5. CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
The two great panpsychists of the 17th century were Spinoza and
Leibniz. Spinoza created a radical monism in which the single
underlying substance of all reality was what he identified as "God
or Nature’’. He defined the two Cartesian dimensions of mind
(‘thought’) and matter (‘extension’) as but two of infinitely many
attributes of the one God/Nature.
In Spinoza’s psycho-physical parallelism, every object has both
its own unique mode of extension and its corresponding mode of
thought (also called the ‘idea’ of the object): ‘‘In God[/Nature]
there is necessarily the idea...of all things...’’ (Ethics, II Prop 3).
Furthermore, the causal chain in the physical realm is mirrored by
a corresponding chain in the mental realm: ‘‘The order and connec-
tion of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things’’. (II
Prop 7). They are ‘‘the same’’ because they both reflect the single
underlying unity of God/Nature.
Moreover, the ‘idea of an object’ is to have a very specific inter-
pretation: it is the mind of that object. Since every object has a cor-
responding idea, every object can be said to have a mind. This is
most apparent to us in our own case, wherein the human mind is
simply the idea of the human body. But it is a general ontological
principle, and thus applies to all things:
404 DAVID SKRBINA
From these [propositions] we understand not only that the human mind is united
to the body, but also what should be understood by the union of mind and body.
... For the things we have shown so far are completely general and do not pertain
more to man than to other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees,
are nevertheless animate. ... [W]hatever we have asserted of the idea [i.e. mind] of
the human body must necessarily also be asserted of the idea of everything else.
(II Prop 13, Scholium)
There is some considerable disagreement as to the proper inter-

pretation of Spinoza’s psycho-physical parallelism, and the meaning
of the crucial Prop 13 (above). Yet there seems to be a consensus
in recent years that any proper reading will entail a form of pan-
psychism.
Leibniz’s panpsychism was based on his monadology. Monads,
as the point-like constituents of reality, possessed a number of
characteristics that were related to mental qualities. First, each
monad is utterly unique in that it represents a unique perspective
or outlook on the universe. The dynamism of the universe is
reflected as an internal dynamism, a living quality, within each
monad. As Leibniz explained: ‘‘Each monad is a living mir-
ror...which represents the universe from its own point of view, and
is as ordered as the universe itself ’’. (Monadology, 1714, sec. 3).
Second, the internal ordering of the monads is to be understood
as consisting of two primary qualities, perception and appetite. Per-
ceptions are the changing internal states of the monads, and these
changes are brought about (in a rather vague way) by the monad’s
appetite; the appetite is a kind of seeking or desiring (reminiscent
of Spinoza’s conatus), a compelling need to reflect the universe.
The strongly animistic tone of the terms ‘perception’ and ‘appe-
tite’ are not coincidental, because each monad is identified with a
soul. The connection of soul with some point-like entity comes
from the earliest parts of Leibniz’s philosophy (prior to his usage
of ‘monad’), but does not become fully developed until the late
1690s. He wrote:
I found that [the monad’s] nature consists in force, and that from this there follows
something analogous to sensation [i.e. perception] and appetite, so that we must
conceive of them on the model of the notion we have of souls. (1695/1989: 139)
The final characteristic of the monad is that it is, above all, a

unity. Monads themselves are unities, but so too, in a different
way, are collections of monads. Any material object is such a col-
lection, and is integrated by the action of a ‘‘dominant monad’’
which represents the integrated unity of the object. Leibniz, follow-
ing Bruno, made a critical distinction between objects with a truly
organic sense of unity and objects that are mere sets, collections, or
aggregations of distinct things. Aggregates such as ‘‘an army or a
flock’’ or ‘‘a heap of stones’’ do not possess a dominant monad
and thus no unified mind. Interestingly, Leibniz never gave a
formal definition as to what qualifies as a ‘group’ and what defines
a ‘true individual’. Even such an apparently unified object as
‘‘a block of marble’’ is not a true individual, but rather is ‘‘only
like a pile of stones’’, that is, only exists as a unity in the mind of
an observer, not in reality (because it is divisible and destructible).
Nonetheless, all things – even mere aggregates – possess mind, if
only in their parts. Of this Leibniz was clear: ‘‘[W]e see that there is
a world of creatures, of living beings, of animals, of entelechies, of
souls in the least part of matter’’. (Monadology, sec. 66).
Philosophical development proceeded rapidly during the Enlight-
enment, especially in France and Germany. The new rationalist
and humanist ideas rejected traditional theology, and thus were
open to non-Christian conceptions of mind and soul. Naturalistic
panpsychism was a clear part of this continuing development.
French thinkers Julien LaMettrie and Denis Diderot discarded
the concept of the supernatural soul, and concluded that mind, or
a mind-like nature, must be present in all matter. This was the view
that came to be known as ‘vitalistic materialism’.
LaMettrie wrote ‘‘it is clear enough that matter contains the
motive force which animates it and which is the immediate cause of
all the laws of movement’’. (1745/1996: 49). Two years later, in his
infamous L’Homme Machine (Man, a Machine), he elaborated on
the view that thought is inherent in matter, and that the organiza-
tion of matter accounts for higher-level mental qualities:
[T]hese [human mental] faculties are obviously just this organized brain itself, there
is a well-enlightened machine! ... [Even our conscience is] no more foreign to mat-
ter than thought is... Is organization therefore sufficient for everything? Yes, once
again. (1747/1994: 59)
The fact that we can know nothing of the ‘subject’ of other

