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American Bible Society v. City of Manila

 [GR L-9637, 30 April 1957]

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant, American Bible Society, is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation
duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November
1898. The defendant-appellee, City of Manila, is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in
conformity with the provisions of RA 409, (Revised Charter of the City of Manila). In the course of its ministry,
plaintiff’s Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the
Japanese occupation) throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects.

On 29 May 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business
of general merchandise since November 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor’s permit and
municipal license, in violation of Ordinance 3000, as amended, and Ordinances 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required
plaintiff to secure, within 3 days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the
period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. On 24 October 1953,
plaintiff paid to the defendant under protest the said permit and license fees, giving at the same time notice to the
City Treasurer that suit would be taken in court to question the legality of the ordinances under which the said fees
were being collected, which was done on the same date by filing the complaint that gave rise to this action. After
hearing, the lower court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Plaintiff appealed to the CA,, which in turn
certified the case to the Supreme Court for the reason that the errors assigned involved only questions of law.

The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed and ordering the defendant to return to plaintiff the sum of
P5,891.45 unduly collected from it; without pronouncement as to costs.

Issue: Is the American Bible Society Liable?

Ruling:

                A municipal license tax on the sale of bibles and religious articles by a non-stock, non-profit, missionary organization at a
minimal profit constitutes a curtailment of religious freedom and worship which is guaranteed by the constitution. However, the
income of such organization from any activity for profit or from any of their property, real or personal, regardless of the
disposition made of such income is taxable.

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY VS MANILA

GRN 9637 April 30, 1957
Felix, J.:

FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation and in the course of its ministry, it has
been selling bible and or gospel portions throughout the country and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. The
City of Manila considered appellant as conducting the business of general merchandize and required it to secure the necessary
permit and license fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant if engaged in business as a religious corporation and thus be made to pay fees or taxes.

RULING:
It may be true that the price of bibles and pamphlets was a bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this could not mean
that appellant is engaged in business for profit. For this reason, we believe that the ordinance requiring them to pay fees or taxes
would impair its free exercise of its religious freedom thru distribution of pamphlets.
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DOMINGO VS GARLITOS
G.R. NO. 18993 June 29, 1963
Labrador, J.:
FACTS:
In Domingo vs. Moscoso, the Supreme Court declared as final and executor the order of the lower court for the payment of
estate and inheritance taxes, charges and penalties amounting to Php 40,058.55 by the estate of the of the late Walter Price. The
petitioner for execution filed by the fiscal was denied by the lower court. The court held that the execution is unjustified as the
Government is indebted to the estate for Php262,200 and ordered the amount of inheritance taxes can be deducted from the
Government’s indebtedness to the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether of not a tax and a debt may be compensated.
RULING:
The court having jurisdiction of the Estate had found that the claim of the Estate against the government has been recognized
and the amount has already been appropriated by a corresponding law. Both the claim of the Government for inheritance taxes
and the claim of the intestate for services rendered have already become overdue and demandable is well as fully liquidated.
Compensation takes place by operation of law and both debts are extinguished to the concurrent amount. Therefore the
petitioner has no clear right to execute the judgment for taxes against the estate of the deceased Walter Price.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARIVIC GENOSA

G.R. No. 135981. September 29, 2000

Facts: On or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, province of Leyte, accused
Marivic Genosa, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, inflicting several wounds which caused his death.
The lower court found the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and
sentenced the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
On appeal, the appellant alleged that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the
hands of her husband, the lower court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claimed that under the surrounding
circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense.
Issue: Whether or not the “battered woman syndrome” as a viable plea within the concept of self-defense is applicable in this
case.
Held: No. The court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. We
now sum up our main points. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the
killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm, from her batterer
and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have
posed probable—not necessarily immediate and actual—grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense.
Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

