T 1 leta-ethics Essential terminology

Analytic statements

The Language of Ethics Emotivism

Ethical naturalism/
ethical cognitivism
Ethical non-
naturalism/ethical
non-cognitivism
lntuitionism

WHAT YOU WILL LEARN ABOUT IN THIS Logical positivism

CHAPTER Meta-ethics
Naturalistic fallacy
• How ethical language is used. Normative ethics
• What different philosophers think is meant when people use words such Prescriptivism
as 'good' and 'bad'. Synthetic statement

• Whether morality is a matter of individual feelings or of reason.

• Whether there are any objective moral truths.
• The different theories of meta-ethics.
• Ethical naturalism.
• Naturalistic fallacy.
• lIntuitionism= G.E. Moore, H.A. Prichard, W.D. Ross.
• Emotivism -A.J. Ayer, C.L. Stevenson.
• Prescriptivism - R.M. Hare.

KEY SCHOLARS

• H.A. Prichard (1871-1947) • C.L. Stevenson (1908-1979)

• G.E. Moore (1873-1958) • A.J. Ayer (1910-1989)
• W.D. Ross (1877-1971) • R. M. Hare (1919-2002)
 184 A2 ethics
meta-ethics - language of ethics 185

THE OCR CHECKLIST $ Thus for many people ethical language is about facts which are either right
Candidates should be able to demonstrate knowledge and under-
standing of:
• the use of ethical language- the ways in which different scholars
understand how words like 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong' are used
when ethical statements are made;
• how meta-ethics differs from normative ethics;
the different approaches: cognitive and non-cognitive; ethical
naturalism, intuitionism; emotivism and prescriptivism and how
these apply to ethical statements.
Candidates should be able to discuss these areas critically and their
strengths and weaknesses.
From OCR A Level Religious Studies Specification H572.
the case then we could never have any meaningful discussion aboutmorality.
or wrong (e.g. 'Abortion is murder' may be seen to be either true or false).
However, this may need to be qualified, as ethical language in expressing
moral facts about the world is also interconnected with beliefs and feelings
which often come before (e.g. 'Abortion is murder for Catholics because they
believe in the sanctity of life' or 'Abortion is murder for Catholics because they
believe the foetus is a person from conception and so abortion goes against
Natural Law').
So we can see that ethical statements are not just about observable facts,
but are often statements about what we believe should happen and so are
not very easy to establish as true or false, as they may be expressions of points
of view that are not shared by everyone. Part of the problem is that words
such as 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'ought' are used in everyday life and are
often just expressing opinions. In ethics, then, do we know something is
good, or do we believe it is good and recognise that our belief is subjective?
This is the question that philosophers of meta-ethics try to answer- can our
ethical statements have any meaning? }
? A

Meta-ethics
The analysis of ethical
WHAT IS META-ETHICS?

The word 'meta' in Greek means 'above' or 'beyond'; thus meta-ethics goes
further than ethical theories to look at what is meant by the terms used in
Thought Point
What do we understand by 'mean' and 'meaning' when we use it in everyday
language?

1 I mean to buy her a Valentine card.

•s v
't!'.,;~ «
y
language. ethics - what does the language mean? Many would say that if we do not 2 I mean to win this race.
know what we are talking about, there is no point to ethical debate. 3 What is the meaning of life?
Normative ethics Meta-ethics differs from normative ethics, which decides which things 4 The convict looked really mean.
A term used to describe are good and bad and gives us a guide for moral behaviour. The theories of