material things is no reason to deny its existence: ‘‘[W]e can attri-
bute the admirable property of thinking to matter even without
406 DAVID SKRBINA
being able to see the connection between the two, because the sub-
ject of that thinking is unknown to us’’. (ibid).
Diderot’s philosophical masterpiece, the dialogue L’Reve
D’Alembert (D’Alembert’s Dream, 1769), put forth a very explicit
panpsychist view: ‘‘this faculty of sensation...is a general and essen-
tial quality of matter’’ (1769/1937: 49). Throughout the dialogue
there are repeated references to the ‘general sensitivity of matter’.
At one point he commented that ‘‘[f]rom the elephant to the flea,
from the flea to the sensitive living atom, the origin of all, there is
no point in nature but suffers and enjoys’’. (ibid: 80). This panpsy-
chist outlook persisted throughout Diderot’s life; in one of his last
works, Elements of Physiology (1774–80), he stated that ‘‘sensitive-
ness’’ was one of the five or six essential properties of all matter.
Apparently, for him, the presence of mind in a naturalistic cosmos
entailed panpsychism.
In the century following the French Enlightenment, panpsychist
thought developed most rapidly in Germany. The hundred years
1780–1880 were marked by the emergence of several major German
philosophers articulating panpsychist views, including Herder,
Schopenhauer, Goethe, Fechner, Lotze, Hartmann, Mach, and
Haeckel.
Johann Herder was a dynamist philosopher who argued that
Kraft (force or energy) was the single underlying substance of real-
ity. As such it reflected both mental and physical properties. Her-
der sought to unify the diversity of forces (gravity, electricity,
magnetism, light) under the single framework of Kraft, of which
the various Kraefte were different manifestations. The Kraft was at
once material-energy, life-energy, spirit, and mind. ‘‘[Herder] repre-
sents the Kraefte of plants and stones as analogous to the soul.
... [E]ach endowed with a different degree of consciousness...’’
(Nisbet, 1970: 11). In the mid-1780s he wrote: ‘‘All active forces of
Nature are, each in its own way, alive; in their interior there must
be Something that corresponds to their effects without – as Leibniz
himself assumed...’’. Herder clearly saw such a panpsychist dyna-
mism as an alternative to the reigning Cartesian mechanistic mate-
rialism, which he strongly opposed.
Arthur Schopenhauer’s masterwork, The World as Will and Idea
(1819), describes a twofold system of reality. On the one hand it is
a theory of classical idealism – the world exists only as our minds
grasp and shape it, hence as pure ‘idea’ (Vorstellung). On the other
hand, the things of the world must possess an inner reality, a Ding
an Sich Selbst, or thing-in-itself. Kant declared this quality to be
fundamentally unknowable. Schopenhauer disagreed. There is, he
said, one particular object that we do know intimately, and that is
our own physical body. On the ‘inside’ we are desire, feeling, emo-
tion: in short, will. But the human body has no special ontological
standing; it is a physical object like all objects. Therefore, whatever
inner nature we have must be realized to some degree in all things.
The thing-in-itself of all objects, he concluded, is nothing more
than will.
If all things possess a will, then all things have an aspect of
mentality – a clear panpsychist ontology. The will that is present in
so-called inanimate objects is not consciousness (which was entirely
too anthropocentric a term for Schopenhauer), but rather a vitaliz-
ing energy that manifests itself in terms that may be described anal-
ogously with human personality traits.
This will is manifest in varying levels or degrees throughout nat-
ure, and generally corresponds to the complexity of the object.
Schopenhauer extended Spinoza’s implication that all things, even
stones, possess an aspect of mentality:
Spinoza says that if a stone which has been catapulted through the air had con-
sciousness, it would think that it was flying of its own will. I add only that the
stone would be right. That catapulting is for the stone what the motive is for me
... (1819/1995: 58)
The point here is not that stones are conscious but that the
inner nature of both men and stones is the same: will. ‘‘In people
[will] is called character, while in a stone it is called quality, but it
is the same in each’’. (ibid).
Schopenhauer’s theory thus brought an effective unity to the
notions of mind and matter:
Now if you suppose the existence of a mind in the human head, ...you are bound
to concede a mind to every stone. ... [A]ll ostensible mind can be attributed to
matter, but all matter can likewise be attributed to mind; from which it follows
that the antithesis [between mind and matter] is a false one. (1851/1974: 212–13)
Just as important is the understanding of physical force as a

manifestation of will. ‘‘The most universal forces of nature pres-
ent themselves as the lowest grade of the will’s objectification’’.
(1819/1995: 61). Elaborating on this theme several years later, he
wrote:
408 DAVID SKRBINA
‘‘[G]enerally every original force manifesting itself in physical and chemical

appearances, in fact gravity itself – all these in themselves...are absolutely identical
with what we find in ourselves as will ’’. (1836/1993: 20).
Wolfgang von Goethe developed a poetic form of panpsychism