RAPE; “TOUCHING” WHEN APPLIED TO RAPE CASES

PEOPLE OF TH PHILIPPINES vs. LEVI SUMARAGO

G.R. No. 140873-77, February 6, 2004

Facts: The spouses Vivencio and Teodora Brigole had four children. Two of them were girls and named- Norelyn and Doneza.
Teodora left Vivencio and kept custody of their fpur children. Then, Teodora and Levi started living together as husband and wife.
Sometime in 1995, Norelyn, who was barely ten years old, was gathering firewood with the appellant Levi in his farm. While they
were nearing a guava tree, the appellant suddenly boxed her on the stomach. Norelyn lost consciousness. She had her clothes
when she woke up. She had a terrible headache and felt pain in her vagina. She also had a bruise in the middle portion of her
right leg. The appellant warned not to tell her mother about it, otherwise he would kill her.
The sexual assaults were repeated several times so she decided to tell her sister and eventually her mother. The trial court found
the accused guilty of the crime rape and sentenced him to death.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Held: Yes, the accused is guilty of the crime charged. For the accused to held guilty of consummated rape, the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that: 1) there had been carnal knowledge of the victim by the accused; 20 the accused achieves
the act through force or intimidation upon the victim because the latter is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious. Carnal
knowledge of the victim by the accused may be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence that rape had
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been committed and that the accused is the perpetrator thereof. A finding of guilt of the accused for rape may be based solely
on the victim’s testimony if such testimony meets the test of credibility. Corroborating testimony frequently unavailable in rape
cases is not indispensable to warrant a conviction of the accused for the crime. This Court has ruled that when a woman states
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that would necessary to show rape did take place. However, the testimony of the
victim must be scrutinized with extreme caution. The prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits.
The credibility of Norelyn and the probative weight of her testimony cannot be assailed simply because her admission that it took
the appellant only short time to insert his penis into her vagina and to satiate his lust. The mere entry of his penis into the labia
of the pudendum, even if only for a short while, is enough insofar as the consummation of the crime of rape is concerned, the
brevity of time that the appellant inserted penis into the victim’s vagina is of no particular importance.
 Posted by UNC Bar Operations Commission

ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

FACTS: Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27,
2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively,
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a
10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of properties. These
questioned provisions contain a uniformp ro v is o authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the
law is unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.

3. Whether or not there is a violation of the due process and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

RULING:

1. Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting
within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950
amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who
must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.

3. The power of the State to make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been established.
Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the
methods of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary
will not interfere with such power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY vs. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-9637 April 30, 1957

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the
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Philippines. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. In the course of its ministry, the Philippine agency of the American Bible
Society has been distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof throughout the Philippines and translating the
same into several Philippine dialects. The acting City Treasurer of Manila required the society to secure the corresponding
Mayors’ permit and municipal license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the
2nd quarter of 1953. The society paid such under protest, and filed suit questioning the legality of the ordinances under which
the fees are being collected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the municipal ordinances violate the freedom of religious profession and worship.

RULING:

A tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities is different from a tax on property used or employed in connection
with those activities. It is one thing to impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher, and another to exact a tax for him
for the privilege of delivering a sermon. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. Even if religious groups and the press are not altogether free from the burdens of the government, the act of
distributing and selling bibles is purely religious and does not fall under Section 27 (e) of the Tax Code (CA 466). The fact that the
price of bibles, etc. is a little higher than actual cost of the same does not necessarily mean it is already engaged in business for
profit. Ordinance 2529 and 3000 are not applicable to the Society for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment
of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals and Alhambra Industries, Inc…

G.R. No. 117982. February 6, 1997

FACTS:

Alhambra Industries, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigar and cigarette products. On 7
May 1991 private respondent received a letter dated 26 April 1991 from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessing it
deficiency Ad Valorem Tax (AVT) in the amount P 488,396.62. Private respondent filed a protest against the proposed
assessment with a request that the same be withdrawn and cancelled. Petitioner denied such protest. The dispute arose from
the discrepancy in the taxable base on which the excise tax is to apply on account of two incongruous BIR Rulings: (1) BIR Ruling
473-88 dated 4 October 1988 which excluded the VAT from the tax base in computing the fifteen percent (15%) excise tax due;
and, (2) BIR Ruling 017-91 dated 11 February 1991 which included back the VAT in computing the tax base for purposes of the
fifteen percent (15%) ad valorem tax.