different moral codes of
behaviour: rules by which we
make moral decisions (e.g.
Utilitarianism, Natural Law,
Kantian Ethics, Virtue Ethics).
A2
5 Those dark clouds mean it is going to rain.
Natural Law, Utilitarianism and Kantian Ethics are examples of normative 6 Does 'good' mean socially approved?
ethics. Meta-ethics is about normative ethics and tries to make sense of the 7 Do you understand what I mean?
terms and concepts used. .
In the twentieth century philosophy was occupied almost totally (in
'analytic' anglophone philosophy at least) with an analysis of language and
this dominated ethical discussion to the detriment of practical questions. It
So, do ethical statements have meaning? The answers to this question/
Vary. Some are moral realists and hold that moral facts are objective facts that
ie's
~
,
A • l)-/ (
was even held that one cannot begin to discuss ethical theories without first
are out there in the world. Things are good and bad independently of us. s
understanding the terms used.
Moral values, such as kind and wicked, are real properties of people in the (} y'{
You often hear people say something is 'good' or 'bad' or 'right' or 'wrong'
same way that rough and smooth are properties ofphysical objects. This K \'
- but what do they mean? Are they simply expressing opinions or are they
View is closely related to cognitive language. According to cognitivists, /Aw,_.f
stating matters of fact? Can we really tell right from wrong? Many people
would answer this by saying that stating what is believed to be right and
wrong is essential for any discussion about our behaviour. If this were not
Inoral statements describe the world. If I say that murder is wrong, then I
have given to murder the property of wrongness - so my statement is
Objectively either true or false.
\
5-
'
,
 186 A2 ethics
meta-ethics - language of ethics 187

Ethical naturalism/ethical According to non-cognitivists, when someone make a moral state-

cognitivism ment they are not describing the world, but expressing their feelings or
A theory thaf' moral values can telling people what to do. As non-cognitivists say that moral statements
be derived from sense are not descriptive, they cannot be described as true or false- they are Thinker:
EH. Bradley
experience. subjective. . . . In order to be a
Moral statements
Meta-ethics is not concerned with what the right or wrong action is in a good person we
are like non-moral
must know our
Ethical non- particular circumstance, but with what it means to be moral. statements and
own position in
can be verified
naturalism/ethical non- society and its
empirically
duties, and carry
cognitivism
out those duties
A theory that ethical COGNITIVE THEORIES OF META-ETHICS
statements cannot be derived
from sense experience. Cognitivism is the view that we can have moral knowledge. People who hold
It is possible to go
cognitive theories about ethical language believe that ethical statements are from what 'is' to Ethical Moore said
ethical naturalism
about facts and can be proved true or false. what 'ought' to be naturalism
committed the
naturalistic fallacy

Meta-ethics

Are our ethics a

Ethical terms can real part of our
Non-
Cognitive be defined using natural existence,
cognitive
non-ethical terms or do they escape
Can we give a from this kind of
natural definition?
explanation of
Subjective
goodness? What
are the objective
moral truths?

Anti-realist
Ethical naturalism

evidence so that I can test the veracity of the statement. Thus I could argue
that euthanasia ends the suffering of an individual; therefore euthanasia is
right.
Ethical naturalism

