Mary Francesca l.

Mike
TD1

What is the likely impact of FICA [Foreign Interference Counter-Measures Act] on Singapore’s
domestic politics? Is the legislation an asset or liability for Singapore?

The Foreign interference countermeasures act, otherwise known as FICA, is a statute enacted by
the Parliament of Singapore. It is no surprise that FICA had been implemented, given the rise of
cyber-security foreign operations that have been occurring over the past few years. There is an
understanding that as much as foreign interference can take root in physical settings, it definitely
is more than capable of flourishing in online spaces as well, thus FICA aims to detect and
destabilize online foreign influences. However, while FICA is valid in helping to strengthen
Singapore’s national security, it dangerously treads on fundamental concepts of international
human rights and legal principles, due to the slew of unreasonable and ambiguous directives
contained in the Act. FICA has far-reaching impacts on various aspects of domestic politics,
including the violation of academic freedom, education, law enforcement, all of which I will be
analyzing throughout the course of this essay. In this vein, I believe that this legislation is a
liability for Singapore, seeing that it tries to protect national security, but at the expense of
further restricting civil liberties.

The state of academia is bound to be in a precarious state, with the introduction of FICA. While
the government has reassured that Singapore academia itself and any international collaborations
will not be affected, the broad, catch-all terms and ambiguity surrounding the wording of the
Act, means that there is no specific scope as to what kind of academic work would be acceptable,
and not fall in the category of violating FICA regulations. This will feed into the prior pervasive
culture of fear and self-censorship. Thus, FICA will most likely deepen rifts within the activist
realm as groups may decide to take it upon themselves to self-police so as to not be issued with
directives under FICA. Meanwhile, individuals who get marked under FICA may be alienated
from their peers, possibly due to the guilt of associating with such individuals. Essentially, the
individual’s personal reputation is greatly jeopardized, and likely his image at the corporate
level. This could mean that any work that is under the hands of ‘’FICA-marked’’ individuals
could be handed over to another individual(s). FICA defines the governments’ duty to intervene
in situations that pose a threat to ‘’public interest’’. However, according to section 4 of POFMA
(Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act)2019, protecting public interests is
defined to be stopping ‘’a diminution of public confidence in the performance of’’any part of the
state. This would mean that any constructive criticism vocalized by academics could come under
fire, regardless of whether they are justified or not, since there is no exception made for criticism
that is voiced out with the intention of wanting to improve the government.

FICA is also extremely threatening to civil society work in Singapore, in an environment where
civil society organizations and independent media outlets are already suffering to obtain funding
and support for their work especially if they dabble in topics that go beyond the ‘’OB (out of
bound) markers’’, such as race and religion or are critical of the government and its policies.
These undertakings are not synonymous with hurting Singapore’s interests, but are unfortunately
perceived to be as such, by the government and thus, penalisable under FICA. As the
government dominates the local funding space for the arts and civil society, it not only confines
people to local sources of funding and support, but also doubles as a deterrence factor for
independent academics, who would be well aware and come to accept the fact that they would
not be able to survive and operate in civil society for long. Thus, this can result in them gradually
phasing out of academia, as they no longer have the financial means and possibly motivation, to
continue their work. FICA also predicates on the harmful assumption that the moment a
Singaporean individual or organization collaborates with a foreign entity, it automatically means
that the Singaporean is working on behalf of the foreign entity or under its instructions or
influence. We can refer to section 5 of the Act which states that ‘’a person undertakes an activity
or engages in conduct on behalf of a foreign principal if the person undertakes the activity or
engages in that conduct – (vi) in collaboration with the foreign principal and b) at the time that
the services of a foreign entity, the person and the foreign principal knew or expected that the
person would or might undertake the activity or engage in that conduct’’. FICA’s logic
automatically assumes the Singaporean in the subordinate position, under the leadership of the
foreign entity, failing to understand that any collaboration between a Singaporean and a foreign
entity can be a collaboration of equals with mutual respect. The presence of foreign involvement
isn’t in and of itself an indication of malicious foreign interference that we need to be so
paranoid and radical against, nor does it mean that Singaporeans are not capable of discerning
right and wrong, when making decisions.