ISSUE:

Whether Sec. 142 (d) of the Tax Code, which provides for the inclusion of the VAT in the tax base for purposes of computing the
15% ad valorem tax, is the applicable law in the instant case as it specifically applies to the manufacturer's wholesale price of
cigar and cigarette products and not Sec. 127 (b) of the Tax Code which applies in general to the wholesale of goods or domestic
products.

RULING:

Sec. 142 being a specific provision applicable to cigar and cigarettes must prevail over Sec. 127 (b), a general provision of law
insofar as the imposition of the ad valorem tax on cigar and cigarettes is concerned. Consequently, the application of Sec. 127 (b)
to the wholesale price of cigar and cigarette products for purposes of computing the ad valorem tax is patently erroneous.
Accordingly, BIR Ruling 473-88 is void ab initio as it contravenes the express provisions of Sec. 142 (d) of the Tax Code.

However, well-entrenched is the rule that rulings and circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue would have no retroactive application if to so apply them would be prejudicial to the taxpayers. The BIR is now
ordered to refund private respondent of the collected taxes form the latter.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc…
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G.R. No. L-23771. August 4, 1988

FACTS: The respondent taxpayer, Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc., operates an electric power plant serving the adjoining
municipalities of Lingayen and Binmaley, both in the province of Pangasinan, pursuant to the municipal franchise granted it by
their respective municipal councils.

On November 21, 1955, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assessed against and demanded from the private respondent the
total amount of P19, 293.41 representing deficiency franchise taxes and surcharges for the years 1946 to 1954 applying the
franchise tax rate of 5% on gross receipts. The private respondent requested for a reinvestigation of the case on the ground that
instead of incurring a deficiency liability, it made an overpayment of the franchise tax. In its letters dated July 2, and August 9,
1958 to the petitioner Commissioner, the private respondent protested the said assessment and requested for a conference with
a view to settling the liability amicably. In his letters dated July 25 and August 28, 1958, the Commissioner denied the request of
the private respondent. Thus, the appeal to the respondent Court of Tax Appeals. Pending the hearing of the said cases, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3843 was passed on June 22, 1 963, granting to the private respondent a legislative franchise for the operation of
the electric light, heat, and power system in the same municipalities of Pangasinan and comes with it a tax equal to two per
centum of the gross receipts from electric current sold or supplied under this franchise.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the 5% franchise tax prescribed in Section 259 of the National Internal Revenue Code assessed against the
private respondent on its gross receipts realized before the effectivity of R.A- No. 3843 is collectible.

(2) Whether or not the respondent taxpayer is liable for the fixed and deficiency percentage taxes in the amount of P3, 025.96
for the period before the approval of its municipal franchises.

RULING:

R.A. No. 3843 provided that the private respondent should pay only a 2% franchise tax on its gross receipts, "in lieu of any and all
taxes and/or licenses of any kind, nature or description levied, established, or collected by any authority whatsoever, municipal,
provincial, or national, now or in the future ... and effective further upon the date the original franchise was granted, no other
tax and/or licenses other than the franchise tax of two per centum on the gross receipts ... shall be collected, any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding." Thus, by virtue of R.A- No. 3843, the private respondent was liable to pay only the 2% franchise
tax, effective from the date the original municipal franchise was granted. As to the second issue, the legislative franchise (R.A.
No. 3843) exempted the grantee from all kinds of taxes other than the 2% tax from the date the original franchise was granted.
The exemption, therefore, did not cover the period before the franchise was granted, i.e. before February 24, 1948. However, as
pointed out by the respondent court in its findings, during the period covered by the instant case, that is from January 1, 1946 to
December 31, 1961, the private respondent paid the amount of P34,184.36, which was very much more than the amount
rightfully due from it. Hence, the private respondent should no longer be made to pay for the deficiency tax in the amount of P3,
025.98 for the period from January 1, 1946 to February 29, 1948.