- Cognitive and
objective
[
Ethical and non-
- ethical statements
are the same
' caring; or by looking at whether his actions had good consequences. If we
Ethical statements
- can be verified and
falsified
This theory holds that all ethical statements are the same as non-ethical
(natural) ones - they are all factual and can, therefore, be verified or falsified.
So 'Thomas More was executed for his beliefs in 1535' and 'Thomas More was
a good man' can both be proved true or false by looking at the evidence. The
first statement is factual, and can be determined by looking at evidence:
eyewitness accounts, death certificate and so on. The ethical naturalists
would claim that we can do the same for the second statement by estab-
lishing if, in his personal behaviour, Thomas More was good, kind, unselfish,
find supporting evidence we can conclude that 'Thomas More was a good
man' and, if not, then the statement is false. The same holds for any moral
issue· if I want to know if euthanasia is right or wrong I simply look at the
3
Criticisms of ethical naturalism- the naturalistic fallacy
In Principia Ethica (1903) G.E. Moore argued against ethical naturalism and
called the attempt to identify goodness with a natural quality a mistake. He
said that to claim that moral statements can be verified or falsified using
evidence is to commit the naturalistic fallacy. He based his argument on
Naturalistic fallacy
David Hume, who thinks that to derive an ought' from an 'is' is logically
invalid: The claim that good cannot be
defined.
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may,
perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality,
which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author
proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning ... when of a
 1 88
G.E. Moore
(1873-1958)
Moore was a philosopher
and professor whose
approach to ethical
problems and philosophy
made him an important
British thinker. His major
work was the Principia
Ethica published in 1903.
He was born into an
evangelical family but
became an agnostic. He
was a leading member of
the Bloomsbury Group,
with John Keynes, Virginia
Woolf and E.M. Forster. He
believed that 'good' could
be understood directly and
became known as an
'ethical intuitionist'. He
believed that any other
attempt to decide what was
'good' failed because of the
'naturalistic fallacy'.
lntuitionism
A theory that moral truths are
known by intuition.
A2 ethics meta-ethics - language of ethics 189
sudden I am surpriz'd to find that instead of the usual copulations of A field of yellow sunflowers
propositions, is and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not
connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible,
but is however, of the last consequence.
(Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, [1740] 2004)
We cannot, he says, infer from a description of how the world is to
how the world ought to be. Moore used what has become known as the
'open question argument'. For any natural property, it always makes sense
to ask 'Is it good?' and the fact that we can even ask this question shows
that 'good' and 'bad' cannot be the names of natural properties in the way
that 'rough' and 'smooth' are. Thus, for instance, if we claim that happiness
is a naturally good thing we could always ask 'Is happiness good?', but if
happiness is naturally good this question would make no more sense than
asking 'Does happiness make people happy?' However, it does make sense
and so we have to conclude that goodness is not a property of happiness.
If we say 'Mother Teresa helped the dying' or 'Martin Luther King, Jr. led
the civil rights movement' it is still all right to ask 'Were those actions
good?' There is still a possibility of people having different opinions, so
moving from a factual objective statement to an ethical statement of values know
· if so»met·thiingis
· gooa.
id Moore called this a'simple notion' and explained ?
does not work because it leaves an open question that has not been it by saying it is rather like trying to define the colour yellow - just as
:e c~nnot explam what 'yellow' is by means of definition, but only by Moore's intuitionism
answered.
However, Moore himself did believe there were moral properties and his 5h0Wing someone an example, so likewise we can only explain what
response to this difficulty was to say that goodness is a 'non-natural' property goouness 1s:
which is indefinable.
We know what 'yellow' is and can recognise it whenever it is seen but
we cannot actually define yellow. In the same way, we know what good »»
Good is indefinable
lntuitionism - G.E. Moore is but we cannot actually define it.
(Moore, Principia Ethica)
G.E. Moore said that good is a simple, unanalysable property, just as a Z '
primary colour is. Moore adapted a version of Utilitarianism in that he said
that right acts are those that produce the most good, but he said that lntuitionism- H.A. Prichard ~ There are objective
moral truths
goodness cannot be identified with some natural property such as pleasure:
goodness cannot be defined. Prichard discusses the moral claim ought' by saying that no definition can
be given to this word, but, like Moore's idea about 'good' we all rec ·®
its prc ''' 2cognise
If I am asked 'What is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is operties - everyone recognises when we ought to do a certe' :