that displayed itself chiefly in his writings that personified nature.
Perhaps his most explicit statement came from a short essay of 1828:
Since, however, matter can never exist and act without spirit [Seele], nor spirit
without matter, matter is also capable of undergoing intensification, and spirit
cannot be denied its attraction and repulsion. (1828/1988: 6)
Here we find a beautifully concise articulation of panpsychism:

no matter without mind, no mind without matter. This is not to say
that mind is identical with matter, nor that one can be reduced to
the other. It simply claims (like Spinoza and Schopenhauer) that
mind and matter ‘go together’, that neither exists without the
other.
Gustav Fechner’s panpsychism was focused primarily on plant
life. The fact that plants have a Seele is of critical importance to
him because it serves as the basis for a completely panpsychic uni-
verse, and a corresponding new worldview. Fechner’s concept of
the plant-soul was based, like Aristotle’s, on a comparison and
analogy with other living beings:
[I]s not the plant quite as well organized as the animal, though on a different plan,
a plan entirely of its own, perfectly consonant with its idea? If one will not venture
to deny that the plant has a life, why deny it a soul? For it is much simpler to think
that a different plan of bodily organization built upon the common basis of life
indicates only a different plan of psychic organization. (Nanna, 1848/1946: 168–9).
Additionally, he often referred to his own intuitive insight into

the nature of the plant-soul:
How different it all is, if the plants have souls and are capable of feeling! ... Is it
not more beautiful and glorious to think that the living trees of the forest burn
like torches uplifted towards the heaven? To be sure, we can only think this; we
do not directly see anything of these soul-flames of nature; but since we can think
it, why are we not willing to? (ibid: 180)
The Earth itself is ‘‘animated’’, and is furthermore ‘‘an angel, so

rich and fresh and blooming, ... turning wholly towards heaven its
animated face’’ (1861/1946: 150, 153). The animate Earth further
implies ‘‘belief in the animate character of all other stars’’ (ibid).
William James described Fechner’s outlook in glowing terms:
[T]he whole human and animal kingdoms come together as conditions of a

consciousness of still wider scope. This combines in the soul of the earth with the
consciousness of the vegetable kingdom, which in turn contributes...to that of the
whole solar system, and so on from synthesis to synthesis and height to height, till
an absolutely universal consciousness is reached. (1909: 155–6)
Hermann Lotze’s central work, Microcosmos (1856–64/1885),

described a comprehensive philosophical viewpoint based on a
rejection of mechanistic thinking. He advocated the notion that all
material objects have ‘‘a double life, appearing outwardly as mat-
ter, and as such manifesting...mechanical [properties, while] inter-
nally, on the other hand, moved mentally...’’ (p. 150). He spoke of
this inner soul- or mental-life as being an ‘‘absolute indivisibility’’
(p. 157), and drew many analogies between the soul and the indi-
visible atoms of matter. He concluded that ‘‘no part of being is any
longer devoid of life and animation’’. (p. 360).
Lotze acknowledged the prima facie improbability of his panpsy-
chist view: ‘‘Who could endure the thought that in the dust trod-
den by our feet, in the...cloth that forms our clothing, in the
materials shaped into all sorts of utensils..., there is everywhere
present the fullness of animated life...?’’ (p. 361). And yet this view
changes one’s outlook on the world; ‘‘dust is dust to him alone
whom it inconveniences’’ (ibid). Ultimately it is the ‘‘beauty of the
living form [that] is made to us more intelligible by this hypothe-
sis’’. (p. 366).
Eduard von Hartmann further developed Schopenhauer’s system
of the world as will and idea, combining elements of Leibniz,
Schelling, and Hegel into a doctrine of ‘spiritual monism’. He artic-
ulated a worldview in which the unconscious will is the cause of all
things. The fact that matter is resolvable into will and idea led
Hartmann to conclude ‘‘the essential likeness of Mind and Matter’’
(1869/1950, vol. 2: 81): ‘‘The identity of mind and matter [becomes]
elevated to a scientific cognition, and that, too, not by killing the
spirit but by vivifying matter’’. (ibid: 180).
Ernst Mach’s philosophical writings emerged in the early 1880s.
A strong empiricist, Mach developed a neutral monistic philosophy
in which the primary substance of existence was something that he
410 DAVID SKRBINA
called ‘‘sensations’’. This realization led him rather suddenly to a

panpsychist conception of reality. Mach wrote: ‘‘Properly speaking
the world is not composed of ‘things’...but of colors, tones,
pressures, spaces, times, in short what we ordinarily call individual
sensations’’. (1883/1974: 579).
The details of Mach’s view were sketchy, but he was clear on
the implications. He noted that both mechanistic and (primitive)
animistic monisms were inadequate worldviews:
Both [the mechanical and animistic mythologies] contain undue and fantastical
exaggerations of an incomplete perception. Careful physical research will lead...to
an analysis of our sensations. We shall then discover that our hunger is not so
essentially different from the tendency of sulphuric acid for zinc, and our will not
so greatly different from the pressure of a stone, as now appears. We shall again
feel ourselves nearer nature, without its being necessary that we should resolve
ourselves into a nebulous and mystical mass of molecules, or make nature a haunt
of hobgoblins. (ibid: 560)
Mach made nature sensate without introducing supernatural