The extensive powers that FICA invests in the government does not just apply to the period of
time in which media outlets and civil society organizations are actively conducting work that is
deemed ‘’threatening’’ to national security, but in fact the powers really take root even before
civil society organizations actually begin to work on their material. We see this in section 19 of
FICA which is a very cleverly hidden loophole in the legislation itself. Section 19 states that an
individual is deemed to have already committed an offense, even if the person is simply
‘’preparing or planning’’ to publish forbidden content, and thus is subject to up to 14 years of
imprisonment and will be slammed with a hefty fine. This nuance speaks volumes about a
legislation that the government has reassured academics that would not be detrimental to their
work, yet extends its powers so broadly to the point where it clearly seeks to intimidate
independent media outlets and bloggers and discourage them from publishing, let alone creating
material. This is also made clear in sections 20, 21 and 22, which give the Ministry of Home
Affairs the right to “prevent” the publication of any judgmental content by blocking the content
itself, or by blocking any Internet address, app or social media. The government will also be able
to restrict access to certain content on platforms and even force a platform to post content
prepared by the government. Thus, the government is able to exercise its censorship powers
arbitrarily, with no real justifications and remains unchallenged with the lack of an independent
judicial review of the bill.

Thus, it is obvious how FICA operates on unreasonable grounds that unfairly accuse not just
Singaporeans, of harboring ill-intentions but foreigners as well. In this vein, FICA can affect
Singapore’s status as an international hub, as foreign companies may no longer feel that
Singapore continues to be an open and welcoming place to conduct business. The transboundary
nature of cyberspace is what facilitates great amounts of collaborations, all of which have
contributed to the growth of the digital economy, entrepreneurship, academic collaboration and
strengthened political alliances. For instance, cyberspace was monumental in sparking the global
climate movement and attracting online activism efforts. Such positive effects of cyberspace that
welcomed foreign exchanges, whilst not being extremely unbridled will definitely be overturned
with the presence of FICA, which would create an overly-regulated cyberspace that narrows the
ability for global exchange and incites fears of even engaging in one. Thus, the term “foreign
interference’’ has to be clearly defined. There are also a wide variety of public policy issues that
are currently or likely to resurface again as subjects of political debate in Singapore, in the
future, such as climate change, trade policy, immigration and social issues like LGBTQ rights.
Such issues will likely involve foreign collaboration, as ideas are exchanged back and forth with
international experts. The concern that FICA brings to the table then, would be ‘’how can such
issues be communicated in a way that would not warrant FICA directives’’ or the more pertinent
question- ‘’how can we effectively discuss important issues like these with FICA hanging over
our heads?’’.

Moreover, the democracy that Singapore claims to be will probably prove to be just another
rhetoric that fails to play out in reality and we can see this through the fact that FICA strains
judicial oversight. There is a symbiotic relationship between judicial overview and democracy, as
judicial overview essentially constricts the powers of the executive so as to ensure that they are
not abused, protecting civil rights and liberties. In Singapore’s system of constitutional
government, courts have the final authority to enforce the legal limits to state power. Through the
judicial review, if the court finds that the executive had acted unlawfully, the court may declare
that the executive’s action is void and of no legal effect.1 However, FICA seems to circumscribe
judicial review, and rather cleverly at that. Clause 104 of the Bill states that any decision or order
made under this Act is ‘’a) final; and b) is not to challenged..or called in question in any court,
except in regard to any question relating to compliance with any procedural requirement of this
Act or the Regulations or Rules governing that determination, order and other decision’’. This is
essentially an ‘’ouster clause’’ which excludes judicial review of certain decisions by the
executive except on narrow procedural grounds. This leads us to question that suppose in the
event that the Minister issues a FICA directive on an individual, for allegedly engaging in
services or communicating material that is the product of foreign interference, but the minister is
biased in his decision to issue the directive, what then are the safeguards for the individual who
is unfairly targeted? Typically, that individual would be able to apply for judicial review,
however, the ouster clause would make such action impossible to undertake, so long as all the
procedures mandated by FICA have been followed through. For an ouster clause to be included
in such an Act that invests the government with unbridled and unchecked power to easily
contravene civic freedoms is definitely disturbing and concerning. Moreover, Division 3 of FICA
which outlines ‘’ Appeals to Minister’’ and ‘’Minister’s function on appeals’’ is puzzling on
many levels. It states that appeals should first be submitted to the Ministry of Home affairs itself,
meaning that the very party which issues the directives under FICA is also the judge in the case.
It would be reasonable to say that any chance of an appeal being successful, would be a rarity
under such an arrangement, where the Minister possesses the sole discretion to throw the appeal
out. We can see this in section 101(2) of the Act which states that ‘’the Minister is not under any
duty to hear, consider, or determine any appeal if.. the appeal or proceedings of the appeal are
frivolous or vexatious’’. Whether the appeal appears to be frivolous or vexatious would simply
mean that no matter how unjustified the circumstances in which a Singaporean is issued a
directive under FICA, it would not receive the due right to be looked at. Ultimately, it is clear-cut
that it is the government who will have the ultimatum on matters of substance of the appeal.