so m al bli 5% tainaction We know these
the end of the matter. Or if I am asked How is good to be defined?' my 1oral ot ligations are obvious. Prichard thought there were two type of %»»»
moral truths by
answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it. ~m~ng- re_ason and intuition. Reason looks at the facts of a situatione~:d intuition
(Moore, Principia Ethica) tuition decides what to do. In any situation, Prichard thought that intuition
would show which particular action was right and where our moral obli-
Moore said we cannot use our senses to tell whether something is good, gation lay. "
but we can use our 'moral intuition' and so we can still say whether a moral ct· He did, however, recognise the problem that people's morals were
statement is true or false. We recognise goodness when we see it- we just ifferent, but said this was because some people had developed their moral
 1 90
/ thinking further than others. Prichard does not explain why, nor does he
Prichard's intuitionism
Obligations are as
~ oo
indefinable as good
Intuition decides
~ what to do in a
situation
Some people's
~ intuition is better
developed than
others'
H.A. Prichard
(1871-1947)
Prichard was a leading
member of the Oxford
School of Moral
Philosophy. This argued
that moral values are
ultimate and are known
through intuition. His main
works were Kant's Theory
of Knowledge (1909), Duty
and Interest (1928), Moral
Obligation (1949), and
Knowledge and Perception
(1950).
A2 ethics
meta-ethics - language of ethics 191
Z
attempt to list any fundamental obligations or moral virtues. Where there is
Thinkers:
a conflict of obligations he simply says we must look at the situation and Ross's intuitionism
G.E. Moore,
decide which obligation is greater. However, according to Prichard, it would F.H. Bradley
seem that intuition would not be something that everyone could use to prove
goodness. The theory is
descriptive and
Prima facie duties
does not help us existence of
are right
make moral moral facts, but
lntuitionism - W.D. Ross 'good' is
_;
indefinable
Ross fleshed out the bare bones of intuitionism found in Prichard, and, while
Judgement must be
acknowledging his debt to Moore and Prichard and agreeing that 'right' and used to decide
loo
'obligatory' are as indefinable as 'good', he was a deontologist, arguing what to do in any
situation
that it was obvious that certain types of actions, which he called prima Meta-ethical
facie duties, were right. In any particular situation we would come to response to the We intuit
Naturalistic self-evident
recognise certain prima facie duties. Ross listed seven classes of prima facie Fallacy moral truths
duties: One duty can be
~ rejected in favour
of another What are the
1 duties of fidelity (e.g. promise-keeping) objective moral
2 duties of reparation - when we have done something wrong truths?
3 duties of gratitude
4 duties of justice
5 duties of beneficence - helping others W.D. Ross
6 duties of self-improvement natural facts by means of evidence obtained through the senses then the (1877-1971)
7 duties of non-maleficence - not harming others. introduction of 'non-natural' facts and a special 'intuition' simply shrouds Ross was a Scottish
the whole issue in mystery. Some recent philosophers, such as virtue ethicists philosopher whose most
Ross says that when these prima facie duties conflict, we must follow the say it is our emotions and practical wisdom that give us this intuitive famous work is The Right
one we think is right in the situation, and sometimes one prima fade duty knowledge. and the Good (1930). Ross
will have to give way to another- that is why Ross called them prima fade In addition, how can we be sure that intuitions are correct, since people agreed with Moore about
duties: they are duties at first sight. may come to different conclusions, whether using intuition or reason to the naturalistic fallacy but
However, Ross still does not tell us how we know what a prima facie duty reach their decisions. As sense experience cannot be used, how can we said that Moore's own
actually is or how to decide which one to obey in cases of conflict. It seems decide between our intuitions? If they contradict each other, both cannot theories also failed by the
that Ross would say that this depends on a person's moral maturity - they be right, but they will be right for the person whose intuition tells him what
same fallacy. He argued
do not know self-evident truths and intuition has deserted them. that maximising good was
to do. We can never know which intuition is true or false, as we do not all just one of the obligations
recognise goodness intuitively in the same way. Moral intuitions seem to which led to the moral
come largely from social conditioning and differ between cultures, so it is 'ought' in any particular
Criticisms of intuitionism hard to see how such intuitions can be a reliable guide to objective ethical instance. He said that there
truths. could never be one true
This idea of knowing what is good by intuition and not by any empirical ethical dilemma because
evidence is not proved conclusively by Moore-he says you either agree with one obligation would
him or you have not thought about it properly. However, it would seem that always outweigh the
others.
if the naturalistic fallacy shows that you cannot infer value judgements from
 meta-ethics - language of ethics 193
1 92 A2 ethics