personal spirits. His unique form of panpsychism led the way for
the soon-to-follow developments of James (radical empiricism) and
Whitehead (process philosophy).
Ernst Haeckel developed a monistic philosophy in which both
evolution and the unity of all natural phenomena played a major
part. The unity and relation of all living things convinced him that
all dualities were false, especially the Cartesian dualism of body
and mind:
[B]ody and mind can, in fact, never be considered as distinct, but rather that both
sides of nature are inseparably connected, and stand in the closest interaction. ...
The artificial discord between mind and body, between force and matter, ...has
been disposed of by the advances of natural science... (1868/1876: 487)
Haeckel was explicitly panpsychist by 1892: ‘‘One highly impor-

tant principle of my monism seems to me to be, that I regard all
matter as ensouled, that is to say as endowed with feeling (pleasure
and pain) and motion...’’ (p. 486). He offered one argument for
panpsychism, namely that ‘‘all natural bodies possess determinate
chemical properties’’, the most important being that of chemical
affinity. This affinity, Haeckel argued, can only be explained ‘‘on
the supposition that the molecules...mutually feel each other’’
(p. 483). Three years later he observed, ‘‘Our conception of
Monism...is clear and unambiguous; ...an immaterial living spirit is
just as unthinkable as a dead, spiritless material; the two are insep-
arably combined in every atom’’. (1895: 58).
6. ANGLO-AMERICAN PANPSYCHISM
Until the late 19th century there were few panpsychists among
English or American philosophers. In the mid-1600s Henry More’s
‘‘Spirit of Nature’’ and Margaret Cavendish’s organicist material-
ism each contained panpsychist ideas, and in the 18th century
Joseph Priestley developed – like Herder – a dynamist theory of
matter that was suggestive of panpsychism.
But Anglo-American panpsychism did not really develop until
the work of William Kingdon Clifford in the 1870s. Clifford
believed in a form of Spinozist parallelism – that some process of
mind exists concurrently with all forms of matter. He cited evolu-
tionary continuity in arguing that there is no point in the chain of
material organization at which mind can be conceived to suddenly
appear:
[I]t is impossible for anybody to point out the particular place...where [absence of
consciousness] can be supposed to have taken place. ... [E]ven in the very lowest
organisms, even in the Amoeba...there is something or other, inconceivably simple
to us, which is of the same nature with our own consciousness... [Furthermore] we
cannot stop at organic matter, [but] we are obliged to assume...that along with
every motion of matter, whether organic or inorganic, there is some fact which
corresponds to the mental fact in ourselves. (1874/1903: 60–1)
In 1884 Herbert Spencer wrote an article elaborating his view

that modern physics has revealed the ‘‘incredible power’’ of matter.
The man of science is forced to conclude:
[E]very point in space thrills with an infinity of vibrations passing through it in all
directions; the conception to which [the enlightened scientist] tends is much less
that of a Universe of dead matter than that of a Universe everywhere alive: alive
if not in the restricted sense, still in a general sense. (1884: 10).
Five years later, in 1890, William James first addressed the

subject of panpsychism in his Principles of Psychology. He devoted
a full chapter to Clifford’s mind-stuff theory, and displayed notable
sympathy to those who saw life and mind in all things. James
asserted that the theory of evolution provides the strongest
evidence yet for such a view:
412 DAVID SKRBINA
If evolution is to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present
at the very origin of things. ... Some such doctrine of atomistic hylozoism...is an
indispensable part of a thorough-going philosophy of evolution. (1890/1950: 149).
James’ first outright endorsement of panpsychism came in his

Harvard lecture notes of 1902–3, in which he noted, ‘‘pragmatism
would be [my] method and ‘pluralistic panpsychism’ [my] doc-
trine’’. (Perry, 1935: 373). In his 1904–5 lectures he addressed the
issue of mind-matter causality, leading
into that region of pan-psychic and ontologic speculation of which [panpsychists]

Professors Bergson and Strong have lately [addressed] in so able and interesting a
way. ... I cannot help suspecting that the direction of their work is very promis-
ing.... (1912/1996: 189)
And again in his 1905–6 lecture notes: ‘‘Our only intelligible

notion of an object in itself is that it should be an object for itself,
and this lands us in panpsychism and a belief that our physical per-
ceptions are effects on us of ‘psychical’ realities...’’ (Perry, 1935:
446).
James arrived at a clear and unambiguous position in his 1909
book, A Pluralistic Universe. He explained that his theory of radi-
cal empiricism is a form of pluralist monism in which all things are
both ‘pure experience’ and ‘for themselves’, i.e. are objects with
their own independent psychical perspectives. In the final lecture
James clearly stated his belief in a ‘superhuman consciousness’ and
of ‘‘a general view of the world almost identical with Fechner’s’’.
(ibid: 309–10). He saw in this a new worldview, a sea-change in
philosophy, ‘‘a great empirical movement towards a pluralistic pan-
psychic view of the universe’’ (ibid: 313).
Two further events of note occurred in 1892. The first was
Royce’s book Spirit of Modern Philosophy, in which he introduced
a form of panpsychism based on absolute idealism:
The theory of the ‘double aspect’, applied to the facts of the inorganic world, sug-
gests at once that they, too, in so far as they are real, must possess their own inner
and appreciable aspect. ... In general it is an obvious corollary of all that we have
been saying. (1892: 419–20).
Royce’s panpsychist views persisted in his later works. A few

