The history of Islamic conquest in the Indian subcontinent, coupled with the positive position of the

economy at the time, furthered even more with willing European links, all provided an arena in which
the Mughals could step in and take charge. However, as John F. Richards poignantly elaborates, such a
favorable atmosphere in no way assured that Mughal rule would be established at all costs. 3 Such
assurance arose out of the prowess displayed first by Babur, and carried over by son Humayun, despite a
lapse of fifteen years in between.

Yet in spite of their commendable abilities, both Babur and Humayun cannot be termed as emperors in
the truest sense, on account of their entire reign resonating with a sole focus of conquest and
establishment, thereby allowing no opportunity for the execution of administrative duties. The Mughal
Empire truly becomes the hallmark we know it as today under the aegis of Akbarian rule. However, the
Mughal Empire, w 4 hich developed into an empire of the subcontinent with the birth of subsequent
rulers, was founded on the conquests of these two rulers of Timurid, or rather Turko- Mongol descent.

Babur

Timur’s grand empire, extending from the lower Volga to the river Indus, become a symbol of cultural
patronage, with cities like Samarqand and Herat drawing intellectuals from all over the Islamic world.

The second half of the fifteenth century marked an end to this Timurid overflow. This was a period
marked by internal conflicts amongst various Timurid sects, propagated largely due to the negative
effects of the Timurid appanage system, an effect replicated during Humayun’s rule. The existence of
such conflicts allowed the entrance of three new existences, each laying their claim on Transoxiana, the
seat of Timurid power —- 1. The Uzbeks, tracing their origins to Turko-Mongol nobility, 2.The Safavids of
Iran, believers of the Shiite Islamic sect and 3. The growing power of the Ottoman Turks.

It was in this dichotomous situation of civil war coupled with foreign threat, that Babur inherited his
father’s seat at Farghana in 1494. Babur initially succeeded in occupying the city of Samarqand in 1497,
with help from his maternal uncles of Mongol descent. However, he left soon after, largely due to
administrative and economic difficulties, as well as the burden of maintaining troops. He regained
Samarqand in 1501.

The Battles of Serikal and Arziyan, in 1502, the former fought between Babur and Shaibani Khan, and the
latter fought between the Uzbeks and other Timurid princes, were decisive defeats for Babur. They
compelled him to sign an Uzbek treaty which forced Babur to move towards Kabul, where he resided for
the next fourteen years, all the while attempting to rescue his homeland from Uzbek dominance.

After the Uzbek conquest of Heart, Safavids and the Uzbek fought the Battle of Merv in 1510 and after
Safavid’s victory, Babur signed an alliance with the Safavids and regained his Samarqand throne.
However after the Safavid defeat at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, Babur had to turn his attention
elsewhere.

The circumstances proved favorable at the time, with Rajput leader Rana Sangha of Malwa’s appeal to
Babur. Many chieftains at the time were unhappy with Ibrahim Lodi’s regime. They called out to Babur,
believing that he would respond in a Timurid manner — come, see, loot and leave. However, Babur
proved them wrong; his arrival in Delhi signaled the advent of an empire that would surpass most.

Babur’s 1518-19 conquest of the fort of Bhira becomes important due to the associated envoys sent to
both Daulat Khan and Ibrahim Lodi, the inattentiveness to which led Babur to a second capture of Sialkot
alongside Bhira in 1520-21, stopping only to check a revolt in Qandahar. The 1525 mutiny of Daulat Khan
was successfully subdued, and Sialkot was recaptured, thus making Babur in charge of Punjab in its
entirety.

This tumultuous situation made an armed Afghan vs Babur conflict inevitable. This conflict initially
received expression in the 20th April 1526 Battle of Panipat, in which Babur’s limited army of twelve
thousand men defeated Lodis’ gargantuan army of over one hundred thousand men and one thousand
elephants.

The importance of the Panipat battle lies not in the establishment of supreme Mughal authority, but in
the advent of a new power struggle in North India, a struggle seen continued in the Battles of Khanwa,
Chadiri, and in Babur’s treatment of the persisting Afghan problem.

The 1527 Battle of Khanwa marks Babur’s victory over Rana Sangha of Mewar. And as J. F Richards puts
it, the gunpowder and cavalry enveloping techniques seen in Panipat were replicated here to yield
equally positive results. The demise of Rana Sangha largely put an end to speculations regarding a
resurgence of Rajput dominance over the subcontinent. Khanwa’s importance as a battle also arises out
its demarcation as ‘jihad’ or holy war, made by Babur himself, thereby intermingling the sphere of the
political with the religious.

Babur further strengthened his hold in the region by capturing the forts of Gwaliyar, Dholpur etc. His
campaign against Medini Rai of Chanderi in Malwa was one of the most violent at the time, ending with
most of the women committing the act of ‘jauhar’. Victories such as the 1528 storming of the great
bastion at Chadiri furthered Babur’s North Indian base, upon which he could continue into the rest of
the subcontinent.

Despite Babur’s 1526 victory over the Afghans, they continued to exist as a persisting presence,
primarily in the region of Eastern Uttar Pradesh. Babur’s inability to win a decisive victory over the
combined Afghan presence caused him to sign a treaty in 1529, according to which he left most of the
land in question to the Afghans, although retaining a small claim over Bihar.

At this time, most of Babur’s close associates believed that he would continue this plunder and then
retreat to Kabul, where Human had already been sent back to. However, this was far from the case.
Babur’s interest in the fertile lands of the subcontinent persisted till his death in 1530.