[Meta-ethics A.J. Ayer

(1910-1989)

Ayer first encountered

Non-
logical positivism while
staying in Vienna in 1932.
His most important work
Objective Subjective was Language, Truth and
Logic (1936). He
developed his ideas from
Realist the Vienna Circle and also
from the work of Hume,
Mill and Moore. He argued
Ethical that empirical truth could
naturalism only be understood through
linguistic analysis, and that
unverifiable statements
lntuitionism
were 'nonsense' and
without any philosophical
significance.
H.A.
G.E. Moore W.D. Ross
Prichard
Study hint
Thought Point
As you work through this
chapter complete the According to ethical naturalists how do we know what is good? ments are not the kinds of statements that can be true or false. Emotivism
1
diagram on p. 193 which will not tell you how to live a moral life, but simply helps us understand
2 Explain the naturalistic fallacy.
has been started for you Show how Prichard and Ross build on the work of Moore. moral statements: as action guiding and as conveying certain attitudes.
3
here. Use a large piece of
Use the intuitionism of Prichard and Ross to argue whether one should give A.J. Ayer said: 'ethical terms do not serve only to express feelings. They are
4
A3 paper and colour-code calculated also to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action.'
money to a man begging in the street.
the different ways of However, this view needs to be examined closely: it says that when
5 Does intuitionism mean that there is no absolute idea of what is good?
looking at meta-ethics. we talk about 'good' and 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong', we are simply expressing
6 Critically examine the strengths and weaknesses of intuitionism.
emotional states of approval and disapproval. Any other interpretation of
ethical statements is meaningless. Emotivism has its roots in the Vienna Circle,
a group of philosophers in the 1920s who developed a theory called logical Logical positivitism
NON-COGNITIVE THEORIES OF META-ETHICS positivism which holds roughly that any truth claim must be tested by The view that only those things
sense experience (the verification principle). Ethical statements cannot be which can be tested are
Non-cognitivism says that there is no ethical knowledge, because ethical tested by sense experience, so they are not genuine truth claims and can only meaningful.
statements are not statements that can be proved true or false. Thus :o sa~ express feelings.
'Euthanasia is wrong' is not a statement about facts, but some other kind 0 A.J. Ayer in his book Language, Truth and Logic, published in 1936 when
saying. Non-cognitivists make a distinction between facts and values. he was just 26 years old, stated briefly that there are only two kinds of
meaningful statements:

Emotivism -A.J. Ayer

1 analytic statements - the truth or falsity of the statement can be Analytic statements
determined simply by understanding the terms that occur in them (e.g. Statements which are true by

Emotivists take a completely different view on moral statements and st.U} 'all bachelors are unmarried men'). Examples of analytic statements are definition.

from the premise that there is no ethical knowledge because ethical judg statements of mathematics or logic.
 194
Synthetic statements
Statements that can be true or
false and can be tested using
experience or senses.
Emotivism
A theory which says that moral
statements are just
expressions of feelings.
A2 ethics
meta-ethics - language of ethics
1 95
2 synthetic statements- the truth or falsity of the statement can be
determined by checking to establish the facts either way. Examples of
synthetic statements are statements of science, history and ordinary life.
Emotivism - Ayer
Ethical statements are not verifiable- there are no empirical facts which
can be checked to see if any ethical statement is true or false - so they are
meaningless. The only way they can be understood is as an expression of '
feelings. Ayer's theory of ethical language is known as emotivism, as it is » Words like 'good'
simply an expression of feeling of approval or disapproval. Emotivism is are meaningless
sometimes known as the Boo/Hurrah theory as in saying 'murder is wrong'
we are saying 'boo to murder', and in saying 'giving to charity is good' we are
saying 'hurrah for giving to charity':
Ethical statements
lees»
are just expressions
The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its of feeling
factual content. Thus if I say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing
that money,' I am not saying anything more than if I had simply said, 'You
stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any
further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of - Ethical statements
it. It is as ifI had said, 'You stole that money,' in a peculiar tone of horror, cannot be validated
or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks.
(Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic)
C.L.Stevenson
A word such as 'steal' invokes feelings about what happened - it is an (1 908-1979)
interpretation of the event. Stevenson was an
Emotivism does show how the ethical statements we make can depend American. He was a
on our own attitudes, upbringing and feelings, and this can lead emotivism professor at Yale and then
to be criticised as 'simple subjectivism'. James Rachels said that it can lead at Michigan. He studied in
to the notion that: 'Where morality is concerned, there are no "facts" and no England with Wittgenstein
one is "right".' However, although Ayer does argue that ethical statements and G.E. Moore. He
have no factual content, he does not believe they have no meaningful developed a theory of
function. Emotivism cannot be compared to normative ethical theories, and emotivism which he used as
it does not give any reason why one person's feelings should be any better a foundation for his theory
'respect', 'steal', 'murder') are both descriptive and emotive, expressing of a persuasive definition.
than another's, or why one person's feelings should stimulate a person to also what we feel about them. So when an individual is making a moral He argued that emotivism
action rather than those of another person. It simply reduces ethical Judgement he is not only giving vent to his feelings; he is also trying as a meta-ethical theory
statements to the level of 'I think orange Smarties are best' and so they are
to influence others' attitudes. Emotivism connects 'caring', 'approving', marked out the difference
simply meaningless. disapproving' with the very meaning of the ethical words. This d between cognitive, scientific
th: thi l ' toes mean
at etlaca, statements can be based on emotions· however these are not language and non-cognitive
merely arbitrary, but rather are based on our experience of the world and language. His defence of
Emotivism- C.L. Stevenson how we want it to be. emotivism is found in The
Emotive Meaning of Ethical
. As Stephenson saw ethical statements as not only expressions of emo-
C.L. Stevenson gave a more detailed version of emotivism in his book Ethics Terms (1937), Persuasive
~~n, but also the result of attitudes based on fundamental beliefs, ethical
and Language (1944). Stevenson did not use the verification principle, but 3agreements between people are disagreements about fundamental
Definitions (1938) and
discussed the emotive meaning of words- many moral terms (e.g. 'honesty', principles. Ethics and Language
(1944).
r 196 A2 ethics
meta-ethics - language of ethics 197