years later he wrote:
[W]e have no sort of right to speak in any way as if the inner experience behind
any fact of nature were of a grade lower than ours, or less conscious, or less
rational, or more atomic. ... [T]his reality is, like that of our own experience,
conscious, organic, full of clear contrasts, rational, definite. We ought not to speak
of dead nature. (1898/1915: 230).
The second item of significance from 1892 was Charles Peirce’s

article ‘‘Man’s glassy essence’’. This essay begins by noting
‘‘[T]here is fair analogical inference that all protoplasm feels. It
not only feels but exercises all the functions of mind’’. (1892/1992:
343). And yet protoplasm is simply complex chemistry, a particu-
lar arrangement of molecules. ‘Feeling’ cannot be accounted for
by mechanistic laws; therefore, we are forced to ‘‘admit that phys-
ical events are but degraded or undeveloped forms of psychical
events’’. (ibid: 348). Peirce then lays out his own ‘dual aspect’
theory of mind:
[A]ll mind is directly or indirectly connected with all matter, and acts in a more or
less regular way; so that all mind more or less partakes of the nature of matter. ...
Viewing a thing from the outside, ...it appears as matter. Viewing it from the
inside, ...it appears as consciousness. (ibid: 349)
7. PROCESS PANPSYCHISM
Into the early 20th century, panpsychist philosophy continued to

develop rapidly, primarily in England and the US. The dominant
system, the one most connected with panpsychism, was process
philosophy. This system is commonly attributed to Whitehead, and
in fact he has done the most to articulate and promote the process
worldview. But the inspiration came from Henri Bergson.
Bergson wrote Creative Evolution in 1907, which continued the
implicit panpsychism of his Matter and Memory (1896). His thesis
– that matter is ‘‘the lowest degree of mind’’ – echoes Peirce. He
added, following Schopenhauer, that ‘‘pure willing [is the] current
that runs through matter, communicating life to it’’ (1907/1911:
206). Bergson’s clearest elaboration came in Duration and Simulta-
neity (1922). Here he achieved a true process philosophy wherein
all physical events contain a memory of the past; given his earlier
insistence that memory is essential to mind, one can see the conclu-
sion that mind is in all things:
414 DAVID SKRBINA
What we wish to establish is that we cannot speak of a reality that endures with-
out inserting consciousness into it. ... [I]t is impossible to imagine or conceive a
connecting link between the before and after without an element of memory and,
consequently, of consciousness.
We may perhaps feel averse to the use of the word ‘‘consciousness’’ if an anthro-
pomorphic sense is attached to it. [But] there is no need to take one’s own mem-
ory and transport it, even attenuated, into the interior of the thing. ... It is the
opposite course we must follow. ... [D]uration is essentially a continuation of what
no longer exists into what does exist. This is real time, perceived and lived. ...
Duration therefore implies consciousness; and we place consciousness at the heart
of things for the very reason that we credit them with a time that endures. (1922/
1965: 48–9)
It is this passage that Capek (1971: 302) called ‘‘the basis of

Bergson’s panpsychism’’.
Whitehead’s panpsychism, though cryptic, is relatively
well-known. It is based in his view of an ‘occasion of experience’ as
the ultimate particle of reality, and as possessing both a ‘‘physical
pole’’ and a ‘‘mental pole’’. If things are nothing but occasions,
and occasions are in part mental, then all things have a mental
dimension. He first made this pronouncement in 1926, both in his
book Religion in the Making and in his lecture, ‘‘Time’’. Of the lat-
ter, Ford (1995: 28) observed, ‘‘With ‘Time’, panpsychism is clearly
affirmed in the sense that every actuality has mentality’’.
Whitehead was somewhat more explicit in Modes of Thought
(1938). The chapter titled ‘‘Nature Alive’’ gives some indication, as
does the following:
[T]his [traditional] sharp division between mentality and nature has no ground in
our fundamental observation. ... I conclude that we should conceive mental opera-
tions as among the factors which make up the constitution of nature. (p. 156).
There are a number of questions surrounding Whiteheads views,