Aside from how problematic the FICA bill is, it is also inadequate in preventing elite capture,
which is arguably more dangerous than online foreign interference, which can be better
managed. More often than not, society is aware of high profile influence campaigns, as they
get the relevant media coverage. However, this is not the case for elite capture as it is
essentially foreign lobbying of elites working within the administration, which is performed in
a highly surreptitious manner. Many other countries have implemented measures to deal with

1
EUGENE, Tan K. B. and ONG, Benjamin Joshua. FICA: What checks & balances are needed
against powers being used inappropriately?. (2021).Mothership. Research Collection School Of
Law.
 such covert operations, such as the US's Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) and
Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act. Most of these countries also conduct
independent judicial review of policies, which as discussed in my essay, is lacking in
Singapore. With the introduction of FICA, it is quite clear that the current narrative on
Singapore’s national security places a heavy emphasis on the sources of interference, failing to
account for the potential targets of interference, which is so much harder to tackle compared to
online foreign interference.

While legislation to tackle malicious foreign interference is valid and important in safeguarding
our national security, it should not be abused as a means of concentrating unbridled powers in the
hands of the government. The wide net that FICA casts over Singaporeans and foreigners’
actions without any reasonable justification, is a prime example of the state being able to
casually exercise its powers without sufficient oversight. In light of the serious ramifications that
this legislation can cause, as discussed above, it is imperative that it be thoroughly examined and
debated in parliament before it is to remain permanently. Moreover, it is not effective to be
over-reliant on legislation to curb malicious foreign interferences, there needs to be just as much
resources invested in public education to educate the young and old on the importance of
protecting our national interests and not getting swayed by any extreme ideas or concepts from
other countries, which could stunt Singapore’s development. Singapore’s multi-racial and
religious population means that it is especially susceptible to tactics of foreign interference that
leverage on the ‘’cultural affinity card’’. For instance, some countries could target Singaporeans
of a particular ethnicity to share their pride in that country’s military and economic progress, at
the expense of criticizing the Singapore government for not giving it sufficient attention. As
such, there should be more open discussions about such covert tactics, and to stress the
importance of being vigilant and wary of such tactics to Singaporeans.
 Bibliography

“Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Bill - Singapore Statutes Online.” n.d. Gov.Sg.

Accessed April 4, 2022.

https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Bills-Supp/24-2021/Published/20210913.

The Workers’ Party. 2021. “Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act (FICA) – Speech by
Gerald Giam.” The Workers’ Party. October 4, 2021.

https://www.wp.sg/foreign-interference-countermeasures-act-fica-speech-by-gerald-giam/.

George et al., 2021. ‘’FICA: Assurances to academics are welcome, but concerns remain.’’ In
ACADEMIASG EDITORIAL

https://www.academia.sg/editorials/fica-2/

Annamalai, Kokila. 2021. “Singapore’s ‘Foreign Interference’ Law Will Weaken People Power.”
Al Jazeera. October 18, 2021.

https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/10/18/singapores-foreign-interference-law-will-crush-
people-power.