Z
Prescriptivism- R.M, Hare
Emotivism - Thinkers:
C.L. Stevenson Logical Both Ayer and Stevenson based their views on the distinction between facts
Positivists
and values, which Hume (Hume's Fork) had already claimed made it
A.J. Ayer
impossible to deduce a prescriptive statement (an 'ought') from a descriptive
r The theory is Non-cognitive-
Ethical statements
' descriptive and moral facts are
statement (an 'is'). Hare attacked this distinction and attempted to showthat
~ are attitudes based does not help us non-provable and ethicalguage lan is essentially prescriptive; the role of ethical statements Prescriptivism
on beliefs about make moral so meaningless is toays what ought to be done and such prescriptions are moral because
the world A theory that ethical
and non-factual they are universal.
Osso,
statements have an intrinsic
Hare argues that universal prescriptivism gives a better account of the
( sense so other people should
nature of ethical statements than naturalist, intuitionist or emotivist meta-
Ethical statements agree with the statement and
are attempts to ethical theories. These theories try to explain what we are doing when we
~ follow it.
influence the views make ethical judgements: are we trying to state truths? If so, what kind of
of others
Meta-ethical Morality is just truths? Are we just expressing our emotions? Are we suggesting a course of
response to an expresion of action? Or are we doing something different? All the philosophers we have R.M. Hare
( Hume's Fork feeling- boo/
looked at saw these questions as closely linked to the meanings of ethical (1919-2002)
hurrah
Ethical statements
Allows us to
terms. Hare says that although these approaches are useful, universal pre- Hare was influenced by A.J.
-
are subjective
opinions hold our own scriptivism is superior. It says 'You ought to do this', and means that everyone Ayer and C.L. Stevenson,
opinions and should do the same in similar situations. Ethical statements are prescriptive as well as Wittgenstein,
disagree with
those of others
which means they do not state facts and are not true or false, but they express Utilitarianism and Kant. He
our will or wishes; in other words they are like imperatives. believed that ethical rules
should not be based on
Hare argues that however we use the word 'good', we always do so in
relation to a set of standards: utility. He used many ideas
Criticisms of emotivism from Kant, particularly the
idea of universalisability;
When criticising emotivism, it is important to remember that it does not A good chair is one that supports your back, is comfortable and fit for
however, his arguments
purport to be an ethical theory, but is simply an analysis of the nature and the purpose.
were still consequentialist
content of ethical language. It starts from the basis of logical positivism and • A good car again varies, depending on whether it is a family car or a rather than those of a
so removes any factual content from ethical language and does not discuss sports car.
deontologist. In The
'ethical facts'. • A good person is someone we should try to emulate . Language of Morals and
However, as Rachels points out, moral judgements appeal to reason; they Freedom and Reason, Hare
are not just expressions of feeling. So whereas the statement 'I like orange This means that the word 'good' always has a descriptive meaning. outlined a theory that he
Smarties' needs no reason, moral judgements do, or else they are arbitrary. If we use the word 'good' in a moral sense, again we are using a set of called universal
Ayer does suggest that ethical statements are more than simply expres- standards that apply to a person or an action and we commend that person prescriptivism: moral terms
sions of feeling, but that they have the intention to stimulate others to act in or that action. This means that the word 'good' also has a prescriptive such as 'good', 'ought' and
the way they feel is right. This is developed further by Stevenson, who asks: meaning. This can happen with any words that both commend and describe 'right' are universalisable
why should one person's feelings about a matter be any better than those of and prescriptive. He argued
such as 'steal' and 'murder'. Hare, like the emotivists, is saying that there is
another? All emotivism can do is draw attention to the reasons why people that the combination of
a difference between the descriptive meaning and the prescriptive meaning,
universalisability and
have different views and then let others decide. It has been shown in history and when we use words with an ethical meaning we use them prescriptively: prescriptivity led to a form
that stimulating people to act through powerful and emotive speeches can 'Stealing is wrong' really means 'You ought not to steal and neither will I.' of consequentialism,
have some unfortunate results (e.g. Hitler). Prescriptivism holds that, to achieve consistency in moral judgements, when namely Preference
Emotivism may be seen as allowing complete freedom of action on the we say that someone else ought to do something, we ought to do it as well. Utilitarianism.
grounds that everyone's opinion is equally valid and so everyone can do as For prescriptivism we are not only saying 'Boo to stealing'; we can say that
they like. stealing is wrong as we would not prescribe it for ourselves.
 198 A2 ethics
meta-ethics - language of ethics 1 99