including resolution to the combination problem that seems inher-
ent in his view, and with regard to his generally obtuse method of
writing – which makes it difficult to discern his true meaning. Yet
his ideas are clearly influential, having deeply affected the views of
Russell, Hartshorne, Griffin, DeQuincey, among others.
A student and colleague of Whitehead, Bertrand Russell ulti-
mately came to a neutral monist view in which events were the
primary reality, and mind and matter were both constructed from
them. After years of suggestive comments, Russell came out with
clear statements in support of panpsychism in the late 1920s,
shortly after Whitehead did the same. By that time he was con-
vinced that the Cartesian distinction between mind and matter
was both artificial and defective. His book An Outline of Philoso-
phy (1927) directly addressed this point. Russell wrote: ‘‘My own
feeling is that there is not a sharp line, but a difference of degree
[between mind and matter]; an oyster is less mental than a man,
but not wholly un-mental’’. (p. 209). Part of the reason why we
cannot draw a line, he says, is that an essential aspect of mind is
memory, and a memory of sorts is displayed even by inanimate
objects: ‘‘we cannot, on this ground [of memory], erect an abso-
lute barrier between mind and matter. ... [I]nanimate matter, to
some slight extent, shows analogous behavior’’ (p. 306). In the
summary he adds,
The events that happen in our minds are part of the course of nature, and we do
not know that the events which happen elsewhere are of a totally different kind.
The physical world...is perhaps less rigidly determined by causal laws than it was
thought to be; one might, more or less fancifully, attribute even to the atom a
kind of limited free will. (p. 311)
This reference to an atomic free will was based on the newly-dis-

covered phenomenon of quantum indeterminacy.
Perhaps Russell’s clearest statement came in his Portraits from
Memory (1956). Here he compared ‘‘things that happen to sentient
beings and things that happen to lifeless matter’’ (1956: 152).
Again, his answer was: they both display a kind of memory. Mem-
ory is ‘‘the most essential characteristic of mind, ...using this word
[memory] in its broadest sense to include every influence of past
experience on present reactions’’. (pp. 153–4). As before, memory
applies to all physical objects and systems:
This [memory] also can be illustrated in a lesser degree by the behavior of inor-
ganic matter. A watercourse which at most times is dry gradually wears a channel
down a gully at the times when it flows, and subsequent rains follow [a similar]
course... You may say, if you like, that the river bed ‘remembers’ previous occa-
sions when it experienced cooling streams. ... You would say [this] was a flight of
fancy because you are of the opinion that rivers and river beds do not ‘think’. But
if thinking consists of certain modifications of behavior owing to former occur-
rences, then we shall have to say that the river bed thinks, though its thinking is
somewhat rudimentary. (p. 155)
416 DAVID SKRBINA
A refreshingly clear and explicit form of process panpsychism

can be found in Charles Hartshorne. Beginning with his exemplary
Beyond Humanism (1937), he articulated the unambiguous position
that all ‘true individuals’ possess a kind of psyche: ‘‘Molecules,
atoms, and electrons all show more analogy of behavior to animals
than do sticks and stones. The constitutions of inorganic masses
may then after all belong on the scale of organic being...’’ (pp.
111–2). Elaborating on this notion over four decades, through his
article ‘‘Physics and psychics’’ (1977), Hartshorne’s panpsychism
(or, ‘psychicalism’) is a clear and consistent theme. He combined
the insights of Leibniz with Whitehead’s process view into a system
which, he claimed, resolved many long-standing philosophical
problems – most notably that it serves as a viable third way
between dualism and materialism. Hartshorne’s entry on ‘panpsy-
chism’ in A History of Philosophical Systems (1950) provided one
of the few surveys of the field, notwithstanding its process bias.
In the final analysis Hartshorne concluded that panpsychism/
psychicalism has little direct bearing on matters of science per se
but does profoundly influence our human attitudes, and conse-
quently – indirectly – our actions. ‘‘For logical, aesthetic, and reli-
gious reasons our view of the general [panpsychic] cosmic status of
quality (and value) influences our behavior, and in this sense its
consideration is pragmatically significant’’ (1990: 397). It is, he
said, the most viable ontology available to us – certainly preferable
to an utterly unintelligible materialism: ‘‘the concept of ‘mere dead
insentient matter’ is an appeal to invincible ignorance. At no time
will this expression ever constitute knowledge’’ (1977: 95).
Apart from the process thinkers, many other great minds of
the 20th century promoted panpsychist ideas. These individuals
include:
• F.S.C. Schiller: ‘‘A stone, no doubt, does not apprehend us as
spiritual beings... But does this amount to saying that it does not
apprehend us at all, and takes no note whatever of our existence?
Not at all; it is aware of us and affected by us on the plane on
which its own existence is passed... It faithfully exercises all the
physical functions, and influences us by so doing. It gravitates
and resists pressure, and obstructs...vibrations, etc, and makes
itself respected as such a body. And it treats us as if of a like
nature with itself, on the level of its understanding...’’ (1907:
442).
• Samuel Alexander: ‘‘there is nothing dead, or senseless in the
universe, [even] Space-Time itself being animated’’ (1920: 69).
• John Dewey: ‘‘[T]here is nothing which marks off the plant from
the physico-chemical activity of inanimate bodies. The latter also
are subject to conditions of disturbed inner equilibrium, which
lead to activity in relation to surrounding things, and which
terminate after a cycle of changes...’’ (1921: 253).
• Sir Arthur Eddington: ‘‘The stuff of the world is mind-stuff’’
(1928: 276).
• J.B.S. Haldane: ‘‘We do not find obvious evidence of life or mind
in so-called inert matter...; but if the scientific point of view is
correct, we shall ultimately find them, at least in rudimentary
form, all through the universe’’. (1932: 13).
• J. Huxley: ‘‘[M]ind or something of the nature as mind must exist
throughout the entire universe. This is, I believe, the truth’’.
(1942: 141).
• Teilhard de Chardin: ‘‘there is necessarily a double aspect to [mat-
ter’s] structure... [C]o-extensive with their Without, there is a
Within to things’’. ‘‘[W]e are logically forced to assume the exis-
tence in rudimentary form...of some sort of psyche in every cor-
puscle, even in those (the mega-molecules and below) whose
complexity is of such a low or modest order as to render it (the
psyche) imperceptible... (1959: 56, 301)
• C.H. Waddington: ‘‘[S]omething must go on in the simplest inan-
imate things which can be described in the same language as
would be used to describe our self-awareness’’. (1961: 121).
• Gregory Bateson: ‘‘The elementary cybernetic system with its
messages in circuit is, in fact, the simplest unit of mind; ... More
complicated systems are perhaps more worthy to be called mental
systems, but essentially this is what we are talking about. ... We
get a picture, then, of mind as synonymous with cybernetic
system... [W]e know that within Mind in the widest sense there
will be a hierarchy of subsystems, any one of which we can call
an individual mind’’. (1972: 459–60).
• Freeman Dyson: ‘‘The laws [of physics] leave a place for mind in
the description of every molecule... In other words, mind is
already inherent in every electron, and the processes of human
consciousness differ only in degree and not in kind...’’ (1979:
249).
• David Bohm: ‘‘That which we experience as mind...will in a natu-
ral way ultimately reach the level of the wavefunction and of the
418 DAVID SKRBINA
‘dance’ of the particles. There is no unbridgeable gap or barrier

