Suspicion However strong cannot take place of Evidence

1. Narasappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 10 SCC 770

This may at the highest raise strong suspicion against the appellant to show

his complicity with the crime, but the suspicion, howsoever strong it may be,

cannot take the place of proof. In the absence of any other evidence to

connect the appellant with the crime, we are of the view that the prosecution

has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and the High Court was

not justified in upholding conviction of the appellant.

2. Digamber Vaishnav v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019)

One of the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence is undeniably

that the burden of proof squarely rests on the prosecution and that the

general burden never shifts. There can be no conviction on the basis of

surmises and conjectures or suspicion howsoever grave it may be. Strong

suspicion, strong coincidences and grave doubt cannot take the place of legal

proof. The onus of the prosecution cannot be discharged by referring to very

strong suspicion and existence of highly suspicious factors to inculpate the

accused nor falsity of defence could take the place of proof which the

prosecution has to establish in order to succeed, though a false plea by the

defence at best, be considered as an additional circumstance, if other

circumstances unfailingly point to the guilt.

 This Court in Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa [Jaharlal Das v. State of Orissa,

(1991) 3 SCC 27 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 527] , has held that even if the offence is

a shocking one, the gravity of offence cannot by itself overweigh as far as

legal proof is concerned. In cases depending highly upon the circumstantial

evidence, there is always a danger that the conjecture or suspicion may take

the place of legal proof. The court has to be watchful and ensure that the

conjecture and suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The court must

satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of evidence should be

established clearly and that the completed chain must be such as to rule out a

reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused.

3. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 183

In the case on hand, the prosecution having failed to prove the basic facts as

alleged against the accused, the burden could not be shifted on the accused

by pressing into service the provisions contained in section 106 of the

Evidence Act. There being no cogent evidence adduced by the prosecution

to prove the entire chain of circumstances which may compel the court to

arrive at the conclusion that the accused only had committed the alleged

crime, the court has no hesitation in holding that the Trial Court and the

High Court had committed gross error of law in convicting the accused for
 the alleged crime, merely on the basis of the suspicion, conjectures and

surmises.

4. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 360

The nature, character and essential proof required in criminal cases was

discussed in detail by Fazal Ali J in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of

Maharashtra2 and the proposition of law culled out on circumstantial

evidence was approved in many subsequent judgments and was recently

reiterated by Krishna Murari J., writing the opinion for a three Judges Bench

in Shailendra Rajdev Pasvan v. State of Gujarat3 where it was succinctly

laid down as under:—

“17. It is well settled by now that in a case based on circumstantial evidence

the courts ought to have a conscientious approach and conviction ought to be

recorded only in case all the links of the chain are complete pointing to the

guilt of the accused. Each link unless connected together to form a chain

may suggest suspicion but the same in itself cannot take place of proof and

will not be sufficient to convict the accused.”

5. Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, (2012)’

Suffice it to say although, according to the appellants the question of the

appellant Velu having the motive to harm the deceased Senthil for falling in

love with his sister, Usha did not survive once the family had decided to
offer Usha in matrimony to the deceased Senthil. Yet even assuming that the

appellant Velu had not reconciled to the idea of Usha getting married to the

deceased Senthil, all that can be said was that the appellant Velu had a

motive for physically harming the deceased. That may be an important

circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the

place of conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of the

crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and

circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the appellant but

suspicion, howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute for proof of the guilt

of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.