Prescriptivism - Hare
Thinkers:
Thought Point
R.H. Hare
1
What does it mean to say that ethical language is about feelings, not facts?
2
The theory is Non-cognitive= Why does Ayer reject the idea that good is indefinable?
3
descriptive and moral facts are How does Stevenson see moral language as influencing action?
Ethical statements does not help us non-provable and 4
-
are expressions of
What is the difference between descriptive and prescriptive meaning?
make moral so meaningless 5
opinion decisions and non-factual What are the differences between emotivism and prescriptivism?

Ethical statements
- are also universal
Morality is an
REVIEW QUESTIONS
Does not specify
why one should expression of
follow one person's feeling, but it also
Look back over the chapter and check that you can answer the following
prescriptions rather prescribes our
They are not just than another's views to others questions. (You could also use Harry Gensler's web exercises. The
- expressing our views address is given at the end of this chapter under Further reading.)
but prescribing them
to others our own opinions
and disagree with What is meant by the word meta-ethics?
those of others 2 Explain one cognitive theory of meta-ethics.
3 Explain the views of G.E. Moore.
4 Explain Ross's intuitionism.
5 Explain one non-cognitive theory of meta-ethics.
Criticisms of prescriptivism 6 Explain emotivism.
If moral judgements are founded on prescriptions, this still does not mean 7 What is prescriptivism?
that there is a valid reason for following one person's prescriptions rather 8 Complete the meta-ethics mind map from memory.
than another's. It does not necessarily mean that morals are universal, as
one person's preferences may be different from those of another. Hare Terminology
recognised this problem in Chapter 6 of Freedom and Reason (1963), where
he admitted that the fanatic who prescribed that all people of a certain race Do you know your terminology?
be exterminated could be making a moral judgement according to his theory.
Try to explain the following key words without looking at your books and
The only constraint is that one should put oneself 'in another's shoes' before notes:
making the judgement and, as the terrorism and suicide bombings of the
twenty-first century show, this does not stop the fanatic. • Meta-ethics
Prescriptivism says that 'ought' judgements are universalisable pre- • Analytic statements
scriptives or imperatives and not truth claims - they are not objective and • Synthetic statements
there is no moral knowledge or moral truth. This goes against the way people • Emotivism
approach ethics in their daily lives - in general people do think it is wrong • Ethical naturalism
to steal, lie, kill the innocent, rape and so on. According to Hare, we could
• Intuition ism
just as easily choose the opposite if we wished and we could change our
• Prescriptivism
moral principles as we choose or as our circumstances alter.
• Cognitive
• Non-cognitive