between any of these levels. ... It is implied that, in some sense, a
rudimentary consciousness is present even at the level of particle
physics’’. (1986: 131).
• Stuart Hameroff: ‘‘[P]erhaps panpsychists are in some way
correct and components of mental processes are fundamental,
like mass, spin, or charge...’’; ‘‘[C]onsciousness may involve a
self-organizing quantum state reduction process occurring at the
Planck scale’’. (1998a, b).
8. TOWARD THE FUTURE
Panpsychism enters the 21st century with vigor and diversity of

thought. A number of recent works have focused attention on it.
Looking back to the year 1996 we find two books that contributed
to a resurrection of sorts. First, Chalmers’ The Conscious Mind lays
out a naturalistic dualism theory of mind in which he suggests
(with an apparent diffidence) that mind can be associated with
ubiquitous information states – following Bateson and Bohm,
though without citing their panpsychist views. His relatively
detailed discussion of panpsychism sparked a resurgence of discus-
sion on the matter, and contributed to a wider interest. Also,
Abram’s Spell of the Sensuous argued from a phenomenological
basis for a return to an animistic worldview, though his work was
more poetic essay than detailed philosophical inquiry. In 1998
process philosopher David Ray Griffin published Unsnarling the
World-Knot, a major milestone in panpsychist philosophy. Griffin
supplies a detailed and scholarly assessment of the subject, though
with a strong focus on the process view, and with only a cursory
historical study.
Into the present century, Christian DeQuincey’s Radical Nature
(2002) offers another process perspective, and a more satisfying
review of the historical aspect. And in 2003 there were yet two
more books dedicated to panpsychism: David Clarke’s Panpsychism
and the Religious Attitude, and Freya Mathews’ For Love of
Matter. Clarke again takes the process view, underscoring the
dominance of this philosophical perspective on the discussion.
Mathews moves into new territory; drawing inspiration from
Schopenhauer, she crafts a truly metaphysical philosophy in which
humans are sensitive participants in an animate cosmos.
Finally, late in 2004, prominent British philosopher Galen
Strawson gave a talk entitled ‘‘Why physicalism entails panpsy-
chism’’. Expanding on themes presented in his (2003a, b), Strawson
argued that emergentism, as a theory of mind, is virtually
inconceivable: ‘‘I think that it is very, very hard to understand what
[emergence] is supposed to involve. I think that it is incoherent, in
fact, and that this general way of talking of emergence has
acquired an air of plausibility for some simply because it has been
appealed to many times in the face of a seeming mystery’’. He
contends that most philosophers of mind employ emergence in a
‘brute’ sense, as an axiom of reality; however, ‘‘emergence cannot
be brute, because brutality rules out nothing at all’’. In other
words, brute emergence of mind ‘‘is not emergence at all; it is
magic’’. Eliminating this possibility, Strawson concludes that the
only viable alternative is panpsychism: ‘‘I now can say that real
physicalism entails panpsychism. All physical stuff is energy...
and all energy, I trow, is an experience-involving phenomenon’’.
(Strawson, 2004).
Thus, at present we can discern at least six active lines of inquiry
into panpsychism: (1) the process philosophy view, as conceived by
Bergson and Whitehead, and developed by Hartshorne, Griffin,
DeQuincey, and Clarke; (2) the quantum physics approach, as devel-
oped by Bohm, Hameroff, and others; (3) the information theory
approach, arising from the work of Bateson, Wheeler (1994), Bohm,
and Chalmers; (4) the part-whole hierarchy, as envisioned by
Cardano and elaborated by Koestler (1967) and Wilber (1995); (5)
the nonlinear dynamics approach, as inspired by Peirce (1892) and fur-
ther articulated by myself (Skrbina, 1994, 2001); and (6) Strawson’s
real physicalism. These areas all offer significant opportunity for
development and articulation. They hold out the hope of resolving
otherwise intractable problems of emergentism and mechanism, espe-
cially when so many conventional approaches have reached a dead
end. As Nagel, Searle, and others have noted, the problems of mind
and consciousness are so difficult, so intractable, that ‘drastic actions’
are warranted – perhaps even as drastic as panpsychism.
Panpsychism, with its long list of advocates and sympathizers, is
a robust and respectable approach to mind. It offers a naturalistic
escape from Cartesian dualism and Christian theology. And, by
undermining the mechanistic worldview, it promises to resolve not
only long-standing philosophical problems but persistent social and
ecological problems as well. Many great thinkers, from Empedocles
420 DAVID SKRBINA
and Epicurus to Campanella and LaMettrie, Fechner and James to

Gregory Bateson, have recognized the potential for the panpsychist
view to fundamentally alter, for the better, our outlook on the
world. An animated worldview is not only philosophically rigorous,
but it can have far-reaching effects.
The mechanistic, objectivist, dualistic worldview has become
deeply embedded in our collective psyche. It has become ‘common
sense’, and thus imposes great barriers to alternative ways of think-
ing. The great minds of the past have overcome this hurdle; they
invite us to follow their lead.
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Beyond Descartes Panpsychism Revisited

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Axiomathes (2006) 16:387–423 Springer 2006

BEYOND DESCARTES: PANPSYCHISM REVISITED

ABSTRACT. For some two millennia, Western civilization has predominantly

The Renaissance changed our view of mind and soul. Philoso-

2. PRE-MODERN IDEAS OF PANPSYCHISM

Pre-historical Europe was clearly an animated and panpsychic

For the Greeks, psyche is that which causes or generates mo-

Other pre-Socratics held similar views. Anaximenes put forth the

Of special note is the thinking of the great Sicilian-Greek phi-

In a nod to the famous line by Thales, Plato seems to resolve

By ‘better’ Aristotle had in mind certain speciﬁc qualities; he

This inherent ‘‘principle of motion’’ is an essential part of all

planets. Importantly, the ether exhibits self-movement; as such, it is

The soul-like pneuma is ubiquitous in the natural world, pene-

Echoing panpsychist thinking from Thales to Plato, Aristotle

Regarded in this way, ‘matter’...might be looked upon as considerably more than

Peck seems taken aback by this startling admission, and appears

Through the pneuma Aristotle avoided an unacceptable and

3. HELLENISM AND THE LATER GREEKS

Post-Socratic (Hellenistic) Greek philosophy continued to incorpo-

4. MODERN VIEWS – THE RENAISSANCE

panpsychist philosophy. His ontological system consisted of a nested

This distinction is important because it anticipates the views

A remarkable tract of occult philosophy in which the world is shown to be a living

Quite a ‘remarkable’ subtitle, one that captures many aspects of

Finally, an observation by Cassirer, who noted that Campanella’s

There is some considerable disagreement as to the proper inter-

The ﬁnal characteristic of the monad is that it is, above all, a

The fact that we can know nothing of the ‘subject’ of other

Just as important is the understanding of physical force as a

‘‘[G]enerally every original force manifesting itself in physical and chemical

Wolfgang von Goethe developed a poetic form of panpsychism

Here we ﬁnd a beautifully concise articulation of panpsychism:

Additionally, he often referred to his own intuitive insight into

The Earth itself is ‘‘animated’’, and is furthermore ‘‘an angel, so

[T]he whole human and animal kingdoms come together as conditions of a

Hermann Lotze’s central work, Microcosmos (1856–64/1885),

called ‘‘sensations’’. This realization led him rather suddenly to a

Mach made nature sensate without introducing supernatural

Haeckel was explicitly panpsychist by 1892: ‘‘One highly impor-

In 1884 Herbert Spencer wrote an article elaborating his view

Five years later, in 1890, William James ﬁrst addressed the

James’ ﬁrst outright endorsement of panpsychism came in his

into that region of pan-psychic and ontologic speculation of which [panpsychists]

And again in his 1905–6 lecture notes: ‘‘Our only intelligible

Royce’s panpsychist views persisted in his later works. A few

The second item of signiﬁcance from 1892 was Charles Peirce’s

Into the early 20th century, panpsychist philosophy continued to

It is this passage that Capek (1971: 302) called ‘‘the basis of

There are a number of questions surrounding Whiteheads views,

This reference to an atomic free will was based on the newly-dis-

A refreshingly clear and explicit form of process panpsychism

‘dance’ of the particles. There is no unbridgeable gap or barrier

8. TOWARD THE FUTURE

Panpsychism enters the 21st century with vigor and diversity of

and Epicurus to Campanella and LaMettrie, Fechner and James to

Abram, D.: 1996, Spell of the Sensuous, Vintage: New York.

Huxley, J.: 1942, ‘The Biologist Looks at Man’, Fortune (Dec.) .

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